Development Solutions Think Piece Series

No. **2**

Anti-Corruption Policies and Institutions in Korea and Singapore:

A Comparative Perspective and Lessons Learnt on Corruption Prevention and Control for Developing Countries

UNDP Seoul Policy Centre
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Acknowledgements

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Foreword

Corruption remains a serious global challenge that impedes sustainable development and promotes inequality and injustice. Fighting corruption is a critical part not only of strengthening accountability and rule of law, but also of ensuring effective and efficient use of financial resources for development.

People all around the world care about this issue. More than 5 million voters in the United Nations Development Program's global My World survey have ranked "honest and responsive governments" among their top four priorities for the new post-2015 development agenda which member states will negotiate next year. As a result, Sustainable Development Goal #16 in particular includes specific targets on anti-corruption.

Historically, the Republic of Korea struggled to address various forms of corruption, such as bribery offenses, political corruption, and collusion between political elites and businesses throughout the industrialization period. Having made a successful transition from being one of the poorest aid-recipient countries to a member of OECD Development Assistance Committee, Korea has made significant achievements in tackling corruption as part of its democratization and governance reform processes. In recent years, Korea's successes in improving public service through anti-corruption measures and the development of innovative tools for corruption prevention have been recognized internationally, and relevant Korean institutions now share Korea's experience and knowledge abroad through various forums and training sessions.

On the UNDP side, UNDP's niche and comparative advantages on anti-corruption comes from decades of experience related to governance as well as its presence in some 170 countries and territories with a dedicated global network of more than 300 governance and anti-corruption focal points. With its longstanding commitment to strengthening institutions and supporting governance reforms, UNDP applies its governance approach to preventing corruption by integrating anti-corruption with other areas of governance support such as public administration reform, legal reforms, local governance, youth and women's empowerment, and strengthening civil society and media.

In this context, the UNDP Seoul Policy Centre has commissioned this comparative study of Korea and Singapore. Singapore was chosen not only because it is commonly cited as a model case in the Asian region for anti-corruption, but also because of the different approaches it has applied to fighting corruption compared to Korea, which makes the study interesting. The objective of this paper is to draw lessons learned on anti-corruption policies and to inspire informed discussions on effective approaches to fighting and preventing corruption.

The paper has been produced as part of the UNDP Seoul Policy Centre's Development Solutions Partnerships (DSPs) programme on anti-corruption. DSPs are key means of fulfilling USPC's mandate to share Korea's experience with the wider UNDP network and enhance the Korea-UNDP partnership on strategic development issues globally. On SDG 16, USPC has developed and implemented two DSPs during 2015-2017—one sharing the anti-corruption evaluation methodology of the Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) of Korea, and another on sharing Seoul Metropolitan Government's Clean Construction System for efficient and transparent management of public construction projects.

Let me be clear: There is no universal model of successful anti-corruption policies, and knowledge exchange does not imply direct replication or transplantation, due to different political, socio-economic and legal contexts. Nevertheless,

I believe this does not stop us from learning from the experience of other countries. Rather, it highlights the need for in-depth studies and practical knowledge exchanges. From this perspective, I hope that this paper will provide critical reflections and recommendations on effective anti-corruption strategies and necessary institutional arrangements, based on the lessons learned from the comparative experiences of Korea, Singapore and UNDP globally.

Last but not least, I would like to thank the authors, Professor Jin-Wook Choi at Korea University, Dr. Joonghoon Park at the Korea Institute of Public Administration, and my colleague, Ms. Ahjung Lee (Policy Specialist at the UNDP Seoul Policy Centre) for producing a highly relevant and interesting paper.

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Balázs Horváth

Director of the UNDP Seoul Policy Centre

About the Seoul Policy Centre

For more than 40 years (1963-2009), UNDP has supported the people and Government of Korea, delivering 270 projects in 20 areas mirroring Korea's development path. UNDP closed its Country Office in 2009, as Korea joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), affirming its status as a significant contributor of development aid. In this context, the UNDP Seoul Policy Centre (USPC) was established in 2011, with the objective of brokering new partnerships between Korea and the developing world through UNDP networks.

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Corruption, Development and Governance :

Introduction

A. Corruption, Development and Governance: A General Explanation

Prevalence of corruption seriously undermines every corner of society. Drawing on several sources, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) highlights key economic costs of corruption as follows (UNDP, 2016):

- The World Bank Institute estimates that US$1 trillion is paid in bribes annually.
- The Asian Development Bank states that a country could lose up to 17 % of its GDP because of corruption.
- Global Financial Integrity notes that the volume of illicit financial flows from Africa was about US$1.8 trillion during the period of 1970-2008.

However, these opportunity costs are not the only negative consequences of corruption. Corruption penetrates and taints governments, markets, the media and even civil society. Corruption in politics weakens the foundation of governance and hinders democracy, as the rule of law falters when the nation is governed by corrupt politics. Corruption in the government undermines state capacity, and policies made by corrupt civil servants create structural poverty. Corruption in the market hinders efficient allocation of scarce resources, seriously undermines incentives to work, invest and save in corruption-ridden countries, and diverts public proceeds from economic activities. Over time, such negative economic effects cumulate to disastrous levels, leading to substantial and increasing differences in economic development relative to countries with low levels of corruption. There are also threshold effects of corruption: some high-risk (yet innovative) private activities would not take place in a corruption-ridden environment, robbing the country of breakthroughs in high-tech, for example. Furthermore, corruption in the media and civil society leaves a vacuum in which corrupt politicians, civil servants and business people exploit resources with no fear of being checked and monitored (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; UNDP, 2008a; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) et.al., 2010).

As such, although corruption may appear to facilitate economic development at certain points in time (for instance, by fast-tracking decision making and resource allocation), it eventually makes a serious negative impact on the country's development. When a country is unable to prevent and control corruption, its citizens cannot enjoy equal opportunities for social development, and inequalities tend to escalate. Moreover, corruption raises the potential returns to bribing the right person, and also reduces the expected gains from true innovation or hard work, because of the knowledge that others, paying bribes, can overtake true innovators and hard workers. Thus, it distorts incentives: it will be rational (because potential risk-adjusted rewards are larger) to put efforts in navigating the corrupt system, rather than in innovating, investing, or expanding production. Corruption also diminishes the effectiveness of diverse forms of aid in the arena of international development cooperation (Hart, 2015; Johnsøn et. al., 2012). Sustainable and equitable national development cannot be achieved with pervasive corruption.

The dangers of corruption matter in every country, regardless of the income level. But the strength of institutions matters. In general, corruption therefore poses a more serious challenge in developing countries that are without accountable governance systems.

The linkage of corruption and development has become a more prominent development issue in the era of globalization, with intensified and expanded flows of illicit resources across national boundaries. Recognizing the importance of tackling corruption, diverse efforts at the national as well as international levels have thus multiplied since the 1990s (Mccoy, 2001). A series of new anti-corruption agencies (ACA) were established in the 1990s in developing countries (Meagher, 2005). Diverse forms of aid from donors and international organizations have been provided to developing countries to assist in their anti-corruption and governance reform efforts (Doig, 1995). In addition, there have been a multitude of scholarly studies and policy reports on corruption, many of which have attempted to provide developing countries with suggestions and recommendations on anti-corruption. Concerted efforts of the international community to bring corruption to the forefront of global agendas culminated in the adoption of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) by the United Nations General Assembly in 2003 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UNDP and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 2012).

Box 1. Corruption as One of the Biggest Challenges in Development

In a 2014 survey, the Pew Research Center, a U.S.-based nonpartisan think-tank, found that corruption is considered by respondents to be the second biggest problem after crime in 34 emerging and developing countries.. The percentage of respondents who thought that the seriousness of these problems increased in the last seven years is given below. For example, the median of those who replied that "corruption is a very big problem" rose from 63% in 2007 to 73% in 2014. It becomes obvious that more people, rather than less, across developing countries feel that corruption threatens both the society and the market.

Saying that ____ is a "very big problem"

Crime	83%
Corruption	76%
Health care	59%
Poor schools	56%
Water pollution	54%
Air pollution	54%
Food safety	50%
Electricity shortages	46%
Traffic	44%

Note : Numbers indicate medians across 34 emerging and developing nations.

Source: Pew Research Center (2014: 2)

To date, however, there is no strong indication that corruption in developing countries has significantly diminished as a result of increasing attention and anti-corruption efforts at the international level. There are several possible reasons why the anti-corruption efforts by international organizations and donors have produced limited impacts in developing countries.

First, systematic engagement in anti-corruption efforts by international organizations, of which the United Nations is a leading actor, has been in place only for little more than ten years since the adoption of UNCAC on 31 October 2003. Considering that corruption is one of the oldest and most endemic challenges to be tackled, more time may be needed for global efforts to yield tangible and significant outcomes. Second, there are a myriad of factors that cause or enable corruption, and as such, tackling corruption is a complex task. Corruption in a country takes place in unique political, economic, social and cultural contexts, with vested interests. Moreover, the gains to the small group of beneficiaries from corruption are individually far greater than the potential individual gains to the millions of citizens who lose out from it. This constellation (reinforced by smaller groups having an easier time coordinating and organizing collective action than very large ones) gives rise to well organized interest groups being able to fend off efforts from groups who represent society-wide concerns even when their magnitude dwarfs the aggregate gains of the corrupt few. Due to the multi-dimensional nature of corruption, partial anti-corruption engagement in limited sectors cannot be successful (Dix, 2011).

Given the critical importance of tackling corruption for development and the limited progress of the past anti-corruption efforts, the international community has come to recognize that anti-corruption engagements need to be comprehensive, strategic, systematic and incessant, as an integral part of global development efforts. Issues of transparency and anti-corruption are also included in the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, as adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015, as Goal 16. The anti-corruption targets contained in SDG 16 represent a breakthrough recognition of the importance of accountability and the rule of law in the international development framework.

Box 2. Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda and Anti-Corruption

In September 2015, the Member States of the United Nations adopted the post-2015 development agenda, consisting of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets, to be implemented by 2030. This new universal agenda seeks to build on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and complete what they did not achieve. With the overall objective of achieving sustainable human development, SDGs seek to eliminate poverty, curtail inequality, protect biodiversity, halt climate change, realize the human rights of all, and achieve gender equality, among others. SDGs and their targets are integrated and indivisible, and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social and environment.

On the post-2015 development agenda, the importance of anti-corruption is highlighted in Goal 16, which is to "promote peace and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Under this goal, Target 5 is to "substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms" while Target 6 is to "develop effective, accountable, transparent institutions at all levels."

Source: United Nations A/69/L.85 (2015, p. 2 & p. 26), available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/L85&Lang=E.

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[1] See
https://www.google.co.kr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjH3Z2Yi4XTAhUCVLwKHYxpAGwQFggmMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hup.harvard.edu%2Fcatalog.php%3Fisbn%3D9780674537514&usg=AFQjCNEPpUvLqwpenUjX0yznsFGzXBknLw&sig2=Fti39T4xBaLezound5XHlQ&bvm=bv.151325232,d.dGc.

B. The "Greasing-the-Wheel" vs. the "Sand-in-the-Gears" Argument

There is a long-standing debate in academic and policy discourse over whether or not corruption functions as greasing-the-wheel or as sand-in-the-gears. The grease-the-wheel perspective interprets corruption as a facilitating mechanism in getting work done efficiently. The metaphor "grease-the-wheel" comes from the following perception of the phenomenon. Without relying on corruption, people cannot process certain tasks in relation to government or public agencies. Corruption, such as the bribing of civil servants, functions as a stimulant to incentivize them to do their job. If paid extra money or given bribes, civil servants will start to respond to a request and work more speedily.

The 'grease function' of corruption may be particularly needed in countries without a well-organized and accountable governance system. In this context, underpaid civil servants see public positions primarily as a way of making extra money through the provision of favours from the private sector. Such perception leads to a situation where government services are bought through corruption. In this situation, it may be more convenient for private businesses and citizens in need of public services to resort to bribes rather than abiding by rules.

