




National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan



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Resilient nations.



A UNDP-supported baseline assessment of civilian firearm holdings, violence victimisation, and perceptions of security in South Sudan

Baseline study conducted by Small Arms Survey





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Foreword

Having experienced years of conflict and lack of development, the Republic of South Sudan remains characterized by deep-rooted political fragmentation with increasing ethnic dimensions. Due to the insecurity experienced amongst diverse communities, the force of the gun has diminished reliance on the rule of law and strengthened a culture of violence and lawlessness. Decades of conflict in South Sudan has led to the widespread proliferation of small arms throughout the population that are often used to settle disputes and continue to threaten the safety of communities and limit wider socio-economic development.

I am pleased to present the first-ever national assessment on small arms in South Sudan. This assessment is a ground-breaking attempt to establish evidence-based data-set on civilian arms possession, how small arms are acquired and the reasons for their acquisition.

It is common to hear analogies like “there are more guns in the hands of civilians in South Sudan than cell phones or water points.” While these assertions cannot be verified, the alarming statistics that have emanated from this assessment points to the startling consequences of the proliferation of small arms, including the strains it places on stability and development. Every gun possessed by civilians and every bullet fired goes beyond the potential loss of life. It is also about people going hungry, orphaned children, destruction of livelihoods, and about communities turning against communities. South Sudan cannot shoot its way out of crisis and conflict, and its people and communities cannot settle their differences through the barrel of the gun.


A central pillar of UNDP’s support to the peacebuilding process in South Sudan is to reduce the incentives to possess and use small arms and light weapons. Reversing the proliferation of small arms and of the use of small arms by civilians is no longer a desired option - it is an urgent necessity! A bold and robust approach to reducing the number and use of small arms in South Sudan is called for.

Anchored in a human security approach, UNDP’s strategy is to support the government to target the mechanisms and incentives behind the uncontrolled civilian possession of small arms. In this regard we have successfully supported the enactment of the Firearms Act. Currently, UNDP is providing support to operationalize the Act through developing the right policy and institutional framework to regulate and manage small arms and light weapons. UNDP is also strengthening community interdependencies through helping communities build livelihoods, cultural and social infrastructure that facilitates collaboration rather than conflict. UNDP is helping to improve the ability of communities to anticipate, manage and resolve their differences peacefully without resorting to arms. Lastly, UNDP also supports the strengthening of access to justice and rule of law to increase the availability, affordability, adaptability and acceptability of justice services in South Sudan.

This assessment, which benefitted from the insight of a wide range of stakeholders, has been undertaken with the objective of providing evidence-based analysis in shaping the wider policy and programmatic interventions on the small arms agenda. The report has been prepared with several diverse audiences in mind. It is intended for government policymakers, development practitioners, civil society, students and research institutions. We hope this report will stimulate further debate and dialogue, and engage South Sudanese and international partners throughout the country.

As the country begins deeper reflection on the pathways to demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) as part of the implementation of the peace agreement, we hope that the findings and recommendation of this assessment will aid such conversations. This assessment will also help shape a shared perspective on what is possible and what is achievable, what would constitute success and what interventions could lead to such success on the small arms agenda and community security. In this regard, the assessment is not only a planning tool, but importantly, it could become the basis for joint government and communal accountability for results.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control for the excellent work, leadership and partnership they have provided in making this assessment a reality. I also wish to extend my sincere gratitude to all who contributed to put together this report, especially our partners in government and the security sector, in civil society, UNDP colleagues, and the Small Arms Survey for their excellent work.



Eugene Owusu,

*Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General,
the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative in South Sudan*

Preface

South Sudan for several decades has been the theatre of conflicts and an established destination for illicit small arms and ammunition. Small arms proliferation among civilians has and is playing a significant role in shaping the future of this country, yet there is no authoritative data that put figures, paint trends and bring voices to this challenge. Speculations and informed conjectures have shaped the narrative about this challenge and in some instances influenced programme support and remedial actions.

Those days should be over.

This National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan (NSAASS) responds directly to the need of addressing the existing knowledge gaps on small arms possession and use in South Sudan. Grounded in a robust methodology, this Assessment brings to the table data on the patterns of possession, management, and use of small arms among a range of actors; attitudes towards small arms and illicit trafficking. It also identifies factors that influence those perceptions and existing knowledge of patterns and flows of illicit arms trafficking, armed violence and actors involved.

This Assessment is part of the wider strategy of the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control to have a secure and peaceful South Sudan in which communities are free from harmful impact of small arms. The findings of the Assessment seats well with the Act on Small Arms. Its recommendations are shaping the implementation plan of the Act that is currently being developed by the Bureau. Also the findings and recommendations of the Assessment will be central to the elaboration of civilian disarmament strategy being put in place by the Bureau.

Going forward, it is our expectation that this Assessment which is a practical testimony to the strong partnership between the Bureau and UNDP, we provide the basis and shape the quality of partnership to take forward the small arms agenda and community security in South Sudan.



Lt. Gen. Andrew Kuol Nyuon

Chairperson - Bureau of Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC)

Executive Summary

Small arms proliferation among civilians in South Sudan has long been thought widespread but there have been no reliable estimates of civilian weapon stocks to date. The deliberate arming of Southern communities during the first and second civil wars and the continuation of both authorized and covert conventional weapons transfers to Juba; illicit cross-border trafficking; and proxy arming of rebel groups by external actors has been extensively documented but not illuminated the scale of civilian stockpile.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in South Sudan has supported the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC) to develop projects and programmes to assess and address community security in South Sudan, including related to the role of small arms and light weapons. As part of this support, the Small Arms Survey undertook a National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan (NSAASS) to estimate the scale of arms in civilian hands across the country, self-reported motivations for arming, and recent experiences of violence victimisation.

The assessment had both quantitative and qualitative components, including a household survey targeting a nationally representative sample of households across government-held areas in all ten (former) states. This component, which was begun in May 2016, had surveyed three-quarters of the target sample in six states (Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Western Barh el Ghazal, Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, and Jonglei) when the July 2016 conflict erupted in Juba. Although security concerns required the closure of the quantitative component at that time, data collected from 1,746 household provide a large enough basis for establishing estimates. The completed qualitative component consisted of 211 completed semi-structured interviews among community leaders and security providers in surveyed areas; 21 key informant interviews; and 4 focus group discussions, conducted before and after the July conflict and the collapse of the first transitional government. The assessment was completed and validated by government, security, NGO, and UN stakeholders at a workshop on 30 November 2016.

Study objectives

The main objectives of the assessment were to produce estimates of:

- › patterns of possession, management, and use of small arms among a range of actors;
- › direct experiences of armed violence among surveyed communities;
- › perceptions of a wide range of stakeholders (civilians, civil society organisations, law enforcement officials, and other key informants and security providers) about attitudes towards small arms and illicit trafficking, identifying factors that influence those perceptions; and
- › existing knowledge of patterns and flows of illicit arms trafficking, armed violence and actors involved;

Background

A focus on small arms proliferation among civilians in South Sudan requires discussing the macro political and civil war context that has dominated or overshadowed the region almost since the birth of modern Sudan in 1956. During the first and, especially, the second civil war era, the deliberate distribution of small arms and light weapons to non-state actors, including local militias, tribal groups, and civilians, was a fundamental tactic used on all sides of the conflict. Much of the latter stages of the second civil war fought between Southern non-state forces. Arms proliferation continued in the six years following signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with conventional weapons imports and cross-border trafficking, as well as proxy arming of commanders with flexible loyalties and in some cases strong local support bases.¹

In addition to enabling military-ethnic armed conflict, increased civilian arming in the civil war and post-CPA periods exacerbated cattle-raiding violence and further complicated relations between sedentary and transhumant populations. The fallout of state elections in 2010 was a new turning point, after which a number of former Khartoum-aligned Southern commanders returned to armed opposition, assisted in some cases by logistical and materiel support from the Government of Sudan. New would-be political actors, unable to access political power through other means, also began local insurgencies at this time.

The context was fundamentally altered again in December 2013 with the collapse of fragile political unity among the government's inner circle and the outbreak of rebel-government conflict in Greater Upper Nile. The rebellion rapidly took on ethnic dimensions, drawing in large numbers of armed Nuer civilians angered over the massacre of their people in Juba and elsewhere. Continued supplies to opposition forces of arms and ammunition originating in Sudan, and the

¹ See for example, Lewis (2009).

delivery to the Government of South Sudan of large transfers of weapons, including from China, has been documented. Through battlefield capture and the change in allegiance of key commanders, command and control over the intended end-users of weapons supplies was significantly eroded. Conflict continued to involve non-state actors on both sides. For example, in offensives in 2014 and 2015 in Unity state, the SPLA counter-insurgency relied heavily on youth militias, notably among the Bul Nuer.²

As of late 2016, the national political context remains fluid and uncertain. In August 2015 the government and SPLM-IO signed the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. But the parties' commitment is weak and the agreement has been poorly implemented. SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar returned to Juba in April 2016 to become First Vice-President and to form the Transitional Government of National Unity, which collapsed less than three months later when clashes rocked Juba in early July. Following Machar's flight out of the country again, the President replaced him as First Vice-President with Taban Deng Gai, the former governor of Unity state.

In the current fragile and uncertain context, authorities struggle to identify directions for dealing with the illicit proliferation of small arms. The national assessment that enables comparisons of levels and types of violence across sub-regions in South Sudan was designed to highlight future priorities for national actors, including BCSSAC and its supporters, following the resolution of the political crisis and a genuine power sharing arrangement.

Main findings

- Some 15% of households in surveyed areas reportedly had at least one firearm. If the findings for surveyed areas are extended to the entire country, this would suggest that that civilians hold between 232,000–601,000 firearms (median 397,000). There is strong reason to think that the higher figure (601,000) is more accurate, since it is believed that some areas not surveyed (such as Unity, Upper Nile, and Eastern Equatoria) may have higher proportions of arms-holding households than the median of surveyed areas.
- There is significant state-to-state variation in the percentage of households reporting having access to firearms, which was highest in Jonglei (21%) and lowest in Western Equatoria (4%).
- Households reported having obtained firearms from a multiplicity of sources, which varied from state to state, with Jonglei notable for approximately one-third of respondents indicating that weapons had come from the military (32%) and Western Bahr el Ghazal residents indicating that the police had supplied their weapons (30%).

² See Craze and Tubiana with Gramizzi (2016).

- 】 The most commonly reported type of firearm reportedly found in armed households was “automatic weapons (including AK47s)”, which was asserted by 54% of those affirming household firearms; rifles/shotguns and handguns together accounted for an additional 22% of affirming respondents.
- 】 The sense of ongoing conflict among respondents in surveyed states (as of May–June 2016) was strongest in Jonglei (with 86% stating that they felt they were living in a context of ongoing conflict, but remained significant in other areas, such as Western Bahr el Ghazal (51%) and Western Equatoria (35%).
- 】 The possession of firearms is strongly linked to the perceived need for self-protection, but the perceived threats vary from region to region. In Warrap and Western Equatoria, 70% and 63% of respondents, respectively, said gangs were the main threat areas; in Jonglei 40% indicated the main threat was armed groups. The protection of property was ranked highest in Jonglei and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (53% and 44%), while the army and “anticipation of future conflict” was seen as the biggest threat in Western Equatoria (50% together).
- 】 More than one-quarter (26%) of respondents or someone they knew had been a victim of violence during the 12 months prior to being surveyed (through June 2016). The rates were highest for households in Jonglei (42%) and Western Bahr el Ghazal (34%). Based on population rates, Western Bahr el Ghazal showed even higher rates than Jonglei (128/100,000 vs. 113/100,000).
- 】 Violence victimisation was elevated for adult males, older individuals, ethnic minorities, urban dwellers, and those living in armed households. These characteristics should therefore be considered risk factors for violence victimisation.
- 】 Of the last incidence of violence encountered in the previous 12 months, 44% of those interviewed described it as “intentional killing”. The same proportion indicated that the incident could be described as “shooting”.
- 】 Civilians are divided on their attitudes about whether civilian disarmament will increase or decrease their security. In general, they view the provision of adequate, equitable, and accessible local security as a precondition for disarmament. In their own opinions, those conditions are not currently met in many areas. More than half (52%) of all respondents said they would comply completely with disarmament, but this varied from state to state.

