

# DEVELOPMENT ADVOCATE **PAKISTAN**

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## Civil Service Reforms in **Pakistan**



DEVELOPMENT ADVOCATE  
**PAKISTAN**



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*Development Advocate Pakistan* provides a platform for the exchange of ideas on key development issues and challenges in Pakistan. Focusing on a specific development theme in each edition, this quarterly publication fosters public discourse and presents varying perspectives from civil society, academia, government and development partners. The publication makes an explicit effort to include the voices of women and youth in the ongoing discourse. A combination of analysis and public opinion articles promote and inform debate on development ideas while presenting up-to-date information.

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#### Editor

Maheen Hassan

#### Design and Layout

Hasnat Ahmed

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P. O. Box 1051,  
Islamabad, Pakistan

For contributions and feedback, please write to us at:  
[communications.pk@undp.org](mailto:communications.pk@undp.org)

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## Civil Service Reform and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda

Public service has remained key to the achievement of national economic and social goals across the world. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that capable and motivated bureaucracy has played an instrumental role in economic growth and overall prosperity. The way Britain became a dominant economy in the 18th century, especially militarily, is attributed to its competent and efficient public administration to raise taxes. The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also recognizes the important role that state institutions play to achieve these goals. Goal 16 of the SDGs focuses especially on building institutions that are accountable, inclusive and characterized by representative decision making.

This need for efficient service delivery is greater for developing countries facing issues of poverty, inequality, hunger, limited access to quality education and health services, lack of clean drinking water and sanitation facilities, and other issues the SDGs aim to address. The state cannot resolve these development challenges without an efficient civil service, which, in turn, cannot perform its functions in a manner characteristic of the SDGs without continuous reform. The increasing demand for service delivery (and accountability) calls for realigning public administration with the broader goals of development.

Effective civil service is characterized by good governance which means sound policymaking, efficient service delivery, and accountability and responsibility in public resource utilization.

Pakistan's civil service saw 38 major reform initiatives between 1947 and 2016 and many analysts consider these to be unsuccessful. The reforms have largely been politically motivated and have failed to address critical issues of accountability, meritocracy, capacity and competency. The good news is that public administration reform has been on the agenda of successive governments in one form or another. The Pakistan Vision 2025 also prioritizes civil service reform as a key objective and the Ministry of Planning Development and Reforms is spearheading a process focusing on specialization and professionalism, outcome-based performance evaluation and meritocracy in appointments.

Like other countries, civil service reform in Pakistan has been largely driven by issues concerning salaries, perks and other financial incentives. There is ample research within and outside Pakistan suggesting that financial incentives do improve performance depending on context. However, there is also substantial evidence to suggest that many people still join the public service on the basis of intrinsic motivation— for example a feeling of pride and nationalism— to serve in public service. Non-financial incentives are required to award and support intrinsic motivation like best employee awards, empowering good performers through increased delegation etc.

Public sector reform should also go beyond incentives. For example, organizations play a key role in attracting and retaining talent. This is not an aspect looked at in reform initiatives thus far. The National Highway and Motorway Police is a case in point: besides the provision of incentives and employing a merit based system for

recruitment, the Motorway Policy created and sustained an organizational culture which motivates its staff for high performance. While higher wages can attract skilled people, a congenial and enabling organizational culture is needed to drive performance. Reform is a continuous process and it should not be treated as a one-time effort. For any major reform process to be successful, it requires multi-stakeholder engagement and a holistic and evolutionary approach.

The government should implement reforms as and when required to maintain a modern and efficient civil service that benefits from consistent and high level political commitment. Political will is key to successful reform initiatives. Countries which have gone through major reform and whose public administrations are considered efficient, were championed at the senior most level of political offices and sustained over long periods of time. Singapore and Malaysia are good examples.

Around the world, efficient public administration and bureaucracy have been characterized by factors such as meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders which provide long term tangible and intangible rewards. Max Weber, the German Sociologist in his work in early 20th century, argued for the fundamental value of bureaucracy as one of the institutional foundations of capitalist growth. Others have emphasized the positive role of bureaucracy in the East Asian Miracle of the 1970s and 1980s. Given the fact that government provides public goods to which market mechanisms often do not apply, an efficient public administration remains the only option for addressing citizens' needs. Efficient and capable public service is therefore important for both economic and social development. Certainly, an efficient and transparent civil service is far more likely to be able to address the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. This can happen if a long term, continuous and comprehensive approach to public service reform is employed, which is championed at the highest political level.



## 200 Years of Civil Service Reform: What can we learn?

**Note: Major analysis has been conducted by Usama Bakhtiar Ahmed (Advisor – Governance and Institutional Reform, UNDP Pakistan) and Adeel Khalid (Advisor - Result Based Management, UNDP Pakistan), with some analysis contributed by UNDP Staff.**

Pakistani civil services have perhaps been the most often reformed with least effect than anywhere else in the world. Nearly 40 separate efforts have been launched by both elected governments and military regimes since 1947.<sup>1</sup> Yet, the consensus view today is that civil servants continue to fail in performing their roles and responsibilities to global standards of modern governance. When polled in 2007 (Box 1), the overwhelming majority of civil servants agreed with this assessment – 93 percent said that civil service performance had deteriorated over the years, with over a third characterizing this deterioration as “*extreme*”.<sup>2</sup> According to academics and practitioners<sup>3</sup> – even civil servants<sup>4</sup> – the service today, generally tends to lack capacity, motivation, neutrality, meritocracy, transparency and accountability. In most cases, these weaknesses are linked to perverse incentives embedded in the institutional environment within which civil servants have arguably functioned for over 200 years.

But the difficulty of introducing real civil services reform in Pakistan is exceeded only by the necessity of doing so. Civil servants make policy, prepare budgets and develop plans. They manage crucial local services such as health and education. They define property rights, enforce laws, adjudicate disputes and regulate industry. They collect taxes, build public works and run public corporations. They organize elections, advise elected representatives and backstop legislatures. Recent public management literature is replete with calls for a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to public sector reform. In Pakistan’s case, ‘whole-of-government’ means the civil service. A small step for civil service reform could arguably be a giant leap for the government of Pakistan and its citizens. Accelerating growth, raising per capita incomes, or improving social indicators – none of

### Box 1: Key findings of Perception Survey 2007

- Civil servants are demoralized: They acknowledge that the service is corrupt, which is a serious problem, and that their public approval rating is low.
- There seems to be no trust in the accountability process.
- The civil service appears to have little faith in their human resource management.
- While acknowledging the benefits of meritocracy, they continue to prefer seniority-based promotion and reward system.
- Written job descriptions as well as criteria for performance evaluation are generally not used.
- Connections are perceived to be the major determinant of nominations for training especially foreign training.
- The civil service fears that their independence has been curbed through repeated political interference.
- Fear of competition is clearly evident even when they recognize that merit and professional competence are important.
- The motivation for joining the civil service is clearly not money. Power prestige and status are cited as the main reasons for joining the service.
- Despite low salaries, the majority is satisfied with their civil service job. Police probably because of the power—Foreign Service and Commerce and Trade—probably because of choice foreign postings— record relatively higher levels of satisfaction. Majority of the officers would like to stay in civil service.
- On their benefits, a majority favours portability of pensions and monetization of perks. Portable pensions cut down the cost of switching jobs and hence encourage mobility. However, we also see that because of job security and power, civil servants do not show a preference for mobility.

Source: Nadeem Ul Haque & Idrees Khawaja “Public Service through the eyes of Civil Servants” in PIDE Series on Governance & Institutions, 2007

these goals can be achieved or sustained without tangible improvement in civil service performance.

Fortunately, recent governments have recognized this reality. The New Growth Framework published in 2011 confessed that, “*No public sector setup can intervene effectively without competent and dedicated public servants*” and called for the swift implementation of the National Commission for Government Reforms (NCGR) reform proposals. More recently, the Vision 2025 developed by the Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform prioritizes “*a complete overhaul of the civil services*” to realize their vision of Pakistan joining the ranks of the top 25 economies

of the world and becoming an upper-middle-income country during the next decade. The Ministry has subsequently moved to launch a full-fledged program in collaboration with UNDP to design and lead a comprehensive reform agenda. Perhaps the greatest challenge to current and future reform efforts will be dismantling ‘rules of the game’ that past dependence has preserved as a colonial legacy.

### Colonial Legacy

**First, loyalty is primarily owed to the state.** In 1886, the Aitchison Commission created two distinct service cadres: the Indian Civil Service (ICS) manned by formally contracted regulars (Covenanted)

1 Ishrat Husain, Governance Reforms in Pakistan; See Annexure I for details

2 [http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Books/PB\\_Service.pdf](http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Books/PB_Service.pdf)

3 See for instance: <http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/PDR/1999/Volume4/995-1017.pdf>

4 See for instance: Aminullah Chaudry, 2011 and Saeed Ahmad Qureshi, 2016

who were mostly English; and the Provincial Services employing mostly Uncovenanted Indians. This ensured that the administrative leadership was institutionally disconnected from the indigenous population and would serve the interests of the Crown, not the colony. While subsequent reforms attempted to dismantle entry barriers for Indian inductees to the ICS, and provide upward mobility options from the Provincial Services, (including the Government Resolution, 1892; Islington Commission 1917; Lee Commission 1924); the ICS retained its essentially elitist, centralized, European character.<sup>5</sup>

**Second, the most important service required by the state is the collection of revenue.** This ICS character was typified by the district administration posts of Deputy Collectors and District Magistrates, created by Regulation 9 of 1833, later merged into the same office and then subsumed into the ICS. These few hundred officials were charged with legislation, criminal investigation, adjudication, property rights administration and a number of other governance functions affecting the lives of 300 million Indians.<sup>6</sup> These responsibilities however, came secondary to the taxation of landholdings and agricultural production. As under the Mughals,<sup>7</sup> land revenue accounted for over 50 percent of all budget receipts under the Raj.<sup>8</sup> From the very outset, this “*fiscal imperative*” dominated all other public goods and services – education, health, and infrastructure were subordinated to taxation.<sup>9</sup> The overriding concern was delivering money to the state, rather than services to the citizens.

**Third, governance is the domain of civil servants more than political leaders.** What Saeed Shafqat has termed an “*anti-politics*” attitude among Pakistani bureaucrats, predates Pakistan itself.<sup>10</sup> The period from 1909 to 1947 may be described as the run-up to independence, where Indian political leadership was increasingly empowered through

constitutional/legal instruments, toward self-rule. Parallel to this effort, however, the bureaucracy was also strengthened as a counterweight. The Rowlatt Act passed in 1919 is a key example. “*Civil servants were given vice regal assurances so as to dispel the fears aroused by the pace of constitutional development*.”<sup>11</sup> By the time they quit India, the British had concentrated most power in the “*steel frame*” of colonial administration i.e. the bureaucracy.<sup>12</sup>

**Fourth, the public is patronized, not served.** With the bureaucracy preoccupied with revenue collection and representative institutions neutralized, political stability came from co-opted landlords, religious leaders and tribal elders. This patronage included lands, titles and pensions.<sup>13</sup> While these clients held the native populace in check, they in turn were reined in by a police force headed by the local revenue collectors.<sup>14</sup> Citizens, therefore, did not have to be served directly, only controlled indirectly, to keep resources flowing in the correct direction.

**Fifth, financial resources are prioritized above human resources.** The business model of the Company, and later, the Crown, did not permit adequate financing for the civil service. Covenanted services were introduced in India at the behest of Lord Cornwallis who found corruption so rampant upon his arrival that pay reform was deemed necessary. Following the Act of 1873, only covenanted officers could hold high positions. The centerpiece of these covenants was that officials would not trade or receive presents, and in return they could hold high office and be paid more than 800 pounds a year (worth about 844,700 pounds per year in 2011).<sup>15</sup> However, beyond this high-water mark for compensation levels, they registered intermittent cuts throughout World War I and its aftermath where the British government found itself with limited fiscal options. Facing exceptional inflationary pressures from 1930 onward, ad-hoc support measures were introduced, such

as the Grain Allowance in 1940, replaced by the Dearness Allowance in 1942. This failed to arrest the overall downward trend in real term compensation.<sup>16</sup>

By 1946, the rising cost of living forced the British government to appoint yet another Pay Commission chaired by Sir Srinivasa Varadachariar which (unlike its predecessors) concluded that civil service pay standards: could not be set below minimum living wage levels; must reflect the payee's education, training and job description; and the government was not a “monopolist employer” assured of suitable human resources regardless of pay offered.<sup>17</sup>

### Post-independence

When the former Indian Civil Service (ICS) was renamed the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP), administrative positions were filled by civil servants who arguably lacked appropriate training, except for only 92 ICS officers inducted into CSP.<sup>18</sup> The problem was compounded by a weak political leadership which found it difficult to surmount the head-start enjoyed by the bureaucracy, in terms of legitimacy and power, for a number of reasons. **First**, politicians had little experience in state-building, which in 1947 entailed firefighting a host of crises – the settlement and rehabilitation of 7.2 million refugees, division and cultivation of abandoned land, restoring law and order in the tribal areas, and resolving hostilities with India – all this from makeshift buildings in Karachi which was just the beginning of the colossal infrastructure challenge faced by the new state. Jinnah even resorted to an appeal to civil servants who had opted to serve in Pakistan, to accept a voluntary pay cut.

**Second**, according to most historians, the political party instrumental in the founding of the state i.e. the Muslim League, had only shallow electoral roots in the territories of Pakistan.<sup>19</sup> With weak credentials in political and policy terms, political leaders were inevitably sidelined

5 Charles Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan*, (Karachi, 1987)

6 Clive Dewey, *Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service* (London, 1993)

7 (Swamy, 2010)

8 (Stern, 1991)

9 (Swamy, 2010)

10 Shafqat, S. (1989), *Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers.

11 Report of Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-committee of Indian National Congress (New Delhi, reprint 1976) p.25

12 Kashif Noon, 2005

13 Ishrat Husain, *Governance Reforms in Pakistan*

14 (Petzschmann, 2010)

15 Based on the economic power value of the income relative to the total output of the economy, which is different from purchasing power calculation based on Relative Price Index used in the UK. It essentially measures the relative 'influence' the income recipient holds over production in the economy, which is best suited to our argument.

16 Anti-corruption and its Discontents, Daniyal Aziz & Usama Bakhtiar, 2012

17 Ibid

18 Aminullah Chaudry, *Political Administrators*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2011, Annexure I.

19 India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths, Philip Oldenburg, 2010



by the bureaucracy, who were cheered on by the international press: *"With so many illiterate people, politicians could make a mess of things...A district officer or magistrate must be given full powers to deal with any situation. Politicians could make policy, but they must not interfere..."*<sup>20</sup>

**Third**, early disputes between civil servants and politicians were mostly settled in the bureaucracy's favour. According to one of the most renowned political scientists from Pakistan, Khalid bin Sayeed, politicians were placed *"under bureaucratic tutelage"* as Jinnah relied increasingly on the civil service toward the end of his life.<sup>21</sup>

**Fourth**, the death of Jinnah in 1948, and the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan, his successor, in 1951, left the political leadership rudderless, and fated to become the disadvantaged 'middle-child' in the struggle for legitimacy and power, against its colonial siblings: the military and the bureaucracy.<sup>22</sup>

It was in this context that the Justice Munir Commission was tasked with the first civil service reform effort in Pakistan's history. The Commission reacted more to the prevailing economic crisis rather than the core problems of civil service salary structures. The Munir Commission therefore based its recommendations on the principle that it was an incorrect policy to *"offer such salaries to the servants so as to attract the best available material. The correct place for our men of genius is in the private enterprise and not in the humdrum of public service where character and a desire to serve honestly for a living is more essential than outstanding intellect. We cannot therefore prescribe our pay scales with the object of attracting to public service all the best intellect in the country."*<sup>23</sup>

They recommended across-the-board cuts in salaries, especially for higher posts where it found them unjustifiably generous. At the lower-paid end, it recommended raise in the standard of living. It divided all employees into 30 broad categories and recommended as many standard pay scales which were introduced in 1949.<sup>24</sup> A drastic reduction in salaries of all categories of employees

followed. By its self-admitted goal of compromising on the quality of human resource, it implicitly deprioritized both performance and integrity concerns. Worse, it precluded any comparison between public and private salaries by assuming that the labour supply was fundamentally different i.e. the private sector required the very best, while the government could make do with the rest.

### The Ayub Khan Era

The next reform effort was preceded by a purge among civil service officers, resulting in some 3,000 dismissals. In 1958, an Administrative Reorganization Committee was constituted which ushered in a number of unprecedented reforms:<sup>25</sup>

- Multiple layers in the Secretariat hierarchy were collapsed into one Section Officers system;
- Financial control, budgeting and accounting was overhauled;
- Administrative Ministries were financially empowered to circumvent cumbersome clearance procedures along with financial advisory services built into Ministries to improve fund-management;
- An Economic Pool was created to fill senior positions in the Ministries of Finance and Industry;
- The Foreign Service was empowered to perform commercial and public relations functions abroad, that were previously performed by the Ministries of Commerce and Information.

While a Standing Reorganization Committee oversaw implementation of these reforms through 1964, a number of additional measures were also introduced:<sup>26</sup>

- A network of new training institutions was established, including an Administrative Staff College in Lahore (for senior government officers) and three National Institutes of Public Administration in Lahore, Karachi and Dacca (for mid-career officers).
- 14 Civil Awards were instituted to recognize excellence in public service.

Unfortunately, the Pay and Service Commission constituted in 1959, under the Chairmanship of Chief Justice A. R.

Cornelius, was less successful in pushing its proposals through to implementation. It was meant to analyze the structure of the CSP and recommend improvements. The Commission envisioned an entirely new 7-tier salary structure with 3-4 grades under each service group. This was reminiscent of the structure prevailing prior to the Islington Commission's post-World War I reforms. It also suggested that the CSP be replaced by a Pakistan Administrative Service with admission open to technical services. The government rejected this radical departure from the prevailing system and chose instead to revise the pay scales prescribed by the Munir Commission. But the report was not released publicly and its proposals were not implemented (Ziring and LaPorte, 1974).

