TRIANGLE
POLICY | RESEARCH | MEDIA

UNDP
Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.

OUTCOME EVALUATION:

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME SYRIA COUNTRY PROGRAMME (2016-2019)

Final Evaluation Report of Outcome I:
Sustainable Livelihoods Opportunities including Local Economic Recovery & Social Cohesion to Enhance Community Resilience

Submitted to:
The United Nations Development Programme
Syria Country Office

MARCH 2019



This report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors alone. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views or official positions of the United Nations Development Programme or its officials, or any of the organizations referred to in the report. Statistics and data provided in the report are provisional and do not necessarily imply official endorsement.

Preface

This evaluation report was commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme – Syria Country Office in order to provide an evidence-based assessment and recommendations for future programming in Syria. The evaluation was conducted between September 2018 and February 2019 across the Syrian Arab Republic by Triangle's evaluation team in Beirut, Lebanon, as represented by its Directors of Knowledge and Research Sami Halabi and Nizar Ghanem, respectively, and supported in the field by the Damascus-based Capacity Building Centre, represented by its Managing Director Laila Kaddour.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Mr. David Akopyan (UNDP Syria, Resident Representative, a.i), Ms. Akiko Suzaki (UNDP Syria, Deputy Resident Representative), Mr. Giacomo Negrotto (UNDP Syria, Partnership Development Specialist) and Ms. Hala Akkad (UNDP Syria, RBM, Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst) for their substantial contributions in terms of overall navigation during the outcome evaluation and effective management during the evaluation process. The authors also wish to acknowledge the continuous support and substantive contributions of Ms. Linda Abdel Aziz (on behalf of UNDP Syria NGOs and CSOs Capacity Assessment and Development Program), Ms. Minako Manome (on behalf of UNDP Syria Local Economic Development and Livelihoods Portfolio), Dr. Hala Rizk (on behalf of UNDP Syria Social Cohesion Portfolio), and Dr. Hayan Saffour (on behalf of UNDP Syria Basic and Social Services and Infrastructure Rehabilitation Portfolio). The authors recognise and appreciate the support received from all UNDP field staff across all governorates covered by this evaluation.

The authors also express their heartfelt gratitude to all key informants for their time during interviews. Last but not least, the authors would like to thank members of the public who provided the outcome evaluation with their perspectives on UNDP's programming in Syria—without these perspectives, this evaluation would not have been possible.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 4
1. List of Tables and Figures 6
2. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 8
3. Nomenclature 9
4. Executive Summary 11
5. Introduction 17
6. Description of Intervention 20
7. Evaluation Scope and Objectives 22
   7.1 Evaluation Scope 22
   7.2 Evaluation Objectives 23
   7.3 Implementation Timeline 28
8. Evaluation Approach & Methods 29
   8.1 Data Sources 29
   8.2 Sampling Frame & Sample 32
   8.3 Performance Standards & Theoretical Frameworks 38
   8.4 Ethical Considerations 41
   8.5 Background Information on Evaluators 42
   8.6 Limitations & Mitigation Measures 43
9. Data Analysis 46
10. Findings 47
   10.1 Major Concerns 47
   10.2 Relevance 47
   10.3 Effectiveness 53
   10.4 Efficiency 81
   10.5 Coherence & Connectedness 84
   10.6 Sustainability 87
   10.7 Partnership 89
11. Conclusions 92
12. Recommendations 94
13. Report Annexes 99
   13.1 Annex A: Terms of Reference 99
   13.2 Annex B: Tools 106
      13.2.1 Focus Group Discussion Questionnaire 106
      13.2.2 KII – Field Staff Questionnaire 111
      13.2.3 KII – Implementing Partners' Questionnaire 113
   13.3 Annex C: Code of Conduct 115

1. List of Tables and Figures

Table A: Evaluation Matrix, Livelihoods 25
Table B: Field Sample & Achievement Levels 32
Table C: Resilience Development Survey Sampling 33
Table D: Focus Group Disaggregation 36
Table E: Key Informant Sampling 37
Table F: List of Limitations & Mitigation Measures 43

Figure 1: Implementation Timeline 28
Figure 2: Resilience Development Survey, Data Overview 34
Figure 3: Literacy Rates Among Beneficiaries 35
Figure 4: Key Informants, Disaggregation by Gender 38
Figure 5: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Illustrative) 40
Figure 6: Project Implementation Organogram 42
Figure 7: What expenses are you able to cover with the money you earn? 54
Figure 8: To what extent did the programme increase your income? 55
Figure 9: How do you get paid? 56
Figure 10: Payment type by age group 56
Figure 11: How much do you earn on a daily basis? 57
Figure 12: How much do you earn on a weekly basis? 58
Figure 13: How much do you earn on a monthly basis? 58
Figure 14: How much are you or your household indebted? 60
Figure 15: To what extent did the programme help lower your or your household's debt? 60
Figure 16: To what extent do you feel that the programme helped you access professional networks within your resident community? 62
Figure 17: Were you able to acquire a paid job as a direct result of the professional network? 62
Figure 18: To what extent do you think community activities facilitated social cohesion? 63
Figure 19: To what extent do you feel that the programme eased social tensions in the community where you reside? 64
Figure 20: How effective do you find the asset provided to earn an income? 65
Figure 21: How long were you employed in emergency employment opportunities in total? 68
Figure 22: Did you find a paid job in the field that you were trained in? 70
Figure 23: How long have you been working in your current job? 70
Figure 24: Do you think that the vocational training was long enough to obtain the necessary skills to find a job? 72
Figure 25: Do you think that the vocational training was detailed enough to obtain the necessary skills to find a job? 73
Figure 26: How effective do you find the toolkit provided to earn an income? 74

Figure 27: Were you able to start / re-start your business as a direct consequence of the business support received? 75
Figure 28: To what extent did the support provided to your business help you earn an income? .. 75
Figure 29: Were you able to employ staff other than yourself? 76
Figure 30: Are you planning on employing staff within the next six months? 77

2. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

BR	Business revival
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBO	Community-based organisation
COO	Concept of operation
CSO	Civil society organisation
CPD	Country programme document
DFID	Department for International Development
EQ	Evaluation question
FBO	Faith-based organisation
FGD	Focus group discussion
FHH	Female headed household
GoS	Government of Syrian Arab Republic
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IP	Implementing partner
IDP	Internally displaced person
KII	Key informant interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluating
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
OR1	Outcome research 1
OR2	Outcome research 2
PWD	People with disabilities
RDS	Resilience development survey
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSF	United Nations Strategic Framework for the Syrian Arab Republic
VT	Vocational training

3. Nomenclature

This report aims to ensure that readers from a range of backgrounds are able to understand its findings. As such, the terms and expressions it uses are both technically accurate and widely comprehensible. However, the reader should be aware of the following terms in order to deepen their understanding of its content:

Age classifications: The report employs the following classifications to describe persons of different ages:

- Adolescents: Persons 15-18 years of age.
- Youth: Persons 19-25 years of age.
- Young adults: 26-35 years of age.
- Adults: 36-64 years of age.
- The Elderly: 65 years of age and above.

Beneficiaries: Direct beneficiaries are persons who receive direct support from UNDP, such as emergency employment opportunities with their households. Indirect beneficiaries are persons whom UNDP programmes support indirectly, such as those who benefit from the knock-on effects of basic services delivery and essential infrastructure rehabilitation. This report employs the term 'beneficiaries' to describe direct beneficiaries of UNDP programming in Syria.

***Civil society organisation (CSO)*:** CSOs are voluntary, non-profit organisations, distinct from the government and private sector. CSOs may advocate for shared public interests, including—but not limited to—human, women's and environmental rights, or carry out humanitarian relief. Associations, community-based organisations, co-operatives, FBOs, NGOs and unions may be classified as CSOs.[1]

***Faith-based organisations (FBOs)*:** FBOs are organisations whose mission is based on the social values of a particular faith, and who often draw their activists, staff members, leaders and

[1] UNDP: Working with Civil Society in Foreign Aid. Accessed: http://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH03%20Annexes.pdf

volunteers from a particular faith group. For the purpose of this study, FBOs refer to faith-based organisations that acted as UNDP implementing partners in the areas of UNDP interventions.

Implementing partners (IPs): Local non-governmental organisations or faith-based organisations through which UNDP implemented its programming.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs): IDPs are persons who have been forced to leave their homes and have not crossed a border to safety but stayed in their country of habitual residence.[2]

***Key informant(s)*:** A person or persons with relevant expertise who provided information relevant to the findings of this evaluation.

Livelihoods: A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base.[3]

Local authorities: Syrian government bodies responsible for administrative regions at the governorate level.

Newly accessible areas: Areas which were previously unstable and have recently opened up for humanitarian and/or development interventions.

Non-governmental organisation (NGO): NGOs are non-profit local, national, regional or international organisations that address issues in support of the public good and/or engage in humanitarian relief.[4]

Programme Component(s): The report refers to the multiple programmes implemented under sustainable livelihood opportunities (Outcome 1) as Programme Components. The main

[2] UNHCR: Emergency Handbook—IDP definition. Accessed: https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/250553/idp-definition
[3] FAO. Tools for Designing, Monitoring and Evaluating Land Administration in Latin America. Accessible at: http://www.fao.org/in-action/herramienta-administracion-tierras/glossary/s/en/
[4] American Psychological Association. United Nations: Definitions and Terms. Accessed: https://www.apa.org/international/united-nations/acronyms.pdf

programme components are: Socio-Economic Recovery, Social Cohesion and Community Resilience, and Support to Vulnerable Groups

***Programme Subcomponent(s)*:** Programmes implemented under Outcome 1 have several subcomponents such as: *Farming Support, Business Revival, Vocational Training, Emergency Employment, Support Micro-to-Small-to Medium Business Revival, Social Cohesion Activities, Sustainable Work/Employment, and Youth-led Initiatives.* These activities were referred to in this report as Programme Subcomponents to facilitate comprehension.

Social cohesion: Social cohesion is defined loosely as the interaction, relationship, and tie between individuals and communities. Specifically, social cohesion describes respecting diversity—such as, but not limited to, religion, ethnicity, income, politics, sexuality, gender, and age—on both, institutional and individual level.[5]

4. Executive Summary

The United Nations Development Programme – Syria Country Office commissioned this evaluation in order to appraise its Resilience Building and Early Recovery Programme and provide actionable recommendations to inform the agency's Country Programme. The Country Programme consists of the following intended outcomes:

Outcome 1: Households and communities benefit from sustainable livelihood opportunities, including economic recovery and social inclusion.

Outcome 2: Basic social services and infrastructure restored, improved and sustained to enhance community resilience in Syria.

This evaluation report covers Outcome 1. A separate evaluation of Outcome 2 was also conducted and may be read in parallel to provide a complete appraisal of UNDP's Country

[5] UNDP (2009): Community Security and Social Cohesion. Towards a UNDP Approach. Accessed: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf

Programme. Accordingly, this report employs the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee criteria to evaluate the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, sustainability and partnerships of Outcome 1.

This evaluation employed a systems resilience evaluation approach which was merged with the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, a framework which considers the well-being of communities in a system with six different categories of assets or 'capitals' – financial, human, natural, physical, political, and social capitals. Evaluation sources included a nationally representative survey of 1,036 beneficiaries alongside 13 focus group discussions and 18 key informant interviews.

Relevance

In general, UNDP programmes were found to be relevant, responded to market demand and matched beneficiary profiles. UNDP interventions provided a much-needed boost to local communities' markets, labour force, and skill sets. Emergency programmes (emergency employment and provision of productive assets) also responded to immediate needs. Non-emergency programming reflected the longer-term sustainable livelihoods needs of beneficiaries, particularly in the form of human, physical and financial capital. Programmes also explicitly targeted and reached vulnerable population segments including female-headed households, persons with disabilities, the youth, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, programme design could have included more contextualised programme specifics rooted in systemic and standardised needs assessments. At the same time, donor limitations were found to limit UNDP's ability to respond to some needs.

Effectiveness

Programming helped beneficiaries sustain themselves, but effects varied across emergency and non-emergency programmes. Emergency programmes were effective in breaking the cycle of unemployment, yet their nature meant they were ultimately unsustainable and their effects limited: salaries and assets could provide access to an individual livelihood over a finite period of time; supporting a household was out of the question. Non-emergency programmes were more effective and provided access to sustainable livelihoods. Yet, the extent of those effects

was also restricted: the majority of beneficiaries who were still working after they benefited from non-emergency programmes earned around $4/day or less, with many at or below the international poverty line.[6]

Programme effectiveness was also commonly influenced by a lack of contextualised needs assessments and programme design. At times, in-kind support was not suited to the local context, which meant beneficiaries were unable to work effectively. That said, vocational training programmes and business revival support were effective in bringing beneficiaries to the market and sustaining livelihoods over time. By the same token, programmes managed to build professional networks and bolster social cohesion by bringing IDPs, returnees and residents together. Finally, NGO capacity building programmes succeeded in developing the skills of individual NGO workers, even if the extent to which those advances contributed to organisation-wide capacity remained unclear.

Efficiency

In light of the context in Syria, UNDP's operations were found to be reasonably efficient: programmes ran their course, implementing partners completed their tasks and there were no major complaints. That said, several internal and external factors led to inefficiencies. The principal factor that slowed down operations, hampered efficient planning and impaired streamlined implementation was the issue of obtaining permissions to operate from official entities in a standardised and efficient manner. In fact, recent regulations concerning which civil society organisations can receive funding have had the greatest effect on how, and indeed with whom UNDP can partner with. Other external factors which affected efficient implementation were funding shortfalls, restrictions and cycles which were not necessarily reflective of the level of need or operational context.

Internally, the nature of emergency crisis response meant that systemic long-term organisation-wide needs assessments were not conducted, something which occasionally lead to inefficient programme design and implementation. Lack of unified and uniformly applied assessment tools,

[6] Daily rates for weekly and monthly earnings are calculated by assuming workers work five days per week and 22 days per month. The international poverty line is considered according to the World Bank standard of $1.90 per day.

vulnerability criteria, market opportunity studies and beneficiary-level databases were all elements which were found to periodically result in inefficiencies. A focus on short-term outputs also meant that questions of sustainability were often left unaddressed. Finally, inconsistent needs assessment criteria and lack of sufficient beneficiary communications lead to perceptions of favouritism in the recruitment process.

Coherence & Connectedness

UNDP programmes were found to be coherent as well as aligned with international and national frameworks. UNDP field offices frequently, but not always, incorporated SDGs into intervention planning as well as M&E practices. When it came to national frameworks, UNDP field offices coordinated with local authorities to bring programming in line with national priorities. Programming also contributed to the UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021 Outcome 3 (Strengthening Resilience to Shocks and Crisis) through a combination, on the one hand, of emergency employment, which shielded beneficiaries from shocks and initiated the recovery process, and, on the other, non-emergency interventions, which produced longer-term sustainable employment opportunities. An emphasis on economic outcomes also contributed to UN Strategic Framework Pillar 3 (Improving the Socioeconomic Resilience of the Syrian people).

But while built-in programme coherence allowed for cumulative livelihood outcomes, beneficiaries were not always connected to programmes efficiently. Programme design and implementation produced positive results, but the link between emergency and non-emergency programmes could be improved: Emergency employment rarely resulted in market-relevant skills, and could have been more closely linked to non-emergency programming in order to provide greater coherence across programmes.

Sustainability

Even if sustainability was not built into programming from the start, some sustainable projects were found to result from non-emergency programming, particularly in vocational training and business revival support. However, sustainability was not found to be a priority during programme design, mostly due to the emergency context in which the current Country Programme was formulated (circa. 2015). Some sustainability assessments were conducted by UNDP M&E teams, but these assessments have yet to be overtly incorporated into programme design. And while some implementing partners' projects supported by UNDP have survived without UNDP funding, these remain a minority.

Partnership

Partnership models were found to be appropriate to the Syrian context, but a lack of capacity, limited number of partners and external regulations affected results. Under current regulatory regimes which govern the CSO sector, UNDP was and remains seriously constrained by the number of partners it can work with. This limitation results in the agency having to build the capacity of the organisations it *is* able to work with, while also trying to achieve output targets—the combination of which creates tension between the need to operate efficiently and achieve output targets. That said, some partnership models show promise. Faith-based organisations were, in general, found to have greater organisational capacity and benefited from fewer regulatory restrictions than other CSOs, although care had to be taken not to rely too heavily on FBOs in areas of high-interfaith sensitivity.

Recommendations

While the outcomes of UNDP livelihood programmes have been widespread, the next phase of Syria's recovery, looking forward to development will require that communities have access to more sustainable longer-term livelihood opportunities. To affect such a change, UNDP and its partners inside and outside of Syria will need to focus on more non-emergency livelihood programmes which are grounded in systematic needs assessments, as well as relevance to local markets, value chains and communities. In order to advance such a transition, both overarching and programmatic approaches will become necessary and are presented as such in the form of recommendations below.

Overarching recommendations

- Adopt a longer-term sustainable livelihoods approach to programme design.
- Institute systemic organisation-wide needs assessments which adopt a sustainable livelihoods approach as the ultimate goal.
- Focus on specific labour-intensive value chains accessible to local communities.
- Mandate beneficiary-level needs assessments and outcome indicators as preconditions for programme design.

Programmatic recommendations

- Create pathways to sustainable livelihoods by offering beneficiaries assistance across the employment cycle (training, job placement, business development and marketing).
- Aim to provide more specialised training and build job centres.
- Establish links between training programmes, collective working arrangements and social funds.
- Support micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) through expanded business revival services, access to financial capital, assets provision and value chain linkages.
- Upgrade CSOs capacity building programmes through organisation-wide capacity assessments, with a view towards standardization.
- Institute advocacy programmes to target equitable economic reform, bolster state services and reduce regulatory hurdles.

5. Introduction

Going on nine years, the crisis in Syria has become one of the most complex and protracted humanitarian contexts in modern history.[7] Overall, 13.1 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, of which more than 4.1 million are in severe need.[8] Among the most pertinent of those needs today, and no doubt in the months and years to come, will be the process of national early recovery in Syria. Over half the Syrian labour force is without a job, which reduces income sources, and places additional strains on households' ability to subsist.[9] The latest available unemployment rates are estimated to be around 53% among adults and 75% among youth (end of 2015).[10] By comparison, the average unemployment rate among OECD countries for adults is 5.3% (third quarter 2018) and 11.1% for youth (third quarter 2018).[11] As result of these interconnected factors, poverty has deepened across Syria. The latest available poverty data shows rates up from less than 15% prior the crisis to 85% in recent years, with some 69% living in extreme poverty.[12,13]

UNDP in the Syrian Arab Republic

Since the beginning of the crisis, UNDP Syria has implemented a unique Resilience Building and Early Recovery Programme that aims to strengthen resilience of the Syrian people to cope with the effects of the on-going crisis, as well as enable those whose livelihoods were severely disrupted to recover and rebuild their lives. In order to provide IDPs and their host communities with rapid employment opportunities and access to basic services, UNDP programmes have worked on the rehabilitation of basic community infrastructure and services. Different types of livelihood interventions to support early recovery and positive coping mechanisms were provided

[7] UNDP (2015): Resilience Building in Response to the Syria Crisis. P. 3
[8] UN OCHA Syria (August 2018): Humanitarian Response Plan. P. 13
[9] UN OCHA (November 2017): Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic 2018. P. 19
[10] UN OCHA (November 2017): Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic 2018. P. 19
[11] OECD (2019): Unemployment Rate. Accessed: https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm#indicator-chart and OECD (2019): Youth unemployment rate. Accessed: https://data.oecd.org/unemp/youth-unemployment-rate.htm#indicator-chart
[12] The poverty line describes the ability of people to purchase the minimum of necessary goods and services a household requires to survive. Extreme poverty describes the ability of people to purchase only the very basic food and non-food items a household needs to live.
[13] UN OCHA (August 2017): Human Response Plan, Monitoring Report. January-June 2017. P. 4, 38

with special attention given to target female headed households (FHH), persons with disability (PWD) and youth.