Conclusions

This assessment has generated the first national estimates of the number of firearms in civilian hands in South Sudan based on household survey and qualitative methodologies. Within the resulting range, 232,000–601,000, the median estimate (397,000 firearms) should be regarded as conservative and most likely an undercount for a number of reasons. First, because it assumes that all households in which a respondent refused to answer the question, or gave a negative answer, are firearms-free—and this is almost certainly not the case. Second, it assumes that states that were not surveyed have the same average level of firearm ownership as the surveyed states others

in the same region,³ and there is good reason to believe that at least some of the four states not surveyed have higher than average rates of household firearms. For example, previous state surveys in Lakes and Eastern Equatoria states found that reported firearm holdings were much higher (35% and 38%, respectively).⁴

For these reasons, the higher end of the range provided (601,000) is probably closer to the true number of firearms in civilian hands in South Sudan. This figure is slightly lower than the Small Arms Survey's previous national estimate in 2009, which was 720,000 (but which was not based on a quantitative or quantitative assessment).⁵ Notably, neither the current assessment nor the 2009 figure includes most—if any—of the small arms in the hands of armed opposition groups, gangs, the official security forces, or paramilitaries. In most settings, however, civilian holdings typically outnumber those of security forces and non-state forces combined, sometimes by a factor of three or more.⁶

Beyond zeroing in on the raw number of guns in South Sudanese communities, this assessment has provided a window into the underlying motivations and rationales that civilians acquire and keep small arms in their households. Self-protection is a fundamental rationale, whether against competing communities, armed groups, rebels, or the national army. In both the household survey and the qualitative interviews, it was clear that guns respond to peoples' perceived need to defend against a variety of threats; and in some areas the strong feeling of ongoing conflict between the government and opposition forces.

It appears that the sense of insecurity among civilians is justified, based on the self-reported victimisation of household members reported in this assessment. That such a significant proportion of violent incidents over the previous year were reportedly fatalities (44%) and seemingly all of them committed with firearms, should be an important reference point for engaging with communities about their well-being. It also shows the need for more routine violence monitoring across the country.

Civilians' insecurity and their need for self-protection directly affects their attitudes towards disarmament. Many civilians said they would be reluctant to part with their weapons because their security would decrease without them. Many residents' previous experiences with disarmament also tended to be negative, and they projected that experience forward into expectations for the effects of future campaigns. In qualitative interviews, key informants suggested the preconditions for disarmament were an end to government–opposition conflict and the equitable provision of community security. The proper ordering of the process was seen by many as ***“peace first, disarmament later”***, rather than the other way around.

3 For example, for the purposes of generating a national estimate, we assume that Unity and Upper Nile states, which were not surveyed, have similar rates of household firearm possession as Jonglei. In the Equatorias, we assume that Eastern Equatoria, not surveyed, had a similar rate of household firearm possession as Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria.

4 For the 2008 Lakes state survey, see Garfield (2007). For the 2009 Eastern Equatoria survey, see HSBA (2010).

5 The previous estimate was generated by applying multipliers based on research in other African contexts. See HSBA (2009). The current assessment methodology is superior for having applied a number of field-based methods based a representative national sample.

6 For a discussion of global estimates of the ratio of civilian to state firearm holdings, and the challenges of estimation techniques, see Small Arms Survey (2011).

As the South Sudan Minister of Interior noted at the validation workshop for this assessment, these findings should be considered a **“first step”** in understanding not only **how many** firearms civilians hold but also **why** and against **what perceived threats**. Certainly many knowledge gaps remain. The assessment was not able to reach some areas due to the July outbreak in Juba of conflict and the precipitous drop in security throughout the country following the collapse of the transitional government. Efforts should be made to survey those areas in the future using similar methodologies; eventually, more routine monitoring of a smaller number of indicators will be needed.

Recommendations

- 】 With the political and military crisis unresolved, there is an ongoing need to monitor the demand for firearms among civilian communities; incidents and trends in violence victimisation; and civilian perceptions of their local security providers. While national assessments like this can be repeated at intervals, smaller scale, local monitoring efforts employing minimum data collection standards on a sub-set of indicators should be explored.
- 】 Efforts to address small arms proliferation in South Sudan must focus on the underlying drivers of the demand for weapons among civilians. While the perceived threats vary by region, they universally imply poor community security. Adequate solutions will undoubtedly be region-specific but all should involve work to improve security provision in rural areas, and to manage conflict arising from community competition over resources and, for example, cattle-raiding.
- 】 Despite the significant armed violence and insecurity in South Sudanese communities, civilian disarmament should probably not proceed without an inclusive settlement to the national political crisis, and only then in close consultations with local community leaders, NGOs, and other stakeholders. The fact that national armed forces are identified as a threat in some communities is evidence that government action to reduce civilian arms is likely to be perceived as biased and repressive in some areas.
- 】 While the newly enacted Firearms Act places tight restrictions on civilian firearms ownership, it is not widely known or understood in civilian communities, and its selective enforcement could lead to the perception that it is used to disarm only opposition-leaning areas. The government should take this expectation into account before planning to roll out enforcement of the new law. In general, like disarmament campaigns, it should probably follow, not proceed, a negotiated settlement to the national crisis facing South Sudan.

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NSAASS characteristics and methodology

This section briefly reviews the major activities of the assessment, which included both quantitative and qualitative components.

Quantitative data collection

The quantitative component of the NSAASS consisted of a household (HH) survey, conducted in the period 25 May–1 July 2016, collecting a total of 1,738 interviews in 134 census enumeration areas (EAs) selected by the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in accordance with their internal procedures along general criteria or probabilistic selection and representing urban and rural localities proportionally. EAs provided by NBS were expressly and exclusively located in government-occupied areas deemed secure for surveying. Data collection was organised locally and employed an enumerator team of 38 men and women assigned to one of 8 local supervisors. All enumerators and supervisors were hired, trained, and certified by SAS staff to carry out the survey⁷.

The HH survey was completed for 134 EAs in six of the ten former South Sudanese states: Jonglei, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Warrap. Mounting insecurity prior to and through the outbreak of conflict in early July 2016 prevented enumeration from proceeding in Eastern Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Lakes. In Unity state, enumeration areas provided by the NBS had been evacuated due to violence or the threat of violence to residents. Lingering insecurity prevented the identification of and deployment to replacement areas there. The locations of completed EAs are shown in the following table:

State	County	EAs
Jonglei	Twic East, Bor South	33
Warrap	Twic, Gogrial West, Gogrial East, Tonj North, Tonj East, Tonj South	29
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Awiel North, Awiel East, Awiel South, Awiel West, Awiel Centre	24
Western Bahr el Ghazal	Raga, Jur River, Wau	11
Western Equatoria	Tambura, Nzara, Ezo, Yambio, Ibba, Maridi	19
Central Equatoria	Terekeka, Juba, Lainya, Yei, Morobo, Kajo Keji	32

⁷ Enumerators and supervisor candidates were identified through a general call for applications circulated by SAS to partner organisations and the NBS. SAS had complete discretion on the final selection of candidates.

Despite the increasing security challenges, at least one former state in each region (Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Greater Upper Nile) was surveyed by 8 July 2016. Data from the EAs within a state are considered representative of the entire state; and the findings provided in this report are presented primarily by state. Occasionally, however, it is useful to highlight and compare regional-level findings. In such instances, we consider all data from the collected sample areas *within a region* to be *representative of that entire region*, despite the fact that some variation of opinion and experience within a region is likely. This is most notable in cases where we wish to make general statements about Greater Upper Nile, for which only survey data from Jonglei could be collected.

Household selection

Survey teams contacted the local authorities and typically local law enforcement and informed them about the survey activities. These visits proved to be instrumental to secure an undisturbed fieldwork and generally positive atmosphere around the survey and provided us access to the LEA/CSO interview respondents in each local area.

Then enumerators performed a random selection of households in each EA. In urbanized settlements, enumerators followed a standard random route sampling routine. In rural areas, they conducted a listing of households / families from which a random sample was created.

Finally, an “adult” member of each selected household (aged 15 or older) was sampled with the help of a deterministic sampling scheme that designated an eligible household member based on the size and gender composition of the household.

Respondent selection table, to select from people in the household aged 15 or above.

	Total eligible respondents					
Number of eligible women	1	2	3	4	5	6+
0	Man	Youngest ⁸ man	Youngest man	Oldest man	Youngest man	Oldest man
1	Woman	Woman	Woman	Woman	Oldest woman	Woman
2		Oldest woman	Man	Oldest man	Oldest man	Youngest man
3			Youngest woman	Man	Oldest Woman	Oldest woman
4				Oldest woman	Man	Oldest man
5					Youngest woman	Oldest woman
6+						Youngest man

Special target group data collection

In parallel to the household survey, 211 semi-structured interviews (SSI) were conducted with local community society organisations (CSO) and law enforcement agencies (LEA) in enumeration areas to validate / triangulate the estimates from the HH survey. CSOs include local non-governmental organisations, community-based groups, religious leaders, and local opinion leaders. LEAs include administrators such as chiefs and county commissioners and security representatives such as the local police chief or army commander. 106 CSO interviews and 105 LEA interviews were conducted.

In addition the SSIs, as of 2 November 2016, 21 key informant interviews (KII) had been conducted with a range of important stakeholders with specific insights and knowledge of the dynamics of small arms and armed violence in South Sudan. The list of target KIIs was developed by the Small Arms Survey in consultation with UNDP and the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC). While a number of target respondents declined to participate in interviews, especially opposition figures, the Small Arms Survey was able to secure in-depth interviews with more than 20 key informants from government agencies, civil society, academia, and international organisation representatives.

Qualitative data collection

In addition to the SSIs and KIIs, Small Arms Survey planned a wide range of Focus Group Discussions (FDGs) around the surveyed states to gather further evidence on the dynamics of small arms and community security. Unfortunately, just as the first FDGs had been organized, the political climate changed dramatically in the country, the Survey was warned that the security situation was not conducive. Nevertheless, the Small Arms Survey was able to organize the following FDGs:

- ▶ Young residents of the Juba Protection of Civilians Camp, Juba
- ▶ Representatives of female workers of NGOs working in peacebuilding and security, Juba
- ▶ Adult male members of the local community, pastoralists and agriculturalists, Aweil, Northern Bahr el Ghazal
- ▶ Youth male members of the local community, Yambio, Western Equatoria

To bolster the qualitative component of the assessment, the Small Arms Survey will make effective use of the validation workshop in Juba and interactive briefing in Nairobi to provide additional qualitative inputs.

Response rate of the household survey

Enumerators faced very little reluctance on behalf of households to take part in the survey. Of 1,830 approaches to households, 1,738 effective interviews could be retrieved, for a success rate of 95%. Non-contact with the households was essentially not a problem: enumerators managed to find someone belonging to the sampled households all but 9 cases. It sometimes required repeated visits (in 25 cases a completed interview was achieved at the second visit, and in one case a third visit to the household was necessary).

The small percentage difference between the attempted and completed interviews was primarily due to interview interruption. In about half of such cases the respondent refused to continue, in the other half there was some circumstantial problem that made the respondent unavailable and the enumerator team had to move to the next interviewing location before the respondent became available again. Other unsuccessful contacts were rare, as shown in the table (right).

