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SCALING FENCES: VOICES OF IRREGULAR AFRICAN MIGRANTS TO EUROPE

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
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‘Migration is a historic and multifaceted phenomenon involving humanitarian, human rights, and demographic issues. It has deep economic, environmental and political implications. It generates many different, legitimate and strongly held opinions. Not always the strongly held are legitimate; not always the legitimate are strongly held.’

38°43'N 9°09'W to 40°70'N 73°90'W

ANTONIO GUTERRES

United Nations Secretary-General

37°15'N 7°12'W
MIGRANT SETTLEMENT
Lepe, Spain





FOREWORD

‘The core message arising from this study, that migration is a reverberation of uneven development and particularly of a development trajectory that is failing young people, sends a strong signal to policymakers.’

UNDP's Human Development Report 2009, *'Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development'*, offered a human development lens on migration, analysing the ways in which, in an unequal world, human mobility is a fundamental driver — and consequence — of development. Published at the height of the global financial crisis, it asked: *'Will the economic crisis raise protectionist barriers against immigration, or will it serve as an opportunity to rethink the role of movement in fostering social and economic progress?'*

A decade on, migration has indeed become a defining issue of political contest in Europe's democracies and elsewhere. The movement of peoples across sovereign borders often triggers a deep sense of fear and uncertainty. Yet, given its fundamental link to the development process, and other trends, it is set to expand in absolute terms as the world's population increases.

How we respond as a global community will have decisive implications: not only for individuals on the move, but for development outcomes in origin countries and for societies in destination countries.

Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe is a contribution to the effective operationalization of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. It seeks to help broaden and better inform public debate, and to support policymakers in forging evidence-based, humane and productive long-term approaches to the phenomenon of migration. The study draws on the most extensive and intensive survey ever undertaken of Africans who had migrated to Europe through irregular means from multiple African countries. It follows the *Journey to Extremism: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment* report published by UNDP in September 2017.

The voices reflected in the *Scaling Fences* report are those of people who have chosen to migrate in the context of being relatively more educated and better off than their peers. They are overwhelmingly young and have, in a number of ways, manifestly gained from development progress on the African continent in recent decades. Yet they share a widespread perception that opportunities to build on this progress and fulfil their aspirations at home are closed. This perception is held so profoundly that it has led to a radical rejection of their circumstances in favour of a potentially perilous and irregular journey to an unknown future in Europe.

The core message arising from this study, that migration is a reverberation of uneven development and particularly of a development trajectory that is failing young people, sends a strong signal to policymakers. We must not become distracted by the false promise of short-term fixes: unnecessarily harsh domestic policies and diverting much needed development assistance from core priorities. Doing so may only serve to further circumscribe the ambitions of young Africans instead of fostering and harnessing their potential as an engine of transformative change. I welcome you to read on.



28°17'S 52°47'W to 40°70'N 73°90'W

ACHIM STEINER
UNDP Administrator

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As new forms of mobility and displacement in the 21st century place demands on global institutions and challenge approaches forged in a different age, efforts to redefine frameworks for managing contemporary migration are critical. Responding effectively to the large-scale movement of peoples has become one of the greatest challenges of our time. UNDP has compiled this study, *Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe*, to further our understanding of the relationship between migration and development, and to respond to gaps in the global evidence base.

Our *Human Development Report 2009*, 'Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development', offered a human-development lens on migration, analysing the ways in which, in an unequal world, human mobility is a fundamental driver — and consequence — of development. It employed a deliberately comprehensive lens, encompassing internal, international, legal, forced, and even historical patterns of migration. A decade on, the *Scaling Fences* report focuses specifically on contemporary irregular African migrants arriving to Europe. This group is, we believe, particularly poorly served by current regulatory frameworks and policy agendas, a situation that serves neither development outcomes in Africa nor the socio-political and economic contexts of European countries favourably.

Scaling Fences' focus is on those migrants who travelled for development-related reasons — whose primary motivation, in their own words, was not humanitarian or protection-related in nature. We believe that, from a development perspective, the drivers and incentives that motivate such people need to be better understood — and the potential of this dimension of overall global migration patterns harnessed. This report's attention to the development aspects of irregular migration reflects UNDP's institutional mandate as the lead development agency within the UN system. It is intended as a contribution to the operationalization of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

Scaling Fences: key findings

The data confirms the thesis proposed elsewhere that migration is a reverberation of development progress. It helps us to understand and appreciate more clearly the perspective of migrants who travel through irregular channels. It illustrates that development is taking place in Africa, but not fast enough and with gains that are uneven and limiting.

The research finds that those who travelled were *relatively* better off than their peers. They had manifestly benefited from development progress in Africa in recent decades, with life stories that had been shaped by macro-level development trends: urbanization, spatial patterns in economic growth, demographic pressure, and, in many cases, a history of family migration. African advances in education levels, including for girls across the continent, feature strongly, with respondents typically educated above the average levels in their home countries. Income for respondents who were earning at the time of their departure appears to have been competitive in national contexts, with many reporting jobs that were described as safe and regular. Despite this, just 38 percent said they earned enough ‘to get by’, 50 percent felt they were not earning enough, and only 12 percent reported being able to save.

Economic motivations, closely tied to self-actualization and a sense that aspiration can only be fulfilled through departure from Africa, were fundamental motivations shared by respondents — who at the same time predominantly pointed to multiple reasons informing their decision to leave. Answers to questions on the governance contexts at home in Africa suggest a strong sense of identity-based social exclusion by, and alienation from, state duty bearers that has informed decisions to migrate. Disappointment in the quality of service provision was high among all respondents. Their overall youthfulness indicates there are significant age-related constraints on opportunity in Africa, with young people finding few avenues through which to pursue their aspirations and dreams, or to accelerate their own prospects and those of their families within the country contexts. The advances of recent decades have only served to inspire a will to migrate and an ability to do so, yet legal channels facilitating migration remain largely closed to this class of traveller.

Irregular migration, for those interviewed, is an investment in a better future: embraced by individuals whose development trajectory is already in ascendance, enabling a radical rejection of the constraining circumstances at home in order to scale metaphorical and even physical fences to personal fulfilment

and better opportunities. Family involvement in making the journey to Europe possible is key, with the notion of migration as a means of diversifying the family income portfolio substantiated by these findings. Just 2 percent of respondents said that greater awareness of the risks of the irregular migration journey would have caused them to stay at home. The research confirms that migrants are taking a calculated risk, comparing the potential gains and losses of migration with those of staying, given conditions at home.

IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOR THOSE INTERVIEWED, IS AN INVESTMENT IN A BETTER FUTURE: EMBRACED BY INDIVIDUALS WHOSE DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORY IS ALREADY IN ASCENDANCE, ENABLING A RADICAL REJECTION OF THE CONSTRAINING CIRCUMSTANCES AT HOME IN ORDER TO SCALE METAPHORICAL AND EVEN PHYSICAL FENCES TO PERSONAL FULFILMENT AND BETTER OPPORTUNITIES.

Scaling Fences illustrates the stark personal and socio-economic implications of the lack of legal pathways available to this group of migrants in seeking to fulfil their aspirations once in Europe. The data makes plain the readiness of the European labour market, including otherwise regular businesses, to absorb the services of irregular migrants when legal channels are closed. Even so, respondents experienced a pronounced degradation of employment profile: the percentage of those employed in elementary (or menial) occupations in Europe compared to at home in Africa rose from nearly one third to over one half. The analysis points to the underutilized human and labour potential among irregular African migrants in Europe. Most of those earning in Europe reported wages well below their host country’s minimum-wage threshold, as well as other types of insecurity associated with work — further highlighting the exploitation contingent on their irregular status. Still, their commitment to honouring family investment in financing the journey to Europe, and family expectations of a return on that investment in the form of rapid social mobility, is confirmed. Of those who were earning, 78 percent were sending money home. Based on an analysis of the purchasing power of remittances, as measured against respondents’ earnings, it could take as long as 40 years to generate an equivalent financial position at home. For those who succeed, the irregular migration journey is therefore likely to yield returns that are transformative and equivalent to a generational leap into the future, despite the risks involved and barriers to overcome.

Irregular migration to Europe from Africa, for many of the individuals willing to absorb its considerable financial and physical risks, can represent a time-bound effort to achieve a multigenerational leap in social mobility-terms. While a clear majority of respondents indicated they wanted to live permanently in Europe, a higher proportion of those who did not were earning, had a legal right to work, and were sending money home. Having ‘made it’ in these terms for this group appears to yield higher confidence and readiness to state a willingness to return home, with ‘mission accomplished’. These attitudes further confirm the picture that emerges from the research of an overall venture that is both high-risk and purposeful, tied to opportunity, and likely to entail hardship and sacrifice.

Conversely, those who have yet to achieve this stability are still questing and are not yet ready to give up on life in Europe. The shame of returning empty-handed for those not earning and not sending money home is poignantly revealed: a larger share of these believed their communities would be unhappy if they returned home tomorrow. Among those who had been in Europe for the longest periods of time, a third reported they were not sending money home. The data indicates that, for a significant minority, the vulnerabilities associated with the nature of their journey only deepened on arrival in Europe. The challenges faced in building a stable life seem to have become, for these respondents, insurmountable. Adrift in some of the richest countries in the world, they are left facing long-term homelessness, hunger, and other forms of deprivation.

The experiences of *Scaling Fences*’ female respondents in Europe are striking. Gender differences were pronounced in relation to work opportunities in Europe. However, the gender-wage gap between men and women in Africa resoundingly reverses in Europe, with women earning 11 percent more, contrasting with previously earning 26 percent less in Africa. Women reported lower levels of deprivation and were more successful in accessing a range of services. They were also in more settled accommodation than male respondents. Higher proportions were sending money home, including among those not earning. A number of factors play a role in this relative success. These include the reality that more had travelled to be with family and/or with children. Policy environments in Europe may be more disposed to provide for female migrants, especially those with children. Their relatively higher level of education compared to that of their peers at home also suggests female respondents may be particularly

motivated, determined, and aware of their personal capabilities. Despite these positives, gender differences were apparent in experiences of crime, with a slightly higher proportion of women falling victim to a crime in the six months prior to being interviewed than men, and significantly more experiencing sexual assault. While female respondents had perhaps jumped the furthest — scaling even higher ‘gender fences’ of patriarchal norms at home and exploitation during their journeys abroad — their physical vulnerability to abuse continues to form part of their experience in Europe.

Policy and programming implications

Through outward migration, Africa is losing substantial numbers among its most aspirational. Collectively, and paradoxically, those leaving represent the positive story of development gains on the continent. While numbers of irregular migrants arriving from Africa to Europe have reduced recently, geographic proximity and demographic imbalances, combined with fundamental factors related to the structure of Africa’s economies and wider governance contexts, caution against any assumptions that this reduction will be sustained long term. Africa’s development progress itself must be understood as likely to lead to continued migration expansion. Based on global evidence, most African countries are just entering the stages of growth and development at which emigration begins to intensify. The notion that migration can be prevented or significantly reduced through programmatic and policy responses designed to stop it is thrown into question by this analysis.

THE NOTION THAT MIGRATION CAN BE PREVENTED OR SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THROUGH PROGRAMMATIC AND POLICY RESPONSES DESIGNED TO STOP IT IS THROWN INTO QUESTION BY THIS ANALYSIS.

Scaling Fences gathers and analyses the experiences and perspectives of migrants who travelled irregularly to Europe in search of something better and offers these to help ensure the responses of all stakeholders are more firmly grounded in evidence. The data challenges the feasibility of blunt deterrence and prevention-focused interventions, suggesting a need for policymakers to reassess approaches. The instrumentalization of international development assistance for political objectives cannot, realistically, be expected to have a long-term impact on

the drivers of irregular African migration. Reframing policy and programmatic responses to migration in light of its structural relationship to improving development outcomes in Africa needs to take place. Ensuring rights-based approaches and ‘do no harm’ accountability at the fore of cooperation is key. Further, current approaches send a false signal to European electorates that such strategies will work in the long run.

Forward-looking policies that are attuned to different scenarios, including those that foresee the number of people travelling increasing substantially in the years and decades to come, are urgently required. Failure to advance new systemic approaches to migration can only rebound, with ‘ungoverned’ irregular migration leading directly to destabilizing political consequences. A clear-eyed and coherent set of strategies for governing irregular migration must be identified: to limit its pernicious effects; to yield gains for migrants as well as the families and countries they have left behind; and to benefit the economies and societies in which these individuals are seeking to build new lives. *Scaling Fences’* human-development lens on migration encourages a broader perspective, and UNDP firmly believes the proposed win-win solutions are attainable. Political courage, in both Africa and Europe, is, however, essential.

The following recommendations are intended to support policymakers in their continued efforts to balance short-term responses to the impacts of irregular migration with long-term policy objectives. Firmly anchored in the voices of those interviewed for this study, they provide pathways towards implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

(i) Transformative development: expanding opportunities and choice in Africa

The profile of those interviewed for this research suggests that African governments need to reorient themselves more competitively in creating incentives for young people to fulfil their aspirations closer to home. They must, in brief, positively signal new directions and opportunities. Indeed, the voices of the irregular African migrants analysed for this study can be taken as a collective plea to their governments to set the level of creativity, ambition and pace of Africa’s economic transformation and socio-political development higher. The time-frame for delivering such outcomes may be long-term. Even so, producing substantive evidence and reassurance that deeper structural transformation in relation to economic opportunities and governance contexts is emerging may

reorient some young people who otherwise view emigration as the only route to social mobility.

Responding to irregular migration requires African governments to demonstrably build societies that attract young Africans to channel their energies and aspirations into the national development project. Over time, these same societies must accelerate progress towards structural transformation. For international partners, this means ensuring that international development funds are spent on fundamental priorities and not diverted to envisaged quick fixes for migration through deterrence and prevention. Accelerated progress requires enhanced consistency across different domains of policy engagement with Africa. The partnership that exists between Africa and Europe must also evolve to meet the challenges of today.

Specific priorities include:

- Engaging young people in shaping the future.** Tackling stifling and gerontocratic systems in Africa is critical. The present-day, multifaceted exclusion of its youthful majority imposes barriers to personal fulfilment while stalling development. Achieving the necessary shifts requires a whole-of-society effort, including among duty bearers in government as well as society at large, to advance meaningful engagement and equality of opportunity for the continent’s youth. The wide age gap between Africa’s young majority and their leaders needs to close. Progress in this regard would signal a new direction with the potential to incentivize youth to engage in transformative development. Enhanced and equitable service provision combined with concerted efforts to tackle discrimination must also be at the core of this agenda. Further, the need to intensify efforts to tackle patriarchal practices at all levels, even among countries that are front-runners in advancing gender parity, are re-emphasized by the research.
- Building inclusive economies.** Enhancing the availability and quality of economic opportunities and ensuring that Africa’s growth is job-rich and benefits a majority, offering the prospect of wealth creation at different levels of the economy are priorities. The transformative economic leap for those earning in Europe sets a high watermark. Investing in domestic value-addition manufacturing, upgrading infrastructure, providing access to markets,

enabling environments for entrepreneurs and small businesses, and generating opportunities for young people to save are all steps to be taken with greater purpose. A specific focus on implementing policies that build economic inclusion and regeneration in cities is needed, noting the urbanite profile of the majority of *Scaling Fences*' respondents.

- **Tackling external constraints to structural transformation.** While the onus is on African states to orchestrate their own structural transformation, relationships with regional and international partners can both help and hinder. Unequal and constrained trade relations feed global, regional and national inequality, and slow the pace of the distribution of economic opportunities. At the regional and international level, much needs to be done to intensify the progress of intra-African free trade as signalled by the signing of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area Agreement in 2018. The goal must be to further expand regional economic opportunities for citizens and new labour-market entrants, and to intensify intra-African migration, including through investing in mapping out and facilitating labour exchanges bilaterally and subregionally. Reframing the wider trade relationships that exist between Africa, Europe and other leading international partners has long been recognized to promise exponential gains in development terms. Opening up European and other global markets to African goods and actively incentivizing domestic value-addition to primary commodities in Africa would bring material benefits through the diversification of economic opportunity. Further, this agenda calls for consistency, including support for the types of governance structures that facilitate broad-based development outcomes. Ensuring the socio-political dimensions of transformation are facilitated (and not stymied) is as important as reframing economic relationships. The curtailment and repatriation of illicit financial flows are critical to the process. International development-partner contributions must be reoriented to assist with strategic priorities that will holistically deliver the kind of accelerated structural, political, economic, and social transformations required.

(ii) From 'ungoverned' to 'governed' migration

The readiness of the European labour market to absorb irregular and cheap migrant labour, as indicated by the data, belies the tough stance on immigration often projected in domestic politics. Meanwhile, the volume of remittances from Europe

to Africa creates its own compelling incentive structures. The Africa-Europe partnership requires reframing to directly respond to these realities. Around the world, labour-mobility agreements that allow businesses to supplement their seasonal and long-term needs (in industries where the supply of domestic labour is insufficient) are already in place. Such agreements not only benefit these domestic industries: they allow migrant workers to gain skills and experience not always available in their home countries, to earn higher incomes, and to send valuable remittances to family left behind.

The need to expand legal pathways for migration is asserted both in the Global Compact and the Joint Valletta Action Plan. Despite these established policy directions, political expediency in exploring new regulations that adequately respond to irregular migration to Europe is currently limited — at least from a European perspective. An evidence-based outlook informed by the *Scaling Fences* research posits the need for progress in identifying such legal pathways for the large number of people determined to travel in search of a brighter future. Policymakers would be well advised to orient themselves in this direction. Ensuring irregular migrants already in Europe are able to access safe and productive livelihoods can help mitigate social and political fallout, rather than the reverse, demonstrating that governments are in control. The creation of expanded legal pathways would effectively enable the global system to catch up with reality, pulling policy frameworks firmly into the 21st century.

Specific priorities include:

- **Facilitating circular migration between European and African countries.** A new generation of expanded legal pathways articulated in bilateral and/or regional agreements is needed. These must be predicated on what the research has suggested to be, for those who are most successful, a circular migration process of arrival in Europe and eventual return home again after a period of income and wealth generation shared as remittances. Analysis of, and reflection on, the sectors where shortages are currently experienced and likely to expand — including looking ahead at the changing nature of work given ageing populations and other factors — should inform such agreements, to ensure they are market-based and can be readily communicated as such. These agreements should be both human rights-based and gender-sensitive, drawing on relevant International Labour Organization (ILO) standards, guidelines and

principles. Such a regularized, rotating supply of labour in the context of recognized shortages would have additional advantages in curtailing the shadow economy and worker exploitation that currently thrives through a lack of regulation. Communicated widely, in Africa and in Europe, these new frameworks would signal a new era of cooperation on migration. Investing in the safe return of those who still fall outside of these agreements, with the full support of governments at both ends of the journey, could be improved through such frameworks, bringing multiple benefits to all involved.

- **Establishing pathways to regularization for irregular African migrants already in Europe.** The rights and needs of those already living undocumented in Europe require urgent attention even as long-term cooperation frameworks are being worked out. Migrants who do not successfully claim asylum and who are not returned on arrival should be provided with a way out of deprivation and homelessness, including through schemes that allow them the right to work and access to services that match their needs. Providing opportunities for individuals to escape the confines of the shadow economy can guard against abuse and exploitation, narrowing the space for criminality. In addition, formalizing these workers would increase the tax revenue of governments. Enabling migrants' contributions to host societies could help build bridges and confidence with host communities.

(iii) Building a new discourse on migration in Europe

It has been increasingly recognized that globalization and economic growth in recent decades have in many respects failed to yield inclusive opportunities in the world's wealthier nations. Divisions along socio-economic lines and geographic areas within countries — including the alienation of many citizens from the political centre — have been exposed across Europe, particularly since the global financial crisis of 2008. The concerns of some citizens at the apparent loss of control of their borders signalled by the 'migration crisis'; at shifting national identities and cultural change; and at other perceived threats to their way of life can be measured against this backdrop. At the same time, it is instructive to recall that while anxiety about migration has served to inflame far-right politics, other empathetic perspectives have been in evidence across Europe. The voices of NGOs, civic associations, and movements that have emerged to support migrants and refugees are often marginalized in the public space.

Democratic engagement in shaping policy approaches to migration, based on meaningful discussion with citizens, can chart a course that defines the types of migration needed to support European societies now and in the future. Such engagement can ease the concerns and anxieties often associated with demographic change, and the visible turbulence created by current policy gaps. A stepwise shift in the discourse about irregular African migration to Europe (and about migration in general) is necessary to help advance new approaches to governing it.

Specific priorities include:

- **Public engagement that defines a new discourse about migration.** European citizens have a right to accurate information about the wider context of global migration trends. Dimensions that are frequently overlooked, and which emerge from this study as needing closer examination, include changing labour-market needs in Europe; information on the lived experiences of individuals on the move; the measured effects of different types of migration policies; and the historical and contemporary ties that often link host countries to migrants' origin countries. The widespread and purposeful dissemination of information on these aspects of migration would help citizens make informed judgements on the type of migration that will serve their country best, achieving real democratic ownership over policy outcomes. At the same time, mechanisms to hold accountable those who disseminate hate speech and false information should be strengthened — in line with the actions agreed in Objective 17 of the Global Compact. The issue of migration will likely remain highly political for years to come, yet balance must be sought and found if the issue is not to be permanently cornered in sharply drawn positions. Policymakers should invest in creating platforms for engagement between citizens, authorities, politicians, civil society, the research community, the media, and migrants themselves. Spaces are needed for citizens of all backgrounds to discuss their perspectives on the issues and interact with one another outside of polarized media forums. A continuous, dynamic feedback loop between stakeholders working collectively towards mutually satisfactory strategies will help to build a more constructive conversation. Responsiveness to the spectrum of citizens' views arising from such new engagement strategies is urgently required; one that is predicated on evidence such as that presented in this report concerning the actual dynamics of migration to Europe.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Globally today, there are more than 258 million international migrants in the world, up from 220 million in 2010 and 191 million in 2005.² The proportion of international migrants in the world population (or ‘migrant stock’) has been relatively stable, climbing to 3.4 percent in 2017, compared to 2.8 percent in 2000.³ However, in some parts of the world, there has been a sharp rise in the number of individuals forcibly displaced — both internally and across sovereign borders — due to conflict, violence and persecution. These numbers reached 68.5 million people by the end of 2017 — almost double the number recorded in 1997.⁴ Available data is also known to overlook substantial additional numbers of irregular migrants, about whom accurate information is notoriously difficult to establish. Global trends, including globalization itself; steep population increases in some parts of the world; deepening inequality between and within nations; and climate change impacts, among other factors, can all be foreseen to create expanding drivers for mobility. Responding effectively to the large-scale movement of peoples has become one of the greatest challenges of our time.


UNDP's *Human Development Report 2009*, 'Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development', offered a human-development lens on migration, analysing the ways in which, in an unequal world, human mobility is a fundamental driver — and consequence — of development. It highlighted that migration can improve convergence in labour-market supply and demand; create remittance flows that are a critical dimension of a nation's development process; enable personal growth, and the transfer of knowledge and ideas between developed and developing countries; and foster economic, political and cultural links between people and nations.⁵ It set out a series of proposals envisaged to bring positive results to migrants, communities and states alike, arguing that lowered barriers to movement and improved treatment of those on the move could benefit workers at home and abroad. Published at the height of the global economic crisis, the *Human Development Report 2009* asked: 'Will the economic crisis raise protectionist barriers against immigration or will it serve as an opportunity to rethink the role of movement in fostering social and financial progress?'⁶

In the intervening decade, failings in the international system's capacity to respond to large movements of people have become all too apparent. Travelling through what are described by a growing number of stakeholders as 'mixed migration' channels has become ever more deadly, as efforts to clamp down on smuggling networks have intensified in recent years.⁷

It is estimated that a total of 30,510 individuals died in transit globally between 2014 and 2018.⁸ During what has frequently (and controversially) been referred to as the 'migration crisis', these shortcomings have been reflected in sometimes daily news of tragic loss of life.⁹ The largest loss of irregular migrant life has occurred in the Mediterranean.¹⁰

The protectionist backlash anticipated in the *Human Development Report 2009* has also been realized. The changing patterns and visibility of the numbers of people seeking refuge as well as better lives and opportunities across borders have all profoundly impacted the global political environment, perhaps especially so in Europe. Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic increase in the number of arrivals to Europe by sea, particularly from 2014. Images of refugees and migrants arriving on the shores of countries such as Greece and Italy — twinned with regular reports of drownings and suffering — have stirred grassroots humanitarian action but also anti-immigration sentiment.¹¹ Politicians in Europe's democracies have struggled to respond to citizens' anxieties, fears and confusion in the face of the upsurge in irregular arrivals and apparent loss of control on the part of their governments. At the same time, single-issue anti-immigration parties have mushroomed across Europe. In an increasingly contested political space in many European countries, the issue of migration has become a defining concern.