On balance though, the overall civil service structure (especially the influence of the CSP) remained intact under the military regime. *"Most of the 3,000 dismissals, compulsory retirements and reductions in rank, took place at the lower ranks."*<sup>27</sup> The purges at the political end were less merciful – 6,000 politicians were disqualified and barred from public office under the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, under what many believe to be trumped-up charges of corruption.<sup>28</sup> Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners were further empowered to take up the slack in administrative governance.<sup>29</sup> By 1961, a group of 371 CSP officials locally administered a country of 100 million people.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, civil servants retained their discretion in the arena of policy making. For instance, the Planning Commission which previously had a minor role, was converted into a full-fledged Division in the President's Secretariat with civil servants in key positions.<sup>31</sup>

### The Yahya Khan Era

Yahya Khan, after coming into power in 1969, repeated the purge-and-reform exercise, by first suspending 303 officers, and barring their re-entry into the service and then appointing Chief Justice A. R. Cornelius as the head of a thirteen-member Service Re-Organization Committee. Echoing the Pay and Services Commission of 1959, the Committee recommended abolishing both the PSP

20 The Times (London), October 30, 1954

21 Sayeed, K. B. (1980) *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*. New York: Praeger.

22 A number of experts have highlighted this phenomenon. See for instance: *The Dynamics of Power: Military, Bureaucracy and the People*, Akmal Hussain, 1993.

23 <http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/civilservicereform/faizbilquees.pdf>

24 Public Accountability Institutions and their Macroeconomic Impacts, Governance Institutes Network International (GINI), 2008

25 The Civil Service under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan. Author(s): Albert Gorvine Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), pp. 321-336.

26 Ibid

27 Ibid

28 Noman 1988, Sayeed 1980, Feldman 1967

29 Pakistan Times, 14th October, 1958

30 The Civil Service under the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan. Author(s): Albert Gorvine Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), pp. 321-336.

31 (Kalia, 2013, p. 162)

and the CSP and replacing them with a Pakistan Administrative Service where generalist officers would be recruited by provinces while remaining positions at the Centre would be filled from specialist cadres. The Committee reasoned that as officers with technical backgrounds underwent more rigorous academic training, they should be appointed at the highest tier of the ministries and their divisions. The Committee also suggested that an elected district council should be set up, with provincial government's representatives appointed as the district commissioners. It may be surmised that Justice Cornelius was looking to tie up loose ends from his previous stint as head of a civil service reform body – but this new effort did not fare any better in terms of implementation.

A Working Group established under D.K. Power in 1969 again arrived at similar proposals, recommending that the CSP should become only one branch of a unified central service, with its jurisdiction limited to law and order and revenue collection. And again, these proposals were not implemented.

### The Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Era

With the ouster of Ayub Khan's government, the Civil Services of Pakistan (perceived as the *"bulwark"* of his regime) came under increasing criticism and widespread public resentment.<sup>32</sup> The civil war of 1971 and the secession of Bangladesh was largely blamed on policies enacted by senior civil servants, while the influence of the Civil Services of Pakistan (descendants of the elite Indian Civil Service) cadre was reduced by the loss of 89 members who opted for the new state.<sup>33</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who rode a wave of socialist populism to a disputed electoral victory, and eventual power in 1971 had made no secret of his antipathy toward the bureaucracy, calling them *"Brahmins"*, *"Naukar-Shahi"*, and *"Bara Sahibs"*.<sup>34</sup> He went beyond the traditional purge (removing 1,300 civil servants) to actually abolish constitutional guarantees against wrongful dismissal or other arbitrary action against their terms of service that had been a part of the constitutional framework since the Government of India Act, 1935. The 1973 Constitution subjected the terms of service for civil servants to ordinary legislation passed by Parliament and the

provincial assemblies.

It was in this context that two reform bodies initiated seminal changes to the structure of the civil service: the National Pay Commission was set up in 1970, presenting its report in three volumes during 1971-72; and the Administrative Reform Committee set up under Khurshid Hasan Mir, Minister for Establishment (and the first politician to head a high-powered civil service reform body). Together, these reforms set in motion the following structural changes:

- The abolition of service cadres, their functional replacement by the "Occupational Groups" and the discontinuation of service labels as part of a single service;
- The adjustment of 4 Classes and some 622 pay scales into 22 Unified or National Pay Scales (NPS) applicable to both federal and provincial employees;<sup>35</sup>
- Lateral entry of private sector professionals into the public sector and vice versa;
- Any major addition, subtraction or alteration to the unified scales was banned;
- Selection grades, special pays and technical pays were also abolished;
- The formulae for determining pay scales for officers in BS-16-18 and BS-19-20 were amended;
- The 'move-over' facility was introduced which allowed default entry into the next grade when the scale maximum was reached;
- Greater opportunity for vertical and horizontal mobility and equal opportunity for advancement across the service; and,
- Grading of each post to be determined by job analysis and job evaluation.

In addition, the elite CSP was arbitrarily split into the Secretariat Group, DMG and TAG with field servants being posted to the latter two groups, while the CSP Academy was abolished outright. Service Associations were also banned.

The last two reform proposals were not far implemented. Occupational groups continued more or less as watertight compartments, while the All Pakistan Groups (Secretariat, District Management, Police and Tribal Areas) continued to enjoy better advancement prospects than others. The technically correct (though

practically infeasible) job evaluation project never got off the ground.

In terms of civil service pay, the reform made rigid and static what was always flexible and adaptable. World War I had cost the British Empire £ 3.2 billion (in 1900 prices),<sup>36</sup> nearly bankrupting the government. Even so, reform proposals as radical as these had not even been considered for their Indian colony. These reforms could not therefore be explained in terms of fiscal prudence alone. If fiscal prudence – or even performance and honesty among civil servants – had been the driving priorities, autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies would not perhaps have been excluded from these reforms. But the scheme was not made applicable to employees of these bodies, which in 2004-05 almost equaled the number of core civil servants. In 2008, there were around 210 such bodies and each could technically set its own salaries.<sup>37</sup> An attempt has been made to try and place the key 'pillars' of the reform in the foregoing political and economic context:

- *Reduction in the number of pay scales* – This would essentially reduce the conventional fiscal superiority of the higher services which they had enjoyed since the Company era. It would also fall in line with the publicly espoused socialist principles of the new government.
- *National standardization of pay scales* – The move toward centrism and national uniformity in administration was understandable given that 'half' the country had just broken away and declared independence.
- *Simplification of the operation of pay scales* – By scrapping the complicated web of rules and regulations guiding pay policy, the bureaucracy would be robbed of its monopoly over an esoteric 'science' that could be used to browbeat politicians.

The Secretariat Group supported lateral/horizontal movement from other cadres i.e. officers moving into the Secretariat Group if they felt that their original cadre had limited or no prospects of promotion for them, which resulted in a certain degree of alleged misuse for promotion and personal benefits.<sup>38</sup> The introduction of lateral entry arguably had a net adverse effect, with serious lapses in transparency and meritocracy of recruitment being

32 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/185%20Reforming%20Pakistans%20Civil%20Service.pdf>

33 <http://www.saeedshafqat.com/articles/pakistan.pdf>

34 Ibid

35 It must be noted that the Commission had recommended 26 NPSs but the government essentially 'decapitated' the top 4 scales to meet an arbitrarily determined low compression ratio.

36 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zqhxvcw>

37 Public Accountability Institutions and their Macroeconomic Impacts, Governance Institutes Network International (GINI), 2008

reported – 150 out of the 201 deputy secretaries were chosen from the CSS (section service cadre) and among them a large number were those whose performance was below-average in the FPSC examination.<sup>39</sup> There were even a few cases where Section Officers became Deputy Secretaries as a result of the reform.<sup>40</sup> In fact, numerous deputy secretaries were appointed without ever appearing in the examinations or the interviews.<sup>41</sup>

The CSP was a cadre established by the then Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan after detailed discussions with the AGG in Baluchistan and the Chief Ministers of Punjab, Singh, NWFP, and East Bengal, in 1950.<sup>42</sup> The reforms under Bhutto left this cadre unrecognizable, while none of the changes were held up to the scrutiny of provincial governments, or even the federal cabinet.<sup>43</sup> The FPSC was similarly left out of any consultation which weakened its role and undermined its authority.

### The General Zia-ul-Haq Era

After coming to power in 1977, General Zia ul Haq established a Civil Service Reforms Commission appointing the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Anwar ul Haq as the Chairman. The Commission discontinued lateral entry, and examined appointments made under this program. Among these, 199 cases of appointment in the Secretariat Group were scrutinized closely. Some officers were reverted to their former positions, some were dismissed and some were retained in service. The FPSC also reviewed how fitting lateral entrants were to be retained in the service. The induction of armed forces personnel into the civil services was institutionalized through a 20 percent quota.<sup>44</sup>

The Anwar-ul-Haq Commission then moved to “rehabilitate and promote some level of confidence among the Civil Services, particularly the CSP.”<sup>45</sup> The TAG was merged into the DMG with the latter being positioned as the second-generation reboot of the CSP. This was despite the fact

that the DMG had a much higher ratio of non-FPSC members than the original cadre. The Secretariat Group was not similarly merged, causing resentment among its members.<sup>46</sup> In addition, the Commission opened up entry to the Secretariat to all public personnel creating a National Administrative Reserve constituted by Grade 20-22 Officers who could serve in headquarters organizations in the federal government.<sup>47</sup>

### The General Pervez Musharraf Era

The revolving door democracies of the 90s saw increasing politicization creep into appointments, postings and transfers within the service, especially at the policymaking levels in federal and provincial secretariats as well as district administration. According to experts, party loyalty generally trumped merit in these decisions.<sup>48</sup>

### National Reconstruction Bureau

Yet another military coup in 1999 brought General Pervez Musharraf to power. The National Reconstruction Bureau established under the leadership of Lt.-Gen. Tanvir Naqvi designed and set about implementing the most ambitious reform agenda since the Bhutto era i.e. the Devolution Plan. Through the Local Government Ordinance 2001/02 and the Police Order 2002/04, the Devolution Plan sought to implement the following measures (relevant from a civil service reform perspective):<sup>49</sup>

- The Executive Magistracy and office of the Deputy Commissioner were abolished and its powers transferred to District and Sessions Judges, District Nazims (mayors elected by District Councils) and the District Coordination Officers (DCOs).
- The Nazims were authorized to initiate annual performance reports of the DCOs and the District Police Officers (chief of district police).
- For the first time, revenue collection was relegated to one of several other local public services provided by the district administration i.e. Executive District Officer, Revenue (EDO-R) was

only one of several other EDOs in charge of health, education and other line departments serving under the coordinating role of the DCO.

- Sectoral line functions and responsibilities (most importantly health and education) were devolved from central and provincial governments to the district governments.
- District administration was placed under oversight by elected representatives, accountability by citizens and responsible for grievance redress against complaints received by citizens through a host of institutional measures.

Unfortunately, the reform suffered from a significant implementation deficit. Devolution of power was limited to administrative responsibility and fiscal decentralization was successful only to the extent of allowing local governments to pay salaries. Provincial line departments continued to manage de facto service delivery. The agenda for introducing new accountability relationships also fell short as most of the new structures (e.g. the District Ombudsman) contemplated by law remained absent on ground. Service delivery performance of elected local governments was also mixed.<sup>50</sup>

However, multiple independent studies concluded that the citizen's preference was not rollback but adjustment in the reform.<sup>51</sup> According to a study published by the Urban Institute in 2010: “there is no *prima facie* case for taking back control of local affairs to the provinces on the justification that they are more accountable, transparent or responsive...Whatever the senior bureaucrats in the provinces might think about it, these results suggest that there is no strong public support for the idea of increasing bureaucratic control over local affairs.”<sup>52</sup>

Despite this, the elected local government system did not survive the return to national democracy in 2008. The lack of legitimacy faced by the parenting regime was a key factor in this failure, which was compounded by the absence of any

38 Aminullah Chaudry, Political Administrators, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2011, p. 117.

39 ibid

40 ibid

41 ibid

42 Aminullah Chaudry, Political Administrators, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2011, p. 119.

43 ibid

44 Pakistani Bureaucracy and Political Neutrality: A Mutually Exclusive Phenomenon? Maryam Tanwir and Shailaja Fennell, 2010

45 Ibid

46 Aminullah Chaudry, Political Administrators, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2011, p. 119.

47 Problems and Issues in Administrative Federalism by Shriram Maheshwari, 1992

48 See for instance, Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, 6 November 2009; and Shafqat and Wahla, op. cit., p. 208.

49 Voices of the Unheard: Legal Empowerment of the Poor in Pakistan, UNDP-UNOPS, 2012

50 Ibid

51 Ibid

52 Ibid

consultation at the design stage, beyond an inner circle of experts.<sup>53</sup> However, the centerpiece reform of the devolution plan i.e. abolition of executive magistracy was not rolled back, in the light of a 2011 decision of the Balochistan High Court which declared the attempted revival of this office unconstitutional.<sup>54</sup>

### *National Commission for Government Reforms*

A National Commission of Government Reforms (NCGR) was set up in April, 2006 under Dr. Ishrat Hussain. The civil service reform package developed by the Commission represents a seminal departure from the way such efforts were conceived in the past. The reform took a whole-of-service view, covering the entire "value chain" of:<sup>55</sup>

- Recruitment and Induction

- Post-Induction Training
- Career Path Planning and Progression
- Performance Management
- Training and Development
- Compensation and Benefits
- Discipline and Code of Ethics
- Severance
- Retirement and Benefits

These service-wide reforms were themselves nested within a still broader reform opus, capturing reorganization of federal, provincial and local governments as well as inter-governmental relations, size and composition of the public sector, internal structures of Ministries and business processes, as well as sectoral reforms in land revenue administration, police, health and education. The terms of reference for this reform clearly outstripped the terms of its implementation. By December, 2007 after failing to convince a

care-taker government to endorse the reform, Dr. Hussain was reported to have publicly conceded failure and asked to be replaced.<sup>56</sup>

But in two major ways, the reform has arguably come to define the debate on civil services reform in Pakistan: a) The analytical work carried out by the reform to technically backstop its myriad proposals has become essential reading for current governance practitioners and future reformers, while the proposals themselves are the 'go-to' benchmarks against which all future reforms will be measured; and b) The definition of a holistic, all-encompassing view of the civil service has shaped the policy narrative and carved out the reform landscape within which ideas and proposals can be discussed and debated.

## The 'Better Governance Index' (BGI)

Measurement of institutional performance remains a critical weaklink in the value chain of Pakistan's public sector governance. There is a political consensus on the significance of holding institutions accountable for results and successive governments have stressed on its significance publicly. However, a chasm persists between the desired policy objective of being able to distinguish better from poor performing institutions and the realization of a credible, systematic and iterative mechanism for measuring, benchmarking and reporting institutional performance. Whatever systems that do exist remain secretive, obscure and opaque. Moreover, efforts to measure the ability of institutions to achieve what they set out to and to do it with fewer resources are compromised by weaknesses of instruments for this determination and the sporadic nature of their use. In short, political will for enhancing institutional performance is poorly backed by systems and instruments for benchmarking performance.

### **Objective**

The BGI will be an initiative for measuring and comparing public sector performance and comprise a range of

relevant metrics that will:

- Serve as a tool for benchmarking performance of public sector institutions;
- Drive better performance, providing public sector managers with a tool for identifying areas for improvement in individual institutions as well as in a group of institutions;
- Help create a competitive market for public sector institutions, leading to enhanced accountability, improved services and lowering of transaction costs; and,
- Likely evolve into an accreditation system for public sector, providing a basis for budgetary allocations, linking individual career progression with institutional results and financial and technical support from donors with performance on donor-assisted projects.

### **Target Audience and Methodology**

The BGI is intended to cover the entire spectrum of public sector institutions in the country. Moreover, it will be cross-government, meaning that it will be used for Federal and Provincial governments as well as for local administrations; both at the Federal and Provincial levels, it will also include the full range of SOEs, attached

departments, and autonomous and semi-autonomous organizations.

The reason for this ambitious coverage is to be able to gauge the performance of each and every type of institution in the public sector, allowing the government and legislators, as well as citizens and other stakeholders, to hold them accountable for their actions and for delivery of better quality of public policies or public services. The three ways in which this task is proposed to be made manageable are: implementation in phases, segmented strategy for developing BGIs (e.g. overall BGI, sector-specific BGI, tier-specific BGI) enabling an evolutionary and organic growth of the instrument; and focusing—in the initial stages of implementation—on basic institutional functions performed by all types of public organizations.

### **Measurement Areas and Criteria**

The BGI will use five measurement areas and fifteen criteria for calculating the scores. These are outlined in figure 1.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

<sup>54</sup> <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/capacity-building/global-centre-for-public-service-excellence/integrating-civil-service-reform-with-decentralisation.html>

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.ncgr.gov.pk/forms/presentation%20on%20the%20ncgr%20to%20pm.ppt>.

<sup>56</sup> <http://aaj.tv/2008/02/reforms-commission-fails-to-complete-task-ishrat/>



**Figure 1: Measurement Areas**

5 AREAS	QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE	ACCOUNTABILITY	INCLUSION AND OPENNESS	EFFECTIVENESS	RESPONSIVENESS
15 CRITERIA, 26 INDICATORS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clarity of institutional vision and mission</li> <li>• Budget accuracy</li> <li>• Gender equity in human resource management</li> <li>• Investment in institutional capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political accountability</li> <li>• Accountability of citizens</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participatory and inclusive decision making and oversight</li> <li>• Proactive public disclosure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Budget execution</li> <li>• Implementation of priority programs</li> <li>• Strengthening of implementation capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Linkage with national/ provincial/ sectorial priorities and programs</li> <li>• Mechanisms for facilitating access to information</li> <li>• Mechanisms for public grievance redress</li> <li>• Use of ICT tools</li> </ul>

### Indicators for Measuring Performance

The indicators used for each measurement area and criteria are as

presented in Table 1, which also indicates possible data sources. A total of 26 indicators are proposed for the 15 criteria under five measurement areas. Since in

Phase I, the BGI is to be developed for Federal line ministries, the indicators are aimed at measuring performance at that level.