Interview outcome	n
Successful	1738
Suspended / interrupted interview	74
Language problem	2
No eligible respondent	3
Nobody at home	9
Refusal HH level - permanent	2
Vacant housing unit	1
Physically / mentally ill, incompetent	1

Interviewing infrastructure

SAS set up a survey data collection infrastructure using Android tablets, using a designated survey system provider (SurveyCloud). SAS distributed tablets for the enumerators and trained them to operate the survey application.

The collected data were initially stored on the tablets. Every time the team got to a location with available WIFI connection, supervisors made sure that the data on the tablets was synchronised with the central database server, operated by SurveyCloud, transferring all interviewing and para-data to a joint survey database. Hence, an interim dataset could be retrieved by SAS staff at any time, enabling a continuous monitoring of the progress and data quality. This central database was updated following the pilot test results to accommodate some small—rather cosmetic—modifications (labelling, variable types, etc.), requested by SAS.

GPS coordinates of the interviews were registered by the interviewing device, helping to verify the interviewing locations for the SAS monitoring team, and provide immediately available inputs for any later spatial analysis of the results.

Weighting

Official population data for South Sudan is out of date and problematic. The last official census was conducted in 2008 (for both Sudan and South Sudan). Its figure of 8.26 million for South Sudan is widely considered to be an undercount. The UN Population Division estimated that the 2008 population was closer to 9.21 million, based on their contention that some 11% of the population was not surveyed in the census. The sampling calculations performed by NBS were based on these population figures.

According to the 2008 census numbers, the three large regions of South Sudan were about the same size in terms of population. In light of this – and corresponding to the population figures used for the sampling process, we applied weights that maintained these 2008 proportions, so that national estimates in this report consider these three regions in the proportion that was suggested by the published results of the 2008 census. See table below.

Region	2008 Census population	Census %	Survey sample	Survey %	Regional weight
Greater Bahr El Ghazal	2722987	0,329639888	810	0,466052934	0,70730139
Greater Equatoria	2628747	0,318231364	554	0,318757192	0,99835038
Greater Upper Nile	2908756	0,352128748	374	0,215189873	1,636363005
Total	8260490		1738		

As to household- or individual-level weighting, we opted for not using weights. We lacked reliable information for any post-stratification and selection probability weights were also missing for the household selection (the size of the EAs from which these households were selected were not known for us).

The samples of CSOs and LEAs were adjusted with this same weight, to mirror the distribution of the general population in the estimates.

In certain sections of the report we are providing total numeric estimates of certain parameters measured by the survey (i.e. number of households with firearms, etc.) To precise these estimates, we tried to incorporate more recent knowledge of the population counts of South Sudan, especially in terms of number of households. However, no direct estimates of these are provided by any source since 2008. We used available population counts and estimated household size to estimate the current number of households in each state. UN Population Division estimated the total population of South Sudan being 12.73 million in 2016, however, this estimate does not have a state-level breakdown. The last estimate that was provided for the previous 10 states of the

country (the most viable statistical division of the country ever since) is for 2014, adding up to a total population of 11.82 million persons. However, none of the population estimates projected the number of households, or the average size of the households, neither for the country, nor on state level. Hence, we derived an estimated average household size from the latest available figure, which was the census. Back then, the mean HH size in 2008 was established as 6.5 across the entire country. Based on the estimated 30% growth in national population since 2008, we used a national HH size of 7.1 for our estimates (the average HH size among our survey respondents was 7.6 persons, see further below). State-level HH size was calculated to be proportionate to their 2008 value with a current mean of 7.1, producing an estimate of the average number of HHs per state, which then generated state-level HH count figures. These calculations are used anywhere in this report where survey findings are extrapolated to state, regional, or national estimates. Because there is considerable uncertainty about the population estimates at all levels, this report always provides high, low, and average figures for such extrapolations.

Interview situation, enumerator feedback

Most respondents were not occupied with anything when were asked to participate in the interview (61%), the rest had to interrupt some activity to take part in the research. In 13% of cases enumerators reported that the respondent was distracted by something during the interview, but in most cases (87%), the enumerator had the full attention of the respondent until the finish of the interview.

In several instances enumerators reported that the respondent seemed fearful during the interview (15%, 260 cases), in 82 further instances they were not sure (5%)– in the rest of the cases the respondents seemed calm and confident (1,396, 80%).

77% of the interviews were carried out in a fully private manner with the target respondent (with nobody else listening) – enumerators were trained to achieve privacy before starting the interview. Full privacy could not be established in 23% of cases, where others present during the interview, but the enumerator still considered the interview to have been conducted in a fairly private setting. 6 interviews had to be conducted with the active attention / participation of others.

Enumerators were asked to report if any of the questions seemed to be problematic for the respondents. In 86% of the cases, such problems were not indicated. When reporting a problem, they were of the following kind:

- ▶ Level of information. Especially when it came to the cost of firearms and ammunition, many respondents were unsure (especially women), but several others also seemed to express a certain level of mistrust as to how this information would be used, and considered it giving up local area secrets.
- ▶ For some respondents, firearm ownership questions were problematic. Enumerators most often described the emotional state of the respondents (those who seemed to have any problems) as mistrusting and fearful when talking about firearms in the household.

- › In certain cases, recollections of firearm accidents and violence caused emotional distress for respondents.
- › In a few cases, enumerators explained difficulties in answering questions because of old age, bad health, and fatigue towards the end of the interview.

The average length of the interview was 22.7 minutes (5% trimmed average)

Respondents

Gender distribution. Survey respondents skewed towards females (56% vs 44% male respondents). While the ideal gender distribution should be closer to the 50-50% range, reliable benchmark data is missing. Many households also reported primarily male deaths due to conflict, and the preponderance of males serving in the armed forces may also decrease their availability in a household-based sample.

Household size. Many respondents lived in very large households, with many children. There were only 21 persons who lived in a single-person household, while 25% lived in families with 10 or more members (including children):

Number of persons in HH	n	%	Number of 15+ persons in HH	n	%
1	19	1,1	1	56	3,2
2	39	2,3	2	306	17,6
3	86	4,9	3	401	23,1
4	111	6,4	4	322	18,5
5	218	12,5	5	235	13,5
6	205	11,8	6	149	8,6
7	210	12,1	7	107	6,2
8	222	12,8	8	53	3,1
9	174	10	9	35	2
10+	449	25,9	10+	73	4,2

The average size of the households was 7.64 (5% trimmed mean, extreme cases removed), and the similar average size of eligible persons in the households was 4.14 persons.

Age.

The age composition of the sample shows a relatively harmonic distribution, indicating that more than half (53%) of the respondents were under 40 years of age. Overall, a large number of people did not give a birth year (705 cases), these were asked to categorise themselves according to age-bands (see right). In the end, 25 respondents were unwilling to indicate either their exact age or an age-band.

Age of respondent	Frequency	Percent
BELOW 21	126	7,3
22-29	316	18,2
30-39	483	27,8
40-59	562	32,3
60 OR OLDER	225	12,9
DO NOT KNOW	25	1,4

Occupation / employment.

The largest group in the sample named farming as their primary occupation (42%) and another 10% had some other agrarian occupation (pastoralist, or agro-pastoralist). 12% of the respondents said they were unemployed at the time of the survey. The full distribution of the reported occupations is presented on the table (right):

Occupation of respondent	Frequency	Percent
FARMING	723	41,6
PASTORALIST	39	2,2
AGRO-PASTORALIST	139	8
BUSINESS	87	5
PUBLIC SERVICE	98	5,6
STUDENT	91	5,3
UNEMPLOYED	201	11,6
PRIVATE SECTOR	16	0,9
MILITARY / PARA-MILITARY / POLICE / WILDLIFE SERVICE, ETC,	72	4,2
HOME BUSINESS	20	1,2
RETIREE	13	0,7
HOUSE WIFE / UNPAID HOUSE WORK	159	9,2
OTHER	80	4,6

Education level.

More than three-quarters of the respondents only completed primary school or had even lower level of education. On the other hand, about 4% of respondents reported post-secondary education. The *“other”* (picked by 1%) typically consisted of university-level education that respondents did not associate with the post-secondary category.

Highest level of completed education	Frequency	Percent
NONE	889	51,2
PRIMARY	551	31,7
SECONDARY	217	12,5
POST-SECONDARY	61	3,5
RELIGIOUS	2	0,1
OTHER	14	0,8
DO NOT KNOW	3	0,2

Income.

The questionnaire did not ask a direct question on income levels, but asked respondents to indicate if they felt better or worse off than others in their area. The distribution of the responses was fairly typical: most (54%) respondents felt they were worse off than others in their vicinity, although about 7% who felt they had more income than the average household in their area. Item-level non-response (those who refused to answer, or said they did not know—which is often a polite refusal in such questions) only amounted to about 5% of the sample.

Household income / Income deprivation	Frequency	Percent
... MORE INCOME THAN MOST FAMILIES AROUND	126	7,3
... ABOUT AS MUCH INCOME AS OTHERS	589	33,9
... LESS INCOME THAN MOST FAMILIES AROUND	931	53,6
DO NOT KNOW	85	4,9
REFUSE TO ANSWER	7	0,4
OTHER	14	0,8
DO NOT KNOW	3	0,2

Ethnicity.

Similarly, the questionnaire did not ask the precise ethnicity of the respondents, only if they belonged to the majority or minority in their area – to provide context for victimisation experience and firearm-related attitudes. 82% of the respondents said they came from the (local) dominant ethnic group, while 17% represented ethnicities that were in minority in their area (1% could not give a reply).

Case counts of various segments used in the data analysis

The table below provides a summary about the weighted and unweighted number of cases for the various analytical segments we used throughout the data analysis. In some analyses that focused on a sub-population within the overall sample (i.e. firearm owners, or victims of violence), the counts in each group are respectively smaller.

		Unweighted Count	Weighted Count
REGION	Greater Upper Nile	374	612
	Greater Equatoria	554	553
	Greater Bahr el Ghazal	810	573
STATE	Jonglei	374	612
	Western Equatoria	207	207
	Central Equatoria	347	346
	Warrap	245	173
	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	331	234
	Western Bahr el Ghazal	234	166
LEVEL OF URBANISATION	Urban	407	373
	Rural	1331	1365
SEX OF RESPONDENT	Female	987	982
	Male	751	756
AGE OF RESPONDENT	Below 21	127	126
	22-29	325	316
	30-39	493	483
	40-59	555	562
	60 or older	210	225
COMPLETED EDUCATION	No formal education	863	891
	Completed primary	558	551
	Completed secondary or higher	296	279

Table continued next page...

MAIN OCCUPATION	Agrarian profession	844	901
	Self-employed	23	20
	Employee	215	200
	Armed profession	63	72
	Economically inactive	298	263
INCOME LEVEL	More income	137	126
	Average	524	589
	less income	972	931
ETHNIC BELONGING	Majority	1398	1430
	Minority	324	291
FIREARM IN HH	Firearm in HH	255	268
	No firearm in HH	1456	1446
VIOLENCE VICTIM IN HH	Victim of violence in HH	396	450
	Not a victim	1320	1270
GENDER COMPOSITION OF THE HH	Female-only HH	196	208
	At least one male in HH	1542	1530

Table ends...

Safety and security


Security perceptions

Although the HH survey was carried out in a period in which widespread armed conflict was not underway and took place only areas where surveyor safety met a minimum threshold, almost half of those interviewed felt they were living in an ongoing armed conflict (48%). In Greater Upper Nile, the proportion was much higher (86%). Six in ten respondents in the total sample agreed that firearms caused many deaths in the local area (61%), and over half reported that people recently have been displaced in their area due to armed violence (56%). The same proportion (56%) indicated that livestock rustling is a big concern in their area (for respondents who reported living in areas suitable for cattle and outside of urban settlements).

Arms are not only used to wage war, but also to commit criminal violence: half of South Sudanese people felt that armed robberies were frequent in their area or were a “big concern” (48%) and almost as many said that kidnapping was an acute problem in their area (46%).

