

The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index **PAPI 2013**

Measuring citizens' experiences



Centre for Community Support
and Development Studies



Centre for Research and Training
of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front



*Empowered lives
Resilient nation.*

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THE VIET NAM PROVINCIAL GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERFORMANCE INDEX **PAPI 2013**

MEASURING CITIZENS' EXPERIENCES

Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES)

Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

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FOREWORD

The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) is the largest and most comprehensive annual policy monitoring tool in the country. Based on citizens' experiences, PAPI measures the performance and quality of provincial governance and public administration in an emerging middle-income context. PAPI is a pioneering initiative that fits Viet Nam's new development level and provides objective, evidence-based provincial performance measures in terms of policy implementation and service delivery.

Through PAPI, citizens of every walk of life provide an important source of information by using their collective voices to describe and amplify the performance of State agencies and public service providers, with a set of objectively verifiable quantitative indicators to assess performance in governance and public administration. This engaging and insightful data also creates an incentive for provinces to improve their performance to serve their 'end-users' better in the long run.

This 2013 PAPI Report presents the results of the third annual nationwide survey, with data articulating the experiences of 13,892 citizens selected randomly and formulating a representative sample of different demographic groups across the country. Since the first survey in 2009, nearly 50,000 citizens have engaged directly in face-to-face interviews and shared their experiences and assessments of the State's governance and public administration performance, from provincial to village levels.

Given the significance of this citizen-driven measuring tool, PAPI is gaining significant recognition in a Viet Nam and international context. At a national level, PAPI has been utilized as a tool to guide citizens' participation, monitoring and feedback in a governance and public administration context, while

at a government level it is providing useful data and information for National Assembly delegates and People's Council members. Thanks to the initiative and collaboration of the National Assembly Standing Committee's Institute for Legislative Studies, the 2012 PAPI results were introduced and discussed with National Assembly delegates in a workshop convened in May 2013. This milestone was followed by a series of regional workshops with representatives from provincial People's Councils and National Assembly delegates from 63 provinces convened in early July 2013, ahead of votes of confidence on elected positions from provincial to commune levels.

Another significant benchmark for PAPI's relevance and importance is its incorporation into the Ho Chi Minh Academy of Politics and Public Administration's (HCMA) high-level executive leadership training programmes.

At a provincial level, an increasing number of provinces see PAPI as an essential monitoring and evaluation tool to help reflect their performances. To date, more than a third of Viet Nam's 63 provinces have analysed and/or requested their respective sectoral departments and agencies formulate action plans and directives to improve provincial performance and better serve citizens. Such provincial responses are designed to leverage strengths and address weaknesses to improve performance in governance and public administration.

Internationally, PAPI is viewed as an excellent model to gather citizens' experiences with likely replication in other countries. The PAPI model has been presented at a number of international governance and government performance management conferences. Most recently, at the Global Roundtable on Government Performance Management in India in December 2013, PAPI was exemplified as one of 12 innovative

worldwide government-monitoring tools. In addition, PAPI data and findings are used by numerous national and international scholars for academic papers in high-profile international journals.

These accolades champion the scientific validity of PAPI results which are captured thanks to close and effective coordination with national partners, in particular the Commission for People's Petitions under the National Assembly Steering Committee, the Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT), the Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES) under the Viet Nam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). PAPI's high quality is also a reflection of close coordination between the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF) Central Committee and its local level committees.

A National Advisory Board provides gravitas and credibility to PAPI data and findings to

ensure their ongoing consistency, relevance and usage. The Board, with representatives from State and government agencies and renowned experts on governance and public administration, provides insights as well as scholarly perspectives on governance and public administration issues. Board members advise PAPI to lever its impact at a national level to help improve national policies and legislation, apart from initiating provincial responses and actions to improve provincial performance.

This 2013 PAPI Report will contribute to ongoing efforts to improve governance and public administration performance at a provincial level. As a rich source of objective data collected using state-of-the-art and scientific methods, PAPI serves as a useful reference point and policy diagnostic tool for policy makers, government leaders, civil society organizations, the media, scholars and international development partners to better understand and respond to the needs of a middle-income Viet Nam.

Centre for
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Development Programme
in Viet Nam

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This 2013 PAPI report is a result of the continued productive partnership between CECODES, VFF-CRT and UNDP. The year 2013 marked the fifth annual round of effective and proactive collaboration between implementing partners and the third annual nationwide iteration.

This report is authored by a team led by Mr. Jairo Acuña-Alfaro from UNDP. The team includes Mr. Đặng Ngọc Dinh and Mr. Đặng Hoàng Giang from CECODES, Associate Professor of Political Economy Mr. Edmund J. Malesky from Duke University and Ms. Đỗ Thanh Huyền from UNDP.

PAPI surveys are made possible thanks to diligent guidance from the VFF and proactive collaboration from provincial to grassroots levels. Special thanks also goes to the 13,892 Vietnamese citizens who were randomly selected for the 2013 PAPI face-to-face interviews. They actively participated in the 2013 PAPI survey by sharing valuable experiences of interactions with local authorities and perspectives on governance, public administration performance and public service delivery in their localities.

PAPI is substantively guided by a National Advisory Board and sincere thanks is extended to its 24 members for willingly dedicating their time and knowledge towards different PAPI activities and processes. In addition, PAPI receives valued technical assistance from a team of international governance measurement experts. Dr. Edmund J. Malesky led the development of PAPI's research methodology, construction of the Index and wrote Chapter 2. Dr. Pierre F. Landry, Associate Professor of Political Science at Pittsburgh University, provided pro-bono advice on post-stratification weights. Mr. Paul Schuler, Ph.D candidate from University of California, San Diego helped with the selection of samples towards the village level.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the past five years, the Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) has captured and reflected the experiences of nearly 50,000 citizens in the country. PAPI is a pioneering initiative that has become the largest time-series national governance and public administration performance monitoring tool in Viet Nam exclusively based on citizens experiences. These annual and nationwide iterations of PAPI provide 'real-time' data and information on the implementation of complex, yet key governance and public administration processes as Vietnamese citizens experience them.

Overall, the three years of nationwide evidence collected by PAPI displays a great deal of stability and consistency in scores annually. The remarkable consistency in dimension scores in 2013 once again provides reassurance on the robustness of data collection and reliability of the sample frame and methodology.

Further encouragement is gained from the steady improvements in how Vietnamese citizens have experienced governance in interactions with the public administration system since 2011. This is especially so in 2013, with PAPI data confirming that for the second consecutive year that Vietnamese citizens on average experienced more positive interactions with local governments with constant improvements, albeit marginal in some cases, in five out of the six dimensions analysed. 'Control of Corruption' is the dimension with the biggest improvement (4.24%) from 2012, followed by 'Transparency' (3.40%). 'Vertical Accountability' (1.19%), 'Public Service Delivery' (0.68%) and 'Public Administrative Procedures' (0.32%) were the other dimensions to take small steps forward, while 'Participation at Local Levels' (-0.33%) lost ground for a second consecutive year.

A deeper level of analysis relates to the actual projected range of scores, based on the survey sample, across the country as a whole and includes a range of scores at provincial level and their distribution, from lowest to highest performers. By looking at this data we can see the poorest performing provinces are raising their game as the lowest scoring province in each of five dimensions in 2013 posted higher scores than the corresponding provinces in

2012. The only dimension to experience a minor decline is 'Public Administrative Procedures'.

Another takeaway message can be obtained by looking at the top scoring provinces that reveal scores for 'Transparency', 'Vertical Accountability', 'Public Administrative Procedures' and 'Public Service Delivery' actually moved up in 2013 compared to 2011. These scoring trends suggest that bottom and top-performing provinces are simultaneously heightening standards of governance and public administration performance.

Overall, the key policy message in 2013 is Vietnamese citizens seem to experience and perceive government efforts to control corruption and improve transparency, with the stability in other dimensions underlining PAPI's ongoing value and relevance to stakeholders.

While there are other positives to take from this report, such as confirmation that citizens remain optimistic about national and household economic prospects, this economic optimism does not necessarily automatically translate into citizen satisfaction with governance and public administration performance at different government levels.

In fact, the 2013 findings underline a number of key challenges facing national and provincial governments as well as local authorities. Leading issues to be addressed include the need to enhance citizen awareness of grassroots democratic rights and create opportunities to participate effectively in political activities and policy making, encourage direct and effective interactions with citizens, consistently enforce measures to control corruption and improve the quality of public administration and services in step with society's development and expectations.

Measuring Provincial Performance Over Time

In keeping with earlier PAPI reports, 2013's edition details provincial performances with an analysis of changes over time at dimensional, sub-dimensional and indicator levels. The focus also turns towards local level policy makers by presenting variations in provincial governance

and public administration performance. This approach is helpful to not only identify strong and weak performers, but also good practices at provincial level that other provinces and especially those with similar socio-economic and geographic characteristics can learn from and adapt to their localities.

PAPI's tailored control panel approach allows policy makers and development partners to take a unique look at levers of provincial performance and track changes over time. For instance, 10 provinces have outperformed the rest of the top tier performers during three years of nationwide PAPI surveys (Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Binh Dinh, Binh Duong, Da Nang, Lang Son, Long An, Nam Dinh, Quang Binh, Thanh Hoa and Ho Chi Minh City). Of interest, fewer provinces have remained anchored in the bottom performing category since 2011 (Cao Bang, Lai Chau, Quang Ninh and Tay Ninh) highlighting a general trend of low scoring provinces improving their performance.

Another trend is reflected in the number of higher scoring provinces in 2013, compared to previous years. In 2011, only four provinces scored more than 40 points (on a scale of 6 to 60 points) in the overall weighted PAPI Index to sit in the top bracket (Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Long An, Quang Binh and Son La). However, in 2012 this number of provinces more than doubled with Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Long An and Quang Binh joined by Binh Dinh, Da Nang, Nam Dinh and Quang Tri. In 2013, these same seven provinces again scored more than 40 points and were joined by Thanh Hoa, Vinh Long and Lang Son as new entries in this top performing group.

At the other end of the scale, there was also dramatic positive upward development. In 2011 a total of 11 provinces scored below 35 points (Binh Thuan, Cao Bang, Ha Giang, Hung Yen, Lai Chau, Lam Dong, Ninh Binh, Phu Yen, Quang Ngai, Tay Ninh and Tra Vinh) and in 2012 this further reduced to just six provinces (Ca Mau, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Khanh Hoa, Tay Ninh and Tra Vinh). But in an eye-catching development in 2013, only Bac Giang province scored below 35 points.

In addition, from this comprehensive analysis in 2013 the central coastal province of Quang Binh emerges as the standout performer as it is the only province present in the top scoring group of all six dimensions. At the other extreme, northeastern Bac Giang province has significant room for improvement to lift itself out of the bottom group of all six dimensions.

PAPI's Impact and Uses

PAPI provides evidence for policy makers to monitor implementation and redesign policies and interventions where necessary at central and provincial levels. As a policy-monitoring tool, however, PAPI is not a stand-alone source of information and data as its full potential for policy making is achieved when complemented and analysed with other monitoring tools. These tools include, for instance, the annual economic-governance performance index commonly known as the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) by the Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), the recent government self-assessment Public Administration Reform Index (PAR-Index) by the Ministry of Home Affairs, provincial level public opinion surveys by the Communist Party Ideology and Propaganda Committees along with current and future monitoring mechanisms from the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF).

In a short period of time, PAPI has become a valuable policy making tool which is reflected by increasing evidence that information and data provided by PAPI is being used in a meaningful way by a growing number of key stakeholders. In 2013 alone, the number of provincial authorities issuing official statements on PAPI data exponentially increased against the previous two years. To illustrate this point, nine provinces in 2013 are reported as having issued specific policy documents to address strengths and weaknesses identified by PAPI. These provinces are Binh Dinh, Binh Thuan, Ca Mau, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Dong Thap, Kon Tum, Quang Ngai and Thai Nguyen. Four other provinces, An Giang, Ha Giang, Lao Cai and Phu Yen took the initiative to host provincial diagnostics workshops and comparative analyses.

An additional element of policy responses has been undertaken by the Ho Chi Minh Academy of Politics and Public Administration (HCMA). In its role to provide policy advice to provincial leaders, the HCMA undertook extensive comparative research with 15 provinces to understand drivers and factors influencing provincial performances. In 2013, the HCMA focused its efforts on in-depth action-research in An Giang, Ha Giang and Phu Yen provinces. To further extend PAPI's reach and influence, it has also been embedded as a regular lecture in the HCMA's high-level leadership training programme as a means to provide current and future Communist Party and provincial leaders with additional information on citizen experiences of governance and public administration performance.

Beyond the objective of using PAPI findings to generate formal policy responses by provincial authorities, an increasing number of research studies are being conducted using PAPI data. These empirical and policy studies undertaken by Vietnamese and international experts make extensive use of PAPI data to build hypotheses and propose alternative policy options. In addition, PAPI has generated significant international, national and provincial level media coverage, which has fostered ongoing public debate on key issues.

Exploring the Equality of Governance and Public Administration Experiences

A feature of this report is the special investigation of an insightful, yet under-explored national trend of performance variations actually occurring more within provinces than across them. This breakthrough PAPI analysis reveals that citizens often experience governance and public administration very differently within the borders of a province and even a village, let alone the wide differences in citizen experiences with governance and public administration quality across Viet Nam. In some provinces, the quality of governance is reportedly high and inequality relatively low, indicating that most citizens experience similar levels of satisfaction in interactions with officials and the quality of public services. In other locations, however, citizens have divergent opinions on overall governance quality.

The reasons for this are much more complicated than traditional reasoning, such as rural-urban divides or variations caused by cultural or historical differences across regions, as this inequality cuts across the nation. What can be noted for certain though is women, the poor, ethnic minorities and those without governance connections have a lower opinion of governance quality than fellow citizens, even within the same rural district or village.

This PAPI discovery provides a helpful corrective to the tendency to focus on purely provincial level policy levers to correct governance quality. Moreover, it is a timely reminder that a province's satisfactory public administration score may simply be the result of less favourable evaluations of local authorities being counter-balanced by other citizens perceiving the same services more favourably.

PAPI delivers this new element of policy examination by digging deeper into the distribution of data. It shows a great deal of variance in policy implementation than can be accounted for by differences in citizens' experiences - even when drilling down to village level. This highlighted inequality in governance is much greater in some parts of the country than others. While Da Nang and Quang Binh shine as provinces providing high quality governance to nearly all of their citizens, Quang Ngai stands out as especially unequal.

While interesting, this analysis only marks the beginning of further policy research. Unexplained variations in governance experiences remain extremely high, indicating that there is far more to the story than has been teased out with observable data.

A Stronger Partnership

The scientific validity of PAPI is reinforced by close and effective coordination with respected national partners, in particular the VFF's Centre for Research and Training (VFF-CRT), the Centre for Community Support and Development Studies (CECODES) under the Viet Nam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). PAPI's consistent high quality is also a reflection of close coordination between the VFF Central Committee and its local level committees.

This 2013 PAPI Report will contribute to ongoing efforts to improve governance and public administration performance at a provincial level. As a rich source of objective data collected using state-of-the-art and scientific methods, PAPI is an essential reference point and policy diagnostic tool for policy makers, government leaders, civil society organizations, the media, scholars and international development partners to better understand and respond to the needs of a middle-income Viet Nam.

Finally, PAPI would not be possible without generous funding from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

INTRODUCTION

The measurement of governance and public administration is complex and manifold. It involves an array of variables and a combination of processes, means and ends. It also encompasses a variety of actors, institutions and regulations. In short, it is a complex multi-dimensional process. Within this complexity, the Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) introduces a parsimonious measurement that facilitates an understanding of how governance and public administration processes are experienced by Vietnamese citizens over time. By adhering to a rigorous approach, PAPI presents a clear and accurate picture of citizens' experiences when they interact with key public administration processes, receive public services and participate in governance processes.

PAPI is an endogenous measure for Viet Nam. It strictly adheres to Vietnamese own rules and regulations to provide a robust social monitoring tool of and for the country. As such, PAPI provides a balanced, objective and neutral metric of governance and public administration reform nationwide and at each of Viet Nam's 63 provinces¹. With three consecutive years of nationwide implementation and five years of implementation overall, PAPI has become a consolidated and respected policy tool at national and provincial levels.

During the past five years, PAPI has collected the experiences of nearly 50,000 citizens². This makes it the largest and perhaps the only time-series national governance and public administration performance monitoring

tool in Viet Nam solely based on citizen experiences. The annual and nationwide iterations of PAPI since 2011, provide 'real-time' data and information on the implementation of complex, yet key governance and public administration processes as they are experienced by Vietnamese citizens.

PAPI, as a policy-monitoring tool, is not a stand-alone source of information and data. Its full potential for policy making is achieved when complemented and analysed with other existing and new monitoring tools. These tools include, for instance, the annual economic-governance performance index commonly known as the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) by the Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), the recent government self-assessment Public Administration Reform Index (PAR-Index) by the Ministry of Home Affairs, provincial level public opinion surveys by the Communist Party Ideology and Propaganda Committees along with current and future monitoring mechanisms³ from the VFF. In turn, PAPI provides evidence for policy makers to monitor implementation and re-design policies and interventions where necessary at the central and provincial levels.

There is already increasing evidence that information and data provided by PAPI is being used in a meaningful way by a growing number of key stakeholders. Table 1 includes a sample list of responses from provincial governments towards the study of policy levers from citizen experiences.

PAPI presents a clear and accurate picture of citizens' experiences when they interact with key public administration processes, receive public services and participate in governance processes.

PAPI is an endogenous measure for Viet Nam. It strictly adheres to Viet Nam's rules and regulations to provide a robust social monitoring tool of and for the country.

1 By 'province' it is understood as all 58 provinces and the five centrally managed municipalities in Viet Nam.

2 Actual number of interviews is 47,389. This includes three pilot provinces in 2009, 30 provinces in 2010, and nationwide implementation in all 63 provinces in 2011, 2012 and 2013.

3 Decision No. 217-QĐ/TW on the issuance of regulations on exercising oversight and social feedback functions of the VFF and socio-political mass organizations of the Vietnam Central Communist Party Committee dated 12 December 2013.

Table 1: Sample of Provincial Responses to PAPI Findings

Provinces	Type of Responses(*)	Responsible Party
An Giang	Provincial diagnostics workshop on 28/10/2013	Provincial People's Committee
Binh Dinh	Directive No. 13/CT-UBND dated 8/8/2013 Provincial Diagnostic Workshops	Provincial People's Committee
Binh Thuan	Directive No. 28/CT-UBND dated 13/9/2013	Provincial People's Committee
Ca Mau	Directive No. 06/CT-UBND dated 17/9/2013	Provincial People's Committee
Cao Bang	Provincial diagnostics workshop on 18/09/2012 Provincial diagnostics workshop and analysis	Provincial People's Committee Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
Da Nang	In-depth analysis of PAPI 2012 Report to People's Committee Training workshop on how to improve PAPI	Institute for Socio-Economic Development Dept. of Home Affairs
Dak Lak	Official Letter No. 2211/UBND-TH dated 03/5/2012	Provincial People's Committee
Dak Nong	Decision No. 276/QĐ-UBND/2013 dated 22/02/2013 with concrete action plan	Provincial People's Committee
Dien Bien	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
Dong Thap	Directive No. 13/CT-UBND dated 5/8/2013	Provincial People's Committee
Ha Giang	Provincial diagnostics workshop on 20/11/2013	Provincial People's Committee
Ha Nam	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
Ha Tinh	Provincial diagnostics workshop on 25/06/2011 Decision No. 587/QĐ-UBND dated 29/02/2012 on PAR reform of the province, stressing the need to maintain and strengthen PAPI scores	Provincial Viet Nam Fatherland Front People's Committee
Kon Tum	Provincial diagnostics workshop in 2010 Replicated PAPI survey for nine districts in 2011 Decision No. 703/QĐ-UBND dated 3/8/2012	Provincial People's Committee
Lao Cai	Provincial diagnostics workshop on 16/08/2013	Provincial People's Committee
Ninh Binh	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
Phu Yen	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012 Provincial diagnostics workshop on 06/12/2013	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
Quang Nam	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
Quang Ngai	Directive No. 19/CT-UBND dated 29/11/2012 Resolution No. 08/2013/NQ-HDND dated 10/07/2013	Provincial People's Committee Provincial People's Council
Soc Trang	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)
Thai Nguyen	Resolution No. 15/2012/NQ-HDND dated 15/12/2012 Provincial Diagnostics Workshop on 17/12/2013	Provincial People's Council Provincial People's Committee/ Dept. Home Affairs
Tra Vinh	Provincial diagnostics workshop and comparative analysis, 2012	Provincial People's Committee (with Ho Chi Minh Academy)

Note: (*) Links to provincial documents available at www.papi.vn

In 2013 alone, the number of provincial authorities issuing official statements on PAPI data exponentially increased from 2011. To illustrate the point, nine provinces in 2013 are reported as having issued specific policy documents to address strengths and weaknesses identified by PAPI. These provinces are Binh Dinh, Binh Thuan, Ca Mau, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Dong Thap, Kon Tum, Quang Ngai and Thai Nguyen. Four other provinces, An Giang, Ha Giang, Lao Cai and Phu Yen took the initiative to host provincial diagnostics workshops and comparative analyses.

This contrasts with use of 2011 data when Kon Tum was the only province reported issuing Decision No. 703/QĐ-UBND dated 3 August 2012 and replicating the PAPI survey for all nine districts with similar results. This illustrated a significant level of initiative shown by the province's leadership and confirmed the robustness of the PAPI sample and methodology, as well as reliability of its findings.

In 2012 further progress was made as Ha Tinh provincial authorities issued Decision No. 587/QĐ-UBND dated 29 February 2012 on PAR reform in the province, stressing the need to maintain and strengthen PAPI scores. In addition, 10 other provinces hosted in-depth provincial diagnostics workshops to analyse the PAPI results and potential implications (Cao Bang, Da Nang, Dien Bien, Ha Nam, Ha Tinh, Ninh Binh, Phu Yen, Quang Nam, Soc Trang and Tra Vinh).

An additional element of policy responses has been undertaken by the Ho Chi Minh Academy of Politics and Public Administration (HCMA). In its role to provide policy advice to provincial leaders, the HCMA undertook extensive comparative research with 15 provinces to understand drivers and factors influencing provincial performances. In 2013, the HCMA

focused its efforts on in-depth action-research in three provinces An Giang, Ha Giang and Phu Yen (see Table 1). Additionally, PAPI has been embedded as a regular lecture in the HCMA's high-level leadership training programme as a means to provide current and future Communist Party and provincial leaders with additional information on citizen experiences of governance and public administration performance.

Also, beyond the objective of formal policy responses from provincial authorities, Appendix B includes information on an increasing number of research studies being conducted using PAPI data. These empirical and policy studies have been done by Vietnamese and international experts making extensive use of PAPI data to build hypotheses and propose alternative policy options.

This report keeps the flow and outline of previous editions. The first chapter tracks changes in the overall national performance of governance and public administration over the three annual iterations of PAPI (2011, 2012 and 2013). The second chapter provides a preliminary, but innovative and pioneering analysis of variations in the quality of governance and public administration within provinces. The third chapter presents aggregated and disaggregated findings for provinces of the PAPI 2013 with time-series comparisons at dimensional and sub-dimensional levels.

This report is also accompanied by an interactive website at www.papi.vn with further background documentation about the methodology and representativeness of the sample as well as detailed provincial level profiles and indicators.



CHAPTER 1


NATIONAL TRENDS
FROM 2011-2013

Monitoring Change in Governance
and Public Administration Performance

The three years of nationwide evidence collected by PAPI displays a great deal of stability and consistency in scores annually (see Figure 1.1). This remarkable consistency in dimension scores in 2013 once again provides reassurance on the robustness of data collection and reliability of the sample frame and methodology. As underlined in previous reports, consistency is expected at dimensional levels because of the aggregation and complexity of aspects measured by PAPI.

Encouragingly, steady improvements are noted in how Vietnamese citizens experience governance in interactions with the public administration system. The evidence from stable PAPI data in 2013 confirms that for the second consecutive year, Vietnamese citizens on average have experienced more positive interactions with local governments. Figure 1.1 renders constant, albeit marginal in some cases, improvements in five out of the six dimensions included in PAPI. Notably, ‘Control of Corruption’ is the dimension with

Figure 1.1: PAPI Mean Scores by Dimensions from 2011 to 2013



Note: (*) With adjustment to Indicator D407 in Dimension 4: Control of Corruption for all three iterations since 2011.

biggest improvement of 4.24% from 2012 to 2013. This is followed by 'Transparency' with an increase of 3.40%. Other dimensions with smaller-scale improvements from 2012 to 2013 include 'Vertical Accountability' (1.19%), 'Public Service Delivery' (0.68%) and 'Public Administrative Procedures' (0.32%). The only dimension that scores a negligible reduction is 'Participation at Local Levels' (-0.33%). In a nutshell, the main policy message from Figure 1.1 is that overall, Vietnamese citizens seem to experience and perceive efforts to control corruption and improve transparency. On the other hand, other dimensions remain constant with no significant statistical changes.

