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REPORT

ON KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDE AND PRACTICES (KAP) SURVEY

FOR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION

IN THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED AREAS OF DONETSK AND LUHANSK OBLASTS

UKRAINE

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Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AP	Anti-Personnel
APMBT	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty
AV	Anti-Vehicle
CL	Community Liaison
DRC/DDG	Danish Refugee Council/Danish Demining Group
EO	Explosive Ordnance
EORE	Explosive Ordnance Risk Education
ERW	Explosive Remnant of War
FSD	Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
GCA	Government-Controlled Areas
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
INSO	International NGO Safety Organisation
KAP	Knowledge, Attitude and Practices
MA	Mine Action
MAC	Mine Action Centre
MoD	Ministry of Defence of Ukraine
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGCA	Non-Government-Controlled Areas
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
NTS	Non-Technical Survey
NSTG	National Standards and Technical Guideline
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSOP	Peace and Stabilisation Operations Programme
QA	Quality Assurance
QC	Quality Control
SES	State Emergency Service of Ukraine
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UN RPP	United Nations Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VA	Victim Assistance

Executive Summary

Eastern Ukraine has experienced armed conflict since 2014. Largely because of this conflict but also because of the Second World War legacy contamination Ukraine now records some of the highest explosive ordnance casualty rates in the world. Consequently, there is an ongoing Mine Action response involving clearance, victim's assistance and explosive ordnance risk education in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, particularly along the 'contact line'. In order to assess current explosive ordnance risk education efforts and recommend improvements to further raise awareness of EO risks and promote behavioural change to mitigate that risk and reduce casualty rates, the United Nations Development Programme in Ukraine commissioned this KAP survey.

Through individual questionnaires, focus group discussions and key informant interviews the KAP survey investigated knowledge levels, prevailing attitudes and perceptions that both facilitate and hamper the adoption of safe behaviour around EO. It found that knowledge levels around EO are impressively high, this includes high awareness about Ukrainian Mine Action activities or processes. These high levels were consistent across age groups and gender. Awareness about reporting methods was also high, with a large majority indicating if an EO was found it should be reported. However, respondents disagreed as to which emergency numbers to use and whether found EO should be marked.

There was a prevailing sense that the presence of EO has negatively impacted on their ability to earn income, or access services and leisure opportunities. As such, respondents agreed that there was a continued need for EORE, particularly for at-risk groups, and that EORE should be tailored to everyday activities and should be provided in an engaging and interactive manner. However, few respondents explicitly pointed to NGOs as key providers of EORE. Instead, Ukrainian security sector actors were emphasised as key providers of safety information.

Respondents as well key EORE providers seemed to agree on who is most at risk from EO accidents: adolescents and men were seen as most likely to have accidents. However, available civilian casualty data indicate that women are more at risk than assumed as they make up 16 percent of EO casualties. Further, as children and adolescents overwhelmingly point to their teachers and parents as main sources of safety information, as well as key receivers of information about any suspicious items, adults should be prioritised in EORE efforts.

The KAP survey included a review of available casualty data, which revealed that there are substantial discrepancies in data collection, verification, management and analysis. As such, there is a larger number of unknowns in addition to a high number of military status casualties, which impedes efforts towards evidence based EORE design and implementation. This further entails potential inconsistencies between who is perceived to be most at-risk from EO accidents and who are actually the main EO victims.

Underscoring these findings, there is a lack of a National Mine Action Authority to take charge of coordination, prioritisation and quality assurance of EORE. This also means that there is no national EORE strategy. While there is a National Technical Standard and Guideline for Mine Risk Education, it has not been updated to reflect current international standards. As such, the KAP survey concludes that there is an urgent need for establishing minimum requirements for coordination, standardisation, evidence-generation and capacity building. This includes making provisions for systematic needs assessments to ensure that EORE messages, materials and methodologies are designed and delivered on the basis of identified risk behaviours and groups all the while building on existing capacities, perceptions, barriers and channels to affect behaviour change.

Chapter 1.
INTRODUCTION

UNDP has been working in Ukraine since 1993 and has been present in eastern Ukraine for the past decades, prior to the current armed conflict. UNDP is one of four United Nations (UN) agencies involved in implementing the UN Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme (UN RPP), which has been designed to mitigate and respond to the causes and effects of the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine. Since breaking out in spring 2014, the conflict in eastern Ukraine has severely impacted the people's security and the 'contact line' is thought to be one of the areas most impacted by explosive ordnance (EO) contamination in the world. The confirmed or suspected presence of EO, including landmines, booby-traps, anti-vehicle (AV) mines, cluster munitions or other explosive remnants of war (ERWs) is causing injuries and deaths to civilians, negatively impacting on agriculture and other livelihood activities, and impeding access to essential infrastructure and services in many parts of eastern Ukraine.

In 2020, the UNDP, within the framework of the UN Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme, launched a new project in eastern Ukraine with the objective to boost mine action capacities. The Capacity Development Support for Integrated Mine Action in eastern Ukraine project is aimed at supporting the Government of Ukraine in establishing comprehensive, coordinated and gender-responsive mine action (MA). This includes providing strategic capacity development support to enhance integrated planning, coordination and operational efficiencies amongst different mine action stakeholders presently active at the national level and regionally in eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). As part of its efforts, UNDP chairs the Mine Action sub-cluster; this sub-cluster mainly focuses on demining activities, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and EO victim reporting.

Central part of the Capacity Development Support for Integrated Mine Action in eastern Ukraine project is to enhance effort to mitigate EO risks thorough an improved EORE framework. EORE activities have been implemented in Ukraine by different actors, including several national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, UNDP, via UN RPP, and other members of the EORE working group has identified a need to establish a baseline to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of ongoing EORE efforts. As such, in October 2020 UN RPP's Capacity Development Support for Integrated Mine Action in eastern Ukraine project initiated a Knowledge, Attitude and Practices (KAP) survey in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts – the first to be conducted in these oblasts since 2017 – with the aim of taking a renewed look at the levels of knowledge around explosive ordnance (EO) and how prevailing attitudes and stated behaviour may put communities at risk of EO accidents.

1.1 About the KAP survey

A KAP survey seeks to identify knowledge (K), attitudes (A) and practices (P) of a specific population on a particular topic i.e., landmines and other EO. KAP surveys not only constitute fundamental parts of the needs assessments that must underpin design and planning,[1] but also support identification of additional issues that may act as either opportunities or barriers to achieving what EORE sets out to do, namely: reducing the risk of injury from EO by raising awareness and promoting behavioural change.[2]

This KAP survey took a mixed method approach by combining desk research with data collection through standardised questionnaires, semi-structured focus group discussions and semi-structured key informant interviews.

The 2020 KAP survey was prepared on the backdrop of previous MA surveys undertaken in eastern Ukraine, namely: 2015 baseline and 2016 end line surveys undertaken by Danish Refugee Council/ Danish Demining Group (DRC/DDG) and a 2017 KAP survey conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Departing from findings of previous KAP surveys, the 2020 KAP survey sought to investigate the current state of knowledge, attitudes and practices among children and adults in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in order to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of hitherto EORE, thereby offering an assessment of current approaches and methodologies deployed to EORE.

[1] GICHD (2014), A Guide to Mine Action, Fifth Edition.

[2] IMAS 12.10 (2020), Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), Second Edition, Amendment 3, September 2020.

1.2 Conflict in eastern Ukraine

The ongoing armed conflict in eastern Ukraine has had a direct and extremely negative impact on community security, social cohesion, the rule of law and significantly increased the risks associated with explosive ordnance, as well as served the widespread and large-scale use of artillery and rocket bombardments involving numerous categories of explosive weapons[3].

A framework ceasefire agreement, the Minsk Protocols, took effect in February 2015 and halted large-scale military operations; however, armed clashes have continued, and several severe flare-ups has seen the deployment of heavy weaponry on both sides of the 'contact line' and shelling increasingly targeting densely populated areas. Early 2020 saw increased fighting in eastern Ukraine but a July 2020 ceasefire, the eighth ceasefire agreement since the beginning of 2018, seems to be the most effective thus far as there has been a sharp decline in armed clashes and explosive weapons events.[4] Even so, active hostilities seemed to gradually increase towards the end of 2020 as the use of heavy artillery reported.[5]

Despite the relative success of the latest ceasefire agreement, civilian casualties continue as a result of the massive EO contamination along both sides of the 457 kilometres long 'contact line', which despite the lack of both non-technical and technical surveys to confirm the extent of contamination is often referred to as one of the most EO affected areas in the world.[6] By hampering safe access to education, farmland, essential services and humanitarian assistance, the EO contamination compounds the already comprehensive humanitarian concerns. While the 3.4 million people projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2021 is similar to the number in 2020, the severity of their needs are projected to be significantly increased.[7]

1.3 Mine Action response in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts

Ukraine's first Mine Action Law came into force in January 2019; the law the framework for humanitarian demining in Ukraine, including establishment of a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and two Mine Action Centres (MACs), one in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and another in the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SES).

