A REPORT CITIZEN SECURITY
Trinidad and Tobago 2012

Human Development and
The shift to better Citizen Security

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UNDP Trinidad and Tobago

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Foreword

For the past 50 years the UNDP has been supporting the development objectives of Trinidad and Tobago. Using a collaborative approach, we aim to provide solutions to the challenges of Democratic Governance; Poverty Reduction; Crisis Prevention and Recovery; Energy and Environment; and HIV and AIDS; and yes, Crime. The Citizen Insecurity Report of Trinidad and Tobago was produced in 2012, the report formed inputs into the first ever Human Development Report for the Caribbean region which was produced by UNDP in 2012. Trinidad and Tobago was one of seven countries that participated in the study, and incidentally, received the largest participation and response in the national surveys conducted in all seven countries.

This report provides a wide perspective of the many components which contribute to crime and hinder development of Trinidad and Tobago. The report provides invaluable insights, and should be used to facilitate platforms for wider dialogue and collective problem solving among policy makers, the protective services, civil society organisations and the private sector. Crime prevention must be integrated into larger development planning, and citizens must be actively involved in the crime prevention process through their civic duties and rights as well as engage in the process of co-producing their own security. I invite you to log on to our website (www.undp.org.tt) and download a copy of the Caribbean Human Development Report which contains a wider perspective of crime in the region and key recommendations.

Richard Blewitt, UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative for Trinidad and Tobago

About the Authors

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Dr. Williams is the coordinator of the Criminology Unit at the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine. She also coordinates the Unit for Social Problems Analysis and Policy Development (USPAP), a research Unit under the umbrella of the Department of Behavioural Sciences. She is a Certified Criminal Justice Specialist, Certified by the American College of Certified Forensic Counselors since 2004 in the Division of Counseling. She is currently a consultant criminologist for the Ministry of National Security of Belize and one of the Caribbean Criminology experts of record for the Organization of American States. Current and recently completed projects include 1) authoring the Analysis of Firearms Legislation for the Caribbean, and 2) providing the Expert Opinion on the Risks faced by Homosexuals in Trinidad and Tobago for the Refugee and Migrant Justice Service of the United Kingdom.

Foreword

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Introduction

This study which focuses on Trinidad and Tobago is designed to provide input to the first ever Caribbean Human Development Report on Citizen Security. The ultimate aim of the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report is to examine those factors which affect human development in various parts of the world, with a view to suggesting policy recommendations which will improve human development. The conception of human development adopted by the UNDP is one which strives to move away from simplistic conceptions and measures such as GDP and the Gini coefficient. While recognizing the benefits of such measures, the UNDP also recognizes that such measures represent a simplification of an otherwise complex construct. In the case of GDP for instance, a country could experience a growth in GDP, or have a high GDP, yet there is an inequitable distribution of incomes; in such a situation, increased wealth could very well go to the richer segments of the population, while the poorer segments may get poorer in relative terms, or even in absolute terms. The UNDP broadens the concept of human development to recognize that a focus on wealth alone cannot capture the diverse nature of development and the range of needs which must be met for development to occur.

Human development, as defined by the UNDP's 1990 Human Development Report can include a range of indicators, but can be usefully conceptualized as including living a long and healthy life, being educated, having a decent standard of living and enjoying political and civil freedoms.[1] Obviously each of these measures can themselves include a range of other concepts, and leave room for maneuver in terms of how they may be defined. This flexibility allows human development to be operationalized in a way which is relevant to the particular culture, country, and time to which it must be applied. At the same time it is recognized that this "flexibility" may pose problems for comparability across different places or regions because of potential differences in conceptualization and definition.

Citizen security is a subset within the broader concept of human security. Human security, according to the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report, can be usefully assessed along seven dimensions: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. In the Caribbean region and indeed in Trinidad and Tobago specifically, citizen security is an important factor which affects human development. The UNDP conceptualizes citizen security as the institutional and social situation in which people can fully enjoy and integrally exert their liberties and rights. This perspective on security includes institutional and social actions to protect and guarantee total and effective liberties and rights of the people through prevention, control and investigation of crimes, and ensures public order and the protection of vulnerable groups.

Citizen security addresses the threats to public, social, political and economic order posed by common crime, transnational organized crime, violence, public fear and insecurity. Citizen insecurity negatively impacts on human development and decrease the quality of human life by reducing choices, reducing life expectancy, increasing fear and fear-related behaviours, negatively impacting on the investment climate of a country, reducing freedom, and impacting on a range of other indicators of human development.

This report aims to examine citizen insecurity within Trinidad and Tobago. In so doing, a range of areas will be examined. These include a focus on the victimization of vulnerable groups, youth violence, risk factors which affect crime, fear of crime, policies aimed at dealing with crime and citizen insecurity, and the systems in place for dealing with crime and citizen insecurity, including the police, courts and prisons.

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[1] United Nations Development Programme (1990) *Human Development Report*. Oxford University Press.

In examining these areas, this report also aims to provide policy recommendations for dealing with crime and citizen insecurity.This report will draw from a wide range of data sources, and in so doing, it hopes to provide one of the most comprehensive and up-to-date analyses on human security in Trinidad and Tobago. The views of the public represent an important input into the process of developing this report, and accordingly will be assessed. A questionnaire was designed to capture many of the variables relevant to this study. A sample of 1595 persons was drawn and data collected in November to January 2010. Key variables include a demographic profile, victimization rates for a range of violent and property crimes, perceptions of the courts and police, the rate of crimes in the community, fear of crime, measures which assess the policy orientation of the population, social cohesion, and self-reported offending.[2]

Technical consultations with experts in various governmental and non-governmental organizations were also carried out. These experts include the acting Commissioner of Police, the Commissioner of Prisons, representatives of the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Judiciary, CARICOM IMPACS, the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, the Institute for Criminology and Public Safety, the University of Trinidad and Tobago, religious and other non-governmental organizations.[3] Key informants were selected based on their expertise and experience in various topic areas relevant to this study. In additions to key informant interviews, secondary sources of data, where they exist, were consulted. These include, but are not limited to previous studies done in Trinidad and Tobago, pre-existing data, documents and policy papers. A number of advantages derive from using the range of data sources outlined above. A large number of data sources allows for a comprehensive and in-depth examination of each topic. In addition, multiple data sources allow for triangulation, and help the researcher to assess the extent to which there are consistencies in findings across multiple data sources.

This country report, and indeed the regional Human Development Report which it will help to inform are not ends in themselves. The expenditure and effort invested to develop these studies demand that the findings be utilized to help improve citizen security, and ultimately, to support human development in Trinidad and Tobago, and the Caribbean generally. To achieve this, there must be some level of national recognition and acceptance of the main messages and findings of this report. This is achieved in part, by having many of the inputs into this project derive from key informants in a range of governmental and non-governmental organizations, previously mentioned. This study thus gives voice to the lessons learned and the range of experiences and expertise of the key informants, many of them being persons who have influence within the area of citizen security. Another feature of this report which is aimed at facilitating acceptance of the main findings is that the study is data driven.

The findings are not based on opinion or intuition or other similar inputs of a subjective nature. In this respect, while it may be possible to argue that the input of key stakeholders and informants are subjective in nature, the persons who were chosen were specifically selected because of their extensive experience and professional qualifications and expertise in a range of areas related to citizen security. It is expected that this combination of experience and professional training will minimize the possibility that the inputs of such persons are merely subjective opinion. One of the most important factors which should encourage national acceptance of this report is that it aims to contribute to an improvement in citizen security in Trinidad and Tobago. It draws from the experience of the Caribbean and internationally to develop an understanding of best practices as they relate to reducing citizen insecurity, and offers a range of recommendations in this respect.

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[2] See Appendix 5 for a copy of the questionnaire.
[3] For a full list of technical committee members, see Appendix 6. The lead author and the UNDP express their deep gratitude to the technical committee members who gave willingly of their time and expertise, and whose input has contributed substantially to the content and quality of this report.

Chapter 1
Criminal victimization and domestic violence

The overall level of criminal victimization in Trinidad and Tobago sets the context for an examination of citizen security. Victimization, however, may be assessed in different ways, and contrasting measures may offer very different indications of the extent of victimization. Generally it has been found that official crime statistics underestimate the level of victimization when compared to self-reported victimization data gathered through victimization surveys. A large proportion of crimes are never reported to the police and thus are not included in official statistics. The 2006 Jamaica National Crime Victimization Survey, for example, found that 67.5% of all incidents of criminal victimization were not reported to the police. Non reporting of victimization may occur for a number of reasons viz persons do not think that the police may be able to solve the crime, the crime is not a serious one, people lack confidence in the criminal justice system, victims are afraid of retaliation from perpetrators, etc. It is nevertheless the case that official crime data are important in estimating the level of victimization since the most serious crimes tend to be captured in such data.

It is widely accepted, for example, that murder statistics tend to be fairly accurate because of the seriousness of the crime. As the seriousness of the crime decreases, or if there is only a minor loss sustained by the victim, then such crimes may not be reported and official crime statistics become less reliable as a measure of victimization. This chapter will examine official crime data in Trinidad and Tobago for the last 20 years (i.e. from 1990 to 2010), and will compare these data to the findings of self-reported victimization. Self-reported victimization data derive from primary data collected specifically for this study. The examination of general crime trends will be followed by an in-depth examination of domestic violence, which represents the victimization of a specific vulnerable group.

Official crime data for Trinidad and Tobago for the period 1990 to 2010 are shown in Figure 1.1 and graphically represented in Figures 1.2 and 1.3.[4] These data indicate that there are long-term increases over time for all crimes considered except burglary, and in the case of sexual offences and kidnappings, there have been noted decreases within the last five to six years. In Trinidad and Tobago over the last twenty years there has been an average of 222 murders per year, with that average increasing to 458 per year for the last five years. On average for the last twenty years, the number of murders has increased by 19 per year. This represents an average annual increase of 10.4%.[5] In the case of murders, available data indicate that the rates were relatively stable from 1990 to 1999, but thereafter increased steadily to 2009, with a small decrease in 2010. Demographic data on murder victims are available for the years 2004 to 2007.[6]

These data indicate that persons between the ages of 21 to 40 are more likely than other persons to become victims of murder (see Figure 1.4). Persons under the age of ten accounted for 1.2% of all murder victims, while those between the ages of eleven to twenty accounted for 16% of the victims. Persons in the twenty one to thirty age group accounted for fully 36.3% of the victims, while those in the thirty one to forty age range accounted for 22.8% of the victims. Persons over the age of forty accounted for 23.7% of the victims.

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[4] Source: Crime and Problem Analysis branch of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. For a complete list of data on serious crimes in Trinidad and Tobago for the period 1990-2010 see Appendix 1.

[5] Average annual increase is calculated as the average of the differences between the number of murders in each year subtract the number of murders in the previous year for all years of the time period for which data are available. Average percentage increase is calculated as the average of the percent increase in murders from one year to the next for all years over the time period for which data are available. The same procedure is applied to other crimes.

[6] Source: Crime and Problem Analysis branch of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. Data are available for n = 1,236 or 87% of all victims for this time period.

These data also indicate that males are much more likely to be murdered than females (89.8% vs. 10.2%), while persons of African descent (76.6%) are more likely to be murdered than persons of Indian descent (17.2%) or mixed descent (6.2%).

Figure 1.1
Crime in Trinidad and Tobago (1990-2010)[7]

	Murder	Wounding/ shooting	Total kidnapping	Sexual offences	Robbery	Burglaries
1990	84	391	13	221	3115	7546
1991	97	453	16	228	3099	7313
1992	109	420	16	274	3786	7938
1993	111	608	41	284	4722	8419
1994	140	533	46	254	4490	7635
1995	122	501	56	309	3858	6542
1996	107	505	81	295	4075	6835
1997	101	370	80	514	3393	6682
1998	97	319	100	572	2780	6112
1999	93	340	136	476	3629	5475
2000	120	387	156	545	4094	5623
2001	151	499	135	545	4269	5016
2002	171	655	235	641	4675	4930
2003	229	784	235	643	4590	4863
2004	261	643	177	581	3885	5214
2005	386	795	280	738	4883	4548
2006	371	657	214	903	5633	4973
2007	391	680	178	825	4965	4958
2008	547	771	155	724	5043	4855
2009	506	689	155	760	6040	5744
2010	473	623	119	696	5075	5207
Average for all years	**222**	**553**	**125**	**525**	**4290**	**6020**
Average for last 5 years	**458**	**684**	**164**	**782**	**5351**	**5147**
Average increase	**19**	**12**	**5**	**24**	**98**	**-117**
Average % increase	**10.4**	**4.0**	**17.5**	**7.5**	**3.6**	**-1.5**

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[7] Data derive from the Crime and Problem Analysis (CAPA) branch of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

Figure 1.2
Trinidad and Tobago crime trends

Trinidad and Tobago Crime Trends (1990-2010)

Legend: Murder — Wounding/ shooting — Total kidnapping — Sexual offences

Figure 1.3
Trinidad and Tobago crime trends

Trinidad and Tobago Crime Trends (1990-2010)

Legend: Robbery — Burglaries

Figure 1.4

Age of murder victims from 2004 to 2007

Age	Percent
1 - 10	1.2
11 - 20	16.0
21 - 30	36.3
31 - 40	22.8
41 - 50	13.9
51 - 60	5.9
Over 60	3.9

For the time period considered, an average of 553 woundings and shootings occurred per year, with this increasing to an average of 684 in the last five years. The number of woundings and shootings increased by an average of 12 per year (an average increase of 4% per annum) over the last twenty years. While there is an overall increase in the number of woundings and shootings over the last twenty years, long term trends indicate that there are two clearly discernable periods in which there is a rise then a fall in the number of incidents. The first period is from 1990 to 1998, while the second period is from 1999 to 2010. With respect to the first period, the number of woundings and shootings increased over the period 1990 to 1993, and then began to decline to 1998. In the second period we again see an increase from 1999 to 2003, with some fluctuating stability between 2003 and 2008, and then a decline to 2010. While it may be premature, one can speculate that this indicates a cyclical trend with respect to woundings and shootings.

Data on total kidnappings[8] indicate that an average of 125 kidnappings occur per year in Trinidad and Tobago, with an average of 164 per year within the last five years. On average, there is an increase in the number of kidnappings by 5 per year. This represents a 17.5% increase per year over the last twenty years. The total number of kidnappings increased steadily from 1990 to 2005, and only began to decline after 2005. From 2005 to 2010, Trinidad and Tobago has seen a steady decline in the total number of kidnappings. Kidnapping for ransom accounts for 11.8% of all kidnappings in Trinidad and Tobago.[9] For the period 2000 to 2010, there has been an average of 22 kidnappings for ransom per year. Kidnappings for ransom exhibited a fluctuating increase for the period 2000 to 2005, but thereafter exhibited a consistent decrease to currently available data (see Figure 1.5). Within the last two years, less than 10 kidnappings for ransom per year have occurred in Trinidad and Tobago.

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[8] Total kidnappings refer to all kidnappings; that is, kidnappings for ransom *and* kidnappings for other purposes.
[9] Raw data on kidnapping for ransom appear in Appendix 1. Technical Committee members pointed out that all kidnappings for ransom are not included in official statistics since the families of some victims may decide to pay the ransom and not report the kidnapping to the police for fear that the victim may be killed.

Figure 1.5
Kidnapping for ransom (2000-2010)

Kidnapping for ransom (2000-2010)

An average of 525 rapes and other sexual offences occurred annually for the period 1990 to 2010, with the average increasing to 782 per year in the last five years. The number of rapes and other sexual offences increased by an average of 24 per year. This represents an average annual increase of 7.5%. The number of rapes and other sexual offences increased steadily over the period 1990 to 2006, with a reversal after 2006. While the decrease in the number of rapes and other sexual offences from 2006 to 2010 is encouraging, it may be too early to determine whether or not this decrease will exhibit long term stability.   Where rape alone is considered, data for the period 2000 to 2010 indicate that there are an average of 275 rapes per year in Trinidad and Tobago.[10] For this period, rapes represent 39.8% of all sexual offences.   These data indicate that there was a gradual increase in the number of rapes for the period 2005, with a similarly gradual decrease from 2005 to 2010 (see Figure 1.6).

Figure 1.6
Rapes in Trinidad and Tobago (2000-2010)

Rapes in Trinidad and Tobago (2000-2010)

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
[10] See Appendix 1 for raw data on rapes.

For the period 1990 to 2010, there has been an average of 4290 robberies per year, with this increasing to an average of 5351 per year over the last five years. On average, the number of robberies has increased by 98 per year. This represents an average annual increase of 3.6%. While the number of robberies has fluctuated from year to year, there is a clearly discernable upward trend in the number of robberies. It is interesting that while robberies have increased, the number of burglaries have decreased over time. On average over the last twenty years, there have been 6020 burglaries per year, with this average decreasing to 5147 in the last five years. Overall, the number of burglaries has decreased by 117 per year. This represents an average annual decline by 1.5%. It should be cautioned that the decrease in the number of burglaries may not necessarily indicate that something is being done correctly to address this specific crime. By definition, burglary is a non-violent crime which takes place in the absence of the victim.

The continuous increases in robberies over the same time period as the decrease in the number of burglaries may indicate that persons who were once content to take property via non-violent means, are now becoming more violent. Robbery incorporates a property crime with an element of actual or threatened violence. These data may indicate that persons who were once engaged in burglary are 'graduating' to the more violent crime of robbery. It should be acknowledged, however, that despite this possibility, there could be other factors, such as increased usage of burglar proofing and private security devices and personnel or even a decrease in the reporting of burglaries which may account for the decrease in the number of officially recorded burglaries.

In assessing official crime data for Trinidad and Tobago it must be borne in mind that a far larger proportion of all crimes occur in Trinidad. Figure 1.7 indicates the proportion of violent crimes which occur in Tobago. For the period 2001 to 2010, 98% of all murders occurred in Trinidad while 2% occurred in Tobago. Other crimes with a very low proportion occurring in Tobago include robberies (2.2%), woundings and shootings (2.7%) and kidnapping (3.2%). A somewhat higher proportion of sexual offences occur in Tobago (4.4%), as well as narcotic offences (7%), and burglaries (8.4%).

Figure 1.7
Percent of crimes which occur in Tobago (2001-2010)

Crimes	Percent
Murder	2.0
Woundings and shootings	2.7
Sexual offences	4.4
Total Kidnapping	3.2
Robberies	2.2
Narcotic offences	7.0
Burglaries	8.4

Primary data gathered specifically for the present project assessed victimization across Trinidad and Tobago. Within the last ten years, 23.9% of the sample (n = 381 respondents) indicated that they had been victims of a crime. Of these, 48.5% were victimized once, 27.3% were victimized twice, and 24.2% were victimized three or more times. Of those who were victimized, 27.6% were between the ages of 18 to 30, 33.6% were between the ages of 31 to 45, 30.2% were between the ages of 46 to 65, while 8.6% were older than 65 years of age. A larger proportion of males were victims of crime within the last ten years (57%), than females (43%). With respect to ethnicity, the majority of victims were of African descent (40.7%), while 25.5% were of Indian descent, 28.1% were Mixed, and 5.7% were of other ethnicities. Figure 1.8 indicates the prevalence of victimization within the last ten years.

The most frequently occurring crime was robbery at gunpoint (5.6% of the sample), followed by robbery with other types of weapons (3.8%), break-ins in homes during the day (3.4%), break-ins at night (2.5%), assault with a weapon (2.3%), theft from a motor vehicle (1.9%), and motor vehicle theft (1.1%). For eleven other crimes upon which respondents reported, prevalence rates of victimization were less than 1%.

Respondents were also asked to indicate whether or not they were victimized within the last year, and if they were victims of a crime, to indicate which crimes. It was discovered that 10.2% of the sample were victims of a crime within the last year. Of those who were victimized within the last year, 23.9% were between the ages of 18 to 30, 37.4% were between the ages of 31 to 45, 31.3% were between the ages of 46 to 65, while 7.4% were older than 65 years of age. A larger proportion of males were victims of crime within the last year (60.7%), than females (39.3%). With respect to ethnicity, 43.6% of the persons victimized within the last year were of African descent, while 26.4% were of Indian descent, 25.8% of Mixed descent, and 4.2% of other ethnicities. Figure 1.8 indicates the prevalence of victimization within the last year. The most prevalent offences within the last year were break-ins during the day (1.8% of the sample), robbery with other types of weapons and assault with a weapon (both 1.1%), robbery at gunpoint (1.0%), praedial larceny (0.9%), and theft from a motor vehicle (0.8%).

Figure 1.8
Self-reported victimization in Trinidad and Tobago (n = 1,595)

	Percent victimized within the last 10 years	**Percent victimized within the last year**
Attempted murder	0.8	0.3
Assault with a weapon	2.3	1.1
Robbery at gunpoint	5.6	1.0
Robbery with other types of weapons	3.8	1.1
Sexual assault and or rape	0.4	0.4
Extortion/protection	0.3	0.2
Domestic violence involving a partner	0.9	0.6
Family violence	0.8	0.4
Break-in at your house in the day	3.4	1.8
A break-in at your house at night	2.5	0.2
Motor vehicle theft	1.1	0.3
Theft from motor vehicle	1.9	0.8
Kidnapping (for ransom)	0.1	0.0
Abduction	0.1	0.1
Financial Crime/Scam	0.6	0.3
Praedial larceny	0.9	0.9
A threat on your life by someone with a weapon	0.9	0.4
A threat on your life by someone without a weapon	0.5	0.2
Overall victimization level	**23.9**	**10.2**

Total n = 1,595

Overall, within the last year 1.4% of the sample were victims of violent crimes, while 5% were victims of property crimes, and 0.5% were victims of financial crimes. Data collected indicate that younger people are more likely to become victims of violent crime than older people (see Figure 1.9).

Of those who were victims of violent crimes, 34.7% were between the ages of 18 and 30, 30.4% were between the ages of 31 to 45, 17.4% were between the ages of 46 to 65, and 17.5% were older than 65 years of age.   In contrast, older people were more likely to be victims of property crime than younger people (see Figure 1.9). Of those who were victims of property crime, 16.5% were between the ages of 18 to 30, 40.5% were between the ages of 31 to 45, 34.2% were between the ages of 46 to 65, while 8.8% were older than 65 years of age. Interestingly, males and females were equally likely to be victims of violent crimes (52.2% vs. 47.8% respectively), while males were more likely to be victims of property crimes than females (59.5% vs. 40.5% respectively). Slightly more than half (52.2%) of all victims of violent crimes within the last year were of Indian descent, while 17.4% were of African descent, 26.1% were Mixed, and 4.3% were of other ethnicities (see Figure 1.10). In contrast, persons of African descent were more likely than any other group to be victims of property crimes. Fully 45.6% of all persons who were victims of property crimes within the last year were of African descent, while 20.3% were of Indian descent, 29.1% were Mixed, and 5% were of other ethnicities.

Figure 1.9
Violent and property crime victimization within the last year as a function of age

Figure 1.10
Violent and property crime victimization within the last year as a function of ethnicity

Within the last year, 2.6% of the sample was physically harmed when they were victimized, while for 1.9% of the sample the harm sustained was serious enough to seek medical attention. For those who were physically harmed, 50% were harmed by a stranger, 10.8% by an acquaintance, 15.2% by a friend, and 24% by other persons. Data collected indicate that younger persons, especially those in the 18-24 and 25-30 age groups, are more likely than older persons to sustain physical injury when they are victimized (see Figure 1.11). On average, as persons became older, the chance of being physically harmed during the victimization incident decreased.[11] Males were more likely to be physically harmed during an incident of criminal victimization compared to females (59.5% vs. 40.5%). With respect to ethnicity, of those physically harmed 38.1% were of African descent, 40.5% were of Indian descent, 19% were Mixed, and 2.4% were of other ethnicities.

Figure 1.11
Sustaining physical injury as a function of age

Sustaining physical injury as a function of age

Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not other persons in their households (i.e. not including themselves) were victims of crime within the last ten years and within the last year (see Figure 1.12). Within the last ten years, 16.5% of the sample indicated that one other person in the household was a victim of crime, 4.8% indicated that two persons were victims of crime, 1.5% indicated that three persons were victims of crime, and 1.3% indicated that more than three persons in their household were victims of crime. Overall, 24.1% of households were victims of crime within the last ten years. Within the last year, 11.5% of households had one person other than the respondent who was victimized, 3.4% had two persons who were victimized, 0.9% had three persons who were victimized, and 0.6% had more than three persons who were victimized. Overall, 16.4% of households were victims of crime within the last year. Within the last year, the most prevalent type of victimization at the household level was robbery (11.5% of households), followed by assault with a weapon (3.9%), motor vehicle theft (2.7%), a threat on life (2.6%), theft from a motor vehicle (2.5%), and domestic violence involving a partner (1.9%).

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[11] Note that while some of the older age groups appear to have a higher incidence of physical harm than the younger age groups, the age ranges for the older age groups are wider (a span of 10 years) than that of the younger age groups (a span of 5 years). When the older age groups are disaggregated into five-year time spans to ensure comparability with the younger age groups, the data indicate that older persons are less likely to be physically harmed than younger persons.

Figure 1.12
Not counting yourself, in 2009 were any members of your household victims of the following crimes

	Percent victimized within the last year
Robbery	11.5
Assault with a weapon	3.9
Motor vehicle theft	2.7
A threat on their life	2.6
Theft from motor vehicle (motor vehicle break-in)	2.5
Domestic violence involving a partner	1.9
Murder	1.4
Attempted murder	1.4
Other family violence (other than your partner)	1.3
Sexual assault and/or rape	1.1
Extortion and/or protection rackets	0.6
Kidnapping	0.6
Abduction	0.5

Total n = 1,595

Victimization data can be used to compute victimization rates for the population. Such rates can be compared to the rates indicated in official crime data to assess whether official crime data represent an accurate picture of the crime situation, or whether such data underestimate the crime situation.[12] Invariably self-report data indicate that victimization levels are substantially higher than indicated by official crime statistics (see Figure 1.13). The largest discrepancy occurs with assault with a weapon, where the rate of such assault based on victimization data is 21.3 times higher than that indicated by official crime data.

Strictly speaking, however, this comparison is problematic since assault with a weapon in the victimization survey data includes a range of weapons while official crime data are restricted to assault with a firearm. Sexual assault is 7.6 times higher than that indicated by official crime statistics. This is followed by financial crimes which are 7.5 times higher than indicated in official crime statistics. The number of burglaries is 6.8 times higher than that indicated in official statistics while the number of robberies is 4.4 times higher and the number of motor vehicle thefts is 2.5 times higher than that indicated in official crime data. With respect to murder, attempted murder rates are 6.4 times higher than actual murder rates. In making this latter comparison it should be noted that attempted murder is different from actual murder.

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[12] This comparison is based on victimization data and official crime data for 2009 since 'past year' in the survey refers to 2009.

Figure 1.13
Crime rates (per 100,000 population) based on official crime data vs. self-report victimization data

	Rates based on official crime data	Rates based on self-report survey data	Ratio of self-report rates : official crime data rates
Attempted murder[13]	39	251	6.4
Assault with a weapon[14]	53	1129	21.3
Robbery	465	2069	4.4
Sexual assault and or rape	58	439	7.6
A break-in at your house	442	3009	6.8
Motor vehicle theft	126	313	2.5
Financial Crime/Scam	42	313	7.5

Domestic violence: A special case of victimization

In a general sense, there may be many vulnerable groups in any given society, and vulnerability may be based on a range of things, including but not limited to a lack of financial resources, cultural differences, the lack of numerical strength of certain groups, sexual orientation and gender roles, cultural stereotypes and a comparative lack of physical strength (for example with children compared to adults).[15] Vulnerable groups by definition are less well protected under certain circumstances, and thus may be victimized to a greater extent than non-vulnerable groups. Unfortunately as well, vulnerability may not be addressed at all, or adequately, by the legislative framework available. Even where there are legislative provisions to reduce vulnerability, social and cultural factors may nevertheless encourage behaviour which helps to perpetuate the vulnerability of some groups.

In the United States, for example, while equal opportunity legislation is intended to protect the rights and privileges of African Americans, many researchers have found that prejudice and discrimination exist, both external to and within the Criminal Justice System, which put such persons at a disadvantage within American society. While there may be many vulnerable groups in Trinidad and Tobago, the remainder of this chapter will restrict its focus to the vulnerabilities of women since the bulk of available empirical data are concentrated in this area.

Women represent a vulnerable population in Trinidad and Tobago. Vulnerabilities exist both within the society and family. Despite increases in the education level of females relative to males in Trinidad and Tobago, available data indicate that for comparable occupations, women earn an average of 65 cents on the dollar compared to men. Data from the Trinidad and Tobago Central Statistical Office show, for example, that in 2000, women who were legislators and senior office managers earned 52.8% of what males in similar jobs earned. For other occupations the earnings of women were similarly lower than that of men (57.7% for Service Workers including Defense Force and Shop Sales Workers, and 55.2% for Craft and Related workers). For other occupational categories, the disparities were lower, but nevertheless still apparent. In the case of Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers and elementary occupations, women earned almost 65 cents on the dollar compared to men.

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[13] Official data for murder are here compared to self-report on attempted murder.

[14] Here self-report data for 'assault with a weapon' is compared to official crime data for woundings and shootings. When making this comparison it should be borne in mind that assault with a weapon is a broader category than assault with a firearm.

[15] Vulnerability is here defined in terms of susceptibility to injury or harm due to an actual or perceived weakness.

For professionals, the figures were higher (73.5%), while the lowest gender disparities were for Technicians and Associate Professionals (84.1%) and clerks (87.8%). Data for 1998 and 1999 indicate similar gender disparities, with slight improvements over the period 1998 to 2000. Figure 1.14 summarizes the relevant data for the period 1998 to 2000.

Figure 1.14
Women's average income as a percentage of men's according to occupational groups (1998-2000)[16]

Occupational group	1998	1999	2000
Legislators, Senior Officers and Managers	52.9	52.3	52.8
Professionals	75.6	80.6	73.5
Technicians and Associate Professionals	76.7	79.7	84.1
Clerks	86.6	85.9	87.8
Service Workers and Shop Sales Workers	50.2	53.5	57.7
Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery workers	52.9	67.3	68.7
Craft and Related workers	50.0	47.3	55.2
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers	54.9	64.8	64.9
Elementary Occupations	61.9	64.1	64.4
Average percent	**62.4**	**66.1**	**67.7**

An examination of the percentage of males and females in different occupations further reveals that the problem of lower earnings, even where the same occupation is concerned, is compounded by the fact that women are concentrated in lower paying jobs, compared to men. Central Statistical Office data for 2000 (see Figure 1.15) indicate, for example that while 22.4% of the female workforce are clerks, only 4.2% of males are employed in this occupation. Similarly, 22.9% of employed females are either Service Workers or involved in Shop Sales, while only 10.8% of males are in similar occupations. There are some exceptions to this, however. More males than females are involved in craft and related occupations and elementary occupations. With respect to some of the higher paying occupations, females are making some headway relative to males.

Of those who are legislators and senior officers and managers, 6.6% are women while 6.3% are men. Similarly, 3.1% of professionals are female while 2.4% are male, and 13.6% of those who are technicians and associate professionals are female, compared to 7.2% male. It is important to note here that while the number of females is increasing relative to males for some of the higher paying occupations, these occupations account only for a small proportion of all occupations, indicating that many females are still restricted to low paying occupations. In addition, as Figure 1.14 indicates, where there are females in high paying jobs, they still only earn a fraction on the dollar compared to males. Figure 1.16 further indicates that overall, there are fewer females than males in the labour force, and the unemployment rate for females is higher than that for males for the entire period for which data are available.

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[16] Source: Central Statistical office of Trinidad and Tobago 2000 Census.

Figure 1.15
Percent of economically active men and women (2000 data)[17]

Occupational group	Women	Men
Legislators, Senior Officers and Managers	6.6	6.3
Professionals	3.1	2.4
Technicians and Associate Professionals	13.6	7.2
Clerks	22.4	4.2
Service Workers and Shop Sales Workers	22.9	10.8
Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery workers	1	4.1
Craft and Related workers	5.5	24.9
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers	2.8	13
Elementary Occupations	21.9	27

Figure 1.16
Women and men's participation in the labour force[18]

Indicator	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Number of women as a percent of the labour force	38.6	37.9	38.3	38.2	38.4
Number of men as a percent of the labour force	61.4	62.1	61.7	61.8	61.6
Female unemployment rate	21.0	19.4	18.8	16.8	15.2
Male unemployment rate	13.2	12.3	11.3	10.9	10.2

Economic vulnerability is a reflection of culture and a belief system which perpetuates and accepts inequality. Such vulnerability is also reflective of a legislative system which has not adequately addressed the issue of gender equality. While economic vulnerabilities have far-reaching implications in and of themselves, the larger sociocultural framework which perpetuates such inequality can also be conducive to other forms of inequality which perpetuate the vulnerability of females relative to males. Such a cultural system implicitly devalues females and their worth and offers less to females in the way of opportunities for improvement and equality of treatment when they require assistance.

Economic inequality disempowers women and leaves them dependent. Economic dependence is a factor which has been linked to domestic violence (Lyon, 2002; Strube and Barbour, 1983). In the case of the family unit, economic dependency refers to the degree to which one person relies on another for financial support and is used to describe a situations in which one member of a dyad (here the male) has exclusive or predominant control over financial resources (Alvi and Selbee, 1997). The economic dependency of one member of a cohabiting couple may lead the dependent person to tolerate mistreatment because of a lack of viable living alternatives (Dearwater, Cohen and Campbell, 1998; Dutton, 1995). Gender based economic inequality also impacts upon single parent families, and is especially important in a Caribbean setting where female-headed households are common.

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[17] Source: Central Statistical office of Trinidad and Tobago 2000 Census.

[18] Source: Central Statistical office of Trinidad and Tobago 2000 Census.

On average, female-headed families will face comparatively greater levels of hardship compared to male-headed single parent families. Such hardships impacts upon the children and mother, and can have a number of negative implications.

Domestic violence refers to physical, psychological or sexual violence which occurs in families. Handwerker (1997) clarifies that violence "encompasses anything that an individual experiences as the illegitimate exercise of what may be variously described as coercion, force, control or exploitation" (p. 30). This definition includes, but is not limited to kicking, shoving, pushing, slapping, clubbing, stabbing, shooting, as well as verbal and psychological terrorization of the individual concerned. As well as causing physical damage, domestic violence can lead to psychological distress and trauma, with effects possibly lasting a lifetime. In addition, females who have been sexually abused as young girls may be in an especially vulnerable state, even many years later, and may never be able to make a full recovery (Browne et al., 1998).

Abused women are often debilitated by anxiety, may suffer post-traumatic stress disorder, exhibit increased consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and illegal drugs, experience depression, and attempt suicide (Andrews and Brown, 1998; Koss, 1990; Plichta, 1992; Rawlins, 2000). Other researchers have found that victims of domestic violence are more prone to health complications since they have lowered immunity brought about by the stress of experiencing domestic abuse (World Health Organization, 1997). Domestic violence impacts negatively upon the lives of everyone who experiences it, witnesses it, or becomes aware of it. It "affects society negatively, causing fear among those close to it, and a sense of helplessness among those who are unsure as to what needs to be done to reduce its incidence" (Rawlins, 2000: p. 168).

One of the most important factors which prevents abused women from seeking help is their disadvantaged economic position. In addition to this, Strube and Barbour (1983) found that abused women's economic dependency is associated with a decreased likelihood of terminating an abusive relationship. Gelles (1976) and Hilberman and Munson (1978) have found that women who are more economically dependent on their partners may be more tolerant of abuse and therefore, less likely to leave abusive relationships. Many abused women lack the education and skills to obtain employment; this is exacerbated in Trinidad and Tobago where there is a lack of equality to job access and remuneration. The responsibility for child care likewise can preclude the acquisition of work outside the home (Strube and Barbour, 1983).

More recent studies suggest that the combination of poverty and violence in the household creates particular difficulties for women's well being and ability to achieve self sufficiency (Lyon, 2002). In essence, abused women may never be empowered unless they are allowed sufficient access to gain resources (Busch and Valentine, 2000). If a woman is not financially secure or lacks the opportunity to become financially secure, she may be unable to leave the abusive relationship. The rhetoric and ideology of empowerment have been provided as a guiding principle for interventions, at least to support abused women who are economically dependent on their abusive partners. Unfortunately, these efforts have a limited impact on changing abused women's status in the family because attempts to operationalize the means by which abused women can become empowered are scarce (Peled et al., 2000).

While economic dependency and the related factors of patriarchal socio-cultural values and beliefs are important factors which increase women's vulnerability, other Caribbean research has linked domestic violence to a number of additional risk factors, including alcoholism and drug abuse, and the breakdown of the family structure, which here includes changes which lead to matrifocality in the case of families with persons of African descent, and changes in the extended family system in the case of families with persons of East Indian descent (Gopaul and Reddock, 1994). Other research suggests that women who have been involved in situations involving domestic violence are more likely to perceive their present situation as hopeless. They adapt instead of leaving or exploring meaningful alternatives.

Despite the fact that a number of risk factors have been identified, many service providers who are developing programs and innovations to help with the problem fail to address the perceived and real difficulties of changing the internal dynamics of the family, the variability of social support, the lack of necessary social and economic resource programs for abused women and their children, and the lack of enforcement of existing laws (McDonald, 1989).

A number of researchers have attempted to assess the prevalence of domestic violence in Trinidad and Tobago. Rawlins (1998) estimates that one in four women in Trinidad and Tobago has experienced some form of domestic violence.   In a later study, Rawlins (2000) sampled 200 women in two communities in Trinidad, Barataria and Chaguanas, and found that 27% of the sample had lived in homes in which they witnessed domestic violence when they were children. As children, 8% of the sample reported being a victim of abuse in the home. Respondents indicated that their fathers were most likely to be the perpetrators of acts of domestic violence (61%), followed by other males in the family (32%). Rawlins further found that 16% experienced domestic violence in adulthood.

In adulthood, the majority of victims (77%) were women, with the main perpetrator being their husbands. These data further indicate that there were no ethnic differences in the experience of domestic violence in childhood or adulthood.   Other research has found that over one quarter of the men on death row in Trinidad and Tobago have been charged with killing their wives, girlfriends, or common-law spouses (Women and Development Studies Group, 1994). Domestic violence has also been linked to child abuse (Anaya, 2004; Humphreys et al., 2001; Jouriles et al., 2008). As such, where women are abused, other family members may also be at risk. Indeed, a study conducted in Trinidad and Tobago by Patel et al. (1999) revealed that of 200 antenatal women who were interviewed, 9.2% had experienced abuse during their most recent pregnancy.

One of the most recent studies to assess the prevalence of domestic violence in Trinidad and Tobago is Anyanwu (2011). Importantly, this study has also attempted to determine whether or not economic dependence is related to the level of domestic violence, as well as the willingness of abused women to leave their abusive relationships. Using a sample of 176 women between the ages of 18 to 61 years, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they were the victims of nine different abusive acts within their relationships with male partners. Responses ranged from never to frequently. Lifetime prevalence for being attacked with a weapon was 17.6%, threatened with violence 26.2%, punched/shoved 33%, hit 34.6%, forced to have sex 16.5%, having their life threatened 19.3%, being dominated 25%, experiencing violence against their children 8.5%, and being stopped from pursuing their choices and interests 18.8%.   Figure 1.17 summarizes the findings.

Figure 1.17
Percent of women who experienced domestic violence in their lifetime (N = 176)

Type of violence	Never	Once	More than once	No response
Attacked you with weapon	79.0	7.4	10.2	3.4
Threatened you with violence	69.9	9.7	16.5	3.9
Punched/ Shoved	63.6	16.5	16.5	3.4
Hit you	61.4	19.3	15.3	4.0
Forced Sex	77.8	8.0	8.5	5.7
Threatened to kill you	76.7	7.4	11.9	4.0
Dominated you	69.9	11.4	13.6	5.1
Violence against your children	76.7	2.8	5.7	14.8
Stopped you from pursuing choice/interest	73.9	5.7	13.1	7.3

The responses from all items were summed to compute a scale which reflected the total lifetime prevalence of domestic violence. While a number of predictors were used in this study (including age, number of children in the family, income, and level of education) the only significant predictor of total domestic violence was the willingness to leave the abusive relationship. Consistent with the findings of Rawlins (2000), there were no ethnic differences in the level of domestic violence experienced by participants. Transforming the total domestic violence variable to compensate for positive skewness did not change the findings. Anyanwu (2011) also examined the factors which predicted the willingness of respondents to leave abusive relationships. Important predictors were subordination due to gender and economic inequality. It was found that women who felt that their partners' actions made them subordinate in the relationship were more willing to leave, while women who experienced higher levels of financial equality expressed greater willingness to leave abusive relationships. This latter finding may be explained by the fact that women who are economically independent may have the means to allow them to leave such relationships.

Interestingly, Anyanwu (2011) found that perceptions of the ability of the criminal justice system to assist in cases of domestic violence were not related to the willingness of women to leave abusive relationships. In Trinidad and Tobago, the family is seen as a private sphere, and even in cases of domestic violence, the society and women themselves prefer to resort to personal solutions to resolve family disputes, rather than seeking the intervention of the criminal justice system. This cultural preference extends to personnel in the criminal justice system who are unwilling to intervene when incidents of domestic violence occur. The findings of Anyanwu (2011) are consistent with data uncovered by Rawlins (2000) who found, in her sample of 200 women from Trinidad, that of those who experienced domestic violence, only 35% reported the incident to the police. Rawlins further discovered that police did nothing in 64% of these cases, took a report in 18% of the cases, and arrested the perpetrator in 18% of the cases.

A consequence of failure to seek the intervention of the criminal justice system in cases of domestic violence can result in the perpetuation of such violence, and indeed to its escalation to the point where victims may be killed. Trinidad and Tobago data indicate that an alarming proportion of all murder cases are the result of domestic violence (see Figure 1.18). For the period 1995 to 2004, a total of 1,838 people were murdered in Trinidad and Tobago. Of these, 201 cases or 10.9% or all murders were because of domestic violence. Almost invariably, the victims were female and the perpetrators male. The gender disparity in victimization is reflected in the number of persons who report incidents of domestic violence. Between 1990 and 1992 for example, a total of 1,436 persons reported offences under the Domestic Violence Act. Of these, only 2.6% were males, while the balance (97.4%) were female (Women and Development Studies Group, 1994: p. 90).

Figure 1.18
Percent of all murders which were the result of domestic violence[19]

Year	Percent
1995	31.4
1996	17.8
1997	17.8
1998	23.7
1999	16.1
2000	20.0
2001	11.3
2002	8.7

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[19] Data source: Crime and Problem Analysis Branch of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

2003	10.0
2004	3.4

It is important to note at this point that the incidence of domestic violence in Trinidad and Tobago is in all likelihood higher that that indicated in official statistics. The definition of domestic violence offered earlier is one which encompasses a wider range of acts against the victim than just those which result in murder. This latter case represents one of the most serious manifestations of domestic violence. Cultural norms which serve to justify male domination within the family, and which encourage the tolerance of domestic violence and decrease the willingness of victims to seek the intervention of the criminal justice system decrease the likelihood that abused women will report their abuse. Indeed, as self-report data previously cited from Anyanwu (2011), Rawlins (1998, 2000), and Women and Development Studies Group (1994) indicate, the prevalence of domestic violence in Trinidad and Tobago is substantially higher than that indicated in official statistics.

Domestic violence is an important issue which requires careful consideration in Trinidad and Tobago. One of the biggest obstacles to dealing with this issue is lack of a criminal justice response to incidents of domestic violence. This could be explained in part with reference to the cultural belief that females should be subordinate to males in the family, and that family disputes should not be brought into the public sphere. These cultural beliefs are shared by women as well as men, and as such, even the victims of abuse, in this case women, are not likely to seek the intervention of the criminal justice system. This results in the passivity of victims and limits the options which may be available to abused women. It should be recognized, however, that domestic violence intersects with the criminal justice system in the form of a number of criminal behaviors. The classification of a crime as domestic violence may result in a less serious charge for the abuser despite evidence that injuries that abused women receive are at least as serious as injuries suffered in ninety percent of violent felony crimes (Dutton, 1986). Harm sustained as a result of domestic abuse include, but are not limited to psychological and emotional abuse, assault and battery, harassment, breaking and entering, violation of an ex parte or protection order, malicious destruction of property, sexual assault, and stalking as well as a number of other offences that may not be immediately recognizable as domestic in origin, such as arson, fraud, or embezzlement.

Legislation to deal with the issue of domestic violence was introduced to Trinidad and Tobago in 1991. The Domestic Violence Act of 1991 formally proclaimed that domestic violence was a crime, and made provisions for the victim to get a Protection Order from any Magistrate's Court. According to this Act, anyone who contravened the legal order could be fined $TT 5,000 or face a maximum sentence of six years in prison. In making these provisions, the aim of the Act was to stop threatened or actual abuse of victims. The explanatory note to the Bill, however, indicated that in Trinidad and Tobago there was the inclination to aim for a more conciliatory approach to dealing with domestic violence, rather than resort to criminal law. The explanatory note stated:

> *"The Bill is an attempt to provide legal protection for the victims of Domestic Violence. It does so in two ways. Firstly, by empowering the Magistrate's Court to grant Protection Orders irrespective of whether other relief is sought and secondly, it provides the police with powers to arrest and lay charges when there is a breach of the Court's Order or where a domestic violence offence is committed… The object of the Bill is to strike a right balance between the need to preserve an existing marital or other spousal or parental relationship on the one hand and the need to protect those persons from exposure to violence on the other. It seeks to achieve this objective by enacting provisions which can both punish and protect."*

The Domestic Violence Act of 1991 did not appear to achieve its intended effect. While a large number of cases were brought before the courts, Protection Orders were not issued for the majority of such cases. Data from the Port of Spain Magistrate's court for the period 1991-1994 indicate, for example, that Protection Orders were granted in only 22.5% of the cases. In addition, the number of crimes related to domestic violence continued to increase subsequent to the Act.