In line with the Syria Humanitarian Response Plan, the United Nations Strategic Framework, the UNDP Country Programme Document and the overarching Sustainable Development Goals, UNDP Syria's interventions have been designed in a holistic and multi-dimensional manner with the goals of early recovery, resilience building, and improved livelihoods. The Country Programme included various priority areas and partnerships that were summed into the following two outcomes:

Outcome 1: Households and communities benefit from sustainable livelihood opportunities, including economic recovery and social inclusion.

Outcome 2: Basic social services and infrastructure restored, improved and sustained to enhance community resilience in Syria.

Since the start of the crisis, the focus of the interventions has been on supporting the resilience of communities through livelihoods support, restoration of basic services and rehabilitation of local essential infrastructure and social cohesion, as well as economic recovery through supporting small businesses and creating employment opportunities.[14] The programme aimed to provide the aforementioned services to all of Syrians with a particular focus on the most affected communities.

The programme's adopted the following guiding principles during design and implementation:

1. **Area-Based Approach**: In order to identify and respond to the specific needs of affected communities, the UNDP adopted an area-based approach throughout its interventions. The approach used local structures as entry points to ensure that interventions are affective in reactivating local basic services in order to support local production, employment schemes and economy. Through this approach, UNDP engaged with local partners and stakeholders to ensure that planning, implementation and monitoring is responsive to local needs. UNDP has been actively operating in nine governorates, namely Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, Damascus, Deir-ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, Latakia, Rural

[14] UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 11

Damascus, and Tartous either through a field presence, outsourced personnel, private service providers, or partner NGOs.[15] In recent months, UNDP has expanded operations to include the governorates of As-Sweida, Daraa and Ar-Raqqa.

2. **Partnerships and Coordination:** The intervention coordinated with local actors such as NGOs, FBOs, and CBOs in addition to several UN agencies within the framework of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), Clusters/Sector Working Groups, and various technical task forces.[16] The Early Recovery and Livelihoods Sector Working Group which provides policy advice and reports on early recovery and resilience is led by UNDP. UNDP is also involved in additional coordination mechanisms such as the UN Country Team, and the Programme Management Team (PMT) to ensure complementarity in implementation and programming between different UN agencies.[17]

3. **UNDP Approach:** Geographical locations of intervention were chosen based on several UNDP criteria. Some of these included severity of needs, the capacity for labour absorption and creation, and the presence of local partners to support implementation. Stability and accessibility were also considered.[18]

4. **Gender Mainstreaming:** As part of the plans mentioned above and in line with the UN Agenda 2030, gender was mainstreamed in line with SDG 5 and was implemented accordingly in practice. Women constituted a minimum of 35% of total beneficiaries with targeted activities tailored to address their needs and priorities. By the end of 2018, across the nine governorates 35,085 monthly job opportunities were provided to women, 27,350 of whom went to female-headed households.[19] Additionally, specialised vocational training was provided to 6,060 women, 3,586 of whom received start-up toolkits to support sustainable income-generating activities.[20]

5. **Monitoring & Evaluation Approach:** UNDP has three mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the field activities. At times, more than one mechanism was used based on the nature of the activity and the specific context of areas. UNDP used these M&E

[15] UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 12
[16] UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 12
[17] UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 12
[18] UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 12
[19] UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 13
[20] UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 13

mechanisms in order to ensure that its projects and programmes were implemented and reached its target numbers. The three mechanisms are: Community-based Monitoring, Third-Party Monitoring and Evaluation, and site visits. Additionally, the UNDP country office in Syria designed and developed an innovative in-house platform in 2014 entitled "Internal Monitoring and Reporting Platform (IMRP)".

6. Description of Intervention

UNDP Syria rolled out an extension of a Country Programme developed for the 2016-2017 period under the overall strategic goal of "enhancing the resilience and socio-economic stabilisation of individuals and communities" by striving to achieve two outcomes: (1) restoring the disrupted livelihoods of the affected communities; and (2) restoring, rehabilitating and maintaining sustainable basic services and infrastructure in damaged areas and host communities. Embedded in each outcome area was an institutional crisis response and capacity development component which targeted key partners.[21]

Programme Outcome 1 Explained:

Outcome 1: Households and communities benefit from sustainable livelihood opportunities, including economic recovery and social cohesion.

Contributing to Sustainable Development Goals 1, 2, and 8, this Country Programme outcome was aligned with outcome 6 of the UNDP Strategic Plan (2014 – 2017), "Early recovery and rapid return to sustainable development pathways are achieved in post-crises and post-disaster situations" and outcome 3 of the UNDP Strategic Plan (2018 – 2021), "Strengthen Resilience to Shocks and Crisis"; as well as the third pillar of the Syria-United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF), 2016-2019, "improving the socio-economic resilience of the Syrian population"; and with national priorities defined in the UNSF: reactivation of the production process and provision of sustainable livelihood resources for the Syrian population.[22] Outcome 1 is also aligned with

[21] UNDP (January 2016): Country programme document for the Syrian Arab Republic (2016-2017). P. 4
[22] UNDP (January 2016): Country programme document for the Syrian Arab Republic (2016-2017). P. 5

the third Strategic Objective of the UN Humanitarian Response Plan "Increase resilience and access to services."

Emergency and Non-Emergency Programming

To achieve Outcome 1, UNDP Syria delivered both emergency and non-emergency programmes to enhance resilience and provide sustainable livelihoods opportunities for a target of 125,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), targeting host community members, and returnees in crisis-affected areas.[23] The initiatives target women, female headed households (FHHs), persons with disabilities (PWDs), and youth.

UNDP Syria's *emergency programming* provides emergency employment opportunities for beneficiaries. Under emergency programming, UNDP Syria also provided productive assets in various sectors of work such as in agriculture craftwork. Productive assets included but were not limited to: livestock, sewing machines, seeds, hairdressing equipment, and toolkits which were intended for immediate use in temporary work.

Non-emergency programmes include market-relevant vocations and vocational training (VT) as well as business revival (BR) opportunities. Beneficiaries received professional training to acquire skills needed to enhance their employability in the labour market and support socioeconomic recovery. Initiatives provided start-up kits and trainees benefited from training activities in areas such as mobile phone, computer, and home appliance maintenance, plumbing, hairdressing, beekeeping, and food processing.

Trainees who graduated from VT programmes received vocational toolkits and those at the top of the courses received additional training for skills in self-employment, with top entrepreneurs submitting business plans and receiving in kind grants to launch their businesses.

Under BR initiatives, UNDP established and supported the recovery of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) to generate longer-term employment opportunities for beneficiaries, targeting vulnerable groups such as FHHs and PWDs. Workshops and businesses included sewing workshops, bakeries, cow farms, and work in the wood and furniture industry.

[23] UNDP (January 2016): Country programme document for the Syrian Arab Republic (2016-2017). P. 10

Social programming

UNDP's social programming established youth led initiatives to promote social cohesion, develop capacity of local partners for resilience building, and further enhance coordination for resilience building.

Youth initiatives provided beneficiaries with emergency job opportunities as well as opportunities to develop their capacities through positively engaging in community activities. Activities such as facilitation of local dialogue, social media and awareness campaigns, art, sports, building communal spaces, along with other activities provided youth with experience in social cohesion.

UNDP Syria provided representatives from local NGOs and civil society training workshops on topics such as managerial skills, finance, programming, and volunteerism as well as on new tools and online platforms for local community interventions.

To further enhance advocacy and coordination for resilience building, UNDP Syria led various capacity building events for the Early Recovery and Livelihoods sector to respond to humanitarian needs immediately.

7. Evaluation Scope and Objectives

7.1 Evaluation Scope

This outcome evaluation assessed UNDP's programming across its targeted geographical areas during the 2016-2019 programming cycle. The overarching purpose of the evaluation was to appraise assistance activities against defined objectives, monitor progress against relevant work plans and produce actionable recommendations on how to improve/adjust the current Country Programme Document (CPD) and future successor arrangements, as well as identify challenges in completing planned activities inside Syria. To cover all of Syria, six strategic governorates were chosen for evaluation, namely Al-Hasakeh, Damascus, Rural Damascus, Hama, Latakia, and Tartous.

Accordingly, this outcome evaluation was specifically designed to appraise **CPD Outcome 1: *Households and communities benefit from sustainable livelihood opportunities, including economic recovery and social cohesion*, and in particular the following four programme components**: *Socio-Economic Recovery, Social Cohesion, Community Resilience,* and *Support to Vulnerable Groups.*

In order to provide an objective, evidence-based assessment of outcomes, as well as actionable recommendations, Triangle adopted an action-oriented participatory evaluation approach which assessed Outcome 1 of UNDP's Country Programme. A separate evaluation of Outcome 2 was also conducted in parallel to this outcome evaluation to provide a complete appraisal of UNDP's Country Programme. Thus, in order to attain a complete overview of UNDP's Country Programme, the two outcome evaluations should be read in tandem.

7.2 Evaluation Objectives

Based on an in-depth review of programme and strategy documents, coupled with ongoing and consistent correspondence with UNDP, Triangle devised the following set of Evaluation Questions (EQs) to guide this evaluation approach and overall methodology. Accordingly, the primary objective of this evaluation was to respond to the following EQs:

1. To what extent did Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities programme contribute to the stabilisation of local communities as well as the restoration of basic and social services and infrastructure?
2. What were the main factors which affected the achievement or non-achievement of outcome objectives?
3. To what extent were cross-cutting themes (i.e. gender equality, local context specificity) incorporated in the design, implementation and outcomes of UNDP interventions?
4. To what extent did the outcomes contribute to national priorities under the UN Humanitarian Response Plan, the UNSF and relevant SDGs?

The evaluation's field work for OR1 and OR2 took place over a period of eight weeks from November 2018 to December 2018 and adopted a participatory mixed-methods approach consisting of key informant interviews, focus group discussions and an individual survey for each

of the two outcomes. Outcomes were evaluated post-ex; in other words, with research subjects that had previously participated in UNDP projects which have run their course.[24]

Triangle's evaluation criteria were based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) framework adjusted to UNDP's programme and presented in the form of an evaluation matrix in Table A below.

[24] Due to issues related to beneficiary sourcing, some research subjects may still be involved in UNDP projects (See Limitations for more info). In some areas programmes were ongoing with beneficiaries, but only through their IPs and not with funding from UNDP.

Table A: Evaluation Matrix, Livelihoods

OECD-DAC Criteria	*Lines of inquiry*	*Data Sources*
Relevance	➢ Does the targeting and combination of livelihoods and resilience interventions meet basic needs of beneficiaries and other vulnerable groups (IDP, host, youth, FHH, PWD) and facilitate recovery? Is this combination context specific?	➢ Beneficiaries
	➢ Does the combination of different types of livelihoods interventions affect people's life systems in a manner which contributes to resilience?	➢ Beneficiaries
	➢ Are the different criteria used in the selection of the areas of intervention and geographic areas appropriate to meet the livelihood needs of local populations?	➢ UNDP Staff
	➢ Are there external factors (e.g. economic, social, gender) which are not being addressed but could make livelihoods and resilience programming more context-specific?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
	➢ Are there any gender-specific vulnerabilities that affect livelihoods and resilience dynamics in the household or community as a result of the assistance provided?	➢ Beneficiaries
	➢ Were livelihoods and resilience interventions programmed in a manner to reverse existing negative coping strategies?	➢ Beneficiaries
Efficiency	➢ How coherent is livelihoods and resilience programming relative to what male and female beneficiaries view they require to be more resilient?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
	➢ Are livelihoods and resilience interventions operating in a generally cost- and operationally-efficient manner?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➢ Are there any gender-specific adjustments or considerations that can be taken into account to allow livelihoods and resilience programming to operate more effectively?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs

	➢ What internal feedback mechanisms and M&E exercises could contribute to greater resilience tracking and efficiency?	➢ UNDP Staff
	➢ Does internal or external bureaucracy affect livelihoods and resilience programming? Can internal procedures be altered to facilitate more efficient livelihoods and resilience programming?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➢ Do partners have sufficient capacity and know-how to implement livelihoods and resilience programming in an efficient manner?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
	➢ What outcomes have resulted as a direct and indirect consequence of livelihoods and resilience programming?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➢ What measurable effects has livelihoods and resilience programming had on the life systems of men/women, youth, PWDs, IDPs/hosts?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
Effectiveness	➢ Do beneficiaries feel that they are more resilient or have access to more sustainable livelihoods as a result of livelihoods programming?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
	➢ Has livelihoods programming been in effect long enough to have the desired effects? If not, should design be altered accordingly?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
	➢ What were the major internal or external factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of outcomes?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
	➢ How does livelihoods and resilience programming complement the work of other UN agencies, NGOs, donors and national/regional actors?	➢ UNDP Staff
Coherence	➢ How does livelihood and resilience programming feed into the SDGs 1, 2 and 8, Outcome 3 of the UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) and the UN Strategic framework (2016-2019)?	➢ UNDP Staff
	➢ What other indicators can be developed to define context-specific resilience built through livelihoods and resilience programming?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➢ Has livelihoods and resilience programming contributed to social inclusion, particularly among and between IDP and host communities?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries

	➢ Were there any components of livelihoods and resilience programming that showed disparity or stood out from other components in terms of building resilience among beneficiaries?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
	➢ Is livelihoods programming designed in a manner that takes into consideration the longer-term issues that could affect the resilience of male and female beneficiaries?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
Sustainability	➢ To what extent, if any, has the prolonged nature of the crises and refugee crisis precluded the sustainability of livelihoods programming?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
	➢ To what extent, if any, will male and female beneficiaries be able to maintain or even build resilience after donor funding has ceased?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries
	➢ To what extent did the training take cross-cutting issues into account (such as gender and youth)?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Local Partners/NGOs
Partnership	➢ How did capacity building of local partners contribute to sustainable livelihoods and resilience building?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Local Partners/NGOs, Beneficiaries
	➢ What areas of partners' capacity to implement livelihood and resilience programming are most lacking?	➢ UNDP Staff, IPs, Beneficiaries

7.3 Implementation Timeline

The evaluation team implemented the activities over a 22-week period according to the implementation timeline in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Implementation Timeline

Evaluation Component	Responsible Office	Month 1				Month 2				Month 3				Month 4				Month 5				Month 6	
		W1 Sept 17	W2 Sept 24	W3 Oct 1	W4 Oct 8	W5 Oct 15	W6 Oct 22	W7 Oct 29	W8 Nov 5	W9 Nov 12	W10 Nov 19	W11 Nov 26	W12 Dec 3	W13 Dec 10	W14 Dec 17	W15 Dec 24	W16 Dec 31	W17 Jan 7	W18 Jan 14	W19 Jan 21	W20 Jan 28	W21 Feb 4	W22 Feb 11
Kick-off Meeting	UNDP + Triangle																						
Preliminary Literature Review & Inception Interviews	Triangle																						
Research Protocol Submission (with Tools)	Triangle																						
Review of Protocol	UNDP																						
Research Protocol Amendments & Approval	UNDP + Triangle																						
Translation and Programming	Triangle																						
Site Scoping & Testing of Tools	Triangle																						
Data Collection Qualitative (Survey/KIIs/ FGDs)	Triangle																						
Translation, Qualitative Data Cleaning	Triangle																						
Analysis (2 Rounds)	Triangle																						
Preliminary Findings Presentation	Triangle																						
Comments gap analysis & report writing	UNDP + Triangle																						
Draft Evaluation Report	Triangle																						
Draft Evaluation Report Submission & Comments Incorporation	UNDP + Triangle																						
Final Report Submission	Triangle																						

8. Evaluation Approach & Methods

With a view to inform future livelihoods interventions targeting residents, returnees, and IDPs, this outcome evaluation was built upon an action-oriented empirical research methodology. Field research was conducted from November 4, 2018 to December 31, 2018. Primary data collection activities comprised a resilience development survey (1,036 respondents), a total of 13 focus group discussions and 18 key informant interviews. Secondary data collection activities were comprised of an adaptive literature review which facilitated feedback of relevant development, journalistic, academic, and grey literature into this report's findings and recommendations.

8.1 Data Sources

Triangle adopted a collaborative approach to the evaluation which entailed cooperation with UNDP on all aspects of evaluation preparations. As part of the collaborative approach, a concept of operations (COO) document which detailed evaluation methodologies and tools was developed and shared with the agency. Triangle entrusted UNDP with the provision of information, feedback, and logistical support required to complete evaluation activities in a reasonably timely and adequate manner. Specifically, sourcing of beneficiaries for survey interviews and focus group discussions, as well as appropriate locations to conduct these activities, were led by UNDP, with the support of Triangle. As long as it did not interfere with objectivity, where possible, partner facilities were used to conduct research activities, particularly FGDs. That said, Triangle maintained the independence and ethical standards of an external evaluation throughout: beneficiary participation was checked to ensure no conflicts of interest were present, and while UNDP representatives' perspectives were taken into account during comment incorporation, findings and recommendations were not altered in any subjective fashion.

8.1.1 Adaptive Literature Review

To fully grasp the nuances of UNDP's programme and its research activities, Triangle conducted an adaptive literature review of programme documentation. The literature review included the programme documents, progress reports, annual reports, studies and assessments as well as the programme's implementation and monitoring data. This literature was framed against the socioeconomic background of Syria since the crisis, and then placed in its historical context and present state. The literature review also considered wider patterns involving economic and social resilience across areas of intervention, and in Syria more generally.

8.1.2 Inception Interviews

Alongside the adaptive literature review, a total of five inception interviews with senior programme staff were conducted to further investigate UNDP's programming and develop a tailored methodology based on evaluation objectives.

8.1.3 Tools Development

Following the inception phase, Triangle developed qualitative and quantitative research tools for field implementation. Specifically, Triangle built questionnaires for FGDs and KIIs, as well as a Resilience Development Survey. The survey was then programmed with open source software[25] on handheld devices. To protect the gathered data from unauthorised access, industry standard best practices for encryption and data backups were employed.[26] Key Informant Interviews and FDG guides were developed based on evaluation matrix questions and were amended to fulfil the specific context of focus group and key informant profiles. Furthermore, enumerators, facilitators, and interviewers obtained informed consent from all persons involved in the survey, FGDs, and interviews.