FIGURE 1 ARRIVALS TO EUROPE BY SEA, 2000-18*



* Arrivals to Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, and Spain (Cyprus arrival data from 2015). All countries' data for 2018 from January to September.
Source: Four Decades of Cross Mediterranean Migration to Europe and IOM Mixed Migration Flows to Europe database.

As new forms of mobility and displacement in the 21st century place demands on global institutions and approaches that were themselves forged in a different age, efforts to redefine normative frameworks for managing contemporary migration are critical. Considerable progress has been made at that level with the incorporation of international migration into Sustainable Development Agenda 2030.¹² A major milestone was marked on 11-12 December 2018, in Marrakech, when 164 states adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.¹³ Prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, the Global Compact is the first intergovernmental agreement to cover all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner. The Global Compact lays out a cooperative framework consisting of 23 objectives with associated actions and commitments, summarized in Annex 1. It asserts that the principle of ‘leave no one behind’ that is at the heart of Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 is directly relevant to all forms of migration and should inform policy responses.

The Global Compact’s reassertion of the importance of rights-based approaches from states is powerful. However, the effort to achieve meaningful reforms to the regulatory environment governing the movement of persons across borders has also been controversial.¹⁴ Despite the Global Compact’s non-binding status, concerns have been raised in relation to perceived tensions between its principles on managing migration and state sovereignty. Political pressure and opposition have led some states to withhold their support. Practical evidence of ‘new ways of working’, designed to reflect the spirit and detail of the commitments made, is slow to build.¹⁵ And specific responses to the situation faced by irregular migrants are frequently crowded out by other priorities. Meanwhile, misconceptions and confusion about the drivers of migration continue to prevail.

Migration to Europe is extremely varied. It includes people arriving through such regular channels as student programmes and professional recruitment. It occurs as the result of the accession of eastern neighbourhood countries to the European Union (EU). It also includes displaced people arriving as the result of war or other types of persecution: especially from Syria, but also Afghanistan, Eritrea and Libya. Both regular and irregular migrants to Europe from Africa form part of this overall traffic. While relatively small in number compared to other populations, Africans have featured prominently in popular representation. Descriptions of Europe being ‘invaded’ or ‘swarmed’ by African migrants are commonplace in the media.¹⁶

Some observers point to an underlying racism informing these narratives.¹⁷ While representing a smaller proportion of total arriving migrants than other populations, African migrants often receive a disproportionate amount of attention and reaction — both in relation to debate about migration in host countries and as these in turn have come to influence international policy and programming.

Understanding of the realities faced by individuals arriving through irregular means from Africa to Europe is often limited to the news of life-and-death tragedies at sea. Coverage of these dramatic and repeated disasters may serve to dampen empathy for the individuals concerned by contributing to a persistent sense of crisis. Blanket assumptions that those arriving are desperate and destitute, or manipulating the asylum system, shape perspectives. In reality, over 80 percent of African migration happens within Africa, both intra- and inter-regionally.¹⁸ The rate of African emigration (that is, the proportion of African emigrants compared to the continent’s population) is one of the lowest in the world — and regular migration from Africa to Europe far exceeds irregular arrivals.¹⁹

Popular perception of African migration to Europe may be exaggerated. It is clear, however, that numbers have expanded over the past decade in absolute terms.²⁰ For reasons related to demographic imbalances, geographic proximity, and the structure of Africa’s economies and wider governance contexts, it is almost certain that migration flows from Africa to Europe will increase in the decades to come. The increased digital connectivity of Africa also comes into play.²¹ Above all — as confirmed by the data presented in this study — progress in relation to development itself spurs on migration. The complex relationship between development and migration is a central theme of this report.

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Noting how charged the issue of migration already is in European societies, it is clear that finding more sustainable and creative approaches to irregular migration is imperative. Evidence-based understanding of its drivers and dynamics are critical to enabling more balanced and effective responses.

At this critical juncture in the migration debate, and to ensure momentum generated by the Global Compact is translated into concrete responses, it is time to listen to those who have made the journey. The *Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe* study sets out to do exactly that.

Focus of *Scaling Fences* study

Data on those forcibly displaced are relatively accurate thanks to the work of specialized agencies such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which provide life-saving support to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, irregular migration, defined as ‘movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of sending, transit and receiving countries’, continues to be one of the least understood dimensions of contemporary migration patterns.²² The overall legal and political environments in which it takes place compound definitional issues to make accurate analysis and monitoring of the phenomenon especially difficult. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration recognizes the paucity of available data to inform policy options and public discourse. International migration literature also increasingly emphasizes that the voices of migrants themselves are often missing from policy debates, with some calling for more nuanced understanding that anchors the study of migration in the ‘biographies of migrants’ life-courses’.²³

UNDP has compiled this study precisely to respond to such gaps in the global evidence base, and to the wider prerogative of advancing understanding of the relationship between migration and development. Our *Human Development Report 2009* employed a deliberately comprehensive lens, encompassing internal, international, legal, forced, and even historical patterns of migration. A decade on, the *Scaling Fences* report focuses on the specific group of contemporary irregular African migrants arriving in Europe that is, we believe, particularly poorly served by current regulatory frameworks and policy agendas. This current situation serves neither development outcomes in Africa nor the socio-political and economic contexts of European countries favourably.

The ‘scaling fences’ motif of the report’s title refers to the significant risks faced by individuals voyaging from Africa to Europe through irregular means. These individuals confront enormous hurdles in arriving and, for those who make it, attempting to build a productive life. It also metaphorically depicts the barriers to personal fulfilment, including through

economic and socio-political opportunities in home countries that, as revealed by the data, drive the will to migrate.

Mixed migration flows, by definition, comprise both people whose reasons for migrating fall under international asylum norms and many whose primary reason for travelling is economic or other. At the same time, these classifications need to be held lightly. The motivations of those travelling for humanitarian or protection reasons and those incentivized by economic reasons are increasingly recognized as multifaceted. Experiences, *en route* and once in Europe, become similarly intertwined. The *Scaling Fences*’ total cohort of respondents reflected both this range and blurring. This report’s focus is on those migrants whose primary motivation, in their own words, was not humanitarian or protection-related in nature. We believe that, from a development perspective, the drivers and incentives that motivate this particular group of people need to be better understood — and the potential of this dimension of overall global migration patterns harnessed. The report’s attention to the development aspects of irregular migration reflects UNDP’s institutional mandate as the lead development agency within the UN system. It also responds to gaps in the wider literature and research.

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The report is the second major review of contemporary development issues affecting Africa to be published by UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Africa focusing on the experiences and perspectives of affected individuals.²⁴ It draws on an extensive survey involving interviews held across Europe, with migrants who had travelled through irregular means from multiple African countries. Survey respondents primarily travelled to Europe by sea, in many cases journeying further afield once in Europe.

Very little has been known until now about the personal stories of African migrants who take on the risks and incur the costs of travelling through such irregular channels to Europe. What were the circumstances of their lives at home? What are the factors that motivated them to leave? What are the opportunities, challenges and experiences faced on arrival to Europe, and what survival tactics are deployed in transitioning? What are

their own attitudes towards their experience, those they have left behind, and their destination countries? Crucially, how does their experience relate to the development context and trajectory of their home countries? And how might policies both in origin and host countries better begin to address their needs and aspirations in the interests of mutually positive outcomes?

This report is the only study of its kind to explore this facet of irregular migration on such a scale — including the comprehensive exploration of the biographic details of migrants' experiences, from life 'at home' to life 'in Europe'. Its timely and unique analysis is intended to inform forward-looking policies that better confront the challenges and understand the benefits of irregular African migration to Europe — for migrants themselves; for the families and countries they leave behind; and for the countries in which they seek to build new lives. It presents evidence based on the perspectives of irregular migrants themselves that challenges stereotypes and myths, and is intended to contribute to a new quality of engagement and response both in Africa and Europe.

The report further addresses the need for gender to be more closely examined in migration research, much of which has traditionally been 'gender-blind'.²⁵ Female experiences in migratory processes have too often been neglected, with male migrants' experiences taken as the norm. Gender relations and patriarchal family structures fundamentally condition migration, influencing both men and women differently.²⁶ *Scaling Fences* has been designed to address a recognized need for improved inclusion of a gender perspective — in data collection, analysis and policy — that ensures migration policy effectively responds to gender equality objectives.²⁷ Gender differences and dynamics are analysed where pertinent throughout the report.

After providing further details on the methodology employed and the profiles of survey respondents, *Scaling Fences* proceeds to share key findings from the data taken together with insights from the wider literature. Findings are structured into two sections, each consisting of two chapters: Section 1 — In Africa (Chapter 1: Life at home, Chapter 2: Motivations and drivers) and Section 2 — In Europe (Chapter 3: Life on the other side, Chapter 4: Attitudes to return). Following these thematic chapters, Section 3 reflects on the implications for policy and programming, identifying key recommendations for policymakers in Africa and Europe.

THIS REPORT IS THE ONLY STUDY OF ITS KIND TO EXPLORE THIS FACET OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION ON SUCH A SCALE — INCLUDING THE COMPREHENSIVE EXPLORATION OF THE BIOGRAPHIC DETAILS OF MIGRANTS' EXPERIENCES, FROM LIFE 'AT HOME' TO LIFE 'IN EUROPE'. ITS TIMELY AND UNIQUE ANALYSIS IS INTENDED TO INFORM FORWARD-LOOKING POLICIES THAT BETTER CONFRONT THE CHALLENGES AND UNDERSTAND THE BENEFITS OF IRREGULAR AFRICAN MIGRATION TO EUROPE — FOR MIGRANTS THEMSELVES; FOR THE FAMILIES AND COUNTRIES THEY LEAVE BEHIND; AND FOR THE COUNTRIES IN WHICH THEY SEEK TO BUILD NEW LIVES.

Methodological approach

Scaling Fences draws on a detailed questionnaire administered in person to 3,069 adult African migrants (over 18 years of age at the time of interview) who had travelled from a total of 43 African countries of origin and were interviewed across 13 European countries. They had all arrived in Europe through irregular means at least six months before they were interviewed for this study.

In the absence of any independent or verifiable means of determining who among the survey respondents travelled for what reasons, the research team used, as a proxy indicator, answers to a key question in the interviews about respondents' self-reported *most important reason* for coming to Europe. Analysis of answers given to this question enabled the identification of 1,099 individuals (36 percent of total interviewed) who cited the following reasons as being most important: 'avoid war/conflict'; 'avoid persecution from government'; 'avoid violent extremism/terrorism'; and 'avoid gang violence'. For analytical purposes, across the data, these 1,099 individuals were separated from the rest of the sample, who cited economic or other reasons as their *most important reason* for coming to Europe. It must be kept in mind that assessment of asylum status falls under the jurisdiction of the state in question and claims can only be assessed by specialized national agencies. The classification made in this report is simply based on respondents' own self-reported primary motivation. This process of sorting respondents led to the creation of a primary sample of 1,970 irregular migrants from 39 African countries who had *not* travelled for asylum or protection-related reasons. This group is the sole focus of this report.²⁸ All data presented in this report relates to this primary sample only.

Preparatory conceptual work, consultations and the design of research tools began in November 2017. Fieldwork took place throughout 2018. The questionnaire explored a range of biographic details as well as perceptions and personal accounts of socio-economic and political factors. It was designed to generate an improved, holistic understanding of the drivers of irregular migration, and of the lives and aspirations of irregular migrants. The report provides an aggregate snapshot in time of these respondents' perspectives and does not provide detailed country-by-country analysis.

A non-random sampling strategy was applied to identify respondents, reflecting the circumstances of the target population. Living on the margins of society with unstable legal status, this population is typically hidden and therefore difficult to access. Research participants were identified in close collaboration with local partner organizations working to provide support to migrants. As part of this approach, the research team trained African migrants to conduct many of the interviews themselves: migrant interviewers comprised around 80 percent of all interviewers. Around 30 percent of respondents were identified directly through local partners, and the remainder were selected using referrals and snowball sampling, or through approaching potential respondents at locations that irregular migrants are known to frequent.²⁹ In so doing, the research reduced potential sampling biases while ensuring high-quality data collection to the greatest extent possible. Interviews were conducted in Arabic, English, French, Spanish, and several African and Nordic languages. Anonymity was guaranteed.

The dataset is unique in terms of the breadth of insights from respondents, the number of respondents, and its spread across both multiple countries of origin and countries of destination. Given the non-random sampling method, all results are applicable only to the dataset and technically cannot be inferred for the larger population of irregular migrants.³⁰ However, the overall sample size and size per location allow for general interpretations about the wider population of irregular migrants who have reached Europe. The methodology was strict and robust, including various quality-control and data-entry checks at each stage of the research. Findings have been aggregated and compiled for descriptive analysis as presented in the following sections, complemented by a literature review and secondary-data findings throughout.³¹

In addition to descriptive analysis of the data, a multivariate regression analysis of the dataset was conducted. Attention to both origin and destination countries was employed to explore whether systematic differences existed among respondents with respect to:

- Cost of the journey to Europe (Model 1);
- Whether the individual received financial help for the journey (Model 2);
- Participation in the labour market in Europe (Model 3);
- Willingness to live permanently in Europe (Model 4).

Results from models with the highest explanatory power that were robust and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval or higher are included in the appropriate sections of this report where pertinent and enriching to the discussion. Further details of the relevant models and the statistical analysis are included in the relevant endnotes. All findings are included in Annex 2.


Lastly, to complement the data, individual testimonies given by the *Scaling Fences*' respondents were gathered by researchers. These have been used to provide further insights on the topic. Film and photographic material have also been gathered and will be showcased as part of the wider UNDP *Scaling Fences* project.

KEY FEATURES AND PROFILE OF RESEARCH SAMPLE

Scaling Fences' interviews took place in 13 European countries across multiple locations, as shown in Figure 2. Host countries were prioritized and selected using secondary data to estimate relative proportions of irregular African migrants residing in the country.³² The level of access and capacities of research partners as well as the personal networks of interviewers further influenced sample sizes per country.

FIGURE 2 **GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF SCALING FENCES' INTERVIEWS**

- Austria**
— Innsbruck
- Belgium**
— Antwerp, Brussels
- Denmark**
— Allerød, Copenhagen, Syddjurs
- Finland**
— Helsinki, Tampere
- France**
— Aix-en-Provence, Grenoble, Lyon, Marseille
- Germany**
— Berlin, Cologne, Dortmund, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Saarbrücken
- Greece**
— Athens
- Italy**
— Palermo, Rome, Turin
- The Netherlands**
— Amsterdam, Eindhoven, Nijmegen, Maastricht, Utrecht
- Norway**
— Oslo, Trondheim
- Spain**
— Alicante, Barcelona, Lepe, Lleida, Valencia
- Sweden**
— Kristianstad, Malmö, Stockholm, Sundsvall, Uppsala
- UK**
— Birmingham, Sandwell




The proportions of interviews per country are illustrated in Figure 3 as follows: Spain, 25 percent; Belgium, Germany and Italy, around 15 percent each; France, The Netherlands and Sweden, between 6-8 percent each; followed by a number of countries hosting 2 percent or less of the sample, such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, and the United Kingdom. By region, 47 percent of the interviews took place in Northern European countries, 43 percent in Southern European countries, and 10 percent in Nordic countries.³³

FIGURE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS


by HOST COUNTRY

■ NORDIC 10% ■ NORTH 47% ■ SOUTH 43%



by COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

■ EAST 15% ■ WEST 71% ■ NORTH 7% ■ SOUTH/CENTRAL 7%




Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.

The boundaries and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. A final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

Nearly three quarters of all African countries were represented in the sample as a country of origin for the migrants interviewed. Twenty-two of the 39 countries covered accounted for less than 1 percent of the sample each, while five countries between them accounted for 55 percent of the sample: Nigeria (17 percent), Senegal (13 percent), Mali (10 percent), Guinea (9 percent), and The Gambia (6 percent). These countries together with Côte d'Ivoire (5 percent), Cameroon (4 percent), Morocco (4 percent), and Somalia (5 percent) are referred to throughout

this report in instances where comparable secondary data is introduced to the discussion. These nine countries were all among the top 20 nationalities of African sea arrivals to Europe between 2014 and 2018.³⁴ Distribution across African regions was as follows: West Africa, 71 percent; East Africa, 15 percent; North Africa, 7 percent; and South/Central Africa, 7 percent.³⁵ The flow chart in Figure 4 gives an impression of where respondents from different countries of origin had travelled to by the time of interview.


FIGURE 4 **PATTERNS OF DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS** by COUNTRY OF ORIGIN and HOST COUNTRY



The average age of respondents at the time of their arrival to Europe was 24 years old, with no significant variation between men and women (Figure 5). Fifty-eight percent were aged 20-29 years old, and 94 percent were under 35 years old. Fourteen percent were under the age of 18 when they travelled. Overall, 77 percent of respondents were men and 23 percent were women (Figure 6). The research team made deliberate efforts to ensure that women were adequately represented in the sample.³⁶

Seventy-one percent of respondents were single, and 27 percent married or in a long-term partnership before coming to Europe (Figure 7). Sixty percent had no children, and the rest had one child or more (Figure 8). A higher proportion of female respondents were married (5 percentage points more) and had children (23 percentage points more) than male counterparts.

FIGURE 5 **AGE AT THE TIME OF DEPARTURE** for EUROPE



Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.

FIGURE 6 **GENDER** by REGION OF ORIGIN




FIGURE 7 **MARITAL STATUS BEFORE TRAVELLING** to EUROPE






FIGURE 8 **NUMBER OF CHILDREN**



All interviewees acknowledged they had arrived in Europe travelling through irregular means at least six months before the interviews took place. As shown in Figure 9, 21 percent of the respondents had arrived in Europe prior to 2011, and 54 percent had arrived since 2015.

Ninety-one percent of respondents had arrived in Europe via a sea route, with just 7 percent and 2 percent coming by land and air, respectively (Figure 10). For 96 percent of respondents, their present experience at the time of interview represented their first time in Europe. However, 18 percent had previously tried to come to Europe through regular means, i.e., before resorting to irregular channels (Figure 11).

FIGURE 9 **YEAR OF ARRIVAL** in EUROPE




FIGURE 10 **MODE OF ARRIVAL** to EUROPE




FIGURE 11 **PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE TRAVELLING** to EUROPE



A majority of the respondents had transited through Libya, with 57 percent indicating it was the last country they were in before embarking for Europe (Figure 12). The remaining transited through Morocco (26 percent), Turkey (7 percent), with Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, and Tunisia each at 2 percent or less; other diverse countries made up the remaining 3 percent between them. Fifty-seven percent arrived in Italy, 30 percent in Spain, and 7 percent in Greece, with the remainder distributed among other locations (Figure 13).

FIGURE 12 'WHAT WAS THE LAST COUNTRY YOU WERE IN BEFORE YOU ARRIVED IN EUROPE?'

33% of respondents who arrived before 2012 came through Libya, compared to **67%** among those who arrived after 2012.





FIGURE 13 COUNTRY OF ARRIVAL in EUROPE

85% of respondents registered in country of arrival.





SECTION 1

AT HOME



‘I had a comfortable life growing up in
Gambia. We were by no means rich, but
my parents made sure we were educated
and cared for. I speak seven languages and
got along easily with people from different
ethnic groups. I had no plans to leave;
I wanted to launch a business.’

13°27'N 16°35'W to 41°54'N 12°30'E

MAHAMADOU, from *The Gambia*

CHAPTER 1: LIFE AT HOME

Improving economic growth during the past two decades in many African countries has created new opportunities for many. Macro-level trends such as urbanization — and migration itself — have further served to expand horizons. And the drive towards poverty reduction and meeting African citizens' basic human needs has seen critical advances in service provision across education, health, access to water, and other important sectors in just a few decades.³⁷ Key indicators such as a reduction in under-five mortality in sub-Saharan Africa by 58 percent between 1990 and 2017, and increased life expectancy from 50 years in 1990 to 60 years in 2017, can all be celebrated.³⁸

While international migration is now firmly established at the heart of the global Sustainable Development Agenda 2030, and the linkages between development and migration are recognized to be profoundly relevant to the governance of international migration, the nature of these linkages is prone to be interpreted in contrasting ways.³⁹ The emergency predicament of many irregular African migrants arriving by sea in Europe prompts assumptions about dramatic, but simple, cause-and-effect relationships between poverty, war and migration. These assumptions shape the popular debate in Europe. They also find reflection in responses that are focused on limiting mobility: either through channelling international development assistance to strengthen borders or to create job opportunities intended to deter migration. Development responses are needed; however, the types of interventions that might most effectively and constructively respond to irregular migration from Africa to Europe require close examination.

Drawing on the dataset to add to the global evidence, this chapter identifies the trends and characteristics shaping life at home for its 1,970 respondents prior to their departure. In so doing, it situates the types of development contexts from which individuals travelled, while raising related questions about appropriate development responses to migration. It focuses on: (i) macro-level trends; (ii) family circumstances; (iii) educational background; and (iv) employment profiles.

1.1 Macro-level trends


The literature on international migration has identified a 'migration hump', whereby emigration from low-income countries increases as income levels and economic growth also increase.⁴⁰ According to this approach, development spurs on migration continually, up to the point at which the low-income country becomes an upper middle-income country — reaching a plateau for some time and then descending from there. The literature also suggests that Africans migrating to Europe tend to come from households located in urban areas.⁴¹ Further, having a relative who has migrated has been found to significantly increase the probability of migration within families; while observing others' experience of family emigration can serve to 'perpetuate' migration within

communities.⁴² Much of the available evidence exploring the linkages between key macro-level trends in development and migration is not specifically focused on those who travel irregularly. However, findings from this study indicate relevance to the experiences of irregular migrants travelling from Africa to Europe, and hence to a new class of traveller.

Scaling Fences' respondents came from regions of their countries with relatively low levels of deprivation. Figure 14 shows the majority of migrants in the sample, travelling from

Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal, were from areas with lower Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) scores than other parts of the country. The MPI is an internationally comparable measure of acute poverty that captures the multiple deprivations experienced with respect to health, education and living standards within communities.⁴³ MPI data is available at subnational levels — allowing for comparisons between regions in a country. A higher MPI score indicates a larger number of people living in a given area who are experiencing multiple types of such deprivations at greater intensity.

LOCATIONS WHERE RESPONDENTS GREW UP
FIGURE 14 *against* SUBREGIONAL MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY INDEX (MPI) SCORES, SELECTED COUNTRIES



Respondents were also overwhelmingly and disproportionately urban in origin, with 85 percent coming from towns or cities. Twice as many came from urban environments than do the wider African population, of whom approximately 45 percent live in towns and cities.⁴⁴ Just half the proportion of respondents grew up in a rural area compared to their parents, though parents were also largely urbanite, with 68 percent having grown up in cities (Figure 15). The continent-wide experience of rapid urbanization serves as a backdrop to irregular African migration to Europe. Analysis of urban growth of Benin City — the single most common city of origin among the respondents — starkly illustrates the rapid rate of urbanization at over 122 percent in the past eight years, exemplifying the continental trend (Figure 16).

FIGURE 15 WHERE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR PARENTS GREW UP





FIGURE 16 URBAN GROWTH, BENIN CITY, NIGERIA, 2000–18

2000 2010 2015 2018



Source: Benin City urban-built analysis from UNDP, UNITAR-UNOSAT, NASA-SEDAC (Global Human Built-up and Settlement Extent) and European Commission (Global Human Settlement Layer). Satellite images from Sentinel, Landsat, US Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, NextView License.

The research also examined if individuals had family members who had already migrated abroad (and thus beyond the rural-urban route within the country contexts). A total of 43 percent had a family member who had moved either to another country in Africa, to Europe or to both, with 27 percent specifying just Europe and 28 percent specifying just Africa (Figure 17). Substantial proportions of these family migrants were sending remittances back home, with some variance in types of reported expenditure between remittances received from Europe and from Africa as shown in Figure 18.