A number of problems reduced the effectiveness of the 1991 Act. With the introduction of the Act, there was a greater demand for legal assistance in obtaining Protection Orders. The state was severely constrained in its ability to provide such assistance. To compound the problem, the state's bureaucracy was incapable of dealing with the large influx of cases since additional personnel were not deployed to this sector. Another major problem with the 1991 Act was that Protection Orders were restricted mainly to the home, and did not apply to other settings such as the workplace or other locations. Even more importantly, the Police Service did not have the manpower to investigate every case of domestic violence, or many cases where persons violated Protection Orders. Bissessar (2000) argues that in many cases, police officers were reluctant to interfere in what was seen as essentially a private family matter. Even in cases where applicants were able to get Protection Orders, there were no provisions made for families who may have lost their only source of financial support. State shelters for victims of domestic violence were not established, and where non-governmental facilities existed, they were small and funded by the private sector, and hence were incapable of dealing with the number of cases.

The Domestic Violence Act of 1999 was introduced in recognition of the many shortcomings of the 1991 Act. This new Act extended the range of protection afforded to include not only the home, but "premises frequented by the applicant including any residence, property, business, school or place of employment." The 1999 Act also made provisions to enable the spouse to "make or continue to make payments in respect of rent or mortgage payments for premises occupied by the applicant." It also ensured that "reasonable care is provided in respect of a child or dependent person." The courts also gained the power to award compensation not exceeding $TT 15,000. In addition, it reduced the discretion of police officers and indicated that officers "must arrest where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed or intends committing an offence or breach of a Protection Order." Importantly also, the new Act increased "police powers of entry and arrest". Part IV, 22 and 23 (1) and (2) allowed that:

> "for the avoidance of doubt, a police officer may act in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Law Act where he has reasonable cause to believe that a person is engaging in or attempting to engage in conduct which amounts to physical violence and failure to act immediately may result in serious physical injury or death. Nothing in this section authorizes the entry onto the premises by a policeman, for the purpose of any search or the arrest of any person, otherwise than in connection with the conduct referred to in Subsection (1)."

Despite the above, a number of problems remained. While one clause indicated that a police officer could enter a building if they had reasonable cause, another indicated that they could only act in accordance with a warrant issued by a Magistrate. Then Senior Superintendent of the Police Service pointed to the shortcoming by stating that "By the time you go to a home and you know that, or you were told that an offence is taking place and you go to a Magistrate to get a warrant, by the time you come back there you have four or five murders" (Trinidad Guardian, August 9, 1999, p. 3). Another major shortcoming related to the length of time and complex nature of the procedures required to get a Protection Order. The Domestic Violence Act of 1999 outlined thirteen procedures or steps which must be followed in order to secure a Protection Order. A number of persons must be seen in completing these steps.

Such persons included a Justice of the Peace, a Magistrate, an Attorney (who must represent the applicant), and a Clerk of the Courts. Securing a Protection Order depended on one's ability to afford an attorney (though one could go through the lengthy procedures for securing Legal Aid), and depended on the availability of the many persons specified (many of whom were only available during typical working hours from Monday to Friday, excluding public holidays).

Quite apart from legislative inadequacies, other problems negatively impacted upon the 1999 Act. The police, for instance, continued to maintain that they do not have the necessary manpower, and in many cases vehicles, to allow them to respond to the many domestic violence cases, including instances of breach of a Protection Order. In addition, while the Act allowed for the continued payment of rent by the spouse of the victim, it did not mandate that such payment should be made. A broader issue was that the Act did not take into account the economic capacity of women to support themselves and their children during and subsequent to court processes aimed at reducing domestic abuse.

As was the case with the earlier 1991 Act, in Trinidad and Tobago there continued to be a lack of state run shelters and services for victims of domestic violence. Bissessar (2000) adds to the debate by making the point that the risk factors for domestic violence in Trinidad and Tobago differ from that of other countries. She indicates that Trinidad and Tobago has 'borrowed' legislation from elsewhere and applied it without critically evaluating its applicability, and without altering it to suit the cultural and other peculiarities which apply. It is no surprise then that a number of authors have argued that the legislative provisions for dealing with the issue of domestic violence in Trinidad and Tobago are inadequate (Bissessar, 2000; Phillips, 2000; Zellerer, 2000).

In order for the criminal justice system to be effective in the fight against domestic violence, judges, prosecutors, probation officers and the police need a clear sense of what behaviors constitute domestic abuse, who the perpetrators are, who the victims of domestic violence are, and how they may appear in the criminal justice system. Given that domestic violence is a crime perpetrated against a vulnerable population, the state has an obligation to intervene in personal relationships to protect women from their abusive partners. Where appropriate, the state can and should remove violent husbands from their homes to protect women (Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Schechter, 1982).

Contemporary women's movements no doubt have triumphed in some crucial areas with respect to gaining recognition and public acknowledgement that the state has the obligation to render full protection to abused women (Pleck, 1989). The transformation of laws related to violence against women in Trinidad and Tobago has had a powerful effect in raising consciousness of women's rights and security and protection by the law. Perhaps even more than regulating behavior, it is symbolic of the changing values and norms in Trinidad and Tobago's society. In forcing governments to enact these laws, women's organizations have brought about recognition that violence against women is a political issue, not a cultural or private one (Clarke, 1997: p.59).

Despite the progress made by women's movements in relation to the acknowledgement of the criminality in domestic violence, not much has been accomplished by the criminal justice system in view of redressing the problems associated with domestic violence and the prosecution of perpetrators. A large part of the problem here has to do with the weight of culture and tradition, and its effect on the criminal justice system. For a long period of time, culture as well as law gave the husband an affirmative endorsement to beat his wife in order to provide her with what was seen as appropriate chastisement and instruction (Coughlin, 1994; McConnell, 1992). Because the wife was viewed as belonging to her husband, what happened between them was regarded as a private matter and was not a concern to the criminal justice system (Dobash and Dobash, 1979).

Although this form of chastisement has long been abolished, the abuse of women by husbands and intimate partners still remains prevalent and aggressors are rarely arrested and prosecuted (Dobash and Dobash, 1992). Critics of police behavior have long argued that leniency in the criminal justice system legitimates domestic violence in the minds of many potential aggressors (Ferraro, 1989). A criminal justice response to domestic violence is indeed important since this may serve as a catalyst to raise awareness and change cultural values which legitimate violence against women. The failure of the criminal justice system to respond, in contrast, will indicate that abused women are not seen as victims, and will serve to reinforce cultural norms which fail to discourage spousal abuse.

Despite the advocacy of a response from the criminal justice system, it must be recognized that this is only a partial solution. Many males, for example, may not be deterred by arrests, and instead increased violence and continued abuse of their partners could result in some cases where the criminal justice system utilizes this option (Buzawa and Buzawa, 1993). Indeed, arrest is only one among other options which may be available to the criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago. What may matter is that a response is made, regardless of whether or not that response involves arrest. The response and the consistency of the response serve to reinforce the idea that domestic violence is unacceptable. Feminist inspired studies argue that arrest alone is ineffective in halting the long term expected progression of domestic violence (Ferraro and Pope, 1993).

Merely adopting a pro-arrest policy alone may signal a primary focus on law enforcement, rather than community involvement and empowerment of battered women. As previous data indicate, economic equality, and the resultant lack of dependency of women on men may prove to be an important step in the fight against domestic violence. In this respect, as Figure 1.19 indicates, the unemployment rates for females have been decreasing over time, though as also indicated, the disparity in unemployment rates between males and females has not decreased over time. With greater access to education, coupled with increased access to employment, women in Trinidad and Tobago are on a path which should facilitate the ability to extricate themselves from abusive relationships. Despite this, the increased cost of living, coupled with the fact that gender inequality does not appear to be diminishing over time, may work against the economic independence of women in Trinidad and Tobago.

Figure 1.19
Percent of males and females aged fifteen and over who are unemployed[20]

A number of governmental initiatives in Trinidad and Tobago reflect cognizance of the fact that in addition to a legal approach, a social, community-based approach is also required in the fight against domestic violence. In 1996, for example, the Community Policing Unit was instituted and mandated to engage in preventative policing, including dealing with cases of domestic violence. Among other things, they were required to maintain a domestic violence hotline (800-SAVE) which operates on a 24 hour, seven days per week basis. In addition, the Gender Affairs Division of the Ministry of Culture and Gender Affairs, in collaboration with a number of non-governmental organizations initiated a number of educational exercises which target police, shelter workers and other stakeholders. These workshops aim to raise awareness of the issue of domestic violence and attempt to encourage attitudinal change and an examination of cultural values which condone violence against women. The Gender Affairs Division has also initiated a male support group and a community-based drop in information center project. Through this project, members of the public can access assistance on matters related to domestic violence, rape, sexual abuse, and family conflict (Phillips, 2000).

Domestic violence is an intractable problem which requires a very carefully formulated approach. Such an approach must recognize the utility of the criminal justice system to prevent and reduce the incidence of such violence, but must also recognize that social awareness and a change in cultural beliefs and values are also required in the long run. The cultural dimension of the problem requires a change in thinking about gender equality, and a concomitant change in practices which reduce inequality, both within the workplace, and within the home. This change alone is not sufficient as efforts against domestic violence also require changing cultural values which encourage the silencing and stigmatization of victims and witnesses, and which discourage law enforcement personnel from intervening even though domestic violence is a criminal offence. Public awareness campaigns may be utilized to alter societal values which currently result in a society which operates as if domestic violence will go away by ignoring it.

Where police officers are concerned, police training should include a specific component which is geared to assist officers in decision making where such difficult issues are concerned. In addition, the capacity of the police to investigate alleged cases of domestic violence should be assessed. Where there are a limited number of officers, and where there are no officers mandated to deal with domestic violence, decisions may be made which place emphasis on crimes which are perceived to be more serious, and domestic violence incidents may be neglected, more because of its lack of perceived seriousness, than because of its actual seriousness. In the case of Protection Orders, effort is required to streamline and simplify the process which is required in the granting of such Orders. Women who are victims of domestic violence often are in a vulnerable and helpless state, and do not have the personal capacity or the social, or even the financial support which may be required to navigate through the cumbersome processes presently required to get a such Orders.

The impact of domestic violence on children also requires careful consideration, and resources need to be devoted to the support and care of children who may need such care. It is the case that policies which deal with domestic violence may focus only on the person who is directly victimized and may neglect other vulnerable persons, including children, who may be affected by such violence. Indeed, Technical Committee members pointed out that in Trinidad and Tobago children who reside in homes where domestic violence against spouses occur may also become victims of physical, emotional and psychological abuse. Research should assess the extent of this phenomena, and measures should be put in place to cater to the needs of children so affected. Domestic violence as well as other types of criminal victimization increase human insecurity and reduce the quality of life. Where human development is broadly conceptualized to incorporate the quality of life, this implies that such victimization negatively impacts on human development. The increasing levels of violent crimes, coupled with the persistence of domestic violence raise serious challenges for human development in Trinidad and Tobago.

Chapter 2
Youth violence

Youth violence as well as the victimization of youths represent a special area of concern with respect to citizen security. Media reports, often based on isolated events, give the impression that youth crime is spiraling out of control in the Caribbean, and in Trinidad and Tobago specifically. One of the dangers of this is that the media may affect public perceptions, which in turn may fuel governmental strategies to deal with the issue of youth violence. Such strategies, almost invariably, call for increasing levels of punitiveness. Evidence gathered in this report indicates that youth violence is the exception rather than the rule, even among institutionalized youths in Trinidad and Tobago. Despite this, the headlines which appear in the news media attest to the fact that the public's perception of youth violence may be at odds with the reality. For example, a headline in the Trinidad Express on December 09, 2010 stated "Gang violence in school" while another in the Guardian on April 24, 2011 proclaimed "Two choices: Educate or incarcerate them". Yet another heading in the Guardian on February 18, 2011 stated "Form one student beats his teacher". While such captions may improve readership, and while such events are newsworthy, when considered in the context of the many instances in which there are no incidents of violence in schools or with youths, it becomes obvious that youth violence, while it does occur, may not be as ubiquitous as commonly assumed.

This chapter will draw upon available empirical evidence to assess the nature of youth crime and violence in Trinidad and Tobago, and among other things, will assess whether or not public perception is in line with the evidence. This chapter hopes to shift the narratives about youth violence and provides a platform upon which reasonable interventions may be developed and utilized where necessary. It will be argued, consistent with the empirical data presented, that a preventative as opposed to a reactive approach to reducing youth violence may be the most cost-effective and appropriate approach for Trinidad and Tobago. It will be further argued that even where a preventative approach fails, policy makers must use incapacitative strategies only in the most extreme of cases, and only as a last resort where youths are concerned. Indeed, much criminological and psychological evidence indicate that many youths are amenable to rehabilitation, and more so than adult offending populations (Moffitt, 1993). Inappropriate labeling of youthful offenders reduces available alternatives and encourages adaptations which may force youths into a criminogenic lifestyle.

Data from Trinidad and Tobago indicate that youth delinquency may start even while children are in primary school. Lall (2007) conducted a study in which she interviewed 589 standard three students between the ages of 9 to 11. Data were collected in March 2006. This study was motivated by the recognition that internationally and locally, it appears that children are engaging in delinquent and even illegal action at decreasing ages. Indeed, Lall (2007: p. 157) writes:

> "in Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean generally from the data gathered thus far, combined with media coverage and official police statistics, we are witnessing increasing acts of sexual deviance, substance use and abuse (that is, use of illegal drugs, smoking, drinking alcohol), students going to school armed with weapons (e.g., guns, knives, cutlasses), wounding/physical assaults/stabbing with intent — many now ending in death in and outside many of our formal school settings."

Lall (2007) assessed delinquency using a 12 item self-report scale. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they had engaged in each of the delinquent acts within the last six months. The most prevalent acts were being in a fist fight (64%) and disobeying and answering back a teacher (66%). Forty five percent of the students said that they drank alcohol, while 2% admitted to using illegal drugs, and 7% admitted to smoking cigarettes. Seventeen percent said that they stole something, 19% skipped school or class, 26% fought using a weapon while 27% said that they used force to get something.

Forty four percent indicated that they got into trouble for not doing their homework. A summary of these findings appear in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1
Delinquent acts committed by 9-11 year olds

Delinquent acts committed by 9-11 year olds (n = 589)

Lall (2007) examined gender differences in the prevalence of delinquency and found that while boys were on average more delinquent than girls, the girls were not very far behind the boys for some categories of delinquency. Seventy two percent of the boys, and 66% of the girls disobeyed their teachers, 74% of boys and 64% of girls were involved in fistfights, 54% of boys and 46% of girls threatened to hit someone, 53% of boys and 45% of girls drank alcohol, 33% of boys and 27% of girls used force to get something, 35% of boys and 26% of girls fought using a weapon, 22% of boys and 10% of girls stole something, while 3% of boys and 1% of girls used illegal drugs. These data are graphed in Figure 2.2. The findings of Lall (2007) are indeed troubling, given the young age at which the respondents engaged in a wide range of delinquent acts, many of them being quite serious. It is also important to note that the measures used captured delinquency "within the last six months." The short time period used ensures that the estimates of delinquency are not inflated merely by capturing incidents of delinquency which occurred over an extended time period.

Figure 2.2
Percent of boys and girls involved in delinquency

Percent of boys and girls involved in delinquency

There are a number of important implications of the findings of Lall (2007). Many of the acts of delinquency were directed at other children within the school setting. The consequences of bullying include subsequent involvement in crime and delinquency as students get older, even progressing into adulthood. Such behaviour also affects the ability to maintain positive relationships, both with peers and within the family. Students who are bullied are afraid to attend school and may have high rates of truancy, which subsequently affect their level of academic achievement and their development of skills. Even when such students attend school, they may have difficulty concentrating, may be fearful, and remain isolated and withdrawn. Indeed, Lall (2007) found that 20% of her sample did not feel safe for fear of being bullied or victimized at school.

Quite apart from the victims of such acts of delinquency, we must also consider the perpetrators. International research has suggested that there is a strong link between delinquency in the early years, and later acts of criminality. In addition, researchers have found a link between substance abuse, delinquency, and crime and violence (Farrington, 1987; Loeber and Dishion, 1983). Substance abuse early in life may also be related to the use of more potent illegal substances later in life, these being associated with several other forms of deviant behaviour including gang involvement, drug dealing, and a range of property as well as violent crime (Spivak and Cianci, 1987).

Deosaran and Chadee (1997) employ a somewhat older sample than Lall (2007) and offer a rare glimpse into the characteristics of youthful offenders in Trinidad and Tobago. They interviewed the entire population (n = 486) of youths incarcerated in three youth institutions in Trinidad and Tobago. These institutions they classified as housing older boys (16-18 years of age, n = 232), younger boys (less than 16 years of age, n = 134), and young girls (less than 16 years of age, n = 120). Interviews with the youths in these juvenile facilities sought to gather data in five areas. These were 1) the offences committed, 2) the social and demographic characteristics of the youths, 3) psychological characteristics of the youths, 4) feelings of remorse, self responsibility and the potential for rehabilitation, and 5) risk factors for delinquency.

When the total population of youths is considered, 37.9% were institutionalized for robbery or robbery-related crimes, 6.1% for drug-related crimes, 2.9% for assault, 1.9% for murder or attempted murder/manslaughter, 3.3% for possession of arms and ammunition, 0.4% for rape, 0.4% for kidnapping, and 0.4% for larceny. Fully 44.5% of the youths in the three institutions, however, were there because of 'offences' which are not illegal but which are considered not acceptable for youths.

For example, when the total population is considered, 27.3% of the youths were institutionalized because they were 'beyond control', 2.6% because they were victims of abuse, 0.4% because there was no one willing to take care of them, and 13.6% because they ran away from home.   With respect to education, over 50% reached up to primary school, 21% a Junior Secondary School, 11% a Senior Comprehensive school, and 4% a Government Secondary School. Approximately 3% went to a trade school, while 2% indicated that they had no formal education. Less than 2% went to, what in Trinidad and Tobago is called a "Prestige School". Most of the youths interviewed had a low socioeconomic status. Slightly over 11% of the youths lived with parents or guardians who were chronically unemployed, while almost 60% had parents or guardians who had low-paying occupations (e.g. unskilled labour, maids, vendors etc.).   Twenty percent lived with parents or guardians who had middle class occupations (e.g. civil servants, teachers etc.), while less than 2% had parents or guardians who had professional occupations (e.g. doctors, engineers etc.). Almost all of the youths at the three institutions lived with a single parent or guardian (10% with father only, 32% with mother only, 29% with one guardian only). Twenty four percent of the youths lived with both parents before coming to the institution, while 3% lived by themselves.

Understanding and dealing with juvenile delinquency

The term "delinquency" is one which is controversial and fraught with definitional inconsistencies. One of the main factors leading to this lack of precision is that a wide range of non-criminal acts, behaviours which are proscribed for youths, but not for adults, can be used to classify a juvenile as delinquent. In this context Savitz (1667: 15-16) writes:

> *"If crime and criminal seem tortuous concepts, they assume pristine clarity next to the extraordinarily elusive terms delinquency and delinquent. Delinquencies are all actions legally proscribed for a child above the age of culpability and below a certain maximum age (16, 17, or 18). If a child engages in proscribed behaviour, the state, acting in place of the parent (in loco parentis), is obliged to treat (not punish) the child. Thus all crimes for which adults are liable, plus many other acts which are prohibited only to juveniles until they reach adulthood, are subsumed under 'delinquency'. Purely juvenile delinquencies (as opposed to juvenile crime) include such offenses as truancy, incorrigibility, and running away from home, as well as some rather trivial offenses such as the use of obscene language, street-corner lounging, visiting 'gaming places' and smoking cigarettes."*

As was seen from the data by Deosaran and Chadee (1997), many youths were incarcerated in youth institutions in Trinidad and Tobago for "offences", such as running away from home or because no one was available to take care of them. The flexibility in defining juvenile delinquency opens up the possibility that many youths, who for the most part are law abiding and live within the accepted norms of society, could be drawn into the youth correctional system or other related systems which may initiate the labeling process, and thereby channel such youths into a life of delinquency and later criminality. The labeling process is one which operates at both the individual and social levels. The society at large and particularly persons in the youth's immediate social environment reevaluate the person who is labeled as delinquent, and retrospectively reinterpret the person's past actions and life within the context of the new label.

Acts which might have been previously perceived as merely a prank would now be seen as evidence that the persons has a maladjusted personality or other such factors which the public may associate with delinquency. Importantly also, persons in the social environment alter the way they interact with and behave toward the labeled youth. Acting on stereotypes of what delinquent youths are like, persons in the social environment may withdraw social support, informational support, their level of communication, and other such factors which collectively serve to reduce the legitimate opportunities for social advancement. Faced with such reduced opportunities, labeled youths may be forced to make use of illegal opportunities for social advancement.

Perhaps even more insidious is the fact that many youths may internalize the delinquent label, and where they previously did not see themselves as delinquent, may come to reevaluate their self-status and see themselves as delinquent. Charles Horton Cooley pointed out, in developing the concept of the 'looking glass self', that the actions and beliefs of others have a powerful impact on how we evaluate ourselves. The labeled youth is bombarded by messages and signals from his environment which indicate that he or she is a delinquent. Over time, he or she internalizes the label of delinquent. At this point, it may become extremely difficult to extricate the youth from a life of delinquency since 'delinquent' is now a part of the youth's self-concept. In conjunction with an altering of the youth's self-concept, youth facilities may serve the unintended function of socializing youths into a life of delinquency. In such institutions, many youths who otherwise would not have led a life of delinquency are exposed to a range of values and attitudes which encourage, or at the very least, facilitate criminal offending.

Youths who are more experienced in committing illegal acts may train inexperienced youths in the techniques and skills required for a 'successful' life of crime. Such social systems also serve to reinforce and reward counter-normative values and behaviours. The labeling perspective in criminology warns us, especially with youths but also with adults, that we must be careful to distinguish between offenders who are merely petty criminals or non-criminals and those who are "hardened criminals" who are highly likely to recidivate. The former class of persons should be given non-custodial dispositions or other dispositions which channel them out of the criminal justice system and which circumvent the labeling process, since inadvertly, if labeled, these otherwise non-criminal persons may be forced into a life of criminality.

Recent theorizing on the genesis of youth delinquency is supportive of the idea that there are different types of delinquency and that all delinquents should not be channeled into youth facilities or other custodial dispositions which initiate the labeling process. Terry Moffitt (1993) distinguishes between life course persistent delinquency (LCP) and adolescent limited delinquency (AL). Life course persistent offenders refer to a small minority of persons who have inherited or acquired neuropsychological deficits which lead to antisocial behaviour and other personality traits which predispose them to engaging in counter-normative actions. It is important to clarify here that Moffitt, in referring to neuropsychological deficits, does not restrict her definition to major mental or other diagnosable disorders, but uses the term in a broader sense to include personality and other trait dispositions which may lead to antisocial and other counter-normative actions. Such traits could be acquired through difficult environments, including, but not limited to exposure to teratogens and parenting styles which expose children to excessive punishment, abuse, neglect, and other such factors.

The LCP offender engages in antisocial and counter-normative actions throughout the life course, with desistence from such behaviour occurring very late in life, by some estimates, when such persons are well into their 50s (Loeber and Farrington, 1997; Moffitt, 2006). The antisocial behaviours of such persons will change over the life-course, and depend very much on the types of opportunities available, and extent of social control applied. As children and youths, such persons may have limited opportunities to engage in serious acts of criminality, but as the LCP offender gets older, such opportunities increase, and so too do the range and severity of acts in which they engage. The LCP offender represents a small proportion of persons who engage in delinquent and illegal actions, though they engage in such actions with a high frequency. Interventions, except if they are applied early in the life-course, tend to be ineffective.

The AL offender, in contrast, represents 'normal' youths who grow up in households which do not predispose them to neuropsychological deficits. Moffitt (1993) argues that when such youths reach adolescence, they experience what she calls a "maturity gap". That is, they feel that they are physically mature and should be accorded an equivalent social status, but feel that adults restrict them from achieving such status.

At the same time the AL youth observes the LCP youth, who by the evaluation of their peers, have achieved a social status similar to that of adults. LCP youths may have more financial resources (gained from delinquent or illegal actions), and may appear to have more autonomy, and are accorded a relatively higher status than the average AL youth. AL youths therefore attempt to imitate the LCP youth during adolescence and likewise may engage in a range of delinquent or even illegal actions. By the time the AL youth enters young adulthood, however, they become socially mature and no longer feel the need to engage in delinquent actions as a means of social advancement. Accordingly, the AL youth will desist from delinquent actions without any interventions being necessary.

Moffitt's (1993) theory is consistent with much criminological data which show an increase in offending/delinquency during the adolescent years, and which show a decline in criminal behaviour once people get older. This theory is also consistent with the findings of other researchers (e.g. Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin, 1972; Shannon, 1991) who have found that a very large proportion of all offences are committed by a small number of high rate offenders. The data gathered by Deosaran and Chadee (1997), as well as other data cited, appear to be consistent with Moffitt's theory. In the case of Deosaran and Chadee, for example, it was found that only 5.4% of the youths were repeat offenders. This percentage of persistent offenders is consistent with estimates discovered by other researchers such as Moffitt (1993), Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin (1972), and Shannon (1991). These recidivists may be the life course persistent offenders which Moffitt describes. Such offenders may not be amenable to rehabilitation, and should be separated from other less serious offenders to circumvent the possibility that social learning or socialization processes might foster increased rates of offending in the less serious youth offenders.

There are a number of important implications of Moffitt's theory which may be applicable to dealing with youth delinquency in Trinidad and Tobago. Moffitt's theory indicates that AL youths will desist from delinquency on their own, and warns that interventions by the criminal justice system which initiate the labeling process may ensnare such youth into a life of delinquency and later criminality. This since such ensnarement affects youths' legitimate opportunities thus making the return to a normative law-abiding life difficult. Instead of the natural process of desistence occurring, such youths are forced to continue with a delinquent lifestyle since the opportunities for a 'normal' lifestyle become blocked. Moffitt's theory thus implies that in dealing with youth delinquency a distinction must be made between the LCP and AL offender and each should be treated differently. The practical difficulty, however, lies in distinguishing the LCP from the AL offender.

There is always the danger that social class and poverty (which in some countries like the USA correlate with race) may overlap with family structures which predispose the development of neurological deficits. If this is the case, then class (and race) biases may be implicated in distinguishing between LCP and AL offenders. If it is possible within the Trinidadian context to develop an unbiased assessment instrument, then it may become feasible and ethically defensible to divert AL youths away from custodial dispositions and into alternate dispositions which avoid the consequences of labeling. In contrast, given that LCP offenders are highly recidivistic, custodial sentences may be more appropriate, and institutional confinement along with appropriate rehabilitation programming may be justified. In this context it is important to note, however, that for the LCP offender, interventions which occur earlier in life have a greater chance of success and especially so when they compensate for the conditions which lead to acquired neuropsychological deficits. As such, interventions which occur in early childhood have a much better chance of reversing the life course of a potential LCP offender, as opposed to interventions which occur during adolescence or later.

An examination of the 'offences' committed by youths in the Deosaran and Chadee (1997) study is supportive of the above mentioned strategy for dealing with juvenile delinquency in Trinidad and Tobago. These 'offences' could be classified into two major groupings; things which are illegal, and things which may be counter-normative, but which cannot necessarily be used to indicate that the youths concerned would 'graduate' into more serious types of offending. This latter category includes acts such as running away from home, attempted suicide, being beyond control, promiscuity, having no adult who is willing to take care of them, being a victim of abuse, and vandalism. These categories of 'offences' accounted for fully 44.5% of the youths in the three institutions studied by Deosaran and Chadee (1997).

The most prevalent of these offences was being beyond control (27.3% of all youths) with this factor being more important for young boys (32%) and young girls (60.7%) than for older boys (6.9%). Almost fourteen percent (13.6%) of all youths were incarcerated because they ran away from home, with this being more important for young boys (24.1%) and young girls (20.5%) than for older boys (3.7%). Almost three percent (2.6%) of all incarcerated youths were in the institutions because they were victims of abuse. This was more important for younger girls (8.9%) than for younger boys (1.6%) or older boys (0%). Arguably many of these 'offences' are not offences at all, and require care and counseling instead of incarceration. These include cases where youths ran away from home, are victims of abuse, and have no one who is willing to take care of them.

The data uncovered by Deosaran and Chadee (1997) are consistent with the findings of Thompson-Ahye (1999) who analyzed all offences for which juveniles were charged before the courts of Trinidad and Tobago for the period January 01 to December 31, 1994. While youth were charged with forty-two different types of offences, Thompson-Ahye found that "The offence for which delinquents were most frequently brought before the court was being beyond control; that outstripped by far, the next prevalent offence, having no parent or guardian" (1999 : p. 189). A very strong argument can be made that youths who commit non-illegal acts should not be incarcerated, and that such incarceration may lead to a range of negative consequences including increasing the propensity for subsequent delinquency and criminality. These findings are consistent with the larger trends of juvenile 'offences' in Trinidad and Tobago. Ministry of National Security data examined by Deosaran and Chadee (1997) indicate that for the period 1986 to 1995, a total of 2,989 juvenile (persons 16 years old or younger) offences were committed. Within this ten-year period, 'destitution', that is, having no parent or other fit person to provide for the youth, accounted for 30% of the juvenile 'offences', while being 'beyond control' accounted for another 22.7%.

While a large number of youths in the Deosaran and Chadee (1997) study appeared undeserving of incarceration, a wide range of illegal acts were committed by other youths, indicating the possibility that for such youths, institutionalization *may* have been more deserving. Fully 37.9% of all youths were incarcerated for robbery, with this being more important for older boys (60.7%) and younger boys (31.3%) than for young girls (1.8%). Other important reasons for the incarceration of older boys included drug offences (10.2%), possession of arms/ammunition (6.9%) and assault (3.7%). For younger boys, other important reasons for incarceration include drug offences (3.9%), assault (2.3%) and larceny and murder/attempted murder (both 1.6%). For young girls, the only other important reason for incarceration was assault (1.8%). Overall, 58.5% of younger boys were incarcerated for committing acts which were not illegal (beyond control, attempted suicide, running away from home, promiscuity, being a victim of abuse, vandalism, and having no one willing to take care of them).

The other 41.2% were incarcerated for illegal acts (including drug offences, robbery, assault, possession of arms/ammunition, rape and larceny). Overall, 11.1% of older boys committed non-illegal acts, while the remaining 88.9% were institutionalized for committing illegal acts. Overall 92.8% of young girls were incarcerated for non-illegal acts, while only 7.2% had committed illegal acts. The percentage of youths who were incarcerated for committing non-illegal and illegal acts is displayed in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3
Percent of youths who committed non-illegal and illegal acts

Percent of youths who committed non-illegal and illegal acts

While many of the youths interviewed had committed illegal acts, they exhibited characteristics which indicate a strong potential for rehabilitation and leading a prosocial life. More specifically, a large proportion of the youths had accepted and acknowledged that they did something wrong, they expressed remorsefulness, they wanted to improve their lives and had worthwhile goals, and family was very important to the majority of youths. Deosaran and Chadee (1997) found that there was a 94% concordance rate between the self-reported reason for incarceration, and the reason for incarceration as indicated on the official records of the institution. This indicates willingness by the youths to accept that they had done something wrong. Important goals for the youths included getting a job (55%), furthering their education (31%), and being with family (32%).

When asked what was needed to improve their lives, fully 25% of the youths indicated that they needed more discipline. Prosocial values were also important to many youths. For example, when asked about what they admired most in their friends, responses included their positive attitude and behaviour (28%), loyalty (12%), kindness and helpfulness (22%), and intelligence and leadership ability (9%). Quite significantly, 68.7% of the youths blamed themselves for being in the institution, while 60% of the youths acknowledged that they did something wrong which resulted in their institutionalization. Even when we consider the most criminogenic group (older boys), fully 77.2% of them blamed themselves for their institutionalization. When asked what they planned to do upon leaving the institution, 45% indicated that they wanted to get a job, 24% wanted to further their education, and 13% wanted to be with family and friends.

While it is possible that incarcerated youths may want to respond in a way which may portray a positive self-image, and while it may be difficult to deny that they did something wrong by the mere fact of their incarceration, Deosaran and Chadee (1997) report that in their opinion, the responses, including the aspirations and expressions of remorsefulness, were genuine. This intuition, while difficult to quantify and systematically examine, is a judgment which experienced researchers can make, and usually is based on guarantees of confidentiality, anonymity, and rapport developed between the interviewer and interviewee. This is important, since if genuine, such expressions remorsefulness provide the basis upon which successful rehabilitation programs can be developed.

It was indicated earlier that labeling and other process which occur during incarceration may force youths along a path where they have little alternative but to resort to illegal activity. While it is certainly the case that we would want to divert youths who did not commit illegal acts away from an institutional setting for this reason, the data from Deosaran and Chadee suggest that even for many youths who did commit illegal acts, we would want to think very carefully abut the disposition assigned to them. Their expressions of remorsefulness and acknowledgment of guilt indicate that many such youths may not go on to reoffend if proper interventions are applied. The influential and strongly supported ideas of Moffitt (1993) are supportive of the idea that many youths who offend may not necessarily go on to develop criminal careers and will eventually desist from crime and delinquency. To reiterate, according to Moffitt, ensnaring such youths in the criminal justice system interferes with the process of desistance, and forces such youths into a life of crime and delinquency. This is not to say that there are not some youths who are dangerous. Indeed, even in the data gathered by Deosaran and Chadee (1997) a small proportion of youths expressed no remorsefulness and indicated that they would return to a life of crime once released. According to Moffitt (1993), very different approaches, including incarceration, are warranted for such youth.

The legislative framework governing the treatment of youthful offenders in Trinidad and Tobago allows room for the approach suggested above since the courts are afforded wide flexibility in the dispositions which they may apply in cases where juvenile offences occur. With respect to youths between the ages of 10 to 16, The Children Act (46:01) states:

> "Where a youthful offender is charged before the High Court or before a Magistrate with an offence punishable in the case of an adult by imprisonment, and in the opinion of the Court… such youthful offender is ten years of age or upwards but less than sixteen years of age, the Court, if satisfied on enquiry that it is expedient so to deal with the youthful offender, may order him to be sent to a certified Industrial School" (Section 43).

Section (83) further states:

> "Where a child or young person charged with any offence is tried by any court, and the court is satisfied of his guilt, the court shall take into consideration the manner in which, under the provisions of this or any other Act enabling the court to deal with the case, the case should be dealt with, namely, whether –

a) by dismissing the charge;
b) by discharging the offender on his entering into a recognisance;
c) by so discharging the offender and placing him under the supervision of a welfare officer (probation);
d) by committing the offender to the care of a relative or other fit person;
e) by sending the offender to an Industrial School;
f) by sending the offender to an orphanage;
g) by ordering the offender to be whipped;
h) by ordering the offender to pay a fine, damages, or costs;
i) by ordering the parent or guardian of the offender to pay a fine, damages, or costs;
j) by ordering the parent or guardian of the offender to give security for his good behaviour;
k) by committing the offender to custody in a place of detention provided under this Part;
l) where the offender is a young person, by sentencing him to imprisonment; or
m) by dealing with the case in any other manner in which it may legally be dealt with.

For the older youths 16 to 18 years of age, the following laws (Chapter 13:03, Section 7) apply:

1. Where a person is convicted before the High Court on indictment of any offence other than murder, or before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction of any offence for which he is liable to be sentenced to imprisonment, and it appears to such Court -

    a) that the person is not less than sixteen nor more than eighteen years of age, and
    b) that by reason of his antecedents or mode of life it is expedient that he should be subject to detention for such term and under such instruction and discipline as appears most conducive to his reformation and the repression of crime,

    the Court may, in lieu of sentencing him to the punishment provided by law for the offence for which he was convicted, pass a sentence of detention under penal discipline in the Institution for a term of not less than three years nor more than four years.

2. Before passing such sentence the Court shall be satisfied that the character, state of health, and mental condition of the offender, and the other circumstances of the case, are such that the offender is likely to profit by such instruction and discipline as aforesaid.

3. No such sentence passed by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction shall be carried into effect until it has been approved by the Minister, for the period fixed by such Court or for some shorter period, and if such sentence is not so approved, the Court may sentence the offender to any punishment provided by law for the offence of which he was convicted.

4. Where a Court has convicted a person for any offence to which subsection (1) applies, the Court may before passing a sentence of detention as therein provided, in addition to any other powers conferred upon it by any other law, commit the person convicted to prison or to such other safe custody as it thinks fit for such period not exceeding one month as it may deem necessary for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is expedient to pass such a sentence of detention.

5. Where a Court has committed a person in the manner herein provided, the Court may cause the person so committed to be brought before it at any time prior to the expiration of the period for which he was committed and thereupon to pass sentence according to law.

In the case of offenders between the ages of 10 to 16, and as implied in Chapter 13:03, Section 7, point 2 for offenders between the ages of 16 to 18, the Courts of Trinidad and Tobago have the option to enforce non-custodial sentences. The findings from empirical research on youth offending and rehabilitation represent an important consideration when the courts are required to sentence youthful offenders. The Work of Moffitt (1993) as well as the data from the other researchers cited in this chapter indicate that the use of incarceration must be carefully considered, and must be used only as a last resort. This point becomes especially forceful given the large amount of international support for Moffitt's theory (for reviews see Moffitt, 2003; 2006). Youthful offenders, and especially those who have committed status offences rather than illegal acts, should be diverted away from the criminal justice system and into modes of rehabilitation which avoid the labeling process and which circumvent the possibility that such youths will be put into situations where they may be socialized into a life of crime and delinquency. More than any other population, youths are critical to the development process of any nation. As such, youths should be considered to be one of the most critical resources for a country's future. At the same time, improper policies which relate to youths can work against security and development by forcing youths along a path which engenders criminogenic behaviour. No nation can afford to ignore the importance of youths for its future, and as such, where inadequacies with youth policies exist, these should be address as a matter of high priority.

Chapter 3
Gangs in Trinidad and Tobago

The Small Arms Survey (2010) indicates that Trinidad and Tobago now rivals Jamaica as one of the most violent countries in the Caribbean, with the number of annual murders rising by over 500% within the past ten years. Indeed official crime data from the Ministry of National Security of Trinidad and Tobago indicate that there are long-term increases over time for all major crimes except burglary, and in the case of sexual offences and kidnappings, there have been noted decreases within the last five to six years (see Figure 1.1). Very little is known about gangs in Trinidad and Tobago, and thus far, researchers have failed to systematically examine the extent to which gangs contribute to the crime problem in Trinidad and Tobago. This study attempts to examine the nature and extent of the gang problem in Trinidad and Tobago, and to offer an assessment of the impact of criminal gangs on violent crime. Recommendations to deal with the gang problem in Trinidad and Tobago are also developed.

This study draws from a range of data sources including official crime and gang data[21], data from the Besson Street Gang Intelligence Criminal History Project[22], data from Katz and Choate (2010), and data gathered from a nationally representative survey of 1595 adults in Trinidad and Tobago[23]. Data from Katz and Choate derive from a range of sources including a survey of gang experts (n =52) in all police districts in Trinidad and Tobago. This expert survey was patterned after the Eurogang Research Program Expert Survey. Data employed by Katz and Choate also derive from the Trinidad Arrestee Project Survey (n = 421 recently booked adult arrestees), the Trinidad Detention Survey (n = 60 adult detainees) and the Trinidad and Tobago Youth Survey (n = 4000 secondary school students).

While there are controversies about the definitions of gangs, a distinction must be made between social groupings which may refer to themselves as gangs, but which do not engage in illegal activity, and social groupings which engage in such activity. This study is concerned solely with the latter, and adopts the definition of gangs used by the UNDP (2012). The UNDP defines a gang as "any durable, street oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity" (p. 67). Here durability refers to the persistence of the group beyond just a few months, while street oriented means that the group spends a substantial amount of time on the streets and in public places. Youth in this definition includes young adults and encompasses persons between the ages of 13 to 25.

Data from CAPA and Katz and Choate (2010) concur that there are approximately 95 gangs in Trinidad and Tobago and approximately 1269 gang members, with the majority of gangs concentrated in Port of Spain, and the Western and Northern Police Divisions. Katz and Choate further indicate that approximately 83% of gang members are of African descent, 13% of East Indian descent and 4% of other ethnic backgrounds. All of the gangs in Trinidad and Tobago are male dominated, while about 87% are comprised of adults. Two thirds of gangs have between 6 to 50 members while 95% of gangs are comprised of citizens of Trinidad and Tobago. The majority of gangs in Trinidad and Tobago (86%) have a group name, while 61% refer to themselves as a gang, 26% as a crew, and 4.2% as a clip or unit. A large proportion (88%) claim turf while 75% defend their turf.

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[21] Throughout this study, 'official crime data' refer to data supplied by the Crime and Problem Analysis branch (CAPA) of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS). These represent the official crime statistics of the Ministry of National Security of Trinidad and Tobago.

[22] This project collected data from 368 gang members and 878 non-gang members in 2005. Data were collected by the Besson Street Police Station, situated in Port of Spain, Trinidad.

[23] This data were gathered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the 2012 Caribbean Human Development Report. The current author was National Consultant for Trinidad and Tobago for this UNDP publication. The present study is the first to examine those data which pertain specifically to gangs in Trinidad and Tobago in this dataset.

The vast majority (85%) do not have special symbols or identifying clothing, and almost without exception illegal activity is accepted by all gang members. Twenty six percent of gangs in Trinidad and Tobago locate their date of origin prior to 2000, while the remainder originated after 2000. Gangs in Trinidad and Tobago are typically smaller than gangs in Latin America and the US, and typically do not have linkages to gangs in other parts of the region or to gangs in other countries. This contrasts to some of the larger gangs in Latin America which have connections to other gangs within their region and in the US (Wells, Katz and Kim, 2010; Katz and Choate, 2010).

The Besson Street Gang Intelligence Criminal History Project offers rare insight into the nature and composition of gangs in Trinidad and Tobago. In this project 368 gang members were interviewed with data collected in 2005. The age distribution of the sample gives an indication of the typical age ranges of gang members.[24] The majority of gang members were young adults between the ages of 18 to 45. More specifically, 26.1% were between the ages of 18-21, 25.4% between the ages of 22-25 and 33.7% between the ages of 26 to 35. Only a small proportion of the sample (5.3%) were seventeen or younger at the time of interview, whereas 8% of the sample were between the ages of 36-45 and 1.5% of the sample were between the ages of 46-55. Of the sample gathered at the Besson Street project, 87.5% were of African descent, 0.8% of East Indian descent and 1.9% of mixed descent while the ethnicities of 9.5% of the sample were unknown. Gang members were almost exclusively male (95.3% of the sample).

Data which are available help to establish that gangs and gang members are engaged in illegal activity. Of the gang members surveyed at the Besson Street Police Station, 51.4% were previously arrested with each member having an average of 2.09 arrests. This compares to a comparison non-gang sample (n=878) where 20.2% had previous arrests, with the mean number of arrests being 0.68. Not surprisingly, arrest data indicate that gang members commit a larger number of crimes than persons who are not in gangs (see Figure 3.1). Arrest data in Figure 3.1 indicate that gang members commit violent offences at approximately three times the rate of persons who are not in gangs (31.5% vs. 10.4%). Almost 26% of gang members were arrested for firearm related offences compared to 8.7% of non-gang persons. Similarly, 15.2% of gang members were arrested for drug trafficking compared to 3.2% of non-gang members. Similar over-representation in criminal offences for gang members obtains for property offences, sexual offences, and drug use/possession.

Figure 3.1: Percent of gang members and non-gang members previously arrested

	Gang members (n=368)	Non gang members (n=878)
Ever arrested	51.4	20.2
Arrest by crime type		
Violent offences	31.5	10.4
Firearm related	25.8	8.7
Drug trafficking	15.2	3.2
Drug use/possession	23.4	8.0
Property offences	13.9	7.6
Sexual offences	2.7	1.8
Other	12.5	5.7

Data on the mean number of arrests also support the idea that gang membership is associated with a disproportionately high crime rate (see Figure 3.2). The average number of arrests for gang members in 2.09, whereas the average number of arrests for non-gang persons is .68. The mean number of arrests for gang members for violent crimes was 0.81 compared to 0.33 for non-gang members.

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[24] These data derive from n = 264 respondents for whom ages are known.

When only firearm related offences are considered, gang members have almost twice the average number of arrests (0.45) compared to non-gang members (0.22). The disparity becomes much larger when we consider drug trafficking. Gang members have an arrest rate which is almost five times that of non-gang members (0.24 vs. 0.05). In a similar manner, the arrest rates for gang members exceeded that of non-gang members for drug use/possession and property offences. Only in the case of sexual offences were the arrest rates similar for gang and non-gang members. The above findings are consistent with previous research which points to an association between gangs, guns, illegal drugs, and other illegal activities (Montoute, 2010; UNODC and the World Bank, 2007; Katz and Fox, 2010; Wells, Katz and Kim, 2010; Katz and Choate, 2010).

Figure 3.2: Mean number of arrests for gang members and non-gang members

	Gang members (n=368)	Non gang members (n=878)
Number of arrests	2.09	.68
Number of arrests by crime type		
Violent offences	.81	.33
Firearm related	.45	.22
Drug trafficking	.24	.05
Drug use/possession	.32	.12
Property offences	.36	.17
Sexual offences	.03	.03
Other	.20	.16

Data on the spatial distribution of gangs and on the spatial distribution of crime suggest that gang members may be responsible for a significant proportion of violent crimes which occur in Trinidad and Tobago. Gangs are concentrated in certain areas of Trinidad and Tobago and similarly, violent crimes tend to be concentrated in the same areas where gangs are located. Data from the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service indicate that the Police Divisions[25] with the largest number of gangs are the Port of Spain Division, Western Division and the Northern Division. Other areas with a notable gang presence include the Eastern Division and the North Eastern Division. The number of gangs in each Police Division is shown in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3[26]
Number of gangs by police division

Number of gangs by Police Division

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
[25] Trinidad and Tobago is divided into 9 Police Divisions. There are approximately 78 police stations within these Divisions.
[26] These figures are based on 2009 data in which gang locations are known for 60 gangs.

