Historical Context of the GLR

The Great Lakes Region (GLR) sits at the intersection of Central and East Africa, spanning the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania, with spillover influence on South Sudan and Zambia under the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) framework. It is a space where political borders do not neatly match cultural, ethnic, and livelihood realities, creating both opportunities and profound challenges.

The geopolitical history of the GLR is marked by volatility and resilience. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, recurrent conflicts in eastern DRC, and cycles of political crisis in Burundi have left legacies of displacement and distrust. This has created one of the largest concentrations of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) on the continent, with eastern DRC alone hosting nearly 7 million IDPs today. Colonial boundary-making carved the region into fragmented national territories, cutting across communities with shared ethnic, trade, and pastoral identities. These “artificial borders” became triggers for identity-based tensions, contested governance, and fragile local authority structures.

At the same time, the GLR is one of the world’s most resource-rich zones. Eastern DRC contains vast deposits of coltan, gold, and cobalt, critical minerals for global supply chains, alongside freshwater resources such as Lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu, and Tanganyika. Yet resource wealth has been as much a curse as a blessing: competition over mining rents and trade routes has financed war economies and illicit networks, entrenching fragility. Regional bodies, the ICGLR, East African Community (EAC), and COMESA, have attempted to frame peace and integration agendas, but overlapping mandates, political rivalries, and limited enforcement mechanisms have constrained their impact. Thus, the GLR remains defined by a dual character: a hotspot of fragility and contested governance, and simultaneously a region of demographic promise, agricultural potential, and cross-border connectivity.

Cross-Border Relationships in Flux

The lived experience of people in the GLR is shaped by the permeability and unpredictability of borders. Some crossings serve as lifelines, while others remain closed or periodically restricted. For instance, the Burundi–Rwanda frontier has been shut since January 2024, forcing traders and patients to reroute via Tanzania. This adds time and cost burdens while encouraging informal detours. Meanwhile, the DRC–Rwanda crossing at Goma–Gisenyi, both Petite and Grande Barrière, remains open but volatile due to the M23 conflict. Flows here are high but subject to restricted hours and ad hoc closures.

Health crises compound this volatility. In September 2025, Ebola alerts in eastern DRC led to heightened screenings and the threat of sudden closures at lake landings and minor posts. For small-scale traders moving perishable produce or fish, even a few hours’ delay can wipe out livelihoods. Borders in the GLR are thus not simply lines of sovereignty; they are daily risk points where shocks reverberate directly into the survival of families.

Trade and Livelihoods Dynamics

Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is not marginal to the region’s economy: it is the beating heart of livelihoods. At Goma–Gisenyi, over 2,000 small-scale traders, mostly women, cross daily carrying beans, cassava, second-hand clothing, or household goods. In the absence of formal jobs, such trading is often the only pathway to cash income. Across the Burundi–Tanzania corridor, beans, maize, and cassava move informally in volumes that stabilize prices and protect households from hunger during lean seasons.

Displaced populations rely heavily on ICBT. Refugee and host communities in Uganda’s Arua or Kasese districts engage in low-value agricultural trade and petty goods exchanges that supplement food aid and reduce aid-dependency. Fish from Lake Albert and Lake Tanganyika supports tens of thousands of households but remains largely unrecorded in official statistics. Policy neglect has kept these systems invisible, meaning their contribution to food security is discounted in planning.

The barriers are well known: informal traders often pay more in bribes than in official tariffs, excessive checkpoints drive up transaction costs, and unpredictable closures force risky detours. Women traders, who dominate the sector, face harassment, extortion, and exploitation at border posts. Some have responded by organizing informal protection networks, pooling money for bribes, sharing intelligence on patrol timings, and leveraging family ties to secure passage. These coping mechanisms reflect resilience but also perpetuate dependency on parallel, informal systems.

Socio-Economic Trends in the GLR

The socio-economic fabric of the GLR reveals both opportunities and severe constraints. The region’s youth bulge is striking with a median age of 16–18 years, it is among the youngest populations globally. Rapid urbanization compounds the pressure, Uganda’s towns grow by 5.7% annually and Rwanda’s by 4.5%, creating acute demand for jobs, housing, and services. Yet productive employment lags, leaving millions vulnerable to recruitment into informal, precarious, or conflict economies.

Displacement pressures are unprecedented. Over 7.9 million people are displaced, with eastern DRC accounting for 6.9 million IDPs. Uganda, hosting 1.6 million refugees, has adopted an inclusive policy granting rights to work and movement, creating “hybrid economies” in settlements like Bidi Bidi. Studies suggest each three refugees generate two jobs for locals, showing how displacement can catalyze economic multipliers if properly supported.

Poverty and inequality remain entrenched in borderlands. 62% of DRC’s population lives below the poverty line, with poverty deepest in border provinces. Burundi’s poverty rates exceed 70%, concentrated in rural zones. Borderland traders earn 30–40% less than urban counterparts, sustaining families on fragile margins. Human development indicators are weak: maternal mortality exceeds 473 per 100,000 live births in DRC and 548 in Burundi; primary school completion remains below 60% in border provinces. Infrastructure is sparse: only 15% of rural households in eastern DRC have electricity access, and road density remains among the lowest in Africa.