But, does corruption really provide the best means to "grease the wheel"? The answer may be affirmative for those who simply want to pay and get what they want. However, studies show that the 'convenience' of corruption does not pay off in the long run at the national level. If we examine the relationships between the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the Government Competitiveness Index (GCI) and per capita income, they are in an inverse proportional relationship. In other words, as the corruption problem increases, a country's competitiveness and national income decline. In the long run, corruption does not work for increasing government effectiveness. In addition, if only those who pay get public services, inequality would increase in terms of access to public services, particularly for the poor and marginalized. This then would directly contradict a critical aspect of SDGs: leaving no one behind. Therefore, the effect of corruption must rather be understood as a form of "sand-in-the-gears" which hinders sustainable development.

The case of Korea clearly demonstrates this effect. During the early developmental stage for the period of the 1960s-1980s or the economic downturn in the 1990s when the nation was struck by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Korean government neglected anti-corruption efforts. With the belief that rapid growth is best for everyone, policy makers did not tackle corruption, and attempted to make the business sector "comfortable" in doing business. Indeed, an underlying challenge in tackling corruption in Korea has been the pervasive perception of corruption as a necessary evil for national development rather than a harmful practice that threatens economic growth and progress (Kos, 2014; Choi and Woo, 2012; The Korea Herald, 2012; Caiden and Kim, 2008, pp. 147-148).

However, experience shows that the benefits of tolerating corruption do not last in the long term. Getting work done through patronage and bribery led to the development of inequalities, violations of rights of the weak, lack of trust in society, deterioration of national competiveness due to increasing transaction costs, as well as misguided and ineffective usage of public resources.

Indeed, "greasing-the-wheel" effect lasted only for a short-term in Korea (Moran, 1998). The 1997 Asian financial crisis revealed the pitfalls of the corrupt government-business relationship in Korea. By 1998, the Korean government under Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) at last declared a "War on Corruption" and announced a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy to create a clean and incorruptible public administration and to enhance governmental transparency and reliability (UNDP 2014, p. 9; Quah 2004, p. 70).

Box 3. Corruption, Competitiveness of a Nation and Per Capita Income

There are strong correlations both between corruption and a nation's competitiveness and between corruption and national income. Using data from the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) and the World Bank's per capita GDP in 2013, correlation tests show that the correlation coefficients of CPI and GCI for 144 countries and of CPI and per capita GDP for 164 countries are 0.82 (p<0.01) and 0.78 (p<0.01), respectively. To examine the relationship between corruption and the competitiveness and wealth of a nation, regression analyses have been conducted. As the regression results in the figures below show, a 1 point increase in the CPI score has the impact of a 0.03 point increase in the GCI score and US$837 increase in per capita GDP. These results confirm the conventional argument that effective corruption control positively affects the competitiveness and wealth of a nation.

$$GCI_{2013} = 2.90 + 0.03 CPI_{2013}$$

$$Per\ Capita\ GDP_{2013} = -21076 + 836.93 CPI_{2013}$$

The grease-the-wheel argument views corruption as grease that makes a corrupt system with a low quality of governance work smoothly, which may have not been the case otherwise (Campos et. al., 2010; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). By contrast, as the metaphor indicates, the sand-in-the-gears argument regards corruption as sand that ultimately damages the entire mechanical system by wearing the gears down. In other words, the "sand-in-the-gears" hypothesis assumes that wherever corruption occurs, it yields negative consequences. Many studies that have examined the damaging impacts of corruption on the public and private sectors are in line with this argument. Public sector corruption, for example, distorts the efficient allocation of public resources, which leads to lowered public sector quality and public trust in government (Lambsdorff, 2006). Private sector corruption not only impedes investment by creating an uncertain business environment, but also breeds an underground economy, all of which distort market efficiency (Mauro, 1995). If corruption is rampant in both the public and private sectors, it may act against sustainable national development and reduce people's quality of life.

Observing diverse instances of the detrimental influence of corruption and conducting research has led international organizations to reject the greasing-the-wheel hypothesis (UNDP, 2008b). Yet the debate on the grease-the-wheel versus the sand-in-the-gears still lingers in academia. Considering the existence of rapid economic growth despite corruption in some Asian countries such as Korea and Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s—and currently in China— some scholars remain open to the validity of the greasing-the-wheel hypothesis. In making the grease-the-wheel argument, they focus on the conditions in which corruption can enhance efficiency. For example, when the quality of governance is low, state bureaucracy is rigid and over-centralized leading to a low level of economic freedom, corruption may help to surmount the hurdles to economic growth (Carden and Verdon, 2010). Beyond politico-economic factors, there are other efficiency-enhancing corruption conditions. Liu and Wu (2007) explain that a socio-cultural trait of social trust in China contributes to economic growth despite the presence of chronic corruption.

Depending on which country and which time periods one analyzes, the actual impacts of corruption on several aspects of development may not be clear, leaving us with impacts that range from positive to negative. Nonetheless, the majority of scholars who have explored the relationship between corruption and development stress that whereas some countries in certain circumstances may gain benefits from corruption, these positive impacts are static and short-term. Corruption, if not prevented and controlled, has a negative effect on long-term growth and development (Braguinsky, 1996). As cross-section analyses in Box 3 suggest, the country's competitiveness and per capita income decrease as the level of corruption becomes serious. Research that supports the "sand-in-the-gears" argument points out that the negative impacts of corruption affect more than economic growth. Drawing on several research findings, UNDP (2008b; 2016b) emphasizes that corruption jeopardizes human development and slows down poverty reduction. In addition to the moral argument which emphasizes the unethical and illegal characteristics of corruption, more empirical studies advocate the sand-in-the-gears argument (Campos et. al., 2010).

C. Policy Directions for Tackling Corruption

There is no one-size-fits-all solution for tackling corruption. In particular, anti-corruption reform is very complicated because corruption, when structured and embedded strongly in the governance of a nation, is more likely to become a political matter. Moreover, corruption in each country takes place within unique political, economic and socio-cultural contexts (Doig, 1995). When the complex and unique contexts of each country are taken into consideration, it becomes all the more challenging to recommend particular sets of solutions for anti-corruption.

While all countries around the world encounter corruption challenges, developing countries tend to face manifold challenges in carrying out effective anti-corruption reform, as part of their broader governance challenges, such as the following (UNDP, 2014b; UNODC et. al., 2010):

- Complex vested interests among political and business elites
- Resistance to reform, including anti-corruption in the civil service
- Inadequate checks and balances among state apparatuses
- Lack of independence and autonomy of anti-corruption agencies with low competencies
- Low awareness of the public on the dangers of corruption
- Inadequate watchdog functions of the media and the civil society

Because of these factors, anti-corruption tends to remain a political slogan and rhetoric deployed to serve the interests of political leaders. Even if an ACA in a developing country wishes to implement corruption-prevention and controlling measures, it is usually supported by inadequate resources and knowledge.

This implies that a strategic approach which blends the short-term and long-term efforts and enhances both the punishment and prevention sides of anti-corruption work is needed to deal with corruption. (Doig, 1995).

Two-way reforms

On the one hand, an ACA would need to make its operation effective. On the other, macro politico-administrative environments would have to be transformed to become more accountable, transparent and responsive. This two-way reform can be undertaken in the short- and long-term with key targets, such as the following:

- *Short-term ACA-centric reforms:* independent legal status; operational efficiency; capacity development; adequate human and financial resources; sufficient authority; mechanisms for transparent information disclosure; and effective outreach to the public.

- *Long-term politico-administrative reforms:* civil service reforms for greater accountability, transparency and responsiveness in state institutions; legislative reforms (such as the public information disclosure act); enhancement of democratic checks-and-balances; alignment of domestic laws and policies with international agreements on anti-corruption including UNCAC.

Greater prevention efforts

In addition, while "anti-corruption work" is conventionally equated with investigations and prosecution, greater prevention efforts are needed (USPC, 2015). Although prevention efforts in practice may not be cleanly separated from the investigation and punishment side, punishment and prevention as anti-corruption measures are conceptually distinct. While the former is an ex-post measure after corruption takes place, the latter denotes an ex-ante measure before corruption occurs. From an academic perspective, ex-ante measures are seen as superior to ex-post measures when taking into account the multiple costs of corruption. Yet rendering prevention effective is a time-consuming and less visible task, compared to punishment. In this context, those who wish to reach a quick-win solution are likely to prefer more direct and visible punitive measures.

Nonetheless, because prevention is indispensable for sustainably tackling corruption at its roots, it deserves a greater and systematic attention. Prevention efforts need to be further included in any comprehensive anti-corruption reform package.

II

Policies and Institutions of Anti-Corruption Reform in Singapore and Korea:

Experiences, Good Practices and Remaining Challenges

A. Singapore's Approaches and Success Factors in Anti-Corruption

In Asia, the Republic of Singapore (hereafter Singapore) has been praised as one of the most corruption-free countries. Today, Singapore is recognized by Transparency International as one of the least corrupt countries in the world with its CPI rank at No. 7 in 2016. In addition, Singapore has consistently ranked as the least corrupt country in Asia by the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC)'s annual reports since 1995.[2]

Nevertheless, Singapore was not always without serious corruption challenges. In the past, corruption was pervasive in the society and bribing was a common means of obtaining government services (Jing, 2007; Quah, 1995; Tan, 1999). While causes of such corruption may be complex and numerous, commonly identified factors include the lack of political will of the colonial government, the low salary of civil servants, absence of proper oversight mechanisms in the civil service, ineffective implementation of anti-corruption laws, and lack of potent risks of detection and punishment in case of corruption (Quah, 1995; 2001).

Since the late 1950s, however, Singapore has introduced and sustained rigorous measures to institutionalize anti-corruption efforts and to transform the society from a country rampant with corruption to one of the least corrupt nations in the world. A series of reforms were introduced, including the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) in June 1960 to replace the ineffective colonial Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO), and the empowerment and revitalization of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) which was established earlier in 1952.

Admittedly, the small size and high urbanization of the city-state may have helped simplify administrative coordination and enhanced political control by the PAP government, thereby increasing chances for successful implementation of anti-corruption policies (Quah, 2011b, p. 202). Nevertheless, being a small city-state by no means guarantees success in anti-corruption. In fact, single cities in other countries often fail to combat corruption within their jurisdiction, and the relative size of cities can potentially make clientelistic networks tighter and harder to break (Stephenson, 2015). Therefore, a simplistic description does not hold.

As the following section summarizes, Singapore's success in anticorruption has been made possible through its continuous political commitment to anti-corruption and rigorous public education, accompanied by effective public administration and civil service reforms, along with a strong legal and institutional framework to deter corruption.

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[2] Please see : https://www.gov.sg/~/sgpcmedia/media_releases/cpib/press_release/P-20170412-1/attachment/CPIB%20Press%20 Release_Corruption%20Statistics%202016.pdf.

1. Historical-Political Context for Anti-Corruption

Under the British rule, there were already several institutional arrangements aimed at dealing with corruption, including the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements of Malacca, Penang and Singapore of 1871 and the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) of 1937. However, the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO), enacted in December 1937, proved to be only minimally effective in fighting police corruption, as warrants were required for the arrest, search and investigation of police officers. In addition, the maximum penalty of three years' imprisonment and/or a fine of $10,000 SGD for offenders proved to be too low to deter corrupt behaviour. Similarly, the understaffed Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), a part of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Singapore Police Force, responsible for combating corruption in colonial Singapore, proved to be ineffective (Jing, 2007, p. 15, Quah, 2013, p. 403). Therefore until the 1950s, corruption was rife in every corner of Singapore, from the government to the private sector (Quah, 2007).

Anti-corruption initiatives only gained prominence after the People's Action Party (PAP) and its leader, Lee Kuan Yew took power in 1959. The PAP, shaped by experience under British colonial rule, strongly committed itself to the goal of eliminating corruption in Singapore.

Upon taking power in 1959, the PAP Government prioritized the establishment of a clean and effective government, and pursued the anti-corruption agenda consistently in the next decades. The political will to allow investigations into ministerial and government officials' accounts in the same manner as into those of the public, have also helped strengthen the deterrence effect and credibility of the government's anti-corruption policies.