According to Katz and Choate (2010), the five police station districts[27] with the most gangs are, in order of priority, Besson Street, San Juan, Sangre Grande, St. Joseph and Belmont. The five police station districts with the highest number of gang members in order of priority are, Besson Street, Belmont, San Juan, Caranage and Sangre Grande. These data are shown in Figure 3.4 and graphically represented in Figures 3.5 and 3.6[28].

Figure 3.4
Police station districts with the highest number of gangs and gang members

Police station districts with the highest number of gangs		
	Number of gangs	Number of gang members
Besson Street	19	385
San Juan	8	130
Sangre Grande	8	90
St. Joseph	7	55
Belmont	6	165
Police station districts with the highest number of gang members		
Besson Street	19	385
Belmont	6	165
San Juan	8	130
Caranage	4	100
Sangre Grande	8	90

Figure 3.5
Number of gangs according to location

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
[27] Police station districts refer to the area of jurisdiction of each Police Station.
[28] Figures 6 and 7 are taken from Katz (2009) and are used with permission from the author

Figure 3.6
Number of gang members according to location

The spatial distribution of gangs can be compared to the spatial distribution of crime to assess the extent to which areas with a higher concentration of gangs have higher levels of crime. It should be noted here, however, that data for the spatial distribution of gangs are only available for 2009. Ideally, such data should be compared to crime data for 2009 or subsequently. It is however the case that the spatial distribution of crime in Trinidad and Tobago is highly stable.[29] This justifies the inclusion of crime data prior to 2009 in such analyses. It is also the case that gangs in Trinidad and Tobago have well defined territory and as such, the locations of various gangs tend to remain stable over time (Katz and Choate, 2010).

Analyses of the data indicated above show that the spatial distribution of crime in Trinidad and Tobago bears a striking similarity to the spatial distribution of gangs. When gang related murders for the period 2001 to 2010 are examined, the largest proportion occurs in the Port of Spain division (42.6%) followed by the North Eastern (18.8%), Western (17.8%) and Northern (15.9%) divisions.[30] These areas also have a disproportionately high number of gangs. More specifically, 26.7% of all gangs in Trinidad and Tobago are located in the Port of Spain division, while 8.3% are in the North Eastern division, and 20% each are in the Northern and Western divisions. In a similar manner, locations with few gangs have comparatively lower numbers of gang related murders. Raw data on gang related murders for the period 2001 to 2010 appear in Figure 3.7 while a graphical comparison of gang related murders and gang presence according to police division appears in Figure 3.8.

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[29] Based on an analysis of crime data for the period 2001 to 2010.
[30] According to official data, gang related murders account for 33% of all murders in Trinidad and Tobago for the period 2001 to 2010.

Figure 3.7
Gang related murders by location[31]

Police Division	Number of gang-related murders												Percent of gangs by location
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total	Percent	
Port of Spain	3	10	28	14	33	37	61	116	87	40	429	**42.6**	**26.7**
Southern	0	1	2	1	0	0	4	3	1	4	16	**1.6**	**5.0**
Western	0	0	3	5	27	18	22	47	42	15	179	**17.8**	**20.0**
Northern	0	1	5	1	9	17	55	44	23	5	160	**15.9**	**20.0**
Central	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	10	0	0	14	**1.4**	**3.3**
South Western	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	**0.3**	**1.7**
Eastern	0	0	0	0	1	0	6	6	1	3	17	**1.7**	**10.0**
North Eastern	0	4	4	11	10	25	53	52	22	8	189	**18.8**	**8.3**
Tobago	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0.0**	**5.0**

Figure 3.8
Gang related murders (2001-2010) and gang locations (2009)

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
[31] Source: Ministry of National Security.

When gang related murders are restricted to the period 2009 to 2010, the spatial distribution of such murders also closely resembles the spatial distribution of gangs (see Figure 3.9). For this period, 50.6% of all gang related murders took place in the Port of Spain Division, also the Division with the largest proportion of gangs. The Western and Northern Police Divisions also had a disproportionately large number of gang related murders and a correspondingly large number of gangs. As Figure 3.9 also illustrates, Police Divisions with fewer gangs also correspondingly have fewer gang related murders.

Figure 3.9
Gang related murders (2009-2010) and gang locations (2009)

While it should be expected that there may be a close association between gang presence and gang related murders, similar spatial patterns are observed for a range of other crimes, even where no distinction is made between crimes committed by gang members and crimes committed by other persons.[32] The spatial distribution of crimes in general, compared to the spatial distribution of gangs supports the possibility that perpetrators may in fact be gang members, even though official records are unable to verify whether or not such crimes were committed by gang members. Figure 3.10 indicates the distribution of gangs in Trinidad and Tobago as of 2009, and also indicates the percentage distribution of various crimes according to police division for the period 2001 to 2010. The spatial distribution of gangs most closely resembles, in priority order, the spatial distribution of murder, woundings and shootings, robbery, burglary and narcotic offences (this is graphically represented in Figure 3.11).[33] The distribution of gangs is less closely related to sexual offences and kidnapping.

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[32] Data which indicate whether or not other major crimes are gang related are not available from the Ministry of National Security.

[33] The relationship between the distribution of gangs and the distribution of crimes was determined by examining correlations between the rank ordering of all variables concerned.

Figure 3.10
Spatial distribution of gangs (2009) and the spatial distribution of crime (2001-2010)[34]

Police Division	Percent of gangs by location	Murder[35]	Woundings/ shootings	Sexual offences	Kidnapping	Robbery	Narcotic offences	Burglary
Port of Spain	**26.7**	26.2	24.8	8.2	10.6	18.5	12.5	14.0
Southern	**5.0**	7.8	11.2	15.4	18.7	15.7	14.2	15.4
Western	**20.0**	13.0	11.0	7.3	10.0	8.8	6.9	9.9
Northern	**20.0**	20.0	17.4	18.4	23.7	24.5	22.3	18.7
Central	**3.3**	8.2	11.1	13.4	11.9	12.9	9.6	11.3
South Western	**1.7**	4.3	5.2	10.2	9.0	4.5	8.0	7.7
Eastern	**10.0**	4.5	5.0	13.7	5.0	3.6	12.1	5.9
North Eastern	**8.3**	14.0	11.6	9.0	7.9	9.3	7.4	8.7
Tobago	**5.0**	2.0	2.7	4.4	3.2	2.2	7.0	8.4

Figure 3.11
Spatial distribution of gangs (2009) and the spatial distribution of crime (2001-2010)

Spatial distribution of gangs (2009) and the spatial distribution of crime (2001-2010)

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
[34] Crime figures indicate the percentage of crime which occurred in each Police Division. Data upon which these calculations are based are available from the author upon request. Data source: Ministry of National Security.
[35] This refers to all murders and includes gang and non-gang related murders.

When crime data are restricted to the period 2009 to 2010, a similar pattern is observed. The spatial distribution of gangs most closely resembles, in priority order, the spatial distribution of murder, woundings and shootings, robbery, narcotic offences and burglary (see Figures 3.12 and 3.13). The spatial distribution of gangs is unrelated to the distribution of sexual offences and kidnapping.

Figure 3.12
Spatial distribution of gangs (2009) and the spatial distribution of crime (2009-2010)[36]

Police Division	Percent of gangs by location	Murder	Woundings/ shootings	Sexual offences	Kidnapping	Robbery	Narcotic offences	Burglary
Port of Spain	**26.7**	22.5	24.1	6.8	14.2	17.3	13.4	12.2
Southern	**5.0**	9.7	10.3	14.1	16.4	14.5	14.2	14.2
Western	**20.0**	14.2	12.5	7.1	6.6	9.2	4.3	9.0
Northern	**20.0**	21.9	16.8	15.2	15.7	25.0	23.2	19.5
Central	**3.3**	9.1	11.0	10.6	15.0	14.5	7.0	14.8
South Western	**1.7**	4.3	6.3	10.2	13.9	4.6	6.1	7.2
Eastern	**10.0**	5.3	5.3	16.4	8.0	4.9	18.5	6.7
North Eastern	**8.3**	10.5	11.3	13.2	4.4	8.1	5.2	8.7
Tobago	**5.0**	2.5	2.4	6.4	5.8	1.9	8.1	7.7

Figure 3.13
Spatial distribution of gangs (2009) and the spatial distribution of crime (2009-2010)

The above data indicate that locations with a higher concentration of gangs tend to have higher crime rates, and particularly for murder, shootings, robbery, burglary and narcotic offences. In the case of sexual offences, while these may be committed by gang members, the distribution of such offences is not concentrated only in areas with a high gang presence. Similarly, kidnapping is distributed throughout the country. It may be the case, however, that some kidnappings are committed by gang members, but that such persons move to locations outside of their areas of residence to commit such crimes.

While the above data are suggestive of the possibility that gangs are responsible for a disproportionate number of crimes, and that gangs tend to commit crimes within their areas of residence, caution is warranted in making these conclusions. While crime data for the last ten years were employed (2001 to 2010), data on the distribution of gangs were available only for 2009. Such analysis is open to the criticism that the crime data temporally precede the gang data. Ideally, the distribution of gangs and the distribution of crime should be mapped from a year to year basis, both with and without a lag on crime data. When crime data were restricted to 2009 and 2010, the findings were essentially the same as the findings using 2001 to 2010 data. It was noted earlier that the spatial distribution of crime has exhibited stability over the last ten years, and thus, to the extent that the spatial distribution of gangs also exhibits stability, it may be reasonable to utilize data for the period 2001 to 2010 in examining the relationship between gang location and crime. Given that gangs in Trinidad and Tobago tend to be localized in terms of territory or turf (Katz and Choate, 2010), the assumption of stability in the locations of gangs is a reasonable one.

Another issue that must be considered is that of causal order. While the reasoning above implies that gangs influence crime rates in various places, it may be the case that gangs gravitate to places with high crime rates for various reasons, or it may be that other factors such as the number of illegal opportunities (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960) influence both the crime rates and the density of gangs in various places. These latter explanations imply that gang presence is more of an epiphenomenon rather than a central causal variable. Another problematic issue in the present context is that the proportion of crimes which can be attributed to gangs is unknown. Even in the case of murder where gang related murders are indicated, the level of accuracy in official crime data can be questioned. King (2012) indicated that data in three areas are typically utilized to classify murders as gang related.

These are motive, suspect identification, and victim-offender relationship. King interviewed homicide detectives in Trinidad and Tobago and questioned them about 57 homicides in the Port of Spain Police Division which occurred between 2006 to 2008. It was found that motive was known for 80.7%, a suspect was identified in 64.9%, and the victim-offender relationship was known for 38.2%. In another study, Maguire et al. (2010), in interviewing detectives from the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, found that motives were known for 48.1% of homicides in 2005, a suspect was charged for 44% of homicides for the period 1999 to 2005, and the victim-offender relationship was known for 11.1% of all homicides for the period 2001 to 2005. King (2011) points to other problems in Trinidad and Tobago, and found that there were weaknesses in securing crime scenes, gathering evidence, submitting evidence, interrogating suspects, protecting witnesses, and analyzing evidence. These limitations, coupled with those mentioned above, imply that caution is warranted in utilizing official crime data to establish a link between gangs and violence in Trinidad and Tobago.

Further evidence that gangs in Trinidad and Tobago are responsible for committing illegal activities derives from a survey of experts on gangs in Trinidad and Tobago, conducted by Katz and Choate (2010). Experts in this context refer to senior persons in the Ministry of National Security and in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, and particularly those Officers who are within the Repeat Offenders Programme, the Homicide Bureau of Investigations, the Organized Crime Narcotics and Firearms Branch, the Criminal Investigations Division, and the Citizen Security Programme.

These experts indicate that two-thirds of the gangs in Trinidad and Tobago are involved in fights with rival gangs, while gang members frequently use alcohol and illegal drugs, and engage in the sale of such drugs. Experts also emphasized that gangs were heavily involved in organized fraud, robbery and other forms of armed violence.

The most recent data on gangs in Trinidad and Tobago come from a United Nations Development Programme survey of 1595 adults in Trinidad and Tobago. Respondents were eighteen years and older, and data were collected in November 2010. It was found that 14.5% of respondents indicated that gang violence occurred in their neighbourhoods in 2009, while 13.9% indicated that there was a criminal gang in their neighborhood. Fully 18.4% of respondents indicated that gang violence was a somewhat serious, serious, or very serious problem in their neighbourhood. When the sample is restricted to persons who indicate that there is a criminal gang in their neighbourhood, fully 71.7% indicated that gang violence was a somewhat serious, serious, or very serious problem in their neighbourhood. When the entire sample is considered, 12% of the respondents indicated that gangs made their neighbourhoods lass safe, while only 0.6% indicated that gangs made their neighbourhoods safer.

When the sample was restricted to only neighbourhoods with criminal gangs, 82.4% indicated that gangs made their neighbourhoods lass safe, while 3.2% indicated that gangs made their neighbourhood safer. Overall, 15.2% of the sample indicated that their neighbourhoods experienced a small amount of gang violence, 8.1% lived in neighbourhoods with some gang violence, while 2.3% lived in neighbourhoods with a large amount of gang violence. When the sample was restricted to only neighbourhoods with criminal gangs, 34.2% of the sample indicated that their neighbourhoods experienced a small amount of gang violence, 45.5% indicated that their neighbourhood had some gang violence, while 14.4% indicated that their neighbourhood had a large amount of gang violence. Quite importantly, it was found that 16% of respondents in neighbourhoods with gangs reported some form criminal victimization, as opposed to 9.6% of respondents in neighbourhoods without gangs. Persons in neighbourhoods with gangs were almost three times as likely to be victims of violent crimes compared to persons in neighbourhoods without gangs (10.1% vs. 3.7%). Where property victimization is concerned, 5.3% of persons in neighbourhoods with gangs reported such victimization compared to 4.2% of persons in neighbourhoods without gangs.

Additional evidence that gangs are responsible for a disproportionate number of violent crimes derives from homicide data from the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. Fully 29% of all murders for the period 2001 to 2010 are attributed to gangs. Even more troubling is the finding that the proportion of murders being committed by gang members is increasing over time. Whereas the proportion of murders committed by gang members for the period 2001 to 2003 was 11.3%, the proportion rose dramatically to 38.3% for the period 2007 to 2010. Gang murders exhibit a consistent increase for the period 2001 to 2008, with a decrease in 2009 and 2010 (see Figure 3.14). It should, however, be noted that the observed increase in gang related murders could be due to increasing awareness and emphasis on gangs, or to the improved ability to solve murder cases. This argument implies that the proportion of gang related murders may have been high, even in the past, but is now only coming to light due to greater awareness of gang involvement in violent crime. At the same time, given the previously mentioned limitations in Trinidad and Tobago in assessing whether or not murders are gang related (King, 2012), it is quite possible that official data underestimate the proportion of murders which are committed by gangs.

Figure 3.14
Total Murders and Gang Related Murders (2001-2010)[37]

Year	Total murders	Gang Related	% Gang Related
2001	151	3	2
2002	171	17	10
2003	229	42	18
2004	261	32	12
2005	386	81	21
2006	371	98	26
2007	391	205	52
2008	547	278	51
2009	506	176	35
2010	472	75	16
Total	**3485**	**1007**	**29**

Gang activity is becoming more violent as evidenced by the increasing number of murders committed by gang members. Data from the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service also indicate that firearm usage has increased dramatically over time where murders are concerned (see Figure 3.15).

Figure 3.15
Trends in homicides by weapon type (2000-2010)[38]

Trends in homicides by weapon type (2000-2010)

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
[37] Source: Ministry of National Security.

[38] 'Other' weapons and 'unknown' weapons are omitted from this graph. Data source: Ministry of National Security.

For the period 2002 to 2010, a total of 3264 murders were committed, of which 2421 or 74% were committed with the use of a firearm. Indeed, as Figure 3.16 indicates, firearms have become the weapon of choice where murders are committed. Prior to 2000, firearms were used in less than one third of all homicides in Trinidad and Tobago, whereas after 2000, firearm usage in homicides consistently increased to the point where at present, firearms represent by far the predominant type of weapon used in homicides. These data imply that at least an appreciable proportion of gang related murders are committed with the use of firearms.

The link between gangs and firearms is a troubling one. Firearm usage has increased over time for a range of additional crimes including wounding with intent and shooting with intent (see Figure 3.16). For the period 2002 to 2010, a total of 2164 woundings with intent were committed, with an annual average of 240. For this period, wounding with intent increased by an annual average of 13.4%.   Shooting with intent exhibits similar upward trends. For the period for which data are available, there were a total of 1204 such shootings, with an annual average of 134. Shootings with intent increased at an average of 5.4% per annum. The only crimes in which firearms were used and in which there were decreases were robbery with aggravation (an annual average decrease of 2.7%) and robbery with violence (an annual average decrease of 0.3%). While there were observed decreases in these crimes, the quantum of such crimes nevertheless is cause for concern.   With respect to robbery with aggravation, the annual average number of such crimes occurring is 1637 while the annual average number of robberies with violence is 455.

Figure 3.16
Crimes committed with the use of firearms[39]

	Murder	Robbery with Aggravation	Robbery with Violence	Wounding with Intent	Shooting with Intent	Total
2002	105	2026	572	229	122	3054
2003	149	2286	786	198	236	3655
2004	195	1426	347	125	112	2205
2005	272	1634	407	299	121	2733
2006	269	2039	490	510	144	3452
2007	302	1219	333	164	122	2140
2008	432	1419	376	282	126	2635
2009	365	1448	424	212	111	2560
2010	332	1235	359	145	110	2181
Total	**2421**	**14732**	**4094**	**2164**	**1204**	**24615**
Annual average	**269**	**1637**	**455**	**240**	**134**	**2735**
Percent increase	**17.7**	**-2.7**	**-0.3**	**13.4**	**5.4**	

Consequences of the presence of gangs in Trinidad and Tobago

The presence of gangs and gang violence have a number of negative consequences in Trinidad and Tobago. Homicide as well as other acts of violence contribute to a reduction in the workforce and to lowered productivity, and are also associated with an increased burden on the health care system since victims must seek medical attention. The increased number of gangs as well as the associated increase in crime also results in a diversion of the country's resources from development initiatives toward fighting crime.

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[39] Source: Ministry of National Security.

National Security expenditure consumes a large proportion of the total annual budget. This reduces the availability of resources for expenditure in other sectors including health care, the provision of social services, education, infrastructure development, and economic development initiatives. Indeed ECLAC (2008) has found that the percentage of GDP spent on national security in Trinidad and Tobago has increased steadily while welfare expenditure has remained relatively constant. The prevalence of gangs in some areas is also related to a decrease in investment in those areas and in reduced opportunities for employment. In neighbourhoods such as Laventille, for example, there are no businesses except small shops owned and operated by local residents. An added consequence of gang presence in such neighbourhoods is the devaluation of property and land value. Quite apart from internal community issues, linkages with other parts of the society may be reduced or severed. Persons from known gang areas may be refused employment by persons from other neighbourhoods. Indeed, as has happened in the past in Laventille, even public services such as garbage collection and electricity services may be withdrawn. In the past, public service workers have refused to venture into these areas without police escort.

Gang presence encourages the relocation of law abiding citizens as well as law enforcement personnel who reside in these areas (Montoute, 2010). This results in a concentration of persons who are either more accepting of gangs or a criminal lifestyle, as well as persons who have no other alternative but to live in such neighbourhoods. This implies that the social controls which may derive from law abiding persons is continuously weakened in such neighbourhoods. Informal social controls have been consistently found to be an important buffer in preventing criminal offending (Hirschi, 2002). Compounding this problem is the fact that there is a reduction or withdrawal of corporate sponsorship for community events or programmes in neighbourhoods with gangs. Community events provide yet another means of social control through the building of social solidarity and trust among residents.

An even more troubling phenomenon is that communities may develop a bond with gangs and their leaders and especially in situations where gang leaders provide assistance to community members. In practice, however, where community members appear to support or even protect gang leaders or members, it may be difficult to determine whether such support is based on genuine commitment or on fear. Community members may demonstrate support for gangs because of fear or because of social expectations which dictate that gangs should be supported. A study by McCree (1998) examined public perceptions of gangs in Laventille and assessed the knowledge of gangs in a sample of 400 randomly selected households in this community. Fully 83.8% of persons surveyed indicated that they had no knowledge of gangs in Laventille. While there were no gender differences in terms of knowledge of gangs, younger persons (aged 15-24 in the study) were somewhat more aware of the existence of gangs in their community than their older counterparts. The apparent lack of knowledge about gangs may be as a result of fear of gangs or of community solidarity with gangs. The latter explanation is supported by one informant who indicated that:

> "Although you may regard the gang leader as a bad person, in the area he is seen as a good person. You go into the area and see a fellow who is known as a gang leader. While you are there, a little child might come to him and say, 'daddy, I don't have any money to buy food.' And he will say: 'well go in the shop and tell them to give it to you, I will deal with it.' Or he might take money from his pocket; he will help the people in the area. The people in the area might even know that he is dealing roughly with their daughters, or that he beat up a woman the other day, but really and truly, he is regarded as the man providing for the village. So the village will protect him" (McCree, 1998: p. 167).

Interestingly enough, research in Trinidad and Tobago has indicated that gangs may even provide a law enforcement function for communities (Katz, 2009). Katz, in examining data gathered from residents in the community of Gonzales found that residents believed that gangs reduced crime levels in their community.

Katz discovered that gangs in Gonzales had instituted a community court which met weekly and in which community matters, including the disciplining of young males for transgressions against the community, were attended to. Indeed one resident of Gonzales went as far as saying that "Gangs are the first ones to respond to crime, the police are incompetent, they take too long and never finish the work. If you go to the gang leader you know they will take care of you" (Katz, 2009: p. 26).

Jankowski (1991) indicates that gang–community relationships may be of three types: 1) antagonistic/hostile/non-supportive, 2) apathetic - community ignores gangs, or 3) mutual/cooperation/supportive. Jankowski notes that gangs depend more on communities for their survival than communities depend on gangs, and where communities are not in support of gangs (even if only covertly) this may be used to encourage a withdrawal of community support from gangs, leading to the eventual weakening or disbandment of such gangs. Jankowski argues that the gang is dependent on the community for its survival since ultimately the community provides new recruits, offers protection from the police, and provides information on rival gangs and on police activity. Jankowski (1991:179) sums up the idea as follows:

> "The gang and community strike up a working relationship, which lasts as long as the two mutually aid and respect each other. If either breaks the code, the pact is terminated and both lose to some degree. However, the gang will experience the greatest loss because it is in more consistent need of the community rather than vice versa. For this reason, gangs make a concerted and aggressive effort to aid the community. If a gang violates the code and is not successful in reestablishing a reciprocal relationship with the community, it will become isolated, which will seriously weaken its ability to operate effectively. This more often than not marks the beginning of the end of such a gang."

Strategies for addressing the gang issue

While "gangs and gang-related violence are at epidemic proportions in Trinidad and Tobago", Katz, Choate and Fox (2010) found, in interviewing key stakeholders and officials in the Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security, the Police Service, and other bodies, that "there is almost no attention to primary gang prevention programming and that there is strong resistance to its implementation within some Ministries" (p. 20). The data analyzed in this study support the idea that gangs in Trinidad and Tobago are engaged in violent offending, and as such, it is imperative that comprehensive intervention strategies be employed. Suppressive strategies are limited in their effectiveness, and must be complemented with preventative mechanisms (ibid.). A comprehensive policy for dealing with gangs must include primary and secondary prevention strategies (Brantingham and Faust, 1976), and must focus on proximal as well as distal risk factors which are at varying levels of analysis, including the individual, peer group, family, community, economy, and society. Such a strategy must be based on empirical evidence which indicate which factors are the most important, such that the factors which are eventually focused upon are the ones which have a demonstrated link to the reduction of gang membership and violence.

Primary prevention refers to those strategies which target the general population, and are designed to reduce the likelihood of criminal offending. In the context of the present study, such strategies should be focused on reducing the likelihood that persons will join gangs, should focus on neighbourhood and school social life and safety, and should build a sense of community cohesiveness, and develop informal systems of social control. An example of a primary prevention programme which can be adapted for use in Trinidad and Tobago is the revised Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) programme. This is a gang and violence prevention programme built around school-based, law enforcement officer-instructed classroom curricula.

The programme is intended as an immunization against delinquency, youth violence, and gang membership for children in the years immediately before the prime ages for introduction into gangs and delinquent behavior.[40] The revised G.R.E.A.T. programme has three primary goals: teaching youths to avoid gang membership, preventing violence and criminal activity, and assisting youths to develop positive relationships with law enforcement (National Youth Gang Center, 2010). The curriculum emphasizes changes in attitude and behaviour through behaviour rehearsal, cooperative and interactive learning techniques, and extended teacher activities. The programme is comprised of thirteen one-hour lessons taught by a trained professional. Preliminary evaluation of the programme indicate that youths who received the programme were more positive about the police, were less positive about gangs, were less likely to join gangs, were less likely to self report committing crime, and were better able to resist peer pressure (National Youth Gang Center, 2010).

In Trinidad and Tobago, suppressive and law enforcement strategies are given priority over preventative measures. As the data in Figure 1.1 indicate, such strategies have met with little success in the fight against crime and violence. There is an absence of coordination between those bodies responsible for crime reduction, and other institutions which may provide mechanisms for primary prevention. Establishing such linkages can be used to provide opportunities for preventative measures without substantially increasing the financial burden on the Ministry of National Security and other law enforcement agencies. As an example, while education may increase levels of civility in the population, and by extension, reduce crime and violence, it does so only as a byproduct, since there is no purposive strategy whereby the education system is used as a mechanism to reduce crime and violence. Criminological and other relevant knowledge can be used to devise purposeful strategies which are implemented within the education system, such that youths develop attitudes, values, and skills, which make them less likely to be predisposed to using violence and engaging in criminal activity. The same applies to other systems which are capable of reaching families and communities. Such an approach will enhance the effectiveness of the Ministry of National Security and other similar agencies, and allow them to capitalize on the strengths, reach, and resources of other institutions, in the fight against gangs and violence.

Secondary prevention strategies should focus on communities with a high gang presence and with high rates of criminal offending. The spatial distribution of crime in Trinidad and Tobago exhibits a high degree of stability, and available data quickly points to those communities which are high crime areas. Figure 3.10, for example, indicates the proportion of each serious crime across Police Divisions for the period 2001-2010. The data which are utilized to compile divisional statistics contain the addresses of each offence committed. Such datasets can be used to determine which Police Station Districts, and which communities within each District are responsible for a disproportionate number of violent offences. An examination of the addresses for all murders for the period January 01, 2009 to October 31, 2011, for example, indicate that the Police Station Districts with the highest number of murders are Besson Street (243 murders or 19% of the national total for that period)[41], Arima (99 murders), West End (78) and Morvant (68).

The communities with the highest number of murders are Laventille (172 murders or 13.4% of the national total for that period), Diego Martin (66), and Morvant (53). Statistics from the range of serious crimes can be employed to identify those communities which should be targeted for sustained intervention. This should be used in conjunction with data on the prevalence of gangs in various communities. There is, unfortunately, no systematic attempt to determine the number and location of gangs and their members in Trinidad and Tobago. The only official data which exist are shown in Figure 3.3 of this study. The most recent data which can be used to ascertain the location of gangs derive from a nationally representative sample of persons who were interviewed by the United Nations Development Programme in November 2010.

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[40] Katz and Choate (2006) report that in Trinidad and Tobago, youths who reported gang membership indicated that on average, they became involved with gangs when they were 12 years old.

[41] As of March 2012, there are 77 Police Station Districts within the nine Police Divisions in Trinidad and Tobago. A total of 1281 murders occurred in Trinidad and Tobago for the period January 01, 2009 to October 31, 2011.

Of the persons who responded 'yes' to the question "Is there a criminal gang (or gangs) in your neighbourhood?" (n = 222 or 13.9% of the sample), the majority of such persons were located in the communities of Port of Spain, Bonaire, San Fernando, and Arima.

Interventions in such communities should be based on the needs of those communities, and should target those risk factors which are the most relevant within each community. There is only one study which has examined the risk factors which are associated with gang membership in Trinidad and Tobago. Katz and Fox (2010) attempt to determine which risk and protective factors are predictors of gang membership. Their sample consisted of 2,206 students with a mean age of 15 years. The sample was drawn from 22 high-risk schools within Trinidad and Tobago.[42] Almost 60% of the sample were females, while 41% were of African descent, 23% of East Indian descent, and 15% were Mixed (one parent of African and the other of East Indian descent). The majority of respondents (79.4%) reported never being in a gang, while 6.2% were current gang members, 6.8% were former gang members, and 7.7% were gang associates. Katz and Fox assessed the relationship between thirty risk factors and thirteen protective factors and gang membership.

These factors belonged to the peer-individual, family, school, and community domains. Risk factors which were important at the peer-individual domain were having antisocial peers, having peers who use illegal drugs and alcohol, early initiation into antisocial behaviour, and the intention to use drugs. Within the community domain, residential mobility and the availability of guns were important predictors. Within the school domain, low commitment to school was an important predictor, while within the family domain, parental attitudes favourable to antisocial behavior was important. A number of protective factors were also found to be important predictors of gang membership. At the peer-individual level, gang members were less likely to report high levels of social skills or prosocial values and attitudes. Katz and Fox also found that exposure to a greater number of risk factors increased the likelihood of gang membership while exposure to a larger number of protective factors reduced the likelihood of gang membership.

Data collected by the United Nations Development Programme (n = 1595 adults in Trinidad and Tobago) also allow for an assessment of risk factors. Important predictors include income, community cohesion, societal cohesion and informal social control. Community cohesion was measured by four items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.871) including "Living here gives me a sense of community" and "The associations/relationships that I have with the people in this neighbourhood/community mean a lot to me" with responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Societal cohesion was measured by twenty items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.866) including "I feel like I belong in this country" and "I feel loyal to the people of this country". Informal social control was measured by three items (Cronbach's alpha = 0.828) which assessed the likelihood that community members would intervene in situations in which others required assistance. Items include "a suspected case of domestic violence" and "a fight breaking out in front of your house with someone being beaten" with responses ranging from very unlikely to very likely.

Dependent variables were the presence of gangs, gang problems in the neighbourhood, and the level of gang violence. These were assessed by asking the following questions respectively: "Is there a criminal gang (or gangs) in your neighbourhood?", "To what extent is there a criminal gang problem in your neighbourhood?", and "To what extent has your neighbourhood experienced gang violence?". It was found that lower income was related to a higher likelihood of gang presence in neighbourhoods. Income was, however, not related to gang problems and gang violence. Community cohesion as well as societal cohesion suppressed gang problems and gang violence in neighbourhoods. More specifically, high levels of each type of cohesion were related to lower levels of gang problems and gang violence. Notably, each type of cohesion exhibited independent influence on gang problems and violence.

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[42] In this study, "high-risk schools" were defined as those identified by the Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Education as having a disproportionate number of students living in high-crime areas, or a high number of delinquent incidents.

Informal social control was also found to exhibit a suppressive effect on gang violence. This may indicate that informal systems of control are effective in reducing gang violence, but could also indicate that higher levels of gang violence may exert a suppressive effect on informal systems of behaviour regulation.

Secondary prevention strategies should focus on eliminating the social conditions which encourage the formation of gangs, and which encourage youths to feel that they have no alternative but to join gangs. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, being born into some communities automatically reduces one's life chances since this immediately comes with stigmatization and labeling provided by the larger society. Social development initiatives should seek to encourage the integration of such communities with the wider society so that stereotypes may be broken. This may be done, for example, by highlighting the successes of such communities, by showcasing the talents in such communities, or by facilitating the participation of residents from such communities in wider social events. Ultimately, young males who feel alienated from mainstream society and the legitimate opportunities which it provides, will turn to their communities and the illegitimate opportunities which are provided by gangs or other similar entities. The Citizen Security Programme, an initiative of the Ministry of National Security in Trinidad and Tobago, targets high risk communities and aims to build community solidarity and assist in the reestablishment of informal systems of social control.

Data from the United Nations Development Programme survey of 1,595 residents in Trinidad and Tobago indicate that of the persons who reported that there are criminal gangs in their neighbourhood, 3.2% indicated that the gangs made their neighbourhood safer. This is in support of other findings by Mc Cree (1998) and Katz (2009) who discovered that there are community members in Laventille and Gonzales who are in support of gangs and their leaders. In the case of Laventille, some community members assert that gangs offer physical protection and financial support. Such persons also feel that their community is alienated and isolated from the rest of Trinidadian society. In the case of Gonzales, some residents believe that gangs provide a necessary law enforcement function where the protective services have failed to do so. In such communities, it may be difficult to encourage residents to relinquish their association with and support for gangs in their area.

This is an extremely difficult situation since it makes the eradication of gangs much more complicated. While this is the case, it should be cautioned that only a minority of persons are in support of gangs in their neighbourhood. It is also entirely possible that community members may appear to support gangs because of fear of reprisals. This assertion is plausible within Trinidad and Tobago. The Gonzales IMPACT Fact Sheet 2006, for example, stated that 71% of residents strongly agree that people who report crimes committed by gangs to the police are likely to experience retaliation by gang members (Johnson, 2007). Secondary prevention strategies should attempt to weaken the linkages between gangs and community members. Such linkages, as in the case of Jamaica, may represent one of the biggest obstacles to the eradication of gangs if they are not addressed in the early stages of their development.

Many of the risk factors indicated in the previous discussion on secondary prevention are distal causes, often referred to as root causes of violence and gang membership. Addressing these root causes is important as they are related to long term reductions in gang membership and violence. It is, however, also important to address proximal causes in the fight against gangs. "Proximate causes are explanatory factors that are much closer in time and space to a violet event" (Maguire, 2012: p. 8). Addressing proximate causes can generate quick reductions in gang violence, and require less time and cost compared to other approaches. Important proximate causes in Trinidad and Tobago include perceived disrespect, territory, disputes over money etc., retaliation, internal power struggles, and functioning as an informant to the police (Maguire, 2012). Within this context, it is also useful to examine the reasons that people cite for joining gangs.

In Trinidad and Tobago, Katz, Choate and Fox (2010) found in interviewing 2,292 youths, that 29.4% joined gangs for reasons of protection and safety, 42% joined for friendship, 8% joined to make money, 5.9% joined because either their parent or a sibling was in the gang, and 14.7% joined for other reasons. Further research is required to determine which proximate causes are important within areas with a high concentration of gangs. Intervention strategies can then be designed to address such factors.

While a preventative approach may inhibit the formation of new gangs, this may not hinder the continuance of already established gangs. Suppressive approaches may be more relevant within this context. Suppressive strategies are reactive in nature and rely on criminal law and the weight of legal sanctions to be effective. Suppressive mechanisms can include arrests, prosecution, fines, imprisonment, seizure of property and other such strategies. Suppressive strategies may serve to incapacitate gang members, deter gang members who have been convicted (specific deterrence), and deter persons who may become involved in gangs (general deterrence). It is important to note that suppressive strategies will not be successful without the simultaneous use of preventative strategies. For example, if imprisoned gang members are subsequently released and go back into a society or community where there are no economic and other legitimate opportunities, and where the social and environmental conditions encourage gang membership, then it is unlikely that such persons will desist from future offending.

Suppressive strategies should increase police presence in communities with a known gang presence. Policing should be visible in such communities with frequent patrols and with mobile units allocated within such communities. Where necessary, police should be equipped with suitable protective gear such as bullet proof vests and additional arms and ammunition, police vehicles, communication equipment, and other necessary equipment. At the same time, officers should be mandated to facilitate communication and dialogue with community members. Communication may provide deeper insight into the gang problem and may point to meaningful solutions. Prosecution against crimes committed by gang members should employ appropriate forensic and other technologies, including the use of the services and information provided by the Regional Integrated Ballistics Information Network (RIBIN). The use of intelligence, both locally and regionally (for example the Regional Intelligence Fusion Center – RIFC) may be profitably employed in the struggle against gang violence.

This should be complemented by information sharing among police stations and divisions, and should attempt to incorporate a systematic data collection strategy aimed at uncovering more information about the evolving gang situation. Suppressive strategies should also attempt to cut off the funding available to gangs. In Trinidad and Tobago, state funding is channeled to gangs through legitimate projects such as the Community-Based Environmental Protection and Enhancement Programme and the Unemployment Relief Programme (UNDP, 2012). Such funding aids in the legitimization of gangs and contributes to the continuance of such gangs. Where gang members are successfully prosecuted, incapacitation should be coupled with rehabilitative strategies, and there should be a simultaneous emphasis on reducing the social, economic and other conditions which predispose gang formation and criminal offending.

One measure which may stem the increasing rate of gang violence relates to removing access to illegal weapons. While the government of Trinidad and Tobago ensures that very strict criteria are observed in the granting of licenses for *legal* firearms, the majority of offences are committed with the use of *illegal* firearms (UNODC and World Bank, 2007). A promising initiative in the fight against illegal firearms has been undertaken by the United Nations Regional Center for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC). This initiative relates to the destruction of stockpiled weapons. More specifically, illegal firearms which are seized as evidence or otherwise, typically are stored for indefinite periods, and often end up back in the hands of criminals. UN-LiREC officials estimate that internationally, as much as 40% of all weapons in the hands of criminals are sourced from weapons which are legally stockpiled by law enforcement agencies.

With respect to Trinidad and Tobago, UN-LiREC found that there was "No regular destruction of surplus, obsolete or confiscated firearms and ammunition… *the* Latest destruction had been undertaken in 2003. *There also were* no destruction protocols or procedures *and* no written Standard Operating Procedures. *While some weapons destruction occurs, there is* limited weapons destruction capability (using disc cutters and industrial smelting) which is logistically inefficient for the number of surplus weapons potentially available for destruction. *UN-LiREC further found that there were* an estimated 5,000 surplus, obsolete and confiscated firearms *and* 10 tons of small arms ammunition in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service which are in need of destruction." (UN-LiREC Annex 2 - country profiles[43]).   UN-LiREC offered a number of recommendations for the security and destruction of arms and ammunition.

This initiative also made assessments and recommendations in the areas of firearms and ammunition stockpile management, training, and legislation and policy.   CARICOM IMPACS implementation of the Regional Integrated Ballistics Information Network (RIBIN) represents yet another related initiative.   This system will allow users to identify weapons used in the commission of crimes from ballistic information, and will facilitate tracing the movement of weapons throughout the Caribbean region.   This, together with better gun registries, marking of seized firearms, and better detection procedures at ports of entry, as well as better coastal surveillance will contribute to a reduction in the availability of illegal firearms.

While it is important to attempt to block the entry of illegal firearms, it is also critical that measures be put in place to stem the supply of such weapons. The UNODC and World Bank (2007) indicate that lax regulations guide the purchase of firearms in South and Central America, and as a consequence 'straw purchasers' are able to legally procure weapons from manufacturers. These weapons may then be resold to be used illegally. Gun registries and better tracking methods including marking guns at the point of manufacture for identification and tracing purposes, as well as closer regulation of gun purchases and scrutiny of purchasers, including conducting background checks with the receiving country to ensure that such persons are authorized to purchase and import weapons, will contribute to a reduction in the availability of firearms. A number of international treatise and conventions represent important initiatives aimed at regulating the flow of firearms.   These include the United Nations Protocol on the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms and the Organization of American States' Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials.

Current weaknesses in the criminal justice system of Trinidad and Tobago must be addressed if suppressive strategies are to be effective. The most recent example which highlights the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system to control gangs comes from a state of emergency which was initiated from August 21 to December 05, 2011. During this time, 242 persons were arrested under the Anti Gang Act (2011) of Trinidad and Tobago. The Act, which defines a gang as "a combination of two or more persons, whether formally or informally organized, that, through its membership or through an agent, engages in any gang related activity" makes it illegal to belong to a gang (2011: p. 3).

All persons detained under this Act were subsequently released, either because there was insufficient evidence or no evidence at all. Quite apart from the circularity of the definition, law enforcement and intelligence capabilities are limited, such that the capacity to deal with crime generally, and gangs specifically is severely curtailed. Where murder is concerned, for example, clearance rates, measured by arrests, indicate severe weaknesses. Between 1990 to 2000, clearance rates in Trinidad and Tobago ranged between 50 to 70 percent, but exhibited a continuous decline after 2000.

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[43] United Nations Caribbean Regional Workshop on Firearms Destruction and Stockpile Management: Moving From Assessment to Action. Trinidad Hilton Conference Centre. December 8-9, 2010.

For the period 2001 to 2009, the average clearance rate for murder stood at 30%. For the same period, the average clearance rate for woundings and shootings was 38%, for robberies 15.8%, and for burglaries and breakings 13.9%.

While specialist units within the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service may be used in the fight against gangs and violence, past experience has shown that there are problems here as well. In Trinidad and Tobago, the Gang/Repeat Offender Task Force was established in May 2006. This was initially staffed with forty sworn police officers who were trained by specialist officers from the United States. The unit was responsible for arresting wanted persons, for gathering intelligence on gangs, conducting patrols in areas with gangs, and for disseminating information to various other units within the Police Service. This specialized unit was however disbanded as a result of allegations of police misconduct, which included accusations of kidnappings, passing information to criminals, and participating in extrajudicial killings. The Special Anti Crime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago (SAUTT), was a similar specialist police unit which was disbanded as of October 31, 2010. Specialist training and personnel, as well as the use of intelligence are important in the fight against gangs and violence. The provision of such services should be governed by carefully formulated regulations, and officers within specialist units must be aware of the regulations which govern their functioning. There must also be clear guidelines and procedures for discipline in the event of breach of these regulations.

Katz (2012) indicates that part of the inefficiency in Trinidad and Tobago is related to the lack of experience of homicide detectives. In interviewing 462 police officers, he discovered that the majority (224) had investigated only one homicide, while a large number (85) had investigated only two homicides, while 42 officers had investigated only three homicides in their careers. Very few officers had investigated four or more homicides. Katz also discovered that there is a large backlog of firearms cases to be processed at the Forensic Science Center in Trinidad and Tobago. As of 2005, the number of backlogged cases stood at slightly over 2000. In this context it is important to note that each case contains one or more pieces of evidence (referred to as exhibits) which require analysis.

Inefficiencies in processing are even more strongly highlighted when the number of unanalyzed exhibits is considered. In 2004 alone, while almost 500 exhibits were processed, slightly over 3,500 exhibits went unprocessed. King (2012) adds to the list of inefficiencies in the Trinidad and Tobago criminal justice system. In assessing police procedures and techniques, he found that "basic policing and investigation tasks were poorly performed" while ancillary organizations such as the crime lab, prosecutors, judiciary, and community groups complain about the police, and contribute to the inefficiency of investigations (p. 7). King advises that all components of the criminal justice system including ancillary organizations, must be examined, since training and technology in policing and other restricted areas will not have the desired effect without considering and remedying inefficiencies in other areas.

Gangs represent an extremely difficult problem in Trinidad and Tobago. Available data indicate that gang violence is increasing and is associated with the increased usage of firearms. Gangs also appear to be integrated within some communities, creating additional challenges for the eradication of such gangs. The gang issue is one which must not be ignored since this increases the risk that the problem may escalate to the point where gangs cannot be eradicated. This paper argues that the use of suppressive strategies should be complemented by preventative strategies in the fight against gangs in Trinidad and Tobago. Preventative strategies should be focused at the individual, community and national levels, while suppressive strategies should target the availability of firearms and should ensure that legal action against gangs and their members utilize appropriate technologies and evidence to ensure successful prosecution.

Chapter 4
Risk factors and determinants

Human insecurity in the Caribbean region has not declined despite the vast resources and range of policies which have been implemented to increase security. It is a fundamental assumption of this study that crime policy must be data driven, and must be informed by a systematic understanding of the root causes of crime. Failure to do so will result in the continued implementation of populist policies, those which help ruling parties to gain political mileage, but which may be based on public opinion rather than on empirical data. Too often governments tailor their crime reduction policies to fit with popular notions of what works. These popular notions may be based on media headlines and "pop psychology" which have very little, if any grounding in criminological theory and research. All too often, short-term policies which expect quick fixes are preferred instead of long-term efforts to fight crime.

This same tendency to prefer quick fixes and to bend to the public will also serve to distort those crime fighting efforts which are grounded in empirical research. Policy as it is formulated and policy as it is implemented may be two very different things. Crime trends in the Caribbean region speak volumes about the failure of such approaches. Indeed, in the case of Trinidad and Tobago for the last twenty years, serious crimes, with the exception of burglary, have risen. Any government which is serious about addressing the crime situation has to be willing to move away from citing short term fluctuations in crime as evidence that crime has decreased. Such governments need to be willing to acknowledge that past efforts have failed, and be willing to make policy decisions which do not always bend to popular sentiment.

The present study contends that in order to effectively fight crime and human insecurity in the Caribbean, at least two conditions must be met. Firstly, a thorough examination of criminological literature must be conducted to determine what are the major causes of crime and insecurity and secondly, empirical data from the Caribbean must be examined to determine which of the main causal factors are applicable to the Caribbean region, and in this case, to Trinidad and Tobago specifically. Not all of the factors indicated by the international literature may be applicable to the Caribbean and indeed, it may be the case that different factors may be applicable to different countries within the Caribbean. Knowledge of these factors will indicate where emphasis must be placed in order to reduce human insecurity.