[25] The evaluation employed KoBoToolbox, a free programme used to create humanitarian and development research questionnaires.
[26] KoBoToolbox Data Privacy Policy. Accessed: https://www.kobotoolbox.org/privacy/

8.1.4 Testing Phase

Triangle and its field team conducted a scoping and testing mission in Hama governorate to test all research tools so as to ensure the outcome and quality of evaluation findings. The evaluation team used a mixed-methods approach consisting of quantitative (survey) and qualitative (FGDs and KIIs) methods to cross-check data and triangulate findings. Changes to lines of inquiry and evaluation strategies were then integrated into final evaluation tools for field deployment.

8.2 Sampling Frame & Sample

Field activities were implemented according to a sampling frame agreed upon between Triangle and UNDP. Table B provides an overview of the evaluation's overall sample and achieved targets.

Table B: Field Sample & Achievement Levels

Resilience Development Survey	***Totals***	***Target***	***Percentage Achieved***
	1,036	1,152	90%
Focus Group Discussions	***Totals***	***Target***	***Percentage Achieved***
	13	12	108%
Key Informant Interviews – Management	5	5	100%
Key Informant Interviews - Field Staff	***Totals***	***Target***	***Percentage Achieved***
	5	5	100%
Key Informant Interviews – IP Staff	***Totals***	***Target***	***Percentage Achieved***
	8	10	80%

8.2.1 Resilience Development Survey Sampling

The Resilience Development Survey (RDS) employed a stratified random sampling method with a 95% confidence level and a 5.5% confidence interval for each cohort. Statistical significance subsequent to disaggregation was set at the levels at or above the confidence interval. Stratified sampling criteria were assigned to each programme component and a 1:1 ratio of male to female respondents was set as the second-level strata. Then, under each programme component, the largest projects (number of direct beneficiaries) were selected for sampling in their respective areas, taking care to include as many initiatives as possible. After that point, random selection

of beneficiaries was applied. Snowball sampling to capture appropriate strata was utilised in cases where random beneficiary sampling did not yield sufficient samples (see Table C).

Table C: Resilience Development Survey Sampling[27]

Governorate	*Emergency Employment*	*Productive Assets*	*Sustained Work*	*Vocational Training*	*Business Revival*	*Total Number of Respondents*
Al-Hasakeh	169	81	16	123	-	**371**
Hama	152	48	14	143	45	**340**
Rural Damascus	49	182	64	30	-	**325**
Total Number of Responses	**370**	**311**	**94**	**296**	**45**	**1,116 \ 1,036**

The actual sample RDS was conducted with a total of 1,036 direct beneficiaries who provided a total of 1,116 responses.[28] The sampling strategy aimed to achieve an equal distribution of participants across the three governorates, and ultimately came close to its intended objective: Al-Hasakeh (371 participants), Hama (340 participants), and Rural Damascus (325 participants). Within each governorate, the evaluation aimed to equally divide the participants between two thematic areas: Socio-Economic Recovery and Support to Vulnerable Groups. As an overarching theme, Social Cohesion and Community Resilience programming was incorporated into the overall survey.

The gender ratio was almost equally split between male (52%) and female (48%) survey respondents. Beneficiaries were further split into residents (66%), returnees (9%), and IDPs

[27] Total number of responses (1,116) and total number of respondents (1,036) differ, as some survey participants benefitted from multiple UNDP projects.
[28] Total number of responses (1,116) and total number of respondents (1,036) differ, as some survey participants benefitted from multiple UNDP projects.

(25%). The majority of participants were adults (56%), followed by young adults (26%), youth (14%), adolescents and senior citizens (both 2%) (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 : Resilience Development Survey, Data Overview



Educational attainment among beneficiaries varied widely and ranged between illiteracy (12%), read and write (5%), primary education (25%), intermediary education (23%), secondary education (19%) and tertiary education (16%). Illiteracy was more common among female participants (15%) relative to males (9%), and also more prevalent among residents (13%) and IDPs (11%) relative to returnees (6%). University and higher studies certificates were most common among youth (36%) as well as young adults (18%), and such degrees were more likely to be held by males (19%) than females (13%). Tertiary education was also more common among residents (18%) and IDPs (15%) than among returnees (11%). Only one (male, resident) beneficiary held a vocational education degree (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 : Literacy Rates Among Beneficiaries



8.2.2 Focus Group Sampling

Focus groups adopted a purposive stratified sampling strategy, disaggregated on the basis of gender (when possible), geography, programme component (see Table D), and furthermore in terms of participant composition. A total of 9 FGDs were conducted with programme beneficiaries, including residents, returnees, and IDPs.

Table D: Focus Group Disaggregation

Number	***Gender***	***Governorate***	***Programme***
1	Females	Rural Damascus	Social Cohesion
2	Males/Females	Rural Damascus	Support to Vulnerable Groups
3	Males/Females	Hama	Socio-Economic Recovery
4	Males	Hama	Social Cohesion
5	Females	Hama	Sewing Workshop
6	Males/Females	Hama	Support to Vulnerable Groups
7	Males	Al-Hasakeh	Socio-Economic Recovery
8	Females	Al-Hasakeh	Social Cohesion
9	Females	Al-Hasakeh	Support to Vulnerable Groups

8.2.3 Key Informant Sampling

A total of 18 KIIs were conducted with various stakeholder groups. Interviewees included senior UNDP programme staff, UNDP field staff, UNDP M&E staff, implementing partner staff (NGO/CBO/CSOs/FBOs), private sector companies and municipal representatives. KIIs were conducted in Al-Hasakeh, Damascus, Hama, Latakia, Rural Damascus, and Tartous governorates (see Table E).

Table E: Key Informant Sampling

Geography	*UNDP Field Staff*	*IP Staff*	*Local Authority*	*Number of KIIs*
Al-Hasakeh	1	2	-	3
Hama	1	2	-	3
Latakia	1	1	1	3
Tartous	1	2	-	3
Rural Damascus	1	-	-	1
UNDP Management, Programme, and M&E Staff				5
Total				18

Figure 4: Key Informants, Disaggregation by Gender



8.3 Performance Standards & Theoretical Frameworks

As of yet, there is little consensus as to what the most appropriate frameworks are to understand or evaluate resilience, and some argument as to whether the concept is appropriate at all.[29,30] But while there is no widely agreed upon framework by which to design and evaluate resilience, there is some consensus around what constitutes the basic pillars of resilience in the humanitarian and development contexts. Most definitions focus on the ability of an entity (individual, household, community, etc.) to absorb, resist, adapt to (long-term) stresses or (short-term) shocks, and finally recover.[31] Broken down further, resilience is also generally thought to comprise of four, perhaps general, but nonetheless key components for appraisal: Risk

[29] For an in-depth analysis see: Levine, S. and I. Mosel, (2014) Supporting resilience in difficult places - A critical look at applying the 'resilience' concept in countries where crises are the norm, Overseas Development Institute.
[30] MacKinnon, D & Driscoll Derickson, K. (2012) From Resilience to Resourcefulness: A Critique of Resilience Policy and activism. Progress in Human Geography.
[31] For some examples see: Levine, S. and I. Mosel, op. cit. & Mitchell, Risk and Resilience: From Good Idea to Good Practice, OECD, (2013).

Exposure, Vulnerability, Coping/Adaptation and Recovery.[32] Similarly, UNDP's resilience-based development response to the Syria crisis were built upon the three aspects of coping, recovering and sustaining.[33] Accordingly, this evaluation adopted a systems approach to resilience analysis which merged the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and UNDP's approaches to resilience as the basis for appraisal. The approach is predicated on analysis at the community level (i.e. IDP, host and returnee communities in each target area) and on how those communities' systems are set up to respond to shocks and changes.

In tandem, the systems resilience approach was merged with the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework in Figure 5 (adopted by DFID, CARE International and Oxfam) which elaborated on how the well-being of a community functions in a system with six different categories of assets or 'capitals' – financial, human, natural, physical, political, and social capital.[34] Hence, the presence, absence and accumulation of these 'capitals' were covered by this evaluation to measure the extent to which outcomes have been achieved. As such, all capitals excluding political and natural capitals were evaluated under OR1.

[32] Levine, S. and I. Mosel, op. cit
[33] UNDP (2013): Resilience-based Development Response to the Syria crisis.
[34] Ibid.

Figure 5: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Illustrative)



Source: OECD and UNICEF (2014) Final Report: Resilience Systems Analysis, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Finally, under the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, the outcome evaluation appraised activities by cross-checking the systems resilience approach, the sustainable livelihoods framework and the evaluation matrix based on the OECD-DAC criteria for evaluations. In line with UNDP standards for outcome evaluations, Triangle also assigned data sources and collection methods to each line of inquiry in the evaluation matrix (see Table A).[35]

[35] See Outcome-Level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for

8.4 Ethical Considerations

Research conducted by Triangle and its field teams took place in accordance with local laws and regulations as well as the adoption of ethical research principles throughout project cycles. As such, Triangle and field team management first conducted legal and ethical briefings with team leaders and primary data collection staff involved in research activities prior to commencing research activities. During this process, contextual legislation and regulations were reviewed in order to ensure that research activities fell within the laws of any and all localities where the evaluation took place.

Subsequently, an assessment of ethical considerations was conducted depending on the research in question.

Once preliminary legal and ethical assessments were completed, Triangle and its field teams developed a project-specific legal and ethical framework and applied them through the evaluation life-cycle. Accordingly, the team leader was tasked with ensuring that legal and ethical guidelines were maintained and upheld. Monitoring and assurance of legal and ethical guidelines were conducted by Triangle and field team management who reviewed progress and project milestones and during weekly quality assurance meetings with the team leader.

For Triangle's Code of Conduct, please see Annex C.

development results for programme units and evaluators, UNDP, December 2011.

8.5 Background Information on Evaluators

The present report is the result of extensive research and analysis conducted between September 2018 and February 2019 by Triangle, with support from its partner organisation in Syria, the Capacity Building Centre. An evaluation team comprised of qualitative and quantitative research experts, in addition to field enumerators were assembled and tasked with the design, research and analysis throughout the project (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Project Implementation Organogram



8.6 Limitations & Mitigation Measures

This evaluation was an extensive and complex exercise conducted in an active crisis setting. The evaluation covered an array of interrelated dimensions and aspects across several geographies. Moreover, the evaluation was the first evaluation of the Country Programme conducted by UNDP Syria at outcome level since 2011. Accordingly, this evaluation was subject to numerous challenges as well as methodological and field research limitations, which field teams attempted to mitigate and adapt to (see Table F).

Table F: List of Limitations & Mitigation Measures

Methodological limitations	
Limitations & Effects	**Mitigation Measures**
1. **Lack of Baseline:** Because of the difficulties presented by the crisis related to conducting nationally representative evaluations, the evaluation team did not possess a representative baseline of needs or resilience to conduct a comparative analysis. Thus, there was no comparison between baseline values and current values to demonstrate progress over time.	Effects are reported as per the responses of the research subjects. Questionnaires were thus devised to qualify timeframes and areas of inquiries to ascertain effects within those parameters.
2. **Mixed methods & geography:** While the evaluation covered all areas of the UNDP Country Programme, mixed methods research[36] was limited to three governorates: Al-Hasakeh, Hama, and Rural Damascus. This was the result of geographical selection criteria which aimed to provide the most representative reflection of the Country Programme, meaning Latakia and Tartous scored relatively low compared to other governorates. This also resulted in	Selection criteria accommodated for Latakia and Tartous through qualitative key informant evaluation activities (KIIs).

[36] Mixed methods research is an evaluation tool which builds upon both qualitative and quantitative analysis.

neither FGDs nor RDS surveys being conducted in the latter governorates.	
3. **Programme components & subcomponents coverage:** The plethora of programme components and subcomponents meant evaluation tools had to focus on the overarching programme level outcomes, rather than delve into the specifics of each subcomponent. In addition, despite conducting thorough inception interviews and reviewing programme documents, the evaluation team was not made aware that beneficiaries were being assisted by multiple rounds of emergency employment, and thus tools did not fully reflect the fact that this intervention was indeed sustained over time, rather than temporary. Evaluation teams were also unaware of the nature of sustainable work schemes prior to deployment.	With regard to numerous subcomponents, sampling attempted to accommodate for the lack of quantitative data through detailed participant composition criteria in focus group discussions. The same was true of emergency employment, whose findings were largely qualitative given that no sustainable were results were envisioned, and thus related lines of inquiry were not included in the RDS survey. Sustainable work was also reintegrated into qualitative tools and a quantitative configuration was devised to produce relevant data.
Field Research Limitations	
Limitation	**Mitigation Measures**
4. **Lack of familiarity with evaluations affected sampling:** Many UNDP staff and implementing partners were unfamiliar with basic evaluation methodologies and the logistics required to conduct such activities. Despite written guidance from the evaluation teams and UNDP head office, the lack of familiarity with evaluations meant that sampling strategies were consistently misunderstood. At times, beneficiary samples were not always provided according to the specifications requested by evaluation teams, which complicated the	Evaluation teams and UNDP head office staff extended the evaluation schedule to give additional time for field teams to comprehend sampling strategies. In addition, detailed action plans were mandated prior to employment and further encouragement to redouble efforts was provided and the director-level. Field staff and evaluation teams also rescheduled several FGDs and resampled survey participants.

disaggregation of findings and the achievement of target set out during inception. In addition, locations in COOs sometimes varied (often for valid logistical reasons such as IDP movements) and timing/locations of research activities were not logical (e.g. distance between areas too large to cover given timeframe) Consequently, several evaluation activities fell out of scope, participant composition varied, activities had to be repeated or were not conducted at all due to timing issues. In total: • One FGD on the Socio-Economic Recovery component in Rural Damascus was not conducted. • Two KIIs were not conducted in Rural Damascus. • A total of 116 surveys were not conducted.	
5. **Mix of agency interventions:** In one areas of Hama, an international NGO had partnered with UNDP, but was also running their own livelihoods programmes with beneficiaries who took part in evaluation activities. Thus, there is a risk that outcomes reported were not purely those related to UNDP programming.	Enumerators repeatedly explained to beneficiaries that the questions they were being asked only related to the programmes that UNDP sponsored.

9. Data Analysis

Data analysis activities adopted an approach that facilitated continuous feedback loops in order to build findings from the field level, as well as provide a nuanced yet accurate reflection of UNDP's management-level perspectives.

Qualitative data acquired through KIIs and FGDs was analysed according to grounded theory method, also known as Glaser-Strauss method. The collected data was extracted, analysed, coded and marked for analysis purposes. The creation of theory was based on the ordering of these data into various categories and themes.

Quantitative data was treated and processed using research and data processing software (SPSS 25.0), and cross-tabulations across socio-demographic information were run to form tables on which percentages could be compared, with visual data representation created accordingly. The data gap analysis delved into disaggregated results in search of any further significance that leads to highlighting particular findings, and built actionable recommendations accordingly.

After concluding the field research, researchers prepared a preliminary findings presentation and conferred with UNDP for feedback. The purposes of the presentation were two-fold: To present emerging findings of the research and to gauge results against the expectations of UNDP in terms of report quality, content, credibility and neutrality. In addition, the presentation allowed evaluation teams to identify any further points of inquiry and discuss recommendations, as well as the format of this evaluation report and final presentations.

10. Findings

10.1 Major Concerns

The ability to earn an income is the chief concern among beneficiaries. The three major concerns among beneficiaries were first and foremost income (72%, first choice)—with lower concern among males (67%) than females (77%) and lowest among adolescents (33%)—followed by health care (18%, second choice)—with highest concerns among adolescents (33%) and senior citizens (22%)—and electricity (12%, third choice). It is worth mentioning that every fourth IDP (24%) mentioned shelter as the second most pressing concern.

10.2 Relevance

In general, programmes were relevant, responded to market demand, and matched beneficiary profiles. UNDP interventions provided a much-needed boost to local communities' markets, labour force and skill sets. In addition to the immediate financial support provided by emergency employment, programmes which provided skills training were found to be market-relevant. Indeed, beneficiaries felt they had the ability to learn skills which were not available to them in the private sector. Specific programme components were also suited to existing occupations and business restart requirements. The business revival and productive assets components were viewed as the most relevant and responsive to the needs of businesses, and were able to provide assets which facilitated market penetration. Support to vulnerable groups provided FHHs, youth, IDPs, and PWDs with suitable employment opportunities. The fact that social cohesion activities were designed by community residents meant they also responded directly to social pressures and local needs.

"As female breadwinners, this training helped us a lot. We're no longer afraid. We've learned a trade." (Female resident, Rural Damascus)

"We asked UNDP not to limit the [intervention] area to just ours, but to extend it to [redacted] [...] we got a positive response." (IP, Tartous)

Programme design was suited to the development of sustainable livelihoods, but could have included more contextualisation. The overall approach to programme design proved relevant to the livelihood needs of beneficiaries. Programmes were oriented around hard skills training and were often complemented by the provision of productive assets, laying the foundation for sustainable livelihoods. However, beneficiaries occasionally felt that the length of vocational training projects was too short to attain the level of market-relevant skills required to facilitate access to sustainable livelihoods. While emergency employment salaries were welcomed, they were insufficient to cover household needs. Kits and productive assets provided were at times felt to be of low quality, while vocational training occasionally provided skills that were not relevant to market; as was the case of chocolate-wrapping workshops in Al-Hasakeh or in Hama, where pine processionary control training was felt to be too specific.

"My sense is that the project is theoretical and unsuited to reality on the ground." (IP, Tartous)

Inclusive design planning and implementation at local level was not always conducted. Local CSOs also reported that they had raised concerns about the relevance of particular projects, but that these concerns had not been responded to. IPs often felt they were less involved in programme design, with one IP stating that they played no role in programme design whatsoever. On occasion, intervention areas were selected when local residents approached UNDP for support.

Although UNDP field offices regularly conducted structured needs assessments, IPs often did not. UNDP needs assessments included recommendations from local IPs, local authorities and the UNDP's own area needs assessments. The combination of these sources allowed UNDP to identify community needs and inform appropriate areas and beneficiaries. When UNDP directly implemented projects, it also conducted interviews with potential beneficiaries to ensure that the most suitable candidates were selected. However, these needs assessments often lacked a systemic nature; they tended to be based on a pragmatic and unstructured approach to targeting and needs appraisal, relying on immediately observable needs and access as the principal criteria for intervention.

"We can't even do repairs with the [sewing machines] they give us"
(Female resident, Al-Hasakeh)

Priority areas were largely set by donor requirements, accessibility and local authority recommendations. Donor funding was often tied to specific geographic areas, at times limiting the ability of UNDP to intervene in regions it deemed as priorities. In Hama and Latakia, for example, UNDP found itself unable to intervene in priority areas due to contrasting donor stipulations. Accessibility also played a defining role in where the UNDP chose to intervene. In crisis zones, UNDP prioritised newly-accessible areas such as Harasta in Rural Damascus.