The legislation has been delayed and the final version of the Mine Action Law was adopted by the Parliament of Ukraine only in September 2020 and signed by the President of Ukraine on December 10, 2020. Consequently, the NMAA and MACs are yet to be established. Instead, all areas of MA in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are planned, coordinated, and controlled by the MoD while SES is responsible for overseeing clearance efforts.[8]

Both the MoD and SES have demining units. In addition, a number of national and international MA organisations are engaged in clearance and EORE: Danish Refugee Council/Danish Demining Group (DRC/DDG), HALO Trust, Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Demining Solutions, Ukrainian Deminer's Association, Mine Action Charity Fund, and Demining Team of Ukraine. Furthermore, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been mandated to support Ukraine's reform efforts, including within MA, since 2015; in this capacity OSCE has provided technical support to the legislative efforts and the establishment of a NMAA.

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[3] Sabine Fischer (2019), 'The Donbas Conflict. Opposing Interests and Narratives, Difficult Peace Process', Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper, April 2019, available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP05/#en-d16368e187

[4] ACLED (November 2020), 'Breaking the Pattern: The Relative Success of the Latest Ceasefire Agreement in Ukraine', available at https://acleddata.com/2020/11/24/breaking-the-pattern-the-relative-success-of-the-latest-ceasefire-agreement-in-ukraine/

[5] OCHA (December 2020), 'Ukraine Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 30 November 2020)', available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/infographic/ukraine-humanitarian-snapshot-30-november-2020

[6] Crowther, Edward (2019), 'Contamination in Eastern Ukraine: Observations by OSCE', in: Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, vol. 23, issue 1, available at https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol23/iss1/9/?utm_source=commons.lib.jmu.edu%2Fcisr- journal%2Fvol23%2Fiss1%2F9&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages ; Protection Cluster Ukraine (March 2019), 'Advocacy note on Mine Action in Ukraine', available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/2019_03_advocacy_note_ on_mine_action_eng.pdf

[7] OCHA (November 2020), At a glance: Ukraine Humanitarian Response Plan 2021, available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/document/ukraine-2021-humanitarian-response-plan-glance-25-nov-2020

EORE activities commenced in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in 2015. There is an EORE working group attended by all EORE providers and chaired by the UNDP as part of its MA sub-cluster responsibilities. In 2016, Ukraine adopted the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) as a provisory measure. Ukrainian National Standards and Technical Guidelines (NSTG) were developed in 2018 and established the technical processes and requirements for all mine action activities, including EORE. The EORE NSTGs is yet to be updated following the release of the third amendment of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) on EORE in late 2020 and thus refers to Mine Risk Education (MRE). The current MRE NSTG makes no provisions for minimum training requirements in order for EORE providers to be accredited.

[8] Mine Action Review (2020), Clearing the Mine 2020, available at http://www.mineactionreview.org/documents-and-reportsclearing-the-mines-2020

Chapter 2.
AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The overall aim of the 2020 KAP survey was to capture information regarding:

- Knowledge of Explosive Ordnance (EO) risks and related safe and unsafe behaviour and whether the EO knowledge level differs between people who have previously received EORE and people who have not received any EORE;
- Attitudes towards EO threats and whether those attitudes affect risk-taking behaviour and coping strategies; and
- Practices with regard to EO risks including stated behaviour around EO risks and the impact of previous/current EORE activities.

2.1 Problem statement and research questions

From this follows the problem statement:

To what extent do current EORE efforts affect the adoption of safe behaviour and alternative coping strategies?

In order to investigate the problem statement, the following research questions were agreed:

1. How do current EORE efforts match knowledge levels, attitudes and stated behaviour around EO considering available casualty data?
2. What are key factors influencing attitudes towards EO and stated behaviour around EO?
3. What are critical needs for at-risk categories in terms of adopting safe behaviour around EO?

2.2 Expected outcomes

The expected outcomes of the 2020 KAP survey were:

1. To provide an assessment of the current EORE efforts, including the establishment of a baseline future EORE efforts can be measured against; and
2. To formulate recommendations, messages and methodologies for EORE target groups.

2.3 Timeline

October 2020: Planning stage that includes drafting of the KAP survey protocol, drafting of individual questionnaires and focus group discussion guides, desk review of previous KAP surveys, available casualty data and EORE materials, and meetings with EORE stakeholders.

November 2020 – January 2021: Implementation stage that includes field testing and finalisation of data collection tools, training and deployment of enumerators, data collection through individual questionnaires and focus group discussions, monitoring of data collection, quality control of data, and data entry.

February 2021: Analysis and reporting stage that includes analysis of compiled findings from questionnaires, focus group discussions and key informant interviews, drafting a report, the UNDP review and final report submission .

Chapter 3.
RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Methodology

The KAP survey was designed to collect quantitative and qualitative information from primary and secondary sources.

3.1.1 Primary data

Primary data was collected by means of three main tools:

1. Individual questionnaires consisting of structured and standardised questions. The questionnaire form was adapted for two different age groups (children and adolescents under the age of 18 and adults) regardless of sex and was kept as concise as possible to counter survey fatigue.
2. Focus group discussions (FGDs) based on two semi-structured interview guides; one tailored for children and adolescents aged 6-17 years, and one tailored for adults aged 18 years and older. The FGDs serve to cross-reference data collected through the individual questionnaires regarding knowledge, identify specific at-risk groups, and probe attitudes and stated behaviour with regard to EO.
3. Key informant interviews (KIIs) based on an interview guide containing a set of open-ended questions. Key Informants were selected on the basis of the desk research as well as preliminary analysis of field data. The KIIs serve to probe deeper and triangulate findings from both primary and secondary data.

Individual questionnaire and the FGD guides were drafted on the basis of the desk review and discussions with key stakeholders, including members of the EORE working group. Draft questionnaire and FGD guides were shared for review by key stakeholders and the EORE Working Group prior to commencing field testing. The questionnaire and FGD guides were field tested in November 2020 to ensure that the questions were relevant, easy to comprehend, and gender and conflict sensitive.

3.1.2 Secondary data

Secondary data was collected through a review of available casualty data, needs assessments, reports and EORE materials. The compilation of secondary data was supported by the EORE Working Group. Secondary data was reviewed on an ongoing basis throughout the KAP survey process as data was made available through desk research and by relevant stakeholders and MA programme partners. The desk review of available casualty data, needs assessments, reports and EORE materials serves to complement and cross- analyse the primary data and feed into the recommendations.

3.2 Geographical locations

Data collection took place in the government-controlled areas (GCA) of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Criteria to identify districts included concentration of known hazardous areas, EO accidents involving civilian casualties, recent EO accidents, previous EORE, proximity to the 'contact line', and previous KAP survey locations. In order to determine the level of knowledge about EO and whether knowledge levels correspond to a decrease in EO accidents, data collection was planned to be divided between a) locations with known hazardous areas and where EO accidents have taken place and b) locations with known hazardous areas but were no EO accidents have taken place.

Data collection took place in the following raions:

Donetsk Oblast: Bakhmut, Kramatorsk, Mariupol, Pokrovsk and Volnovakha.
Luhansk Oblast: Shchastia, Sievierodonetsk, Starobilsk and Svatove.

Due to COVID-19, data collection plans were continuously reviewed and revised. As such, survey locations changed as data collection teams were relocated in line with epidemiological developments and official health guidance.

Figure 1. KAP Survey Target Locations in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts



3.3 Survey population and sampling

The survey population comprised residents and IDPs in order to establish EORE needs and the effect of the EORE that has been provided for specific target groups. Previous KAP surveys conducted in Ukraine had low participation of children and adolescents under 18 ranging between 5 and 20% of the total respondents, and a sex ratio of 60:40 female/male.[9] Considering the overrepresentation of men and boys in the available casualty data (cf. chapter 4) as well as the emphasis placed on children and adolescents as key EORE target groups in Ukraine, the sampling plan made explicit provisions to include these groups.

The sample for individual respondents using a structured questionnaire is represented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Age and sex-based distribution of individual respondents

Age	Sex	Count
6–11 years	women	27
	men	37
12–17 years	women	97
	men	111
18–34 years	women	60
	men	66
35–39 years	women	196
	men	116
60+ years	women	54
	men	35

3.4 Data collection, management, analysis and reporting

Primary data collection took place solely in the government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and was sub-contracted to a Ukrainian NGO, Mine Action Charity Fund. A total of 10 two-person teams were deployed, 5 teams in each oblast, to undertake individual interviews and FGDs in both Ukrainian and Russian languages. Data collection teams were comprehensively trained prior to deployment. Each data collection team was 50:50 men/women gender balanced. Two Regional KAP Managers were in charge of the daily management of the data collection teams; this included conducting first checks of all questionnaires and FGD forms.

UNDP monitored data collection, quality checked 15% of individual questionnaires to avoid critical non-conformities,[11] thoroughly cleaned the dataset and translated it into English prior to analysis. UNDP conducted the KIIs by phone and Skype in Ukrainian and translated all notes prior to analysis. Data analysis and reporting was carried out by an externally contracted KAP Survey Technical Advisor.

3.4.1 Deployment and permissions

Written requests were submitted to the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) Centre of Ukraine, local authorities and regional state administrations. Approvals were received in writing from the relevant authorities in Luhansk Oblast and verbally from Donetsk Oblast authorities. The data collection partner had an agreement with the JFO Centre Command and Civil-Military Cooperation Group; this included sharing of weekly movement plans.

