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Compendium of Permanent Housing Interventions in Post-Yolanda Rehabilitation in Eastern Visayas, Philippines



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In Eastern Visayas, Philippines**

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Acronyms

AFD	<i>Agence Francaise de Development</i>
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
BDO	Banco de Oro
BDRMC	Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committee
BFAR	Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
BYSCWA	Barangay 61 Yolanda Survivors Construction Workers' Association
CBCP-NASSA	Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines—National Secretariat for Social Action
CC	Community Council
CCO-DP	Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace
CEO	City Engineering Office
CFC	Couples for Christ
CFC-ANCOP	Couples For Christ- Answering the Cry of the Poor
CGI	corrugated galvanized iron
CHCDO	City Housing and Community Development Office
CLUP	Comprehensive Land Use Plan
CMP	Community Mortgage Program
CoMSCA	Community Managed Savings and Credit Association
Cordaid	Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid
CSOs	civil society organizations
CSWDO	City Social Welfare and Development Office
DA	Department of Agriculture
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DOH	Department of Health
DOLE	Department of Labor and Employment
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways
DRR	disaster risk reduction
DRRMO	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office
DS	Development Sponsors
DSD	duplex structural design
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EGGAR	Engineering, Geological and Geohazard Assessment Report
EO	Executive Order
ESAMELCO	Eastern Samar Electric Cooperative
EU	European Union
EVSU	Eastern Visayas State University

FGD	focus group discussion
FRANCESCO	Pope Francis for Resilient and Co-Empowered Sustainable Communities
GI	galvanized iron
GK	Gawad Kalinga
GRRGO	Guiuan Recovery and Rehabilitation Group Office
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
HLURB	Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
HOA	homeowners' association
HUDCC	Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
IADA	integrated area development approach
ICEB	interlocking compressed earth block
IDP	internally displaced people
IPI	International Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
JFLFI	Julio and Florentina Ledesma Foundation, Inc.
KOICA	Korean International Cooperation Agency
LEYECO	Leyte Electric Cooperative
LGU	local government unit
LIAC	Local Inter-Agency Committee
LMWD	Leyte Metropolitan Water District
LPP	local participatory planning
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
LRRP	Local Government Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan
LWUA	Local Water Utilities Administration
MC	Memorandum Circular
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MGB	Mines and Geosciences Bureau
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MRF	materials recovery facility
NASA	Neighborhood Association for Shelter Assistance
NBZ	no-build zone
NDCC	National Disaster Coordinating Council
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NEA	National Electrification Authority
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NGOs	non-government organizations
NHA	National Housing Authority
NSCP	National Structural Code of the Philippines
OCD	Office of Civil Defense
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPARR	Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery

PCUP	Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor
PEF	Peace and Equity Foundation
PHIVOLCS	Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology
PO	people's organization
PPPP	private with people partnership
PWD	people with disability
RCAP	Resilient Community Action Plan
RCAP	Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Palo
RPT	real property tax
SAC	Social Action Commission
SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission
SHeG	Self Help Group
SHFC	Social Housing Finance Corporation
SHO	<i>De Stichting Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties</i>
SS	Sector Sponsors
UAP	United Architects of the Philippines
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UPA	Urban Poor Associates
UP-ALL	Urban Poor Alliance
WASH	water and sanitation
YCRRP	Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan

Introduction

Typhoon Yolanda (international name: Haiyan) left in its wake unprecedented loss of lives and damage to property in the islands of Central Philippines where more than 16 million people were affected by the tropical cyclone. The typhoon first made landfall in Guiuan, Eastern Samar, but its ferocity was felt most in Tacloban City where storm surges caused deaths in the thousands and left the city in ruins. As Yolanda moved westward it caused the greatest devastation to the cities of Ormoc in Leyte and Roxas in Panay Island.¹ The number of displaced people was estimated at more than 4 million who had to be housed in temporary shelters and eventually in permanent houses.²

Many international development agencies and local NGOs provided recovery and rehabilitation assistance to the affected families and communities in the most devastated areas, among them Samar and Leyte. One of them is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which assisted the affected local government units (LGUs) and communities in debris clearing and waste management, livelihood assets replacement, and disaster risk reduction and management. With funding commitment from the European Union (EU), UNDP implemented a comprehensive recovery and rehabilitation project in selected Yolanda-affected communities in the Visayas. The project focused on four components, namely: 1) disaster-resilient public infrastructure, 2) sustainable livelihoods, 3) resettlement of displaced populations, and 4) support to recovery coordination and local capacities for disaster risk reduction and management.

Part of UNDP's commitment under the component of Resettlement of Displaced Populations is to provide technical assistance to national government agencies and local government by fielding consultants and conducting relevant studies and information and education campaigns on resettlement issues and rights of displaced persons. To provide the government and other development partners a comprehensive reference of workable approaches to resettlement that adhere to the basic government requirements and international declarations, especially the Rights to Adequate Housing, UNDP decided to produce a compendium of post-Yolanda resettlement approaches, packages, and physical designs that have been implemented by various organizations in the Visayas.