In examining the causes of crime and citizen insecurity, researchers distinguish between the levels of aggregation at which the causal variables are operative. Some researchers argue that effective crime reduction policies must be focused at the aggregate level (for example nation, state, city or community) while others argue that interventions must be focused at the level of the individual. An example which illustrates the level of aggregation issue relates to poverty reduction as a means of reducing crime. While there is some debate about whether or not poverty causes crime, a number of researchers have found a relationship between poverty and crime rates. This relationship has been found at the aggregate level for cities (Bailey, 1984; Flango and Sherbanou, 1976), standard metropolitan statistical areas (Blau and Golden, 1986; DeFonzo, 1983; Fowles and Merva, 1996), and countries (Gartner, 1990; Sigelman and Simpson, 1977).

These studies suggest that poverty interventions should be aimed at the aggregate level, though they disagree on which level of aggregation may be most appropriate. In contrast, other researchers have looked at variations among persons in their level of poverty and level of self-reported criminal offending (Krahn and Harrison, 1992; Stiles et al., 2000). These latter studies suggest that interventions should be directed at the individual. As such, while it is typically agreed that poverty reduction should reduce crime and citizen insecurity, researchers disagree on the most appropriate level at which interventions should be applied. The main idea being brought out here is that policy makers must be aware that some causal factors may operate at one level of analysis while other causal factors may operate at another level of analysis. To be effective, interventions must be aimed at the appropriate level of analysis which is relevant to each causal factor.

Where there are disagreements on the most appropriate level of analysis, an examination of empirical data should provide the best indication of the level at which interventions may be most cost-effectively applied. This chapter will firstly examine some of the main risk factors which have been identified by past criminological research and theorizing. This will be followed by an assessment of research in Trinidad and Tobago which has focused on risk factors, and will conclude with an examination of the findings from the primary data which were collected for this study. In collecting this data, a number of risk factors were measured, along with a variety of outcome measures, including personal criminal victimization and crime at the community level.

Economic deprivation

A number of researchers have found that economic deprivation is causally linked to criminal offending. This is not to say that all economically deprived people will commit crime, nor does it imply that all types of crime are driven by economic deprivation. The literature on economic deprivation and crime has variously conceptualized economic deprivation as either poverty, inequality, or relative deprivation. Poverty refers to the non-attainment of basic nutritional and other non-nutritional requirements which are considered essential to a healthy productive life. The poverty line is specific to particular locations, and is defined according to the cost required to meet these basic needs in that specific location. The nutritional threshold below which a person is likely to suffer ill health varies from place to place, depending on climate and other such factors. The World Bank defines this threshold for the Caribbean region at a daily intake of 2400 calories per adult.

Persons who do not earn enough income to meet their basic nutritional requirement are termed indigent. Inequality, typically assessed at the aggregate level of analysis (for example inequality between countries, states, cities, neighbourhoods, etc.) is often measured by the Gini coefficient which computes the disparity in average incomes among a distribution of incomes among the relevant units of analysis. High levels of inequality indicate that there are large differences between the incomes of the rich and the poor. Relative deprivation refers to the perception of inequality. Perceptual measures are restricted to the individual level of analysis, though some authors argue that perceptions can be inferred from structural indicators (see for example Davies, 1956; Gurr, 1970; Rosenfeld, 1986). Relative deprivation researchers argue that the perception of inequality may be very much at odds with measures of inequality based on objective data such as a distribution of income, since typically, people are unaware of such objective data. Such researchers contend that people's perceptions of economic deprivation inform their actions and that such measures form an important complement to measures based on objective data.

Researchers of crime have typically argued in favour of either poverty, inequality or relative deprivation. In defending the utility of the preferred measure, researchers typically try to explain why the chosen measure is causally linked to crime, and why the other measures are not causally linked. This controversy is fuelled in part by the fact that each measure has received some level of empirical support. For example, Stiles et al. (2000) and Bailey (1984) found that poverty was a significant predictor of property crime and homicide respectively, while Davies (1969) and Rosenfeld (1986) found that relative deprivation was a significant predictor of political violence and violent crime respectively. Kennedy et al. (1991) and Carroll and Jackson (1983), in contrast, found that inequality was a significant predictor of homicide and property crimes respectively. Recent research has argued, however, that the compartmentalization of economic deprivation into "pure" subscales such as poverty or inequality may be misguided. Such research argues that economic deprivation is a complex experience that cannot be captured by a single measure, and instead must be tapped by multiple measures simultaneously. The approach typically taken is that a range of potential indicators of economic deprivation are factor analyzed to determine which subscales tap the latent construct of economic deprivation.

Factor scores, as well as weighted sums of applicable subscales are typically used to represent this more complex conceptualization of economic deprivation. Such multifaceted measures of economic deprivation have been found to be strong predictors of both property and violent crime (Land, McCall and Cohen, 1990).

Economic deprivation may lead to crime and citizen insecurity for a number of reasons. One of the most frequently cited explanations relates to the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears, 1939). This hypothesis states that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration, and that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression. Frustration refers to interference with goal directed behaviour, and in the case of economic deprivation, it refers to one not having adequate economic means to achieve one's goals. Other researchers have argued that economic deprivation creates an 'unbalanced' or 'uncomfortable' mental state, not unlike Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance or Piaget's (1953) disequilibrium. Morrison (1973) writes that "dissonance is a psychologically upsetting state that generates attempts to reduce this dissonance" (p. 159).

One means of dissonance reduction involves engaging in criminal or violent activities which will allow one to gain that which is lacking. Economic deprivation may also serve as a technique of neutralization, reducing inhibitions against proscribed behaviours and facilitating the victimization of others (Agnew, 1999; Agnew et al., 1996). Economic deprivation may also reduce social trust and the commitment to the conventional social order if others are perceived to be the cause of one's deprivation (Kawachi et al., 1997; 1999). Kawachi et al. (1997) argue that "belief in the goodwill and benign intent of others facilitates collective action and mutual cooperation… Collective action in turn, further reinforces community norms of reciprocity" (p. 1492). "Visibly high inequalities in material assets tend to produce resentment, that in turn disrupts the social fabric" (Kawachi et al., 1999: p. 721). This disruption of the social fabric interferes with informal systems of social control which normally operate at the community level, and which suppress criminal activity.

Social disorganization

The classic work of Shaw and McKay (1942) represents one of the first examples of criminological theorizing which sought to locate the explanation for criminal offending at a social level, rather than within the individual. Shaw and McKay, in studying Chicago's juvenile court records realized that crime rates were stable in different parts of the city, regardless of who entered or left these areas. This suggested that ecological factors, rather than the characteristics of the persons themselves, influenced the crime rates in various parts of the city. The important task for Shaw and McKay was to discover which ecological characteristics influenced criminal activity.

Shaw and McKay (1942) recognized that a number of characteristics were consistently associated with high crime rates. Areas with these characteristics were described as "socially disorganized" and were characterized by racial heterogeneity, high rates of residential mobility, and low average socioeconomic status. In such neighbourhoods, the conventional institutions of social control, such as community organizations, schools and churches, were unable to regulate the behaviour of youths within their community. In addition to the lack of informal social controls, socially disorganized neighbourhoods tended to produce "criminal traditions" or accepted counter-normative patterns of behaviour which could be passed on to successive generations through the process of socialization.

The three factors identified by Shaw and McKay work against social cohesion and the mechanisms of informal social control. High levels of residential mobility in various neighbourhoods could occur for a number of reasons. If people feel unsafe in particular places or if they do not feel a sense of belonging to and pride for their neighbourhood, they may be inclined to relocate as soon as it becomes feasible. In addition, many residents may choose to leave poorer neighbourhoods once they are economically able to do so.

The high rate of population turnover works against the development of bonds which tie people to each other, and which help to build a sense of trust and commitment to others in the neighbourhood. Racial heterogeneity, especially where there is distrust among people of different races, also hinders the development of community cohesion. Where there is a lack of social trust and a breakdown of community cohesion, people become unwilling to intervene in the affairs of each other. As functionalist theorizing suggests, informal mechanisms of behaviour regulation are far more important in ensuring normative behaviour than the responses of the legal system. More often than not, it is the case that the majority of people in a given population choose to be law-abiding, not because they fear repercussions from law enforcement agencies, but because they are committed to adhering to the norms of society. Socialization as well as informal means of social control ensure such behaviour regulation. Social disorganization, by affecting socialization and social solidarity, weakens informal controls, which in turn lead to increased rates of criminal offending.

Strain theory

While social disorganization theory assumes, among other things, that the rejection of conventional middle class values may increase rates of criminal offending, Merton (1968) believed that the adherence to certain middle class values can also serve to increase criminal offending. Writing about the American obsession with economic success, Merton argued that at all levels in the social strata, Americans believe that they could achieve the "American dream" and that they could become rich and successful. This belief, according to Merton, creates a powerful motivational force to achieve such success. Despite the widespread belief in the possibility of upward social mobility, however, the American social structure limits individuals' access to the means to achieve such mobility. That is, everyone does not share equally in terms of the means to achieve such success via legitimate channels.

While there is normative emphasis on the ends, the same level of consensus about the means to achieve these ends does not exist. Where opportunities are blocked, persons may use illegitimate or illegal means to achieve the socially prescribed success goals. Messner and Rosenfeld, in their 1997 publication *Crime and the American Dream*, refine and extend the work of Merton. While Merton argues that the American stratification system restricts access to legitimate opportunities for upward social mobility, Messner and Rosenfeld, in contrast, recognize that "the American dream promotes and sustains an institutional structure in which one institution – the economy – assumes dominance over all others" (1997: xi). That is, the pursuit and commitment to achieving economic wealth creates "institutional imbalance" where other institution such as the family and education have limited ability to reduce crime rates by insulating members of the society from the criminogenic pressures of the American dream.

Merton's theorizing may be applicable to the Caribbean to the extent that regional societies share similar cultural values and strive to achieve similar success goals, and to the extent that equal access to achieve material success may not be equitably distributed. One of the problems in assessing the applicability of the work of Merton (1968) as well as Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) is that aggregate level measures which represent cultural values or institutional structure are lacking within the Caribbean context. A number of aggregate level studies using American data, however, are supportive of strain theory (e.g. Chamlin and Cochran, 1995; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; Piquero and Leaper Piquero, 1998).

Agnew (1985; 1992), in contrast to Merton (1968), examines the impact of strain at the individual as opposed to the structural level of analysis. Agnew's (1985, 1992) General Strain Theory posits that strain leads to negative emotions which may lead to a number of outcomes, including delinquency. The specific strains discussed in the theory include the failure to achieve positively valued goals (e.g. money or status), the removal of positively valued stimuli (e.g. loss of a valued possession), and the presentation of negatively valued stimuli (e.g. physical abuse).

While many specific types of strain may fall into these categories, Agnew specifies the conditions under which strain is likely to lead to crime. Strains which are 1) seen as unjust, 2) high in magnitude, 3) associated with low social control, and 4) create some incentive to engage in criminal coping are most likely to lead to violence and delinquency.

According to General Strain Theory, individuals experiencing strain may develop negative emotions, including anger when one sees adversity as imposed by others, resentment when one perceives unjust treatment by others, and depression or anxiety when one blames oneself for the stressful consequence. These negative emotions in turn necessitate coping responses as a way to relieve internal pressure. Responses to strain may be behavioural, cognitive or emotional, and not all responses are delinquent. General Strain Theory however is particularly interested in delinquent adaptations. General Strain Theory identifies various types of delinquent adaptations, including escapist (e.g., drug use), instrumental (e.g., property offenses), and retaliatory (e.g., violent offenses) outcomes. Delinquent adaptations to strain become more likely when strain leads to anger. This is the case because anger "increases the individual's level of felt injury, creates a desire for retaliation/revenge, energizes the individual for action, and lowers inhibitions" (Agnew, 1992, p. 60). Coping via illegal behaviour and violence may be especially true for adolescents because of their limited legitimate coping resources, greater influence from peers, and inability to escape many stressful and frustrating environments.

General Strain Theory has attempted to specify the factors which increase the likelihood that individuals will cope with strain by committing crime. Agnew contends that crime becomes a likely outcome when individuals have a low tolerance for strain, when they have poor coping skills and resources, have few conventional social supports, when they perceive that the costs of committing crime is low, and when they are disposed to committing crime because of factors such as low self control, negative emotionality, or their learning history.

Routine Activities Theory

Routine activities theory, developed by Cohen and Felson (1979), instead of attempting to explain why offenders may be motivated to commit crime assumes that there will always be a pool of motivated offenders and attempts to explain how the basic elements of time, location, and people may either increase or decrease the likelihood of criminal victimization. The routine activities approach recognizes the interdependence among people and the environment in which they operate. Cohen and Felson argue that once there is the convergence of three factors, victimization will occur. These three factors are 1) motivated offenders, 2) the existence of suitable targets, which include persons or property, and 3) the absence of capable guardianship. Routine activities theory thus indicates how people's actions and the environments they occupy may be crime producing. A number of tests of routine activities theory have found that the variables it suggests are significant predictors of crime. Examples of empirical support include Robinson and Robinson (1997) who use burglary as their dependent measure, and Kennedy and Silverman (1990) and Messner and Tardiff (1985), who use homicide as their dependent measure.

While the routine activities approach highlights the importance of the environment in criminal offending, one of its shortcomings is that it does not attempt to explain offender motivation. This is an important component, especially where crime reduction is the objective. Indeed Bryant and Miller (1997) sought to compensate for this weakness and found using 1990 data, that adding a measure to represent motivated offenders improved the predictive ability of routine activities variables.

The Social support/altruism approach

Social support approaches in criminology have attempted to explain how social support and altruistic actions insulate people from engaging in crime. This approach draws from a range of studies and concepts, including Braithwaite's (1989) theory of integrative shaming, Cullen's (1994) development of social support as an important construct for criminology, Chamlin and Cochran's (1997) social altruism theory, and Messner and Rosenfeld's (1994, 1997) institutional anomic theory. While there are important differences among these approaches, a central proposition which runs through each approach is that social aggregates vary in their degree of cohesiveness, support and shared values, as well as their willingness to assist others, and importantly, this variation is assumed to be predictive of crime rates.

Lin (1986, p. 18) defines social support as "the perceived or actual instrumental and/or expressive provisions supplied by community social networks and confiding partners." Cullen (1994) argues that "whether social support is delivered through governmental social programs, communities, social networks, families, interpersonal relations, or agents of the criminal justice system, it reduces criminal involvement" (p. 527). The closely related construct of social altruism is also inversely related to crime and refers to "the willingness of communities to commit scarce resources to the aid and comfort of their members" (Chamlin and Cochran, 1997, p. 204).

In an empirical test of the social support/ altruism approach, Chamlin and Cochran (1997) collected data from a sample of 279 US cities. They operationalized social altruism as the amount of United Way contributions in each city. Controls in their analyses include poverty, inequality, population size and age structure, racial heterogeneity, residential mobility, and family disruption. Net of the effect of controls, Chamlin and Cochran found that their measure of social altruism was inversely related to both property and personal crimes. While their findings tend to imply that communities in which people are more supportive tend to have lower crime rates, it is also possible to reverse the causal order in explaining the relationship between both variables. That is, in communities with lower crime rates, people tend to be more supportive. In all likelihood, there is a reciprocal relationship between both variables, where social support affects crime, but where crime also affects social support. An important intervening variable in the latter causal sequence may be social trust. Where crime rates are high, people may become more distrustful of their fellow neighbours, and through fear or the belief that their neighbours are not deserving of altruistic behaviours, people may reduce the amount of social support they offer. Here, while social support may insulate persons against crime, crime may work against social support.

Subcultural theories

Unlike social support/altruism approaches which assume that structural factors can insulate individuals from committing crime, subcultural theories attempt to outline the social and cultural conditions which can increase the predisposition to committing crime. The main idea behind this approach is that certain cultural conventions can be criminogenic. One of the earliest attempts to use this approach was based on the observation that on average, places in the Southern United States had higher crime rates than in the North (Huff-Corzine, Corzine, and Moore, 1986). Researchers have argued that cultural norms in the South may predispose individuals to engage in acts of violence, and such norms may also serve to foster approval of such actions when committed by others in the community. Researchers, however, disagree on which norms specifically are responsible for increased rates of violence in the South. A range of factors have been proposed, including a tradition of chivalry (Hackney, 1969), increased defensiveness (Erlanger, 1975), willingness to resort to violence if someone's good name is sullied (Brearley, 1932) and family and community socialization (Gastil, 1971).

More recent researchers have argued that urbanization creates conditions which encourage subcultural adaptations which foster a criminogenic lifestyle. According to Fisher (1975), large urban populations produce deviant subcultures through a three-step process. Firstly, larger urban populations imply that there is a greater likelihood that persons with unconventional interests and lifestyles will come into contact with conventional others. Secondly, urban contexts provide an environment where unconventional persons can make linkages with each other, and establish subcultures within the larger culture. Finally, limited space and resources result in competition between various subcultural groupings and the dominant culture, resulting in an "intensification" of subcultural values. Here, members of subcultural groups adhere more closely to their values and belief systems as a means of increasing group cohesion to improve their chances of survival. The result, according to Fisher is an increase in unconventional behaviour, including crime and deviance. Through the process of socialization, these values which are supportive of unconventional behaviour may be diffused across generations.

In the Caribbean setting, the social and spatial isolation of various groups, especially where these groups perceive themselves to be marginalized, may lead to the development of subcultures which oppose the dominant normative culture and its values. In areas such as Laventille and Beetham in Trinidad, or Don controlled areas of Kingston, Jamaica, opposition to mainstream culture and values may develop since residents perceive that the state does not support them or look after their welfare. Further, persons from such areas may feel ostracized by mainstream society. These factors encourage two outcomes. Firstly, persons from such communities may feel that the state has no jurisdiction over them since there is the perception that the state does not care about them, and does nothing to help them. This erodes the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and reduces or eliminates its ability to regulate behaviour in such locations. Secondly, lack of a sense of belonging to mainstream society results in opposition to a law-abiding lifestyle. This is not to say that such persons are inherently criminogenic, but rather, in recognizing their social isolation and in affirming their selfhood in response to such isolation, such persons necessarily perceive themselves as being in opposition to mainstream society, and therefore must reject its culture and value system. Ironically, this sets up a self fulfilling prophecy where members of mainstream society take the behaviour of such persons as a justification for their social exclusion. Such persons must live and function within, and reinforce their own counter-normative culture and lifestyle if they are to be respected within their environments.

Empirical research on root causes in Trinidad and Tobago

While the theoretical literature has proposed a number of potentially useful variables which should be considered in attempting to understand the causes of crime and delinquency, for the most part, such research has been validated in North America. Policy makers must be guided by the findings of local research when designing interventions. While empirical research in North America or elsewhere may validate various theoretical approaches and explanatory variables, it cannot be assumed that such findings may generalize to the Caribbean generally, and to Trinidad and Tobago specifically. The historical and sociocultural context of Trinidad and Tobago is different from that of other countries, and as such, empirical research conducted locally provides the most solid grounding in terms of the directions which policy makers should take. The remainder of this chapter will examine such research, and includes an analysis of primary data collected for the purpose of the current study.

Katz and Fox (2010) offer one of the most recent assessments of the prevalence of gangs in Trinidad and Tobago, and importantly assess the relationship between a number of risk and protective factors and gang involvement. Katz and Fox attempt to determine which risk factors are more important in predicting gang membership, and also examine the cumulative effect of multiple risk and protective factors as they relate to gang membership. Katz and Fox (2010) examine data from the Trinidad and Tobago youth survey.

This survey, funded by the Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security, is aimed at offering insight into the nation's crime problem. The target population was third and fifth form students in high-risk urban public schools. High-risk schools were those with a high proportion of students living in high crime areas, or schools in which there was a high number of delinquent incidents. The final sample consisted of 22 schools which represent 24% of all public schools in Trinidad and Tobago and 33% of all public schools located in urban areas. Usable data were collected from a total of 2,206 students in 2006. Respondents were 11 to 19 years of age with a mean age of 15 years old. Almost 60% of the sample were females, while 41% were of African descent, 23% of East Indian descent, and 15% were Mixed (one parent of African and the other of East Indian descent). Persons of other ethnicities made up the rest of the sample.   A comparison to Trinidad and Tobago's population statistics (Central Statistical Office 2000 census) indicates that East Indians were underrepresented in this sample. This may have occurred since many such persons may attend rural school, schools in low risk areas, or private schools.

Katz and Fox (2010) distinguish between current gang members, former gang members, gang associates (having two or more friends in a gang), and persons who have never been in a gang and do not know persons from a gang. Items measuring these typologies include "Have you ever belonged to a gang" and "Think of your four best friends. In the past year, how many of your best friends have been a member of a gang". The majority of respondents (79.4%) reported never being in a gang, while 6.2% were current gang members, 6.8% were former gang members, 7.7% were gang associates. Males were more likely than females to be current gang members (8.9% vs. 4.4%), former gang members (10.1% vs. 4.5%) and gang associates (10.4% vs. 5.8%). With respect to ethnicity, 7.6% of persons classified as 'other', 6.4% of the person of African descent, 5.8% of the person of East Indian descent, and 4.5% of persons of Mixed descent reported that they were current gang members. Almost 10% of the persons of mixed descent reported being former gang members, while 6.8% of "other" descent, 5.6% of African descent, and 6.4% of East Indian descent reported former gang membership. Nine percent of persons classified as "other" reported being gang associates, while 8% of African descent, 7.4% of Mixed descent, and 5.8% of East Indian descent similarly reported having two or more friends who were gang members.

It is important to ascertain whether or not Katz and Fox's (2010) estimates of youth involvement with gangs represent a true reflection of the situation as it exists in Trinidad and Tobago. While a number of factors appear to indicate that the findings may overestimate the prevalence of youth involvement with gangs, other factors which may reduce the estimates compensate for this possibility. Katz and Fox restrict their focus to students from high-crime at-risk areas and do not examine data from rural areas, low-crime areas, and from private schools. In addition, while Katz and Fox ask questions about the organizational structure of gangs (gang name, territory/turf, having a gang leader, having meetings, rules, consequences/punishment for breaking gang rules, colours/signs/symbols/clothing, drug sale/use, and engaging in other illegal activities) they do not use this data to distinguish between criminal gangs and non-criminal gangs. Failure to restrict the focus to criminal gangs and to include rural low-risk areas may serve to inflate the estimates of youth involvement with gangs.

A number of other factors, however, counteract this tendency. In this study, data were collected during school time. Prior research has shown that gang members tend to have high absenteeism rates (Hardwick, 1995). If this apples to Trinidad and Tobago, many such persons may have been excluded from the study. This study also excludes persons who may have been in detention and who were suspended from school due to disruptive behavior. In addition, since the study is based on self-report data, responding in a socially desirable/acceptable way is possible. If this occurred, some respondents would have failed to disclose their membership and association with gangs. To the extent that the countervailing factors identified above counter balance each other, the estimates of youth involvement in gangs in Trinidad and Tobago may represent a true picture of the present situation.

While it is difficult to speculate on the relative impact of each factor on the estimates provided by Katz and Fox, the large sample size gathered supports the argument that the estimates provided may be reliable. In support of this assertion, other studies of the prevalence of youth involvement with gangs in the Caribbean have arrived at similar estimates (Ohene et at., 2005).

In addition to assessing gang membership, thirty risk factors as well as thirteen protective factors were measured. These factors belonged to four domains; the community, school, family, and peers-individuals. With respect to risk factors at the community level, measures included low neighbourhood attachment, community disorganization, social mobility and perceived availability of handguns. School level risk factors include academic failure and low commitment to schools. Family risk factors include a family history of antisocial behavior, family conflict, poor family management, permissive attitudes towards the use of alcohol and drugs, and parental attitudes favourable toward antisocial behavior. At the peer-individual level, risk factors include rebelliousness, early initiation into antisocial behavior, early initiation of drug and alcohol use, attitudes favourable to antisocial behavior, having antisocial peers, and sensation seeking. Community, school and family level protective factors included opportunities for prosocial involvement and rewards for prosocial involvement relevant to each context. Peer-individual level protective factors include religiosity, social skills, prosocial attitudes/values, prosocial involvement, and interaction with prosocial peers.[44]

Katz and Fox (2010) employ multinomial logistic regression to examine the relationship between the risk and protective factors and the specified outcome variables. Prior to analysis, collinearity diagnostics were employed, and indicated that there were no multicollinearity problems with the predictors. Risk factors within the peer-individual domain were more important as predictors of gang involvement than predictors from the other domains. Despite this, there were a number of significant predictors within the school, family, and community domains. With respect to the peer-individual domain, it was found that persons who were associated with gang members were more likely to report having antisocial peers and having peers who use illegal drugs and alcohol. Early initiation of antisocial behavior as well as the intention to use drugs predicted former gang membership status.

Current gang members report having more antisocial peers, peers who use illegal drugs, early initiation into antisocial behavior, and the intention to use drugs. Within the community domain, the availability of handguns and residential mobility were important predictors of gang membership. Former gang members were more likely to report higher levels of residential mobility, while the availability of handguns predicted former as well as current gang member status. Within the school domain, it was found that former gang members reported lower commitment to school. Within the family domain it was found that parental attitudes favourable to antisocial behavior predicted the association with gang members.

Katz and Fox (2010) discovered that a number of protective factors were related to gang membership. Within the individual domain it was found that current gang members were less likely to report high levels of social skills or prosocial values and attitudes. Former gang members reported less interaction with prosocial peers as well as having fewer social skills. Contrary to expectations, however, opportunities and rewards for prosocial involvement predicted gang membership. More specifically, it was found that reporting rewards for prosocial involvement increased one's odds of being a former gang member as well as a gang associate. Within the school domain, current gang members were more likely to report opportunities for prosocial involvement, while former gang members reported more opportunities for prosocial involvement in the family domain. Katz and Fox speculate that rewards for prosocial involvement, as well as actual prosocial involvement may serve to increase gang involvement since such involvement may bring current gang members in contact with at-risk youths, as well as youths who are not currently in gangs.

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[44] For a complete list of measures, as well as the questionnaire used, refer to Katz and Fox, 2010, Table 1 and Appendix A.

Socialization effects and peer influence processes may serve to encourage youths in the latter two categories into a pro-criminal lifestyle. Alternatively, it may be the case that opportunities for prosocial interaction may be created in communities which are perceived to be at risk. If both processes are operative, this ironically may indicate that social programmes which aim to provide prosocial opportunities for at-risk youths may inadvertently create opportunities for socialization into pro-criminal values and attitudes. This suggests that in designing intervention strategies, care should be taken to minimize the opportunities whereby at-risk youths are socialized into a culture of deviance by gang-involved youths. One possibility here may be to focus upon those interventions which target factors in the community, school, family, and in individuals, but which do not require interaction among at-risk youths. That said, it should be acknowledged that further research is needed in Trinidad and Tobago to fully clarify the relationship between gang involvement and opportunities for prosocial involvement.

Katz and Fox (2010) conduct analyses to assess the cumulative effect of multiple risk and protective factors. Respondents who were exposed to a greater number of risk factors were more likely to be gang involved, than those exposed to fewer risk factors. As expected, respondents who were exposed to a greater number of protective factors were less likely to be gang involved than persons who were exposed to fewer protective factors. It was found, for example, that "current gang members were disproportionately in the highest cumulative risk category, next were former gang members, followed by gang associates, and those never in a gang" (Katz and Fox, 2010: p. 194). Importantly, Katz and Fox also found that a number of youths who were exposed to multiple risk factors, but simultaneously exposed to multiple protective factors were not likely to be gang involved. This suggests that protective factors may counteract the effect of risk factors and may be used as interventions for at-risk youth.

Unfortunately however, many youths who live in at-risk communities, schools and families, are not simultaneously exposed to protective factors. The identification of at-risk youths should be followed by intervention programmes aimed at developing a protective environment to buffer the effect of risk factors. Simultaneously, important risk factors must be addressed. This approach suggests that intervention strategies should be two tiered, and focus on both risk as well as protective factors within multiple environments such as the community, school and family. It is important to note here, however, that the findings of Katz and Fox (2010) indicate the critical importance of personal factors and peer influence, vis a vis predictors at other levels of analysis such as the community, school, and family. This implies that interventions which target the individual-peer level of analysis may have a stronger impact on the reduction of delinquency and gang involvement than interventions which target other levels of analysis. It is nevertheless the case that these varying contexts are interrelated, and the importance of not neglecting each context must be stressed.

The finding that the perceived availability of handguns is linked to gang association warrants closer attention. This association suggests that persons who live in communities where there are many handguns may join gangs for protection (Klein and Maxon, 2006; Decker and Winkle, 1996; Peterson et al., 2004). If this is the case, feelings of fear and a lack of perceived community solidarity and safety may be a driving force for joining gangs. This suggests that emphasis should be placed on removing firearms from communities while building a sense of social cohesion and trust, such that community members, and youths particularly, do not feel the need to join gangs for protection.

The finding that residential mobility was linked to gang involvement further supports the need for interventions to build community solidarity. Communities characterized by high rates of residential mobility tend to have lower levels of informal social control due to a lack of cohesion and trust among community members. In such fragmented communities, people feel isolated and lack a sense that others in the community care about and are interested in their well-being. As such, there is the need to seek protection from alternate sources such as gangs.   Providing other sources of control as well as security may reduce the need to seek such security from within gang structures.

Quite ironically, residential mobility and the fragmented communities this creates may engender a sense of normlessness and a lack of stability with respect value systems, norms, roles and the like within various communities. Gang structures, while they may be counter-normative, may nevertheless exhibit stability in terms of the expected norms of behavior and codes of conduct which are upheld. It may be the case that some persons may join gangs for the sense of stability and belonging which such structures provide. Social cohesion within neighbourhoods, as well as harmonious family relationships may act as a buffer under such circumstances.

That the family is an important element to consider comes from the finding that youths who are more likely to be associated with gangs come from families which favour antisocial behavior. This idea points specifically to the socialization role of the family but implicates the family as a critical institution in the life of young adults. In this respect, parental ability to adequately supervise and socialize children may be an important factor in building resilience and resistance against gang involvement. Parental skills development is something which does not exist in Trinidad and Tobago, but can be established indirectly through inclusion of relevant content in the high school curricula, or through parental classes for expectant parents. While the study by Katz and Fox (2010) provides important insights into the risk and protective factors at the community, school, family, and peer-individual levels of analyses, research is also required on larger social processes and structures. Such research may suggest additional intervention strategies.

Seepersad (2009) examined the relationship between economic relative deprivation and crime and counter-normative actions in a sample of 950 males drawn from 71 randomly selected districts in Trinidad and Tobago. Respondents were between the ages of 16 to 30 at the time of interview. Relative deprivation occurs when one compares oneself (egoistic) or one's in-group (fraternal) to a comparison referent and discovers that one or one's in-group is economically deprived relative to the comparison referent. Outcome measures in this study included past year self-reported criminal offending, lifetime self-reported criminal offending, willingness to participate in counter-normative political actions, actual participation in counter-normative political actions, willingness to participate in counter-normative non-political actions, and actual participation in counter-normative non-political actions. Seepersad (2009) found that cognitive relative deprivation (the recognition of deprivation) led to affective relative deprivation (feelings associated with deprivation, e.g. anger, frustration, resentment) which in turn led to crime and counter-normative actions.

This finding applied to both personal (egoistic) and group (fraternal) relative deprivation. It was further discovered that a number of additional variables conditioned or moderated this causal pathway. More specifically, personal deprivation was found to lead to stronger emotional responses if persons were pessimistic about their deprivation being relieved in the future, while at the group level, higher levels of optimism about future economic improvements were related to stronger emotional responses. Both types of deprivation also lead to stronger emotional responses when persons believed that financial success and wealth are important. It was also discovered that where respondents had criminal peers, relative deprivation was more likely to lead to crime and counter-normative actions than if respondents did not have criminal peers. It was also found that the recognition of personal deprivation was more likely to lead to depression and lower self-esteem if people blamed themselves for their deprivation than if they did not. Persons who were not optimistic that their deprivation would be relieved in the future were more depressed than persons who were optimistic. While this study focused on relative deprivation, a number of additional variables were included in the analyses. Other important predictors of crime and counter-normative actions were criminal values and attitudes, having criminal peers, the availability of illegal opportunities and low self control.

Primary data gathered for the present study measured a number of indicators of crime and insecurity. Measures include crime in the community, victimization (past year and past ten years), domestic violence, gang presence and gang violence, self-reported criminal offending and fear of crime.[45] A number of important predictor variables were also measured. These include a range of demographic variables, community cohesion, societal cohesion, and informal social control. Each outcome measure was regressed on the range of predictor variables indicated above (see Figure 4.2 for a summary of the findings of these analyses).

Three measures assessed the level of criminogenic behaviour.[46] The first is the level of crime in the community, in which respondents indicated whether or not each of thirteen specified crimes had occurred in their community within the last year. The responses to these items were summed to create the measure of crime in the community. Significant predictors of crime in the community were age, the level of education, community cohesion, and informal social control. The two other measures which were used to assess criminogenic behaviour were the level of criminal victimization experienced within the last ten years and within the last year. In each case, respondents were presented with a list of eighteen specified crimes and asked to indicate the frequency with which they had been victimized within the respective time periods. Overall measures were created as the sum of responses within each time period. For both measures, significant predictors were gender, education, and societal cohesion. Ethnicity and income were also significant predictors of victimization within the last ten years, while informal social control was a significant predictor of victimization within the last year.

A number of consistencies exist with respect to the predictors of the three measures of criminogenic behaviour. With respect to ethnicity it was found that persons of East Indian and Mixed descent were more likely than persons of African descent to be victimized within the last ten years. It was further discovered that education is significantly and positively related to all outcome measures. This indicates that persons who are more educated are more likely to be victimized, and at the community level, indicates that victimization occurs more frequently in communities with a higher average level of education. This is not surprising since, on average, education tends to be positively correlated with income so that persons with higher educational levels tend to have a greater level of material possessions, or at least are perceived to do so. Having more possessions increases the number of opportunities for criminal victimization, at least where property crimes are concerned. If actual or threatened violence is used in the acquisition of such property, then such crimes will be classified as violent crimes, indicating the possibility that such persons could also be the victims of violent crimes.

This was confirmed by supplemental analysis (not shown in Figure 4.2) in which education was positively and significantly related to both property and violent victimization within the last ten years and property crime within the last year. Community cohesion, societal cohesion and informal social control were significantly negatively related to the three measures of criminogenic behaviour. More specifically, community cohesion was a significant predictor of crime in the community ($\beta = -.143$, $p < .001$), while societal cohesion was a significant predictor of victimization within the last ten years ($\beta = -.059$, $p < .05$) and victimization within the last year ($\beta = -.089$, $p < .004$), and informal social control was a significant predictor of crime in the community ($\beta = -.065$, $p < .016$) and past year victimization ($\beta = -.056$, $p < .04$). These findings are not surprising, as much criminological literature has indicated that tightly knit communities are better able to regulate behaviour through informal systems of control. In such communities, members have a stake in the community and feel a sense of kinship and responsibility to their fellow men, and as a consequence are willing to intervene when prosocial norms are broken.

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[45] Technical notes on scale computation for these and other variables appear in Appendix 3.
[46] See the first three data columns in Figure 4.2.

What is interesting about the findings is that the cohesion measures exhibit an independent influence on criminogenic behaviour net of the effect of informal social control (at least in the case of crime in the community and past year victimization). This indicates that while societal or community cohesion may exert an influence on criminogenic behaviour through its effect on informal systems of control, such cohesion results in behaviour regulation through other means quite apart from its influence on informal social control. This implies that in Trinidad and Tobago, interventions which seek to reduce crime and insecurity can focus both on developing cohesion and on enhancing systems of social control.

Significant predictors of domestic violence were age, gender, and societal cohesion. Age was significantly inversely related to domestic violence (β = -.057, p < .027). Here, older persons were more likely to be victims of domestic violence than younger persons. This may be the case simply because older persons have spent greater lengths of time in relationships or have had more relationships than younger persons, thus increasing the number of opportunities available for incidents of abuse to occur. The data also indicate that females are more likely to be victims of domestic violence than males (β = .15, p < .001). This finding is consistent with much international literature. Quite importantly, it was found that societal cohesion was inversely related to domestic violence (β = -.083, p < .006). This is consistent with the argument in Chapter 1 that societal conditions can either encourage or discourage domestic violence. In this case, higher levels of societal cohesion can serve to reduce the incidence of domestic violence.

Societal cohesion could result in greater support for victims and could even serve to increase the provision of advice and counseling to abusers or potential abusers. In addition, persons who feel more closely integrated into their society may experience a greater sense of belonging and well being, and may thus be better adjusted than persons who are not as closely integrated. It may be the case that better adjusted persons have greater skill at resolving relational conflicts when they occur, or that better adjusted persons simply have fewer conflicts in their relationships. It is also possible that societal cohesion can reduce domestic violence by exerting an influence through informal systems of social control. In this respect, it should be noted that supplemental analyses, not shown in Figure 4.2, indicate that once the domestic violence regression equation was recomputed but with the societal cohesion measure omitted, community cohesion became significant (β = -.089, p < .001), while informal social control almost became significant (β = -.048, p < .076). When community cohesion was removed from this equation, informal social control became significant (β = -.079, p < .002).

This seems to suggest that in addition to exerting an effect on domestic violence through informal social control, societal cohesion is also capable of reducing domestic violence through its effect on community cohesion. That is, societies which are more closely integrated result in more closely integrated communities, which in turn serves as a buffer against domestic violence. With respect to gangs, 13.9% of the respondents indicated that there were criminal gangs in their neighbourhood. Of these, 49.5% indicated that gangs posed a slight problem, while 41.9% indicated that gangs posed a serious problem for their neighbourhood. Slightly over 11% of the respondents indicated that criminal gangs had become a problem in their neighbourhood within the last year, while 18.5% indicated that the time frame was between one and three years, 24.3% indicated that the time frame was between three to five years, and 36% indicated that gangs had become a problem more than five years ago. Of those who indicated that there were criminal gangs in their neighbourhoods, 82.4% indicated that gangs had made their neighbourhood a less safe place, while a small minority (3.2%) indicated that gangs had made their neighbourhoods safer. Slightly over 14% of the respondents in neighbourhoods with gangs indicated that there was a large amount of gang violence in their neighbourhood, while 45.5% indicated that there was some violence, 34.2% indicated that there was only a little violence, while 5% indicated that there was no violence.[47]

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[47] These cross tabulations do not add up to 100% since some interviewees responded 'don't know'.

The above findings are summarized in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1
Survey findings: Gangs in Trinidad and Tobago

	Percent
There are criminal gangs in my neighbourhood	13.9
Gangs pose a serious problem	41.9
Gangs pose a slight problem	49.5
Gangs make the neighbourhood a less safe place	82.4
Gangs make the neighbourhood a safer place	3.2
Large amount of gang violence in neighbourhood	14.4
Some gang violence in neighbourhood	45.5
Little gang violence in neighbourhood	34.2
No gang violence in neighbourhood	5.0

Regression analyses indicated that age, income, community cohesion, societal cohesion and informal social control are significant predictors of the measures of gang presence, gang problems and gang violence (see columns 5 to 7 in Figure 4.2). More specifically, lower levels of income were related to a higher likelihood of gang presence in neighbourhoods. This indicates that gangs are more likely to be located in poorer areas. Age was positively related to gang violence. This may simply indicate that older persons are more sensitive to incidents of violence (or that younger persons are more desensitized to violence), and as such, older persons may perceive that there are greater levels of violence than younger persons. Community cohesion as well as societal cohesion suppressed gang problems and gang violence in neighbourhoods.[48] More specifically, high levels of each type of cohesion were related to lower levels of gang problems and gang violence. Notably, each type of cohesion exhibited independent influence on gang problems and violence. Informal social control was also found to exhibit a suppressive effect on gang violence.[49] This may indicate that informal systems of control are effective in reducing gang violence, but could also indicate that higher levels of gang violence may exert a suppressive effect on informal systems of behaviour regulation.

Self-reported criminal offending represents a measure of personal offending.[50] Significant predictors of self-reported criminal offending were age, gender, education, community cohesion, and societal cohesion. Age was significantly negatively related to personal offending ($\beta = -.087$, $p < .001$) where older persons were less likely to be involved in criminal offending. Education was similarly negatively related to personal offending ($\beta = -.091$, $p < .001$) where more educated persons were less likely to offend. Not surprisingly, males were more likely to commit offences when compared to females ($\beta = -.199$, $p < .001$). While lower levels of societal cohesion was related to higher levels of personal offending ($\beta = -.095$, $p < .002$), contrary to expectations it was found that higher levels of community cohesion was related to higher levels of personal offending ($\beta = .066$, $p < .034$). This finding may be explained if we consider the simultaneous effects of low societal cohesion and high community cohesion. Low levels of societal cohesion may indicate the isolation of various communities, where such community members feel excluded from the institutions and opportunities provided by the wider society.

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[48] The positive coefficients for community and societal cohesion as predictors of gang violence result from the codings used. A high score represents high levels of cohesion for both measures. Gang problems was coded such that a high score represented a high level of problems whereas gang violence was coded such that a high score represents a low level of violence.

[49] The positive coefficient for the effect of informal social control on gang violence occurs for a similar reason as does the positive coefficients of the community and societal control measures in this equation (see the previous footnote).

[50] See column 8 in Figure 4.2.

This may encourage the development of community cohesion for such isolated communities. Such internal cohesion may serve as a means of protecting the members of such communities from the wider society which may be perceived to be antagonistic to the members within such communities. Higher level of community cohesion in turn may facilitate interaction between persons who do and persons who do not commit criminal offences. Since this occurs within the context of socially isolated communities, such communities may develop norms and values which go against those of the wider society, that is, such communities could develop norms which value criminal offending. If this is the case, then persons who do not normally commit criminal offences may potentially be socialized into criminal offending. This is consistent with the research of Katz and Fox (2010) who found that greater opportunities for prosocial involvement was related to a higher likelihood of becoming involved with gangs.

It will be recalled that Katz and Fox speculate that prosocial involvement may serve to increase gang involvement since such involvement may bring current gang members in contact with at-risk youths, as well as youths who are not currently in gangs. Socialization effects and peer influence processes may serve to encourage youths in the latter two categories into a pro-criminal lifestyle. Given that data from Katz and Fox (2010) and the present study both derive from Trinidad and Tobago and have consistent findings in this respect, this indicates that policy makers and practitioners must be aware of the potential negative effects of socialization processes when criminogenic and non-criminogenic persons interact. Policy makers should also be aware of the potential negative effects which could occur when communities are socially isolated from the wider society.

The final measure of insecurity which was employed was fear of crime. Two submeasures (worry and safety) were employed.[51] The findings across the two measures are almost perfectly consistent. Significant predictors of both measures are age, ethnicity, education, community cohesion, and societal cohesion. Additionally, income and informal social control were significant predictors of the safety (but not the worry) measure of fear of crime. With respect to ethnicity, persons of African descent worried less about crime and felt safer than persons of other ethnicities, while persons of Indian and Mixed descent worried more about their safety, and persons of Mixed descent additionally felt more fearful for their safety than persons of other ethnicities. Where income was concerned, persons with higher income levels felt more fearful for their safety than persons with lower incomes.

Education was positively related to both worry and safety. More specifically, persons who were more educated experienced greater levels of worry and felt more fearful for their safety. Community cohesion and societal cohesion were inversely related to both measures of fear of crime. That is, fear was higher where there were lower levels of community and societal cohesion. Informal social control was negatively related to the safety measure of fear of crime. This indicates that where there were high levels of informal social control, people felt safer than where there were low levels of social control.

When the pattern of findings is considered as a whole, the most important predictors of crime and insecurity are societal and community cohesion (significant predictors of nine and seven outcome measures respectively). Education and age are each a significant predictor of six of the ten outcome measures employed. Gender is a significant predictor in five of the ten equations computed, while informal social control is significant in four equations. Ethnicity and income are each significant predictors of three of the outcome measures examined. Our findings indicate that interventions which are aimed to reduce crime and insecurity should focus on community and societal cohesion. Both variables are related measures, though one operates at the community level while the other operates at the national level.

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[51] See columns 9 and 10 in Figure 4.2.

Despite the similarity in both constructs, each has distinct implications and can exist without the other. For example, we can have communities with a high amount of internal cohesion, yet at same time, such communities can be ostracized by and isolated from the rest of society. While our data indicate that on average higher levels of community cohesion reduces crime and insecurity, it is entirely possible that if such communities feel a sense of isolation from the larger society (that is, if there is low societal cohesion), then such communities can develop and reinforce norms which are at odds with those of the wider society. Persons who feel a sense of isolation from the wider society may not feel compelled to conform to prosocial norms of behaviour, especially if such norms are perceived to be a product of the wider society. Where pro-criminal norms develop in socially isolated communities, residents, and indeed youths as well, may feel that they need to defend such norms as a form of defiance against the wider society.

In such situations it may be difficult or impossible for the average person, and more so for youths, to transcend such counter-normative systems and adhere to the prosocial norms which are expected of the wider society. This reasoning indicates that in Trinidad and Tobago we must be careful to avoid situations where entire communities are stereotyped and isolated from the wider society. Such stereotyping immediately sets up barriers to achievement via conventional means since the legitimate opportunity structure normally provided by the wider society may not be accessible to persons in such communities. When this occurs persons in such communities may need to 'innovate' to achieve the success goals which are normally expected in the society. Where such success goals include the acquisition of financial wealth, such innovators may resort to illegal means of achieving such success goals. Overall, the findings suggest that policies should aim at building *both* societal and community cohesion.

