



## Governance Outcome Evaluation 2004-10



*Local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services*

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AGRPB	Assistance to Governance Reforms and Practices in Balochistan
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
ANP	Awami National Party
BEGIN-ER	Building Enabling Governance & Institutions for Earthquake Response
CCB	Citizen Community Board
CCF	Country Cooperation Framework
CO	Country Office
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSOs	civil society organizations
DFID	Department for International Development
DTCE	Devolution Trust for Community Environment
EAD	Economic Affairs Division
EIROP	Essential Institutional Reforms in NWFP
ERRA	Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GBG	Gender-Based Governance
GGP	Good Governance Project
GJTMAP	Gender Justice through Musalihat Anjuman Project
GOP	Government of Pakistan
LFO	Legal Framework Order
LGO 2001	Local Government Ordinance 2001
LG&RD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
LGRDD	Local Government and Rural Development Department
MAs	Musalihat Anjumans
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOWD	Ministry of Women Development
MQM	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
MTDF	Medium-Term Development Framework
MTR	Mid Term Review
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NDRMF	National Disaster Risk Management Framework
NGOs	Non-Governmental organizations
NRB	National Reconstruction Bureau
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
P&DD	Planning and Development Department
PERRA	Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz
PML-Q	Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid-e-Azam
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
RBM	Results-Based Management
SERRA	State Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority
STEP	Society for Torghar Environment Protection
SUSG-CA	Sustainable Use Specialist Group-Central Asia
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WPS	Women's Political School Project
WWF	World Wildlife Fund



# Executive Summary



The extensive local government reforms introduced by the government of General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) in 2001, were one of the most fundamental and far reaching interventions made in the system and processes of governance seen in Pakistan in many years. This intervention was based upon the premise that government was most likely to be accountable to the people when its' functions, particularly those related to the delivery of basic social sector services, were devolved, and included a substantial element of community participation which would be best handled by the lowest competent authority.

Perhaps the most visible and revolutionary manifestation of the new system of devolution and local government, was the huge presence of women in elected public office. As many as 60,000 women councillors were elected and nominated through local government elections in 2001 and 2005. In many important ways, this was this single biggest factor which has affected all other interventions that have taken place at the local government level in Pakistan.

Because of the nature of the far reaching and extensive interventions in the system of representation, governance and service delivery, there is no denying the fact, that previously existing institutions and social, political, and in particular power, relations, were all challenged, changed and affected. Any understanding of the nature of the new relationships and arrangements put in place must recognise and highlight this perspective. This Outcome Evaluation dealing with local government and devolution must be examined in a more holistic political economy context and manner than other evaluations.

UNDP Pakistan's leadership position in networking and resource mobilization for the devolution and the reconstruction process has been widely acknowledged. A wide range of project and non-project support was provided through interventions that were embedded in the local government system and others that had indirect connections. With specific attention on the local government and the LGO 2001, the focus of this evaluation is the Outcome: local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services. Our period of review is 2004-10 which corresponds with the extended CPAP of the same period.

The evaluation team was tasked with an in-depth examination of a related set of 12 projects and programmes intended to achieve this Outcome within four units: Democratic Governance, Poverty Reduction, Environment and Energy, and Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Some of the projects were embedded in the devolution and reconstruction process while others had indirect links.

This Evaluation is based upon a reading of a very large volume of documents related to the Outcome Evaluation, including project and programme documents of all the twelve projects/programmes. To supplement, clarify and triangulate various concepts and findings from the review of documents, the Evaluation team also conducted a wide range of interviews with key stakeholders, as well as detailed discussions with communities and beneficiaries of the projects/programmes. We are very aware that evaluations of this nature are conditioned by a lack of quantifiable measures of success. This is more so in the case of processes and systems which may take many years to bear fruition, such as an effective devolved local government system, particularly where issues of political economy and social engineering are at work, yet we have been able to reach a number of conclusions.

In the earlier stages of the devolution process, UNDP provided critical project and non-project assistance to NRB as it designed the local government system. UNDP Pakistan also assisted the electoral process and subsequently focused on capacity building of newly elected local government representatives, especially women, and also trained government officials at the local level. The training of local government officials and other government officials related to public services has been one of the main features of most of the programmes and projects which are under review in this Outcome Evaluation. In particular, the gender focus of these programmes has been a key component of the training programmes. Innovative approaches to organize communities and involve them in natural resource management and poverty reduction were also supported. We found evidence of improved awareness, enhanced voice and positive developments at the grass roots level due to local government and that the capacity building programme had created an enabling environment for women

Many direct and indirect stakeholders and beneficiaries constitute the social capital that was a consequence of the local government system. UNDP's project and non-project assistance helped support the creation and strengthening of this social capital. Extensive training support was provided to elected representatives, especially women in programmes/projects.

The evidence gathered indicates that considerable progress has been made towards the broad articulation of the Outcome. The capacities of local authorities and local communities to plan have increased through extensive and sustained training to elected representatives and government officials. Women and men in local beneficiary communities have benefited from support in planning conservation and economic activities. Innovative approaches to natural resource management providing an economic incentive for conservation have also been introduced. A mix of project and non-project assistance embedded

in the local government system and also that which was indirectly linked have contributed to progress towards the Outcome. In many specific projects and programmes, concrete progress has been made towards the specific indicators and outputs expected at the end of the year or of the project cycle.

Since the government in power at that time actively supported the structures and institutions put in place, many donors and development partners found a highly conducive environment towards achieving the goals which they had set for themselves. A number of very high profile projects were initiated after 2001 in the local government arena, many with considerable amounts of donor funding. While there was little or no effective fiscal decentralisation – a cornerstone to making any devolution programme successful – the Government of Pakistan had huge fiscal space, and following 9/11, donor money was easily available in Pakistan for development initiatives. The process of devolution has been facilitated by the improvement in the macroeconomic environment rather than by any conscious effort on the part of provincial governments to support the process of decentralization. By and large, it appears that devolution took place at the right time when the economy was able to create more fiscal space to enable expanded financing of local.

One cannot ignore the overall social climate in the country either, where slogans such as ‘enlightened moderation’, allowed far more ‘liberal’ uses of public spaces, particularly for women. The space created by a military general who promoted the participation of women in public life, was also one of the most important factors which should have allowed for easier and better progress towards the Outcome.

There is no question or debate about the relevance of UNDP’s support towards the twelve projects/programmes in order to achieve the Outcome, nor any doubt about the relevance of the Outcome itself. We feel that not only was devolution and local government one of the most important and relevant interventions necessary for broader pro-poor and pro-women, devolved, delivery of basic social services, but that it was imperative that donors and other development partners support such efforts from the early days in 2001, as many did. To further elaborate on the issue of relevance, we must highlight the fact that the new system of devolution and local government required capacity building and training of the nature which is captured in many of the projects and programmes under review here. Women councillors needed training, officials needed gender sensitisation given the huge influx of women as elected public representatives, communities needed guidance and support in how to mobilise their own abilities, and so on.

A key issue which affects all those raised in this Report, and affects concerns about relevance, sustainability, effectiveness, impact, as well as linkages, and is perhaps the most critical of all regarding the Outcome, concerns the need for UNDP to significantly accelerate its ongoing efforts to adapt to new realities, situations, alliances and challenges that were emerging. While re-strategizing efforts were initiated in 2008, UNDP needs to develop exit strategies where needed or a strategy to adapt to these new changes despite the significant investments it had made in the period under review and in fact since 2001. Strategic and timely responses to changing realities will help UNDP continue achieving progress towards the Outcome through consistent but revised strategic support to devolution and citizen participation.

The ambiguity and uncertainty around the LGO 2001 and the possible future of the local government system have had a huge impact on the Outcome, especially since around 2008. UNDP may have achieved the Outcome, or made huge strides towards achieving the Outcome, had the old devolution and local government system continued. The fact that reality changed is not UNDP's fault or responsibility, but it is important that UNDP put greater effort into anticipating the nature and direction of developments on the political, particularly local government, front, and adapt, adopt and rethink its strategies accordingly. The senior management and leadership must acknowledge some failings in not being able to do so more promptly, and to translate thinking and adaptability about such issues and convey them to the project and programme level so that these could adapt as well.

As much as the system of local government in place since 2001 is under review, the activities embedded in it, especially those which worked through partners and stakeholders who were an integral part of the local government system, need to be reviewed and revised, where possible in consultations with trainers, government officials, elected and unelected public representatives, members of CCBs, and UNDP programme and project staff.

In principle, UNDP's choice of projects and programmes has been correct and appropriate and would have helped make considerable progress towards achieving the Outcome. However, with much of the constituency for which the interventions were meant now in a different and changing environment, and with an unknown design of institutional structures and relationships that are likely to replace the old one, it does become difficult to give any clear guidelines for how to proceed. Nonetheless it is suggested that support to devolution is continued though with revised strategies and partners, where needed:

- Accelerate a review of all future commitments under the CPAP 2004-10 which deal with local government and more proactively suggest scenarios and alternate support strategies.
- Accelerate the re-strategizing of specific projects and programmes which were embedded in the LGO 2001.
- Strengthen the role of local authorities and communities in projects and programmes that are not embedded in the LGO 2001 but have the potential to contribute to the Outcome.
- Draw on UNDP's own extensive knowledge and experiences and also help create robust empirical evidence to assist and influence the impending decisions on local government. This requires increased engagement with provincial governments in the preparation of the new design and system so that it follows the principle of subsidiarity.
- Continue supporting local government training institutions in time for the new cadre of elected representatives for when (if) they come into office. However, many activities designed around the institutions, relationships and structures of the LGO 2001, will require a re-think as their context and operations are likely to be changed.
- Undertake or support an extensive, empirically based, review and analysis of inputs, outputs and outcomes (including financial issues) of the consequences and effects of the local government system (2001-09). Ensure wide dissemination of the review so that it may assist the anticipated restructuring of the local government system.



- Continue to train and gender sensitise public officials at all tiers of government. Also maintain contact with those that were trained during the period 2004-09, so as to follow the social and human capital created.
- Expand focus on the demand side of the governance equation. Broaden engagement with communities and civil society organizations. Identify partners that may include NGOs, media and academic institutions through a review of different models of citizens' engagement with the state for improved planning and service delivery that are successfully practiced in Pakistan and elsewhere. Particularly focus on experiences that help amplify citizen voice and agency.
- Review internal operational modalities and staffing so as to ensure: (a) optimal response time; (b) consistent and strategic support to interventions from conceptualization to follow-through phases; (c) availability of required skills and experience related to gender and other disciplines.

# 1.0 Introduction

## 1.1 Background and Context

There is little denying the fact, that the Devolution Plan and the extensive local government reforms introduced by the government of General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) in 2001, were one of the most fundamental and far reaching interventions made in the system and processes of governance seen in Pakistan in many years. This intervention was widely perceived to be a hugely ambitious experiment in social engineering with the potential to produce improved governance, greater public participation and more equitable development delivered at the grassroots. This intervention was based upon the premise that government was most likely to be accountable to the people when its functions, particularly those related to the delivery of basic social sector services, were devolved, and included a substantial element of community participation which would be best handled by the lowest competent authority.

Even after eight years of being in place, the complexity of the changes made by the extensive Devolution Plan and the Local Government Ordinance 2001 (LGO 2001) and the absence of sufficient credible empirical data and evidence, make it difficult to gauge the impact and extent of the outcomes of this new local government system. Multiple dependent and independent variables make causality difficult to interpret. Nonetheless, on the surface at least, it appears that the system has provided people greater and quicker access to government, especially in rural areas, has certainly expanded women's political space through the reservation of seats, and has led to considerable development work. On the other hand, there is genuine concern that ineffective accountability, elite capture, increased rent-seeking, and a lack of clear roles and authority, have all enhanced polarisation between the representative and administrative governance structures at the local and provincial levels, and the combination of these factors have impeded the pace and outreach of development.

Perhaps the most visible and revolutionary manifestation of the new system of devolution and the local government put in place in 2001, was the huge presence of women in elected public positions, as councillors at Union, Tehsil and District levels of administration and representation. With 33 percent reserved seats for women at all levels in the devolution system, 36,066 women councillors were elected and nominated in the first round of local government elections in 2001. With the size of the councils reduced in 2005, but still with the 33 percent reserved seats for women, 24,528 women were elected to serve the public through the local government system<sup>1</sup>. In a society which was considered to be 'tribal', backward, conservative and much worse, this entry of women as public representatives, must stand out as the most important outcome of the devolution reforms ever undertaken in Pakistan. As a result, a noticeable 'growing dynamism in women's political participation' has been noted by many (SPDC, Devolution and Human Development in Pakistan, 2007, p 65). In many important ways, it was this single factor which has affected all

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1 These are the number of womens' reserved seats in the 2001 and 2005 elections; not all were contested or filled.

other interventions (including those evaluated in this Evaluation) that have taken place at the local government level in Pakistan.

Because of the nature of the far reaching and extensive interventions in the system of representation, governance and service delivery, there is no denying the fact, that previously existing institutions and social, political, and in particular power, relations, were all challenged, changed and affected. Any understanding of the nature of the new relationships and arrangements put in place, must recognise and highlight the political economy perspective of these interventions and rearrangements.

Unlike, say, interventions in the health sector, or in the environment or industrial sector, institutional and electoral reforms which challenge and address issues of power and control, are necessarily political issues, in which the balance of power relationships between institutions, social groups, and gender, are all reformulated. The need to apply a political economy framework is fundamental to any evaluation related to outputs and outcomes which emanate from local government and devolution reforms. For these reasons, as we argue and demonstrate in a number of sections below, this Outcome Evaluation dealing with local government and devolution, must be examined in a more holistic political economy context and manner than are other evaluations, such as those on the Environment and on Gender.

The need to use a political economy approach is emphasised by the course of events that have taken place over the last few months. At the time of writing, January 2010, the local government system in place since 2001 is effectively in abeyance. While numerous reasons have been given for this state of affairs, it has also been admitted by senior elected and unelected government officials, that the prevailing system no longer serves the needs of the present political dispensation, primarily because it altered key institutional and power relations and arrangements. Elections were to be held in 2009 for a third round under the LGO 2001, but following elections at the National and Provincial levels in 2008, the entire system of elected local government has been put on hold, if not yet completely abandoned.

It is important to highlight the fact, that this process, of newly elected higher tiers of government – National and Provincial – doing away with elected local forms of government, particularly those inherited from military generals whom these elected bodies replace, is nothing new in the context of Pakistan. Both in 1971 and in 1988, as now in 2009/2010, with the return to some form of democratically elected government, previous forms of local government were dissolved. In January 2010, there is a great deal of uncertainty and ambiguity concerning the existence and form of local government, a sentiment that has prevailed since the elections of February 2008. This fact has an important bearing on this Outcome Evaluation as well.