**Table 1: Indicators For The BGI**

Measurement Area	Criteria	Indicators	Source
Quality of Governance	Clarity of institutional vision and mission	Statements are clear, brief and reflect the values, philosophy and culture of the institution	Institution's website
		Vision statement expresses in sensory terms, the future position or image of the institution	
		Mission statement focuses on one or a few strategic goals	
	Budget Accuracy	Variance between revised budget and budget estimates	Annual Budget and CGA
	Gender Equity in HR	Proportion of female employees in total working staff	Green Book
	Investment in Capacity Building	Training budget as a proportion of total Personnel budget	Annual Budget and CGA

<b>Accountability</b>	Political Accountability	Timely and complete responses to PAC review queries	PAC reports
		Regular submission of briefings to the Standing Committees of Parliament	Public Relations Officer in the institution
	Accountability to citizens	Publication of Annual Budget on institution's website	Institution's website
		Publication of Yearbook	Institution's website
		Majority of tenders follow PPRA rules	PPRA reports
		Use of social accountability tools	Institution's website
		Citizens' Charter issued	Institution's website
<b>Inclusion and Openness</b>	Participatory and inclusive decision making and oversight	Forums on which citizens, private sector, academia or civil society are represented	Institution's website and Public Relations Officer of Institution
	Proactive public disclosure	Publication of updated policies, strategies on website	Institution's website
		Availability of expenditure data	Institution's website
<b>Effectiveness</b>	Budget execution	Proportion of released annual budget actually utilized	CGA
	Implementation of priority programs	Completion level of priority programs	Green Book
	Strengthening institutional capacities for implementation	Training expenditure as a proportion of total personnel expenditure	Annual Budget and CGA
<b>Responsiveness</b>	Linkage with National/Provincial sectoral priorities and programmes	Explicit linkage of priority programs with the Vision 2025	Green Book
		Explicit linkage of priority programs with relevant sector policy	Green Book
	Mechanisms for facilitating access to information	Designated Official nominated under Right to Information Act 2010	Institution's website
		Standards for access to information services clearly mentioned	Institution's website
	Mechanisms for public grievance redress	Designated Official for public grievance redress and addressing references from Ombudsmen	Institution's website
		Standards for grievance redress services clearly mentioned	Institution's website
	Use of ICT tools	Availability of online services for complaints, information, registration, social media	Institution's website

*Note: This Summary has been extracted from a longer paper entitled, "The Better Governance Index: A Conceptual Framework for Measuring Institutional Performance", yet to be released by UNDP Pakistan.*

### *Pay and Pension Commission, 2009*

In 2009, the government again appointed a Pay Commission, headed by Dr. Ishrat Hussain. The Commission based its recommendations on the following policy principles:<sup>57</sup>

- The need to “*attract, retain and motivate talented young men and women into its ranks*” was paramount for effective government, which would lead to development and growth. This was a complete repudiation of the Justice Munir thesis.
- Disparity in public and private pay levels is especially acute for higher grades (because of erosion in real terms) and technical and professional services. Civil service pay should be linked to comparable private jobs. This set aside the ‘monopolist employer’ theory of the Islington Commission, just as the Srinivasa Commission had done in 1947.
- Ad hoc allowances could not offset the motivational drawbacks of low pay for potential and current employees given the risk of reversal. Similarly, perks and privileges provided in-kind, cost the government far more than they motivated recruitment, retention or performance.
- Education, healthcare, law and order, and the administration of justice should be prioritized for pay reform.
- Pay and promotion must be linked to both performance and inflation.
- Fiscal constraints could not be ignored. Pay reform should be phased to parcel out the financial burden over time.

Broadly, the Commission proposed the following measures:

- All ad hoc relief allowances granted since 1999 to be regularized as part of the NPS.
- The number of pay scales to be reduced from 22 to 14 – five for officers and nine for other grades.
- Pay scales to be raised by 50 percent in phased annual increments till 2012.
- In-kind perks to be monetized and made part of NPS.

Implementation of these recommendations has been uneven and the results are as yet unclear. The NPS were clearly not reduced in number. In 2010, the governm-

ent did provide the 50 percent increase in salaries but not through a revision in pay scales and not through phased increments, but as a lump sum 50 percent increase of the BPS 2008.<sup>58</sup> In 2011, five ad hoc allowances granted since 1999 to 2009 were in fact, merged into the BPS-2008 which were reintroduced as the BPS-2011.<sup>59</sup>

### **Lessons Learned**

This paper offers no specific policy solutions, but certain ‘lessons’ can be distilled from the foregoing narrative to help evolve a meaningful approach to the problems highlighted throughout.

- **The objectives of civil service reform must be aligned with the broader goals of the incumbent government.** While this may sound obvious, past pay policies have not fulfilled this basic requirement. Governments have officially sought and/or accepted ‘second-best’ civil servants while expecting delivery of the best governance/development outcomes. If the goal is socio-economic turnaround to mirror the achievements of countries such as China,<sup>60</sup> Malaysia, Singapore,<sup>61</sup> South Korea,<sup>62</sup> Taiwan,<sup>63</sup> (among others) then it may be remembered that these governments not only explicitly sought the ‘best and brightest’ for public service but also reformed their systems to achieve this goal.
- **The Government of Pakistan does not monopolize the ‘best and brightest’ human resource.** It is unclear if this assumption was supported by evidence even when it was first declared a policy principle by the Islington Commission in 1919. But now it has certainly been falsified by recent evidence which indicates both a thinning of suitable recruits and a hemorrhaging of talent from among serving ranks. Over 57,000 posts in ministries, divisions, and semiautonomous bodies of the federal government were reported vacant in 2014.<sup>64</sup> Currently, the government competes as an employer with the corporate sector, the international development industry within Pakistan as well as public and private employers in other

countries, for the high-end labour market. It has not sufficiently cornered the market to be able to procure the best services without offering a viable service structure in terms of pay, career-progression, capacity development, performance evaluation, and tenure security.

- **Civil servants are not immune to established economic principles.** A number of reforms have miscast civil servants exclusively as ‘homo patrioticus’, assuming that the ‘best and brightest’ will opt to join, stay and perform in the service driven solely by non-economic values, chiefly patriotism. Most available evidence negates this assumption. Civil servants are ‘homo-economicus’ – rational economic agents seeking to maximize utility. In fact, recent empirical evidence (in sub-fields such as public-choice theory and new institutional economics) suggests that this may be *more* true of civil servants than other economic agents.<sup>65</sup> In their roles as service-providers, regulators and policymakers, civil servants may be afforded opportunities for promoting self-interest unavailable to private actors.
- **Political or ideological factors should not dominate reform agendas.** Reforms should ideally be designed exclusively on an evidence-based consideration of human resource requirements. In the past, structural changes have been widely perceived as being driven by ideological and/or political considerations. Political feasibility must of course remain a key criterion for assessing any policy option, but should not completely outweigh the need for efficiency, effectiveness and high performance. Unlike the historical periods recounted in this paper, democratic governments today are the norm rather than the exception. Gains and losses in political capital should therefore be seen across a longer-term horizon than was previously conceivable. In the long run, expediency may turn out to be the more politically expensive policy position.

57 2009 Pay and Pensions Commission Report. Based on a lecture delivered by Dr. Ishrat Hussain at ‘94th National Management Course held at the National Management College, Lahore on Feb 25, 2011.

58 [http://www.finance.gov.pk/circulars/adhoc\\_allowance\\_medical.pdf](http://www.finance.gov.pk/circulars/adhoc_allowance_medical.pdf)

59 Office Memorandum, No.F.1 (5) Imp/2011-419, Finance Division, (Regulations Wing), 4th July, 2011

60 <http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/44526166.pdf>

61 Public Administration Singapore-style, Jon S. T. Quah, 2010

62 <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/eropa/unpan033712.pdf>

63 Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: an Impossible Dream? Jon S. T. Quah, 2011

64 <http://tribune.com.pk/story/781234/this-seats-not-taken-thousands-of-federal-govt-jobs-remain-unfilled/>

65 <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11077-005-2309-2>

- **Costing for pay reform must be holistic and specific.** Pay policy has been driven by a narrow accounting or budgeting perspective, given ever-present fiscal scarcity concerns. Affordability models which take fixed wage bill ceilings as their point of departure take a narrow view of the problem, excluding multiple relevant factors from review. **First, historical trends matter for pay policy.** Calculating affordable increments from static salary budget lines ignores real term erosion over decades. Dozens of such scale revisions have proved ineffectual. **Second, the costs of pay policy are not limited to the wage bill.** Any resulting attrition entails sunk costs in training as well as costs of recruiting and retraining replacements. Disruption of activities may cause cost overruns and delays. Turnover at senior levels may cause significant losses in institutional memory. Unfilled vacancies create costly gaps, which, in support Ministries/Divisions such as Planning, Law, Establishment and Finance affect all spheres of government. Corruption driven by under-compensation is also

a significant economic cost. As are social welfare losses resulting from sub-optimal policies and uneven implementation where poorly paid civil servants perform below par. Evidence suggests that neither the Company, the Crown nor the Government of Pakistan looked beyond the most direct financial costs when determining pay levels for their employees. **Third,** a strictly 'dollars-and-cents' approach oversimplifies the pricing of incentives because individual positions are hidden within standardized grades. Optimal pay setting should be based on job evaluation and job analysis which brings to light the following factors, *inter alia*:

- Moral hazard which is likely to be very different for a Customs Officer posted in Chaman versus a Section Officer posted to a Federal ministry;
- Switching costs and opportunity costs (represented by comparable private sector pay) which determine turnover;
- Quantum and predictability of workload;

- Nature of responsibility i.e. amount of fiduciary risk managed, including both finances and personnel;
  - Security of tenure and the implicit certainty of perks and privileges; and,
  - Degree of informality associated with access to perks and privileges;
  - Premium on skills and qualification given the expected rate of return on education and training;
  - Pay levels prevailing above, below and at par with the job in question.
- **Under-implementation of reform is counterproductive.** Past governments have 'cherry-picked' measures from proposals submitted by reform bodies. They have also chosen to disregard proposals in their entirety or implement them half-heartedly. These decisions not only distort civil service structure and function but also discredit reform itself.



## Assessing Public Service Delivery through Citizen Surveys: Key findings of Two Perception Surveys

### Survey 1: Online Survey on Citizen's Feedback on Public Service Delivery

An online survey, targeting 1500 respondents, was conducted to gather citizen's feedback on public service delivery. The survey gave an opportunity to hear from the general public being the ultimate beneficiaries of public services regarding their experience in dealing with and availing of services from public sector institutions. The objective was to identify interventions to strengthen capacities and build effective institutions for the provision of services for the post 2015 development agenda.

#### Accessibility

Accessibility of the social services continues to be an issue despite increased fiscal transfers and administrative powers to the provinces.

Among the problems identified in availing public service, poor quality of service was ranked as the highest with 18 percent urban and 13 percent rural respondents deeming it as such (Figure 1). Poor quality of service was found to be most prevalent across all sectors: 64 percent males and 49 percent females rated health facilities in their locality unsafe and inadequate; 62 percent respondents raised issues with low quality of education being given to their children; over 60 percent respondents reported to have faced a problem in availing electricity and gas supply and complained of the poor quality of the services and 79 percent respondents marked transport facilities as non-compliant to basic safety measures thereby hinting that the quality of service in this sector was also unsatisfactory.

While addressing the reasons for poor quality of service, lack of technical skill was found to be the most common reason amongst respondents (Figure 2). Again, there were several sector wise differences and commonalities in identifying what reason was most prevalent. In the health sector, unavailability of qualified staff, inadequate health emergency infrastructure, and no or expensive medications were identified as the major reasons for poor quality of service. Likewise, lack of staff and missing facilities were found to be the most common reasons in the

#### Dimensions of Public service delivery covered in the online survey:

**Efficiency:** The respondents were asked about the quality, timeliness and accessibility of the range of services they have availed. This also included safety measures, staff quality etc.


**Inclusivity:** Respondents were asked about the ability of institutions and service providers to foster inclusivity and managing the demand from an increasing diversity of actors.

**Accountability:** Respondents were asked if they were aware with the policy and legal safeguards available for the accountability of the public service providers.

**Transparency:** Respondents were asked if they had sufficient access to information on public utilities and their services.

**Grievance redress:** Respondents were asked questions related to grievance redress mechanisms, whether they know where to file a complaint, if yes, had they filed a complaint, received a response, and were satisfied with the response?


Figure 1: Problems in Availing Public Service




education sector. The electricity and Gas Supply Sector identified long waiting times, high price of services and incompetence of staff as the main culprits behind poor quality of service. Low incentives, lack of technical knowledge and lack of staff were the problem areas in the transport sector. There was a low female response rate with reference to access to police services. This may be

attributed to: a) women's low levels of interaction with police and legal services in Pakistani society, and b) fear of reporting to police or formal justice mechanisms. Over half the sample reported: 'Police matters should only be dealt by male members in household or communities'. Therefore, factors of pre-defined gender roles also shone through.


**Figure 2: Reasons for Poor Service Delivery**



**Figure 3: Percentage of Respondents Aware of Institutions/ Legislation/ Mechanism Available for Public Service Complaints**



**Figure 4: Effectiveness of Media in Ensuring Accountability of Public Institutions**



## Inclusivity

The top three reasons why respondents may have faced difficulty in accessing a public service included: a) favoritism resulting in discriminatory supply of such services (42 percent), b) deprived due to gender (26 percent) and deprived due to some disability or being part of a marginalized cohort (11 percent).

A follow up question asked if such discrimination in supply of public services was a regular phenomenon. For 27 percent the incidence of discrimination in accessing public service is recurring. 61 percent had reported this discrimination or grievance however less than half were provided relief.

Survey results also disclosed that majority respondents suffered a lack of awareness on government policies, legislative mechanisms and anti-corruption institutions (Figure 3).

It was also useful to discover that majority of respondents obtained information regarding public services through the website (28 percent urban and 17 percent rural). It is also interesting to note that a very integral source of information, the media, was seen by majority as 'slightly effective' in ensuring accountability of public institutions (Figure 4).

## Survey 2: Assessing the feedback of a high performance public institution-The National Highways and Motorway Police

### Introduction

A survey of 485 commuters both commercial and non-commercial was done in the months of September and October at four locations – Karachi, Sukkur, Lahore and Peshawar. The main objective of this study was to focus on the beneficiaries/feedback regarding the services of National Highway and Motorway Police (NHMP) as an institution. Several factors were kept in consideration whilst conducting this study, including age of respondents, educational background, nature and frequency of travel.

### Summary of findings

#### i. Vehicle Breakdown and the Response of the NHMP Police

On Grand Trunk (G.T) Road/Highways, 76 percent of all such respondents that witnessed a breakdown, owing to an accident or otherwise, reported calling the NHMP Police (Figure 1). This shows the high level of confidence that people have in this institution. While only a few reported not calling the police, when

asked for reasons, more than 50 percent reported that there was no need to call the police for the incident as the matter was mutually resolved by the commuters who were involved and bystanders. Only 3.1 percent reported not calling the police because the police helpline did not respond or the police did not show up despite been sent messages.

On Motorways, 75 percent of all respondents reported calling the police. Not even a single respondent reported that the police was not around in case of an accident. Only one percent reported that the police showed up late at the site of the breakdown.

Respondents were also asked to rate the performance of the police on a scale of 1 (Excellent) to 4 (Poor). Figures 2 and 3 depict their performance in two different categories.

These figures are highly indicative of the excellent performance of the NHMW police as a force which is ever present to help and resolve situations arising from breakdowns on the NHMW network. No reasonable complaint was found.

### ii. Accident and the Response of the NHMW Police

There were a total of 124 accidents on the G.T Road/Highway as opposed to only 34 on the Motorway. Overall, 76 percent respondents reported calling the police in case of an accident on the G.T Road/ Highway, and 77 percent on the Motorway. The respondents were asked to rate the police in terms of timeliness in responding to accidents. Figure 4 sums up the results. The overall rating for performance was positive.

### iii. Police Checking for Violation for Road Use Laws

Respondents were asked if they were ever apprehended by the police for violation of road use laws like over-speeding, not wearing seatbelts etc. A total of 386 respondents on the G.T Road/Highway answered in the positive, out of which 82 percent reported that they were fined on being apprehended. As opposed to this, 128 respondents on the Motorway answered in positive, out of which 78 percent reported that they were fined on being apprehended. This indicates a better following of the law on part of the latter.

Respondents were also asked to rate these actions based on their fairness. The idea was to see how these apprehensions were viewed by those who were targeted. The

Figure 1: No. of respondents who called the NHMW Police




Figure 2: Rating of Police Performance on Timeliness in Reaching Out to Vehicle Breakdown Sites






Figure 3: Rating of Police Performance on Helping/ Providing Assistance




**Figure 4: Rating of the Police on Responses to Accidents in Terms of Timeliness**




**Table 1: Responses on NHMW Police Fairness in Apprehensions**

APPREHENDED BY THE POLICE	GT ROAD/HIGHWAY		MOTORWAY	
	FAIR	UNFAIR	FAIR	UNFAIR
SUKKUR	91 percent	9 percent	-	-
KARACHI	100 percent	0 percent	-	-
LAHORE	86 percent	14 percent	90 percent	10 percent
PESHAWAR	94 percent	6 percent	92 percent	8 percent
CUMULATIVE	96 percent	4 percent	91 percent	9 percent

**Figure 5: Feeling of Safety and Security when Traveling on G.T Road/ Highways**



**Figure 6: Feeling of Safety and Security when Traveling on Motorway**



Police force must not look vindictive and must not be seen to be unfair. Table 1 sums up the overwhelmingly positive responses. The fact that the NHMW Police are able to apprehend without being seen as unfair is a great achievement on their part.

