LocationsWhat Drives Social Norms and Demographic Shifts in Pakistan?
By Dr. Zeba Sathar | Distinguished Scholar and Country Advisor, Population Council Pakistan
Persistently high desired fertility in Pakistan reflects both entrenched social norms and weak socioeconomic development.
The recent stall in both fertility and desired family size, averaging around four children, distinguishes Pakistan from other countries in the region. Low development over the past two decades likely contributes to maintaining this desired family size. In contrast, the ideal family size in Bangladesh and India decreased to two children about 20 years ago. Pakistan lags behind regional peers, such as Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, not only in fertility decline but also in socioeconomic indicators, particularly under-five mortality and female education. Evidence suggests that persistently high desired fertility reflects both entrenched social norms (i.e., limited demand for smaller families) and weak socioeconomic development.1
Demographic change typically follows a country’s development trajectory. Pakistan has recorded notable development gains, such as higher education and incomes, improved connectivity, better health and education services, and broader livelihood access. However, these advancements have been disproportionately accrued in urban areas, particularly large cities like Lahore and Karachi, and many parts of Punjab. Consequently, change has been most visible in these locations. Women with middle and secondary/higher education led the fertility transition, especially in the 1990s, but since then, fertility among these groups has remained stagnant or even increased modestly. Even in the regions and groups at the forefront of change, shifts away from conventional norms have been limited. Compared to similar groups elsewhere in the region, they appear to be drawn back towards traditional patterns.
Almost half of all pregnancies in Pakistan are unplanned, a considerable proportion of which result in millions of induced abortions, alongside a high unmet need for family planning services.
Slow and uneven social change, especially in gender relations and weak women’s empowerment, underpins the limited fertility decline. Although education and urban living have expanded, Pakistan has not experienced rapid social modernization. Instead, social mores and ethnic allegiances continue to constrain change, and for many women, the social rewards of childbearing outweigh those associated with self-actualization and achievement. These constraints are reflected in women’s low and stagnant labour-force participation, including among educated women.
Rapid urbanization might be expected to accelerate social and demographic change, yet Pakistan’s urban-rural fertility gap (approximately one child) has not widened, and fertility stagnation is also evident in cities. This pattern of fertility has been linked to the lack of changes in structural transformation of the economy despite rapid urban expansion, a particularly weak manufacturing sector. Employment growth has been concentrated in services, while many Pakistanis remain engaged in agriculture.2
Some inter-generational changes are evident: A full generation is now entering reproductive ages with more education than their parents. However, a significant proportion of women remain outside this net. The situation is, therefore, ‘glass half full and half empty.’ Women who attain above-secondary education often make different life choices, including greater investment in children, later marriage, and improved birth spacing.
Policies and programmes have had a strong influence on demographic trends. Fertility decline in Pakistan began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, coinciding with the post-Zia period (1988-2000) and a return to democratic rule. The population sector received increased attention, and reductions in population growth were supported by a greater emphasis on social sectors under the Social Action Programme, including the positive effects of the Lady Health Workers Programme. It was expected that the rapid decline from over 6 children to 4 children per woman would continue further, but it did not. Since 2005, fertility has decreased only slightly and at a much slower rate, while family size has hardly changed.
Weak family planning programming in Pakistan, both in messaging and behaviour-change communication, as well as in the availability and quality of services, limits women’s ability to achieve their desired birth spacing and number of children. Recent evidence also suggests that almost half of all pregnancies are unplanned (as reported by women). A considerable proportion of these pregnancies result in millions of induced abortions, alongside a high unmet need for family planning services.3 Even urban, educated couples do not consistently desire significantly smaller families or use contraception to prevent unwanted births. Later marriage is often accompanied by rapid and frequent pregnancies, offsetting its potential effect on fertility.
Looking ahead, sustained investment in social and human development, particularly expanding education and employment opportunities for women and girls, could strengthen the trade-off between childbearing and self-actualization, gradually shifting fertility norms over time.4 Media, social media, and mass entertainment increasingly portray greater choices for women and a wider range of roles, which may also shape aspirations across generations. New role models appear on television and online, including stories of motorcyclists, sportswomen, and other public figures, which can rapidly change gender norms closely related to demographic changes.
In the near term, a further fertility decline of roughly one child over the next decade appears plausible. Convergence may continue as fertility differences by women’s education narrow. A resumption of decline is anticipated in Punjab and Sindh, while Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan may take longer to follow suit.
Although family norms are shifting towards smaller families, Pakistan is unlikely to reach replacement-level fertility in the near term. Achieving that transition would require much deeper social and structural change—and Pakistan remains far from it.
1. Bongaarts, J., & Sathar, Z., ‘Is Pakistan’s Fertility Transition Stalling?’, Asian Population Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, 2023, pp. 186–202.
2. Arif, G. M., ‘Structural Transformation, Urbanization, and Employment Patterns in Pakistan’, in Pakistan @ 2050: Demographic Shifts, Social Norms, and Human Development, Population Council, 2024.
3. Sathar, Z., Singh, S., Shah, I. H., Niazi, M. R., Parveen, T., Mulhern, O., & Mir, A. M., ‘Abortion and Unintended Pregnancy in Pakistan: New Evidence for 2023 and Trends over the Past Decade’, BMJ Global Health, vol. 10, no. 1, 2025, article e017239.
4. Bashir, S., Maqsood, S., & Samir, K., ‘Investing in Girls’ Education and Female Empowerment: Shifting Generational Aspirations to 2050’, in Pakistan @ 2050: Demographic Shifts, Social Norms, and Human Development, Population Council, 2024.