The findings further suggest that policy makers should focus on the possibility of manipulating education to reduce crime and insecurity. It was found that education reduced the likelihood of committing criminal offences. These findings suggest that education is an important factor for consideration, especially where marginalized and at-risk youths and communities are concerned. The education system functions as a selection mechanism to allocate persons to the various roles in society. Persons who are not successful within the educational system may not be allocated to roles where they have opportunities to achieve the level of material wealth or other success goals which they desire. A focus on literacy and on ensuring that at-risk persons have access to the support systems necessary to ensure that they persist with their education and are eventually successful will go a long way to reducing crime and insecurity. If youths are allowed to drop out of the school system, and if there are no mechanisms for monitoring and following up on excessive truancy, then such youths may become vulnerable to joining gangs and other counter-normative groups.

Such monitoring mechanisms may help to reduce the likelihood that such at-risk youths could end up becoming involved in a criminal lifestyle. Truancy in schools is something which should not be ignored, and instead should be aggressively pursued by following up with parents or guardians. Frequent absenteeism may be a signal that youths are becoming involved in counter normative and illegal behaviour. Also within this context, preschool education becomes important. Research has shown that students who are afforded preschool education are more likely to achieve academic success as they progress through the various stages of their education (Schiefelbein, 1981). The move toward universal preschool education in Trinidad and Tobago is, therefore, a step in the right direction. In Trinidad and Tobago, this is part of a larger initiative to provide universal education, at least up to the secondary level, and to provide affordable education even at the tertiary level.[52] While such initiatives are important, it must be stressed that the provision of education alone is not sufficient. The availability or education does not mean that quality education will be accessed. While educational opportunities may be available, as stated above, at-risk youths may be the ones least likely to benefit from such opportunities.

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[52] Currently the government pays fully or partially for tertiary education in Trinidad and Tobago, depending on the particular course of study.

Measures must be put in place to ensure that these opportunities are utilized to their full potential. While education is an important predictor, a focus on education also comes with disadvantages. While more educated people are less likely to commit criminal offences, they are also more likely to be victimized and are more fearful than persons who are less educated. If the benefits of education could be maximized, however, this should reduce the number of offenders and subsequently erode the level of victimization and fear for persons with higher levels of education.

Income was related to three of the outcome measures of crime and insecurity. These measures included victimization within the last ten years, gang presence, and the safety measure of fear of crime. While these data illustrate that there is a relationship between income at the personal level and measures of crime and insecurity, it is also important to assess the relationship between national indicators of economic well being and the level of crime and insecurity. Economic indicators for Trinidad and Tobago are available for the period 1990 to 2008.[53] Correlations were computed using these indicators and the range of crime measures which appear in Appendix 1. Measures of property and violent crime were computed from the data in Appendix 1 and also employed in calculating these correlations.[54] These correlations indicate, almost invariably, that the number of unemployed persons as well as the unemployment rate are inversely related to violent crimes but are positively related to property crimes and narcotic offences (see Figure 4.3).

This indicates that unemployment is related to an increase in property offences and drug usage, whereas lower levels of unemployment (i.e. higher levels of employment) are related to higher levels of violent crime. This can occur where there is a higher level of resource availability and economic well being, but where such economic resources are not equitably distributed within the population. Visible disparities in income and standard of living can create frustration and anger for those who are deprived in society. Such frustration and anger can translate into increased levels of violence. This is supported by other economic data in Trinidad and Tobago (see Figure 4.3).

Both Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Income are positively related to a range of violent crimes including murder, woundings and shootings, rape and sexual offences, kidnapping, robberies, other serious crimes, and total violent crime. In contrast, both constructs are inversely related to narcotic offences and property crimes including burglaries, fraud, and total property crime. The only exception to this rule is with general larceny which is positively related to Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Income. While data on the distribution of economic resources is not available for the time period under consideration, these findings strongly suggest that increasing wealth and economic well being, if unaccompanied by an equitable distribution of such wealth, can result in increased levels of violent crime. While national efforts should focus on increasing overall wealth, policy makers should put measures in place which ensure that the poor and dispossessed share in some of the wealth which is generated.

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[53] See Appendix 4.

[54] Violent crime = murder, wounding and shooting, rape, serious indecency, kidnapping, and robberies. Property crime = burglaries, fraud, and general larceny.

Figure 4.2[55]
Predictors of crime and insecurity

Predictors	Dependent Variables									
	Crime in the community	Victimization (past 10 years)	Victimization (past year)	Domestic violence	Gang presence	Gang problems	Gang violence	Self-reported offending	Fear of crime (worry)	Fear of crime (safety)
Age	-.066**			-.057*			.106***	-.087***	-.044[56]	-.057*
Gender		-.072**	-.072**	.15***				-.199***	.051*	
Ethnicity		[57]							[58]	[59]
Income		-.046[60]			-.059*					-.051*
Education	.063*	.114***	.070**					-.091***	.120***	.119***
Community cohesion	-.143***				.080**	-.083**	.064*	.066*	-.087**	-.094**
Societal cohesion		-.059*	-.089**	-.083**	.127***	-.112***	.129***	-.095**	-.073*	-.081**
Informal social control	-.065*		-.056*				.082**			-.124***

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Figure 4.3
Correlations between economic indicators and crime measures

Correlations

	Murder	Wounding & Shooting	Rape & Sexual Offences	Serious Indecency	Kidnapping	Narcotic Offences	Burglaries	Robberies	Fraud	General Larceny	Other Serious Crimes	Violent crime	Property crime
Labour Force (in thousands)	.815**	.615*	.938**	-.331	.876**	-.742**	-.911**	.624**	-.498*	.768**	.840**	.786**	-.742**
Employment (in thousands)	.832**	.655**	.953**	-.132	.889**	-.747**	-.924**	.638**	-.340	.821**	.871**	.813**	-.778**
Unemployment	-.884**	-.656**	-.928**	.222	-.815**	.756**	.893**	-.632**	.461*	-.817**	-.826**	-.802**	.753**
Unemployment rate (%)	-.844**	-.637**	-.947**	.139	-.861**	.746**	.927**	-.621**	.377	-.814**	-.855**	-.798**	.789**
Gross Domestic Product	.966**	.718**	.869**	-.381	.703**	-.724**	-.756**	.706**	-.542*	.847**	.770**	.842**	-.568*
Gross National Income	.967**	.707**	.864**	-.383	.691**	-.717**	-.747**	.697**	-.554*	.846**	.767**	.833**	-.559*

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

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[55] Standardized regression coefficients are shown.
[56] p < .083
[57] African descent β = .244***, East Indian descent β = -.225***, Mixed descent β = -.161**
[58] African descent β = .285***, Mixed descent β = -.128*
[59] African descent β = .117*, East Indian descent β = .104, p < .07
[60] p < .081

The focus of this chapter was on risk factors and determinants which facilitate crime and insecurity. Policy makers must be mindful of three key issues if they intend to manipulate risk factors to reduce crime and insecurity. The first has to do with the level of aggregation at which the risk factors and outcomes are situated, the second with the preventative versus reactive distinction, and the third with the amount of variance which each risk factor explains in the outcome measures of interest. The level of aggregation at which risk factors are situated is an important consideration. Risk factors may be situated at the aggregate (social structural) level of analysis or at the individual (personal) level of analysis and can be located anywhere along this continuum.

As such, risk factors which are targeted may operate at the level of the society, community, school, family, or individual. The manipulation of risk factors at any given level of analysis usually targets specific outcomes at the same level of aggregation, though there are obviously linkages among the different levels of analysis. Knowing that there are differing levels of analysis helps in the organization of intervention strategies since multiple levels of analyses can be targeted simultaneously. This also aids in evaluation research since well-specified predictors usually lend themselves to a clear understanding of what outcomes may be expected when such predictors are manipulated.

The second issue relates to the preventative versus reactive distinction. This sensitizes policy makers and researchers to the fact that interventions can be put in place to *prevent* the escalation of crime and insecurity, but where these do occur, interventions can also be targeted to reduce the likelihood of the reoccurrence of criminal offending. This report previously drew upon the ideas of Brantingham and Faust (1976) who made the distinction between primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. Primary prevention referred to those intervention strategies which target an outcome behaviour before it happens. Examples include preschool education and social skills training for adolescents.

 Secondary prevention targets at-risk persons and communities, while tertiary prevention is the more reactive approach which typifies the functioning of the Criminal Justice Systems of many countries. While many populations may prefer the reactive-type strategies because of their visibility and perceived short-term effects, preventative strategies are just as important. While these may be long-term in terms of their outcomes, such strategies over the long run reduce the burden of crime and insecurity faced by the Criminal Justice System, facilitating more manageable and efficient operations.

Another advantage of preventative interventions is that their effects tend to be more lasting. Chapter 8 will utilize the ideas of levels of analysis and a preventative versus a reactive approach to crime prevention to develop a conceptual framework for considering risk factors (see Figure 8.1). The final issue of importance when considering intervention strategies has to do with the amount of variance which each predictor explains in the outcome variables of interest. Simply put, some risk factors have a more powerful impact on crime and insecurity, and where these are manipulable, it makes more sense to tackle such factors since this improves the cost effectiveness of the intervention strategy. Many statistical tools, including multiple regression and analysis of variance can provide estimates of the relative impact of various predictors. Such analyses can be used to guide the formulation of intervention strategies.

Chapter 5
Responses of the population and state to insecurity

In democracies, policy is influenced by the responses of the population to crime. These responses may set the agenda for action and demand greater responsiveness by state agencies and the political administration. They may however also instigate negative outcomes. The responses of the public are not always well informed. And, even when informed, are not always governed by reason. Violent crimes tend to evoke strong emotions. Reactions may be conditioned by the prejudices and biases of the population. These emotions, biases and prejudices may fuel ineffective responses and even undemocratic ones. Out-groups are easily scape-goated, instant solutions are demanded and the underlying causes of the problem, and well-designed prevention programmes that are based on this, are neglected. If policy is to be influenced in socially constructive (and value appropriate) ways, then the responses and policy orientations of the populations must be better understood. This chapter will evaluate the mentalities and behavioural responses of the Trinidad and Tobago population to crime, violence and insecurity. It will also describe other aspects of citizens' subjective responses to insecurity including the fear of personal victimization, group insecurity and levels of confidence in state institutions which are integral to the provision of citizen security.

The level of insecurity experienced in any country is tied in to the level of development. Insecurity is a broad term, and refers not only to those psychological and other outcomes of crime, but refers also to the general condition and quality of human life. As such, human development impacts on human security, which in turn has implications for the policy orientation of the population under consideration. The link between human development and security is thus critical. Human development refers not only to the growth of per capita income but is also related to critical factors such as freedom and justice, which are also essential for human beings to lead better lives. The level of human development is also tied to the availability of options ranging from nutrition and education, to income and employment, self-esteem, and to freedom of expression. In the final analysis, these factors should all be enjoyed on a peaceful and permanent basis, in a safe and secure way. Human security is a necessary condition for human development.

The UNDP defines *human security* as "*the liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable*". Human security is reinforced when the state retains the ultimate power of coercion and uses this power to support its commitment to fostering respect for the rights of its citizens. When other groups usurp control of instruments of force or in any way reduce the level of control wielded by the state, whether in real or perceived terms, human security and the perception of such security is negatively impacted. An important component of human security is citizen security. This relates specifically to the risk of becoming a victim of violence or of dispossession. There can be no human development without protection against violent and predatory crime. Citizen security, like the broader construct of human security, is a necessary precondition for human development.

The simple fear of crime reduces our liberties, and our ability to live a normal life. Crime causes the State and all the citizens to divert their scarce resources to pay for the hospitals, jails, police officers, insurance premiums, and other various expenses needed to prevent crime or to correct its adverse effects. Additionally, with respect to globalization, insecurity scares investment way from the country, hinders its economic growth, and produces unemployment. Criminality weakens the social fabric, destroys confidence among people, and erodes the credibility of institutions as well as the respect for the rule of law. In short, citizen insecurity is a serious obstacle to the human development of any country.

From the perspective of human development, citizen security has several major implications:

1. Attention should not center on the crime itself nor on the offender – as in conventional criminology – but should focus first on the actual or the potential victim of those crimes. The main interest of Human Development should therefore be the protection of citizens against the violent or predatory actions which negatively impact their basic opportunities or liberties.
2. The very concept of Human Development would imply a universally accepted definition of ethics.
3. The distinctive mark of the human development paradigm is its recognition that public policies should not be directed towards a single goal – for example, wealth – or to maximize a single value – for example, efficiency. This recognition stems from the fact that there exists a plurality of values which, although not always compatible with one another, are worth pursuing for their own sake.

From the standpoint of human development, the challenge is to find a policy or a program which would effectively contribute to the *simultaneous* achievement of the several values. Citizen security is in and of itself a human value which depends directly on elements of freedom and equity. Yet in order to achieve freedom and equity, sacrifices must be made or negative "collateral effects" must, by necessity, be expected. With respect to freedom, one civil liberty or another has to be sacrificed or some "soft" legal provisions will be ignored in order to control crime. With respect to equity, it is difficult to maintain in the face of increasing criminality, and society adopts an "everyone is to fend for himself" attitude, even though this implies that the weak in society will be unprotected. The challenge for a human development report is to single out the strategies that will provide effective security for everybody with freedom and equity for all. "Effective security" means an actual reduction in the crime rates and in the probability of being victimized by criminals.

The Trinidad and Tobago population accords critical importance to issues of citizen security. Indeed, primary data gathered for this project indicate that crime is one of the most serious concerns of the population of Trinidad and Tobago. Respondents were asked to indicate what is the most serious issue facing the country. The largest proportion of respondents (37.8%) indicated that violent crime was the most pressing concern. This was followed by the cost of food (13.5%), unemployment (10.3%), the cost of living (7.9%), access to health care (7%), property crime (5.5%), corruption (4.1%), housing (3.8%), insecurity (3.1%), and poverty (2.3%). These data are illustrated in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1
Most serious issue faced by the country

While violent crime is the most pressing concern of the population, the perception of crime does not always mirror the realities of crime. Yet, the ability to properly distinguish between perception and reality, as it relates to crime, is critical if we are to understand the problem and design effective policies to address the problem. Since the perception of crime may not mirror the reality of crime, it is dangerous to allow the beliefs of the average citizens to be tainted by fear, prejudice, false information or manipulation. This only serves to exaggerate or in some cases, to minimize the actual magnitude of the problem and, in essence, distort the nature of the real criminal threats facing society. The distortions are oftentimes perpetuated by the media, who can, and sometimes do,

1. Exaggerate the frequency or the incidence of crime,
2. Stereotype the typical criminal to the detriment of certain segments of society,
3. Generalize from a few observations and, more importantly,
4. Make irresponsible generalizations with respect to the causes of crime, how crime is manifested and possible remedies

There are growing concerns about rampant crime and violence in the English-speaking Caribbean, particularly in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. A March 2007 report by the World Band and the United Nations' Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) revealed that the murder rate in the Caribbean is higher than in any other region of the world. Drug trafficking has been consistently cited as both a root cause and a proximate cause of much of this criminal activity and is a major security concern for the Caribbean community especially given the social, institutional, and economic ramifications.

While the concern for crime is paramount in the population, the data above indicate that there are several other pressing concerns, most notably those related to economic well being (e.g. the cost of food, the cost of living, and unemployment). These represent important issues which must be addressed if human security broadly speaking is to be improved in Trinidad and Tobago. While the larger issue of human security is an important one, the more specific issue of citizen security also warrants closer scrutiny. As far as Trinidad and Tobago is concerned, the "popular ideology" about citizen insecurity could be narrowed down to a dozen or so extended, but inexact, beliefs. In attempting to assess these beliefs, respondents who were interviewed for this study were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with a number of issues which attempted to tap into the policy orientation of the population as it relates to citizen security.

A number of items attempted tap the extent to which the population believed that a more punitive approach is required to address the crime situation in Trinidad and Tobago (see Figure 5.2). Fully 89.8% of the population agreed or strongly agreed that criminals should be more harshly punished, while 75.2% supported the death penalty. This is consistent with the overwhelming belief (90.2% agreed or strongly agreed) that criminals represent a threat to the way of life in Trinidad and Tobago. Despite this, responses indicated that the population was not of the opinion that only reactive, punitive-type approaches are required. Indeed, a large proportion of the respondents were strongly in support of preventative measures as a means of addressing the crime problem. Fully 89.1% of the respondents believed that education was an important initiative in this respect, while 91% supported initiatives for youths.

Job creation, the reduction of poverty, as well as investment in poor urban communities were also seen as critical (92%, 90.5%, and 89.1% respectively agreed or strongly agreed). In addition to this, 89% believed that reducing corruption would reduce crime levels in the society. This preventative orientation was consistent with a lack of support for a number of policy alternatives.

More specifically, only 31.8% of respondents believed that police should be given a free hand to kill criminals, while only 33.7% believed that building more prisons was the solution. Further, only 17.2% of respondents believed that easier access to firearms by law-abiding citizens represented a viable means to reduce crime. Similarly, only 11.8% believed that only a military government could reduce crime. This does not mean, however, that the population was not in support of the use of the military in crime suppression. Almost half of the persons surveyed (53%) believed that the government should rely more on the military in order to reduce crime.

In a similar manner, the police was also seen as important. A large proportion of respondents (72.5%) believed that the government should invest more in the Police Service, though only a minority (17.9%) believed that it was alright for the police to break the law to control crime. In contrast to this, it is interesting to note that a notable proportion of the respondents (42%) believed that human rights represented an obstacle to effective crime control. While respondents expressed a broad spectrum of views, both with the reactive/punitive as well as the preventative orientation, a small proportion of the respondents believed that there was no remedy to the crime problem in Trinidad and Tobago (15.7%) and that nothing could be done to control crime (12.1%).

Figure 5.2
Percent agreed or strongly agreed on issues related to citizen security (n = 1595)

1. I feel that my society is fundamentally unjust (unfair)	51.4
2. I feel that my society is fundamentally law abiding	30.9
3. Criminals should be more harshly punished	89.8
4. I support the death penalty	75.2
5. Criminals are a threat to our way of life	90.2
6. Human rights are obstacles to more effective crime control	42.0
7. It is alright for the police to break the law in order to better control violent crimes	17.9
8. The police should be given a free hand to kill criminal gunmen	31.8
9. In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in the police force/service	72.5
10. In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in education	89.1
11. In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in programmes for young people	91.0
12. In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in job creation	92.0
13. In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in reducing corruption	89.2
14. In order to reduce crime, the government should invest more in the communities of the urban poor	89.1
15. In order to reduce crime the government should invest more in reducing poverty.	90.5
16. In order to reduce crime, the government should build more prisons	33.7
17. In order to reduce crime, the government should rely more on the military	53.0
18. In order to reduce crime, people should be allowed easier access to firearms.	17.2
19. In order to reduce crime dons should be used as agents of crime control	11.0
20. The problem of crime has no remedy	15.7
21. Only a military government can effectively control crime	11.8
22. Nothing can be done to control crime in this country	12.1

Additionally, there are several myths that hamper the process of improving citizen security.

1. Citizen (in)security is merely a police issue,
2. The problem of insecurity can be solved by spending more money, putting minors in jail, expediting trials and extending punishments,
3. "Zero tolerance" must be enforced. According to this well-known theory (much questioned in the United States, where it originated) a maximum of severity should be applied to all crimes, beginning with the smaller infringements.

But experience has shown that the problem is more complex. There is no strong statistical correlation, for example, between the increase in the rate of imprisonment and medium or long term reduction in crime rates (Doob et al., 2003). On the one hand we find organized crime, drug trafficking, kidnapping, human trafficking, and the like. These are connected to or are a part of global criminal enterprises. There is no argument that they are serious threats, and society should address them with the full weight of the law. This is why, particularly in Trinidad and Tobago, far reaching reforms to train, modernize, and professionalize the Police Service are needed. This approach is critical to equip law enforcement with the qualifications to efficiently address such tasks as the investigation of money laundering, and, more importantly, to break the link between police officers and organized crime.

In addition to the many traditional insecurities of citizens, there are some nontraditional ones that deserve just as much attention from the standpoint of human development. They are typically referred to as the "invisible" or "hidden" insecurities. These invisible insecurities revolve around specific social groups that are targets of social discrimination in that they are more likely to be victimized and less likely to receive adequate and relevant protection from society. This social discrimination typically affects four groups of people in different ways:
1. Members of specific ethnic/cultural minorities – in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, young males of African descent,
2. Young men and adolescents, especially in poor urban areas such as East Port of Spain,
3. Children, particularly those living in low income households, and
4. Women exposed to violence from their mates and in their immediate home or work environment

With respect to women and children, the hidden insecurity manifests itself in several ways:
1. Levels of juvenile delinquency,
2. The homicide rate of minors,
3. A growing number of rape cases,
4. A growing number of cases of incest,
5. Abuse from relatives and counselors,
6. Violence at home,
7. Violence on school compounds

It is arguable that the process of categorizing insecurities into traditional or invisible categories is directed by the social pathologies that themselves differentiate the "ordinary" from the organized forms of crime. It should also be noted that the (real or perceived) risk of victimization depends on several factors:
1. The type of crime in question,
2. The age and gender of the victim,
3. The social origins and place of residence of the victim,
4. The hour of the day or night and,
5. The specific location under consideration

The failure of the current retributive process is in part due to the fact that there is no such a thing as "citizen *insecurity*" but there are citizen *insecurities*. Drug trafficking is one such phenomenon. It is a growing source of violence and corruption that is fed from extra-regional influences on the demand side, but that also has its roots in Central and South America from the supply side. Regardless of whether we assign blame to the level of demand or the level of supply, the consequences impact the regional community, therefore the solutions will of necessity involve input and action from the regional community. There may, however, be a need to reevaluate the international strategies that have been employed thus far such that they are more culturally specific. Additionally, there may be a need to develop a new approach to drug trafficking as a critical part of a new and revised security initiative.

In contrast to the level of insecurity caused by street crime in Trinidad and Tobago, there is another major source of insecurity that is seldom considered as such, one that traditional studies typically fail to mention. This source of objective insecurity is corruption. Corruption is defined by the UNDP as *the undue appropriation of public, or collective property* - that is, property belonging to each and every citizen. In this context, corruption takes one of three principal modalities:

1. One of inaction in which the failure of authorities to act on behalf of the public interest perpetuates the de facto power of the perpetrators,
2. The acceptance of bribes in cash or in kind, by a public officer, sometimes of the highest rank,
3. The small scale corruption in which many citizens are involved e.g. requesting an illegal fee or paying a fee in exchange for electoral support

The first obligation of the State is to guarantee the security of its citizens. In order to effectively carry out this charge, citizen security should be treated as a public issue, and therefore be subject to public scrutiny. Security is not an issue for the police only or for any other specialized agency for that matter. All modern societies entrust the core responsibility for crime prevention and public control to the three arms of the criminal justice system; the police, the courts and the prisons. Trinidad and Tobago is no exception, and, like all the other states in the region, continues to make, support, and sustain those three institutions.

In Trinidad and Tobago, the current situation is such that the Police Service, the Judiciary and the Prisons are all overwhelmed by the exceptionally high rates of crime. This contributes directly or indirectly to the level of citizen response to crime and violence.[61] Citizens acknowledge several weaknesses in the processes of the criminal justice system which negatively impact upon crime and violence. These include:

1. Poor quality of judicial investigation which results, in many cases, in a lack of evidence to identify, detain and sanction offenders,
2. A shortage of competent lawyers to represent detainees who do not have the resources to retain private attorneys. This has resulted in a phenomenon of 'prison for the poor' and,
3. The ineffectiveness of the correctional system, which includes ineffective or nonexistent rehabilitation program and in which inmates are socialized into the values, culture, and skills required for becoming 'better' criminals

This, tempered by the inadequate service provided by the police, bottlenecks in the courts and overcrowding in the prisons, has caused the average citizen to feel overwhelmed by the apparent state of lawlessness.

Recent trends such as deportations of criminals from countries such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom have created additional pressures on communities that are already at risk.

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[61] These problems and deficiencies will be discussed in more detail in the Chapter 7.

The increasing crime levels since the 1990s also represent a disturbing trend. This trend feeds levels of fear among citizens. Rising levels of crime and violence as well as perceptions of insecurity among citizens and visitors (particularly in Tobago) have also negatively impacted the business community and the ability of the country to leverage its energy-based resources towards economic growth. This also impedes social development, particularly in poor, high-risk communities. The public sector's capacity to address these issues is presently insufficient (Barnes and Seepersad, 2008).

The growth in violence in the past two decades has been one of the major challenges for the development of the twin island republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Homicide rates, which are three times the global average (34.3[62] per one hundred thousand inhabitants versus 10.7[63]), make this region one of the most violent in the world. While there is no doubt that homicides paint a more dramatic picture of violence, acts against property are a normal, daily occurrence in specific areas of Trinidad and Tobago. For individuals walking the streets of East Port of Spain, for example, there is a constant threat of being mugged or assaulted and stabbed or shot as a part of the mugging.

This is perhaps the most common expression of the urban violence phenomenon that has manifested in the 'hot spots' of Trinidad and Tobago. These trends have led to an escalation of fear among ordinary citizens. Those who can afford it have resorted to taller than usual fences with barbed wire, purchasing guard dogs and hiring private security. Although this trend has a positive economic impact vis-à-vis a growing number of private security companies, dog breeding which now feeds an increase in the number of veterinarians, and other related industries, the negative impact of violence on physical, human, and social capital cannot be ignored (Moser and Shrader, 1999).

Human security cannot only be measured on an objective and a subjective level but it can also be measured in quantitative and qualitative terms. As such, no single composite index of human security would be valid, reliable or sufficiently sensitive to the varying levels of human security and to the different circumstances that exist in the region. Rather, in measuring levels of human security, it becomes necessary to evaluate discrete quantitative indicators and opinion surveys at the regional, sub-regional and country levels. Regardless of which level is being evaluated, the presence or absence of human security is measured by four criteria:

1. The degree to which citizens accept their state,
2. The degree to which the state complies with international charters pertaining to human rights,
3. The manner in which the state utilizes its monopoly of the means of force and coercion,
4. The degree to which institutional checks and balances prevent abuses of power

Weaknesses in any of these areas represent threats to citizen security. Citizen security has become one of the main concerns of the population of the Trinidad and Tobago and it is a formidable obstacle to sustainable human development. People and communities see their lives and their institutional options restricted by threats against personal and patrimonial security, as well as their access to basic public goods and services.

Locally, many processes have been implemented to improve the quality of this essential public service. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service would argue, for example, that they have reengineered themselves to present a more civilian friendly face. The results of the victimization survey belie this argument. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service would also argue that they have adopted a degree of professionalization and that they now work in closer tandem with the communities.

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[62] Based on homicide data for the period 2005 to 2010.
[63] Based on the Global Burden of Armed Violence Report. Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.

Again, the results of the survey indicate that there is room for continued improvement in this area. Additionally, a growing number of crime prevention programs have been launched, and new preventive units of the police have been created. The criminal justice system has also been reformed to leave behind the traditional formalism in favor of procedural efficiency, with better qualified personnel and with better equipped offices.

These and other innovations have been implemented to improve the provision of citizen security. Unfortunately, it would appear that many of the reforms are more of form rather than of substance, and from a practical perspective, one cannot expect institutions as complex as the police, the judiciary and the prisons to change overnight. In spite of their ongoing reforms, the three institutions are still overwhelmed by the new wave of violence and insecurity that has been plaguing the country. Additionally, social issues such as unemployment, inequality, and the lack of social welfare policies continue to contribute to increased levels of criminality.

The victimization survey findings underscore that fear for personal safety is relatively widespread. This is not surprising given that 23.9% of the sample were criminally victimized within the last ten years, while 10.2% were victimized within the last year. Within the last year, one in two persons felt fearful of becoming a victim of crime. In addition, 10% of the respondents felt unsafe or very unsafe in their homes at night, while 9.2% felt similarly unsafe in their workplace. Somewhat more than 7% of the respondents felt unsafe or very unsafe in their neighbourhoods during the day, while one in four persons felt similarly unsafe in their neighbourhoods at night.

The survey also discovered that 38.4% of the respondents felt that living in Trinidad and Tobago was insecure or very insecure. It is thus not surprising that respondents engaged in a range of protective behaviours. When going out, 39% of the respondents planned their routes to avoid dangerous places, while 31.5% of the sample travel in groups if they have to go out at night. Interestingly during the day 4.8% of the sample occasionally carried a weapon for protection, while another 8.7% carried a weapon most of the time or all of the time. In the night these percentages increase slightly, with 5.8% carrying a weapon occasionally and 8.9% carrying a weapon most of the time or all of the time.

The perceived lack of effective police response has contributed to widespread dissatisfaction with the TTPS performance, exacerbating feelings of insecurity, and undermining trust in government institutions. Fully 62.3% of the respondents interviewed for this study indicated that at the national level, the police perform poorly or very poorly with respect to controlling robbery. Almost 60% answered similarly for rape, 60.1% for domestic violence, 62.9% for burglary, 73.5% for the control of drug trafficking, 73.8% for the control of arms trafficking, and 67.6% for crimes of the powerful. It was further found that 49.4% of the sample thought that the police performed poorly or very poorly with regard to demonstrating respect for people's rights, while 49.5% felt similarly with regard to the police having respect for the law, 46.6% with respect to dealing with people, 54.8% with treating people equally, and 48% with respect to demonstrating courtesy to citizens. The lack of a coordinated and collaborative approach to the many dimensions of the problem and failure, until recently, to place sufficient emphasis on prevention, has constrained the ability of the Criminal Justice System to respond effectively.

Any strategy which focuses on human development will, by necessity, require effective and efficient security for all citizens, with a focus on freedom, equity, and respect for civil liberties. The launch of any security strategy that is consistent with a human development focus requires a credible, effective and legitimate set of supporting state institutions. This institutional support can only be provided by a state that fulfils all of its basic functions effectively and without bias. Citizen security in any democratic society strengthens social cohesion.

The implementation of effective security measures will result in a reduction of crime rates and on the risk of victimization. Security with freedom assumes the protection of all citizens and the absence of unreasonable levels of fear as currently exists in Trinidad and Tobago. Additionally, the perpetrators of these crimes should also be free from judicial abuse, and their rights should be fully protected in the event of prosecution and trial. Finally, security with equity should be afforded to all citizens and not just those who are able to pay for it. Human development is based on the widening of life options and the effective liberties of people, independent of their circumstances. Citizen security is therefore a necessary component of any strategy for human development.

Chapter 6
State policies and the policy orientation of the population

A key concern of the *Caribbean Human Development Report* is how to generate significant impact on public policy. To do this the policy environment must be better understood. It is therefore important to understand that state policies are influenced by public opinion and public opinion is not always well informed. For example, high rates of crime and violence have eroded the confidence of the Trinidad and Tobago public in their government and consequently, have increased feelings of insecurity. Another consequence of the high rates of violent crimes is that public opinion is becoming increasingly punitive. A recent phenomenon has been seen in reports of cases of vigilantism where citizens support and even participate in extra-legal punitiveness and human rights violations when meted out to suspected criminals.[64]

It is noteworthy that this trend is not restricted to Trinidad and Tobago. The *Central American Human Development Report*,[65] for example, identifies several myths that are generally accepted by sections of populations of Central American countries. Population orientations of this type must be closely monitored because such myths may, for example, be politically manipulated and used to inform the implementation of hard line policies that support increasingly punitive responses to criminal activity without addressing the root causes of crime. On the other hand, a more strategic approach to improve the provision of services by government institutions to improve and better manage the overloaded security and justice systems, may not always find popular support, and policies that do not have popular support are unlikely to be implemented. This trend may reduce the existing system to a simple triangle of police, judges, and jails, and ignore the missing links to civil society and to other state institutions, including those at the local level.

There is no argument that there are multiple categories of insecurity in Trinidad and Tobago, including homicide and assault, rape, kidnapping and human trafficking, domestic violence and violence against women, organized crime linked to drug trafficking, and corruption. There is also no denying the "incubators" for criminal activity. These incubators include severely stressed family structures, an over abundance of un- or under-employed, un- or under-educated youth, not to mention the availability of light weapons. These incubators must also be placed in the context of feelings of inequality and social exclusion, as the results of the victimization survey have indicated.

This chapter will critically analyse state policies for their content, value, and effectiveness. The value orientation of state policies will be compared and contrasted with the policy orientation of the populations to ascertain the level of values based support that exists among citizens.

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[64]See article on *Vigilante Citizen Released* available at
http://www.power102fm.com/services/NewsWindow/tabid/589/EntryID/8479/Default.aspx
[65] Central American Human Development Report available at http://economiccluster-lac.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=170&Itemid=54&lang=en

The evolution of the declaratory/written policies of the state will be analysed and contrasted with the actual behaviour of the state. Any disparity between policy as it is intended, and policy as it is implemented will be highlighted and explained taking into account the capacities of the state. On the basis of this analysis, policy and programme gaps may be identified, and suggestions made for improving the capacity of the state and the lobbying of groups that are representative of civil society. In focusing on state responses to crime and criminal activity, this chapter will rely heavily on official crime control plans; those proposed by the political parties and other non governmental agencies as well as parliamentary records to provide information on both declaratory and actual policies. As a method of probing the policy orientation of the population, this chapter will rely on data from the UNDP survey and official country crime data, such that we can properly evaluate perceptions of the success of the policies that are actually implemented.

Classes of Crime

To evaluate state responses to crime and criminal activity we must first clearly identify the classes of crime the state policies were created to address. We will then identify the various policies which have been implemented or proposed to address the specific classes of crime. Finally, we will evaluate the effectiveness of those policies based on population responses as gauged from the survey data.

Figure 6.1
Concepts and definitions of crime, according to the Central Statistical Office report *Social Indicators 1985–1992*[66]

Serious Crimes	Classes of Serious Crime	Crimes
Serious crimes are all crimes carrying a penalty of five or more years' imprisonment for which proceedings have been instituted in the High Court. Six classes of serious crime are defined:	**Class I**	Serious crimes against persons. They include murder, conspiracy to commit murder, manslaughter, infanticide, attempted murder, suicide and attempted suicide, written threat to commit murder, felonious wounding, acts causing or tending to cause danger to life, rape and unlawful carnal knowledge, abduction, defilement and procurement of women; child-stealing; burglary, abortion and concealment of birth, and unnatural offenses.
	Class II	Serious crimes against property with violence. They include blackmail and extortion, breaking and burglary, robbery, possession of housebreaking implements by night.
	Class III	Serious crimes against property (valued at US$ 2000 or more) without violence.

[66] Trinidad and Tobago, Central Statistical Office. Social Indicators 1985–1992. Port-of-Spain (Republic of Trinidad and Tobago); 1996. p. 182–4

		They include embezzlement and larceny[67] by a servant, falsification of account, false pretense, fraud and fraudulent conversion, post office felonies, and larceny in dwelling houses.
	Class IV	Serious crimes against property resulting from injury with malicious intent.[68] They include arson, other malicious damage valued at more than US$ 1000 (excluding private disputes) and cattle maiming.
	Class V	Serious crimes defined as forgery and crimes against currency. This class includes forgery (other than currency notes), coinage offenses, and forgery of currency notes.
	Class VI	Serious crimes against the state. They include treason, sedition, perjury, riot, criminal libel, personation, corruption, fire and other inchoate offenses such as incitement and conspiracy.
Minor crimes		
Minor crimes are all crimes carrying a penalty of less than five years imprisonment for which proceedings have been instituted in the Magistrates' Courts or the High Court. These crimes are defined as commission or attempted commission of the following:		Indecent assault, assault with intent to commit a felony on officers of the peace (including police), possession of housebreaking implements by day, embezzlement (under US $2 000), fraudulent conversion (under $2 000), false pretense (under $2000), larceny (under $2 000), praedial larceny (under $2 000), unlawful possession of property belonging to another (theft), violation of post office ordinance, operation of a brothel, being in enclosed and other premises for an unlawful purpose,

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[67] Larceny: For the purposes of this report, this comprises larceny and larceny of postal packages. Note, however, that larceny is considered to exist only when goods worth US$ 2 000.00 or more are involved.

[68] This is based on English Law governing criminal liability and is in keeping with the Criminal Damage Act of 1971 which replaced the Malicious Damage Act of 1861. s1(2) of the 1971 act created the aggravated offense of damaging or destroying property with either intention to endanger life or recklessness as to whether life is endangered.

		assault occasioning actual bodily harm, causing bodily harm, causing bodily harm by reckless driving, escaping lawful custody, and violations of Firearm Act 44/1970.
Minor offenses		
Minor offenses are offenses for which prosecutions has been summarily instituted in the Magistrates' Courts. They involve the following:		Loitering; assault and battery; assault upon a police officer in the execution of his duty; willful obstruction of a police officer in the execution of his duty; offenses against the Persons Act OAPA 1861 s47; cruelty to animals; breach of the peace; unlawful bearing of a dangerous weapon; malicious damage (under US$ 1000) except in private disputes; gambling; violation of laws or ordinances regarding liquor licenses and clubs, wild animals and birds, cinemas, theaters and dance halls, agricultural fires, sale of produce, the Children Ordinance, food & drugs; public mischief; narcotics offenses; violation of the Dangerous Animals Act of 2000 obligating owners to possess a license and insurance to keep a ferocious dog; violation of laws regarding shop opening hours; violation of laws regarding weights and measures; violation of price-of-goods regulations; violation of rationing regulations; and offenses under ordinance such as robbery, blackmail, burglary and deception.

State Responses to Crime

The constitution

Citizen security is espoused in the foundation document, the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. In its recognition and declaration of rights and freedoms, the Constitution guarantees the protection of the rights and freedoms of all citizens.[69] Section 5, says specifically,

1) Everyone has the right to life, liberty, security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law.
(2) Everyone has the right to have his life respected and this right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception.
(3) Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
(4) No one shall be deprived of his liberty except in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed:
> *(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a court;*
> *(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law;*
> *(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before a competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is considered reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society that has a proper respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual to prevent him committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;*
> *(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before a competent legal authority;*
> *(e) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to his deportation or extradition.*

As stated, therefore, this foundation document sets out the basic guidelines for laws and policies that protect citizens' rights and support redress when these rights are violated. Specific Acts as outlined below (see Figure 6.2) attempt to guarantee personal protection and the freedoms which the Constitution attempts to protect.

Figure 6.2
Legislative Acts which attempt to reduce insecurity

Dangerous drugs act of 1994	If an enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence mentioned in section 53A or 53B of this Act has been committed on a ship to which that section applies he may— (a) arrest without warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of the offence; and (b) seize and detain anything found on the ship which appears to him to be evidence of the offence.[70]
The Extradition (Commonwealth and Foreign Territories) Act, 1985	A. Section 8 is amended by repealing subsection (6) and substituting the following subsection: (6) A person's return, under this Act, to a declared Commonwealth or

[69] The constitution of the republic of Trinidad and Tobago, (act 4 of 1976), Chapter 1: The recognition and protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms Part 1 *Rights Enshrined*, Section 5, Items (a)-(e). available at http://www.ttparliament.org/documents/1043.pdf

[70] 1996/24 - Dangerous Drugs (amendment) Act, 1994 (Act no. 27 of 1994). Available at: http://www.unodc.org/enl/showDocument.do?documentUid=705&node=docs&cmd=add&country=TRI

	foreign territory shall not be debarred by reason only of the fact that the person will be sent from that territory to another territory for or in respect of any offence committed before his return under this Act".
Protection of officers	An enforcement officer shall not be liable in any civil or criminal proceedings for anything done in the performance of his functions under this Schedule if the court is satisfied that the act was done in good faith and that there were reasonable grounds for doing it.[71]
Domestic Violence Act [72]	Strengthen legislation to ensure a prompt and equitable legal remedy for victims of domestic violence.
The Kidnapping Act of 2003	**3.** (1) A person who, for ransom, reward, or for any similar consideration unlawfully leads, takes, entices away, abducts, seizes or detains any person without his consent or with his consent obtained by fraud or duress and without lawful excuse such that the person (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the "kidnapped person") is held, confined, restricted, imprisoned or prevented from returning to his normal place of abode or sent or taken out of Trinidad and Tobago, commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment for not less than twenty-five years.[73] **4.** A person who receives, has possession of or disposes of any money or property or any proceeds thereof, which has previously been delivered as ransom in connection with an offence punishable under section 3, knowing or having reason to believe that the money or other property had, at any time, been delivered as such ransom, commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment for not less than fifteen years. **5.** A person who demands or pursues, by negotiation, a demand for a ransom, reward or other benefit for the release of a kidnapped person, commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment for not less than twenty-five years. **6.** (1) A person, who, without reasonable excuse, the burden of proving which shall be on the person relying on it, discloses either orally or in writing or in any other medium to another person, information relating to the accounts held in financial institutions, money or property owned by a third person which the person providing the information knows or ought to know may be used in connection with the kidnapping of that third person or some relative or friend of his, commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment for not less than five years. (2) A person shall be deemed to have given information contrary to subsection (1) if he gives the information to a person whom, having

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[71] The Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1994. Available at
http://www.unodc.org/enl/showDocument.do?documentUid=705&node=docs&cmd=add&country=TRI

[72] The Domestic Violence Act, 1999 available at http://www.ttparliament.org/legislations/a1999-27.pdf

[73] *Legal Supplement Part A to the "Trinidad and Tobago Gazette'', Vol. 42,No. 109, 25th July, 2003* First Session Eighth Parliament Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Act No. 21 of 2003.

	regard to his relationship to the accused person, or to any other circumstances, that he knows or intends that the information will be passed on to an accused person.
Crimes Against the Person Act,[74]	Putting a person in fear of violence (1) Conduct which would constitute an offence under section 30A and which causes the other person to fear that violence will be used against him, and the person whose course of conduct is in question knows or ought to know that his conduct will cause the other person so to fear, commits an offence and is liable on conviction or indictment to a fine of ten thousand dollars and to imprisonment for five years or, on summary conviction, to a fine of five thousand dollars and to imprisonment for six months. (2) For the purpose of this section, the person whose course of conduct is in question is deemed to know that it will cause another person to fear that violence will be used against him if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct would cause the other person so to fear.

A number of plans and programmes have also attempted to reduce insecurity and crime in Trinidad and Tobago. Important initiatives are highlighted below.

PNM Manifesto 2010
The 2010 Manifesto of the People's National Movement[75] included such interventions as:

Interventions	Purpose
The Citizen Security Programme (CSP)	Overall goal to reduce the levels of crime and violence by improving efforts to prevent, counteract and control factors associated with criminal acts and violence.
The Special Anti-Crime Unit (SAUTT)	Focuses on three main areas. i. strengthening national forensic capabilities; ii. providing developmental training for law enforcement; iii. lending operational support to the Police Service and other law enforcement agencies.
The Specialist Crime Academy	Over 500 SAUTT Officers have received training in areas such as Crime Scene Investigation, Forensic Awareness and DNA, Investigative Interviewing

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[74] Legal Supplement Part A to the "Trinidad and Tobago Gazette'', Vol. 44, No. 105, 24th June, 2005 Third Session Eighth Parliament Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Act No. 11 of 2005. Available at http://www.ttparliament.org/legislations/a2005-11.pdf

[75] Caring about you today and tomorrow. The 2010 manifesto of the PNM. Available at http://visionpnm.com/pdf/2010%20PNM%20Manifesto.pdf

	and more.
The Crime and Problem Analysis (CAPA) Unit	Established in 2007 to improve the capacity of the Police Service to gather accurate and timely information on crime and undertake in-depth analysis.
Gang Violence and Activity	An international Comprehensive Gang Model has been applied, leading to computerized information systems and improved analysis and mapping procedures; and to the establishment of a Repeat Offenders Programme Task Force (ROPTF), responsible for identifying street gangs, their membership structures and turf.
The Forensic Science Centre	Installation of a modern DNA Laboratory, adding this state of the art methodology to our crime-fighting capacity.
New Police Stations	Construction of 5 Police Stations and 3 Police Posts. Moreover, 19 new Stations are scheduled for communities throughout Trinidad and Tobago.
Integrated Border Management System	Equipping nationals with travel documents that reduce exposure to identity and passport fraud. Machine readable passports have been introduced to ensure hassle free travel. To date over 350,000 citizens have been issued with new machine readable passports. The waiting time for a new passport has been reduced to 12 working days.

Legislation
The International Child Abduction Act 2008, and the Children Authority Amendment Act, 2008.
Legislation to allow for an increase in the number of High Court Judges and Judges in the Court of Appeal by fifty per cent, the largest single increase since Independence.
Legislation to allow for the more efficient use of technology in court proceedings and to allow for the more efficient prosecution of criminal offences.
Legislation to increase the number of prosecutors in The Office of the Director of Public Prosecution to allow for the speedier and more efficient disposition of criminal matters.

Plans
Identify priorities for the next term, specifically those measures that will ease the flow of cases through the system and result in a more expeditious delivery of justice.
Streamline the categories of matters which can be dealt with before a magistrate.
Remove from the magistracy those matters which can be dealt with administratively, such as certain traffic violations and applications for certain types of licenses.
Remove from the High Court the resolution of those disputes - and the disposition of certain matters - which can best be dealt with before specialized tribunals, such as certain land disputes and the establishment of title to real property in certain classes of cases. The new systems and procedures will assist in the resolution of the problem of titles to property, particularly in Tobago.
Reform the rules governing the conduct of Preliminary Inquiries in respect of certain categories of offences.
In the short term the measures we have adopted and those which we propose will result in quicker court processes including speedier access to the criminal justice system. We are resolved to fix our justice system.

People's Partnership Manifesto 2010[76]

Plans
Radar linked to all branches of the security services. Connectivity to be monitored.
Establishment of the National Security Protective Services Training Academy to improve capacity of our police officers to perform at their optimal levels.
Training programmes and merit systems will be established to motivate police to new ideals of justice.
Strengthen the National Security Council to link intelligence, strategy and execution in crime fighting.
Modernize physical infrastructure and amenities to boost morale and improve productivity.
Implement the criminal injuries and compensation laws and adjust the measure of compensation to criminal activities.

Law Enforcement
Support the management of the Police Service to ensure that there are proper levels of policing and hold it accountable for effective delivery through the establishment of clear measurable benchmarks for crime reduction and containment.