In keeping with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 which highlights the need for sharing knowledge, expertise, and lessons learned to promote the incorporation of disaster risk management into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes, the compendium aims to inform policy and programme reforms of the Philippine government and development partners' resettlement and housing programmes in general, and post-disaster resettlement programmes in particular. This is done by compiling the interventions of development agencies and other institutions, including government, in providing permanent resettlement and housing to Yolanda-affected families in select areas in the Visayas. The documentation aims to highlight the distinctive approaches, good practices and lessons learned from implementing these projects as well as the critical importance of

¹ John P. Rafferty and Kenneth Pletcher, "Super Typhoon Haiyan," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 21 November 2016; available from <https://www.britannica.com/event/Super-Typhoon-Haiyan> (accessed 4 May 2017).

² Adrian Edwards, "1-year on from Typhoon Haiyan, thousands of people still rebuilding lives" (speech delivered at a press briefing, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 7 November 2014); available from <http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2014/11/545c9cda6/1-year-typhoon-haiyan-thousands-people-still-rebuilding-lives.html> (accessed 15 May 2017).

integrating disaster risk management into the social and economic development processes of areas and localities.

Selection of Projects

All the projects featured in this compendium provided permanent housing to Yolanda-affected families. Nine of the ten projects are in Eastern Visayas, specifically the islands of Leyte and Samar, which suffered the greatest devastation from Yolanda. Four projects are in Samar Island: one each in the municipalities of Basey (by the J. F. Ledesma Foundation) and Hernani (by Gawad Kalinga), and two in Guiuan (by ACTED and Cordaid). A fifth project is in Ormoc City (by SM Cares) and the remaining four projects are in Tacloban City (by the National Housing Authority or NHA, Tacloban City Government, UNDP, and the FRANCESCO), all in the island of Leyte. The tenth project is in Capiz province (by UN-Habitat) on the island of Panay in Western Visayas, specifically in Roxas City and the neighboring municipalities of Pontevedra and Pan-ay.

Two projects, both located in Tacloban City, were implemented by government, one by the local government of Tacloban City, and the other by the NHA. The eight other projects were implemented by private organizations, four of which are international humanitarian and/or development agencies: UNDP and UN-Habitat are organizations of the United Nations, Cordaid is a Dutch Catholic development aid organization, and ACTED is a French NGO. The other four are local NGOs which received support from some foreign foundations and/or local benefactors. These are Julio and Florentina Ledesma Foundation, Inc. (JFLFI), Gawad Kalinga Development Foundation, SM Cares, and Pope Francis for Resilient and Co-Empowered Sustainable Communities (FRANCESCO) consortium.

FIGURE 1. Project Sites



MAP FROM WIKIMEDIA COMMONS. TYPHOON PATH FROM PAG-ASA.

Approaches in Providing Permanent Housing

In selecting the ten projects, UNDP intended to show an array of approaches in providing post-disaster permanent housing from which could be culled lessons by way of strategies and good practices in implementing the strategies. Some projects, for instance, utilized strategies that relied much more on community involvement and leadership than did the other projects. Some project implementers made use of multi-stakeholder partnerships while others limited their partnership with the local government. As will be evident when the reader examines the project profiles, the strategies are premised on a particular rationale, context, and set of limitations. Presenting the array of strategies allows the reader hopefully to see the different possibilities within a given context.

UNDP and UN-Habitat employed community-contracting in the construction of the housing units. Both invested heavily in capacity building as an integral component of their project's recovery and rehabilitation strategy. But while UN-Habitat forged partnerships with many organizations to accomplish different aspects of its project, UNDP limited its partnership to the LGU.

International aid organizations and foreign NGOs have legal constraints in their ability to acquire land for their housing projects. They normally depend on the local government, or a government agency such as the NHA, to provide the land which are usually made available for the use of the project beneficiaries under a usufruct arrangement. Local NGOs have no such constraint and can purchase land for eventual disposition to and ownership by their beneficiary families.

Housing Design and Standards

Another objective in making the project profiles, aside from presenting the range of strategies employed by the different projects, is to provide as much information as possible on the technical aspects of the housing for the purpose of establishing benchmarks in terms of technical design and cost, which could be especially useful to post-disaster housing providers. Since cost is an important consideration in designing post-disaster housing interventions, the compendium presents different projects that adopted different housing designs with their corresponding rationale and cost components. Cost estimates for complementary project interventions such as site development and community development support are provided when these are made available by the project implementers.