Table 1.1 further builds on the analysis by rendering annual changes at sub-dimension levels. Given PAPI's aggregation approach, it is important to analyse what drives or hinders national performance in the overall dimensions. Such an understanding will help unearth drivers of performance as well as identify barriers to reforms.

'Control of Corruption' is the dimension to chalk up the largest improvements in 2013 from 2012, and overall since 2011. This is indeed a positive signal that measures being adopted to control this deep-rooted impediment to development are gaining traction, albeit still with significant room for improvement. In particular, on a sub-dimensional level it is worth noting a positive 8.60% change in aspects related to 'limits on public sector corruption', a 6.34% rise in 'equity in employment' and a 4.46% jump in 'limits on corruption in public service delivery'. Interestingly, no significant changes are noted in terms of provincial authorities' willingness to fight corruption (see Table 1.1).

'Transparency' is the second best performer, with all three sub-dimensions having exhibited improvements when 2013's scores are compared with 2012's (see Table 1.1). The sub-dimension 'transparency in commune budgets' leads the way with a positive 4.4% change, followed by 'transparency in land-use planning and pricing' with 4.26% and 'transparency in poverty lists' with a 1.98% change. The dimension related to 'Vertical Accountability' had a small-scale advancement of 1.19% overall. However, these positive developments contrast with a 5.32% decrease in terms of citizens' experiences when interacting with local authorities. The two key accountability institutions at local levels included in this dimension each experienced improvements of 5.45% and 3.51%.

'Public Administrative Procedures' and 'Public Service Delivery' are perhaps the dimensions most closely related to citizens' direct experiences with the public administration system. They capture citizens' interactions with public officials and public employees when undergoing administrative procedures, dealing with government bureaucratic processes and one-stop shops (OSSs) as well as interacting with service providers, such as teachers and health practitioners. Interestingly, both areas exhibit negligible changes at dimensional and sub-dimensional levels. Two interpretations can be extrapolated for this. First, the changes are minor due to the elasticity of the measure. That is, on the aggregated scale from 1 to 10, both dimensions exhibit the highest mean scores, given lower possibilities for improvements. The second interpretation is administrative and service delivery reforms, while leading to marginal improvements may have greater room to adjust their pace and enhance the quality of both types of the services.

Finally, Table 1.1 presents the results for 'Participation at Local Levels', the only dimension with a reduction in mean scores for two consecutive years, albeit marginally during 2012-2013. At the sub-dimensional level, it is interesting to note a reduction of 4.02% in terms of 'opportunities for participation', while 'voluntary contributions' experienced a significant improvement of 7.54%. These aggregate scores call for further analysis and research to extrapolate what is driving these changes (see Chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion at provincial level).

Of note, Table 1.1 also highlights seven sub-dimensions in 'Transparency' and 'Public Service Delivery' that have experienced positive mean score changes during all three PAPI iterations. They are the only two dimensions that have not experienced a negative mean change score for the periods 2011-2012 and 2012-2013.

The analysis of mean scores by dimension and sub-dimension is relevant, but only a starting point to capturing a clear picture of nationwide trends, as aggregate levels can also hide important performance issues. A deeper level of analysis relates to the actual range of possible scores within the country as a whole and includes the range of scores at provincial level and their distribution, from lowest to highest performing scores. Figure 1.2 illustrates this distribution and how it has evolved during the past three years. The figure depicts scores for the lowest and

highest scoring provinces in each dimension from 2011-2013, with the median scoring province (red dot) in the centre of this distribution.

There are several ways to digest this information. First, by looking at the lowest scoring provinces (the lowest scores) five dimensions experienced positive increases

on the lowest performing province in 2013 compared with 2012. The only dimension to experience a minor decline is 'Public Administrative Procedures'. Overall, the message is that bottom performing provinces appear to be increasing their scores and heightening standards of governance and public administration performance.

Table 1.1: PAPI Overall Scores by Dimension and Sub-dimension: 2011-2013

	2011	2012	2013			Mean Change %		
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Low(*)	High(*)	2011-12	2012-13	2011-13
Dimension 1: Participation at Local Levels	5.30	5.16	5.14	5.06	5.23	-2.66	-0.33	-2.97
Civic Knowledge	1.11	1.06	1.04	1.00	1.07	-4.78	-2.33	-7.00
Opportunities for Participation	1.88	1.82	1.75	1.72	1.78	-3.23	-4.02	-7.12
Quality of Elections	1.45	1.47	1.49	1.46	1.52	0.91	1.35	2.27
Voluntary Contributions	0.85	0.81	0.87	0.85	0.90	-4.69	7.54	2.50
Dimension 2: Transparency	5.47	5.61	5.80	5.70	5.90	2.54	3.40	6.02
Poverty Lists	2.15	2.23	2.28	2.21	2.34	3.61	1.98	5.67
Commune Budgets	1.76	1.77	1.85	1.82	1.88	0.70	4.40	5.13
Land-Use Planning/Price Frames	1.56	1.61	1.68	1.65	1.70	3.13	4.26	7.52
Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability	5.50	5.58	5.65	5.57	5.73	1.41	1.19	2.62
Interactions With Local Authorities	1.87	1.88	1.78	1.75	1.81	0.21	-5.32	-5.12
People's Inspection Boards	1.85	1.87	1.97	1.93	2.01	1.21	5.45	6.73
Community Investment Supervision Boards	1.78	1.83	1.90	1.86	1.94	2.89	3.51	6.49
Dimension 4: Control of Corruption(**)	5.76	5.90	6.15	6.00	6.29	2.43	4.24	6.77
Limits on Public Sector Corruption	1.40	1.43	1.56	1.50	1.61	2.63	8.60	11.46
Limits on Corruption in Public Service Delivery	1.76	1.75	1.83	1.80	1.86	-0.34	4.46	4.10
Equity in Employment	0.94	0.96	1.02	0.97	1.07	1.46	6.34	7.89
Willingness to Fight Corruption(**)	1.66	1.75	1.74	1.71	1.77	5.42	-0.57	4.82
Dimension 5: Public Administrative Procedures	6.88	6.87	6.89	6.84	6.94	-0.17	0.32	0.14
Certification Procedures	1.68	1.67	1.69	1.66	1.73	-0.57	1.27	0.69
Construction Permit Procedures	1.77	1.77	1.76	1.75	1.77	-0.16	-0.37	-0.52
Land Use Rights Procedures	1.58	1.56	1.58	1.57	1.59	-1.12	1.14	0.00
Commune-level Procedures	1.84	1.86	1.85	1.83	1.87	0.99	-0.59	0.40
Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery	6.75	6.90	6.95	6.88	7.01	2.29	0.68	2.99
Public Health	1.75	1.78	1.78	1.76	1.81	1.66	0.33	2.00
Public Education	1.65	1.67	1.68	1.68	1.69	0.82	1.12	1.95
Infrastructure	1.75	1.85	1.86	1.80	1.91	5.83	0.28	6.13
Law and Order	1.60	1.60	1.62	1.61	1.63	0.32	1.40	1.72

Notes: (*) 95% confidence interval levels. (**) Adjusted for comparative purposes.

Overall, the message is that bottom performing provinces appear to be increasing their scores and heightening standards of governance and public administration performance.

A second interpretation can be deduced by looking at the median scoring provinces (red dots). This score is relevant as it splits the distribution of performance in half, translating into half of the provinces having a higher or lower score. Again from the six dimensions assessed five experienced an increase, with the exception of 'Participation at Local Levels'. A third takeaway message can be obtained by looking at the highest scores (top scoring provinces), which reveal that 'Transparency', 'Vertical Accountability', 'Public Administrative Procedures' and 'Public Service Delivery' have actually moved up in 2013 compared to 2011's scores. This suggests top-performing provinces are heightening standards of governance and public administration performance.

Figure 1.2 highlights the actual distribution of scores (with further discussion in Chapter 2) and graphically shows the differences in performance across the country. In this regard, a fourth interpretation is the actual distribution of experiences in issues of 'Participation at Local Levels', 'Transparency' and 'Control of Corruption' has narrowed since 2011. In other words, citizens seem to be having similar levels of experiences in these areas, as the distribution is lowest. This is


particularly evident in 'Public Administrative Procedures', where the length of the bar between the lowest and maximum scores is the shortest.

The preceding discussion highlights the importance of disaggregation in governance and public administration performance. Despite advances in the preceding decade, the discussion about progress and forces, individual and collective, resistant to public administration reforms in Viet Nam was based on general aggregates with limited data and the portrayal of general trends nationwide.

PAPI breaks the mould in two ways. First, PAPI individually disaggregates performance levels by each province. Second, PAPI introduces the demand side of governance and public administration by directly querying citizens about their experiences.

These citizen experiences do not happen in a vacuum. They are circumscribed within a context, in which governance and public administration have been defined as areas of significance in Viet Nam's sustainable development efforts as part of the Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2011-2020. The next section turns to the analysis of the overall development context.

Figure 1.2: Changes in Dimension Scores
(lowest, median and maximum provinces)



Note: (*) With adjustment to Indicator D407 in Dimension 4: Control of Corruption for all three iterations since 2011.

Overall Development Context

The overall economic situation of the majority of Vietnamese citizens is considered to be satisfactory, with the findings for 2013 consistent with the previous two years. Figure 1.3 suggests that on average, eight-in-10 Vietnamese citizens perceive their current economic situation to be “normal” to “very good”. Yet, as highlighted in the previous two years, equality in economic opportunities remains a challenge as citizens from non-Kinh ethnic backgrounds perceive their economic situation as worse than Kinh.

Figure 1.3 suggests that nearly four-in-10 non-Kinh citizens consider themselves to be in a “poor” or “very poor” economic situation and only 7% see themselves in a “good” or “very good” position. These stark differences have important policy implications for the future. On one hand, the findings underline the continuing challenge to bridge the gap in opportunities between ethnicities. But on the other hand, they imply that expectations

in terms of the quality of governance and public administration will differ according to economic conditions. As a result, the implementation of public policies will have to adapt to changing expectations, while maintaining consistency in upgrades of public service provision standards.

These levels of optimism and inequality are also reflected in citizens’ assessments of their current economic situation compared to five years ago (Figure 1.4) and their likely situation in five years time (Figure 1.5). On average, half of surveyed citizens consider their economic situation to be “better” in 2013 than five years ago, a quarter the “same” and only two-in-10 citizens as “worse”. Looking to the future, the levels of optimism remain with one-in-two citizens forecasting their economic situation will be “better” in five years time, one-in-four (25%) to remain the “same” and only 8% to be “worse”. These findings are remarkably consistent from assessments in 2011 and

Eight-in-10 Vietnamese citizens perceive their current economic situation to be “normal” to “very good”. Yet, equality in economic opportunities remains a challenge as citizens from non-Kinh ethnic backgrounds perceive their economic situation as worse than Kinh.

Figure 1.3: Current Economic Situation in 2013




Figure 1.4: Economic Situation Compared to Five Years Ago





Figure 1.5: Economic Situation in Five Years Time




2012. This stability overtime confirms important development gains for Viet Nam and highlights challenges ahead.

One additional element needed to understand and help analyse the earlier-mentioned levels of economic optimism is to uncover the most important socio-economic issues for citizens. In 2013, a new question was added to the PAPI survey to explore what worries Vietnamese citizens most. Figure 1.6 presents the results. Environmental pollution (46%), traffic accidents (44%) and drug abuse (43%)

are the most serious socio-economic issues, followed by food hygiene and safety (36%) and corruption (25%). Low scoring issues include health care quality (20%), living costs (19%), employment (16%), income (14%) and education quality (13%). At the disaggregation level, in terms of ethnicity, Kinh citizens are most concerned with environmental issues, drug abuse, food hygiene and corruption than other ethnicities. But, when it comes to living costs, employment and income, non-Kinh citizens are the most concerned.

When it comes to living costs, employment and income, non-Kinh citizens are the most concerned.

Figure 1.6: Most Serious Socio-economic Issues in 2013




Corruption and Quality of Public Services

From these highlighted socio-economic issues, PAPI places emphasis on corruption and its different manifestations in the public sector. Other elements spotlighted by PAPI are quality and experiences with health care and education services. This section discusses the nationwide comparative findings in these parameters.

The perception of corruption and incidences of bribery are intrinsically complex phenomena

to measure. But, PAPI provides a rigorous approach to measure both in the Vietnamese context. At the national aggregate level, citizens tend to see corruption as better controlled in 2013 than 2011 and 2012. This is evident in the incremental change in the national mean score over the past three years (see Figure 1.1). However, despite this overall improvement, corruption and bribery in the public sector remain constant in areas and sectors that PAPI measures (see Figure 1.7).

Figure 1.7: Perceptions of Corruption and Bribery in the Public Sector (2011-2013)



In addition, when asked about corruption and bribery in the public sector, citizens largely agree with statements that bribes are required to receive construction permits (24% in 2013, 22% in 2012 and 16% in 2011), to receive land use rights certificates (LURCs) (30% in 2013, 29% in 2012 and 21% in 2011) and for students to be better taken care of at primary schools (27% in 2013, 10% higher than 2011). To further underline how corruption and bribery remain constant in the public sector, the same proportion of citizens (42% and 40%) agreed with the statement

about incidences of bribery at public district hospitals over the past two years, with a similarly consistent response regarding bribes for jobs in the public sector (42% and 44% in agreement). The same percentage of citizens perceived the incidence of public officials diverting State funds for private use (20% in agreement during 2012 and 2013).

Table 1.2 compares the results of different estimation strategies on the frequency of bribes in the public sector for 2013. The measurement of corruption and informal

Table 1.2: Estimating Frequency of Bribes (Different Methodologies)


Analysis Technique	Land Use Rights Certificates	Public District Healthcare	Public Primary Education	Survey Question
Corruption Perception ¹	25.3%	37.0%	29.0%	D402 (b, c, d)
Experiential Questions ²	13.7%	12.8%	8.8%	D507hi, D604dl, D606cdk
Frequency estimated from size ³	32.7%	20.3%	29.0%	D507fa, D604e1, D606cd

Note:

- (1) Respondents are asked to agree or disagree with statements about perceived corruption activities in their locality. Those who partially or totally agree are added together (non-response included in denominator).
- (2) Respondents who used procedures, public healthcare services at district hospitals or education services at public primary schools are asked to reflect on whether they paid a bribe or not.
- (3) Reports the share of respondents in the treatment group who answered that they paid more for items than those in the control group.

payments is intrinsically complex, as no one single measure or metric will provide an accurate estimate. PAPI recognizes this complexity by introducing different approaches, including a combination of corruption perception and experiential questions. As expected, the difference between analysis techniques is significant. However, the perception of corruption in all measures is greater than actual experiences of corruption (see first two rows of Table 1.2).

An additional indicator of corruption is how citizens perceive local governments are dealing with the problem. Figure 1.8 suggests citizens believe their local officials are gradually becoming more serious about controlling corruption (from 34% in 2011 to 38% in 2013). Furthermore, citizens who have heard about the Anti-Corruption Law (AC Law) tend to be more confident in local governments' resolve to tackle corruption, than those who have not heard about this law (see Figure 1.8).

Figure 1.8: Provincial Government Serious about Anti-Corruption

Drivers of Quality in Public Services

In previous editions of PAPI, it has been argued that as Viet Nam progresses on its development stages, expectations on the quality of public administrative services and public services will change. As such, accessibility to such public services becomes less of a concern for citizens, as attention turns to the enhanced capabilities of public service providers. In the three iterations of PAPI, citizens remained largely satisfied with administrative services. At ground level, access to one-stop shops across the country has been made easier and cheaper for ordinary Vietnamese citizens who want to get legal papers processed at public offices. Similar to the 2012 PAPI report, an important element is included in 2013 to analyse the drivers of satisfaction in the quality of public administrative services.


The analysis breaks down changes in users' overall satisfaction with public administrative services provided at provincial, district and commune levels. It is based on citizens' real experiences in using key administrative

services encompassing certification services, construction permits, LURCs and administrative procedures provided at the commune level. In step with 2012, areas of concern in the quality of public administrative services mainly relate to the soft skills of public officials undertaking the administrative work. Figure 1.9 presents the results for each of the four administrative services.

Regarding certification procedures, when citizens experience disrespectful treatment or unmet deadlines, their satisfaction levels diminish by 36% and 32%, respectively. The reduction in service satisfaction is even more dramatic with the granting construction permits, where disrespectful behaviour lowered satisfaction levels by 78% and perceived incompetence by 51%. For LURC applicants, the biggest turn-offs in 2013 were disrespectful treatment by officials (-69%) and excessive paperwork (-50%). For commune-level administrative procedures, the main reasons for dissatisfaction were unmet deadlines (-51%) and disrespectfulness (-50%).

Areas of concern in the quality of public administrative services mainly relate to the soft skills of public officials undertaking the administrative work.

Figure 1.9: Changes in Satisfaction with Public Administrative Procedures
(% change from overall satisfaction)




Note: (*) Question about bribes for LURCs included in battery of questions on quality of LURC services since 2013.

In terms of the quality of public services, PAPI introduces drivers of satisfaction towards public primary schools and public healthcare facilities. Figure 1.10 visualizes the main drivers of satisfaction for both public services, that Figure 1.6 earlier illustrates are of major areas of concern for 20% (health) and 13% (education) of citizens in 2013.

teacher exhibits poor teaching performance in the classroom, followed by demands for bribes or informal payments (-15%) and irregular feedback mechanisms (-11%). These findings reveal that the main drivers of satisfaction are related to the soft and human relations at schools, rather than hardware or infrastructure aspects like classroom conditions.

Regarding public primary schools, parents' satisfaction reduces by 28% when their children's

Figure 1.10: Changes in Satisfaction with Public Services
(% change from overall satisfaction)



A similar pattern is found regarding public district hospital experiences. The key drivers of satisfaction are not necessarily accessibility or capital investment in infrastructure and facilities. Instead, healthy human interactions between patients, their relatives and medical service providers are key. For instance, disrespectfulness eroded patients' satisfaction levels by 51%, followed by irregular visits by health practitioners (-44%), unreasonable expenses (-43%) as well as bribes and informal payments requests (-33%). Other criteria such as sharing beds with other patients, no electric fans, unreasonable waiting times and recommendations to buy medicines from private pharmacies are of less relevance to district hospital users.

as users in terms of soft parameters in human relations and interactions. This confirms the hypothesis that in the current development stage of Viet Nam, accessibility is becoming less relevant in users' perspectives as attention turns to the actual quality of services provided. Several paths can be followed to improve such quality, with a cornerstone undoubtedly being the levels of knowledge and skills of public officials and employees providing these services. Indeed, the quality of human resources has already been identified as a key strategic breakthrough in the country's Socio-Economic Development Strategy (2011-2020).

Figure 1.11 illustrates how citizens perceive the importance of personal connections, rather than merit, in obtaining employment in five key public sector positions. The importance of nepotism is consistent over


In the current development stage of Viet Nam, accessibility is becoming less relevant in users' perspectives as attention turns to the actual quality of services.

time, with more citizens noting that personal connections are either ‘important’ or ‘very important’ for all five commune-level public posts (people’s committee officers, land registrars, justice officers, police and primary school teachers). This PAPI evidence should compel policy makers to enhance merit-based recruitment as a strategy to enhance the quality of public services. However difficult this challenge remains, addressing it

will help meet the objective of a cleaner, more efficient public administration system as expected in the National Master Programme on Public Administration Reform 2011-2020. Enhanced transparency in recruitment processes, selection based on merit and skills as well as continued on-the-job training may accelerate the drivers towards higher citizen satisfaction with public sector services.

PAPI evidence should compel policy makers to enhance merit-based recruitment as a strategy to enhance the quality of public services.

Figure 1.11: Importance of Personal Connections in Getting Public Jobs (2011-2013)



Conclusions

This chapter has presented a selection of aggregated national level findings and revealed a great deal of consistency across time in many indicators. Furthermore, it has spotlighted areas of progress and exposed gaps in public policy implementation. Reflecting 2012’s findings, citizens remain optimistic about national and household economic prospects.

However, that economic optimism does not necessarily translates into citizen satisfaction with governance and public administration performance at different government levels. The 2013 findings have shown that key challenges for national and provincial governments and authorities are to enhance citizen awareness of grassroots democratic rights and create opportunities to participate effectively in political activities and policy making; to increase direct and effective

interactions with citizens; to consistently enforce measures to control corruption; and, to improve actual quality of public administrative and public services, in step with society’s development and expectations.

To build on what we have learnt so far, Chapter 2 will explore the equality of governance and public administration within provinces. The analysis will examine an insightful and under-explored fact about PAPI, namely the variation in performance within provinces rather than across them. In particular, the chapter will explore how citizens often actually experience governance and public administration very differently within the borders of a province. The chapter argues that this unexplained variation in experiences with governance is extremely common, indicating that there is far more to the story than that has been analysed with observable data.

Economic optimism does not necessarily translates into citizen satisfaction with governance and public administration performance at different government levels.

CHAPTER 2

EXPLORING EQUALITY OF GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WITHIN PROVINCES

Introduction

One interesting, but under-explored fact about PAPI is that governance varies more within provinces than across them. Most academic work on governance in Viet Nam focuses on provinces because decentralization granted the first-tier subnational unit the most authority. However, as this chapter will discuss, citizens actually experience governance very differently even within the borders of a province. In this chapter, this variance in citizen experiences in governance and public administration quality is referred to as inequality. This analysis reveals that this phenomena exists at all levels of authority in Viet Nam, from provincial all the way to village authorities. Within each province, there is more variance in governance quality than across them.

In addition, as demonstrated herein, there are wide differences in citizen experiences with governance and public administration quality across Viet Nam. In certain locations, governance is high and inequality relatively low, indicating that most citizens experience similar satisfaction in their interactions with officials and the quality of public services. In other locations, however, overall governance quality is greatly uneven, where certain citizens experience premium services while others rank their experiences with public services very low.

Digging deeper into the PAPI data, the dimension where the highest level of governance inequality is observed is 'Control of Corruption'. The province of Quang

Ngai is characterized by high inequality in this dimension, as some citizens are rarely touched by informal fees in their interactions with officials or in accessing public services. Nevertheless, their compatriots in the same province, even within the same commune or village, are haunted by the spectre of malfeasance by local officials.

It is slightly beyond the scope of this analysis to provide a definitive analysis of the determinants of inequality because the phenomenon far pre-dates the data. However, it is clear that the explanation is much more complicated than traditional reasoning, such as rural-urban divides or variations caused by cultural or historical differences across regions. Inequality remains high within regions and rural districts. In other words, simple cultural explanations or discussions of a rural-urban divide fall short. What can be noted for certain is that women, the poor, ethnic minorities and those without governance connections evaluate the quality of governance poorer, even within the same rural district.

The findings in this chapter provide a helpful corrective to the tendency to focus on purely provincial level policy levers to correct governance quality. Moreover, it is a reminder that a satisfactory score on overall public administration may result simply from the fact that respondents ranking local authorities poorly may simply be counter-balanced by a few fortunate citizens who are receiving favourable services.

Women, the poor, ethnic minorities and those without governance connections evaluate the quality of governance poorer, even within the same rural district.

Variance Decomposition

As a first step in assessing governance inequality, a simple variance decomposition is performed as shown in Table 2.1. The table is divided into two panels. The top panel studies the 13,892 respondents in 2013, while the bottom panel explores variations since 2011 in all the PAPI surveys within the panel of 832 villages that have been studied⁴.

Table 2.1 provides three main messages. The first aspect to notice confirms the tendency already identified in Chapter 1 that overall PAPI scores do not vary greatly over time. This can be seen in the final row of Table 2.1. Since 2010, there have been no dramatic changes in citizens' experiences with governance quality. Including a set of year dummies (technically, year-fixed effects) explains only 1.6% of the variation in the weighted PAPI scores. Moreover, the standard deviation in scores in a given year is 5.01, more than three times the size of the standard deviation between years (1.57). Less technically, this means there have been little positive or negative shocks to governance over time, and the dispersion among Vietnamese citizens at

a single point in time, caused by geographic or personal factors, is far more important to understand the diversity of experiences with governance.

The second aspect to notice is the maximum variation in governance that can be explained by differences in administrative units (27%), when the village level is studied. This means that 73% of variations in experiences with government and public administration is accounted for by individual level characteristics (i.e. gender, ethnicity, age, education) and a stochastic element (white noise). Also, regardless of the administrative unit or time frame, variance within a unit is always greater than variance across units. For instance, the standard deviation in the average PAPI score among provinces is 1.29 on a scale of 1 to 100. In contrast, the standard deviation within provinces is 4.7. Because the leaders of subnational governments are the same, it would appear different types of citizens are experiencing wide divergences in the quality of their interactions with these leaders and with the public services they provide.

Different types of citizens are experiencing wide divergences in the quality of their interactions with these leaders and with the public services they provide.