[9] DRC/DDG (2016), Ukraine Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey. End line Report; DRC/DDG (2015), Ukraine Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Survey. Baseline Summary.

[10] During field testing in November 2020, a total of 289 individual questionnaires was undertaken; these are not included in the dataset. Further, during data collection in December 2020 a total of 865 individual questionnaires were undertaken; 66 of these were removed from the dataset during quality assurance and data cleaning.

[11] Only respondents who had explicitly consented to sharing their contact details during the individual interview were contacted. UNDP performed quality checks on a total of 127 individual respondents.

All data collection teams at all times carried relevant documentation, including copies of the UN mandate, approval letter from JFO Centre Command, approval letters from civilian authorities and organisational IDs.

3.4.2 Research ethics

The entire KAP survey process was based on humanitarian principles and human rights standards, and the data collection process abided by:

Informed consent

Individual questionnaires and FGDs were conducted with informants aged six or above only. All informants participated on a voluntary basis and were given the option of non-response. For children under 18, a permission was first to be sought from a parent, teacher, guardian or other responsible adult.

Privacy and confidentiality

Adult respondents (above the age of 18 years), as well as parents, teachers or guardians of children and adolescents interviewed were explicitly asked to confirm if they would provide their phone number in order for the UNDP to conduct quality checks in line with the relevant national legislation and UNDP guidelines. No information was captured unless explicit permission was granted. All personal information was removed from the dataset to ensure the confidentiality of respondents.

Do No Harm

All efforts to Do No Harm were taken throughout the KAP survey process. This included taking a flexible approach to identifying informants and interview settings, including taking the sociocultural, conflict drivers and political contexts into consideration. Only questions appropriate for this setting, and according to what was ethical, moral and responsible, were included in the survey.

Safeguarding

Permissions were sought from parents or other responsible adults prior to conducting any interview with children and adolescents under 18. Interviews and FGDs with children and adolescents were undertaken either within private homes or within schools, clubs and other educational facilities to ensure that locations were safe and appropriate.

3.4.3 Safety and safeguarding

All data collection activities were undertaken in line with the COVID-19 health and safety protocols, including strict caps on participants in FGDs, all enumerators and respondents wearing face masks and maintaining physical distance, and conducting interviews by Skype or Zoom whenever possible. UNDP established risk management, medical support requirements and COVID-19 precautions in line with the WHO and Ukrainian Ministry of Health recommendations. This included strict caps on participants in FGDs, all enumerators and respondents wearing face masks, adhering to hygiene measures and maintaining physical distance.

The COVID-19 situation was closely monitored throughout the data collection process. Based on the official epidemiological data, data collection plans were adapted, and activities adjusted on a daily basis. Relocation of teams to safer areas happened in close coordination between the data collection partner and the UNDP. Survey teams upon receiving such an information changed locations of their activities.

The data collection partner was contractually obligated to adhere to the stipulated safety and health regulations. This included comprehensive training of data collection teams prior to deployment. Enumerators were briefed on safety and COVID-19 daily prior to being deployed to the field. Ongoing internal and external quality assurance included safety and COVID-19 compliance checks.

3.5 Challenges and corrective actions

A number of issues challenged the data collection process. This included several instances of non-compliance with the COVID-19 protection measures on the part of respondents, survey fatigue and distrust, poor connectivity, and stress associated with both COVID-19 and the reality of working in conflict-affected areas. Furthermore, children and adolescents were difficult to access due to COVID-related school closures and restrictions on access to open schools.

Despite these challenges, data collection teams managed to conduct the planned number of questionnaires and FGDs. In order to accomplish this, data collection teams not only adhered to strict health and safety protocols but carried extra personal protective equipment to distribute to respondents.

Data collection teams were instructed and monitored in terms of their efforts to role model COVID-19 safe behaviour, as well as provided with a first aid training. During the field phase, no COVID-19 cases have been reported among the data collection teams.

Based on previous experiences with children, adolescents and men being underrepresented as KAP survey respondents, data collection teams made extra efforts to ensure that these target groups were included. This meant spending time identifying means of safely accessing children and adolescents, including conducting online FGDs where possible. Despite both survey fatigue and, on the opposite end of the spectrum, distrust due to a perceived lack of support, the fact that data collection teams were composed of residents from the same areas meant that they were able to empathetically engage with respondents, thereby diffusing frustration.

Data collection teams were not always able to access internet due to a lack of the portable mobile devices and, thus, could not enter data in a timely manner. This meant that paper versions of the questionnaire had to be forwarded to office locations in order to be checked and entered. Document control was ensured through the use of unique IDs for all individual questionnaires and FGD transcripts in addition to a two-step approach to quality assurance involving the regional KAP Survey Managers and UNDP.

It was anticipated that enumerators might experience high levels of stress due to being deployed in areas double affected by armed conflict and COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. In addition to ensuring that data collection teams were thoroughly briefed before deployment, the regional KAP Survey Managers would conduct daily briefings to ensure that teams were prepared for local conditions and allow for adaptations to work plans. The data collection partner made provisions for additional data to be collected within the agreed timeframe to ensure that sample plans could be adhered to in case enumerators made unforced or stress-induced errors.

Chapter 4.
EO CASUALTY DATA ANALYSIS

Casualty data is not simply a set of abstract numbers but represents individual human beings with families belonging to specific communities. The very purpose of the data collection effort is to strengthen the promotion and protection of these individuals and communities and their rights.[12]

Casualty data collection, management and analysis are key elements in an evidence based EORE strategy.[13] However, despite the centrality of comprehensive casualty data to the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EORE, there is no unified or standardised approach to gathering, verifying and analysing data on civilian EO casualties in Ukraine.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is mandated to collect data on behalf of the full United Nations Country Team and has rigorous data evaluation procedures in place. This also means that OHCHR casualty data is subject to revisions as more information becomes available over time. Other MA stakeholders use open-source data and reports by various organisations, in particular the International NGO Safety Organization (INSO), with access to both government and non-government-controlled areas.

4.1 Casualty trends

According to the data collected by the OHCHR, more than 1,000 civilians were involved in accidents with EO in the period April 2014 to December 2019; casualties comprised 327 dead and 750 injured.[14] In 2019, OHCHR recorded 59 civilian EO casualties;[15] however, other reports indicated far more than EO casualties. For instance, DRC/DDG recorded more than 100 EO civilian casualties while the Landmine Monitor reports more than 300 casualties, albeit with no detailing of civilian or military status.[16]

Based on the Landmine Monitor, Ukraine was third among the state parties to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention in terms of EO casualties in 2019; however, OHCHR and OSCE findings tell a different story.

Table 1 below shows some inconsistencies in the available casualty data.

Table 1. Differences in available EO casualty data

	OHCHR[17]		DRC/DDG[18]						OSCE[19]		Landmine Monitor[20]	
			Killed			Injured						
	Killed	Injured	Military	Civilian	Unknown	Military	Civilian	Unknown	Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured
2014	40	34	52	13	14[21]	152	19	46[22]	-	-	46	102
2015	113	231	224	28	41	398	68	75	-	-	706	
2016	56	179	102	25	15	184	69	15	37	75	785[23]	
2017	65	176	85	47	0	201	122	0	150		120	309
2018	36	88	77	36	0	154	91	0	87		-	-
2019	17	42	81	47	0	175	99	0	48		324	
2020	17	59	49	29	0	158	94	0	-	-	-	-

[12] OHCHR (2019), Guidance on Casualty Recording.

[13] IMAS 12.10 (2020), Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), Second Edition, Amendment 3, September 2020.

[14] https://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2020/canada-and-un-launch-new-mine-awareness-project.html

These discrepancies are likely to have happened due to the limited independent verification of e.g., open- source data as well as, at least in part, obfuscation of civilian and military EO casualties.

Despite such inconsistencies, the fact remains that while civilian casualties of EO incidents have decreased since 2015, Ukraine still has some of the highest EO casualty rates in the world. Despite the comprehensive lockdowns and movement restrictions in Ukraine during the COVID-19 pandemic OHCHR recorded 76 civilian EO casualties, constituting a 28.8 percent increase in civilian casualties compared with 2019.[24]

Available EO casualty data and casualty data analysis undertaken by the EORE providers have revealed the following trends:

- Despite inconsistencies in available data, adult men by far make up the main group of casualties in both Government-Controlled Areas (GCA) and Non-Government-Controlled areas (NGCA) of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. While men in military occupation constitutes the largest proportion of EO casualties overall, there has been a marked increase in civilian occupation men casualties since 2018 and the trend seems to be consistent in recent years.
- While there seems to be consensus that adult women constitute a much smaller portion of adult EO casualties as compared to adult men, gender difference in casualties seems to be less significant if disregarding military occupation casualties. According to the DRC/DDG dashboard, the period of 2014-2020 saw 29 women and over 1,000 men with military occupation become EO casualties, while the same period saw adult women constitute 1 in 6 civilian casualties (113 adult women vs. 609 adult men).[25] Based on figures from the period 1 January 2017-15 September 2020, OSCE concludes that adult men are 2.5 times more likely to be killed or injured by EO than adult women.[26]
- Boys and adolescent boys under 18 are over-represented in casualty data compared to girls and adolescent girls. This discrepancy increases with age. Almost all EO accidents that involved men under 18 were due to picking up, tampering, handling or playing.
- The main activities leading to the EO accidents among civilians are picking up, handling or otherwise tampering with EO, and playing. This is also confirmed by the OSCE that found that over 40% of cases in which men were killed or injured by EO, and 87% of cases in which boys and adolescents were killed or injured by EO, was due to "mishandling or attempting to dismantle" EO.[27]
- While adolescent girls are less frequently injured or killed by EO than adolescent boys, the

[15] Ibid.