At the end of 2009, following the expiry of the seven-year protection provided to the local government under the Legal Framework Order, the authority to shape its future was placed with the provincial governments. The governments of Balochistan and NWFP have effectively decided to replace the nazims with administrators and have passed the required legislation and notification. The other provinces are likely to follow suit despite some sharp disagreements on specific modalities of appointing administrators, especially in Sindh. While final decisions on the future

of the local government system are yet to be made, some indications suggest that it is likely to be rolled-back to a system of local government which might be closer to the 1979 local bodies model introduced by General Ziaul Haq.

## **1.2 Description of the Programme**

UNDP Pakistan's leadership position in networking and resource mobilization for devolution and the reconstruction process is widely acknowledged (Outcome Evaluation Decentralization Policies, 2003). A wide range of project and non-project support was provided through interventions that were embedded in the local government system and others that had indirect connections. UNDP Pakistan's support for democratic governance through processes and institutions is premised on the link between the quality of governance and human development. This finds synergy with efforts to attain MDGs through improved governance and consolidating devolution as a means of delivering better development results and ensuring social and economic justice.

The nine-point strategy for UNDP's Country Programme Action Plan (2004-08) included the need to: strengthen and stabilize reform initiatives, particularly those with direct links to poverty reduction, devolution, community empowerment and promoting public-private partnership to meet development challenges. This built on the results achieved in 1998-2003 in upstream policy support, innovation for community empowerment and capacity building reflected in the successful design of the devolution plan and its implementation (CPAP 2004-08).

One of the seven principal outcomes included in the CPAP 2004-08 is local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services.

## **1.3 Purpose of Evaluation**

According to UNDP's Monitoring & Evaluation Guidelines, outcomes are developmental changes between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impact, and are achieved in partnership with others. Following the transition to results-based management, achieving outcomes is the overriding role of the UNDP Pakistan Country Office. Evaluating the status of outcomes and the related role of UNDP is an important part of its strategic management.

Based on our understanding of UNDP guidelines, this Outcome Evaluation is an in-depth examination of the contributions of a related set of programmes towards achieving the Outcome. The evaluation gauges success in achieving the Outcome and assesses the underlying reasons for this. It uses the Country Programme Action Plan (2004-08) as a basic guiding instrument.

## 1.4 Scope of the Evaluation

With specific attention on the local government and the LGO 2001, the focus of this evaluation is the outcome: local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services. Our period of review is 2004-10 which corresponds with the extended CPAP of the same period.

The evaluation team was tasked with an in-depth examination of a related set of 12 projects and programmes intended to achieve this outcome within four units: Democratic Governance, Poverty Reduction, Environment and Energy, and Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Some of the projects were embedded in the devolution and reconstruction process while others had indirect links. The team was to gauge UNDP success in achieving the outcome, and, assess the underlying reasons for achievement and non achievement – see Annexure 1 for the Terms of Reference. The evaluation was structured around the following four key issues:

- Progress towards the outcome: How was the outcome formulated? Were past experiences and recommendations used? Was adequate background work carried out? What progress was made towards achieving the outcome? What balance efforts are needed to achieve the outcome? Is the outcome still suitable and relevant? Were there any innovative approaches tried and capacities development through UNDP assistance.
- Underlying factors: What were the key assumptions made? Were there any substantial design issues? How did UNDP work with other relevant actors?
- UNDP contribution: Is the outcome and the constituent components relevant for UNDP assistance? Are the UNDP funded constituent outputs credibly linked to achievement of the outcome?
- Partnership strategy: Was the UNDP partnership strategy appropriate and effective? What role did UNDP play and did it identify a niche for itself? How did the partnership contribute to achieving the outcome?

The interlinked factors considered by the evaluation team were: (a) relevance; (b) effectiveness and impact; (c) efficiency; (d) sustainability; (e) network linkages; (e) lessons learnt/recommendations.



# 2.0 Evaluation Methodology

This independent and external evaluation was conducted by a two-member team, who worked in close collaboration with each other and with the UNDP Country Office (CO). The mission was invited by the CO to prepare and present a methodology which was revised on two occasions keeping in mind UNDP's perspectives and priorities. The methodology was clarified and sharpened and made more pertinent with the requirements of the Outcome Evaluation, following an engaging interactive and iterative process between the mission and the CO – see Annexure 2 for final, approved, Methodology. Twelve projects/programmes that were to form part of the Outcome Evaluation were selected and determined by the UNDP CO following some discussions by the CO about which projects/programmes should be part of the Evaluation. Some changes were made in the projects first selected, and only once all issues regarding the methodology had been cleared, did the mission begin the evaluation.

A very large volume of documents related to the Outcome Evaluation was provided by UNDP to the mission. This reading material consisted of project and programme documents of all the twelve projects/programmes, and included annual progress reports, project documents, mid-term or final reviews (where applicable), and a host of other material, such as training manuals, etc, related to many of the projects/programmes. Further specific project/programme related material and literature was also provided to the mission during its visits to specific projects/programmes – see below. In addition, the UNDP CO also supplied a great deal of documents and reading material related to evaluation and outcome methodology, country plans, and copies of the three Outcome Evaluations undertaken by the CO prior to this one. The CO had also asked the mission to examine supporting material not related to UNDP projects, such as government policies and laws as well as independent reports and studies which look at policy and data, undertaken by scholars and institutions. All these documents provided one of the most important pillars of the Outcome Evaluation which was guided by UNDP and other documents – see Appendix 3 for a list of documents examined. In particular, we build on the considerable insights, analysis and information provided by two of the three earlier Outcome Evaluations, that on the Environment, and the one on Gender, both of which also examined themes such as devolution and the new local government system in some detail.

To supplement, clarify and triangulate various concepts and findings from the review of documents, the Evaluation team also conducted a wide range of interviews with key stakeholders including government officials at the federal, provincial, and local levels, with civil society partners, donors, and with UNDP staff. These interviews were held in the federal capital Islamabad and in the three provincial capitals, Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi – see Annexure 4 for list of people met.

A third set of activities undertaken for the Evaluation, consisted of detailed discussions with communities and beneficiaries of the projects/programmes. Focus Group Discussions were held with people from the earthquake-affected

union councils of Bihali, Balakot, Ghanool, Karnol, Oghi and Shamdhara in District Mansehra, in the NWFP. Discussions were also held in Quetta, where more than 50 beneficiaries and partners and members of the community participated in discussions around the performance and outcomes of a number of UNDP projects. Quetta, Karachi, Thatta, and Abbottabad became sites for the Outcome Evaluation which were more focussed towards communities and beneficiaries, other than just meetings with government officials, civil society, and donors.

Following its terms of reference, the mission has undertaken a thorough review of documentation, met key stakeholders from related UNDP projects/programmes under review, and reviewed the findings of previous independent reviews and evaluations. In accordance with the UNDP guidelines for outcome evaluations, this evaluation is not intended to be a comprehensive evaluation of each project, however, its findings focus on the broader Outcome and are equally valid, particularly in terms of being a useful guide to UNDP (and other stakeholders) on how to develop and implement future activities. This is especially so, as we argue above, since the local government system under which most of UNDP's activities related to this Outcome were undertaken, is likely to be significantly changed or even rolled back.

We are very aware that evaluations of this nature are conditioned by a lack of quantifiable measures of success. This is more so in the case of processes and systems which may take many years to bear fruition, such as an effective devolved local government system, particularly where issues of political economy and social engineering are at work. Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that data and information collection in Pakistan is quite weak. For these reasons, a fully quantified analysis of the Outcome would have required resources beyond the scope of the Evaluation and would probably not have been very revealing. Besides, our search has revealed that such data may not actually be readily available, and hence we try to make use of other sets of data and numbers from other sources which help us in our Evaluation -- essentially relying on qualitative data and analysis but drawing on quantifiable data where available.

In fact, as we emphasise in our Conclusions to this Evaluation, a system of local government and devolution is likely to be replaced with a new one, without a thorough and systematic evaluation, particularly an empirical evaluation, of the consequences and effects of the local government system that existed between 2001-09, and perhaps, sadly, we will never know how effective or ineffective the previous system actually was. In this regard, political economy considerations have far out-weighed technicist and managerial ones, a fact that we cannot fail to emphasise. Such an empirical evaluation would also guide continuing support to decentralization and devolution of authority while expanding public space and agency of citizens which our Conclusions to this Evaluation also recommend.

# 3.0

## Main Findings

### 3.1 Progress towards the Outcome

In order to examine the nature and form of the progress towards the Outcome, we first discuss some broad trends that have emerged over the period 2004-10 and see how they have had an impact on the Outcome, following which we examine some specific project/programme related issues which help us focus more sharply on the Outcome and its constituents.

#### 3.1.1 Broad Trends

The Devolution Plan was part of the seven point reform agenda announced by General Musharraf after assuming power in October 1999. The local government system that was subsequently put in place ran through three distinct phases.

The first phase was in play from 1999 to 2002 when the newly set up and all powerful National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) took the lead in designing the new local government system. Devolution was extremely high profile and had the unconditional backing by the military-led regime which heralded it as a silent revolution. This fact alone, has made a huge difference to the outcomes of the process as well as to the role, positioning and influence, and subsequent impact of how donors, partners and development agencies, including UNDP, have had on the government-sponsored and led devolution process.

Despite reservations and resistance from the administrative bureaucracy, the Local Government Ordinance was promulgated in early 2001 and the new system of government became operational on August 14 of that same year. The country's mainstream political parties showed marginal interest in the first round of elections resulting in the unintended consequence of creating an opening for a relatively new cadre of public representatives to become involved in representative government. This opening was particularly significant for women, peasants, labour and minorities as reserved seats for them ensured their representation on local government councils at all levels. This phase is also characterized by the need for clarity in revised roles and responsibilities of the representative and administrative governance structures.

The cost-sharing mechanism for development introduced through the Citizen Community Boards, as well as the establishment of the Insaaf Committees and the Musalihat Anjumans (part of the Alternate Dispute Resolution mechanism), all part of the LGO 2001, were slow to take off in this stage. In this phase UNDP Pakistan's assistance was well positioned. It provided critical project and non-project assistance to NRB as it designed the local government system. UNDP Pakistan also assisted the electoral process and subsequently focused on capacity building of newly

elected local government representatives, especially women, and also trained government officials at the local level. The training of local government officials and other government officials related to public services, has been one of the main features of most of the programmes and projects which are under review in this Outcome Evaluation. In particular, the gender focus of these programmes has been a key component of the training programmes. Both are discussed further, below.

The second phase covered the period 2002-07. The 2002 elections brought into power the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) at the national level and in Punjab and in coalition governments in the remaining provinces. Despite the seven-year protection provided to the local government under the Legal Framework Order promulgated in 2002, significant changes were made to allow provincial governments to reclaim greater control and to address anomalies in authorities of the representative and administrative governance structures at various tiers. The authority of the district government, especially that of the District Nazim remained largely intact resulting in a highly contested second round of local government elections in 2005. There was greater support to help provincial governments to better manage the devolution process. Citizen involvement through voluntary groups showed an increase but continued to be marginal. Data available from social audits conducted in 2001/02 and 2004/05 show that in 2004 0.9 percent of households interviewed had females in a voluntary group compared to 0.6 percent in 2001/02 and 3.3 percent of households had males in a voluntary group in 2004 compared to 2.1 percent in 2001/02<sup>1</sup> (Social Audit, 2001/02 and 2004/05). UNDP Pakistan's assistance in this phase helped strengthen the internal structure of the local government including committees for justice, dispute resolution, and citizen monitoring. It also helped citizens to access development funds through the CCBs.

Innovative approaches to organize communities and involve them in natural resource management and poverty reduction were also supported. And following the 2005 earthquake, UNDP support was provided to establish temporary pre-fabricated offices for local administration to replace those that were destroyed by the earthquake. UNDP's Gender Outcome Evaluation conducted in 2008 confirmed that evidence was available on improved awareness, enhanced voice and positive developments at the grass roots level due to local government. It highlighted that the capacity building programme had created an enabling environment for women: 'most women felt that the devolution policies served as a major catalyst' (UNDP, Gender Outcome Evaluation, 2008).

The third phase of the local government system commenced after the 2008 elections which brought to power an alliance between the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz at the centre and a PML-N government in the Punjab. The PML-N unambiguously demanded a roll-back of the local government system to the 1979 model introduced by General Ziaul Haq. At the conclusion of the seven-year protection under the LFO, the authority to shape the future of the local government was returned to the provincial governments after 31 December 2009. In this phase the NRB was effectively wound up with only one member continuing after its Chairperson resigned in late 2009.

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1 57,321 households were interviewed in the Social Audit of 2001/02 and 53,960 households in 2004/05

According to the government officials and other stakeholders interviewed, anticipated changes to the local government system include the re-establishment of the executive magistracy with development functions remaining with the elected local representatives. The functioning of the police is also likely to remain beyond the mandate of elected local representatives. Also likely is the re-introduction of different systems for the urban and rural areas, with urban management returning to municipal corporations. The general belief and assumption is that decisions on the local government are likely to have wider ownership if made by the provincial parliaments. The implications of these changes are discussed in a separate section, below.

The level of fiscal decentralization under new arrangements, is yet to be determined. According to government officials interviewed, the funds given to districts in the past, were generally distributed equally among Union Councils. Criteria like need or population were usually not considered. According to some, this led to inequitable access to resources. There was also concern that resource-rich districts fared better than poorer districts. The mechanism of the Provincial Finance Commissions that had the potential to ensure equitable distribution of resources remained largely ineffective. Following the 2002 elections, the re-introduction of allocation of development funds to members of the national and provincial parliaments as well as the senate enhanced the lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities of elected representatives at different tiers of governance. Development funds of national and provincial parliamentarians and senators were further increased by the present PPP-led government in the annual budget for 2009/10. All these processes and interventions have considerably undermined the efforts at making local government institutions financially independent and effective.

All indications and discussions suggest, that the role of the CCBs is likely to be removed in the proposed system that is to emerge. The very nature of CCBs as a cost-sharing mechanism for development projects ensures that they will wind up after the completion of the project/s for which they were created.

Though the system put in place by General Musharraf's government may unravel, its spin-off benefits over a 10-year period may be more resilient. The estimated 200,000<sup>2</sup> citizens including 60,000 women elected as public representatives and those that served on various committees at different tiers of local government have had invaluable opportunities to understand demand-driven development, manage local budgets, monitor government performance, and interface with local administrative machinery and service providers. In addition to the related capacity development is the more intangible result of greater confidence and higher self-esteem, a fact articulated by all women representatives interviewed in the course of this Evaluation. Though numbers are difficult to estimate, many thousands of citizens were also involved through the electoral process, and relatively lower numbers involved in debating and knowledge creation around the merits and demerits of decentralization and local government.