Here, sustained and strong commitment to anti-corruption in Singapore was made possible within a particular political context. Governed by the PAP since 1959, Singapore has shown great political continuity, with the PAP winning all elections (Quah, 2010a, p. 175). Although the "early years of PAP rule were characterized by several political challenges" (Bellows, 2009, p. 25), after the 1968 elections the PAP had consolidated political control to the degree that at no point were there more than 3 opposition candidates elected to Parliament (Bellows, 2009).

The political commitment of the PAP, in part, stems from the momentum gained by its initial election success which followed the exposure of a corruption scandal in the Ministry of Education, which involved the acceptance of a total of $700,000 SGD by the Minister of Education (Quah, 2010a, p. 175). The PAP won the December 1957 City Council election with a campaign promise to curb corruption. The PAP then proceeded to run its 1959 electoral campaign upon the campaign slogan "stay clean: dismiss the venal" (Jing 2007, p. 16), winning the 1959 general elections, too. Aware of the need to curb corruption to ensure the attainment of Singapore's development goals, the newly elected PAP then made it a political priority to ensure a clean government under the slogan of 'zero-tolerance for corruption' (Quah, 2013, p. 404). Scholars such as Ortmann and Thompson (2014, p. 435) hereto added that the Singaporean example provides evidence that "the lack of corruption and effective governance are not linked to liberal democracy but can be achieved through pragmatic decision-making by a determined ruling elite (…)."

Furthermore, Singapore's rapid economic growth also has enabled the PAP government to allocate sufficient funds and personnel to its goal of curbing corruption. The process of Singapore's economic development was accompanied by high levels of government intervention and strategic decision-making by the one-party PAP government. Owing to Singapore's relatively strong human capital base and institutional framework, the PAP government was able to implement reforms in line with its conviction that successful economic development requires a highly skilled, clean and incorruptible workforce and public administration (Huff, 1995).

Nevertheless, perhaps the most important factor behind the political will for anti-corruption was the understanding and strong belief of Lee Kuan Yew and the political leadership that the newly independent Singapore, a small island with no natural resources, had no option but to stamp out corruption as a means of securing a promising future for the nation. They saw the urgency of making the country's politico-economic environment more business- and trade-friendly, and saw anti-corruption as necessary for creating such a favorable environment (Soh, 2010). And over time, the political and economic necessity to fight corruption has become an entrenched social value and a criminal issue. As the Deputy Director of CPIB put: "A generation of Singaporeans ha[ve] been [molded] by our pioneer political leaders to treat corruption with disdain. Corruption is viewed not just simply as a moral issue, but considered a crime (Ang in USPC 2015).

Box 4. Anti-Corruption Leadership in Singapore

Conceptualizing the fight against corruption as a matter of life or death, Lee Kuan Yew, during his reign as Prime Minister, had a strong conviction to make a clean government the foremost priority. In his memoir, Lee states that "When the PAP government took office in 1959, we set out to have a clean administration. We were sickened by the greed, corruption, and decadence of many Asian leaders. … We had a deep sense of mission to establish a clean and effective government. When we took the oath of office…in June 1959 we all wore white shirts and white slacks to symbolize purity and honesty in our personal behavior and our public life" (Lee, 2000, as cited in Quah 2013, p.146).

Reflecting Lee Kuan Yew, Soh Kee Hean, the former Director of the CPIB, claimed that "For a small city state, it was therefore vital for Singapore to control corruption for our national survival. It was necessary in order to provide a conducive climate and level playing field to spur economic growth. It is a competitive advantage to attract foreign businesses to invest in our land" (Soh 2010, p. 149).

As expressed by the current Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong in his speech at CPIB's 60th Anniversary Celebrations in 2012, the high political and social value placed upon anti-corruption has been sustained: "The political leaders have to continue to set high standards of honesty and integrity; the society must continue to reject corruption, not just because of the rules and penalties, but because this reflects the society we want to live in, and the values we uphold and hold ourselves to. Then we can keep Singapore special and a home which we will continue to be proud of" (Lee, 2012, p. 5).

2. Singapore's Key Approaches and Good Practices

Singapore's strategy on anti-corruption relies on the following four pillars of corruption control:

- effective anti-corruption law;
- effective adjudication to punish and deter those who are prone to corruption;
- effective administration to reduce opportunities for corruption; and
- effective enforcement agency.

2.1. Strong Rule of Law & Deterrence Approach

In the absence of an effective anti-corruption model until the 1960s, Singapore adopted a very aggressive corruption repression strategy in order to rebuild national integrity. Establishing a strong rule of law comprised of tough and effective anti-corruption legislations, an independent and strong anti-corruption agency, vigorous enforcement, and an independent judiciary has been regarded as the most vital tool to transform the behavior of the society and public perception. Singapore's approach sought to deal with corruption at all levels "regardless of who or what is involved and no matter how big or small the bribe amount is" with the objective of sending a "strong and stern message that corruption will never be condoned or tolerated in any way" (Ang in USPC, 2015).

2.1.1. Robust Anti-Corruption Legal Framework

First, with the PAP's strong political commitment to anti-corruption, Singapore established a robust legal framework for curbing corruption. The 1960 Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA), enacted as a replacement of the ineffective colonial Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO), formed a legal foundation of Singapore's anti-corruption work. Furthermore, the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (CDSA) was enacted in 1999 to specifically criminalize the laundering of benefits derived from corruption, and to undertake investigations and confiscation of such benefits.

Through its high penalties, POCA and CDSA provide for a strong deterrence effect, making corruption an unprofitable endeavor in Singapore. The penalty for a single corruption charge can entail an imprisonment for maximum five years and/or a maximum fine of $100,000 SGD, in addition to the requirement of repaying the amount accepted as bribe. (If the convicted case concerns a public contract or body, the maximum imprisonment term can extend to 7 years.) In addition, public servants convicted of crime can lose their employment, benefits or pension (Quah, 2011b, p. 221; Ang in USPC, 2015).

Further adding to the deterrence effect, evidence of corrupt activities in Singapore can include the intention of corruption, as well as the mere fact that a person accused of corruption is found unable to account for property or monetary assets disproportionate to his or her sources of income. Furthermore, corrupt behaviour in embassies and other government agencies abroad have been classified as indictable under the Singaporean legal framework. Should a defendant have died, CDSA still enables the confiscation of benefits derived from corruption as well as the issuance of confiscation orders against the deceased's estate, in the event that the deceased defendant has received benefits disproportionate to his or her known source of income inexplicably to the court. (Quah, 2013, p. 404; Quah, 2011b, p. 220).

Such strong rule of law has in turn helped to change people's perception of corruption, and create a strong anti-corruption culture in the society. As the Deputy Director of CPIB, Mr. Ang Seow Lian explained at an international meeting, "With the rule of law, a meritocratic society that detests corruption has been nurtured [in Singapore]. The support of the entire society which adopts a zero tolerance stance towards corruption reinforces the success" (Ang in USPC, 2015).

2.1.2. Strong Anti-Corruption Institutions with Potent Power

Singapore's advances in anti-corruption are based on the high levels of transparency and accountability in governmental institutions and its strong and powerful institutional framework for anti-corruption, particularly the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). As one of the oldest anti-corruption agencies in the world, CPIB since its creation in 1952 has played a key part of Singapore's Criminal Justice System, with three main responsibilities: 1) receipt and investigation of complaints concerning corruption; 2) investigation of malpractices and misconduct by civil servants; and 3) examination of public service procedures to reduce loopholes for corruption in administrative practices (Quah, 2011b, p. 221).

Before the establishment of CPIB, it was the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Police that mainly handled corruption-related duties. However, given the fact that corruption was widespread within the police force, anti-corruption efforts were mostly ineffective (Quah, 1995).

Located within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), however, CPIB reports directly to the Prime Minister of Singapore, and its high levels of functional independence enables CPIB to carry out its investigations without influence from other government agencies or ministries.

To fulfil its responsibilities, CPIB is divided into the Operations Division, which is subdivided into the Operations Branch, including the Special Investigation Team, and the Operations Support Branch, and the Administration and Specialist Support Division, which has four units: Administration Unit, Prevention and Review Unit, Computer Information System Unit, and the Plans and Projects Unit.

Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB)

- Operations Division
- Operations Branch
- Operations Support Branch

- Administration and Specialist Support Division
- Administration Unit
- Prevention and Review
- Computer Information System Unit
- Plans and Projects Unit

Owing to the POCA and the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, CPIB is equipped with strong investigative powers and with the necessary resources and capacities for successful anti-corruption work (Quah, 2013, p. 404, Quah, 2011b, p. 218). For example, CPIB is able to investigate the accounts "of any person suspected of committing a corruption offence" (Quah, 2013, p. 404), including ministers and senior civil servants without the Prime Minister's permission if the elected president consents therewith (Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, Art. 22G).

On the grounds of its powers of search and seizure, CPIB is permitted "to enter any suspected place and search, seize, and detain incriminating documents under a warrant issued by a magistrate or the CPIB's Director" (Quah, 2011b, p. 220).

The CPIB further enjoys powers "to obtain information on an individual's property, income tax, and bank accounts from the relevant government departments and banks" (Quah, 2011b, p. 220) and the right to inspect a civil servant's bank book and those of his wife, child or agent.

As all offenses under the POCA are classified as indictable offenses, and as persons "required by the CPIB ... to provide information are legally bound to do so" (Quah, 2011b, p. 220), CPIB can rely on powers of arrest and search of arrested persons. Despite its strong investigative powers, CPIB does require the Public Prosecutor's consent to institute prosecution against corrupt offenders, and to refer the case to the Economic Crimes and Governance Division (EGD) of the Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC) for prosecution (CPIB, 2014).

To improve the gathering of information for its investigative purposes, CPIB cooperates with various government agencies and relies on strong whistleblower protection mechanisms, which enable CPIB to attract informants from the public and private sector (Quah, 2011b, p. 220).

Furthermore, CPIB not only conducts prosecution but also uses its investigation activities for corruption prevention. In the course of its investigations, CPIB identifies weaknesses, corruption-prone areas, or loopholes in administrative procedures and sends recommendations for corrective actions to relevant institutions. This kind of prevention activity mainly targets government departments and addresses areas such as procurement procedures, appointment procedures for personnel susceptible to corruption, and accreditation procedures (Ang in USPC, 2015).

According to CBPI, combined efforts of the CPIB and the Attorney-General's Chambers have brought about a high conviction rate for corruption-related offences, leading to the conviction rate of 100 % in 2016, which represented a 3% increase from 2015.[3]

Lastly, Singapore has put in place measures to ensure and sustain CPIB's integrity itself. The PAP government established two review committees for the CPIB's activities, the Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee (ACAC) and the Anti-Corruption Review Committee (ACRC). Both committees are staffed by senior civil servants and are chaired by the head of the Singapore Civil Service (SCS). In addition, CPIB's participation in international compliance reviews and self-assessments under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) further help improve the quality and accountability of Singapore's anti-corruption agency. CPIB also conducts regular public opinion surveys to evaluate its performance (UNDP 2014, p. 17; Quah, 2011b, p. 230).

2.2. Holistic Prevention Approaches: Synergies with Public Administration Reforms

Nevertheless, the anti-corruption strategy of the Government of Singapore did not entirely rely on the deterrence approach, driven by a powerful anti-corruption agency. The Government pursued fundamental changes in the national civil service in a way that minimized opportunities for creating structures or enabling environments for corruption. This was based on understanding that a "responsive public service is an important lever in corruption prevention as this would deter citizens or corporations from offering bribes to procure faster or better services" (Ang in USPC, 2015).

Among some notable changes, salary increases that enabled civil servants' salaries to mirror the private-sector-salary scale contributed to reducing civil servants' motivation to engage in corruption. To attract highly skilled civil servants to a "competent and honest government" (Quah, 2013, p. 410), the PAP government benchmarks the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants to the average salaries of top earners in the private sector. The National Wages Council (NWC) was formed "to formulate general guidelines on wage policies, to recommend annual wage adjustments, and to advise on incentive systems for improving efficiency and productivity" (Quah, 2013, p. 410). While the original rationale behind the salary increase was the prevention of "brain drain … to the private sector" (Jing, 2007, p. 19), it was also employed to prevent corruption, following the idea that with competitive salaries and fringe benefits, the incentive for corrupt acts is substantially lowered (Quah, 2011a, pp. 30, 35).