[16] International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (2020). Landmine Monitor 2020.

[17] OHCHR (2021), 'Conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine caused by mines and ERW', dated 28 January 2021.

[18] The casualty data compiled by DRC/DDG builds on open sources as well as reports by various stakeholders such as INSO and OSCE as well as information gathered from local and regional sources, incl. SES and local authorities. The data is separated into total number incl. military status/civilian status/unknown status of casualties. The dataset includes deminers in civilian casualties. The full dataset is available at https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiODE4OTc2ODMtNzcyZC00YzJiLTlkNWMtZDg4MDkxODM4NWI5IiwidCI6IjJhMjEyMjQxLT g5OWMtNDc1Mi1iZDMzLTUxZWFjM2M1ODJkNSIsImMiOjh9&pageName=ReportSection , last accessed on 23 February 2021

[19] The OSCE does not appear to clearly distinguish between civilian and military casualties. OSCE (2017), Thematic Report: Civilian Casualties in Ukraine 2016, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/a/342121.pdf ; OSCE (2020), Thematic Report: Civilian Casualties in the Conflict-affected Regions of Eastern Ukraine 1 January 2017-15 September 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/b/469734.pdf

[20] The Landmine Monitor numbers are based on correspondence with various MA operators as well as (for 2014) media reporting. The numbers noted here does not include victims of cluster munitions.

[21] Civil status of casualties: Military/civilian/unknown.

[22] Ibid.

[23] The civil status of the 785 casualties: 435 military, 219 civilians, 28 deminers, and 103 unknowns.

[24] OHCHR (2021), 'Conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine caused by mines and ERW', dated 28 January 2021.

[25] The dashboard contains a disclaimer that it is for informational purposes only. As such, there may be inconsistencies in data, including casualties for whom the sex and occupation is unknown. https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiODE4OTc2ODMtNzcyZC00YzJiLTlkNWMtZDg4MDkxODM4NWI5IiwidCI6IjJhMjEyMjQxLT g5OWMtNDc1Mi1iZDMzLTUxZWFjM2M1ODJkNSIsImMiOjh9&pageName=ReportSection , last accessed on 23 February 2021.

activities putting them at risk are also different. While the activity at the time of EO accident for the vast majority of adolescent boys is either tampering or playing, the main risk activity for adolescent girls is household work.

- According to the DRC/DDG dashboard, the main activity at the time of EO accident is unknown for 1 in 5 of all civilian casualties. The lack of information is particularly or adults between 35-59 years with no difference between men and women.
- Household work, although not defined, and livelihoods activities such as foraging for food, collecting water or firewood, hunting and fishing are key activities that may cause EO accidents. This is central to tailoring EORE efforts as such activities often prompt intentional or forced risk-taking as people have no or few alternatives.
- Travelling is another key activity during which EO accidents happen; however, few details are available in terms of whether travel was related to other activities, e.g., travelling for work, education or leisure.
- Military activities are a leading cause of the EO accidents. While EORE efforts generally focus on civilians, further insights into why military personnel are over-represented in EO casualty data might support the refinement of EORE messaging provided to civilians.
- The main types of EO causing accidents are overall landmines. However, if only looking at civilian casualties more than a quarter (26.2%) of the EO types are unknown, while UXO (21.5%) appear to cause slightly more accidents than landmines (20.63%), closely followed by AXO (20.5%), and finally booby traps (10.5%).[28] It should be noted that there is currently no way to distinguish between booby traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
- Data regarding landmine accidents are not fully disaggregated in terms of Anti-personnel (AP) and Anti-vehicle (AV) landmines. In 2017, Ukraine saw 74 casualties from AV-mines. While the number dropped to 34 AV-mine casualties in 2018, Ukraine is still considered one of the most AV-mine affected countries in the world.[29] Keeping in mind that 'travelling' is a main activity causing EO accidents, the lack of disaggregation of AP- and AV-mine is problematic.
- Children and adolescents under 18 are mostly injured or killed by AXO (30.4%) and UXO (28.6%). Landmines constitute 14.3% and booby traps make up 3.1% of the devices involved in EO accidents with children and adolescents. However, the device is unknown in 23.6% of the accidents.[30]
- Adults are mostly injured or killed by unidentified explosive devices (26.6%) followed by landmines (22.3%), UXO (19.8%), AXO (18%) and booby traps (12.4%)[31].
- There is no data related to displacement status.

4.2 Gaps and way forward

Based on the information provided by a number of different stakeholders, in addition to relying on open-source data and publicly available reports, EORE actors undertake ad hoc needs assessment and, in some cases, use anecdotal evidence from frontline personnel to establish who is most at risk and why/how/when people are at risk. While the efforts to collect and analyse casualty data on the part of various EORE stakeholders is highly commendable, the limited scope of verifying the civilian status of casualties and limited disaggregation in terms of age, sex and activity at the time of accidents means that it is difficult to establish prevalent risk categories, a prerequisite for targeting and tailoring of EORE. The efforts of the EORE stakeholders are in line with the Ukrainian National Standards and Technical Guidelines (NSTGs) for EORE; however, with the current lack of a coordinated system for data collection,

[26] OSCE (2020), Thematic Report: Civilian Casualties in the Conflict-affected Regions of Eastern Ukraine 1 January 2017-15 September 2020, dated November 2020.

[27] Ibid.

[28] https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiODE4OTc2ODMtNzcyZC00YzJiLTIkNWMtZDg4MDkxODM4NWI5IiwidCI6IjJhMjEyMjQxLTg5OWMtNDc1Mi1iZDMzLTUxZWFjM2M1ODJkNSIsImMiOjh9&pageName=ReportSection, last accessed on 24 February 2021

[29] GICHD and SIPRI (2019), Global Mapping and Analysis of Anti-vehicle Mine Incidents in 2018.

[31] Ibid.

quality control, data management and joint analysis, available casualty data seems to mainly support Victim Assistance (VA) efforts, rather than broadly feed into EORE strategies and methodologies.

As outlined above, the DRC/DDG dashboard disaggregates casualty data by several indicators outlined in the MAS 12.10; however, a number of shortcomings and unknowns remain. The DRC/DDG dashboard disaggregates casualties by sex, age and activity at the time of the accident. From this it appears that the vast majority of civilian casualties are injured or killed when either tampering with EO or playing. The data confirms that most boys between the ages of 6-11 years and adolescent boys between the ages of 12-17 are killed or injured when either 'tampering' or 'playing'. However, these are two highly separate activities. By lumping the activities together, it is difficult to establish what activity puts most under 18- year-olds at risk.

The activity at the time of accident is unknown for 20% of civilian casualties. If including the casualties for whom their civilian/military status is not established, the activity at the time of accident is unknown in 24% of all accidents. Such a significant number of 'unknowns' makes it difficult to accurately plan and design EORE.

Travelling is a main activity during which EO accidents may happen, but few details are available as to the nature, purpose and means of travelling. Further, there are few details in terms of EO victims' residence/displacement status. Such details would allow for identifying points of entry for delivery of EORE as well as tailoring messaging to prevailing risks along the route.

There is a marked difference in devices harming military people and civilians. The type of EO that causes accidents among civilians is often unknown. Furthermore, the main devices leading to injuries and deaths among children and adults are different – children are far more likely to become victims of AXO and UXO than landmines, while the device is unknown in 1 out of 5 EO accidents involving adult, civilian men. This has implications for EORE messaging as safe behaviour depends on what type of device people are most likely to fall victim to.

Finally, information regarding whether EO victims had received any EORE prior to the accident is not available or systematically collected. As such, it is not possible to establish the effectiveness of provided EORE, including the appropriateness of messages around safe behaviour, in terms of preventing EO accidents.

Table 2. Minimum data requirements as per IMAS 05.10[32]

	Accident		Victim
Information	Data field	Information	Data field
Report info	Accident ID	Report info	Victim ID
	Accident report date		Victim report date
	Organisation		
Location	Geographic location reference point	Victim info	Sex
			Date of birth
			Resident in locality
Place	Type of place	Victim status	Status (dead/injured)
			Victim injury
Accident details	Accident data and time	Cause	Cause of the accident
	Demining accident/Accident/ Demining incident/incident		
Accident EO	EO type	Activity	Activity at time of the accident
	EO category		

[32] IMAS 05.10 (2020), Information Management for Mine Action, Second Edition, Amendment 1, February 2020.