Many of these direct and indirect stakeholders and beneficiaries constitute the social capital that was a consequence of the local government system introduced by General Musharraf. UNDP's project and non-project assistance helped

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<sup>2</sup> The total number of seats in the 2001 elections was 126,462, which was reduced to 79,703 in the 2005 elections. Not all seats were contested or filled.



support the creation and strengthening of this social capital. Extensive training support was provided to elected representatives, especially women in programmes/projects such as the Gender Based Governance Systems (GBGS), the Women's Political School Project (WPS), and the Gender Justice Through Musalihat Anjuman (GJTMA) project. Moreover, UNDP Pakistan has helped create considerable social capital in the form of citizen committees for innovative approaches to poverty reduction and natural resource management in programmes/projects such as the Lachi Poverty Reduction Project (2000-07), Conservation of Habitats and Species of Global Significance in the Arid and Semi-Arid Ecosystems in Balochistan, the Pakistan Wetlands Programme and in the various interventions under the Small Grants Programme including the Diversification of Livelihoods of Fisherfolk and Promotion of Natural Resources Conservation at Sandspit and the Energy Efficient Housing Project.

The institutional structure of local government through which the social capital functioned is likely to change substantially, curtailing opportunities for participation in governance processes. It is difficult to predict whether this social capital will find other channels to remain engaged in governance. And even if it does, the choice of channels it makes is also difficult to ascertain.

The evidence gathered indicates that considerable progress has been made towards the broad articulation of the Outcome. The capacities of local authorities and local communities to plan have increased through extensive and sustained training to elected representatives and government officials. Women and men in local beneficiary communities have benefited from support in planning conservation and economic activities. Innovative approaches to natural resource management providing an economic incentive for conservation have also been introduced. A mix of project and non-project assistance embedded in the local government system and also that which was indirectly linked have contributed to progress towards the Outcome. However, synergies between different interventions need to be significantly strengthened to leverage impact.

Despite the significant changes anticipated in the local government system, the Outcome will remain relevant. Application of the principle of subsidiarity is critical to rationalize the cost of governance in Pakistan, to make it demand-driven and accountable. It is important that UNDP positions itself to maintain its niche as a critical supporter of strong, credible, and effective governing institutions that have the confidence of citizens. As recommended in the 2006 Mid-Term Review of UNDP's Country Programme (2004-08), UNDP needs to strengthen its work with provincial governments in keeping with and supporting the principle of subsidiarity. However, as we discuss below, there are a number of critical issues which emerge as the local government system under review is significantly changed from the version that was in place at the beginning of the CPAP in 2004.

UNDP also needs a much broader engagement with communities and civil society organizations while pursuing the Outcome. It should assess different models of citizens' engagement with the state for improved planning and service delivery that are successfully practiced in Pakistan and elsewhere. UNDP should also review mechanisms that encourage and amplify citizens' voice needed for improved governance mechanisms and service delivery as it shapes its continued role in pursuing the Outcome. More effective programming opportunities with media, including new

web-based media, should be explored. These changes will require significant improvement of the major indicators against the Outcome to ensure that they are relevant to changed ground realities. With hindsight, it is now easier to suggest, that had UNDP made far reaching and effective links with civil society and NGOs, at a time when the LGO 2001 system seemed to be coming to its end, those links would have endured despite the end of the LGO 2001.

### **3.1.2 Projects/Programmes and Outcomes**

In this section, we look at the Outcome as it related to some specific issues rather than in the broad-strokes manner undertaken above. However, as per UNDP guidelines the Outcome Evaluation is not intended to focus on specific project or programme targets, but with somewhat broader indicators. This section builds on project/programme reports and documents as well as on earlier Outcome Evaluations giving a sense of continuity to some of the themes analysed for this particular Outcome. We only refer to specific details in specific programmes and projects in how they would relate to the overall Outcome itself.

The broad 'major indicators' as outlined in the Terms of Reference have not been entirely achieved, and it is improbable that they would have been achieved even under a flawless system in such a short space of time. Most of the projects/programmes in the Poverty and Gender and in the Governance portfolios, such as the Support to the Devolution Trust for Community Environment (DTCE), the Good Governance Project (GGP), Assistance to Governance Reforms and Practices in Balochistan (AGRPB), the Essential Institutional Reforms in NWFP (EIROP), GJTMA, GBGS, and the WPS, for the most part, focus on training and on capacity building, as broad inputs which would make the Outcome achievable. Capacity building support is also provided in the other projects/programmes included in this Outcome Evaluation. Moreover, the Lachi Poverty Reduction Project (LPRP) focuses on organizing communities around economic activities and natural resource management. Projects/programmes included in the Environment & Energy portfolio primarily focuses on natural resource management but with strategies of involving local communities by providing them an economic incentive for conservation. Projects in this category include the Conservation of Habitats and Species of Global Significance in the Arid and Semi-Arid Ecosystems in Balochistan and the Pakistan Wetlands Programme (PWP) as well as various interventions under the Small Grants Programme (SGP). The Building Enabling Governance & Institutions for Earthquake Response (BEGIN-ER) helped local authorities to function despite the destruction of its infrastructure.

The objectives of the national GBGS are to attempt to ensure that gender based governance is institutionalised and sustained through a comprehensive capacity enhancement regime to contribute to an inclusive public policy agenda. Since GBGS builds on three previous UNDP projects including WPS, which has focused on women councillors' capacity enhancement and was intended to institutionalise gender based governance through appropriate capacity enhancement of women councillors and relevant training institutions. Project documents claim that as a result of this and other interventions, gender mainstreaming has taken place and government officials have been 'advocating for gender reforms in the planning process'. The GBGS, is meant to train women councillors to raise their issues and concerns in proposing pro-poor and pro-women policy agenda. Furthermore, the training under the programme is

meant to improve the capacity building of bureaucrats and the political leadership. The key focus here is gender, and capacity building through training, of numerous women councillors, planning officers, women parliamentarians, and scores of Union Council Secretaries have undergone training.

The Balochistan focused AGRPB, also has similar goals in terms of training women public officials as well as the gender sensitising of male public officials at all tiers of government. In addition, this project also intends to strengthen and align provincial and local government, and develops skills and information systems related to e-governance. This project also focuses on training and on the capacity building of the Rural Development Academy in Quetta which then trains other local government officials as well as trainers.

Support to the DTCE, is somewhat different from the WPS, GBGS and the AGRPB, in that it focuses on mobilising communities so that they can be more actively involved in the development and delivery of services and facilities at the local level. While supporting and organising CCBs is the most well-publicised activity of the DTCE, it has also been active in mobilising CCB Networks, Village and Neighbourhood Councils, working with the Police in Police Community Relation Programmes, and in partnering with Press Clubs and Bar Associations. Despite all these activities, it is the role that the CCBs play in development related tasks and outputs which is what DTCE is best known for. On this count, DTCE has worked with CCBs in 38 districts and has been actively involved in development works. It also provides grant funding for selected CCB-identified community development projects through cost-sharing with local councils and CCBs. DTCE has also been involved in the building of capacity of union level officials and community leaders in relation to CCB mobilisation.

The GJTMA is an outlier in many ways compared to the other Governance and Gender programmes and projects, although it too has a training component. The main purpose of this project is to enable the formation of Musalihat Anjumans, which are forums which act as alternate dispute resolution mechanisms. Over a thousand Anjumans have been operationalised and hundreds of cases have been brought to the Anjumans for resolution, most of which have been reconciled/resolved. In addition, Musalihat Anjuman Support Societies which build the capacity of Musalihat Anjuman members, and district level Musalihat Anjuman Justice Advocates, watchdog forums have also been formed in parts of the country. The GJTMA project situates the issue of violence against women and conflict resolution within the context of devolution, local government and new community inclusive structures created by the Local Government Ordinance, 2001. The placement of this project is intended to relate to reengineering local processes and introducing mechanisms which can be accessed by the poorest quintile, within which women tend to suffer disproportionately from violence, abuse and discrimination, thus hampering their ability to participate in social, economic and political activity.

The Habitat and Species project promotes community-based resource management to conserve threatened and endemic habitats and species in the Torghar and Chaghai conservancies in Balochistan. Local communities have a greater stake in conservation due to its economic benefits that the project/programme has helped highlight through policy support and information/training provision. The Pakistan Wetlands Programme covering four sites across Pakistan follows an integrated approach to natural resource management which includes policy support,

creation of scientific knowledge, demonstrating and building capacities for sustainable use. Both projects engage local communities through community-based natural resource management plans and economic incentives such as trophy hunting and eco-tourism. This entails local community interface with government to negotiate the management of natural resources and the revenue it may generate. Managing conflict is also an integral part of the project/programme strategies. The LPRP helped organize communities around initiatives related to rainwater harvesting, drinking water supply, agricultural productivity and microfinance.

The two initiatives of the SGP that were reviewed included the Diversification of Livelihoods of Fisherfolk and the Energy Efficient Low Cost Homes. The former helps increase community stake in conservation by supporting mangrove-based eco-tourism and also advancing corporate responsibility by successfully attracting funding support from large corporations. The latter demonstrates ways of conserving energy through appropriately designed housing provided to poor households that are vulnerable to flooding. Effective use of waste water is also part of the demonstration. The demonstration was made possible through active support of local government representatives, and was subsequently scaled up by the Government of Sindh.

BEGIN-ER was essentially a response to the 2005 earthquake. The post-earthquake reconstruction was impeded by the fact that many government offices were destroyed by the quake. BEGIN-ER provided pre-fabricated offices to help local administration resume functioning and give its urgently needed input in planning reconstruction.

In many of these specific projects and programmes, concrete progress has been made towards the specific indicators and outputs expected at the end of the year or of the project cycle. However, the Outcome that we are evaluating is: local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services.

It is important to repeat and underscore the point, that hard, quantifiable data to establish if the Outcome has been achieved, is difficult to come about. More importantly, we also realise and understand, that the processes set under-way on account of the Devolution Plan and the LGO 2001, would have taken many years, if not decades, to put in place, and hence, any evaluation must be cognisant of these factors. Nevertheless, some observations can be made regarding the probable outcome of these inputs.

While it is impossible to empirically support the claim that the extensive training that has been given has had some effect in terms of 'local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas being enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services', it is possible to claim that some progress towards this Outcome must have been made on account of these interventions. With numerous programmes and projects focussing on the training of officials and elected representatives in the local government system, as well as in the provincial government, we find it difficult to conclude otherwise. Similarly, extensive training in natural resource management and disaster risk reduction combined with initiatives such as trophy hunting and eco-tourism have also increased stakes in conservation and conservation-based development planning. All the

focus group discussions with beneficiaries and with elected and unelected government officials demonstrated that there has been a great deal of social capital that has been created and a broad social consciousness regarding such issues, strengthened. Despite project data that claim that so many projects were initiated by women councillors, or that there was gender sensitisation, or that training manuals will be made more gender sensitive, it is not possible to quantify such achievements in any meaningful way in order to assess the Outcome. Social and attitudinal change, that these interventions and this training is mainly about, takes many decades and generations for it to be effective and is affected by numerous other factors as well, other than simply 'training'. For instance, greater consciousness about conservation and the livelihoods dependent on it is evident not only by training support but also by the numbers of people engaged in conservation-based activities and the public and private support they are attracting. Moreover, the general objective conditions are always also critical in allowing new values and attitudes to be disseminated and absorbed in groups of people who are considered to be resistant to change. As we argue in section 3.2.2 below, many of these factors were conducive to allowing these broad changes to be initiated.

As we argue above, there is little hard data which examines the actual performance and outcomes of the interventions brought about by the local government and devolution reforms that took place in 2001. While there is a lot of 'analysis' few studies have actually looked at data. Some studies by Pattan, a research organisation working with specific focus on local government, have been conducted, and one by the Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC). We highlight some of the issues raised in both.

We highlight some of the main findings from the SPDC study published in 2007 in order to assess how the local government system performed in its first six years. On the question whether devolution has improved efficiency in public services, the report states that little has been achieved, one key reason being that provincial government 'are not fully prepared to devolve power to local governments' ( p xvii), that the 'institutional capacity of local governments is a major issue' (ibid.), that there is poor technical capacity and ability of staff, that numerous institutional structures, such as village and neighbourhood councils, monitoring committees, complaint cells, Musalihat Anjuman, are 'either not operational or not performing according to the mandate given by the LGO' (p xviii). On CCBs, while acknowledging the advance made in registration largely on the basis of the 'encouragement by government and donors' and the potential of CCBs, the study concludes that the 'devolution process has not yet led to significant empowerment of the people' ( p xix), although it does recognise that significant processes have been put in motion which would have a beneficial effect on women and other marginalised groups. Overall, the assessment of the study is cautiously positive of the impact of devolution.

Highlighting key gaps, the SPDC study highlights the need for capacity building and training of elected and other officials in the local government system, especially women. Clearly, as we show in this Evaluation, UNDP has filled a major gap and felt need in strengthening the local government system through its interventions. Despite the presence of CCBs, it finds that 'the devolution process has not yet led to significant empowerment of the people' (p 74). It finds that 'there are no indications yet of any impact of devolution on health indicators ... In fact, Pakistan remains



largely off-track in the attainment of the health related MDGs' (p 101), and that 'it is not possible to conclude that the devolution process has had any significant impact yet on gender equality in the area of devolution' (p 118). The Report concludes, that while education indicators showed some progress, the lack of 'significant change to date in the trend of health indicators, gender equality and regional disparities limits the potential impact of local governments on poverty in the post-devolution period'.

One of the many studies conducted by Pattan, which interviewed local government candidates and elected officials following the 2005 elections, found that 'most respondents believed that the performance of local institutions (CCBs, PSC, monitoring committees, etc.) was not effective' (Pattan, Common Grounds 2: A Report based on survey of candidates, councillors and nazims, 2006, p 6). Another report which examined the performance of Nazims in the first phase 2001-05, found that 'knowledge about the union council functions, its duties and local government as a whole remained a problematic area for the nazims' (Pattan, In the Spotlight: A Report based on case studies of 20 Union Nazims 2001-2005, p 52), and also highlighted serious problems with the absence of funds at the Union Council level and the ineffectiveness of CCBs. It states that 'local government could not utilize the district government budget allocation for CCBs ... [and] ... it was not uncommon that a CCB was registered but could not undertake any development project because they could not contribute their 20 % share of project cost ... Also in some areas, enthusiastic nazims encouraged local people to form CCBs but could not mobilize them to pool in 20 % of the project cost' (Ibid, p. 52-3).