However, not all parts of the country are equally affected by these concerns. In Greater Upper Nile (GUN), 86% of respondents said armed conflict is on-going; in Greater Bahr el Ghazal (GBeG) it was 30%; in GE, 24%. The disparities were also reflected in perceptions of the role of firearms: 96% in GUN thought that firearms caused many deaths compared to 44% and 38% in GBeG and GE, respectively; 92% in GUN likewise reported displaced people in their area compared to 33% in GBeG and 38% in GE. Violent crime was also affecting GUN significantly more than others: 97%

Percentage of respondents who felt they were living in an ongoing armed conflict



6 IN 10 respondents agree that firearms caused many deaths in the local area

56% have been displaced in their area due to armed violence




of those living in rural areas in Jonglei state reported livestock rustling being frequent (a crime usually committed by armed groups), 94% said kidnapping was frequent or big concern, and 68% thought that armed robberies are a problem. All these problems were seen as much less widespread in other regions, usually with half as many or fewer confirming these to be serious concerns in their local areas. While livestock (that is, cattle) rustling in South Sudan is a rural problem (59% versus 42% in those areas where people still felt this was a problem that could apply to their area), other types of armed robberies are more concentrated in urban areas (urban: 59%, rural: 45%).

43% of South Sudanese people specifically reported that attacks on their communities by armed groups are of a frequent or big concern. This again was by far the most widespread in GUN (79%), but significant minorities in GE (18%) as well as in GBeG (29%) confirmed that such attacks take place.

Sexual assaults by armed individuals is relatively less frequently mentioned as a major concern (as the questionnaire put it: a “big” concern): 27% reported this was an acute issue in their area. This figure is again the highest in Jonglei / Greater Equatoria, where 34 % of respondents confirmed this being a frequent form of armed violence. Sexual violence seems to be more an urban problem: respondents from urban neighbourhoods were more likely (36%) than their rural counterparts (25%) to consider this a serious issue. Difference between

Security of local area

Q I will now read out several statements. Please respond by indicating if you agree or disagree with each item. Please feel free to tell me if any of these do not apply to your area.



Base: all respondents, 'not applicable' answers disregarded.

Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

male and female respondents, or across other socio-demographic strata, was minimal and corresponded mostly to the urban-rural difference (i.e. people with agrarian occupations felt this was a lesser concern).

Illegal roadblocks (which are forms of extortion typically committed with the threat of firearms) was reported to be a frequent or major concern by one quarter of the respondents (25%) – without significant variance across

regions or social strata, however those belonging to the local ethnic minority were clearly more likely (35%) than others (23%) to express concerns in this regard.

The only problem in this list which was not directly related to security, corruption, was rather equally regarded as a major or frequent concern in all regions: the proportion of affirmative responses varied between 48% and 52%, resulting in a national average of 50%.

Most of these items were asked from the general population sample only. However, some of these local area concerns were tested with the community leaders in the areas where NSAASS took place, to obtain a second perspective of the responses received from the general population. One item about firearms trade was also asked from local community leaders (CSO) as well as from local law enforcement officers (LEA) – some other aspects were tested with CSO respondents only. People from the household sample were more likely to perceive firearms trade to be present in their local area (with 28% having confirmed it) compared to either CSO (17%) or LEA (18%) respondents. Quite remarkably, 26% and 29%, respectively, in the opinion leader groups chose to answer “don’t know” to this question. As to the perception of people being displaced in the local area, the rate of affirmative replies between HH and CSO respondents were virtually identical (56% and 58%, respectively). Opinions also converged when asked about attacks from neighbouring tribes: 48% of the general population and 54% of the community leaders felt this was a great concern.

Sexual assaults, on the other hand, were regarded as being widespread by more people in the general population (27%) than among CSOs (19%). Conversely, a higher proportion of CSOs felt that attacks on their communities by armed groups was a major concern (59%) when compared to the opinions of the general population (43%). In any case, the general sense of the relative more and less important security concerns in the local area was very similar among the leaders and the members of the communities.

Small arms possession and reported sources

This section of the report discusses perceptions of firearms, reported possession, number and types of prevalent firearms, and sources. Note that all of the findings below described are based on self-reports of individuals who took part in the NSAASS, on behalf of their households.

Firearm perceptions

In South Sudan, people were about evenly split as to whether they found having weapons (firearms) as a necessity: 35% fully agreed that having a weapon is a necessity in their local area, while 37% strongly disagreed. If counting all affirmative responses together, exactly 50% of those interviewed tended to agree with this statement to some degree, and similarly, when combining all negative replies, 47% disagreed to some extent. Rural people were more likely than urban dwellers (53% versus 37%) to say this, and youngest were more likely than oldest (youngest age group: 57%, oldest: 35%). Those without any formal education were also more likely to be of the opinion that arming households is a necessity (56%, compared to 42% among those who at least completed high school). Local ethnic majority respondents were more likely than ethnic minorities to provide an affirmative response (52% and 36%, respectively). There were no significant gender differences.

While in most cases the opinions received from local community leaders corresponded with the responses received from the general population, in this question the opinions of the two groups clearly diverged. CSO respondents were clearly less likely to believe that having weapons is really a necessity in their area: 70% in total disagreed and half of the respondents even

Weapons a necessity? (%)		
Response	HH	CSO
STRONGLY AGREE	35	18
FAIRLY AGREE	15	9
FAIRLY DISAGREE	10	19
STRONGLY DISAGREE	37	51
DK	3	3
REFUSE	0	0

strongly disagreed with this proposition. Only slightly over a quarter (27%) in this respondent group thought having weapons being essentially required in the area where they lived. This finding is in fairly sharp contrast with the fact that the CSO group at the same time – despite their estimates about how widespread firearms were in there area being higher compared to the general population -- did not find the number of firearms in their area to be excessive (“too many”), as discussed at the end of the section “Perceptions of firearms in the local area”.

Going back to the general population, only 61% of those living in armed households (those who said they had at least one firearm) thought having weapons was necessary, on the other hand, 47% in households where reportedly were no firearms said it is in fact necessary to have a weapon of some sort. (Those with armed professions were one of the greatest advocates of having weapons being necessary in the area where they lived: 64 % agreed with this proposition). In households where someone was a victim of violence in the recent past people were much more likely (61%) than those without victimisation experience (47%) to consider weapons necessary.

Finally, these results varied heavily across states. As shown on the table below, respondents from Jonglei were much more convinced about the necessity to have weapons (70%), and figures were also relatively high in the states surveyed in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal. On the other hand, the vast majority disagreed with the proposition in the Greater Equatoria region as well as in Warrap.

Weapons in this area are a necessity (%)						
Response	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
STRONGLY + FAIRLY AGREE	79	28	38	37	53	50
STRONGLY + FAIRLY DISAGREE	20	66	57	58	44	46


Perceptions of firearms in the local area

When asked to estimate the number of people in their local area who have firearms, respondents remained fairly cautious: 15% said they could not tell (or, in a small proportion of cases, did not want to tell), and 24% said there are no firearms at all in their local environment. Only 1% told the enumerators that they thought almost all people in their area had guns, 7% said many people possess firearms. Typically people responded to this question by either stating that only very few people have firearms (36%) or that **“some”** people have such weapons (18%). Adding up all categories from very few to almost all, we find that 62% of respondents considered

civilians in their local area had firearms. This rate varied significantly across states, with Jonglei and Northern Bahr el Ghazal topping the ranking of states. The high ranking of Northern Bahr el Ghazal is partly due to the fact that respondents in this state were most outspoken: the lowest number of don't know responses were registered in this region. On the other hand, exactly one third of the respondents in Central Equatoria and 37% in Western Bahr el Ghazal suggested that nobody in their local area had guns.

Firearms in the local area

Q In your opinion, are there many people who have guns/ firearms in this area?



Base: all respondents.

Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

While the opinions of the community leaders and local law enforcement officers are broadly resembling those detected among the general population, these local leaders were more inclined to feel that firearm ownership was in fact very widespread in their local community, with 19% of CSO as well as LEA respondents indicating that many or almost all households in their local area had firearms. About three in ten (27% among CSOs and 30% of LEAs), on the other hand, said that nobody in their community had firearms – this is also slightly above the level recorded from household respondents.

When asked about the recent dynamics of the proliferation in firearms, many of these local community leaders had no clear

Households with firearms (%)			
Response	HH	CSO	LEA
NONE	24	27	30
VERY FEW	36	30	24
SOME	18	15	24
MANY	7	15	16
ALMOST ALL	1	4	3
DK	14	9	4
REFUSE	1	0	0

opinion: 26% could not answer the question. Of those who could formulate an opinion, the majority felt that the number of firearms has in fact decreased in their area (32%) as opposed to only 15% who felt that there are more guns in their communities compared to a year ago.

Perceptions of the most widespread weapons types in the local area

When asked what types of weapons are used in their local area, HH survey respondents most often confirmed the presence of automatic weapons (that is, AK47s) in their areas. More than half of the respondents replied that these are frequently used in their local area, and no other weapon, including non-firearms, came close to this figure in most parts of the country. Only in Greater Equatoria, crude and bladed weapons were more often said to be used in the respondents' areas than AKs. However, nationally, only about one quarter of respondents said that non-firearms are among the frequently used weapons in their area, and even fewer confirmed widespread use of rifles (13%) or handguns (8%). 5% indicated that military grade weaponry is often used where they live, and 3% reported frequent use of grenades and other explosives. 13% could not and 1% did not want to answer this question. Community leaders (CSO respondents) more or less confirmed these results: they also reported automatic weapons being most widespread (44% said they were typical in their area), followed by crude weapons (34%) – although this group felt that rifles or shotguns were more often used in their area (24%) than bladed weapons (21%). People from the CSO group systematically gave higher rates of confirmation about the presence of rifles (shown above), handguns (17%) and military-grade arms (9%) compared to the general population.

Weapons in local area

Q What types of weapons are frequently used in this area?



Base: all respondents.

Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

Reported firearm possession

Overall, **15% of all respondents indicated their household contained at least one firearm.** In the total sample, 1.3% avoided answering this question, stating either that they did not know if their household had guns, or said they would not tell. If we combine those avoiding response and those confirming firearm ownership (with the assumption that avoiding response is an indication of actually having a gun in the household but not wanting to tell about it), household level prevalence rate of firearm ownership is 17%. 83% of the respondents stated they had no guns in the possession of any household member.

Self-reported household firearm possession, by state (%)					
State	Has firearm	Does not have firearm	Can't tell	Refused	Yes + avoiding response
JONGLEI	21	79	1	-	22
WESTERN EQUATORIA	4	96	-	-	4
CENTRAL EQUATORIA	13	85	2	0	15
WARRAP	16	83	1	1	17
NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL	16	80	3	0	20
WESTERN BAHR EL GHAZAL	13	87	1	-	13
ALL AREAS SURVEYED	15	83	1	0	17

Prevalence rates varied considerably across regions, with Jonglei reporting the highest gun ownership (21%). In Western Equatoria, on the other hand, only 4% of respondents said they had (at least one) firearm in the household. The rest of the states were near the average of all respondents combined, indicating a prevalence rate between 13% and 16%.

More affluent households (21% vs. 14% among those who had below average income), and those who belonged to the local ethnic majority (17% versus 8% who were from the minority), were more likely to reporting having household firearms. Respondents belonging to typically poorer socio- demographic segments were also slightly less likely than others to indicate household firearms (those with agrarian professions, the economically inactive, those without any formal education) but even in these groups a fairly high share of respondents claimed to have a firearm at home.

There was no difference in reported gun possession according to the level of urbanisation. Finally, 45% of those with an armed profession said someone at home had a gun.