Any structured approach to casualty data reporting and analysis should adhere to the reporting means as established by the OHCHR. This would include some of the following steps: definition of who is a 'casualty', standardisations of data categories, data verification, applying a standard of proof and establishing internal quality control.[33]

Such steps could support the establishment of a unified approach to accident/victim reporting in line with minimum data requirements as set out by International Mine Action Standards (IMAS):

As such, the work done by the OHCHR in Ukraine to date could form the basis for setting up and implementing not only a unified MA approach to accident/victim reporting but also provide the parameters for MA advocacy strategies to ensure that e.g., the rights of EO victims are at the forefront of victim assistance, including referrals to essential services. Most importantly, a standardised approach to casualty data collection, disaggregation, reporting and analysis would allow EORE providers, national authorities and relevant stakeholders, including donors, to design, prioritise and implement EORE approaches that are accurately tailored to the prevalent risk behaviours.[34] This would also support the setting of indicators against which EORE outcomes can be measured.

[33] OHCHR (2019), Guidance on Casualty Recording.

[34] IMAS 12.10 (2020), Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), Second Edition, Amendment 3, September 2020.

Chapter 5.
2020 KAP SURVEY FINDINGS IN DONETSK AND LUHANSK OBLASTS

5.1 Introduction

The findings are based on data collected through individual interviews using a standardised questionnaire, semi-structured FGDs and KIIs. Please refer to section 3.3 for disaggregated details of individual respondents and FGD participants.

KIIs were conducted on an ad hoc basis to triangulate and probe into issues arising during the individual structured interviews and FGDs. Key informants were drawn from, among others, local authorities, community leaders, the educational sector, and EORE providers. A total of 9 KIIs were conducted.

The KAP survey was successful in terms of including children aged 6-11 years and adolescents aged 12-17 years as respondents. This is important considering the relatively low number of children and adolescents that participated in the three previous EORE KAP surveys undertaken in Ukraine and the fact that children and adolescents have been a key target groups since 2015; the inclusion of approx. 40% of children and adolescents is, thus, helpful in terms of assessing EORE efforts.

Through the surveying of respondents' knowledge of the dangers associated with EO, and how this knowledge is translated into stated behaviour, this KAP survey is hoped to contribute to building a baseline against which stakeholders can plan, monitor, adapt and evaluate EORE interventions.

5.2 Background of the respondents

The findings are based on 799 individual questionnaires and 26 FGDs with community members and IDPs as well as 9 key informant interviews with authorities and representatives from the educational, security and private sectors in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Further, interviews were conducted with national and international EORE stakeholders in Ukraine. Individual respondents included community members and IDPs currently residing in the survey areas (cf. section 3.2). Out of them 54% were women and 46% - men, with 34% of respondents under 18 (see Figure 2 in section 3.3). The questionnaires were divided 50/50 between Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Only adult respondents were asked about the economic situation of their household; 60% considered their economic situation as average, while 36% as poor or very poor. Men reported higher rates of employment than women with the majority of working women being employed in the educational sector (18%) and the majority of working men employed in a range of different sectors and industries.

Figure 3. Economic situation of the household (Adult population, N = 527)



Figure 4. Employment status (Adult population, N = 527)



8% of adult respondents stated that they have a disability recognised by the state; children and adolescents were not asked. Of these, almost half (48%) stated that they are currently employed with only one (1) person describing her-/himself as unemployed but looking for a job. 33% of adults with a recognised disability are either retired or a pensioner, and half characterised their households as poor or very poor.

Most adults (75%) indicated to be educated above the general secondary level half of all adults have a specialist or technical background. 87% of respondents under the age of 18 stated that outside of COVID-19 lockdowns, they would normally attend school 5 days a week. Three adolescent boys stated that they do not go to school; two due their school being closed.

Figure 5. School attendance for under-18-years-old (Children and adolescents, N = 272)



Respondents generally claimed to speak either Ukrainian or Russian as a mother tongue and the other language to a fluent level; only 5% spoke English fluently.

Figure 6. Knowledge of Ukrainian and Russian languages (Total sample, N = 799)



5.3 Sources and levels of EORE knowledge

All respondents, regardless of age group, were asked the same questions to ascertain knowledge about EO as well as EORE retention. Multiple answers were possible; however, respondents were not prompted for answer nor provided with options for answers.

When asked whether they knew any Ukrainian MA activities or processes, an impressive 71% of all respondents said yes. In the 6-11-years age group, 67% said that they had some knowledge of Ukrainian

MA activities – this puts children at par with adult men of 35-59 years (68%). When asked to clarify which MA activities or processes they knew of, EORE was mentioned by the majority (82%), clearance of EO by almost half (49%), while a quarter (25%) brought up victim assistance (VA). This corresponds to the number of respondents who stated that they had received some form of information about the dangers of landmines and other EO (77%).

Figure 7. Knowledge of Ukrainian MA processes or activities (Total sample, N = 799)

	6-11 years	12-17 years	18-34 years	35-59 years	60+ years
Yes	67%	82%	66%	73%	52%
No	16%	7%	22%	25%	38%
Don't know/Not sure	16%	9%	10%	2%	10%
No response	2%	2%	2%	1%	0%

It should be noted that respondents were not asked if they had received EORE but, rather, whether they had received some form of information about EO. Similarly, the majority of FGD had received some EORE previously; out of 167 FGD participants, 118 stated they had received EORE. All children and adolescents participating in FGDs had received EORE.

Figure 8. Sources of information about the dangers of EO by age group (Total sample, N = 799)

Sources of information	6-11 years	12-17 years	18-34 years	35-59 years	60+ years	Overall
Teacher	68%	51%	11%	3%	0%	24%
Parents	47%	41%	9%	1%	0%	18%
Military	29%	51%	23%	29%	42%	35%
UN	25%	28%	13%	9%	13%	17%
SESU	24%	33%	37%	37%	33%	34%
Grandparents	19%	9%	2%	0%	0%	5%
Friends	14%	20%	12%	9%	10%	13%
OSCE	12%	22%	24%	11%	10%	16%
Police	10%	44%	27%	26%	25%	30%
International NGOs	3%	5%	21%	23%	12%	15%
National NGOs	2%	3%	7%	7%	8%	6%
No information	8%	19%	23%	25%	42%	23%

Just over a third of those respondents confirmed they had received information about the dangers of EO (37%) said that they had received it less than one year ago. However, 33% of adolescents (12-17 years) could not remember when they had received information about EO while 41% of children (6-11) stated that they had received such information more than one year ago. 60% of adult men between 35-59 year (49%) said that it had either been more than one year since they had received any information about the dangers of EO, or they could not remember.

When asked about from where they had received information about the dangers of EO, just over a third mentioned the military (35%) or the SES (34%) while 30% mentioned the police. 20% mentioned either an international or a national NGO as the provider of information about the dangers of EO. The majority of children had received information from their teachers (68%) and parents (47%) while adolescents

cited teachers and the military (both at 51%) followed by the police (44%) and their parents (41%) as main sources of EORE; however adolescent boys ranked teachers (45%) higher than the police (42%) while adolescent girls ranked both the military (51%) and the police (48%) higher than their parents (38%).

As for means by which respondents had received information about the dangers of EO, the top 4 sources provided were: public meetings and TV, followed by leaflets and social media. For children specifically, public meetings were cited as the main source of EORE (68%) closely followed by TV and social media (both at 39%). Adolescents cited TV as a main medium of EORE (62%) followed by public meetings (55%) and social media (47%). When looking at adult men between, the vast majority cited Ukrainian security sector actors, SES, the military and the police, as the main sources of information about the dangers of EO.

Individual respondents were not asked questions pertaining to EO recognition but, instead, were asked to explain how potentially dangerous areas can be identified. Recognition questions were left out due to time considerations in an attempt to not compound perceived survey fatigue, as well as due to an assumption that people who have received EORE are likely to be able to identify EO. Further, EORE beneficiaries should preferably, identify signs of potentially dangerous areas before they get close enough to identify EO.

The findings overall point towards high levels of knowledge about what EO can do: kill (98%) and injure (87%). Children and adolescents who participated in FGDs were shown pictures of various types of EO and asked if they knew what those items could do; similarly, to individual respondents, they all agreed that EO can kill and injure persons, intimidate people, destroy houses and "break a school".

Adult FGD participants were not shown any pictures of EO but were instead asked to describe what they associated with the term 'explosive ordnance'. Some FGD participants who had not received EORE– all adults – described EO in 'action movie' terms:

> ***A mine is a small thing that lies on the ground, should be round, as shown in the films, slightly sprinkled with earth***
>
> **(adult FGD participant, Donetsk Oblast)**

Most adult FGD participants talked about the fear that EO induces. Some recounted memories from the early days of the conflict, others talked about how people are afraid to cultivate their fields or undertake other livelihood activities.

This is an interesting finding as children are assumed to inform their parents, teachers or other responsible adult in case they come across anything suspicious. It appears that there is a geographic divergence as well as 62% of respondents in Donetsk Oblast knew of means of reporting compared to a much higher 78% in Luhansk Oblast. As with overall EORE efforts, most respondents indicated that they had learned about hotlines and other means of reporting EO from mainly security sector actors: SES, the police and the military. As for respondents that had not received any form of information about the dangers of EO, 35% said yes – and the majority of these again pointed to security actors as the source of information. Interestingly, half of the 20 adolescent respondents who said that they had not received any EORE stated that they had heard about means of reporting EO.