## **3.2 Underlying Factors**

A large number of factors outside the control of UNDP, the federal or provincial, and especially, local governments, have significantly affected progress towards the Outcome.

### **3.2.1 Political Transition**

At the beginning of the period under review, i.e., 2004, few could have predicted all the turn of events that the next five to six years were to bring. Among changes that were anticipated, was the nature and outcome of the second round of local government elections held in 2005. As expected it was highly contested and brought into power, especially as District Nazims, strong party-backed candidates. Party-identity came into sharper focus and also shaped province-district relationships. Districts led by candidates from the same political party that ruled in the province fared better in terms of access to resources, etc. Where party identities did not match, the polarization deepened between district and province and, between elected representatives and local administration. Among the least expected events was the devastating earthquake in October 2005 which brought death and destruction to parts of NWFP and in the Azad Jammu & Kashmir. Military-led relief and reconstruction efforts were put in place, with minimal initiative remaining with the NWFP government at the provincial and local levels.

In March 2007 a presidential reference against the Chief Justice of Pakistan triggered a popular movement for the

rule of law. As its momentum increased, the support for General Musharraf began to erode. In the same year, two former prime ministers, Ms. Benazir Bhutto leading the Pakistan People's Party and Mr. Nawaz Sharif leading the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz returned to Pakistan after spending several years in self-imposed exile. Ms. Bhutto was assassinated in December 2007 while campaigning for the elections which were subsequently held in February 2008. Her party, the Pakistan People's Party, returned victorious and formed the government at the centre. Coalition arrangements were made in Punjab with PML-N, in NWFP with the ANP, and in Sindh with the MQM. General Musharraf continued in the presidency until August 2008 when he announced his resignation in a televised speech. These events transformed the political context of Pakistan. General Musharraf and his close allies relinquished their control and power, many of whom were strong advocates of the local government system. At the same time, PML-N led the opposition to the local government system demanding significant changes in it. Following the 2008 elections, many analysts predicted the roll-back of the local government system, a prediction which now appears likely to come true.

The period under review is also marked with significant escalation in armed militancy and a sharp rise in insecurity across Pakistan. According to news reports, 60 suicide attacks were carried out in 2008 and 80 in 2009 killing more than 2,400 citizens across Pakistan. Attacks on UN humanitarian assistance included a suicide attack on the Islamabad office of the World Food Programme in October 2009. Military operations were initiated in Malakand and South Waziristan in 2009 resulting in large-scale internal displacement of citizens from affected areas. Figures of casualties from the conflict zones are not easily available.

### **3.2.2 A Highly Conducive Environment**

In the section above, we have analysed and listed a large number of broad political developments which have had a significant impact on the devolution plan, on local government, and on the overall governance systems in Pakistan. Many of the consequences highlighted here, have been deleterious towards achieving the Outcome we set out to assess. With political change and turmoil and security issues for much of 2004-10, one can safely claim that all attempts to meet the goals and targets as part of the Outcome, would have been highly challenged. However, on the other hand, there are numerous highly conducive factors that also need to be highlighted which would have had a very positive impact towards achieving the Outcome.

The period from 2004 to around 2007 or 2008, was still a highly conducive period for the local government and devolution processes to achieve its goals and objectives. The architects of the original Devolution Plan and the LGO 2001 were still securely in place in power, and much of the political system, despite some changes, was largely a continuation of the same kind of military dominated civilian politics. The local government system was also protected under the LFO promulgated in 2002. While, as we point out, there were many discontinuities in the 2001-10 period, during 2004-07, there were many continuities as well. After 2007, and certainly from 2008-10, the environment changed and became hostile towards the system of local government and towards the previous structures of institutionalised governance.

Since the government in power at that time actively supported the structures and institutions put in place under General Musharraf's Devolution Plan, many donors and development partners found a highly conducive environment towards achieving the goals which they had set for themselves. A number of very high profile projects were initiated after 2001 in the local government arena, many with considerable amounts of donor funding. Local government had become the new mantra and was seen as a vehicle for addressing most basic issues faced by the population.

Two further issues require some comment. A new system will always be challenged by vested interests that lose out, especially since new beneficiaries and emerging vested interests may not have been in a position to enforce their agency. As we argue in the Introduction, a political economy framework allows us to see who gains, who loses and who tries to slow the process of transition. With new power being passed on to elected representatives, many officials did hamper the progress of the system and may have acted to slow down this transition. Nevertheless, because of support from the highest office of the land, the balance was in favour of change and transition.

Another fact worth mentioning is that although there was little or no effective fiscal decentralisation – a cornerstone to making any devolution programme successful – the Government of Pakistan had huge fiscal space, and following 9/11, donor money was easily available in Pakistan for development initiatives. Along with this, Pakistan's economy was booming and growth for much of 2002-08, was close to 6 percent per annum on average. With such macroeconomic indicators suggesting that Pakistan's economy was doing well, all fiscal arrangements, whether devolved or centralised, were conducive to increased social sector investment. The SPDC report also found that 'the process of devolution has been facilitated more by the improvement in the macroeconomic environment than by any conscious effort on the part of provincial governments to support the process of decentralization. By and large, it appears that devolution took place at the right time when the economy was able to create more fiscal space to enable expanded financing of local government' (SPDC, Devolution and Human Development in Pakistan, 2007, p 81).

One cannot ignore the overall social climate in the country either, where slogans such as 'enlightened moderation', allowed far more 'liberal' uses of public spaces, particularly for women. The space created by a military general who promoted the participation of women in public life, was also one of the most important factors which should have allowed for easier and better progress towards the Outcome. Another important contributor of a highly conducive environment.

Although the process of devolution and local government reform may not have achieved all its intended targets and goals, there is little denying the fact that there was much movement towards them. The fact that UNDP and other development partners and donors now need to adapt to the fast-changing realities emerging after the scenario noticeably soured and the balance shifted against the elected system of local government, is discussed in a separate section below. However, we are led to argue, that for most part, the overall environment in which the Outcome was located, was highly conducive towards devolution and local government reform and initiatives.

### 3.3 UNDP's Contribution

UNDP has clearly made significant contributions to the Outcome and the progress made towards it. The earlier support to designing the local government system was followed up in this period with assistance to operationalize it. As we demonstrate, considerable training support was provided to elected representatives, especially women, as well to other government officials. The formation and functioning of committees related to justice, dispute resolution, and monitoring, were supported by UNDP, and directly helped strengthen and support the internal structures and functioning of the local government system. In fact, our field visits and discussions with project/programme staff as well as with beneficiaries, suggested that it was UNDP's initiatives which led to a number of actions.

In this regard, the extensive discussions held in Quetta, and especially with regard to the GJTMA, suggested very clearly that the Musalihat Anjumans were active, operational, as well as effective in five districts, essentially due to UNDP's efforts. Although part of the LGO 2001, Musalihat Anjumans were not set up in the 2001-04 period, and even now, have not been set up in all districts across Pakistan. There seemed to be clear evidence that the operationalisation and success of the Musalihat Anjumans in the five districts in Balochistan, was principally due to UNDP's contribution. Support for CCBs was also provided to help citizen involvement and support escalated pace of development, and it is well recognised that support to DTCE was fundamental in establishing, supporting, promoting, and even financing CCBs across the 38 districts (as well as in other districts) in which DTCE had made partnerships. UNDP not only helped set up DTCE but also coordinates all donor support for it.

Support for far reaching reforms at the provincial level, whether through the AGRP or EIROP, was made through UNDP's contribution, allowing the newly evolving model of devolution and local government to be supported by a key component, that of capacity building and training. UNDP has allocated a great deal of resources towards supporting and strengthening the human capital systems in place which were to make the devolution and local government systems more effective. As we argue above, it is difficult and probably unfair, to assess the impact of training in a new system of governance requiring numerous critical changes, in such a short time. Yet, as we also infer, it seems highly likely that such efforts have not gone to waste and have added towards improving and fortifying social and human capital. Similar efforts to support and train women councillors and public officials through the WPS or GBGS, have also been acknowledged by beneficiaries to enhance social capital and human skills. UNDP's role in this has been important, if not critical. The recent Gender Outcome Evaluation found that,

Field evidence suggests many women councillors now possess the skills and confidence to play an effective role in their respective domains and are also making a difference. Women councillors in Karachi were particularly active but the mission also met with a number of spirited female councillors in Quetta and Lahore. Many reported that they regularly participate in council sessions, various health and education awareness campaigns, engage in city wide development debates and some even head the various monitoring and budget committees. (Gender Outcome Evaluation, p 22).

UNDP has provided consistent assistance to the government in natural resource management and energy efficiency. These efforts have also had a strong community focus. UNDP's assistance has helped to engage communities in managing natural resources, understanding sustainable use of resources, and introducing economic incentives such as trophy hunting and eco-tourism. More importantly, the interventions have helped local communities manage internal conflict and also negotiate with the government on issues around natural resource management and sharing revenue that it may generate. The economic incentive to conservation is particularly important to poor communities dependent on natural resources for their livelihood. Its spin-off benefit includes the corporate philanthropy it has attracted which has also expanded the constituency of support for conservation.

Local councillors were also involved in conservation efforts, but often as part of the community. Examples of gender-responsive initiatives include the energy efficient housing initiatives in the Thatta and Badin districts of Sindh which will provide entitlement of houses to women of the household. In other cases women became part of the process as a 'by-catch'. For example, women's role in managing livestock, fetching water, etc., was cited as the reason for a focus on them. Greater attention is required to ensure that gender remains a strong cross-cutting theme and concern. Innovative approaches to integrated development assisted by UNDP also benefited local communities and involved many local elected representatives. These initiatives focused on women's economic activities and micro-level rural infrastructure.

UNDP's assistance following the 2005 earthquake responded to the urgent need for temporary structures to allow government to continue functioning despite the destruction of their offices by the earthquake. This helped gather urgently needed data required for planning reconstruction. This response was timely and well-received by government and donors, however, its contribution to the Outcome is not very significant. Training was provided in Disaster Risk Reduction at the district level, and support was provided to the National Disaster Management Authority and its provincial and district counterparts to prepare Disaster Risk Management Plans. However, closer links with local communities was not included in the interventions; moreover, greater focus on gender was required.

UNDP's contribution in achieving the Outcome, has also been acknowledged by government officials and other partners and stakeholders in the process. UNDP has the advantage of carrying a very uncontroversial reputation and hence has been welcomed by all partners. However, some donors have questioned UNDP's internal expertise on issues related to, in particular, gender, questioning whether there are enough gender specialists in UNDP who can manage programmes and projects with a high gender orientation and focus. It was also suggested by some stakeholders interviewed that UNDP needs to expand its staff strength to enable greater involvement in project/programme management from conceptualization through implementation. It was stated that UNDP is effective at the time of developing projects but was often not able to continue close involvement during implementation that may also need course correction.



### 3.4 Partnership Strategy

UNDP's 1998-2003 Country Cooperation Framework emphasises the need to build alliances across all its programmes, as part of the larger UN family and with the donor community at large. It also argues for the need to collaborate with NGOs and CBOs, though it did not clearly lay out the strategy of how these alliances would be built. The CPAP 2004-10, on the other hand, has a far more formalised and formulated approach to how the partnerships are to work. The CPAP envisages that UNDP would work in partnership with the UN System, Government of Pakistan and national and international development partners. It believes that partnerships are required to be able to have greater impact through joint advocacy, programming and evaluation, knowledge sharing, networking and resource mobilisation. It hopes to create greater dialogue amongst development partners and donors and hold forums for discussion where collaboration can be undertaken. In particular, the partnership portal hopes to mobilise interest and participation in the reform and reconstruction process, especially those which have links with poverty reduction, devolution and community empowerment, amongst others. A key aspiration of the CPAP was to 'promote partnerships between government, parliament and civil society in efforts to broaden choices and increase opportunities, particularly for the poor, women and marginalised groups'. The document provides a very large list of potential partners from a very wide spectrum of life.

All of the twelve projects under review which constitute elements which work towards achieving the Outcome, have various sets of partners, from donors, to government at various levels, civil society organisations, and even training academies and organisations. With regard to this Outcome, the UNDP's partnership with the National Reconstruction Bureau at the federal level and with elected representatives, especially women, at the districts and union level has been crucial. Its partnership with the Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment has also supported citizen engagement in local government. UNDP's partnerships with the Ministry of Environment at the federal level as well as its provincial departments were critical to its efforts in community-based natural resource conservation. Strategic partnerships with key conservation organizations such as IUCN-The World Conservation Union and the WWF-Pakistan helped provide some of the community mobilization skills along with the required technical assistance. Business and corporations were among other important partners in supporting community-managed conservation that in some cases also helped set up health and education facilities.

In most of the projects/programmes under the Poverty and Gender, and Governance portfolios, partnerships have been forged with federal and provincial level ministries and departments, even though most of the activity under the Outcome is meant to be appropriate for local government. Nevertheless, custom and protocol in Pakistan require following a hierarchical approach working through, as an example, the Local Government Ministry in Islamabad, which has little real and practical involvement in actual local government tasks. Similarly, the 'brain' which worked behind the devolution planning and local government strategies and programmes, the National Reconstruction Bureau, which formed a central focus in UNDP's Good Governance Project, was also based in Islamabad, ostensibly working for greater devolution and empowerment at the local level. Similarly the DTCE works out of Islamabad through partnership arrangements with district governments in the 38 districts that it covers. While it seems odd

that highly centralised entities ought to be supported under a devolution and local government programme, in Pakistan, it is important that contacts be established at the highest level through which development partners and donors can influence broad design and strategy.

The Governance programmes, such as the GBGS and AGRPB, have also interacted with training institutions in the Punjab and in Balochistan, where in the former, the Lala Musa Training Institute, and in the latter, the Rural Development Academy (RDA), have been identified for further capacity building and skill up-gradation so that both could further train local government representatives and other public officials. Although neither institute was visited, discussions with the staff of the Rural Development Academy in Quetta, suggest that the RDA does not have the human skills and capacity for it to effectively train public officials. While some of the Instructors were articulate and were probably good trainers, the Academy seemed to be under-staffed. Other donor programmes such as the CIDA Devolution Support Programme have provided support to the Lala Musa Training Institute but point to the need for consistent government support to realize its full potential. UNDP's and the projects' directives to build the capacity of such institutions, supply side factors would have impeded any substantial progress towards the Outcome.