"We sometimes have emergency needs but I cannot intervene because the donor stipulates the locations." (UNDP Field Staff, Hama)

"The challenge is reconciling the UNDP strategy with donor stipulations and the needs on the ground." (UNDP Field Staff, Latakia)

Delays in official permissions limited the scope of interventions and range of implementing partners. In all areas, IPs and UNDP staff cited issues with obtaining official permission to intervene. While UNDP were ultimately able to obtain permissions, IPs, especially those which were not faith-based organisations (FBOs), found it difficult if not impossible to do so. In practice, this meant that the UNDP often partnered with FBOs, typically local churches. In religiously diverse areas such as Al-Hasakeh, UNDP was often seen by some local communities as being associated with the Christian faith.

A lack of countrywide standardised systemic needs assessments resulted in programme complications. The absence of such assessments meant sustainability, market relevance and complementarity were not always factored into programme design. While emergency employment was not designed to be sustainable at the start, its repeated use indicated the need for a sustainability dimension. Similarly, the productive assets component did not always factor in the cost of doing business, which meant beneficiaries could not sustainably put assets to work. Products produced through sustainable work interventions sometimes lacked relevance to the local market.

Programmes targeted the most vulnerable social groups including FHHs, PWDs, youth, and IDPs. Programmes were found to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable categories identified as target groups by UNDP. Programme design also accommodated for particular needs of these groups. With regard to gender, UNDP-provided support to FHHs did not receive other livelihoods support, child-care needs were accommodated for in some areas, and vocational training programmes encouraged participation in occupations which normally preclude women. With regard to the youth, university-aged students felt a sense of purpose because of vocational training programming. Male youths, however, participated less in programmes due to many reasons related to the current situation. This instability also meant some beneficiaries of the emergency employment component were unable to collect their salaries. On matters of disability, interventions were largely relevant, but occasionally did not take into explicitly target PWDs, as in Al-Hasakeh. In Latakia, plans to provide specific livelihoods programming for PWDs have not materialised. Despite these positive results, quotas for the above social groups were rarely if at all enforced, with representation assessed largely post factum.

"Initially the girls [picking up solid waste] hid their faces but then it was all fine."
(Male, IDP, Homs)

10.2.1 Geographical Summary (Relevance)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Tartous	Latakia
UNDP coordinated with local partners and local authorities to conduct needs assessments, but **donor stipulations** were a limiting factor. **When no implementing partners were available**, UNDP moved to intervene directly, as was the case with agricultural projects in Ghazlaniye and Al-Muadamiye. Beneficiaries were selected through **neighbourhood committees**, with criteria to ensure representation from vulnerable groups. **Vocational training provided market-relevant skills**, but were generally felt to be too	**UNDP identifies intervention areas using a needs analysis**. Donor stipulations influenced prioritisation of areas. **Before intervention, UNDP conducted basic analysis and evaluation** of potential partners (CSOs, churches, government bodies) as potential partners or facilitators. UNDP experienced delays in **obtaining official permissions**. IPs are selected based on specific criteria, and UNDP looks for IPs with development potential. Final intervention recommendations are made based on IP capacity.	**Program design:** IPs submit project proposal concept notes to the UNDP. UNDP then filters out unsuitable proposals based on internal criteria. **Productive assets** interventions such as livestock distribution helped beneficiaries but did not account for additional costs imposed (e.g. cost of fodder, water, vaccinations). **Social cohesion** programming was designed to meet the needs of vulnerable groups including PWDs and female IDPs. Relatively few IDPs actually took part in projects, however. Although the IPs interviewed felt	UNDP Field Staff claimed **intervention area selection** were based on recommendations from FBOs, CSOs and government officials, although this was not always reflected in IP interviews. **Permissions** remain an issue for UNDP and IPs. UNDP can only work with IPs that are on a MOSAL-approved list. UNDP has trouble **selecting IPs** due to competing UNDP and IP intervention preferences/abilities. When **selecting beneficiaries**, UNDP used lists of IP-provided names to match	**Intervention areas** are almost exclusively set by donors. UNDP field office faced **challenges reconciling UNDP strategy** with **donor stipulations** and **needs on the ground**. **Official data** provided was outdated, affecting the profitability of cash crops. IPs felt that **most projects were contextualised**, but interventions could focus more on rural-based agricultural projects. **Vocational training** was felt to be relevant but required more in-depth curricula to penetrate markets.

short to penetrate the market. Productive assets (toolkits) provided were **not felt to be of sufficient quality** to penetrate the market.	**Emergency employment** projects were sometimes not felt to build market-relevant skills e.g. pine processionary removal.	**vocational training** and **equipment provided** was relevant, beneficiaries commented that it was not always market-relevant (e.g. chocolate-wrapping workshops.)	beneficiary skills with relevant projects. **IP comments** regarding scope of intervention area were occasionally, but not always, incorporated into project design. IPs **recommended ways to improve project** relevance but felt these were not incorporated into project.	

10.3 Effectiveness

Programming helped beneficiaries sustain themselves, but effects varied across emergency and non-emergency programmes. By design, emergency programming, such as emergency employment and the provision of productive assets, only brought short-term and limited relief to beneficiaries. However, because UNDP employed beneficiaries for multiple rounds of emergency employment, the effect of the programme was larger for some beneficiaries relative to others. Non-emergency programming, such as vocational training and business revival, often led to employment which provided beneficiaries with more sustainable income and the ability to cover basic needs. Salaries provided by UNDP's emergency programming were widely insufficient in meeting the needs of a family household. What is more, inflation and weak purchasing power had a detrimental effect on emergency employment salaries. Beneficiaries of emergency programming also pointed out that work opportunities — and salaries — often ceased once UNDP had concluded its interventions in an area.

"When [UNDP] ran projects, everyone said 'dawn has finally broken'."
(Male resident, Hama)

"The support was enough for a person living on their own, nothing more. It's not enough for a family." (Female IDP, Hama)

Income earned by workers who had benefited from non-emergency programming[37] was predominantly spent on basic needs. Beneficiaries still earning an income at the time of the survey reported being able to cover various basic needs. Most of the beneficiaries spent their income on food (26%), clothing (15%), potable water (13%), education (11%), and transportation (10%). Only 4% of the employed beneficiaries also reported to use the money to lower their debt (see Figure 7).

[37] Defined as persons who had benefited from either vocational training or business revival programme subcomponents, and are currently earning some form of income. Hereafter this cohort will be defined as workers.

Figure 7: What expenses are you able to cover with the money you earn?



The vast majority of beneficiaries (96%) reported that non-emergency programming did increase their income, with a higher share of women saying it did so to a large extent (28%) compared to men (19%). However, one in four beneficiaries stated that UNDP's programme increased income only to a very little extent—with the highest share among adolescents (71%) perceiving the programme's effect to be miniscule (see Figure 8). Beneficiaries in Rural Damascus agreed that vocational training had either increased their existing income or provided them with income following a long period of unemployment.

"We've now got a fixed income and feel hopeful […] that things will get better, because we've broken the barrier of unemployment." (Male IDP, Rural Damascus)

Figure 8: To what extent did the programme increase your income?



For those earning an income, gender and age proved to be the most significant variables affecting income stability. Most beneficiaries were paid on a daily basis (43%), followed by monthly (37%), and weekly income arrangements (20%) (see Figure 9). The type of income—daily, weekly, and monthly—was also found to be associated with the age of beneficiaries: the younger the beneficiary, the higher chance they would be paid on a daily or weekly basis. Indeed, the highest shares of daily labourers were found among adolescents (86%) and youth (49%). Correspondingly, monthly salaries were predominantly earned by older beneficiaries, with highest shares among adults (51%) and young adults (38%) (see Figure 10). Literacy rates were less significant in how beneficiaries were paid. Among population groups, residents and IDPs were about half as likely to be paid on a monthly basis relative to returnees (67%).

Figure 9: How do you get paid?



Figure 10 : Payment type by age group



The majority of workers across payment frequencies earn around $4 or less, with many at or below the poverty line.[38] Daily labourers were found to earn the least amount of money on average with 71% making less 2000 SYP or less per day ($3.88/day), as was the case for 52% of weekly income earners. Earning income on a monthly basis did not necessarily translate into higher average income: 82% of monthly income earners made less than 50,000 SYP or less per day ($4.4/day). Indeed, the majority of monthly income earners (54%) made less than 1,136 SYP per day ($2.2/day), placing them at or around the global income poverty line of $1.90, as was the case for 26% of daily labourers and 15% of weekly labourers (see Figures 11, 12, and 13).

Figure 11: How much do you earn on a daily basis?



[38] Daily rates for weekly and monthly earnings are calculated by assuming workers work five days per week and 22 days per month. The international poverty line is considered according to the World Bank standard of $1.90 per day.

Figure 12: How much do you earn on a weekly basis?



Figure 13: How much do you earn on a monthly basis?



Programmes managed to lower their debt, even if effects were marginal. More than two-thirds (70%) of beneficiaries were found to be indebted, with the majority of debts at or below SYP 250,000 ($485). More than two-thirds (68%) said the programme did help lower their debts, yet only 8% of the beneficiaries perceived a large effect (see Figure 14). The majority of female beneficiaries (65%) had debt levels of SYP 250,000 or less, while more than half of the male beneficiaries (53%) accumulated debts higher than SYP 250,000. That said, the effect on debt varied by intervention: participants of business revival projects had the highest share of beneficiaries who said the programme lowered their debt (87%), followed by beneficiaries who received productive assets (83%), and participants of the vocational training programmes (67%). Similarly, almost one third (30%) of the beneficiaries receiving business revival support felt that the programme had a large effect on lowering their debts, yet only 5% of those receiving vocational training, and no beneficiary receiving productive assets felt that way. The beneficiaries that were able to repay some debt highlighted that this was the case only during the period of their employment (particularly those in emergency employment). Correspondingly, only 6% of the beneficiaries were able to save some money (see Figure 15).

"The situation was very good, but the project finished [...] and suddenly we were humiliated by debt." (Male resident, Al-Hasakeh)

"[Since the project has finished] we've become indebted again and are stalling our repayments to everyone." (Female resident, Al-Hasakeh)

Figure 14: How much are you or your household indebted?



Figure 15: To what extent did the programme help lower your or your household's debt?



Programme subcomponent design had a significant effect on whether in-kind asset provision was effective. Beneficiaries had mixed feelings about the effectiveness of the productive assets provided. Generally, quality, type, and quantity were the main factors which influenced effectiveness. Qualitative evidence showed that in terms of quality, sheep, cows, and sewing machines were most adversely affected by quality issues, something which resulted little to no effect on income generation. Productive asset toolkits at times did not match those that beneficiaries had previously been trained with, which also negatively affected programme outcomes. In particular, the toolkits provided in Al-Hasakeh were also felt to be of low quality.

Programmes built professional networks, which sometimes lead to a job. More than half of beneficiaries (53%) said UNDP's programmes helped them access professional networks, but only 13% said that programmes did so to a large extent (see Figure 16). Beneficiaries of emergency programming (45%) were least able to access professional networks, relative to beneficiaries which took part in sustainable work (64%), vocational training (72%), and business revival (82%). In addition, over one third of the beneficiaries (35%) who built networks found employment as a direct result of their new professional network (see Figure 17). This was particularly the case for business revival (54%), sustainable work (52%), and vocational training (50%) programmes.

Figure 16: To what extent do you feel that the programme helped you access professional networks within your resident community?



Figure 17: Were you able to acquire a paid job as a direct result of the professional network?



Social cohesion programming strengthened community ties, although this varied by geography. Most beneficiaries (85%) perceived the programme to have facilitated social cohesion (see Figure 18). Both IDPs and returnees recognised programmes' effects on a reduction in tensions between community members their communities, with 91% and 88% stating so respectively (see Figure 19). On the whole, beneficiaries felt that projects bolstered social inclusion by including IDPs, residents and returnees in the same programmes. Yet, this varied according to context.

"I came from Deir ez-Zor and people [...] were not very welcoming during the first period. [...] if it weren't for this training and the work, I would have hated this country and emigrated." (Male IDP, Rural Damascus)

"We used to have social cohesion in Al-Hasakeh, but it disappeared during the years of the crisis. The UNDP have restored it and we've begun to love one another again." (Female resident, Al-Hasakeh)

Figure 18: To what extent do you think community activities facilitated social cohesion?



Figure 19: To what extent do you feel that the programme eased social tensions in the community where you reside?



In Al-Hasakeh, where the local context is complicated, UNDP interventions saw all the local communities and IDPs working alongside one another. In Hama, the general consensus was that there had been successful attempts to improve social cohesion: for example, 5,000 people (including residents and IDPs) had gathered for the inauguration of a park that a UNDP project had rehabilitated. However, beneficiaries in Hama also reported that while there were no clear signs of tension between IDPs and their host communities, there was general antipathy towards IDPs as the latter were less conservative than residents. This was also reflected in Rural Damascus, where IDP beneficiaries reported that residents treated them with condescension. In other areas, there was a perception that community links were already strong, and that UNDP projects reinforced these (especially among IDPs).

"The best social cohesion projects are the livelihoods projects [...] you can't introduce social cohesion to people by itself." (IP, Al-Hasakeh)

Productive assets had a positive yet marginal effect on income. Almost three-quarters of beneficiaries (74%) who received productive assets said the programme had a positive effect on income, yet only 10% perceived the effect on their income to be large. A higher share among women (32%) felt the productive assets to have no effect on income compared to men (20%).

This was also the case among returnees and IPDs, of whom 35% and 33% stated that the provided assets had no effect on their income, respectively, relative 22% share among residents (see Figure 20). Only one in four survey participants were able to select the asset provided, which could have contributed to feelings that the subcomponent was rigid and lacked contextualisation.

Figure 20: How effective do you find the asset provided to earn an income?



Productive farming assets were felt to be useful, although required additional resources/greater contextualisation to achieve market penetration. Productive assets such as seeds allowed beneficiaries in agricultural areas of Latakia, Tartous and Al-Hasakeh to begin farming again. As a result of UNDP interventions, the value of farming production increased significantly, sometimes by a factor of two or more. Beneficiaries stated that they were able to take goods to market once again, boosting the local economy and creating competition. Dairy kits were felt to be too small to be of much use to beneficiaries, as they lacked additional, harder-to-source materials such as cooking gas in order to be productive. That said, beneficiaries felt that a greater emphasis on soft skills such as marketing could have enhanced programming effectiveness.

"[The UNDP] provided toolkits, work and helped people help themselves, other people and the community in general... They regained their livelihoods."
(Male resident, Al-Hasakeh)

"We perceive that there is more of a focus on beneficiary numbers than on project outputs - quality over quantity". (Female resident, Al-Hasakeh)

Livestock distribution facilitated access to income, but lack of contextualisation limited effects. As previously mentioned, the effectiveness of livestock provision was influenced by how well programmes were designed. Provision of poultry was regarded as effective because chickens were easy to maintain. Sheep distribution, which took place in Hama and Al-Hasakeh was less well-received: each beneficiary was only provided with two or three sheep, and these often proved to be sickly. High upkeep costs associated with sheep meant that poorer beneficiaries were unable to maintain them, and were sometimes forced to resell the sheep. Beneficiaries were more positive about cattle: in Al-Hasakeh and Latakia, cows produced milk and had begun to reproduce, creating a positive–if limited—knock on effects on the local economy. When combined with the right vocational training, bees also proved successful: after 3-4 months of training, beneficiaries in Al-Hasakeh and Latakia were able to double the number of hives they had been provided. However, in Latakia, bees were procured from outside the intervention areas, meaning that bees provided were not suited to the local environment.

Emergency employment proved effective in the short term, but the use of the programme as a stop-gap measure increased aid dependence. UNDP's cash-for-work scheme provided immediate relief for beneficiaries. Half of the beneficiaries (51%) were contracted for one round of emergency employment, followed by those reporting two rounds (28%), three rounds (10%), and more than three rounds (10%). Women had a significantly higher share (70%) than men (40%) of those employed for one round. Accordingly, while one in four male beneficiaries enjoyed three rounds or more, only 15% of female beneficiaries did. The length of emergency employment varied massively, with some working for 6 months and others for two years. Earnings ranged between SYP 35,000 – SYP 60,000 per month which, while consummate with non-emergency programming, was felt to be largely insufficient to

support a household. What's more the repeated use of emergency employment precluded longer-term outcomes, while increasing dependence on UNDP for a livelihood.

"I didn't think of it as a salary, I thought of it more as voluntary work than paid work." (Male resident, Hama)

"I am married with two children and [the salary] isn't enough. Even if I were by myself, it wouldn't be enough." (Male IDP, Rural Damascus)

The combination of emergency employment and infrastructure programming meant temporary income and more skills, but lacked sustainable results. Beneficiaries reported that emergency employment broke the cycle of chronic unemployment brought about by the crisis. However, there was a general feeling that emergency employment did not translate into market-relevant skills, due to the elementary nature of tasks involved. There were also limited opportunities for beneficiaries of emergency programming to transition into more sustainable occupations. Yet, depending on the length and type of emergency employment, some beneficiaries said they managed to increase their professional networks and gain practical as well as theoretical skills, albeit to a limited extent. Working in the water, sanitation and health (WASH) sector was felt to build the most skills, relative to other emergency employment in debris removal and solid waste management.

"The experience from this work is only relevant to this work. You couldn't use it anywhere else." (Female resident, Hama)

Figure 21: How long were you employed in emergency employment opportunities in total?



Sustainable work had positive effects on income, skills, and social cohesion as well as the reversal of negative coping strategies. The revival of workshops evaluated provided women including FHHs with access to sustainable income and market-relevant skills. Workshops initially lasted for six months, and participants were given the opportunity to extend for another six months before transferring to work with a local NGO. However, the salaries at the local NGO were lower—neither the UNDP salary nor the NGO salary was felt to fully cover basic needs. That said, social cohesion and professional networks were built due to relatively long periods of joint work. Sustainable work also allowed female beneficiaries to reverse negative coping strategies, such as buying an additional food for the household and sending their children to school instead of work.

"When I came, I did not know [how to sew]. We studied textiles, learnt how to use all the machines, how to crochet and how to sew." (Female resident, Hama)

Programmes which built human capital developed market-relevant skills and enabled market penetration. Vocational training programmes such as sewing and carpentry workshops provided beneficiaries with in-demand skills that led to subsequent employment. However, low market absorption capacity hindered the ability of some to penetrate the labour market. In addition, the lack of asset-specific training reduced the effectiveness of start-up toolkits, and some vocational training programmes including carpentry and mobile maintenance lacked depth, scope and duration.