#### iv. NHMW Police's Role in Increasing Road Laws Awareness

This indicator tried to assess how much awareness was imparted by the NHMW Police in order to educate commuters regarding laws and the benefits of abiding by them. As per cumulative results, out of those who did receive traffic law awareness on the G.T Road/Highway, only seven rated the Police as unfair, whereas 133 rated it as fair. Likewise, out of those who did receive traffic law awareness on the Motorway, 18 rated the Police as unfair, whereas 35 rated it as fair. However, among those who did not receive such awareness, 38 percent believed that the Police was unfair in its apprehensive action. This underscores the need for the NHMW Police to remain communicative towards commuters and keep imparting knowledge about traffic laws.

80 percent respondents who received traffic law awareness from the NHMW Police believed that the knowledge imparted helped them immensely. They opined that such awareness made their journey easier, free from accidents and vehicle failure, and reduced the risk of travel significantly.

#### v. Safety and Security of Travelling on the NHMW Network

Respondents were asked if they felt safe and secure when traveling on the NHMW Network. Figures 5 and 6 sum up their responses.

Out of all the reasons respondents said they felt safe, two particularly went to the credit of the Police, including forbiddance of over-speeding and overloading (especially in case of the Motorway,) and presence of road reflectors.

#### vi. Public Rating of NHMW Police on Honesty and Fairness

Respondents overall gave a good rating of the Police on honesty and fairness in its dealings. Commuters generally expressed satisfaction with the Police for honesty and fairness. Table 2 sums up the results.



### vii. Rating of NHMW Police on Helpfulness towards Commuters

Respondents were asked to rate the NHMW Police on how helpful it was towards various types of commuters on the intercity roads. Table 3 sums up the results. Major consensus tilted towards good behavior on both road networks. Overall the performance was satisfactory but Motorway Police performed better in terms of helpfulness.

### viii. Rating of NHMW Police on Respect for Commuters

Police are symbols of security and therefore should not be associated with feelings of hostility and negativity. Respondents were asked to rate how the NHMW Police treats them. 90 percent reported that the Police was respectful towards them. Figure 7 sums up their responses.

### ix. Rating of NHMW Police on Enforcement of the Law

One of the reasons for the effectiveness of the NHMW Police is their commitment towards enforcing the law. Respondents were asked to rate on the same. 86 percent gave positive responses thereby further strengthening the service delivery of the NHMW Police. On helpfulness, van transporters (50 percent) and bus drivers (35 percent) gave the most positive review to the NHMW Police on its enforcement efforts of the law. Table 4 depicts the cumulative results.

### i. Rating of NHMW Police on Abolition of the VIP Culture

Special treatment given to VIP's has long been a common complaint against the police force in the country. Respondents were therefore asked to rate as to whether the NHMW Police was equal in terms of treatment with VIP's and the general public. 75 percent respondents felt that the Police was doing enough to curtail the VIP culture on the intercity road network. Figure 8 sums up the responses.

### xi. Rating of NHMW Police on Patrolling

Police patrolling ensures law abiding behavior by commuters. When questioned on whether commuters were satisfied with police patrol, 87 percent responded in the positive thereby reinforcing that the National Highway and Motorway network is well protected with effective police surveillance and patrol. Figure 9 illustrates the results.


**Table 2: NHMW Police Rating on Honesty and Fairness**

RATING	GT ROAD/HIGHWAY	MOTORWAY
EXCELLENT	40 percent	58 percent
GOOD	35 percent	21 percent
SATISFACTORY	16 percent	14 percent
POOR	5 percent	2 percent
INDIFFERENT	5 percent	5 percent


**Table 3: NHMW Police Rating on Helpfulness towards Commuters**

RATING	GT ROAD/HIGHWAY	MOTORWAY
EXCELLENT	28 percent	30 percent
GOOD	46 percent	50 percent
SATISFACTORY	17 percent	14 percent
POOR	5 percent	2 percent
INDIFFERENT	5 percent	4 percent

**Figure 7: NHMW Police Rating on Respect towards Commuters**




**Figure 8: Rating of the NHMW Police on Abolition of the VIP Culture**




**Table 4: Rating of NHMW Police on Enforcement of the Law**

RATING	EXCELLENT	GOOD	SATISFACTORY	POOR	INDIFFERENT
CUMULATIVE	16 percent	45 percent	25 percent	7 percent	7 percent


**Figure 9: Rating of NHMW Police on Patrolling**



**Figure 10: NHMP Rating on Efforts to Increase Awareness about Traffic Laws**



**Figure 11: Rating of NHMW Police on Issuance of Fog and Weather Information**



**Table 5: Does the NHMW Police Seek Bribes?**

	SUKKUR	KARACHI	LAHORE	PESHAWAR	CUMULATIVE
YES	0 percent	14 percent	11 percent	0 percent	7 percent
NO	100 percent	86 percent	89 percent	100 percent	93 percent

## xii. Rating of NHMW Police on Increasing Road Safety Awareness

Knowledge on road safety and laws is integral to ensure safety on the road. The NHMW Police here play a critical role in spreading awareness so that people are constantly reminded and are well versed with rules and regulations. When asked about the NHMW Police efforts to increase road awareness about traffic laws, 83 percent respondents gave the Police a positive rating on its law awareness efforts. Satisfaction was the highest in Sukkur with 93 percent positive rating and lowest in Lahore with 71 percent. Figure 10 sums up the results.

## xiii. Rating of NHMW Police on Issuance of Fog and Weather Information

Fog becomes a critical issue in the winter season. This is especially true for Lahore and adjoining areas that experience the most amount of fog. Many a times, Lahore Airport and the Motorway M2 have to be closed down owing to poor visibility due to the fog. Therefore the NHMW Police have a critical role to play by providing awareness and counsel to travelling motorists so as to increase their safety.

The results on this question regarding the police's efforts on issuance of fog and weather information were received mostly as satisfactory, however, 68 percent satisfaction at Lahore is critical since it is the most affected area. Figure 11 depicts the overall picture.

## xiv. Illegal Practices among NHMW Police

Respondents were asked whether the Police had been seen taking bribes from the commuters (as is the norm with the local police) or forced bus drivers to carry their friends as free riders. The latter appeared to be a minor issue with only 12 percent reporting such incidents. In terms of the former, seven percent reported that Police sought bribes from the commuters which is not very satisfactory (Table 5). It was expected that the incident of Police bribery would be lower. Efforts need to be made to ensure that the NHMW Police does not turn into in-city police which is known for its corruption and bribery.

## Conclusion

The performance of the National Highway and Motorway Police has been found to be satisfactory. Satisfaction being more pronounced since most government organizations perform so poorly, the performance of NHMW Police looks sharper by contrast. There is significant

room for improvement. Any effort in this direction should focus on areas from improved recruitment, hiring and training, to the selection of new leadership

structures. All organizations are capable of self-learning, adaptation, adjustment, experimentation, and innovation. NHMW Police must develop an indigenous

research wing so that change management clues emerge from within the organization.



## Shaukat Hayat Khan

Inspector General

National Highways and Motorway Police

**When the motorway police was established, it pulled most of its staff from the police force. Latter was generally considered to be corrupt and inefficient whereas motorway police is considered corruption free with high standards of services. What made it possible? What were the key enablers?**

When an organization is conceived on the basis and intention of making it as a benchmark for others, then that is the real factor behind it becoming a success story. The initial idea conceived was aimed at establishing a police force that would be different than the existing one. One factor kept in mind was that all recruitment done was on the basis of education and fair competition, without any external influence. Second, the deportation formula was also devised on qualifications and other very specific requirements that made it a very tough screening process. The Motorway Institution presented a very different environment for candidates who came on deputation from their traditional background, for instance, the salary package at that time was almost a hundred percent more, there were eight hour work shifts instead of the usual 24 hour shifts in the regular police force, the working conditions were simpler and service conditions were cleaner. There was always an emphasis placed on the three core values including integrity, courtesy and help towards general public. The major task here involved patrolling only. Third, immense focus has always been placed on proper training of the force inculcating in them the mindset of 'service' and not of 'officer'. When the public witnessed such instances of humble behavior, a positive image of the Motorway Police began to bloom. Finally, the process and procedures such as that of ticketing, violations etc were based on different dynamics when compared to traditional police. Budgetary allocations provided to the institution were also very substantial. A reward system was also put in place whereby 25 percent of the force was evaluated on the basis of performance, education and quantum of help provided to public and then subsequently awarded with three basic bonus salaries. The welfare package was also higher than that of the traditional police.

**Higher salary was considered one of the motivations for joining the motorway police. However, as of present, there is not much difference between salary and other remuneration packages of the traditional and motorway police, as well as other such institutions. Still, motorway police is considered efficient and corruption free. In your view, what other non-financial factors keep the motorway police committed and motivated?**

Non-financial factors would include the shift system and recreational facilitation. Traditional police personnel work round the clock but the Motorway Police has eight hour shifts. Then sufficient recreational facilities including better accommodation, entertainment and sufficient welfare are also provided.

**It is said that achieving excellence is difficult but sustaining it is more difficult. We have seen in Pakistan that institutions take a good start but don't maintain it in the long run. What has kept higher standards in motorway police sustainable over such a long time?**

Ups and downs are a natural way for any process. What is important is that the ups are substantial and downs are marginal. The hard work and consistency of our senior past leadership in the core values of the institution has a major factor to play in the long standing success of this institute. Another major factor in the long term success of the Motorway Police has been the zero tolerance of external and internal influences. All positions and promotions are based purely and only on merit and this merit is evaluated on an extensive monitoring system, the reporting of which reaches till the headquarters therefore enabling the system to be completely transparent. We are extremely conscious in upholding the core values and maintaining a corruption free system. Recently, we have also devised a new set of National Highway and Motorway Police efficiency rules that will be notified soon, based on careful planning, monitoring and evaluation. Lastly, accountability mechanisms are vigilant and quick thereby maintaining the smooth working of the system.

**Motorway police is a success story as a public sector institution. Keeping in view the motorway police experience, what are the 4-5 recommendations that you would like to provide that could make public sector institutions service oriented, corruption free, client friendly and attractive to competent professionals?**

The major factor in the success of any institution is reflected in the inputs i.e. the human resource employed. Therefore, ensuring that the selection of this human resource is based completely on honesty and integrity is a major factor in making public institutions service oriented, corruption free and client friendly.

Also as the famous saying goes, 'as you sow so shall you reap,' therefore proper structured training is also an integral factor in the eventual success of the institution. The training imparted will reflect in the later functioning of all the personnel and if they have a clear vision and understanding on the core values and procedures, then that will ensure a smooth functioning of the institute on ground. A transparent and legal equitable reward system is also important to establish in any public service institute. It promotes motivation within the team and pushes them to perform effectively.

Finally, the style of administration also matters. Communication within the organization and different counterparts is key.

# New Public Passion: Motivation in Public Service – A New Zealand Perspective<sup>1</sup>



**Ryan Orange**

Ex-Deputy State Services Commissioner  
New Zealand

often we fool ourselves into believing that extrinsic motivation – the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment – through compliance and accountability are enough and that intrinsic motivation is not reliable so cannot be systematised. Intrinsic motivation is important for civil service performance and is essential to dynamism. Dynamism – the ability to adapt at pace to respond to rapid change – is essential for the civil service required in a complex and fast changing world. If you are working on reform and not thinking explicitly about harnessing the intrinsic motivation of civil servants you are not heading for the right destination and undermining the likelihood of sustainable change.

sustainable reform. The piece will conclude by setting out key lessons from the reform experience to identify what else is required for successful and sustainable reform. This section emphasizes the importance of the Reform Moment and the need for reform to be sharply focused.

*The challenge: change is accelerating, complexity abounds, money is short and morale is low*

The challenge is that the goalposts keep shifting – for the public, private and non-profit sector. The rate of change is accelerating in an increasingly complex globalised and interconnected world.


In complex networks, decision-making is fragmented but interdependent, leading

**Figure1: Change is accelerating, complexity abounds...**

## Introduction

In a complex and rapidly changing world delivering and sustaining significant improvements in public services is critical to quality of life and sustainable development. Public service reform is being pursued with mixed results in a great range of jurisdictions to respond to this changing environment. Drawing on the experience of reform in New Zealand and engagement with other jurisdiction's reform endeavours this, article seeks to identify what is universal and what is contextually unique about public service reform and identify approaches to strengthen the chances of successful reform.

The article will focus on the concept of New Public Passion (NPP) and the importance of intrinsic motivation to sustainable reform. The idea that intrinsic motivation matters – that we will try harder if we feel we are doing the right thing, be more engaged if we find our work interesting and more passionate about the pursuit of our values – does not appear to be a controversial statement. The very idea of public service is a call to intrinsic values of service to our community.<sup>2</sup> However the importance of intrinsic motivation is being underestimated or ignored in civil service reform all over the world – right now. Too



While intrinsic motivation is critically important, it is only one aspect of

to unpredictability and rapid change as "patterns arise out of a vast array of interactions and seemingly out of

<sup>1</sup> This opinion piece is summarised from a longer paper written for and soon to be published by the UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence

<sup>2</sup> This paper does not make a distinction between Public Service Motivation (PSM) and intrinsic motivation. The core dimensions of PSM – compassion, civic duty, self-sacrifice and attraction to public policy-making – are treated here as integral rather than separate to intrinsic motivation. For clarity 'recognition' is considered in this paper to be an extrinsic motivator that is given as a reward or withheld as a punishment.



nowhere”<sup>3</sup>

So if a significant increase in adaptability is required, it would be ideal to be operating in an environment of resource flexibility and enthusiastic appetite for change. However, even as demands increase, many civil services are confronting tighter financial constraints and low levels of morale.<sup>4</sup> The Sustainable Development Goals cannot be achieved without overcoming this challenge.

## New Public Passion

### *The toolkit: necessary but insufficient*

The obvious solution to this challenge is to employ super-heroes in every seat. If every civil servant could only be trustworthy, collaborative, citizen-centred, creative, driven and brilliant then surely this challenge would be surmounted. However, in the absence of a steady supply of super-heroes we have to rely on very ordinary civil service heroes and the quality of the public management systems they work in really matters.

Most of the public management toolkit that we rely on, however, was not designed for managing complexity and rapid change. The historical toolkit of Public Administration and New Public Management is necessary but not sufficient and New Public Governance is attempting to bridge that gap. It will only do so successfully if it harnesses intrinsic motivation and builds New Public Passion.

### *The idea: intrinsic motivation really matters*

New Public Passion is about harnessing the intrinsic motivation of public servants to improve performance. The central message is that intrinsic motivation really matters.

Through a primary focus on accountability

is a critical tool for improving performance but will work best in partnership with the alignment of values to harness intrinsic motivation. High levels of intrinsic motivation are the public services natural advantage but that advantage needs to be encouraged and stewarded or it is lost.

We need to harness intrinsic motivation to

enable dynamic and adaptive civil servants to respond to increasing change and complexity. In environments with constrained resources and low morale, more effectively harnessing intrinsic motivation is a critical lever for maintaining performance during periods of change. Too often, reforms are implemented without any real effort to engage civil servants in the drivers or benefits of reform in a language they can understand or through the lens of values they can relate to.

New Public Passion is not a brand new idea but it is a timely drawing together of important thinking about the link between motivation and performance in a public service context. In addition to practical experience, the idea is based on well-established theory and the direction of private sector thinking about how to respond to the changing nature of the global marketplace.

The idea draws on Public Service Motivation and seeks to build the lessons from this body of research into the heart of our public

## Levers for improving motivation

The UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence identifies the following strategies for strengthening New Public Passion in developing countries in the paper: *The SDGs and New Public Passion: What really motivates the civil service?*<sup>12</sup>

**Developing Pride and Recognition in Public Service** – which stems from a sense of purpose – of public or moral duty, or nationalism. It is not just about seeking reward from financial gain or obvious power, but reward from stimulating intellectual application, involvement in matters of the state, a secure financial life and respected social standing.<sup>13</sup> The sense of pride among civil servants and the public image of public institutions represent intrinsic sources of motivation or commitment that eventually affect civil servants' performance.<sup>14</sup>

**Establishing a Merit-based, Professional Civil Service** – evidence suggests that building a merit-based civil service has been the most effective way of incentivising staff, while pay reform and performance monitoring have been less effective.<sup>15</sup> Even in an environment where the civil service is politicised, it is possible for the merit principle to be implemented. In China, despite corruption, nepotism and cronyism, there exists a largely meritocratic and competent civil service, geared to advancing the common good, which has made the world's second largest economy what it is today.<sup>16</sup>

**Promoting a Values-based Public Service** – values such as transparency, responsibility, accountability and impartiality underpin public service. To be credible, all human capital management practices need to be consistent with the message that 'public service matters',<sup>17</sup> and these practices, from recruitment to performance management, should be reviewed to emphasise public service values in an integrated way.<sup>18</sup>

**Empowerment and Autonomy** – civil servants need to feel that the organisation provides them with a degree of discretion and autonomy to undertake tasks they find meaningful. Very bureaucratic organisations, with high levels of red tape, are demotivating for public managers. However, active reform efforts to increase managerial authority and focus on results can reinvigorate Public Service Motivation.<sup>19</sup> Explicitly linking the role of public officials to the Sustainable Development Goals acknowledges the pivotal role they play in achieving important national and global outcomes.

**Employee Engagement** – there is a growing trend in public sector organisations to track 'employee engagement', in order to take action on issues raised and enhance engagement.<sup>20</sup> Given that high Public Service Motivation has been positively correlated with job satisfaction and organisational commitment, it should be incorporated into employee engagement practices.<sup>21</sup>

and managerialism, our public management systems have come to over-rely on extrinsic motivation. The alignment of incentives to drive extrinsic motivation

3 Bourgon, Jocelyne. 2009. *New Governance and Public Administration: Towards a Dynamic Synthesis*. Public lecture hosted by the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, Australia, 24 February.

4 Bourgon, Jocelyne. 2009. *New Governance and Public Administration: Towards a Dynamic Synthesis*. Public lecture hosted by the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, Australia, 24 February.

12 UNDP GCPSE 2015.

13 Chapman, Richard A. 2013. *Leadership in the British Civil Service (Routledge Revivals): A study of Sir Percival Waterfield and the creation of the Civil Service Selection Board*. Routledge, p.195.

14 Haque, M. Shamsul. 2001. Pride and performance in the public service: three Asian cases. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 67 (1): 99-116.