The projects adopted different processes in coming up with the housing designs, with varying degrees of community participation. Since the designs are expected to conform with standards either as legally prescribed, as in the National Building Code, or as indicated by international good practices, the compendium provides a brief survey of relevant laws and international literature which are instructive for designing resilient housing.

Methodology

The methodology for collecting data for the compendium relied mostly on primary sources. The five-member research team visited the different project sites in teams of two, and conducted interviews with representatives of the implementing organizations and of the beneficiary/partner-community using an interview or focus group discussion (FGD) guide. Some identified respondents provided written responses to the interview questions to augment the face-to-face interview. Other

stakeholders, such as the local government, professional organizations, and civil society organizations, were also interviewed when they were available at the time of the team's field visit.

Project-related documents were requested from the project implementers and were used as reference materials to supply additional information about the projects.

The research team members performed an ocular inspection of the houses and of the project sites and conducted the interviews or focus-group discussion with the beneficiary/partner communities on-site.

A validation workshop was conducted with the project implementers, local governments, national agencies and other stakeholders to validate the key findings and lessons from the project experiences formulated by the research team and to gather additional insights from the participants based on similar experiences of post-disaster housing.

International Action Frameworks, Guiding Principles and Government Regulations in Shelter Recovery and Rehabilitation

This section gives a short summary of relevant national recovery programs and international frameworks for action that guide post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation interventions, some of which are specific to Yolanda. This is included in the compendium to serve as reference points for the various elements of the housing interventions described in the project profiles. These elements include, among others, the goals and objectives of the housing recovery effort, the technical design of the houses, the social processes undertaken with the families undergoing rehabilitation as well as their underlying principles. In many ways, the interaction among these elements constitutes an integrated system or logic that shapes both the output and the process of a particular housing intervention. The specific projects can then be better appreciated within the context of international standards as well as the national and local government rehabilitation plans and programs.

The Sendai Framework

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, adopted at the Third UN World Conference in Sendai, Japan, on 18 March 2015 as a successor instrument to the “Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters”, gave a strong emphasis on disaster *risk* management as opposed to disaster management, a goal focused on preventing new risk, reducing existing risk and strengthening resilience. A priority area of action (Priority 4) in the Sendai Framework is “enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to ‘Build Back Better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.”³ It states that

[d]isasters have demonstrated that the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, which needs to be prepared ahead of a disaster, is a critical opportunity to “Build Back Better”, including through integrating disaster risk reduction into development measures, making nations and communities resilient to disasters.⁴

The Framework acknowledges that pursuing this goal entails specific actions at the national and local levels. One of these is promoting

the incorporation of disaster risk management into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes, through the development of measures such as land-use planning, structural standards improvement and the sharing of expertise, knowledge, post-disaster reviews and lessons learned and integrate post-disaster reconstruction into the economic and social sustainable development of affected areas.⁵

The Sendai Framework thus propagates the view and awareness that for post-disaster reconstruction to be effective, there are necessary measures that must be in place before the occurrence of a disaster. This is why risk management and resilience building need to be integrated into the economic and social development plans and processes of areas, particularly those vulnerable to disasters.

Three specific measures by national and local authorities are highlighted. One is land use planning. The relevance and critical importance of this measure is highlighted in the project profiles featured in

³ United Nations, Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, *The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030*, 2015, IV.20.

⁴ Ibid., IV.32.

⁵ Ibid., IV.33.

the compendium. The search for land where post-disaster permanent housing can be built is often the most time-consuming part of reconstruction. If land use plans are updated according to the need to provide for resettlement for vulnerable populations, local authorities can already begin to engage in land banking, or at least facilitate the acquisition of land for resettlement by ensuring that land documents are in order.

The second measure highlighted by this priority agenda of the Sendai Framework is structural standards improvement. Again, some of the projects featured in this compendium paid specific attention to making housing designs that complied with the latest standards for resilient housing and a few even sought to meet international standards. The setting of the standards and its enforcement, however, remain the responsibility of national and local authorities which must not only monitor and regulate compliance but also provide incentives for the adoption of improved standards.

The third specific measure is the sharing of knowledge, expertise and lessons learned. As will be seen in the project profiles, NGOs have adopted knowledge learned from other projects to inform their post-disaster housing interventions. Moreover, they adopted strategies that gave opportunities for community members to learn about managing risks and building resilience, not only in housing but also in economic and social aspects such as community organizing and livelihood development.

The Sphere Project and Standards for Humanitarian Action⁶

Initiated in 1997 by a group of humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the Sphere Project – or ‘Sphere’ aimed to improve the quality of humanitarian actions during disaster response and to hold accountable the humanitarian organizations for their actions. Sphere’s philosophy is based on two core beliefs: first, that those affected by disaster or conflict have a right to life with dignity, and second, that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of disaster or conflict.