Table 2.1: Variance Explained in Weighted PAPI Score
(by administrative unit and time)

Variance Decomposition in 2013 (n=13,982)			
Unit of Analysis	Standard Deviation of Unit Effects on Governance	Standard Deviation of Governance within Unit	Variance Explained in 2013 (FE Regression)
Province (63)	1.29	4.70	7.3%
District (208)	1.65	4.58	12.8%
Commune (416)	2.09	4.39	20.9%
Village (832)	2.30	4.29	26.9%
Variance Decomposition 2010 to 2013 (n=46,849)			
Unit of Analysis	Standard Deviation of Unit Effects on Governance	Standard Deviation of Governance within Unit	Variance Explained (2010-2013, FE Regression)
Province (63)	1.19	4.88	11.7%
District (208)	1.58	4.79	15.1%
Commune (416)	2.24	4.68	20.5%
Village (832)	2.15	4.41	22.3%
Time (4)	1.57	5.01	1.6%

Note: Implemented using the `lone`way and `xtmixed` functions in STATA.

⁴ It is important to remember, that the first PAPI in 2010 only sampled 30 provinces, so the true panel of villages only began in 2011. As a result, the provinces selected in 2010 were entered separately into the analysis.

Thirdly, it is possible to compare the standard deviation across units to show that lower levels of government are critically important to understanding variations in government quality. When moving down the administrative hierarchy, the variance explained by the subnational unit and the standard deviation among units increases. For instance, in 2013 the variation among provinces only explains 7.3% of the respondent-level variation in PAPI scores. District-level factors are even more important accounting for 12.8% of the variation. Communes are more critical still (20.9%). And finally, village-level differences

explain 27% of variations and have a 2.3 standard deviation.

Overall, attention to the average provincial level score is only the starting point and the analysis must be further disaggregated. This set of information highlights how village leaders within a province are implementing public policies and providing services that are dictated by higher-level officials. These differences are important to understand the welfare of Vietnamese citizens and their satisfaction with local and national governments. In short, PAPI scores are strongly correlated with citizens' satisfaction.

Depicting Governance Equality within Provinces

The wide variation in PAPI scores within provinces is juxtaposed with significant differences in inequality within provinces. In some provinces there is very little difference between citizens within the same locality, but in others the divergence is severe with neighbours essentially experiencing two different classes of administration and public services. While some citizens experience an elite service of high efficiency, others rank their experience as extremely poor.

This divergence in inequality is visualised in three scatter-plots (Figures 2.1 to 2.3). In each graph, the vertical axis displays the overall, weighted PAPI score for a given year at provincial level. The horizontal axis depicts the standard error of the PAPI score for each province. A standard error is the standard deviation in provincial scores divided by the square root of the observations, in order to address the fact that provincial variances may result from different sampling sizes in certain provinces. For example, standard errors in Quang Ngai province in 2012 and 2013 range from near zero (indicating low inequality) to more than 14 indicating incredible variation in the experiences of citizens within the same locality.

Because standard errors above six are extremely rare, graphs are split to display the full distribution. Interestingly, the wide outliers (extremely high inequality provinces) observed in 2012 and 2013 did not exist in 2011. To add additional clarity, bubbles are sized to reflect relative standard errors. The red dashed lines illustrate the average PAPI score and standard error of PAPI experienced in a given year.

These graphs highlight four quadrants for analysis. The Northwest quadrant indicates the ideal governance realm, as these localities have high overall governance and low differences in citizen experiences (i.e. lower inequality). In 2013, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Da Nang, Long An and Vinh Long are standout exemplars. The Northeast quadrant is the second best performer with above average governance, but substantial inequality. Ha Noi, Kien Giang, Lang Son and Tien Giang are in this quadrant as is Quang Binh, but the latter exhibits substantially better governance and lower inequality. Hai Duong also features in this quadrant, but as an outlier with abnormal differences in citizens' governance experiences as it has an above average governance score, but a high degree of inequality. The third-ranked Southwest quadrant contains provinces with below average governance and low inequality. Administrative performance is not great, but at least citizens have very similar experiences with governance and public administration. Here, mountainous provinces like Dak Lak, Dien Bien and Phu Tho are found. Bac Giang scores the lowest in governance and public administration with little variance in experiences. The worst-case scenario is provinces with low governance and high inequality (the Southeast quadrant), with Binh Phuoc, Ha Nam and Yen Bai consistently in this quadrant throughout the period under investigation. In addition, the south-central coastal province of Quang Ngai exhibits an unusual high level of inequality.

While some citizens experience an elite service of high efficiency, others rank their experience as extremely poor.

In 2013, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Da Nang, Long An and Vinh Long are standout exemplars high overall governance and low differences in citizen experiences.

Figure 2.1: Weighted PAPI Score and Standard Error in 2013




Figure 2.2: Weighted PAPI Score and Standard Error in 2012





Figure 2.3: Weighted PAPI Score and Standard Error in 2011



Inequality Over Time

With three years of data, PAPI in 2013 now has a wealth of material to analyse possible trends. Table 2.2 illustrates how the bivariate correlation in inequality across provinces is relatively stable over time. The bivariate correlation between 2013 and 2012 is 0.81, indicating that the same provinces reported high and low inequality. However, while the size of the correlation falls to 0.57 when

outliers are dropped, it remains statistically significant. Such correlations were also significant, but dramatically lower between 2011 and 2012. Together these numbers indicate that inequality is still common in Viet Nam, but can diminish over time as witnessed between 2011 and 2012 in most subnational governments.

Table 2.2: Correlation in Provincial Inequality Over Time

Full Range				Standard Error <6			
Year	2013	2012	2011	Year	2013	2012	2011
2013	1			2013	1		
2012	0.8067*	1		2012	0.5722*	1	
2011	0.1487	0.2963*	1	2011	0.1818	0.3773*	1

Note: * Significant at the .05 level.

Table 2.3 takes a closer look at these changes. Hai Duong and Quang Ngai stand out as provinces that have experienced dramatic increases in inequality over time. Alternatively, Binh Phuoc, Lao Cai and Quang Binh shine as provinces that have done the most to improve access to governance since the changeover in administrations in 2011 as part of the five

year government cycles. It is also interesting to note that the increases in inequality were much greater between the 2011 and 2012 surveys, than in the subsequent year. Although speculative, this could reflect the changes in local leadership that occurred at about the same time. More research is needed to gain a clearer picture of this.

Table 2.3: Biggest Changes in Inequality By Province

Greatest Decreases in Inequality			
2012 to 2013		2011 to 2012	
Province	Change	Province	Change
Binh Phuoc	-4.81	Lao Cai	-4.12
Quang Binh	-2.18	Ninh Binh	-2.72
Lang Son	-2.05	Bac Kan	-2.35
Can Tho	-1.91	Cao Bang	-2.03
Bac Lieu	-1.65	Ca Mau	-1.50
Greatest Increases in Inequality			
2012 to 2013		2011 to 2012	
Province	Change	Province	Change
Tien Giang	1.05	Lang Son	1.99
Ha Noi	1.54	Binh Phuoc	2.88
Ha Nam	1.67	Vinh Phuc	3.37
NinhThuan	3.08	Yen Bai	3.95
Hai Duong	6.68	Quang Ngai	13.21

Inequality by Sub-Dimension

Focussing solely on the overall PAPI scores obscures levels of inequality observed at dimension level. Table 2.4 provides necessary clarity with the average, minimum and maximum inequality observed at provincial level for each year of the PAPI survey and for each PAPI dimension.

Some interesting patterns emerge, with Dimension 5 (Public Administrative Procedures) and Dimension 6 (Public Service Delivery) constantly shining as areas where citizens experience the lowest inequality (see Chapter 1 and Figure 1.2, in particular). In contrast, 'Control of Corruption' demonstrates the highest inequality each year. Moreover, more than any other dimension, inequality

in corruption control has increased. This suggests two things. First, there are wide differences in the impact corruption is having on the everyday lives of citizens throughout Viet Nam and even within provincial borders. Some citizens are barely directly affected by corruption and bribery, while it has become a major problem for others. Secondly, this divergence has become increasingly pronounced over time, with Quang Ngai an extreme example of this trend. A positive story also emerges from the data. Again and again, over time and across dimensions of governance, one province stands out as having significantly consistently positive perceptions of governance—Quang Nam.

There are wide differences in the impact corruption is having on the everyday lives of citizens throughout Viet Nam and even within provincial borders.

Table 2.4: Inequality by Dimension and Survey Year

Year		Overall PAPI Local Level		Transparency		Vertical Accountability		Control of Corruption		Public Administrative Procedures		Public Service Delivery		Public Service Delivery	
2011	Mean	0.82		0.04		0.04		0.04		0.10		0.01		0.02	
	Min	0.05	Quang Nam	0.01	Long An	0.00	Quang Nam	0.00	Quang Nam	0.01	Phu Yen	0.00	Quang Nam	0.00	Binh Dinh
	Median	0.54	TT - Hue	0.02	Ca Mau	0.03	Hoa Binh	0.01	TT - Hue	0.06	Thai Nguyen	0.01	Da Nang	0.01	Quang Nam
	Max	4.50	Lao Cai	0.23	Binh Thuan	0.26	Quang Binh	0.25	Nam Dinh	0.56	Lao Cai	0.16	Hai Phong	0.11	Ninh Binh
2012	Mean	0.91		0.06		0.04		0.04		0.10		0.01		0.02	
	Min	0.04	Phu Yen	0.00	Hai Phong	0.01	Long An	0.00	Tien Giang	0.01	Tien Giang	0.00	Phu Yen	0.00	Quang Tri
	Median	0.21	Hanoi	0.03	Binh Thuan	0.02	Quang Tri	0.02	Phu Yen	0.05	Ninh Binh	0.01	HUng Yen	0.01	Kon Tum
	Max	14.74	Quang Ngai	0.58	Quang Ngai	0.59	Quang Ngai	0.20	Binh Phuoc	1.11	Quang Ngai	0.18	Dien Bien	0.20	Quang Nam
2013	Mean	0.98		0.06		0.06		0.04		0.11		0.01		0.02	
	Min	0.02	Quang Nam	0.01	Phu Yen	0.00	Kon Tum	0.00	Hai Phong	0.01	Quang Nam	0.00	Kien Giang	0.00	Hai Phong
	Median	0.41	Phu Tho	0.02	Hai Phong	0.03	Phu Yen	0.02	Hoa Binh	0.06	TT - Hue	0.01	Binh Phuoc	0.01	Quang Tri
	Max	14.59	Quang Ngai	0.81	Quang Ngai	0.51	Quang Ngai	0.20	Lang Son	1.51	Quang Ngai	0.08	Dien Bien	0.16	Dien Bien

Drivers of Equality

This chapter has demonstrated that citizens’ experience with governance varies throughout Viet Nam and is only partially explained by differences across administrations. Strikingly, around 73% of the variation in PAPI scores is accounted for by differences between citizens within individual villages. This shows that governance inequality is not simply about regional differences, historical patterns such as north-south development trajectories or even rural-urban divides. Something much more individualized and personal is taking place and affecting citizens’ responses to the PAPI survey. To analyse this, the PAPI and dimension scores are regressed on individual characteristics of the respondents.

These regressions can be seen in Table 2.5, which employs a very simple OLS set-up with varying levels of fixed effects. Here, how different individuals within a subnational unit report governance and public administration is examined. The dependent variable is the weighted PAPI score, while the key independent variables are gender (whether the respondent is male), age (ranging from 15 to 92 years), ethnicity (Kinh majority = ‘1’, other minorities = ‘0’), education (ranging

from ‘1’= ‘no education’, to ‘9’= ‘post-graduate degree’), wealth (measured by the number of household possessions of the respondent), occupational prestige (skilled professionals = ‘1’), whether the respondent is a former or current government official and finally whether the respondent lives in a rural district (rural = ‘1’). All models employ survey year dummies, holding constant differences over time and in the administration of the survey.

These variables are tested in four different specifications with different levels of fixed effects - province (model 1), district (model 2), commune (model 3) and village (model 4). In a fixed effects model, the variance observed at the local level is removed, allowing to simply compare respondents within a particular locality. For instance, in model 1 the coefficient on male is the average difference in PAPI scores between males and females after the effects of provinces have been removed. In essence, this reveals how individuals within the same locality experience governance and public administration.

The first thing to notice is that the R-squared in model 1 is 23%. As noted earlier, provincial factors account for 11.7% of PAPI variations in

Around 73% of the variation in PAPI scores is accounted for by differences between citizens within individual villages.

Men experience substantially better governance than women, the Kinh majority report better governance than ethnic minorities and the wealthy and professional class experience greater satisfaction than the poorer, micro-entrepreneurs and manual labourers.

the over time model. Thus, adding individual factors has doubled the explanatory power. Nevertheless, 77% of variations remain unexplained, meaning that there remain individual features that have not been accounted for in the control variables (i.e. personal charisma, family connections).

The individual covariates reveal that men experience substantially better governance than women, the Kinh majority report better governance than ethnic minorities and the wealthy and professional class experience greater satisfaction than the poorer, micro-entrepreneurs and manual labourers. The largest effect is for former and current government officials, who have a governance score nearly three points higher than similar individuals without government experience

on the 100-point scale. This is a sizable effect, roughly one half of a standard deviation.

Interestingly, young and educated respondents report worse experiences with governance and public administration. This trend likely reflects differing expectations, rather than a substantially worse performance for that group.

Citizens in rural districts do experience worse governance, but the effect is not large (0.1 on a 100-point scale). Digging deeper, in models 2 through 4 the comparison between individuals within districts, communes and towns is tightened. Notice that the same patterns observed in model 1 remain robust, even at these more fine-grained levels of analysis. The bias toward males, the wealthy

Table 2.5: Correlates of Weighted PAPI Score (Ordinary Least Squares)

Dependent/Independent Variables	(1: province) PAPI	(2: district) PAPI	(3: commune) PAPI	(4: village) PAPI
Male=1	0.231*** (0.042)	0.203*** (0.043)	0.269*** (0.041)	0.300*** (0.041)
Age	0.030*** (0.002)	0.030*** (0.002)	0.026*** (0.002)	0.022*** (0.002)
Kinh =1	1.218*** (0.074)	0.789*** (0.063)	0.758*** (0.087)	0.272*** (0.104)
Education	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Wealth (Stuff Count D611)	0.385*** (0.009)	0.390*** (0.009)	0.343*** (0.009)	0.298*** (0.009)
VCP or Gov =1	2.802*** (0.068)	2.895*** (0.069)	2.694*** (0.067)	2.647*** (0.066)
Skilled Occupation =1	0.688*** (0.048)	0.763*** (0.049)	0.554*** (0.049)	0.371*** (0.049)
Rural =1	-0.108** (0.049)			
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province FE	YES	NO	NO	NO
District FE	NO	YES	NO	NO
Commune FE	NO	NO	YES	NO
Village FE	NO	NO		YES
Constant	29.503***	29.786***	33.776***	34.761***
Observations	46,813	46,813	46,813	46,812
R-squared	0.239	0.201	0.280	0.329
RMSE	4.526	4.635	4.421	4.303

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

and former/current government officials remains strong, even among individuals within the same village. The rural coefficient is dropped, because now citizens in rural areas are being compared to each other.

The coefficients for ethnic Vietnamese (Kinh) and professional occupations decline between commune and village levels, while remaining significant. This demonstrates that these two groups are highly concentrated in particular communes and districts, so the bias is primarily a result of clustering at the higher levels of analysis. Nevertheless, there are marginal differences to be observed even among citizens in the same neighbourhood.

In Table 2.6, the analysis is repeated for each sub-dimension. The general patterns remain very much the same as males, ethnic Vietnamese, the wealthy, professionals and former/current government officials enjoy substantially better governance across nearly all dimensions. Moreover, these patterns remain stable even when comparing individuals within the same district. Nevertheless, a few interesting addenda can be noted.

First, individual characteristics are far less important when it comes to 'Public

Administrative Procedures' and 'Public Service Delivery'. The largest correlations between individual characteristics and governance are observed in the more traditional governance arenas, particularly in the dimensions 'Participation at Local Levels', 'Transparency' and 'Control of Corruption'.

Second, there is still a very high degree of unexplained variation across all governance dimensions, but particularly when it comes to 'Control of Corruption'. Only 8.5% of variation in that score can be explained by the independent variables, even with district fixed effects. In simpler terms, there is simply much corruption in Viet Nam that is still unknown.

Third, the governance gap for rural areas is entirely related to access to public services. In all other dimensions, rural districts outperform urban ones.

Finally, the male advantage is reversed when it comes to 'Public Service Delivery'. Males actually report marginally worse scores than females in this area, as all else is equal. More research is necessary to tease out possible reasons, but it may simply be that women tend to be larger consumers of these services (education and health), and thus their needs are greater accounted for in the delivery.

Table 2.6: Correlates of Dimension Scores (Ordinary Least Squares)

Dependent/ Independent Variables	(1) Participation at Local Level	(2) Transparency	(3) Vertical Accountability	(4) Control of Corruption	(5) Public Administrative Procedures	(6) Public-Service Delivery	(7) Participation at Local Level	(8) Transparency	(9) Vertical Accountability	(10) Control of Corruption	(11) Public Administrative Procedures	(12) Public Service Delivery
Male=1	0.344*** (0.011)	0.030** (0.013)	0.120*** (0.011)	0.173*** (0.018)	0.079*** (0.008)	-0.038*** (0.006)	0.343*** (0.011)	0.031** (0.012)	0.121*** (0.011)	0.171*** (0.018)	0.079*** (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.006)
Age	0.021*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.000)	0.021*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.000)
Kinh =1	0.182*** (0.020)	0.254*** (0.022)	0.101*** (0.020)	0.279*** (0.032)	0.095*** (0.014)	0.153*** (0.011)	0.160*** (0.021)	0.201*** (0.024)	0.153*** (0.022)	0.280*** (0.035)	0.102*** (0.015)	0.163*** (0.011)
Education	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Wealth (Stuff CountD611)	0.067*** (0.002)	0.087*** (0.003)	0.060*** (0.002)	0.072*** (0.004)	0.062*** (0.002)	0.044*** (0.001)	0.066*** (0.002)	0.085*** (0.003)	0.062*** (0.002)	0.065*** (0.004)	0.065*** (0.002)	0.047*** (0.001)
VCP or Gov =1	0.786*** (0.018)	0.869*** (0.020)	0.947*** (0.018)	0.458*** (0.029)	0.277*** (0.013)	0.153*** (0.010)	0.773*** (0.018)	0.856*** (0.020)	0.923*** (0.018)	0.458*** (0.029)	0.268*** (0.013)	0.148*** (0.010)
Skilled Occupation =1	0.046*** (0.013)	0.061*** (0.014)	-0.003 (0.013)	0.056*** (0.021)	0.081*** (0.009)	0.201*** (0.007)	0.054*** (0.013)	0.081*** (0.014)	0.013 (0.013)	0.075*** (0.021)	0.084*** (0.009)	0.195*** (0.007)
Rural = 1	0.136*** (0.013)	0.021 (0.014)	0.125*** (0.013)	0.293*** (0.021)	0.038*** (0.009)	-0.230*** (0.007)						
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
District FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Commune FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Village FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Constant	3.663***	4.359***	4.320***	4.013***	6.045***	6.914***	3.928***	4.333***	4.641***	4.988***	6.184***	6.564***
Observations	46,813	46,813	46,813	46,813	46,813	46,813	46,812	46,812	46,812	46,812	46,812	46,812
R-squared	0.193	0.168	0.174	0.077	0.143	0.282	0.205	0.181	0.189	0.085	0.149	0.310
RMSE	1.189	1.346	1.223	1.949	0.840	0.644	1.182	1.337	1.214	1.943	0.838	0.632

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Conclusions

PAPI has introduced an innovative approach to the study of how policies are implemented equally at the provincial level. In doing so, it has pioneered the understanding of citizens' experiences with governance and public administration. This chapter has introduced a new element of policy implementation by digging deeper into the distribution of the PAPI data. It has shown that there is a great deal of variance in policy implementation than can be accounted for by differences in citizens' experiences - even when drilling down to village level.

This inequality in governance is much greater in some parts of the country than others. Da Nang and Quang Binh shine as provinces that are providing high quality governance to nearly all of their citizens, while Quang Ngai stands out as especially unequal.

A final section looked at why governance and public administration performance differs so dramatically even among neighbours in the same village. The analysis found that women, minorities and the poor score their localities significantly worse than others.

While interesting, this chapter only marks the beginning of further policy research. Unexplained variations in governance experiences remain extremely high, indicating that there is far more to the story than has been teased out with observable data. More detailed work is necessary to sort out what is going at a fine-grained level. The following chapter will look precisely into the observable data for 2013 at the provincial level and its progression over time.

Da Nang and Quang Binh shine as provinces that are providing high quality governance to nearly all of their citizens.



CHAPTER 3

PROVINCIAL PERFORMANCE
IN 2013 AND COMPARISON
OVER TIME

In keeping with earlier PAPI reports, this chapter moves away from national aggregation and detail provincial performances with an analysis of trends at dimension, sub-dimension down to indicator levels. The focus also turns towards local-level policy makers by way of presenting variations in provincial governance and public

administration performance. This is helpful to identify not only good and poor performers, but also good practices at provincial level that other provinces, especially those with similar socio-economic and geographic characteristics, can learn from and adapt to their localities.

DIMENSION 1: PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVELS

Participation in political, social and economic life is a Vietnamese citizen's constitutional right, enshrined in the country's Grassroots Democracy Ordinance (GRDO). Understanding citizens' participation in society is necessary to examine their involvement and roles in governance. This first dimension of PAPI, 'Participation at Local Levels', measures citizens' knowledge of their rights and how they exercise them.

The first sub-dimension 'civic knowledge' examines citizens' knowledge of their electoral rights and awareness of institutions that safeguard political participation at grassroots level. The second sub-dimension 'opportunities for participation' assesses citizens' opportunities to participate in the

election of representatives to the National Assembly, People's Councils at different levels and village heads. The third sub-dimension 'quality of elections' covers the quality of elections of grassroots citizen representatives, village heads. The fourth sub-dimension 'voluntary contributions' investigates how citizens participate in planning and overseeing commune development projects they contribute to.

As depicted in Table 1.1 (Chapter 1), this dimension in 2013 has displayed little change in national mean values when compared to 2012. The national mean is 5.14, which is insignificantly different from 5.16 in 2012 and 5.30 in 2011.

Understanding citizens' participation in society is necessary to examine their involvement and roles in governance.

Map 3.1: Provincial Performance in Participation by Quartiles





Figure 3.1a: Participation at Local Levels (Dimension 1)



13 provinces improved their performances compared to 2011, with scores increasing by more than 5%. Hau Giang, Thai Binh, Tra Vinh and Yen Bai are the biggest improvers.

Despite stability, differences in provincial performances in this dimension remain. Of the six PAPI dimensions, 'Participation at Local Levels' has the third largest variance between the best and poorest performers, after 'Control of Corruption' and 'Vertical Accountability'. Quang Binh, the best performer, scores almost a half-point more than second-placed Thai Binh (see Figure 3.1a) and about 2.15 points more than Lai Chau, the poorest performer. When the 95% confidence intervals (CIs) are taken into account, the better performers do not necessarily outperform the poorer performers in this dimension, especially those around the national mean score.

When provinces are grouped into four performance groups following PAPI's conventional colour coding⁵, this dimension shows interesting regional patterns (see Map 3.1). Most of the best performing provinces are in the northern and central regions of the country, with the exceptions being An Giang, Dong Nai and Hau Giang in the south.


Table 3.1 allows a comparison of sub-dimensional scores from 2011 to 2013. Similar to the two previous iterations, the sub-dimension 'opportunities for participation' contributes the greatest to the national

dimensional score with 1.75 points on a scale from 0.25-2.25 points. Next comes the sub-dimension 'quality of elections' with 1.47 points. The sub-dimension 'civic knowledge' has a national mean of 1.04, while the sub-dimension 'voluntary contributions' contributes the least, averaging 0.87 point.

For a longer-term perspective, provincial scores in 2013 are compared to 2011. As shown in Figure 3.1b, 13 provinces improved their performances compared to 2011, with scores increasing by more than 5%. Hau Giang, Thai Binh, Tra Vinh and Yen Bai are the biggest improvers with score gains ranging between 10.7% and 15.2%. On the other hand, 25 provinces experienced declines of more than 5%, with the dimensional scores of Bac Giang, Khanh Hoa, Lai Chau and Quang Ninh plummeting by more than 16%. The other 25 provinces remain constant with negligible changes within a $\pm 5\%$ range. Of the five centrally-governed municipalities, Da Nang maintains its score, while Can Tho, Ha Noi, Hai Phong and Ho Chi Minh City saw significant declines greater than 5% over the course of two years.

⁵ The blue provinces represent the best group (75th percentile), the yellow ones form the weakest provinces (25th percentile), the green and the orange group represent the high average and low average performers, respectively.

Figure 3.1b: Changes in Performance in Participation (% - 2013 against 2011)



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2013 data from 2011 data, with $\pm 5\%$ defined as statistically significant.