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[76] Prosperity for All. Manifesto of the People's Partnership for a United People 2010.

Establish a National Security Operational Centre (NSOC), involving use of technology to set up a real-time centralized system for tracking crime. This will involve equipping every Police vehicle with a Global Positioning System (GPS) and linking with every police station through an appropriate technology platform. Abuse of equipment will not be tolerated.

Enforce traffic laws. A majority of crime involves the use of vehicles. Enforcement of road traffic laws and regulation would serve as a major deterrent to such illegal activity. A variety of mechanisms including Radar Speed Detection Guns will be used in this.

Use GPS bracelets on offenders who are on probation but are still deemed a security
risk (so that their movement can be monitored) and if legislation is required, we will take the necessary steps.

Resocializing away from crime	
Recidivism	The prison system is replete with young offenders and more seasoned offenders who keep passing through a revolving door. Young first-time offenders convicted of relatively minor offences could be paroled and engaged in community service. We must move to a serious strategy for rehabilitation and reintegration into the society and an economy that is linked to education and skills building.
Community Policing	This is important for policing, community building, and crime prevention and will be executed as a strategy that acknowledges that police presence in the community is an important deterrent to crime.
	Expand and implement Community Service sentencing for certain categories of crime.
	There may be need to streamline the Attorney General's office to address these multiple functions and to achieve multiple objectives for prosecution of criminals and streamlining the justice system for efficiency.
	Our crime reduction strategy must be supported by a poverty reduction strategy that is different in that it would tackle the different age groups within a household to ensure education and skills for the young, second chances for dropouts that bring them into productive endeavour, special programmes for women, skills programmes for the unskilled willing to work and targeted programmes for the elderly and persons living with disabilities.
	Overhaul the penal system so that prisoners have a real opportunity to turn around their lives reducing the revolving door syndrome of repeat offenders
	Facilitate the further establishment of half-way houses in conjunction with NGOs to assist in reintegration of past offenders into society.
	Strengthen legislation relating to domestic abuse and other forms of violence against women and children.

Informal methods of control

Informal social control is important since much of behaviour regulation takes place via informal social means, as opposed to being regulated by the impending threat of punishment from the criminal justice system. If informal systems of control can be reinforced, this removes some of the burden from the criminal justice system in terms of societal reliance on formal procedures for behaviour regulation. Limited staffing does not afford the Police Service and other protective services the luxury of monitoring all behaviour in Trinidad and Tobago, and as such, it is imperative that social controls function effectively in regulating behaviour and ensuring that for the most part, citizens operate within the constraints of the law.

Data gathered from the Survey on Citizens' Security for the Caribbean Human Development Report speak directly to the policy orientation of the population with respect to informal social interventions. Respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood that community members would intervene where three specified transgressions of the law occurred. Fully 31.7% of respondents thought that it was unlikely or very unlikely that persons in their community would intervene where domestic violence was occurring, whereas 43.3% thought that it was likely or very likely that community members would intervene. In the case of a fight, many more people (57.9%) thought that it was likely or very likely that community members would intervene, though some persons (20.6%) though that it was unlikely or very unlikely. Where a stranger was suspected of stealing something, 61.6% thought that it was likely or very likely that the community would intervene, whereas 16.7% thought that it was unlikely or very unlikely.

Quite interestingly, our data reveal that there is a significant positive correlation between measures for societal and community cohesion and the three measures of informal social control previously mentioned. These findings indicate, not surprisingly, that informal social controls are more likely to be operative where communities are more closely knit, and where the society as a whole is more closely integrated. This indicates that strategies which build a sense of community and societal cohesion will act to strengthen informal systems of social control. Notwithstanding the intention of various governments to build community and societal solidarity, data provided by the Crime and Problems Analysis Unit of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service indicate that there has been a steady increase in criminal activity in Trinidad and Tobago over the last twenty years.[77] This indicates that the building of societal and community cohesion is not something which should be left to chance, but something which should be thought of as a purposeful strategy in the fight against crime and insecurity.

Policy orientation of the population

Since the policy orientation of the population is impacted greatly by feelings of insecurity, the population opinion with respect to the various arms of the Trinidad and Tobago Criminal Justice System is important. As indicated earlier in this report, the public is not fully satisfied with the performance of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.[78] Sixty two percent of the respondents interviewed for this study indicated that at the national level, the police perform poorly or very poorly with respect to controlling robbery. Almost 60% answered similarly for rape, 60.1% for domestic violence, 62.9% for burglary, 73.5% for the control of drug trafficking, 73.8% for the control of arms trafficking, and 67.6% for crimes of the powerful.

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[77] These data were examined in Chapter 1.
[78] Measures of satisfaction were obtained both at the national level, and at the level of the community.

It was also found that 49.4% of the sample thought that the police performed poorly or very poorly with regard to demonstrating respect for people's rights, while 49.5% felt similarly with regard to the police having respect for the law, 46.6% with respect to dealing with people, 54.8% with treating people equally, and 48% with respect to demonstrating courtesy to citizens. Overall at the national level, 19.4% of the respondents felt that the police had become more effective over the last three years with respect to controlling crime while 41.3% felt that their performance was the same, and 38.6% felt that the performance of the police had declined.

Similar findings obtained when respondents were asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with police performance at the community level. With respect to the control of robbery, 43.4% of respondents felt that the police performed poorly or very poorly, though notably, 38.9% felt that police performance in this area was fair, while 17.2% felt that their performance was good or very good. With the control of rape, 36.7% felt that the performance of the police was poor or very poor, while 39.4% felt that their performance was fair, and 21.7% felt that their performance was good or very good. With respect to the control of domestic violence, 39.9% of the sample felt that police performance was poor or very poor, while 39.2% felt that their performance was fair, and 19.9% felt that their performance was good or very good. With respect to controlling house-breaking, 49.8% of the population felt that police performance was poor or very poor, while 32% felt that their performance was fair, and 17.5% felt that their performance was good or very good. Overall at the community level, 18.6% of the respondents felt that the police had become more effective over the last three years with respect to controlling crime while 50.8% felt that their performance was the same, and 29.8% felt that the performance of the police had declined.

Given the above, it is not surprising that confidence in the police is less than would be desired. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they had high or low confidence in the police with respect to controlling a range of crimes. As indicated in Figure 6.3, the majority of respondents (an average of 66.4% across all crimes considered) had low or very low confidence in the police.

Figure 6.3
Confidence in the police[79]

	Low or very low	Neutral	High or very high
Rape and Sexual Assault	62.0	28.3	9.7
Burglary	63.2	26.3	10.5
Domestic Violence	60.1	29.0	10.9
Robbery	65.0	24.2	10.8
Extortion	53.3	33.0	13.7
Murder	72.2	19.1	8.7
Gang violence	69.0	21.1	9.9
Drug trafficking	73.6	16.0	10.4
Gun trafficking	74.7	15.5	9.8
High level fraud	70.8	20.4	8.8

Similar to the findings for the police, large proportions of the public are dissatisfied with the operation of the justice system in Trinidad and Tobago (see Figure 6.4). Almost half (46%) of the respondents felt that the court system was not fair, while 35.9% felt that the court system had not gotten fairer over the last five years.

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[79] Percentages are given.

Fully 44.6% of respondents felt that suspects who may be innocent are not sufficiently protected by the courts, while 49% believed that poorer subjects are treated less fairly. Interestingly, a large proportion of the respondents (60.4%) thought that the justice system may yield to political pressure or could be manipulated by politicians. Consistent with this it was found that 70.2% of the sample believed that politically connected criminals are likely to go free. In a similar manner, 61.6% felt that powerful criminals are likely to go free. When asked about corruption, 69.7% felt that there was corruption in the justice system while 58.6% felt that judges were corrupt.

Figure 6.4
Confidence in the courts[80]

	Disagree or strongly disagree	Agree or strongly agree
The courts are fair	46.0	30.8
The courts are more fair today than they were five years ago	35.9	23.1
I am confident that the courts effectively protect suspects who are innocent of the crimes for which they are charged	44.6	21.2
Suspects who are poor are not likely to be treated fairly	26.8	49.0
I am confident that the justice system is not manipulated by politicians/ does not yield to political pressure	60.4	13.1
The judges are not corrupt.	58.6	15.3
The justice system is free of corruption	69.7	9.4
The justice system is unable to convict powerful criminals. Powerful criminals are likely to go free	18.4	61.6
Politically connected criminals are likely to go free.	14.5	70.2

The level of victimization as indicated by official crime statistics as well as from the results of the victimization survey conducted as part of this report indicate that the population is subject to high levels of property and violent crime. Long term trends indicate that crime rates, particularly for violent crimes are increasing over time. This helps to fuel distrust and dissatisfaction with the performance of the protective services in Trinidad and Tobago. While official crime data and the victimization survey results are examined in detail in Chapter 1, some main findings are repeated here to put this discussion into context.   Official crime data indicate that many violent crimes are increasing, and more so within recent times. Within the last five years there was an average of 458 murders, 684 woundings and shootings, 164 kidnappings, 782 sexual offences, 5351 robberies, and 5147 burglaries per year.

For the period 1990 to 2010, murders increased by an average of 10.4% per year, woundings and shootings by 4%, kidnappings by 17.5%, sexual offences by 7.5%, and robberies by 3.6%. Despite this, it should be noted that the number of rapes began to decline after 2006, and the number of kidnappings similarly declined after 2005. Burglaries have also recorded a decline, with an average reduction by 1.5% per year over the last twenty years.

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[80] Percentages are given. Responses of 'don't know' are omitted from this table.

Self-reported victimization data gathered for this report also indicate that the population experiences high levels of insecurity, and more so than would be suggested by official crime data. Within the last ten years, 23.9% of the sample indicated that they had been victims of a crime. Of these, 48.5% were victimized once, 27.3% were victimized twice, and 24.2% were victimized three or more times. Within the last year (i.e. 2009), one tenth of the sample (10.2%) were criminally victimized. Comparisons of the findings from the victimization survey indicate that the actual rates of robbery are 4.4 times higher than suggested by official crime statistics, while the incidence of sexual offences is 7.6 times higher, burglaries 6.8 times higher, motor vehicular theft 2.5 times higher, and financial crimes 7.5 times higher.

While the above findings appear to suggest that the criminal justice system is performing less than adequately, this report maintains that the solution to the crime and insecurity issues in Trinidad and Tobago lie not only within the criminal justice system, but also outside of that system. Typically, criminal justice systems come into contact with perpetrators of criminal offences only *after* such offences have occurred. That is, criminal justice systems around the world typically operate in a reactive or after-the-fact manner. This report maintains that this reactive approach must be complemented by a proactive or preventative approach where measures are put in place to reduce the likelihood of criminal offending occurring in the first place.

This 'up front' type of approach will reduce the burden on an already strained criminal justice system, which could then be poised to deal with those (much fewer) cases which may occur whenever the preventative approach proves to be less than adequate. At the same time, it must be noted that despite the widespread dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system, this does not mean that this system is not functioning. While it is agreed that violent crimes are increasing, what we need to consider is the alternative situation of what would happen in the absence of a functioning criminal justice system. That is, it is quite possible that the increase in violent crimes may be much worse without the presence of the criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago. As such, the assumption that the criminal justice system is not performing may be a simplification. It may be the case that the criminal justice system is performing, but lacks the resources to fully control the increase in crime rates. The intention here is not to justify inaction by the criminal justice system, or to say that their functioning cannot be improved; rather the intention is to say that with successful preventative approaches in place, the criminal justice system with its limited resources may be better able to manage the country's crime situation once some of the potential offenders are removed from the equation through preventative interventions.

Conclusion

Based on citizen responses as well as official data gathered from the Crime and Problem Analysis branch of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (see Appendix 1), there appears to be a gap in the intention of crime policies and the outcome of such policies. This has resulted in an increase in various categories of crime as well as mistrust of law enforcement. Such a situation will serve to increase levels of insecurity.

Some of the recommendations for closing the gap between de jure and de facto policy implementations include the need for a convergence of the heads of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, along with the attorney general, to set forth an agenda for integrated action. Moreover, there is a need for governments that succeed each other to support continuity with initiatives already underway. With respect to police reform, based on a preventive model, along with the creation of investigative units and special forces to combat drug trafficking, there should also be a national institute to protect and support victims, a strengthening of the judicial system and the establishment of a strong public defender institution.

Finally, at the local level there should be an encouragement of debates aimed at preventing violence and tackling the crime problem directly.

An overall transformation is required to be able to satisfy citizen security needs which, in turn, will be reflected in the orientation of the population. There must be a short term improvement in the effectiveness of state policies and the impact on population orientation. Governments will need to design strategies to initiate dialogue, information sharing and collaboration. Respect for citizens' rights must become the rule and not the exception. This should, by necessity, involve promoting respect for the different cultures and norms. To achieve this, Governments will need to mobilize regional and international partners to increase capacity and through this, build advocacy coalitions with state and non-state agencies. This approach will also build the capacity to design, implement and monitor public policies to enhance citizen security while facilitating the implementation of strategies to promote dialogue, information sharing and improve cooperation and collaboration.

The most obvious way to reform policies and agendas is to determine what shifts in thinking are required and, if any, which ones best take a citizen security approach. States must also ask if any new elements need to be added to the policy making process, and, if so, on what principles are they to be based? Strategies must be put in place to strengthen social capital to foster respect for the law as the norm (reduce excessive degrees of lawlessness that currently exist in Trinidad and Tobago), thus rebuilding citizen confidence and trust and encouraging a reorientation of the population. The long term implications for these polices would be the creation of safer communities, a promotion of citizen participation and community initiatives to prevent/reduce violence at the community level and allow for a greater degree of offender reintegration. States should also evaluate initiatives promoted by private/civil society that have positively impacted, reduced or prevented crime (e.g. community courts). States must enhance institutions of control to improve their effectiveness and ultimately the government's capacity to build and maintain sustainable partnerships at the local and national level. They must implement initiatives to increase public trust and confidence in the effectiveness of state policies to effectively deal with citizen security issues.

Chapter 7
The Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (2009) defines citizen security as the social situation in which all persons are free to enjoy their fundamental rights and public institutions have sufficient capacity, against a backdrop of the rule of law, to guarantee the exercise of those rights and respond efficiently when they are violated. The definition postulates that the citizenry and not the maintenance of order is the principal focus of the state's protection in citizen security. They further suggest that institutional interventions to prevent and control violence and crime (citizen security policies) can be regarded as an indirect but nonetheless significant opportunity: first, to, buttress sustainable economic development; second, to strengthen democratic governance and the observance of human rights. In Trinidad and Tobago the main institutions responsible for the implementation of citizen security are the police, judiciary and prison service. They are considered the key agents in the criminal justice system.

This chapter focuses on the criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago by specifically analyzing the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS), Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service (TTPrS) and the Trinidad and Tobago Judiciary in relation to the execution of their function as institutions of control within society. The chapter also explores the attempts to transform these agencies in keeping with the paradigm shift from '*state security*' to '*citizen security*'.

Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS)

The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) is the national police agency of Trinidad and Tobago with a policing staff of approximately 7000 officers and headed by a Commissioner of Police. Johnson, King, Katz, Fox and Goulette (2008) posit that effectively policing a democracy requires the cooperation and involvement of its citizens. In the absence of citizen cooperation, policing either devolves into the oppressive styles often seen in dictatorships or the police retreat from interaction with the populace and become ineffective agents of social control. Over the last decade the crime statistics in Trinidad and Tobago suggest that the Police Service is struggling to execute its function as an agent of social control. This has led to negative cycle where the lack of efficiency has negatively impacted on the relationship between the police and the citizenry and this in turn has contributed to the escalating crime situation.

Pino (2009) in examining police statistics in connection with the number of offences reported to the police within the period 1962 to 2007 argues that since independence in 1962 there has been a general increase in murders. From 1962 to 1980 there were approximately 50-60 murders per year. During the 1980s the number gradually went up and maintained an average of 100 per year until 2000. Since 2000 he argues that violence and gun violence in particular have skyrocketed. Kirton, Anatol and Braithwaite (2010) in their study "*The Political Culture of Democracy in Trinidad and Tobago (2010)"* argues that in the period 2000 – 2008 Trinidad and Tobago experienced a 400% increase in the annual number of homicides to 42 per 100,000, more than double the Caribbean average. They further noted that for the period January – March 2010 the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service statistics identified 1,378 reported cases of burglaries and break-ins, 124 reported cases of narcotics, 1,527 reported cases of larceny and larceny related offences and 147 reported cases of sexual cases.

The rising crime rate was identified as a major concern to the citizens of Trinidad and Tobago. Kirton, Anatol and Braithwaite (2010) in their administration of the *Latin American Public Opinion Project Survey* in Trinidad and Tobago in January/February 2010 found that 63% of respondents indicated that delinquency and crime was the issue of highest concern affecting the country. Mastrofski and Lum (2008) also noted that public opinion surveys conducted in Trinidad and Tobago indentified crime as the country's biggest problem and showed that confidence in the police was low. Data collected for this report, and reviewed in chapter 5, indicate that at present a large proportion of the population in Trinidad and Tobago continue to lack confidence in the police.

This spiraling crime situation brought into focus the need for an effective and efficient response from the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. Wells and Katz (2008) noted that although homicides were on the increase the Trinidad and Tobago, clearance rates were far from ideal, suggesting that the Police Service was struggling to manage the crime situation in Trinidad and Tobago. Parks and Mastrofksi (2008) argue that this low clearance rate influences citizens' lack of confidence in the ability of the police to ensure their safety. They further noted that a substantial portion of the public believed that many police officers are corrupt or use excessive force. Pino (2009) further argues that while citizens are fearful of crime, they are at the same time afraid to go to the police due to lack of trust and fear of retaliation by criminals. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (2004) indicated that the USA State Department expressed concerns about police killings during apprehension, death of persons in police custody and police abuse of prisoners.Actual clearance rates based on Ministry of National Security arrest data reveal strengths and weaknesses (see Figure 7.1).

While the average clearance rate for sexual offences is relatively high (67.5% for the period 2000-2009), clearance rates for murder (27.9%), woundings and shootings (38.7%), kidnapping (47.7%), burglaries and breakings (13.9%), and robberies (15.9%), leave much to be desired. Even more troubling is the fact that for almost all crimes reviewed, clearance rates are decreasing over time.   For example, while the average clearance rates for murder for the period 2000 to 2003 was 46.5%, this decreased to 22.8% for the period 2006 to 2009.   Similarly, for woundings and shootings, average clearance rates for the period 2000 to 2003 was 47%, while clearance rates declined to 33.5% for the period 2006 to 2009. Available data indicate that the only crime with a discernable (though temporary) improvement in clearance rates was kidnapping. Clearance rates for kidnapping peaked in 2005 and 2006 (58% and 57% respectively) but then declined until available data in 2009 (see Figure 7.2). It is important to note at this point that the clearance rates below are based on arrest data. The number of persons convicted is far fewer than the number of persons arrested.   Very low conviction rates reduce confidence in the criminal justice system and indicate that there may be challenges both within the Police Service and other institutions such as the courts.

Figure 7.1
Clearance rates (2000-2009)[81]

	Murder		Woundings and shootings		Rape, Incest, Sexual offences		Kidnapping		Burglaries and Breakings		Robberies	
	rep	det	rep	det	rep	det	rep	det	rep	det	rep	det
2000	120	68	387	217	545	409	156	61	5623	867	4094	767
2001	151	69	499	223	545	383	135	69	5016	807	4269	689
2002	171	74	655	296	641	451	235	110	4930	740	4675	704
2003	229	92	784	333	643	468	235	96	4863	710	4590	758
2004	261	69	643	265	581	414	177	83	5214	894	3885	751
2005	386	94	801	282	744	546	280	163	4582	659	4868	911
2006	371	100	657	243	903	646	214	121	4973	719	5633	921
2007	391	74	680	286	825	550	178	92	4958	676	4965	849
2008	547	99	771	205	724	405	155	67	4855	464	5043	567
2009	506	137	689	196	760	393	155	55	5744	560	6040	743
Total	3133	876	6566	2546	6911	4665	1920	917	50758	7096	48062	7660
Percent detected	27.9%		38.7%		67.5%		47.7%		13.9%		15.9%	

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[81] Based on arrest data. Source: CAPA.

Figure 7.2
Trends in clearance rates for the period 2000 to 2009

The less than favourable view of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service is not confined to the adult population. Johnson, King, Katz, Fox and Goulette (2008) in their analysis of *"Youth Perceptions of the Police in Trinidad and Tobago"* administered a questionnaire to 2,376 secondary schools students ranging in age from 13 to 18 years old. The researchers found that young people have a relatively negative view of the police, regardless of whether they are asked about service quality, fairness of treatment or police misconduct. It was discovered that 36.8% of respondents agreed that they are satisfied with the services provided by the police while a somewhat larger proportion (41.5%) expressed dissatisfaction on this issue.

One of the earlier attempts at police reform in Trinidad and Tobago was the introduction of Community Oriented Policing, commonly referred to as community policing. According to Deosaran (2002) the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police decided to implement Community Oriented Policing in the region in 1993. Roy Mitchell, a crime consultant to the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service from 1996-1998 and the architect of the Implementation Proposal for the Community Policing Plan in an article in the Newsday newspaper 27/1/2008 noted that the Plan was introduced in 1996. He defined community policing as '*a consultative process*' which required a rethinking of the old top-down approach to police-citizen relations. He argued that policing under this concept allowed citizens to articulate their problems. He noted that under traditional policing "*strategies to deal with crime are being handed down and the people are not being allowed to come up with strategies*".

Notwithstanding its good intentions community policing as the vehicle of change in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service began to '*fizzle out*' in 2002. When asked why this occurred Mitchell indicated that he was unable to answer that question. The answer to this question could be found in a review of the recommendations advanced by Deosaran (2002) for the successful implementation of Community Oriented Policing. He argued that before the implementation of community policing it was necessary to ensure the development of the human resource within the Service and the democratization of the command structure away from the old colonial and paramilitary style. He also argued that to improve community policing it was necessary to institute oversight and evaluation, build awareness and train all officers in the concepts of community policing. These recommendations were never implemented and community oriented policing was implemented within the old colonial structure. This greatly reduced the potential of the community oriented policing approach to be a long term initiative.

French Criminologist Marie-Emmanuelle Pomme-rolle in responding to the Newsday newspaper query as to why community policing failed used the example of the Kenyan experiment. In critiquing the effectiveness of the new community policing plan in Kenya she adamantly stated that the scheme had failed. Similar to the Trinidad and Tobago experience she indicated that the Kenyan police force remain the inheritors of colonial authoritarian forces and have not changed since the experiment of community policing began. She argued that first and foremost the overall police system has to be democratized in order to facilitate the introduction of community policing.

In 2007 Stephen D. Mastrofski and Cynthia Lum were contracted as consultants by the Trinidad and Tobago Government to assist in devising and implementing policy to reform the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service and improve their standard of performance. Mastrofski and Lum (2008) in their analysis of the original administrative structures in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service argue that the distribution of governing authority was dysfunctional. They noted that the Ministry of National Security had the responsibility for general policy oversight and budgetary authority over the TTPS. The Police Service Commission (an independent five member board) made key personnel decisions such as hiring, promotion, discipline and dismissal. This meant that although the Commissioner of Police was considered the head of the organization, his office had little authority to exercise internal control that would ensure the execution of his operational decisions.

They postulate that there was no independent authority to monitor the performance of the Service. This function was carried out by the Ministry of National Security and the Police Service, the very entities held accountable for its success. They noted that the staff of the Police Complaint Authority, which was charged with receiving complaints from the public and monitoring the investigations of the complaints, was ill-suited to effectively implement their assigned functions. The Commissioner's lack of legitimate internal control coupled with the lack of a proper monitoring and evaluation system for the TTPS resulted in less than adequate performance.

The analysis of Mastrofski and Lum (2008) substantiated previous findings on the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. The Committee on the Restructuring of the Police Service (1984) reported that leadership was seen as extremely weak due to managerial inefficiencies, a lack of communication among senior officers, ineffective disciplinary procedures, high turnover among supervisors, uneven and unclear workload among officers and a lack of respect for senior officers among junior officers. Seaby (1993) conducted a thorough investigation into accusations of police corruption and found that corruption was endemic and existed at all ranks. He reported the same inadequate leadership, management, discipline and accountability issues previous reports on the TTPS had identified.

In 2007 in response to the crisis of a spiraling crime rate and lowered public confidence in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, the government embarked on a package of reforms intended to transform the governance and ultimately the performance of the Police Service through the provisions of new legislation aimed at addressing the inconsistencies and imbalances in the system (Mastrofski and Lum, 2008). Mastrofski and Lum (2008) noted that Trinidad and Tobago adopted a substantially modified version of the approach advanced by the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, also called the Pattern Commission.

In discussing the model adopted by Trinidad and Tobago, Mastrofski and Lum (2008) explained that the reforms consolidated more administrative authority in the office of the Commissioner of Police. The Commissioner was given the authority to conduct personnel matters such as hiring, promoting, transfers and the dispensation of discipline. This provided the opportunity for the Commissioner to exert more influence over the conduct of his subordinates. The Ministry of National Security was given the responsibility to guide the policy direction of the Police Service and monitor its performance.

Under the new reforms provisions were made for external and independent oversight of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service by the Police Service Commission and the Police Complaint Authority. The Police Service Commission was assigned the role of '*watchdog*' over the TTPS and as an independent check on the Ministry of National Security. The Commission was now expected to evaluate the performance of the TTPS according to the expectations established by the Ministry of National Security. The power to hire, discipline and review the performance of the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners were also vested in the Commission. The Police Complaint Authority (PCA) was given the responsibility to investigate reports of serious police misconduct and corruption. They were also given a range of investigative powers aimed at providing this independent entity with the authority to investigate and report on the matters reported by members of the public. This reform was geared towards offering an element of transparency and legitimacy to the process.

Mastrofski and Lum (2008) argue that these reforms strengthen the legitimacy of all governing entities, provides greater internal and external control, transparency and effective technical management. They advise that the success of the reforms was hinged on the government and its agencies' ability to improve governance through committed leadership which is reflected in selecting the right caliber of individuals for employment in the service, developing effective managers and ensuring accountability to the citizenry.
Despite the implementation of the reforms, Trinidad and Tobago continues to experience a high crime rate and there has been limited improvement in the relationship between the police and the citizenry. Pino (2009) in critically analysing the attempt at police reform in Trinidad and Tobago argues that the model adopted was flawed in its application. He postulates that while Mastrofski and Lum (2008) noted the problems of capacity, corruption and the like hindering the prospect for successful reform, it appears that the foreign trainers and advisors Mastrofski included did not or could not create a reform program that took into account the complex political, social, and economic difficulties unique to the Trinidad and Tobago experience.

Pino (2009) further argues that the model adopted was based on functionalist notions of community policing and the problem solving model which assume healthy institutions and an empowered citizenry. He noted that civil society groups and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) which represent the interest of the citizenry were not truly involved in the reform process even though legitimacy, accountability and adherence to civil authority are necessary components of democratic policing. Pino (2009) is therefore arguing that a collaborative partnership between the police and citizens is integral to the success of the development and implementation of a reform progamme for the police service in a democratic society. This in turn will lend itself to the effective management of the crime situation.

It is recommended that deliberate strategies be employed to build police-community relations. This includes, but is not limited to a more sustained attempt to institute community policing in Trinidad and Tobago. Related to this is the need to understand public opinion as it relates to policing. Community oriented policing is sensitive to the needs and opinions of the public, and such needs and opinions can be utilized to some extent to tailor policing such that it is more responsive to the needs of the various communities which are served by the police. Police-community relations are negatively affected by allegations of corruption and by incidents of police brutality. While such negative events may be the exception rather than the rule, measures must be put in place which minimizes the possibility of their occurrence. Pre-employment screening can be used to reduce the number of persons entering the Service who are likely to use excessive force or to be susceptible to corruption. Police training should also incorporate one of more courses aimed to guide officers in terms of dealing appropriately with the power imbalances which exist when they interact with civilians.

This inequitable distribution of power could lead to situations where power is abused. It is also recommended that evaluations of the Police Service be expanded to include a wider range of areas, as opposed to using crime rates as a barometer of police performance. This report argues that the Police represent only one element in the fight against crime and insecurity, yet crime control seems to be taken by the public to be something which lies exclusively within the purview of the police. Expanding the indicators which reflect police performance will allow for the highlighting of strengths within the Police Service and will help to build public confidence. The British Home Office's Police Performance Assessments of the Police in England and Wales offers a good example of the use of a wider range of indicators to assess police performance. The Home Office uses seven indicators including tackling crime, serious crime and public protection, protecting vulnerable people, satisfaction and fairness, implementation of neighbourhood policing, local priorities, and resources and efficiency.

The Judicial System in Trinidad and Tobago

The Judiciary of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago comprises the Supreme Court of Judicature and the Magistracy. The Supreme Court of Judicature is made up of the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The court system includes one Appeal Court, three Supreme Courts, one Family Court and Magistrate Courts divided within thirteen districts. The Judiciary is guided by the vision that: *The Judiciary of Trinidad and Tobago provides an accountable court system in which timeliness and efficiency are the hallmarks, while still protecting integrity, fairness, equality and accessibility and attracting public trust and confidence.* However, President of the Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago Mr. Martin Daly in December 2010 admitted that the Trinidad and Tobago judicial systems is confronted with challenges in relation to preliminary enquiries and the backlog of cases. This situation negatively impacts on the ability of the Judiciary to operate in an efficient and timely manner. He further posits that these challenges are not unique to Trinidad and Tobago but common to other jurisdictions within the Caribbean region.

The Honourable Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, Mr. Ivor Archie, in delivering the feature address at the Ceremonial Opening of the 2010-2011 Law Term admitted that the Judiciary is confronted with challenges in the execution of its functions. In analyzing the performance of the Criminal High Court he noted that the picture was not very encouraging. There was a 14% increase in indictments filed when compared with 2008-2009. The number of capital matters in the High Court declined even as the numbers in the Magistrate Courts for preliminary enquiries continue to increase. The number of matters disposed fell by 30%. Clearance ratios also declined in the past year from 0.87 to 0.53 and acquittals accounted for the largest share of dispositions at 40%. This was followed by discontinued matters or dropped charges.

In the Magistrates' Courts new filings remain high dropping marginally from 90,437 matters in 2008-2009 to 89,416 in 2009-2010. Disposition rates improved from 79,226 in 2008-2009 to 88,907 in 2009-2010.

Archie (2010) points out that although the Judiciary is seen as central it is not the only institution involved in the administration of justice. The core process of the Judiciary is case management but in order to facilitate the speedy and efficient execution of this process the necessary information and resources must be in place at the appropriate time for the Judicial Officer to dispense with the matter before him or her. The necessary information and resources are, in many instances, outside the direct control of the Judiciary or may reside in other stakeholders or agencies whose priorities may be different from that of the Judiciary. Archie (2010) noted that this is compounded further by the external challenges posed by overburdened police, prison and social services and environmental challenges such as new technologies, increased filing, reduced National Income, customer expectation and most importantly threats to the security of court officers, jurors and witnesses.

Despite the challenges, Archie (2010) argues that there have been some improvements in the system which lends itself to improving the delivery of service. He notes that the Judiciary has restructured the internal management structure along three distinct lines. These include the setting of performance standards which will inform management decisions, the reengineering of the organizational culture into one of professionalism and one which is performance driven, and a clear understanding of the core processes that are being managed and the things that impact on their efficient execution. He further posits that the Judiciary has focused on the nurturing of strategic partnerships which has resulted in the successful introduction of the new remand via videoconferencing pilot project. This project involves the cooperation of the Prison and Police Service, the Bar, the Ministries of the Attorney General and Public Administration and the judicial technology service provider. It has also been suggested that the technology be expanded to include bail applications. These advances in the delivery of service improve the efficiency of the Judiciary. Another noted improvement was the increase in the physical space allotted to the Judiciary. The Industrial Court building in San Fernando was handed over for use by the Supreme Court with the promise of more accommodation. The increase in physical space enhances the ability of the Judiciary to conduct the business of the court.

In December 2010 an interview was conducted with Magistrate Roger Ramgoolam to identify and explore improvements required to facilitate the greater efficiency and effectiveness in the administration of justice in Trinidad and Tobago. Magistrate Ramgoolam offered the following recommendations:

- Improvements are needed in the legal aid system. There is need to increase the remuneration package for legal aid cases in order to attract more attorneys into the system. This will reduce the 3-4 months delay currently experienced in appointing legal aid counsel.

- The increase in the number of scientific officers, particularly firearms and narcotics analysts at the Forensic Science Centre, is required. This will facilitate the timely analysis of court exhibits thereby ensuring that the prosecution is prepared to proceed with cases.

- The replacement of Police Prosecutors with qualified State Attorneys or alternatively the use of police officers who are qualified attorneys to prosecute cases in the Magistrate Courts. This will improve efficiency in the system in that fewer cases will be referred to the Director of Public Prosecution for the assignment of a prosecuting attorney and it will allow for a higher standard of prosecution.

- The implementation of the video link remand system between the courts and the prison facilities. This will remove the need to transport remanded prisoners to and from the courts. As indicated earlier, this recommendation is currently being piloted.

- The provision of additional physical space to accommodate the increase workload of the Judiciary.

- The replacement of the Preliminary Enquiry at the Magistrates' Courts with paper committals. Through the submission of reports and statements instead of the physical appearance of witnesses, the Magistrate will make the decision whether the accused should be committed to stand trial at the next sitting of the High Court. This will facilitate the timely administration of justice.

- The introduction and implementation of plea bargaining legislation to facilitate the speedier disposition of cases. The prosecution will be authorised to offer the accused/defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to the original or lesser charges with the recommendation of a reduced sentence. This will assist in reducing the current backlog of cases currently pending in the judicial system.

- The implementation of a Victim Compensation Programme which addresses the victim's emotional, physical, psychological and financial needs.

- The provision of competitive remuneration packages for all Judicial Officers. This will motivate the existing officers and encourage applications from competent qualified individuals.

- The development of a memorandum of understanding between the University of the West Indies and the agencies within the criminal justice system to facilitate the undertaking of empirical research which will inform the decision making process.

- The review of the sentencing legislation which will provide the Judiciary with a wider range of options such as mediation, community service, drug rehabilitation and counseling.

The recommendations advanced by Magistrate Ramgoolam address both matters directly under the purview of the Judiciary and matters which fall under the jurisdiction of other entities within the criminal justice system and over which the judiciary has minimal influence. The recommendations therefore support the analysis of the Honourable Chief Justice Ivor Archie that the success of the judiciary is dependent on input from independent agencies.

The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service

The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service (TTPrS) is an enforcement arm of the criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago. It is a division of the Ministry of National Security and is headed by the Commissioner of Prisons, who has delegated powers under the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, and who is ultimately responsible to the Ministry of National Security. There are seven prisons and institutions under the authority of the Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service. These include: The Carrera Convict Prison (CCP), Maximum Security Prison (MSP), Women's Prison, Port of Spain Prison, Golden Grove Prison (GGP), Remand Prison and the Youth Training Centre (YTC).

According to the Prison Service mission statement "*the Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service, as an arm of the Criminal Justice System, is committed to the protection of society and crime prevention by facilitating the opportunities for habilation/rehabilitation of Offenders while maintaining control under safe, secure and humane conditions.*"[82]

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[82] http://ttprisons.com/

Baptiste (2002) notes that the mission statement advocates that the best way to protect society is to ensure the successful reintegration of prisoners into society so they become law-abiding citizens. He further notes that the rehabilitative efforts of the TTPrS are founded on a model that incorporates correctional education, cognitive development and spiritual restoration.

King and Bartholomew (2007) argue that despite the claims of a rehabilitative approach, the present penal system is operating primarily according to a retributive model of penology. According to the *Final report of the Cabinet appointed Task Force on prison reform and transformation*, the current prison system is characterized by a "tense setting... which is the result of fragmentation, useless coercion, and obsolete and outdated policies" (Baptiste, 2002: 416). Therefore the philosophical conceptualization of the prison as a rehabilitative instrument has not fully materialized. They point out that this argument is supported by the fact that Trinidad and Tobago had a recidivism rate of greater than 50%.

According to the World Prison Brief (2010) compiled by the International Centre for Prison Studies, King's College London, Trinidad and Tobago had a prison population of 3,591 as of January 2010, with a prison population rate of 276 per 100,000 of the national population. In an analysis of the world prisons population rates it was found that Trinidad and Tobago ranked number 38 out of a total of 216 nations. These statistics suggest that there is a need to devise mechanisms to address the level of incarceration and recidivism within our society.

Cid (2009) examined the effects of custodial versus non custodial sentences on recidivism. His findings revealed that prison sanctions do not reduce recidivism more effectively than suspended sentences, however, the risk of recidivism increases when the offender is imprisoned. He argues that the results of his research are compatible with labeling theory, which proposes that prison is likely to lead to higher rates of recidivism compared to a suspended sentence. In order to reduce recidivism it seems reasonable to replace prison with non-custodial sentences. This he postulates is especially important when the offender has no previous conviction or no previous imprisonment. With high-risk offenders, the risk of recidivism increases if the penalty is imprisonment and the re-offending rate is also very high when the penalty is a suspended sentence. Cid (2009) differentiates between the high-risk offender who has a higher risk of reoffending whether incarcerated or not, and those with no exposure to imprisonment. He is essentially advocating discretionary sentencing or alternative sanctions for first-time offenders to reduce the possibility of recidivism among this category of offenders.

Greenwood and Abrahamse (1982) alluded to the concept of discretionary sentencing in their analysis of '*selective incapacitation*'. Incapacitation refers to the use of various punishment restraints to debilitate or remove criminals from society, and thus prevents the crimes that they would have committed, were they still free (Wright, 1994). Greenwood and Abrahamse (1982) developed a dangerousness assessment instrument which enables criminal justice practitioners to determine which offenders should receive long incapacitating prison sentences and which offenders can be sentenced to alternative programs or safely released into the community. Such risk assessment instruments rely on either clinical or actuarial procedures and measures to estimate the risk of reoffending. Persons with a high risk of reoffending should be incapacitated while those with a low risk of reoffending should be subject to alternate, usually non custodial, dispositions.

Proponents of selective incapacitation contend that if properly applied, imprisonment rates can remain stable while crime rates are decreased (Greenwood and Abrahamse, 1982). This logic is based on the assumption, widely empirically validated, that small minorities of criminals are persistent offenders and commit the majority of crimes (Tunnell, 1990; Bridges and Stone, 1986; Horney and Marshall, 1992).

Specific deterrence is ineffective with this minority for a number of reasons viz, they believe that the certainty of being re-apprehended is low; they believe that even if re-apprehended, punishment may not be severe and they view prisons as non threatening (Wright, 1994). As such, incapacitation, and not deterrence strategies should be applied. In all likelihood, such individuals may belong to a group of 'life course persistent' offenders (Moffitt, 1993) who may be resistant to rehabilitation and whose criminal behaviour is rooted in neurological and childhood psychopathology. The proponents of selective incapacitation contend that if the risk of reoffending could be predicted, then such high risk individuals should be incapacitated for longer periods thus significantly decreasing the overall number of crimes committed. Concomitantly, low risk offenders should receive shorter sentences, thus offsetting the costs of longer sentences for the high risk offenders. It appears that deterrence (vs. incapacitation) policies may be more applicable to this latter group of non-chronic offenders while incapacitation is more applicable to chronic offenders.

Selective incapacitation may represent a framework from which the Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service can benefit. The newly appointed Prisons Inspector Daniel Khan, in a Guardian article dated 22/1/2011, articulated his concerns with the Trinidad and Tobago prisons. He asserted that the sub-par conditions such as overcrowding, unsanitary cells, denial of airing time, limited prison visits and numerous concerns relating to food were some of the complaints received from prisoners. He further noted that there have been several local judgments discussing whether these conditions are unconstitutional. Our courts have used adjectives such as *distressing, appalling and sub-human* and the Court of Appeal emphasized that such conditions were *completely unacceptable in a civilized society*. These conditions pose a major challenge to the rehabilitative process and create an environment where prisoners are hoarded together without consideration for the nature of offences committed.

This situation provides a breeding ground for '*crime education*' where seasoned criminals are able to influence first-time offenders and contribute to a high rate of recidivism for released prisoners. Imprisonment of offenders who are unlikely to reoffend increases the likelihood of reoffending for a number of reasons. Once imprisoned, such persons are exposed on a continual basis to values and attitudes which support illegal behaviour, they become enmeshed in pro-criminal social networks and may be referred to criminal contacts outside of prison. Further, such offenders may develop new 'skills' which facilitate reoffending and may develop hatred for conventional society and justifications for committing illegal acts against society. In addition, the loss of employment, disruption with social networks, and labeling and stigmatization by the wider society limits the possibility of successful reintegration and acceptance within conventional society upon release. Such persons may have no option but to resort to criminality once released.

In keeping with this line of reasoning it may be appropriate to consider alternatives to incapacitation and explore the concept of selective incapacitation. According to Prison Fellowship International (2010), alternative strategies may include community-based punishments rather than prison for non-dangerous offenders, legislators adopting sentencing reforms to allow for discretionary sentencing, the use of mediation and the use of probation as an alternative to prison. Such alternative dispositions avoid both the labeling and stigmatization which is associated with imprisonment, eliminates the socialization process which occurs in prison, and does not disrupt bonds with conventional society.

The Prison Service of Trinidad and Tobago demonstrates its recognition of the importance of alternative approaches to punishment in its acceptance of the importance of the restorative justice approach. Maiese (2003) posits that restorative justice is concerned with healing victims' wounds, restoring offenders to law-abiding lives, and repairing harm done to interpersonal relationships and the community. It seeks to involve all stakeholders and provides opportunities for those most affected by the crime to be directly involved in the process of responding to the harm caused. She noted that a central premise of restorative justice is that victims, offenders, and the affected communities are all key stakeholders in the restorative process.

In 2002 the Government of Trinidad and Tobago appointed a Task Force to review the Penal Reform System in Trinidad and Tobago. The Task Force noted that given the government's national policy emphasis on social sector delivery and consequential empowerment, together with its recognition for the need to integrate the functioning of the Criminal Justice System, of which Correction Administration is an integral part, the Report was seen as a framework of reference for modernizing the Penal System in Trinidad and Tobago. One of the key recommendations advanced by the Task Force was the implementation of a restorative justice philosophy throughout the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago.

They define restorative justice as a vision, a public policy and a criminal justice model that links social justice and criminal justice and postulate that the ultimate restorative justice goal is to keep people out of prison by dealing with them in the community without compromising public safety. The ultimate purpose of restorative justice measures is to heal torn relationships and to restore justice. This means promoting responsibility, safety and peace, so that offenders become stakeholders in society. The Prison Service through its website admits that it is an ongoing challenge to move its operations, objectives, policies, rules and culture from retributive to restorative justice. They are nevertheless committed to ensuring its complete implementation.

Evidence of the newly installed government's attempts to expand the restorative approach can be discerned in the Minister of Justice Mr. Herbert Volney's discourse on the penal system. In a Guardian newspaper article dated 6/1/2011 he indicated that prisoner management which hinges on the notion of reformation and restoration was one of his main priorities. Minister Volney further noted that *"The policy of the Government is to move the approach of prisoner management from the retributive to the restorative in that not only is punishment a primary facet of incarceration but reforming prisoners for their return to society as better persons"* *(Guardian 2011 pg A8).* The concept of restorative justice was further embraced by the State when the Prime Minister, the Honourable Mrs. Kamla Persad-Bissessar, in an article in the Daily Express dated 2/2/2011 announced that the Ministry of the People will be seeking to issue grants of $5000 per person to former inmates to deal with rehabilitation and reintegration back into communities to curb the repeat revolving door syndrome.

Conclusion

The criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago is currently confronted with the reality of responding to the spiraling crime situation engulfing the society. The society identified the rising crime rate as a major concern and is demanding efficient and effective responses from the three arms of the criminal justice system: the Police, the Judiciary and the Prison Service.

The demand for action and the failure of the criminal justice system to effectively respond has ushered in an era of ongoing reform within each of the enforcement arms of the system. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, through the implementation of legislative changes, has sought to positively impact on the overall performance of the Service. It has been argued that even with the new reforms the Service has not been able to effectively arrest the crime situation. It was argued that the minimal success was due to the failure of the drafters of the plan to consider and incorporate the cultural, social, and economic context of the Trinidad and Tobago experience. It was also noted that the failure to recognize the citizenry as a valid contributing stakeholder both to the restructuring process and the drafting of a 'citizen security' crime plan undermine the success and ultimate purpose of the reform efforts.

The Trinidad and Tobago Judiciary is also confronted with the challenge to respond to the changing needs of the society. The demand for timely justice is negatively impacted by the inability of the Judiciary to effectively manage backlog caseloads. This has resulted in the Judiciary being described as time consuming and non-responsive to the needs of citizens. To address the inefficiencies within the system a number of recommendations were advanced. It was noted that the recommendations support the analysis postulated by the Honourable Chief Justice Ivor Archie that the Judiciary is dependent on the input of other entities within the criminal justice system to ensure its efficiency. The challenges within the other agencies negatively impact on the administration of justice. This suggests that the criminal justice system is a unified system made up of different parts. Each part has a specific function to execute to ensure the stability of the whole. The failure in one part will negatively impact the functioning of the entire entity.

Over the last decade the Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service has been engaged in the process of reforming its culture, goals and methodology from a retributive to a restorative orientation. The challenges in its implementation are made evident by the high recidivism rate within the system. With the recent change in government and their stated support for the restorative approach it is hoped that the Prison Service will achieve its goals of reforming its organization and contributing to the rehabilitation of individuals within the system. The above research suggests that the key agencies comprising the criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago are aware of the need to move away from the colonial focus of 'state security' and become agents of 'citizen security'. The challenge lies in creating the framework which will incorporate all stakeholders to facilitate the effective transition. At this point it can be said that attempts are being made by the Police, Judiciary and Prison Service to make the transition in Trinidad and Tobago.