Striving to support these two core beliefs, the Sphere Project framed a Humanitarian Charter and identified a set of minimum standards in key life-saving sectors: water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items; and health action. The Core Standards are process standards which set guidelines for the manner in which humanitarian actions in these sectors are to be provided. The minimum standards describe conditions that must be achieved in any humanitarian response in order for disaster-affected populations to survive and recover in stable conditions and with dignity. The inclusion of affected populations in the consultative process lies at the heart of Sphere’s philosophy. The Sphere Project, consequently, was one of the first of what are now known as the quality and accountability (Q&A) initiatives.

The Humanitarian Charter, the Protection Principles and the Core Standards articulate Sphere’s rights-based and people-centered approach to humanitarian response. They focus on the importance of including the affected population and local and national authorities at all stages of the response.

Founded on the principle of humanity and the humanitarian imperative, these rights include the right to life with dignity; the right to receive humanitarian assistance; and the right to protection and

⁶ This section draws heavily from The Sphere Project, “What is Sphere” (no date); available at <http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/what-is-sphere/> (accessed 16 June 2017).

security. The Charter also emphasizes the importance of agency accountability to affected communities. The Core Standards and minimum standards are an articulation of what these principles and obligations mean in practice.

All humanitarian agencies should ensure that their actions do not bring further harm to affected people (Protection Principle 1), that their activities benefit in particular those who are most affected and vulnerable (Protection Principle 2), that they contribute to protecting affected people from violence and other human rights abuses (Protection Principle 3) and that they help affected people recover from abuses (Protection Principle 4). The roles and responsibilities of humanitarian agencies in protection are, generally, secondary to the legal responsibility of the state or other relevant authorities.

As will be seen in the project profiles in this compendium, many of the humanitarian NGOs observed the rights-based and people-centered approach to humanitarian response in varying degrees, in particular by giving priority to the most affected and vulnerable, and involving the affected population and local and national authorities at all levels of the response. Some NGOs purposely adopted a people-led approach while others incorporated consultations with the affected families on key project decisions. Local authorities were involved in most of the projects, also in varying degrees.

A few NGOs sought to incorporate the Sphere principles even in the design of the housing units. For instance, the Basey Ecoville and the ACTED Eastwinds projects were particularly mindful of the protection principle in designing houses to protect women and girls from possible abuse within and outside the home.

National Housing Code

The development of a reference standard for housing construction became particularly urgent with the occurrence of successive natural calamities, particularly strong typhoons such as Pablo (international name Bopha, 2012) and Yolanda (international name Haiyan, 2013) and earthquakes (Bohol, 2013) that brought massive destruction of houses.

The need for a housing code became evident in the face of the reality that most of the houses that sustain damage after a typhoon or an earthquake are non-engineered, and the weaknesses in construction are due to the use of substandard materials (e.g., small sizes of structural elements), inadequate anchorage, and inadequate construction methods and practices (e.g., absence of lateral force resisting system).⁷ Even engineered houses are non-compliant with existing building codes. Complying with engineering standards, however, normally results in a more expensive house. This is demonstrated in the development of resilient housing standards for post-Yolanda resettlement housing projects of the National Housing Authority (NHA). NHA's initial house design had a cost of ₱195,000. After the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) subjected the design to

⁷ Philippine Working Group on Disaster Risk Resilience, "Safe and Resilient Housing and Communities: Reviewing Standards for Design and Construction: A Meeting Report of the Philippine Working Group on Disaster Risk Resilience" (22 October 2014); available from http://essc.org.ph/content/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ESSC_PWG-Meeting-Report_22Oct2014.pdf (accessed 16 May 2017), 5; Miriam Lusica-Tamayo, "National Structural Code for Housing (NSCP): Residential Structural Design Code" (3 April 2014); available from http://essc.org.ph/content/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Day2Session3D_-TAMAYO_ASEP_DraftResidentialStructuralDesignCode.pdf (accessed 16 May 2017), 8.

structural evaluation and improved the design by revising the size of the elements used (e.g. size of rebars, thickness of hollow blocks), the unit cost went up to ₱ 250,000. The challenge therefore is in developing designs that meet the required structural strength at the reasonable cost.

Volume 3 of the National Structural Code of the Philippines (NSCP), which is still under development, could be regarded as the Residential Structural Design Code. Volume 1 of the NSCP applies to buildings, while Volume 2 pertains to bridges. Prior to the development Volume 3, the NSCP is used as a reference for the National Building Code. However, engineers have noted that the NSCP is not appropriate for housing since the structures would be over-engineered (e.g. having larger than necessary columns and beams) and prohibitively costly. Therefore, a structural design code specifically for residential structures was needed. Such a code would set the engineering requirements for smaller structures ensuring that the strength and performance of the structures are retained but at a realistic cost.