Table 3.1: List of Indicators on Participation at Local Levels (Dimension 1)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean			National PAPI 2013 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2013 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
Total Dimension	Dimension 1: Participation at Local Levels		1	10	5.30	5.16	5.14	5.06	5.23	Minimum Median Maximum	4.32 5.23 6.48	Lai Chau Da Nang Quang Binh
Sub-Dimension 1	Civic Knowledge		0.25	2.5	1.11	1.06	1.04	1.00	1.07	Minimum Median Maximum	0.78 1.05 1.59	Ninh Thuan Son La Quang Binh
Sub-Dimension 2	Opportunities for Participation		0.25	2.5	1.88	1.82	1.75	1.72	1.78	Minimum Median Maximum	1.34 1.77 2.05	Ca Mau Dak Nong Son La
Sub-Dimension 3	Quality of Elections		0.25	2.5	1.45	1.47	1.49	1.46	1.52	Minimum Median Maximum	1.16 1.56 1.86	An Giang Quang Tri Thai Nguyen
Sub-Dimension 4	Voluntary Contributions		0.25	2.5	0.85	0.81	0.87	0.85	0.90	Minimum Median Maximum	0.47 0.80 1.33	Khanh Hoa Lang Son Ninh Binh
S1. Civic Knowledge	Civic Knowledge	d101a, d101b, d101d	0	3	1.76	1.56	1.46	1.42	1.50	Minimum Median Maximum	1.05 1.52 2.09	Binh Thuan Bac Kan Quang Binh
S1. Civic Knowledge	Knows Grassroots Democracy Decree (%)	d102a	0%	100%	34.14%	30.42%	27.37%	24.30%	30.44%	Minimum Median Maximum	4.23% 27.92% 73.77%	Lai Chau Binh Duong Quang Binh
S1. Civic Knowledge	Aware of "People Know, People Decide..." (%)	d102b	0%	100%	64.66%	67.51%	65.47%	61.92%	69.03%	Minimum Median Maximum	35.58% 68.72% 93.58%	Ninh Thuan Hau Giang Thai Binh
S1. Civic Knowledge	Correct Term Limit of 2.5 Years (%)	d108	0%	100%	6.97%	7.26%	9.60%	7.57%	11.63%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.30% 9.28% 33.50%	Vinh Long Phu Yen Hau Giang
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Voted in Last Commune People's Council Election (%)	d101b1	0%	100%	70.57%	65.29%	57.49%	55.16%	59.82%	Minimum Median Maximum	29.23% 60.63% 76.52%	Ca Mau Thanh Hoa Cao Bang
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Voted in Last Commune People's Council Election (%)	d101d1	0%	100%	65.94%	55.66%	48.40%	45.86%	50.95%	Minimum Median Maximum	17.23% 50.56% 73.11%	Ca Mau Ninh Thuan Cao Bang
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Voted in Last National Assembly Election (%)	d103a	0%	100%	83.38%	85.57%	88.49%	86.57%	90.42%	Minimum Median Maximum	68.62% 92.85% 99.96%	Dong Thap Dak Lak Tuyen Quang
S2. Opportunities for Participation	Participated in Village Head Election (%)	d107	0%	100%	69.25%	72.87%	71.33%	68.74%	73.91%	Minimum Median Maximum	52.68% 71.76% 92.32%	Ca Mau Bac Kan Vinh Long

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean			National PAPI 2013 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2013 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
S3. Quality of Elections	More than One Candidate (%)	d105	0%	100%	51.50%	52.27%	53.81%	50.36%	57.27%	Minimum Median Maximum	16.06% 56.45% 83.38%	Lai Chau Binh Dinh Son La
S3. Quality of Elections	Invited to Participate (%)	d106	0%	100%	57.72%	58.38%	60.36%	56.87%	63.85%	Minimum Median Maximum	16.64% 63.08% 93.73%	Lai Chau Tuyen Quang Quang Tri
S3. Quality of Elections	Paper Ballot was Used (%)	d107a	0%	100%	86.47%	89.15%	89.72%	86.57%	92.87%	Minimum Median Maximum	11.48% 89.91% 100.00%	Da Nang Nghe An Bac Ninh
S3. Quality of Elections	Votes were Counted Publicly (%)	d107d	0%	100%	60.28%	63.63%	65.94%	62.41%	69.47%	Minimum Median Maximum	27.13% 77.28% 99.65%	Can Tho BRVT Nam Dinh
S3. Quality of Elections	Candidate was Suggested (%)	d107b	0%	100%	42.93%	47.92%	41.49%	32.75%	50.22%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.00% 46.30% 100%	Da Nang Phu Tho Quang Tri
S3. Quality of Elections	Voted for Winner	d107c	Min	Max	90.74%	88.66%	91.71%	90.04%	93.38%	Minimum Median Maximum	67.67% 93.07% 100%	Dong Thap Thanh Hoa Tien Giang
S4. Voluntary Contributions	Voluntary Contribution to Project (%)	d109ba	0%	100%	47.90%	47.28%	44.98%	41.95%	48.01%	Minimum Median Maximum	5.60% 36.84% 86.30%	Lai Chau Quang Ngai Hung Yen
S4. Voluntary Contributions	Community Investment Supervision Board Monitors Contribution (%)	d109bb	0%	100%	10.97%	8.56%	13.89%	10.72%	17.07%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.00% 7.31% 53.52%	Dien Bien Lang Son Dong Nai
S4. Voluntary Contributions	Voluntary Contribution Recorded (%)	d109bc	0%	100%	69.94%	71.12%	75.25%	72.62%	77.88%	Minimum Median Maximum	35.60% 76.20% 98.51%	Lai Chau Ninh Thuan Yen Bai
S4. Voluntary Contributions	Participated in Decision-Making to Start Project (%)	d109bd	0%	100%	34.42%	37.29%	45.28%	41.88%	48.69%	Minimum Median Maximum	8.70% 43.43% 78.57%	Dien Bien Can Tho Ninh Binh
S4. Voluntary Contributions	Provided Input to Project Design (%)	d109be	0%	100%	21.91%	22.78%	27.96%	25.61%	30.32%	Minimum Median Maximum	4.46% 26.73% 57.95%	Lai Chau Lam Dong Ninh Binh

Note: (*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum.

Civic Knowledge

Citizen awareness of the GRDO, the legal document containing mechanisms to safeguard citizens' participation in governance, has declined over time. The percentage of citizens who knew about GRDO in 2013 was about 27.4%, about 20% lower than in 2011.

This sub-dimension shines light on what citizens know about their political and civic rights, and thus on how local governments have disseminated GRDO principles to citizens. To measure civic knowledge, respondents are asked if elections for chairperson of commune/ward People's Committee, members of commune/ward People's Council and provincial representatives to the National Assembly in their respective commune/ward have taken place in the past five years. By the letter of the law, the first possible answer is meant to be 'false' since this position is nominated, while the last two are elected posts. In addition, citizens are asked if they know about the GRDO, in particular the phrase "People know, people discuss, people do, people verify"—a short, colloquial description of the GRDO and about the correct office terms for village heads they elect from their communities.

The national mean of this sub-dimension is 1.04 points on a scale of 0.25-2.5 points. Quang Binh posts the highest score with 1.59, about twice the lowest score of 0.78 by Ninh Thuan. Compared to 2011's scores, there is a significant decline of 7% in this sub-dimension, attributed to the gradual fall in the national mean score of citizens' knowledge of elected positions (see Table 3.1). One explanation for this trend is memories of the 2011 National Assembly and People's Councils elections have faded over time. While the majority of respondents in Quang Binh gave correct answers regarding the three posts, numerous respondents in Binh Thuan could only pick one correct answer.

This can be interpreted as Quang Binh having a superior ability to disseminate electoral rights to its citizens than Binh Thuan.

The decline in the national mean is also attributed to a reduction in the three other indicators of civic knowledge. Citizen awareness of the GRDO, the legal document containing mechanisms to safeguard citizens' participation in governance, has declined over time. The percentage of citizens who knew about GRDO in 2013 was about 27.4%, about 20% lower than in 2011. In the top-scoring province Quang Binh, 74% of citizens knew about the GRDO, opposed to 4.23% in Lai Chau.

In contrast, the phrase "People know, people discuss, people do, people verify" is better known with 65.5% of citizens confirming their awareness of it in 2013, consistent with findings in the previous two iterations. In Thai Binh, almost everybody was aware of the phrase as was found in 2012, while in Ninh Thuan only one-third of the population knew about it.

The last indicator of the sub-dimension measures citizen knowledge of the duration of terms for elected representatives, the village/residential group heads, which according to GRDO is 2.5 years. At a national level, about 9.6% of respondents gave the correct answer, a little higher than in 2011 and 2012, but still much lower than expected. In Hau Giang, the southern province with the highest score in this indicator, only one-third of citizens could identify the correct length of term, while in Vinh Long few could.

Opportunities for Participation

This sub-dimension highlights citizens' experiences in participating in elections of representatives for the National Assembly, People's Councils and villages. It also points to how active local governments are helping citizens exercise rights to political participation. Here, citizens are asked about whether they voted in the most recent elections within the past five years.

Overall, this sub-dimension contributes the largest to the dimensional score, with a national mean value of 1.75 points on a scale from 0.25-2.25 in 2013. Nonetheless, there is a downward trend compared to scores in 2011 (1.88 points) and 2012 (1.82 points). Son La is the highest scorer in this sub-dimension with 2.05 points, while Ca Mau is last with 1.34 points. The general school of thought is the decline is explained by people having

a fresher memory of National Assembly and People's Council elections in 2011 than in subsequent years.

Indeed, the number of respondents in 2013 that recall voting in elections of commune People's Council and the National Assembly members in 2011 amounted to 57.5% and 48.4%, respectively, a sharp decline from 70.6% and 65.9% in 2011. In terms of People's Council elections, as many as 76.5% in Cao Bang remembered having participated, in contrast to 29.2% in Ca Mau. Memories of the last National Assembly vote have also dulled, as 73% in Cao Bang recalled voting, while only 17% did in Ca Mau. The number of citizens participating in such elections as revealed in this sub-dimension is lower than reported in official figures⁶, possibly because of the practice of proxy voting where a voter could have voted on behalf of other voters in the same household.

As village head elections are supposed to be convened every 2.5 years, it is expected that more citizens report actual participation in the election process. At a national level, 88.5% of respondents in 2013 confirmed their village heads took office after elections, about the same as 2011 and 2012's findings. The vast majority of respondents in Tuyen Quang reported that elections were organized for citizens to choose their village heads, while in Dong Thap 69% did so. Dong Thap repeated its 2012 lowest score on this indicator.

On personal voting experiences in village head elections, about 71% of respondents reported they went in person to the elections to vote, about the same as figures for 2011 and 2012. Ca Mau had the lowest number of respondents with personal experiences of voting (53%), while Vinh Long had the highest (92%).

Quality of Village Elections

The quality of village elections is assessed by indicators measuring citizens' free choice of candidates, the way the elections are conducted to ensure fair selection and transparency, and whether winners are properly announced to the public. At a national level, this sub-dimension scores 1.49 points, consistent with 2011 and 2012's results (on a scale from 0.25-2.5 points). Provincial scores tend to converge around this average level. Thai Nguyen's score is the highest at 1.86 points, while An Giang's 1.16 points is the lowest.

At a national level, about 60% of respondents said they were invited to the most recent village head election, almost no change from previous iterations. The frequency rate observed in this indicator ranges from 17% in Lai Chau to 98% in Quang Tri, with the latter province once again having the largest number of citizens invited to village head elections.

Among those who participated in the most recent village elections, nearly 54% said they

had at least two candidates to choose from. While the number meets minimum GRDO requirements, the proportion is lower than expected and varies across provinces with 83% of respondents in Son La, but only 16% in Lai Chau. About 90% of respondents said paper ballots were used in village head elections, with only 12% of respondents in Da Nang reporting paper ballots (similar to its 2012 level), while Bac Ninh posted a perfect 100%. Also, at a national level 65.9% of respondents reported that votes were counted publicly, led by Nam Dinh (99.6%) in contrast with the worst performer Can Tho (27%).

As observed in the previous iterations, the election of village heads does not seem to be competitive. In fact, about 42% of respondents in 2013 confirmed they were suggested candidates to vote for. These findings are consistent with 2011 and 2012. Among voters in the most recent village elections, 91.7% said they voted for the winners, about the same as previous iterations. In Tien Giang, almost every respondent claimed to vote for the winner, while in Dong Thap 67.6% did so.

Among voters in the most recent village elections, 91.7% said they voted for the winners, about the same as previous iterations.

⁶ See Resolution No. 434 NQ/HĐBC dated 1 June 2011 on the results of the National Assembly election in 2011, where much higher provincial proportions of votes were recorded.

Voluntary Contributions

The share of citizens having participated in decision-making to start a public project they later contributed to increased from 34.4% in 2011 to 45.3% in 2013.

Voluntary, instead of forceful, contributions to building and/or remodeling community infrastructure such cultural houses, roads or schools is seen as a form of voluntary, active citizen participation. Once citizens contribute voluntarily, they tend to participate more actively in different project processes, from initiating to overseeing roles. This sub-dimension measures citizens' experiences in exercising these participatory rights.

As shown in Table 1.1 (Chapter 1), the sub-dimension 'voluntary contributions' has a larger contribution to Dimension 1 'Participation at Local Levels' in 2013 than in 2012 (with a positive year-on-year increase by 7.54%). This indicates that citizens are increasingly exercising their participatory rights in community projects. Having noted that, this sub-dimension remains the weakest of the four in Dimension 1 on a scale from 1-10 points, as observed in the previous iterations. The national average is 0.87 point, with large differences between provinces, with Ninh Binh scoring 1.33, but Khanh Hoa hitting only 0.47.

The first indicator shows the share of respondents who voluntarily contributed to a public project in their community over the last 12 months in the form of cash, in-kind or labour. At a national level, about 45% said they made such a contribution in 2013, in line with 2011 and 2012 proportions (see Table 3.1). In Hung Yen, 86% contributed on a voluntary basis, compared to just 5.6% in Lai Chau. Tellingly, more than half of respondents reported making contributions due to external or authoritative pressures.


The proportion of respondents confirming that their contributions were recorded in a bookkeeping system remains constant at 75% compared to 70% in 2011 and 2012. The 2013 findings peaked at 99% in Yen Bai against just 36% in Lai Chau at provincial level.

The share of citizens having participated in decision-making to start a public project they later contributed to increased from 34.4% in 2011 to 45.3% in 2013. Still, the gap between provinces remains large, from 79% in Ninh Binh to just over 8% in Dien Bien. Similarly, the share of people having an opportunity to provide project design inputs also improved significantly, from 22% in 2011 and 2012 to about 28% in 2013. Ninh Binh has the best results with 58% respondents having engaged in such a process, while in Lai Chau the proportion is only 4.5%.

About 14% of respondents nationwide answered correctly that the spending of voluntary contributions should be monitored by Community Investment Supervision Boards (CISBs), as directed by the GRDO. This is a slightly better result than 11% in 2011 or 9% in 2012, but still a small number. Even in Dong Nai, the best performer, 46% believed that monitoring was undertaken by local authorities, village heads or not undertaken at all. In Dien Bien, a negligible number of people could confirm the correct form of monitoring. These findings reflect a lack of significant improvement in terms of highlighting the work of CISBs and/or People's Inspection Boards (PIBs), which in theory should exist in every commune and be well known to citizens.

DIMENSION 2: TRANSPARENCY

Map 3.2: Provincial Performance in Transparency by Quartiles



PAPI measures citizens' "rights to know" about State policies that affect their everyday governance and livelihoods. 'Transparency' in three key sub-dimensional areas 'poverty lists', 'commune budgets' and 'land-use planning and pricing' is the focus of this second dimension of PAPI. Information relating to the trio is required by GRDO to be made publicly available in a transparent manner so citizens across the country can "know, discuss, do and verify".

There has been a significant improvement in this dimension since 2011, with an encouraging percentage point change of +6% over the course of three years, from 5.47 to 5.8 point estimates (see Table 1.1, Chapter 1). The largest significant change (+7.52% points) over the past three years is in improved transparency in 'land-use planning and pricing' given the low starting point of 1.56 in 2011 and modest improvement in 2012 (with the year-on-year change of +3.13%). In the two other sub-dimensions, there has been a significant improvement in the transparency of information regarding 'poverty lists' and 'commune budgets' during the course of three years at 5.67% and 5.13%, respectively from 2011-2013.

At a provincial level, Quang Binh tops this dimension with a 2013 score of 6.87, while Bac Giang lags behind with only 4.88 points. Figure 3.2a shows the estimates of provincial scores for all 63 provinces. It underlines Quang Binh's outstanding performance compared to other provinces. Da Nang, Quang Tri, Thai Nguyen and Thanh Hoa are also in the top five best performers. Together with Quang Binh, Quang Tri was also in the top five in 2012, while Thai Nguyen and Thanh Hoa are new entries in this group. The poorest performers include Bac Giang, Dong Thap, Ha Giang, Kien Giang and Lam Dong. Notably, Kien Giang

has been in the bottom five in this dimension for three consecutive years and Bac Giang has seen the largest year-on-year decline.

As seen in Figure 3.2a, the sub-dimension 'land-use planning and pricing' is presented by the shortest bar of the three sub-dimensions, suggesting that information about 'land-use planning and pricing' is the least transparent. In contrast, 'poverty lists' are more readily available for citizens to be informed. On a scale of 0.33-3.33 points, the score for transparency of 'poverty lists' is significantly high at 2.28, while transparency on 'land-use planning and pricing' averages 1.68 (see Table 3.2). The sub-dimension transparency on 'commune budgets' hovers around 1.85 points.

Interestingly, the best and high average performers are mostly central and northeastern provinces, while northwestern and southwestern provinces tend to be poorer performers. Map 3.2 illustrates the regional patterns of provinces grouped into four different levels of performance.

The changes from 2011 to 2013 in this dimension are among the most dramatic in PAPI (see Figure 3.2b). Compared to 2011, dimensional scores of seven provinces have increased by greater than 15%. Tra Vinh experienced an exceptional improvement of approximately 35%. Da Nang and Tay Ninh followed with positive changes of more than 22%. Overall, as many as 38 provinces in total showed improvements of more than 5%. Only six provinces declined more than 5%, with Son La seeing the biggest drop (-17%), followed by Bac Giang (-11%). About one-third of all provinces have seen little change with scores ranging between $\pm 5\%$. Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Noi had modest increases in dimensional scores by 4.5% and 5.6%, respectively.

There has been a significant improvement in this dimension since 2011, with an encouraging percentage point change of +6% over the course of three years.

'Land-use planning and pricing' is the least transparent.

Figure 3.2a: Transparency (Dimension 2)





Figure 3.2b: Changes in Performance in Transparency (% - 2013 against 2011)



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2013 data from 2011 data, with $\pm 5\%$ defined as statistically significant.

Table 3.2: List of Indicators on Transparency (Dimension 2)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean			National PAPI 2013 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2013 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
Total Dimension	Dimension 2: Transparency of Local Decision-Making		1	10	5.47	5.61	5.80	5.70	5.90	Minimum Median Maximum	4.88 5.86 6.87	Bac Giang Gia Lai Quang Binh
Sub-Dimension 1	<i>Poverty Lists</i>		0.33	3.3	2.15	2.23	2.28	2.21	2.34	<i>Minimum Median Maximum</i>	<i>1.77 2.38 2.86</i>	<i>Bac Giang Hung Yen Thai Nguyen</i>
Sub-Dimension 2	<i>Commune Budgets</i>		0.33	3.3	1.76	1.77	1.85	1.82	1.88	<i>Minimum Median Maximum</i>	<i>1.55 1.85 2.47</i>	<i>Dong Thap Can Tho Quang Binh</i>
Sub-Dimension 3	<i>Land-Use Planning/Pricing</i>		0.34	3.4	1.56	1.61	1.68	1.65	1.70	<i>Minimum Median Maximum</i>	<i>1.27 1.64 1.91</i>	<i>Son La Tuyen Quang Quang Tri</i>
S1. Poverty Lists	Poverty List Published in Last 12 Months	d202	0%	100%	53.55%	58.26%	58.32%	55.03%	61.61%	Minimum Median Maximum	25.28% 65.85% 90.86%	Dong Nai Tra Vinh Quang Nam
S1. Poverty Lists	Type 1 Errors on Poverty List (% Disagree)	d202a	0%	100%	39.85%	37.04%	35.21%	31.46%	38.95%	Minimum Median Maximum	6.91% 33.95% 62.35%	Thai Nguyen Tay Ninh Khanh Hoa
S1. Poverty Lists	Type 2 Errors on Poverty List (% Disagree)	d202b	0%	100%	34.66%	34.11%	32.24%	28.02%	36.47%	Minimum Median Maximum	6.33% 32.70% 77.22%	Thai Nguyen Gia Lai Bac Giang
S2. Commune Budgets	Commune Budget is Made Available (%)	d203	0%	100%	29.80%	34.12%	37.38%	34.26%	40.49%	Minimum Median Maximum	10.71% 44.77% 76.73%	An Giang Hau Giang Thai Binh
S2. Commune Budgets	Respondent Read Commune Budget (%)	d203a	0%	100%	37.38%	34.07%	34.23%	31.50%	36.96%	Minimum Median Maximum	7.86% 32.84% 73.93%	Dong Thap Lao Cai Binh Duong
S2. Commune Budgets	Believe in Accuracy of Budget (%)	d203b	0%	100%	69.66%	73.34%	74.04%	71.17%	76.92%	Minimum Median Maximum	39.73% 73.19% 97.04%	Bac Giang Gia Lai Hai Phong
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Aware of Commune Land Plans (%)	d204	0%	100%	19.99%	19.61%	20.82%	18.49%	23.16%	Minimum Median Maximum	1.63% 19.68% 49.16%	Bac Giang Quang Ngai BRVT
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Comment on Commune Land Plans (%)	d205	0%	100%	6.19%	6.49%	7.00%	5.71%	8.28%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.06% 6.38% 17.97%	Bac Giang Phu Tho Ha Nam
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Land Plan Acknowledges Your Concerns (%)	d205a	0%	100%	81.12%	82.65%	86.77%	81.87%	91.67%	Minimum Median Maximum	19.87% 92.62% 100%	Lai Chau Dak Nong Binh Duong
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Impact of Land Plan on Your Families (3=Beneficial)	d206	1	3	2.05	2.09	2.04	2.00	2.08	Minimum Median Maximum	1.44 2.03 2.50	Lai Chau Bac Kan Gia Lai
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Did not Lose Land as a Result of Land Plan	d207	0%	100%	71.38%	74.91%	76.21%	73.04%	79.38%	Minimum Median Maximum	33.45% 72.56% 93.52%	Son La Binh Thuan An Giang
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Compensation Close to Market Value (%)	d207a	0%	100%	12.86%	17.96%	18.84%	14.05%	23.64%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.00% 13.40% 40.82%	Soc Trang Ninh Binh Hung Yen
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Informed of Land Usage (%)	d207c	0%	100%	93.12%	90.66%	92.89%	90.11%	95.68%	Minimum Median Maximum	33.44% 98.17% 100%	Cao Bang Quang Binh Quang Tri
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Land Use for Original Purpose (%)	d207d	0%	100%	85.40%	82.64%	85.23%	80.57%	89.90%	Minimum Median Maximum	31.39% 92.21% 100%	Cao Bang Bac Ninh Dien Bien
S3. Land-Use Planning/Pricing	Know Where to go to get Land Price Information (%)	d208	0%	100%	38.25%	42.76%	49.85%	47.13%	52.58%	Minimum Median Maximum	18.42% 48.06% 76.16%	Dong Thap Phu Tho Quang Binh

Note: (*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum.

Transparency in Lists of Poor Households

58% of respondents said lists of poor households in their commune were published in the past 12 months.

The first indicator of this sub-dimension measures the share of citizens aware of the publication of lists of poor households in their commune during the year. At a national level, 58% of respondents said lists were published in the past 12 months, a slight increase from 53.6% in 2011. As many as 91% of respondents in Quang Nam noted the publicity of such information, in stark contrast to just 25.3% in Dong Nai.

The remaining two indicators reflect how citizens experience processes surrounding the quality of poor household listings, which indirectly indicates the level of transparency in the process of nominating poor households for State subsidies from local governments. The PAPI findings show some improvements as 35.2% of respondents nationwide in 2013 said truly poor households were not included in their commune lists, a small decline from nearly 40% in 2011. In Khanh Hoa, the error was confirmed by 62% of respondents, while in Thai Nguyen it was only 7% in 2013.

Another focus area was the mistaken nomination of non-poor households to poor household lists, sometimes a result of leveraging relationships with commune leaders. At a national aggregate level, this type of mistake was confirmed by 32% of respondents, a slight decline from 35% in 2011. In Bac Giang, 77% confirmed this second type of error, while in Thai Nguyen only 6% attested the issue.

The low proportions of Thai Nguyen respondents confirming the two types of errors in nominating poor households saw it top this sub-dimension with an aggregate score of 2.86 points, with Bac Giang the weakest performer with 1.77 points. The national mean of this sub-dimension is 2.28 points, a little higher than 2011 and 2012 scores (see Table 3.2).

Transparency in Commune Budgets

When it comes to whether information about commune budgets is made publicly available for citizens, 37.4% of respondents nationwide in 2013 were aware of such information.

This sub-dimension reveals the level of transparency in commune budgets, an important GRDO requirement that communes must comply with to ensure citizens' "rights to know". Knowing how commune budgets are used will also help keep grassroots public officials under check and prevent possible diversion of public funds for private use.