"Their lives were turned upside down. They transformed from individuals who were consumers and dependent on their families, into productive workers who could play their part in accelerating progress and development." (Male IP, Hama)

Vocational training brought people into the labour market and kept them there. Almost three in four beneficiaries (73%) who completed vocational training (VT) found a paid job in the field they were trained in. Male beneficiaries were significantly more likely to find a paid job after concluding VT (84%) relative to female beneficiaries (59%). Paid vocations were also more common among residents (78%), relative to IDPs (61%), or returnees (56%) (see Figure 22). Of those who landed a job, 85% were still employed in the field of their vocational training at the time of the survey, indicating the long-term income effects of VT training. While males and residents had higher chances in finding a paid job after the training, no major difference was found across genders and residency statuses of those still employed (see Figure 22). More than half of the vocational training participants (55%) have been working in their field for more than one year—which was more prevalent among females (71%) than males (46%) (see Figure 23). Interviewees consistently reflected on the fact that VT turned vulnerable people into productive citizens, and occasionally increased beneficiaries' chances of securing an income.

Figure 22: Did you find a paid job in the field that you were trained in?



Figure 23: How long have you been working in your current job?



Opinions on the length of vocational training programmes varied, but programmes were generally seen as long enough. The less educated beneficiaries were, the more they found the length of the vocational training adequate. Accordingly, the highest proportion of vocational training graduates who felt that the training was long enough were those who could only read and write (100%) or were illiterate (92%), as opposed to those who held a university certificate (60%) (see Figure 24). More female participants thought the VT was too short (35%) relative to male participants (25%). Also, more IDPs found the training to be too short (36%) compared to residents (26%) and returnees (22%). Interviews with beneficiaries, however, found the opposite to be the case, with a majority of participants expressing that the length of vocational training was insufficient to penetrate the market, regardless of whether trainings were three weeks or three months long.

"The training course was good, but three months is not enough time to learn, particularly when it comes to complicated professions." (IDP furniture trainee, Rural Damascus)

"If only the number of beneficiaries had been fewer and the focus on training had been greater." (Female resident, FGD, Al-Hasakeh)

Figure 24: Do you think that the vocational training was long enough to obtain the necessary skills to find a job?



Perceptions on the depth of vocational training were largely positive. As with the length of vocational training, the majority of beneficiaries (78%) found vocational training programmes to be fairly detailed. Among beneficiaries, more men (83%) were satisfied with the training programmes' comprehensiveness than women (73%). Also, more residents (84%) found the training detailed enough, relative to returnees and IDPs (both 67%) (see Figure 25). When interviewed, beneficiaries felt that the skills gained would be able to provide them with sustainable work in future and praised the quality of vocational training facilitators.

Figure 25: Do you think that the vocational training was detailed enough to obtain the necessary skills to find a job?



Vocational training provided market-relevant skills, but require adjustments to maximise impact. While vocational training sessions and trainers were well-received by beneficiaries, toolkits provided could have included more robust equipment such as lathes (carpentry) in order to enable beneficiaries to start their own enterprises. Some beneficiaries reported that while they were able to put their skills to use, they also had to find additional forms of employment to meet their financial needs. Moreover, while the in-training salaries allowed beneficiaries to meet their immediate financial needs, it ran the risk of creating financial dependencies post-training. This was evident in Al-Hasakeh, where problems arose when UNDP handed over a food processing project to local CSOs: trainees faced pay cuts and changes to their working conditions. Indeed, the project was no longer seen as sustainable or market-relevant.

Impressions of toolkits were largely positive. A total of 89% of beneficiaries who received a toolkit felt it had an effect on income generation. However, 27% stated the kits had very little effect on income generation and 11% said it had no effect (see Figure 26). More than twice the amount of females than males felt that the kits provided had no effect on earning an income

(16%) relative to males (7%). Furthermore, those who felt no effect on their income were predominately illiterate (25%), university graduates (23%), and youth beneficiaries (23%).

"Once the training ends, [UNDP] provides a toolkit that helps you a lot. Even if you can't find work, you can work on your own and maintain your life."
(Male resident electrician trainee, Hama)

Figure 26: How effective do you find the toolkit provided to earn an income?



Business revival allowed beneficiaries to open sustainable businesses and garner significant levels of income. The support enabled 91% of the beneficiaries to start/restart their businesses (see Figure 27). The remaining 9% who were unable to commence business activities were all female. Of those able to restart a business, 93% were still running their business at the time of the survey. The programme also had a positive effect on beneficiaries' income**:** 93% of beneficiaries who were still operating their businesses stated that the support helped them to earn an income, while 38% perceived the effect on income to be large (see Figure 28). Of those beneficiaries still operating their business, 36% were able to employ staff other than themselves, with an average of two employees across the ventures. Almost one in

four (17%) business owners who had not been able to employ staff other than themselves were planning to do so within the six months subsequent to the survey (see Figure 30). Yet employment of staff was linked to gender, with more men having already employed staff (47%) in comparison to women (30%), and more men planning to employ staff (38%) compared to women (10%) (see Figures 29 and 30).

Business revival support often overlapped with other livelihoods interventions and was perceived to be tailored to individual needs. Prior to business revival support, most (84%) beneficiaries had previously benefitted from vocational training. Overall, business revival was also viewed as a highly flexible programme: with 84% of beneficiaries stated that they were able to choose the type of business support provided. However, a higher share of male beneficiaries was able select the support received (93%) relative to females (80%).

Figure 27 : Were you able to start / re-start your business as a direct consequence of the business support received?



Figure 28: To what extent did the support provided to your business help you earn an income?



Figure 29: Were you able to employ staff other than yourself?
(Asked to active businesses)



Figure 30: Are you planning on employing staff within the next six months? (Asked to active businesses which had not employed any staff other than themselves)



10.3.1 Geographical Summary (Effectiveness)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Tartous	Latakia
Qualitative Findings: **Vocational training** provided market-relevant experience. **The lack of available labour** caused staff shortages. **UNDP payment methods** (money transfer agency) made it impossible for some beneficiaries to access salaries and therefore did not attend work in the first place. **Quantitative Findings:** **Literacy level:** In Rural Damascus 21% of the beneficiaries held a secondary education and 12% of the beneficiaries graduated from university.	**Qualitative Findings:** **Sustained job opportunities** provided (chiefly female) beneficiaries with market-relevant skills. Beneficiaries felt that **social cohesion programming** had not been in place long enough to have a significant impact. While **emergency employment** met beneficiaries' immediate financial needs, it was not felt to have improved their job opportunities. **Quantitative Findings:** **Literacy level:** Beneficiaries in Hama had a higher average education	**Qualitative Findings:** **Vocational training provided beneficiaries with** skills and equipment. However, IPs felt that there could have been greater connections between vocational training and sustainable work. Beneficiaries interviewed felt **productive assets** (cement and tools) were effective. **Business support** created sustainable bakeries that remain in operation 18 months after UNDP retracted support. The impact of **business support** was limited due to the small scale of projects. Only a few people earned money and experience, and there was no tangible effect on the community or local economy.	**Qualitative Findings:** Some **productive assets** (chickens, seeds) were positively received and had a significant impact on the local economy. More soft 'business' skills would have improved beneficiaries' ability to generate an income. **Vocational training** provided a strong foundation but were not sufficiently in-depth to increase job opportunities IPs commented that **vocational training** improved social cohesion in the local community. **Lack of local workforce skills** reduced programme effectiveness.	**Qualitative Findings:** **Productive assets** had a positive effect on beneficiaries' ability to generate an income. Beneficiaries were able to bring goods to market. **Vocational training** occasionally increased beneficiaries' chances of securing an income. Beneficiaries were able to open cooperative workshops but this was not always the case. While **vocational trainings** did not reach youth and PWDs, they did reach FHHs and IDPs. **Social cohesion** projects enabled beneficiaries to cope with effects of the crises, but training sessions were too short to have a large impact.

On the other hand, 9% were illiterate and 3% were only able to read and write. **Vocational training:** Beneficiaries in Rural Damascus had mixed perception about the length of vocational training, yet widely felt it was long enough (70%). Yet, only half the beneficiaries (53%) perceived vocational training to be detailed enough. **Vocational training:** Two in three beneficiaries (67%) in Rural Damascus finishing vocational training found a paid job, of whom 85% were still employed at the time of the evaluation. **Income stability:** The majority of beneficiaries in Rural Damascus (71%) were paid on a daily basis, which was significantly higher than rates of daily payments in Al-Hasakeh (37%) and Hama (43%).	level than beneficiaries in Al-Hasakeh and Rural Damascus, with 24% holding a secondary education degree and 29% holding a tertiary education degree. Only 3% of the survey beneficiaries were illiterate and 2% were able to read and write. **Vocational training:** Beneficiaries in Hama had mixed feelings about the length of vocational training, with 51% perceiving the training to be long enough and 49% felt the training to be too short. **Vocational training:** Hama seems to have stable markets. Nearly two-thirds (64%) beneficiaries found a paid job after vocational training, of whom 89% were still employed at the time of the evaluation. **Business revival:** Beneficiaries perceived business revival to be highly effective in re-	**Quantitative Findings:** **Literacy level:** Beneficiaries in Al-Hasakeh had a lower average education level than beneficiaries in Hama and Rural Damascus, with 22% of the beneficiaries being illiterate (37% among females) and 10% of the beneficiaries only able to read and write. Secondary education stood at 13% and only 7% of the beneficiaries held a university degree (3% among females). **Productive assets:** 84% of beneficiaries who received productive assets perceived the intervention to have an effect on their income. **Vocational training:** The vast majority of beneficiaries in Al-Hasakeh (94%) perceived the		

	/starting their business and earning an income. 84% of the revived businesses were still operating at the time of the evaluation and 42% of the active businesses were able to employ staff other than the business owner.	vocational training to be long enough. **Vocational training:** Vocational training in Al-Hasakeh seems to have been well tailored to local market needs, with more than four in five beneficiaries finding a paid job after the training, of whom 81% were still employed at the time of the evaluation. **Social capital:** While overall, the share of beneficiaries who perceived they could rely on their community in times of stress and instability in Al-Hasakeh (26%) was similar to those in Hama (23%) and Rural Damascus (28%), IDPs in Al-Hasakeh were least likely to rely on their community members (41%).		

10.4 Efficiency

All NGOs stated that issues with obtaining approvals impeded planning and implementation. Relatively recent regulations on NGO permissions for funding which took effect at the beginning of 2018 seriously hindered the extent to which non-FBO IP interventions could be funded. In turn, UNDP field offices and IPs faced challenges when seeking official permissions for funding and deployment, hindering implementation. The length of time to obtain permissions varied significantly across regions, ranging between 2 weeks (Hama) to four months (Al-Hasakeh). In general, FBOs did not experience issues with permissions due to a separate regulatory regime. However, UNDP field staff in Tartous reported that it was getting harder to work with FBOs due to the issue of permissions not being forthcoming.

"No CSO [in Al-Hasakeh] has been given permission since the start of 2018."
(IP, Al-Hasakeh)

"There is a battle between me and the [redacted] to try and obtain permissions to implement the project." (UNDP field staff, Tartous)

Funding shortfalls, restrictions and cycles caused issues for some programmes. A general reduction in UNDP funding led some IPs to discontinue their programmes and their effects. Funding would limit the ability of UNDP field offices to intervene. Donor funding cycles were occasionally misaligned with programming components, such as agricultural programmes in Al-Hasakeh, resulting in delayed implementation.

A lack of systemic long-term needs assessments occasionally led to inefficient programme design and implementation. Rapid response needs assessments promptly addressed emergency local needs, yet did not always identify longer term needs. A lack of unified systematic assessments (e.g. tools, vulnerability assessments) resulted in inefficient variable design and implementation practices, while a focus on short-term activities also meant that questions of sustainability were often left unaddressed. In addition, a lack of consistent needs assessment criteria and sufficient beneficiary communications led to perceptions of favouritism in the recruitment process. In addition, M&E processes varied by area, thereby lacking the systemic nature needed to produce comparable evaluations across intervention areas.

"There's never any diversity in the people who work, we don't know how they choose people." (Female resident, Hama)

"What is a dentist doing taking part in a phone repair course?" (Female IDP, Hama)

10.4.1 Geographical Summary (Efficiency)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Tartous	Latakia
Local authorities did not pose any challenges to UNDP project implementation. Permissions take around 2 weeks to obtain, quicker than they did between 2014-2016. **UNDP M&E processes** were strong. UNDP includes indicators in all its Rural Damascus programming, and an M&E team produces weekly reports as well as a post-project summative report. An impact evaluation is also carried out once projects have been handed over to partner organisations. **IP M&E processes** were less reliable. One IP reported that they did not conduct any evaluations prior to implementation and instead relied on beneficiaries' complaints to evaluate project impact.	**Funding has been erratic** and can be tied to certain areas, causing confusion between UNDP, partners and beneficiaries when deciding upon intervention areas. **During implementation phase**, the UNDP employed an M&E team comprised of local young men and women to follow up with IPs and produce monthly M&E reports. **None of the UNDP CSOs** in Hama have been able to acquire permission to intervene in the governorate since the beginning of 2018. UNDP is finding it increasingly difficult to obtain **permissions to work with FBOs.**	**No CSOs have been given permission to work** in Al-Hasakeh since the start of 2018. **Funding cycles** were occasionally misaligned with programming components such as agricultural programmes. The combination of **delays in UNDP payments and currency fluctuations** meant the number of beneficiaries had to be reduced.	**UNDP Tartous field office was granted a certain amount of decision-making power** to make context-specific interventions. **UNDP have output indicators** and rely on field visits, M&E team reports and IP reports, allowing them to monitor projects consistently. **UNDP were unable to carry out emergency interventions** because they have not obtained permissions from the governorate. **IPs had to obtain official permission** to set up project, causing delays.	**IPs reported no access problems or problem obtaining official permissions.** **Cultural and social differences between local and IDP communities** (and internally in the local community) complicated the process of intervening in a way that was seen to be impartial by all groups. **A lack of project funding** posed occasional challenges to successful implementation. **UNDP conducted M&E through field visits** to beneficiaries, with regular visits to see how many jobs had been sustained. UNDP conducts post-project field visits to survey beneficiaries.

10.5 Coherence & Connectedness

UNDP programmes are coherent as well as aligned with international and national frameworks. UNDP field offices frequently, but not always, incorporated the SDGs into intervention planning. The nature of UNDP interventions per se meant that outcomes often contributed to the SDGs and national priorities, whether deliberately or not. Programming addressed SDG1 (No Poverty) by targeting the poor and disadvantaged; SDG2 (Zero Hunger) by targeting food-focussed businesses and meeting beneficiaries' food needs, short-term economic needs, and by providing market-relevant skills; and SDG8 (Decent Work & Economic Growth) by providing a temporary boost to the local economy and ensuring short-term employment. When SDGs were incorporated into intervention planning, UNDP field offices determined progress against the SDGs using M&E reports. On occasion, field offices used other indicators including migration levels to and from intervention areas to measure programming success. However, at least one UNDP field office interviewed commented that they did not work on the SDGs.

When it came to national frameworks, some UNDP field offices coordinated with local authorities to ensure that programming contributed to achieving national priorities. Programming contributed to UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021, Outcome 3 (Strengthening Resilience to Shocks and Crisis) through a combination, on the one hand, of emergency employment, which shielded beneficiaries from shocks and initiated the recovery process, and non-emergency interventions, which produced longer-term sustainable employment opportunities. The emphasis of interventions on economic outcomes also contributed to UN Strategic Framework Pillar 3 (Improving the socioeconomic resilience of the Syrian people). Social issues were addressed, but less consistently than economic ones, according to beneficiaries.

Built-in programme coherence allows for cumulative livelihood outcomes, yet beneficiaries are not always connected to programmes efficiently. Programme design and implementation produced positive outcomes, but the link between emergency and non-emergency programmes could be improved. Emergency employment rarely resulted in market-relevant skills, and could have been more closely linked, for instance, to vocational training in order to provide coherence across programmes.

Definitional and conceptual issues shroud ultimate goals. When interviewed, no single definition for 'resilience' could be agreed upon by UNDP staff. Most UNDP staff were clearly aware of resilience as a concept, but gave various different definitions. Most definitions vaguely centred around the need to target vulnerable groups and provide them with sustainable sources of income and work. On occasion, UNDP field officers did not have a specific definition for resilience, meaning that they translated it into programming using inconsistent indicators.

There was little effective coordination with other actors on the ground, but this did not pose significant issues. On occasion, the UNDP delivered interventions in conjunction with other humanitarian organisations including WFP and UNHCR. On the whole, however, UNDP interventions did not take into account other actors on the ground, although this was not felt to be an issue. In some cases, attempts and proposals to formalise coordination were made, whether through coordination meetings or cooperation agreements between organisations. However, these were not perceived to have a tangible impact. In addition, there were few explicit attempts to deconflict UNDP programming with that of other humanitarian actors in order to avoid duplication. On the other hand, IPs were subject to greater scrutiny by the local authorities and were required to coordinate closely with them.

"There is no interconnection or coordination with the work of other organisations. Everyone wants to do everything!" (UNDP Field Staff, Hama)

"We don't work alongside other organisations because the team can hardly keep on top of its own work". (IP, Hama)

10.5.1 Geographical Summary (Coherence & Connectedness)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Tartous	Latakia
Field office incorporate the SDGs at the planning stage and use M&E indicators to determine how much progress has been made against them. UNDP **coordinated with other local humanitarian actors** to avoid duplication of interventions.	UNDP field office works on SDGs 3, 7, 9, and Pillars 2 and 3 of the UNSF, **using specific indicators** to measure success. Although there are **no clear signs of social tension** between IDPs and host communities, there is a **general discontent** towards IDPs from among the local community because Hama is a conservative city.	**UNDP field office clearly addresses all SDGs**, with a particular focus on SDG1. **The UNDP and IPs ensure their interventions align with national and local priorities** through planning discussions, and IPs permit the local authorities to monitor project implementation. **Coordination between UNDP and local actors was limited**. IPs tried to coordinate with traditional bakeries run by the WFP but to no effect. Projects **strengthened social bonds** between IDPs and locals together, respecting communities' diversity.	**UNDP field office does not explicitly work** on SDGs. **Coordination with other actors was limited.** There was a proposal to establish greater coordination between CSOs in Tartous but this does not appear to have been formalised. **IPs coordinate with the Ministry of Agriculture** and notify them of ongoing projects.	UNDP **incorporated the SDGs** from the very beginning of project design. **UNDP have started proposing projects to be conducted with other organisations**. Currently in talks with the UNHCR to set up safe houses for IDPs. **Livelihoods programmes** strengthened social bonds between IDPs and the local community. **IPs coordinated with local authority, local community committees and other actors** on the ground during implementation.

10.6 Sustainability

Sustainability was not a priority during programme design due to context, but is beginning to seep into programming logic. Sustainability assessments were not integrated in the programming cycle, but remain a consideration. IPs were aware of the need to incorporate sustainability into projects, with some regularly assessing the sustainability of projects throughout the implementation period. However, sustainability was not built into programming from the start, as UNDP did not specifically request sustainability to be incorporated into project proposals. And while non-emergency programming has produced enduring outcomes, a focus on emergency response curtails wider sustainable outcomes.