The NSCP Volume 3 is applicable to one- to two-family dwellings and provides prescriptive limits for column-spacing and floor-to-floor heights. It covers reinforced concrete, wood, light gage and composite constructions as well as the use of alternative materials. It gives a simplified presentation of minimum loads, minimum sizes and reinforcements for “typical cases”, especially for masonry, and provides detailing for earthquake-resistant structures and for typhoon-resilient structures as well as guideposts for site selection.⁸

Among the advantages of the proposed Housing Code (NSCP Volume 3) are: 1) the focus on critical construction details related to building envelope, such as correct spacing of roof sheathing nails, adequate use of roof tiedowns, and window protection; 2) the emphasis on construction quality; 3) it simplifies wind and seismic design requirements to a degree commensurate with knowledge and uncertainty as to how homes actually perform; and 4) the emphasis on design precautions against locating homes in steep slopes and weak soils.⁹

Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act

In May 2010, following the devastation of typhoons Ondoy (international name Ketsana, 2009) and Pepeng, the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (RA 10121) was signed in effect reconfiguring the former National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) to the present National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC).

The Act shifted the policy environment and the way the country deals with disasters from mere response to preparedness. RA 10121 provides a comprehensive, all-hazard, multi-sectoral, inter-agency, and community-based approach to disaster risk management through the formulation of the National Disaster Risk Management Framework....

The law also promotes the development of capacities in disaster management at the individual, organizational, and institutional levels. A very important feature of this law is its call for the

⁸ Lusica-Tamayo, 2.

⁹ Ibid., 3.

mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction in physical and land-use planning, budget, infrastructure, education, health, environment, housing, and other sectors.¹⁰

Evidently, it adopts the strategic measures proposed by the Sendai Framework that seek to integrate DRR into the social and economic development plans and processes.

The Act mandates the establishment of a Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (DRRMO) in every province, city and municipality, and a Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committee (BDRRMC) in every barangay. Mindful of the need for capacity building especially at the local government level, the Strategic National Action Plan on Disaster Risk Reduction for 2009-2019 aims to enhance the capacities of Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils. Finally, RA10121 provides for the calamity fund to be used in support of disaster risk reduction or mitigation, prevention, and preparedness activities for the potential occurrence of disasters and not just for response, relief, and rehabilitation efforts. This enables LGUs to more proactively take steps toward improved disaster preparedness and for undertaking necessary actions as part of local development plans that would facilitate faster response to disasters.

Local Government Rehabilitation and Recovery Plans

The Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (YCRRP) of August 2014 lays down the objectives of the rehabilitation and recovery efforts and

presents a clear path from the Government's objectives through inputs in the form of programs, projects, and activities to outputs, outcomes, and benefits. The Plan identifies the timelines and recovery phases to facilitate coordination of interdependencies between policy determination, budget and resourcing, program implementation, and beneficiary needs.¹¹

The objectives of the rehabilitation program are: 1) to restore, rehabilitate, or reconstruct damaged infrastructure necessary to sustain economic and social activities in the affected areas; 2) to repair houses or rebuild settlements and basic community facilities and services that are more resilient to hazard events; 3) to restore the peoples' means of livelihood and continuity of economic activities and business; and 4) To increase resilience and capacities of communities in coping with future hazard events.

Given the timelines and recovery phases outlined in the plan, the housing interventions featured in this compendium fall within the medium-term phase that covers the period 2015 to 2016, wherein

projects and programs give emphasis to greatly enhancing the resiliency of the communities against disasters, and integrating concepts and principles on disaster prevention and mitigation, as well as disaster preparedness. Cash-for-work and other livelihood programs implemented in the short-term will be replaced with skills enhancement and sustainable economic and livelihood initiatives to provide

¹⁰ London School of Economics and Political Science and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, "Philippine Disaster Reduction and Management Act (RA 10121)" (27 May 2010); available from <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/law/philippine-disaster-reduction-and-management-act-ra-10121/> (accessed 16 May 2017).

¹¹ National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), "Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan" (1 August 2014); available from <http://yolanda.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Yolanda-CRRP.pdf> (accessed 16 May 2017), 12.

long-term employment. Resettlement areas will continue to be upgraded in terms of social services and facilities, livelihood and employment, and their capacity for DRRM, transforming them into disaster resilient communities.¹²

The YCRRP also contains the Local Government Rehabilitation and Recovery Plans (LRRPs) of each province affected by Yolanda. This section presents the highlights of the LRRPs of the cities where the projects featured in this compendium are located. The LRRPs provide a backdrop and perspective to the project profiles in the compendium in terms of the assessed housing recovery need in each locality and the estimated resources needed to address the need.¹³

The **City of Tacloban**, being a highly-urbanized city, incurred the most damage to housing among all affected cities and municipalities, with a total of 34,149 units damaged. Based on Tacloban City report submitted on 22 May 2014, the total damages for Tacloban is estimated at ₱7 billion with ₱2.5 billion for the Infrastructure Sector, ₱0.73 billion for the Productive Sector, ₱3.40 billion for the Social Services Sector, and ₱0.36 billion for other sectors.