Results from this sub-dimension point to improved transparency of commune budgets. The national mean in 2013 is 1.85 on a scale from 0.33-3.33 points, a slight increase by 5% compared to 2011 and 2012. Quang Binh performed the best scoring 2.47 points, while Dong Thap scored 1.55.

When it comes to whether information about commune budgets is made publicly available for citizens, 37.4% of respondents nationwide

in 2013 were aware of such information, against 30% in 2011 and 34% in 2012. Thai Binh again grabbed top position with 77%, with An Giang at the bottom end of the scale with 10.7%.

Of the citizens who are aware of commune budget information, one-third actually read it—a proportion on par with 2012 and slightly lower than 37.4% of 2011. Nearly 74% of respondents in Binh Duong read publicised commune budget notices, while just 8% did so in Dong Thap.

Some 74% of those who read the notices were upbeat about their quality, roughly the same as 2012. In Hai Phong, almost all respondents found the information trustworthy, while 40% in Bac Giang believed the information was accurate.

Transparency of Land-Use Planning and Price Frames

Despite no prominent land-related conflicts in 2013 like those reported in 2012, problems around land use, ownership, corruption and mismanagement remained pressing concerns. In fact, the draft revised Land Law was discussed before it was eventually passed by the National Assembly in November, 2013. The topicality of this issue makes PAPI's work in this sub-dimension all the more important as measuring transparency in 'land-use planning and pricing' contributes to tracking local governments' performance in implementing land policy changes in addition to compliance with GRDO to make the information universally transparent.

As alluded to earlier, this sub-dimension contributes the least to the dimension as a whole, although the national mean aggregate has risen from 1.56 in 2011 to 1.68 in 2013. Quang Tri is the best performer with 1.91 points, while Son La posted just 1.27 points.

Of note, there was barely any improvement in the publicity of commune land plans during 2011 to 2013 (see Table 3.2, Indicator d204). Only 20.8% of respondents nationwide reported being aware of commune land plans. In an extreme case, just 1.6% of respondents in Bac Giang are aware of land-use plans, while in the best performer Ba Ria-Vung Tau less than half of its population could access this information.

Of those informed about land-use plans, only a small proportion (7%) had the opportunity to comment on them, a minor improvement on 6.2% in 2011 and 6.5% in 2012. Ha Nam topped the list with 18% saying they could comment on the plans, but very few Bac Giang respondents enjoyed the same opportunity. One bright spot here is among those who provided comments on recent land-use plans, around 87% said the plans acknowledged their comments, a step forward from the previous two PAPI iterations. However, there are striking differences between provinces, exemplified by Binh Duong's 100% verses 20% in Lai Chau.

Over the past three years, the impact of land-use plans on households has

remained constant. The value '1' is assigned to respondents whose households felt no impact, '2' to households with negative impacts and '3' to households that benefited from such plans. The national mean is 2.04, about the same as 2011 and 2012's figures, with Gia Lai seeing the most people benefit (2.5), while Lai Chau seeing both no impact and negative impact (1.44).

The next indicator measures the share of citizens that did not lose land due to recent land planning. About 76% of respondents nationwide reported they were not affected in 2013. A solid 94% of participants in An Giang reported no land loss, in vivid contrast to Son La where two-thirds of respondents experienced some loss.

Pricing of land subject to being revoked is one of the top concerns for those affected by land planning. At a national level, 18.8% of respondents reported the offered prices were close to market value. While impressive when compared to 13% in 2011, it is the same as 2012's findings. In Hung Yen, the top performer, only 41% confirmed the offered compensation was acceptable.


The vast majority (93%) of those who lost land due to recent land planning were informed about the intended use of the land being revoked, as was found in the previous two iterations. However in Cao Bang, only one-thirds of respondents were informed. On whether the revoked land was used for the initially informed purpose, 85% of respondents attested the purpose had not changed. Interestingly, northern mountainous provinces posted scores at opposite ends of the scale with Dien Bien enjoying a 100% rate in contrast to Cao Bang's 33.4%. When asked about access to official land price information, about 50% of respondents nationwide could give an answer, a large increase from 38% in 2011 and 43% in 2012. In Quang Binh, two-thirds of the respondents knew where to get such information, while only 18% could in Dong Thap.

Only 20.8% of respondents nationwide reported being aware of commune land plans.

At a national level, 18.8% of respondents reported the offered prices were close to market value.

DIMENSION 3: VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Map 3.3: Provincial Performance in Vertical Accountability by Quartiles



As in previous PAPI iterations, this dimension measures key 'Vertical Accountability' aspects 'interactions with local authorities', along with the coverage and effectiveness of 'PIBs' and 'CISBs'. These mechanisms, in accordance with the GRDO, make local governments and public officials accountable to their citizens in the operationalization of governance functions. These institutions are mandated to realize citizens' rights to "discuss" and "verify" as per the GRDO.

As depicted in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 (Chapter 1), there has been a marginal increase in the national means in this dimension since 2011, while the variance across provinces remains large as observed in previous iterations. The latter observation is clearly illustrated in Figure 3.3a, with the top five provinces (Hai Duong, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri and Thai Binh) performing outstandingly better than the rest. The provincial scores range from 4.63 (Bac Giang) to 7.15 (Thai Binh) on a scale of 1-10 points. The national mean is 5.65, insignificantly higher than 5.5 in 2011 and 5.58 in 2012.

Map 3.3 displays some interesting regional patterns, with good performers concentrated in the Red River Delta, north-central and southeastern regions, while poor performers are dotted across northern provinces, the

Central Highlands and southwestern regions. Compared to PAPI 2012, Lao Cai drops from the best to the poorest performing group, while Bac Ninh excels itself.

Notably, greater citizen satisfaction with PIBs and CISBs has largely contributed to the modest increase in this dimension (see Table 3.3). In Hai Duong and Ninh Thuan, almost every respondent gave PIBs and CISBs the thumbs up in their communes. Nonetheless, the sub-dimension 'interactions with local authorities' has significantly declined in its national aggregate mean score by more than 5% compared to 2011 and 2012. This calls into question the effectiveness of regular and ad hoc citizen meetings being commissioned by local governments from provincial to grassroots levels⁷. Regarding provincial improvements since 2011, Figure 3.3b shows that 23 provinces have made significant improvements with their scores increasing between 5% and 19%. Tra Vinh and Vinh Phuc have made the most impressive progress on this dimension. In contrast, 11 provinces have seen declines in dimensional scores by more than 5%, headlined by Bac Giang at -15%. The rest have largely remained in a holding pattern since 2011. Among centrally-governed municipalities, only Ho Chi Minh City saw a large gain (7.6%), while Can Tho's score dropped by nearly 7%.

7 See Bui, Phuong Dinh et al (2013) for assessments of provincial performance in vertical accountability in eight provinces (available at www.papi.vn).

Figure 3.3a: Vertical Accountability (Dimension 3)





Figure 3.3b: Change in Performance in Vertical Accountability (% - 2013 against 2011)



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2013 data from 2011 data, with ±5% defined as statistically significant.

Table 3.3: List of Indicators on Vertical Accountability (Dimension 3)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean			National PAPI 2013 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2013 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
Total Dimension	Dimension 3: Vertical Accountability		1	10	5.50	5.58	5.65	5.57	5.73	Minimum Median Maximum	4.63 5.75 7.15	Bac Giang Tien Giang Thai Binh
Sub-Dimension 1	Interactions with Local Authorities		0.33	3.3	1.87	1.88	1.78	1.75	1.81	Minimum Median Maximum	1.14 1.85 2.36	An Giang Bac Ninh Ha Tinh
Sub-Dimension 2	People's Inspection Boards		0.33	3.3	1.85	1.87	1.97	1.93	2.01	Minimum Median Maximum	1.62 1.89 2.69	Cao Bang Binh Duong Hai Duong
Sub-Dimension 3	Community Investment Supervision Boards		0.34	3.4	1.78	1.83	1.90	1.86	1.94	Minimum Median Maximum	1.35 1.90 2.46	Bac Giang Lam Dong Vinh Phuc
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Contacted Village Head (%)	d301a1	0%	100%	18.54%	18.07%	14.01%	12.03%	15.99%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.20% 13.84% 46.99%	Ninh Thuan Bac Kan Thai Binh
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Contacted Commune People's Committee (%)	d301b1	0%	100%	12.20%	12.01%	8.77%	7.18%	10.36%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.30% 7.53% 42.73%	Lai Chau Nghe An Ha Tinh
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Contact with Village Head Successful (%)	d301b1	0%	100%	87.96%	86.82%	84.37%	80.29%	88.45%	Minimum Median Maximum	5.97% 88.48% 100%	Lao Cai Hoa Binh Hai Duong
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Contact with Commune Successful (%)	d301b2	0%	100%	80.49%	82.82%	77.80%	71.67%	83.93%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.15% 77.00% 100%	Nam Dinh Ca Mau Da Nang
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Made a Proposal to Authorities (%)	d302a1	0%	100%	23.36%	25.96%	24.32%	22.37%	26.28%	Minimum Median Maximum	5.44% 29.50% 58.58%	Lai Chau Phu Tho Quang Binh
S1. Interactions with Local Authorities	Proposal Successful (%)	d302a2	0%	100%	87.28%	87.28%	87.73%	85.28%	90.19%	Minimum Median Maximum	73.80% 89.05% 99.07%	Nghe An Ha Noi Ninh Binh
S2. People's Inspection Boards	Village has a PIB (%)	d303	0%	100%	33.84%	33.18%	36.56%	33.40%	39.71%	Minimum Median Maximum	12.28% 36.33% 77.60%	Bac Giang Soc Trang Thai Binh
S2. People's Inspection Boards	PIB selected by Vote (%)	d303a	0%	100%	43.54%	42.55%	45.93%	42.10%	49.76%	Minimum Median Maximum	13.99% 39.07% 68.98%	Ca Mau Binh Phuoc Thai Binh
S2. People's Inspection Boards	PIB Effective (%)	d303c	0%	100%	78.70%	78.64%	82.90%	80.41%	85.39%	Minimum Median Maximum	43.09% 81.50% 97.40%	Ha Giang Bac Lieu Hai Duong
S3. Community Investment Supervision Boards	Commune has a CISB (%)	d304	0%	100%	14.48%	16.69%	17.16%	15.26%	19.07%	Minimum Median Maximum	1.38% 19.08% 44.89%	Ninh Binh Hai Phong Vinh Phuc
S3. Community Investment Supervision Boards	CISB Effective (%)	d304b	0%	100%	81.65%	83.23%	86.06%	82.92%	89.21%	Minimum Median Maximum	42.83% 87.87% 100%	Bac Giang Ben Tre Ninh Thuan

Note: (*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum.

Interactions with Local Authorities

This sub-dimension measures local governments' accountability, when citizens engage local governments to express and seek solutions to concerns of a personal or community nature. This engagement can be in the form of ad hoc inquiries to village heads, periodical meetings with local government officials and/or voters meetings with National Assembly delegates and/or People's Council members.

As noted earlier, this sub-dimensional score has dropped significantly compared to 2011 and 2012. Overall, the national mean is 1.78 out of 3.33, compared to 1.87 in 2011. Ha Tinh topped the list with 2.36, with An Giang tallying just 1.14. The main reasons from this decline are the lower frequency and effectiveness of citizen meetings with village heads and commune officials. This is an area for the VFF and political-social mass organizations to step in and assert their oversight roles at grassroots level given their newly mandated roles⁸.

In 2013, only 14% of respondents nationwide made contact with local village heads to address a problem, in contrast to 18% in 2011 and 2012. While Thai Binh has the highest proportion (47%) in 2013, a big drop from the top figure in 2012 (59%), very few respondents in Ninh Thuan interacted with their village heads in 2013. Similarly, the frequency of meetings with commune officials has declined from 12% in 2011 and

2012 to less than 9% in 2013. Interactions at this level took place more often in Ha Tinh (43%), but rarely happened in Lai Chau.

The effectiveness of the interactions also appears to be declining in terms of citizen interactions with grassroots public officials. At a national level, about 84% of those who made contact with village heads reported they reached some form of solution after the meetings. Citizens in Lao Cai had the least probability of success, with only 6% of respondents rating meetings to be effective. Regarding interactions with commune officials, 78% of meeting participants nationwide left with a meaningful outcome. In this area of interaction, the differences between provinces was extreme, ranging from 100% in Da Nang to 0% in Nam Dinh.

To assess how accountable and open local governments are to citizens, this sub-dimension also constitutes an indicator on frequencies and effectiveness of citizen proposals to local governments. Similar to 2011 and 2012's findings, about 24% of respondents nationwide said they sent suggestions or proposals to local governments in 2013, with 87.7% of respondents reporting their proposals were acknowledged. While Quang Binh was home to respondents making the most submissions (59%), more respondents in Ninh Binh (99%) had their proposals recognized.

In 2013, only 14% of respondents nationwide made contact with local village heads to address a problem. Of these respondents, about 84% of those who made contact with village heads reported they reached some form of solution after the meetings.

People's Inspection Boards

This sub-dimension measures the coverage and effectiveness of PIBs, a grassroots and people-elected mechanism to keep local public officials accountable to citizens. In theory, PIBs should be established in all communes and work effectively given they

are formed under GRDO-driven democratic voting mechanisms.

However, this sub-dimension's findings translate into a moderate national mean of only 1.97 points on a scale of 0.33-3.33, about 5% higher than in 2012. Hai Duong is the best

The coverage of People's Inspection Boards was only reported by 36.6% of respondents nationwide in 2013.

⁸ See Decision No.217-QĐ/TW on the issuance of regulations on exercising oversight and social feedback functions of the VFF and socio-political mass organizations of the Viet Nam Central Communist Party Committee dated 12 December 2013.

performer with 2.69 and Cao Bang the worst with 1.62 points.

PIB coverage was only reported by 36.6% of respondents nationwide in 2013, about the same as 2011 and 2012's findings (see Table 3.3). Among those aware of PIBs in their localities, only 46% correctly said PIBs are people-elected mechanisms, an insignificant increase compared to 2012.

Thai Binh is again the top performer in the coverage and effectiveness indicators, with

77.6% reporting the existence of PIBs and 69% reporting the board members were selected by citizen vote. In Bac Giang, only 12.3% of the respondents reported PIBs in their villages, while 14% in Ca Mau confirmed that PIB members were selected by citizen votes.

Of the small number of respondents to report the existence of PIBs, about 83% noted that PIBs in their localities work effectively, a little higher than in 2011 and 2012. In Hai Duong, 97% talked positively about the work of PIBs, while only 43% did so in Ha Giang.

Community Investment Supervision Boards

Just 17% of respondents said Community Investment Supervision Boards exist in their localities.

Using the same approach as the previous sub-dimension, CISB findings are constructed from two indicators encompassing the coverage and effectiveness of CISBs. As noted earlier, this sub-dimension has seen positive development, with a 6.5% point increase in 2013 compared to 2011. Nonetheless, the national mean of 1.9 points is modest on a 0.33-3.33 scale.

The key reason for this modest score is the poor coverage of CISBs as reported in citizens' assessments. Across the country, just 17% of respondents said CISBs exist in their localities, a slight increase from 14.5% in 2011.


One possible explanation is PIBs in many communes perform the tasks of CISBs⁹. Vinh Phuc seems to have more CISBs than other provinces, as 45% of respondents noted the existence of such boards, while just 1.4% did so in Ninh Binh.

Among those who noted the existence of CISBs, about 86% said the boards work effectively, a little more than in 2011. This proportion hit 100% in Ninh Thuan, but a lowly 43% in Bac Giang. However, this indicator should be treated with caution as some provinces had a limited number of respondents.

⁹ See Bui Phuong Dinh et al (2013) series for assessments of provincial performance in PIBs and CISBs in different provinces (available at www.papi.vn).

DIMENSION 4: CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Map 3.4: Provincial Performance in Control of Corruption by Quartiles



At the national aggregate level, citizens tend to see corruption is better controlled in 2013 compared to 2011 and 2012.

This section presents findings from PAPI 2013 surveys regarding citizen experiences with local government performance in controlling corruption by four sub-dimensions: 'limits on public sector corruption', 'limits on corruption in service delivery', 'equity in employment' and 'willingness to fight corruption'. It also puts the 2013 findings in comparison with 2011 and 2012 findings to see trends in provincial performance.

At the national aggregate level, citizens tend to see corruption is better controlled in 2013 compared to 2011 and 2012. This is evident in the incremental change in the national mean score during the past three years, from 5.76 in 2011 to 5.90 in 2012 and up to 6.15 in 2013 (see Figure 1.1, Chapter 1). Half of provinces converged between 6.20 and 7.6 points in 2013 and this encouraging development is likely due to improvements in all of the sub-dimensions except 'willingness to fight corruption'. Two southern provinces, Long An and Tien Giang are the best performers in this dimension.

At a provincial level, similar to what was observed in 2011 and 2012, strong regional patterns and large variations in provincial performances controlling corruption are observed in 2013. Map 3.4, Figure 3.4a and Table 3.4 offer some intriguing perspectives as southern provinces tend to do better in anti-corruption than northern and central region provinces. In fact, as many as seven out of the 10 best performers in this dimension are southern provinces, while the same number

in the bottom-end of the scale are northern provinces. Also, this dimension has the largest variation in scores across provinces, with a difference of approximately 2.9 points between the best and worst performers, similar to what was witnessed in 2012.

Comparing the mean scores across provinces, Tien Giang remains the top performer at 7.6 points, a 10.59% point rise from its score in 2011 (see Figure 3.4b), with top scores in two sub-dimensions ('limits on public sector corruption' and 'equity in employment'). Long An retains its second placing from 2012 and performed best in 'limits on corruption in service delivery'. These two outliers are followed by mostly central and southern provinces (An Giang, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Binh Duong, Ca Mau, Can Tho, Gia Lai, Soc Trang, Thanh Hoa and Vinh Long). This regional pattern (see Map 3.4) is similar to 2010, 2011 and 2012's findings. The next 43 provinces have smaller differences in scores in 2013, converging around the median score of 6.2 points.

Cao Bang made a big jump in 2013 to transform from a poor to an average performer, with its 2013 scores significantly increasing almost 50% and 17% from its 2011 and 2012 figures, respectively. Meanwhile, Bac Giang and Kon Tum are found at the other end of the scale. Notably, Bac Giang scored 4.68 points (see Table 3.4), with a reduction of 6% against the 2011 benchmark (see Figure 3.4b) after a significant rise in 2012¹⁰.

¹⁰ See Figure 3.4b in the PAPI 2012 Report for comparison of findings between 2012 and 2011 (CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP, 2012, p. 61).

Figure 3.4a: Control of Corruption in the Public Sector (Dimension 4)





Figure 3.4b: Change in Performance in Control of Corruption (% - 2013 against 2011)



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2013 data from 2011 data, with $\pm 5\%$ defined as statistically significant.

Table 3.4: List of Indicators on Control of Corruption (Dimension 4)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean			National PAPI 2013 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2013 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
Total Dimension	Dimension 4: Control of Corruption		1	10	5.76	5.90	6.15	6.00	6.29	Minimum Median Maximum	4.68 6.20 7.60	Bac Giang Binh Thuan Tien Giang
Sub-Dimension 1	Limits on Public Sector Corruption		0.25	2.5	1.40	1.44	1.56	1.50	1.61	Minimum Median Maximum	0.99 1.58 1.96	Bac Giang Hai Duong Tien Giang
Sub-Dimension 2	Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery		0.25	2.5	1.76	1.75	1.83	1.80	1.86	Minimum Median Maximum	1.52 1.84 2.14	Kon Tum Phu Yen Long An
Sub-Dimension 3	Equity in Employment		0.25	2.5	0.94	0.96	1.02	0.97	1.07	Minimum Median Maximum	0.60 0.94 1.63	Kon Tum Da Nang Tien Giang
Sub-Dimension 4	Willingness to Fight Corruption		0.25	2.5	1.66	1.75	1.74	1.71	1.77	Minimum Median Maximum	1.32 1.74 2.06	Bac Giang An Giang Vinh Long
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	No Diverting of Public Funds (% agree)	d402a	0%	100%	52.06%	52.70%	59.87%	56.73%	63.00%	Minimum Median Maximum	27.15% 61.19% 80.26%	Bac Giang Kien Giang Tien Giang
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	No Bribes for Land Title (% agree)	d402b	0%	100%	49.74%	51.27%	55.40%	52.70%	58.10%	Minimum Median Maximum	26.46% 56.68% 78.49%	Bac Giang Dong Thap Thanh Hoa
S1. Limits on Public Sector Corruption	No Kickbacks on Construction (% agree)	d402e	0%	100%	51.19%	54.10%	59.06%	56.02%	62.10%	Minimum Median Maximum	33.50% 61.46% 81.12%	Kon Tum Nghe An Ha Tinh
S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery	No Bribes at Public District Hospital (% agree)	d402c	0%	100%	46.52%	45.65%	51.10%	48.22%	53.98%	Minimum Median Maximum	17.89% 49.37% 75.56%	Thai Binh Quang Ngai Tien Giang
S2. Limits on Corruption in Service Delivery	No Bribes for Teachers' Favouritism (% agree)	d402d	0%	100%	59.14%	59.00%	63.07%	60.95%	65.20%	Minimum Median Maximum	39.17% 64.29% 84.12%	Kon Tum Dong Nai Ha Tinh
S3. Equity in State Employment	No Bribes for State Employment (% agree)	d402f	0%	100%	40.33%	39.07%	42.86%	39.96%	45.76%	Minimum Median Maximum	16.28% 37.59% 76.18%	Vinh Phuc Dak Nong Tien Giang
S3. Equity in State Employment	Total No Relationship for State Employment	d403a-d403e	0	5	1.06	1.20	1.27	1.16	1.38	Minimum Median Maximum	0.37 1.17 2.86	Lai Chau Vinh Long Binh Duong
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Corruption had no Effect on Respondent (%)	d405a	0%	100%	95.39%	96.00%	96.49%	95.53%	97.45%	Minimum Median Maximum	86.24% 97.73% 100%	Quang Ngai Thai Nguyen Soc Trang
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Know Anti-Corruption Law (%)	d406	0%	100%	42.45%	44.11%	40.09%	37.43%	42.76%	Minimum Median Maximum	14.43% 37.46% 69.20%	Hau Giang Thai Binh Vinh Long
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Province Serious about Combating Corruption (%) (**)	d407	0%	100%	34.00%	34.60%	38.10%	35.3%	40.9%	Minimum Median Maximum	11.20% 34.65% 61.35%	Kon Tum Lang Son Binh Duong
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Denunciation Price '000s VND (Imputed)	d404	0	150,000	5,523	5,111	8,176	7,467	8,886	Minimum Median Maximum	2,486 7,656 16,749	Vinh Long Dak Lak Lam Dong
S4. Willingness to Fight Corruption	Victims Denunciate Bribe Request (%)	d405a	100%	0%	9.15%	7.01%	2.95%	-0.80%	6.69%	Minimum Median Maximum	0% 0% 87%	Binh Dinh Cao Bang Soc Trang

Note: (*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum. (**) Changed for all three iterations of PAPI since 2011.

Limits on Public Sector Corruption


In this sub-dimension, citizens are asked about some common forms of corruption involving public officials at provincial level. As shown in Table 3.4, in this sub-dimension the national mean score is 1.56, slightly higher than in 2011 and 2012. Tien Giang excels itself to post the highest score of 1.96 points (out of 2.5) in 2013, with 5.57% and 9.68% rises against 2012 and 2011, respectively. This means Tien Giang's citizens continue valuing provincial leaders' efforts to stamp out corruption by public officials and civil servants. Meanwhile, Bac Giang scores the lowest at 0.99 points, a sharp year-on-year fall of 26% against 2012 (when it saw a surge of 25.6% against 2011) and a reduction of 7% against 2011.

Figure 3.4c shows the four PAPI indicators measuring different types of corruption. The branches of the star represent the percentage of people who agree that the corresponding statements in the legend are true. Similar to

what was found in 2011 and 2012, no province is close to the perfect star graph displayed in the bottom-left corner. Central and southern provinces seem to be better at mitigating corruption in the public sector. Among the top performers are An Giang, Binh Dinh, Can Tho, Gia Lai, Hau Giang, Long An, Soc Trang and Tien Giang. Bac Kan and Thanh Hoa are only northern high-performing provinces. Once again, Tien Giang posted almost perfect scores reflecting its consistent performance across all four measures concerning public officials and civil servants. Long An and Soc Trang have also been notable performers.

Among the five centrally-governed municipalities, Hai Phong and Ha Noi are among the bottom 15 performers in these indicators, with little improvement compared to 2011 and 2012. For instance, 59.13% of Ha Noi respondents perceived there was no incidence of public officials diverting public

Figure 3.4c: Perception of Corruption by Types
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement)



funds, while in Hai Phong 49.77% denied such a practice. Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City are grouped in the middle of the pack, while Can Tho is among the top five performers.