It is difficult to conclude how the experience of family emigration among *Scaling Fences*' respondents corresponds to averages among the population in the various countries. Available secondary data is incomplete and inconclusive for this purpose. Nonetheless, at 43 percent it forms a salient aspect of background circumstances within the group, representing first-hand experience of having relatives who have both emigrated and are sending remittances to help with various costs at home. Parents themselves may be more likely to have migrated from rural to urban settings in recent memory. The data suggests that the idea of personal mobility is perhaps deeply affirmed as an option from the outset for those who travel as irregular migrants from Africa to Europe, derived from recent trends and experiences on the continent. Even for those who did not have direct experience of family migration, the narrative of others' experiences, amplified by the ever narrowing digital gap and increasing connectivity that brings awareness of both inequality and opportunity to the peripheries of the global economy, can also be inferred as influences.

FIGURE 17 **'DID ANY OF YOUR FAMILY MEMBERS MOVE TO LIVE IN...?'**





FIGURE 18 **FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION BY MIGRANT RELATIVE**

MIGRANT RELATIVE in ■ AFRICA ■ EUROPE



'In recent years, in my village and the surrounding areas, there have only been a few good harvests. There's too little rain, or too much. People don't have enough to eat, pay school fees, buy clothes. So much, then, depends on remittances from migrants.'


MAN, 27 years old, from Mali now living in Spain

1.2 Family circumstances

Scaling Fences' respondents came from households averaging 10 members and had an average of five siblings. The size of households was significantly larger than national averages and, as shown in Figure 19, higher than the continent-level average. This indicates that population pressure and commensurate stress on household economies may be a further salient feature of the development context influencing migration.

Fifty-one percent of respondents claimed to have been contributing to the household economy before they travelled, with no differences between men and women (Figure 20). This represents a similar proportion as those who were working or earning money prior to departure (discussed further below). Before migrating, many of the individuals in the sample were therefore already meeting domestic obligations to help pay their families' expenses. A higher proportion of eldest children, particularly in comparison to youngest children, were contributing financially (by 15 percentage points more).


FIGURE 19 RESPONDENTS' HOUSEHOLD SIZES



Shows weighted average of household sizes.

Source: Average household size in Africa from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2018), Household Size and Composition, 2018.

FIGURE 20 PERCENT WHO CONTRIBUTED TO HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY by GENDER and by POSITION AMONG SIBLINGS



1.3 Educational background

Available studies suggest that a majority of Africans who migrate internationally are better educated than their peers at home.⁴⁵ The migration process itself can incentivize people to invest in education and accumulate further skills.⁴⁶ The larger share of the literature focuses on migration in general. The *Scaling Fences* research again appears to confirm relevance for those who have arrived in Europe as irregular migrants. Meanwhile, globally, an increasing 'feminization' of migration has been observed.⁴⁷ More young women have been found to migrate for reasons of education than men.⁴⁸ There has been an increase in migration particularly by college-educated women from developing countries to developed countries, including from African nations.⁴⁹ However, gender-based discrimination can hinder migration opportunities for many women, typically leading to restrictions on autonomy and mobility. For women seeking to migrate through regular channels, this may even be reflected in national legislation. As recently as 2016, married women were not allowed to apply for a passport without their husband's consent in 12 African countries.⁵⁰

'My dad died and because I'm the firstborn they all looked up to me for help. Therefore, I had to get out of Ghana and find ways to support my family. I was looking for the silver lining.'

MAN, 40 years old, from Ghana now living in Sweden

As shown in Figure 21, only 16 percent of the total sample had no education at all or had not completed primary school, while 24 percent had completed primary and 43 percent had completed secondary school. Six percent had completed some type of vocational training, and 8 percent had studied to tertiary-level education across the sample. The irregular migrants interviewed for this study, from key countries of origin, had on average nine years of education, with similar findings for women and men (Figure 22). Noting gender differences in education attainment levels in home societies, the overall parity between men and women in the research sample suggests women were particularly well educated against the average in origin countries.⁵¹ Indeed, as also shown in Figure 22, indicative comparison of respondents' education levels with those of the wider population in selected countries (both national average and those in the 15-29 age range) suggests that median levels of education were relatively high. Women had five more years of schooling than their counterparts at home, whereas men had three. While not at the level of the college-educated women who are the subject of the literature referred to above, female respondents were more educated than their peers compared to men. It can be deduced that increased education has significantly expanded individuals' horizons and aspirations. Again, the picture that emerges is of individuals who have gained in relative terms from the recent development trajectory of Africa — including significant progress on the continent in relation to education for girls.⁵²

FIGURE 21 HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED





FIGURE 22 MEDIAN YEARS OF EDUCATION compared to 15-29 AGE RANGE and NATIONAL AVERAGE, SELECTED COUNTRIES



Trends are indicative only, particularly for countries with low base-size among *Scaling Fences*' dataset. Shows weighted averages of education levels by gender of the nine selected countries (using weights from *Scaling Fences*' sample). Education data for 15-29-year-olds in Somalia not available.


Source: National mean years of schooling from UNDP, Human Development Index database, 2018; 15-29 age range median years of education from USAID Demographic and Health Survey (latest data/country report available). National data for Somalia (median years of education for 25+) from UNDP (2012). *Somalia Human Development Report*.

1.4 Employment profiles

Up to a certain point, economic development, alongside other features of development progress, can drive migration. Among other factors, this is because international migration is costly, particularly extra-continental migration from Africa.⁵³ It involves paying for the voyage itself, and, for those who travel through irregular routes, for the services of facilitators and smugglers. Improved access to resources allows people to meet these costs. Available research identifies that individuals in Africa who are prepared and able to emigrate have on average higher incomes than those who want to stay or who are only considering migrating.⁵⁴

Forty-nine percent of *Scaling Fences*’ respondents were ‘earning money’, 9 percent were ‘in school’, and the remaining 42 percent were doing neither (Figure 23). Those who were not earning gave a range of reasons for why they were not earning, of which ‘lack of jobs’ was the most significant at 50 percent. Thirty-four percent of those not earning (including those in school) — equivalent to 17 percent of all respondents — also said they would not have stayed at home even if they had been. Earning, or the prospect of earning at home, was not a factor that constrained the decision to migrate for two thirds (66 percent) of respondents.

FIGURE 23 **EARNING STATUS** at HOME



Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.


The average incomes of those who were earning at home are shown by gender and region in Figure 24. Reflecting African and global patterns of gender wage disparity, women were found to have been earning approximately 26 percent less than men. By region, average monthly income varied from a high nominal

value of US\$470 in North Africa to \$300 in West Africa.⁵⁵ Notwithstanding these discrepancies across the sample, comparison with available country data on salaries suggests that respondents were earning competitively against country norms in most cases — 63 percent more on average (Figure 25).

FIGURE 24 **AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME at HOME by REGION OF ORIGIN and by GENDER**



FIGURE 25 **AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME at HOME against COUNTRY AVERAGES, SELECTED COUNTRIES**



Trends are indicative only, particularly for countries with low base-size among *Scaling Fences*' dataset. Values are rounded off to the nearest tenth place. Weighted average shown for the eight selected countries. To make monthly salaries comparable, they were first adjusted to 2015 dollars, using implied PPP conversion rates to adjust for inflation. **Source:** Salary data for Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, and Mali from ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, Monthly Earnings dataset, accessed January 2019; for Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal from WageIndicator Surveys from WageIndicator.org. The higher end of the salary scale for a medium-skilled employee was used for Nigeria, <https://wageindicator.org/Wageindicatorfoundation/publications>; for Cameroon from National Institute of Statistics (2011), Deuxième Enquête sur l'Emploi et le Secteur Informel au Cameroun, Institut National de la Statistique, Cameroon; and for Morocco from Central Bank of Morocco – Bank Al-Maghrib (2018), Rapport Annuel 2017. Monthly salary data for Somalia not available.

The main occupations among those earning at home were 'services/sales workers' (30 percent), 'elementary' (or menial) occupations (29 percent) and 'craft/related trades workers' (18 percent) (Figure 26). Proportionally, twice as many women than men worked in services/sales (51 percent and 24 percent, respectively), whereas twice as many men than women worked in craft/related trades (21 percent and 10 percent, respectively). Figure 27 suggests mixed results in relation to the quality of employment — with 42 percent saying it was 'not safe' but a majority indicating it to have been both regular and safe. Despite these attributes and the competitive incomes reported,

of those earning, 50 percent felt they 'did not earn enough', 38 percent earned 'enough to get by', and 12 percent earned 'enough to save'. Across all respondents, as many as 70 percent stated that they 'did not earn enough', while only 7 percent earned 'enough to save' (Figure 28). Taken together, these findings raise important questions as to the quality of jobs and opportunities for personal advancement in Africa. It would seem that despite being relatively successful in economic terms within local contexts, available opportunities fell far short of meeting respondents' aspirations.

FIGURE 26 **MAIN OCCUPATIONS** at HOME




FIGURE 27 **ATTRIBUTES OF WORK** at HOME




FIGURE 28 **FINANCIAL WELL-BEING BEFORE COMING** to EUROPE



KEY FINDINGS

Chapter 1 demonstrates that contemporary macro-level development trends such as urbanization, spatial patterns in economic growth, demographic pressure, and a history of family migration all form key elements of the Africa-to-Europe irregular migration story. Other advances such as those in education levels, including for girls across the continent, also feature strongly. Eighty-five percent of the study's respondents were urban in origin, almost twice the African average — with rural-urban mobility within their families also in evidence. Many respondents (43 percent) also had a relative who had migrated further afield in Africa or to Europe. Median levels of education among respondents from key countries were higher than those of peers. This was even more so for women, who had five additional years of schooling compared to age-range female peers at home, while men had three when compared to their peers. A majority of respondents were young, male and single: the average age was 24, while almost all were under 35 when they travelled. Household sizes at home were significantly larger than continent averages.

Fifty-one percent of respondents were contributing to the household economy before leaving, hinting at family obligations informing incentives to leave that are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. Type of employment was differentiated across men and women, with females earning on average 26 percent less than male peers. However, among the 49 percent of respondents who were earning at the time of their departure, income appears to have been competitive in the national context of key countries — averaging 63 percent more than national averages — with many reporting jobs that were described as safe and regular. Despite this, just 38 percent earned enough 'to get by', 50 percent felt they were not earning enough, and only 12 percent reported being able to save. Meanwhile, for two thirds of respondents, earning, or the prospect of earning at home, was not a factor to

change the decision to migrate. The research strongly suggests a need for nuanced understanding of the relationship between employment and drivers of irregular migration, which in turn has implications for interventions designed to deter migration through job creation at home.

The present generation of African young people represented in the study has manifestly benefited from recent development progress. However, such gains still leave them excluded from any prospects of emigrating through legal channels. It emerges that those in relatively better off positions in terms of education and employment are at the fore among those ready to take the risks to travel irregularly to Europe in search of something better. Among these individuals, an appetite for mobility has only been sharpened by an improving development context: their ambition has outpaced locally available opportunities. In other words, their emigration serves as an indication that development is taking place but not fast enough, and with gains that are uneven and limiting.

The relative socio-economic standing of respondents in their home environments, their readiness to migrate irregularly, and the salience of key macro-level development trends in shaping their horizons all suggest irregular migration is an expression of development progress. Efforts to coercively prevent or otherwise deter it are questionable, even unrealistic, when viewed through this lens. Meaningful acceleration of development progress far beyond current levels, such that credible options are created closer to home for future generations of Africa's young and dynamic population, may be the only viable long-term 'solution'. In the short term, these findings suggest a reappraisal of tactics and interventions is needed.

THE RELATIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STANDING OF RESPONDENTS IN THEIR HOME ENVIRONMENTS, THEIR READINESS TO MIGRATE IRREGULARLY, AND THE SALIENCE OF KEY MACRO-LEVEL DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN SHAPING THEIR HORIZONS ALL SUGGEST IRREGULAR MIGRATION IS AN EXPRESSION OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS. EFFORTS TO COERCIVELY PREVENT OR OTHERWISE DETER IT ARE QUESTIONABLE, EVEN UNREALISTIC, WHEN VIEWED THROUGH THIS LENS.



‘Ultimately, we all want the same things in life: good health, decent jobs, liberty and freedom to pursue opportunities for our families and ourselves. And because many people don’t feel they have that in Africa, they come to Europe.’

14°41'N 17°26'W to 45°11'N 5°43'E

AZIZ, from Senegal

CHAPTER 2: MOTIVATIONS AND DRIVERS

Many millions of young Africans face similar circumstances at home to those faced by the small minority of individuals who decide to undertake the dangerous journey to Europe using irregular routes. Understanding the drivers that impact the personal motivation of those who do leave is both complex and under-researched, despite a substantial, multidisciplinary literature on international migration overall.

The growing policy and academic interest in what drives migration frequently takes as its starting point a policy objective to stop it.⁵⁶ A human-development lens on migration advocates a broader perspective, recalling that the expansion of people's freedoms to live their lives as they choose is central to enabling positive development outcomes. It recognizes that movement is one of the key expressions or actions individuals may choose to realize their life plans.⁵⁷ Further, it emphasizes the dynamic interaction between individual decisions and the socio-economic context in which they are taken.

This chapter mines the dataset in order to highlight key drivers and motivations for migrating that emerged across respondents. Findings are clustered as follows: (i) multifaceted reasoning; (ii) weighing economic factors; (iii) family considerations; (iv) governance context; and (v) the individual.

2.1 Multifaceted reasoning

Although drivers of migration are often reduced to single issues such as war or poverty, the idea that decision-making about migration is likely to be multifaceted, combining multiple structural and individual factors, is also well established in the literature. When asked why they move, migrants rarely name one specific trigger.⁵⁸


Multifaceted reasoning is confirmed by this study. As discussed in the Introduction, respondents were asked a two-part question. The first was to identify the *most important reason* for migrating.⁵⁹ They were then asked to identify additional factors that were important to them in their decision to come to Europe (with no limit on selection of issues). Just 6 percent provided only one reason, while 94 percent identified two or more (Figure 29). As indicated by the personal testimonies gathered by the research team and interspersed throughout the report, motivational factors readily bleed into and shape each other. The precise confluence of factors remains highly individualized, with the richness of human experience prompting innumerable details and variations. Still, policy responses must consider the evidence, and an analysis of the various reasons provided helps to identify trends.

2.2 Weighing economic factors

In a context of global inequality, the prospect of being able to transform the economic situation of family members left at home through remittances is, of course, a huge factor shaping motivations and drivers of Africa-Europe migration. In 2017 alone, remittances to sub-Saharan African countries from Europe were estimated at \$25.3 billion — representing 36 percent of total remittances received.⁶⁰ Remittances to Africa exceed international development assistance and often serve as a lifeline to African households.⁶¹ They are used for ‘consumption smoothing’, and to invest in key costs such as education, health and housing.⁶² The prevalence of remittances in local communities has been shown to act as a driver of migration, as several households aspire to the same benefits as neighbours with family members overseas.⁶³

The data confirms the pertinence of potential wealth transfer through remittances in driving irregular African migration to Europe. It also resonates with available research that identifies economic motivation as a central, but rarely sole, influencing factor.⁶⁴ While it has been established that many migrants are motivated by improved economic prospects elsewhere, in the words of the UNDP *Human Development Report 2009*: ‘theories that emphasize purely economic factors fail to capture the broader social framework in which decisions are taken’.⁶⁵ Others confirm that factors such as wage differentials, while important, do not suffice in explaining migration trends.⁶⁶

FIGURE 29 NUMBER OF REASONS IDENTIFIED FOR COMING TO EUROPE



Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.

As shown in Figure 30, 'work/send money home' was stated by 60 percent of respondents as their *most important reason* for coming to Europe. In responding to the further question on other factors important to them in their decision to come to Europe, economic motivations were selected by an additional 21 percent. This means a total of 81 percent selected 'work/send money home' as either the *most important reason* or as another reason for coming to Europe.


It is striking to note that only 1 percent of all respondents selected 'work/send money home' as their *only* reason for travelling (Figure 29). Economic factors are closely intertwined with other considerations based on this data. The range of other

common reasons selected as *most important* or *additional* is also shown in Figure 30; the implications suggested by the different selections are discussed throughout this chapter.


Comparing by gender reveals that a higher proportion of women, by 12 percentage points, selected 'family/friends related' as *most important reason* (Figure 31). 'Work/send money home' was the key reason influencing both men and women but important to more males: among men, 'work/send money home' was selected four times more than 'family/friends related', whereas for women it was selected only two times more.

FIGURE 30 REASONS FOR COMING to EUROPE

'What was the most important reason that motivated you to come to Europe?'



'[...were there other] reasons for you to come to Europe?'



Multiple-answer question. Shows percent of individuals who selected reason.

FIGURE 31 MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR COMING to EUROPE by GENDER

- WORK/SEND MONEY HOME
- FAMILY/FRIENDS RELATED
- EDUCATION
- PERSONAL ISSUES/FREEDOM
- EXPLORE/ADVENTURE
- OTHER





FIGURE 32 **COST OF JOURNEY TO EUROPE AND AS RATIO AGAINST INCOME at HOME** by REGION OF ORIGIN and by GENDER

The journey to Europe was a major financial investment for respondents, costing on average \$2,710.⁶⁷ The longer journeys from East and South/Central Africa cost more than journeys from North and West Africa. Women paid an average of \$3,900, while the average cost reported by men was \$2,370 (Figure 32). The *Scaling Fences* regression analysis finds gender to be a statistically significant determinant of the cost of the journey, with women likely to pay 31 percent more than men.⁶⁸ Different factors were identified during the research in explaining this variation. As discussed below, the gender-differentiated sliding scale of journey costs can be taken in part as an indication of anxiety about risks faced by women during the journey and an effort to purchase protection. More men also worked *en route* to offset costs. In addition, the regression analysis finds that those with children with them in the host country paid 18 percent more for the journey. As well as women, individuals with higher levels of education were also significantly more likely to pay higher amounts. Those educated to secondary level and beyond paid up to 39 percent more than those who had not completed primary schooling.

Notwithstanding these variations, as shown in Figure 32, journey costs represent considerable sums: from six to 20 months' income of those who were working before they left home. Yet, as described in the previous chapter, 50 percent of respondents who were earning and 70 percent of respondents overall said they were 'not earning enough', and just 7 percent overall reported being able to save money. The sacrifices and financial leap undertaken to make the journey possible are

indicative of the return on investment anticipated from new opportunities in Europe.

2.3 Family considerations

From influencing the decision to migrate, to financing the trip, to expecting remittances once a family member has reached Europe, the research indicates that the role of family in enabling African migration to Europe is critical.⁶⁹ Forty percent of respondents gave 'family/friends related' as either the *most important* or an additional reason contributing to their decision to migrate (Figure 30 above). Family considerations also clearly influence other reasons selected, in particular 'work/send money home' and 'personal issues/freedom'.

Unpacking what sorts of factors informed selection of 'family/friends related' as well as 'personal issues/freedom' sheds light on the gender dynamics informing migration among respondents. Further analysis of the open-ended questions that formed part of the interviews indicated that joining a family member or friend in Europe was often part of the reasoning of the female respondents who selected 'family/friends related'.⁷⁰ Issues such as forced marriage, abusive relationships, female genital mutilation (FGM) and other forms of sexual abuse, as well as sexual orientation, all featured in women's responses. For men, family/personal problems, including inheritance, were more prominent. The specific restrictions to personal freedom that arise for young women in highly patriarchal environments are salient factors influencing female respondents' decision to emigrate.


‘I always knew there was something special about me and I did not want to waste my potential by staying in Africa. Staying in Africa meant one of two things. Getting married at a young age or getting pregnant at a young age. Both would have shattered my dreams.’

WOMAN, 26 years old, from Nigeria now living in Italy

As discussed in Chapter 1, while family experience of mobility among respondents emerges in broad terms as a critical factor influencing experiences, just 27 percent had a relative in Europe. Together with new capacities to migrate occasioned by improving development contexts, the expansion of people-smuggling routes in recent years has served to democratize migration opportunities.⁷¹ Given the relatively low proportion who already had a relative in Europe, it may be possible to deduce that this group of irregular African migrants are among a new pioneering wave — the first among a class of Africans who are sufficiently well off to travel and attempt to establish themselves, but far from privileged in background.

It is well established that African migrants to Europe frequently rely on family networks both to help pay for the journey and to support them financially as they settle into their host countries.⁷² Based on the ratio between cost of journey and average incomes highlighted above, the implied challenge for most people to fund their journey solely through their own income is clear. The data confirms that many families as well as friends had indeed contributed financially to covering respondents’ journey costs. Fifty-three percent of respondents received some kind of financial support from family or friends, while 45 percent paid for themselves (Figure 33). A significantly higher proportion of women (28 percentage points more) received financial support compared to men — likely reflecting the higher percentage travelling to join a family member or friend. The *Scaling Fences*’ regression analysis finds that women were less likely to have self-financed their journey to Europe.⁷³ The regression analysis further confirms the statistical significance of family migration history among respondents. Those with a family member in Europe were 13 percent more likely to receive financial support for their journey.

FIGURE 33 FINANCIAL SUPPORT RECEIVED FOR JOURNEY to EUROPE



A relationship between education level and financial support received for the journey to Europe emerges from the data: 63 percent of those with no education paid for their own journey as compared to 37 percent of individuals educated to tertiary level (Figure 34). The regression analysis confirms that higher education played a significant role in leveraging financial support from family or friends for the journey.⁷⁴ These findings perhaps indicate an expectation of increased returns on the part of those who contributed — an investment in human capital — or simply that those with higher levels of education come from families with greater levels of disposable income to invest in a better future.

These findings show that migration is for the most part a costly, family-level livelihood strategy and investment process, enabling diversification of the household economic portfolio. The scale of the financial undertaking and degree of family involvement to make the journey possible has implications for respondents' attitudes to return that are explored in Chapter 4.


Meanwhile, those who said they paid for the journey themselves were more likely to have been earning at home. They provided additional anecdotal details, with some

claiming they borrowed or sold family assets to help fund the journey. The regression analysis finds that 'earning before departure' is a statistically significant determinant in decreasing the likelihood of having received financial support, by 16 percent, while those who self-financed their migration were more likely to have arrived recently. While not explicit in the research, the gap between the low numbers of those able to save against those who paid for their own journey implies that recourse to creditors outside of family networks may well have been part of the strategy for covering costs. Many also found paid work while *en route*, to help cover their costs, with almost twice the proportion of men than women reporting that they worked during the journey (not shown).⁷⁵

'It is a communal investment. You are selling gold or animals to make one person migrate. Only a small percentage can go. The person migrating has a great responsibility to provide back home.'

MAN, 22 years old, from Senegal now living in France

FIGURE 34 **FINANCIAL SUPPORT RECEIVED FOR JOURNEY to EUROPE by HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED**




2.4 Governance context

The governance context at home in Africa also emerges as a key influencing factor among respondents, fusing with economic, family and other considerations. ‘Governance/security context’ reasons were selected by 26 percent of respondents as an additional reason for coming to Europe (Figure 30 above). In other areas of questioning, 62 percent of respondents stated they had been treated unfairly by their government (Figure 35), citing ‘ethnicity’ (27 percent), ‘political views’ (21 percent) and ‘region of country’ (15 percent) as reasons. A higher proportion of women cited ‘gender’ and ‘sexual orientation’ as sources of unfair treatment than men by 15 percentage points and 7 percentage points, respectively. As shown in Figure 36, 80 percent of those interviewed said they had not been involved in politics at home, and a similar proportion reported that their voice was unheard (or that their country’s political system provided no opportunity through which to exert influence on government). This result is consistent with the low levels of confidence in institutions that was also exhibited (Figure 37). The percentage of individuals stating ‘none at all’ in relation to confidence was at 58 percent for national government; 51 percent for the police; 42 percent for the army; and 34 percent for community leaders. Religious institutions garnered the highest vote of confidence across the research sample, with 51 percent reporting ‘a great deal’ of confidence in them. A similar level of dissatisfaction with service provision was recorded, with those ‘not at all satisfied’ with job opportunities at 54 percent. For health services, it was at 49 percent; for everyday safety, at 44 percent; and for education opportunities, at 40 percent

(Figure 38). Taken together, these findings strongly suggest patterns of social exclusion and a wider sense of alienation from state duty bearers as key factors shaping the worldview and experience of respondents.