As a strategy for recovery and future development, the City is proposing the creation of new development districts, namely, the North Coast (New Employment and Residential Area), the South Coast (New Central Business District), the Mid Coast (Transit and Trading Area and Satellite Government Center), and the Upland (Conservation and Protection Area).

Priority projects include the provision of 5,855 temporary shelters for Internally Displaced People (IDP), 39,798 on-site shelter repairs, and 10,000 new permanent houses in new sites. Priorities also include the repair or improvement of transportation infrastructure, educational facilities, power supply, and drainage system.

The total budget for the identified projects in the LRRP is ₱25.619 billion, with ₱12.980 billion for economic development and livelihood; ₱4.360 billion for resettlement; ₱6.783 billion for infrastructure; and ₱1.496 billion for social services.

Samar is one of the nine provinces in the Visayas that suffered extensive damage to life, housing, livelihood, and infrastructure, affecting an estimate of 200,000 individuals.

In its LRRP, it is reported that the province suffered damage to infrastructure amounting to ₱0.863 billion, and damage to the agriculture sector amounting to ₱1.425 billion. The typhoon left 245 dead, 2,443 injured, and 30 missing in the hardest-hit areas of Basey and Marabut alone. There was also a widespread destruction in these two towns, with as much as 100 percent of houses destroyed. A total of 15,365 households or about 76,825 people are estimated to have been affected in these municipalities.

According to its LRRP, some 68,599 farmers were left with nothing for their livelihood and survived through the relief supports from the Government and various entities.

Samar's LRRP put forward an assessed damage of ₱2.660 billion with ₱0.342 billion in losses and ₱8.045 billion as needs for reconstruction and recovery. The Social Services Sector has a total need of ₱1.594

¹² NEDA, 16.

¹³ The following paragraphs are entirely quoted from Section 7.5 of the YCRRP.

billion, while the Productive Sector needs ₱1.438 billion. Further, the Infrastructure Sector has a ₱2.343 billion funding requirement. The Resettlement Sector investment need is estimated at ₱2.670 billion to relocate 8,900 households. This will bring the total investment needs to ₱8.045 billion.

The Province of Capiz was one of the provinces hardest hit by Typhoon Yolanda, cutting a swath of destruction in the capital, Roxas City, and in all 16 municipalities. The typhoon left 72 persons dead, about 2,700 people injured, and 1 missing. Records show that 72,214 houses were totally destroyed while 76,253 houses were partially damaged. A total of 156,074 families or 703,566 individuals were affected while 164,383 people were displaced and temporarily housed in 937 evacuation centers.

Damage to property and livelihood was massive. Total damage is reported at ₱5.61 billion and losses at ₱1.59 billion. Damage to infrastructure was valued at ₱1.75 billion while losses amounted to ₱257.77 million. The Productive Sector covering agriculture, mining, tourism, and industry, trade and services suffered ₱171.82 million in damages and ₱1.26 billion in losses.

Further, the Social Services Sector including education, health, and housing sustained ₱3.63 billion and ₱65.73 million in damages and losses, respectively. Finally, the Environment Subsector accounted for ₱55 million in damages. The total recovery and reconstruction need is estimated at ₱13.17 billion.

The LRRP of Capiz identified priority projects with an estimated budget of ₱19.186 billion, of which ₱9.267 billion is for the restoration of social services specifically in education, health, and housing. The latter includes ₱9.173 billion as shelter assistance to affected families. About ₱3.481 billion is needed for the relocation and resettlement of 12,036 permanently displaced families living in high-risk areas; ₱2.045 billion for the Livelihood Sector aimed to provide viable and sustainable income and employment opportunities for farmers, fisherfolk, and other affected groups; and ₱4.392 billion for the rehabilitation or reconstruction of critical physical infrastructures.

The LRRP of Capiz lays out the reconstruction and development agenda of the province post-Yolanda, anchored on building back better and more resilient infrastructures and communities. It seeks to integrate disaster-resilient standards in reconstruction projects, address income losses in agriculture and non-agriculture enterprises, and provide adequate social protection to vulnerable sectors including farmers and fisherfolk.

Engagement with the Non-Government Sector

The YCRRP contains a section on “Engagement with the Non-Government Sector” which lays down the guidelines for government’s engagement with NGOs and the private sector in relation to the objectives of the plan. When the YCRRP was formulated in August 2014, the OPARR was to be the main coordinating agency of the government’s recovery program. However, after the OPARR ceased to exist in April 2015, its functions were transferred to NEDA.¹⁴ Eight of the projects featured in the compendium were implemented mainly by non-government or humanitarian organizations. Still they

¹⁴ President Benigno S. Aquino III, on 22 April 2015, signed Memorandum Order No. 79 transferring the functions of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). The Order paves the way for the 'winding of affairs' and transfer of the coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of all disaster-related programs, projects, and activities (PAPs) from the OPARR to the NEDA.

had to collaborate or forge partnerships with the local government in implementing the projects. The institutional arrangements most likely needed to conform with the guidelines set forth in the YCRRP.