Some projects have survived without UNDP support, although they remain a minority. Beneficiaries and IPs reported that some projects had been able to survive without UNDP support. In Hama, for example, a sewing project remained in place two years after the withdrawal of UNDP funding. However, many IPs remain heavily reliant on UNDP funding and direction, causing issues when funding dries up. Profitability in particular was cited as an issue, with several projects struggling to compete in the private sector following UNDP's withdrawal. In Al-Hasakeh, a UNDP-supported chain of bakeries was sustainable, but faced stiff competition from other rivals.

"We reached all the social groups we'd planned to and the project remains ongoing to this day." (IP, Al-Hasakeh)

Capital grants and loans were seen as necessary to enable beneficiaries to launch their own enterprises and procure their own equipment. Indeed, beneficiaries would prefer to buy their own equipment as opposed to receiving toolkits from the UNDP, based on concerns about the quality of UNDP-issued equipment.

"There should be a focus on productive, sustainable projects that don't end when the funding does." (Male, FGD, Al-Hasakeh)

"At present, the effect [of ending assistance] might be negative since people aren't ready for it. They would suffer a lot economically and socially. There would be even fewer jobs than there are already." (Male, FGD, Hama)

10.6.1 Geographical Summary (Sustainability)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Tartous	Latakia
UNDP field staff stated that **sustainability assessments** were completed after every project. **Vocational training** beneficiaries felt that salaries were less than what the market offered, but that the work was reliable, sustainable and allowed them to enter the market. **NGO Capacity Building** beneficiaries felt that the support provided was not sustainable. Beneficiaries were rarely able to access sustainable employment post-training, with no follow-up from the UNDP.	UNDP team are very aware of **sustainability issues** but no formal assessment has taken place. Beneficiaries across all programming felt that a **greater focus on collective projects** (such as workshops), rather than building individual capacity, would enhance sustainability. **IPs reported that some projects had become self-sustaining** and expanded post-UNDP withdrawal. According to UNDP Field Staff interviewed, only 25-30% of local IPs could sustain their projects after UNDP departure. **IPs had the capacity to sustain their activities** beyond UNDP retraction, but require human and financial capital in order to expand capacity.	UNDP field office assessed sustainability during project implementation **although no formal sustainability assessment** was conducted, either by UNDP or IPs. UNDP Field Staff felt **some projects were sustainable** but found it difficult to evaluate them (e.g. sewing workshops). due to the difficulty of reaching women in their homes. **Vocational training** beneficiaries agreed that UNDP programming provided women with sufficient skills and equipment to be able to set up their own businesses. The sustainability of projects was assessed **during the implementation phase** in order to ensure IPs had the necessary capacity to continue post-project handover.	UNDP field office M&E team conducted **sustainability assessments** during field visits. IPs felt that agricultural **projects were not profit-generating**, presenting challenges to sustainability. In **productive assets** programming, sustainability could be increased by combing programming with professional skills training (marketing). **A small number of CSOs** are able to continue providing LVs if UNDP retracts.	**No formal sustainable assessments** appear to be conducted for any project. However, UNDP Field Staff evaluate project sustainability during regular follow-up field visits, and assess whether partners will be able to sustain projects post-handover. **IPs continuously monitor projects** during the implementation period, and on a non-regular basis post-implementation. No sustainability reports are written. **IPs felt they would be unable to sustain projects** were UNDP to retract.

10.7 Partnership

Partnerships models are structured according to context, but only a few IPs showed genuine promise. IPs were selected according to the needs of specific intervention areas and IP capacity. While some IPs displayed strong project management capabilities, UNDP Field Staff affirmed that general low IP capacity posed several challenges during implementation. Delays occasionally arose whenever the UNDP wanted to follow up on project updates and bookkeeping. Indeed, according to UNDP field staff members in Hama, IPs often demonstrated a lack of transparent accounting practices. Moreover, IPs were reported to have weak internal structures, with roles not always clearly defined, and a mindset suited for smaller-scale projects. IPs also were reported to rely on volunteer staff and suffered from high turnover rates.

"[IP] administrations can a mindset that needs to be transformed […] from a family-run organisation to a sustainable, charitable one." (UNDP field staff, Al-Hasakeh)

IP capacity building has shown some success, but needs better targeting and practical relevance to succeed. While capacity was successfully built at the individual IP employee level, greater impact could be achieved if targeted at organisation-wide capacity gaps. UNDP IP capacity building training sessions had limited effects since these sessions were usually attended by the same individuals, as in the case of trainings in Al-Hasakeh. In Tartous, UNDP field staff reiterated that IPs did not use the skills obtained in the capacity building workshops in augmenting their organisations.

"The garden rehabilitation project gave us excellent experience, and we now know what works and what we need to develop." (IP, Latakia)

"The training gives [IPs] the theory, but they can't reflect it in practice." (UNDP field staff, Tartous)

Recently-introduced state regulations have begun to impede IPs from partnering with UNDP, reducing the number of partnership opportunities. Across all regions, field staff and IPs reported that it was very challenging for NGOs to obtain permission to intervene in partnership with UNDP. In Hama, for example, no CSOs had been able to obtain permission since the start of 2018. While FBOs experienced fewer regulatory restrictions, IPs and UNDP

field staff in Tartous, Hama, and Hasakeh also reported that it was also proving harder for FBOs to obtain permissions.

Some partnership models show promise. FBOs were observed to have greater organisational capacity and benefitted from fewer regulatory restrictions than other CSOs, although care had to be taken not to rely too heavily on FBOs in areas of high interfaith sensitivity, such as Al-Hasakeh.

"You could say that the organisation turned into an institution [as a result of the UNDP project]." (IP, Al-Hasakeh)

10.7.1 Geographical Summary (Partnership)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Tartous	Latakia
IPs have **limited capacity to design and implement projects**. UNDP runs **capacity building training courses** for IPs, although IP staff capacity gaps remain significant.	**UNDP experienced difficulties with IPs** whenever they wanted to follow up on program implementation, accounts, and sustainability plans. UNDP programming **enabled IPs to build capacity** to conduct tasks such as field surveys/project management.	Some **IPs significantly increased their capacity** through partnerships with UNDP. These IPs are now able to bid for projects with a range of different INGOs intervening in the area. UNDP IP capacity building training sessions **had a limited effect** since these sessions were usually attended by the same individuals. **IPs built capacity by sending teams to UNDP Damascus,** as well as undergoing UNDP field training sessions.	**IPs were able to build their capacity** through UNDP-run workshops. **IP capacity varied significantly**, and individual staff retention was an issue due to low IP salaries.	UNDP select certain IPs for training in Damascus, enabling them **to build their capacity.** **IPs felt that their capacity had increased** through hands-on experience during programming period.

11. Conclusions

It is evident that UNDP's current Country Programme was designed to respond to the context which preceded 2016: a period marked by instability and an emergency across most of Syria. Since then, however, marked changes in the context have meant that communities across the country have started to rebuild their lives and livelihoods: markets have reopened, people have returned to their homes and work has begun on rebuilding communities. As this transition and communities adapt, the UNDP's livelihoods programmes will also require re-grounding, so they can continue to produce and sustain outcomes over time.

Positive outcomes, varying degrees

There is no doubt that UNDP's programmes have been both relevant to, and effective in building up sustainable livelihood components and some degree of resilience. The variety of livelihoods programmes have shown positive results and allowed community members to access employment opportunities, garner income, be productive, build market-relevant skills and social cohesion, as well as sustain a livelihood over extended periods of time. Where programmes still face challenges is in the magnitude of effects related to these outcomes, something which, in turn, is affected by several interrelated factors.

The first factor is contextual: markets and communities have only just begun to recover from the effects of a crisis that, while no longer raging in most UNDP intervention areas, remains ever present in Syria. The lack of basic infrastructure, purchasing power, any large-scale reconstruction efforts and the capacity of local markets to absorb the number of workers who are actively seeking employment means market penetration is inherently difficult. But UNDP programmes have been particularly effective when they jointly target both infrastructure and livelihoods needs, for instance through temporary employment opportunities which remove debris or provide public services. By design, these emergency employment programmes were not meant as tools to provide sustainable employment, but have been utilised as a stop-gap measure to keep beneficiaries in work (funding permitting) while continuing to provide public services.

Non-emergency programming has also shown positive results, particularly in terms of building market relevant-skills which help community members penetrate and sustain their employment

over time. Vocational training and business revival programmes in particular were seen to have the best outcomes, but so too did programmes which provided sustainable work and productive assets. Programmes which combined the need for skills as well as the provision of assets were also found to be among the most effective. In addition, livelihood programmes were successful in building social cohesion between IDPs and non-IDPs (residents and returnees), even if these effects were constrained to programme participants rather than the wider community.

That being the case, the degree of these outcomes was and remains the strongly linked, as to whether or not programmes are designed in a manner which is tailored to the demands of the market: programmes which were modelled on systematic need assessments yielded more outcomes than those that did not. In fact, outcomes were less pronounced in areas where subcomponent programme design was informed by a process that was relatively less assessed than other areas.

Sustaining outcomes, navigating regulations

Because the current Country Programme was devised during a period of greater instability, considerations around sustainability were less relevant: sustainable results were often precluded by uncertainty and the need to focus on emergency response. Indeed, sustainability was not found to be a prevalent consideration of livelihoods programming. While that may be the case, the Country Programme was connected to both international (SDGs), national (UNSF) and institutional (UNDP Strategic Plan) goals --something which helped to provide an overarching framework for interventions in spite of an unpredictable context.

But uncertainty caused by crisis dynamics was not the only external factor which affected outcomes. An unclear and constantly changing regulatory framework which required that UNDP obtain various forms of approval from numerous official entities also resulted in reduced efficiency, complicated planning and in turn reduced effectiveness. In particular, recent regulations governing the conditions by which most NGOs can acquire funding from UNDP has curtailed the agency's ability to work with these organisations in different areas. Fewer partners has meant less reach and greater reliance on entities which operate outside of the new regulations, particularly faith-based organisations.

Time to transition

While the outcomes of UNDP livelihood programmes have been widespread, the next phase of Syria's development will require that communities have access to more sustainable, and longer-term livelihood opportunities. To affect such a change, UNDP and its partners inside and outside of Syria will need to focus on more non-emergency livelihood programmes that are grounded in systematic needs assessments, as well as relevant to local markets, value chains and communities.

12. Recommendations

As the context in Syria becomes relatively more stable, the need to transition away from emergency responses and towards more sustainable livelihoods can only be expected to grow. In order to respond to this new reality, UNDP will also need to formulate its next county strategy. The next strategy will need to address higher-order livelihood needs, while taking care to ensure emergency programming is still employed when required, particularly to respond to the needs the most vulnerable. In order to advance such a transition, both overarching and programmatic approaches will become necessary and are presented as such in the form of recommendations below.

Overarching recommendations

Adopt a longer-term, sector-specific sustainable livelihoods approach to programme design. Devised in the midst of the Syrian crisis, UNDP's livelihoods interventions have managed to achieve many of their objectives and have contributed to sustainable livelihoods. However, longer-term impacts are not prevalent across components, and programmes have not been able to lift many beneficiaries out of poverty and into subsistence. To do so, it is recommended that future programming focus on a longer-term sector-specific sustainable livelihoods approach.

Focus on specific labour-intensive value chains accessible to local communities. Difficulties in accessing employment following interventions are rooted in lack of market demand

and an enabling business environment. Hence, it is suggested that the Country Programme focus on labour-intensive value chain development with the explicit aim to place beneficiary job seekers along value chain verticals. Through this value chain approach, UNDP can then build economies of scale and production capacity invigorate local markets. The increased production of demanded goods and services should not only focus on value chain development, but also on associated outcomes such as bringing down local prices and reducing production costs, leading to more local productivity, economic development and employment.

Institute systemic organisation-wide needs assessments which adopt a sustainable livelihoods approach as the ultimate goal. The current standards by which livelihoods needs are assessed, and indeed integrated in projects' development are overly not suited to sustainable, localised, relevant and effective livelihoods programming. If corrective action is not taken, a lack of systemic needs contextualisation and beneficiary-level selection criteria will continue to adversely affect programme relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and ultimately impact. Accordingly, UNDP should consider organisation-wide mandatory criteria for when, where and how livelihood needs assessments are conducted, as well as integrate the results of those assessments into the project development cycle. This mandatory criterion is particularly relevant to market studies and value chain assessments, which should form the core of project design and implementation. By adopting this approach, livelihoods programmes can become better suited and flexible to the needs of an emerging marketplace, as well as provide a solid evidence base for programmes to be replicated across the country.

Mandate beneficiary-level needs assessments and outcome indicators as preconditions for programme design. Once systemic needs assessment criteria are put in place, there will be a need to structure these assessments so they provide beneficiary-level insights, rather than relying on key informants to inform needs appraisals. Accordingly, programme design should incorporate assessments within a sustainable livelihoods approach by integrating capital formation into programme design, indicators and implementation practices. Programme design can then become value-chain specific and incorporate sustainable livelihood outcome indicators, shifting the focus of from output-levels to longer-term outcomes and impacts.

Programmatic recommendations

Create pathways to sustainable livelihoods by linking beneficiaries and programmes. Findings from this evaluation show that the current scope and duration of interventions is often insufficient to provide sustainable livelihoods. As such, while projects should be more integrated, they should also provide longer-term targeted support to the same beneficiaries. In essence, more of a focus should be placed on achieving market penetration and subsistence, which will require that longer-term projects are established to provide beneficiaries and implementing partners enough time to build supply side capacity to sustain livelihoods. To do so, beneficiaries should be placed on a 'sustainable livelihood pathway' whereby their needs are continually assessed and they are offered support across the employment cycle, from training, through job placement, to business development and marketing. Particular focus should be placed on linking emergency and non-emergency programmes as well as connecting vocational training with on-the-job training (internships and apprenticeships), job placement services and career guidance in strategic value chains. While this approach could result in lower output levels, the results of programming will become more sustainable and thus create multiplier effects across the economy.

Aim to provide more specialised training and build job centres. In order to create linkages required to build sustainable livelihoods, the capacity of training facilities will need to be built to transition facilities into job centres which can institute active labour market programmes (ALMPs). Hence, UNDP should consider supporting the establishment of job centres which focus on job matching and training courses relevant to the local value chain development. These centres would then be able to match trainees with private sector organisations willing to offer internships/apprenticeships or jobs, in addition to offering beneficiaries soft skills to enter employment markets. In order to design such activities, implementing partners should be required to gather information about businesses and workshops in their areas which contribute to strategic value chain development. Assessments of potential employers will entail mapping the number of small, medium and large businesses across strategic value chains, tailoring training courses to develop those value chains, as well as studying the labour needs of local enterprises.

Establish links between trainee programmes, collective working arrangements and social funds. Collective working arrangements (such as those in the sustainable work component) have proved beneficial, and training programmes should be tailored to incentivise beneficiaries to work and produce collectively. In order to provide sustainability, models such as village saving and loans schemes can be incentivised (through seed capital) to provide social and financial safety nets to its members, as well as the capital to establish joint enterprises. The model is particularly beneficial to women, who often have less access to financial assets than other family or community members.[39] Under these schemes, contributors can manage funds themselves and can borrow in proportion to their shares, especially in emergency situations.

Support medium and small enterprises (MSEs) through expanded business revival services, financial capital, assets provision and value chain linkages. In order for local economies to recover, demand side interventions will need to be put in place alongside supply-side interventions. Accordingly, business revival support should be expanded to assess individual organisations' needs and provide tailored tangible (equipment, tools, cash payments for internships/apprenticeships, loans/grant) and/or intangible support (business process support, staff training). MSE support will require that business development coaching is also tailored to the specific needs of each enterprise, which in turn should be drawn from assessments. In addition, preliminary assessments are to be accompanied by clear selection criteria and profiling tools in order to identify MSEs with potential for growth in strategic value chains. Field visits will be required to determine the eligibility of MSEs for support, identify business needs, gaps and potential to grow, as well as to determine their capacity to take on interns or new employees. Business development support will also need to link MSEs and suppliers working in strategic value chains.

Institute advocacy programmes to target economic reform, bolster state services and reduce regulatory hurdles. In Syria, sustainable livelihoods will require that economic reforms which UNDP is uniquely situated to advocate for with official entities. Accordingly, this evaluation recommends instituting an advocacy programme which lobbies for sustainable economic

[39] Village savings models lead to the formation of small groups of people who join savings from income generating activities to take a small, low interest loan together. See CARE International (2017): Join my Village: Introducing the Village Savings and Loan Model. https://www.care.org/our-impact/joinmyvillage/blog/2011/02/introducing-village-savings-and-loan-model

reform, as detailed in the Sustainable Development Goals and 2030 Agenda. This advocacy programme will need to include, but not be limited to, job creation policies, socioeconomic development strategies, and agricultural sector reform. UNDP should attempt to integrate its support programmes (e.g. active labour market programmes and job centres) with state services to bolster the efficacy of state service provision and reduce regulatory hurdles.

END OF EVALUATION REPORT

13. Report Annexes

13.1 Annex A: Terms of Reference

TOR FOR OUTCOME EVALUATION

UNDP SYRIA COUNTRY PROGRAMME (2016 – 2019)

---

1. **Background**

UNDP's corporate policy is to evaluate its development cooperation on a regular basis in order to assess whether and how UNDP-funded interventions contribute to the achievement of agreed outcomes, i.e. changes in the development situation and ultimately in people's lives. Under the Results-Based Management (RBM) framework - UNDP's core management philosophy- there has been a shift from traditional project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to Results-Oriented M&E, in particular outcome monitoring and evaluation that covers a set of related projects, programmes and partnership strategies intended to achieve a higher-level outcome. An outcome evaluation assesses how and why an outcome is or is not being achieved in a given country context and the role UNDP has played. It is also intended to clarify underlying factors affecting the development situation, identify unintended consequences (positive and negative), generate lessons learned and recommend actions to improve performance in future programming and partnership development.

2. **Context**

Since the beginning of the crisis, UNDP Syria has been implementing a unique Resilience Building and Early Recovery Programme that aims to strengthen resilience of the Syrian people to cope with the effects of the ongoing crisis and enable those whose livelihoods were severely disrupted to recover and rebuild their lives. Ensuring a well-coordinated response that provides IDPs and their host communities with rapid employment opportunities and access to basic services are enhanced through the rehabilitation of basic community infrastructure with special attention for females heading households, persons with disability and youth.
An area-based approach has been adopted from the beginning to design and implement the various interventions in partnership with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Community and Faith Based Organizations (CBOs, FBOs), as well as through direct implementation modality in collaboration with national institutions, local communities and local private sector.

3. **Outcomes to be Evaluated**

According to the Evaluation Plan of UNDP Syria County Office, two separate outcome evaluations are to be conducted to assess outcomes 1 and 2 of the Country Programme. They are as follows:

Outcome 1: Households and communities benefit from sustainable livelihood opportunities, including economic recovery and social inclusion

This Programme Outcome aims to contribute to Sustainable Development Goals 1, 2, and 8, and is aligned with outcome 3 of the UNDP Strategic Plan (2018 – 2021) "Strengthen Resilience to Shocks and Crisis" and falls with the third pillar of the United Nations Strategic framework (2016 – 2019) "Improving the socio-economic resilience of the Syrian population".