Nevertheless, while one of common reasons for the failure of anti-corruption efforts around the world is indeed the inability of governments to provide basic necessities to their civil servants (ADB and OECD, 2006), sufficient amounts of salary cannot be identified as the only factor of success in Singapore. Singapore has managed to go deeper with broader public service reforms.

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[3] CPIB 2017. Please see: https://www.gov.sg/~/sgpcmedia/media_releases/cpib/press_release/P-20170412-1/attachment/CPIB%20 Press%20Release_Corruption%20Statistics%202016.pdf

In addition to salary increases, the Government has attempted to eradicate corruption opportunities through continuous civil service reforms (Ang in UNDP, 2015), which aimed to enhance accountability, responsiveness, and transparency in the government through institution building. Since 1951, the recruitment and promotion of civil servants in Singapore on the basis of merit has ensured that only the most competent become members of SCS, eradicating the historically pervasive practice of recruitment based on nepotism and politics.

Furthermore, improvements in the administrative workflow and productivity further contributed to a reduction of opportunities for corrupt acts. CPIB, for example, reviews government procedures to speed up the granting of permits with the purpose of making it unnecessary to bribe public officers into faster approval (CPIB, 2014). Additionally, the Service Improvement Unit enables the public to submit feedback on the services of SCS (Quah, 2007, p. 44). The Contractors Registration System (CRS), a centralized, one-stop registration system for contractors applying for public-sector construction projects, has forced an improvement in the procurement criteria for construction projects, increased the speed of operation and enhanced the professionalism of contractors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, 2012a). Through its Civil Service Computerisation Programme (CSCP), SCS operates using fully computerized and automated work functions. Additionally, SCS introduced Work Improvement Teams to prepare civil servants for change and improvements (Singapore Public Service Division, 2014).

The Government has also instituted comprehensive and yet clear standards and rules against corruption, such as the Government Instruction Manual and the Code of Conduct Key Principles, whereby Government officials are required to report any acts of corruption or conflict of interest. The instruction manual clearly states that civil servants are to act in a manner that does not allow them to obtain any special advantage through their official position or connections, and that they are to ensure that the public does not perceive it otherwise (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2009, p. 172). It stipulates separation of public duties from private interests, and puts in place a disclosure system for accepting gifts that are impractical to reject as well as a declaration system for assets, investments, and indebtedness, in order to reduce a conflict of interests (Ang in UNDP, 2015).

Lastly, Singapore has further upgraded its public administration reforms through e-governance approaches. In 1995, the Government introduced the "Public Service in the 21st Century" (PS21) initiatives for sound administrative governance, organizational excellence and service excellence, utilizing information & communication technologies and e-Government applications to reduce opportunities for corruption (Ang in UNDP, 2015).

Box 5. Examples of the PS21 Initiatives

- eCitizens: a one-stop portal that enables citizens to process about 1,600 public services online such as the passport application
- Online Business Licensing Service (OBLS): a one-stop portal that integrates over 70 different types of licenses from almost 20 government agencies into a single application for new business registration
- GeBIZ: an end-to-end online procurement system of the Government

Source: Ang, 2015

Deploying such holistic, systematic and well-sequenced civil service reforms, Singapore's government was able to achieve its anti-corruption objectives.

In turn, successful anti-corruption efforts, in accordance with the late Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew's vision, have helped transform the small resource-meager island state into one of the most vibrant economies in the world.

3. Summary of Main Success Factors and Lessons Learnt

In sum, the success of the anti-corruption strategies in Singapore may be attributed to the following key factors.

A steadfast and strong political commitment to anti-corruption does matter, and this is made possible with political stability and the institutionalization of political will.

Singapore's experience in curbing corruption illustrates that the precondition for a strong and comprehensive anti-corruption strategy lies within the political will of a country's leadership. Without full political commitment beyond rhetoric, neither a robust legal framework, nor an independent and powerful anti-corruption agency could have been fully functional.

A robust legal framework that equips the anti-corruption agency with strong investigative powers and with the necessary resources and capacities to successfully implement its deterrence approach and punitive measures.

Anti-corruption laws with their provision for high penalties for corrupt acts can provide for a strong deterrence effect, making corruption an unprofitable endeavour. The existence of penalties alone however does not yet enable the desired deterrent effect; corrupt acts must also be investigated and if found guilty, defendants must be punished. To this end, high penalties must be accompanied by the legal provision of an effective enforcement mechanism, equipped with sufficient qualified staff and the necessary monetary resources.

In the case of Singapore, POCA, accompanied by CDSA, provides the legal background for the penalties in place, as well as for the bestowal of the necessary powers and capacities to the independent anti-corruption agency, CPIB.

An incorruptible and independent anti-corruption agency removed from police control and under two-layer accountability mechanisms.

Singapore's history shows that an anti-corruption agency must be fully independent and, above all, removed from political influence and police control to be able to investigate corruption on all levels. To ensure that corruption does not occur within the ranks of the independent anti-corruption agency, it is necessary to provide for mechanisms that control the work and proceedings of the anti-corruption agency.

In the case of Singapore, this is done by way of two review committees for the independent anti-corruption agency's activities, as well as by way of participation in international compliance reviews and self-assessments under UNCAC.

Strong mechanisms for corruption prevention on all levels, ranging from outreach programs to review mechanisms.

The case of Singapore illustrates that to ensure the effective reduction of corruption, an investigation-punitive approach should be accompanied by multi-level corruption prevention programs pertaining to both educative measures and reviews to address loopholes before corruption reoccurs. This includes cooperation with various government agencies and the provision of strong whistleblower protection mechanisms.

In Singapore, the anti-corruption agency exceeds its investigative role and reaches out to civil servants and the public through talks, festivities and programmes to educate them "on the strategic importance of corruption control in Singapore" (CPIB, 2014). The Singaporean anti-corruption agency also actively engages in review processes in government agencies where corruption has occurred and can rely on the strong whistleblower protection mechanisms included in the POCA. Additionally, Singapore provides for mechanisms to include the business sector in its corruption prevention programmes.

Accompanying public administration reform and adequate human resources in the public administration.

To ensure a sustainable approach to curbing corruption, it is necessary to remove potential hurdles in the public administration. Included in these hurdles are low salaries and staff numbers, as well as long and slow administrative workflows and low productivity.

In Singapore, civil servants are recruited and promoted on the basis of merit and paid with competitive salaries, benchmarked to the average salaries of top earners in the private sector. Additionally, reviews of government procedures and the automatization of work functions contributed to a faster administrative workflow and higher efficiency in the public administration. Government officials further have to know and abide by a manual that requires correct and fair behaviour and the reporting of any corrupt act or conflict of interest.

4. Remaining Challenges in Singapore

Despite being one of the least corrupt countries in the world, with powerful investigation and enforcement mechanisms and corruption prevention efforts, Singapore is not completely free from cases of corruption, and there are still cases of corruption in multiple forms (Ang in UNDP, 2015). As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong commented in his essay in 2016, Singapore has achieved some success eradicating corruption, but it is under no illusions that it has permanently and completely solved the problem.[4] In 2016, CPIB received 808 complaints[5] and subsequently investigated 118 cases (CPIB 2017).[6]

At the same time, strong prosecution of those corruption cases demonstrate the strength of the political will and institutional framework. For instance, in July 2015, former Member of Parliament (MP) and powerful union leader Phey Yew Kok was finally brought to Court and charged with a total of 34 corruption and criminal offences after 35 years as a fugitive on Interpol's wanted list. In January 2016, Phey pleaded guilty to 12 charges, including 10 counts of criminal breach of trust offences involving S$243,878, and subsequently was sentenced to 60 months in jail.

As the following graphs show, the CPIB reports show that the majority of corruption cases in Singapore committed in the private sector, and prevention of corruption in the private sector remains a challenge. At the same time, the number of private sector employees prosecuted in court was down from 148 persons in 2014 to 100 persons in 2016.

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[4] http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/fight-against-corruption-singapores-experience.
[5] These complaints received by the CPIB include both corruption-related and non-corruption related. Non-corruption-related complaints are referred to relevant government authorities for follow-up.
[6] Please see: https://www.gov.sg/~/sgpcmedia/media_releases/cpib/press_release/P-20170412-1/attachment/CPIB%20Press%20Release_Corruption%20Statistics%202016.pdf.

Breakdown by Public vs.
Private Sector of the Cases Registered & Employees Prosecuted in Court
(Source : CPIB 2016 [7])

**Private Sector Employees Formed
Majority of Persons Prosecuted in Court**

12%(20)

88%(148)

2014

9%(11)

91%(109)

2015

4%(4)

96%(100)

2016

■ Public Employees
■ Private Individuals

Custodial sentences
increasingly meted out to
Private sector employees

Areas of Concern

Maintenance
Work

Wholesale &
Retail
Businesses

[7] https://www.gov.sg/~/sgpcmedia/media_releases/cpib/press_release/P-20170412-1/attachment/CPIB%20Press%20Release_Corruption%20Statistics%202016.pdf.

B. Korea's Approaches and Good Practices in Anti-Corruption

Comparatively speaking, fighting corruption in Korea had not been a serious priority until the early 1990s, because economic development was considered a more important priority than any other issue. Moreover, Korea's state-led economic development relied on the close relationships between the government and the business sector, particularly conglomerates, creating conflicts of interest and giving rise to various forms of corruption.

The dynamics of corruption in Korea changed significantly in the early 1990s with the civilian democratic regime taking power in 1993, and then more profoundly in the late 1990s when the Asian financial crisis hit the country in 1997. As a means of differentiating his regime from previous ones, the Kim Young-sam administration (1993-1998) undertook political reforms that partially eliminated money politics. The financial crisis of 1997 compelled the Kim Dae-jung administration (1998-2003) to tackle corruption as a national priority in recognition of how pervasive corruption had contributed to this crisis.

President Kim Dae-jung therefore undertook comprehensive and aggressive anti-corruption reforms. As a result, the Anti-Corruption Act was enacted in 2001 and the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) was established in January 2002 as a national anti-corruption agency. With the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Act, the Korean government put anti-corruption and national integrity at the top of its agenda, and put a lot of effort into building a comprehensive national anticorruption system led by the KICAC (Lee in UNDP-SMG, 2015).

With the establishment of KICAC, a predecessor of the current ACRC, the national integrity system was set in place, balancing the punitive approach of the Prosecutors Office (PO) with the ACA's preventive approach.

As of 2014, Korea's ranking in Transparency International's CPI ranking remains at the 43rd rank out of 175 countries, and the country's successes in stamping out corruption may still fall below the expectation of the Korean public. Nevertheless, since the 1990s, the Korean Government has continuously undertaken various direct and indirect anti-corruption measures, and substantial improvements have been made throughout the public and private spheres. In particular, as described below, the prevention-oriented approach has brought about remarkable changes in the Korean civil service.

1. Historical-Political Context for Anti-corruption in Korea

As one of the archetypical examples of a developmental state, Korea has geared its policies toward rapid economic growth from the 1960s until the 1980s. The industrialization process in Korea can be characterized by the mobilization of national resources led by the government with the strong power and authority of a meritocratic state bureaucracy (Kang, 2002). The government-led economic growth was strongly supported by an authoritarian regime during the presidencies of Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1988), and Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993). At the same time, the Korean government utilized conglomerates as drivers of fast economic growth. The ensuing close relationship between strong authoritarian governments and conglomerates resulted in "crony capitalism" (Lho and Cabuay, 2005; Narayan, 2013). This government-business nexus brought serious corruption into both public and private sectors in Korea until the early 1990s.

In dealing with corruption, successive regimes in the post-Korean War Era ostensibly supported strong punishment against corrupt offenders, as expressed by the anti-corruption pledges made by every president. In effect, however, the punitive approaches of the Korean Government were neither potent nor implemented effectively enough to control and prevent corruption. This is primarily because most political leaders tended to utilize punishment as a political instrument to stabilize their regimes and to earn popular support rather than lead to meaningful reform.