A recent Outcome Evaluation on Gender, which looked at some of the projects and activities under review here, regarding the training curriculum reported that,

various reports and interviews with relevant stakeholders suggest that the UNDP has contributed to the training contents and practices of selected training institutes focusing on gender sensitivity. Thus capacities are being built for integrating and adapting gender in the development and delivery of training to a wide range of public officials with significant downstream value. There is greater awareness about gender issues among the civil servants and policy makers who have benefited from the variety of training programs. However, these have yet to translate into systemic capacities. For instance, the team was not unable to find any evidence of actual implementation of inclusion of gender elements in the pro-forma PC-1s in any province, nor did gender appear in the budget call circular after one initial instance in 2006. It appears that both the supply side efforts from GSP as well as the demand side response will need additional time and efforts. (Gender Outcome Evaluation, p 21)

Within the environment and energy portfolio, UNDP has strong partnerships with key stakeholders in the government including the Ministry of Environment, the National Council for Conservation of Wildlife, and related departments at the provincial levels. It also has strong links with leading conservation organizations including IUCN-The World Conservation Union and WWF-Pakistan. Those interviewed by the Evaluation team confirmed that UNDP is considered to be a valuable partner in terms of mobilizing resources and helping the conceptualization of interventions. However, more support was recommended in the implementation phase of interventions, especially for course correction. An earlier Outcome Evaluation on the Environment had pointed out, that although partnerships exist and can be fruitful, 'there is no clear system to monitor partnerships' (p 23, Environment Outcome Evaluation, 2005).

UNDP's partnership with the provincial government of NWFP and the state government of Azad Jammu & Kashmir

and close links with the Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) helped the implementation of the BEGIN-ER project. However, links with local government and beneficiary communities was weak in this project.

One factor worth emphasising in how UNDP works, at least in Pakistan, is that it often works with or through the Government of Pakistan and its various ministries and arms. During the interviews conducted, it was suggested that UNDP should be more consultative in the conceptualization phase of projects/programmes. A design phase was suggested to bring all stakeholders on board and build their ownership. It would also help the UN ensure that its various segments work in synergy. Continued engagement was suggested through the course of the project/programme to address problems faced by the project including delays in implementation.

In most of the projects under review, there was a governmental National Project Director (NPD), either at the federal level or at the provincial level, or a Provincial Project Director if the project was province-based. The NPD is a serving senior bureaucrat who is supposed to be the government's representative on the project and usually heads numerous steering and other committees. We found during the course of our field work and interviews, not surprisingly, that the nature of outputs and success of any project is influenced by the attitude, role and support of the NPD. Sometimes fortunately, sometimes unfortunately, many NPDs are appointed during the course of the life of one UNDP project having various influences on the project. Good NPDs may be replaced by uninterested ones, having a negative effect on how the project is implemented, or vice versa. This is perhaps how UNDP operates in Pakistan, but there has been some criticism of this hierarchical, top-down, approach by other donors, who feel that the modality is highly bureaucratic and suffers from problems similar to bureaucracies. In some of the projects visited, there had been extensive delays in staffing, start-up dates, and other factors all of which affected the performance of the projects. The notable exception was the BEGIN-ER project in which UNDP's relatively better response time was appreciated.

The counter-part of a NPD, is the National Project Manager (NPM), who not very infrequently is also a senior government servant on deputation to the project. While NPMs may have a longer tenure than the NPD, often friction between the NPD and NPM may also result in delays. Often a cordial relationship works to the project's advantage. The recent Gender Outcome Evaluation study found that 'several national project managers are generalists and picked from career civil service cadres' for gender projects and hence, may not be the best candidates for this task (Gender Outcome Evaluation, p 21). Although it is not the brief of this Evaluation to consider how UNDP works in Pakistan, we do suggest that UNDP considers changing some of its operation modalities.

Since many of the projects under review in this Outcome Evaluation deal with gender, and as gender is so central to almost all UNDP projects, some conclusions reached by an earlier UNDP Gender Outcome Evaluation of 2009, with regard to the Ministry of Women's Development, may be pertinent to our understanding of some of the problems projects would face. Since one of the most important projects of these twelve, the GBGS, is also housed in the Ministry, this criticism will alert us to the problems and issues which may exist in achieving the goals set for the Outcome.

According to the Gender Outcome Evaluation:

the Ministry of Women Development (MOWD) aspires to be a lobbyist and catalyst for gender causes. However it is unclear how this role is currently being fulfilled with a highly skeletal staff and virtually no long-term gender specialists on board. Largely run by generalists the MOWD is clearly faced with serious credibility, structural and operational challenges. It is expected to act as a catalyst to ensure that relevant ministries mainstream gender into their planning and implementation of programmes in education, health, poverty reduction and environment etc.

However the MOWD has neither the necessary status and authority nor the technical capacity to accomplish this gigantic task. MOWD is not among the most sought after ministries by civil bureaucrats for posting. It usually ends up providing temporary shelter to those civil servants who have either fallen out of favor with the powers that be of the time or need a break from the hectic routine and pressures of more active and important ministries. In most cases, officials in top management positions of the MOWD come from other ministries and departments with little or no background in gender and get transferred out relatively quickly. As a result the permanent technical capacity of the ministry remains very weak. Thus the mission concludes that it is unrealistic to hope that, short of major changes in government commitment and funding, MOWD could effectively play the role expected from it ... ' (p 19).

UNDP's partnerships with civil society are weak especially relative to its engagement with the government. The virtual absence of interlocutors like NGOs, media and the academia is striking, highlighting the significant gap in focus on the demand side of the governance equation. A much expanded partnership with a wide range of civil society actors would have helped progress towards the Outcome. But for this, UNDP requires to improve its understanding and assessment of relevant actors and the roles they can play in pursuing the Outcome. For instance, the role of the media, academic institutions, and advocacy-oriented organizations, needs to be explored with a view of amplifying citizen voice and agency.

# 4.0

## Summary of Findings and its Aspects

In this section we discuss some of the issues not fully addressed in the earlier part of this Report and which are part of the Terms of Reference. We undertake some overall analysis of the progress towards the Outcome, UNDP's role and position in moving closer to the Outcome, and other issues which we feel may have had an impact and effect on achieving the Outcome. Importantly, a number of broader political economy issues are also discussed and raised in order to understand where and how the Outcome was located, in a much more holistic context.

There is no question or debate about the relevance of UNDP's support towards the twelve projects/programmes in order to achieve the Outcome, nor any doubt about the relevance of the Outcome itself. We feel that not only was devolution and local government one of the most important and relevant interventions necessary for broader pro-poor and pro-women, devolved, delivery of basic social services, but that it was imperative that donors and other development partners support such efforts from the early days in 2001, as many did. Moreover, the support envisaged by UNDP in its CPAP in 2004, was building on a clear belief that devolved service delivery would help achieve numerous of its goals and objectives including a closer movement towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and it was also an extended and enhanced continuation of its earlier strategies from 1998-2003. Moreover, two key documents of Government of Pakistan, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the Medium Term Development Framework (MTDF), both emphasise the central role of devolution and local government in providing basic services to the poor. The support by UNDP to the devolution and local government initiatives, clearly articulated in this Outcome, was highly relevant to both, UNDP, as well as to the needs of the Government of Pakistan.

To further elaborate on the issue of relevance, we must highlight the fact that the new system of devolution and local government required capacity building and training of the nature which is captured in many of the projects and programmes under review here. Women councillors needed training, officials needed gender sensitisation given the huge influx of women as elected public representatives, communities needed guidance and support in how to mobilise their own abilities, and so on. The programmes, project and support by UNDP was relevant towards establishing and strengthening the devolved local government system, all of which worked towards achieving progress towards the Outcome itself. As the hostility towards the local government system increased after 2008, UNDP began reassessing strategy to ensure continued relevance in an environment that continues to remain highly fluid. While continued focus on devolution will remain relevant to Pakistan's governance context despite anticipated changes to the LGO 2001, UNDP must evolve a new strategy which will likely entail the inclusion of new partners. Stronger relationships with provincial governments on the issue of devolution will need to be matched with a stronger focus on community-based interventions and new partnerships with civil society interlocutors that have the capacity to amplify citizen voice and agency.

While much evidence has been provided above about the effectiveness and impact of inputs towards the Outcome, some further issues are discussed here. Questions of whether UNDP ‘will be able to achieve the Outcome within the set timeframe’ of 2004-10, or whether new or changed interventions are needed, has now been overtaken by the anticipated significant and irreversible changes in the system of devolution and local government that UNDP was supporting in 2004 – also see this section, below. Clearly, with so much transformation and change in the local government system, UNDP’s efforts related to a deep rethink need to be accelerated for all future commitments under the CPAP 2004-10 which deal with local government. Nevertheless, governance as the cross cutting theme in the One UN reform is likely to be of even more significance and importance and relevance as a new, democratic, dispensation and system of governance takes roots. While we await the new local government system to evolve and be made public, UNDP Pakistan must continue and expand its engagement with provincial governments, providing guidance and support based on its extensive experience to those who are in the process of designing the new system. This is an opportunity which UNDP must fully avail and offer its knowledge and services to do so.

This evaluation mission has not looked at the financial efficiency of projects or programmes as this was not in its mandate and hence any comments made are more of a general nature. Much of the contribution of the twelve projects/programmes was towards capacity building and training, inputs that often have high costs, and returns are difficult to capture or estimate, especially since they have a long gestation period. Also, in the case of Balochistan which suffers from insufficient and poor infrastructure and difficult access, any project would have high administrative and office costs. Nevertheless, we found that in the case of the Balochistan GJTMA project and the Balochistan GBGS, there was only three staff on both projects. Given the terrain of Balochistan and the high achievements of both projects, we find it admirable that both projects had such low personnel costs and each had only one vehicle. By lowering such overheads, it is probable that such projects would have been efficient in the way they utilised funds and human resources to achieve their intended results. Moreover, in the case of the Small Grants Projects reviewed, counterpart funding from the Government of Sindh for energy efficient housing and from corporate philanthropy for eco-tourism in Karachi helped scale up the impact of relatively small investments by UNDP. In the case of the coastal village of Kakapir in Karachi, investment by corporate philanthropy also helped provide economic opportunities to women and establish health and education facilities for local communities.

Questions about the sustainability of UNDP interventions related to the Outcome, are discussed in the final part of this section, but the main point which needs to be made, as it has in numerous sections of this Report, that the entire structure of local government that UNDP’s interventions were anchored in is changing. For much of the CPAP period 2004-10, UNDP was on track to support and sustain its own interventions and move closer to the Outcome, but as we argue below, since 2007/08, it became difficult to argue in favour of sustaining a system (or inputs which fed into it) which was clearly on its way out. While UNDP began reviewing arrangements and discussing alternatives with counterparts including the government, it needs to be more proactive in terms of suggesting scenarios and alternate support strategies in order to retain the leadership position that it held on devolution before the rules of the game began changing in 2007/08.



In January 2010, in many important ways, there is little left to 'sustain' in the UNDP supported projects that were embedded in the local government system based on LGO 2001. Most of these interventions are in a review and re-strategizing phase with internal discussions as well as consultations with external partners including government counterparts. With Nazims and councillors not being sure of their future role or authority and CCBs uncertain of their inclusion in any revised local government system, clearly any training or other capacity building interventions will be largely irrelevant to the needs of a as-yet unevolved system of governance and administration which is likely to replace the previous system.

The projects/programmes included in the Environment & Energy portfolio were not embedded in the local government system and hence are less affected by the changes that are likely to be made to it.

Gender concerns were very centrally integrated into UNDP project outputs, and gender seems to be a cross-cutting theme in most UNDP projects at the Outcome level. The level of strategic focus though varies. In some projects/programmes, gender concerns are a by-catch, rather than a consciously explored theme. The notable exception in terms of a gender focus is BEGIN-ER, which was designed to respond to an emergency situation. While some of the projects and programmes that have been examined as part of this Outcome Evaluation have been clearly gender projects, gender has increasingly become an overriding theme in much developmental effort, particularly those supported by donors. UNDP was able to create the right type of linkages and networks with key institutions which helped carry out efforts towards the Outcome. NRB, NCCW, Ministry of Environment, DTCE, and linkages with provincial and federal government departments and ministries seem to have worked effectively. Moreover, some devolved projects, such as the Balochistan AGRP and the Habitats & Species project, NWFP's EIROP, and the SGP's projects in Sindh were specifically provincial projects.

A key issue which affects all those raised in this section and elsewhere in this Report, and affects concerns about relevance, sustainability, effectiveness, impact, as well as linkages, and is perhaps the most critical of all regarding the Outcome and period of analysis (2004-10), concerns the need for UNDP to accelerate its efforts to revise strategies for supporting devolution within a context that is likely to remain fluid for at least most of 2010. Some existing partnerships like that with provincial governments need to be stronger, and new partnerships especially with key players within an expanded spectrum of civil society need to be explored and developed. Equally, community-based interventions that were not embedded in the LGO 2001 need greater support to effectively deal with the impending changes that are likely to be made to the local government system. There is enough evidence from the past to underscore the fact that when governments change, in particular when military regimes are forced out and are replaced with democratic and elected governments, the institutional arrangements put in place by military regimes, which always include local government systems, are dismantled. If not in late 2007, but certainly in 2008, it became clear that General Musharraf's constitutional, political and institutional arrangements are very likely to be replaced

by some other form of governance. Hence, it is essential for UNDP to work with greater urgency to develop and implement exit strategies where needed or a strategy to adapt to new changes despite the significant investments it had made in the period under review and in fact since 2001. Strategic and timely responses to changing realities will help UNDP continue achieving progress towards the Outcome through consistent but revised strategic support to devolution and citizen participation.

For example, UNDP should examine what is to happen to the knowledge and skills created through the extensive training efforts. Will the individuals trained be followed? Will the social capital created through DTCE and CCBs survive after the changes to the local government system are made. While their efforts may have borne some fruit during 2004-08/09, we know that in the next year or two, the activities of both DTCE, and certainly CCBs, will be very different, and probably next to nothing in the case of the CCBs. Moreover, the situation has been in limbo since the middle of 2008, where Nazims and councillors have been unsure about their status and future. Hence, all the training and capacity building that has taken place since then, may have been highly inefficient and perhaps, even a waste. UNDP's decision to continue many of the projects/programmes working with the local government system and institutions is in accordance with its continued support to devolution and citizen participation. While the Evaluation team also recommends continued support it suggests that effective re-strategizing must be given due priority. This will include the involvement and ownership of partners and counterparts in the government. It will also entail greater attention to reviewing work plans and activities to ensure that resources are not inefficiently used.<sup>1</sup>

The ambiguity and uncertainty around the LGO 2001 and the possible future of the local government system have had a huge impact on the Outcome, especially since around 2008. UNDP may have achieved the Outcome, or made huge strides towards achieving the Outcome, had the old devolution and local government system continued. The fact that realities changed and continue to evolve is not UNDP's fault or responsibility, but it is important that UNDP put greater effort in anticipating the nature and direction of developments on the political, particularly local government, front, and adapt, adopt and rethink its strategies accordingly. The senior management and leadership must acknowledge some failings in not being able to do so more promptly.