Respondents were asked about clues to identifying a potentially EO contaminated area, and how EO contaminated areas may be marked. The vast majority of respondents indicated a high awareness of official warning signs bearing the text 'mines danger' (93%) with fewer respondents indicating awareness of potentially unofficial warning signs such as graffiti (31%) and home-made signs (25%).

> ***Do not walk where there are signs of 'Be aware of mines'***
>
> **(participant in FGD for adolescents, Luhansk Oblast)**

Given the prevalence of unofficial signs and the emphasis on unofficial signs in EORE provided by some INGOs, the emphasis placed on official signs is interesting and may point to a disconnect between some EO awareness materials that depict red 'danger mines' signs to the same or higher degree than various forms of unofficial or localised signs. This is corroborated by the high number of respondents who had received some form of EORE previously and noted that dangerous areas can be marked with

warning signs (96%); 57% mentioned red flags, only 27% of respondents mentioned home-made signs while even fewer mentioned other forms of non-official markings. Even respondents who stated they had not received any form of information about the dangers of EO knew of markings; 89% mentioned official signs, 46% knew of red flags, while 14% knew of home-made signs.

Figure 9. Knowledge of clues to recognise dangerous areas by other information about EO (Total sample, N = 799)



There was a strong sense of former battle areas being dangerous due to EO. When asked about clues to identifying a dangerous area, 77% of all respondents mentioned remains of weapons while 65% mentioned destroyed or damaged buildings.

Figure 10. What are clues to identifying a dangerous area? (Total sample, N = 799)



In general, FGDs confirmed a high understanding of the potential dangers of the 'contact line' and other areas associated with fighting. This included current agricultural lands.

> *There is no real map of mined places on the contact line. After the rotation, the military do not know where [mines are] and who planted the mines.*
>
> **(adult FGD participant, Luhansk Oblast)**

When asked if they had ever heard of any phone number, email or other means of reporting EO, 70% of respondents affirmed that they had. However, children (73%) and adolescents (79%) seemed to be

more aware of means of reporting than adults between the ages of 18-59 (69%). Just under half of adults (48%) aged 60 or older knew of reporting means.

When asked about from where they had learned about emergency numbers and other reporting means, respondents overall said they had received information from mainly security sector actors: SES 48%, police 43%, and 31% military. Children and adolescents had mainly learned about reporting means from teachers.

Figure 11. Sources of information about reporting means (Total sample, N = 799)



Several individual respondents were not sure what number to dial but instead stated that they would call SES, the police, the village committee or, in some cases, provided exact numbers of military units based in their area.

Figure 12. Emergency numbers to report EO (Total sample, N = 799)



The confusion and proliferation of phone numbers are reflected in the FGDs where many respondents mentioned dialling 101 or 102 but were not always sure which emergency agency they would reach with those numbers. While it is encouraging that many respondents know of reporting means, the confusion in terms of which number to call may need to be addressed.

More than half of all respondents (55%) knew of EO accidents that had taken place in their community while 11% was not sure if any EO accidents had taken place. 21% of people who knew of EO accidents in their community stated that the accidents had taken place less than one year ago while 32% said that 1-2 years had passed since an EO accident had taken place in their community.

Figure 13. Awareness of EO accidents/incidents in their area in the last two years (Total sample, N = 799)



When asked if there were EO accidents in their communities within the last two years, most adult FGD participants in Luhansk Oblast said yes while most FGD participants in Donetsk said no. However, when continuing to discuss, some FGD participants in Donetsk said that they actually were not sure if accidents had taken place.

5.4 Attitudes towards EO risk behaviours and at-risk groups

When asked whether they had ever encountered an EO, most said no (81%). However, of 136 respondents who said that they had encountered EO, 20 (14%) said that they had not reported it. Half of these were men aged 35-59 (10 out of 20). Quite concerning is the finding that 5 respondents under 18 said that they had encountered EO but not reported it. When asked about why they had not reported the EO, most explained that the presence of the EO was well known; one respondent said that the EO "did not pose a threat".

Figure 14. Stated behaviour in case of finding EO (Total sample, N = 799)



When inquiring about behaviour in case they encountered any EO, children and adolescent FGD participants – all of whom had received previous EORE – overall stated actions in line with the main EORE messages: Avoid going, avoid touching, and report. When discussing who to report to, both age groups mentioned parents, teachers or, simply, adults; however, they were in general quite focused on emergency numbers – mainly 101 and 102.

> ***In our village there are territories that can be called "falsely mined" ... A concrete example is a field at the end of the street, there are «Dangerous» signs, but in fact it is not known whether it is mined or not, it just stands. People don't use it.***
>
> **(FGD participants, majority without EORE, Luhansk Oblast)**

When asked about what they would do in case they encountered EO, children and adolescent FGD participants discussed a number of actions, including stopping and leaving using the same tracks. It is important to note that KAP survey respondents, both individual respondents and FGD participants, were consistently asked about explosive ordnance, rather than about landmines and ERW. Consequently, the findings are not able to conclude whether people know and distinguish between stated behaviour around landmines versus other forms of ERW. The KAP survey did not inquire regarding marking

practices and, thus, cannot say anything about whether EORE recipients may have been encouraged, or perceive to have been encouraged, to mark suspicious items. However, it should be noted that adolescent FGD participants in both Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts mentioned that they would mark EO with "ribbons" – one of the informal marking systems observed in Ukraine.

When asked who they thought was most at risk of getting into accidents with EO, respondents particularly emphasised adolescent boys and current military personnel. Adolescent girls were considered slightly more likely to have EO accidents than agricultural workers and adult men. Children were considered at higher risk than former military personnel.

Figure 15. Who is perceived to be most at-risk of EO accidents (Total sample, N = 799)



The attitudes towards risk groups were confirmed by adult FGD participants who considered children and adolescents to be at risk due to curiosity, playing and other leisure activities, in addition to a lack of knowledge. Interestingly, though, when asked specifically about activities placing adults at risk, FGD participants were quite detailed in terms of livelihoods and professional activities; in fact, FGD participants were quite in line with available casualty data and information shared by MA stakeholders in identifying mostly men engaging in agricultural activities, scrap metal collection, electrical, gas and water installations, and military service.

> ***Those who clear mines, the military men, tractor drivers and those who work in the fields, they can stumble upon mines. Most often men.***
>
> **(FGD participants, none of whom had received previous EORE, Donetsk Oblast)**

This, in turn, did not correspond to the groups identified as in most need of EORE: the vast majority said that adolescents – both boys and girls – should receive more information followed by agricultural workers and current military personnel. This finding was reflected across all age groups, including adolescent respondents themselves.

Respondents' sense of who is most at risk from EO was in line with some findings of the casualty analysis: Military men and adolescent boys. Based on the FGDs, there was no discernible between the attitudes of respondents with and without previous EORE. However, both individual respondents and FGD participants were generally of the opinion that women are far less at risk than men and boys:

> ***In general, everyone can suffer an accident but, of course, men are at greater risk.***
>
> **(FGD participant, woman, Luhansk Oblast)**

Deminers and military men considered at high risk – participants in several FGDs talked about accidents in which deminers were killed despite being specialists.

FGD participants particularly emphasised that people are at risk due to intentional or forced activities such as engaging in livelihoods activities especially mushroom picking, farming, tending to livestock,

scrap metal collection and tending to gas/power/water lines. This is very much in line with assessments and reports shared by several EORE providers. In terms of age and gender, FGD participants seemed to agree that men and boys were at higher risk than women and girls. Interestingly because men, regardless of age, were seen to be more "curious" and willing to intentionally if not recklessly take risks.

Despite the available casualty data indicating that travelling is a risk activity, neither individual respondents nor FGD participants considered IDPs and returnees to be a particular risk group. More research would be useful in this regard to determine who the travellers that are involved in EO accidents are.

Figure 16. Groups considered most in need of EORE (Total sample, N = 799)



Respondents overall prioritised the groups they considered most at risk when asked about who is most in need of EORE. Interestingly, despite the vast majority of respondents having received some form of EORE, the main reason provided for why certain groups need more EORE was that "they have little knowledge about EO" (47%). However, when zooming in on specific at-risk groups, there seemed to be a high awareness of what could potentially increase the probability of having an accident involving EO; for example, for adolescent boys and agricultural workers the importance of providing them with more EORE was linked to them working or living in potentially contaminated areas. Having said that, there was still a marked assumption that adolescents overall did not know enough about the dangers of EO. This despite 81% of individual adolescent respondents and all of the adolescent FGD participants stating that they had received some form of EORE. With inquiring about current military personnel, more than a quarter of respondents said that they should receive EORE because they have little or no knowledge about EO.

While individual and FGD respondents agreed that more, or continued, EORE is needed overall for a community member there seems to be some consensus around the need for EORE to be further tailored to everyday activities. The assumed lack of knowledge was linked to activities potentially placing people at risk, regardless of whether they have received EORE or not. However, IDPs, returnees or people who might be moving around, including across the 'contact line', were not considered to be a high priority group for EORE.