Statistics for this sub-dimension presented in Table 3.4 highlight some improvements during the past three years. The indicator ‘no diversion of public funds by public officials’ rises from 52% to 59% in denials of the practice. Similarly, indicators ‘no bribe for LURCs’ and ‘no kickbacks for construction permits’ reveal that citizens saw less bribery in obtaining these important household entitlements from 2011 to 2013 (i.e. the possibility of ‘no bribes for LURCs’ increases from 49.7% in 2011 to 55% in 2013 and of ‘no kickbacks for construction permits’ increases from 51% to 59%).

Nonetheless, at provincial level citizens have strikingly different views when asked about indicators as 80.26% of respondents in Tien Giang reject the notion of local officials diverting public funds, while in Bac Giang the figure is just 27.15%. Meanwhile, more respondents in Bac Giang claim that kickbacks are required to apply for construction permits, while 78.49% of respondents in Thanh Hoa reject such claims in their province. Regarding bribes for land titles, a resolute 81.12% of respondents in Ha Tinh reject statements that citizens must give bribes for LURC applications to be processed. At the other end of the spectrum, Kon Tum citizens suggest these practices occur more frequently.

Limits on Corruption in Public Service Delivery

This sub-dimension measures the level of corruption perceived and experienced by citizens when using public health care and primary schools. As shown in Table 3.4, the national mean score for this sub-dimension is 1.83 on a scale of 0.25 to 2.5 points. This shows a slight improvement compared to previous PAPI surveys, but in reality there has been little improvement in ‘Control of Corruption’ in the two important public services of education and health¹¹. Long An tops the list with a score of 2.14 points, while Kon Tum scores lowest with 1.52 points.

At a national level, citizens seem to see some small, but insignificant improvements in ‘Control of Corruption’ in public health care and primary education services in 2013 as compared with 2012 and 2011. About 51.1% of respondents agree with the notion that no bribes are needed at public district hospitals to get better care. Respondents in Tien Giang experience less bribery at public district hospitals than other provinces, while Thai Binh citizens seem to experience more, as only 17.89% of respondents denied that

bribes are required. On access to bribe-free primary education, 63.07% of respondents claim that paying bribes to teachers for special treatment is uncommon, a slight increase from 59% in 2011 and 2012.

At an indicator level, no province comes close to the perfect score regarding citizens’ perception of bribery in education and health (see Figure 3.4c). The top performer in the indicator ‘no bribe at public district hospital’ is Tien Giang, where 75.56% of respondents deny that people have to pay bribes when accessing health care at district hospitals. On the other hand, half of the provinces fall between the range of 49.37% and 17.89% of denials, implying that bribery in public district hospitals is still prevalent. On bribery at public primary schools, Ha Tinh seems to have controlled it better, with 84.12% of respondents denying it occurs in the province. However, in half of the country between 39.17% and 64.29% of respondents deny it takes place, meaning that addressing the true reality of bribery at public primary schools is a challenge for almost every province.

63.07% of respondents claim that paying bribes to teachers for special treatment is uncommon.

11 These findings are also consistent with the 2012 anti-corruption diagnostics by the Government Inspectorate and the World Bank. For more detailed analysis, see Government Inspectorate and the World Bank, 2012, p. 88.

Equity in Public Employment

At a national level, only 42.86% of respondents deny the need to pay bribes for public sector employment.

This sub-dimension includes perception-based queries about citizens' views on equity in public sector employment. It is composed of two indicators, 'no bribes for State employment' and 'public sector jobs that do not require connections' (i.e. nepotism).

At the sub-dimensional level, the change in score between 2011 and 2013 is minimal (from 0.94 point in 2011, 0.96 point in 2012 to 1.02 in 2013). Again, Tien Giang is a shining light as respondents saw more equity in State employment than any other province, with its sub-dimension score increasing from 1.32 in 2012 to 1.63 points in 2013. Kon Tum scores the lowest at 0.6.

Figure 3.4d also suggests that bribes for public sector jobs are prevalent across provinces, as observed in previous years. At

a national level, only 42.86% of respondents deny the need to pay bribes for public sector employment, a slight increase on 2012. At a provincial level, Tien Giang maintained the highest levels with the largest number of respondents denying such behaviour in their province (76.18% in 2013, a rise from 70.49% in 2012). Meanwhile, Vinh Phuc had the smallest number of denials (16.28%) and half of the country had between 16.28% to 37.59% of citizens rejecting the practice.

Personal relationships still play an important role for those who wish to pursue public sector careers in five positions focussed on by PAPI. This observation has been confirmed by each of the PAPI surveys over the past three years and underlines the systemic nature of nepotism in public sector employment, even the lowest levels of government. The

Figure 3.4d: Levels of Nepotism at the Provincial Level

(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing personal connections are important; Perfect =100% disagreement)



importance of personal connections is reflected in the national mean scores of 1.06 to 1.27 for 'no bribes for State employment' in the five posts queried during the past three years (see Table 3.4)¹². Citizens in Lai Chau, in particular, perceived that personal relations are needed in four posts, while citizens in Binh Duong viewed personal relations are less needed in three out of five posts.

Also, the prevalence of nepotism is evident in the small variance across provinces and in the star graphs presented in Figure 3.4d. Southern provinces such as Binh Duong, Long An and Tien Giang seem to perform better in ensuring equity in public employment, given the large gaps between their performance scores and the remaining provinces.

Willingness to Fight Corruption

This sub-dimension measures government efforts to combat corruption and engage citizens to fight corruption in their jurisdictions. It is comprised of knowledge-based and experience-based indicators (see Table 3.4 for details about the indicators).

A key weapon in the fight against corruption is the Anti-Corruption Law, but awareness of it has slightly diminished as 40% of total respondents nationwide know of it, a reduction from 44.11% in 2012 and 42.45% in 2011. Vinh Long has the highest awareness amongst respondents (69.2%), while Lai Chau has just 14.43%. This suggests dissemination and communication of the Anti-Corruption Law needs to be stepped up.

Those who have heard about the Anti-Corruption Law tend to be more confident in local governments' resolve to tackle corruption (see Figure 1.8, Chapter 1). About 38.1% of respondents in the national sample thought local officials were serious in dealing with exposed corruption cases, a little higher than 2011 and 2012. Agreement was highest in Binh Duong (61.35%) and lowest in Kon Tum with only 11.2% trusting their officials' resolve. (see Table 3.4).

On tolerance of bribe requests from commune-level public officials or police, the national mean monetary amount that would trigger denunciation against bribe requests from both positions inflated to VND8.18 million in 2013 from VND5.11 million in 2012. Citizens in Lam Dong tend to tolerate such requests, as respondents on average said they would only report when bribes reached VND16.7 million against VND2.5 million on average tolerated by Vinh Long respondents.

When experiences with corruption are queried, respondents tend to be more reserved in retelling their own stories. As such, these perception-based indicators are important to indicate how citizens feel about corruption issues. PAPI 2013 data suggests that as many as 96.49% of the national sample claimed corruption by a local public official or civil servant had no effect on them, about the same as 2011 and 2012. In Soc Trang, all respondents denied being impacted on a personal level, while Quang Ngai has the lowest proportion of denials at 86.24%.

There is also a declining trend in citizens' willingness to fight corruption. This indicates a serious problem with governance, because it means that the legal institutions (including the Law on Denunciation and the Law on Complaints) that encourage citizens to fight corruption and make denunciations when illicit acts are experienced are not working. Among the respondents (336 people) that acknowledged being asked for bribes by public officials or civil servants at a national level, only 17 made a formal denunciation. In 2012, 331 said they or family members were affected and 27 denounced. In 2011, 322 were affected and 47 denounced. The reasons why the remaining respondents in 2013 choose not to proceed with denunciations vary, with 48.4% claiming denunciations would be ineffective, 8.9% were scared of retaliation, 11.8% found the complaints procedures too burdensome, about 16% did not know how to denunciate and the remainder gave different reasons or refused to answer.


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The reasons why respondents in 2013 choose not to proceed with denunciations vary, with 48.4% claiming denunciations would be ineffective.

¹² Indicators in d403 in the Questionnaire were all converted to dichotomous variables: '1' means 'not important' and '0' means 'important'. A score of '5' means relationships are 'not important' for any position.

DIMENSION 5: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Map 3.5: Provincial Performance on Administrative Procedures by Quartiles



This dimension examines the quality of public administrative services in areas directly important to citizens and encompasses certification services and application procedures for construction permits, land (LURCs) and personal documents. The four indicators used to construct this dimension help reveal the true performance of local government agencies against six elements constituting a professional and responsive administrative service, including convenience, security, reliability, personal attention, fairness and accountability. Also, factors that affect citizens' satisfaction with public administrative services in the four PAPI focus areas are identified.

This dimension has displayed little improvement in citizens' satisfaction with 'Public Administrative Procedures'. As observed, the aggregate performance of all provinces regarding their provision of public administrative services to citizens has barely changed during the past three years. The national mean score for this dimension in 2013 is 6.89 points - an insignificant rise of 0.32% point from 2012 (see Table 1.1, Chapter 1 and Table 3.5). This dimension also has the second highest aggregate national score.

There is low variance across provinces in terms of performance in dealing with public administrative procedures, similar to findings in the previous two rounds of PAPI surveys. At a national level, Figure 3.5a shows a high concentration of all provinces around the mean score of 6.89 and within the national mean range of 6.84-6.94 with the 95% CIs. The difference between the lowest provincial score of 6.25 (Quang Ngai) and the highest 7.79 (Quang Tri) is the smallest of the six dimensions. When the 95% CIs are taken into account, the better performers do not necessarily outperform the poorer performers in this dimension, given that Quang Tri is seen as outstanding when taking the absolute dimensional scores into account.

Map 3.5 depicts no discernible regional patterns in 2013, similar to that observed in 2012. It also reveals consistent performances in a number of provinces, if compared with Dimension 5 maps in 2011 and 2012¹³. For instance, central Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and Da Nang city have successfully maintained their status as the best performers over three years. Quang Tri has moved from the best performers list in 2011 to high

average list in 2012, but accelerated its pace in 2013 to be the best performer of all.

When comparing provincial levels of performance, some provinces have made significant improvements, while others fell behind in 2013 compared to 2011. As Figure 3.5b suggests, provinces like Ha Giang (+12.68%) and Binh Thuan (+10.95%) are among those that significantly performed better in 2013 than 2011. Nonetheless, Thanh Hoa (-7.36%), Bac Lieu (-7.12%) and Bac Giang (-6.6%) have seen large reductions in scores over the previous two years.

Among the five centrally-governed municipalities, only Can Tho (7.74% points) has progressed significantly, while Da Nang has improved by 2.5% points. The other three municipalities (Hai Phong, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City) are slipping in a negative direction.

At the sub-dimensional level, changes across four sub-dimensions compared to 2012 and 2011's findings are also statistically insignificant. Aside from improvements in the sub-dimension on 'certification procedures' (from 1.67 in 2012 to 1.69 points in 2013), the other three sub-dimensions see marginal changes (see Table 1.1, Chapter 1 and Table 3.5).

Of the four sub-dimensions as depicted in Table 3.5, 'land use rights procedures' has yet to satisfy respondents. On a scale of 0.25 to 2.5 points, the national 2013 mean score for sub-dimension 3 'land procedures' gains the lowest score. While 'certification procedures' improved over the past two years, it has not received sufficient national level citizen satisfaction with the national mean in 2013 at 1.69 points, a little higher than 'land procedures'. On another note, citizens appear to have become more satisfied with commune-level OSS services.

As observed in Figure 1.9 (Chapter 1), key drivers of citizens' dissatisfaction in the four administrative services in 2013 are civil servants' disrespectful behaviour and incompetence, a lack of clarity and display of information and fees (especially for construction permits and LURCs), in addition to missed deadlines (especially in LURCs and other administrative procedures handled at commune level). Users are expected to become more satisfied with reforms once these bottlenecks to administrative procedure reforms, at least in these four services, are addressed.

Key drivers of citizens' dissatisfaction in the four administrative services in 2013 are civil servants' disrespectful behaviour and incompetence, a lack of clarity and display of information and fees.

13 See Maps 3.5 in CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP (2013, p. 67) and CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP (2012, p. 68).

Figure 3.5a: Public Administrative Procedures (Dimension 5)





Figure 3.5b: Changes in Performance in Public Administrative Procedures (% - 2013 against 2011)



Note: Y = percentage of change in 2013 data from 2011 data, with ±5% defined as statistically significant.

Table 3.5: List of Indicators on Public Administrative Procedures (Dimension 5)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean			National PAPI 2013 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2013 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
Total Dimension	Dimension 5: Public Administrative Procedures		1	10	6.88	6.87	6.89	6.84	6.94	Minimum Median Maximum	6.25 7.05 7.79	Quang Ngai Vinh Long Quang Tri
Sub-Dimension 1	Certification Procedures		0.25	2.5	1.68	1.67	1.69	1.66	1.73	Minimum Median Maximum	1.32 1.75 2.26	Bac Giang Nghe An Ha Tinh
Sub-Dimension 2	Construction Permits		0.25	2.5	1.77	1.77	1.76	1.75	1.77	Minimum Median Maximum	1.37 1.78 1.95	Soc Trang Ha Giang Quang Binh
Sub-Dimension 3	Land Procedures		0.25	2.5	1.58	1.57	1.58	1.57	1.59	Minimum Median Maximum	1.08 1.58 1.93	Cao Bang Kon Tum Ha Nam
Sub-Dimension 4	Personal Procedures		0.25	2.5	1.84	1.86	1.85	1.83	1.87	Minimum Median Maximum	1.67 1.88 2.05	Bac Giang Kon Tum Son La
S1. Certification Procedures	Applied for Certification Service (%)	d501	Min	Max	38.82%	37.52%	37.11%	34.52%	39.70%	Minimum Median Maximum	11.99% 41.06% 83.98%	Bac Giang Hoa Binh Ha Tinh
S1. Certification Procedures	Total Quality of Certification Procedures (8 criteria)	d503a-e, d503g-i	0	8	7.10	7.14	7.34	7.24	7.45	Minimum Median Maximum	4.80 7.45 7.92	Bac Giang An Giang Dak Nong
S2. Construction Permits	Applied for Construction Permit (%)	d505	Min	Max	4.89%	4.38%	3.45%	2.72%	4.18%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.16% 2.92% 14.45%	Bac Giang Soc Trang Quang Ninh
S2. Construction Permits	Did not use Many Windows for Construction Permit (%)	d505d	0%	100%	92.86%	87.58%	94.63%	91.95%	97.30%	Minimum Median Maximum	12.58% 99.32% 100%	Soc Trang Dien Bien Binh Phuoc
S2. Construction Permits	Received Construction Permit (%)	d505e	0%	100%	91.96%	92.70%	92.10%	86.36%	97.84%	Minimum Median Maximum	23.11% 99.99% 100%	Binh Duong Ha Noi Long An
S2. Construction Permits	Total Quality of Construction Procedures (8 criteria)	d505fa-fe, d505fg-fi	0	8	6.82	6.55	6.70	6.24	7.17	Minimum Median Maximum	1.82 7.41 8.00	Dak Nong Ca Mau Quang Tri
S3. Land Procedures	Took part in Land Use Rights Certificates Procedures (%)	d507	0%	100%	10.64%	8.38%	8.75%	7.45%	10.05%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.78% 7.02% 24.42%	Bac Giang Kon Tum Dak Nong
S3. Land Use Rights Certificates Procedures	Did not use Many Windows for Land Use Rights Certificates (%)	d507e	0%	100%	84.68%	78.03%	80.74%	75.38%	86.11%	Minimum Median Maximum	27.30% 89.28% 100%	Soc Trang Dak Lak TT-Hue
S3. Land Use Rights Certificates Procedures	Received Land Title (%)	d507g	0%	100%	82.48%	80.74%	75.85%	68.79%	82.91%	Minimum Median Maximum	11.79% 77.87% 100%	Lao Cai Hung Yen Quang Tri
S3. Land Use Rights Certificates Procedures	Total Quality of Land Use Rights Certificates Procedures (8 criteria)	d507ha-hh	0	8	5.05	4.87	5.09	4.56	5.63	Minimum Median Maximum	1.41 5.34 7.96	Binh Dinh Ninh Thuan Ha Nam
S4. Personal Procedures	Took Part in Personal Administrative Procedures (%)	d508a-d508k	Min	Max	33.04%	33.15%	31.50%	29.41%	33.58%	Minimum Median Maximum	17.93% 33.33% 62.59%	Ha Noi Gia Lai Son La
S4. Personal Procedures	Total Quality of Personal Procedures (8 criteria)	d508d1a-d1e, d508d1g-d1i	0	8	6.79	6.91	6.92	6.74	7.09	Minimum Median Maximum	3.47 7.08 7.91	Bac Giang Kon Tum Kien Giang
S4. Personal Procedures	Did not use Many Windows for Personal Procedures (%)	d508c1	0%	100%	93.14%	94.57%	93.03%	91.04%	95.03%	Minimum Median Maximum	81.69% 95.52% 100%	Ninh Binh Binh Phuoc Nam Dinh

Note: (*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum.

Public Certification Services

This sub-dimension measures provincial performance in providing certification services to citizens at district and commune levels in 2013. PAPI asks service users about the clarity of procedures, publicity of fees, behaviour and competence of civil servants, paperwork loads, notification of deadlines, receipt of results and their overall service satisfaction levels.


As observed in previous PAPI reports, certification services were the most commonly used of the four services studied in this dimension in 2013, with 37.52% of the total population using such services at commune People's Committees, district justice offices or other public offices. The level of citizen satisfaction was also the highest of all four administrative services being measured. Most users (94.7%) accessed the service at commune-level People's Committees, while only 3.3% approached district-level justice

offices. This sub-dimension has a national mean of 1.69, about 1.27% points higher than 2012 (see Table 3.5). Ha Tinh excelled in offering certification services to citizens with the highest score of 2.26, while Bac Giang fell behind other provinces with the lowest score of 1.32.

Figure 3.5c shows the levels of respondents' agreement with statements about the quality of certification services. This indicator is scaled between 0 and 8, with "8" representing the sample maximum score aggregated from the eight criteria. On the whole, respondents are satisfied with certification services as the national mean of this indicator is 7.34 and higher than 2012's score. Half of the provinces score between 4.8 (Bac Giang) and 7.92 (Dak Nong), with the latter province having quickly emerged as a top performer on all eight criteria used to measure the quality of certification services.

On the whole, respondents are satisfied with certification services as the national mean of this indicator is 7.34 and higher than 2012's score.

Figure 3.5c: Assessment of Quality of Certification Services
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement)



Also, more provinces in 2013 experienced improvements in all eight criteria, as shown in the near-perfect shapes of the star graphs representing the top 20 provinces (see Figure 3.5c). However, poorer performers like Bac Giang, Ca Mau and Phu Yen have work to do to catch up with the better performers.


On ground level, Dong Thap citizens require better publicity of fees, more competent civil servants, clearer deadlines and timely delivery of services. For respondents from Cao Bang and Khanh Hoa, irregular publicity of fees, burdensome paperwork and missed deadlines were common complaints.

Application Procedures for Construction Permits

To construct this sub-dimension, PAPI measures the quality of services granting construction permits to civil construction projects, such as building/expanding/remodelling houses in anything more than a basic way (with some exceptions for citizens in remote areas).

On a scale of 0.25-2.5 points, the national mean is almost the same as the previous three years at 1.76 (see Table 1.1, Chapter 1). Across 63 provinces, there is a high convergence of provinces between the maximum score of 1.95 (Quang Binh) and the minimum score of 1.37 (Soc Trang).

Figure 3.5d: Assessment of Construction Permit Application Procedures
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements; Perfect =100% agreement)



Note: Provinces listed herein are those with more than 15 respondents in the total sample having applied for the construction permits.

The economic downturn in Viet Nam seems to have affected households, especially in decisions to improve housing conditions. The number of applicants for construction permits in 2013 was very small at 3.45% of the total population, smaller than in previous years. At a provincial level, Quang Ninh had the largest percentage of respondents (14.45%) applying for such permits over the past three years, while Bac Giang had the lowest at 0.16%.

Of construction permit applicants at a national level, 94.63% said they did not have to deviate from the accepted procedure to get paperwork processed in 2013¹⁴. This finding illustrates citizens' better experiences with OSSs handling construction permits than in previous years. For example, OSSs provided a streamlined service for Binh Phuoc respondents seeking construction permits. Half of all provinces' citizen respondents reported positive experiences ranging from 99% to 100%. In contrast, only 12.58% of surveyed applicants in Soc Trang reported a smooth service.

Overall, the quality of services granting citizens construction permits remains stable with an average national level score of 6.7

on a scale of 0-8 points. Quang Tri applicants enjoyed good service, while those in Dak Nong were relatively unhappy.

The star graphs in Figure 3.5d highlight respondents' levels of agreement with given statements examining the quality of service. The graphs only show findings for provinces where there were more than 15 applicants for construction permits in 2013, but depict significant variations across provinces. Compared with Dien Bien, Ha Noi, Hoa Binh and Yen Bai whose total quality scores are closest to perfect, Dong Nai, Lai Chau and Quang Ninh are exceptionally poorer. Lai Chau and Quang Ninh need improvement in all eight criteria, while Dong Nai receives complaints about not providing clear information about procedures, not publicizing application fees, poor competence of civil servants and not meeting deadlines.

Among centrally-governed municipalities, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City have seen gradual improvements, but the latter can improve in terms of meeting deadlines. Da Nang needs to catch up on seven criteria, except clearly displayed information about procedures, to gain better service satisfaction for citizens.

Overall, the quality of services granting citizens construction permits remains stable with an average national level score of 6.7 on a scale of 0-8 points.

14 Caution is advisable when using these numbers, due to the reported small number of applicants for construction permits in each province.


Application Procedures for Land Use Rights Certificates (LURCs)

PAPI measures provincial performance in the provision of LURCs for citizens and the quality of LURC-related administrative services. It covers application procedures for new LURCs, LURC renewals and transferring LURCs at provincial, district and commune levels. Similar to other batteries on administrative procedures, LURC indicators include questions about the proportion of people that submit applications for LURCs, availability of the OSS service, clarity of procedures, publicity of fees, behaviour and competence of civil servants, deadlines and timeliness of results as well as overall service satisfaction.

The number of respondents who applied for the three types of LURC-related procedures (including new LURCs, renewed LURCs and transfer of LURCs) was significantly small in 2013, as observed in previous PAPI iterations. Of the 1,333 respondents (or 8.75% of the whole sample) whose households applied for LURCs during the past three years, 26.8% applied for new LURCs, 12.7% for renewed LURCs and 60.49% to transfer LURCs. About 69.5% conducted the procedures at commune/ward People's Committees and 20.9% at district People's Committees.

Figure 3.5e: Assessment of LURC Application Procedures

(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect =100%)



Note: Provinces listed herein are those with more than 15 respondents in the total sample having applied for land use rights certificates.

Table 3.5 illustrates how this sub-dimension has the lowest score of all four types of administrative procedures (1.58) points on a scale of 0.25-2.5 points, about 1.14% higher than in 2012. Ha Nam province performs the best with a score of 1.93 and Cao Bang the worst with 1.37. The majority of provinces tend to cluster in the mid-range section of the scale. This suggests LURC-related provincial administrative service performances need a thorough review to make a national policy granting LURCs to all land users effective in line with the Prime Minister's Directive No. 05/CT-TTg on 4 April 2013. This directive has not been fully implemented as it originally requested provinces to grant LURCs to all uncertified land users by the end of 2013.

The bottlenecks, as Table 3.5 suggests, are due to the fact that numerous applicants had to visit more than one office to accomplish LURC procedures, although the percentage is lower than when compared to 2012. At a national level, 80.74% of respondents said they did not have to visit multiple offices or 'windows' to have paperwork processed, a 4% rise from 2012. The province with the largest proportion of applicants not using multiple windows for LURCs is Thua Thien-Hue (100%) against (27.3%) in Soc Trang.

Among the respondents who used the service in the past year, about 75.85% were successful, a 5% decline from 2012 at national

level. In Quang Tri, all applicants were successful, while in Lao Cai the proportion was 11.79%. In addition, 6.3% of applicants nationwide had their paperwork processed with solicitation from 'intermediaries' rather than being fully supported at the relevant OSSs. As observed in previous PAPI iterations, most applicants received their final results 30 days after lodging an application, but the length differs greatly from one to 700 days (i.e. nearly two years).

On the total quality of LURC application processes (see the legend in Figure 3.5e), there is a remarkable difference across provinces. The national mean is 5.09 on a scale of 0-8 points, a little higher than the 2012 score of 4.87.

The star graphs in Figure 3.5e present 46 provinces where more than 15 applicants responded on any of the three types of procedures queried. As observed in previous PAPI iterations, the poorest 10 performers in the eight criteria are mostly northern provinces, with the exception of Gia Lai, Ha Tinh and Khanh Hoa. Thanh Hoa performs well in all eight criteria, while others in the top 10 have uneven performance levels. In particular, Hau Giang still needs to improve transparency in fees and charges, while Phu Yen is raising its game in most criteria except clear deadlines, meeting deadlines and the competence of civil servants.

The bottlenecks are due to the fact that numerous applicants had to visit more than one office to accomplish LURC procedures.