Although ‘age’ did not score highly in response to the question about ‘reason for discrimination’, the overall youthfulness of respondents should be recalled in assessing their bleak perspectives on governance issues. Generational experiences can be deduced as key to understanding drivers of irregular migration, an assessment that chimes with the limited progress in meaningfully including African youth in governance that has been documented elsewhere.⁷⁶ Africa has the youngest population in the world: by 2055, the continent’s youths (those aged 15-24) are expected to be more than double the 2015 total of 226 million.⁷⁷ Yet the continent remains stubbornly inhospitable — politically, economically, socially, and culturally — to young people. Despite gains in key areas such as education for girls, young women face specific obstacles, with gender inequality costing sub-Saharan Africa on average \$95 billion a year.⁷⁸ Today, the median age on the continent is just over 18, but two fifths of its leaders are over 70.⁷⁹ This is the world’s largest age gap between governors and the governed, and it raises concerns about how well decision makers in Africa understand the needs and aspirations of young people. The attitudes of *Scaling Fences*’ respondents reveal perceived barriers to opportunities and inclusion, coupled with a broad sense of alienation, which taken with other factors have spurred the decision to leave.

FIGURE 35 PERCEPTIONS OF TREATMENT BY GOVERNMENT in HOME COUNTRY



Multiple-answer question for ‘Why do you feel your government did not treat you fairly?’ shows percent of individuals who selected reason.

FIGURE 36 **INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL ISSUES/INFLUENCE ON GOVERNMENT** in HOME COUNTRY




Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.

‘I made up my mind because I saw no other way of getting myself, out of a life with no hope or dignity. I felt sad that my country did not provide me, and young people like myself the promise of a brighter future, and I was determined to take matters into my own hands if I wanted to have any kind of future.’


MAN, 28 years old, from Cameroon now living in France

FIGURE 37 **CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS** in HOME COUNTRY



Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.

FIGURE 38 **SATISFACTION WITH SERVICES** in HOME COUNTRY



Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.

2.5 The individual

This chapter has thus far reviewed the range of drivers that have influenced the decision to migrate within the sample and enabled the process. These factors inform an aspirational leap of faith that prompts individuals to take the dramatic step of leaving home for the unknown — a new life in Europe. What emerges is that many Africans may be driven to migrate based on the differences they perceive or imagine between socio-political and economic opportunities in Europe compared to those at home. This observation must be qualified by the fact that only a small number of those who express a desire to migrate actually do so. According to a recent Afrobarometer survey of 34 African countries, approximately a quarter of Africans aged 18-25 years considered emigration ‘a lot’.⁸⁰ Clearly, nothing like this proportion go further towards acting on these thoughts.⁸¹


Theories of migration point to the importance of both capabilities and aspirations in making emigration possible for specific individuals.⁸² While it is well established that people must have the motivation and sufficient financial resources to migrate, psychological resources — mental strength, resilience, and the intellectual capacity to engage in meticulous planning and careful organization — may be just as essential.⁸³ The relevance of the existential, psychological and emotional dimensions of migration is increasingly recognized.⁸⁴

Part of this psychology relates to a sense of adventure or a willingness to take risks. While just 11 percent of respondents selected ‘explore/adventure’ as a primary or secondary reason for departure (Figure 30 above), *all* respondents can be considered *de facto* to have a proven risk-taking attitude by virtue of having undertaken the journey. Personal testimonies and commentary gathered during the research pointed to bravado as well as religious faith as components that moderated respondents’ attitudes to risk. The dangers associated with the journey an irregular migrant takes from Africa to Europe have increased over time, as efforts to stem irregular migration have intensified. However, just over half of respondents had expected to encounter danger during their journey — a seemingly low proportion given the wide coverage by news outlets of the loss of life associated with irregular migration routes (Figure 39). The majority of respondents rated the actual danger experienced greater than the expected level, with 93 percent having reported experiencing danger during the journey to Europe.

‘We spent three days travelling by sea. It was extremely cold, and we had no vests, no blankets and no protection from the extreme weather. We were all hungry with very little food and at one point I believed I would not survive the journey. I would not advise even my worst enemy to take this journey because it’s very difficult and risky. [But] I think back to my journey here sometimes and if I had to, I would do it all over again.’

WOMAN, 33 years old, from Cameroon now living in France

FIGURE 39 EXPECTED AND ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OF DANGER DURING JOURNEY to EUROPE



**‘I did not work [during the journey],
but I had to offer my body to protect
my 10-year-old daughter.’**

WOMAN, 33 years old, from Cameroon
now living in France

A higher proportion of women compared to men underestimated the dangers of the journey — perhaps reflecting gendered inequalities in access to information that have been noted elsewhere.⁸⁵ Anecdotally, researchers heard stories of extortion and harassment from female respondents. The proportion of women who reported actual danger experienced being greater than expected was 12 percent higher than their male counterparts. The high risk of sexual abuse and harassment can be taken as key in explaining this variance. Women and girls as well as children travelling through irregular channels face acute susceptibility to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), perpetrated by smugglers, fellow travellers, detention-centre authorities, and even, on arrival, in host communities.⁸⁶ Sex-trafficking has flourished in the context of legal restrictions on movement and commensurate empowerment of organized criminal networks. Transactional sex also forms part of a larger pattern of sexual abuse and exploitation to which women

and girls are particularly vulnerable when emigrating through irregular channels from Africa to Europe.⁸⁷

While for the most part a picture of close involvement of family members in facilitating migration among respondents emerges from the research, it is also the case that a significant number of respondents reported that they had kept their parents and siblings or close friends in the dark about their plans to migrate. The number of respondents who kept their family in the dark about their plans rose from 28 percent among those who arrived before 2011 to 46 percent among those who arrived after (Figure 40). Taken together with the number of individuals who self-financed their journeys, these findings hint at an emerging trend of more individualized calculation and preparation to emigrate.

The research explored the question of which factors would have changed people’s minds about travelling to Europe. Forty-one percent of respondents said nothing would have done so (Figure 41), while for 24 percent of the respondents ‘improved economic circumstances’ at home might have changed their minds; and for 15 percent ‘improved governance/service provision’. Just 2 percent answered they would have changed their minds ‘if I knew how dangerous the journey would be’ and 1 percent ‘if I knew what living in Europe would be like’.

FIGURE 40 **SUPPORT FOR DECISION TO MIGRATE to EUROPE by YEAR OF ARRIVAL**





FIGURE 41 'WHAT WOULD HAVE MADE YOU CHANGE YOUR MIND ABOUT COMING TO EUROPE?'



In her novel *Americanah*, Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie talks of the 'oppressive lethargy of choicelessness', faced by a generation who are 'eternally convinced that real lives happened somewhere else, and were now resolved to do dangerous things, illegal things, so as to leave, none of them starving, or raped, or from burned villages, but merely hungry for choice and certainty'.⁸⁸ This literary presentation of the contemporary dynamic inspiring some young Africans to emigrate resonates with the picture of composite motivation that emerges from the *Scaling Fences* research. For those individuals who do travel, the perceived opportunity to transform life through emigration to Europe, scaling the fences of constrained aspiration at home, and even the fences erected ever higher against their arrival and that of others to Europe, is the deciding factor — trumping risk and uncertainty.

'When things are not going well, and you feel stuck, you are forced to leave for better opportunities elsewhere, no matter the cost. It's not a matter of choice, it's a matter of survival. In fact, I would rather die trying to find a better life than to stay trapped in a situation that I cannot escape from. That was my life back in Cameroon, one where I felt trapped with no way out. How is that different from being in a prison?'

MAN, 29 years old, from Cameroon now living in France

KEY FINDINGS

Economic motivations, closely tied to self-actualization, were fundamental in driving irregular migration from Africa to Europe among respondents. A total of 81 percent selected ‘work/send money home’ as either the most important or as an additional reason for undertaking the journey. However, only 1 percent selected economic reasons as the sole reason. Chapter 2 confirms the multifaceted reasoning that informs decision-making about migration. Just 6 percent pointed to a single reason overall, while 94 percent chose to select two or more reasons.

At least 40 percent pointed to reasons that were ‘family/friends related’ or ‘personal issues/freedom’. Unpacking what sorts of factors informed these answers sheds further light on gender dynamics. Joining a family member was common among women respondents, with issues such as forced marriage, having an abusive partner, FGM or other forms of sexual abuse, and discrimination based on sexual orientation featuring in their testimonies. The specific restrictions on personal freedom that arise for young women in highly patriarchal environments evidently influenced the decision to emigrate.

Answers to questions on the governance contexts at home in Africa point to a strong sense of identity-based social exclusion and alienation from state duty bearers. Seventy-seven percent of respondents felt their voices to be unheard; 62 percent felt they had been treated unfairly by their government. Disappointment in the quality of service provision was high across all respondents. Above all, the overall youthfulness of respondents confirms significant age-related constraints on opportunity, with young people finding few avenues through which to pursue their aspirations and dreams, or accelerate their own and their families’ prospects within the country contexts. These findings send a strong message to African governments: there is a critical need to build more inclusive societies, including through reducing the continent’s age gap between the governing and the governed.

The high cost of the journey revealed in the data underlines the major investment required, taken as a ratio to earnings. Family involvement in making the journey to

Europe possible is a key enabler, with the notion of migration as a form of investment in diversifying the family income portfolio substantiated by these findings. Fifty-three percent received some form of financial support from family or friends — more so in the case of female respondents who were likely to pay 31 percent more than men, hinting at well-founded anxieties related to the threat of SGBV *en route*. More educated individuals were more likely to receive financial support. The clear policy implications are that focusing exclusively on stemming migration blocks opportunities not only for individual migrants but for their families, curbing vital remittances. Meanwhile, a significant proportion of respondents reported they paid for their own journey, pointing perhaps to mounting individualism in society as well as the prevalence of private creditors.

Ninety-three percent of respondents had experienced dangers during their journey, even though only 56 percent had expected to do so. Nevertheless, just 2 percent said that greater awareness of these risks would have caused them to stay at home. Indeed, despite the risks, 41 percent of respondents said nothing would have changed their minds, while 24 percent said improved economic circumstances and 15 percent indicated improved governance/services provision would have done so. One approach development partners and African governments are using to deter irregular migration is to highlight its perils in public awareness campaigns. Given the seemingly high levels of unawareness regarding the potential dangers of the journey, this appears to be a logical approach. However, these findings question the likely effectiveness. The research confirms the view that migrants are taking a calculated risk, comparing the potential gains and losses of migration with those of staying, given conditions at home. Migration is an investment in a better future, embraced by individuals whose development trajectory is already in ascendance, enabling a radical rejection of the constraining circumstances at home to scale metaphorical fences towards personal fulfilment and better opportunities. The individuals interviewed, as well as in many cases their families, have determined that the potential advantages in reaching Europe far outshines the challenges, or the prospects of the ‘oppressive lethargy of choicelessness’ they perceive as their future at home. Even in hindsight, this appears to hold true despite the spectrum of difficulties experienced on arrival in Europe.



‘It was an unspoken rule in the house that school was out of the question for me. My father said I should focus instead on learning how to care for the house and prepare myself for marriage. I always knew my father was wrong and I longed to attend school and get educated.’

3°52'N 11°31'E to 45°11'N 5°43'E

CAROLE, from Cameroon



SECTION 2 IN EUROPE



‘I have been in The Netherlands without documents for 12 years now. I don’t have the right to work or study, or to proper housing. When I first arrived, I was aspiring to become a footballer or a teacher. But I’ve given up. It’s like I don’t even exist. Everything is impossible if you don’t have papers. You’re just trapped in limbo.’

4°19’S 15°19’E to 52°22’N 4°54’E
ERIC, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo

CHAPTER 3: LIFE ON THE OTHER SIDE

The *Scaling Fences* report now turns to assess the experiences of irregular African migrants once they have reached and are living in Europe. What quality of life awaits those who travel irregularly for reasons other than humanitarian need or protection? How far does the reality match aspiration and expectation when reflected against motivation?

Evidence of the experiences of irregular African migrants once living in Europe is comparatively scarce, perhaps even more so than data examining the drivers of their migration noted earlier. EU and member-state legislation is based on the principle that irregular migrants should be swiftly removed. The reality is that many will stay in Europe for prolonged periods of time, undocumented (or *sans papiers*).⁸⁹ Alongside others who may have originally arrived legally but overstayed, or who have had asylum claims rejected, such individuals often face an existence on the margins and in the shadows, with limited or no rights to access services or employment. This situation brings challenges not only to the individuals concerned but also to host societies on multiple levels.

Chapter 3 explores these issues and other aspects of respondents' reflections on their lives in Europe as revealed through the data. It examines: (i) experiences in the European labour market; (ii) profile of those earning; (iii) return on investment; and (iv) material and psychological well-being.

3.1 Experiences in the European labour market

Despite a growing demand for labour in Europe linked to key factors such as its ageing population,⁹⁰ the number of long-term work permits issued to African labour migrants reduced from 80,000 in 2008 to 20,000 in 2016.⁹¹ These declining numbers can be taken as an indication of a pervasive paradox shaping the labour situation of migrants in general across Europe.⁹² While migrant labour may be needed across a range of sectors, it is often controversial, fuelling divergence between market need and popular discourse.

Migrant workers in EU member states can experience higher rates of unemployment and job insecurity, experience poorer working conditions, and are more likely to be overqualified.⁹³ It has been found that female migrant workers may experience particular challenges and vulnerabilities.⁹⁴ And it has been well documented that Africans can face a particular range of barriers that impede their entry into the European labour market, including racial discrimination.⁹⁵

The circumstances faced by irregular migrants are likely to be especially challenging, with pathways towards legal employment by definition restricted. Vulnerabilities incurred during the dangerous journeys to Europe are often, as a result, perpetuated on arrival. At least until paperwork may be regularized, any income-generating activity they undertake places them into 'irregular worker' status, employed outside the formal employment system defined in many countries by minimum wages, social security and other work-related benefit programmes. Irregular work may be enabled by complicity between employers and workers, or it may entail varying degrees of exploitation and coercion, as in instances of human trafficking. Migrants themselves may opt for or be pushed to engage in illicit activity as a source of income.

Thirty-eight percent of respondents were earning money in European host countries when they were interviewed, with a slightly higher proportion among women than men (Figure 42). This represents about half of the proportion who had cited economic reasons as the primary or an additional reasons motivating them to travel (81 percent in total). The low proportion earning underlines the legal barriers that prevent those who travel irregularly from integrating into labour markets. Overall, 36 percent of respondents had a legal right to work (Figure 43). The regression analysis finds those who had a legal right to work to be 37 percent more likely to be earning in Europe. Focusing just on those earning, a majority had a legal right to work; however, 38 percent were found to be earning without this being in place. The regression analysis finds women, those with tertiary education and those with children in the host country, more likely to be legally allowed to work by 7 percent, 11 percent and 16 percent, respectively.⁹⁶ These findings hint both at the relative success of more educated respondents in establishing themselves, and at relatively more favourable policy environments in Europe for women and children.⁹⁷

FIGURE 42 **EARNING STATUS** in EUROPE





FIGURE 43 **'ARE YOU LEGALLY ALLOWED TO WORK IN [HOST COUNTRY]?'**



The significant percentage of those working without a legal right to do so revealed by this data was further contextualized with anecdotal evidence. While many were involved in ordinary menial types of employment (discussed below), instances of sex work, exploitation by organized criminal groups and engagement in other forms of illicit economic activity as a survival tactic were also mentioned.⁹⁸ The findings point to the overall dearth of legal pathways for irregular African migrants to fulfil their aspirations upon making the journey to Europe. They also suggest the readiness of otherwise ‘regular’ businesses, as well as criminal networks, to absorb their services when regulated labour markets are closed. These experiences among respondents illustrate how current policy frameworks governing migration to Europe from Africa contribute to the creation of a group vulnerable to exploitation and closely enmeshed in destructive socio-economic dynamics.


It is noteworthy that, over time, significant numbers of respondents had succeeded in gaining a legal right to work — despite having arrived (in their own words) for reasons other than humanitarian need or protection. As the most immediately available route towards regularization,

‘It’s very stressful living as an undocumented migrant. At any time, you can be ordered to be deported back to your country. This affects your mental state and your ability to sleep or function in society. As an undocumented migrant, you have a sense of being imprisoned, albeit an open prison. After getting my case approved, I felt free. I felt like the sky was the limit and anything and everything was possible. I felt energized and knew I wanted to keep fighting for others who were in the same position as I had been.’

MAN, 34 years old, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo now living in The Netherlands

the research indicates how the asylum system is becoming burdened, creating incentives for misuse in the current policy context, where there are no alternatives. The data further illustrates that, for many, difficulties in regularizing their status can become long-term, with just over a quarter of those who arrived prior to 2005 reporting they still did not have a legal right to work (Figure 44). Despite the intention to work, not being allowed to do so legally presents barriers that can take years to overcome. Some never succeed.


FIGURE 44 ‘ARE YOU LEGALLY ALLOWED TO WORK IN [HOST COUNTRY]?’ by YEAR OF ARRIVAL




Comparing the types of work undertaken by those earning in Africa with the types of employment available in Europe suggests that — even leaving aside exploitation — the skill sets and potential of irregular African migrants in Europe may be underutilized.⁹⁹ As discussed in Chapter 1, of those working in Africa, a majority were in ‘sales/services’ (30 percent), elementary (or menial) occupations (29 percent), or in craft/related trades (18 percent). In Europe, the proportion of those working in elementary occupations rose to 60 percent of those working, while sales/services sectors dropped to 18 percent (Figure 45). With twice the proportion working in elementary occupations in Europe within the sample than had been in Africa, it is clear that many people had taken lower status jobs in Europe than they had had at home.

Drawing on respondents’ own description of their employment to establish what types of work they were engaged in (among those earning in Europe) reveals that opportunities continued to be proscribed in traditional gender terms on arrival. This is perhaps even more so than at home, at least for women. In Europe, female respondents reported significant increases in occupations such as cleaning, housekeeping, child or elderly care, healthcare, hairdressing as well as sex work (Figure 46). The proportion of male respondents jumped in farming or similar field work, and a significantly larger proportion of men were also found to be in cleaning-related jobs in Europe, whereas this had been at only 1 percent in Africa.

FIGURE 45 **MAIN OCCUPATIONS** at HOME and in EUROPE by GENDER



Classification of occupations provided by respondents were made with reference to the ILO’s international standard classification of occupations. See ILO (2012).

FIGURE 46 **TYPE OF WORK** at HOME and in EUROPE (IN OWN WORDS) by GENDER

Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.

Meanwhile, despite the sharp gender delineation around types of employment, women were earning on average 11 percent more than men in Europe (Figure 47). Compared to the situation at home, which found them earning on average 26 percent less, this is a significant leap, suggesting the young women among respondents have managed to scale specific gender barriers to some extent through the course of migrating (in addition to the ‘fences’ experienced by the whole group). The higher likelihood of women obtaining a legal right to work can be assumed to have directly contributed to this outcome. The regression analysis finds that respondents who were legally allowed to work were earning 79 percent more than those earning without a legal right to do so.¹⁰⁰

Despite the striking gender wage-gap inversion, overall, the average earnings of respondents were low not only when measured against European averages but also considering minimum wages where these exist. This contrasts with the situation at home, where many of the respondents were earning well above the average. Once in Europe, a higher proportion of those who had arrived earlier described their source of earning to be regular, compared to those who arrived more recently (Figure 48). This likely corresponds with progress in obtaining a legal right to work and broader ability to become self-sustaining over time. However, one fifth indicated the reverse, suggesting that a substantial number of employers and other stakeholders in Europe are benefiting from an exploitative shadow labour economy, in which many irregular African migrants find themselves stuck, often for prolonged periods of time.

AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME by REGION OF HOST COUNTRY

FIGURE 47 against HOST COUNTRY REGIONAL AVERAGE and MINIMUM WAGE* and by GENDER





FIGURE 48 ATTRIBUTES OF WORK in EUROPE by YEAR OF ARRIVAL




3.2 Profile of those earning

Respondents earning in Europe also tended to have higher levels of education compared to those not earning. A quarter of those with no education/incomplete primary level all had an income, but this rose to 39 percent each for those with primary and secondary levels; 48 percent for those with tertiary-level education; and 50 percent for those with vocational training (Figure 49). While this left 52 percent of those with a college degree and 50 percent of those with vocational training not earning at the time of interview, this should be seen in the context of the overall irregularity of respondents' status, and still suggests that higher levels of education as well as practical work skills correlate positively with the ability to become self-sustaining. It also indicates the underutilized human and labour potential among the contemporary irregular African migrant population in Europe.

While the regression analysis does not find association between level of education and level of income, it does confirm education to be a statistically significant determinant of the earning status of an individual.¹⁰¹

Along with those who were relatively more educated, a higher proportion of respondents who had been earning at home were also earning in Europe, by 18 percentage points. The regression analysis confirms that earning status before migrating is a statistically significant determinant of earning in Europe, such that those who were earning at home were more likely to be earning in their host country. Those who said their most important reason for coming to Europe was 'work/send money home' were also more likely to be earning in Europe. These findings indicate the focus and drive of this group of respondents, as well as the abilities especially of more educated individuals and those with work backgrounds to establish themselves over time.

EARNING STATUS in EUROPE by HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION
FIGURE 49 ATTAINED and by EARNING STATUS at HOME



'I'm lucky because I had a good level of education and training and have been able to use that to develop myself as a writer and performing artist. I consult for NGOs working on migrant issues and also provide translation services. I spend 3-4 days at the community center creating cultural programmes and activities and talking to migrants and refugees and providing them moral support.'

MAN, 41 years old, from Sudan now living in
The Netherlands

3.3 Return on investment


Despite the vulnerabilities experienced in the European labour market and overall challenges in finding decent work, the commitment to honouring family investment in financing the journey to Europe (for the majority whose families contributed) and expectations of a return on investment (for all, regardless of level of family investment) are clearly refracted in the *Scaling Fences*' findings. Of those who were earning, 78 percent were sending money home: 40 percent of all respondents (Figure 50). Seventeen percent of those not earning were also sending money home: 24 percent of women not earning as compared to 15 percent of men. However, over one third of those who arrived before 2005 were not sending money home. This group also demonstrated an unusually high refusal rate in answering this question, hinting perhaps at discomfort in admitting to not sending money home. As will be discussed, successfully (or not) providing a 'return on investment' had implications for respondents' attitudes to returning home from Europe.

'I have dreams: dreams for myself in Europe and dreams for myself in Africa. But I cannot follow those dreams right now, because my family's needs are immediate and pressing. I must simply work every day and send most of my earnings back.'

MAN, 27 years old, from Mali now living in Spain

Meanwhile, despite falling below minimum wages as shown above, total average earnings as reported in interviews far outstrip average earnings at home in Africa when taken as an aggregate across those with a legal right to work and those without, in different regions, and over different phases of arrival. Among respondents who were earning both in Africa and Europe, average earnings per month in Europe were three

FIGURE 50 **SENDING MONEY HOME** by GENDER and EARNING STATUS in EUROPE and by YEAR OF ARRIVAL



times the value of earnings at home. With an average monthly income of \$1,020 in Europe, respondents who were earning would have been able to recuperate the cost of their journey in a realistic time-frame, taking living expenses into account. Overall, respondents were sending remittances with a value of just under one third of European income, which in real terms represented over 90 percent of their monthly earnings at home (Figure 51). Based on analysis of the purchasing power of remittances, it is possible to extrapolate that, on average, even if real earnings at home were to grow at 3 percent per year, it would take respondents who were earning 40 years to be able to generate an equivalent financial position in their country of origin (Figure 52).¹⁰² At a 5 percent annual real salary growth rate, attaining this position would take 24 years. These

aggregate calculations do not factor in growth in Europe, which would in principle make this gap even wider.

While these calculations are approximate (further analysis comparing purchasing power for migrants is required), they serve to illustrate that the income-diversification strategy represented by investing in the journey to Europe undertaken by respondents (as well as their families in most cases) is manifestly based on sound economic reasoning. For those who succeed, the investment is likely to yield returns in social mobility that are transformative and equivalent to a generational leap into the future, despite all the risks and barriers involved. The implications of this economic perspective for policymakers seeking short-term fixes to irregular migration are significant.