FGD participants overwhelmingly agreed that people in general needed more EORE to decrease the risk of EO accidents. FGD respondents who stated they had not received any form of EORE particularly emphasised that little information about the dangers of EO was available and encouraged that information be disseminated by almost any means possible. Meanwhile, FGD respondents who had received EORE were keen to have mostly visual such as graphic renderings and videos, edutaining and social media based EORE including through TikTok and Instagram. Individual and FGD respondents repeatedly emphasised that 'specialists' such as security sector actors were instrumental in disseminating safety messages but also pointed out that it should be practical and interactive. However, as some FGD participants noted, EORE should also be undertaken in ways that allow people with little or no internet access to receive the information in a meaningful manner.

When asked if they had seen civilians touching, moving, kicking or otherwise tampering with EO 8% of respondents said yes. This was again linked, mainly, to a lack of knowledge about EO contaminated

areas and safe behaviour (25%) and reckless behaviour such as showing off (22%) or simply not caring (9%).

Figure 17. Perceived reasons for touching EO, Respondents that confirmed they had seen civilians touching, moving, kicking or otherwise tampering with EO, N = 64



11% of respondents said that they had seen people entering or moving in an area contaminated with EO. When probed for why they thought people would risk going into areas that were potentially contaminated, the majority explicitly linked it to a lack of knowledge, though it is unclear if it is lack of knowledge about areas that might be contaminated, lack of knowledge about safe behaviour or both, and livelihoods activities, i.e., intentional/forced behaviour potentially coupled with unawareness.

Figure 18. Perceived reasons for entering dangerous areas (Total sample, N = 799)



5.5 Stated practices and behaviour

When asked about safe behaviour in case they were going to an area that they are unfamiliar with, or an area that has experienced armed conflict, individual respondents, only 6% of all respondents, did not know or had no answer for what safe actions to take. 530 or 66% of respondents stated that they would stay away from suspicious areas while half or 50% stated that they would only use well-known paths. Only 32% of respondents stated that they would ask locals about safe/unsafe areas. This is interesting since 612 or 77% of respondents said that they had received some form of EORE.

Figure 19. Stated behaviour if going to a new area or an area affected by conflict (Total sample, N = 799)

Keep away from suspicious areas	66%
Only using well-known paths	50%
Asking locals where is safe	32%
Other	4%
Don't know / Not sure	4%

Encouragingly, 78% of children stated that they would stay away from suspicious areas while only 63% of adolescents said the same. 48% of adolescents stated that they would ask locals about safe paths and areas. For adults, the stated practice of asking locals where is safe steadily dropped for older age groups. Stated safe behaviour seemed to be linked to the earlier provisions of EORE:

> ***Do not go where you are not asked to. Don't walk on unfamiliar paths. Avoid walking in fields that are not planted with crops.***
>
> **(adolescents in FGD, all with previous EORE, Luhansk Oblast)**

Only 23% of people who noted that they had not received any form of EORE, stated that they would ask locals where it is safe. However, that number only increased slightly among people who said that had received some form or EORE: 35% said that they would ask locals.

The KAP survey methodology does not allow for investigating revealed behaviour, i.e., how people act in practice when entering dangerous areas or encountering EO. Rather, the KAP survey establishes stated behaviour, i.e., how people state that they will act in certain situations. In order to survey stated safe practices and behaviour, individual respondents were presented with a number of scenarios and asked about what they would do.

Safe behaviour depends on the situation you are in. When it comes to EO, actions to take differ when talking about landmines, both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, and other forms of unexploded ordnance (UXO). In order to investigate stated behaviours further, individual respondents were provided with three scenarios and asked what actions they would take – they could provide multiple actions:

When presented with the first scenario, 'It seems to you that you are in a minefield. What will you do?', the majority of respondents (64%) listed calling 101 as an action they would take, 28% would stop/stand still, while 25% said that they would shout for help. At the same time, 52% of respondents said that they would retrace their steps while 10% said that they would run away.

Figure 20. Scenario 1: 'It seems to you that you are in a minefield. What will you do?' (Total sample, N = 799)

	Women	Men	Girls	Boys	Total
Call 101	70%	65%	58%	53%	64%
Retrace my steps	47%	59%	50%	55%	52%
Stop / stand still	33%	20%	31%	28%	28%
Shout for help	20%	17%	40%	34%	25%
Run away / go back	6%	6%	22%	14%	10%
Don't know	2%	2%	1%	1%	2%

This may indicate that people do not distinguish between unsafe situations and appropriate safe actions. This is substantiated by FGD participants under the age of 18 who, despite being presented with pictures of different types of EO including landmines, focused on calling for help as well as leaving "following your tracks".

> *I would have walked away before calling, because my older brother told me that a call could activate a mine*
>
> **(adolescent FGD participant, Luhansk Oblast)**

For the second scenario, 'You see your friend or family member is lying injured in a minefield. What will you do?', respondents were more assured in their stated safe actions: 69% would call emergency services, 55% would get an expert such as a deminer, and 26% would call for help. While still too high, it is encouraging that only 12% stated that they would run to the assistance of a friend or family members lying injured in a minefield.

Figure 21. Scenario 2: 'You see your friend or family member lying injured in a minefield. What will you do?' (Total sample, N = 799)

	Women	Men	Girls	Boys	Total
Call 101	74%	71%	69%	56%	**69%**
Get an expert (SES or military deminer)	51%	52%	59%	62%	**55%**
Call for help	28%	24%	57%	54%	**36%**
Run to help them	10%	13%	16%	14%	**12%**
Other	4%	4%	1%	2%	**3%**

> *If you find one mine, see if there is another one nearby.*
>
> **(adolescent FGD participant, Luhansk Oblast)**

For the final scenario, respondents were asked: 'What would you do if you found a landmine or other explosive ordnance close to your house or in your area?'. Almost all respondents (97%) said that they would ask for help to remove the EO, 42% would warn others, and 38% would mark the EO. Almost half of men between 35-59 years said that they would mark the EO. This indicates a high level of awareness of safe behaviour, though the stated intent to mark may indicate potentially unsafe behaviour. Very encouraging is the finding that almost all children and adolescents stated that they would ask for help and less than 1% said that they did not know what they would do.

Figure 22. Scenario 3: 'What would you do if you found a landmine or other explosive ordnance close to your house or in your area?' (Total sample, N = 799)

	Women	Men	Girls	Boys	Total
Ask for help	96%	97%	98%	97%	**97%**
Warn others	34%	36%	56%	55%	**42%**
Mark it	41%	45%	31%	30%	**38%**
Find another way / path	8%	8%	17%	17%	**11%**
Go back	8%	10%	16%	11%	**11%**

When asked a follow-up question about whom they would report any EO found around their house or area there to, respondents stated that they would report to Ukrainian security actors, mainly SES (72%), the police (57%) and the military (31%). Adolescents also stated that they would report any EO found close to their house or in their area to security forces, while children would mainly report to their parents (81%).

5.6 Perceptions

In order to investigate prevailing perceptions regarding EO, every respondent was asked to state their level of agreement/disagreement according to the following scale: 1) strongly disagree, 2) somewhat disagree, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) somewhat agree, and 5) strongly agree.

Just over three quarters or 76% of all respondents considered landmines and other EO to be one of the biggest threats to their family. This despite less than a third agreeing with the statement that they are aware of landmine or EO contamination in the area where they live. The high level of awareness of EO contamination and associated risks is not surprising considering the years of armed conflict. Not

Figure 23. Statement 1: 'I consider landmines/explosive ordnance to be one of the biggest threats to me or my family' (Total sample, N = 799)



Figure 24. Statement 2: 'I am aware of landmine/explosive ordnance contamination in the area where I live' (Total sample, N = 799)

surprisingly, the number of respondents perceiving EO to be one of the biggest threats to their family respondents rose to 81% when solely looking at the people who strongly agree with the statement that they are aware of landmine/EO contamination in their area of habitation.

When asked about observed behaviour, most respondents agreed that people in their community always behave safely with regard to EO; people who knew of EO contamination in their communities especially agreed with that statement, though 28% of respondents who strongly agreed with the statement that they were aware of EO contamination in their community were not sure whether people behaved safe around EO.

When asked if they thought people in their communities entered dangerous areas to collect resources or otherwise to engage in livelihoods activities, more than half or 53% of all respondents said that they strongly or somewhat agreed. Once again zooming in on respondents who strongly agreed with the statement that they were aware of EO contamination in their community, 59% were of the perception

Figure 25. Statement 3: 'People in my community always behave safely with regard to landmine/explosive ordnance' (Total sample, N = 799)



that people entered dangerous areas for livelihoods activities. This was elaborated further on by adult FGD participants in areas where accidents had taken place in the last two years: They noted that people in their community knew of safe behaviour but would sometimes enter dangerous areas in search of, for instance, scrap metal.

> ***Our examples are not very good. When they found shells, they pulled them over to the metal scrap. Of course, we know that we need to call services, but the problem is that even if you call it, it's not a fact that they will come!***
>
> **(adult FGD participants, Luhansk Oblast)**

The vast majority of respondents (83%) agreed that their daily routines have been affected by the presence of EO. While just under half of children and adolescents somewhat or strongly agreed, between 54% of adults perceive that the presence of EO affect their daily routines. It should be noted that it is not possible to check which types of EO that most impact daily routines, or if people may be thinking of other risks associated with armed conflict such as shelling.