There are five guidelines:

1) *Preference for single-source, fully implemented projects.* Non-government actors are asked to

take an end-to-end approach to the design and delivery of projects to be funded and implemented. This means that each project will be allocated to a single non-government entity that is responsible for fully funding, implementing, and completing the project. The project implementer may raise additional funds from other non-government entities or individuals. This implementer will also be responsible for ensuring that the project is completed and reported in line with OPARR's monitoring and evaluation framework. This may require different levels of contracting and sub-contracting aspects of project delivery to other entities. However, the implementer takes primary responsibility for the delivery of the project.¹⁵

2) *Implementer-driven.* The government¹⁶ will

coordinate primarily with the first-level primary project implementers who volunteer to implement projects and who are responsible for fund-raising. These could either be Development Sponsors (DS) who focus their efforts in a specific geographic region, or Sector Sponsors (SS) who implement projects concentrated on housing, education, health, and livelihoods across a wider geographical area.¹⁷

3) *Support for Donor Matching.* Donors that

want to contribute to recovery efforts through the donation of resources but do not want a direct role in the implementation of actual projects will be helped to find corresponding implementers. Potential donors will be directed to the various DS/SS who will then receive the donation and commit to the implementation of the projects. Conversely, the government also assists implementers who are seeking donors for agreed and approved projects ready for implementation.¹⁸

4) *Importance of the Authorized Recipient Agency.*

In delivering its mandate, OPARR will neither be responsible for direct project implementation nor for accepting or rejecting projects from Development Sponsors or Sector Sponsors on behalf of the Government. This role will be played by the Authorized Recipient Agency (ARA), which will basically be the responsible government department or agency via the Government's Cluster rehabilitation coordination structures or a provincial or municipality/city government. OPARR will introduce DS and SS to the ARAs who will be responsible for signing a Memorandum of Agreement authorizing the project.¹⁹

¹⁵ NEDA, 98-99.

¹⁶ The government entity indicated in the YCRRP is the OPARR (the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Recovery and Rehabilitation). The OPARR was de-commissioned in 2015 through Memorandum Order No. 79.

¹⁷ NEDA, 99.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

In the projects featured in the compendium, the municipal/city government functioned as the ARA.

5) *Support for underserved areas.* The government

will ensure that donations and other key resources are channeled appropriately to underserved regions and communities. The government will work closely with NGOs and the private sector, in order to harness opportunities for private sector entities that can be leveraged to ensure that donations are channeled to areas that may garner less attention and focus than other high-profile areas.²⁰

²⁰ NEDA, 99.

Project Profiles

Yolanda Permanent Housing Program in Region VIII

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY



A. Project Information²¹

The National Housing Authority (NHA) is the government agency that is “tasked to develop and implement a comprehensive and integrated housing program which shall embrace, among others, housing development and resettlement, sources and schemes of financing, and delineation of government and private sector participation.”²² Per Executive Order (EO) 90 of December 1986, the NHA was identified as one of the six shelter agencies placed under the supervision of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). The same EO mandated the agency to be the sole government entity to engage in housing production for low-income families.

When Typhoon *Yolanda* struck the Philippines on 8 November 2013, Eastern Visayas and the neighboring provinces were almost entirely damaged. A total of 205,128 families in 116 municipalities and cities in Regions IV-B, V, VI, VII, VIII and the Carada Administrative Region were assessed to have lost lives and/or their homes and properties having been located in “high risk” areas. Then President Benigno S. Aquino III mobilized concerned government agencies to render necessary and immediate assistance. He created the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) under Secretary Panfilo M. Lacson to serve as the overall coordinator of the different clusters for reconstruction and recovery efforts for all areas affected by

²¹ As of 27 February 2017, NHA’s project in Region VIII has assessed a housing need/target of 56,140 units, of which 44,684 units have been bid out or awarded. Only the housing interventions in Tacloban City involving 14,433 families are documented in this report.

²² President, Presidential Decree, “Creating the National Housing Authority and Dissolving the Existing Housing Agencies, Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor, and For Other Purposes, Presidential Decree 757,” (31 July 1975); available from http://www.nha.gov.ph/about_us/2015-pdf/PD757.pdf (accessed 3 July 2017).

Yolanda.²³ The Resettlement Cluster headed by HUDCC, which included the NHA, was responsible for constructing permanent housing for the 205,128 families under the government's "Build Back Better" scheme.²⁴ The OPARR, along with the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), submitted the plans for reconstruction and recovery and when these had been approved at the regional level, then President Aquino immediately approved the budget for Yolanda victims.