At the beginning of new administrations, serious investigations and prosecutions were conducted against grand corruption scandals in which politicians, high-ranking civil servants and businessmen were involved. However, many of these anti-corruption activities were tainted by lax and inconsistent law enforcement with corrupt offenders, often with a special pardon by the president releasing them from imprisonment well before the end of court-imposed sentences. As a result, grand corruption in Korea survived through the regimes as a systemic phenomenon, an outcome of deeply-rooted collusions of power and interests among politicians, high-ranking civil servants and business people (Choi, 2009; Kang, 2002; You, 2014.)

This situation apparently changed in the early 1990s. Faced by rampant corruption, President Kim Young-sam (1993-1998), who headed the first civilian government since President Park Chung-hee, strongly asserted for the eradication of corruption in his inauguration speech. President Kim's emphasis on fighting against corruption was not only a recognition of the danger of corruption, but also a political slogan to distinguish his administration from previous authoritarian regimes. President Kim's utilization of anti-corruption can be exemplified by the imprisonment of two former presidents—Presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo—in 1995 on multiple charges including corruption. The Kim Young-sam administration undertook substantial political and economic reforms related to anti-corruption during 1993-1995.

The financial crisis that struck several Asian countries in 1997 brought about another turning point for anti-corruption in Korea. Among many factors affecting the outbreak of the financial crisis, one critical factor was deeply rooted corruption stemming from the legacy of crony capitalism. As a means of recovery for the nearly collapsed economy, President Kim Dae-jung formed the Special Committee on Anti-Corruption in 1999. Following this, Kim tried to initiate several anti-corruption reform measures, including the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Act and the establishment of KICAC as a dedicated new anti-corruption agency. Another key achievement during the Kim administration was the usage of e-Government as a key tool of government reform. Whereas KICAC directly targeted anti-corruption, e-Government implementation was an indirect anti-corruption policy measure with which accountability and transparency were enhanced.

Although the national integrity system in Korea has varied slightly from one administration to another, the overarching anti-corruption framework, which integrates direct measures with indirect ones, has largely remained intact since the Kim Dae-jung administration—with the conventional law enforcement mechanism on one hand, and the supplementary civil service reform driven through e-Government on the other hand.

2. Korea's Approaches to Anti-Corruption

2.1. Legal Framework

During the Kim Dae-jung and the Roh Moo-hyun administrations, significant preventive measures were introduced with the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2001. As the key legal foundation of Korea's anti-corruption efforts, the Act provided the grounds for establishing a new anti-corruption agency in 2002, namely KICAC which was later renamed as ACRC in 2008. The Act laid the ground for significant improvements in Korea's anti-corruption efforts, both in punitive and prevention aspects.

After several revisions, the Act now consists of 91 articles in total, serving as an umbrella law with regards to anti-corruption. Salient aspects of this law include the definition of "acts of corruption," the functions and structure of ACRC, and protection of whistleblowers. Concerning the definition of corruption, the Act adopts a quite broad definition that goes beyond the traditional definition of corruption. Article 2.4(a) defines corruption as "the act of a public organization employee to seek illegitimate gains for himself/herself or for any third party by abusing his/her position or authority, or violating Acts and subordinate statutes in connection with his/her duties." This definition is almost identical to the classic legal definition of corruption. However, Articles 2.4(b) adds another aspect, stating that corruption constitutes "the act of causing financial damage to a public organization in violation of Acts and subordinate statutes, when it is in the process of executing its budget, or acquiring, managing or disposing of its property, or entering into and executing a contract to which it is a party." Article 2.4(c) furthermore includes in the definition the "act of forcing, recommending, suggesting or encouraging someone to engage in or conceal the acts provided for by Article 4.2(a) and Article 4.2(b)." While the Act attempts to define the acts of corruption clearly, the scope of corruption acts in the Act is narrow because unlike the anti-corruption legislation in Singapore, private sector corruption is not included.

Aside from the definition of corruption, the Act requires both public and private entities to take up and fulfill their responsibilities to promote ethics and integrity in public organizations and in the society as a whole.

Articles 11 to 31 are devoted to the roles, responsibilities and operations of ACRC. Here, unlike Singapore's CPIB which has a strong anti-corruption law enforcement function, ACRC is not given investigative powers. Rather, ACRC's mandate and functions focus on corruption prevention aspects, such as formulation and implementation of corruption-fighting policies, anti-corruption education and training, provision of corruption-prevention recommendations to public organizations, monitoring of public organizations' integrity levels and anti-corruption efforts through assessments, examination of corruption-causing factors in laws, and publishing of reports on corruption.

The Act also provides a series of reward systems and protective measures for whistleblowers who report on corruption in the public sector. According to the Act, it is prohibited for public organizations to disclose a whistleblower's identity without his or her consent. If the whistleblowing results in the recovery or increase of revenues in a public organization, the whistleblower may be awarded up to KRW 3 billion in corruption cases (approximately US$2.7 million), or KRW 2 billion in public interest cases.

In addition, Korea also enacted the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act (2015) after several years of debate at the Parliament. The law came into effect in September 2016. The Act is designed to address the problems of improper solicitations based on family ties and regional or academic relationships that have long undermined the fair performance of public officials' duties as one of the main causes of corruption in Korea.

According to the Act, public officials will be punished by imprisonment for a maximum of three years or by a fine not exceeding 30 million won if they receive money, gifts or other items in excess of one million won at a time or three million won in a fiscal year from the same person. In this case, it does not matter whether the offer is related to their official duties, or whether the benefits are given for any favors. If public officials accept money or gifts under one million won in value in relation to their duties, they will be subject to a fine for negligence twice to five times the benefits they received. The same level of punishment will be imposed on those who provide or promise to provide money, gifts or other items to public officials or their spouses. The Act also prohibits improper solicitation made directly or through a third party by stipulating 15 types of acts that may hinder the fair performance of public officials' duties. While those who make improper solicitations to public officials will face a fine for negligence, public officials who perform their duties in accordance with the improper solicitations they received will be punished by imprisonment for a maximum of two years or by a fine not exceeding 20 million won (ACRC, 2017).

While the implementation of this law has only recently begun, not without some controversy, the vast majority of the Korean public supports the law, and the law has arguably begun to change the way people think and talk about corruption in everyday life.

2.2. Institutional Framework for Anti-Corruption

The anti-corruption law enforcement system of Korea comprises of several agencies and institutions as in other countries. The anti-corruption law enforcement is broadly divided into two parts—punishment and prevention.

The punishment and prevention functions in Korea are executed by PPO and ACRC, respectively, unlike other countries with an ACA which carries out the most crucial anti-corruption activities. In spite of this difference, since the 1990s, the Korean Government has strengthened its legal and institutional mechanisms to fight corruption by blending PPO's punitive approach with ACRC's preventive measures.

For Investigation and Prosecution

There are three key institutions that perform punishment functions including investigations and prosecution: the Public Prosecutors Office (PPO), the Police, and the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI). Nevertheless, the PPO takes the ultimate responsibility in Korea's law enforcement system as provided by the Article 4 of the Prosecutors' Office Act (POA), which established that public prosecutors bear the responsibility to investigate and prosecute criminal cases, including corruption. In particular, upon an order of the Prosecutor-General, the Anti-Corruption Department within the Supreme Prosecutors' Office (SPO) directs, supervises, and coordinates special investigations against serious corruption cases[8].

Although the police can investigate corruption cases, Article 196 of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) stipulates that police investigations of criminal cases including corruption shall be conducted "under instructions of a public prosecutor." Moreover, Article 246 of CPA designates public prosecutors as the sole entity to institute and execute prosecution.

As a constitutional body and the supreme audit and inspection institution, the BAI under the President has the prime responsibility to examine the final accounts of revenues and expenditures of all public entities. The BAI also has the authority to inspect the work of government agencies and the duties of their employees. Based on constitutional mandates, the BAI can investigate and detect corruption cases through its audit and inspection functions. If there is a suspicion of crime, the BAI may refer the case to the PPO for investigation.[9]

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[8] Please see: http://www.spo.go.kr/eng/about/departments.jsp.
[9] Please see: http://english.bai.go.kr//.

The independence and impartiality of a law enforcement agency is one of most crucial success factors. When a law enforcement agency is not able to exercise its powers with impartiality, it risks losing its legitimacy and public trust. In this vein, Articles 4(2) of POA of Korea stipulates that "[e]ach prosecutor shall observe political neutrality and shall not abuse the powers bestowed."

However, SPO has at times faced challenges with withstanding undue political influence in the agency's operations (Cho, 2002; Choi, 2009). For example, when the Prosecutor-General resigned in September 2013, well before the expiration of his 2-year term, the media in Korea claimed that, while the official reason for resignation was the unethical behavior of the Prosecutor-General, he had been under serious pressure from the President's Office to resign due to the political sensitivity of the investigation he had ordered involving the National Intelligent Service and the 2012 presidential election. Facing this situation, about 40 prosecutors expressed deep concern that this resignation might hurt the political neutrality of SPO thereafter (Lee et. al., 2013).

Being aware of the public concerns about its political independence, SPO has made efforts to reform its anti-corruption structure by creating the Anti-Corruption Department (ACD) within the Supreme Prosecutor's Office (SPO) in 2013.

Prior to the ACD, the Central Investigation Department (CID) in the SPO had taken a leading role in investigating and prosecuting the most serious corruption cases in Korea. However, because of controversy over political neutrality and fairness, CID was replaced by ACD in December, 2013. In order to distance it from politics, the investigative function of CID was transferred to the District Prosecutors' Offices (DPOs) while ACD took responsibility for supervising and supporting the DPO's investigations.

The newly established ACD consists of the Investigation Control Division (ICD) and the Investigation Support Division (ISD). ICD's primary role is to plan, coordinate and supervise special investigative tasks. To carry out this function, maintaining close cooperation with other government agencies is important for the ICD. ISD's main functions include support for accounting analysis and money tracking, training of prosecutors and investigators, criminal asset recovery and networking with relevant international organizations. During the first year of its establishment, ACD has actively performed these functions by organizing several task forces to plan and coordinate the investigation of serious corruption scandals in the securities market and the defense industry. Moreover, ACD during 2014-2015 successfully recovered the bribery proceeds laundered in the U.S. by the former President Chun Doo-hwan (Koo, 2015). Out of the joint investigation into bribes that the ex-president tried to hide, the U.S. and Korea together collected about USD 1.2 million 28.7 million (Han, 2015).

For Prevention

ACRC, a dedicated anti-corruption agency (ACA), plays the most important role on the prevention side. However, the ACRC differs from typical ACAs in other countries in its organizational mission and structure.

Typical mission statements of other ACAs are as follows:

- Mission statement of the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC): "With the community, the ICAC is committed to fighting corruption through effective law enforcement, education and prevention to help keep Hong Kong fair, just, stable and prosperous" (http://www.icac.org.hk).

- Mission statement of the Singapore CPIB: "To combat corruption through swift and sure, firm but fair action" (https://www.cpib.gov.sg).

- Mission statement of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC): "To eradicate corruption, abuse of power and malpractice in Malaysia; and to concertedly and continuously strengthen integrity and enhance expertise through human resources development programmes" (http://www.sprm.gov.my).

In comparison, Korea's ACRC differs from these typical ACAs in several respects. First, it is mandated to "protect people's rights and interests and build a transparent and fair society." This provides a broader scope of work than those ACAs referenced above.[10] Second, in terms of its function, while the typical ACAs usually undertake activities pertaining to investigation, prevention, and public education, ACRC does not have investigative power.

The functional difference between ACRC and some other ACAs arises from the reshuffling of government structure at the beginning of the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013). With the objective of protecting civil rights through a one-stop service centre, the Lee administration merged the former KICAC with the Ombudsman of Korea and the Administrative Appeals Commission in February 29, 2008 (http://www.acrc.go.kr). At that time, civil society in Korea was concerned that this merger might weaken the ACA's anti-corruption function. Nevertheless, the prevention-centric anti-corruption function of ACRC has been strengthened after the merger.