15 Rao, Sumedh. 2013. *Civil service reform: Topic guide*. Birmingham: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.

16 Berggruen, Nicolas, and Nathan Gardels. 2013. Re-Politicisation vs. De-Politicisation. *New Perspectives Quarterly* 30 (2): 45-50.

17 O'Riordan, Joanna. 2013. *Public Service Motivation*. Institute of Public Administration, p. 9.

18 Paarlberg, Laurie E., and Bob Lavigna. 2010. Transformational leadership and public service motivation: Driving individual and organisational performance. *Public Administration Review* 70 (5): 710-718.

19 Yousaf, Momna, et al. 2014. 'Do public service motivation, red tape and resigned work satisfaction triangulate together?' *International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management* 63(7): 923-945.

20 Manning, Nick. 2012. Improving the Contribution of Senior Staff to Program Performance presentation delivered to the BCOP of the PEMPAL network meeting March 2012. PEMPAL.

21 Crosby, Durand. 2014. Improving Employee Retention in the Public Sector by Increasing Employee Engagement in Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Engaged Management Scholarship, Tulsa, OK, September 10-14, 2014.

management models. James Perry defines Public Service Motivation (PSM) as “an individual's predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions”.<sup>5</sup> Perry's own 2010 review of 20 years of PSM research argues that the studies conducted have built up the evidence to indicate that high PSM improves the attraction, selection and retention of individuals as civil servants; that PSM matters for performance (but that there is more evidence of this at the institutional rather than the individual level); and that high PSM has an inverse relationship with preference for monetary rewards.<sup>6</sup>

PSM research has shown a link between having a mission of public good, reform and effective transformational leadership. Wright found that “the importance of an organization's mission increases employee work motivation in the public sector by making the job more important, even after controlling for the effect of performance-related extrinsic rewards”.<sup>7</sup> Moynihan and Pandey's research indicates that red tape and length of organizational membership are negatively related to public service motivation, whereas hierarchical authority and reform efforts have a positive relationship.<sup>8</sup> Together, Wright, Moynihan and Pandey concluded that “given both the public service orientation of public organization missions and the attractiveness of such goals to many public employees, public sector transformational leaders may be in a better position to activate the higher-order needs of their employees and encourage them to transcend their own self-interest for the sake of the organization and its clientele”.<sup>9</sup>

The importance of intrinsic motivation is absolutely not unique to the civil service. Gary Hamel, as an influential thinker on improving the performance of private sector businesses, argues that *The Future of*

*Management* is about re-inventing management to deliver innovation and requires shifting from hierarchies to communities of purpose.<sup>10</sup> His recipe for success is a workforce motivated to be creative rather than obedient and he argues that engagement of this workforce will be driven by passion (35 percent), creativity (25 percent), initiative (20 percent) and intellect (15 percent) while diligence (5 percent) and obedience (0 percent) cease to be strong drivers.<sup>11</sup>

For the public and private sectors, the world is becoming a more complex and rapidly changing environment. To adapt to this environment we cannot afford to look only to extrinsic motivation but must harness intrinsic motivation to drive performance.

Responsiveness is vital and accountability is the chief engine of responsiveness. Wherever it can be, accountability should be clearly defined and rigorously accounted for. However, intrinsic motivation particularly matters in times of financial constraint and low morale as tapping into it more effectively may be the only way to deliver more for less for a period of time and create the momentum to get over a change 'hump'.

Dynamism is critical for responding to complex and rapidly changing environments and effectively harnessing intrinsic motivation is essential for enabling dynamism.

### Sustainable Reform

*The approach in practice: sustainable reform*

It is through the practice of reform that one learns the hard way that you underestimate the transformative potential of intrinsic motivation at your peril. The key lessons learnt from the practice of reform are summarised in Figure 2.

#### Diagnosis


Most jurisdictions already know what is wrong with their system. They may not be having an honest

conversation about it. They frequently are confounded by the entanglement of political dynamics (that civil service reform cannot directly address) with bureaucratic dysfunction and feel that change is too hard. But in a Reform Moment, if an honest conversation can be had that is focussed directly on the role of the civil service, the problems identified are usually both clear and longstanding.

#### Reform Moment

Timing is everything in civil service reform. In a perfectly dynamic system, continuous improvement would avoid the need for reform as civil service change would keep pace with the environment in which it

**Figure 2: New Zealand's Public Passion and Reforms**



#### *The benefits: generating trust, supporting responsiveness and enabling dynamism*

Harnessing intrinsic motivation can help to generate trust, support responsiveness and is critical to building and sustaining dynamism.

Trust is foundational. It is very difficult to have a civil service that is responsive and dynamic if there is a deficit of trust. In environments with low levels of trust a vicious circle of helplessness, apathy and self-interest can eventuate. Harnessing intrinsic motivation is one of the few ways to break out of this vicious cycle.

5 Everest-Phillips, Max. 2015. The power of 'new public passion'. The Strait Times, November 5. <http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-power-of-new-public-passion>

6 Perry, James L. and Wise, R. S. 1990. The Motivational Bases of Public Service. Public Administration Review. 50: 367-73

7 Perry, James L., Hondeghem, Annie and Wise, Lois R. 2010. Revisiting the Motivational Bases of Public Service Motivation: Twenty Years of Research and an Agenda for the Future. Public Administration Review. 70(5): 681-90.

8 Interviews with managers engaged in information management activities at US state-level primary health and human service agencies: Moynihan, D. P., Sanjay, K. P. 2007. The Role of Organizations in Fostering Public Service Motivation. Public Administration Review. 67: 1: 40-53. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00695.x

9 A nationwide sample of senior managers in U.S. local government jurisdictions with populations of more than 50,000: Wright, B., Moynihan, D. P. and Pandey, S. K. Pulling the Levers: Transformational Leadership, Public Service Motivation, and Mission Valence.

10 Hamel, G. 2012. What Matters Now: How to Win in a World of Relentless Change, Ferocious Competition, and Unstoppable Innovation. Jossey-Bass.

11 Hamel, G. What Matters Now: How to Win in a World of Relentless Change, Ferocious Competition, and Unstoppable Innovation.

operates. However, we do not work in perfectly or even particularly dynamic systems and step-changes in technology, expectations and complexity demand periodic reforms that break parts of the system in order to remake them in a fit-for-purpose fashion.

There are four primary features that are conducive to a Reform Moment in which there is real stimulus for significant change and a chance of success.

- *Change gap* – Where it is obvious that what a system is capable of doing falls short of what is required or expected, there is a change gap. Change gaps are necessary for a Reform Moment but are not enough without the following three aspects being aligned.
- *Change readiness* – Any system has a

differently.

If you do not have and cannot generate a Reform Moment, do not attempt reform. Reform is hard, expensive and disruptive with a high risk of failure.

#### Focus

The need to focus is the single most important lesson that can be derived based on the practice of reform. There will always be more things that would benefit from change than there will be the capacity to change them.

Most importantly, do not waste time and energy on things that you cannot change in this Reform Moment. While the ultimate destination may be to change cultural norms in your system, if you start by trying

makers and actors are openly committed to change to help sustain resolve through the difficult times ahead.

- *Move at pace and adapt as you go* – In a complex environment it is simply not possible to predict the full impact of change so be prepared to adapt as you go to sustain momentum.


#### Destination

In a complex and rapidly changing environment, reform is a tool for improving the ability of a system to respond to change on an ongoing basis.

*The question: what does this mean for you?*

Nothing is more certain than that every Reform Moment is unique and will require

**Figure 3: New Zealand's Better Public Service Reforms**



threshold for how much change it can handle. Repeated change, whether successful or not, leads to change fatigue and can have a catastrophic impact on the harnessing of intrinsic motivation. Picking a Reform Moment requires an understanding of the appetite for change and the capacity for the system to take on change at that time.

- *Trigger crisis or opportunity* – Even if a civil service has a clear change gap and has a degree of change readiness, a specific trigger crisis or opportunity creates a catalyst for change and the potential for focus to build reform momentum.
- *Reform leadership* – Leadership is vital for successful reform and if there is no reform leadership then there is no Reform Moment. Reform leadership is required to break with past practice and take the risk of doing things

to change all of these at once, reform will fail.

Focus is the driver of the five key reform steps:

- *Pick a few things* – Do not try to be comprehensive as there will always be more things to change than there is capacity to change them.
- *That are important and on the path* – You are better off moving with urgency and commitment to address selected issues that are clearly important and on the path to the destination you are trying to reach, than running an expensive and time-consuming process to be sure about what to do.
- *Get the right mandate* – Know who the critical decision-makers are and ensure they are signed up to the reform endeavour.
- *Announce your intent* – Announce your intent to ensure that critical decision-

a different response to enable change. There are no silver bullets for successful reform and if someone is offering to sell you one, think again.

However, the challenges of reform and enhancing civil service performance are a universal experience. Every community in the world has and will struggle with that challenge in their own context. The problems are common (e.g. politicisation, fragmentation, poor implementation, corruption, information deficits, cultural barriers, performance measurement) but the experience is unique to that particular environment.

So in this universal and unique change environment, the claim of New Public Passion is that it is important to think about the intrinsic motivation of civil servants in the design of your public management system and in planning and

driving reform efforts to change the design of your public management system.

#### A practical example: New Zealand's Better Public Services reform

New Zealand's Better Public Services reforms (2010-2015) successfully rewrote the rules of the New Zealand public management system to enable focussed work across agency boundaries to deliver results, longer term planning to support stewardship and changed leadership roles and incentives to strengthen system leadership.<sup>22</sup> The features of the reform are summarised in Figure 3.

There were four key factors that made this the strongest Reform Moment in New

- *Change readiness* – Radical change comes at a high cost and after a reform as large as New Zealand's New Public Management changes, the system can take a while – 25 years in this case – before it is ready to take on large-scale change again.
- *Trigger crisis* – The 2008 Global Financial Crisis shifted New Zealand from surplus to deficit and fundamentally constrained the financial flexibility available in the civil service. While New Zealand did not enter a period of significant austerity, agency budgets and staff numbers were capped after a decade of year-on-year growth. Delivering better services while absorbing annual inflationary pressures requires new ways of

effort. He was also highly skilled at using the language of results-led reform to harness the intrinsic motivation of civil servants to want to make a difference to the lives of New Zealanders in the greatest need, while not resiling from providing extrinsic motivation through clear articulation of his expectations of senior officials to sustain reform momentum.

The ten Prime Minister's Better Public Services Results for New Zealanders<sup>23</sup> have been the central focus of successful reform implementation. These Results were selected because they were important and long-standing problems that had proven resistant to previous attempts at change where making meaningful progress would

**Figure 4: The Better Public Services Results and targets as at March 2016**

1	Reducing long-term welfare dependence	Reduce working age client numbers by 25% to 220,000 from 295,000 as at June 2014, and an accumulated actuarial release of \$13 billion by June 2018
2	Increase participation in Early Childhood Education	In 2016, 98% of children starting school will have participated in quality early childhood education
3a	Increase infant immunisation	Increase immunisation coverage for children at 8 months to 95% by December 2014
3b	Reduce rheumatic fever	Reduce first episode rheumatic fever hospitalisations annual rate to 1.4 per 100,000 by June 2016
4	Reduce Assaults on children	Reduce children experiencing substantiated abuse to 2,954 annually by June 2017
5	Increase proportion of 18 year olds with National Certificate of Educational Achievement Level 2	85% of 18-year-olds will have achieved NCEA Level 2 or an equivalent qualification in 2017
6	Increase proportion of 25 to 34 year olds with New Zealand Qualifications framework Level 4 or above	60% of 25-34-year-olds having a qualification at Level 4 or above in 2018
7	Reduce the rates of total crime, violent crime and youth crime	Reduce the June 2011 violent crime rate by 20% and the youth crime rate by 25% by June 2017 and the total crime rate by 20% by June 2018
8	Reduce re-offending	Reduce June 2011 reoffending rate by 25% to 22.5 by June 2017
9	New Zealand business have a one-stop online shop for all Government advice and support	Reduce December 2012 business costs from dealing with government by 25% by 2017. Government services to business will have similar key performance ratings as leading private sector firms by July 2017.
10	New Zealanders can complete their transactions with Government easily in a digital environment	An average of 70 per cent of New Zealanders' most common transactions with government will be completed in a digital environment by 2017

Zealand since the 1980s reforms:

- *Change gap* – The increasing complexity and rate of change of the world in the 2010s was impacting on New Zealand through globalisation, information technology and the rise of the third sector.

working.

- *Reform leadership* – Bill English, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance from November 2008, was a critical champion of change and was able to secure the support of the Prime Minister and Cabinet for the reform

require collaboration between multiple organisations (Figure 4)

The Better Public Services Results have worked as a reform tool because of their degree of focus.

- *Pick a few things* – There are only 10

<sup>22</sup> See the range of Cabinet minutes on Better Public Services at: <http://www.ssc.govt.nz/bps-cab-papers-minutes>



Results: they are not everything important government is doing in New Zealand and they are not even necessarily the 10 most important things that government is doing.

- *That are important and on the path* – The Ministerial decision to not engage in a lengthy analytical and consultation process for determining the 10 Results was key to capturing the Reform Moment in early 2012.
- *Get the right mandate* – Labelling the Results as the *Prime Minister's Results* sent a clear message to Ministers and civil servants that the Results mattered and that they needed to be prioritised against other work.
- *Announce your intent* – The radical step of publicly declaring the Result, the target and accountable Ministers and officials before having an agreed approach was a catalyst to cross-agency engagement in a system where most incentives ran in the other direction. Six monthly reports have been publicly released on the progress on Results including the Cabinet paper, dashboard and underlying data.<sup>24</sup>
- *Move at pace and adapt as you go* – There was a clear imperative for agencies to develop an approach with urgency to deliver on Ministerial expectations and meet public reporting requirements. Having a target in place provided a catalyst for action and the targets and measures in turn can be strengthened on the basis of experience.

While the Results have created a successful central focus for reform, the challenging reform environment and difficulties implementing broader change highlighted a number of key lessons about what not to do:

- *Do not try and fix everything at once.* Through the early phases of the reform process, significant amounts of time were spent trying to generate grand structural solutions and comprehensive frameworks. With the power of hindsight, these efforts carried the seeds of their own failure. The reforms progressively gained momentum by shifting the focus from comprehensive restructuring to improving the rules to enable change and then focussing on specific areas for implementation.
- *Do not focus your energy on the things you cannot change directly in this Reform Moment.* Whenever civil service leaders were brought together to discuss reform, Chief Executives and Senior Officials would focus on the role of Ministers and the interface between

Ministers and Chief Executives as a key barrier to effective cross-agency collaboration. Changing the role of Ministers was not up for debate and concentrating on it reduced rather than increased the potential for significant change. As a consequence of focussing on change to the behaviour of civil servants, the reforms have ultimately had some impact on Ministerial arrangements and behaviours.

- *Do not ignore intrinsic motivation.* The policy and design work for the reforms sought to harness accountabilities, incentives and performance measurement to drive change. However, coming from a New Public Management mind-set led to underplaying the importance of capturing hearts and minds in reform implementation. The ten Results successfully aligned intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, but this was more by accident than design. The Results spoke to the key drivers of why many of the people working on the Results had become public servants in the first place. The passion of the leaders and teams for improving the lives of new Zealanders was essential in sustaining their efforts to overcome resistance to working differently..

<sup>23</sup> Available at: <http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/Snapshot-March2016.pdf>

<sup>24</sup> See: <http://www.ssc.govt.nz/better-public-service>



# Technology, Innovation and e-Governance – The Case of Pakistan



**Hasaan Khawar**

Former civil servant belonging to Pakistan Administrative Service (formerly District Management Group)

## Introduction and Context

The quest for innovation in public sector governance and service delivery is not new and political governments all over the world have been seeking better ways to serve their citizens. Innovation is often considered a 'magic concept'<sup>1</sup> that can be used to improve not only the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector but also sometimes its legitimacy through improved capability to handle societal challenges<sup>2</sup>. Governments all over the world thus continuously look for innovations in public service delivery with varying objectives such as improving efficiency, reducing costs, enhancing citizen satisfaction, introducing fresh management paradigms or creating new capabilities to improve overall capacity. These innovations can be motivated by political point scoring, fiscal constraints, inability to tackle particular challenges or even purely altruistic reasons, but irrespective of the driving force behind them, these often result in better outcomes for the public.

**Table 1: Country Rankings**

Country	Rank	Online Service Component	Telecommunication Infrastructure Component	Human Capital Component
Pakistan	158	0.3228	0.1174	0.3337
India	118	0.5433	0.1372	0.4698
Bangladesh	148	0.3465	0.0941	0.3866
Indonesia	106	0.3622	0.3054	0.6786
Malaysia	52	0.6772	0.4455	0.7119
China	70	0.6063	0.3554	0.6734
Myanmar	175	0.0236	0.0084	0.5288
Afghanistan	173	0.1811	0.1472	0.2418

Source: UN E-government Survey 2014

The advent of technology during the last two decades has especially changed the face of governance globally, bringing in a host of innovations in various aspects of public service delivery. However, these improvements have also increased citizens' expectations, who in the 21st century have become increasingly demanding and quality conscious. The changing role of the private sector in this arena cannot be ignored, where it has ventured into various domains creating new solutions and exerting additional pressure on the governments to perform better.

## Situation in Pakistan

These global changes, coupled with increasingly aware 21st century citizens, have also compelled public sector in Pakistan to evolve and make way for technology. The country experimented with various institutional models during the past few years, both at federal and provincial level, to promote e-governance and stimulate innovation, through use of technology. Although these institutions have witnessed mixed success, the face of the government has evolved significantly in recent years, with rampant use of social media, video conferencing facilities for communication, websites and portals for

various departments, use of online services in selected areas and digitization of massive government archives such as land records, etc.