FIGURE 51 **COMPARING MONTHLY INCOME at HOME, in EUROPE and REMITTANCES SENT**





FIGURE 52 **CALCULATING NUMBER OF YEARS TO REACH FINANCIAL POSITION ATTAINED in EUROPE**

To estimate differences in the financial position of respondents in Europe relative to when they were in their home country in Africa, an extrapolation exercise was conducted to estimate the number of years it would have taken for individuals (had they stayed in Africa) to be able to contribute the same real value of current remittances sent home while also maintaining the same ratio between this contribution and total salary in Europe.



3.4 Material and psychological well-being


The marginalization experienced by many irregular migrants in European cities has been documented by rights activists and others, charting a downward spiral of homelessness and vulnerability, and chronic situations of destitution.¹⁰³ Research into the psychological well-being of African migrants in Europe reflects varied experiences. One study that set out to establish whether international migrants increased their own happiness and that of their families by migrating concludes that those who have migrated from sub-Saharan Africa to Western Europe report they are 144 percent happier as a result.¹⁰⁴ Other studies suggest that migrants may have a higher risk of developing mental health issues and suffering from psychological distress.¹⁰⁵ In some countries, research has found that African migrants who reported undergoing relentless job insecurity, discrimination, prejudice, and rejection that is racially motivated experienced high and continued levels of stress.¹⁰⁶

Despite the relative condition of being better off before travelling among respondents, the data suggests the vulnerability associated with the nature of their journey in many cases seems to deepen on arrival in Europe. At its most extreme, the experience of irregular migration to Europe appears to have led to a chronic condition of destitution.¹⁰⁷ Respondents were asked about their experience of four specific measures of deprivation since their arrival. These were ‘gone without enough food’; ‘felt unsafe in accommodation’; ‘gone without

needed medical treatment’; and ‘gone without earning money’. Across respondents, 77 percent had gone without an income; 42 percent had foregone food; 40 percent ‘felt unsafe in home/accommodation’; and 37 percent had ‘gone without needed medical treatment’ (Figure 53). Almost all had been through difficult times, though it is notable that ‘gone without earning money’ featured more prominently among their deprivations. Women appeared to have a somewhat reduced experience across all four specific measures of deprivation as compared to men.¹⁰⁸

Type of accommodation emerged as a key determinant of well-being. At the time of interview, 36 percent of respondents were living in camps/reception centres or other shelters; 28 percent were in privately rented accommodation; 11 percent were homeless; and a further 12 percent were staying with family or friends (Figure 54). A higher proportion of women seemed to be in more settled accommodation. Different types of accommodation were reported across the regions of Europe, with significantly lower proportions living in sheltered accommodation or on the streets in Nordic countries than in Northern or Southern European countries. In terms of quality of housing/accommodation, those living in Nordic countries were better off, with 62 percent privately renting or living with family/friends, compared to 42 percent and 33 percent in host countries in the South or North, respectively. Meanwhile, over half of those who arrived before 2011 were in privately rented apartments or housing, compared to 28 percent of those who arrived between 2011 and 2014 and 17 percent of


FIGURE 53 EXPERIENCE OF DEPRIVATIONS in EUROPE



‘I spent almost four years homeless. I slept outside on park benches during the day and tried to find odd jobs cleaning at night. Most of the time I would roam the streets with nothing to do. Being homeless is one of the worst things that could happen to a human being. It affects you to the core and you lose a bit of your humanity.’

MAN, 41 years old, from Sudan now living in The Netherlands

FIGURE 54 TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION at TIME OF INTERVIEW



Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.


those who arrived between 2015 and 2018. While unsurprising to note that those who had been in Europe longer were more settled, it is significant that similar percentages of those arriving from 2005-10 and those arriving from 2011-14 reported being homeless, at 12 percent and 14 percent, respectively. This stagnation suggests that for a group, the experience of migrating irregularly from Africa to Europe presents long-term, sometimes insurmountable challenges in relation to building a stable life.

Thirteen percent of *Scaling Fences*' respondents reported having been the victim of a crime in the previous six months, with a higher proportion of women compared to men by 5 percentage points (Figure 55). Among these women, 27 percent reported that the nature of the crime was sexual assault, as compared to just 2 percent of men. Elsewhere in the literature, it has been shown that fear of deportation or arrest, language barriers and lack of access to information often prevent women from reporting violence, exploitation and

sexual abuse.¹⁰⁹ Despite doing relatively better compared to men in relation to deprivations, women's vulnerability to sexual and gender-based violence, heightened during the journey to Europe, does not end upon arrival. Among respondents who reported having been a victim of crime over the past six months, the primary type of crime experienced was verbal assault. This can perhaps be inferred to reflect hostility towards migrants among host communities as identified widely in other research.¹¹⁰


Respondents were asked which services they had used or wanted to use within the past six months. Over 60 percent had accessed health services, but far fewer (around a quarter or less) had accessed other services such as legal aid, or advice on housing and employment (Figure 56). When respondents were asked which services they had wanted to use in the past six months, in comparison to those they had used, the major gaps were in housing and employment advice.¹¹¹ Significant numbers also reported service gaps in banking and legal

FIGURE 55 EXPERIENCE OF CRIME in EUROPE by GENDER



Multiple-answer question. Shows percent of individuals who reported experience of type of crime.

FIGURE 56 SERVICES USED IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS by GENDER




Multiple-answer question. Shows percent of individuals who selected service used/wanted to use.

aid. The exclusion from access to key services that would enable migrants to move towards becoming self-sustaining reported in the research serves as a micro-level reflection of the wider European policy environment. It is notable that, again, a higher proportion of female respondents appeared to have been more successful in accessing services including in these areas than men.

Despite the material deprivation and other challenges faced, respondents rated their well-being fairly high. In answer to the question of whether life in Europe was better than, worse than or the same as at home across four categories — financially, socially, emotionally, and in relation to personal security — both male and female respondents reported financial and personal security to be much improved, with more ambivalence on social and emotional considerations (Figure 57).

FIGURE 57 **RATING OF ASPECTS OF WELL-BEING** in EUROPE compared to HOME



Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.

Feelings of loneliness were common among respondents. Overall, a large majority reported feeling lonely and missing home ‘always or sometimes’ — at over three quarters each — as shown in Figure 58. However, significant numbers replied hopefully in answer to the question ‘Overall, are you positive or negative about your future life if you decide to stay in [host country]?’: 77 percent said they were, with minimal differences across those earning and those not earning (Figure 59).

While these questions are essentially abstract, and answers likely to be highly subjective, the simultaneous prevalence of both loneliness and positivity may be explained by reflecting back to respondents’ individual or existential motivations for migrating discussed in Chapter 2. Positivity can be taken as an articulation of hope expressed by a majority despite difficulties faced. It may reflect individuals’ self-actualizing, dramatic and even exhilarating steps on the road to escaping the ‘oppressive lethargy of choicelessness’ towards fulfilling aspirations suggested by responses about motivation. Such attitudes can be taken to contrast with memories and perspectives about life and opportunity at home. This fortitude does not, however, negate day-to-day feelings of loneliness that accompany rupture with the familiar, and exposure to new and often tough environments. These findings are indicative of a willingness to endure hardship (both physical and emotional), with longer term objectives and family commitments in mind.

‘Despite the challenges, I made it alive. I entered Paris via Gare du Nord and when I finally made it to French soil I felt a sense of happiness. I was happy, but more importantly, I was hopeful.’

MAN, 19 years old, from Côte d’Ivoire now living in France

FIGURE 58 EXPERIENCE OF LONELINESS and MISSING HOME





FIGURE 59 'OVERALL, ARE YOU POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE ABOUT YOUR FUTURE LIFE IF YOU DECIDE TO STAY IN [HOST COUNTRY]?'



KEY FINDINGS

Through the prism of *Scaling Fences*' respondents' experiences, Chapter 3 illustrates the stark personal and socio-economic implications of the lack of legal pathways available to this group of migrants in seeking to fulfil their aspirations in making the journey to Europe. While 38 percent of respondents were reportedly earning at the time of interview, 38 percent of these in turn were doing so without a legal right to. The data hints at the readiness of otherwise regular businesses as well as criminal networks to exploitatively absorb the services of irregular migrants when legal channels are closed. At the same time, significant numbers of respondents had succeeded in gaining a legal right to work, despite having travelled, in their own words, for reasons other than humanitarian need or protection. These experiences reflect the way in which the asylum system becomes perhaps the only route available for these migrants where other legal pathways do not exist.

The findings also provide an indication of the focus and drive among many of the respondents, especially the more educated ones and those with work backgrounds, to become self-sustaining over time. A higher percentage of those who had been earning at home as well as those with higher levels of education were found to be earning once in Europe. Nearly twice the proportion of respondents with tertiary and vocational types of education were earning compared to those with no education. At the same time, many of these were not earning at the time of interview. Respondents had also experienced a pronounced degradation of employment profile: the proportion within the cohort employed in elementary (or menial) occupations in Europe as compared to at home in Africa rose from nearly one third to over one half. This points to an underutilized human and labour potential among irregular African migrants in Europe. The data suggests a need for creative policy frameworks that draw migrants' skill sets more productively into the European labour market.

Most of those earning in Europe reported wages well below host country minimum wage thresholds, as well as other types of insecurity associated with work — further highlighting the exploitation contingent on their irregular status. This compares with the situation at home where many were earning well above the average. Still, respondents' commitment to honouring family investment in financing the journey to Europe, and expectations of a return on that investment with prospects of rapid social mobility, is confirmed by the analysis. Of those who were earning, 78 percent were sending money home. Based on analysis of the purchasing power of remittances, as measured against respondents' earnings at home, it could take 40 years to generate an equivalent financial position at home. While these calculations are approximate, they show the income-diversification strategy represented by the investment in supporting the journey to Europe undertaken by respondents and their families is based on sound economic reasoning. For those who succeed, it is likely to yield returns that are transformative and equivalent to a generational leap into the future, despite all the risks and barriers involved. The implications of this economic perspective for policymakers seeking short-term fixes to irregular migration are significant.

Among those who had been in Europe for the longest periods of time, one third reported they were not sending money home. In other cases, the data reveals that, for a significant minority, the vulnerabilities associated with the nature of their journey only deepened on arrival in Europe. The challenges faced in building a stable life seem to have become, for these respondents, insurmountable. Adrift in some of the richest countries in the world, this group are left facing long-term homelessness, hunger and other forms of deprivation.

Overall, respondents reported their well-being, in relation to financial and personal security aspects to be much improved in Europe as compared to at

home, albeit with more ambivalence about social and emotional considerations. Feelings of loneliness and 'missing home' were very common. Even so, a majority of respondents, including those not earning, expressed hope for their future in Europe. The existential commitment and affirmation represented in the act of undertaking the journey are reflected in these findings.

The experiences of female respondents in Europe are striking. Gender differences were pronounced in relation to work opportunities in Europe. However, the gender-wage gap between men and women in Africa resoundingly reverses in Europe, with women earning 11 percent more in Europe, contrasting with previously earning 26 percent less in Africa. Women reported lower levels of deprivation, were more successful in accessing a range of services, and were in more settled accommodation than men among respondents. Higher proportions were sending money home, including among those not earning.

A number of factors from across the data play a role in this relative success of female respondents in building a new life in Europe. These include the reality that more had travelled to be with family and/or with children. Policy environments in Europe may be more disposed to provide for female migrants, especially those with children. Their relatively higher levels of education compared to peers at home also suggests female respondents may be particularly motivated, determined and aware of their personal 'capabilities'. Despite these positives, gender differences were apparent in experiences of crime, with a slightly higher proportion of women falling victim to a crime in the six months prior to interview than men, and significantly more experiencing sexual assault. While female respondents had perhaps jumped the furthest — scaling even higher 'gender fences' of patriarchal norms at home and exploitation during their journeys — their physical vulnerability to abuse continues to form part of their experience on arrival in Europe.



‘I don’t have many complaints about being here. Sometimes I feel accepted and other times I feel like a foreigner. The main issues I have are the barriers to fully integrate into Italian society. But these are all temporary situations. I am destined for greater things in life. And I know I will accomplish my goals.’

6°19'N 5°36'E to 41°54'N 12°30'E

HELEN, from Nigeria



‘Europe is not what I expected. It is plagued by many social challenges. But there are also opportunities. I recently completed vocational training. I speak Spanish and want to study political science. My goal is to return home and get involved in changing conditions, so that other young people do not risk or lose their lives [in a] journey to Europe.’

9°41 N 13°32 W to 40°23 N 3°43 W
ALIOU, from Guinea

CHAPTER 4: ATTITUDES TO RETURN

The attitudes that migrants have towards their eventual return to their home countries is one of the least investigated dimensions of the migration cycle. Economists have focused on the ways in which wage differentials between countries of origin and destination may be critical in determining return movements for some waves of labour migration.¹¹² Others have paid attention to social and institutional conditions in a migrant's country of origin, and how perceptions of these influence migrants' attitudes to return.¹¹³ The decision to return can be spurred on by dense emotional, familial and social ties, and the idea or memory of home, as much as by tangible or material calculations. Some research underlines that family and community expectations related to the gains of migration can significantly shape migrants' attitudes to return. One survey found that the 'success of the migration experience', and the sense of having achieved one's migration goals, significantly shaped 'readiness' to return to one's country of origin.¹¹⁴ An apparent trend of increasing numbers of Africans who have migrated to North America and Western Europe returning to their country of origin to take advantage of new opportunities and growth, bringing with them new skills, networks and perspectives, has also been identified. Such a pattern of return to the continent has been dubbed 'reverse brain drain' or 'brain gain'.¹¹⁵

Data gathered for the *Scaling Fences* report, presented and summarized below, serves to build on and nuance these existing findings on what influences attitudes and intentions to return among this specific group of irregular African migrants.


4.1 Mission accomplished?

A majority of the *Scaling Fences* respondents, at 70 percent, indicated that they wanted to live permanently in Europe, while 15 percent said they did not, and the remaining 15 percent were not sure or did not know (Figure 60). No significant differences across gender were found. Of those who wanted to stay permanently, 36 percent were earning at the time of interview; and 33 percent had a legal right to work. Conversely, a higher percentage of those who did *not* want to stay permanently in Europe were earning at the time of interview compared to those who did want to stay — by 15 percentage points. Fifty-one percent of those who did *not* want to stay permanently had a legal right to work, amounting to 18 percentage points more than those who wished to stay permanently.

The regression analysis confirms a negative and statistically significant relationship, at 11 percent, between willingness to live permanently in Europe and earning in Europe, even after controlling for whether the respondent was legally allowed to work in the host country.¹¹⁶

A higher proportion of those who did not want to live permanently in Europe were sending money home compared to those who expressed a willingness to stay permanently — by 20 percentage points. Among those who expressed a willingness to live permanently in Europe, 82 percent arrived after 2011 compared to 63 percent among those who did not. Social factors in host countries seem to have had limited influence on attitudes to living permanently in Europe. The regression analysis finds that though significant in determining labour-market participation, being a member of a social club did not play a statistically significant role in determining an individual's willingness to live permanently in Europe.


FIGURE 60 'WOULD YOU LIKE TO LIVE PERMANENTLY IN EUROPE?'



Overall, these findings point to the presence of a group within the cohort for whom having ‘made it’ (in terms of legal right to work, actual employment and successfully sending money home) has seemingly yielded a confidence in returning home with a sense of ‘mission accomplished’. Conversely, those who have yet to achieve this stability, whether because more recently arrived or still struggling over several years spent in Europe, are still questioning. These results indicate the voyage to Europe is both a long-term investment and ultimately time-bound for the more successful migrants. They confirm the notion of ‘migration as investment’ discussed above, while suggesting policies that enable circular migration may warrant serious consideration (as discussed in the final section of this report).

Respondents were also asked what stops them from returning home (Figure 61). Thirty-five percent cited reasons related to the wider governance and economic settings in Africa. Twenty-five percent identified a combination of reasons that in one way or another related to not having sufficiently achieved objectives in migrating to Europe, such as not having papers and not having money. An additional 8 percent highlighted ‘family’, which may also relate to not achieving objectives (though it could equally refer to having family in Europe as a reason to stay). Thirty-four percent answered ‘nothing’ prevented them or provided ‘other’ reasons. Based on these answers, it is clear that memories of home and of the very factors that motivated the decision to migrate continue to influence attitudes to staying in Europe. This assessment is further confirmed by the regression analysis, which finds a willingness to live permanently in Europe to be positively associated with those who believe their voices were unheard at home (with reference to respondents’ answer to the question about whether they feel able to influence the government in their home country, discussed in Chapter 2). Accordingly, respondents who felt they had no influence at home were 22 percent more likely to express a willingness to live permanently in Europe compared to those who felt they had a great deal of influence. Far from providing evidence of the ‘reverse brain drain’ documented elsewhere, whereby individuals have been incentivized to return home to contribute to development momentum, these findings suggest that perceptions about the home environment continue to repel those who may otherwise wish to return.

FIGURE 61 **‘WHAT, IF ANYTHING, IS STOPPING YOU FROM GOING BACK TO YOUR HOME COUNTRY IN AFRICA?’**




Multiple-answer question for respondents who did not answer ‘nothing’. Percentages shown for responses other than ‘nothing’ and ‘don’t know’ indicate percent of respondents who selected the response. Aggregate results of the main categories show the percent of people who identified any of the subcategories.

Attitudes towards institutions in Europe appear to inversely reflect the persistent lack of confidence in the quality of life at home. Despite gaps in service provision and experiences of material deprivation noted in Chapter 3, respondents' rating of European institutions was high overall, with religious institutions rated highest with 68 percent stating 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot of' confidence; NGOs at 71 percent; army and police both at around or over 50 percent; national government at 44 percent; and community leaders at 35 percent (Figure 62). By the same token, 42 percent reported low levels of confidence in the national governments of host countries. Comparing confidence in institutions in Europe with those at home, nearly five times as many respondents reported having the highest levels of confidence in the host country's government and police as was the case in relation to government and police at home (see Figure 37 in Chapter 2, p.46). These findings seem as much to reflect a continuing sense of alienation and disaffection with governance systems at home, which was part of the incentive structure motivating departure, as to represent an evidence-based rating of performance in Europe. Indeed, in relation to some institutions in Europe, significant numbers answered 'don't know' as a rating. Nonetheless, even if partially abstract, the perception that European institutions 'work' as compared to those in Africa can be taken as an important feature of respondents' perspective and experience — possibly influencing attitudes to return.

'In Europe, if you have the desire and commitment, you will make it. In Africa, you can have the passion, desire, will, and commitment, but there is no outlet to express yourself. And so I count myself as extremely lucky to be in a society that took a poor, young man from Cameroon and gave him a chance.'

MAN, 29 years old, from Cameroon now living in France

FIGURE 62 **CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS** in EUROPE



Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding off.

FIGURE 63 'IF YOU WENT BACK TO YOUR COUNTRY TOMORROW, WOULD YOUR COMMUNITY BE HAPPY OR UNHAPPY?'



Respondents' willingness to live permanently in Europe was also related to perceptions about home communities' attitudes to their return. Overall, while 46 percent said that their communities would be happy if they returned tomorrow, this number rose to 67 percent among those who were *not* willing to live permanently in Europe, compared to 41 percent among those who were (Figure 63). The regression analysis confirms that those who said their communities would be happy if they were to go back demonstrated less willingness to stay permanently in Europe compared to their peers.¹¹⁷

Perceptions of whether communities would be happy about their return were further influenced by whether respondents were earning and/or sending money home. Among the respondents who were earning, 55 percent said their communities would be happy if they went home, compared to 41 percent among those who were *not* earning. Fifty-nine percent of respondents who were sending money home said their communities would be happy, but this dropped to 38 percent among those who were *not* sending money home.

These findings suggest that attitudes to return are subjectively shaped by anxiety about home communities' perceptions of their success or failure in Europe. The data discussed in Chapter 2 posited migration as a family investment, channelled through individual readiness to take great risks for substantial returns. This same dynamic thus becomes a critical factor in shaping how success and failure are seen in the eyes of migrants and their families.¹¹⁸ Returning home empty-handed is not an option for a significant percentage of respondents. Policies designed to turn people away using a 'deterrence through bad conditions' approach warrant reappraisal in light of this data.

'I stole money from my father's second wife. I would rather die than go back to Guinea.'

MAN, 22 years old, from Guinea now living in Spain

KEY FINDINGS

Irregular migration to Europe from Africa can, for many of the individuals who are willing to absorb the considerable financial and physical risks involved, represent a time-bound effort to achieve a multigenerational leap in social mobility. While 70 percent of respondents indicated they wanted to live permanently in Europe, with no significant differences in percentages across men and women, those who did *not* were more likely to be earning. Higher proportions of those who did *not* want to live permanently in Europe had a legal right to work and were sending money home, compared to those who wanted to. Having ‘made it’ in these terms for this group appears to yield higher confidence and readiness to state a willingness to return home, with ‘mission accomplished’. These attitudes confirm the picture that emerges from the research of an overall mission that is purposeful, tied to opportunity, high-risk, and likely to entail hardship and sacrifice.

Conversely, those who have yet to achieve this stability are still questioning and do not consider giving up on their experience in Europe yet. Perceptions of communities’ attitudes to their return further influence their own attitudes to return: the regression analysis confirms that those who said their communities would be happy if they were to go back demonstrated significantly less willingness to stay permanently in Europe compared to their peers. The shame of returning empty-handed is poignantly revealed: 55 percent of those earning and 59 percent of those who were sending money home perceived their communities would be happy upon their return. This dropped to 41 percent and 38 percent among those who were not earning and not sending money home, respectively. The notion that people will give up and leave as a result of less permissive policy environments in Europe is challenged by these findings: indeed, the reverse is implied. Assisting people to achieve their objectives while contributing legally and at full capacity to the

European labour market may better incentivize them to ultimately return home, while creating win-win outcomes from migration.

Perceptions and memories about life at home once arrived in Europe reflect motivations for leaving, and for 35 percent of respondents continue to represent metaphorical fences against returning. The regression analysis finds those who felt that they had no voice or influence with the government in their home country were significantly more likely to express a willingness to live permanently in Europe. Confidence in European institutions, despite the challenges experienced, was high among respondents, especially compared to confidence in institutions at home in Africa. Five times as many respondents reported having the highest levels of confidence in the governments and police of host countries compared to confidence levels in the governments and police in their home countries. While perhaps abstract, given that respondents may not have had first-hand experience of many of the institutions rated highly (such as the army), these findings suggest a sense of alienation from duty bearers and life at home that endures on arrival in Europe. Far from providing evidence of the ‘reverse brain drain’ documented elsewhere, whereby individuals return home to contribute to development momentum, the research indicates a need for new efforts to create such incentives in Africa for young citizens. This is a critical dimension of responding to irregular migration now and in the future.