Chapter 8
Main findings and recommendations, promising programmes, and conclusions

This report examined citizen security in Trinidad and Tobago. Chapter 1 focused on criminal victimization and examined both official crime data as well as the results of a victimization survey conducted specifically for this report. Domestic violence, which represents a specific case of victimization of a vulnerable group in Trinidad and Tobago was examined within the context of Chapter 1. Chapter 2 focused on youth violence, while Chapter 3 assessed the issue of gangs in Trinidad and Tobago. Chapter 4 offers an empirical basis upon which to design intervention strategies, and examined the risk factors which encourage crime and violence. Chapter 5 looked at the responses of the population and state to insecurity, and it was argued that if political decisions are based solely on popular sentiment, this could lead to ineffective crime policies. While the opinion of the population is important, this must be understood within the context of the findings of theoretical and empirical work in criminology. Chapter 6 examined state policies and the policy orientation of the population while Chapter 7 offered a critical examination of the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago. Overall, this report assesses the nature and extent of crime and insecurity, draws linkages to human development, and offers recommendations for dealing with crime and insecurity in Trinidad and Tobago.

Main findings and recommendations

Official crime data as well as self-reported crime victimization data were examined in order to assess the extent and nature of criminal victimization in Trinidad and Tobago. For the period 1990 to 2010, there was an annual average of 222 murders, 553 woundings and shootings, 125 kidnappings, 525 rapes and other sexual offences, 4290 robberies, and 6020 burglaries. Long term crime trends indicate an increase for all of these major crimes except burglary. Murders have increased by 10.4% per year, while woundings and shootings have increased by 4%, kidnapping by 17.5%, rape by 7.5%, and robberies by 3.6%.

Burglaries in contrast, have decreased by an average of 1.5% per year over the last twenty years. While there was an overall increase in kidnappings, it should be noted that this is related to an increase for the period 1990 to 2006. The total number of kidnappings in Trinidad and Tobago began to decrease after 2006 up to available data for 2010. Kidnapping for ransom represent 11.8% of all kidnappings in Trinidad and Tobago. There was an annual average of 22 kidnappings for ransom per year for the period 2000 to 2010. Kidnapping for ransom exhibited an increase for the period 2000 to 2005, but thereafter exhibited a decline up to available data for 2010. While there is a noted decrease in burglaries, caution should be exercised in taking this as evidence of a decrease in crime. Indeed it may be the case that persons who commit burglaries have become more violent over time, and as such, former burglars may be displaced unto the statistics for robberies or other violent crimes. Summary crime data for the last five years offer a more contemporary indication of victimization rates which are reflective of the noted increases in many crimes over time. In the last five years (i.e. 2006 to 2010) there were an average of 458 murders per year, 684 woundings and shootings, 164 kidnappings, 13 kidnappings for ransom, 782 rapes and other sexual offences, 5351 robberies and 5147 burglaries.

Self-reported victimization data collected specifically for this project from a representative sample of 1,595 randomly selected respondents from thirty-seven geographic regions in Trinidad and Tobago offer a useful comparison to official crime data. The advantage of such victimization data is that it offers a more accurate picture of the extent of criminal victimization. This is the case since official crime data do not include those instances of victimization which are not reported to the police.   It is nevertheless the case that victimization data may also capture a number of less serious offences which may serve to inflate estimates of the extent of criminal offending. One advantage of the present study which compensates for this is that victimization data were collected for specified offences allowing a distinction to be made between victimization rates for serious versus non-serious crimes.

It was found that within the last ten years, 23.9% of the sample had been victimized. Of these, almost half (48.5%) were victimized once, while, 27.3%. were victimized twice, and 24.2% were victimized three or more times. Within the last ten years, the most frequently occurring crime was robbery at gunpoint (5.6% of the sample), followed by robbery with other types of weapons (3.8%), break-ins during the day (3.4%), and break-ins during the night (2.5%). More males (57%) than females (43%) were victims of crime within the last ten years, while the majority of victims were of African descent (40.7%) followed by person of mixed descent (28.1%) and Indian descent (25.5%).

It was also discovered that within the last year, 10.2% of the sample were victimized. The majority of victims were male (60.7%), while 43.6% of the victims were of African descent, 26.4% of Indian descent, and 25.8% of mixed descent. The most prevalent types of victimization within the last year were break-ins during the day (1.8%), robbery with other types of weapons and assault with a weapon (both 1.1%), and robbery at gunpoint (1%).

Victimization data were compared to official crime data to assess the extent to which official data underestimates the extent of criminal offending in Trinidad and Tobago. Victimization data indicate that the actual number of robberies which occur is 4.4 times higher than that indicated by official crime statistics, while the rate of rape is 7.6 times higher, break-ins into homes 6.8 times higher, motor vehicle theft 2.5 times higher, and financial crimes 7.5 times higher. Other comparisons which were made include a comparison between murder and attempted murder, and between woundings/shootings and assault with a weapon. While strictly speaking these latter comparisons do not involve perfectly similar constructs, like the previous comparisons, they indicate that actual victimization is higher than that indicated by official crime data.

An important area of focus for the present study relates to youth violence. Past research in Trinidad and Tobago has found that serious acts of delinquency begin even while youths are in primary school. Lall (2007) collected data from 589 nine to eleven year olds and found that within the last six months, 64% were involved in a fist fight, 45% consumed alcohol, 26% assaulted someone with a weapon, 17% stole something, 7% smoked cigarettes, and 2% used illegal drugs. While delinquency may be initiated at an early age, policy makers should be aware that intervention strategies must avoid the processes of labeling and stigmatization, and whenever possible, must avoid a strategy based on institutionalization. There is the real danger in Trinidad and Tobago that public perceptions about youth violence may fuel the implementation of inappropriate measures for dealing with youthful offenders and delinquents. Much international research (Moffitt, 1993; 2003; 2006) shows that the vast majority of youthful offenders engage in acts of delinquency as a result of imitative behavior.

Such adolescents experience what Moffitt (1993) calls a "maturity gap" and in trying to compensate for this maturity gap, they imitate the delinquent behavior of a numerically much smaller group of persistent delinquents.   The persistent delinquency of such youths, according to Moffitt (1993) is rooted in neuropsychology.   The average youth who imitates delinquent behavior will naturally desist from such behavior once they become more mature. No special intervention is therefore needed for the vast majority of delinquent youths, though more serious measures are required where persistent delinquents are concerned. Intervention strategies which stigmatize youths who engage in imitative delinquency, or which provide opportunities for interaction with persistently delinquent youths may interfere with the naturally occurring desistance process, and may ensnare a "normal" youth into a life of delinquency.

Data from Trinidad and Tobago indicate that at present, inappropriate strategies are being employed in dealing with delinquency. Deosaran and Chadee (1997) for example interviewed the entire population of three juvenile institutions in Trinidad and Tobago and quite alarmingly found that 58.5% of youths in an institution for young boys, and 92.8% of youths in an institution for young girls were institutionalized for non-illegal acts. Indeed a strong case could be made that many youths who were institutionalized were in need of counseling, support, and care, as opposed to being placed in an institutional settings. "Offences" for which such youths were institutionalized include attempting suicide, being victims of physical and sexual abuse, having no one to take care of them, running away from home, and being beyond control.

The findings of Deosaran and Chadee (1997) are consistent with other data from Trinidad and Tobago. For example Ministry of National Security data for the period 1986 to 1995 indicate that of all juvenile offences which were adjudicated, destitution (having no parent or other fit person to provide for the youth) accounted for 30% of the cases, while being beyond control accounted for 22.7%.   Quite importantly, in the study by Deosaran and Chadee (1997), it was found that even for youths who were institutionalized for committing illegal acts, such youths exhibited characteristics which indicated a strong potential for rehabilitation.

The institutionalization of youths who are in need of protection and counseling, or youths who are not serious offenders is contrary to the objective of reducing crime and violence. Such youths will be channeled into a life of continued delinquency and eventual criminality for a number of reasons.   Institutionalization is accompanied by stigmatization, socialization into antisocial norms and values, labeling and stereotyping. Once institutionalized, the life chances of youths are negatively affected, and opportunities for advancement via pro-social means are reduced or eliminated.   Furthermore, an institutional setting is one in which socialization effects may encourage the adoption and acceptance of counter-normative values, attitudes and lifestyles by youths who may otherwise eventually desist from a delinquent lifestyle. The laws of Trinidad and Tobago allow for wide discretion in the sentences handed down to youths, and institutionalization is only one among a range of other options.

Where there is a lack of alternatives, the decisions of adjudicators are constrained. There is at present an urgent need for the development of alternative options for youths so that magistrates and judges are not forced to use an incapacitative strategy where it cannot be justified. Consideration should also be given for the use of mediation in youth justice, and the use of family circles and community courts where youths are concerned, since this also provides alternatives to sending youths through the formal court system. In cases where youths have committed offences and have been convicted and have served their sentence, consideration should be given to the possibility of sealing or removing their juvenile record so that their future life chances are not hampered by acts committed when they were younger. This latter suggestion may be more applicable where less serious offences are concerned. Careful consideration is also warranted in cases where youths are drug addicts or users. While these may be in the minority, if special attention is not given in such cases, such youths have a greater than average likelihood of graduating to serious criminality when they get older.

The issue of criminal gangs is one which is becoming increasingly important in Trinidad and Tobago. To ignore the potential threat which gangs pose, or to deemphasize the magnitude of the problem risks the possibility of inaction. Inaction may lead to a situation where the gang problem escalates to the point where it becomes overwhelming and can no longer be controlled. Data from the Ministry of National Security as well as the research findings of Katz and Choate (2010) concur that at present, there are approximately 95 gangs with a total of 1269 gang members in Trinidad and Tobago. The majority of gangs are concentrated in the Port of Spain, Western and Northern police divisions. Available data indicate that approximately 83% of gang members are of African descent, 13% of East Indian descent, and 4% of other ethnic backgrounds. All gangs in Trinidad and Tobago are male dominated and most (87%) are comprised of adults. A large proportion of all gangs (88%) claim some area as their turf, while 75% defend their turf. While the vast majority (85%) do not have identifying symbols or clothing, recent trends indicate that the prevalence of tattoos and other symbols is increasing.

Data reviewed in this study indicate that gang members are engaged in a disproportionate amount of illegal behavior. The Besson Street Gang Intelligence Criminal History Project collected data from 368 gang members and found that 51.4% were previously arrested, with each gang member having an average of 2.09 arrests. When compared to persons who were not in gangs, it was found that 20.2% of such persons had prior arrests, with the average number of arrests for such persons being 0.68. When this data were further disaggregated according to crime type it was found that gang members were three times more likely than non-gang members to be arrested for violent offences, and drug use/possession, five times more likely to be arrested for drug trafficking, twice as likely to be arrested for property offences, and one and a half times more likely to be arrested for sexual offences. Further evidence that gang members are disproportionately engaged in serious and violent crime comes from Ministry of National Security data on murder.

For the period 2001 to 2009, fully 33% of all murders (900 out of 2752) were gang-related murders. Even more disturbing is that fact that the annual number of gang-related murders showed a steady upward trend for the period 2001 to 2008, with a slight decrease occurring only in 2009. A spatial comparison of the density of gangs and the incidence of crimes in Trinidad and Tobago revealed that violent crimes occur more frequently in areas with a higher proportion of gangs. The crimes which were found to be most closely related to gang presence were murder, woundings/shootings, robbery, burglary and narcotic offences. Ministry of National Security data on firearm usage in the commission of crimes indicate that there is a disturbing upward trend, to the point where firearms have become almost exclusively the weapon of choice in murders. The prevalence and availability of firearms, coupled with the increasing violence of gangs in Trinidad is cause for serious concern.[83]

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[83] Gang presence and activity appear to be minimal in Tobago.

Suppressive as well as preventative strategies must be employed in the fight against gangs. Suppressive strategies alone will fail if the social conditions which encourage gang membership are not addressed. Such conditions will ensure a steady supply of youths who are willing to join gangs, and who see no other alternative to survival. Under such conditions, the most effective suppressive strategies will be met with a steady supply of replacements for gang members who are incarcerated. Preventative strategies should focus on social dynamics within communities with a gang presence, as well as on external societal factors which result in the social isolation and exclusion of such communities and their members from the wider society. The social isolation of gang-affected communities stereotypes such communities and their members resulting in a reduction of prosocial alternatives and opportunities.

When the legitimate opportunity structure is blocked, community members may resort to illegitimate means to achieve upward social mobility. In addition, social isolation may result in a withdrawal or reduction of public services otherwise provided within Trinidad and Tobago. Examples here include law enforcement and access to social services. Gangs may usurp such functions, and could thus be perceived by community members as essential to the functioning of their community. If this occurs, gangs may become entrenched within such communities, much the same as currently exists in Jamaica. Once this happens, the eradication of gangs will become extremely difficult or impossible.

Data gathered for this study indicate that gangs have not as yet become entrenched within communities in Trinidad and Tobago. Of the persons who indicated that there were criminal gangs in their communities, only 3.2% indicated that the gangs had made their communities a safer place. Despite this, however, technical consultation in Trinidad and Tobago indicates that there is evidence that communities are becoming more closely associated with gangs and their leaders, and in some instances are beginning to see gangs as beneficial. Initiatives should be adopted which facilitate interaction between persons from socially marginalized communities and the wider society and which sensitize the public to the ills of stereotyping and which highlight successes from within such communities; this with the aim of challenging negative stereotypes. Educational, social, and economic opportunities must also be provided to persons in marginalized communities such that there are available legitimate pathways to upward social mobility.

Social dynamics within at-risk communities must also be addressed. Emphasis must be placed on reorienting the value systems of community members if there is a commitment to antisocial behavior and norms. Isolation from the wider society may facilitate the development of alternative value systems and subcultures within marginalized communities. Once such subcultures become established, they may become self reinforcing since the adoption of an alternative value system and culture may seem appropriate where community members perceive that they do not belong to or are not allowed to participate fully within the wider society. Antisocial norms will be reinforced by gangs, or may even facilitate the development of gangs. Furthermore, socialization processes will facilitate the perpetuation of such antisocial values.

Systematic research is needed in such communities in order to understand the social dynamics and to uncover the risk factors which predispose gang membership. In this respect, the present study cited the work of Katz and Fox (2010) which examined risk factors in the community, school, family, and peer-individual domains. An understanding of which factors are relatively more important will allow policy makers to design interventions which target those variables which have the greatest likelihood of achieving the intended effect. In this respect the research by Katz and Fox (2010) found that factors within the peer-individual domain were more important than factors in the family, school, and community domains. Despite this there were a number of variables within the latter three domains which were important. Future research should widen the range of variables within each domain, and should include an additional domain to capture larger structural processes.

Suppressive strategies should not be neglected where the elimination of gangs is the objective. The Anti Gang Bill (2010) is a step in the right direction and indicates the resolve of the present government in the fight against gangs. The explanatory note to the bill states that:

> "The Bill seeks to make it a serious offence, *inter alia*, to be a member of a gang, to be in possession of a bullet-proof vest, to participate in or contribute to the activities of a gang, to support or invite support for a gang, or to harbour or recruit children in a gang. The Bill also seeks to confer on a Court the power to order the forfeiture of personal property in certain circumstances" (p. 4).

While some of the provisions of the bill are uncontroversial, others merit careful consideration. It may be extremely difficult for example, to establish uncontrovertibly that a person is a member of a gang, or that even where illegal activity has taken place, that such activity is gang-related. Even more troubling is the possibility that it may be difficult to establish the most basic fact of whether or not a gang exists. The Act states that:

> "For the purpose of this Act, it shall not be necessary to show that a particular gang possesses, acknowledges or is known by any common name, insignia, flag, means of recognition, secret signal or code, creed, belief, structure, leadership or command structure, method of operation, criminal enterprise, concentration or specialty, membership, age or other qualification, initiation rites, geographical or territorial situs, boundary or location, or other unifying mark, manner, protocol or method of expressing or indicating its membership when the gang's existence can be demonstrated by a preponderance of other admissible evidence, but any evidence reasonably tending to show or demonstrate the existence of or membership in a gang shall be admissible in any action or proceedings brought under this Act" (Section 2, p. 10).

This lack of clarity with respect to establishing that a gang exists leaves space for the possibility of the inappropriate usage of evidence in attempting to demonstrate the existence of a gang. It also signals that where such 'evidence' is seen to be inadequate, then the existence of a gang, even where it exists, may be difficult to establish. Given the very lengthy sentences imposed for gang membership and gang activity, jurors may be unwilling to convict if they are not absolutely certain that the existence of the gang could be established, and where established, that gang membership could be established.

Perhaps even more controversial is Clause 9, subsection (1) (a) which makes it an offence to harbor or conceal the child of a gang member. This appears to indicate that the children of gang members should not be accorded the same rights and protections which are expected for children in general. Indeed, it may be argued that the children of gang members are especially vulnerable and may be in need of protection and care by other persons. Despite these limitations, the Anti Gang Bill (2010) signals that the threat which gangs pose is receiving careful consideration, and that suppressive strategies will not be overlooked in Trinidad and Tobago.

Crime policies in Trinidad and Tobago and elsewhere must be based on empirical evidence. While popular opinion may exert some effect on policy decisions, such opinion often is not sufficiently informed, and may be based on emotion, desperation at the escalating crime situation, or a desire for revenge. Despite this, as indicated in Chapters 5 and 6, the population of Trinidad and Tobago recognizes that punitive policies alone will not solve the crime problem. Indeed, it has been found that the population is strongly in support of a range of educational, social, and other non-punitive types of approaches to dealing with the crime situation. Notwithstanding the above, however, a large proportion of the population is also in support of increasingly punitive approaches to dealing with crime. There is always the risk that the emotion which underlies such tendencies could lead to less than optimal solutions to the crime situation.

This report is in support of both punishment-based as well as preventative approaches, but argues that the best way to determine how to proceed in developing crime policies is to rely on rigorous empirical research which assesses a range of risk factors, including those related to typical criminal justice system type approaches, and those related to alternative more 'social' type approaches.

In assessing risk factors, it is useful to conceptualize such factors both within a levels of analysis framework and within a temporal framework. With respect to levels of analysis, this sensitizes researchers and policy makers that important predictors of crime and insecurity may be situated at a range of levels, including the societal/structural level, community, family, school, and individual level of analysis. It may even be possible to argue that larger international/global processes impact on the social and economic circumstances in Trinidad and Tobago, and thus influence crime rates.

Admittedly, however, such factors may be difficult or impossible to manipulate since they may be outside the sphere of control of any one nation state. Superimposed upon the levels of analysis is a temporal framework. This temporal framework sensitizes the researcher to the fact that interventions to reduce crime could occur before the crime has occurred (preventative), where there is a risk that crime could occur (preventative actions targeting at-risk persons or communities), or after the crime has occurred (reactive). These three temporal phases have been labeled primary, secondary and tertiary prevention (Brantingham and Faust, 1976). The superimposition of the temporal and levels of analysis frameworks is shown in Figure 8.1 and sensitizes researchers and policy makers to the various possibilities for risk factors.

Figure 8.1
Conceptual framework for risk factors

	Societal/structural	Community	School	Family	Individual	Other
Primary prevention						
Secondary prevention		**Risk factors within each cell**				
Tertiary prevention						

The present study examined primary data, as well as previous research to determine which risk factors may be important in Trinidad and Tobago. Two important factors which emerged in the analysis of primary data were community cohesion and societal cohesion. The former refers to a sense of belonging and trust at the community level, while the latter refers to the same construct, but at the societal level. Both factors were found to act as buffers against crime. High levels of cohesion ensure that informal social processes are operative, and that citizens are willing to come to the aid of others who may be in need of assistance. High cohesion also indicates a collective commitment to values which are considered normative, including standards of behavior which avoid illegality.

This ensures that children are socialized into a law-abiding lifestyle, and that informal means of behavior regulation are operative and act on children as well as adults, both at the community and societal levels. Societal cohesion is critical, not only because it provides a buffering effect against crime, but also because low levels of social cohesion could result in the social isolation of some communities, facilitating feelings of exclusion and ostracism directed against such communities and their members. When this occurs, values which are counter to those of the wider society may develop, and may lead to counter-normative behaviours. Indeed, this study found that where societal cohesion was low, but where community cohesion was high, this led to an increase in self-reported offending. The social exclusion and isolation of some communities may lead to a strengthening of relationships within such communities since such community members may feel that they have only themselves to rely on. Social isolation may encourage, or even mandate, that norms which are contrary to those of the wider society must be developed. Such norms become self-reinforcing, and continued social exclusion of such communities will increase resistance to adopting wider prosocial societal values.

Prior research has also uncovered a range of additional factors which are of importance in understanding and controlling crime in Trinidad and Tobago. Seepersad (2009) for example discovered that personal and group economic deprivation (egoistic and fraternal relative deprivation), as well as criminal values and attitudes, having criminal peers, the availability of illegal opportunities, and low self control were all consistent predictors of crime and counter normative behaviours. Katz and Fox (2010) further found that important predictors of gang membership include having antisocial peers, early initiation into antisocial behavior, and having peers who use alcohol and illegal drugs. Within the community domain, Katz and Fox (2010) found that the availability of handguns and residential mobility were important predictors of gang membership, while within the family domain it was found that parental attitudes favourable to antisocial behavior predicted gang membership. Within the school domain, low commitment to school was found to be an important predictor.

This study recommends that systematic research needs to be conducted on risk factors using the framework in Figure 8.1. Past research must be reviewed to determine what is currently known about risk factors. In addition, evaluation research is required to assess the utility of current intervention programmes. This includes an evaluation of the cost effectiveness of such programmes. Such evaluation, in conjunction with research on risk factors and a review of past studies will indicate which risk factors and approaches are useful with the local context and will offer suggestions for future interventions.

The criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago is responsible for dealing with issues of crime and security. As is evident from previous reasoning, proactive (preventative) as well as reactive (after the crime has occurred) measures are required if the nation is to be successful in its fight against crime. With the exception of general deterrence strategies, it could be argued that much of what is done by 'traditional' criminal justice systems is reactive. A progressive criminal justice system is one which extends its focus to include preventative measures. This is not to say that it is expected that the criminal justice system has all of the resources or personnel to engage in preventative crime control through all or most of the major institutions in Trinidad and Tobago.

Rather, what is being said is that instead of other institutions functioning to reduce crime only incidentally, or only as a by-product of their functioning, there should be a more purposeful and deliberate integration of ideas and strategies from criminology and criminal justice in other institutions, such that these institutions have planned strategies to aid in the fight against crime. So for example, while the education system in Trinidad and Tobago may serve a crime reduction function, this occurs as a by-product of its functioning, rather than as a result of a deliberate strategy.

Careful thought could be put into developing programmes for schools which are aimed at developing social skills, civic mindedness, self-control, self-esteem, racial and religious tolerance, the ability to defer gratification, moral values, and other such factors which may help in the development of law abiding youths and young adults. The use of the educational system is but one example. Such ideas could be applied to other institutions such as the community and family.   The UK Crime and Disorder Act (1998) offers a useful template of how legislation may be used to integrate the functioning of a range of governmental and non-governmental agencies where crime control is the issue. Among other things, this Act affords the opportunity for each local authority in England and Wales to formulate and implement a strategy to reduce crime and disorder in their area. The Act also requires the local authority to work with every police authority, probation authority, health authority, social landlords, the voluntary sector, and local residents and businesses. A system has been put in place to ensure that there is communication and coordination among the various entities and that there is a sharing of expertise in moving forward with initiatives which derive from specified goals as they relate to the reduction of crime and insecurity.

While the above argues for a reconceptualization of the functioning of the criminal justice system in Trinidad and Tobago, it is also important to strengthen the law enforcement function of this system. Inefficiencies and problems within the Police Service, Judiciary, and Prisons can reduce the effectiveness of the criminal justice system with regard to controlling crime. A major problem facing the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service is a lack of public confidence. Data collected for this report show that for a range of performance areas, approximately 60% of the population feel that the police perform poorly or very poorly. It is misleading to think that public opinion is unimportant for the functioning of the Police Service.

 The public functions as a system of surveillance for the police, and where the public fails to report incidents of victimization due to a lack of confidence in the police, such illegal activity will go unchecked. Importantly also, where the public believes that that the police do not function effectively, they may attempt to take justice into their own hands, possibly resulting in even more serious transgressions against the law. It is also the case that persons who feel insecure due to a lack of confidence may migrate. Typically those persons who may be more educated, or who possess greater financial resources may be the one more likely to migrate, resulting in a removal of intellectual and financial resources from Trinidad and Tobago.

Finally, a sense of confidence, where people feel that the Police are there to serve and protect them will foster a sense of community and partnership with the Police and the criminal justice system generally, and facilitate a situation where both the public and police work together to achieve the common goals of reducing crime and building security. Community policing represents one way whereby partnerships between the police and public may be developed. This report has examined a number of reasons why community policing in Trinidad and Tobago has met with less success than initially hoped for, and suggests that community policing as a philosophy and as a new way of doing policing should not be abandoned. Recent police reforms were also examined. Such reforms were guided by the recommendations of Professor Stephen Mastrofski, and aim to improve the legitimacy, accountability, external and internal management capability, and technical capability of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

While the public often focuses on the performance of the Police Service in evaluating crime rates, it is the case that the other arms of the criminal justice system play an equally important role. Inefficiencies in the Judiciary and the Prison Service, where they exist, will also translate into problems with crime and insecurity. The Judiciary of Trinidad and Tobago faces the overwhelming task of adjudicating at a rate which is fast enough to keep up with the large number of offences which occur on a daily basis. Consideration should be given to alternatives which may reduce the caseload of the judiciary, at least where less serious offences are concerned. A restorative justice model, where there is provision for mediation, counseling, and other facilities which allow for an out-of-court solution to disputes is encouraged.

This model, quite apart from freeing the Judiciary from dealing with less serious matters has the advantage that dialogue between victims and offenders may initiate a rehabilitation process in offenders. Offenders who are encouraged to empathize with victims and to make reparations for wrongdoing in a social context which is more accepting of the offender, but which at the same time signals social disapproval for the wrongdoing, may be more willing to desist from reoffending. Social pressures are responsible for the law abiding behavior of the vast majority of persons, and exert as much, or perhaps even more influence on behavior than the threat of punishment from the criminal justice system. Where offenders are allowed opportunities for reintegration into the community, this reduces the likelihood that such persons may be forced into a life of crime due to a lack of legitimate opportunities which are typically provided by society.

A reduction in the caseload of the Judiciary should be accompanied by the streamlining of the processes which affect the efficiency of judicial functioning such that cases which must be adjudicated are addressed in a timely manner. A number of suggestions were offered in this respect. The system of legal aid should be improved by increasing the fees paid to attorneys. At present, the fees paid attract very few attorneys and there is typically a three to four-month delay in appointing legal aid counsel. In addition, the system of police prosecutors should be revisited. Many police prosecutors are not trained attorneys and this results in serious disadvantages for the prosecution. Qualified attorneys should be appointed to conduct all cases in the Magistrates' Courts, or in the alternative, police prosecutors should be qualified attorneys. A special system of remands via a video link will reduce the need for the transport of prisoners to court. This would reduce costs and time spent. In the alternative, regional remand facilities could be constructed. Such facilities should be located in close proximity to the major courts.

There is need for an increase in compensation paid to witnesses and jurors who attend court. Current fees reduce witness participation and juror dedication. Trivial cases such as private trivial cases as well as licenses and tickets should be done by lay Magistrates. A system should be put in place which ensures that police officers attend court when they function as witnesses or complainants. At present, police absenteeism results in a delay in the administration of justice. That said, it is recognized that police absenteeism occurs because of less than adequate case management, where officers may attend cases several times, with the case being postponed each time due to a range of issues. These occurrences results in a wastage of the valuable time of Police officers. A case management system should be put in place where cases are allowed to proceed only when all documentation, personnel, and other requirements are ready and in place for the case to proceed. Plea bargaining legislation, which offers the possibility of sentence discounts, should be considered. This will allow at least some cases to circumvent lengthy court trials by the admission of guilt. Consideration should also be given to the increased usage of paper committals as opposed to preliminary inquiries. Victim and witness protection are also important within the Trinidad and Tobago context.

Witnesses as well as victims may fail to testify because of fear of reprisals from offenders. Better protection will improve the chances of successful prosecution. Consideration should also be given to the use of witness testimony via a video link. Where narcotics cases are concerned, there is a need for revision of the sentencing options. Currently drug addicts are treated in a similar manner to drug traffickers. Addicts are in need of rehabilitation and medical treatment. Prison sentences do little or nothing to treat addiction. Alternatives to imprisonment, such as mandatory treatment in a drug rehabilitation center should be considered. This report recommends a thorough evaluation of the key constraints which face the Judiciary of Trinidad and Tobago. Such evaluation should draw heavily on Magistrates and Judges to develop suggestions to streamline the processes involved in the administration of justice.

The Prison Service represents the third major component of the Criminal Justice System in Trinidad and Tobago. If not properly managed, prisons could become breeding grounds for persistent criminality and recidivism as opposed to places where rehabilitation occurs.

At present in Trinidad and Tobago, persons who have committed non-serious offences are housed together with serious offenders while on remand. This increases the chance that socialization effects may become operational where less serious offenders learn the skills, values and attitudes required to become more proficient and committed to offending. This also facilitates social networking whereby alliances may be developed between non-serious and serious offenders, or where offenders may be given the contact information of other offenders who are not within the correctional system. While some segregation is afforded once convicted, a more carefully graded system of segregation will ensure that similar effects are not operative among the inmate population. This of course necessitates an expansion of current facilities. This will serve to reduce overcrowding, and improve the working conditions of prison officers. Imprisonment should only be used as a last resort in Trinidad and Tobago. Incapacitation strategies should be employed only for serious offences, and for persons who are likely to recidivate (as evidenced by a culture-appropriate dangerousness assessment). Other persons who are unlikely to reoffend, or who have not committed serious offences should be sentenced to alternative dispositions. Alternatives could include community service, mandatory rehabilitation, or some form of reparative disposition. Selective incapacitation will reduce the strain on the prison system and will maximize the cost-efficiency of imprisonment while protecting the public.

Current programmes in Trinidad and Tobago

This report has examined the issue of crime and insecurity in Trinidad and Tobago and has offered a number of suggestions aimed at reducing crime and improving security. This chapter will highlight two programmes which represent promising initiatives in Trinidad and Tobago. These programmes are the Citizen Security Programme and the Community Safety and Enhancement Programme. Both programmes have a preventative orientation and utilize some of the ideas suggested in this report.

The Citizen Security Programme

The Citizen Security Programme in Trinidad and Tobago represents an example of an emerging best practice related to the control of crime and insecurity. The Citizen Security Programme Project Profile Report (2007) notes the serious increases of serious crimes in Trinidad and Tobago since 2000. The homicide rate more than tripled, from 9.2 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000 to 28.2 per 100,000 in 2006. Homicides were concentrated in a few neighborhoods (North West tip of the island through Port of Spain, Chaguanas and San Fernando), occurred mainly at night and involve the use of firearms. Robberies showed an increased from 210 per 100,000 in 1998 to 375 per 100,000 in 2002. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) reported that 13% of homicides committed between 2000 and 2002 were domestic violence related. Reported sexual offenses against children increased from 166 in 2000 to 258 in 2002. The data supports the assertion that Trinidad and Tobago was experiencing an upsurge in violent crime.

The spiraling crime situation brought to the fore citizens' fears for their personal safety and its impact on their quality of life. According to the Report (2007) this fear was reflected in the results of a victimization survey conducted by the Citizen Security Programme within the same period. The findings underscored that fear for personal safety was relatively widespread. Twenty eight percent (28%) of those surveyed reported witnessing someone wounded by a sharp weapon or firearm. Four in ten persons felt very unsafe in their neighborhoods at night which impacted the quality of their community life. It was also noted that one in five respondents limited where they shopped and curtailed recreational activities they formerly enjoyed as a result of their fear for their personal safety.

The increasing crime rate also contributed to the society's lack of satisfaction in the performance of the Police Service and facilitated feelings of insecurity among the citizenry. According to the Report (2007) the situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the society held a negative view of the community-police relationship. It highlighted that the victimization survey revealed that the highest incidence of victimization (45%) reported related to mistreatment of a family member by the police. Almost half of those surveyed believe that the police were not doing a good job. Among assault victims who reported incidents to the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, 70% were unsatisfied with the way the police dealt with the report. These victims felt that the police did not do enough (34%); seemed uninterested (24%), or did not treat the victims correctly or politely (14%).

The Report (2007) postulates that the lack of a coordinated and collaborated approach to the many dimensions of the crime situation in Trinidad and Tobago and the failure to place sufficient emphasis on prevention constrained the ability of the Ministry of National Security to respond effectively. In an attempt to address the crime situation and to implement its Vision 20/20 Crime and Violence Reduction Strategy which aimed to significantly reduce crime by using a holistic sustained approach that addresses the root causes of crime, to reduce the involvement of young people in crime, to instill a culture of law, order and respect for human life among all citizens and to restore public trust and confidence in the protective services, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago requested the assistance of the Inter American Development Bank in the preparation of a Citizen Security Programme.

The Objectives and Components of the Citizen Security Programme:

The Citizen Security Programme (CSP) is an initiative of the Ministry of National Security. It seeks to contribute to the reduction in crime and violence by addressing the most proximal risk factors—firearms, unsafe neighbourhoods, violent personal behaviors, in 22 'high needs' communities; 19 in Trinidad and 3 in Tobago. These communities are recognized as high crime or crime hot spot areas. Gonzales, Schofield and Hart (2005) define a 'crime hot spot' as an area that has a greater than average number of criminal or disorder events, or an area where people have a higher than average risk of victimization. Within the local context the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service defines a 'crime hot spot' as a specific geographic location where an unusual amount of criminal activities are committed by one or more offenders.

To further the goals of the CSP, the programme also attempts to strengthen the diagnostic, policy, monitoring and evaluation capacity of the Ministry of National Security. There are four main objectives of the Programme. These include:

- The reduction in the number of homicides, robberies and woundings in partner communities,
- An increase in the perception of safety in partner communities,
- A reduction of injuries related to firearms, child maltreatment, domestic violence and youth violence,
- An increase in collective efficacy to prevent violence in the partner communities.

The Citizen Security Programme has three components which seek to improve the capacities of the three stakeholders involved in the citizen security process. The three stakeholders are the Ministry of National Security, the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service and the members of the targeted communities. The components are the:

(i) institutional strengthening of the Ministry of National Security by improving its ability to plan, coordinate, manage and execute violence and crime prevention projects, and monitor crime and violence trends;

(ii) institutional strengthening of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service to increase public confidence by improving performance, training, management and supervision, thus enhancing the quality of police interaction with the public and victims of crime and complementing the ongoing transformation efforts of the service; and

(iii) co-ordination and implementation of community-based preventive strategies through eight (8) separate but interrelated programmes:

- Community Action Councils (CAC)

- Rapid Impact Projects (RIP)

- Community Peace Promoters (CPP)

- Community Based Social Intervention (CBSI)

- School Based Violence Reduction Programmes

- Youth Friendly Spaces (YFS)

- Public Education Messages

- Inspiring Confidence in Our Neighbourhood (ICON)

Community Safety and Enhancement Programme[84]

Cabinet by Minute No. 3168 dated December 18, 2003, agreed to the establishment of a Community Safety and Enhancement Programme (C.S.E.P.) in the then Ministry of Community Development, Culture and Gender Affairs to promote community safety and security through the development of crime prevention strategies and the implementation of projects with resource support from internal and external sources. The Programme was formally launched on July 5, 2004 in the presence of an audience of approximately five hundred persons comprising Government Ministers, Officials of Government Ministries, officers of the Police Service, representatives of the business community, members of non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations, the Media and emerging Safety and Enhancement Groups.

The programme focused on the strategies and structures employed by people in their communities to make their communities and neighbourhoods safer. The activities aimed at promoting the programme ranged from training workshops on character development and themes related to safety awareness and crime prevention and involving unemployed youths in community enhancement activities as alternatives to crime and deviance. Complementing the training were information dissemination exhibitions at Point Fortin, San Fernando, Siparia, Couva, San Juan, Sangre Grande, Rio Claro, Trincity, Gulf City, Long Circular Mall and Mid Centre Mall.

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[84] Information supplied by Trevor Emmanuel, Assistant Coordinator, Community Safety and Enhancement Programme, Ministry of Community Development.

Community Safety and Enhancement Groups have been engaged in more than eighty projects to date. Some of the major projects are as follows:

1. Peace Concert in Red Hill, Morvant followed by Peace March from Port-of-Spain to Laventille by gang members.
2. Workshop theme Developing Manhood where approximately eighty-five young men (gang members) benefited from the Defining Masculine Excellence Programme. They went on to be trained in the use of heavy equipment.
3. An employment generating training programme in Food Processing and Management conducted by the Caribbean Agro-Business Association at the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine for twenty-three (23) young women from Morvant, Beetham Estate and Laventille.
4. An ongoing agriculture programme in Carlson Field initiated by members of the St. Barb's Safety and Enhancement Group, involving twenty-five young men and women from the Laventille district.
5. Lectures in twenty-five communities on Community Safety and Crime Prevention.
6. Regional crime workshops at Sangre Grande, Mayaro, Princess Town, Penal and Arouca.
7. Street Theatre on crime prevention in the communities of Laventille and Morvant.
8. Crime Prevention through the sport of boxing in Smith Hill, Carenage.
9. Home work, Remedial Assistance and Risk Identification Projects. Youths from Covigne, Patna, Bagatelle and Environs participated.
10. Gang Resistance Education Programme (Pilot) with Restorers Safety and Enhancement group, Diego Martin. Young men benefited by being trained to resist joining gangs and engaging in violent behavior.

The officers of the Community Safety and Enhancement Programme have also established and sustained a close working relationship with other public and private sector organizations and agencies involved in crime reduction initiatives. An Assistant Coordinator of the Programme has been serving on the Steering Committee of the Citizen Security Programme since its inception. Officials of the Community Safety and Enhancement Programme also serve on the Police Regional Councils and partner with the National Drug Council on a number of projects, including mobilization work related to the commemoration of International Day Against Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking. The nationwide coverage of the programme and the nature of the work to be undertaken, however, require additional officers. At present the existing staff establishment includes two Assistant Coordinators and four Liaison Officers. An increase will provide the programme with the required capacity to advance the efforts in the East Port of Spain districts, including Laventille, Morvant and other vulnerable districts which are inadequately serviced. In light of the fact that the Community Safety and Enhancement Programme's mandate is to promote community safety and security through the development of crime prevention strategies and it's potential for making inroads in high crime communities, all efforts should be taken to ensure that the Programme's mandate is implemented.

Conclusion

Crime and insecurity impact negatively on human development and represent one of the biggest concerns of the population and government of Trinidad and Tobago. Any worthwhile solution requires careful consideration of the many issues which potentially affect the functioning of the criminal justice system, but also requires the integration of ideas from criminology and criminological research within other institutions. The present study offers an assessment of some of the issues and challenges facing Trinidad and Tobago in the fight against crime and insecurity. Recommendations were offered within each of the substantive areas focused upon in this report.

Areas examined include crime and victimization trends, youth violence, gangs in Trinidad and Tobago, risk factors for crime and insecurity, state policies, and the criminal justice system. It is anticipated that this report will stimulate thinking about the many challenges which presently exist, and will offer some insight into possible solutions.

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Appendices

Appendix 1[85]
Serious crimes in Trinidad and Tobago (1990-2010)

Years	Murder	Wounding & Shooting	Rape & Sexual Offences	Serious Indecency	Kidnapping	Narcotic Offences	Burglaries	Robberies	Fraud	General Larceny	Other Serious Crimes
1990	84	391	221	67	13	1211	7546	3115	245	2331	676
1991	97	453	228	77	16	1078	7313	3099	393	2434	652
1992	109	420	274	98	16	963	7938	3786	415	2545	726
1993	111	608	284	87	41	1080	8419	4722	332	2743	766
1994	140	533	254	70	46	1098	7635	4490	447	2834	707
1995	122	501	309	99	56	1118	6542	3858	398	2781	674
1996	107	505	295	116	81	1259	6835	4075	541	3196	731
1997	101	370	514	206	80	1209	6682	3393	572	2686	744
1998	97	319	572	157	100	1300	6112	2780	388	2686	906
1999	93	340	476	180	136	1334	5475	3629	411	2882	917
2000	120	387	545	167	156	1225	5623	4094	522	3042	853
2001	151	499	545	134	135	485	5016	4269	308	2961	898
2002	171	655	641	149	235	509	4930	4675	425	3164	853
2003	229	784	643	88	235	505	4863	4590	459	3210	919
2004	261	643	581	52	177	589	5214	3885	329	3365	862
2005	386	795	738	61	280	482	4548	4883	300	4052	980
2006	371	657	903	81	214	543	4973	5633	322	3064	856
2007	391	680	825	76	178	604	4958	4965	236	3570	930
2008	547	771	724	55	155	536	4855	5043	234	4407	1043
2009	506	689	760	44	155	552	5744	6040	548	3772	1102
2010	473	623	696	60	119	499	5207	5075	198	4058	905
Average	**222**	**553**	**525**	**101**	**125**	**866**	**6020**	**4290**	**382**	**3133**	**843**
Average for the last 5 years	**458**	**684**	**782**	**63**	**164**	**547**	**5147**	**5351**	**308**	**3774**	**967**

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[85] All data in Appendix 1 were sourced from the Crime and Problem Analysis branch of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

Total kidnapping and kidnapping for ransom (2000-2010)

YEARS	Total Kidnappings		Kidnapping for Ransom	
	reported	detected	reported	detected
2000	156	61	4	2
2001	135	69	7	1
2002	235	110	31	15
2003	235	96	50	12
2004	177	83	28	8
2005	280	163	58	15
2006	214	121	17	8
2007	178	92	14	2
2008	155	68	17	5
2009	155	55	8	6
2010	119	41	7	4
Average	**185.4**	**87.2**	**21.9**	**7.1**

Total sexual offences and rapes (2000-2010)

YEARS	Total Sexual Offences		Rapes	
	reported	detected	reported	detected
2000	545	409	261	155
2001	545	383	274	141
2002	641	451	302	153
2003	643	468	277	138
2004	581	414	305	171
2005	738	546	334	158
2006	903	646	259	110
2007	825	550	317	145
2008	724	405	236	100
2009	760	393	247	78
2010	696	346	215	76
Average	**691.0**	**455.5**	**275.2**	**129.5**

Appendix 2

Crime according to location in Trinidad and Tobago (2001-2010)

Murder

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total (2001-2010)	Percent of Grand total
PORT OF SPAIN	39	45	67	77	117	99	86	164	127	93	914	26.2
SOUTHERN	17	20	19	16	20	27	32	27	38	57	273	7.8
WESTERN	7	13	29	39	70	44	44	67	74	65	452	13.0
NORTHERN	30	34	44	45	64	65	98	104	114	100	698	20.0
CENTRAL	17	11	18	20	16	36	27	51	45	44	285	8.2
SOUTH WESTERN	9	9	13	12	22	15	16	13	15	27	151	4.3
EASTERN	5	11	11	8	17	12	13	29	24	28	158	4.5
NORTH EASTERN	22	24	25	40	50	67	71	86	54	49	488	14.0
TOBAGO	5	4	3	4	10	6	4	6	15	10	67	2.0
TOTAL	**151**	**171**	**229**	**261**	**386**	**371**	**391**	**547**	**506**	473	**Grand total 3486**	

Woundings and shootings

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total (2001-2010)	Percent of Grand total
PORT OF SPAIN	112	166	191	119	234	180	117	249	154	162	1684	24.8
SOUTHERN	67	79	93	67	83	57	114	70	69	66	765	11.2
WESTERN	51	61	93	91	78	83	66	64	92	72	751	11.0
NORTHERN	84	89	136	116	142	111	147	140	112	109	1186	17.4
CENTRAL	42	79	85	106	69	71	94	68	81	63	758	11.1
SOUTH WESTERN	28	52	42	23	47	34	17	27	49	34	353	5.2
EASTERN	17	32	50	31	44	34	29	34	39	31	341	5.0

NORTH EASTERN	84	83	83	70	87	74	75	83	78	70	787	11.6
TOBAGO	14	14	11	20	17	13	21	36	15	16	177	2.7
TOTAL	**499**	**655**	**784**	**643**	**801**	**657**	**680**	**771**	**689**	**623**	**Grand total 6802**	

Rapes/Incest/Sexual offences

	2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**Total (2001-2010)**	**Percent of Grand total**
PORT OF SPAIN	71	67	63	41	68	58	64	51	53	46	582	8.2
SOUTHERN	84	71	115	83	113	196	135	88	120	85	1090	15.4
WESTERN	35	51	54	39	62	62	62	44	47	56	512	7.3
NORTHERN	130	104	116	158	139	164	130	134	104	117	1296	18.4
CENTRAL	51	84	61	61	108	164	156	105	80	75	945	13.4
SOUTH WESTERN	72	68	71	84	68	87	76	47	90	58	721	10.2
EASTERN	38	116	77	42	107	86	106	158	106	133	969	13.7
NORTH EASTERN	51	57	65	46	44	62	71	49	118	74	637	9.0
TOBAGO	13	23	21	27	35	24	25	48	42	52	310	4.4
TOTAL	**545**	**641**	**643**	**581**	**744**	**903**	**825**	**724**	**760**	**696**	**Grand total 7062**	

Kidnapping

	2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**Total (2001-2010)**	**Percent of Grand total**
PORT OF SPAIN	14	23	26	20	22	17	18	21	29	10	200	10.6
SOUTHERN	22	34	36	28	60	57	46	25	25	20	353	18.7
WESTERN	11	23	23	25	52	15	11	11	9	9	189	10.0
NORTHERN	38	67	78	53	49	51	44	24	25	18	447	23.7
CENTRAL	17	27	16	19	33	27	19	26	18	23	225	11.9
SOUTH WESTERN	11	19	17	12	21	19	18	15	19	19	170	9.0
EASTERN	7	9	11	2	16	6	9	13	14	8	95	5.0

NORTH EASTERN	14	31	23	14	19	14	12	9	7	5	148	7.9
TOBAGO	1	2	5	4	8	8	1	11	9	7	56	3.2
TOTAL	135	235	235	177	280	214	178	155	155	119	Grand total 1883	

Robberies

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total (2001-2010)	Percent of Grand total
PORT OF SPAIN	1140	1018	870	678	859	971	769	855	1055	872	9087	18.5
SOUTHERN	607	633	714	544	777	953	894	938	896	720	7676	15.7
WESTERN	371	398	385	431	454	482	424	366	614	407	4332	8.8
NORTHERN	1018	1213	1139	956	1146	1319	1224	1202	1467	1311	11995	24.5
CENTRAL	394	618	592	444	473	786	717	718	829	779	6350	12.9
SOUTH WESTERN	163	140	210	163	182	261	253	329	211	297	2209	4.5
EASTERN	72	117	124	108	166	210	187	251	356	193	1784	3.6
NORTH EASTERN	436	480	487	469	647	489	354	285	506	392	4545	9.3
TOBAGO	68	58	69	92	164	162	143	99	106	104	1065	2.2
TOTAL	4269	4675	4590	3885	4868	5633	4965	5043	6040	5075	Grand total 49043	

Narcotic offences

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total (2001-2010)	Percent of Grand total
PORT OF SPAIN	44	66	74	106	58	76	46	55	83	58	666	12.5
SOUTHERN	106	57	64	107	62	67	67	78	69	80	757	14.2
WESTERN	39	33	43	39	23	49	69	29	26	19	369	6.9
NORTHERN	101	149	119	126	111	108	124	102	137	107	1184	22.3
CENTRAL	40	77	44	56	63	48	55	55	33	41	512	9.6
SOUTH WESTERN	45	28	39	51	48	49	59	40	29	35	423	8.0

EASTERN	52	27	45	32	34	65	115	78	91	103	642	12.1
NORTH EASTERN	41	41	38	33	53	41	35	54	33	22	391	7.4
TOBAGO	17	31	39	39	43	40	34	45	51	34	373	7.0
TOTAL	**485**	**509**	**505**	**589**	**495**	**543**	**604**	**536**	**552**	**499**	**Grand total 5317**	

Burglaries/Breakings

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total (2001-2010)	Percent of Grand total
PORT OF SPAIN	737	803	753	805	659	681	647	639	703	630	7057	14.0
SOUTHERN	793	811	744	774	618	772	906	760	832	720	7730	15.4
WESTERN	528	477	433	565	459	464	527	532	492	491	4968	9.9
NORTHERN	1022	903	1037	1084	877	839	750	784	1169	965	9430	18.7
CENTRAL	470	438	488	513	402	512	646	582	810	813	5674	11.3
SOUTH WESTERN	355	426	349	351	334	403	432	428	343	443	3864	7.7
EASTERN	259	305	264	265	258	296	287	309	415	319	2977	5.9
NORTH EASTERN	437	426	451	450	487	443	378	348	518	432	4370	8.7
TOBAGO	415	341	344	407	488	563	385	473	462	394	4272	8.4
TOTAL	**5016**	**4930**	**4863**	**5214**	**4582**	**4973**	**4958**	**4855**	**5744**	**5207**	**Grand total 50342**	

Appendix 3

Technical notes on scale computation

In all scaled variables, regardless of whether or not scale computation was required, responses of 'don't know' (coded as 100) and 'no answer' (coded as 101) were recoded to represent a zero level of the variable prior to regression analyses.