However, it is not all good news as according to the UN Global E-government Survey (2014)<sup>3</sup>, Pakistan ranked 158th with an e-government development index merely at 0.2580, putting it amongst the bottom 30 countries<sup>4</sup> globally, flanked by others like Afghanistan, Myanmar and Timor. The situation has only worsened with time, as Pakistan was ranked 156th in 2012, with an e-government development index of 0.28. Other countries in the region including India, China and Bangladesh outperformed Pakistan and were ranked at 118th, 70th and 148th positions respectively, improving from 125th, 78th and 150th in 2012 (Table1).

This table also reveals that while India exceeds Pakistan on all counts, when compared with Bangladesh, Pakistan fares well in terms of infrastructure but lags behind in online services provision and human capital.

Despite this fall in international rankings, the last few years have witnessed a number of new technological innovations

<sup>1</sup> Pollitt, C. & G. Bouckaert (2011, 3d ed.), Public Management Reform: A comparative analysis. Oxford: OUP

<sup>2</sup> Bekkers, V., J. Edelenbos & B. Steijn (2011) An Innovative Public Sector? Embarking on the Innovation Journey, in: Bekkers, V., J. Edelenbos & B. Steijn (eds.), Innovation in the public sector: linking capacity and leadership. Houndsmills: Palgrave MacMillan; 197-222

<sup>3</sup> United Nations E-Government Survey 2014, Annex p.202. Available at [https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/portals/egovkb/documents/un/2014-survey/e-gov\\_complete\\_survey-2014.pdf](https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/portals/egovkb/documents/un/2014-survey/e-gov_complete_survey-2014.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> The survey covers 193 countries worldwide and is conducted every two years.

emerging on the public sector governance canvass in Pakistan. These innovations varied greatly in their nature and ranged from themes like m-governance, data mining and big data, to automation of processes and digitization of records; and use of satellite imagery and Geographic Information System (GIS) to open data, citizen engagement and social accountability. The sector spread of these technological innovations also appears to be quite vast, covering rural and urban development and planning; agriculture and livestock; justice, law and order; water and sanitation; health; education; transport and communications; irrigation; excise and taxation; relief and rehabilitation; and travel and tourism.

While it may be difficult to mention all of these brilliant innovations, there are certain enabling initiatives and dominant trends that have changed the landscape of e-governance in the country. National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) for instance is one of such examples. The organization has reportedly created one of the largest biometric databases in the world, registering millions of citizens in the country. The innovation that may seem simple in nature involved multiple technological and political challenges. Based on this massive database, the government now has significantly enhanced capability for a host of ancillary services such as mobile users verification, voters validation, tax payers identification, etc. Similarly, World Bank funded Project for Improvement to Financial Reporting and Auditing (PIFRA) provides another example of a landmark initiative, strengthening the financial management backbone of the country. The project spanning over many years brought basic financial discipline at all levels of government including federal, provincial, and local governments, through implementation of SAP-based system. The project also helped in creating a repository of all government expenditure and receipt transactions with improved transparency and accountability.

At the provincial level, two leading trends that have been adopted across a number of sectors in recent years include the use of satellite imagery and GIS technology coupled with android-based smart phones and introduction of extensive citizen feedback and communication systems.

The former trend, popularly known as 'smart monitoring', makes use of geo-tagged data to improve teachers' attendance, enhance functioning of public health facilities, augment solid waste management system and boost vaccination coverage. The latter model, originally pioneered in Jhang, a rural district in Punjab, has resulted in its widespread replication whereby citizens are proactively contacted for their feedback regarding public services. Furthermore, projects like Safe City are generating loads of data for providing real-time information and intelligence and creating a superior quality emergency response system, whereas massive digitization of land records in Sindh, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have facilitated citizens' access to these records. Online interfaces for various services including job applications and admissions, FIR registration and passport tracking have also greatly benefitted citizens. Consequently, these technology-backed innovations have greatly enhanced government's capability to improve governance.

### Way Forward

With the limited overall use of technology in the government and a fairly small technological base, public sector provides plenty of room for application of technology with significant expected impact. However, promoting innovation in government relies on multiple factors that need to be present in parallel to ensure desired results. Many of these factors are often beyond the control of individual organizations and are rather dependent on the macro environment outside, meaning thereby that complexity of the institutional surroundings and political context can make a significant difference (Bhatta, 2003<sup>5</sup>; Pollitt 2003<sup>6</sup>; Hartley 2005<sup>7</sup>). Therefore, in order to stimulate innovation, there is a need for a coherent framework or a well-synergized innovation ecosystem, formalized through a national innovation policy. Such an ecosystem can provide favourable infrastructure and an enabling environment for innovations to take roots. Countries in which governments have created such ecosystems, such as Singapore, Sweden and Finland, with emphasis on building networks, improving coordination and regulations and promoting awareness have witnessed greater success with promoting innovation<sup>8</sup>.

The ecosystem, amongst other integral components, should have a well-structured mechanism to encourage and strengthen innovations and providing them with an enabling environment where they can be nurtured. Despite the recent proliferation of technology in governance, the government does not have a consistent approach to motivate various untapped sources of innovations, such as citizens, employees and external and internal partners.

From the e-governance perspective, there is a need to develop a comprehensive digital government strategy on how e-governance would be embedded in the institutional architecture of the government. Such a strategy would play a critical role in complementing various innovations in the public sector and facilitating a digital transformation. This should be supplemented through permanent institutional anchor for innovation-related measures to drive the innovation agenda across various functional areas and sectors. The vision should be to promote widespread use of e-governance within government through creating functioning models for replication across the country, ultimately leading to establishment of smarter cities.

Last but not the least, knowledge creation, transfer and commercialization are also critical for a well-functioning innovation eco system. While this role is played by academia in the developed world, there is a need to stimulate such knowledge creation in the country and the government can catalyze this process through targeted interventions and facilitating research. This could be done through making research grants on priority areas, in line with national innovation policy and private sector growth needs. Such grants can also be made for establishment of technology transfer offices within universities, so that the research produced can be linked to the private sector. Additionally, the government can play an effective regulatory role in intellectual property rights enforcement to encourage investment in knowledge creation.

### Conclusion

The increasing mobile density has played a key role in deepening the use of technology and spreading innovations. With more than 130 million mobile phone

<sup>5</sup> Bhatta, G. (2003) Don't just do something, stand there! – Revisiting the issue of risks in innovation in the public sector, *The Innovation Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 2

<sup>6</sup> Pollitt, C. (2003), *The Essential Public Manager*, Buckingham, Open University Press

<sup>7</sup> Hartley, (2005) Innovation in governance and public services: past and present, *Public Money & Management*, pp27-34.

<sup>8</sup> Vertova, G (2014). The State and National Systems of Innovation: A Sympathetic Critique. Retrieved from [http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp\\_823.pdf](http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_823.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> The Public Innovator's Playbook: Nurturing Bold Ideas in Government

subscribers, 39 million Internet users and nine million smart phone owners, Pakistan is at the threshold of technological takeoff, offering an unprecedented opportunity

for the government to better serve this expanding pool of digitally connected citizens. The only way to make it happen is strong political commitment with a well-

thought out policy leading to creation of a vibrant innovation ecosystem.



*A Technology and Strengthening Democracy Workshop underway*

## Public Sector Training: Equipping Civil Servants for the Challenges of Modern Day Governance



**Arifa Saboohi**

Director General  
Civil Services Academy  
Lahore

### Introduction

Since the turn of the century, Pakistan has witnessed a rising demand from the citizens for better service delivery by the state machinery. This, along with vocal electronic and print media, technological advancement making access to information faster and easier, has created enormous performance pressures on public officials, who are responsible for key inputs in policy formulation and its implementation. This consequently, underscores the need for capacity building of public sector managers in new skills, tools and methods with regard to public service delivery mechanisms. There is also a need for public sector training institutions to constantly review and revise their training programmes in the light of emerging challenges.<sup>1</sup>

### Evolution of public sector training

On independence, Pakistan adopted, with a few modifications, the structure of services existing in pre-independence India. At the federal level (BS-17 and

above), the two categories of services were (a) All Pakistan Service (comprising Pakistan Administrative service and Police Service of Pakistan), and (b) The Central Services. The latter consisted of 13 services in all, including Pakistan Foreign Service, Accounts Services, Pakistan Customs and Excise Service, Pakistan Taxation Service, etc.<sup>2</sup> *"The inherited administrative system was based on the generalist tradition which emphasized learning through experience rather than through conscious formal training".*<sup>3</sup>

Post independence, four distinct phases can be traced with regard to policy initiatives in public sector training. Till the early 1960s, the training offered to public sector managers was, by and large, of pre-service nature. The first major training institution to be established in 1948 was the Pakistan Administrative Service Academy (later renamed as Civil Services Academy), which imparted pre-service training to officers of Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS). Subsequently, pre-service training institutions were established for other services also for specialized, job related training.<sup>4</sup>

The requirement for in-service training was first highlighted in the first five year plan (launched in 1955). The Plan recognized government's need for an administrative machinery, capable of effectively implementing its economic and social programmes.<sup>5</sup> This resulted in the Public Administration Training Policy of 1960, focusing on preparing civil servants for national development through training in development administration. A number of institutions like the Pakistan Administrative College (PASC), Lahore, and National Institutes of Public Administration (NIPA), Karachi and Lahore, were setup to provide in-service training to high ranking and mid-

management level civil servants. The main courses conducted by these institutions focused on policy development, management and economic and social development.<sup>6</sup>

The major problem in the implementation of the above training policy was the federal agencies' reluctance to nominate officers for training. Thus, some key decisions were taken in 1961. For the first time, training was linked with promotion; various levels of officers to be trained in different institutions were defined, and quotas for federal and provincial services in each training institution were fixed. The policy also required preparation of evaluation reports by the training institutions and their consideration at the time of promotion, and a post training impact assessment.<sup>7</sup> These policy initiatives, at best, had partial success only.

The third phase of public sector training came about after the Administrative Reforms of 1973, which replaced the federal civil services with occupational groups and re-classified bureaucracy under 22 salary grades. Accepting the need for esprit de corps and harmony among members of the federal civil services, a pre-service Common Training Programme (CTP) for all occupational groups immediately after recruitment, was instituted at the Civil Services Academy (CSA), in 1973.<sup>8</sup> On completion of the CTP, each occupational group proceeded to its respective specialized training institution, for job specific training. This pre-service training structure continues to date.

The last major change in public sector training regime occurred after implementation of the devolution plan in 2000, when the government re-organized the training structure of the civil services through establishment of National School

<sup>1</sup>Public Sector Training in Pakistan Conference Report 2012, [http://www.asp.org.pk/knowledge\\_base/pdfs/Public\\_sector\\_training-institutiious.pdf](http://www.asp.org.pk/knowledge_base/pdfs/Public_sector_training-institutiious.pdf)

<sup>2</sup>Dr. Agha Iftikhar Hussain "The Civil Services" in Government & Administration in Pakistan; Editor Jameelur Rehman Khan; Pakistan Public Administration Research Center 1987; p127-131

<sup>3</sup>Dr. M. Fazil Khan, "Administrative and Management Training and Education in Pakistan" in Government & Administration in Pakistan; Editor Jameelur Rehman Khan; Pakistan Public Administration Research Center 1987; p 368

<sup>4</sup>Ibid, p 374 -378

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, p 369 - 386

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, p 370

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, p 371-373

<sup>8</sup>Dr. Agha Iftikhar Hussain "The Civil Services" in Government & Administration in Pakistan; Editor Jameelur Rehman Khan; Pakistan Public Administration Research Center 1987; p139



of Public Policy (NSPP), under the NSPP Ordinance, 2002. An autonomous organization with a Board of Governors (BOG) headed by the President of Pakistan, NSPP has been given the mandate to provide pre and in-service training, instructions and research in public policy, public administration, law, economics, finance and management sciences. Its Board has the power to declare any government training institution as its constituent unit (so far, these powers have been exercised in case of CSA and NIPAs only). It is also required to serve as a research institute for federal government on matters of public policy.


The structural changes resulted in the merger of PASC and NIPA, Lahore, in the NSPP. PASC was converted into the National Management College (NMC), and NIPA Lahore into Senior Management Wing (SMW) of NMC. NIPA's at Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi were renamed as National Institutes of Management (NIMs) and, along with CSA, Lahore, were made the School's constituent units. A Mid-career Management Course was introduced for BS-18 officers at NIMs. Two new institutes, National Institute of Public Policy (NIPP), and Executive Development Institute (EDI) were established as NSPP's integral units to conduct quality research on public policy issues, and provide collaborative learning opportunities to leaders in public and private sectors respectively.

### Situational analysis of Current Training Regime

Public sector training institutions have come a long way since their inception. In terms of training infrastructure, they are well established. Training provided at these institutes, at various levels (from BS 17-21), has developed and matured over a period of time. Since the establishment of NSPP, training is more rigorous and there is a renewed focus on developing core competencies required at various management levels. Competencies like evidence based decision making and problem solving, leadership, team building and resource management, remain common to all management courses conducted by the NSPP and its constituent units. The Senior and National Management Courses also focus on inculcating skills like policy formulation and strategizing policy implementation. The curriculum, training methodology and evaluation of training programmes conducted for the same level of officers at NIMs located in all provincial headquarters and Islamabad, has also been standard-

ized. While the nature of courses conducted at these institutions stays rooted in management and leadership, the complexity of modern day governance challenges is increasingly compelling training institutions to focus on new skills in partnership with other institutions. One such partnership is with the Centre for Economic Research Pakistan (CERP). This has enabled NSPP to use training modules on evidence based decision making developed by CERP in association with John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The ICT module has been revamped and reinforced keeping in view the emerging need for e-governance. The current ICT and Apps development module, designed and conducted with the help of Punjab Information Technology Board, sensitizes participants about use of technology tools for enabled monitoring, intervention and decision making based on data, for better governance and service delivery. By and large, the training methodology is now more focused on workshops, seminars, simulation exercises and syndicate mode learning.

Despite the above gains, most civil servants perceive public sector training programmes as a means for termination of probationary period (in case of pre-service training), and promotion (in case of mandatory in-service courses). There appears little motivation to undergo training for skill development and professional growth. In a perception survey of civil servants conducted in 2007, 80 percent respondents cited foreign training superior to domestic training, identifying the quality of faculty and better training content and methodology, as the major reasons (Figure 1).<sup>9</sup>



dependent on the quality of its faculty. Attracting and retaining the best faculty positions, from the academia, and especially from within the services, remains the greatest challenge for public sector training institutions. Unlike the armed forces, where being selected for an instructional assignment is a matter of prestige, a civil servant opting for the training institute is generally, looked upon as having failed in the mainstream. Posting at a training institution thus, needs to be incentivized, not only monetarily (which has been done in the shape of an additional salary to instructors), but also in terms of giving preference to faculty that has proved its worth in training institutions, in selection to key positions in the government and promotion to higher rank. Training institutions also need to develop a recruitment structure and salary package that will attract the best from the academia, so as to have the right mix of academics and practitioners on their faculty.

Another reason for the less than optimal performance of the training institutions is the lack of coordination between the former and the government departments, to determine the desired outcomes of the training programme. Training needs assessments (TNAs) have, at best, been conducted infrequently, by the employers or the training institutions. The training institutions thus depend on the faculty's experience, and feedback received from the participants of each course, to determine the training needs and formulate and revise its curricula accordingly. Conducting periodical TNAs, based on stakeholders needs in terms of required competencies to achieve organizational goals, are thus essential.

There is no formal mechanism to evaluate whether training positively affects the trainees performance at his/her work place. Human resource issues prevent training institutions to follow up on trainees' performance pursuant to the training course. Third party impact evaluations would assist training institutes re-examine their training curricula and teaching methodology.

On completion of a training course, a detailed evaluation report on the trainee's performance is sent to the employer, which includes an assessment on his/her future posting and promotion potential. This assessment is based on the demonstrated performance of the trainee during the period of the course. The evaluation criterion is well identified and

<sup>9</sup>Nadeem Ul Haque & Idrees Khawaja "Public Service through the eyes of Civil Servants" in PIDE Series on Governance & Institutions, 2007



has evolved over a period of time. Unfortunately, the Human Resource Managers of various government departments rarely use these reports for determining future postings of the trainee or their capacity building in weak areas identified in the reports. These reports are considered only at the time of promotion. The weightage assigned to training within the promotion policy (15 percent), is not significant. Consequently, more often than not, the recommendations of the training institution with regard to promotion and future posting potential, are ignored by the selection/promotion board, unless it is a borderline case. There is a strong case for enhancing the training reports weightage as these can effectively offset the assessment of the annual Performance Evaluation Reports, which are generally exaggerated.

Except for the Specialized training institutions whose courses are more aligned with the specific job requirements of their trainees, the main training courses offered by NSPP and institutions under it, aim to enhance management and leadership skills. Domain related training above BS-17 has yet to receive the attentions it deserves. This is also an area identified by participants of the mandatory courses held by the NSPP and its constituent units for BS 18 and above. Short duration but intensive courses which build upon the domain knowledge of the officer and improve his/her technical skills, can significantly enhance the officer's ability for better service delivery. Such courses can be conducted best at the Specialized Training Institutions of different services. There is thus, a need to strengthen the Specialized Training Institutions (STIs) as well as more institutionalized collaboration among the various STIs to leverage each other's strengths.

Lastly, the technical and professional cadres at the federal and the provincial governments, do not receive systematic training during their careers to acquire new techniques and knowledge, relevant to their professions. This is also true for BS 16 and below officials who comprise the bulk of government employees and in most cases, have a direct interface with public-'patwari' in the revenue department, an inspector in the police department, an appraiser in the customs department being a few examples. Public service delivery cannot improve without equipping them with the required skills. There has to be a bottoms up approach to training as well.

## Conclusion

Vision 2025 developed by the government of Pakistan, recognizes institutional development and modernization of public sector as one of the pillars of development and growth framework. It also stresses the importance of having a skilled, motivated, result focused, high performance civil service which is responsive to citizens' needs. Public sector training institutes can play an important role in improving the knowledge and skill set of civil servants. But for this to happen, the gaps identified above have to be bridged. It also needs to be noted that training alone cannot bring about a significant change. Rather, the entire human resource management value chain, i.e., recruitment, training, promotion, performance appraisal, compensation, welfare and post retirement benefits needs to be targeted in a holistic (but phased) manner.