**THE SHAME OF RETURNING EMPTY-HANDED IS
POIGNANTLY REVEALED [...]**

**THE NOTION THAT PEOPLE WILL GIVE UP AND
LEAVE AS A RESULT OF LESS PERMISSIVE POLICY
ENVIRONMENTS IN EUROPE IS CHALLENGED
BY THESE FINDINGS: INDEED, THE REVERSE IS
IMPLIED. ASSISTING PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE THEIR
OBJECTIVES WHILE CONTRIBUTING LEGALLY AND
AT FULL CAPACITY TO THE EUROPEAN LABOUR
MARKET MAY BETTER INCENTIVIZE THEM TO
ULTIMATELY RETURN HOME, WHILE CREATING
WIN-WIN OUTCOMES FROM MIGRATION.**

37°15'N 7°12'W
MIGRANT SETTLEMENT
Lepe, Spain





SCALING FENCES: SNAPSHOT

93% EXPERIENCED DANGER DURING THE JOURNEY

ONLY 2% SAID PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF THIS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THEM FROM TRAVELLING 41% SAID NOTHING WOULD HAVE CHANGED THEIR MIND

**24
AVERAGE
AGE** AT TIME
OF TRAVEL
TO EUROPE

85%
COME FROM
**URBAN
ENVIRONMENTS**
ALMOST TWICE
THE AFRICAN
AVERAGE

RESPONDENTS
COME FROM AN
AVERAGE
HOUSEHOLD
SIZE OF 10 TWICE THE
AFRICAN AVERAGE

57%
HAD AT LEAST
SECONDARY
EDUCATION
BEFORE DEPARTURE

3 TO 5 YEARS MORE
SCHOOLING THAN
PEERS AT HOME

**77% FELT THEIR
VOICE WAS
UNHEARD
BY GOVERNMENT**

84% HAD LOW
LEVELS OF
CONFIDENCE
IN NATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS

1/2 OF
RESPONDENTS
**LEFT
DESPITE
HAVING
A JOB**

FOR 66% EARNING,
OR THE PROSPECT OF
EARNING AT HOME, WAS
NOT A CONSTRAINING
FACTOR IN THE
DECISION TO LEAVE
BUT 81% CITED
'WORK/SEND
MONEY HOME'
AS A REASON FOR
MIGRATING

IRREGULAR
MIGRATION CAN BE
**A FAMILY
INVESTMENT**

53% RECEIVED FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FOR THE COST
OF THE JOURNEY FROM
FAMILY OR FRIENDS

○ EUROPE

38% OF
RESPONDENTS ARE
**EARNING
IN EUROPE**
OF THOSE, 38% DO
SO WITHOUT A LEGAL
RIGHT TO WORK

78% OF THOSE
EARNING IN EUROPE
**SEND
MONEY
HOME**
REMITTANCES
REPRESENT OVER
90% OF REAL INCOME
AT HOME FOR THOSE
WHO WERE WORKING

**WOMEN
EARNED**
26% LESS THEN
MEN IN AFRICA
BUT 11% MORE
WHEN IN EUROPE

○ 77% FEEL

POSITIVE
ABOUT THEIR FUTURE
IN EUROPE DESPITE
DEPRIVATION AND
LONELINESS

○ 11% ARE

HOMELESS
42% HAD FOREGONE FOOD
77% HAD GONE WITHOUT
INCOME

○ MORE OF THOSE EARNING,
SENDING MONEY
HOME, AND WITH A
LEGAL RIGHT TO WORK

**ARE WILLING
TO LEAVE
EUROPE**

○ A DEVELOPMENT
DEFICIT IN AFRICA
**MOTIVATES
PEOPLE TO
MIGRATE** IT ALSO
PREVENTS THEM FROM
RETURNING. 35% CITED
CONDITIONS AT HOME AS
BARRIERS TO THEIR RETURN.

SECTION 3

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PROGRAMMING

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PROGRAMMING

The *Scaling Fences* study has gathered and analysed the experiences and perspectives of migrants who travelled irregularly to Europe in search of something better and offers these as a contribution to ensuring the responses of all stakeholders are more firmly grounded in evidence. The research has found that, while far from elite in status at home, respondents had manifestly benefited from development progress in Africa in recent decades. They were relatively well off compared to peers at home, with above average earnings and education levels, and their life stories had been shaped by macro-level development trends, including spatial patterns in economic growth, urbanization and migration itself. It appears that for these individuals the capacity to migrate and an appetite for greater opportunity, as well as a sense that aspirations would not be met at home, have been sharpened by improving development contexts.

Barriers to opportunity — or ‘choicelessness’ — emerge from this study as critical factors informing the calculation of these young people. In other words, their migration serves as clear evidence, first, that development is taking place in Africa and, second, that it is not happening fast enough, with gains that are uneven and limiting. The data confirms the thesis proposed elsewhere that migration is a reverberation of development progress. It has expanded our understanding of the relevance of this perspective to a new class of traveller.

Africa is losing substantial numbers among its most aspirational. Those leaving, collectively, and paradoxically, represent the positive story of development gains on the continent. While numbers of irregular migrants arriving from Africa in Europe have reduced recently, geographic proximity and demographic imbalances, combined with fundamental factors related to the structure of Africa’s economies and wider governance contexts, must serve to caution against any assumptions this reduction will be sustained long term. Above all, Africa’s development journey itself must be understood as likely to lead to the continued expansion of migration. Based on global evidence, most African countries are just entering the stages of growth and development at which emigration begins to intensify.¹¹⁹ The notion that migration

‘Many of our brothers and sisters died trying to come here. For what? We are losing our best and brightest, able young men and women, to the Mediterranean Sea [...] and to European countries where their talents are being wasted. How can we say Africa is a continent of young people and young people are the future when we are losing so many of them?’

MAN, 35 years old, from Togo now living in Spain

can be prevented or significantly reduced through programmatic and policy responses designed to stop it is dampened by an appreciation of the migration-development dynamic.

**AFRICA IS LOSING SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS
AMONG ITS MOST ASPIRATIONAL. THOSE
LEAVING, COLLECTIVELY, AND PARADOXICALLY,
REPRESENT THE POSITIVE STORY OF
DEVELOPMENT GAINS ON THE CONTINENT.**

A wave of domestic, regional and global instruments and interventions has come into force over the past few years, responding to the perceived ‘migration crisis’ by seeking to reduce irregular migration from Africa to Europe.¹²⁰ The African Union, Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the EU and its member states are all actively engaged in this search for solutions. The evidence presented in this report provides an opportunity to fact-check these responses through the prism of the voices of the irregular migrants interviewed.

There are two broad axes that characterize the thrust of migration policy and programming today. International development funding has been channelled towards reducing irregular migration through the control of external EU borders. The intention is to turn away or discourage irregular migrants before they reach the Mediterranean while also cracking down on smuggling. Human rights commitments have been at risk of violation, with harmful consequences in countries of origin, on transit routes and in Europe.¹²¹ Most recently, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights gave evidence criticizing the practice of supporting the Libyan Coast Guard despite mounting evidence of egregious human rights abuses, rape and torture on Libyan soil. He called on all European states to ensure human rights due diligence in interventions designed to stem migration.¹²²

Development funds have also been leveraged to secure commitments to concrete outcomes in the return and readmission of migrants. Others have been directed towards programmes designed to deter and disincentivize would-be migrants, with a particular emphasis on tackling ‘root causes’, employment creation and awareness-raising.¹²³ But a straightforward assumption that job creation will curb the will to migrate is challenged by the two thirds of *Scaling Fences* respondents whose decision to leave was not affected either by the fact they were earning or a prospect of earning at home. The high risk/high return on investment that is a function of economic disparities between Europe and Africa

raises further questions as to the efficacy of these interventions. Similarly, the fact that only 1 to 2 percent of respondents said they would have made a different decision about migrating if they had known more about the risks of the journey or what life was like in Europe clearly signals that interventions focused at this level may fall short. Instead of enabling choices at home, the effects of these interventions may be to wall ambition.

A STRAIGHTFORWARD ASSUMPTION THAT JOB CREATION WILL CURB THE WILL TO MIGRATE IS CHALLENGED BY THE TWO THIRDS OF *SCALING FENCES*' RESPONDENTS WHOSE DECISION TO LEAVE WAS NOT AFFECTED EITHER BY THE FACT THEY WERE EARNING OR A PROSPECT OF EARNING AT HOME.

The data challenges the feasibility of blunt deterrence and prevention-focused interventions, suggesting a need for policymakers to reassess approaches. The instrumentalization of international development assistance for what are in effect political objectives cannot realistically be expected to have a long-term impact on the drivers of irregular African migration. Further, they curtail critical and targeted remittances that taken as a whole far exceed overseas development assistance as a source of finance for development. And current approaches send a false signal to European electorates that such strategies will work in the long run. Reframing policy and programmatic responses to irregular migration in light of its structural relationship to improving development outcomes in Africa needs to take place. Ensuring rights-based approaches and 'do no harm' accountability at the fore of cooperation is also key.

The limitations of European policy responses to irregular migration reflect the fact that policymakers have become ever more constrained from a political perspective. Translation of global norms, such as those enshrined in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, into domestic member state arenas is far from straightforward. While understood to serve short-term political objectives in this context, the 'deterrence through bad conditions' approach that has increasingly come to characterize European member states' responses to irregular migrants arriving in their countries directly aggravates populist anxiety and political volatility. It leaves a visibly dispossessed group of ethnically 'other' individuals stuck in limbo in the parks and squares of European towns and cities, around whom it is easy, if simplistic, to project fears and

hostile narratives. Given both the incentives for coming to Europe and the barriers to return highlighted by this data, such individuals are, in effect, trapped. The presence of undocumented irregular migrants pushed into long-term legal limbo feeds a negative cycle of public anxiety and inflammatory discourse. Destructive socio-political dynamics fuelled by voter concern about irregular migration are growing yearly — and can be expected to continue to do so. Indeed, polarization on these issues among European governments at the level of the EU has been at times another contributing factor to political deadlock.¹²⁴

The case for new approaches that will move more progressively towards implementation of international commitments is clear. Forward-looking policies that are attuned to different scenarios, including those that foresee the number of people travelling increase substantially in the years and decades to come, are urgently required. Failure to advance new systemic approaches to migration can only rebound, with 'ungoverned' irregular migration leading directly to destabilizing political consequences. A clear-eyed and coherent set of strategies for governing irregular migration must be identified: to limit its pernicious effects; to yield gains for migrants as well as the families and countries they have left behind; and to benefit the economies and societies in which these individuals are seeking to build new lives. The human development lens on migration put forward by this report encourages a broader perspective, and UNDP firmly believes such win-win solutions are attainable. However, they require political courage in both Africa and Europe.

FAILURE TO ADVANCE NEW SYSTEMIC APPROACHES TO MIGRATION CAN ONLY REBOUND, WITH 'UNGOVERNED' IRREGULAR MIGRATION LEADING DIRECTLY TO DESTABILIZING POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.

This report will now turn to proposing priorities for responding to irregular African migration to Europe that are suggested by the *Scaling Fences*' data, emphasizing sustainable solutions that more constructively respond to the underlying drivers, motivations and wider dynamics at play. The following reflections are intended to support policymakers in their continued efforts to balance short-term responses to the challenging impacts of irregular migration with long-term policy objectives. Recommendations are firmly

anchored in the voices of those interviewed for this study; they are also intended to provide pathways towards implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Recommendations are clustered in three sets of priorities: (i) transformative development: expanding opportunities and choice in Africa; (ii) from 'ungoverned' to 'governed' migration; and (iii) building a new discourse on migration in Europe.

(i) Transformative development: expanding opportunities and choice in Africa

The profile of those interviewed for this research suggests that African governments must reorient themselves more competitively in creating incentives for young people to fulfil their aspirations closer to home. They must, in brief, positively signal new directions and opportunities. Indeed, the voices of the 1,970 irregular African migrants analysed for this study can be taken as a collective plea to their governments to set the level of creativity, ambition and pace of Africa's economic transformation and socio-political development higher. The time-frame for delivering such outcomes may be long-term. However, producing substantive evidence and reassurance that deeper structural transformation in relation to economic opportunities and governance contexts is emerging may reorient some young people who otherwise view emigration as the only route to social mobility. Such indicators of change can serve to incentivize and invite young Africans to 'be part of the change they want to see'.¹²⁵ Answers to questions in the *Scaling Fences* research about what would have motivated respondents to stay, and what prevents them from going back, indicate a potential to re-engineer personal motivation among this type of migrant, based on improved confidence in Africa's trajectory as it may affect them and their families.

Responding to irregular migration requires African governments to demonstrably take steps towards building societies that attract young Africans to channel their energies and aspirations into the national development project. In the long term, these same societies must accelerate progress towards structural transformation. For international partners, this means ensuring that international development funds are spent on fundamental priorities and not diverted to a search for envisaged quick fixes for migration through deterrence and prevention. It requires enhanced consistency across different domains of policy engagement with Africa. Ensuring the partnership that exists between Africa and Europe evolves to meet the challenges of today is therefore key.

Specific priorities include:

- **Engaging young people in shaping the future.** Tackling stifling and gerontocratic systems in Africa is critical. The present-day, multifaceted exclusion of its youthful majority imposes barriers to personal fulfilment while stalling development. Achieving the necessary shifts requires a whole-of-society effort, among duty bearers in government as well as society at large, to advance meaningful engagement and equality of opportunity for the continent's youth. The wide age gap between Africa's young majority and their leaders needs to close. Progress in this direction would signal a new direction of travel that will incentivize youth engagement in transformative development. Responsiveness to the priorities of young citizens can help build a demographic dividend, buoyed by a sense of momentum, whereby young people's participation, influence and engagement will be unleashed, and confidence in their future at home restored. Enhanced and equitable service provision combined with concerted efforts to tackle discrimination must also be at the core of this agenda. Further, the need to intensify efforts to tackle patriarchal practices at all levels, even among countries that are front-runners in advancing gender parity, are re-emphasized by the research, which identified a particularly tenacious subgroup of young women among respondents.
- **Building inclusive economies.** This report has confirmed that migration is a reverberation of development, but of development that is uneven and with gains that are perceived to be limiting. Enhancing the availability and quality of economic opportunities and ensuring that Africa's growth is job-rich and benefits a majority, offering the prospect of wealth creation at different levels of the economy, is a key priority asserted by the research. Many respondents were earning competitively relative to averages at home but 'not enough' and 'not enough to save'. The transformative economic leap represented for those earning in Europe sets a high watermark. Investing in domestic value-addition manufacturing, upgrading infrastructure, providing access to markets, enabling environments for entrepreneurs and small businesses, and otherwise generating opportunities for young people to save are all steps to be taken with greater purpose. A specific focus on implementing policies to build economic inclusion and regeneration in cities is needed, noting the urbanite profile of the majority of *Scaling Fences*' respondents.¹²⁶

- **Tackling external constraints to structural transformation.** While the onus is on African states to orchestrate their own structural transformation, relationships with regional and international partners can both help and hinder. Unequal and constrained trade relations feed global, regional and national inequality, and slow the pace of distribution of economic opportunities. At the regional and international level, much needs to be done to intensify progress towards intra-African free trade as signalled by the signing in 2018 of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area Agreement. The goal must be to further expand regional economic opportunities for citizens and new labour-market entrants, and to intensify intra-African migration, including through investing in mapping out and facilitating labour exchanges bilaterally and subregionally. Further afield, reframing wider trade relationships that exist between Africa and Europe and other leading international partners has long been recognized to promise exponential gains in development terms.¹²⁷ Opening up European and other global markets to African goods and actively incentivizing domestic value-addition to primary commodities in Africa would bring material benefits through diversifying economic opportunity.¹²⁸ Additionally, this agenda calls for consistency, including support for the types of governance structures that will facilitate broad-based development outcomes. In other words, ensuring the socio-political dimensions of the required transformation are facilitated (and not stymied) is as important as reframing economic relationships. Curtailing and repatriating illicit financial flows are no less critical. International development-partner contributions must be reoriented to assist with strategic priorities that will holistically deliver the kind of accelerated structural, political, economic, and social transformation discussed above. The goal must be expansion, not the restriction of choice or opportunity.

(ii) From 'ungoverned' to 'governed' migration

The readiness of the European labour market to absorb irregular and cheap migrant labour, as indicated by the data, belies the tough stance projected in domestic politics. Meanwhile, the volume of remittances from Europe to Africa creates its own compelling incentive structures. The Africa-Europe partnership requires reframing to directly respond to these realities. Around the world, labour mobility agreements that allow businesses to supplement their seasonal and long-term needs in industries where domestic labour supply is not sufficient are already in

place. Such agreements not only benefit domestic industries but also allow migrant workers to gain skills and experiences not available in their home countries, and to earn higher incomes while sending valuable remittances to family left behind.¹²⁹

The desirability of expanding legal pathways for migration is asserted both in the Global Compact and the Joint Valletta Action Plan.¹³⁰ Despite these established policy directions, political expediency in exploring new regulations that respond to irregular migration to Europe is clearly limited at the present time — at least from a European perspective.¹³¹ However, an evidence-based outlook informed by the *Scaling Fences* research posits the need for progress in identifying such legal pathways for the large number of people determined to travel in search of a brighter future. Policymakers would be well advised to orient themselves in this direction. Ensuring irregular migrants who have already arrived in Europe are able to access safe and productive livelihoods can help mitigate social and political fallout, rather than the reverse, demonstrating that governments are in control. The creation of expanded legal pathways would effectively enable the global system to catch up with reality, pulling policy frameworks firmly into the 21st century.

Specific priorities include:

- **Facilitate circular migration between European and African countries.** A new generation of expanded legal pathways articulated in bilateral or regional agreements is needed. These must be predicated on what the research has suggested to be, for those who are most successful, a circular migration process of arrival in Europe and eventual return home again after a period of income generation shared as remittances. Analysis of, and reflection on, the sectors where shortages are currently experienced and likely to expand — including looking ahead at the changing nature of work given ageing populations and other factors — should inform such agreements, to ensure they are market-based and can be readily communicated as such. These agreements should be both human rights-based and gender-sensitive, drawing on relevant ILO standards, guidelines and principles.¹³² Such a regularized, rotating supply of labour in the context of recognized shortages would have additional advantages in curtailing the shadow economy and exploitation that currently thrives through lack of regulation. Communicated widely, in Africa and in Europe, these new frameworks would signal a new era of cooperation on the issue. Investing in the safe return of

those who fall outside of these agreements, with the full support of governments at both ends of the journey, could be improved through such frameworks, bringing multiple benefits to all involved.

- **Establish pathways to regularization for irregular African migrants who are already in Europe.** The rights and needs of those already living undocumented in Europe require urgent attention even as long-term cooperation frameworks are being worked out. Migrants who do not successfully claim asylum and who are not returned on arrival should be provided with a way out of deprivation and homelessness, including through schemes that allow them the right to work and access to services that match their needs.¹³³ Providing opportunities for individuals to escape the confines of the shadow economy can guard against abuse and exploitation, and narrow the space for criminality.¹³⁴ In addition, formalizing these workers would increase the tax revenue of governments. Visibly ensuring migrants' contributions to host societies could help build bridges and confidence within them.

(iii) Building a new discourse on migration in Europe

It has been increasingly recognized that globalization and economic growth in recent decades have in many respects failed to yield inclusive opportunities in the world's wealthier nations. Divisions along socio-economic lines and geographic areas within countries — including the alienation of many citizens from the political centre — have been exposed across Europe, particularly since the global financial crisis of 2008. Paradoxically, such alienation resonates among *Scaling Fences'* respondents in relation to their own lack of participation and inclusion at home. The concerns of some citizens at the apparent loss of control of borders signalled by the 'migration crisis'; at shifting national identities and cultural change; and at other perceived threats can be seen against this backdrop. At the same time, it is instructive to recall that while anxiety about migration has served to inflame far-right politics, other empathetic perspectives have been in evidence across Europe. The voices of NGOs, civic associations and movements that have emerged to support migrants and refugees are often marginalized in the public space.

Democratic engagement in shaping policy approaches to migration based on meaningful discussion with citizens can chart a course that defines the types of migration that may be needed to support European societies now and in the future.

Such engagement can help manage the concerns and anxieties that for many are associated with demographic change and the visible turbulence created by current policy gaps. A stepwise shift in the discourse about irregular African migration to Europe (and about migration in general) is a necessary component of advancing new approaches to governing it.

Specific priorities include:

- **Public engagement defining a new discourse on migration.** European citizens have a right to accurate information about the wider context of global migration trends. Dimensions that are frequently overlooked, and which emerge from this study as needing closer examination, include changing labour-market needs in Europe; information on the lived experiences of individuals on the move; the measured effects of different types of migration policies; and the historical and contemporary ties that often link a host country to migrants' origin country. Widespread and purposefully accessible dissemination of information on these aspects of migration would help citizens make informed judgements on the type of migration that will serve their country best, achieving real democratic ownership over policy outcomes. At the same time, mechanisms to hold accountable those who disseminate hate speech and false information should be strengthened — in line with the actions agreed in Objective 17 of the Global Compact. While the issue of migration will likely remain highly political for years to come, balance must be injected if the issue is not to be permanently cornered in sharply drawn positions. Policymakers should invest in creating platforms for engagement among citizens and between citizens, authorities, politicians, civil society, the research community, media, and migrants themselves. Spaces are needed for citizens of all backgrounds to discuss their perspectives on the issues and interact with one another outside of polarized media platforms. A continuous and dynamic feedback loop between stakeholders working collectively towards mutually satisfactory strategies will help to build a more constructive conversation. Responsiveness to the spectrum of citizens' views arising from such new engagement strategies is urgently required; one that is equally predicated on the evidence such as that presented in this report concerning the actual dynamics of migration to Europe.



ANNEXES

ANNEX 1**OVERVIEW OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING
MIGRATION FROM AFRICA TO EUROPE****Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: Objectives**

- (1) Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies
- (2) Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin
- (3) Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration
- (4) Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation
- (5) Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration
- (6) Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work
- (7) Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration
- (8) Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants
- (9) Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants
- (10) Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration
- (11) Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner
- (12) Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral
- (13) Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives
- (14) Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle
- (15) Provide access to basic services for migrants
- (16) Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion
- (17) Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration
- (18) Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences
- (19) Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries
- (20) Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants
- (21) Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration
- (22) Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits
- (23) Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration.

Source: UN General Assembly (2019). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2018: Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

ANNEX 2

REGRESSION ANALYSIS

A multivariate regression analysis (i.e., controlling for standard characteristics) of the irregular migration process between Africa and Europe for the 1,970 respondents in the *Scaling Fences*’ dataset was conducted. In doing so, perspectives of both origin and destination countries were employed to explore different features of the irregular migration process between Africa and Europe, and to identify whether systematic differences existed among respondents with respect to six outcome variables.

It is worth recalling that the sample consisted of 1,970 adult African migrants (18 years of age or older) who used an irregular route to come to Europe and had been in Europe for at least six months at the time of interview. Respondents’ primary motivation, in their own words, was development related.

Empirical analysis

The regressions were estimated using either ordinary least squares or a linear probability model, depending on whether the dependent variable was continuous or binary, respectively. Each outcome variable is estimated as follows:

$$Y_{icd} = a + bX_{icd} + u_c + v_d + e_{icd}$$

where Y_{icd} is the outcome variable pertaining to the migrant i from country c , at destination d , while X_{icd} are individual-level characteristics and socio-economic factors. u_c and v_d are origin-country (country of birth) and host-country fixed effects, respectively, which control for all aggregate-level characteristics that vary across origin and destination countries. All models include country-of-origin and country-of-destination fixed effects in order to absorb all variation that is common to individuals who come from the same country. In particular, origin-country fixed effects control for aggregate (long-term) migration push factors such as population size, the level of development or other socio-economic factors (the reference category here is Nigeria). Destination-country fixed effects control for host countries’ migrant reception systems and aggregate socio-economic factors in a receiving country (the reference category here is Italy). In addition, point-of-departure (i.e., the last countries migrants were in before leaving Africa, whereby the reference category is ‘other’) and point-of-arrival (i.e., the first countries they arrived at in Europe, whereby the reference category is Italy) fixed effects are included in one of the specifications of each model to control for variations that may exist among respondents depending on the route of travel. Robustness checks were conducted by running the same specifications

of each model controlling for country-of-origin (where respondents grew up) instead of country-of-birth fixed effects. Results are fully consistent with those presented in this report.

Regressors in X_{icd} include individual-level demographics and socio-economic characteristics at origin; all models include them as standard controls. In particular, the standard demographic controls are gender; age; age squared; highest level of education attained (reference category is no education/incomplete primary level); marital status before travelling to Europe; whether the individual had a family member who had previously migrated to Europe; whether the individual's children were living with him or her in the host country; number of siblings; birth order; whether the individual grew up in a rural or urban area; and time since arrival in Europe (in months).

Moreover, the models include standard controls for the way respondents were found, whether through NGOs/local partners, other respondents, or in public spaces (reference category is NGO/local partner), and for features of their migration process such as whether they arrived by sea or land (reference category is plane).

In different specifications, and depending on the specific empirical model, additional controls were included. All regressors included in each model can be found in the results tables, along with results of its associated impact for each specification.

Model specifications

Model 1: Cost of the journey to Europe

Model 1 explores the determinants of the self-reported migration cost to journey to Europe irregularly. The cost is expressed in logarithm form, and this is used in the model as a proxy for the fee that the *Scaling Fences*' respondents reported paying to smugglers.

Model 2: Migration as a form of investment

Model 2 explores the migration process from an investment angle by focusing on the systematic differences between respondents who reported receiving financial support for their journey to Europe, either from family or friends. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual received support and 0 otherwise.