ACRC primarily carries out corruption prevention measures that focus on measuring corruption. It sets national anti-corruption policy guidelines, promotes anti-corruption capacity building and education, identifies corruption risks, and advises corruption-prone institutions in the public sector (ACRC, 2012).

2.3. Good Practices in the Area of Prevention

On the prevention side, Korea has made significant progresses in the past 15 years by utilizing various innovative tools it developed. The following are some of Korea's good practices related to the prevention of corruption, spearheaded by ACRC.

2.3.1. Monitoring & Evaluation Tools: Integrity Assessment and Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment

Regular monitoring & evaluation of anti-corruption efforts and outcomes constitute an effective and critical means of corruption prevention in Korea. Here, ACRC's Integrity Assessment and Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment (AIA) are two main tools administered on an annual basis. Assessments are not new in the world. What is unique about these assessments, however, is the way in which they have been formulated and utilized by ACRC as a means of creating political will and incentives, to fight corruption in Korea at the institutional and individual levels by ranking all the assessed institutions and releasing that information to the public. This compels the heads of the public institutions to pay greater attention and introduce specific measures to enhance their integrity and prevent corruption.

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[10] http://www.acrc.go.kr.

Integrity Assessment

ACRC's Integrity Assessment is one of the most important and innovative tools in Korea's corruption prevention efforts. It was first adopted in 2000 with several goals. In order to prevent corruption, there is a need to measure the level of corruption at the organizational level and to understand the factors that breed corruption in public organizations. In this context, the Integrity Assessment provides information on the degree of corruption in public organizations, but also helps diagnose the areas and functions which are prone to corruption in the public sector. It also helps to strengthen public scrutiny of the problems associated with corruption and to build political will in public organizations to fight corruption through the public releases of the assessment scores for each institution.

In 2014, a total of 640 public organizations were assessed, which included almost every organization in the public sector, thanks to the legal basis provided in the ACRC Act of 2001 (ARCR, 2014a). Different from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI), it surveys people who have real experience of doing work with public organizations. It also seeks to measure the corruption problem in each public institution assessed, not only through perceptions, but by the actual experiences of survey respondents. Combining external and internal integrity together in a holistic composite integrity index, the Integrity Assessment captures the multiple dimensions of corruption risks and vulnerabilities in public organizations.

The annual assessment entails substantial costs for ACRC because of the large-scale questionnaire survey. In 2014, a total of 253,819 respondents participated in the Integrity Assessment which cost ACRC about 2.1 billion Korean KRW, or approximately USD 2 million (ACRC, 2014a). Nevertheless, the Integrity Assessment has been worth the cost, as it has successfully provided incentives for voluntary anti-corruption efforts among public organizations.

Incentives are generated in at least three ways. First, as ACRC releases the results of the Integrity Assessment to the public and the Korean public has a keen interest in the public sector corruption, those organizations whose Integrity Assessment results are poor face criticism from the media and citizens. Second, in a practical sense, the results of the Integrity Assessment have a bearing on the performance-based bonuses of public employees, as the annual allocation of performance-based bonus is determined by the results of the Business Performance Evaluation (BPE), which is conducted each year by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance on public organizations. The Integrity Assessment results are included as one of evaluation criteria of the BPE. Third, the leaders of public organizations are sensitive to the results of the Integrity Assessment because they may receive a commendation letter from the President if their organizations show extraordinary results compared to other organizations.

With the creation of such incentives, the Integrity Assessment seems to have made an overall positive impact made on Korea's anti-corruption efforts. For instance, while the level of integrity in the public sector has fluctuated from year to year, the overall level has increased over the years—i.e. from 6.43 on a 10-point scale in 2002 to 7.78 in 2014.

Box 6. Korea's Annual Integrity Assessment

ACRC's Integrity Assessment was first developed by the Presidential Special Committee on Anti-Corruption in 1999. Its development was based on the understanding that the traditional anti-corruption approach relying on detection and punishment had neither been sufficient nor effective in dealing with corruption in the Korean public sector, and that the prevention approach, when effective, could present a more fundamental and sustainable solution to the problem.

The Integrity Assessment is based on the Act of the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission mandates the diverse functions of corruption prevention to the ACRC. Among them, Article 12 (5) of the Act provides the legal ground on which the ACRC can conduct the Integrity Assessment: "Article 12 (5) The work of developing and recommending policy measures to prevent corruption in public institutions and matters concerning institutional improvements, and surveying the actual status of the public institutions for the purpose of developing and recommending them." With this mandate, the ACRC has been able to assess the integrity of most public organizations. The 2014 Integrity Assessment includes 640 public organizations, including central government ministries and agencies, all levels of local governments, offices of education, public service-related organizations, and public universities (ACRC, 2014a).

Before the Integrity Assessment was officially launched in 2002 by the then-Korea Independent Commission against Corruption (KICAC), predecessor of ACRC, the Korean Government conducted three pilot assessments in 2001-2002 to fine-tune the tool. In order to ensure necessary capacities and resources to undertake this annual assessment, ACRC has put the Anti-Corruption Survey and Evaluation Division in overall charge of administering the Integrity Assessment, while outsourcing the large-scale technical survey work to professional entities (that specialize in the public opinion polls survey) through a competitive bidding process each year.

The Integrity Assessment tool of ACRC has attracted interest from other countries and has been adopted by several countries including Indonesia, Bhutan, Thailand, Mongolia, Vietnam and Malaysia. It was also awarded the 1st prize of the 2012 UN Public Service Awards in the category of Preventing and Combating Corruption in the Public Service (ACRC, 2013, 2014a). While the costs and technical input required for conducting the Integrity Assessment are substantial (e.g. about USD 2 million on an annual basis with the support of well-trained researchers in Korea), the Integrity Assessment tool has a potential for cost-effective modification and contextual application in developing countries, as in the case of Indonesia and Mongolia.

<Process of the Annual Integrity Assessment>

Summary Description of the ACRC Integrity Assessment

Concept	- To encourage public institutions to engage in voluntary efforts to prevent corruption by regularly assessing and disclosing the integrity levels of public institutions
Objectives	- Identify corruption-prone areas and root causes of corruption in the public sector
	- Facilitate an informed understanding of main trends in corruption levels of public organizations
	- Provide basic data, with annual updates, for development of government's anti-corruption strategies
Key	- Areas to be assessed: corruption-prone work areas (i.e. service areas) of public organizations
	- Persons to be surveyed: public service users, public officials and policy customers
	- Survey questions: personal perception of corruption as well as actual experiences with corrupt practices (e.g. offering of money, gifts, entertainment and favours)
	- Data sources: results from phone or online (web-based) surveys, statistics of corruption public employees and media reports of corruption cases

Source: ACRC, "Integrity Assessment of Public Organizations" (2014), available at:
file:///C:/Users/UNDP/Downloads/IntegrityAssessment(Brochure)%20(1).pdf

Voluntary Anti-Corruption Reform through Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment (AIA)[11]

Along with Integrity Assessment for public organizations, ACRC has also developed an additional assessment tool, called the Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment (AIA). These two assessments are conducted separately on an annual basis, and complement each other. AIA has been an annual exercise for corruption prevention since 2002 and now covers more than 250 public institutions. The concept of AIA is to evaluate how the institutions are implementing various measures to prevent corruption, and how those measures are being effective, based on the policies and guidance set by ACRC. ACRC uses indicators and a weighted scoring system to enforce particular priorities for action each year.

As such, AIA is different from the more extensive and survey-oriented Integrity Assessment as it only assesses voluntary efforts of an organization to raise its integrity level, such as institutional improvements, observation of code of conduct, and promotion of awareness and organizational culture to prevent corruption. At the same time, the two assessments are closely related to each other, in terms of measuring inputs and outputs of integrity efforts, since an organization's efforts to prevent corruption (i.e. inputs) affect the actual level of its integrity (i.e. outputs), both directly and indirectly, over time (UNDP-ACRC, 2016).

AIA provides a guiding framework to the heads of public institutions in undertaking priority measures that prevent corruption. The methodology includes assessment criteria and suggestions on specific and clear actions (e.g. number of staff designated for anti-corruption work; provision of performance bonus to staff contributing to higher ranking of the organization; % of employees to receive anti-corruption training; existence of whistle-blower protection and reward mechanisms; development of institutional code of conduct; corruption cases detected by internal actors). As such, it creates a concrete mechanism for ACRC to lead public sector organizations to implement key initiatives to fight corruption each year (UNDP-ACRC, 2016).

As the AIA tool relies on a self-reporting mechanism of the target institutions and creates incentives to designate more people and attention for anti-corruption efforts within all of these institutions, it also helps build the internal anti-corruption capacity and a sense of ownership within the public sector with little extra resources. In Korea, ACRC spends about USD 150,000 per year for the administration of the AIA in Korea even including the publication costs. As such, AIA serves as a low-cost and high-impact institutional tool for corruption prevention, compared to ad hoc outsourced evaluations. AIA helps anti-corruption policy implementation & monitoring to be institutionalized as part of the work plan of each target institution.

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[11] This section is drawn from: The Guidance Note on Korea's Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment (UNDP and ACRC 2016.)

Box 7. ACRC's Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment

At the beginning of each year, ACRC reports to the President an outline of its anti-corruption policies and institutional priorities. Followed by the elaboration of the annual work plan, ACRC then develops and releases the annual anti-corruption guidelines and draft indicators for that year's AIA. In March, ACRC organizes a policy workshop for government offices and public enterprises, including those who are subject to AIA, to explain the AIA implementation guidelines and draft indicators in detail, and receive questions and suggestions from the participating institutions.

Based on the feedback from the workshop, ACRC then finalizes the assessment criteria and indicators, and releases them along with the AIA implementation plan in April, including the assessment schedule, reporting templates and a sample AIA report, for reference.

The public institutions follow the guidelines for the rest of the year and submit their implementation reports (covering the period from November 1 of the previous year and until October 31 of the current year) by early November. For verification of the reported facts, target institutions have to submit official documents as evidence for their performance reports. This prevents the organizations from forging official documents to receive a higher score on the assessment. In addition, ACRC selects about 15% of the target organizations for further verification through an on-site inspection.

Once all the performance reports are submitted, ACRC works with the external evaluation panel and evaluates the reports, along with site visits and verification activities. ACRC consolidates the assessment scores and releases draft scores to the target institutions in early December, after which it receives feedback until mid-December and makes necessary adjustments thereafter.

With their final scores, institutions are then ranked in performance groups or tiers (from 1 to 5, with 1 being the best performing category), rather than individually from the first to last. This methodology is designed to reduce the pressure on each institution yet give a clear indication of their performance level relative to other public institutions. The tiered ranking of each institution is released to the public through ACRC press releases, and the final consolidated report of AIA as a whole is published in January of the following year.

The results of each year's AIA receive significant media attention. Those who fared well on the assessment would benefit from improved organizational reputation, and those individuals who make exceptional contributions to AIA within the organization receive rewards such as performance bonuses, promotions, and overseas anti-corruption training opportunities. ACRC also provides separate reports to all the target institutions, with specific scores per index and comments on particular areas for improvement. In addition, ACRC offers consulting services to interested institutions in order to troubleshoot and address specific areas for reform.

Source: UNDP and ACRC (2016), Guidance Note on Korea's Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment.

Awareness Raising through Education and Public Campaigns

Education and public campaigns are important tools for corruption prevention. The Korean government has therefore sought to improve the ethics of civil servants and their perception of corruption. Here, the ACRC plays a leading role in educating civil servants in diverse ways (ACRC, 2012). Sometimes, customary or tradition-based corrupt behaviors may not be perceived as a violation of law. ACRC's training programmes are thus designed to correct civil servants' misconceptions about corrupt practices stemming from social and organizational traditions and customs. ACRC also utilizes public campaigns to convey anti-corruption messages to the general public and particularly the younger generation. In order to institutionalize training and public campaign activities, ACRC has also established the Anti-Corruption Training Center (ACTC). The ACTC carries out three primary tasks—anti-corruption and integrity training for civil servants and students, dissemination of the culture of integrity to society and the development of integrity educational contents.

Apart from the ACTC's outreach efforts to society, the ACRC encourages government organizations to conduct anti-corruption training by including the completion of training as one criterion of the ACIA. Accordingly, most public organizations in Korea conduct regular integrity training programmes.