Application Procedures for Personal Documents at Commune Level

This sub-dimension measures the performance of commune-level People's Committees in addressing applications for different types of personal documents. It covers administrative procedures such as birth and marriage certificates, death notifications, ethnicity-related procedures, residency registrations, housing and employment subsidies¹⁵.

The national mean score for this sub-dimension (1.85) in 2013 and is the highest

of all four procedures measured. Overall, this suggests that citizens appear satisfied with the commune-level provision of personal documents. The difference between the maximum and minimum scores is also the smallest (2.05 at Son La compared with 1.67 at Bac Giang). It should be noted that at a national level, around 31.5% of respondents applied for listed procedures over the course of one year. In Son La, 62.59% of respondents used one of these services, while in Ha Noi 17.93% did so.

Overall, this suggests that citizens appear satisfied with the commune-level provision of personal documents.


15 These types of personal papers were selected based on the list of administrative procedures that commune-level People's Committees are delegated to process for citizens.

On the total quality of service (see Figure 3.5g), there seems uniformity in commune-level performance across the country, except for the cases of Bac Giang, Hai Phong, Lao Cai and Quang Ninh. The national mean in this indicator is 6.92 on a scale of 0-8, a little higher than 2011 and 2012's scores.

Although there is a relatively high level of satisfaction with these services nationwide, there is still some variation in scores. Half of the

provinces fall between 7.08-7.91 points, while the difference between the highest score of 7.91 (Kien Giang) and the lowest 3.47 (Bac Giang) is large, suggesting room for provinces to exchange experiences on how to improve. Figure 3.5g shows that in 2013, Can Tho, Kien Giang and Tra Vinh grabbed top positions in this indicator, while Bac Giang and Quang Ninh could have significantly improved their performances in all eight criteria.

Figure 3.5g: Assessment of Commune-level Administrative Procedures
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect =100%)



DIMENSION 6: PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

Map 3.6: Provincial Performance in Public Service Delivery by Quartiles





Figure 3.6a: Public Services Delivery (Dimension 6)



This sixth dimension examines the quality of 'Public Service Delivery' through four key public services: public health care, public primary education, basic infrastructure and residential law and order. Similar to previous waves of PAPI, citizens were asked about their direct experiences with the accessibility, quality and availability of basic public services in their communes/wards, districts and provinces. In particular, they were asked how responsive local authorities are to the basic needs and demands of citizens, with the usage and efficiency of public investment in these areas of special interest.


Overall, the national aggregate level in 'Public Service Delivery' showed some improvement in 2013, but it was slower-paced than 2012 (see Figure 1.1, Chapter 1 and Table 3.6). The national mean score in this dimension is 6.95 points in 2013. This dimension is also notable for the highest aggregate national score of all six dimensions on a scale of 1-10 points. An improvement in 'basic infrastructure' is a major contributor to the increase in the national score, with a rise by 6.13% compared to 2011 (see Table 1.1, Chapter 1). This positive result is supported by a more modest 2% upswing in the 'public health' and 'primary education' sub-dimensions. In contrast, 'law and order' has seen less improvement over the past three years.

The high level of consistency in provincial performance compared to 2012 is also worth noting, with provinces converging between 6.02 to 7.76 points. When provinces are grouped into quartiles, regional patterns emerge with positive signs in south-central and southern provinces (see Map 3.6). Vinh Long is the best performer, although Tra Vinh made the biggest move from the poor performer group to one of the high average provinces in 2013 compared to 2012. Centrally-governed municipalities Da Nang, Hai Phong and Ho Chi Minh City were

strong in 'Public Service Delivery', mostly due to accessible and good quality basic infrastructure (see Figure 3.6a).

The poorest performers are scattered in northern mountainous, Central Highlands, south-central and southern provinces. Binh Phuoc, Ca Mau, Cao Bang, Dak Nong, Gia Lai, Son La, Tay Ninh and Yen Bai once again are among this group in 2013, with the poor quality of roads, limited access to tap water, unavailability of electricity and distribution of garbage collection services problematic. Some year-on-year declines are also observed in mean score values of this lowest percentile (see Figure 3.6b). Notably, when comparing 2013 to 2011 (see Figure 3.6b), Son La saw the largest decline in performance in 2013 (-6.97%), while another mountainous and poor-performing province Dak Nong travelled in the opposite direction with a +13.9% point gain.

Table 3.6 unmasks the 'basic infrastructure' sub-dimension as having the greatest variation across provinces, while 'law and order' is relatively consistent across the country. While Tra Vinh displayed some healthy attributes regarding its quality 'public healthcare', Hai Phong needs an injection of fresh momentum to offset declines. Kien Giang chalked up impressive citizen satisfaction numbers in 'public education' in 2013, while Phu Tho lagged behind. In 'basic infrastructure', Hai Phong engineered a top performance, while Ca Mau needs more investment in this aspect. To complete the round-up of sub-dimensions, in 'law and order' the southern border province of Tay Ninh saw improvements in the safety of localities in 2013, but the northern border province of Ha Giang has seen significant declines over time.

Figure 3.6b: Change in Performance in Public Service Delivery (% - 2013 against 2011)

Note: Y = percentage of change in 2013 data from 2011 data, with $\pm 5\%$ defined as statistically significant.

Table 3.6: List of Indicators on Public Service Delivery (Dimension 6)

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean			National PAPI 2013 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2013 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
Total Dimension	Dimension 6: Public Service Delivery		1	10	6.75	6.90	6.95	6.88	7.01	Minimum Median Maximum	6.02 6.87 7.76	Ca Mau Soc Trang Vinh Long
Sub-Dimension 1	Public Health		0.25	2.5	1.75	1.78	1.78	1.76	1.81	Minimum Median Maximum	1.50 1.83 2.22	Hai Phong Thai Binh Tra Vinh
Sub-Dimension 2	Public Education		0.25	2.5	1.65	1.67	1.68	1.68	1.69	Minimum Median Maximum	1.28 1.64 2.13	Phu Tho Yen Bai Kien Giang
Sub-Dimension 3	Basic Infrastructure		0.25	2.5	1.75	1.85	1.86	1.80	1.91	Minimum Median Maximum	1.29 1.70 2.46	Ca Mau Quang Ngai Hai Phong
Sub-Dimension 4	Law and Order		0.25	2.5	1.60	1.60	1.62	1.61	1.63	Minimum Median Maximum	1.49 1.62 1.71	Ha Giang Phu Yen Tay Ninh
S1. Public Health	Population with Health Insurance (%)	d601	0%	100%	53.95%	53.00%	54.02%	50.79%	57.25%	Minimum Median Maximum	31.88% 56.88% 98.40%	Bac Giang HCMC Lai Chau
S1. Public Health	Quality of Health Insurance (4 pt scale)	d601b	0	4	3.30	3.33	3.37	3.33	3.42	Minimum Median Maximum	2.85 3.39 3.71	Bac Ninh Binh Dinh Dak Lak
S1. Public Health	Quality of Free Medical Care for Kids (5 pt scale)	d603c	0	5	3.85	3.92	3.91	3.82	4.00	Minimum Median Maximum	2.99 3.91 4.46	Hai Duong Quang Tri Quang Ngai
S1. Public Health	Poor Households are Subsidized (%)	d602	0%	100%	72.21%	75.05%	74.16%	71.93%	76.38%	Minimum Median Maximum	48.04% 79.20% 98.57%	Cao Bang Ben Tre Tra Vinh
S1. Public Health	Checks for Children are Free (%)	d603a	0%	100%	69.55%	73.03%	72.59%	68.81%	76.38%	Minimum Median Maximum	31.74% 77.88% 99.34%	Hai Phong Ninh Thuan Tra Vinh
S1. Public Health	Total Hospital Quality (10 criteria)	d604da-d604dk	0	10	5.49	5.57	5.75	5.43	6.07	Minimum Median Maximum	2.58 6.07 8.41	TT-Hue Dak Lak Ha Giang
S2. Public Education	Kilometre Walk to School	d606ca	Min	Max	0.99	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.96	Minimum Median Maximum	0.50 1.00 2.00	Kien Giang Soc Trang Da Nang
S2. Public Education	Number of Minutes Travelling to School	d606cb	Min	Max	10.06	9.71	9.63	9.56	9.70	Minimum Median Maximum	5.00 10.00 15.00	Bac Ninh Quang Ninh Ha Nam
S2. Public Education	Overall Rating of Primary School (5 pt scale)	d606ce	0	5	3.86	3.96	3.97	3.91	4.04	Minimum Median Maximum	3.40 3.88 4.39	Son La Ha Giang Hau Giang
S2. Public Education	Total School Quality (9 criteria)	d606cda-cdi	0	9	4.43	4.88	5.09	4.84	5.35	Minimum Median Maximum	3.07 5.09 7.20	TT-Hue Tien Giang Quang Binh
S3. Infrastructure	Households with Electricity (%)	d607	0%	100%	97.04%	97.76%	98.5%	97.8%	99.1%	Minimum Median Maximum	61.9% 100% 100%	Dien Bien BRVT Ha Nam

Dimension and Sub-Dimensions	Name of Indicator	Survey Question	Scale		National Mean			National PAPI 2013 (95% CI)		Provincial PAPI 2013 Scores		
			Min	Max	PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	Low	High	Status	Scores	Provinces
S3. Infrastructure	Quality of Road (1=All Dirt; 4=All Asphalt)	d608	1	4	2.80	2.85	2.82	2.74	2.90	Minimum Median Maximum	1.59 2.80 3.73	Cao Bang An Giang Hai Phong
S3. Infrastructure	Frequency of Garbage Pick-up (0=Never; 4=Everyday)	d609	0	4	1.92	2.42	2.62	2.37	2.88	Minimum Median Maximum	0.14 1.81 5.43	Ca Mau Dien Bien Nam Dinh
S3. Infrastructure	Share Drinking Tap Water (%)	d610=5 or 6	0%	100%	34.80%	42.07%	40.17%	34.52%	45.83%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.50% 27.99% 100.00%	Gia Lai Khanh Hoa Da Nang
S3. Infrastructure	Share Drinking Unclean Water (%)	d610=1 or 2	0%	100%	6.45%	6.41%	7.91%	3.85%	11.97%	Minimum Median Maximum	0.00% 0.26% 63.12%	Binh Dinh Bac Lieu Ha Nam
S4. Law and Order	How Safe is Locality (3=Very Safe)	d510a	1	3	1.97	1.97	2.03	2.00	2.06	Minimum Median Maximum	1.60 2.01 2.29	Ha Giang Lang Son Tay Ninh
S4. Law and Order	Change in Safety Over Time	d510a-d510b	Min	Max	8.09%	10.96%	14.98%	11.94%	18.01%	Minimum Median Maximum	-19.36% 11.75% 45.24%	Binh Duong Tra Vinh Soc Trang
S4. Law and Order	Crime Rate in Locality (% Victims of Crime)	d511a-d511d	0%	100%	18.26%	17.17%	15.34%	13.46%	17.22%	Minimum Median Maximum	3.50% 13.50% 32.27%	Kien Giang Yen Bai Kon Tum

Note: (*) Min = Sample Minimum; Max = Sample Maximum.

Public Health Care

Three key drivers of citizens' satisfaction with public district hospitals are: (i) health workers' level of respect towards patients and their carers, (ii) regular health worker visits to patients and (iii) reasonable expenses at hospitals.

A clear understanding of public district hospitals' performance and quality can provide the health sector with vital evidence in its search for solutions to overcrowding in public provincial and central hospitals. To help meet this objective, this sub-dimension studies the overall quality of public hospitals at district level and offers a snapshot of public health insurance effectiveness, availability of free medical checks for children under six years old and free health care for the poor.

At a national level, the performance of public district hospitals has remained unchanged during the past three years. On a 0.25-2.5 point scale, the national mean in 2013 is 1.78, the same as 2011 and 2012 (see Table 1.1, Chapter 1), with the median score of 1.83 signalling that citizens are reasonably

satisfied with public health care at district level in half of the nation. Tra Vinh topped the list with 2.22 points, while Hai Phong scored lowest with 1.50 points in absolute terms.

As observed in previous years, citizens' experiences with public district hospitals varied across provinces in 2013. Figure 1.10 (Chapter 1) highlights three key drivers of citizens' satisfaction with public district hospitals, being health workers' level of respect towards patients and their carers, regular health worker visits to patients and reasonable expenses at hospitals (among the 10 criteria in Figure 3.6c). Despite some overall year-on-year increases in the national aggregate of hospital quality, service users still score public district hospitals at an average level of 5.75 points (see Table 3.6).

Figure 3.6c: Citizens’ Assessment of Public District Hospitals
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect =100%)




Figure 3.6c suggests that users in Ha Giang, Hoa Binh and Long An were more satisfied with services in 2013, although improvements in a few criteria are needed. Son La and Tra Vinh belied their reputations as poor provinces to be listed as top 10 performers. Meanwhile the five centrally-governed municipalities - especially Hai Phong, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City – turned in average or poor performances. Thua Thien-Hue falls behind with the least user satisfaction in all 10 criteria, attaining only 2.58 points in 2013.

On access to health insurance, 54% of respondents at national level had health insurance cards, a slight increase from 53% in 2012. Lai Chau headlined with 98.4% against 31.9% in Bac Giang. The 56.88% median proportion score means more than half of provinces provide health care coverage to a majority of their citizens. Among those holding health insurance cards, nearly 45% of respondents had free health insurance

provided by the State, 44.66% had voluntary health insurance and 10.43% had compulsory health insurance.

Looking at the quality of health insurance, the national mean score is similar to previous years, with an average score of 3.37 points on a 4-point scale reflecting users’ appreciation of health insurance. Users in Dak Lak rated quality the highest (3.71 points), while those in Bac Ninh were less impressed (2.85).

A large majority of poor households are entitled to health insurance subsidies from the State, with 74% of respondents reporting such subsidies in their communes in 2013. In Tra Vinh, 98.5% pointed to subsidies in the province, while 48% did so in Cao Bang. Tra Vinh is also notable for its 99.34% of respondents agreeing that children under six years old are covered by healthcare subsidies, while the opposite is reported in Hai Phong.

Public Primary Education

Respondents' perception of public primary schools' overall quality was a little better in 2013 than in 2012. However, poor quality teaching qualifications, bribery and irregular feedback from schools are three key factors reducing parents' satisfaction with this public service.


The four key indicators to construct this sub-dimension are the distance in kilometres from home to schools, length of time in minutes required for children to go to school along with the total quality of primary schools based on nine criteria and a 1-5 point scale. These indicators can support the measurement of citizens' satisfaction as outlined in the Ministry of Education and Training's Decision No. 3982/2013/QĐ-BGDĐT encompassing accessibility, infrastructure and facilities as well as the educational environment, activities and results. Also, criteria used to measure the overall quality of public primary schools comes from national minimum standards primary schools need to meet to be accredited¹⁶.

Overall, this sub-dimension has seen incremental rises with the national mean (1.68 points) in 2013 on a 0.25-2.5 point scale

representing a 1.12% year-on-year increase against 2012 and 1.95% against 2011. Kien Giang delivered the highest score of 2.13 points, with Phu Tho at the bottom of the scale. The median score in this indicator was virtually the same as 2011 and 2012, at 1.64.

Respondents' perception of public primary schools' overall quality was a little better in 2013 than in 2012 as sketched out in Table 3.6, with a national mean of 5.09 points on a scale of 0-9 points. Poor quality teaching qualifications, bribery and irregular feedback from schools are three key factors reducing parents' satisfaction with this public service (see Figure 1.10, Chapter 1). Public primary schools in Quang Binh maintained their table-topping position in 2013 with a collective score of 7.2, but Thua Thien-Hue slips to around 3 points.

Figure 3.6d: Citizens' Assessment of Public Primary Schools
(Branch Size= % of respondents agreeing to the statements in the legend; Perfect =100%)



¹⁶ See Circular No.59/2012/TT-BGDĐT of the Ministry of Education and Training on 28 December 2012 for detailed minimum standards for primary schools to be accredited "national standards achievers".

The star graphs in Figure 3.6d underscore the challenge for all provinces to meet the minimum quality criteria as per Circular No.59/2012/TT-BGDĐT. Even Quang Binh, which posted the closest to perfect scores during the past two PAPI iterations, has issues to address such as teacher favouritism towards school children taking extra classes, insufficient classes resulting in three shifts and crowded classrooms. The same users' experiences are witnessed in the heavily populated Ho Chi Minh City. Of interest, the top 10 provinces are from different economic development backgrounds (e.g. Ca Mau, Bac Giang, Ho Chi Minh City, Ninh Thuan, Quang Binh and Thai Binh).

Similar to previous annual findings, most respondents with children in primary schools rated the overall quality of primary education between "average" and "good", evident in the national mean score of 3.97 on a scale of 1 ("very poor") to 5 ("very good"). Hau Giang posted a remarkably high score (4.39) beating its own record in 2012, but Son La respondents rated education as only "average" as was the case in 2012.

The national median for distance travelled from home to the nearest primary school in 2013 is stable at 0.95 of a kilometre and the median journey time is 9.6 minutes, about the same as previous years.

Basic Infrastructure

This sub-dimension measures citizens' satisfaction with basic infrastructure against what should be provided by local governments. Specifically, it looks at households' access to electricity, the quality of roads nearest houses, frequency of garbage collections in residential areas and quality of drinking water.

At a national level, improvements in basic infrastructure have emerged over the past three years, although the pace in 2013 was much slower (+0.28% against 2012) than improvements in 2011-2012 (+5.83%). Hai Phong maintained its top position with 2.13 points, close to the maximum score of 2.5. At the other end of the scale, Ca Mau disappointed with 1.29.

Encouragingly, citizens across the country have good access to electricity overall, with 98.5% of respondents plugged into electricity use at home. Half of all provinces have 100% coverage to households, but the difference between the median best performing province (Ba Ria-Vung Tau with 100%) and the poorest (Dien Bien with about 62%) is still large. The latter province has made little

progress in electricity coverage over the past three years, as it has the lowest percentage of respondents reporting access to electricity.

Findings on the other three indicators are similar to 2011 and 2012 with lingering differences between urban and rural provinces. In Cao Bang dirt and gravel roads remain common, while in Hai Phong respondents exclusively use paved roads. On the frequency of garbage collections, Nam Dinh is catching up with Da Nang and Ninh Binh to be the best performer with daily collections, while Ca Mau has the most infrequent collections.

Around 40.2% of respondents across the country reported access to clean water at home as the primary source of drinking water, as opposed to untreated water from rivers, lakes or rainwater (7.9%). This is dramatically illustrated by Gia Lai where just 0.5% of respondents can access clean water as reported in 2012, in stark contrast to all respondents in Da Nang. The median percentage of nearly 28% means that in most provinces, access to clean water for drinking remains limited.

Encouragingly, citizens across the country have good access to electricity overall, with 98.5% of respondents plugged into electricity use at home.

Law and Order

15.3% of respondents reported being victims of one of the four types of crimes (i.e. vehicle theft, robbery, break-ins and physical violence).

The levels of safety experienced by citizens in everyday life is reflected by a trio of indicators in the shape of safety levels in localities, changes in safety levels and crime rates in localities (vehicle theft, robbery, break-ins and physical violence).

Overall, there is little improvement in law and order during 2011 and 2013 as the national mean is 1.62 points, short of the ideal score for this sub-dimension at 2.5. At a national level, around 14% of respondents observed positive law and order changes in their localities, a little higher than in 2012. Tay Ninh appears a relatively safe place to live, while 30% of Ha Giang respondents have experienced one or more of the four measured types of crimes. A healthy number of respondents (45%) in Soc Trang pointed to improvements in

residential safety in their province, but Binh Duong citizens saw a negative trend in 2013 compared to previous years.

The lack of safety perceived by respondents in the past year is worrisome, although marginally less so than 2012, as 15.3% of respondents reported being victims of one of the four types of crimes. As many as 32% of respondents in Kon Tum were crime victims during the 12 months before the survey, as opposed to just 3.5% in Kien Giang. Nonetheless, more victims are reported in a number of provinces in 2013 than 2011, with Binh Duong, Ha Giang, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City having reported increasing numbers of victims over the past three years. Home break-ins and vehicle theft top the list of common crimes across all 63 provinces.

AGGREGATION OF DIMENSIONS INTO COMPOSITE 2013 PAPI


In the footsteps of previous PAPI reports, this section aggregates all of the six dimensions into a single index to facilitate overall comparisons between provinces. Three methods are used to construct these indexes for readers to select the approach that best suits their needs. Readers are reminded that PAPI’s philosophy is analysts should focus on the dimensions and sub-dimensions to maximize the constructive impact of the report.

As in previous iterations and reports, three aggregation approaches adopted for PAPI 2013 are presented. First, a dashboard of the six dimensions of governance and public administration is presented. Second, the unweighted composite scores are presented, taking care to calculate CIs around those rankings¹⁷. Third, a weighted PAPI aggregation that derives the weights from a regression analysis of citizens’ satisfaction in local governance is built.

2013 PAPI Dashboard and Control Panel

Figure 3.7a illustrates the dashboard approach to the aggregation of PAPI 2013. Each dimension is ordered on an ascending 1-10 point scale. All provinces have the possibility of scoring 10 in each dimension

to receive a “Perfect” star, as shown in the bottom corner of the chart. Each branch of the star represents progress toward the perfect score of 10.




17 Graphs with confidence intervals are included at www.papi.vn. In these graphs, policy makers and readers can ascertain where there are statistically significant differences across provinces.

The benefit of the dashboard is it helps identify weaknesses in solid-performing provinces which are obscured in an additive index. This is illustrated by Quang Binh, the most consistent high-performing province in 2013, which still has room for improvement in ‘Control of Corruption’ where it scored 6.44 compared to its high of 7.56 in ‘Public Administrative Procedures’. Da Nang, another province to excel, demonstrates weaknesses in the areas of ‘Participation at Local Levels’ (5.22) and ‘Transparency’ (5.94). Another example is Ho Chi Minh City’s imperfect star, which suggests room for improvement in ‘Participation at Local Levels’ (4.79) as well as ‘Transparency’ (5.64). In contrast, the lowest performing location Bac Giang scores relatively well on ‘Public Service Delivery’ (6.55), but poorly in four dimensions. Hai Phong, another low scorer, presents great

strength in ‘Public Service Delivery’ (7.43), but lags behind in other dimensions.

A particular area of PAPI’s strength is its ability to present data and information in objective and statistical terms. However, presenting just the average dimension scores, as shown in Figure 3.7a, overstates the level of PAPI’s precision. What can be said with a high degree of certainty is the average scores represent the most likely score that is possible in repeated random sampling in Viet Nam. Figure 3.7b provides a different perspective, which the range of possible dimension scores for three diverse provinces, encompassing Quang Binh (highest sum of the six dimensions), Bac Giang (lowest score) and Dak Lak (median score). Rather than presenting the average scores, the 90% CIs for the three provinces around each dimension are presented.

Figure 3.7b: 2013 PAPI Dashboard of Three Provinces (Including 90% CIs)



Viewing PAPI scores in this way is enlightening and particularly useful for policy makers. Scores for three dimensions (Transparency, Vertical Accountability and Participation at Local Levels) are significantly different across the three provinces. Thus, it can be said with a great deal of confidence (nine times out of 10) that in repeated samples, the ordering of these provinces (best, middle and worst) would be retained. On one dimension (Participation at

Local Levels), the CIs of Bac Giang and Dak Lak overlap, indicating that their scores are not statistically distinguishable and could be reversed in repeated samples. Nevertheless, Quang Binh is significantly superior to Bac Giang on all dimensions. Moreover, except for ‘Control of Corruption’ the top-ranked province is statistically distinguishable in all dimensions from the median province. Thus, while it might not be possible to differentiate

the top half of provinces on these indicators, it can be said that these locations can be distinguished by their quality from the lowest-performing province. Policy makers and interested readers wishing to view CIs in addition to aggregate scores can download them from the PAPI website (www.papi.vn).

Another way to look at these performance levels is by way of a “control panel” approach shown in Table 3.7. Using the same colour codes of the provincial maps presented in previous sections of this report, it can be observed that provinces excel in some dimensions, but lag behind in others. Table 3.7 features the six most populous provinces in Viet Nam. Of the six, only Thanh Hoa can be grouped in the top-performing group (above the 75th percentile) with three dimensional scores among the group

(‘Participation at Local Levels’, ‘Transparency’ and ‘Control of Corruption’). Ha Noi performs well in ‘Transparency’, yet when it comes to ‘Control of Corruption’ it falls into the group of poorest performers. Ho Chi Minh City shines in ‘Transparency’, but trails in ‘Participation at Local Levels’. Nghe An, with no dimension in the top group in 2013, lags behind its 2012 performance level. Of the six largest provinces, An Giang falls into the poorest performing group (below the 25th percentile) in four dimensions, but thrives in ‘Control of Corruption’ and holds its own in ‘Public Service Delivery’ compared to 2012 results¹⁸.

This “control panel” approach visually shows how policy makers can look for lessons in implementing particular policies and share these good practices with other provinces.

Provinces excel in some dimensions, but lag behind in others.