UNDP Syria works on the reactivation of the production process and provision of sustainable livelihood resources for Internally Displaced Persons, host communities, returnees and crisis-affected areas; initiatives are designed to promote recovery of Micro-Small and Medium Enterprises, support to market-relevant vocations and vocational training, value chain recovery, agricultural livelihoods, as well as creation of new businesses opportunities.

Within those interventions, specific initiatives were tailored to target and address needs of the increasing number of Persons with Disabilities and Females who became the only bread winners of their families.
Youth are also a major focus by identifying their different needs, priorities and challenges arose from the crisis, employment support and skills development are used as entry points to promote social cohesion and engaging them in several communal activities.
Non-governmental organizations and Faith-Based Organizations are crucial in delivering livelihood interventions in the targeted geographic areas, as well in engaging local communities.

Outcome 2: "Basic and social services and infrastructure restored, improved and sustained to enhance community resilience in Syria".
This Country Programme outcome aims to contribute to Sustainable Development Goals 3, 6, 7 and 9, and is aligned with outcome 3 of the UNDP Strategic Plan (2018 – 2021) "Strengthen Resilience to Shocks and Crisis" and falls under the second pillar of the United Nations Strategic framework (2016 – 2019) "Restoring and expanding more responsive essential services and infrastructure".

UNDP Syria works on the stabilization of local communities and promoting the return of Internally Displaced Persons by restoring and repairing basic social infrastructure and services in severely affected-crisis areas with limited access, this includes activities such as: repairing schools, rehabilitating health facilities, supporting debris management and rehabilitating roads, sanitation networks, commercial areas and businesses as well as restoring electricity supply and renewable energy sources.

The local projects are being implemented in close cooperation with local authorities, municipalities, technical directorates, Local NGOs and local communities; local private sector is involved too in rehabilitation activities.

4. Evaluation Purpose

The main purpose of these 2 outcome evaluations is to assess the extent to which the Country Programme outcomes 1 and 2 have achieved their results over the years of the Country Programme (2016-2019). The evaluations will provide an opportunity to ensure accountability to stakeholders in managing for results, and are also of a useful learning exercise, especially in relation to informing the formulation of the new Country Programme Document for UNDP, which will begin in 2019 onwards. The main users of the evaluation will be UNDP, both implementing and development partners as well as national key partners.

5. Evaluation Objectives

- **Evaluate impact of the implemented interventions and its contribution to the stabilization of local communities and restoration of basic and social services and infrastructure;**
- **Assess contribution that current outputs have made/ are making to the progress towards achieving the planned results of the second outcome of UNDP Syria Country Programme Document as well as identifying unintended positive/ negative results;**
- **Examine how this outcome contributes to national priorities (UNSF), UNDP SP and relevant SDGs;**
- **Assess the outcome and relevant output against relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability in supporting early recovery priorities and assessed needs;**
- **Assess level of integrating gender equality, conflict sensitivity, environment concerns elements in the programme implementation**
- **Assess partnership strategy in relation to outcome;**
- **Review links/joint activities with the other UNDP Outcome and its programmes and how these have contributed to the overall achievement of the Country Programme Document.**

6. Expected Deliverables

The key product expected <u>from each outcome evaluation</u> is a comprehensive analytical report that follows UNDP's corporate standards (see attached template), the report must:

- **Identify strengths and weaknesses in the current Programme/Projects in terms of design, management, implementation, human resource and available resources;**

- **Identify major factors that facilitate and/or hinder the progress in achieving the planned results, both external and internal factors**
- **Extract challenges, lessons learnt and best practices;**
- **Identify priority areas of focus for future programming and the way forward**
- **Provide recommendations for improvements/ adjustments for the current CPD and future successor arrangement.**

7. Scope of the Evaluation

Geographical Coverage

The evaluation should cover all target governorates where UNDP has implemented the local projects including hard-to-reach areas, i.e.: Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, Hama, Tartous, Lattakia, Aleppo, Al-Hassakeh and Deir-Ez-Zour

Outcome analysis

- **What is the current situation and possible trend in the near future with regard to the outcome?**
- **Whether sufficient progress has been achieved vis-à-vis the outcome as measured by the outcome indicators?**
- **To what degree UNDP's projects have incorporated the cross-cutting themes i.e. gender, conflict sensitivity…?**
- **Are the stated outcome, indicators and targets appropriate for the current situation in Syria?**
- **Whether the outcome indicators chosen are relevant and sufficient to measure the outcomes?**
- **What are the main factors (positive and negative) within and beyond UNDP's interventions that are affecting or that would affect achievement of the outcome? How have or will these factors limit or facilitate progress towards the outcome?**

Output analysis

- **Are the current outputs relevant and linked to the achievement of the outcome?**
- **Has sufficient progress been made in relation to these outputs?**
- **What are the factors (positive and negative) that affect accomplishment of the outputs?**
- **What is the quantity, quality and timeliness of outputs? What factors hindered or facilitated the achievement?**
- **Are the current indicators appropriate to link these outputs to the outcome, or is there a need to improve these indicators?**
- **Any risk analysis (short, medium and long term) has been undertaken?**

Partnership Analysis

- **Whether UNDP's key and implementing partners have been appropriate and effective;**
- **Were partners, stakeholders and/or beneficiaries involved in the design of UNDP's interventions? If yes, what were the nature and extent of their participation? If not, why?**
- **How have the key and implementing partners contributed to the achievement of the planned outputs?**

8. Methodology

An appropriate mix of qualitative and quantitative methods will be used to gather and analyze data/information in order to offer diverse perspectives to the evaluation, and to promote participation of different stakeholders. The final decision about the specific design and method for the evaluation should be developed in consultation with UNDP Management, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer and UNDP Programme team on the basis of what is appropriate and feasible to meet the evaluation purpose, objectives and answers to evaluation questions.

The outcome evaluation should be carried out by using available data/information to the greatest extent through a wide participation of all stakeholders including UNDP Syria, key partners, local institutions, NGOs, FBOs and CSOs as well as field visits to selected project sites, the collected data should be disaggregated by gender, age and location.
The evaluation team must propose a methodology and plan for this assignment which will be approved by UNDP Management and Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, the proposed approach should include study questions, data required to measure indicators, data sources and collection methods that allow triangulation of data and information.

9. **Evaluation Team and Required Capacity**

The evaluation team should comprise of international/ national experts with high levels of technical, sectoral and policy expertise; rigorous research and drafting skills; and the capacity to conduct an independent and quality evaluation. The number of evaluators must be determined by the lead evaluator who submits the proposal depending on the requirements of the assignment. Either a team of consultants *or* a consulting firm could submit proposals in response to this call for proposals.

The following requirements must be fulfilled by the Evaluation Team leader, the Evaluation Team and/or the Consulting Firm.

<u>One Team Leader should have:</u>

- **A minimum of 5 years' experience in programme/ policy evaluations, monitoring and evaluation, strategic planning and result-based management**
- **Experience and subject knowledge in sustainable livelihoods, youth empowerment, social cohesion, reconstruction and crisis response programs, gender would be an added advantage**
- **Equivalent of a Master Degree in areas of Economics, Business Administration, Statistics, or any other related field of study;**
- **Professional level in both written and spoken English and Arabic**

<u>Team members (minimum 3) should have:</u>

- **A minimum of 3 years of relevant professional experience, including previous substantive evaluation experience and involvement in monitoring and evaluation and result-based management (preferably in sustainable livelihoods, social cohesion, gender empowerment, and youth empowerment)**
- **Equivalent of a Bachelor Degree in Economics, Business Administration, Statistics, or any other related field;**
- **Good command of both written and spoken English and Arabic**

<u>Team Leader and Team members should have:</u>

- **Prior hands-on experience in conducting programs/ policy level evaluations**
- **Proven experience with quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis; participatory approaches**
- **Experience in using results-based management principles, theory of change /logical framework analysis for programming;**
- **Excellent understanding of the local context in each area**
- **Proven ability to produce high quality analytical reports in English**
- **Ability to bring gender dimensions into the evaluation, including data collection, analysis and writing**
- **Strong interpersonal skills and ability to work with people from different backgrounds to deliver quality products within a short timeframe**
- **Be flexible and responsive to changes and demands;**
- **Be client-oriented and open to feedback.**

Consulting Firm should:

- **Be a legally registered entity**
- **Have accessibility to the Syrian governorates as required. Offeror shall submit within its proposal documents or information proving this request.**
- **Have a minimum of five years' relevant experience in providing similar services in the region and especially in Syria**
- **Demonstrate an ability to engage a technically and managerially sound team to perform the required services and an ability to conduct concurrent/multiple assignments.**
- **Not have a conflict of interest in providing similar services to relevant implementing partners, it must be completely impartial and independent from all aspects of interests. A duly signed statement shall be submitted within the proposal as confirmation of no conflict, impartiality and independency.**
- **Litigation and arbitration history of the Offeror does not bear any potential reputational or other risks for UNDP**
- **Financial indicators to prove long-term sustainability and possession of the sufficient sound financial position to ensure it can meet its financial commitments under this TOR.**
-

General Required Competencies:

- **Knowledge on UNDP programming principles and procedures; UNDP evaluation framework, norms and standards;**
- **Knowledge of Early Recovery approach and UNDP Response**
- **Demonstrate integrity by modeling the UN's values and ethical standards;**
- **Promote the vision, mission, and strategic goals of UNDP;**
- **Display cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability;**
- **Fulfill all obligations to gender sensitivity and zero tolerance for sexual harassment.**

10. Description of tasks

Evaluation Team Leader	Evaluation Team (3 members minimum)
Lead the entire evaluation process, including communicating all required information with UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	Assist the Evaluation Team Leader in the collation and desk review of Programme Documents
Finalise the research design and questions based on the feedback and complete inception report	Based on the approved inception report, assist in the coordination of data-gathering activities, including focused group discussions with clusters of respondents
Leads the coordination and conduct of data gathering activities: desk review, focus group discussions	Assist in data gathering: Field interviews and focus group discussions;
Data analysis, final report consolidation and submission	Data analysis and drafting of report
Deliver and Present the draft final report to the Reference Group	Co-present the final report and document comments

11. Key Performance Indicators

Performance Attribute	Performance Indicator
Quality of Service	• Timely performance of monitoring, data collection and evaluation as agreed • Timely submission and quality of reports • Efficiency of contractor personnel • Contractor flexibility • Effective and efficient solutions of problems and recommendations
Professional interaction with UNDP area officer and implementing partners	• Highest standards of integrity and competence

12. Timeframe for the Evaluation Process

The duration of each outcome evaluation is up to 45 working days, as follows:

Activity	Duration
Inception Phase	**12**
Desk review of key documents, Evaluation design, methodology and detailed work plan	4
Finalizing the evaluation design, methodology and detailed work plan	5
Preparing and finalizing an inception report	3
Data Collection and Analysis Phase	**23**
Desk preparations	3
Data collection and field visits	15
Analysis and Synthesis	5
Reporting stage	**10**
Preparation of draft evaluation report	5
Submit draft report to UNDP	1
Review of the draft report with UNDP Management for QA	2
Incorporating additions and comments provided by UNDP CO	2
Submission of the final evaluation report to UNDP Syria	0

Overall duration of the whole assignment should be within 5 months

13. **Reporting line**

All works defined in this ToR should be reported to the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer. The Monitoring and Evaluation Officer will inform UNDP Management, Programme Team and other teams in the CO as well as Field Offices when required.

14. **Confidentiality**

Data gathered, analysis generated, and any information related to the evaluation for UNDP Syria belongs to UNDP Syria and should be used by the contractor solely for reporting to UNDP Syria and may not be used for any other purpose by the contractor.

END of ToR

13.2 Annex B: Tools

13.2.1 Focus Group Discussion Questionnaire

Evaluation of UNDP's Country Programme 2016-2019 "Households and communities benefit from sustainable livelihood opportunities"

Focus Group Discussion Guide

Facilitator Instructions

1. Purpose of evaluation

In order to provide an independent assessment of the quality of the work, we have been asked to conduct an evaluation of UNDP's programme in Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. For this purpose, we will conduct interviews and focus groups discussions.

2. Where do we conduct focus group discussions?

Focus group discussions should only be carried out in safe and secure place, and where respondents will not feel expected or pressured to respond in a certain way. Facilitators should have assessed the location where FGDs are taking place against these criteria during scoping visits which take place before FGDs commence. If facilitators witness the presence of any authority figures or persons who could alter or intimidate respondents, they should contact their field coordinator and relevant UNDP Staff to enquire about whether to hold the FGD. In turn, FGD facilitators should also ensure that there are no UNDP representatives present or within earshot of the space during the time of the FGD.

3. How do we select beneficiaries for FGD?

FGD participants have been selected based on specific criteria and their access to the services provided under the livelihoods programming. UNDP representatives will be responsible for bringing participants to the location where the FGDs will be held, as per pre-defined criteria. Approximately 6-8 participants will be part of each FGD conducted.

4. How to conduct focus group discussions?

The FGD will take approximately 60-90 minutes to complete, depending on the depth of the responses provided; the participants will be informed of this in advance.

During the FGD, please:

- Ask each question (below) using identical language;
- DO NOT express your own opinion or express support or lack of support to any opinion;
- Demonstrate the required flexibility during the dialogue paying attention not to divert too far from the specific talking points;
- Let the respondent choose his/her own words – do not correct or paraphrase;
- Encourage the respondent to offer more information by asking follow-up questions and probes.
- Be aware of time constraints and feel free to politely interrupt the respondent and move on to the next question if the respondent is being overly-repetitive or not offering additional insight.
- Beneficiaries often overly-emphasis on the fact that assistance provided is not sufficient and needs to be increased. While this is an important dynamic to be explored, do not let the magnitude of aid become the central element of the interview once/if such a dynamic takes place.

5. Presentation & Informed Consent

At the beginning of the FGD, please read the informed consent statement, explaining the purpose of your work and that you are conducting an evaluation of UNDP's activities in order to provide an independent assessment of the quality of the services provided as well as the effects of that service on the life and conditions of beneficiaries. Also be sure to explain that the information obtained during the FGD will be treated as confidential and participants won't be quoted personally; rather, the information will be combined with the responses of other beneficiaries in order to contribute to improving UNDP's operations in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and across Syria. Facilitators must also clarify that beneficiaries will not receive any services or compensation from participating in the survey.

Once the above has been explained, enumerators must establish informed consent by asking respondents if they have understood and agree to the terms, purpose and intention of the survey. Only when respondents state that they have understood and agreed to the terms, purpose and intention of the survey, should enumerators commence with questions.

Accordingly, the following statement of consent should be read out loud before commencing activities:

Hello, my name is _____ and I am part of an independent evaluator conducting an evaluation of the UNDP in Syria on community members' perceptions of their work being carried out in Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. We are looking at all the livelihoods assistance that the UNDP offers in your communities.

The reason you have been selected because you reside in an area where one or more of UNDP's livelihoods programmes have taken place. All participation in this discussion is voluntary. If you agree to participate in this discussion, all your responses will be kept anonymous and confidential, and neither the UNDP nor anyone else will see your individual responses. Results of this this discussion will not be shared with your neighbours or any authority, and any results will not be reported in any way that is mixed with that of other so that it is impossible for your responses to be identified. Your names are not asked for or used but we ask only so that we can facilitate this discussion.

If you do agree to take part now, you can change your mind at any time during the focus group without any implications. The discussion poses no risks to you or your health. However, if a question causes any anxiety or discomfort you may also choose not to answer without giving a reason.

This discussion should take approximately 1 hour to complete. Do you have any questions that you would like to ask before we begin?

[Ensure that each participant provide verbal consent, and the facilitator signs off on informed consent.]

6. Questions

During FGDs, the free flow of the discussion between participants and the facilitator is the most important facet of the focus group. However, all main question areas will need to be covered, so please do not skip any of the main questions or probes. For each question try to establish **instance, degree, frequency and dynamics** as instructed during training.

As guidance, the questions below should be covered during the FGD. Texts in brackets are instructions to the facilitator, and not to be read out to the participants.

A. Ice Breaker / Prep

1. [Around the room, each participant separately] I would like to start the conversation by getting to know each one of you a bit better. What is your first name, how many people in your family, etc.?
2. I want us all to think back to a time before the crisis, and how things have changed in this community. I will start by asking a few questions about how life has changed:
    a. Can you please explain to me briefly the main aspects of how your work and income have been affected since the start of the conflict?

B. General:

Now, I want to ask some general questions about UNDP's assistance to your households:

3. [Go around the room and ask each participant individually] What kind of assistance have you received or accessed from UNDP since 2017?

    [The FGD assistant should make a note on a checklist of how many persons have benefited from different activities of the Livelihoods programme: Emergency employment // Vocational Training // Professional Skills Training // Start-up-Kits/Productive Assets/In-kind entrepreneurial support // Establishing/Reviving Enterprises // Disability Aids).
4. What has been your experience of the livelihood programmes UNDP provides in your area? [Do not let the conversation go off track, just cover general impressions and issues here.]
    a. Are there any major issues?
    b. Are there any significant achievements?
5. Practically speaking, do livelihood programmes allow individuals and households to access job opportunities? (Please answer for each type of livelihood programme identified at the start)
    a. How far do these programmes go towards providing people in your community with a livelihood that can be sustained over time? [Please explain]?
    b. If not, what are the main reasons you are unable to sustain a livelihood?
6. Do you think the programme activities and services meet the specific needs of IDPs? How about Returnees, are their specific livelihoods needs being met? [Try to understand if there are any specific assistance programmes that are problematic to any of the population segments.]
    a. How about for women and female-headed households specifically, how are their needs being met?
    b. How about the needs of PWDs?
    c. What about the youth?

C. Programmes: Specific programmes implemented by UNDP.

TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT // LIVELIHOOD STABILISATION FGDs:

1. Who here was temporary employed and who here received assets for livelihood stabilisation? [To confirm the question above]

[Temporary Employment]

2. What has been your experience of temporary employment in general?
    a. Did you receive any kind of compensation (stipend, transportation, salary, etc.)?
        i. If yes, to what extent was the compensation received enough to cover your livelihood needs while you received it (shelter, food, water, schooling, fuel/gas, etc.…) [Please ask them to why the salary was sufficient/insufficient]

3. Do you feel that the temporary employment built market-relevant skills, which you could use once you completed the programme? (Please explain why/why not)
4. Do you feel that temporary employment allowed you to gain access to networks of people and/or institutions which facilitate future work opportunities? (Please explain why/why not)
5. Were you able to work in more than one round of emergency employment?
    i. If so, did this repetition enable you to build skills on the job?
    ii. If so, did this repetition allow you access to more professional networks?