## Using Social Media to Push for Good Governance



**Dr. Idrees Khawaja**

Senior Research Economist,  
Pakistan Institute of Development  
Economics (PIDE).

**G**ood governance has eight components-it is: participatory, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective, efficient, equitable and follows the rule of law<sup>1</sup>. Much, if not all, elements good governance would accrue on their own if the government is receptive, transparent and open to accountability. The question is how to make this *happen*?

Citizens have typically used a variety of means to convey preferences, voice concerns, demand transparency and hold the governments accountable. The traditional means, of pushing for good governance, though useful in specific situations have their downsides. Informal means like advocacy, protests, strikes, petitioning the government, defiance campaigns and civil disobedience etc. are difficult to organize and sustain. Moreover, organizing these is subject to preferences of the leaders. No wonder these are used sparingly and only for issues of concern to a larger segment of the society. Formal means, for example, participation of citizens in decision making forums of the state, like nomination on governing bodies of public entities, are prone to selection bias of the state, and the citizens

being out numbered. State forums, where citizens have won seats for themselves, may witness the leaders, being either coopted or pushing their personal agenda. Thus it is not difficult to see that all such means of pushing for good governance are open to elite capture and have often stood captured.

Periodic elections offer citizens an opportunity to hold governments accountable-voting out non-performers penalizes the incumbents and imparts a lesson to the incomers. However, electoral accountability is difficult in countries where politics is dynastic or personality-based, and is driven by patron-client relationship-a job offered here, an FIR registered there and a land right hounded elsewhere in return for votes<sup>2</sup>. Add to it the possibility of electoral malpractices in favour of one or the other candidate and the die is cast.

media, make it to '*breaking news bars*' and get through to talk shows?

Again, experience suggests that whatever goes viral on social media is picked up by electronic media. The question then is how to make governance deficit of one or the other kind, viral on social media.

Social media has several feathers in its cap with regards to good governance, including Egypt's Tharir square and more recently, the failed coup in Turkey. More generally, social media has been used by citizens to report news, expose wrongdoings, express opinions, mobilize protests, monitor elections, scrutinize government and deepen participation<sup>3</sup>.

It is not uncommon to hear of a trending issue on social media making waves on electronic media. Hashtags on Twitter and Facebook are a good option to raise governance issues and make these viral. A

**The example of Nigerians comes to light here, who have successfully used hashtags on Twitter to raise various governance concerns. Examples include <sup>4</sup>,**



**OccupyNigeria**

a social-political protest after the government put an end to fuel subsidy;



**BringBackOurGirls**

a movement meant to secure the release of abducted school girls,



**NigeriaDecides**

to ask questions and demand answers from the electoral body during elections and



**NigeriansMarchAgainstCorruption** to announce protests march against corruption.

What may the citizens use then to push for good governance? Experience suggests that the executive fears bad-publicity tickers on electronic media. Therefore, one way to make the executive lend ears to the citizens and to follow the law, is to use electronic media. However the media does not pick every other issue of interest to the citizens. The questions then are, how can citizens seek attention from electronic

citizen concerned about a particular issue can post a comment or a clip, and add to it a hashtag. If the hashtag starts trending, chances are it will be picked up by the electronic media. Almost any instance, for example corruption, injustice, maltreatment in jails, cheating in exams, state of schools, state of health services, irregularities in recruitment, promotions and procurement in public entities and civic

<sup>1</sup> Gramberger, Marc. "Citizens as partners: OECD handbook on information, consultation and public participation in policy making." (2001).

<sup>2</sup> Rajan, Raghuram, 2008, "Is there a Threat of Oligarchy in India" Speech to Bombay Chamber of Commerce.

<sup>3</sup> Diamond, L. Liberation Technology, Journal Democracy, volume 21, No. 3, July 2010, pp.69-83.

<sup>4</sup> Inuwa, A. Social Media: A Catalyst for Good Governance, Opinion, Peoples Daily <http://weekend.peoplesdailyng.com/index.php/opinion/opinion/6957-social-media-a-catalyst-for-good-governance>

issues etc have the opportunity to be raised in this manner.

'A picture speaks a thousand words' and this is the beauty of social media which allows a message to be communicated effectively-for those short on time, this feature provides them the opportunity to complain, advocate or read. Moreover, further facilitations in the form of automatic services are also gaining momentum whereby simply signing up for a campaign enables the user to receive regular updates without even having to individually follow a campaign.

The chief advantage of using social media is its uncoordinated nature, unlike print and electronic media. Being uncoordinated, it is neither opinionated nor driven by an ideology or vested commercial interests. Therefore, no issue that a person yearns to raise gets excluded. This makes social media less susceptible to elite capture.

Governments too, are employing social media to further governance ends. It is now inconceivable for a municipal body in developed countries not to have an electronic mechanism of registering civic complaints with most bodies having Twitter or Facebook accounts. When hurricane Sandy struck the United States, the Governor's office in New York tweeted over 800 times in just three days. Similarly, the city of Boston uses a mobile app to alert citizens about civic issues like potholes<sup>5</sup>.

Examples at home and around are not few. Raids conducted on several eateries by the Punjab Food Authority caught attention of electronic media after the Authority's Director posted raid-images on her Facebook page. In 2012/13, then Chief Secretary of Gilgit-Baltistan addressed complaints ranging from a delay in completion of a bridge, to irregular appointments in education department, through Facebook<sup>6</sup>. In neighbouring India, the traffic police in Bangalore successfully used Facebook to announce rerouting of

traffic to allow a religious procession<sup>7</sup>.

The lesson then is that in order to make good governance possible, all public officials need to have electronic mechanisms for a two way communication with citizens as well as their subordinates and the citizens need to ask for such mechanisms. Governments would be well served if they were to make the social media, their eyes and ears.

To mobilize citizens for a cause, access to public data on the subject, in a form understandable by a non-technical person is crucial. Experts can voluntarily share such data on social media. Citizens can then glance over the easy to understand, for example, data on national budget, to reflect upon whether national expenditure priorities match preferences of the citizens

### Right to information Act – why is it barely utilized?

Right to information Act stands promulgated in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The acts, if used extensively, carry enormous potential to improve governance at the provincial level. With the perception that Pakistan enjoys regarding the extent of corruption, favouritism, nepotism and inefficiency etc, one would have expected a flood of questions regarding costs of projects, reasons for delay in completion, basic education and health costs, queries regarding number of doctors posted in Basic Health Units, budgets of police stations, allocation of development funds in districts and so on and so forth. Questions like these, answers to these and the publicity that the answers may receive in the media have the potential to improve governance. The questions that remain are plenty: Why is the Right to Information Act not being utilized extensively by citizens to seek information? Why journalists, in search of juicy stories, not using the act? The answer to these questions can help evolve strategies for greater use of the act which in turn is likely to influence governance for the better. Possible reasons for little use include fear of facing the wrath of the state and the lethargy of the citizens-they do not want to spend time involved in preparing the petition, posting the application and making good use of the information provided.

at large. In case of ambiguities and mismatches, the concern would go viral on social media thereby prompting electronic media to highlight the issue as well and question the government on reassessing priorities. At times social media creates further hype on an issue raised on electronic media. A limitation is that the unregulated nature of social media can make it difficult to sift fact from fiction. Therefore what appears on the media should only be used to initiate serious inquiry rather than jump to conclusions.

The problem still remains! What would prompt citizens to take out time from sharing jokes, clips and photos of family events on WhatsApp and instead, comment on a serious issue such as the skewed distribution of national funds among different regions of a country?

Instances of pedestrians capturing parking violations on their cell phone and sharing it with the traffic police are common occurrences in some countries; but can this apply in Pakistan or in less developed countries?

Citizens may lack the exuberance to voice their concerns on local and national issues. They may carry their own historical baggage of '*kuch nahein hoga*' (nothing will happen). To counter this sort of attitude, which is but natural given past experience, people need to be convinced through proper advocacy and motivating historical examples of resilience and sustained struggle. The public are also hesitant in speaking up on sensitive issues in order to avoid the possible wrath of the authorities. Numerous countries have laws that protect the whistle blowers. Countries

also have non-profit organizations that provide legal help to the whistle blowers. Such non-profits might be needed in Pakistan as well.

The key to citizens' push for good governance lies in citizens feeling the urge to push. How may this urge be developed? It starts from the mind: the virtues of citizens' push for good governance and the benefits of collective action for oneself and the society, are ideas that

need to be inculcated in the minds of the citizens. How can this be achieved? Short term would include advocacy, preferably through the electronic media owing to its huge impact, whereas long term would include revising curriculums and teaching methodologies at schools.

Despite social media's lesser susceptibility to elite capture, the low level of internet penetration beyond large cities and the low literacy rate makes it difficult for the marginalized to use social media, though 25 million Facebook users as of March 2016 is not a small number<sup>8</sup>.

To institutionalize the use of social media for governance, a framework needs to be developed. This would not be easy as would-be losers would pose resistance. To

<sup>5</sup> Sreeram Ananthasayanam, "Social Media for Good Governance," (2013). Available at

<http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-miscellaneous/tp-others/social-media-for-good-governance/article4480396.ece>

<sup>6</sup> Hussain, Y. Social Media as a Tool of Good Governance in the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan. Cross Roads, Asia, Working Series 22.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> Umair Qureshi, "Pakistan Facebook Users crosses the landmark of 25 Million users," (2016). Available at <http://umairqureshi.com/pakistan-deepens-facebook-user-base-with-over-11-million-users/>

Initial failures of social media in helping improve governance may cause disap-

Egypt's Thārir Square-the former rooted in centuries of indigenous advocacy fueled in part from enlightenment literature produced by French philosophers like Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu-was a success while the latter still seems to be a struggling cause.





## Open Data – Improving Public Service



E-Governance Consultant

An emerging concept that has gained immense popularity in improving governance and accountability of governments is Open Data. Open Data refers to a government opening up data for the public to access, use and reproduce freely. This requires proactive disclosure of public sector data without restrictions (barring information classified as sensitive for the state). In order to promote and ensure Open Data, many governments have legislated access to public sector data through laws covering Right to Information (RTI) or Freedom of Information (FOI). These legislations establish protocols, measures and bounds of information to be granted to public at large especially focusing on mechanisms for requests and retrieval of information pertaining to affairs of the government. Information disclosure and/or provision is restricted to disallow information of personal nature, pertaining to national security etc. RTI / FOI laws can also mandate proactive disclosure of data as a means to grant access to information.

An integral part of improving public sector performance and service delivery is accountability. Efforts at enhancing capacity, improving resource allocations, developing institutions and creating incentive structures will eventually fail to achieve the desired impact without having robust controls and measures that strengthen systems. While it is an implicit

function of the state to have internal mechanisms for accountability at all layers, spanning across various measures of performance and delivery, more often than not, such functions have not been able to fulfil the purpose of improving performance in developing countries. Open Data can help pivot improvements in governance across a range of domains and is hence important for both the government and the public. A brief synopsis of key impact areas is presented below.

### Accountability

Motivation to showcase high performance when data is made public adds a healthy pressure on the government to achieve targets, improve outcomes and be able to highlight the impact achieved. Institutionalization of transparency through open access to data, statistics, documents, reports, analysis and communication helps keep matters in check. The public eye for review brings to light malpractices and hence increases accountability. Collection of data from various corners and consolidating it in a usable manner creates a meaningful pool of resources that helps increase knowledge and information sharing. Insights into government operations and analysis of trends, achievements, progress and performance can help identify bottlenecks and take corrective measures.

### Planning

Similarly, public having access to granular data will help improve planning of the non-government sector with regards to various programs, initiatives, development efforts and opportunities. Efforts to introduce and mainstream participatory forms of governance can be implemented better using open data. Credible data and improved knowledge about working of the public sector supported by platforms around this data can help improve decision-making of the private sector.

### Empowerment

Open data also paves the way for citizen empowerment through informed decisions about public services and resource allocations. Having detailed

information on performance measures of basic services like health and education can enable citizens to make the best choices to avail such facilities, identify shortcomings and have a voice in demanding actions to improve service delivery. Continuous availability of the data allows monitoring and evaluation of new projects, corrective actions taken, efficacy of actions and resulting impact. In a nutshell, data helps maintain a pulse on deviations.

### Problem Solving

Another increasingly popular use of open data is problem solving for the government. Active collaboration of citizens with policymakers, backed by data, is helping improve the approach to solving long-standing issues facing the public. Support from citizens in terms of contribution to ground level data, analysis and bringing together expertise from various quarters can help improve the resolution cycle for addressing inefficiencies.

RTI laws have been enacted as early as 1951 (Finland). However, traction gained over the last few decades has primarily been fuelled by developments in technology on the supply side, and the awareness by the public of being answerable to them on the demand side. Citizens electing governments should be able to understand how responsibilities have been discharged. In South Asia, Pakistan was the pioneer in enacting a Freedom of Information Act in 2002 followed by India in 2005 and Bangladesh in 2008. Enacting legislation, however, is only a first step. Quality of the legislation in terms of how open it makes the government is critical. Global rankings comparing country legislations put India at 3 (1 being the highest quality legislation), Bangladesh at 20 and Pakistan at 84.

Once a law has been enacted, implementation of the law is the next big challenge. Proactive disclosure to make data available publicly in a usable manner and being able to implement the mechanics to cater to information requests through the required institutional structures is of

paramount importance. In addition to a Federal FOI Act, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and KP have also enacted their own provincial laws. KP and Punjab had clear provisions on the implementation mechanisms to cater to information requests and have already set up structures to comply. The legislation in Sindh and Balochistan however does not contain any such mechanisms and no formal structures have been implemented as yet. Pakistan, in its nascent stages of moving along the open government curve, has unfortunately not been able to establish


any significant platforms that offer the scale and reach to allow meaningful exchange of information that leads to positive impact. Our political economy and social context, however, offer immense potential to create an open data regime to improve transparency, accountability, data availability and resultantly public services. The richness of open data is bound to help government and citizens alike. Some nascent and basic efforts however have been undertaken. They include:

- Pakistan Data Portal – collaboration

between CSOs to collect and make available public datasets.

- Open Data Initiative – a limited scale portal that puts key datasets of the government of Punjab in the public domain along with offering visualizations to analyze and present information.
- A number of department/entities make data available through their own websites which includes federal agencies and provincial departments including Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Education, Health, etc.

### Case-studies of open government/open data initiatives from across the globe



The portal contains five key types of information<sup>1</sup>: 1) Direct spending by federal government agencies through contracts and tender processes; 2) All financial transfers to states, municipalities and the federal district; 3) Financial transfers to social program beneficiaries; 4) Administrative spending, including staff salaries, staff travel expenses and per diems and office expenditures; and 5) Information on all government official credit card spending. Another important component is a National Debarment List, which provides a background check for all companies and individuals who have committed fraudulent practices before issuing new public contracts.

<sup>1</sup>Nadeem Ul Haque & Idrees Khawaja "Public Service through the eyes of Civil Servants" in PIDE Series on Governance & Institutions, 2007

Making government open is a paradigm shift in the governance philosophy. It requires moving away from a walled garden approach to restrict information flow and control insights to making it public to collectively improve outcomes. Embracing the move to being 'open' requires strong implementation support in addition to policy guidelines. While limited scale efforts in silos are underway in Pakistan at the federal and provincial levels to proactively disclose data, there is need for a concerted strategy and implementation plan to support open data. For example, a lot of data available does not cover the entire disclosure cycle and hence is of limited utility in achieving the desired impact. The Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform under its joint project with UNDP has already envisaged development of a Data Portal that builds on the individual efforts in place now and serves as a first step in ensuring public access to current and usable data for Pakistan. At very initial stages yet, this data portal will start with existing available data sets. It is imperative that, at a later stage, this portal moves to more granular data on government performance and service delivery where applicable.

Keeping in view the challenges of transparency, accountability, planning, resource allocations and service delivery standards that Pakistan faces across administrative units and sectors, an Open Government approach may catalyse the reforms underway to further boost outcomes. Key areas that should be the focus of proactive disclosure by the government are:

- Financial Transparency/Procurement – budget, spending, process
- Processes and Compliance
- Performance Management Frameworks and Target Benchmarking
- Service Delivery KPIs and Achievement
  - Service Standards on provision of Health, Education, Law Enforcement, Judiciary, Infrastructure Development

To ensure adequacy of data made public and its relevance to improving outcomes, it is essential that robust systems and capacity are in place that connect all relevant provincial and federal layers to record/collect and report such data. Development of technology tools/platforms to enable collection and utilization of data is a simpler task. Data metrics that provide a 360 degree of the various functional domains of the government is a complex change management exercise. Development of such data

instruments, their timely reporting and eventually making it public will require the highest levels of political and bureaucratic support. With federal and provincial laws in place, and fragmented precedents that have opened public sector data within specialized domains, open data can help create a nexus of public-private collaboration to improve performance of the public services. Active engagement between provincial and federal government will be required to ensure a sustainable data collection process that helps present a holistic view of service delivery domains. Similarly, a structured results based management framework will have to be conceived, designed and implemented to create open data as a by-product. The boom in information and communication technologies in Pakistan already provides a ready landscape to allow utilization of data even at grass roots. As a first step, a single national data portal should be created that is populated with all public sector information that exists in digital form and a roadmap for progression made public.



## Dr. Tahir Hijazi

Member (Governance and Reform)  
Planning Commission of Pakistan

### **What are the governance and civil service reforms being pursued by you and the Planning Commission, and how much progress has been made so far?**

The Planning Commission has initiated civil service reforms in around 43 focus areas. These focus areas include but are not limited to recruitment, selection, training, performance evaluation, promotion, compensation etc. Recommendations from our end have been completed and have been shared with relevant stakeholders for further action and approval. In some cases, the reforms have already been approved and are being implemented, for example, raising the age limit from 28 years to 30 years for entry into civil service.

Progress entails two broad phases. The first phase relates to the preparation of documents outlining the process for implementation, and extensive discussion with stakeholders, a step which has been in progress since the last two years, with the resultant consensus having been reached and ripe for implementation. The second phase includes approval by concerned authorities. Phase one has been achieved and completed almost entirely whilst phase two is still in progress.