Table 3.7: Control Panel of 2013 PAPI Dimension Performance by Six Most Populous Provinces

Province	D1. Participation at Local Levels	D2. Transparency	D3. Vertical Accountability	D4. Control of Corruption	D5. Public Admin. Procedures	D6. Public Service Delivery
An Giang	4.792	5.297	4.638	6.535	6.679	7.101
Dong Nai	5.483	5.698	5.275	5.537	6.921	6.768
Ha Noi	5.457	6.329	5.944	5.640	6.846	6.946
Nghe An	5.205	5.773	5.870	5.767	7.220	6.632
Thanh Hoa	5.594	6.607	5.970	6.919	6.726	6.816
TP. Ho Chi Minh	4.793	6.278	5.642	6.306	7.074	7.233
Colour code:	Best performer	Above 75th percentile		Low Average	Between 25th and 50th percentile	
	High Average	Between 50th and 75th percentile		Poor Performer	Below 25th percentile	

Unweighted 2013 PAPI


A second approach to aggregation is to add up the scores of each dimension. The benefit of this approach for PAPI is the ease in calculating CIs for aggregate scores, because the variance in the final score for each respondent is already obtained. This aggregation yields a theoretical PAPI score ranging from 6 to 60. In practice, no province consistently performs at the top or

bottom of every indicator, so the actual range is 33.84 (Bac Giang) to 42.61 (Quang Binh).


Figure 3.7c and Map 3.7a show the final unweighted performance levels for the 63 provinces, using the individual level aggregation method. The colours in Figure 3.7c in each bar depict provincial scores in each of the six dimensions.

18 See CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP (2013, p. 90).

Figure 3.7c: Unweighted 2013 PAPI by Dimension



Map 3.7a: Unweighted 2013 PAPI by Quartiles



Weighted 2013 PAPI

A positive and eye-catching development was the number of higher scoring provinces in 2013, compared to 2012.


The third approach to aggregation adopted by PAPI is a regression-based one. As with previous iterations of PAPI, this approach calculates the relationship between key PAPI dimensions and citizen satisfaction with local governance, controlling other factors that may also influence citizens' satisfaction levels. The specific dependent (outcome) variable for this exercise was drawn from question D305, where citizens were invited to fill out a 100-point "feeling thermometer" of total satisfaction with different levels of government. From this analysis, weights were assigned to each sub-dimension.

To ensure consistency, the 2013 version of PAPI employed the same weights as previous rounds to generate the weighted PAPI Index, as shown in Figure 3.7d and in Map 3.7b. A positive and eye-catching development was the number of higher scoring provinces in 2013, compared to 2012. In 2011, only four provinces scored more than 40 points


(on a scale of 6 to 60 points) in the overall weighted PAPI Index to sit in the top bracket (Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Long An, Quang Binh and Son La). However, in 2012 this number of provinces more than doubled with Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Long An and Quang Binh joined by Binh Dinh, Da Nang, Nam Dinh and Quang Tri. In 2013, these same seven provinces again scored more than 40 points and were joined by Thanh Hoa and Vinh Long as new entries in this top performing group.

At the other end of the scale, there was also dramatic positive upward development. In 2011 a total of 11 provinces scored below 35 points (Binh Thuan, Cao Bang, Ha Giang, Hung Yen, Lai Chau, Lam Dong, Ninh Binh, Phu Yen, Quang Ngai, Tay Ninh and Tra Vinh) and in 2012 this further reduced to just six provinces (Ca Mau, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Khanh Hoa, Tay Ninh and Tra Vinh). But in an eye-catching development in 2013, only Bac Giang province scored below 35 points.

Figure 3.7d: Weighted 2013 PAPI by Dimension
(Colours by Dimension, Weighted by Impact on Local Governance Satisfaction)




Map 3.7b: Weighted 2013 PAPI by Quartiles



Consistent with 2011 and 2012's findings, as expected the weighted and unweighted 2013 PAPI aggregates are highly correlated (0.91***), but fluctuations occur in some provinces. For this reason, once again, it is critical to pay attention to CIs around the final scores and not just the aggregate measures.

These are plotted in Figure 3.7e. The four groups of provinces highlighted earlier are preserved (see also Map 3.7b). There are still localities above the 75th percentile (or above 39.175), those below the 25th percentile (or below 37.051) and two groups of provinces between the two red lines.

Figure 3.7e: Weighted 2013 PAPI (with 95% CIs)




Stability Over Time

PAPI is highly stable over time, although not fixed, allowing provinces to improve their performances.

Figure 3.7f provides a scatter plot of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 PAPI indices. The three indexes have a correlation coefficient of 0.69, which is significant at the 99% level. This indicates

that PAPI is highly stable over time, although not fixed, allowing provinces to improve their performances.

Figure 3.7f: Correlation between the 2011, 2012 and 2013 PAPI Indices




Citizens and Businesses: Correlation between PAPI and PCI

Figure 3.7g demonstrates the correlation of the 2013 PAPI with the 2013 PCI scores. While the relationship is positive, it is weak ($r=0.66$) and not statistically significant. As reported in previous years, the relationship is not perfect and has lost its statistical significance over time. This means some provinces stand out as locations where citizens give higher evaluations to local leaders than businesses, but citizens in other provinces are less satisfied

with governance and public administrators than businesses. Similar to observations in previous iterations, this positive yet weak relationship indicates there are differences in how businesses and citizens view governance performance, requiring different types of policies from local officials. Some locations manage the balancing act well, while others have yet to find an appropriate mix.

Some provinces stand out as locations where citizens give higher evaluations to local leaders than businesses, but citizens in other provinces are less satisfied.

Figure 3.7g: Correlation with 2013 Provincial Competitiveness Index



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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Key Demographic Specifications of PAPI 2013 Sample

PAPI has been designed, built and implemented following a sound and robust methodology upon the experiment in 2009, the expanded survey in 2010 and the first nationwide survey in 2011. PAPI's methodology is a stepping stone for results to be credible and accepted by different stakeholders and interested parties. The same methodological framework, sampling strategy and survey implementation processes applied in previous PAPI iterations are undertaken in PAPI 2013 without any adjustment to ensure its reliability and stability and to enable comparisons over time¹⁹.

The reliability of the PAPI survey can be checked against the variables made available

since the release of the 2009 National Population Census, given the outdated census data. Table A compares the distribution of key demographic variables between the PAPI and available census data as well as confirms the closeness of the PAPI sample to the actual demographic characteristics of the Vietnamese population. In addition, the impact of weights on the composition of the sample by ethnicity is shown in Figure A1, while Figure A2 presents the age distribution of the PAPI 2013 sample and national census of 2009.

Table A: Comparison of Key Demographic Variables Over Time and with 2009 Census (%)

		PAPI 2011	PAPI 2012	PAPI 2013	Census 2009
Gender	Male	47.04	47.33	47.32	49.41
	Female	52.96	52.67	52.68	50.59
Ethnicity	Kinh	84.5	84.35	84.57	85.73
	Others	15.5	15.64	15.43	14.27

19 Interested readers can reference Chapter 3 of the PAPI 2010 Report (VFF, CECODES & UNDP, 2011, pp. 93-104), Appendix A of the PAPI 2011 Report (CECODES, FR, CPP & UNDP, 2012, pp. 117-118) and Appendix A of the PAPI 2012 Report (CECODES, VFF-CRT & UNDP, 2013, pp. 103-107) for more details.

Figure A1: PAPI 2013 Kinh Ethnicity Composition vs. National Census 2009





Figure A2: Age Distribution of PAPI 2013 Sample vs. National Census 2009 (excluding respondents aged 70 or above in PAPI sample)



Two further tests to ensure the representativeness of the PAPI 2013 sample with the national population are the comparison of the occupation and educational levels of respondents and their relationship with the post-stratification weights applied. This is shown in Figures A3

and A4 for occupational and educational levels, respectively. As was the case with PAPI 2011 and PAPI 2012, readers can be reasonably confident that PAPI 2013 is adequately representative of the underlying population to allow for meaningful comparisons across provinces and groups.

Figure A3: Occupation of PAPI 2013 Respondents (%)




Figure A4: Education Levels of PAPI 2013 Respondents (%)




Table B: Gender Distribution of PAPI 2013 Respondents by Province

Province	Male		Female		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	No.
An Giang	191	49.61	194	50.39	385
Ba Ria-Vung Tau	109	42.41	148	57.59	257
Bac Giang	89	45.41	107	54.59	196
Bac Kan	99	49.75	100	50.25	199
Bac Lieu	98	50.78	95	49.22	193
Bac Ninh	92	46.7	105	53.3	197
Ben Tre	96	49.23	99	50.77	195
Binh Dinh	86	43.22	113	56.78	199
Binh Duong	92	47.67	101	52.33	193
Binh Phuoc	90	46.39	104	53.61	194
Binh Thuan	90	45.69	107	54.31	197
Ca Mau	95	49.48	97	50.52	192
Can Tho	100	51.02	96	48.98	196
Cao Bang	80	41.67	112	58.33	192
Da Nang	85	43.59	110	56.41	195
Dak Lak	98	51.31	93	48.69	191
Dak Nong	88	45.6	105	54.4	193
Dien Bien	95	50	95	50	190
Dong Nai	182	47.4	202	52.6	384
Dong Thap	98	47.8	107	52.2	205
Gia Lai	87	45.31	105	54.69	192
Ha Giang	84	43.3	110	56.7	194
Ha Nam	98	50	98	50	196
Ha Noi	272	46.82	309	53.18	581
Ha Tinh	88	44.9	108	55.1	196
Hai Duong	82	42.71	110	57.29	192
Hai Phong	82	43.62	106	56.38	188
Hau Giang	105	50.48	103	49.52	208
Hoa Binh	81	41.97	112	58.03	193
Hung Yen	104	54.17	88	45.83	192
Khanh Hoa	81	41.33	115	58.67	196
Kien Giang	97	50.26	96	49.74	193
Kon Tum	79	40.72	115	59.28	194
Lai Chau	89	45.64	106	54.36	195
Lam Dong	103	53.09	91	46.91	194
Lang Son	97	50.26	96	49.74	193
Lao Cai	99	50.51	97	49.49	196
Long An	107	54.04	91	45.96	198
Nam Dinh	85	43.59	110	56.41	195
Nghe An	189	49.09	196	50.91	385
Ninh Binh	94	49.21	97	50.79	191
Ninh Thuan	87	45.08	106	54.92	193
Phu Tho	93	48.19	100	51.81	193
Phu Yen	99	48.53	105	51.47	204
Quang Binh	86	44.79	106	55.21	192
Quang Nam	91	44.61	113	55.39	204
Quang Ngai	85	42.5	115	57.5	200
Quang Ninh	85	44.97	104	55.03	189
Quang Tri	92	46.46	106	53.54	198
Soc Trang	89	45.88	105	54.12	194
Son La	97	49.24	100	50.76	197
Tp. HCM	271	47.21	303	52.79	574
Tay Ninh	108	55.96	85	44.04	193
Thai Binh	87	43.94	111	56.06	198
Thai Nguyen	94	47.47	104	52.53	198
Thanh Hoa	194	49.62	197	50.38	391
Thua Thien-Hue	87	43.94	111	56.06	198
Tien Giang	92	47.92	100	52.08	192
Tra Vinh	94	48.21	101	51.79	195
Tuyen Quang	102	51.78	95	48.22	197
Vinh Long	97	48.02	105	51.98	202
Vinh Phuc	97	50.26	96	49.74	193
Yen Bai	91	47.4	101	52.6	192
Total	6,574	47.32	7,318	52.68	13,892

Appendix B:

Examples of Use of PAPI Data for Policy and Empirical Research

In Vietnamese

2014 – *Tăng cường hiệu quả quản trị nhà nước và cải cách hành chính tỉnh An Giang*. Báo cáo khuyến nghị chính sách của Học viện Chính trị quốc gia Hồ Chí Minh. Bùi Phương Đình cùng cộng sự. Tháng 2 năm 2014.

2014 – *Nâng cao hiệu quả cải cách hành chính tỉnh Phú Yên*. Báo cáo khuyến nghị chính sách của Học viện Chính trị quốc gia Hồ Chí Minh. Lê Văn Chiến cùng cộng sự. Tháng 2 năm 2014.

2014 – *Nâng cao Chỉ số PAPI của tỉnh Hà Giang, kết quả đạt được và bài học kinh nghiệm*. Báo cáo khuyến nghị chính sách của Học viện Chính trị quốc gia Hồ Chí Minh. Hà Việt Hùng cùng cộng sự. Tháng 2 năm 2014.

2013 – *Bài toán chất lượng giáo dục trong xây dựng xã hội học tập ở Việt Nam*. Phạm Đỗ Nhật Tiến (2013). Tạp chí Khoa học Giáo dục, số 98. Tháng 11/2013 (Bài viết trích dẫn phát hiện nghiên cứu PAPI ở nội dung đo lường sự hài lòng của người dân)

2013 - *Chỉ số công lý - Thực trạng về Công bằng và Bình đẳng dựa trên ý kiến của người dân năm 2012* - UNDP, Hội Luật gia Việt Nam & CECODES (2013) - Công bố ngày 3 tháng 10 năm 2013

2013 - *Kết quả khảo sát Chỉ số Hiệu quả quản trị và hành chính công Thành phố Đà Nẵng năm 2012* - Báo cáo nghiên cứu do Viện Nghiên cứu Phát triển Kinh tế - Xã hội Đà Nẵng thực hiện - Tháng 9 năm 2013

2013 - *Nâng cao vị thứ của tỉnh Nghệ An trong bảng xếp hạng PAPI*. Nguyễn Thị Lan, Trường Cao đẳng Kinh tế- Kỹ thuật Nghệ An (2013). Nghệ An

2013 - *Một số yếu tố ảnh hưởng đến hiệu quả quản trị và hành chính công cấp tỉnh: Nghiên cứu so sánh Sóc Trăng và Trà Vinh*. Bùi Phương Đình, Lương Thu Hiền, Lê Văn Chiến, Đặng Ánh Tuyết, và Hà Việt Hùng, Học viện Chính trị - Hành chính Quốc gia Hồ Chí Minh. Hà Nội, 2013

2013 - *Một số yếu tố ảnh hưởng đến hiệu quả quản trị và hành chính công cấp tỉnh: Nghiên cứu so sánh Quảng Nam và Phú Yên*. Đặng Ánh Tuyết, Lê Văn Chiến, Bùi Phương Đình, Lương Thu Hiền, và Hà Việt Hùng, Học viện Chính trị - Hành chính Quốc gia Hồ Chí Minh. Hà Nội, 2013

2013 - *Một số yếu tố ảnh hưởng đến hiệu quả quản trị và hành chính công cấp tỉnh: Nghiên cứu so sánh Hà Nam và Ninh Bình*. Lê Văn Chiến, Đặng Ánh Tuyết, Bùi Phương Đình, Lương Thu Hiền, và Hà Việt Hùng, Học viện Chính trị - Hành chính Quốc gia Hồ Chí Minh. Hà Nội, 2013

2013 - *Một số yếu tố ảnh hưởng đến hiệu quả quản trị và hành chính công cấp tỉnh: Nghiên cứu so sánh Cao Bằng và Điện Biên*. Hà Việt Hùng, Bùi Phương Đình, Lương Thu Hiền, Lê Văn Chiến và Đặng Ánh Tuyết, Học viện Chính trị - Hành chính Quốc gia Hồ Chí Minh. Hà Nội, 2013

2013 - *Công tác phòng, chống tham nhũng trong năm 2013: Những thách thức không mới*. Jairo Acuna-Alfaro (2013). Dịch từ bài viết bằng tiếng Anh đăng tại chuyên mục Tiêu điểm, Tạp chí Diễn đàn Pháp luật Việt Nam (Thông tấn xã Việt Nam), Vol 19, Số 221-222, Tháng 1 và Tháng 2 năm 2013, trang 12-16

2012 – *Quản trị nhà nước và phát triển con người - Báo cáo về Phát triển con người 2011*. UNDP (2012)(Sử dụng số liệu PAPI để phân tích tương quan giữa quản trị nhà nước và phát triển con người ở cấp độ tỉnh - Xem Chương Sáu, trang 121-126)

2012 - *Phân cấp kinh tế ở Việt Nam nhìn từ góc độ thể chế*. Vũ Thành Tự Anh (2012). Bài viết theo yêu cầu của Ủy ban Kinh tế của Quốc hội, có sử dụng dữ liệu PAPI 2011 để phân tích về minh bạch thông tin đối với người dân (tr. 12-14)

2012 - *Tham nhũng từ góc nhìn của người dân, doanh nghiệp và cán bộ, công chức, viên chức*. Thanh tra Chính phủ Việt Nam và Ngân hàng Thế giới (WB) (2012). Với sự hỗ trợ về chuyên môn của Cơ quan Hợp tác quốc tế Anh quốc (DFID) và Chương trình phát triển Liên Hợp quốc (UNDP) tại Việt Nam.(Báo cáo sử dụng dữ liệu PAPI 2011 để phân tích mối tương quan của một số chỉ số quan trọng.)

2012 - *Sửa đổi Luật Đất đai 2003 ở Việt Nam: Tạo sự đối xử công bằng cho những người có quyền sử dụng đất*. Nhóm các nhà tài trợ cho Việt Nam (2012). Bản kiến nghị chính sách chung của nhóm các nhà tài trợ cho Việt Nam có sử dụng dữ liệu PAPI để phân tích.

2012 - *Giảm nghèo bền vững và quản lý rủi ro do thảm họa thiên nhiên ở khu vực duyên hải miền Trung: bài học rút ra và các gợi ý về chính sách*.(Liên Hợp quốc tại Việt Nam, 2012).Số liệu PAPI được dùng cho tài liệu nghiên cứu phục vụ cho cuộc họp nhóm tư vấn giữa năm tại Tỉnh Quang Trị, Tháng 6 2012. Trang 30-32

2011 - *Huy động người dân tham gia nâng cao trình độ phát triển con người ở Việt Nam*. Acuña-Alfaro, Jairo (2012). Tạp chí Mặt trận, Số 98, tháng 12

2011 - *Xây dựng chỉ số hiệu quả quản trị và hành chính từ góc nhìn của người sử dụng: kinh nghiệm từ Việt Nam*. Acuña-Alfaro, Jairo (2011). Trong “Để nhà nước phản hồi: Kinh nghiệm đánh giá hiệu quả quản trị” Ấn phẩm của UNDP. Trung tâm quản trị Oslo - New York, October 2011

2011 - *Phân tích khía cạnh giới từ kết quả nghiên cứu PAPI 2010*. Trần Thị Văn Anh (2011). Nghiên cứu do Trung tâm Nghiên cứu Phát triển và Hỗ trợ Cộng đồng chủ trì thực hiện với sự hỗ trợ của UNDP Viet Nam, UN Women và Trung tâm Quản trị nhà nước của UNDP tại Oslo - Hà Nội

In English

2014 - *Social Cohesion Review of Viet Nam*. In OECD Social Cohesion Policy Reviews. OECD Paris (2014). Forthcoming.

2013 - *Perception of Bribery, Health Insurance and Health Outcomes: Three hypotheses arising from Provincial-level Data in Viet Nam*. Midori Matsushima and Hyroyuki Yamada (2013). Mimeo.

2013 - *Case study: Viet Nam – Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI)*. (UNDP Myanmar, 2013). PAPI highlighted as a “good practice” in “Good Local Governance and People Centred Services – What Can We Learn from Best Practices in the Region?”, (2013). Conference Report by UNDP Myanmar and the Union Government of Myanmar, Ministry of Home Affairs and UNCDF. Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar.

2013 - *Using an Asset Index to analyse Governance in Vietnam*. Marine Emorine, La Hai Anh and Xavier Oudin (2013). Draft Research Report.

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- 2013 - *Dynamics of citizen participation in Viet Nam*. Marine Emorine, La Hai Anh and Xavier Oudin (2013). Draft Research Report.
- 2013 - *Justice Index – Assessment of Distributive Justice and Equality from a Citizen-based Survey in 2012*. UNDP, VLA & CECODES (2013) [The Justice Index 2012 is found significantly statistically correlated with PAPI 2012].
- 2013 - *Improving the Quality of Public Administration in Viet Nam: A Case Study, in "Leveraging Change for Better Lives: UNDP in Asia and the Pacific"* (UNDP, 2013). Bangkok: UNDP Asia-Pacific, page 40.
- 2013 - *Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Informal Fees in Education and Healthcare in Viet Nam*. Paul Schuler and Reena Badiani (2013). Final Draft Report for the World Bank in Viet Nam.
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- 2013 - *Quality Of Land Management And Public Governance Democratization*. Bui Quang Tuan & Researchers from Viet Nam Economic Institute (Viet Nam Academy of Social Sciences) (2013). Final Draft Research Paper.
- 2013 - *Relationship between Spatial Disaggregated Components of Good Governance and Human Development in Viet Nam: Evidence from PAPI dataset*. Ngo Quang Thanh and Nguyen Anh Phong (2013). Draft Research Paper.
- 2013 - *Governance and Public Administration Performance in Viet Nam: A view from citizens*. Acuna-Alfaro, Dang Ngoc Dinh, Dang Hoang Giang, Edmund J. Malesky and Do Thanh Huyen (2013). In Focus, Viet Nam Law and Legal Forum, May 2013 Vol., pp. 5-10.
- 2013 - *Viet Nam in the Global Economy: The Dynamics of Integration, Decentralization and Contested Politics*. Jandl, Thomas (2013). Lexington Books. Makes extensive use of PAPI data.
- 2013 - *The Economic Impact of Recentralization: A Quasi-Experiment on Abolishing Elected Councils in Viet Nam*. Malesky, Edmund; Tran Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Viet Cung (2013). Mimeo.
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- 2012 - *Revising the 2003 Law on Land in Viet Nam: Creating Equitable Treatment for Land Use Right Holders*. (Donors Group, 2012). Donors' Joint Policy Brief using PAPI data as inputs for analysis.
- 2012 - *Measuring Governance and Corruption*. Amman, Jordan (2012). PAPI highlighted as international experience at Fifth meeting of the Anti-Corruption Community of Practice in the Arab Region: "Programming for Social Accountability". June, pp. 28-29, 2012.
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- 2012 - *Confronting Corruption the Health Sector in Viet Nam: Patterns and Prospects*. Taryn Vian, Nguyen Thi Khieu Vien and others (2012). Public Administration and Development, Vol. 32 Issue 1, 2012, pp. 49-63. Published online in Wiley Online Library. (A paper by international academics and Vietnamese experts using PAPI data).
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Implementing Partners



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Centre for Community Support & Development Studies (CECODES)

Established by the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) from 2007, CECODES is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation specialised in development research and community support. The overall function of CECODES is to carry out evidence-based research to assess policy impact and to implement solutions to strengthening capacity of communities. CECODES works towards contributing to the improvement of governance performance, focusing on facilitating the interactions between the State, the Market, and the Civil Society.



Centre for Research and Training of
the Viet Nam Fatherland Front

Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF-CRT)

Established on 28 December 2012 under Decision No. 1725/QĐ-MTTW-BTT by the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF), the Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front is an autonomous agency operating by state laws and regulations. VFF-CRT has the four mandates, including: (i) to provide training and retraining of VFF personnel from all levels; (ii) to conduct research on theory and practice of great solidarity, institutional settings and operation of the VFF and other relevant areas and thematic issues; (iii) to set up and operationalise VFF Museum; (iv) to coordinate and partner with other research and training institutions home and abroad in research and personnel training.



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UNDP is the United Nations' global development organization, a network advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. UNDP is on the ground in 166 countries, working with them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. As countries develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and its wide range of partners.

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“We need to fulfil better our responsibility in reflecting citizens’ sentiment, expectations and recommendations to the Party and the government at different levels. The Viet Nam Fatherland Front (VFF) needs to listen to and reflect citizen voices, develop regular reports of the VFF at the central and provincial levels on citizen opinions to the Party and the government at different levels, and these reports also provide evidence for orientation of VFF activities.

We hope that UNDP will share with the VFF experiences in collecting citizen voices and enhancing citizen participation so that Viet Nam can improve the socio-economic management performance.”

Dr. Nguyễn Thiện Nhân

*(Viet Nam Communist Party Politburo member,
President of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front—VFF) spoke at
the 13th Presidential Board Meeting of the 7th Plenum VFF Central Committee on
12/1/2014 and at the meeting with UNDP Senior Management on 16 January 2014.*

“The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) is of great empirical importance for lead public officials and executives to review their performance thanks to its objectivity. PAPI is also a tool to measure improvements in efforts to enhance the quality and performance of the state apparatus. After all, PAPI is a positive contribution to the public administration reform agenda.”

Dr. Tạ Ngọc Tấn

*(member of the Central Party Committee and
President of the Ho Chi Minh National Politics Academy)
spoke at the 2012 PAPI launching event on 14 May 2013.*

“Globally, the task of ‘measuring’ governance and public administration is inherently complex. But PAPI demonstrates that it is possible to gauge the quality of governance and public services. It does so by questioning citizens both as users and beneficiaries of public policy and services, then aggregates their views in a rigorous and statistically robust process.”

*Excerpt from the speech by Ms. Pratibha Mehta,
UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative
at the 2012 PAPI launch on 15 May 2013.*



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Resilient nations

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