Figure 26. Statement 4: 'Disregarding the COVID-19 situation, my daily routines have been affected by the presence of landmines/explosive ordnance' (Total sample, N = 799)

Adults who somewhat or strongly agreed with statement 4 were provided with three additional questions related to the perceived impact of EO on their and their family's daily routines.

Figure 27. Proportion of adult respondents claiming that the presence of landmines and EEO in their communities had a negative effect on their... (Adult population, N = 527)

83% either somewhat or strongly agreed with the statement that if disregarding COVID-19 their economic situation has been negatively impacted by the presence of landmines or other EO. It should be noted that it is not possible to confirm whether people fully disregarded COVID-19; however, as especially people who are retired, self-employed or working part-time perceived of their economic situation to be negatively affected, it is likely that adults overall commented on their economic situation at the time of the survey.

In general, adult respondents perceived that the presence of EO has negatively impacted their access to earning income, getting services and enjoying leisure opportunities. However, without a baseline to measure against it is difficult to ascertain if such perceived restrictions in access are fully due to the presence of EO or, at least in part, due to COVID-19 related constraints.

The prevalent perceptions around the negative impact of EO on livelihoods supports the drive towards more tailored approaches as proposed and propagated by several EORE providers. However, it also points towards a need to integrate EORE into non-MA approaches, where possible, to ensure that people of concern have tangible alternatives.

Chapter 6.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusions

The KAP survey set out to assess to what extent current EORE efforts affect the adoption of safe behaviour and alternative coping strategies in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine. While the level of knowledge of EO, including associated risks and safe behaviour, is generally deemed to be high – regardless of whether people say they have received some form of EORE or not – it is not possible to assess the quality and effectiveness of the EORE efforts to date. As such, it is difficult to determine whether there is a causality between EORE efforts since 2014 and the drop in casualty numbers. The fact is that people are generally well aware of the effects of armed conflict, regardless of whether they have received EORE or not. **One way to investigate the link between EORE and the adoption of safe behaviour would be to systematically collect casualty data that includes details of whether any form of EORE was received prior to the accident, when such EORE took place, and who the EORE provider was.** Unfortunately, casualty data is not currently collected, verified, managed and analysed systematically across the MA stakeholders.

The KAP survey reveals a potential schism between who is perceived to be most at-risk from EO accidents and who are actually the main EO victims. While adult men are correctly seen as the main at-risk group, the mixing up of military and civilian casualty data reduces applicability to humanitarian mine action and obfuscates the fact that most accidents are due to 'unknown' devices, just as the activity at the time of the accident is often 'unknown'. Furthermore, while adult women are relatively under-represented in casualty data, they still fall victim to EO – and to a higher degree than often concluded.

Without updated NSTGs outlining, among others, minimum requirements for training, competencies on the part of EORE providers, needs assessments, targeting and tailoring EORE efforts, and affiliated accreditation process, it is not possible to evaluate EORE efforts in the eastern Ukraine as a whole. Key MA stakeholders are well aware of this and there seems to be a high level of willingness to coordinate; however, without a national authority taking the lead in coordination and standardisation, efforts are bound to remain fragmented and unable to promote EORE as a fully considered and integrated part of national MA strategies. This is not to say that EORE efforts are not of good quality; rather while EORE efforts, especially on the part of INGOs, are in line with international standards they may need further tailoring to the Ukrainian, especially the eastern Ukraine, context.

Security sector actors are a main EORE provider; however, for the purpose of this KAP survey it has not been possible to review materials and main messages used by e.g., SES, the police or the military. However, considering the absence of a NMAA and subsequent lack of coordination and standardisation, it is assumed that EORE efforts on the part of national security sector actors are not in line with IMAS. This is substantiated by photographic and anecdotal evidence provided by participants in the KAP survey. Furthermore, while the Ukrainian MRE NSTGs make provisions for the development, testing and revision of EORE materials, it does not consider how to connect with identified target groups to facilitate behaviour change. In fact, little consideration seems to be made in terms of EORE as social and behaviour change communication, including establishing how increases in EO knowledge levels translates into attitude and behaviour change. This includes considering who the best and most trusted EORE providers are or, put differently, who people are most likely to listen to and act on the information provided. **This brings into focus the urgent need for coordination, standardisation, evidence-generation and capacity building in line with IMAS.**

While a KAP survey is useful to reveal misconceptions or misunderstandings that may represent obstacles to the intended outcome of EORE activities by assessing declared or stated attitudes and behaviour, it is less instructive in terms of establishing correlations between what is said and what is done. This is particularly the case for adults, and especially adult men. As one EORE stakeholder put it: "A lot is based on assumptions". **More research is needed to understand the key factors influencing attitudes**

towards EO, including attitudes towards who is most at-risk, and how to influence behaviour change most effectively and coherently in identified target groups. Without more thoroughly establishing the critical needs of the people who are most represented in casualty data, for instance those who come into harm's way though livelihoods activities or by virtue of travelling to, between, or through potentially contaminated areas, it is difficult to design and implement relevant activities.

6.2 Recommendations

> *There is no national strategy, no national coordination of EORE activities. No one controls who conducts EORE campaigns.*
>
> **(key informant, EORE provider)**

Based on the findings of the KAP survey, including the outlined limitations, the following recommendations are made to ensure that EORE efforts in the Donbas and beyond are in line with the minimum standards outlined in the IMAS 12.10 EORE:

- **Establishing a national authority to plan, coordinate, prioritise and oversee humanitarian MA efforts should be treated as a matter of high priority.** Without a NMAA with a clearly defined mandate, the much-needed coordination and quality assurance will not happen systematically compliant with IMAS. The provision of EORE for civilian populations should be a main task for all NMAAs; as such, attention should be on capacity building and support for aligning NSTGs and strategies to international standards, including standards for quality management. This necessitates the design and adoption of a national information management system, e.g., building on IMSMA, to consolidate and monitor EORE efforts.
- **Steps should urgently be taken to draft a national EORE strategy in line with the IMAS 12.10 EORE.** This should depart from a comprehensive assessment of the current Ukrainian EORE programme, including existing EORE resources, capacities and approaches, to identify good practices and gaps pertaining to needs assessments, message and material development, training, casualty data analysis etc. By building on what is already in place and the many excellent lessons that have already been learned, a comprehensive, nationally owned and contextualised EORE programme strategy could quickly be put in place. In addition, this would allow for a rapid updating/upgrading of the EORE NSTGs.
- **The MRE NSTGs should urgently be revised to reflect a more flexible approach to community liaison/community engagement, rather than the current "single approved approach to interaction with communities".** Given the centrality to designing, implementing and monitoring EORE efforts, steps should be taken to ensure that findings from community liaison/community engagement are compiled, consolidated and shared among all MA stakeholders. Through community liaison/community engagement efforts, continuous feedback should inform strategies that are flexible enough to cater to evolving contexts and needs. Such steps could further supplement, or even replace, periodic KAP surveys by establishing indicators against which progress towards national strategies can be measured.
- **While there is also a need for EORE targeting military status individuals, EORE strategies should carefully disaggregate civilian and military target groups in order to better tailor responses.** This should include establishing ad hoc behaviour change communication strategies based on an accurate diagnosis of why and how individuals and groups of people are at-risk from EO. While humanitarian EORE efforts are mainly centred on civilians, the link between military service and EO-risks should be taken into consideration when planning EORE responses considering the finding that security sector actors are key actors in providing EO awareness and may be seen as examples to follow in terms of behaviour around EO. This should entail the development of a communications strategy that on the basis of identified barriers and conduits to behaviour change aims at delivering EORE to identified risk groups according to their needs, priorities and capacities.
- **EORE messages, materials and methodologies should be designed on the basis of identified risk behaviours and target groups.** This requires urgent steps to improve on casualty data collection and analysis. While EORE providers do well in consolidating and analysing

available casualty data, this task should fall on a national authority with the support of relevant stakeholders. In the interim steps should be taken to consolidate and clean existing datasets, thereby identifying data gaps and build consensus around needs for improvement. Messages should be risk-appropriate and focus less on identification of EO and more on identification of potentially dangerous areas, including what to do if going to an unknown area or an area that has experienced armed conflict. Current EORE materials and messages should be reviewed to ensure that they are in line with the 'reality' encountered in various parts of Ukraine – and not just close to the 'line of contact'. This includes ensuring that people of concern are not provided with information about official signs that may or may not be available or, indeed, trusted.

- **The KAP survey has revealed that there is a high level of awareness of the dangers of EO; however, there might be a 'disconnect' in terms of how to convert knowledge into behaviour change.** Trust and perceptions should be the key guiding principles for EORE efforts, particularly in conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine. The KAP survey revealed several instances of people not trusting the information they receive or not perceive it as less relevant to their situation. Needs assessments for EORE should take care to establish perceptions around who is considered to have the best interests of EORE target groups at heart, i.e., who can best connect to specific target groups and spur them into – correct – action. The majority of respondents, regardless of whether they had prior EORE or not, pointed to security actors and teachers as some main providers of EORE. If people trust various security sector actors and teachers to provide them with safety information, then consistent efforts need to be put toward supporting those actors in providing quality EORE in line with IMAS. This would include undertaking capacity building and conducting advocacy among security sectors to ensure that civilians are not encouraged to engage in unsafe behaviour such as marking.