Model 3: Determinants of participation in the host country's labour market

Model 3 is a series of models intended to analyse the main determinants of participation in the labour market in the host country. In particular, Model 3.1 explores the determinants of being legally allowed to work in the host country. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual is legally allowed to work in the host country and 0 otherwise. Model 3.2 explores the differences between those who are earning (whether allowed to work legally or not) and not earning in the host country (extensive margin). The dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual is earning and 0 otherwise. Model 3.3 explores the intensive margin among those earning in the host country using the level of (log) earnings as a dependent variable.

Model 4: Attitudes to return

Model 4 attempts to understand the respondents' attitudes to return by exploring whether systematic differences exist between those who are willing to live permanently in Europe and those who are not. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual is willing to live permanently in Europe and 0 otherwise (those who are either not willing to live permanently in Europe or are not sure/depends).

REGRESSION RESULTS

p<0.01

p<0.05

p<0.1

MODEL 1

Dependent variable: (log) cost of journey to Europe

VARIABLES

Gender: 1 = female, 0 = male

Age

Age squared

Highest level of education attained = primary
(reference category = no education/less than primary)Highest level of education attained = secondary
(reference category = no education/less than primary)Highest level of education attained = tertiary
(reference category = no education/less than primary)

Marital status: 1 = married, 0 = single or not married

Family member in Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise

Children in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise

Number of siblings

Birth order among siblings

Where respondent grew up: 1 = rural, 0 = urban

Time since arrival to Europe (in months)

Rating of security at home: 1 = insecure, 0 = secure

Time to prepare for the journey to Europe: 0 = few days, 1 = a few weeks,
2 = a few months, 3 = one or two years, 4 = more than two yearsRespondent attempted to use level means to travel to Europe previously:
1 = yes, 0 = otherwise

Mode of arrival to Europe = land (reference category = sea)

Mode of arrival to Europe = plane (reference category = sea)

How respondent was found = public place (reference category =
NGO/partner organization)

How respondent was found = other (reference category = NGO/partner organization)

How respondent was found = recommended by other respondents
(reference category = NGO/partner organization)Work/send money home as most important reason for coming to Europe:
1 = yes, 0 = otherwise

Earning before departure for Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise

Worked during journey to Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise

Number of weeks worked during journey to Europe

Rating of actual riskiness of journey = quite dangerous (reference category
= very dangerous)Rating of actual riskiness of journey = not very dangerous (reference category
= very dangerous)Rating of actual riskiness of journey = not at all dangerous (reference category
= very dangerous)Rating of expected riskiness of journey = quite dangerous (reference category
= very dangerous)Rating of expected riskiness of journey = not very dangerous (reference category
= very dangerous)Rating of expected riskiness of journey = not at all dangerous (reference category
= very dangerous)

Country-of-birth fixed effects

0.365	0.422	0.374	0.381	0.407	0.332	0.311
0.113	0.108	0.114	0.114	0.111	0.115	0.094
-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
0.061	0.138	0.056	0.073	0.062	0.059	0.092
0.296	0.407	0.294	0.289	0.288	0.277	0.264
0.396	0.490	0.392	0.413	0.409	0.397	0.390
-0.115	-0.081	-0.117	-0.121	-0.132	-0.117	-0.119
0.050	-0.013	0.045	0.034	0.044	0.059	0.065
0.164	0.225	0.159	0.150	0.151	0.194	0.177
-0.000	0.016	-0.000	0.000	-0.002	-0.004	0.000
0.004	-0.005	0.003	-0.000	0.001	0.008	0.007
0.160	0.141	0.157	0.183	0.185	0.206	0.127
-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
0.030	0.082	0.031	0.048	0.036	0.028	-0.002
0.051	0.058	0.048	0.054	0.042	0.046	0.049
-0.035	-0.008	-0.030	-0.024	-0.009	-0.014	-0.042
-0.009	0.017	-0.012	0.017	0.011	-0.017	-0.093
1.498	1.235	1.497	1.477	1.505	2.230	1.526
0.057	0.002	0.064	0.076	0.071	0.070	0.070
0.218	0.171	0.214	0.265	0.249	0.227	0.267
0.099	0.228	0.098	0.080	0.080	0.117	0.122
-0.092	-0.097	-0.095	-0.082	-0.084	-0.081	-0.094
		0.022				
			-0.105			
				0.002		
					-0.143	
					0.033	
					-0.174	
						-0.059
						-0.069
						0.026
YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

MODEL 1

Dependent variable: (log) cost of journey to Europe

Host-country fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-of-departure fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Country-of-first arrival fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Constant	4.977	4.568	4.963	4.975	4.994	4.906	5.376
Observations	898	914	893	867	869	885	860
R-squared	0.347	0.221	0.348	0.351	0.351	0.353	0.365

MODEL 2.1

Dependent variable: financial support of cost of journey (1 = received support, 0 = otherwise)

VARIABLES

Gender: 1 = female, 0 = male	0.133	0.221	0.133	0.118	0.126	0.129
Age	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.018	0.010	0.006
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Highest level of education attained = primary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.039	0.133	0.041	0.049	0.033	0.043
Highest level of education attained = secondary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.103	0.222	0.108	0.105	0.101	0.116
Highest level of education attained = tertiary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.072	0.170	0.074	0.073	0.079	0.073
Marital status: 1 = married, 0 = single or not married	0.004	-0.006	-0.002	0.013	0.022	0.013
Family member in Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.127	0.122	0.129	0.128	0.135	0.128
Children in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.023	0.011	-0.021	-0.022	-0.027	-0.034
Number of siblings	0.007	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.008	0.006
Birth order among siblings	-0.005	-0.010	-0.006	-0.003	-0.007	-0.003
Time since arrival in Europe (in months)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Rating of security at home: 1 = insecure, 0 = secure	0.036	0.088	0.035	0.023	0.036	0.036
Time to prepare for the journey to Europe: 0 = few days, 1 = a few weeks, 2 = a few months, 3 = one or two years, 4 = more than two years	-0.011	-0.003	-0.011	-0.010	-0.012	-0.013
Respondent attempted to use level means to travel to Europe previously: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.042	0.035	0.048	0.045	0.045	0.036
Mode of arrival to Europe = land (reference category = sea)	0.035	0.020	0.037	0.040	0.034	0.006
Mode of arrival to Europe = plane (reference category = sea)	-0.171	-0.003	-0.170	-0.164	-0.151	-0.222
How respondent was found = public place (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.029	-0.010	-0.029	-0.046	-0.011	-0.032
How respondent was found = other (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.055	0.040	-0.056	-0.060	-0.044	-0.040
How respondent was found = recommended by other respondents (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.010	0.135	-0.009	-0.008	0.011	0.014
Work/send money home as most important reason for coming to Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.020	0.025	0.022	0.021	0.019	0.024
Where respondent grew up: 1 = rural, 0 = urban			0.070			
Earning before departure for Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise				-0.163		
Where respondent's father grew up: 1 = rural, 0 = urban					-0.065	
Where respondent's mother grew up: 1 = rural, 0 = urban					0.104	
Earning status of respondent's father at the time of departure: 1 = earning, 0 = otherwise						0.026
Earning status of respondent's mother at the time of departure: 1 = earning, 0 = otherwise						-0.031
Country-of-birth fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Host-country fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-of-departure fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Country-of-first arrival fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Constant	0.367	0.257	0.357	0.243	0.268	0.346
Observations	1,278	1,302	1,275	1,270	1,199	1,214
R-squared	0.284	0.157	0.288	0.305	0.295	0.287

MODEL 3.1

Dependent variable: legally allowed to work in host country (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise)

VARIABLES

Gender: 1 = female, 0 = male	0.071	0.022	0.068	0.074
Age	0.031	0.024	0.030	0.029
Age squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Highest level of education attained = primary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.019	0.039	0.017	0.019
Highest level of education attained = secondary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.054	0.060	0.052	0.047
Highest level of education attained = tertiary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.114	0.097	0.112	0.107
Marital status: 1 = married, 0 = single or not married	0.019	0.033	0.019	0.015
Family member in Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.048	0.04	0.045	0.04
Children in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.160	0.193	0.161	0.163
Number of siblings	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008
Birth order among siblings	-0.003	-0.006	-0.003	-0.003
Where respondent grew up: 1 = rural, 0 = urban	0.075	0.104	0.074	0.073
Time since arrival in Europe (in months)	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Mode of arrival in Europe = land (reference category = sea)	0.136	0.171	0.135	0.131
Mode of arrival to Europe = plane (reference category = sea)	-0.457	-0.095	-0.454	-0.436
How respondent was found = public place (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.047	-0.094	-0.046	-0.032
How respondent was found = other (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.068	-0.087	-0.066	-0.059
How respondent was found = recommended by other respondents (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.01	-0.058	-0.009	-0.004
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'work/send money home': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.054	-0.063	-0.056	-0.041
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'family/friends related': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.114	-0.117	-0.115	-0.111
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'personal issues/freedom': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.107	-0.185	-0.107	-0.103
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'education': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.018	0.046	0.017	0.017
Received financial support for cost of journey to Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise			0.021	0.017
Participating in social club/organization in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise				0.096
Country-of-birth fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES
Host-country fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES
Country-of-departure fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO
Country-of-first arrival fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO
Constant	-0.079	-0.125	-0.083	-0.107
Observations	1335	1360	1335	1335
R-squared	0.397	0.201	0.397	0.405

MODEL 3.2

Dependent variable: earning status in host country (1 = earning, 0 = otherwise)

VARIABLES

Gender: 1 = female, 0 = male	0.044	0.013	0.044	0.047	0.017	0.024
Age	0.036	0.047	0.036	0.026	0.024	0.023
Age squared	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Highest level of education attained = primary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.066	0.070	0.066	0.060	0.060	0.062
Highest level of education attained = secondary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.083	0.108	0.084	0.078	0.064	0.058
Highest level of education attained = tertiary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.143	0.142	0.143	0.138	0.100	0.094
Marital status: 1 = married, 0 = single or not married	0.011	-0.038	0.011	0.007	-0.001	-0.007
Family member in Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.088	0.075	0.088	0.088	0.066	0.059
Children in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.096	0.107	0.096	0.098	0.041	0.046
Number of siblings	-0.010	-0.013	-0.010	-0.009	-0.007	-0.007
Birth order among siblings	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
Where respondent grew up: 1 = rural, 0 = urban	0.024	0.010	0.024	0.021	-0.003	-0.002
Time since arrival in Europe (in months)	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001
Mode of arrival in Europe = land (reference category = sea)	0.158	0.167	0.159	0.155	0.106	0.103
Mode of arrival to Europe = plane (reference category = sea)	-0.479	-0.322	-0.480	-0.479	-0.300	-0.284
How respondent was found = public place (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.040	-0.050	-0.040	-0.030	-0.024	-0.005
How respondent was found = other (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	0.011	0.017	0.011	0.015	0.035	0.044
How respondent was found = recommended by other respondents (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	0.052	0.125	0.052	0.048	0.057	0.065
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'work/send money home': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.050	0.150	0.050	0.056	0.071	0.086
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'family/friends related': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.021	-0.011	-0.020	-0.016	0.022	0.024
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'personal issues/freedom': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.051	0.021	-0.051	-0.055	-0.008	-0.005
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'education': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.030	-0.032	-0.030	-0.017	-0.041	-0.042
Received financial support for cost of journey to Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise				-0.006		
Earning before departure for Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise				0.137		
Legally allowed to work in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise					0.382	0.367
Participating in social club/organization in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise						0.116
Country-of-birth fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Host-country fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-of-departure fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Country-of-first arrival fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Constant	-0.500	-0.674	-0.498	-0.407	-0.472	-0.504
Observations	1,321	1,346	1,321	1,313	1,317	1,317
R-squared	0.318	0.210	0.318	0.334	0.402	0.413

MODEL 3.3

Dependent variable: (log) earnings in Europe

VARIABLES

Gender: 1 = female, 0 = male	0.096	0.116	0.093	0.077	0.034	0.026
Age	0.056	0.051	0.056	0.055	0.033	0.034
Age squared	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
Highest level of education attained = primary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	-0.112	0.081	-0.115	-0.106	-0.089	-0.086
Highest level of education attained = secondary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.082	0.239	0.079	0.077	0.043	0.047
Highest level of education attained = tertiary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	0.161	0.199	0.157	0.160	0.107	0.109
Marital status: 1 = married, 0 = single or not married	0.067	-0.078	0.065	0.072	-0.005	0.000
Family member in Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.024	-0.092	-0.028	-0.014	-0.097	-0.100
Children in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.187	0.353	0.187	0.192	0.116	0.114
Number of siblings	0.021	0.011	0.021	0.020	0.019	0.019
Birth order among siblings	-0.024	-0.049	-0.024	-0.023	-0.010	-0.010
Where respondent grew up: 1 = rural, 0 = urban	0.017	-0.046	0.015	0.016	0.005	0.007
Time since arrival in Europe (in months)	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001
Mode of arrival in Europe = land (reference category = sea)	0.152	0.268	0.152	0.156	0.096	0.093
Mode of arrival to Europe = plane (reference category = sea)	-0.586	0.370	-0.583	-0.580	-0.164	-0.178
How respondent was found = public place (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.106	-0.284	-0.106	-0.116	-0.129	-0.131
How respondent was found = other (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.076	-0.128	-0.075	-0.082	-0.032	-0.035
How respondent was found = recommended by other respondents (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	0.051	0.164	0.051	0.047	0.025	0.024
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'work/send money home': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.076	0.145	-0.077	-0.072	-0.008	-0.016
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'family/friends related': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.212	-0.138	-0.215	-0.229	-0.088	-0.095
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'personal issues/freedom': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.546	-0.283	-0.546	-0.534	-0.474	-0.478
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'education': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.021	0.092	-0.022	-0.012	-0.043	-0.046
Received financial support for cost of journey to Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise			0.021			
Earning before departure for Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise				0.038		
Legally allowed to work in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise					0.778	0.785
Participating in social club/organization in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise						-0.048
Country-of-birth fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Host-country fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-of-departure fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Country-of-first arrival fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Constant	4.757	5.053	4.753	4.778	4.722	4.736
Observations	482	490	482	479	481	481
R-squared	0.514	0.237	0.514	0.518	0.625	0.626

MODEL 4

Dependent variable: willingness to live permanently in Europe (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise)

VARIABLES

Gender: 1 = female, 0 = male	0.012	0.041	0.014	0.017	0.008	0.016	0.019	0.017
Age	-0.001	-0.007	-0.001	0.004	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.006
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Highest level of education attained = primary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	-0.045	0.020	-0.044	-0.045	-0.044	-0.031	-0.033	-0.033
Highest level of education attained = secondary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	-0.045	0.025	-0.043	-0.038	-0.043	-0.023	-0.023	-0.021
Highest level of education attained = tertiary (reference category = no education/less than primary)	-0.030	0.042	-0.029	-0.023	-0.027	0.006	0.007	0.009
Marital status: 1 = married, 0 = single or not married	-0.085	-0.074	-0.085	-0.087	-0.085	-0.079	-0.076	-0.074
Family member in Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.046	-0.069	-0.045	-0.049	-0.046	-0.037	-0.035	-0.033
Children in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.030	-0.012	-0.031	-0.034	-0.031	-0.021	-0.017	-0.019
Number of siblings	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
Birth order among siblings	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012
Where respondent grew up: 1 = rural, 0 = urban	0.095	0.053	0.096	0.103	0.093	0.103	0.106	0.105
Time since arrival in Europe (in months)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Mode of arrival in Europe = land (reference category = sea)	-0.112	-0.140	-0.111	-0.108	-0.106	-0.094	-0.090	-0.090
Mode of arrival to Europe = plane (reference category = sea)	0.002	0.226	0.001	0.004	-0.003	-0.050	-0.066	-0.068
How respondent was found = public place (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.028	-0.025	-0.028	-0.027	-0.031	-0.026	-0.026	-0.032
How respondent was found = other (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.060	-0.056	-0.061	-0.061	-0.061	-0.051	-0.054	-0.057
How respondent was found = recommended by other respondents (reference category = NGO/partner organization)	-0.064	0.009	-0.064	-0.058	-0.062	-0.056	-0.056	-0.059
'How much did the political system in your home country allow you to have an influence on what the government did?': 1 = a great deal, 2 = a lot, 3 = some, 4 = a little, 5 = none at all	0.056	0.062	0.055	0.057	0.055	0.056	0.057	0.056
'If you went back to your home country tomorrow, would your community be happy or unhappy, do you think?': 1 = happy, 0 = otherwise	-0.091	-0.114	-0.091	-0.087	-0.089	-0.086	-0.083	-0.082
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'work/send money home': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.050	0.069	0.051	0.047	0.049	0.060	0.056	0.051
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'family/friends related': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	0.060	0.043	0.060	0.064	0.056	0.061	0.054	0.055
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'personal issues/freedom': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.027	0.018	-0.027	-0.024	-0.025	-0.026	-0.030	-0.032
Most important reason for coming to Europe 'education': 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise	-0.039	-0.034	-0.038	-0.048	-0.042	-0.017	-0.015	-0.013
Received financial support for cost of journey to Europe: 1 = yes 0 = otherwise			-0.009					
Earning before departure for Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise				-0.078				
(log) Earning in host country					-0.008			
Earning status in Europe: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise						-0.132	-0.117	-0.110
Legally allowed to work in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise							-0.048	-0.046
Participating in social club/organization in host country: 1 = yes, 0 = otherwise								-0.035
Country-of-birth fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Host-country fixed effects	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country-of-departure fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Country-of-first arrival fixed effects	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Constant	0.663	0.585	0.665	0.596	0.630	0.549	0.550	0.565
Observations	1,148	1,170	1,148	1,141	1,148	1,131	1,128	1,128
R-squared	0.143	0.103	0.143	0.153	0.145	0.157	0.158	0.159

ANNEX 3**CALCULATING NUMBER OF YEARS TO REACH FINANCIAL POSITION ATTAINED IN EUROPE**

To estimate differences in the financial position of respondents in Europe relative to when they were in their home country in Africa, an analysis comparing real salaries at home with the real value of remittances sent home, and the ratio between remittances sent and salaries in Europe, was conducted. In particular, the analysis extrapolated the number of years it would have taken individuals, had they stayed in Africa, to be able to contribute the same real value of current remittances sent home while maintaining the same ratio between this contribution and their total salary in Europe, i.e., their current financial position.

The analysis was conducted for respondents who were earning both at home and in Europe. To minimize inaccuracies resulting from inflation, foreign exchange conversions and respondents' poor recollection, the analysis was restricted to those arriving between 2010 and 2018 and for respondents who reported to be earning more than \$5 per month. Respondents from Somalia and South Sudan were excluded from this analysis because of inconsistent data on foreign exchange rates and implied purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates. As throughout the report, all real values from the analysis have been rounded off to the nearest tenth place and are to be taken as indicative of trends rather than definite values.

Using 2015 as a base year, the following variables, formulas and calculations were first used to convert values to real 2015 dollars.¹³⁵ For origin country c at time of departure for Europe t :

$IncA_t^c$ = Monthly income in country of origin (reported in US\$)

E_t^c = Exchange rate of local currency per \$1 or per €1

PPP_t^c = Implied purchasing power parity conversion rate (local currency per international dollar)

I_t^{US} = Real inflation rate in the United States

$IncE$ = Current monthly income in host country (reported in €)

$Remit$ = Current monthly remittances sent home (reported in €)

To convert salary at home to real dollars in 2015, it is first converted to local currency at home, using the prevailing exchange rates at the time of departure for Europe, and then to real dollars using implied PPP conversion rates in the same time period. Finally, because the PPP data is relative to the US dollar, the analysis adjusts for the US inflation rate to convert to real dollars in 2015. The following formula was used:

$$[1] \text{ Income (2015\$)} = \frac{\text{IncA}_t^c * E_t^{c:\$}}{\text{PPP}_t^c} * I_t^{US}; \text{ where}$$

$$I_t^{US} = \frac{\text{CPI}_{2015}^{US}}{\text{CPI}_t^{US}} \text{ and CPI is the consumer price index}$$

A similar procedure is followed to calculate the real value of remittances sent in 2015 dollars:

$$[2] \text{ Remit (2015\$)} = \frac{\text{Remit} * E_{2018}^{c:\$}}{\text{PPP}_{2018}^c} * I_{2018}^{US}$$

To extrapolate the number of years it would take to contribute the same real value to the household while maintaining the ratio between contribution to the household and total salary as in Europe, i.e., until real income is equal to:

$$\text{Income (2015\$)}^* = \text{Remit (2015\$)} * \frac{\text{IncE}}{\text{Remit}}$$

Under assumed annual real income growth g , the number of years n , it would take to reach $\text{Income (2015\$)}^*$ is calculated as follows:

g = Real income growth rate (assumed at 3, 5 and 10 percent)

n = Number of years

$$n = \frac{\log(\text{Income (2015\$)}^*) - \log(\text{Income (2015\$)})}{\log(1+g)}$$

ANNEX 4

OVERVIEW OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS GOVERNING MIGRATION FROM AFRICA TO EUROPE

Processes, partnerships, compacts, conventions, and laws have emerged to govern migration from Africa to Europe — some of these instruments are specific to Africa, some are specific to Europe, some have emerged within the context of African-European cooperation, complementing global processes such as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Below is a brief and inexhaustive chronological summary of key instruments.¹³⁶

African instruments

- The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa was the first refugee convention worldwide to be adopted at the regional level.
- The 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, also known as the Abuja Treaty, was the first legal framework to emphasize the free movement of persons with a view to promoting development and regional integration in Africa.
- The Migration Policy Framework (currently under revision) and the African Common Position on Migration and Development were both adopted by the African Union in 2006.
- The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a Common Approach on Migration in 2008, which sets out priorities for achieving free regional circulation.
- The Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, also known as the Kampala Convention, was adopted in 2009.
- In 2009, the African Union established the AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking (AU COMMIT), which is a continent-wide campaign focused on protecting victims of human trafficking, prosecuting traffickers, and prevention.
- The IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework was adopted in 2012 by the Council of Ministers of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and outlines a comprehensive approach to managing migration in the region.
- The African Union's Migration Policy Framework

for Africa and Plan of Action (2018-30) is a strategic document that aims to assist member states and Regional Economic Communities to manage migration. With its recommendations based on current migration trends and dynamics, the framework identifies eight pillars of action: migration governance; labour migration and education; diaspora engagement; border governance; irregular migration; forced displacement; international migration; and migration and trade. The framework also encourages coordination and cooperation with the European Union around developing diaspora engagement policies and addressing smuggling.

- The African Observatory for Migration and Development (AOMD) was established in July 2018 by African leaders and aims to help coordinate and harmonize national migration policies in Africa.

European instruments

- EU Readmission Agreements (EURAs), which are signed between the EU and non-EU countries, facilitate and guide the return of irregular migrants in EU countries to their countries of origin or transit. The first readmission agreement was signed with Hong Kong in 2001.
- The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, established in 2005 and updated in 2012, is the European Union's overarching framework outlining migration and asylum policy.
- Mobility partnerships, which have existed since 2008, are a key instrument in the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility. These partnerships aim to improve migration-development outcomes, address the issue of irregular migration, and organize and facilitate the mobility of third-country nationals.
- The Dublin III Regulation, which came into force in July 2013, determines which EU country has to examine an application for asylum. According to the regulation, any asylum application in the EU must be treated by, and is the responsibility of, one EU country.

- The EU Reception Directive of 2013 establishes standards for the reception of individuals applying for international protection.
- The European Agenda on Migration from May 2015 aims to address migration management in the short, medium and long terms, and in the areas of asylum, borders, irregular migration, and legal migration.
- The Emergency Relocation Mechanism, a two-year plan adopted in September 2015, was established to share responsibility among EU member states by relocating asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other EU countries.
- The EU-Turkey Statement, signed in March 2016, aims to deter the movement of refugees from Turkey to the EU. According to the agreement, Turkey — in exchange for €3 billion and for the EU's commitment to facilitating visa-free travel for Turkish citizens — would help control Balkan borders and take back migrants who had travelled to the EU through Turkey.
- The Malta Declaration, adopted by EU leaders in February 2017, focuses on actions aimed at stemming migration flows from Libya to Italy. These interventions include, among others, supporting the Libyan national guard and other agencies in the form of training and equipment; disrupting the business model of smugglers; and improving Libya's reception capacities.