We emphasise this last point above with the help of the rather prescient observation by the authors of the 2008 UNDP Country Programme Annual Review, published in 2009, which states: 'various governance, justice as well as other development initiatives are likely to see a major set back if the LG systems are diluted or undermined through administrative sections. The assessment points to an urgent need for vigorous advocacy at the federal and provincial tiers to ensure that the gains made over the past decade are sustained and further built' (p 39). Interestingly, the Gender Outcome Evaluation of 2009, also reached similar conclusions. It stated, that

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<sup>1</sup> The Gender Justice and Protection Project under the Gender Support Programme was started in the last quarter of 2007, and the Annual Review Report dated 2 January 2008 states, that 'a stakeholders' workshop was planned and all arrangements made, but the event was postponed because of the expected change of the government in the month of November'

“several major changes have been already introduced through executive orders including the defacto revival of the district and erstwhile divisional heads (DCs/Commissioners) whose new mandates overlap, under-mine or supersede those enjoyed by the local governments. Virtually all of the male and female representatives across all four provinces expressed concerns that a significant backtrack-ing is expected on this front with serious impacts on grass root governance leading to weakening or dilution of the roles and authorities acquired since 2001. The concerns of women workers and elected representatives were particularly strong as they perceived they were likely to be the most marginalized as a result of proposed changes”. (*Gender Outcome Evaluation, p 26*).

UNDP’s re-strategizing began in 2008. For instance, a governance review was invited in 2008 which advised on keeping a foot in the door while emphasizing the fluidity of the policy environment on devolution. Moreover, its recommendations on focusing on local level service delivery within the One UN were also subsequently followed through involvement in the Health and Education joint programme of the One UN. Another area that the governance review identified was legal empowerment of the poor, which has since been pursued. Efforts such as these are in the right direction and more needs to be done on the same lines with all projects/programmes that were embedded in the LGO 2001.

# 5.0

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The main argument that we make in our Outcome Evaluation is that UNDP chose the right kinds of interventions to support the devolution and local government reform process, inputs which would have eventually worked through towards some progress towards the Outcome: local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services. We make this point by accepting that the prevailing benchmark on which UNDP was working, was very poor and limited, and a great deal of time and effort was required to raise the standards of deliverables through local government institutions. A point raised by many observers at the time of the beginning of the devolution process – and much later, as well – was the need for capacity building and training of elected and unelected officials at the local government level. We feel that many of UNDP's inputs were focused on filling this gap and need.

Many of UNDP's projects and programmes working towards the Outcome, were based on training and capacity, and hence the outcomes of each interventions become difficult to quantify in real, effective, terms, except that we know that numerous women and men were trained. What is more difficult to capture is the exact impact of all that training. While it is clear from the field interviews and document review that the training helped women councillors gain greater knowledge and confidence on the local government system, it is more difficult to give quantifiable data on its exact impact in better quality service delivery and greater participation working towards the Outcome. Even under the best of circumstances, training outcomes take time; when a completely new system which brought in different sets of actors and rearranged power and institutional relations is put in place, training and capacity building are faced with additional constraints and pitfalls. Nevertheless, while it is impossible to quantify achievements in a more meaningful manner which suggests that measurable progress has been made towards the Outcome, our discussions, observations and analysis suggests, that overall there was progress being made towards the Outcome, for as long as there was certainty and unambiguity about the system that was in place. Following the end of 2007, the rules of the game began to change.

UNDP's preparedness for the imminent changes in context that was also urged through numerous words of caution and concern about the inevitable changes that were likely, much of this coming from UNDP reports and evaluations themselves, is moving in the right direction but needs much greater acceleration. All indications suggest that the local government system in place since 2001, is likely to be replaced. While this has major implications for UNDP and other donors and development partners – particularly in the long interim period in which there is a great deal of uncertainty – the efforts at revising and re-strategizing in order to anticipate, respond or adapt to what are likely probabilities need to be significantly increased. There is an urgent need to review past achievements in the context of the transformed present and anticipated future context and strategize on ways to capitalize on past gains in devolution and citizen participation.

As much as the system of local government in place since 2001 is under review and possible revision – the activities embedded in it especially those which worked through partners and stakeholders who were an integral part of the local government system need to be reviewed and revised. Our discussions with trainers, government officials, elected and unelected public representatives, members of CCBs, and even UNDP programme and project staff, all indicated a move towards this. For example, with the uncertainty around elected councils their activities slowed down or even came to a halt, and the potential audience at the local government level who should be trained, became disinterested. When the future of the system itself became uncertain, many that were part of it also became doubtful and some even lost purpose, direction and incentive. We again emphasise the fact that at this time UNDP's efforts to revising and re-strategizing should have shown greater urgency and vigour.

# 6.0 Lessons, Generalizations and Actionable Points

The support to devolved systems of governance is as relevant now as it was in 2004, at the start of the CPAP to reduce the costs of governance and to ensure greater citizen participation. In principle, UNDP's choice of projects and programmes has been right and would have helped make considerable progress towards achieving the Outcome. However, with much of the constituency for which the interventions were meant are in a different and changing environment, and with an unknown design of institutional structures and relationships that are likely to replace the old one, it does become difficult to give any clear guidelines for how to proceed. Nonetheless it is suggested that support to devolution should be continued though with revised strategies and partners, where needed. More specifically, the following actionable points are recommended:

- Accelerate a review of all future commitments under the CPAP 2004-10 which deal with local government. More proactively suggest scenarios and alternate support strategies in order to retain a leadership position on support to devolution.
- Accelerate the rethink and re-strategizing of specific projects and programmes which were embedded in the LGO 2001. Unlike many other donors, UNDP has not halted its projects around the LGO 2001 apart from the Support to Good Governance project that was closed ahead of schedule. Yet, we realise, and there is a clear awareness in UNDP about this as well, that there cannot be business-as-usual, and UNDP will have to take a strong and hard look at how to situate and refocus the projects in a situation which is highly fluid.
- Strengthen the role of local authorities and communities in projects and programmes that are not embedded in the LGO 2001 but have the potential to contribute to the Outcome.
- Strategically use the interim period until decisions on local government are made to draw on its own extensive knowledge and experiences and also help create robust empirical evidence to assist and influence the impending decisions on local government. This requires increased engagement with provincial governments in the preparation of the new design and system so that it follows the principle of subsidiarity.
- Continue supporting local government training institutions in time for the new cadre of elected representatives for when (if) they come into office. However, one must accept the inevitability that many activities which were designed around the institutions, relationships and structures of the LGO 2001, will require a re-think as their context and operations are likely to be changed with varying degrees of impact on the activities.
- Undertake or support an extensive, empirically based, review and analysis of inputs, outputs and outcomes (including financial issues) of the consequences and effects of the local government system (2001-09). Ensure wide dissemination of the review so that it may assist the anticipated restructuring of the local government system.
- Continue to train and gender sensitise public officials at all tiers of government, since these officials are likely to be in place once the new systems are in place. Also maintain contact with those that were trained during the period 2004-09, so as to follow the social and human capital created



- Expand focus on the demand side of the governance equation. Broaden engagement with communities and civil society organizations. Identify partners that may include NGOs, media and academic institutions through a review of different models of citizens' engagement with the state for improved planning and service delivery that are successfully practiced in Pakistan and elsewhere. Particularly focus on experiences that help amplify citizen voice and agency.
- Review internal operational modalities and staffing so as to ensure: (a) optimal response time; (b) consistent and strategic support to interventions from conceptualization to follow-through phases; (c) availability of required skills and experience related to gender and other disciplines.

Finally, using the format used in the Environment Outcome Evaluation regarding the rating of a number of issues regarding the progress towards achieving the Outcome, we present the following:

**1. Outcome Rating; local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services.**

- *Overall, has there been: Positive change; Negative change; No change.*

We believe that progress, while slow, was made towards the Outcome while the local government system was in place and while there was certainty around it (2004-08). After that with the goalposts changed, progress slowed down. The interventions that were not embedded in the local government continued to support the Outcome, but in the indirect way they were planned to support it. There has been concrete progress towards all the indicators and targets set out in 2004 in all the programmes/projects which constitute this Outcome.

**2. Sustainability rating. Is progress towards the Outcome?:**

- *Sustainable; Unsustainable; Too soon to tell.*

Progress towards the Outcome was sustainable while the old system was in place. With a new system likely to replace the earlier one, a complete new plan of action will have to be prepared by UNDP. As we argue in numerous places, UNDP was moving towards the goals set out and would have reached many of the targets had the old structures been in place.

**3. Relevance rating. Is the Outcome?:**

- *Relevant to the country's development situation and needs; Somewhat relevant to the situation/needs; Not relevant*

We believe that the Outcome was very relevant to the country's development situation and needs and filled many gaps. The Government of Pakistan was highly committed to devolution, and by all means UNDP supported a programme which was highly relevant to the needs of its partner. Also, the training and capacity building initiative of

UNDP was highly relevant to making the devolution plan sustainable.

**4. Output Ratings: In general, have the UNDP Projects we've looked at:**

- *Achieved their targets; Partially (i.e. 2/3 or more) achieved their targets; Not achieved their targets*

Our evidence suggests that UNDP projects partially achieved their targets. They could have achieved higher targets, but by around 2008 or so, the climate and environment in which the projects and programmes were embedded, began to change in an era of uncertainty.

**5. Cost-effectiveness rating: has progress towards Outcome been cost-effective, with specific reference to UNDP contribution?:**

- *Yes; Somewhat (if so, how could it have been better); No*

We believe that the progress, and UNDP's contribution, seems to be cost-effective. We have found that many of the projects have been fairly lean in terms of their overheads and have achieved their goals with limited resources.

## **Annexure 1: Terms of Reference Outcome Evaluation-Governance**

UNDAF outcome: Local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services.

### **Major indicators:**

1. 100 percent of district governments effectively accessing and managing devolved financial resources.
2. Monitoring committees and citizen community boards (CCBs) established in 100 percent districts
3. 50 percent public service facilities made functional in a gender balanced manner
4. Perception of local government system and access to justice, including police functioning, by the poorest quintile improved by 50 percent<sup>1</sup>.

### **1. Introduction**

The link between human development and quality of governance is strong and well established and is at the core of development issues in Pakistan. This is reflected in the national strategies to attain MDGs through, Improved governance and consolidating devolution, both as a means of delivering better development results and ensuring social and economic justice. These considerations underpin UNDP Pakistan's efforts in supporting governance processes and institutions that would improve their response to the needs of Pakistani citizens. The governance interventions are aimed at making policy formulation and implementation more effective and participatory; enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of key governing institutions; and supporting initiatives for citizens involvement in decisions that affect their lives. In this context the governance programme is working with the Government of Pakistan and national partners in three core areas of intervention: (i) devolution support; (ii) strengthening governing institutions; (iii) economic governance.

Pakistan has introduced a devolved system of governance that is aimed at improving the quality of and access to public services delivery at the local levels. UNDP Pakistan supports government institutions in policy formulation and implementation of devolution at the national, provincial and local levels.

Strong, credible and effective governing institutions that have the confidence of the citizens and the ability to deliver their mandate are the foundations of sound governance. UNDP Pakistan supports capacity strengthening of the key governing institutions such as Parliament and Election Commission of Pakistan and other public sector organizations and enables their engagement with other partners in civil society to improve the relevance and effectiveness

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<sup>1</sup> Country Programme Document 2004-2008. The consultants will need to look at the enhanced RBM indicators given in the Annex as well.

of their mandate.

Under the economic governance component, UNDP Pakistan is also involved in issues of public-private partnerships, advocating global compact, promoting corporate social responsibility, policy research on globalization and strengthening aid coordination.

Outcomes are developmental changes between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impact, and are achieved in partnership with others. Partners are agents or actors with whom UNDP has, or intends to have, a substantive relationship in the pursuit of common outcomes. Partners may include stakeholders, if they are involved in working towards the outcome; beneficiaries of outcome actions; and donors involved in some way with UNDP on the outcome

## **2. Objective of outcome Evaluation**

An outcome evaluation is an in-depth examination of a related set of programmes, component of strategies intended to achieve a specific outcome. The objective of the outcome evaluation is to gauge the UNDP success in achieving the outcome and assess the underlying reason for achievement and non achievement

The evaluation team will judge relevance of the programmes to Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) and United Nations Framework for Development (UNDAF) and its contribution to achieving the CPAP objectives. The evaluation team should examine each programme component separately on the basis of effectiveness and efficiency. The evaluation team will assess the outcome of the programme whether the programme has made a difference in the planning and management practices of the local authorities in development activities.

The scope of the evaluation is determined by the following:

**2.1 Outcome status;** The key questions to be discussed under the outcome status are; what were the origin of the outcome and its constituent interventions?; How were the past experience, findings and recommendations of previous evaluations if any, dialogue with stakeholders used in design of outputs?; Assess the adequacy of background work carried out in project design; Determine whether or not the outcome has been achieved and, if not, whether there has been progress made towards its achievement. Identify the balance effort needed and the suitability or otherwise of pursuing the achievement of the outcome. List innovative approaches tried and capacities developed through UNDP assistance.

**2.2 Underlying factors:** An analysis of the underlying factors beyond UNDP's control that influenced the outcome. What were the key assumptions made, internal and external factors? Distinguish the substantive design issues from the key implementation and/or management capacities and issues including the timeliness of generating outputs, the degree of stakeholder and partner involvement in the completion of the outputs, and how processes were managed/carried out. The outcome evaluation should examine UNDP work with other relevant actors and their influence/contribution in achieving the outcome.

**2.3 UNDP contribution:** The relevance of the outcome and the constituent components specifically for UNDP assistance. Also determine whether or not UNDP funded constituent outputs and other interventions—including the outputs, programmes, projects and soft and hard assistance— can be credibly linked to achievement of the outcome.

**2.4 Partnership strategy:** Ascertain whether UNDP's partnership strategy has been appropriate and effective. What were the partnerships formed for? How did partnerships arise? What was the role of UNDP? Did it identify a niche for itself? How did the partnership contribute to the achievement of the outcome? How did they function and sustain? What was the level of the participation of stakeholders? List key beneficiaries and their major perceptions. Examine the partnership among UN Agencies that both influenced the programme design and contributed to the achievement of results through provision of services of national and international volunteers.

**2.5 Key Evaluation Aspects;** Specifically, the outcome evaluation is expected to address the following aspects:

**2.5.1 Relevance:**

- Provide a detailed assessment of how well the interventions are focused on the needs and demands of the beneficiaries'.