### **What are the key changes that the Planning Commission endeavours to bring through civil service reform? In other words, what improvement does it intend to bring in the services of public sector institutions?**

The aim of the Planning Commission is to improve the overall efficiency of civil servants through better government structures, better incentive systems and better accountability mechanisms. The Planning Commission continues to propose recommendations to enhance and improve the services of public sector institutions. A few example recommendations include, but not limited to, strengthening of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) in terms of technical expertise, two-stage entry examinations for CSS that would enable thorough screening, specialized cluster for entry exam, strengthening of the establishment division to look after all the civil servants in their promotions, transfers, trainings, performance evaluations, pensions, rewards, punishments etc. and as part of this, we have recommended hiring professional human resource management, legal experts etc.

## say that again

*"...Civil Service Reforms can only be brought when there are more agents of change, increased collaborations and team work"*

### **Q3. What factors are negatively impacting or resisting governance and civil service reform initiatives in Pakistan and how are you addressing those?**

Economic factors of financial constraints offer resistance in terms of advancing the cause. Politically, no resistance has been experienced. A major issue is that of inertia-there is not much will or motivation for change to take place. Although there have been multiple complaints regarding the system over the years, yet people are comfortable in their current situations and are resistant to change. This resistance to change might be due to a number of factors including a hidden fear of being adversely affected by the change and the unwillingness to adapt, considering change is psychologically very difficult to absorb.

### **Any lessons learnt so far from your efforts related to civil service reforms? What will you continue to do and what will you do differently next time?**

Our approach to reform is based on a strategic framework based on institutionalization done in collaborative, inclusive and citizen focused programs (ICIC). This model has been conceived by different public sector representatives in collaboration with the Federal Minister of Planning, Prof. Ahsan Iqbal. Every reform action intends to be sourced from this framework. The Minister's plan of action to involve as many stakeholders as possible in the dialogue has proved to be a very positive and effective approach. So discussion on forums etc is a mechanism that we would continue to practice in the future as well. Having said that, discussion, of course, is just the first step, and it should be followed by a strong implementation strategy.

The role of technology and social media cannot be ignored and this is one facet that we intend to work upon in the future. Apart from this, more frequent trainings and workshops, talks by international consultants and experts, increased involvement of universities as well as inclusion of related courses as part of academic programs, are all novel ways to take the cause of the effective implementation of civil service reforms forward.

Based on my experience, the biggest lessons learnt are that firstly, change cannot occur unless one is determined to work for it, and second, Civil Service Reforms can only be brought when there are more agents of change, increased collaborations and team work.





## Ahsan Iqbal

Federal Minister

Planning, Development and Reform

**Tell us about the civil service reforms you are pursuing.**

It is quintessential to contextualize the historical background of civil service in Pakistan. As an independent country, Pakistan inherited civil service from British colonial India. In the colonial service, the purpose was essentially to collect taxes and maintain law and order. After Pakistan got its independence, it was burdened by the refugee crisis and did not have sufficient resources to invest in development of institutions. Moreover, it lost its founding leaders in quick succession. This resulted in consolidation of power by civil-military bureaucracy which carried strong imprints of colonial legacy. As a result, the orientation of civil service was not to serve but to rule. Undemocratic regimes being non-representative and unaccountable to the people of Pakistan did not have the will to reform the civil institutions. On the other hand, political instability did not allow democratic governments to focus on reform agenda as they were mostly operating in survival mode. The year 2013 marked the watershed moment in Pakistan's history as for the first time, one civilian elected government transferred power to another. So, in 2013, the government of Prime Minister Sharif after assuming power took up a reform agenda to reorient civil institutions to provide quality service delivery to citizens. The objective of the reform agenda is to enhance capacity, efficiency and effectiveness of civil institutions. Being a representative and democratic government, the current regime has to deliver services to the people of Pakistan. Therefore, it is deemed essential by Prime Minister Sharif's government to modernize the public sector and it is in this backdrop that civil service reforms are pursued. To take a holistic approach towards reforms, the government devised Vision 2025 that provides a roadmap for institutional reforms in the context of the broader development agenda. As part of the implementation of Vision 2025, the Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform is pursuing civil service reform in the areas of recruitment, selection, training, promotion and career progression, performance evaluation, incentive structure, posting and other HR related issues.

**In terms of progress, what has been done so far?**

A Number of attempts were made in the past to reform civil service. Dozens of commissions were formed to pursue civil service reforms but their recommendations could not be implemented due to a lack of ownership by the civil service. Therefore, an extensive consultative process was initiated by the current government to create ownership among the civil service of the reform process. Moreover, it was prioritized by the government to sensitize civil servants about the urgency of reforms. More than two thousand civil servants were engaged in the consultation processes in all the provinces. Consequently,

some key reforms have been finalized and are in the process of implementation. For example, performance contracts for eleven economic ministries; cluster based entry exam for professionalization and induction of civil servants; reform of training programs by introducing new subjects based on modern management and technology through Training Needs Assessment (TNA); and, relaxation in the upper age limit to provide an opportunity to applicants with higher qualification and experience for entry in to civil service.

**What is the motivation behind Civil Service Reform?**

Civil service is the primary instrument of service delivery. Unfortunately, due to its poor performance and dated structure, the gulf between citizens' expectations and state's response has widened. This has led to a growing trust deficit in society on state institutions. In order to restore trust of citizens on state institutions, civil service must be restructured on a high performance organization model. Thus, the basic motivation behind civil service reform is to improve service delivery for citizens and effective implementation of the government's development agenda. The context in which the colonial bureaucratic structure was developed is redundant in today's complex and changing environment. With the increasing empowerment of citizens, it has become necessary to reform the public sector to match citizens' expectations. Moreover, the service revolution in the private sector has also raised the benchmark many folds for public sector service delivery. Citizens are no longer passive actors in governance. New power centers have emerged in society. Therefore, the motivation behind the civil service reform initiative is to develop a new paradigm of public sector management based on institutional, collaborative, inclusive and citizen-centered governance.

**In the past there have been a number of attempts to reform public sector and civil service. They have not been very successful. What do you think is different this time that makes you confident that your reforms will bear fruits?**

As mentioned above, previous attempts of civil service reforms failed due to a lack of ownership by key stakeholders. Being cognizant of this historical fact, this time we have taken all stakeholders on board for civil service reforms. We have undertaken extensive consultations with key stakeholders which included two annual governance forums and twenty five stakeholders' workshops on civil service reforms. We have consulted all relevant departments and groups of the Ministries while developing reform proposals. We have also engaged media in this process to disseminate information. Due to detailed deliberation among multiple stakeholders, we can see that this

## say that again

*"...It is important to create a network of pro-reform agents to provide an enabling environment for reforms."*

time there is a wider ownership of civil service reforms. Moreover, we have prioritized the implementation side of these reforms. Predicated on all these factors, we strongly believe these reforms are going to yield positive outcomes.

### **Have you faced any obstacles to the civil service reform in Pakistan?**

There was an inertia of a status-quo which gradually melted through engagement and consultation processes. However, there were some skeptics who argued that this attempt would fail like previous attempts. Furthermore, there is a strong inter-service rivalry which touched fault lines of internal conflict within civil service. However, I am confident that the inclusive and consultative approach accompanied by political ownership of the whole process is going to yield positive outcomes and set goals will be accomplished soon.

### **Any lessons you learnt based on your previous efforts so far that you would like to share with those engaged in similar initiatives?**

First of all, a broad coalition must be created to support a reform initiative. Without creating a strong and compelling sense of urgency for reform, it is difficult to push people out of their comfort zone. The political ownership of the chief executive is very critical to send a signal of seriousness and commitment at all levels. Institutional reform process is not mechanical in nature, it has to be an organic process that requires careful nurturing and perseverance to bear fruits. At times, setbacks and resistance will come in the way and it is important to remain positive and committed to the reforms agenda. It is important to create a network of pro-reform agents to provide an enabling environment for reforms. Unless the reform process is linked to incentive and evaluation system, it is difficult to expect any behavioral change.



**Fahad Mahmud Mirza**

Section Officer  
(Large Enterprises Development)  
Ministry Of Industries And Production

## **Why did you join the Civil Service?**

In my opinion, Civil Service is the only platform which allows you to facilitate the public in their affairs, in your own capacity and competence, because the only objective here is to meet Pakistan's goals, as opposed to the private sector where meeting organizational goals are the mainstay. This check is my motivational impetus to serve Pakistan as much as possible.

## **In your opinion, are the youth of Pakistan motivated enough to join the Civil Services? Why?**

With the number of applicants and aspirants for Competitive Examination rising each year, the youth is more motivated to join the Civil Service because it complies with every person's self-esteem and self-actualization to be a part of the most respected group in the country, which is a very positive idea. On the flip side, one very valid reason is job security and availability since the major private sectors are saturated and many professional degree holders take their chance by competing here, keeping in view the physiological, safety and social needs of every human, naturally. The competition is increasing with every passing year through the influx of more qualified individuals coming from all parts of the country, but there is still a major portion of our society that completely neglects joining the civil service.

## **What key reforms should be initiated to encourage youth participation in civil services?**

- Exposure needs to come from an early age. Curriculums at school and college levels need to incorporate an introduction to civil services, its structure and stature both, so that civil services is encouraged to not only be taken up as a mere job but as part of a higher purpose to serve the country. Often, small children aspire to become doctors or engineers from an early age, but none of them aspire to become civil servants. This mentality needs to be changed: the elements of social responsibility and duty towards our country, rather than merely attaining professional degrees needs to be indoctrinated from a very early age.
- Research Attachments' need to be established whereby government ministries in affiliation with universities create programs for the youth to conduct researches on pressing issues in the major sectors of Pakistan. Such avenues will open up the realities of the public sector to the youth, in contrast to what is read or heard on social media. The conclusions and recommendations on these research activities will help formulate a better way forward, and encourage youth participation as well. The key for encouragement is active participation, and getting a flavour of the service.
- The time frame for the selection process, from the date of examination till entry into service, needs to be cut down by half. The long one year waiting time period before the final selections are announced is extremely demotivating for all candidates. In order to address this issue, the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) should conduct eight exam papers only (four compulsory and four optional), instead of 12. This will marginally decrease the work load and time for announcing the results and encourage more participants to take the exam.
- Finally, a good pay structure needs to be introduced to elevate levels of motivation and push youngsters in choosing the civil service over the private sector. The Singaporean Civil Service Model is a good example in this respect, as its focus is on giving higher salaries in order to promote participation and combat corruption.



**Daniyal Ahmed Javed**

Officer  
Police Service of Pakistan

## Why did you join the civil service?

The legal regime in Pakistan is rickety. Employees are not provided adequate rights in the private sector. Most jobs are predatory and exploitative in nature. However, MNCs do offer an alternative. Sadly, their presence is limited and prized roles are scarce. Meanwhile, local corporates are run by the whims of nonprofessional owners. Even where there is some semblance of joint liability company, ownership and management lines are diffused. Therefore, civil services with its autonomy, prestige, defined career path, latitude in decision making and society wide impact offers itself as an attractive option. It is a merit based transparent system that discriminates on ability only. Moreover, one can bring relief to masses and in this process achieve higher satisfaction. This nonmonetary benefit cannot be monetized in the form of higher salary.

## In your opinion are the youth of Pakistan motivated enough to join the civil service? Why?

This translates into a pass percentage of one percent only. The thriving academy industry witnessed in urban areas is a testament that youth looks up to civil service as a desirable career choice. A slow job market, diminishing foreign direct investment and retarded growth in an overseas economy makes CSS a credible opportunity for urban youth.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, a predominant chunk of our demographic base resides in rural areas. The private sector and entrepreneurship is restricted to urban areas. Hence with limited avenues, a swarming number of rural youth takes CSS as a viable option for social mobility.

## What key reforms should be initiated to encourage youth participation in civil services?

Without sounding condescending, I would state that civil services is an elite club. It has a different philosophy, evolution and history. Whereas, the democratic model is inclusive and participative, the bureaucratic approach is selective but competent. Therefore, it is not about the quantity of youth participation but the quality. In this regard, human resource management needs to be streamlined. Modern HR tools in selection, training and compensation should be applied to attract able, young people to this sector.



**Hayat Omer Malik**

Assistant Commissioner (UT)  
Inland Revenue Service

## Why did you join the civil service?

Civil Service of Pakistan provides an opportunity to an individual that is both unique and worthwhile. It pushes a civil servant in to situations where he can both lead and serve at the same time. This opportunity instills in an officer a spirit that other professions lack and therefore makes it worth it.

## In your opinion are the youth of Pakistan motivated enough to join the civil services? Why?

Unfortunately this is not the case right now. Urban cities where private sector opportunities are ample do not leave much incentive for youngsters to opt for the civil service. As opposed to this, individuals from rural backgrounds tend to be more aware of the civil services as a profession. It also pertains to society's belief that the civil services are only a tool for gaining power and influence rather than a proper profession.

## What key reforms should be initiated to encourage youth participation in civil services?

Instead of mere advertisement, the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) needs to create awareness as its first step in outlining how an individual can pursue his/her 'personal' and 'professional' development as a civil servant. This is severely lacking as a policy goal for the FPSC, thus individuals with dubious intentions and those hailing from well entrenched political and bureaucratic families are the only ones who end up joining the civil service.





**Sarah Hayat**

Assistant Commissioner  
Lahore Cantt

## **Why did you join the civil service?**

Upon receiving my graduate degree from abroad, I returned to Pakistan and joined the Economics Department at a prestigious university in Lahore as a Teaching Fellow. At that moment, I had not decided on a career for myself although I was quite interested in economic research. The position provided me with an opportunity to contribute to research involving IFIs as well as government departments. Though this experience was intellectually satisfying, I was not completely happy as I realized that most of the policy suggestions and research findings were not followed up at the implementation stage, which left them completely in the hands of government departments that may or may not have the technical capacity to see things through to the end. With my training in Economics, I believed I could bridge this gap by being on the implementation side of things and make a substantial contribution to society.

## **In your opinion are the youth of Pakistan motivated enough to join the civil services? Why?**

In short, yes. The volume of candidates that register for the exam every year is a testament to this fact. At the expense of sounding pedantic, whether the motivation of aspirants is fueled by the "right" reasons is a separate issue. I should take a moment to explain what I mean by "right" here: In my experience, many candidates sit this exam because a) they do not have any other option; b) they think this career will be financially rewarding; or c) they have seen the perquisites and the authority that officers of very senior ranks have access to. These, I believe are all the wrong reasons for wanting to join the civil services as this is a career that is exceptionally challenging and not proportionately rewarding financially. If we take the example of PAS, erstwhile DMG, young officers who have been urban city dwellers all their lives get posted to remote locations in Gilgit Baltistan (GB) or Balochistan with meagre financial compensation. Unless a candidate joins the civil services with the right expectations he/she is bound to be dissatisfied. Save for a few service streams, all civil servants have to experience an arduous journey that puts their fortitude to the test. Without a genuine interest in the workings of the State and public service delivery, I find it hard to believe that a civil servant can succeed at their job.

## **What key reforms should be initiated to encourage youth participation in civil services?**

Four key reforms come to my mind:

- The starting point should be the implementation of measures that boost information dissemination to all parts of Pakistan. For remote areas belonging to Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, GB and Kashmir, this is important as their inhabitants might not even be aware of the opportunities that exist. In the case of Punjab, it is important to attract candidates from some of the best private and public universities. To illustrate, a step that could be taken in the immediate run could focus on increasing the outreach of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) over social media. In the longer run, civil services could also be advertised through institutions of secondary and higher education.
- Reformation is needed to reduce the timeframe of the whole recruitment cycle. At present, it is nearly 16 to 17 months long. If we add to this the time it requires to prepare for the exam, we are looking at nearly two full years. This, in my opinion, is a major deterrent for most university graduates and definitely contributes to repelling some of the brightest youth.
- Presently, promotions to higher grades are time bound and individual performance is a secondary criterion, which I think discourages many ambitious members of the youth from pursuing civil services as a career. The order needs to be reversed, whereby merit and performance take the centre stage, instilling some of the qualities of the private sector in the public sector.
- Finally, I think financial compensation will need to be increased for civil servants if the best talent is to be attracted. I understand that there are a number of challenges in implementing such a reform but it is one that is needed nonetheless and there is no alternative to this.



**Mariah Atiq**

Assistant Director (UT)  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

## **Why did you join the civil service?**

Prior to joining the civil service I was engaged as a marketing officer with a Dutch multinational company from the oil and gas sector on a handsome salary. Over the course of time, I realized that though high salaries are a definite incentive offered by the private sector, the prestige that comes with joining the civil service has an air of its own. Although serving the country can be done in whatever capacity, however the armed forces and civil services are in my eyes, the two best opportunities to serve the country. In this regard, Foreign Service was a natural choice that would enable me to present a positive image of Pakistan abroad.

## **In your opinion are the youth of Pakistan motivated enough to join the civil services? Why?**

Recent statistics indicate an upward trend with regards to the youth joining the civil service. Ten years ago, the number used to stand at four to five thousand. Now, however, it is increasing with each passing year. The increase in the age limit has also encouraged more participation. However, in a country of 20 million where more than half of the population comprises of youth, it would be encouraging to see more and more candidates appearing in the exam.

## **What key reforms that should be initiated to encourage youth participation in civil services?**

One key reform should be the hiring of professionals, especially in service groups like Inland Revenue Service and Audit and Accounts, where individuals with relevant qualifications be inducted. In this regard, such service groups should be placed in one cluster and relevant degree requirement be mandatory for it.

E-government should be introduced at the federal and provincial level so that the governments can right-size the huge number of unskilled people posted on Groups to 1-16. These employees get 85 percent of the wage bill of the ministries while the CSP officers only get 15 percent.

The system of promotions should be based on accomplishments rather than on levels of seniority. Some measures have been introduced in this regard; however, the process should be transparent.

Finally, the salary package of civil servants is quite negligible when compared with the private sector and needs to be revised.

**DEVELOPMENT ADVOCATE**  
**PAKISTAN**