Predictor Variables

Age was assessed by question 5 on the questionnaire. For the purposes of regression analysis, missing ages were recoded to the mean of the distribution of ages. This applied to two persons. The age distribution of the sample is as follows:

	Frequency	Percent
18-24	234	14.7
25-30	225	14.1
31-35	115	7.2
36-45	288	18.1
46-55	218	13.7
56-65	324	20.3
Over 65	189	11.8
Total	1595	100.0

Gender was assessed by question 6 on the questionnaire. 49.7% of the sample were male while 50.3% were female. For the purposes of regression analysis, missing gender (coded as 101) was recoded to missing (uncoded).

Ethnicity was assessed by question 87 on the questionnaire. Ethnicity was recoded into four categories as follows: African descent, Indian descent, Mixed and Other. A small number of respondents (n = 62 or 3.9% of the sample) indicated other ethnicities, and were grouped together to form this latter category. The ethnic distribution of the sample is as follows:

	Frequency	Percent
African descent	738	46.3
East Indian	455	28.5
Mixed	340	21.3
Other	62	3.9
Total	1595	100.0

Income was assessed by question 79 on the questionnaire. This scale was coded such that a high score indicated low income.

Education was assessed by question 82 which asked respondents to indicate the highest level of education which they attained. This scale was coded such that a high score indicated a high level of education.

Community cohesion was assessed by questions 74A a to d and 74B a to l.   Items 74A a, b, c, d and items 74B c, k were reverse coded such that a high score on all items represented a high level of community cohesion.   Factor analysis yielded a four factor solution with the first factor accounting for 37.7% of variance and second factor accounted for 14.5%. Almost all items loaded unto the first factor except 74B j and k. These items appeared to lack validity. The factor loading for item 74B c had a somewhat low factor loading for factor 1 (loading = .339). All other factor loadings were high (range = .530 to .782). A measure of community cohesion was constructed as the mean of all items except 74B j and k. Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .890.

Societal cohesion was measured by question 76. Reverse coding was employed such that a high score would represent a high level of societal cohesion. Items which required reverse coding were 76 d, k, and l.   While five subscales of societal cohesion were identified in the questionnaire (belonging, inclusion, participation, legitimacy, and respect), factor analysis was conducted to confirm whether or not the factor structure of the data are consistent with the a priori expectations for the various scales. Factor analysis yielded a five factor solution, with the first factor accounting for 33.2% of the variance, and the second factor accounting for 10.9%. A one factor solution best fit the data, with all except three items loading strongly unto the first factor. Items which did not load strongly unto this factor were 76 j, k, l.   For the rest of items, factor loadings ranged from .359 to .742.   This scale was constructed as the mean of all items except 76 j, k, l. Cronbach's alpha for this scale is .887.

Informal social control was measured by question 75.   This scale was computed as the sum of questions 75 a, b, c. In this scale, a high score represents a high level of informal social control.

Dependent variables

Crime in the community was assessed by question 36 in which respondents were asked to report whether or not thirteen specified crimes occurred in their community within the last year. All 'yes' responses were coded as 1 and all other responses coded as 0. While factor analysis indicates that these data possess a three factor structure, a one factor solution best fit the data. The first factor accounted for 34.7% of the variance while the other two factors accounted for only a negligible proportion of the variance. All items loaded strongly unto factor one with factor loadings ranging from .482 to .650. The measure for crimes in the community was constructed as the sum of the responses for the thirteen specified crimes. The internal reliability of this scale is .838

Self-reported victimization (past 10 years) was measured by question 4 which asked respondents to indicate whether or not they had become a victim of eighteen specified crimes within the last ten years. Affirmative responses were coded as 1 and negative responses as 0. The responses were summed to create an overall measure for total self-reported victimization within the last ten years. This scale was further subdivided into property and violent crime scales. Items which tapped property crimes within question 4 were 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, and 16. Items which tapped violent crimes were 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 17, and 18.

Self-reported victimization (past year) was measured by question 10 which asked respondents to indicate whether or not they had become a victim of eighteen specified crimes within the last year. Affirmative responses were coded as 1 and negative responses as 0. The responses were summed to create the measure for self-reported victimization within the last year.

This scale was further subdivided into property and violent crime scales. Items which tapped property crimes within question 4 were 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, and 16. Items which tapped violent crimes were 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 17, and 18.

Domestic violence was measured by questions 25 to 31. The measure of domestic violence was constructed using the sum of the responses to questions 25 to 29. These questions assessed the extent to which the respondent experienced a range of victimizations which could be classified as domestic violence. Prior to scale computation, all items were recoded such that a high score reflected a high incidence of domestic violence. All items used to construct this scale loaded unto a single factor, with factor loadings ranging from .748 to .878. The internal reliability of this scale is .862.

Gangs – the presence of gangs as well as the level of gang violence in neighbourhoods was assessed by question 41, 42, and 45. Since each question measured a different construct, they were not combined into a single scale, but instead were used as single item dependent measures. The presence of gangs was coded as 1 = yes and 2 = no. Gang problems was coded such that a high number represented a large problem. Gang violence was coded such that a large number represented a low level of violence.

Self-reported offending was constructed as the sum of questions 89, 90, 91, 93. These items assessed whether or not persons were accused of committing a crime, whether they were detained by the police, whether they were arrested, and whether they were charged for a crime. All items recoded so that a yes response = 1 and a no response = 0. All items loaded unto a single factor with factor loadings ranging from .75 to .793. The items account for 60% of the variance in this factor. The internal reliability of this scale is .769.

Fear of crime (worry) was assessed by question 50a to h. Items assessed the extent to which respondents worried about a range of specified acts of victimization including murder, assault, burglary and robbery. All items were recoded such that a high score represented a high level of worry. This measure was computed as the mean of all items specified.

Fear of crime (safety) was assessed by question 51a to d. This question required respondents to indicate how safe or unsafe they feel in a number of places including their home, place of work, and neighbourhood. Items were recoded so that a high score represented feeling unsafe. The measure of fear of crime (safety) was computed as the mean of all items listed above.

Appendix 4

Economic data for Trinidad and Tobago for the period 1990-2008[86]

	Labor Force (in thousands)	Employment (in thousands)	Unemployment (in thousands)	Unemployment Rate (%)	Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	Gross National Income (GNI)
1990		374.1	93.6	20.0	21539	19830
1991	492.0	401.0	91.2	18.5	22559	20653
1992		405.9	99.2	19.6	23118	21187
1993	504.0	404.6	99.9	19.8	24491	22639
1994		415.6	93.9	18.4	29312	26717
1995	521.0	431.6	89.4	17.2	31697	28781
1996	530.4	444.2	86.1	16.3	34587	31451
1997	541.0	459.8	81.3	15.0	35871	33381
1998	558.7	479.3	79.4	14.2	38065	35898
1999	563.4	489.4	74.1	13.2	42889	40373
2000	572.9	503.3	69.6	12.2	51371	47421
2001	576.5	514.1	62.4	10.8	55007	51657
2002	586.2	525.1	61.2	10.4	56290	52384
2003	596.5	534.1	62.4	10.5	70719	61874
2004	613.5	562.3	51.2	8.4	83653	81161
2005	623.7	574.0	49.7	8.0	100386	95624
2006	625.2	586.2	39.1	6.2	122108	116230
2007	622.4	587.8	34.6	5.6	137427	131355
2008	626.6	597.7	29.0	4.6	152115	146503

Percent of males and females aged fifteen and over who are unemployed[87]

	Females	Males
1985	17.0	15.0
1986	18.9	16.3
1987	25.2	20.7
1988	23.6	21.2
1989	24.5	20.8
1990	24.2	17.9
1991	23.4	15.7
1992	23.9	17.0
1993	23.4	17.7
1994	22.3	16.1
1995	20.6	15.1

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[86] Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) online database
[87] Source: ILO KILM Database (5th Ed. 2007). Sourced from the UNDP:
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=GenderStat&f=inID%3a121

1996	21.0	13.2
1997	19.4	12.3
1998	18.9	11.3
1999	16.8	10.9
2000	15.2	10.2
2001	14.4	8.6
2002	14.5	7.8
2003	13.8	8.3
2004	11.2	6.4
2005	11.0	5.8
Average	**19.2**	**13.7**

Appendix 5

Survey Questionnaire

Survey on Citizens' Security
for the
Caribbean Human Development Report 2010

Interviewer Accountability/Administrative Purposes Only	
Interviewer Name:	
Interviewer ID Number:	
Interview Number:	
Name of Supervisor:	
Date of Interview:	
Starting Time:	
Country Name:	
Country Code:	
End Time:	

INTRODUCTION:
Good day, I am ……………………..from ……... We are conducting a survey on the security of citizens.
We would greatly appreciate your answering a few questions for us. The information you give to us will
be held in the strictest of confidence and at no time during or after the survey can you be identified.

CANDIDATE SCREENER

1. Are you 18 years or older?

    A. Yes   B. No (terminate)

2. Including yourself, how many persons are presently living in your household? [____/____]

3. How many persons living in living in your household are 18 years or older? That is, all adults who are living here in this house with you.   [____/____]

4. Selection of respondent: Ask to speak with the person in the household who most recently had a birthday. If this person is not available or is outside of your required quota, ask to speak with the person who had a birthday immediately before this person. If this person is also not available and is also outside of your quota go to the next household.

5. I am going to read different age groups to you, please tell me within which of the following age groups does your exact age fall?

18-24 years	☐ (check quota)
25-30 years	☐ (check quota)
31-35 years	☐ (check quota)
45-54 years	☐ (check quota)
55-64 years	☐ (check quota)
65+	☐ (check quota)

6. Gender: Male ☐ (check quota) Female ☐ (check quota)   ☐ Other

Section 1: Satisfaction with Living Standards/Level of Human Development	

Q1. Using a scale from 1 to 7, please <u>SCORE</u> the following problems by their seriousness in your country. Use "1" for the least serious and "7" for the very serious. (Show Card No 1)

1. Level of unemployment	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Adequate housing	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. Adequate schooling for the children	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Cost of food	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Level of property crime	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. Level of violent crime	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Level of insecurity	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. Cost of living	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Level of poverty	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Level of corruption	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Level of migration	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Adequate sanitation	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Access to health care	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Adequate voice in governmental affairs	1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Q2. Using a scale from 1 to 14, please <u>RANK</u> the following problems by their seriousness in your country. Use "1" for the most serious problem and "14" for the least serious problem. (Show Card No 1)

1. Level of unemployment	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
2. Adequate housing	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
3. Adequate schooling for the children	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
4. Cost of food	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
5. Level of property crime	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
6. Level of violent crime	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
7. Level of insecurity	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
8. Cost of living	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
9. Level of poverty	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

10. Level of corruption	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
11. Level of migration	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
12. Adequate sanitation	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
13. Access to health care	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
14. Adequate voice in governmental affairs	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Section 2: Actual Victimization

Q3. Within the last ten years, have you been the victim of a crime?

1 ☐ Yes (Move to Q4)
2 ☐ No (Move to Q20)

Q4. Within the last ten years, have you been a victim of any of the following crimes/behaviour?

1 ☐ Attempted murder
2 ☐ Assault with a weapon
3 ☐ Robbery at gunpoint
4 ☐ Robb
5 ☐ Sexual assault an
6 ☐ Extortion/protection
7 ☐ Dom
8 amily violence
9 in Byour house in the day
10 in At your house at night
11 ☐ Motor vehicle theft

12 ☐ Theft from motor vehicl
13 ☐ Kidnapping (for ransom)
14 ☐ Abduction
15 ☐ Financial Crime/Scam
16 ☐ Praedial larceny
17 reat on your life by someone with a weapon
18 ☐
19 **(Record below)** me

_____
_____
_____

Q5. Within the last ten years, how many times have you been criminally victimized?

1 ☐ Once
2 Twice
3 ☐ Three or more times
4. ☐ Never

Q6. In 2009 were you the victim of sexual harassment?

1 ☐ Yes (Move to Q7)
2 ☐ No (Move to Q8)

Q7. If yes, was the harasser a:

1 ☐ Stranger
2 ☐ Acquaintance
3 ☐ Friend
4 ☐ Other

Q8. In the year 2009, were you the victim of a crime?

1 ☐ Yes (Move to Q9)
2 ☐ No (Move to Q20)

Q9. In the year 2009, were you the victim of a violent crime, and/or a property crime, and/or financial crime/scam? (NB. If violence is used to relieve you of your property, it is a violent crime.) Tick all that

apply.

1. ☐ Violent (including rape and sexual assault)
2. ☐ Property
3. ☐ Financial Crime/Scam
4. ☐ Other

Q10. In the year 2009, were you the victim of any of the following crimes: (Show Card 2)

1	under attempted m	10	break-in at your house at night
2	☐ Assault with a weapo	11	☐ Motor vehicle theft
3	☐ Robbery at gunpoint	12	☐ Theft from motor vehicle
4	☐ Robb	13	☐ Kidnapping
5	☐ Sexual assault an	14	☐ Abduction
6	☐ Extortion	15	☐ Financial Crime/Scam
7	☐ Dom	16	☐ Praedial larceny
8	☐ Family violence	17	☐ A
9	in B your house in the day	18	without a weapon l
		19	☐ A

Q11. If yes, were you physically harmed?

1. ☐ Yes (move to Q12)
2. ☐ No (move to Q14)

Q12. If you were physically harmed, did you seek medical treatment for your injuries?

1 ☐ Yes
2 ☐ No

Q13. If physically harmed, was the perpetrator:

1 ☐ Stranger
2 ☐ Acquaintance
3 ☐ Friend
4 ☐ Other

Q14. Did you report the (violent) incident to the police?

1 ☐ Yes (Move to Q15)
2 ☐ No (Move to Q18)

Q 15. Did the police act on your report?

1 ☐ Yes (Move to Q16)
2 ☐ No (Move to Q18)
3 ☐ Don't know

Q16. How satisfied were you with the action taken by the police?

1 ☐ Very Satisfied (move to Q18)
2 ☐ Satisfied (move to Q18)
3 ☐ Somewhat satisfied (move to Q17)
4 ☐ Dissatisfied
5 ☐ Very dissatisfied

Q17. Why were you dissatisfied with the action taken or service provided by the police?

1 ☐ They did nothing	7. Other (please record):
2 ☐ They took	_____
3 like a professional busine	_____
4 ey did not keep rom	_____
5 ☐ They were not	
6 ☐ They	

Q18. If you were the victim of a property (non-violent) crime, including fraud, did you report this crime to the police?

1 ☐ Yes
2 ☐ No

Q19. How satisfied were you with the action taken by the police?

1. ☐ Very Satisfied
2. ☐ Satisfied
3. ☐ Somewhat satisfied
4. ☐ Dissatisfied
5 ☐ Very dissatisfied

Q20. Not counting yourself, how many members of your household have been victims of a crime in the last ten years?

1. ☐ None
2. ☐ One
3. ☐ Two
4. ☐ Three
5. ☐ More than three

Q21. Not counting yourself, how many members of your household, if any, were victims of a crime in 2009?

1. ☐ One (Move to Q22)
2. ☐ Two (Move to Q22)
3. ☐ Three (Move to Q22)
4. ☐ More than three (Move to Q22)
5. ☐ None (Move to Q23)

Q22. Not counting yourself, in 2009 were any members of your household victims of the following crimes (show card 12)? If no to all of these, move on to Q23. Yes = 1 and No = 2

1. Murder	☐	☐ 2
2. Attempted murder	☐	☐ 2
3. Assault with a weapon	☐	☐ 2
4. Robbery	☐	☐ 2
5. Sexual assault and/or rape	☐	☐ 2
6. Extortion and/or protection rackets	☐	☐ 2
7. Domestic violence involving a partner	☐	☐ 2
8. Other family violence (not related to your partner)	☐	☐ 2
9. Motor vehicle theft	☐	☐ 2
10. Theft from motor vehicle (motor vehicle break-in)	☐	☐ 2
11. Abduction	☐	☐ 2
12. Kidnapping	☐	☐ 2

13. A threat on their life	☐	☐ 2
14. Any other crimes not mentioned? **(Record below)**		

Q23. Has a family member not living in your household but living in this country ever been a victim of any of the following crimes: murder, shooting, armed assault resulting in hospitalization, rape, robbery, kidnapping, abduction, and or extortion?

1 ☐ Yes
2 ☐ No

Q24. Using a scale from 1 to 9, please rank the following problems by their seriousness in your country. Use "1" for the most serious problem and "9" for the least serious problem. (Show Card No 3)

1 Level of unemployment	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 Adequate housing	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3 Adequate schooling for the children	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4 Adequate food for the table	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5 Level of crime	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6 Adequate drinking water	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
7 Adequate sanitation	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
8 Adequate health care	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
9 Adequate voice in governmental affairs	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Section 3: Domestic Violence					
Thinking about the issue of domestic violence and violence between partners, please indicate your experience with the following. This experience is limited to the year 2009.	Many times (5+)	A few times (2-4)	Once	Not at all	Don't Know
Q25. To what extent has any member of your household (age 16 or over) deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of any sort, or kicked you or used violence on you in any way?	1	2	3	4	5
Q26. To what extent has your spouse (or ex-spouse) ever said things to you that frightened you, such as threatening to harm you or someone close to you?	1	2	3	4	5
Q27. To what extent have you been injured, even slightly, on any occasion **(in 2009)** when your spouse (or ex-spouse), or a partner (or ex-partner), or a	1	2	3	4	5

boyfriend/girlfriend (or ex-boyfriend/ girlfriend), used violence against you? **By injuries we mean bruises, scratches and cuts of any kind.**					
Q28. To what extent have you been sworn at or insulted by a partner (ex-partner) or a boyfriend/girlfriend (or ex-boyfriend/girlfriend)?	1	2	3	4	5
Q29. People use some violence in a relationship - pushing, shaking, hitting, kicking, etc; to what extent, if any, has your spouse (ex-spouse) ever used violence on you for any reason? **If No go to Section 4.**	1	2	3	4	5
Q30. How frightened were you on the most recent occasion when your spouse (ex-spouse) or a partner (or ex-partner) or a boyfriend/girlfriend (or ex-boyfriend/girlfriend) used force against you?	1	2	3	4	5
Q31. Did the police come to know about what happened on the most recent occasion when your spouse (ex-spouse) or a partner (or ex-partner) or a boyfriend/girlfriend (or ex-boyfriend/ girlfriend) used violence against you?	1	2	3	4	5

Section 4: Crimes in the Community

Q32. Is crime a problem in your community?

1   ☐ Yes
2   ☐ No **(If No go to Q35)**

Q33. If yes, how serious is the violent crime problem?

1   ☐ Out of control
2   ☐ Very serious
3   ☐ Serious
4   ☐ Quite serious
5   ☐ Not serious

Q34. If yes, how serious is the property crime problem?

1   ☐ Out of control
2   ☐ Very serious
3   ☐ Serious
4   ☐ Quite serious
5   ☐ Not serious

Q35. How frequently do violent crimes occur in this neighbourhood?

1	☐ Frequently
2	☐ Occasionally
3	☐ Rarely
4.	☐ None in the last five years

Q36. In 2009, did any of the following crimes/behaviours occur in your neighbourhood? Yes = 1 and No = 2		
1 Murder	☐Yes 1	☐No 2
2 Shooting	☐1	☐2
3 Robbery	☐1	☐2
4 Extortion and or protection	☐1	☐2
5 Rape and/sexual assault	☐1	☐2
6 House break-ins in the day	☐1	☐2
7 House break-ins at night	☐1	☐2
8 Fights in the street	☐1	☐2
9 Motor vehicle theft	☐1	☐2
10 Gang violence	☐1	☐2
11 Kidnapping	☐1	☐2
12 Abduction	☐1	☐2
13 Threats of violence by one member of the community against another	☐1	☐2
14 Any other crimes not mentioned? **(Please record)**		

Q 37. Thinking specially about your neighbourhood, how much of a problem do you think the following crimes are. **Show Card No 4**	Very serious	Fairly Serious	Serious	Not serious	Not a problem
a. Murder	1	2	3	4	5
b. Violent assaults	1	2	3	4	5
c. Motor vehicle theft	1	2	3	4	5
d. House-breaking	1	2	3	4	5
e. Robbery from the person	1	2	3	4	5
f. Sexual assault	1	2	3	4	5
g. Domestic violence involving partners	1	2	3	4	5
h. Gang violence	1	2	3	4	5

Q 38. If yes to any of the above named crimes, what has been the response of the neighbourhood?

1.	☐ Has done a lot as a group
2.	☐ Has done some things
3.	☐ Has done a few things
4.	☐ Not done anything
5.	☐ Other

Q 39. If something has been done, what?

1.	Given support to the victims
2.	Helped the police/security forces
3.	Taken self-help as a group to punish criminals
4.	Organized itself to prevent crime by policing/actions in support of the police (patrols, neighbourhood watch)

5 ☐ Organized itself to prevent crime by engagement with youth etc

6.☐ Other

Q 40. If nothing, why?

1 ☐ Most persons are too occupied with their economic survival to find the time

2 ☐ The community has no leadership

3 ☐ I do not trust my neighbours

4 ☐ The people who are involved in the violence/crimes are too powerful

5 ☐ Previous efforts failed (why bother because past programmes have failed…)

Q 41. Is there a criminal gang (or gangs) in your neighbourhood?

1. ☐ Yes

2. ☐ No **(If No go to Q45)**

Q 42. To what extent is there a criminal gang problem in your neighbourhood?

1. ☐ No problem

2. ☐ A slight problem

3. ☐ A big problem

Q 43. If yes, since when has this become a problem?

1	☐ Within the last year
2	☐ More than one but less than three years ago
3	☐ More than three but less than five years ago
4	☐ More than five years ago

Q44. Have the gangs made the neighbourhood safer or less safe?

1	☐ Safer
2	☐ Less safe
3	☐ Not applicable/question doesn't make any sense t

Q 45. To what extent has your neighbourhood experienced gang violence?

| 1. | ☐ A large amount of violence |

2.	☐ Some violence	
3.	☐ Little violence	
4.	☐ No violence	

Q 46. In your opinion, in 2009, did some people leave or move from your community because of violence or fear of crime? Would you say:

1 ☐ Many people left

2 ☐ A few people left

3 ☐ Nobody left because of crime

4 ☐ Don't know

Q 47. Using a scale from 1 to 9, please <u>RANK</u> the following problems by their seriousness in your neighbourhood. Use "1" for the most serious problem and "9" for the least serious problem. (Show Card No 5)

1. Level of unemployment	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2. Adequate housing	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3. Adequate schooling for the children	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
4. Cost of food	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
5. Level of property crime	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
6. Level of violent crime	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
7. Level of insecurity	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
8. Level of poverty	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
9. Access to drinking water	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
10. Adequate sanitation	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
11. Access to health care	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
12. Adequate voice in governmental affairs	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Q 48. Type of neighbourhood? (To be decided by the interviewer)

1.	☐ Urban middle strata
2.	☐ Urban working class
3.	☐ Urban poor
4.	☐ Rural middle strata
5.	☐ Rural working class
6.	☐ Rural poor
7.	☐ Hinterland (Suriname and Guyana only)
8.	☐ Other

Section 5: Fear of Crime in the Society					
Q. 49 (PRE) **Some people worry at sometime or another about being a victim of crime. In the past year, have you ever felt fearful about the possibility of becoming a victim of crime?**					
1 ☐ Yes 2 ☐ No 3 ☐ Cannot remember					

Q. 50 (INT) **Thinking about each of the following things, please indicate how much you worry about them. (Show Card 6)**	All the time	Most times	Sometimes	Now and then	Not at all
a. Being killed	1	2	3	4	5
b. Being attacked and beaten-up by someone that you know	1	2	3	4	5
c. Being beaten up by your spouse or partner	1	2	3	4	5
d. Having your vehicle stolen	1	2	3	4	5
e. Having your house broken into at night	1	2	3	4	5
f. Being robbed by someone with a gun	1	2	3	4	5
g. Being sexually assaulted	1	2	3	4	5
h. A close relative being killed	1	2	3	4	5

Q. 51(INT) **How safe do you feel at the following places? (Show Card 7)**	Very unsafe	Unsafe	Fairly safe	Safe	Very Safe
a. Your home after dark	1	2	3	4	5
b. When at your place of work	1	2	3	4	5
c. When walking alone in your neighbourhood during the daytime	1	2	3	4	5
d. When walking alone in your neighbourhood during the night	1	2	3	4	5

Q. 52 (INT) **This next section asks about your security related behaviour <u>in the last 12 months</u>. Please indicate your response to the following statements (Show Card 8).**	All times	Most times	Occasionally	Never	NA
a. When going out, do you plan your route to avoid	1	2	3	4	5

dangerous places?					
b. When going out at night, do you travel in a group for security?	1	2	3	4	5
c. Do you travel with a weapon at nights?	1	2	3	4	5
d. Do you travel with a weapon in the days?	1	2	3	4	5
e. Do you keep a weapon at home (when you are there)?	1	2	3	4	5
f. Do you use a private security company to protect your home?	1	2	3	4	5
g. Since 2009, have you put any security devices on/in your home? **1 =yes; 2 =no**	1	2			
h. Since 2009, have you changed your home to a more secure location? **1 =yes; 2 =no**	1	2			

Q. 53 Would putting more police on the streets make you feel more secure?

1 ☐ Yes   2 ☐ No

Q. 54 How secure or insecure do you consider (living in) your country to be?

1   ☐ Very secure

2   ☐ Secure

3   ☐ Uncertain security

4   ☐ Insecure

5   ☐ Very insecure

Q. 55 What is the capacity of your country to solve and better manage the problem of insecurity?

1   ☐ Very Sufficient

2   ☐ Sufficient

3   ☐ Insufficient

4   ☐ Very Insufficient

5   ☐ Don't Know

   PRE = prevalence; INT = intensity

Section 6: Policy Orientation of the Population					
Q 56.This next section asks your opinions on issues related to how best to prevent and control	**Strongly Agree**	**Agree**	**Unsure**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**

crime					
a. I feel that my society is fundamentally unjust (unfair)	1	2	3	4	5
b. I feel that my society is fundamentally law abiding	1	2	3	4	5
c. Criminals should be more harshly punished	1	2	3	4	5
d. I support the death penalty	1	2	3	4	5
e. Criminals are a threat to our way of life	1	2	3	4	5
f. Human rights are obstacles to more effective crime control	1	2	3	4	5
g. It is alright for the police to break the law in order to better control violent crimes	1	2	3	4	5
h. The police should be given a free hand to kill criminal gunmen	1	2	3	4	5
i. In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in the police force/service	1	2	3	4	5
j. In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in education	1	2	3	4	5
k. In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in programmes for young people	1	2	3	4	5
l. In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in job creation	1	2	3	4	5
m. In order to reduce the crime rate the government should invest more in reducing corruption	1	2	3	4	5
n. In order to reduce crime, the government should invest more in the communities of the urban poor	1	2	3	4	5
o. In order to reduce crime the government should invest more in reducing poverty.	1	2	3	4	5
p. In order to reduce crime, the government should build more prisons	1	2	3	4	5

q. In order to reduce crime, the government should rely more on the military	1	2	3	4	5
r. In order to reduce crime, people should be allowed easier access to firearms.	1	2	3	4	5
s. In order to reduce crime dons should be used as agents of crime control	1	2	3	4	5
t. The problem of crime has no remedy	1	2	3	4	5
u. Only a military government can effectively control crime	1	2	3	4	5
v. Nothing can be done to control crime in this country	1	2	3	4	5

Section 7: The General Performance of the Police

Earlier we asked you about your personal experiences with the police. Now we wish to go beyond your immediate experience to ask you some questions about the general performance of the police.

Q 57. (E) Specifically as it relates to your own community (the area that you live in), how do you rate the performance of the police on the following items? (Show Card 9)	Very Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good
a. Control of robbery	1	2	3	4	5
b. Control of rape	1	2	3	4	5
c. Control of domestic violence	1	2	3	4	5
d. Control of house-breaking	1	2	3	4	5
e. Control of extortion	1	2	3	4	5
f. Control of demonstrations	1	2	3	4	5
g. Praedial Larceny	1	2	3	4	5

Q58. (E) Generally speaking as it relates to the country as a whole, how do you rate the performance of the police on the following items? (Show Card 10)	Very Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good

	Very Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good
a. Control of robbery	1	2	3	4	5
b. Control of rape	1	2	3	4	5
c. Control of domestic violence	1	2	3	4	5
d. Control of house-breaking	1	2	3	4	5
e. Control of drug-trafficking	1	2	3	4	5
f. Control of fire arms-trafficking	1	2	3	4	5
g. Control of extortion	1	2	3	4	5
h. Traffic control	1	2	3	4	5
i. Control of demonstrations	1	2	3	4	5
j. Control of the crimes of the powerful	1	2	3	4	5

Q59. (V) How do you rate the performance of the police on the following items? (Show Card 11)	Very Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good
a. Respect for citizen's rights	1	2	3	4	5
b. Respect for the rights of people who are accused of crimes	1	2	3	4	5
c. Respect for the law	1	2	3	4	5
d. Respect for the right to participate in political protests	1	2	3	4	5
e. Fairness in dealing with people	1	2	3	4	5
f. Fairness in dealing with demonstrators	1	2	3	4	5
g. Treating people equally	1	2	3	4	5
h. Courtesy to ordinary citizens	1	2	3	4	5

Q 60. Using a scale from 1 to 5, please rank the extent to which the police have generally been respectful of your rights as a citizen. Use "1" for very respectful and "5" for very disrespectful.

1	2	3	4	5
Very Respectful	Respectful	Neutral	Disrespectful	Very Disrespectful

Q 61. (E) Specifically, as it relates to your community (the area that you live in) do you believe that the Police Service is becoming more effective, less effective, or has remained at the same in controlling crime over the last three years?

1		
☐ More effective	☐ The same	☐ Less effective

Q 62. (E) Generally, as it relates to the country as a whole, do you believe that the Police Service is

becoming more effective, less effective, or has remained at the same level of effectiveness in controlling crime over the last three years?
1 ☐ More effective   2 ☐ Less effective   3 ☐ The same
Q 63. (V) Which of the following do you believe, "The police use too much, too little or just enough violence in dealing with criminal suspects"?
1 ☐ Just enough   Too much   2 ☐ Too little   3 ☐
Q 64. Have you ever been stopped and individually questioned by the police?
1 ☐ Yes   2 ☐ No
Q 65. Were you ever detained, arrested or charged by the police?
1 ☐ Detained   2 ☐ Arrested for a minor offence   3 ☐ Charged for a cr   4 ☐ None of

Section 8: Confidence in the Police

Q 66. Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how much confidence you have in the police to effectively control the following crimes. Use "1" for a low level of confidence and "5" for a high level of confidence: Show Card 12)	1 (LOW)	2	3	4	5 (HIGH)
a. Rape and Sexual Assault	1	2	3	4	5
b. Burglary	1	2	3	4	5
c. Domestic Violence	1	2	3	4	5
d. Robbery	1	2	3	4	5
e. Extortion	1	2	3	4	5
f. Murder	1	2	3	4	5
g. Gang violence	1	2	3	4	5
h. Drug trafficking	1	2	3	4	5
i. Gun –trafficking	1	2	3	4	5
j. High level fraud	1	2	3	4	5
Q 67. How much confidence do you have in the police to effectively respond to emergency calls?					
1 ☐ No confidence 2 ☐ 3 ☐ Some amount of Confidence ☐ Agre					
Q 68. How much confidence do you have in the police to successfully control the more powerful					

criminals?			
1 ☐ No confidence	2	☐ Some amount of confidence ☐ great deal of confidence	

Q 69. How much confidence do you have in the police to effectively control the crime problem in your country?

1 ☐ No confidence	2	☐ Some amount of Confidence	☐ Agre

Q 70. How much confidence do you have in the police to effectively control the crimes of the wealthy and/or powerful?

1 ☐ No confidence	2	☐ Some amount of Confidence	☐ Agre

Q 71. Do you think that increasing the size of the Police Service would be an effective means of reducing crime?

1 ☐ Yes	2 ☐ No

Q 72. Do you believe that the police are competent?

1 ☐ Yes	2 ☐ No

Section 9: The Courts/Justice System					
Q 73. Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate your assessment of the performance of the criminal justice system on the following (fairness, integrity, effectiveness):	**Strongly disagree**	**Dis-Agree**	**Don't Know**	**Agree**	**Strongly Agree**
a. The courts are fair	1	2	3	4	5
b. The courts are more fair today than they were five years ago	1	2	3	4	5
c. I am confident that the courts effectively protect suspects who are innocent of the crimes for which they are charged	1	2	3	4	5
d. Suspects who are poor are not likely to be treated fairly	1	2	3	4	5
e. I am confident that the justice system is not manipulated by politicians/ does not yield to political pressure	1	2	3	4	5
f. The judges are not corrupt.	1	2	3	4	5
g. The justice system is free of corruption	1	2	3	4	5
h. The justice system is unable to convict powerful criminals. Powerful criminals are likely to go free	1	2	3	4	5
i. Politically connected criminals are likely to go free.	1	2	3	4	5

Section 10: Community Cohesion					
ASK ALL RESPONDENTS					
Q 74A. Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following.	**Strongly agree**	**Agree**	**Don't Know**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**
a. Living here gives me a sense of community	1	2	3	4	5
b. The associations/relationships that I have with the people in this neighbourhood/community mean a lot to me	1	2	3	4	5
c. I like to think of myself as being in many ways similar to the people who live in this neighbourhood/community.	1	2	3	4	5
d. I like to think of myself as being in many ways similar to people of other ethnic groups who live in this country	1	2	3	4	5
Q 74B. Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how you rate the cohesiveness of your community on the following.	**Not at all**	**Some what**	**A fair extent**	**A good extent**	**A great extent**
a. To what extent do you feel like you belong in this neighbourhood/community	1	2	3	4	5
b. To what extent do you feel loyal to the people of this neighbourhood/community	1	2	3	4	5
c. To what extent would you prefer to live somewhere else rather than continue to live in this neighbourhood/community	1	2	3	4	5
d. To what extent are you proud of being in your neighbourhood/community	1	2	3	4	5
e. To what extent do you work together with others to reduce violence in your community?	1	2	3	4	5
f. To what extent do you work together with others to improve your community?	1	2	3	4	5
g. To what extent do you participate in community activities?	1	2	3	4	5

h. How involved are you in community organizations and activities such as the church, sports, community centres, cultural activities	1	2	3	4	5
i. I feel respected by the people who live in this community	1	2	3	4	5
j. Young people in my community suffer job discrimination because of where they live	1	2	3	4	5
k. The police do not respect the rights of people who live in my community	1	2	3	4	5
l. Would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy **(Using "1" for least trustworthy and "5" for most trustworthy)**	1	2	3	4	5

Section 11: Informal Control					
Q 75. **What is the likelihood that people from your community would intervene if the following situations or incidents occurred in your neighbourhood?**	**Very unlikely**	**Unlikely**	**Unsure**	**Likely**	**Very Likely**
a. A suspected case of domestic violence.	1	2	3	4	5
b. A fight breaking out in front of your house with someone being beaten.	1	2	3	4	5
c. A stranger is suspected of stealing from someone.	1	2	3	4	5

Section 12: Societal Cohesion					
ASK ALL RESPONDENTS					
Q 76. Using a scale from 1 to 5, indicate how you rate the following. "1" being the strongest feeling and "5" having the weakest feeling.	**1 (weakest)**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5 (strongest)**
B) I feel like I belong in this country	1	2	3	4	5
B) I feel loyal to the people of this country	1	2	3	4	5
B) To what extent are you proud of being (state nationality)	1	2	3	4	5
B) I would prefer to live in another country	1	2	3	4	5

IN) The associations that I have with the people in this country mean a lot to me	1	2	3	4	5
IN) I like to think of myself as similar to the people who live in this country.	1	2	3	4	5
IN) To what extent do people in your country have similar values as yourself?	1	2	3	4	5
P) To what extent would you be willing to work together with others to reduce violence in this country	1	2	3	4	5
P) To what extent would you be willing to work together with others on something to improve this country	1	2	3	4	5
P). I voted in the last general elections **Yes (1) No (2) Not Applicable (3)**	1	2	3		
P). People like me have a hard time getting a job because of their ethnicity, race, colour	1	2	3	4	5
P). People like me have a hard time getting a job because of where they live (class).	1	2	3	4	5
R) I feel respected by (most of) my fellow citizens	1	2	3	4	5
R) I am respected by most citizens of other race/ethnicity	1	2	3	4	5
R) I am respected by persons who earn a higher income than me	1	2	3	4	5
L. The Police Service deserves my support	1	2	3	4	5
L. The court system deserves my support	1	2	3	4	5
L. To what extent do you think that the courts of this country guarantee a fair trial?	1	2	3	4	5
L. To what extent are your rights protected regardless of which party is in power	1	2	3	4	5

B = belonging; IN = inclusion; P= participation; L = legitimacy; R= respect

Section 13: Demographics

Q 77. In terms of work, which of the following best describes your present situation?

1. Employed, Full-Time Job	☐	6. Retired	☐
2. Employed, Part-Time Job	☐	7. Housewife	☐
3. Seasonally Employed	☐	8. Student	☐
4. Self-Employed	☐	9. Sick/Disabled	☐
5. Unemployed, out of work	☐	10. Other	☐

Q 78. To which of the following occupational groups do you belong

1. Unskilled Worker, Labourer	☐	8. Shopkeeper	☐
2. Tradesman, Skilled Worker	☐	9. Higgler/ Vendor	☐
3. Clerical, Office Worker	☐	10. Farmer	☐
4. Businessperson	☐	11. Farm Worker	☐
5. Teacher	☐	12. Hustling	☐
6. Professional (lawyer, architect, doctor etc.)	☐	13. Other Type of Work	☐
7. Manager, Supervisor	☐	14. Never been employed	☐

Q 79.   Your household income :

1. ☐ Is enough to live comfortably and save enough to make investments
2. ☐ Is enough so that you can save
3. ☐ Is just enough, but you cannot save
4. ☐ Is not enough, you cannot pay your bills
5. ☐ Is not enough, you cannot cover your basic needs

Q 80. Do you receive additional income from extended family, friends and others who do not live in your house (except for list on Card No 12)

1 ☐ Yes   2 ☐ No

Q 81. How many persons are in your household?

  _____

Q 82. Indicate the highest level of schooling achieved:

No formal schooling ☐   Some Primary ☐   Completed Primary ☐
Some Secondary   ☐   Completed secondary ☐   Some tertiary ☐   Completed Tertiary ☐

Q 83. Did you achieve any of the following:

1. ☐ Pass in four subjects (including English Language) in the secondary level examinations (CSEC)
2. ☐ Pass in four or more subjects (including English Language) in GCE O'Level/CXC
3. ☐ Pass in two or more subjects in CAPE

4. ☐ A degree (associate included)

Q 84. Do you think that your economic situation is better than that of your parent(s)?

1 ☐ Much Better
2 ☐ Better
3 ☐ The same
4 ☐ Worse
5 ☐ Much Worse

Q 85. Urbanicity   (to be completed by interviewer; do not specify population size as a criterion)

1 ☐ Capital of the country
2 ☐ Parish/provincial capitals
3 ☐ Other main towns
4 ☐ Small towns
5 ☐ Rural
6 ☐ Interior /deep rural

Q86. What is your marital status?

1 ☐ Single
2 ☐ Married
3 ☐ Common-law marriage
4 ☐ Divorced/Separated
5 ☐ Other

Q87. Do you consider yourself :

1 ☐ Black/Afro	6 ☐ Mixed
2 ☐ East Indian	7 ☐ Javanese
3 ☐ Indigenous/ Amerindian	8 ☐ Maroon
4 ☐ Chinese	9 ☐ Other
5 ☐ Portuguese	

Q 88. Do you consider yourself:

1 ☐ Upper class
2 ☐ Middle class
3 ☐ Lower class
4 ☐ Poor class
5 ☐ Other

Section 14: Self Reporting & Contact with System

Q 89. Have you ever been accused of committing a crime?

1	☐ Yes (Move to Q75)	☐ No (Move to Q79)

Q 90. Have you ever been detained by the police?

1	☐ Yes	2 ☐No

Q 91. Have you ever been arrested by the police?

1	☐ Yes	2 ☐ No (move to Q 79)

Q 92. If yes, for which of the following:

1. ☐A violent crime involving the use of a weapon (blunt instruments excluded) 2. ☐A violent crime not involving the use of a weapon 3. ☐A property crime 4. ☐Ganja use 5. ☐Use of other drugs 6. ☐Other	
Q 93. Have you ever been charged with a crime?	
1 ☐ Yes 2 ☐No	
Q 94. Including yourself, has any member of your present household ever assaulted and injured another member of the household?	
1 ☐ Yes **2** ☐ No	
Q 95. Excluding yourself, has any member of your present household ever assaulted and injured anyone who is not a member of the household?	
1 ☐ Yes 2 ☐No	
Q 96. Including yourself, has any member of your present household ever committed a crime?	
1 ☐ Yes 2 ☐No	

**Thank you for your time. End of questionnaire!**

End Time: _____

Appendix 6

Authors and Technical Committee members

Technical Committee Members

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Aslem Richards (Mr.)	CSP Tobago, Ministry of National Security
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Darin Carmichael (Mr.)	T&T Chamber of Commerce
Derek Chadee (Dr.)	ANSA Mc Al Psychological Research Center, UWI
Dr. Raymond Kirton (Dr.)	UWI Institute of International Relations
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Gary Tagallie (Mr.)	Ministry of People and Social Development
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This **Caribbean Human Development Report 2012** was produced after a thorough consultation and based on a telltale survey of 12,000 citizens from seven countries, including Trinidad and Tobago. The report reviews the current state of crime in the English and Dutch speaking Caribbean, as well as the policies and programme developed at both national and regional levels to address crime. The report offers a set of recommendations to reduce and prevent violent crime while advancing human development. It advocates for a balances mix of policies that includes social programmes to induce youth away from crime preventative measures to abort the cycle of violence and stop gender violence, and a shift from state security approach to one focusing on citizen security and participation. Visit our website to download a copy of this report at ww.undp.org.tt

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