**2.5.2 Effectiveness and Impact:**

- Whether the outcome has been achieved and, if not, whether there has been progress made towards the achievement of both qualitative and quantitative targets;
- With the current and planned interventions under the Country Programme 2004-10 in partnership with other actors and stakeholders, will UNDP be able to achieve the outcome within the set timeframe and inputs – or whether additional resources are required and new or changed interventions are needed?
- The level, degree and appropriateness of participation by the beneficiaries, stakeholders, government and donor partners.
- The role of governance as a cross cutting theme in the One UN reform. Its current role and suggestions for improvement for the upcoming years.

**2.5.3 Efficiency:**

- Assess how the programmes and projects have utilized the funding and human resources to achieve intended results.

**2.5.4 Sustainability:**

- What is the prospect of the sustainability of UNDP interventions related to the outcome and provide recommendations for ensuring sustainability.
- An analysis of the underlying factors beyond UNDP's control that influence the outcome;

### **2.5.5 Network /linkages:**

- Analyze how well Gender concerns have been integrated in UNDP project outputs and specific recommendations how to make it a cross-cutting theme in all UNDP projects at outcome level;
- What has been the role of UNDP soft-assistance activities in helping achieve the outcome?
- Type and scope of linkages formed during established with national authorities, private sector, civil society organizations and other donors.

### **2.5.6 Lessons learnt/ recommendations:**

- formulate a set of specific recommendations for any re-orientation of the program, identify the necessary actions required to be undertaken, who should undertake those and what the deadline should be, in order to remove or minimize the problems identified and to ensure efficient and effective implementation and to maximize impact.

## **3. Methodology**

The Evaluation team should submit a detailed outline of the methods proposed to carry out the task. The methodology should include number of project (sample projects) to be included in the evaluation based on the criteria set by the SMU and number of beneficiaries (Sample respondent). The following key activities are necessary for the evaluation team to undertake during their assignment.

- Meetings with senior management and programme staffs of UNDP
- Meetings with the steering committee, (briefing and debriefing)
- Review documents (published and unpublished: project documents, Quarterly and Annual Progress reports, evaluations, monitoring reports, Country Programme Document, UNDAF etc)
- Meeting with government officials, relevant stakeholders, communities
- Field visits (projects area)

The evaluation team must have an expert in local governance, an institutional expert with participatory monitoring and evaluation approaches and competence in conducting gender sensitive analysis.

## **4. Other requirements**

1. The evaluation team will be housed in SMU UNDP
2. The Evaluation Team will submit a draft report to Chief SMU and CD.
3. The Evaluation team will provide one hard and one soft copy of the final draft.
4. The Evaluation team will hand over the unpublished document to UNDP

## **5. Deliverable and Layout of the report**

A comprehensive evaluation report, with an executive summary, highlighting the evaluation Methodology, key findings, lessons learned, rating on performance, best practices and Recommendations would be the final product of evaluation. The contents of the report should



emerge from the corporate Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators and would essentially cover the following:

- Executive summary
- Introduction
- Description of the evaluation methodology
- An analysis of the situation with regard to the outcome, the outputs and the partnership strategy;
- Key findings, in the context of mainstreaming the MDGs and the need for integrating and strategizing the UNDP development assistance for gender equality and women empowerment.
- Conclusions and recommendations
  - An action item list to build an appropriate niche for UNDP interventions in the country.
  - Strategies for continuing UNDP assistance towards the outcome;
  - A rating on progress towards outcomes and progress towards outputs;
  - A rating on the relevance of the outcome.
  - Specific recommendations with regard to UNDP engagement in the One UN reform process related to gender equality and strategic priorities for future years in this area
- The assessment should also review the relevance of the outcome and recommend appropriate modifications.
- Annexes: These will include terms of reference (TORs), field visits, people interviewed, documents reviewed etc.

#### 6. Time Frame

Tentative Time Frame for the Study is 40 working days with a contract period of November 20 2009 to December 30, 2009.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Activities</i>
<i>20 November</i>	<i>Meeting with UNDP Senior Management regarding scope, purpose and methodology of the evaluation mission</i>
<i>21- 29 November</i>	<i>Literature review</i>
<i>30 Nov -6 Dec</i>	<i>Methodology development</i>
<i>7 December</i>	<i>Share the methodology with the evaluation committee</i>
<i>8-16 December</i>	<i>Field work: Meetings with UNDP staff, Economic Affairs Division (EAD), DTCE, Ministry of Local Government, and relevant departments, civil Society partners, communities (beneficiaries) National Project Directors (NPD), Programme Directors, National Project Managers (NPM), provincial Project Managers, UN agencies or cross cutting groups and other relevant agencies</i>
<i>17 December</i>	<i>De-briefing with evaluation committee and SM</i>
<i>18- 24 December</i>	<i>Report writing</i>
<i>28 December</i>	<i>Presentation of Draft Report to UNDP evaluation committee</i>
<i>29- 30 December</i>	<i>Prepare final report after incorporating comments</i>

## 7. Project Tree

### Outcome summary

Country Programme Outcome		
PAK_OUTCOME36	Local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of activities including the provision of public services.	
Outcome linked to...		
UNDAF	National goal	Reform of political structures and system, government structures and system, law enforcement structures and system, public employment system, primary health care structures and system, educational structures and system, public information structures and system and economic structures and system (10PDP) <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Introduction of genuine democracy at grassroots level (Devolution Plan)</li><li>• Transfer of power and authority to people’s representatives (Devolution Plan)</li><li>• Service orientation of Government (Devolution Plan)</li></ul> Fiscal needs judged by conditions of areas (Devolution Plan)
	UNDAF outcome	Support to institutional capacity building for improved governance, particularly at the local Government level
Strategic Plan	Focus area	Democratic governance
	Key result area	Strengthening responsive governing institutions
	Provisional Corporate Outcome	1. National, regional and local levels of governance expand their capacities to manage the equitable delivery of public services and support conflict reduction2.Legislatures, regional elected bodies, and local assemblies have strengthened institutional capacity, enabling them to represent their constituents more effectively

Indicators			
Indicators	Baseline	Target	Data Source
1.1- Local government structure and systems strengthened and procedures re-engineered 1.2- Transparency mechanisms established at the district level, involving poor communities 1.3- Legal and judicial police reforms introduced and implementation strategy developed 1.4- Public Safety Commissions and legal aid centers established 1.5- Mechanisms for formation and activation of CCBs set up 1.6- Local development plans developed by CCBs in cooperation with local authorities (at least 10 in each Union Council)	2005 - Local government plan was formulated in 2002 and there were no citizens community boards	2010 - Increased citizen participation and improved utilization of district development funds in local government in Pakistan through enabling legislation, systems, procedures review and creation of requisite mechanisms.  DTCE program extended to 60 districts	Progress reports  Evaluation report

Major output projects							
Award	Output project (Pipeline Proposal ID)	Description	Baseline	Indicator	Target 2009	2009 Budget (US\$)	PO
00014120	00014120	GOV) - DTCE	The local government plan was formulated in 2001 and the implementation of its community empowerment elements was initiated through DTCE. Before the initiation of the project in Dec 2003, there were 5,027 Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) in existence.	<p>1. Monitoring Committees (MCs) and Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) established in 37 districts.</p> <p>2. Amount of funds drawn down from district funds for CCB projects.</p>	<p>1. Technical resource centre to promote citizen engagement established in 2 Provinces;</p> <p>2. Citizens perception survey for evidence based planning and decision making launched;</p> <p>3. Registration of 2700 new CCBs, utilization of PKR 1 billion of Local Government funds, capacity building of 350 new CCBs and 300 Union Councils in partner districts in project management; and</p> <p>4. Formation, activation and capacity building of citizen engagement forums/networks in 10 partner districts including Monitoring Committees</p>	4,254,510	Shirin Gul
00014127	00040337	(GEN) Gender Justice (GJTMA)	Law (Local Government Ordinance 2001) related to the formation of Musalihat Anjumans / MAs (Alternate Dispute Resolution platforms) promulgated but no MAs yet formed / functional.	<p>1. Monitoring Committees (MCs) and Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) established in 37 districts.</p> <p>2. Amount of funds drawn down from district funds for CCB projects.</p> <p>1. No. of Musalihat Anjumans (MAs) / Alternate Dispute Resolution platforms functional with women representation.</p> <p>2. No. of cases settled by MAs.</p>	<p>1. 1050 Musalihat Anjumans (MAs) re-notified (Making all previously notified MAs operational)</p> <p>2. 4000 MA members trained</p> <p>3. 1550 Public Servants trained and support Dispute Resolution through Musalihat Anjumans</p> <p>4. 3500 disputes amicably settled by MAs</p> <p>5. 2 Training Modules (includes manuals and training plans) developed for Judiciary &amp; MAs on Alternate Dispute Resolution system</p>	1,128,328	EFFENDI, Faiza

00045103	00053218	(GOV) Asst to Gov. Reforms and	The Social Audit 2001 revealed general dissatisfaction of citizens with public service delivery in Balochistan. Local government institutions are weak and the policies and procedures of local and provincial government institutions are not aligned.	<p>1. Provincial and Local gov institutional policies and procedures aligned with each other and the LGO 2001</p> <p>2. Citizens satisfaction with public service delivery improved.</p>	<p>1.Capacities of 5 provincial and 3 district level institutions assessed and strengthened;</p> <p>2.Access to and responsiveness of public service enhanced through replication of PIS and establishment of District Management Information Centre in 2 project districts (Quetta and Qila Saifullah). Upscale Participatory Information System in Loralai to improve monitoring district development at provincial level;</p> <p>3.A draft policy framework on e-governance designed for Provincial Government and pilot implementation in District Quetta (automation of domicile system, arms license and Human Resource Management Information System); and</p> <p>4.Capacity of 30 local CSOs in 6 project districts enhanced to enable them to play an effective role for improved public service delivery at the grassroots level.</p>	409,327	Saman Qureshi
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## **Annexure 2: Methodology for UNDP's Outcome Evaluation – Governance**

**by**

**S Akbar Zaidi and Rashida Dohad**

**12 December 2009.**

### **1. Introduction**

UNDP Pakistan's support for democratic governance through processes and institutions, is premised on the link between the quality of governance and human development. This finds synergy with efforts to attain MDGs through improved governance and consolidating devolution as a means of delivering better development results and ensuring social and economic justice.

UNDP Pakistan's governance programme is working with the Government of Pakistan, provincial governments, other donors, and national partners in three core areas of intervention: (i) devolution support; (ii) strengthening governing institutions; and (iii) economic governance. It supports government institutions in policy formulation and implementation of devolution and democratic governance at the national, provincial and local levels. It also supports capacity strengthening of key institutions such as Parliament and the Election Commission of Pakistan, and other public sector organisations and enables their engagement with other partners in civil society. Under the economic governance component, UNDP Pakistan is involved in issues of public-private partnerships, advocating global compact, promoting corporate social responsibility, policy research on globalization and strengthening aid coordination.

UNDP Pakistan has engaged a team of two external consultants, Dr. S. Akbar Zaidi (team leader) and Ms. Rashida Dohad, to conduct an Outcome Evaluation. Within the governance programme, the evaluation will focus on devolution and the following Outcome:

Local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services.

### **2. Objective**

Based on our understanding of UNDP guidelines, this Outcome Evaluation will be an in-depth examination of the contributions of a related set of programmes towards achieving the Outcome. The evaluation will gauge success in achieving the Outcome and assess the underlying reasons for this. We will be using the agreed-to TORs as benchmarks but will also refer to the Country Programme Action Plan (2004-08) as a basic guiding instrument in terms of providing a baseline and also a set of indicators against which the success towards the outcome will be evaluated.

### **3. Framework**

The Outcome Evaluation will explore specific issues within the following six key areas which are included in the TORs for this Evaluation:

#### **3.1 Relevance**

The Evaluation will provide a detailed assessment of how well the interventions focused on the needs and demands of the beneficiaries.

#### **3.2 Effectiveness and Impact**

The Evaluation will assess:

- whether the Outcome has been achieved and, if not, whether there has been progress made towards the achievement of both qualitative and quantitative targets;

- With the current and planned interventions under the Country Programme 2004-10 in partnership with other actors and stakeholders, if UNDP will be able to achieve the Outcome within the set timeframe and inputs – or whether additional resources are required and new or changed interventions are needed?
- The level, degree and appropriateness of participation by the beneficiaries, stakeholders, government and donor partners.
- The role of governance as a cross cutting theme in the One UN reform. Its current role and suggestions for improvement for the upcoming years.

### **3.3 Efficiency**

The Evaluation will not be looking at the financial arrangements of each project or programme, but might be in a position to offer some general comments on how funds have been utilised as a contribution towards the Outcome.

### **3.4 Sustainability**

The Evaluation will assess:

- What is the prospect of the sustainability of UNDP interventions related to the Outcome and recommendations for ensuring sustainability.
- The underlying factors beyond UNDP's control that influence the Outcome;

### **3.5 Network /linkages**

The Evaluation will:

- Analyse how well Gender concerns have been integrated in to UNDP project outputs at the Outcome level and give specific recommendations on how to make this a cross-cutting theme in all UNDP projects at that level;
- Assess the role of UNDP's soft-assistance activities in helping achieve the Outcome;
- Assess the role of the linkages formed during the course of the projects and programmes with national authorities, the private sector, civil society organisations and other donors – at the outcome level.

### **3.6 Lessons learnt/Recommendations:**

The Evaluation will formulate a set of specific recommendations for any re-orientation of the programme in terms of its contribution to the Outcome, identify the necessary actions required to be undertaken, who should undertake those and what the deadline should be, in order to remove or minimise the problems identified and to ensure efficient and effective implementation and to maximise impact.

## **4 Sample projects**

UNDP selected the following projects for the Outcome Evaluation, based on the following criteria:

- UNDP interventions which have been going on during the CPD period.
- Those which contribute to the Outcome: 'Local authorities and communities in rural and urban areas enabled and involved in planning and management of development activities, including the provision of services'.
- Projects from other Units (E&E, PRU, CPRU) which have contributed to the Outcome i.e. local government planning, devolution, etc.