[Livelihood Stabilisation]

6. What kind of support did you receive (assets, seeds, fertilisers, tools, training)?
7. What has been your experience with the assets you were provided with in general? [Please ask about each type mentioned previously]
    a. To what extent did this support allow you to recover/restart your income-generating activity?
    b. Did the support provided facilitate greater access to markets? If so, please explain how? If not, please explain why?
    c. Did support increase your income? If so, how far did that go to providing you with enough income to sustain your livelihood?
        i. How far did the income go towards covering basic needs (shelter, food, water, schooling, fuel/gas, etc.…)?
8. Were you able to receive more than a one-time round of support?
    a. If so, to what extent did repeat support provide more of a sustainable livelihood than if it was a one off?

[Both]

9. To what extent do you feel that these programmes enabled you to build greater potential to:
    a. enter the market;
    b. earn an income;
    c. improve your household economic situation in future?
10. Are you currently working?
    a. If not, why not?
    b. Are you currently looking for a job? If so, what are the main issues you face?
11. Aside from making the temporary employment programme longer or paying more, what else would you recommend the programme could do to improve your livelihood?
12. Who here is an IDP? [If any:] Did these projects help improve your integration in the local community (Please explain why/why not)?
13. Who here is a returnee? [If any:] Did these projects help improve your reintegration in the local community (Please explain why/why not)?
14. Did these projects improve social relations between IDPs and host community members?
15. Did the implemented projects change the way the local economy functions, for instance in terms of market activity or job creation? (Please elaborate further)

VOCATIONAL TRAINING FGDs:

1. How would you describe your experience in the vocational training?
2. What did you learn during the VT?
    a. Considering your (socio-economic) situation, how useful did you find the training in finding employment and acquiring income (please explain why/why not)?
    b. How about in terms of allowing you to actually being able to sustain a livelihood?
3. Do you consider the methodology that was used in this programme interactive and appropriate?
4. Do you feel that you built skills during the training which helped you enter the market, earn an income and cover expenses (please explain why/why not)?

5. Alongside the VT you were also trained on soft skills/professional skills. What exactly did you learn during the additional training?
    a. Do you feel that the soft-skills learned helped you to enter the labour market, earn an income and cover expenses (please explain why/why not)?
    b. How about in terms of allowing you to actually being able to sustain a livelihood?
6. Did you conclude the VT?
    a. If yes, did you receive a vocational toolkit?
        i. How beneficial and appropriate do you think the toolkit is in help starting/finding a job?
    b. If not, why didn't you conclude the VT?
7. Did the implemented VT change the way the local economy functions, for instance in terms of market activity or job creation? (Please elaborate further)
8. Are you currently working?
    a. If yes, are you working in the field of your training?
        i. Do you feel the skills you acquired allow you to excel in your job, relative to your peers/colleagues?
        ii. If not currently working, are you currently looking for a job? If so, what are the main issues you face?
9. Who here is thinking to start a new business as a result of the training sessions? (If any) Have the training sessions facilitated that process (if so, please explain how)?
10. Who here is an IDP? [If any:] Did the VT help improve your integration in the local community (Please explain why/why not)?
    a. Probe: intercommunity classes (IDPs and hosts)
11. Who here is a returnee? [If any:] Did the VT help improve your reintegration in the local community (Please explain why/why not)?
    a. Probe: intercommunity classes (returnees and hosts)
12. Did the VT improve social relations between IDPs and host community members?

PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT (PRODUCTIVE ASSETS // START-UP KITS // IN-KIND ENTREPRENEURIAL SUPPORT) FGDs:

1. Do you think the support you received has helped you to launch your business (for start-up kits) // or expand (for productive assets) and in-kind entrepreneurial support)? (Please explain why/why not, report for each of start-ups and productive assets)?
2. (Productive assets only:) What challenges did you face in your line of work before the programme?
    a. Have the assets provided by the programme spherically addressed those challenges? If so, how and to what extent? If not, why?
3. (Start-ups only:) Do you think the support received would be sufficient to succeed in your new business? (Please explain why/why not?)
    a. What other kind of support would you need to be completely confident?
4. To what extent has the support increased your ability to earn an income / generate profit so far? (Please explain why/why not?)
5. Who here is an IDP? [If any:] Did the business support help improve your integration in the local community (Please explain why/why not)?
6. Who here is a returnee? [If any:] Did the business support help improve your reintegration in the local community (Please explain why/why not)?
7. Did the business support improve social relations between IDPs and host community members?
8. Did the implemented business support change the way the local economy functions, for instance in terms of market activity or job creation? (Please elaborate further)

D. Sustainability & Conclusion:

1. Who here feels that they would be able to secure a livelihood if you had access to capital (in the form of a loan, or a grant, please explain why, why not)?
    a. If so, what would you do with that capital?
    b. How about if you had access to any kind of tools, equipment, would that help? (Please explain why, why not)
    c. How about access to land or other kinds of natural resources (Please explain why, why not)
2. Do you think UNDP's programme helped your community cope with the socio-economic challenges? How and what more can be done to make this sustainable?
    a. What do you think could be done to support community members to work on their own without external support?
3. If UNDP's assistance were to end today, what effect would that have on your community?
    a. What do you think could be done to support community members to work on their own without external support?
    b. What effect do you think ending UNDP's support would have on livelihoods?
4. If you had ten minutes with the Director of UNDP in Syria, what would you say to them regarding UNDP's activities in your area?
5. Is there anything else you would like to add, perhaps something of interest you feel UNDP should know about?

END OF FGD DISCUSSION GUIDE

13.2.2 KII – Field Staff Questionnaire

Key informant interview guide – UNDP Field Staff – LV

Understanding Resilience:

1) How would you assess the current livelihoods situation in the areas of UNDP's interventions?
    a) What are the main problems faced by the communities/households?
        i) Probe: Lack of livelihoods (jobs, skills, market access, etc.)
        ii) Probe: Lack of social services (health care, education, etc.)
        iii) Probe: Tensions between social groups (religious, IDP/host, etc)
2) Do you have a specific definition of resilience that guides your work in the field?
    a) If yes: what is it?
    b) If no: How do you translate *resilience* into LV programming?
    c) How is community and HH resilience monitored at field levels?
        i) Are there baseline indicators? [probe: regulatory of monitoring and methodology].

Programme Design:

3) What are the current programmatic priority areas in Syria?
    a) How does UNDP identify these priority areas?
4) How are projects designed in your area?
    a) Who participates in this process?
    b) How does the process differ between LV and Infrastructure programming?
        i) How are programme priorities defined in your area?

c) How are communities and beneficiaries selected for interventions in your area?
d) How are your implementing partners (IPs) selected?
e) To what extent do implementing partners // local authorities participate in designing projects/setting the programme agenda (and implementation for local authorities)?
    i) What are the mechanisms that UNDP employs to ensure that local communities and local governments are consulted in the design of programmes?

5) How do you ensure that outcomes contribute to national priorities under the UN Humanitarian Response Plan, the UNSF and relevant SDGs?
    a) Probe LV: SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), SDG 8 (Decent Work & Economic Growth); UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021 Outcome 3 (Strengthening Resilience to Shocks and Crisis); UN Strategic Framework Pillar 3 (Improving the socio-economic resilience of the Syrian people)
    b) Probe Infra: SDG 3 (Good Health & Well-Being), SDG 6 (Clean Water & Sanitation), SDG 7 (Affordable & Clean Energy), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation & Infrastructure); UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021 Outcome 3 (Strengthening Resilience to Shocks and Crisis); UN Strategic Framework Pillar 2 (Restoring & expanding more responsive essential services & infrastructure)
6) Has livelihoods programming been in effect long enough to have the desired effects? If not, should design be altered accordingly?
7) To what extent is your programme able to ensure equal opportunities in the livelihoods sector among different groups? (please explain if so, how/if not able, why not)
    a) Are you currently able to target all groups you intend to?
        i) Probe: women/FHH, IDP/host, PWD, youth

Implementation:

8) What factors facilitated your programme objectives' achievements?
9) What challenges did you face in achieving certain objectives and/or reaching targets?
    a) Probe: access, permissions, community, trust, internal/external factors
10) In your view, what impact does the LV programming have to beneficiaries' livelihoods?
    a) Probe: Ability to earn an income, sustaining a job, building professional networks
    b) Does the vocational training practically increase the beneficiaries' chances of securing a livelihood?
        i) How do you assess that?
    c) To what extent do you feel interventions help enhance the labour market and increase economic activity?
        i) How do you assess that?

Synergy and sustainability:

11) How does livelihoods and resilience programming complement the work of other UN agencies, NGOs, donors and national/regional actors?
    a) How do you assess that?
12) Is sustainability of the recently implemented livelihoods project assessed? What can be done to increase sustainability of these activities?
    a) To what extent did existing networks and institutions support and facilitate the implementation of the project? (i.e. local organizations, community-based organizations, faith-based organizations)
    b) To what extent were local capacities developed? Do you think these are strong enough to continue providing livelihood opportunities to the community if UNDP retracts? If not, what would need to happen for that to take place?
13) Do you think there are potential synergies between the livelihoods sector and other, such as education, that should receive more focus (funding) to increase effectiveness?
14) Do you see any linkages between improved livelihoods and social cohesion in your area?
    a) If so, to what extent do you feel these links can contribute to peacebuilding in future, if at all?
15) In your view, what could facilitate the impact of LV programming which hasn't been considered so far?

END OF INTERVIEW

13.2.3 KII – Implementing Partners' Questionnaire

Key informant interview guide – IP – LV

Livelihoods environment:

16) How would you assess the current livelihoods situation in the areas of UNDP's interventions?
    a) What are the main problems faced by the communities/households?
        i) Probe: Lack of livelihoods (jobs, skills, market access, etc.)
        ii) Probe: Lack of social services (health care, education, etc.)
        iii) Probe: Tensions between social groups (religious, IDP/host, etc)

Programme Design:

17) What is your role in the process of setting the programme agenda with UNDP?
    a) How are programme priorities defined?
    b) How are areas // communities // beneficiaries selected for interventions?
    c) How are your organisation's tasks, aid delivery and implementation methods, timeframe, etc. determined with UNDP?
    d) Did you conduct a livelihood needs assessment to determine objectives? (How/why not)
        i) Probe: consult target community for gaps and livelihood needs
    e) Can you describe how you build the capacity of your teams in the field? (Are you able to strike a balance between national-level and international development priorities and standards, as well your programme/project development priorities and agenda?)
18) To what extent do you think are the strategies of UNDP and the GOS aligned?
    a) Probe: TVET, early recovery objectives from HRP, Strategic Framework for Cooperation
    b) How do you coordinate with local authorities?
19) Do you think that interventions in the livelihoods sector you are implementing are suited to the context where you work and the communities affected by the crisis?
    a) Do you think that current interventions respond to the rights and needs of people affected by the crisis?
    b) How does your programme ensure that equal opportunities in the livelihoods sector are made available to different groups? i.e. IDPs, women, vulnerable men, female-headed households, people with disabilities, youth.
    9. In your view, to what extent were programme objectives achieved?
    c) Were all target groups reached?
    d) What factors were essential for achieving programme objectives?
    e) What factors made it difficult to/prevented your agency from achieving certain objectives and/or reaching targets?
20) In your view, what is the impact of interventions in the livelihoods sector? [Impact: outcomes; projection]
    a) Was there a substantial increase in the beneficiary's ability to earn an income?
    b) How did/does business skills and vocational training increase the beneficiaries' chances of securing a livelihood?
    c) To what extent do interventions help enhance the labour market and increase economic activity?
    d) To what extent did the beneficiaries' attitudes towards their future and ability to cope with the effects of the conflict change?
21) Do you think the content of vocational and business skills training programmes reflect an understanding of the labour market and current/potential employment opportunities for beneficiaries?
22) To what extent is your programme able to ensure equal opportunities in the livelihoods sector among different groups? (please explain if so, how/if not able, why not)
    a) Are you currently able to target all groups you intend to?
        i) Probe: women/FHH, IDP/host, PWD, youth

Implementation:

23) What factors facilitated your programme objectives' achievements?
24) What challenges did you face in achieving programme objectives and/or reaching targets?
    a) Probe: access, permissions, community, trust, internal/external factors
25) In your view, what impact does the LV programming have to beneficiaries' livelihoods?
    a) Probe: Ability to earn an income, sustaining a job, building professional networks
    b) Does the vocational training practically increase the beneficiaries' chances of securing a livelihood?
        i) How do you assess that?
    c) To what extent do you feel interventions help enhance the labour market and increase economic activity?

Synergy and sustainability:

26) How does livelihoods and resilience programming complement the work of other UN agencies, NGOs, donors and national/regional actors?

27) How is the sustainability of the recently implemented livelihood project assessed?
    a) What can be done to increase sustainability of these activities?
    b) To what extent did your capacity develop as part of the programme?
    c) Which areas do you feel were developed the most, and which still require more capacity building?
28) Do you think you have the capacity to continue providing livelihood opportunities to the community if UNDP retracts? If not, what would need to happen for that to take place?
29) Do you see any linkages between improved livelihoods and social cohesion in your area?
    a) If so, to what extent do you feel these links can contribute to peacebuilding in future, if at all?
30) In your view, what could facilitate the impact of LV programming which hasn't been considered so far?

END OF INTERVIEW

13.3 Annex C: Code of Conduct

Triangle's Code of Conduct lays out ethical standards which ensure the protection of, and respect for informants, clients, and programme beneficiaries, as well as Triangle employees, consultants, partners and their employees. Further, the Code of Conduct is designed to ensure effective processes and accountability for assignments. Triangle all those contracted by it (hereafter: staff) shall act by, and uphold the core values and guiding principles laid out in the document below with respect to in all their professional activities to avoid misconduct in workplace settings[40]. Outside of workplace settings, staff should uphold the standards set out in this code of conduct so as to ensure that no ill repute comes to themselves or to Triangle. Senior personnel at Triangle have a particular responsibility to uphold these standards and shall set a good example in all their activities.

To ensure that the Code of Conduct is enforced at all times, Triangle will train its staff on its Code of Conduct regularly. External research personnel contracted by Triangle will be instructed on research subjects' protection. Triangle is also committed to keep its Code of Conduct updated and will inform and educate its internal and external staff about any updates.

Core Values and Guiding Principles

Do no harm
Triangle's "Do no harm" philosophy commits to the values of the Charter of the United Nations, the respect for human rights, social justice, human dignity, and respect for the equal rights of men and women. The "Do no harm" approach minimises research risks for all stakeholders, while seeking greatest benefits for research projects. To ensure the minimisation of risks to stakeholders, Triangle and its staff respect research subjects' decisions on participation (in whole or in part), will always ensure voluntary and informed consent of research subjects, as well as will make effort reasonable effort to protect research subjects from foreseen risks (e.g. through safe places for focus group discussions and key informant interviews).

Respect and equality
Triangle and its staff acknowledge and respect local cultures, customs, and traditions and always take into account cultural differences and corresponding approaches. As such, all stakeholders (i.e. research subjects, staff and clients) will be treated with courtesy and respect. The selection of research subjects will be fair and based on circumstances on the ground. Triangle and its staff will act—and interact with all stakeholders—truthfully and without deception at all times. Triangle is also committed to treating all stakeholders fairly, regardless of gender, ethnic, national or religious background, age, disability, marital status, parental status or sexual orientation.

Vulnerable groups
Triangle and its staff are aware that vulnerable groups (such as—but not limited to—children, youth, women, and people with disabilities (PWDs)) are predominantly prone to violence, exploitation and/or neglect, which gives extra reason to commit to handling their participation in the research process according to internationally-recognised best practices. Triangle and its staff also recognise, respect, and understand the physical and emotional privacy of participants of the vulnerable populations. Apart from emotional safety, Triangle and its staff recognise the need for a physically safe environment to conduct research activities and will strive to ensure gender- and context-sensitivity at all times. Furthermore, Triangle and its staff will strive to facilitate accessible venues for PWDs to secure their participation in the research process.

Quality of work and fairness

[40] A 'workplace setting' is defined as any location or conveyance used in connection with Triangle's activities, including, but not limited to Triangle's offices, client offices, field research locations, conferences, social events connected with Triangle or its clients, email correspondence or phone conversations.

Triangle offers a comprehensive approach to its work to impress upon stakeholder's competence, integrity, and honesty. By agreeing to an assignment, Triangle acknowledges to have understood projects' objectives, to possess staff qualified to achieve those objectives, as well as to have the necessary capacity to process the assignments' tasks. Triangle always seeks to establish a mutual understanding with clients about objects, scope of work, and workplan. Furthermore, Triangle stands for fairness and impartiality and acknowledges the fact that all disputes are multifaceted. For this reason, Triangle and its staff will seek to provide balanced objective reporting, no matter the complexity of the subject at hand. Triangle and its staff will abstain from personal opinions and will confine themselves to evidence-based reporting and recommendations.

Confidentiality and privacy
Triangle is aware of the sensitivity and confidentiality of data collected in the field. Therefore, Triangle and its staff will protect the privacy of research subjects and will not disclose any confidential information (such as names, addresses, etc.) unless prior approval by the research subject is provided. Qualitative and quantitative information gathered during the research process will be used in an aggregated format or will be cleaned from identifying information to ensure that any agreed upon anonymity is upheld.

Conflicts of interest
Triangle strongly avoids conflict of interest to rule out biased objectivity in its research process. However, in case conflicts of interest occur, Triangle and its staff will inform all parties involved in a transparent manner and endeavour to remove or mitigate the effects of any conflicts of interest. Triangle and its staff and the work they produce is and will always be independent, and will not be influenced by political or social pressures or economic incentives, bribes or favours.

Harassment and anti-fraternization
Triangle is committed to providing a safe environment for all its staff and stakeholders free from discrimination on any grounds and from harassment at work including sexual harassment.[41] Triangle operates a zero-tolerance policy for any form of sexual harassment in the workplace, treat all incidents seriously and promptly investigate all allegations of sexual harassment. Any staff member found to have sexually harassed another will face disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal from employment. All complaints of sexual harassment will be taken seriously and treated with respect and in confidence and no one will be victimised for making such a complaint.
Triangle also recognises that anyone can be a victim of sexual harassment, regardless of their sex and of the sex of the harasser. Triangle recognises that sexual harassment may also occur between people of the same sex. What matters is that the sexual conduct is unwanted and unwelcome by the person against whom the conduct is directed.

Triangle also upholds anti-fraternization policy which prohibits all supervisor-subordinate romantic relationships and requires staff to notify Triangle's management of romantic relationships with other staff, so that the Triangle may place the staff in different departments or projects. Any relationship that interferes with the company culture of teamwork, the harmonious work environment or the productivity of employees, will be addressed by applying the progressive discipline policy up to and including employment termination. Adverse workplace behaviour—or behaviour that affects the workplace that arises because of personal relationships—will not be tolerated.

END OF CODE OF CONDUCT

[41] Sexual harassment is defined as an unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature which makes a person feel offended, humiliated and/or intimidated. It includes situations where a person is asked to engage in sexual activity as a condition of that person's employment, as well as situations which create an environment which is hostile, intimidating or humiliating for the recipient. Sexual harassment can involve one or more incidents and actions constituting harassment may be physical, verbal and non-verbal.

END OF DOCUMENT