Based on data collected, some 115,000 to 287,000 households in the surveyed areas contain at least one firearm, generating an average of **192,000 households containing at least one firearm in the states surveyed.** These estimates, which are likely to be undercounts, are subject to the

following assumptions: that “**don’t know**” and “**refuse to answer**” responses do not imply gun possession; and that there is uniformity of household arming behaviours across government-held and non-government-held areas, and across surveyed and non-surveyed areas within regions.

It is possible to extrapolate from surveyed areas to a national estimate for the number of armed households in South Sudan. We estimate that some 162,000 to 436,000 households in South Sudan contain at least one firearm, generating an average of **285,000 armed households in South Sudan**. These estimates, which are likely to be undercounts, are subject the same assumptions as above, and that arming behaviours are similar within states in the same region (for example, across Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile; across Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria, and Western Equatoria; or across Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and Western Bahr el Ghazal).


It is further possible to generate a number of firearms in civilian hands across all of South Sudan based on these findings. Using extrapolation techniques, we estimate that some 232,000 to 601,000 civilians keep firearms in South Sudan, generating an average of **397,000 civilian-kept firearms in South Sudan**. This estimate, which is likely to be an undercount, is subject to the same caveats listed above.

Number of weapons

On average, there were 1.39 firearms per households in which a respondent reported that it contained a firearm. The majority of these households had a single firearm (79%), but 21% of the armed households reported having multiple firearms.

Number of firearms at home

Q Which type and how many firearms do people in this household have?



Base: respondents reporting a firearm in their household
Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

This survey found the highest number of firearms in armed households in Central Equatoria. In this state, the survey found two households with a fairly large self-reported arsenals (15 and 10 weapons, respectively), which drove this average up. But even without these two outliers, the reported number of weapons in household possession was highest in that state, with 1.58 firearms per armed household. The fewest number of guns per household was registered in Warrap (1.13).

Based on the number of reported firearms per household (derived from survey responses without any further adjustment), the direct estimate of number of firearms per 1,000 households is 214 for South Sudan, and ranges from 48 in Western Equatoria to 271 in Central Equatoria.

Types of firearms in civilian possession

Most surveyed households with firearms reported having an automatic assault rifle (typically AK47)⁹: 66% of the armed households reported having one or more such weapon. Rifles (15%) and handguns (10%) are reportedly far less widespread. Using a direct estimate from the survey responses, on average there were 118 automatic weapons, 22 rifles and 12 handguns per 1,000 households in South Sudan at the time of the survey. Considering the general population (all households), the highest penetration of assault rifles were found in Jonglei (with 207 per 1,000 households) and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (145), while the lowest in Western Equatoria (19 per 1,000 households).

Firearm owners

Almost without exception, respondents from armed households indicated that the primary owner(s) of the guns are adult males, typically in their thirties or early forties (45%). Nonetheless, one in five living in armed households refused to give specific information on the owners of the weapons: 7% said they could not tell whose are the weapons and 14% declined to answer this question. If we discount this set of respondents and focus only on those who were willing to answer the question about the specific owners of the firearms, we find that in 83% of the cases only males owned the firearms of the household, and only in 18% of cases we found female owners (these were the cases when the firearm was considered a household property and both male and female members were reported as owners). Ownership was found to be less imbalanced in Equatoria as well as in Western Bahr el Ghazal: in these states fewer than 6 in 10 gun owners were male. Usually it was a very small proportion where only females owned guns within the household, 6% nationwide (but 24% in Central Equatoria).

⁹ 'AK47' is here considered a generic category of assault rifle.

Gender of firearm owners (% , without nonresponse)							
Owner	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
MALE OWNER(S) ONLY	83	92	57	59	80	91	59
FEMALE OWNER(S) ONLY	6	3	0	24	7	2	0
OWNERS FROM BOTH GENDERS	12	6	43	17	13	7	41

Motivation for bearing arms

When asked what people had their firearms for, they most often said **they keep their firearms for self-defence: overall 71% of people living in armed households indicated that they keep a firearm for personal protection**. More specifically, 41% kept firearms against armed criminals, 37% to protect their property, including livestock. Somewhat smaller proportion said they armed against armed groups, and 7% specifically against SPLA. About a quarter (24%) of armed households said they had guns because they needed it in some kind of organised security or defence force – typically when working with the police, the armed forces or as a watchman, and in some cases as member of a local militia.

Responses obtained from community leaders confirmed this picture: the overwhelming majority of community leaders interviewed also thought that people keep their guns primarily for self-defence (personal protection from criminals: 60%, personal protection from armed groups: 42%, protection from SPLA: 23% and protection of property: 43%). 19% of the CSO respondents also agreed that people have firearms to take part in some organised security scheme, and 3% mentioned participation in militias.

In GE, well over half of the general population respondents (59%) told enumerators that they kept their guns (also) for hunting – in Central Equatoria this was the most frequently cited response (63%). Across all areas surveyed, the proportion of those keeping guns for hunting amounted to 17% (CSO respondents felt this as a less important reason, with only 8% confirming this option). Some 15% of the households kept their guns as a precaution for any emerging conflict or war, 21% in the CSO sample agreed with this proposition.


Purpose of firearms, by State (% of armed households, multiple answers were permitted)							
	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
FOR SELF-DEFENCE	71	81	63	40	80	74	57
PERSONAL PROTECTION FROM GANGS, CRIMINALS	41	37	63	29	70	44	33
PERSONAL PROTECTION FROM ARMED GROUPS	26	40	25	4	5	26	20
PROTECTION FROM SOUTH SUDAN MILITARY	7	4	25	2	5	19	13
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY (INCL. LIVESTOCK)	37	54	13	9	18	44	17
FOR ORGANISED DEFENCE / SECURITY	24	26	25	22	15	20	33
PART OF WORK EQUIPMENT (POLICE/SOLDIER/WATCHMAN)	22	24	25	22	13	19	30
TAKE PART IN LOCAL MILITIA	1	1	0	0	3	2	3
FEAR OF FUTURE CONFLICT, INSTABILITY, WAR	15	13	25	9	13	30	10
FOR HUNTING	17	6	63	58	13	7	3
PART OF TRADITION	3	0	0	7	0	13	0

For a sizable minority of general population respondents, weapons are considered multi-purpose tools – about 3 in 10 of all surveyed households (29%) had firearms serving at least two of the five general purposes this survey investigated (of the the five distinct dimensions listed in the table above). The majority of sole-purpose firearms were kept for self-protection (69%), 22% to participate in some type of organised security or defence scheme, and 9% for hunting. Very few single-purpose arms were said to be kept as general precaution for a possible future conflict (1%), or as part of tradition (2%).

Reported sources of supply

In general, respondents did not feel that civilian access to firearms was particularly easy.

As the graph below suggests, most people thought that acquiring a firearm in their local area was difficult. At the same time, only about one in five respondents (19%) said that getting a firearm in their area was impossible – interestingly enough, 14% of those who actually had a firearm at home (as it came up later during the interview) previously said it was impossible to acquire one. Again, a sizable minority of respondents did not know how easy or difficult was it to get a firearm in their area (11%). Variations across socio-demographic strata were rather negligible, the occupation, education level, sex, or age of the respondents did not influence opinions on how easy it is to acquire a firearm in the neighbourhood. But regional differences were once again found to be fairly pronounced.



Reported acquisition of firearms in local area (household respondents %)							
Response	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
FAIRLY/ RATHER EASY	4	2	7	4	2	9	6
COMPLICATED, BUT POSSIBLE	18	13	10	14	30	32	26
VERY DIFFICULT	48	70	52	36	26	26	36
IMPOSSIBLE	19	11	19	22	31	28	18
DO NOT KNOW	11	4	12	24	10	4	15
REFUSE TO ANSWER	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
POSSIBLE, COMBINED	70	85	69	53	59	68	68


Only 11% in Jonglei thought it was impossible to get a gun in their area, while 31% in Warrap had this opinion. Overall, the lowest proportion of respondents who were positive that firearms could be acquired in their local area was found in Central Equatoria (53%). In contrast, 85% in Jonglei told enumerators that one can get a gun in the local area, even if it is very difficult.

Generally, both local area community representatives (CSO) and law enforcement officers (LEA) seconded the opinion registered from the households that it is indeed difficult to get a firearm for civilians. Community leaders were most optimistic that it was impossible to acquire a firearm for civilians in their local area: only 63% felt this was possible for local residents. Representatives of the local law enforcement (police or in some cases, army) were more sceptical, only 5% thought that it was impossible to get a gun for someone interested. But even in this group, only a few respondents thought that this was an easy exercise (8%).

Acquisition of firearms for civilians is ... (%)			
Response	HH	CSO	LEA
FAIRLY/RATHER EASY	4	5	8
COMPLICATED, BUT POSSIBLE	18	21	27
VERY DIFFICULT	48	37	54
IMPOSSIBLE	19	21	5
DO NOT KNOW	11	16	5
REFUSE TO ANSWER	1	0	1
POSSIBLE, COMBINED	70	63	89

Source of civilian weapons

Q I will now read out several statement. Please respond by indicating if you agree or disagree with each item. Please feel free to tell me if any of these do not apply to your area.



Base: all respondents, 'not applicable' answers disregarded,
Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

Sources of firearms held by survey respondents

The most common reported source of household firearm reported by the general population respondents was by purchase (43%), but many weapons were acquired through other means. Based on the reports of armed households only, firearms are very often provided to households either for self-protection or for community protection by armed forces (military: 22%, police: 14%), or by the local authority (8%). One in 10 household representatives said at least one of their weapons was given by an employer (which employer was typically not the army or the police, however in a few cases such responses went together). Family and close social networks were also relatively important sources of firearms: 8% of armed households reported they got at least one of their guns from a friend or family member.

Considering the survey coverage area was government-controlled, it is no surprise that very few people said they got firearms from rebels groups (1%) – the same proportion who said they found their weapon or that they seized from a rival community during a raid. This survey found no household with self-crafted or rented firearms.

Several representatives of local law enforcement (LEA) as well as community leaders confirmed that firearms were indeed available from armed forces: 39% and 42%, respectively, indicated that it was

possible for civilians in their area to access guns from the military or the police. One in five community representatives even thought that this was fairly or very easy. Law enforcement officials were, on the other hand, less likely to admit that their organisation or their colleagues could provide firearms to the civilian population in their local area: 56% said this was impossible.

Availability of firearms from the police and the military (%)		
Response	CSO	LEA
IMPOSSIBLE	41	56
SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT	21	24
FAIRLY EASY	10	11
VERY EASY	10	3
DK	16	5
REFUSE	1	0
POSSIBLE, COMBINED	42	39

Where can firearms be acquired?


The majority of people surveyed reported purchasing their guns. In a separate question the survey asked where they think firearms could be bought or obtained otherwise. This question was asked from the general population – not just those who reported having firearms at home. NSAASS also asked this question from local community leaders (CSO) and local law enforcement officers (LEA).

Most people interviewed in the households told the enumerators that they had no idea where guns can be purchased or obtained (40%). An almost as high percentage of the CSO (34%) and LEA (32%) respondents were also uninformed (or dodged the answer with selecting the “**don’t know**” option).

Regardless of the respondent type, the two most frequent replies were that (a) people purchase those on the black market (HH: 29%, CSO: 57%, LEA: 51% -- community representatives were clearly more likely to name this source) and (b) that the local authority provides the firearms to people (HH: 27%, CSO: 14%, LEA: 22%). We presented earlier that only a small fraction of the privately held firearms our household respondents confirmed in their possession came from the local authority (8%), but a larger proportion said their guns were given by the military or the police (36% combined) – these may count towards this category as well. Only 5% of HH respondents believed that firearms are purchased legally on open markets, or can be bought from local manufacturers / gunsmiths, and 3% selected that firearms in their area are obtained from licenced dealers.

Where can firearms be acquired?

Q Where do you think people obtain or purchase their firearms from?