Based on this, the following sample projects are included in the Outcome Evaluation:

### **4.1 Crisis Prevention and Recovery**

- Building Enabling Governance & Institutions for Earthquake Response (BEGIN-ER)



#### **4.2 Environment**

- Conservation of Habitats and Species of Global Significance in Arid & Semi-Arid Ecosystems of Balochistan
- Pakistan Wetlands Programme
- Small Grants Programme (selected 1-2 projects that relate to the Outcome)

#### **4.3 Governance:**

- Support to Devolution Trust for Community Environment (DTCE)
- Support to the Good Governance Project (GGP)
- Assistance to Governance Reforms and Practices in Balochistan (AGRPB)
- Essential Institutional Reforms in NWFP (EIROP)

#### **4.4 Poverty and Gender**

- Gender Justice Through Musahilat Anjuman (GJTMA)
- Gender Based Governance Systems (GBGS)
- Women's Political School Project (WPS)
- Lachi Project

The distribution of work and responsibilities between the two evaluators will be equally shared in terms of projects/programmes, with Rashida Dohad looking at 4.1 and 4.2, and S Akbar Zaidi at 4.3 and 4.4, above. Both evaluators will work separately and in parallel when required in areas of their expertise, and collectively when so required.

### **5. Evaluation methods and activities**

The outcome evaluation will include three key activities: (a) review of documents; (b) interviews of key individuals/organisations; and (c) field visits.

#### **5.1 Review documents**

There is a very large volume of documentation which is part of each of the 12 projects under review. In addition, there is external documentation related to the context of the Outcome including government policies and relevant data of other organizations. There is also documentation which examines UNDP's Country Programme Document, and earlier Outcome Evaluations undertaken in the past. Moreover, UNDP has also provided three sets of manuals/templates which identify how an Outcome Evaluation is to be conducted. We will be following UN guidelines and templates as closely as possible.

Given the very limited time span and the very large amount of documentation provided, a thorough review of the documents, keeping the Outcome in focus, will form a key and substantive, first step of this Outcome Evaluation.

#### **5.2 Interviews/meetings and sample questions**

To supplement our findings and to clarify and triangulate various concepts and findings from the documents, our readings and review will be complimented by key, focused, meetings and interviews with a number of actors and partners around the projects, programmes, and around UNDP's and UNDAF's core activities related to the Outcome. However, given the very tight schedule and time frame, we will only be able to conduct some key interviews. Our desire to interview someone will also be determined by their availability. Hence, the list provided here is merely indicative of the individuals and offices we would ideally wish to interview.

##### **5.2.1 Senior management and programme staff at UNDP**

The first set of meeting by the evaluators, in order to clarify, guide and set the directions of the subsequent field

work, will have to be with all relevant UNDP staff related to projects, programmes, planning and other activities related to the 12 projects mentioned above, and to the overall Outcome.

### **5.2.2 Government officials**

Note: The individual(s) to be interviewed will be decided in consultation with UNDP staff.

#### **Federal**

- Economic Affairs Division (EAD)
- Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (LG&RD)
- Ministry of Environment
- Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA)
- Planning and Development Division (P&DD)
- Ministry of Women's Development (MoWD)
- National Reconstruction Bureau

#### **NWFP**

- Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority (PERRA)
- Planning and Development Department (P&D)
- Local Government Department (LGRDD)
- District Reconstruction Unit-Abbottabad

#### **Balochistan**

- Forest and Wildlife Department
- Planning and Development Department (P&D)

#### **AJK**

- State Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority (SERRA)
- District Reconstruction Unit -Muzaffarabad

Sample questions to government officials

The questions will be drawn from the framework with six key elements that have provided above. The will include:

- 
- What do you see as the contribution of the UNDP programme towards the Outcome?
- Do you believe there was appropriate participation of beneficiaries? If not, why do you think that was the case? If yes, can you give an example of appropriate participation?
- Do you believe the UNDP intervention was/will be sustained beyond project period? What will be the impact of sustainability, or its absence, on the outcome?

### **5.2.3 Relevant stakeholders**

- NGOs
- IUCN Pakistan
- Sustainable Use Specialist Group-Central Asia (SUSG-CA)/Society for Torghar Environment Protection (STEP)
- WWF-PakistanAurat Foundation
- Pattan and Fafen
- PILDAT

## Sample questions to NGOs

The questions will be drawn from the framework with six key elements that have provided above. The will include:

- 
- What do you see as the contribution of the UNDP programme towards the Outcome?
- Do you believe that appropriate partners were selected, and their appropriate participation ensured? If not, why do you think that was the case? If yes, can you give an example of appropriate participation?

## UN agencies

- Food & Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
- International Labour Organisation (ILO)
- United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)

## Sample questions to UN (agencies)

The questions will be drawn from the framework with six key elements that have provided above. The will include:

How was UNDP able to leverage impact? Can you give an example of leverage within the UN agencies that helped achieve success towards the Outcome?

## Donors

- Asian Development Bank
- DFID
- European Commission
- Royal Netherlands Embassy
- Swiss Development Agency
- Royal Norwegian Embassy/NORAD

## Sample questions to donors

The questions will be drawn from the framework with six key elements that have provided above. The will include:

- What has been the role of UNDP in terms of achieving the Outcome?
- What programmes would you specifically cite in terms of attribution towards the Outcome?
- Do you believe that UNDP interventions towards the Outcome were efficient? Can you elaborate with one or more examples?

## 5.3 Field visits (projects area)

It is very unlikely that the evaluation team will be able to visit each project included in the evaluation, and be able to interview relevant National Project Directors (NPD), Programme Directors, National Project Managers (NPM), and provincial Project Managers. In consultation with UNDP staff, we will determine which projects ought to be visited. Moreover, since some of the projects to be reviewed are closed projects, we may not find the management of those projects in place. The Evaluation team will also meet with beneficiaries at the community level in 1-2 selected programmes where possible. Focus group discussions may be used to gather information.

## 6 Tentative Report Outline

The Outcome Evaluation will be documented in a Report which is likely to have the following content:

- Executive summary
- Introduction
- Description of the evaluation methodology
- An analysis of the situation with regard to the Outcome, the outputs and the partnership strategy;
- Key findings, in the context of mainstreaming the MDGs and the need for integrating and strategizing the UNDP development assistance for gender equality and women's empowerment.
- Conclusions and recommendations
- An action item list to build an appropriate niche for UNDP interventions in the country.
- The status of the Outcome and strategies for continuing UNDP assistance towards the outcome;
- A rating on progress towards outcomes and progress towards outputs;
- A rating on the relevance of the outcome.
- Specific recommendations with regard to UNDP engagement in the One UN reform process related to gender equality and strategic priorities for future years in this area
- The assessment will also review the relevance of the Outcome and recommend appropriate modifications.
- Annexes: These will include terms of reference (TORs), field visits, people interviewed, documents reviewed and management responses to the draft report, etc.
-

### **Annexure 3: List of Documents Reviewed**

#### **UNDP Project Related Documents**

1. All Project Documents, Annual Progress Reports, and MTRs (where available) of Projects listed in the Terms of Reference.
2. UNDP, Draft Final Report, BEGIN-ER, June 2009
3. UNDP, Booklet, Rebuilding Lives – Towards A Safer Pakistan
4. UNDP, Booklet, Engaging Communities – making environmental sustainability a reality in Pakistan
5. UNDP, Terminal Report Support to Good Governance (2003-2006)
6. UNDP Pakistan (2004), Country Programme Action Plan for Pakistan – 2004-2008
7. UNDP Pakistan (2006), Mid-Term Review of the UNDP Country Programme – 2004-08
8. UNDP, Gender Outcome Evaluation, 2008
9. UNDP, Environment Outcome Evaluation 1998-2004, May 2005
10. UNDP Pakistan, Country Cooperation Framework 1998 – 2003
11. UNDP Pakistan, Country Programme Action Plan 2004-2008
12. UN Pakistan, United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2004-2008
13. UNDP Evaluation Office, Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators
14. UNDP, Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results
15. UNDP Headquarters, RBM in UNDP – Knowing the What and the How
16. Muhammad Waseem, and Shandana Khan Mohmand, (2002), Outcome Evaluation 2002: Decentralisation Policies, UNDP Pakistan
17. WWF-P, Programme Folder, The Pakistan Wetlands Programme
18. Luc Bellon, A Treasure in My Backyard: Suleiman Markhor, SUSG-C Asia, Quetta, 2008
19. Zia Hashmi, Benazir – Dream House for the Poor
20. Zofeen Ebrahim, Beyond the Storm, Eco-Friendly Dream Homes article for IPS and IFEJ, Karachi, 2009
21. Brochure, Benazir Housing Technology – A poor person’s house in the age of climate change

22. Fisher Folk Development Organization, Brochure, Mangroves Eco-tourism

### **Other Documents**

1. Government of Pakistan, Local Government Ordinance, 2001
2. Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Millennium Development Report 2004
3. Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, Draft Mid-Term Development Framework 2005-2010
4. National Reconstruction Bureau, Social Audit of Government & Public Delivery Services – Baseline Survey, 2002
5. CIET and DTCE, Social Audit of Government & Public Delivery Services, 2005
6. Omar Asghar Khan Development Foundation, Citizen Perspectives on Local Government – Public Dialogue in Hazara, 2010
7. SPDC, Devolution and Human Development in Pakistan, 2007
8. Pattan, A Comparative Analysis: Local Government Election 2001 & 2005. 2006
9. Pattan, In the Spotlight: Case Studies of Union Nazims ( 2001& 2005). 2006
10. Pattan, Claiming Space: Case studies of Women Councillors. 2006
11. Pattan, Common Grounds-1: Survey of Voters, 2005. 2006
12. Pattan, Common Grounds -2: Survey of Candidates, Councillors and Nazims 2005. 2006
13. Pattan, Local Governments and Women. 2002

Annexure 4: People Met		
Government		
1.	Sheikh Ghazanfar Hussain	Secretary, Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development, Government of Pakistan
2.	Capt. (Retd) Atta Muhammad Khan	Joint Secretary, Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development, Government of Pakistan
3.	Mr. Muhammad Arshad Sultan	Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development, Government of Pakistan
4.	Mr. Umeed Khalid	Conservator, National Council for the Conservation of Wildlife
5.	Mr. Naeemul Haq	Member, National Reconstruction Bureau
6.	Mr. Zafar Abbas	Director, Special Project Cell (former Director Governance), Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority
7.	Mr. Muhammad Ayub	Chief, Women Development and Manpower, Planning and Development Division, Planning and Development Division, (National Project Director, GBGS)
8.	Mr Nasar Hayat	National Project Manager, GBGS
9.	Mr Rizwan Mahmood	Planning, M&E, GBGS
10.	Ms Saira Irum	Gender Specialist, GBGS
11.	Mr. Muhammad Ikram Khan	Secretary, Planning & Development, Government of NWFP
12.	Mr. Hifz ur Rahman	Secretary, Local Government & Rural Development
Government of NWFP		
13.	Ms. Tahira Yasmin	Deputy Director, Local Government & Rural Development, Government of NWFP
14.	Mr. Qambar Ali Khan	Chief Economist, Government of NWFP
15.	Mr. Sikandar Qayyum	Director General, SDU, P&D, Government of NWFP
16.	Mr. Ali Raza	Chief, Foreign Aid, P&D, Government of NWFP
17.	Mian Maqsood Gul	Assistant Chief, Foreign Aid, P&D, Government of NWFP
18.	Ms. Hina Firdaus	Foreign Aid, P&D, Government of NWFP
19.	Mr. Nazar Hussain Mahar	Former Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh
20.	Mr. Ali Anwer Halepoto	Nazim, District Badin
21.	Mr. Naseem Bazi	Secretary Implementation, Planning & Development Department, Government of Balochistan
22.	Mr. Faisal Jamal	Secretary Local Government Board, Balochistan, PPD GBGS, PPD GJTMA
23.	Qazi Shahid Pervez	Secretary Local Government, Government of Balochistan
24.	Capt ° Javed Khan	Provincial Project Manager, GJTMA Project, Balochistan
25.	Mr. Sami Raza Baig	Provincial Project Manager, GBGS Project Balochistan
26.	Mr. Shehryar Taj	National Project Manager, AGRPB, Balochistan
27.	Ms. Naureen Ara	M&E Specialist, GBGS Project Balochistan
28.	Mr. Abdul Naeem Khan	Director Rural Development Academy, Balochistan
29.	Mr. Muhammad Hanif	Deputy Director, Rural Development Academy, Balochistan
30.	Mr. Naimutallah Babar	Chief Instructor, Rural Development Academy, Balochistan
Civil Society Organizations		
1.	Mr. Daniyal Aziz	Chairperson, Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (DTCE)



2.	Mr. Zafar Hayat Malik	Chief Executive Officer, DTCE
3.	Sardar Naseer A. Tareen	Chair, Sustainable Use Specialist Group – Central Asia
4.	Mr. Masood Ul Mulk	Chief Executive Officer, Sarhad Rural Support Programme
5.	Dr. Ejaz Ahmed	Deputy Director General, WWF-Pakistan
6.	Mr. Anwar Nasim	Director, Finance, WWF-Pakistan
7.	Mr. Richard Garstang	National Programme Manager, Pakistan Wetlands Programme (PWP)
8.	Mr. Masood Arshad	Programme Manager, National Programme, PWP
9.	Mr. Ahmad Khan	Programme Manager, Regional Programme, PWP
10.	Mr. Mohammad Ismail	Coordinator, Field Operations, Research & Development Foundation
11.	Mr. Farooq Pathan	Social Mobilizer, Research & Development Foundation
12.	Mr. Abdul Ghani	President, Fisherfolk Development Organization
13.	Mr. Muhammad Saleem Jomezai	Manager, Field Operations, DTCE
14.	Ms. Afiya S Zia	Gender and Local Government Specialist, Independent Scholar and Consultant
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14.	Mr. Naseer Ahmed Soomro	Project Officer, Diversification of Livelihoods

#### **Fcous Group Discussions**

18 women and 45 men	Earthquake-affected union councils of Bihali, Balakot, Ghanool, Karnol, Oghi and Shamdhara in District Mansehra, NWFP
10 women and 15 men	Members of the Haji Jaffar Jamari Taraqiati Tanzeem (men), and Dua Tanzeem (women), village Jaffar Jamari, Jhirk, Taluka and District Thatta Members of the Fisherfolk Development Organization, village Kakapir, Sandspit, Karachi
10 men (note: the meeting with women was not possible due to a funeral in the village)	Members of the Fisherfolk Development Organization, village Kakapir, Sandspit, Karachi
19 women and 32 men composed of the following were met in meetings at Quetta	President Zhob Press Club; Male Councillors; Female Councillors; District Councilors; 3 WPS Master Trainers
Quetta	CCB Network Chairman, Pishin; CCB Network Chairman, Zhob; 2 UC Nazims Quetta; 3 Secretaries UCs Quetta; 3 Chairmen Musalihat Anjumans; Members Musalihat Anjumans, male and female; President Zhob Press Club; Male Councillors; Female Councillors; District Councilors; 3 WPS Master Trainers



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