BOX 8. Anti-Corruption Training Centre of Korea

Since 2003, the ACTC's anti-corruption and integrity training programs for civil servants have grown rapidly from 2 training programs for 71 civil servants in 2003 to 24 training programmes for 4,535 civil servants in 2013. In order to accommodate different training needs, the ACTC's training programmes offer five tracks: an integrity instructor training programme, training programmes for compliance officers, training programmes for civil servants whose duties are prone to corruption, training programmes for school principals and vice-principals, and training programmes customized to the lifecycle of civil servants. To maximize training effectiveness, the ACTC utilizes several training methods that combine lectures with participatory learning, case analyses, site visits and cyber training. To disseminate integrity culture in society, the ACTC operates the College Student Integrity Experts Nurturing Program and the Integrity Coach Nurturing Program which provides diverse activities to young students and members of the general public who are interested in developing integrity-related educational contents and in becoming integrity training experts. The ACTC attempts to increase social awareness of integrity by developing more contents. From 2008 to 2013, the ACTC made 13 educational materials and 24 audio-visual contents (ACRC, 2014b).

2.4. Political and Administrative Reforms

While the ACRC leads corruption prevention activities as an anti-corruption agency, there are broader sets of politico-administrative reforms in Korea that have proven to be effective in preventing corruption. While anti-corruption efforts based on zero-tolerance law enforcement are effective and necessary, they are fundamentally reactive because of a detection-and-punishment approach. By contrast, corruption control by reforming political and administrative systems is more proactive because these reforms aim to eliminate the root causes of corruption.

Yet transforming political and administrative system through reform is difficult and time-consuming (Fjeldstad and Isaksen, Jan, 2008). Moreover, considering that there are many political and administrative factors that cause corruption, pinpointing direct reform targets may not be easy. Despite this difficulty, general recommendations for political reform

relating to corruption control include the strengthening of political accountability through fair political competition and transparent party financing. The focal points of administrative reform are so broad that they range from structural and procedural changes in administration to devolution of powers from a central to a local government (World Bank, 2007).

In Korea, substantial preventive political and administrative reforms were introduced since the early 1990s when a civilian government under President Kim Young-sam came into power. Since then, each administration implemented numerous reform measures to confront the corruption problem directly or indirectly. Among them, there are several notable reform measures that have significantly reduced corruption, such as the adoption of real name registration in financial and real estate transactions, the strengthening of mandatory asset reports of high-ranking civil servants and the implementation of the comprehensive "Government Innovation" policy.

The Kim Young-sam administration made special efforts and showed a potent leadership to eradicate grand corruption which stemmed from the close state-business ties (Kim, 2011). To this end, President Kim rapidly introduced the real name registration in finance and real estate transactions that prohibited people from using fictitious or others' names for bank accounts and real estate registration. This was an important and crucial anti-corruption reform step to dismantle the previous money-power nexus on which corrupt officials and businesspeople hid illegal assets in bank accounts under false names (Kihl, 2005).

Another important preventive measure during the Kim Young-sam administration was the revision of the Public Service Ethics Act, through which the asset registration of high-ranking civil servant was further strengthened. Although the asset registration was mandated at the time of enactment of the Public Service Ethics Act in 1981, it was not implemented effectively. Consequently, the Kim administration tightened asset registration requirements from Grade 3 or above to Grade 4 or above. Moreover, the revised act required the disclosed assets of civil servants with Grade 1 or above, heads of local government, members of local councils, and their immediate family members to be published in the Government Bulletin. By requiring high ranking officials to report all their assets to the public, the mandatory asset report increased the possibility of revealing inappropriate or illegal gains in assets. Since then, the asset registration and disclosure system has served as one of crucial corruption prevention measures in Korea (Park, 2007).

In addition, re-employment restrictions were introduced in order to prevent the conflict of interests among civil servants after the end of their careers, by limiting their employment in directly-related areas in the private sector. Furthermore, the Code of Conduct for Public Officials (CCPO), enacted as a Presidential Decree, provides a set of ethical standards for public officials, employees of public companies and public service agencies. Since 2005, CCPO has been applied to all public officials, as well as to the employees of all public companies and public service agencies in Korea. In November 2010, the Code of Conduct for Local Council Members was also enacted as a Presidential Decree.

Throughout the Roh Moo-hyun administration, comprehensive and substantial government reforms were carried out in the name of "Government Innovation". While historically each administration in Korea initiated administrative reforms, the Government Innovation policy was distinguished from previous reform efforts because of the broad scope of reform targets, which included all the public organizations such as central government ministries and agencies, local governments, state-owned enterprises and other public organizations. In executing reform, the Roh administration applied the same principles to all reform targets.

Moreover, the areas of reform were comprehensively defined in two ways. First, each public organization was required to reshape its vision and mission, leadership, structure, process, system, and culture. Second, the Government Innovation policy set up six core reform areas at the national level: administration reform, personnel reform, decentralization reform, tax and financial system reform, e-Government reform, and archives reform (Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization, 2007). Therefore, Government Innovation was broad enough to bring key values-efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and participation-back to the civil service. Pertaining to corruption control, the Government Innovation policy not only restructured corruption-prone administrative processes and systems but also introduced diverse preventive measures to the government.

In sum, like in the case of Singapore, Korea's experience shows that corruption prevention cannot be achieved effectively solely by the efforts of an anti-corruption body without being synchronized with other political and administrative reforms. Although corruption control is not the only reform goal, the Korean Government has successfully transformed the civil service towards higher accountability, transparency and integrity by instituting measures that compel civil servants to avoid any potential conflict of interests.

Post-Employment Restrictions for Public Officials: Example of the Seoul Metropolitan Government

- Korea's Public Service Ethics Act restricts the post-employment of retired public officials. Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) established its own criteria for restricted public officials, as well as a guideline for retired SMG public officials.
- Restrictions apply to every SMG officer in Grade 4 or higher; as well as grade 7 or higher level officials who worked in specific sectors such as construction, civil engineering, environment and taxation among others.
- Any officials under this category may not be employed, within 3 years after retirement, under the following restricted enterprises (institutions): Profit-making private enterprise with over 1 billion KRW capital, over 10 billion KRW apparent transactions; social welfare corporations with over 10 billion KRW basic assets; and public related organizations that perform safety inspections, authorization/permission or procurement.

Source: UNDP-SMG, International Workshop for Public Construction Transparency: Workshop Handbook & Policy Toolbox (2015).

2.5. E-governance reforms for increased transparency

The concept of "good governance" when applied to the government relates to how a government in an interaction with the society makes and implements policies. While there may be different definitions of "good governance," the concept usually implies responsiveness, accountability and transparency in running a government, as well as empowerment of citizens. [12]

E-Governance is an approach aimed at enhancing good governance utilizing information and communications technologies (ICTs). Since one of core pillars of governance is the government, e-Government can be regarded as a subset of e-Governance. In other words, e-Government can improve the values of responsiveness, accountability and transparency, contributing to building and maintaining e-Governance. Since corruption is caused when a government lacks responsiveness, accountability and transparency (Klitgaard, 1988), scholars and practitioners regard e-Government as a useful anti-corruption platform (Choi, 2014).

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[12] Among the definitions of good governance, the United Nations conceptualizes good governance as the country's institutions and processes that promote "equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, in a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring" (http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/governance/). In a similar vein, the World Bank highlights that good governance is associated with "democracy and good civil rights, with transparency, with the rule of law, and with efficient public services" (http://web.worldbank.org/).

The Korean Government has rigorously promoted the introduction of e-Government as an essential vehicle for governance reform in the last two decades, particularly during the period of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations from 1993 to 2003. The Government, at all levels, has continuously innovated and adopted diverse e-Government systems for more effective and strategic administration of public services.

As the table below shows, several of Korea's e-Government systems have earned international praise and Korea has also been ranked No. 1 by UN's e-Government survey (UN, 2014).

Internationally Recognized e-Government Systems of Korea

System	Ministry	Subject	Award	Year
e-Procurement (KONEPS)	Public Procurement Service	UN	Public Service Innovation Award	2003
		OECD	Exemplary Case of Transparency Improvement	2004
		WCIT	Public Sector Outstanding Award	2006
Immigration Examination (KISS)	Korea Customs Service	UN	Public Service Innovation Award	2007
e-Customs Clearance (UNI-PASS)		UN	Exemplary Case of Anti-Corruption Activity	2001
		WCO	Intellectual Property Right Award	2006
		AFACT	e-Asia Award	2007
Home Tax (Home Tax)	National Tax Service	OECD	e-Tax Service	2006
Informatization Village (Invil)	MOSPA	UN	Public Service Innovation Award	2010
On-Nara		World e-Democracy Forum	Top 10	2009
Online Petition Portal System (OPPS)	Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission	e-Challenge	Demonstration	2009
		World e-Government Forum	Top 10	2006

Source: National Information Society Agency (2014: 113)
Note: "Subject" in this table notes the awarding entity.

E-Government in Korea has improved the efficiency and the effectiveness of the government's management and public service delivery by reducing unnecessary bureaucratic red tape, while enhancing transparency and accountability (Choi, 2014; UN, 2014). For example, according to the World Customs Organization (WCO) evaluation, the Korea Customs Service's UNI-PASS, an e-Customs system, is the fastest clearance system among 169 WCO member countries (National Information Society Agency (NIA), 2014).

Another good example of an e-Government system which contributes to corruption control is the Korea Online e-Procurement System (KONEPS), a fully integrated electronic procurement system. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) viewed KONEPS as an e-Government system which has significantly improved efficiency and transparency in procurement administration (OECD, 2013).

It is not only the central government ministries and agencies that embrace e-Government systems in their administration. E-Government has become the standard in Korea. Local governments and other public organizations now utilize various E-Government systems to manage intra-organizational administrative processes, to provide services to citizens, and to communicate their work and policies with the public.

Box 9 shows an example of how a local government has created and implemented e-Government systems successfully in management of public construction projects, thereby reducing opportunities for corruption and mismanagement. Seoul's One-Project Management Information System (One-PMIS), which has brought about a full digitalization of reporting & document sharing in public construction management, among Seoul government, contractors and sub-contractors. The Construction Information System linked to One-PMIS ("Allimi" in Korean) makes a real-time disclosure of all project related information: contract payments, contractors' weekly reports, safety records and responsible project managers of private companies. According to a recent independent survey of 1,368 people, 88.6% of the respondents agreed that One-PMIS contributes to enhancement of transparency of Seoul's public construction project management. On the Allimi, 91.5% of the respondents agreed that this information disclosure system contributes to the transparency of the public construction projects, and the same share agreed that the system contributes to their increased awareness of the public projects in their neighborhoods (SMG, June 2016).

Box 9. The Clean Construction System of the Seoul Metropolitan Government

The 'Clean Construction System' was introduced in the Korean capital of 12 million inhabitants in 2011. It was developed by the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) as a package of innovative tools to improve transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, and citizens' access to information in the public infrastructure sector, which used to be one of the most corruption-prone sectors in the country.

SMG's CCS has helped increase efficiency and transparency in what used to be the most corruption-prone sector, and won the prestigious UN Public Service Award in 2013, in recognition of its innovation and potential for application in other countries. A video introduction of Seoul's Clean Construction System is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5nw3O0tfUO0.

CCS consists of four e-governance tools and provides an integrated technological and institutional solution to the complex challenges of the public construction sector.

1. Four Components of the Clean Construction System (CCS)

- **One-PMIS (Project Management Information System)** One-PMIS has enabled real-time information sharing. It has also enhanced efficiency and cost-saving with e-documentation by reducing burdens of document storage and search processes. Utilizing One-PMIS, various stakeholders in the public construction projects can now interact with real-time information in each stage of the project from planning to engineering and construction.
- **Construction Informer ("Allimi" in Korean)** Linked to One-PMIS, the Allimi website discloses work summary, contract status, photographs of the work progress, and contractor information which are citizen related construction information. Much of the information registered in the One-PMIS is automatically transferred to the Allimi website.
- **Subcontract Payment Monitoring System (sPMS or "Daegeum E-Baro" in Korean)** sPMS has created a direct payment system to protect subcontractors suffering from overdue wage payments. Payments are made directly from the developer to the general contractor's, to subcontractor's, and to construction worker's accounts, separately, instead of through a chain of payments made from the developer all the way down to the construction workers via the general contractor and subcontractors.

