Nokutula Mhene

Project management specialist

Growing up, I had classmates from Marange in Zimbabwe’s eastern highlands. To say you were from Marange invited laughter; it meant dust and poverty. Then diamonds were discovered, and overnight the town became the centre of a global rush. People flooded in, chasing fortune.

Today, the rush is over. The dust remains. The communities are still poor. The diamond rush is gone and the wealth cannot be seen when you look at the community.

I am often told that Africa is one of the richest continents on earth, abundant in natural resources and critical minerals. Yet I find myself asking: if we are so rich, why does the dominant image of Africa remain one of poverty?

Banning raw exports not enough

Across the world, critical minerals are being positioned as the engine of a green and digital future. Yet without deliberate choices, Africa will not benefit. We will repeat the fate of Marange: raw extraction, value captured elsewhere, and communities left behind.

Africa will not ‘win’ the critical minerals boom by simply owning and exporting more ore. Banning raw exports will not be enough. We will win by governing better, pricing and taxing smarter, and building regional infrastructure and value chains that turn mineral wealth into shared prosperity.
 

"The continent does not need another Marange. It needs a minerals model that leaves more than dust behind"

Mining Indaba 2026 featured extensive discussions on critical minerals. South Africa has now adopted its Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy, and the African Union has set out a continental roadmap through Africa’s Green Minerals Strategy. In his recent State of the Nation Address, President Cyril Ramaphosa framed critical minerals as a cornerstone of South Africa’s industrial strategy and future growth.

Global demand is accelerating. Lithium demand could grow tenfold by 2050 under the International Energy Agency’s Net Zero scenario, while vanadium demand is projected to rise eightfold by 2050.

The fiscal problem

Sub-Saharan Africa is especially abundant in these natural resources. South Africa is the world’s leading producer of PGM-containing mined material, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for roughly three-quarters of global mined cobalt production. However, the space remains geopolitically contested, while finance and infrastructure constraints continue to limit industrialisation.

Consider ruthenium. South Africa supplies more than 90% of global ruthenium, a vital input for technologies such as semiconductors to fuel cells. Yet in South Africa, royalty calculations often exclude ruthenium because it is not separately invoiced or reported. This reporting structure can result in unrealised royalty and tax revenue, reducing funds that could otherwise support industrialisation and development.

Pricing also presents a challenge. UNDP’s analysis shows that domestic pricing for ruthenium and cobalt can diverge from equilibrium values. In South Africa, ruthenium traded about 9% below equilibrium in 2023, and around 71% of output is sold through three- to five-year contracts, limiting exposure to market prices. Zambia’s cobalt shows larger gaps, with 2023 prices well below equilibrium.

In addition to being a fiscal problem; this is a missed industrial opportunity. UNDP estimates that localising production of ruthenium-based goods in South Africa could generate $25m in additional tax revenue, $51m in economic output, and nearly 1,000 new jobs each year. In Zambia, localisation of cobalt-based products could yield $215,000 in tax and $321,000 in output.  Get the conditions right, and localisation turns minerals into real livelihoods.
 

Africa does not need another Marange

So what must Africa do now to avoid another ‘Marange moment’ in critical minerals?

First, fix the basics: transparency, pricing and royalties. Governments and revenue authorities should require clearer disaggregation of by-product minerals in declarations and composite export sales, and issue administrative guidance on valuation methods. When by-products are treated as accounting afterthoughts, countries lose revenue and bargaining power.

Second, build regional value chains. Export restrictions can be useful signals of intent but bans without processing capacity invite smuggling and rent-seeking. Regional economic communities can coordinate standards, infrastructure corridors, power pools and industrial clusters so that scale becomes a competitive advantage.

Third, invest in the enabling conditions that make beneficiation real: power, logistics, skills and policy certainty. Limited refining capacity forces raw exports, while weak transport and energy infrastructure and gaps in technical education constrain industrialisation. A practical agenda would pair targeted incentives for priority value-chain nodes with predictable regulation and vocational training aligned to the jobs created by localisation. 

Some argue that Africa is not yet positioned for industrial policy, suggesting instead that the continent focus on extraction. This is why we must design governance and fiscal systems that make accountability easier. If we do not act while supply chains are still taking shape, we may not get another chance.

Africa’s critical minerals will either entrench the old pattern of extraction without development, or become the foundation of a very different future. That outcome will not be shaped by speeches or strategies, but by hard choices about pricing, taxation, regulation and investment. And most importantly, by a deliberate decision to build value at home rather than export it.

The continent does not need another Marange. It needs a minerals model that leaves more than dust behind. A model that powers local industry, secures fair revenues and delivers tangible dignity to the people who live above the resource.