Base: all respondents
Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

Where are firearms obtained from? (%)			
Source	HH	CSO	LEA
LICENSED FIREARMS DEALER	3	5	11
BLACK MARKET	29	57	50
OPEN MARKET	5	5	1
LOCAL MANUFACTURERS / GUNSMITH	5	7	7
INHERITED FROM FAMILY	13	11	13
PROVIDED BY LOCAL AUTHORITY	27	14	22
OTHER	4	6	9
DK/REFUSED	40	34	32

LEA respondents were clearly more optimistic in the regard that firearms may be acquired from legitimate sources: 11% suggested people buy guns at licenced dealers (although only 5% of CSO respondents agreed). Remarkably, local community leaders were clearly less likely to name the local authority (or its armed proxies) as the source of civilian weapons (14%).

Quite a few household respondents suggested that firearms remain within the family: 13% said that guns in their area are inherited from their family. This more or less corresponds with the 8% of actual gun owners indicating that their gun came from friends or family, and the figure is broadly matching those given by CSO and LEA respondents (11% and 13%, respectively).

Attitudes towards civilian disarmament

Past and future disarmament

More than one in five (22%) respondents of the survey confirmed that there was some effort of civilian disarmament in the area they lived in the last two years. Most likely were those from Western Bahr el Ghazal to confirm disarmament taking place (32%) while there was essentially no reporting of such activity in Western Equatoria.

In the last two years, have civilians been disarmed in this area? (%)

Response	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
YES	22	27	3	25	24	14	32
NO	73	68	96	67	72	86	60
DO NOT KNOW	5	5	1	9	4	1	9
REFUSE TO ANSWER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Fewer respondents were aware of plans of any imminent or future disarmament: 11% of all respondents heard about such initiatives in their region. Western Equatorian respondents (22%) and those from Western Bahr el Ghazal were most conscious of such current or future plans.

Are you aware of any current or future plans to disarm civilians in this region? (%)

Response	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
YES	11	6	22	6	12	15	24
NO	75	87	63	78	63	73	57
DO NOT KNOW	14	8	15	16	25	12	19
REFUSE TO ANSWER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

The survey results suggest that **respondents in general did not have a positive experience with past attempts to disarm civilians, and more respondents felt that such operations actually decreased security in the areas where they took place** than the opposite (the question was asked of those who were aware of previous disarmament activities from the two years preceding the survey). These opinions were frequently even extreme, with the most (42%) stating that security decreased very much in the aftermath (or during) the disarmament activities. Altogether, 52% perceived negative changes, and only 36% felt that disarmament efforts contributed to the security of the areas they took place. Not many respondents felt that civilian disarmament had no effect on security in the affected areas (18% in all areas, although this was a relatively frequent response in Central Equatoria – see table below).

How do you think that the disarmament has changed the security of the population living in the disarmed areas? (%)							
Response	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria*	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
IT HAS DECREASED SECURITY VERY MUCH	42	66	(43)	15	29	22	27
IT HAS DECREASED SECURITY A LITTLE	10	7	(14)	20	2	4	16
IT HAS NOT MADE A DIFFERENCE	18	9	(14)	32	17	16	28
IT HAS INCREASED SECURITY A LITTLE	12	4	(14)	12	31	29	11
IT HAS INCREASED SECURITY VERY MUCH	14	14	(0)	9	17	29	15
DO NOT KNOW	4	0	(14)	12	3	0	3
REFUSE TO ANSWER	0	0	(0)	0	0	0	0

* VERY LOW NUMBER OF CASES, N = 7

The opinions received from different States were fairly polarised. In certain states (Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal) the overall balance of benefits and negative effects remained positive, but in the other states surveyed the picture was rather negative. Especially in Jonglei, where two-thirds of those aware of previous disarmament thought that their effect on security was rather catastrophic, and only 28 % saw any improvement in the security situation.


In another question, we asked respondents whether or not, in their opinion, some future civilian disarmament effort in their area could contribute to the security of their household or not. Note that the two questions are not directly comparable, as this one referred to the security of the household, while the previous one to the security of the area. In any case, the overall expectation was similar: on balance more people would anticipate a decrease in the security level with a future civilian disarmament than the opposite. **Overall, 45% would expect that their household would be less secure if civilians in the area would be disarmed and only 31% would expect positive changes in their level of security.**

If, in the future, there was disarmament in your area, how would this affect your household's level of security? (%)

Response	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
IT WOULD VERY MUCH DECREASE SECURITY	31	44	33	15	27	19	35
IT WOULD SOMEWHAT DECREASE SECURITY	14	17	13	13	7	10	16
IT WOULD NOT MAKE A DIFFERENCE	15	9	15	16	24	26	12
IT WOULD SOMEWHAT INCREASE SECURITY	15	12	11	15	16	26	19
IT WOULD VERY MUCH INCREASE SECURITY	16	17	18	16	14	18	12
DO NOT KNOW	8	1	10	23	12	1	6
REFUSE TO ANSWER	1	0	0	2	0	0	1

CSO respondents were highly polarised in this question, with about as many expecting a sharp decrease in security if a disarmament took place in their community (would very much decrease security: 33%) as the opposite (would very much increase security: 32%). Thanks to a slightly larger proportion that expected a modest positive effect (8% expected that disarmament would somewhat increase security, versus 5% who expected it to somewhat decline), the overall balance of the expectations tilted, however marginally, to the positive direction. In the general population, the negative expectation is fairly homogenous throughout the various socio-economic segments of the sample, with some slight variations.

The opinions are much less unidirectional when looking at the states. The graph presents the percentage point difference of the generally positive opinions (did/ would very much/somewhat increase security) on one hand, and the negatives (did/ would very much/somewhat decrease security) on the other. That is, if a score is zero, than the same proportion of people replied positively and negatively, if the score is positive that those with a positive opinion outnumbered those with a negative one, and finally, if a score is negative, than negative opinions outweigh the positive ones.



Giving up firearms

The survey asked all respondents (irrespective of their previous reports whether or not they had firearms in the household) how they would respond to a future civilian disarmament effort, if they had any firearms. This approach was adopted with the anticipation that a certain number of households would not admit to their guns to the enumerators, hence we did not want to restrict the investigation of attitudes towards a hypothetical future disarmament only to those openly speaking about their guns.

It is important to note that these responses do not directly predict or forecast the success of any actual disarmament operation but could indicate the relative openness of the population to cooperate in future efforts of organised civilian disarmament.

In the question we presented various rather independent options, based on the analysis of previous studies in comparable settings. These included:

- › Compliance (“give up all firearms”)
- › Outright resistance or non-compliance (“hide firearm(s)”, “fight to defend the right to keep firearm(s)”, “give up one firearm and hide rest”, “sell all firearm(s)”)
- › Avoidance (“relocate household”)
- › Compensation (“I would seek compensation”)
- › and other, miscellaneous responses to disarmament actions.

Looking at the full distribution of responses, it is evident that **the slim majority (52%) of the general population said they would be compliant and would give up all arms to the authorities.** About a quarter of the people indicated they would not or not fully comply, most of whom said they would hide all firearms they had (14%). Some said they would give up one firearm, but keep others (4%), and 2% were even willing to fight for his right to retain their weapon(s). 3% would sell on their firearms in such a situation, making the compliance with disarmament efforts someone else’s problem.

Reaction to future disarmament

Q Supposing that you had guns in your household, what would you think: If the government tried to disarm your household, how would you or your household members react?



Base: all respondents.


Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

Only 1% of respondents said they would simply relocate if there was a civilian disarmament operation in the area where they currently live. 6% said they would seek compensation in exchange of giving up their weapons and 3% replied in a way the enumerators could not code into any of the existing categories.

Differences across various socio-economic strata were miniscule, with the vast majority in each segment of the society being more willing to give up their guns than not. There was, however, an important predictor of future compliance: **those who had a recent violence victim in their family were less likely to give up their arms** (64% considering all respondents and 55% among those who also said they had firearms) than those who did not have such experience recently (72% and 62%, respectively). It may also be of some importance that – if reported firearm owners are concerned – those who belonged to the local majority were more likely to project a compliant behaviour (61%) than those from the local ethnic minority (53%).

The survey further asked those who said they would resist disarmament to explore their possible motivations to comply. First of all, 32% who said in the first place that they would not give up (all) their firearms said that nothing could convince them to do so. The most important condition for an increased compliance was – in line with earlier findings – that rival communities would also be disarmed (40%), and – maybe not in an unrelated manner – if threats to life and property would be removed (20%). Almost one in 10 respondents (17%) would be encouraged to give up their guns if they were compensated for them. For a small minority, a UN-led or other internationally organised disarmament would increase compliance (9%), and a similar proportion indicated that if the disarmament would involve a trusted local NGO, they would be more likely to comply. The “other” replies to this question were typically identical to those given to the previous one, mainly calling for an earlier disarmament of the rival communities, or stating conditions that eliminate the need of self-defence.

What could increase compliance with disarmament efforts?



Base: those who said they would resist disarmament Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

Violence and victimisation


Experience of violence

More than one quarter of those interviewed in South Sudan reported that they themselves or someone in their household fell victim to some form of violence in the “last one year”. Typically, these incidents did not happen to the respondent (the actual respondent was affected by violence only in 4% of the cases), but someone else in the household. As South Sudanese households are fairly large (in our survey the average household size was nearly 8 persons), these experience add up in a relatively high rate of victimisation on household level.

In many cases those who became targets, were confronted with violence multiple times. Only 58% of those who had violence victims in their household said their family was victimised only once in the past year. On the other hand, 20% of victims indicated that people in their family were exposed to two attacks, 10% reported 3 incidents and 9% said they were targeted 4 or more times (3% could not or did not want to tell). Using this number of attacks, we calculated one-year incidence rates of violence, where we first generated an average number of attacks suffered by 1,000 households within the one-year span prior to the interview, and then we estimated the individual incident rates of violence as well by dividing the number of experiences of violence of the household with the number of its members (the survey only asked the number of incidents on household-level, hence a direct estimate of individual-level violence incidence rate was not available from the data).

Experience of violence

Q Have you or any member of your household been a victim of a violent crime or violent encounter in the past year?



Base: all respondents.

Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

Prevalence and incidence rates of violence							
Prevalence	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
INDIVIDUAL PREVALENCE (%)	4,7	4,1	3,9	3,2	0,4	5,4	15,0
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL PREVALENCE (%)	26	42	20	12	7	19	34
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL INCIDENCE RATE OF VIOLENCE (PER 1,000 HOUSEHOLD)	489	707	295	326	98	375	838
EST. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL INCIDENCE RATE OF VIOLENCE (PER 1,000 INDIVIDUALS OF ALL AGES)	79	113	38	70	18	52	128

The analysis suggests that the household-level incidence rate of violence was 489 per 1,000 households in the areas surveyed, and the individual-level incidence rate was 79 per 1,000 people during the one-year span (June-July 2015 to June-July 2016).

When looking at these results in different states, Jonglei and Western Bahr el Ghazal emerge as those with the highest rates of violence. In Jonglei, 42% of households were exposed to violence in the 12 months preceding the survey and we registered 707 incidences of violence per 1,000 households. The similar figures were 34% and 838 in Western Bahr el Ghazal. Warrap seemed to be the safest for its residents with a fairly low 7% household level exposure to violence and an overall incidence rate of only 98 incidences of violence per 1,000 households.

Looking at the various socio-economic segments of the sample, several important observations can be made:

- » Most indicators of violence exposure suggest that people are less safe in urbanised areas than in rural places: urban residents had a higher likelihood to be victimised personally (7.7% versus 3.8%), and both the household-level (714) and individual-level (122) incidence rates were significantly higher than in rural areas (427 and 67, respectively).