Livelihoods in the GLR

Agriculture and agropastoralism employ 60–80% of populations, with cassava, maize, beans, and sorghum forming staples and coffee and tea key cash crops. But yields remain far below global averages — maize yields are 1.5 tons per hectare compared to 5.8 tons globally. Climate change is further eroding productivity: since 2000, yields in Rwanda, Burundi, and eastern DRC have declined by 10–20% due to erratic rainfall and droughts.

Artisanal mining is a major employer, with over 2 million miners in eastern DRC producing gold, tin, and coltan under conditions marked by insecurity and exploitation. Fishing on Lakes Albert and Tanganyika supports hundreds of thousands of households, but overfishing and poor regulation have reduced catches. Informal economies dominate non-farm employment, accounting for 70–90% of jobs. Women drive petty trade, earning $10–50 per day in towns like Goma–Gisenyi — barely enough to sustain households. Climate shocks intensify these precarities, displacing communities through droughts in Uganda’s Karamoja or floods around Lake Tanganyika.

Key Insights & Lessons

The evidence demonstrates that trade, livelihoods, and resilience are inseparable. Informal cross-border trade provides up to 70% of intra-GLR commerce, but its invisibility in national statistics undermines its recognition. Women, who constitute the majority of small-scale traders, are burdened by both harassment and unpaid care responsibilities. Day-care and lactation spaces in markets — often ignored in policy design — could significantly expand women’s trading capacity.

Recent policy wins provide entry points. In 2025, DRC signed an inter-ministerial decree to implement the COMESA Simplified Trade Regime (STR), eliminating customs duties for small consignments. If operationalized with product lists, helpdesks, and joint committees, this could transform petty trading from risky to resilient. Upgrades at Rusizi II OSBP and extended hours at Goma posts also reduce uncertainty.

Regional institutions must move from frameworks to operations. Harmonized product lists, grievance redress desks, and service standards for border posts would shift trader experiences daily. SSCBT data modules piloted in DRC prove that invisible flows can be counted, offering a foundation for food security and price stabilization policies. Minimum service standards at border markets — from child-care to lighting — must be mainstreamed.

Yet border closures remain a critical constraint. Perishables perish when delays mount; patients reroute via third countries at high costs; traders are forced into informal networks. The transaction-cost stack, unpredictability, and invisibility of ICBT keep families trapped in subsistence. The prize is clear: with STR, OSBP, services, and data, petty trade can be formalized at the margin, smoothing food flows and hard-wiring resilience into border food systems.

Viable Corridors for Trade–Livelihood–Resilience Nexus

Three corridors emerge as most viable:

1. The Northern Corridor (Mombasa–Kigali–Goma/Bukavu), with high traffic through Gatuna/Katuna and Goma–Rubavu, where bonded warehouses are due to improve logistics.
2. The Central Corridor and Lake Tanganyika arc (Dar es Salaam–Kigoma–Bujumbura–Uvira), anchored by Rusizi II, promising smoother food and fish flows.
3. The Albert–Edward Lakes corridor (Mpondwe/Kasindi, Mahagi–Arua, Lake Albert landings), where agricultural goods and fish sustain border households.

These corridors are where investments in simplified regimes, women-friendly services, climate-resilient infrastructure, and displacement-inclusive programming can deliver tangible transformation.

UNDP’s Distinctive Value-Add

While others focus on customs modernization and infrastructure, UNDP can add unique value by filling upstream and downstream gaps. Supporting climate-smart production, aggregation centers, and storage facilities ensures border communities produce surpluses. Linking petty traders to digital payments, market intelligence, and micro-logistics allows them to capture higher margins. Refugee-hosting areas can be integrated into these value chains, turning displacement into an asset.

Women’s economic empowerment must move beyond harassment prevention to providing the enablers — day-care services, cooperative structures, savings groups, and access to credit — that allow women to scale up their role from petty traders to processors and aggregators.

UNDP can also convene local and regional stakeholders. Joint Border Community Committees, linking governors, women’s groups, and refugees, could bring REC frameworks down to the sub-national level. Embedding SSCBT modules in national statistics will give policymakers the visibility they need to account for borderland economies. Finally, climate-resilient corridors — solar-powered cold storage, climate insurance schemes, adaptive investments — would protect food and trade flows from climate shocks.

Policy Implications and Way Forward

The way forward requires reframing borderlands as development corridors rather than peripheries. National strategies and UNDP’s next Regional Programme Document must elevate them as spaces where trade, displacement, and livelihoods converge. Investments should prioritize full value-chain resilience over border post fixes. Refugee economies must be formally included in regional integration efforts.

Gender-smart facilitation — with childcare, storage, and trader cooperatives — should become standard in STR and OSBP policies. Regional institutions must move from frameworks to operational service standards, harmonizing lists, grievance redress, and safeguards. Climate resilience should be treated as trade resilience, with investments in storage, insurance, and adaptive infrastructure. And SSCBT data modules must be institutionalized, making the invisible visible in economic planning.

The GLR remains one of Africa’s most fragile yet promising frontiers. By centering border communities, women, and displaced populations in trade and livelihood programming, and by investing in resilience across full value chains, UNDP and its partners can transform the Great Lakes from a zone of chronic crisis into a corridor of inclusive development.