LocationsBeyond Difference:
The Need for Political and Democratic Consensus in Pakistan
By Dr. Nafisa Shah | Member, National Assembly of Pakistan
Pakistan’s crises are too deep, and its people’s needs too urgent, for every political cycle to begin again from zero. The task now is to build a politics in which disagreement remains democratic, institutions remain constitutional, and progress is made durable enough to outlast the government that begins it.
Pakistan today presents a picture of a development wasteland: surplus energy that remains too expensive for productive use, a disjointed road and motorway network, deindustrialization, dependence on imported goods, neglected farmland, rich minerals where people have no control over their extraction, underdeveloped villages and overcrowded cities, and a country forever in debt.
This dystopian landscape is a symptom of fractured politics, marked by deep divisions, unresolved differences, and a failure to develop democratic, equitable governance at all levels.
Pakistan’s Constitution and its federal identity represent its historically and culturally diverse communities. However, periods of political instability and disruptions to democratic continuity have weakened federalism, democracy, and political systems, while longstanding institutional dynamics have also shaped policy processes.
Questions of resource distribution are often contested and have led to political and social subnational movements that further divide and fragment the country. For instance, upstream and downstream differences over water distribution have led to strong movements in the lower-riparian province of Sindh. Similarly, Balochistan continues to agitate over deprivation of its rights over resources, while urban and rural communities differ over questions of governance.
These tensions have also contributed to recurrent insurgencies in border areas, contributing to terrorism that has further exacerbated social and political tensions.
Let us also survey the state of the people of Pakistan. It is estimated that nearly one third of the country lives below the poverty line, with women and minorities further on the margins. Generally, too, the failure of the state to promote civil society and a strong rights-based social contract with investments in human development as envisaged in the Constitution, have placed Pakistan among the lowest-ranking countries on human rights and development indicators.
All these interconnected crises, often described as a polycrisis, require an institutional and political response that is long-term.
Economic reform, climate resilience, education, population pressures, human development, federal-provincial relations, and institutional strengthening all require sustained action across governments, across the country, and across provincial, class, and religious divides.
Addressing this polycrisis therefore demands more than isolated policy measures or short-term political bargains. Pakistan needs democratic competition, but it also needs durable cross-party agreement on long-term national priorities. They require political engagement and at least a minimum national consensus which is above and beyond electoral cycles and party mandates. They need to be able to be integrated within the very identity and structure of the state.
There are several ways such agreements can be built into our political and civic structure.
For instance, there are already constitutional bodies that can support collective decision-making and resolve questions related to centre-province disagreements. The Council of Common Interests is designed as a dispute-resolution forum, but it is hardly utilized. The second is the National Economic Council, which can set new standards of cooperative federalism if it is used for a national approach towards economic solutions.
There are also examples of cross-party solidarity. Political parties have, at different times in Pakistan’s history, allied effectively against dictatorships. There are policy consensus documents as well. For instance, the Charter of Democracy became the basis for the 18th Amendment, a near-consensus reform passed by the National Assembly that restored the 1973 Constitution and addressed several questions of centre-province relations, allowing the opposition leader a say in constitutional appointments such as the Election Commission.
The Parliament itself offers a stage of constant dialogue and negotiation. I have personally been instrumental in forming two cross-party forums that bring together parliamentarians across party divides. The first is the Women Parliamentary Caucus, established as a non-partisan parliamentary platform to bring women parliamentarians together across party lines, strengthen their legislative voice, and advance women’s rights, gender-responsive lawmaking, oversight, and inclusion in public policy. Over time, it has contributed by making gender equality a more regular part of parliamentary business, connecting national and provincial women legislators, engaging civil society and development partners, and demonstrating that shared constitutional commitments can create cooperation even in a divided political environment.
The second is the Parliamentary Forum on Energy and Economy, a cross-party initiative created to address Pakistan’s chronic energy and economic challenges through open discussion, evidence-based debate, and engagement among parliamentarians, experts, policymakers, citizens, and stakeholders. Its consultations on issues such as electricity distribution companies, electricity transmission, energy planning, budgets, circular debt, renewable energy, and the energy-economy nexus show how Parliament can move beyond partisan confrontation and create informed consensus on reforms that require continuity across governments.
But the central problem remains: How does one end confrontation and institutional incursions, restore a constitutional order that makes way for a different kind of politics, create democratic mechanisms for consensus-building, and break the vicious cycle that traps us into divisive politics? Much of this depends on political parties, who must come to some settlement on strengthening democratic and political institutions. Unless that happens, we will continue to live in dystopian landscapes.
The fundamental question before Pakistan, therefore, is not simply how to end confrontation, but how to restore a constitutional order in which democratic competition can produce continuity rather than collapse. A minimum common agenda cannot emerge from temporary bargains alone; it requires leadership willing to defend Parliament, respect federalism, include excluded voices, and place long-term national priorities above short-term advantage. Pakistan’s crises are too deep, and its people’s needs too urgent, for every political cycle to begin again from zero. The task now is to build a politics in which disagreement remains democratic, institutions remain constitutional, and progress is made durable enough to outlast the government that begins it.