- ▶ Male individuals are more likely to be victimised (individual prevalence rate: 5.9) than women (3.7). If we look at female-only households, household level violence prevalence (32% vs. 25%), household-level incidence rate (645 vs. 467) and also individual-level prevalence rate (128 vs. 72) were significantly higher compared to those who lived in households with at least one male member.
- ▶ The individual prevalence of violence increased with the age of respondent: those who were 60 or older were more than twice as likely to be personally victimised (8.2%) than those below 21 (3.2%).
- ▶ The better educated (those who finished at least secondary education) were more likely than others to experience violence.
- ▶ Ethnic minorities (those who belonged to a minority tribe in the area where they lived) were clearly more exposed to violence on an individual level (7.5% prevalence vs. 4.2% among those belonging to the majority), however, household rates were fairly similar in the two groups.
- ▶ On a personal level, violence prevalence was higher with those who lived in armed households (individual prevalence: 6.6% vs. 4.3%) but household rates of violence were closer (per capita incidence rate : 78 vs. 79)

Type of violence

Respondents who previously stated that they personally or someone else in their household fell victim to violence were asked to describe the most recent incident that took place within the past one year. Enumerators then coded these replies according to a number of categories that described various dimensions of the incident, including criminal category, perpetrator typology, etc. When we talk about crime types, what we really speak about are incidents of violence where the particular type was mentioned, often along with others.


A surprisingly high proportion of the violence incidents people reported about could be classified as murders – or attempted murders, if we consider the relatively low rate of fatalities in incidents that were described as such: according to the records of the enumerators, intentional killing was used to describe the last violent incident by 44% of victimised households. The same proportion mentioned just “shooting” in general (44%). One in five violent encounters were (also) described as robbery (19%) or livestock theft (19%).

In some cases violence did not materialise or it was used as some kind of a message, and the incident was described as a threat or intimidation (17%) – many of such incidents resulted in injuries or even death, as discussed further below.

Kidnapping (14%) and abduction (9%) were also fairly often recorded. Gang violence (14%), communal violence (13%), banditry (10%), political violence (7%) and revenge killings were also relatively frequent descriptions that violence-affected households offered to enumerators when they described the incident.

Type of violence

Q Still speaking of the most recent violent crime or violent encounter that happened to you or your household. How would you describe what happened?



Base: those with violence victims in the household.
Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

In order to simplify the analysis, we collapsed some categories from the full list into eight different types that we will use in further analysis. Furthermore, in order to get a full picture, we interpolated the results received from victims to the total survey population to identify the prevalence of various types of violence in South Sudan. This analysis shows that in an extremely high number of families (14%) were confronted with violence with the (anticipated) intention to kill within the past one year. This did not mean that these homicides were all completed or that they targeted the families directly (as mentioned, in many cases affected households reported no injuries or death as a result of the incident): some respondents could have referred to incidents where they were not the primary targets of violence.

About one in ten households reported to be affected by some unspecified armed violence (11%) or by violent property crime (9%). Kidnapping, gang violence and political violence affected 5%, each. 4% were exposed to threats or intimidation, and 2% reported cases of violence that involved violence against women and children. Again, these percentages refer to the total population covered by the survey.

Types of violence, by state, total sample (%)							
Prevalence	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
MURDER, HOMICIDE OR MANSLAUGHTER	14	28	5	2	2	7	15
UNSPECIFIED ARMED VIOLENCE	11	20	9	3	1	7	15
VIOLENT PROPERTY CRIME	9	15	6	5	2	5	6
KIDNAPPING	5	13	4	1	0	0	0
GANG VIOLENCE	5	13	1	1	1	1	1
POLITICAL VIOLENCE	5	11	0	2	2	4	3
THREAT / INTIMIDATION	4	7	6	4	0	2	3
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN	2	1	2	1	1	4	5

Jonglei, and to a lesser extent Western Bahr el Ghazal were the states where most types of violence were most frequent – this is not a surprise as violence in general was reported in highest numbers in these states already. What is interesting, that some of the violence types were essentially only recorded in Jonglei, where otherwise fairly rare violence types were relatively frequent (violence related to property, kidnapping, gang violence and political violence). It was also Jonglei that elevated murder and homicide as the number one violence type nationally: 28% of all respondents in this state said that they or their household members encountered some form of killing in the past one year.

Location

Still speaking of a representative cross-section of past victimisation (the most recent case households encountered), the survey asked people where they encountered this particular incident of violence. Based on the replies of victimised households, most violence was encountered at home (58%) and only 41% of the incidents occurred in public—most often on the street (13%), at a cattle camp (7%), on a farm (6%) or at work (4%).

The type of violence that were most probably encountered in public was political: 50% of these were encountered outside home. On the other hand, murder / homicide as well as kidnappings were said to have taken place more often than other crimes at home of the respondents (67% and 66%, respectively).

Kidnappings as well as violence against women and children took place on farms at above-average rates. Violence against women (and children) were also more likely than other forms of violence to happen at the workplace or on private land.

Streets and roads and places for public gatherings provided a scene for political violence more often than to other forms of violence.

Finally, cattle camps saw almost all forms of violence – especially threats, violent property crimes, kidnapping – in fairly high numbers, while camps were less frequently mentioned as places of murders/homicides or shootings in general.

Weapons used

In the vast majority of cases, when people were confronted with violence, the offenders used or displayed some kind of weapon: only in 3% of the cases respondents did not mention any weapons on the scene. Firearms and other light weapons played a dominant role (fired or not) in the violent encounters our respondents and their families were confronted with.

Corresponding to the general availability of various weapons in the country, AK47s (generally taken to cover a range of assault rifles) were used in most incidents (63%), followed by rifles or shotguns (22%). Remarkably, 16% reported that the last incident of violence they or their family fell victim to was committed with the help of military equipment, suggesting that the perpetrators could have come from the ranks of one of the armed forces operating in the country. In 7% of the violent encounters heavy explosives (grenades, launchers) were used.

In about one out of ten incidents of violence were crude (11%) or bladed (10%) weapons used (these two will be merged into a single non-firearm category in the later paragraphs). A similar percentage of violent encounters were committed using handguns (9%).

Weapons used against violence victims



Base: those with violence victims in the household.
Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

In all states but Central Equatoria, only a very small minority of incidents occurred without a weapon being present. (Note that the figures in the below tables are somewhat inflated because we excluded the nonresponse – the 10% who replied don't know – from the analysis). Crude and bladed weapons usually played a secondary role, although they were quite frequently used as primary weapons in attacks in Central Equatoria (where 28% of violence were committed by non-firearms only) and to a lesser extent in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (21%). Still, in the majority of cases, in all states, firearms were (also) used in violence incidents.

Type of weapons used against violence victims, by state (%)

Type of weapon	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
NO WEAPON WAS USED	4	0	9	19	8	9	3
ONLY FIREARM WAS USED	76	94	59	31	69	40	58
FIREARM AND NON-FIREARM WAS USED	12	5	21	22	8	31	22
ONLY NON-FIREARM WAS USED	9	1	12	28	15	21	16

Similarly, differences in the presence of firearms were only nuanced when we compare crime types. In each category, the vast majority of incidents involved firearms. The crime types where non-firearms played a greater role were political violence, threats / intimidations, and violence against women and children. In the latter cases about one in ten acts of violence went down without using any weapon.

Type of weapons used against violence victims, by violence type (%)

Violence against women and children	Threat / intimidation	Violent property crime	Political violence	Kidnapping	Gang violence	Murder, homicide or manslaughter	Unspecified armed violence	Violence against women and children
NO WEAPON WAS USED	9	4	3	2	0	1	0	10
ONLY FIREARM WAS USED	60	79	77	90	96	87	77	35
FIREARM AND NON-FIREARM WAS USED	15	12	5	5	3	11	21	32
ONLY NON-FIREARM WAS USED	16	6	15	2	1	2	2	24

Injury and death

Corresponding to the lethality of the weapons most often used in violent attacks in South Sudan, many families that encountered violence reported casualties resulting from it. Considering the last case of violence only, almost two-thirds (65%) of the households suffered injuries or had someone in the household die (see table below). Respondents admitted that 326 members of their households had suffered injury and 351 had been killed from mid-2015 to mid-2016.

Only 35% of the “most recent” incidents of violence did not result in any harm to the respondents households. The most likely to survive unharmed were in Western Equatoria (48%), Central Equatoria (43%), and Warrap (40%), while such chances were the lowest in Western Bahr el Ghazal (27%).

Injury and death caused by violence, by state (%)							
	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
NO INJURY OR DEATH	35	34	48	43	40	31	27
ONLY INJURY	20	18	20	45	27	19	13
DEATH AND INJURY	19	12	13	8	20	37	53
ONLY DEATH	26	37	20	5	13	13	7
DEATH TOTAL	45	48	33	13	33	50	60

An alarmingly high number of cases, the reported violence resulted in death: 45% overall indicated that someone in their household was in fact killed in the last incidence of violence respondents described. The highest fatality rates were detected in Bahr el Ghazal (West : 60%, North : 50%) and in Jonglei (48%).

Curiously, while the most lethal form of violence was indeed murder/homicide/manslaughter, in many cases no casualties were reported. Such type of violence resulted in death in the household of the respondents in 56% of cases. This is not much higher than the death rate connected to violent crimes (53% of incidents that were described as robbery, land dispute, banditry or livestock theft also resulted in household casualties). The least deadly form of violence was gang violence, which in 56% did not result in any injury and was fatal only in 29% of cases.

Injury and death caused by violence, by violence type (%)								
	Threat / intimidation	Violent property crime	Political violence	Kidnapping	Gang violence	Murder, homicide or manslaughter	Unspecified armed violence	Violence against women and children
NO INJURY OR DEATH	33	29	25	40	56	33	39	35
ONLY INJURY	31	18	26	15	15	12	13	27
DEATH AND INJURY	15	21	17	17	16	22	24	34
ONLY DEATH	22	32	32	28	14	34	24	5
DEATH TOTAL	37	53	49	45	29	56	48	38

Victims of violence

Victims of violence were typically males (58% of all violence targeted males only), attacks where the victims were only females were much rarer (8%). In the rest of the cases victims from both genders were reported (26%), or the respondent could not or did not want to tell the background of the victims.

Regardless of their gender, violence victims were most frequently middle-aged persons (aged 30-45), and young adults (aged 18-29) were the second most frequently targeted demography.

Children were the least likely victims of violence, 9% of households mentioned that a boy and 4% that a girl aged 17 or below (was among those who) encountered the most recent act of violence the household was exposed to.


Reporting to the authorities and perpetrators

Reporting rates of crimes household respondents told enumerators about were unusually high in this survey. Corresponding to the severity of the violence the respondents described, most cases (72% of the incidents) were *officially* reported to some authority. Reporting rates were highest in Jonglei (76%), Northern Bahr el Ghazal (74%) and Western Bahr el Ghazal (72%), where severity of violence was also the highest, and lowest in Central Equatoria, where only 54% of violence the households suffered was brought to the attention of any official or other authority that was in the position to do something about it, such as find and punish the perpetrators, or prevent further similar attacks.

Violence against women and children was the type of violence that got most often reported (86%), on the other hand, 58% of violence related to property was brought to the attention of some

Reporting rates of violence, by area.

Q Did you or anyone else officially report this incident anywhere?



Base: households that encountered violence. *Source:* South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

authority. Reporting rates were also high when the incident was described as murder (or homicide or manslaughter: 80%) or if it was a shooting (81%).

Consequently, violence committed with the help of firearms were reported in somewhat higher proportion than other types: 86% of the incidents where firearms and other weapons were also used and 74% of the cases where only a firearm was used was made a report about. Those attacks where only non-firearms were used were also reported in high proportion (70%), while only about a half of those violent incidents were brought to the attention of the authorities where no weapons were used (49%).

Overall, considering not just the official ways of reporting, almost without exception, people told someone about the violence they experienced. Only 3% said that they did not tell anybody about the violent incident they described to the enumerator.