Cooperation instruments between the EU and Africa

- The Cairo Action Plan, adopted in 2000, aims to address the root causes of migration and to fight racism and xenophobia.
- The Rabat Process, launched in July 2006, brings together 55 African and European governments, ECOWAS and the European Commission around the objective of enhancing cooperation and dialogue on migration management, migration and development, and international protection.
- The Joint Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, also known as the Tripoli Process, was established in 2007 and aims to create better and more jobs in African countries. It is part of the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.
- The Khartoum Process, a policy platform formed in 2014 by the AU and the EU, along with 37 states on both continents, aims to enhance cooperation and dialogue around mobility and migration. The Khartoum Process focuses particularly on fighting smuggling and trafficking in human beings.
- The Joint Valletta Action Plan was adopted following the 2015 Valletta Summit and aims to address the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration; improve the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; curb irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and enhance cooperation on readmission, return and reintegration, among other priorities.
- The Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs, announced by the UN in September 2018, with the aim of strengthening economic partnership, investment and trade between Africa and the EU, is intended to give Africans opportunities in their own countries to help ameliorate the problem of irregular migration.
- The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa) was launched in November 2015 and was one of the flagship outputs of the Valletta Summit. The EUTF aims to improve stability and migration management, including through addressing the root causes of irregular migration, forced displacement, and destabilization. The types of programmes funded by the EUTF include those aimed at enhancing migration management, enhancing resilience in terms of food security, and supporting overall governance, security, development, and rule of law in African countries.

ENDNOTES

1. Remarks of United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres at the migration event 'The Road to Marrakech', available at: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-09-26/road-marrakech-remarks>.

Introduction

2. Within the 258 million are 150.3 million migrant workers; 4.8 million students; 25.4 million registered refugees; 124.8 million women; 36.1 million children. See IOM (2018: 9). See also UN DESA Population Division, International Migration Stock, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.asp>.
3. IOM (2018: 20).
4. 'The increase was particularly marked between 2012 and 2015, mostly due to the Syrian conflict. The total figure includes 25.4 million refugees, 40 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and 3.1 million asylum seekers.' See IOM (2018: 28).
5. UNDP (2009).
6. UNDP (2009: 46).
7. Horwood, Forin and Frouws (eds.) (2018). The Danish Refugee Council's Mixed Migration Centre defines mixed migration as: 'Cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated by a multiplicity of factors, people in mixed flows have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Those in mixed migration flows travel along similar routes, using similar means of travel — often travelling irregularly, and wholly or partially assisted by migrant smugglers.' Horwood, Forin and Frouws (eds.) (2018: 9).
8. IOM (2019).
9. Many observers refute the 'crisis' terminology — suggesting it prioritizes the impact of a few hundred thousand people arriving on Europe's shores over the millions of people displaced and migrating globally. For instance, see Hovil and Clette (2017). Others identify the refugee crisis as 'never [having] been a crisis of numbers: it's a crisis of politics, a crisis of trust'. See interview with Alexander Betts in Horwood, Forin and Frouws (eds.) (2018: 86).
10. Of the 30,000 irregular migration deaths and disappearances reported by IOM for the period 2014 to 2018, over 17,000 took place in the Mediterranean. See IOM (2019).

11. As evidenced by the small army of grassroots kitchens, teachers and other support workers who mobilized to the camps in Calais; by the citizens in Brussels who have offered their homes as shelters during the winter season; by the Venligboerne (Friendly Neighbours) who drove to offer lifts, clothing and food to migrants walking through Denmark; and by the heroic sea-rescue efforts of fishermen in Greece and Italy.
12. IOM (2018: 10) has identified that '11 out of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) contain targets or indicators that are directly relevant to migration. Target 10.7 calls upon countries to "facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies", and others refer to migration-related topics such as remittances and human trafficking. Beyond this, many more targets are indirectly relevant to migration, which is a crosscutting theme'. The 2030 Agenda's core principle to 'leave no one behind' also de facto demands inclusion of all migrants in the implementation of the SDGs. For the full list of SDGs, see Sustainable Development Goals, available at <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals>.
13. See the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, available at https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/195. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration incorporates many of the recommendations from UNDP's *Human Development Report 2009*, as well as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and long-standing Global Forum on Migration and Development recommendations. See UNDP (2009) and <https://gfmnd.org>. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration is the outcome of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2016. That document called for the further elaboration of two global compacts aimed at more effective and coordinated action around the world — one on migration and one on refugees. See New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, available at <https://www.unhcr.org/new-york-declaration-for-refugees-and-migrants.html>. The Global Compact on Refugees was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2018.
14. United Nations Secretary-General Welcoming the Global Compact for Migration at the General Assembly, 19 December 2018 — SG/SM/19416-GA/12114-DEV/3384, available at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sgsm19416.doc.htm>.
15. 'New Ways of Working' is an agenda to foster greater coordination and synergy among diverse actors in the humanitarian space, as called for in the Agenda for Humanity launched in Istanbul at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016. See <https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/5358>.
16. Parshotam (2018); Crawley (2018).
17. Nwabuzo and Schaefer (2018).
18. African Union Commission (2018: 20-21). Intra-African migration, which has important historical context as well as contemporary drivers, expanded from 12.5 million to 19.4 million between 2000 and 2017. UNCTAD (2018: 43). The top three destination countries for intra-African migration are South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria. Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan also host significant African refugee communities. UNECA (2017: 6). For discussion of historical context, see Abebe (2017).
19. IOM (2017a: 1). See also Migali et al. (2018: 21).
20. Total inflows from Africa to Europe are estimated to have increased by 15 percent between 2014 and 2016. IOM (2017a).
21. Digital connectivity is one of 10 trends currently shaping the global migration context according to the European Commission. See European Policy Strategy Centre (2017).
22. UNCTAD (2018 xxi). According to IOM (2011: 54), 'there is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries, it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country'. The legal framework of secondary EU law on irregular migration focuses on the prevention and enforcement side of immigration policies, and is based on the core principle that member states cannot tolerate the presence of a migrant with irregular status. See Delvino (2018: 4). Some also use the term 'illegal immigrants' when referring to irregular migrants — a term loaded with negative connotations. See Kostas (2017). Others, seeking to move beyond definitional challenges, have introduced alternative terminology such as 'unauthorized migration'. See Hiltner (2017).

23. King (2012: 3).
24. The first, *Journey to Extremism: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment*, explored the phenomenon of violent extremism in the African context. See UNDP (2017).
25. King (2012: 27); Boyd and Grieco (2003).
26. Gender is taken in this report to refer to the differences and power relations that exist between women and men; socially constructed ideas about how men and women should behave; and gender-based vulnerabilities, including in relation to sexuality.
27. UN Women (2013).
28. The rich dataset across the total cohort of 3,069 individuals warrants further exploration and investigation from different perspectives — including by comparing the primary and secondary groups' perspectives, for instance. UNDP will make the data available to select researchers for this and other purposes. Verbatim answers were analysed to identify respondents who reported having been trafficked from their home country; these were excluded as part of the 1,099. Trafficking victims, if registered as such, have legal entitlements via the Palermo Protocols, and therefore can only be considered 'irregular' in relation to the routes they travelled, not their legal status on arrival.
29. Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling technique in which existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances.
30. One of the challenges with the term 'irregular migrant', which in turn informs the limitations of policy responses, is that it glosses over a wide diversity of experiences, profiles and, likely, perspectives. It includes categories of irregular African migrants such as those who arrived legally but allowed visas to lapse; those who attempted the journey but were not successful; those who arrived but returned home; and those who have become so established that they are not in the networks of the research partners with whom UNDP collaborated in identifying respondents.
31. Responses of 'Don't know' or 'Refused' and other missing data were removed from descriptive analysis throughout if they formed less than 4 percent of overall responses to the question at hand.

Key features and profile of research sample

32. The European countries covered in the research reflect available secondary data on the number of African nationals found to be illegally present. See Eurostat, Asylum and Managed Migration database, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database>.
33. Nordic region: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland. Northern region: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands, United Kingdom. Southern region: Greece, Italy, Spain.
34. UNDP's own calculation derived from the UNHCR Mediterranean Situation database, available at <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>.
35. Regions of origin are classified based on a country's membership in the Regional Economic Communities of the African Union.
36. Gender distribution in the sample reflects gender proportions of third-country-nationals found to be illegally present in Europe, which was used as a proxy for the real distribution. See Eurostat, Third-country nationals found to be illegally present — annual data (rounded), available at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eipre&lang=en. The lopsided ratios of men and women arriving — highly visible through media coverage of the migration 'crisis' — have even caused some analysts to raise concerns about a looming 'man problem' in Europe. See *The Economist* (2016).

Chapter 1: Life at home

37. The share of Africans who are poor fell from 56 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 2012. However, because of population growth, absolute numbers in poverty are higher: rising from 280 million in 1990 to 330 million in 2012, for instance. See Beegle et al. (2016). Since 1999, the number of children enrolled in primary schools in sub-Saharan Africa increased by 75 percent to 144 million in 2012. See UNESCO (2015b: 3).
38. Hug et al. (2018). Also see World Bank data on life expectancy at birth, available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.dyn.le00.in>.
39. See Flahaux and de Haas (2016). See also Clemens (2014) and Horwood, Forin and Frouws (eds.) (2018).
40. Clemens (2014); Martin-Shields et al. (2017). Historical and cross-country comparison studies have found that improved development trajectories fuel migration up to a certain point,

and that emigration rates from low-income countries will start to decrease only when income per capita reaches the level of an upper middle-income country.

41. In rural areas, the constraints are higher for those wanting to migrate internationally. An exception identified in the FAO study is the case of Malawi, where 74 percent of households with international migrants are located in rural areas. See FAO (2017) and Flahaux and de Haas (2016).
42. INED (2014). See also Hagen-Zanker (2008).
43. Alkire and Jahan (2018).
44. UNDP's own calculation based on World Development Indicators database. See World Bank, urban population (percent of total), available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.urb.totl.in.zs>.
45. European Commission (2018).
46. Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001).
47. Martin (2008). For more on the debate around the feminization of migration, see also Donato and Gabaccia (2016).
48. See IOM (2018); IOM (2008); UN INSTRAW (2009); and UN DESA (2015b).
49. World Bank (2018); IOM (2003).
50. In 2016, married women were not allowed to apply for a passport without their husband's consent in 32 countries, including 12 African countries (Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Malawi, Mali, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda). See World Bank (2015). Discrimination against women in social institutions and norms constrains female emigration 'by limiting their access to opportunities, resources and power, particularly discrimination within the family and restricted civil liberties'. See Ferrant and Tuccio (2015: 248).
51. UNESCO (2015a: 3) found that no country in sub-Saharan Africa had yet achieved gender parity in primary or secondary education by 2015.
52. The Gender Parity Index, which measures gender parity in education, identifies a clear trend of reducing gender disparity in primary gross enrolment ratios for a majority of countries in Africa, often starting from a point of severe disadvantage for girls. Countries that made good progress in reducing gender disparity include Benin, Burkina Faso and Morocco. However, Africa remains the furthest from parity: of the 18 countries in the world with fewer than 90 girls for every 100 boys enrolled, 13 are in sub-Saharan Africa. UNESCO (2015a).
53. Shimeles (2018).
54. One recent study found that more than half of Africans (54 percent) who have begun taking concrete steps to emigrate are employed, while 16 percent are seeking employment, and the remaining 30 percent are economically inactive. See Natale et al. (2018: 17). A high rate of employment at the moment of departure was documented in a 2011 study carried out in Athens involving over 500 interviews with migrants from seven sub-Saharan African countries. See Papadopoulos and Fratsea (2015).
55. The averages of earnings in Africa are calculated for respondents arriving between 2010 and 2018 and for respondents who reported to be earning more than \$5/month. This is to minimize errors that may be related to inflation, foreign exchange conversions or misremembered information from respondents. (The same approach is applied to the analysis of the costs of the journey, discussed in Chapter 2.) Throughout the report, all monetary values have been rounded to the nearest tenth place and are to be taken as indicative of the trends rather than as definite figures.

Chapter 2: Motivations and drivers

56. Frouws and Horwood (2019).
57. UNDP (2009).
58. Frouws and Horwood (2019); Migali et al. (2018); IOM (2017b).
59. As explained in the Introduction, answers to this question informed the report's categorization of respondents in order to allow for analytical focus on those not primarily motivated by humanitarian need.
60. Calculated using World Bank migration and remittances database, 2017. These figures do not include informal remittances, which are likely to add further value. See World Bank, Migration and Remittances Data, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data>.

61. African Development Bank (2018: xvi).
62. Ratha et al. (2011).
63. Mbaye (2013).
64. Giménez-Goméz et al. (2017).
65. UNDP (2009: 13).
66. Shimeles (2010).
67. Average costs are calculated for arrivals between 2010 and 2018. Costs are reported in nominal dollar values (as reported by respondents). These costs situate well compared to other sources. See for instance UNHCR (2017) and Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (2014). These averages should be taken in the context of the different years of arrival represented within the sample. Global evidence suggests that smuggling costs increase as migration and asylum policies get more restrictive. See Brenner et al. (2019).
68. All regression findings related to the cost of the journey to Europe refer to Model 1.
69. It is important to note that the definition of ‘family’ commonly evoked is that of the Eurocentric nuclear family, whereas families in Africa can take on different formations (patriarchal families, woman-headed households, polygamous marriages, etc.). See König and de Regt (2010).
70. This resonates with other available research suggesting that women travelling in mixed-migration flows are more likely to migrate for family-related reasons, including with male family members influencing decision-making. A recent IOM study found that only half of the women had taken the decision to migrate independently, with many saying their partner was the main decision maker. Woman migrants and refugees arriving in Italy were found to be much more likely than men to have migrated for family or friend-related reasons (38 percent compared to 18 percent). Many of these women reported having migrated to escape abuse in the family, to join a partner, or due to forced marriage. See IOM (2016). See also Castagnone et al. (2015).
71. Horwood, Forin and Frouws (eds.) (2018).
72. González-Ferrer et al. (2013). Country-specific reports and data document the extent to which migration can be embedded in a ‘rich, broader family-related process whereby families pool risks and rewards in financing the migration of certain family members’ that can ultimately help diversify income sources.
73. Women were 12 percent less likely than men to migrate with no financial support (Model 2).
74. All regression findings related to financial support received for the journey to Europe are from Model 2. The model finds that those who attained at least secondary-level education were more likely to receive financial support for the journey by up to 11 percent compared to those with no education/less than primary level. The model also finds that those who arrived earlier were more likely to receive financial support for the journey. All else constant, those who arrived 10 years ago were 11 percent more likely to have received financial support for their journey compared to those who arrived a year ago.
75. Anecdotal evidence suggests such work to have been primarily menial, often in harsh conditions, and for no pay.
76. Dibeh et al. (2018).
77. UN DESA (2015b).
78. UNDP (2016: 4).
79. *The Economist* (2017).
80. Appiah-Nyamekye and Selorney (2018). See Afrobarometer (2019).
81. The counterfactual question as to why so many do not migrate also warrants enquiry. King (2012).
82. de Haas (2011).
83. UNICEF (2017).
84. See King (2012).
85. See ‘Women on the Move — Drivers, Choices and Risks’ in Horwood, Forin and Frouws (eds.) (2018: 60-62).
86. Ibid. Men may also fall victim to SGBV, though this is typically less well documented.
87. See, for example, Heinrich Böll Stiftung (2018). The scale of sexual exploitation and abuse is beginning to be researched in

detail, with different levels of violence and atrocity associated with different routes and locations now recognized. See, for instance, Grotti et al. (2018); Schlein (2017); Merkle et al. (2018); United Nations Support Mission in Libya and OHCHR (2018); and Benavides (2018).

88. Adichie (2013: 276). In the case of the young African characters in Adichie's novel, migration is to the United States.

Chapter 3: Life on the other side

89. Delvino (2018).
90. OECD and EU (2014).
91. See Eurostat, First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship, available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/product?code=migr_resfirst.
92. Landau and Kihato (2018: 2).
93. See Eurostat, Migrant integration statistics — labour market indicators, available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators. Also see Quintini (2011).
94. Williams (2012).
95. Nwabuzo and Schraeder (2018). See European Agency for Fundamental Rights (2018); European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2017); Clark et al. (2018).
96. Findings from Model 3.1. The model also finds that those who grew up in a rural area, those who were in Europe longer and those participating in social clubs/organizations in their host countries were more likely to have a legal right to work, while those whose most important reason for coming to Europe was 'family/friends related' were less likely to have a legal right to work.
97. For instance, see Article 21 of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, laying down standards for the reception of applications for international protection (recast), available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0033&from=EN>.
98. The criminal economy around irregular migration has been documented elsewhere, both in relation to human smuggling and, in some countries, to unlawful profit from the administration of migrant reception centres. See Brenner et al. (2019), which cites evidence that the global human-smuggling trade may generate returns of anywhere between \$5 billion and \$35 billion. Also see Al Jazeera (2018).
99. Other research points to the overqualification of migrant workers in Europe, with one study suggesting African migrants in particular often experience a dramatic deskilling and downgrading upon integrating into the European labour market as a result of limited opportunities being open to them. See Castagnone et al. (2015).
100. Findings are from Model 3.3. The model also finds a positive association between level of earnings and having a family member in Europe. This is also the case between level of earnings and having children in Europe. However, the model finds a negative association between level of earnings and the most important reason for coming to Europe being 'personal issues/freedom'. As for education levels and most important reason for coming to Europe being 'work/send money home', the model does not find these to be determinants of the level of earnings.
101. Findings reported in this subsection are from Model 3.2. In addition to the results reported in the subsection, the model also finds a positive association between earning status and those with family in Europe, earlier arrived migrants, and those who participate in social clubs/organizations.
102. For details on calculations, see Annex 3.
103. Vanderbruggen et al. (2014).
104. See Figure 3.1 in Hendriks et al. (2018: 50).
105. Pannetier et al. (2017) and Hinds (2018).
106. Berg (2015).
107. See also UNICEF and IOM (2017); see UNHCR (2015).
108. There were, furthermore, significant regional variations, with Nordic countries where interviews took place, again demonstrating more favourable environments across all four 'measures of deprivation'.
109. ILO (2003).

- 110. OSCE (2018). See also Rankin (2018).
- 111. Higher proportions of respondents in Nordic countries reported using bank and money-transfer services more frequently than their peers in other regions.

Chapter 4: Attitudes to return

- 112. See, for example, Dustmann (2003).
- 113. Cassarino (2004).
- 114. Bonifazi and Paparusso (2019).
- 115. Haidara (2013). Also see Chacko (2007).
- 116. All findings reported in section 4.1 are from Model 4. The model finds that longevity in Europe plays a role in individuals' willingness to live permanently in Europe; but once earning status is controlled for, the effect of longevity is no longer statistically significant. This provides evidence of the correlation between earning status and longevity explored in Chapter 3 as well as evidence of the relative importance of earning status in determining willingness to live permanently in Europe. The model also finds that those who were married before departure are less likely to express a willingness to live permanently in Europe, suggesting intentions to reunite with family in home country. On the other hand, those coming from rural areas are more likely to express a willingness to live permanently in Europe.
- 117. By about 8 percent (Model 4).
- 118. Discussed in other literature, see, for example, Bauwens (2017). Also see Schulman (2018) and Loftsdóttir (2019).
- 121. Akkerman (2018). States' targeting of humanitarian actors providing search and rescue, food and shelter has come under particular scrutiny from human rights monitors, as highlighted in the report 'Saving Lives Is Not a Crime', prepared by the UN Secretary-General's Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (2018). The conditions under which irregular migrants and refugees are kept in official and unofficial reception centres across Europe, notably those in northern France and the Greek islands, are deeply problematic. See Taub (2016).
- 122. United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights (2018).
- 123. See European Parliament (2016) and Funk et al. (2017: 3).
- 124. See Kostaki (2018).
- 125. As flagged in Chapter 4, there is evidence to suggest that Africans have been motivated to come home and contribute to development outcomes when signals from government are auspicious (recalling the 'reverse brain drain' that was at one time anticipated). See Chacko (2007) and Haidara (2013).
- 126. The complexity of development and need for faster, more durable solutions to achieve structural transformation suggest a need for innovative approaches. Drawing on new ideas from the fields of complexity science, lead-user innovation, and collective intelligence to accelerate development impact, UNDP is, for instance, piloting strategic initiatives. One such is a Country Accelerator Lab Network, which seeks to advance interdisciplinary approaches and non-linear solutions that crowd in the collective efforts of a variety of partners, and tap into local insights and the knowledge of people closest to the problem and the solutions. These labs will surface and reinforce development solutions, mobilizing a wide and dynamic partnership of actors contributing knowledge, resources and experience. They are designed to contribute to intensifying the pace, inclusiveness and energy of development progress.
- 127. Kohnert (2007). Also see Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (2015).
- 128. See Die Welt (2018); Barbière (2016); and Lopes (2018). The current phase of renegotiation of the post-Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP countries provides an excellent opportunity for such a reframing. However, indications that talks have become stalled precisely on the issue of migration, and efforts

Section 3: Implications for policy and programming

- 119. Analysis of the cross-country relationship between emigration stock (number of people born in each country but residing in another country as a percentage of the total population) and Human Development Index (HDI) undertaken by the Scaling Fences' research team finds a pronounced inverted-U relationship across countries between these factors. The analysis further revealed that most African countries are just entering the stages of development at which emigration begins to increase. Also see Martin-Shields et al. (2017:1); and Clemens (2014).
- 120. Annex 4 provides an overview of the burgeoning policy domain.

by the EU to leverage commitments on returns and readmissions in the context of the agreement, suggest short- as opposed to long-term priorities are shaping policymakers' perspectives. See EURACTIV (2017).

129. This is the case, for instance, of the labour-mobility arrangement signed between Australia, New Zealand, and twelve Pacific island countries. This agreement is complemented by the Seasonal Worker Programme, which facilitates the circulation of temporary workers from Pacific island countries to address seasonal business peaks in a variety of industries such as hospitality and tourism, accommodation and livestock, and horticulture agriculture. Since 2012, more than 16,000 seasonal workers from nine Pacific island countries have participated in the Seasonal Worker Programme. Australian government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2018).
130. The specific mechanisms suggested under the Global Compact Objective No.5: 'Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration' provide additional details. The European Commission has highlighted the importance of 'Mobility Partnerships' between the EU and third countries as a tool to properly manage migration. The European Commission also calls for more efforts 'to tap into the migration-development nexus and reorient assistance towards strengthening partnership with third countries, supporting the build of entrepreneurial capacities and institutions'. See European Political Strategy Centre (2015:5).
131. Indeed, even in relation to refugee resettlement, experts note the number of places fell to unprecedented levels in 2017 and 2018. They call for increased legal channels for refugees to reach their destination safely, and for better protection (such as resettlement, humanitarian visas and family reunification) for those forcibly displaced or fleeing violent conflict and other disasters. See essay 'Lethal choices — The Rising Death Toll of Mixed Migration' in Horwood, Forin and Frouws (eds.) (2018: 68-72). Also see EU FRA (2015).
132. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, available at https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/195.
133. Delvino (2018: 13).
134. See Quintini (2011) and European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2007).

Annex 3: Calculations comparing the purchasing power of salaries in Africa and Europe

135. Data sources for variables used in calculations — PPP (implied conversion rates): IMF, World Economic Outlook database, accessed January 2019. Foreign exchange — 2010-14 rates: Groningen Growth and Development Centre (2013). Penn World Table 8.0: Exchange Rate, National Currency/USD (Market + Estimated), 2011; 2015-17 rates: UNCTADstat, Economic trends database, available at <https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx>; 2018 rates: Exchange-Rates.org, available at <https://www.exchange-rates.org/MajorRates/ByRegion/F>. Consumer Price Index—Federal Bank of Saint Louis, Economic Research Division, Consumer Price Index: Total All Items for the United States, Index 2015 = 100, Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted, available at <https://fred.stlouisfed.org>.

Annex 4: Overview of policy instruments governing migration from Africa to Europe

136. Sources consulted include: Abebe (2017); Collett and Le Coz (2018); Fox (2018); Hovil and Cette (2017); Kasozi (2017); Nshimbi and Moyo (2016); Toaldo and Barana (2016); as well as information directly available from the African Union, European Commission, IGAD, and other regional institutions.

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