- **Electronic Human Resources Management System for Construction Workers (E-HRM)** E-HRM utilizes a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)-based employee clock in/clock out management system, and a personal bank-affiliated electromagnetic ID card (with credit or debit card function) issued to construction workers. The E-HRM records construction worker banking information on the E-HRM server which is then transmitted to One-PMIS. The system benefited construction workers by providing a tool to keep track of their severance grants, while providing more systematic human resources management for SMG.

2. Factors behind successful introduction of CCS

- Development of new systems and smartphone applications to enhance accessibility to citizens and to receive their questions & feedback was crucial in improving SMG's administration processes.
- Mayor's strong leadership to tackle corruption and the overall institutional culture for openness and transparency provided an enabling environment.
- Cooperative relations with international organizations and construction workers unions and applying stakeholders' opinions in the implementation have led to successful adoption and utilization of the system.
- Creative and effective utilization of advanced IT technology has contributed to the development and operation of CCS.

SMG's arrangements are regarded as the groundwork for transparent municipal administration by putting an end to the previous practices that kept work progress and resource information secret, and by disclosing all the basic information on projects such as the project overview, photos of major processes, and web camera site videos for public viewing. Successful development and implementation of this new system has demonstrated that the government can help bring greater transparency into the private sector in the public infrastructure development by encouraging communication among relevant parties. In the construction field, the new system has not only improved the payment process, but also the overall management of projects, specifically in the areas of financial inputs and resources and materials.

Source: UNDP-SMG, International Workshop for Public Construction Transparency: Workshop Handbook and Policy Toolbox (2015).

3. Key Success Factors of Korea's Anti-Corruption Experience

While there are multiple factors that have helped reduce the general level of corruption in Korea, the following three factors seem to have played a key role in Korea's anti-corruption experiences.

Progressive strengthening of the legal framework on corruption and effective punishment.

On the whole, the strength of the anti-corruption legal framework and the level of punishment against corrupt offenders have substantially increased in Korea, while investigative activities have been intensified. As a result, the Korean Government has been able to promote the strong message that corruption is a high-risk-and-low-return crime, particularly for civil servants, and that whoever is involved in corruption will face a high possibility of being investigated and punished.

Systematic monitoring of the level of corruption and anti-corruption efforts across all government institutions helped increase the public awareness and political will to tackle corruption.

With the introduction of annual monitoring & evaluation tools such as ACRC's Integrity Assessment and Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment since the early 2000, Korea has been assessing and measuring inputs and outputs of anti-corruption work in a systematic way, and this has helped increase the political will of public institutions to tackle corruption. The results of these assessments also provide useful feedback for public institutions to voluntarily identify and address corruption risks in their organizations.

Political and administrative reforms to eliminate the root causes of corruption

Korea's anti-corruption efforts have yielded fruits because structural causes of corruption were addressed through rigorous political and administrative reforms. Since the early 1990s, successive administrations sought to break the strong ties among politics, Government and business that have traditionally bred conflicts of interest and corruption in Korea's politico-administrative system. Moreover, the policy of Government Innovation during President Roh Moo-hyun, aimed at reshaping the vision and mission in public service, restructured the leadership, structures, processes, systems, and culture of public organizations at all levels, and made the public sector better serve citizens. Out of these reforms, the Korean civil service has become more efficient, transparent and accountable.

E-governance and E-government reforms play a crucial role in executing the civil service reform effectively and empowering the citizens.

Korea has built and maintained one of the most advanced e-governments in the world, and this has positively contributed to corruption prevention in the country. Introduction of diverse e-Government systems have shown positive impacts not only on the administrative efficiency but also on the transparency of central and local governments by reducing unnecessary personal contacts in administrative processes, as well as sharing and releasing the public information widely.

4. Remaining Challenges in Korea

Since the early 1990s, Korea has made significant progress in tackling corruption. In comparison with Singapore which has maximized the "detect and punish" approach (Ang, 2015; Quah, 2001, 2007, 2013), Korea has taken more preventive approaches, relying on anti-corruption assessments, public education, and rigorous political and administrative reforms including introduction of E-Government systems.

While enhancement of the legal framework and law enforcement efforts have been also important, the low level of public trust in the judicial system of Korea remains a challenge in Korea's anti-corruption efforts. According to a survey-based OECD report on the level of public confidence in the judicial system of OECD member countries, 27% of Korean respondents expressed their confidence in the nation's judicial system, which is much lower than the OECD average (54 %) (OECD, 2015).

In addition, coordination remains an important issue given the decentralized structure of the institutional framework. As discussed earlier, anti-corruption law enforcement processes in Korea are functionally divided into several agencies, in contrast with the case of Singapore where punitive and preventive work are more organically coordinated and integrated under CPIB. In a decentralized framework, close coordination and partnership among law enforcement agencies becomes all the more important for the effective control and prevention of corruption in Korea.

III

Lessons Learnt from Korea and Singapore for Corruption Control and Prevention

The first step in dealing with corruption is measuring its extent and impact. If the study of corruption is designed to diagnose the causes of corruption and its seriousness, the process provides policymakers with better information on areas to prioritize in anti-corruption initiatives. Moreover, comprehensive assessments of corruption, when taken regularly and systematically allow anti-corruption authorities to understand the changing forms of corruption.

Political and administrative reforms intend to remove dysfunctional aspects in political and administrative systems. In connecting these to anti-corruption efforts, reform makes politicians and civil servants more responsive and accountable to citizens and political and administrative affairs more transparent.

E-governance, powered by ICTs is currently indispensable for almost every country. In this context, e-government is one of the core elements because it increases the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of government and empowers citizens. In addition, e-government is perceived as an essential tool for reforming public administration.

In efforts to combat corruption, the ideal approach is a balance between preventive and punitive measures. In fact, there is no country where all the anti-corruption functions from corruption detection to investigation and prosecution to conviction are carried out by a single agency. Instead, there are multiple agencies with distinct roles and responsibilities regarding anti-corruption activities. In some sense, the multiple agency structure can ensure reciprocal checks-and-balances in law enforcement. Yet it can also cause a coordination problem which may hinder effective law enforcement (Choi, 2009).

Experts and practitioners agree that a comprehensive approach is necessary for effective corruption control and prevention. Such an approach demands that all actors in the government, market and civil society participate in the anti-corruption reform process (UNDP, 2014b; UNODC et. al., 2010). Because anti-corruption reform is painstaking and time-consuming, there are not many countries which complete reform successfully. From scholarly studies and field experience, many recommendations and lessons have been made and identified.

For example, Quah (2007, pp. 35-46), in making anti-corruption recommendations for Asian countries drawn from the Singaporean experience, suggests the following key success factors: political will, independent and incorruptible anti-corruption agency, reform to deal with major corruption-inducing factors, and effective punishment of corrupt offenders. In an evaluation report on anti-corruption strategies of fourteen Asia-Pacific countries, UNDP (2014b, pp. 26-27) identifies five key factors as determinants of successful anti-corruption efforts as follow: connection of political changes to an anti-corruption drive, effective utilization of corruption measurement, integration of corruption data collection to formulation, and monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption strategies, high-level political support to an anti-corruption agency, and continuous monitoring of anti-corruption strategies. In addition to these policy recommendations, other studies and policy reports touch upon different aspects of anti-corruption recommendations depending on which case they examine. Diverse anti-corruption strategies reflect the complexity of solutions related to effective corruption prevention and control.

The anti-corruption experiences of Korea and Singapore suggest several lessons to be shared with developing countries. The lessons below are selective rather than exhaustive to understand the anti-corruption paths and strategies in Korea and Singapore. Although the lessons pertinent to Korea and Singapore can be generalized and applied to developing countries, they may not reflect the socio-political and administrative conditions of developing countries. Nonetheless, the experiences of both countries can provide useful lessons for them.

Lesson One: Strong law enforcement supported by political will is essential.

Because institution-building is the first step to solving problems, a dedicated anti-corruption agency (ACA) should be created by a strong legal framework to address various corruption-related issues in a systematic manner. Moreover, as in the anti-corruption law of Korea ("Act of the Prevention of Corruption and the Establishment and Management of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission"), an anti-corruption legislation needs to mandate the independent status of an ACA and to stipulate the missions and functions of an ACA as clearly and comprehensively as possible. When the roles and responsibilities of an ACA are clearly ensured by a law, an ACA can resist legally any potential attempt to make its functions feeble. However, an ACA cannot successfully achieve its anti-corruption mission in the absence of political support and commitment (Fjeldstad and Isaksen, 2008).

The experience of Singapore clearly indicates how these two elements—a newly created ACA and political will—are of importance in anti-corruption endeavors. To see an ACA function effectively, its anti-corruption activities should be carried out on the basis of independence and impartiality which cannot be ensured if its political will and support are absent (Quah, 2001; 2007; 2013; UNDP, 2005). In some cases, political elites in developing countries are directly involved in corruption (UNDP, 2014b). If this happens, strong anti-corruption political leadership is less likely to be exercised. Under these circumstances, elections become important as a vehicle to select reform-minded leaders in developing countries. Moreover, the vigilant monitoring of and the exertion of political pressure on political leaders by civil society are necessary.

Lesson Two: E-Government can help prevent corruption, particularly where there is lack of political will for punitive approaches.

Utilization of e-Government driven by the advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs) is useful to prevent and control corruption when political will is lacking and an ACA fails to function effectively. E-Government constitutes an indirect anti-corruption strategy compared with one that relies on ACA's law enforcement. However, as exemplified by the Korean experience, e-Government has been effective in enhancing transparency in the administrative processes and accountability of civil servants. Therefore, an e-Government-centric anti-corruption strategy is much softer and easily accepted. Moreover, e-Government is less politically sensitive because whereas a law enforcement-centric strategy is often faced with strong resistance from vested interests in many developing countries, most governments regard it as an integral component of civil service management and public service delivery. There is ample evidence of how an ICT-driven e-Government can contribute to corruption prevention and control in developing countries (Choi, 2014; UN, 2014).

Lesson Three: Effective civil service reforms accelerate anti-corruption reform.

ACA-led anti-corruption reforms cannot be successful if there is no civil service reform because a major source of corruption can be attributed to inappropriate rules and ineffective workings of a government. As Klitgaard (1988) stresses, if monopoly powers and discretion of civil servants are minimized and if accountability mechanisms are in place in government, corruption occurs less frequently. Therefore, civil service reforms are necessary, in order to transform corruption-prone processes, structure, rules and culture in the government to make the civil service more accountable, responsible and transparent. Both Korea and Singapore have benefited from civil service reform to prevent and control civil servants' corrupt behaviors.

Civil service reforms that can help curb corruption include strengthening of a civil service code of conduct, simplification of cumbersome administrative procedures for licenses and permits, rationalization of conflicting and overlapping rules and regulations, disclosure of information to the public, establishment of public complaint handling mechanisms, and introduction of performance-based financial management backed by strict internal and external audit (UNDP, 2005).

Furthermore, it is important to create and maintain a merit-based recruitment and promotion system of civil servants, combined with strong administrative as well as criminal sanctions against corruption offenders within the public service.

Lesson Four: Corruption control should begin with a systematic measurement of corruption.

When compared with other criminal violations, corruption is distinctive because it is secretive, contagious, addictive and can become customary. In addition to these characteristics, corruption usually does not produce direct victims (UNODC et. al., 2010). Consequently, it is difficult to pinpoint the sources and the seriousness of corruption. As the adage "no measurement, no cure" implies, corruption control should begin with measuring corruption (UNDP and Global Integrity, 2008). Many developing countries do not know why and to what extent corruption is rampant. Although TI's CPI provides information on the prevalence of corruption in a nation, it does not disclose the precise sources and causes of corruption. In this regard, developing countries would benefit from designing and conducting corruption diagnoses (UNDP, 2014b).

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