Most often, law enforcement, such as police (66%) or the military (27%) were made aware of the cases of violence. Local informal justice systems were also notified in relatively high proportion of cases (chief or chief's court: 31%). Social networks were also very often alerted of the violence the sampled households suffered: 36% told about it their family, 30% their neighbours and 23% their friends. (Again, multiple responses were permitted, so one could name any number of these possibilities).

The less frequently mentioned answer categories were religious leaders (6%) and private security providers (5%).

Essentially nobody brought their case to the attention of a formal court (1%), they rather used the police as the logical intermediary if they wanted to report the case to the official justice system. As the survey could not access the territories under opposition control, the proportion of those who mentioned their case was brought to the attention of the rebel military, was close to zero (1%).

The 8% 'other' replies partly consisted of complaints, that there was nobody to report their case to (*"it was a rebel attack so there's nowhere you can report to"* or *"no one, because there's no one to report to"*) and partly accounts of no-reports (*"nobody"* or *"not reported to any authority"* or *"we never informed anyone about incident because they already knew about it."*) Some people notified local youth, some the payam administration (or county commissioner)

Despite the high rate of reporting, most respondents from households affected by violence told the enumerator that the perpetrator(s) of the attack they suffered were never caught and punished. In an alarmingly low proportion, only in 4% of the reported cases was the perpetrator captured and punished (by formal or traditional courts). In other 2% of cases the perpetrators were punished outside of the various systems of justice (punished informally or by mob justice). In most cases however, simply nothing happened after the report (64%). It is equally remarkable that 15% said that the perpetrators of the violence were identified, but no further action was taken. 4% said that their case was still pending.

Firearm accidents

Firearms may not only inflict harm on people when they are deliberately used on them, but firearms that aren't properly kept or handled can also be dangerous, even deadly. Overall, 8% of our respondents indicated that someone in their household had a firearm accident over the past 12 months (the individual level rate of firearm accidents was 2%). In the 1738 households this survey reached out to we recorded 201 firearm accident-related injuries and 142 deaths.

Firearm-related accidents were much higher in Northern (12% on household level), but especially in Western Bahr el Ghazal (21%) compared to the other states the survey covered. Not just their frequency, but also their severity was among the highest in these states: in Western Bahr el Ghazal 82% of the households that confirmed at least one firearm-related accident reported a related death. The same figure was nominally the second highest in Warrap, but due to the very low number of reported cases, this figure may be misleading. The low proportion of accidents that did

not result in any injury may suggest that respondents tended to report cases that resulted in injury and tended to forget about those cases that left everyone in the family unharmed.

Firearm accident and related injuries, by state (%)							
	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
FIREARM ACCIDENT RATE							
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL	2.1	1.6	1.4	0.9	0.0	3.6	6.9
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL	7.6	5.4	6.2	4.6	2.0	12.4	21.4
OUTCOME OF FIREARM ACCIDENT, HH LEVEL							
NO INJURY OR DEATH	15	20	15	25	(0)	12	10
ONLY INJURY	26	30	69	31	(20)	24	8
DEATH AND INJURY	44	25	8	19	(60)	59	76
ONLY DEATH	15	25	8	25	(20)	5	6
FATAL ACCIDENTS, TOTAL	59	50	15	44	(80)	63	82

Remarkably, while firearm accidents were indeed higher among firearm owners (13% on household level), those who reportedly did not have any guns at home also reported such accidents affecting some household members (7%). It is impossible to tell if this figure indicates some resistance in reporting household firearms, or that these cases came into contact with firearms elsewhere where they had the reported accident. It is noteworthy that those with violence victims in the households were significantly more likely to report firearms accidents affecting household members (21%) than those not reporting any violence from the past year (3%). Here we can assume a certain level of interaction effect in the sense that locations where violence is most widespread has the most armed households, and also that the experience of violence (which is typically armed in South Sudan, as shown above) triggers people to attend to their weapons more frequently. But we can't exclude that a certain part of the reported cases of (armed) violence were in fact firearm accidents that injured or killed household members.

Other strata where firearm-related injuries were higher were urban areas (12% compared to 6% in rural areas), those with higher level of education of household income. The latter two is correlated to firearm possession as well as to the number of firearms people had at home.

Respondents from local law enforcement (LEA) also reported grave concerns with gun security and discipline: overall 17% of LEA representatives in the survey area have confirmed that they themselves have been injured by an accidental firearm shooting in the year preceding the survey. (Note that the question is ambiguous in the sense that these accidental shootings might have occurred by law enforcement personnel, or others.) An incredibly high number, 61% reported that their colleagues in the local law enforcement suffered injuries from accidental firearm discharge.

Perceptions of security and security providers

Reported presence of security providers


Overall, 74% confirmed that there was some institution or group in their local area that was supposed to provide security for the residents, and almost a quarter (24%) of the respondents felt there was no security provision in the area where they lived.

The state where security provision was available to most respondents was Warrap, but even here, 20% of those interviewed said they were essentially defenceless against crime and violence, as far as any institutionalised response was concerned. The variation of the general availability of some form of organised security was fairly low: the gap between the lowest and highest results was only 11 percentage points.

On the other hand, the organisations that respondents reported to be present to provide security around the place they lived, were more diverse. Police presence for example was only 40% in Central Equatoria and 38% in Western Equatoria, while 67% in Jonglei and 69% in Western Bahr el Ghazal. Nationwide, 59% of the respondents reported that police was available in their local area, 20% said their local authority was there to provide security, and 16% referred to the military as local security providers. Especially in the states where these state controlled forms of (formal) security provision were less present, the tradition forms of justice and law enforcement were more prevalent.

Security provision

Q Are there institutions or groups that are supposed to provide security to your area?



Base: all respondents.

Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

Presence of institutions or groups that provide security, by state (% , all respondents)							
	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
ANY INSTITUTION OR GROUP	74	73	73	73	82	74	77
POLICE	59	67	38	40	74	63	69
RELIGIOUS LEADERS	3	0	5	6	4	2	6
TRADITIONAL LEADERS (CHIEF)	29	9	58	46	26	44	14
MILITARY	16	29	11	9	1	13	8
REBEL GROUPS	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
PEACE COMMITTEE	1	1	1	2	0	1	4
PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDERS	4	9	1	0	0	2	1
LOCAL AUTHORITY	20	34	11	19	7	9	8

Especially the village chief filled in the security void in areas not covered by state-run law enforcement: 29% nationwide, but 58% in Western Equatoria, 46% in Central Equatoria and 44% in Northern Bahr el Ghazal mentioned security provision related to the village chief to be available in their area.

Combining police, military, local authority and peace committees, we established that for 63% of the households, some form of formal security provision was available. As mentioned earlier, for 26% no security was provided by any group or institution. For the remaining 12% informal security and justice systems were available only.


The availability of some formal security provision was above average in cities (urban: 70%, rural: 60%), these seemed to be more available for male respondents (66% as opposed to 60% of females) – also slightly more available to households with at least one male member (63% versus 59% in women only households). Formal security was more often available to those with higher levels of education (68%) and especially income (78%).

There was no difference in this regard according to the ethnicity of respondent (if (s)he was from the local majority or minority).

Availability of security provision

Q Are there institutions or groups that are supposed to provide security to your area? [If YES] Who are these institutions or groups that are supposed to provide security?

■ formal security present
 ■ only informal security
 ■ no security provision



Base: all respondents. Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July

Likelihood of reporting violence


We already established that the vast majority of the violence that occurred to the households got reported somewhere (72%). In a separate question we asked respondents whether or not – if they encountered or just saw any violence or crime – they would report this crime to anyone.

Irrespective of their background and socio-economic status, the vast majority of the respondents stated that they would report crimes if they saw one: 84% of those interviewed answered affirmatively.

People would primarily turn to police (58% said they'd go to the police in the first place), but many considered their local chief as the first authority to be informed about the crime (27%). These two were also named as recipients of the reports people made about their past violence victimisation experience (66% of victims notified the police and 31% told the chief about the incident, see section above). Formal local authorities were picked by a smaller minority (8%), while no other institution or group was mentioned by more than 2% of those interviewed.

Reporting of crimes and violence

Q Would you inform anyone / or report anywhere if you saw or experienced any crime or violence? ...
[If yes] Which of the following institutions or groups would you inform in the first place?



Base: all respondents (first graph), those willing to report (second graph)
Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July




Policing and crime control


We asked respondents how they felt about the availability and reliability of the police in their area. As clarified earlier, many respondents did not feel the police to be present in their area at all – or at least in a way that it would be able to actually provide security for the locals (41%). Despite this fact, and the high rate of violent criminality respondents reported during the questionnaire, the satisfaction levels with important aspect of the quality of policing and crime control are perhaps surprising: overall 55% regarded access to police (or military, serving crime control purposes) to be called very or quite easily in case of distress, and almost half of the respondents (48%) also stated that they would respond to such calls very or quite fast. This item we also tested with our CSO respondents, who confirmed that police response is typically slow (54% said it was quite or very slow) – 19% felt that response time was quite and 24% that it was very fast, essentially matching the figures received from the household respondents. Overall, about two thirds in the general population (64%) regarded the quality and policing in their area as very good or fairly good.

The surprisingly high ratings may be related to the fact that people tended to perceive crime control to be improving (35%) rather than to be declining (16%) in their area over the past year. Most respondent thought that the quality of policing did not change significantly recently (41%). There was only one state where the general perception of the policing had on balance deteriorated: in Western Equatoria more respondents said that over the past year policing (provided by the police or by the army) has deteriorated (29%) than the opposite (24%).


Quality of policing and crime control



Q How fast do the police/army in this area react when they are informed about an ongoing incident?



Q What is your perception of the overall ability of the police/army to prevent and control crime? Do you think they do a very good job, a fairly good job, a fairly poor job or a very bad job?



Base: all respondents.

Source: South Sudan NSALW, 2016 June-July


Policing and crime control, by state (% , all respondents)							
	All areas surveyed	Jonglei	Western Equatoria	Central Equatoria	Warrap	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Western Bahr el Ghazal
IMPROVED	35	33	24	38	47	28	43
STAYED THE SAME	41	43	30	38	29	63	33
GOT WORSE	16	16	29	12	11	7	21
DK+REF.	9	7	18	11	13	2	3
PERCEPTION OF QUALITY POLICING	39	46	29	31	52	37	30

Most favourable perceptions of the short-term dynamics of the policing was recorded in Warrap, where almost half of the individuals interviewed thought crime control to be improving (47%) and only 7% felt a decline. No change in the quality of policing was most often registered in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (63%).

The last row of table above presents a percentage of those who felt police was (relatively) easily accessible, that they respond to distress calls (relatively) fast and that they do a (relatively) good job in controlling crime and violence. The perception of quality policing percentage, in the last row of the table above, provides a summary percentage of all respondents who answered all three items positively. According to this indicator, policing seems to be most effective in Warrap (52%), but also in Jonglei (46%). Lowest ratings were, on the other hand, registered in Western (29%) and Central Equatoria (31%) as well as in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (30%).

Absolutely counter-intuitively, perceptions of quality policing were stronger in rural (43%) than in urban areas (24%). Those with relatively higher incomes were also slightly more favourable about policing quality than others. Those with firearms regarded policing quality much higher than people living in unarmed households (47% vs. 38%). This is partly due to the fact that those in armed professions typically had more favourable opinion about policing, and were more likely than others to have guns at home – but even without them the respective proportions were 45% and 37% among armed and unarmed households. At the same time, there was no difference in the ratings between those who represented households that faced violence and those who did not. A significant difference was however recorded according to the ethnicity of the respondent: those who belonged to the local majority were much more likely to be satisfied with the quality of policing and crime control (42%) than those from the minority (22%).





National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan

A UNDP-supported baseline assessment of civilian firearm holdings, violence victimisation, and perceptions of security in South Sudan

Final Report for UNDP
Small Arms Survey – December 2016
(revised February 2017)



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