For Tacloban City, the number of families assisted by NHA was 14,433, spread over 19 projects. As of 27 February 2017, the rate of accomplishment of land development for 18 sites²⁵ averaged 76.2%. The construction of the permanent houses was at various stages. Of 14,433 units, 2,833 units were 25 to 75% complete, while 8,522 units were completed. Construction of the balance of 3,078 units has not started. Of the completed 8,522 units, 6,590 units have either been occupied, awarded or turned over. (See Appendix 1 for the list of NHA projects and status of accomplishments for the Yolanda Permanent Housing Program.)

The housing intervention of NHA generally followed its administered resettlement programs where large tracts of raw land are acquired and developed to generate serviced lots or core housing units for families displaced by the government's infrastructure projects and those residing in danger areas such as waterways and railroad tracks. For the Yolanda project, houses were built on a 40-square meter lot with a floor area of 22 square meters. Similar to its previous housing interventions, NHA followed the standard design of DPWH which includes the following features:

- Use of permaform²⁶ which is considered durable. However, the durability also depended on the work of the developer. Cement is poured into the center of the flex board, but the quality of the work depends on how the cement is sufficiently and compactly poured;
- Core house using hollow blocks with minimum fixtures, i.e., door, windows, roof and toilet. The houses in 12 of 19 projects have provisions for a loft; and
- With available electricity and water lines.

According to Mr. Leonard Tedence Jopson of the City Housing and Development Office, NHA's housing projects conformed with the National Building Code. The Design for Socialized and Economic Housing and other related laws were also followed to ensure the construction of houses that could withstand natural calamities and extreme weather conditions, specifically winds of up to 250 kph. In addition, the houses are situated in sites that can allot adequate space for community facilities such as schools, health and multi-purpose centers, material recovery facility, and police outposts. In the

²³ The five clusters are: (1) Infrastructure (headed by the Department of Public Works and Highways), (2) Social Services (by the Department of Social Welfare and Development), (3) Livelihood (by the Department of Trade and Industry), (4) Support (by the Department of Budget and Management), and (5) Resettlement (by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council).

²⁴ "Build Back Better" aims to ensure the rehabilitation of structurally sound buildings and dwellings that are capable of withstanding calamities, and protecting families and communities during times of disaster.

²⁵ No data on land development and housing construction was available for the second batch of St. Francis Village in Brgy. Suhi which reported 505 units bid out/awarded.

²⁶ A building technology accredited by an inter-agency committee (mostly government agencies including the NHA) for Accreditation of Innovative Technologies for Housing (AITECH), permaform "is a system that has a main component of double panel boards (fiber cement board) and is adhesively separated by an adaptor that are glued at its inner surface." See the AITECH Manual 2017 available at http://www.nha.gov.ph/housing_tech/2017-pdf/AITECHManualAOJanuary2017.pdf.

spirit of *bayanihan* (spirit of communal unity), some beneficiaries, particularly those fit to work, were selected to render labor or sweat equity for 500 working hours in the construction of the houses. The house, which is built for a family of five members, is not allowed to be sold nor rented.

The unit cost of the land and housing package is ₱290,000. This translates to a total of ₱4.18 billion for 14,433 units. The beneficiaries though have been advised initially that they would be made to pay the amount of ₱95,000 to be amortized in 25 years. As of interview date, they were anticipating the final decision of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte on his pronouncement during the housing summit of February 2017 about the government giving the houses for free.

The collaborating organizations of NHA in this housing project for Yolanda victims in Tacloban are those in the Local Inter-Agency Committee (LIAC). The LIAC was formed to coordinate the many tasks of implementing the permanent housing project of NHA.²⁷ Members of the committee include the LGU department heads as internal members, and the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), DPWH, urban poor sector representatives and concerned CSOs as external members. It is headed by the mayor as Chair and NHA as co-Chair. Subcommittees were formed for various functions such as social preparation, provision of social services, and livelihood.

The non-government organizations or foundations which became involved in NHA's Yolanda housing project for Tacloban City are those that sponsored a project and committed to build houses following President Aquino's "Build Back Better" policy, e.g., 400 units with GMA Kapuso Foundation, and more than 500 units with Habitat for Humanity and the Philippine Institute of Civil Engineers. A memorandum of agreement (MOA) was signed between NHA and GMA Kapuso Foundation and a groundbreaking ceremony was held in January 2014.

Table 1
Project Information: Yolanda Permanent Housing Program in Region VIII

Location	Northern barangays of Tacloban City
Implementing Organization	National Housing Authority
Collaborating Organizations	(1) Tacloban City Government; and (2) several non-government organizations or foundations such as GMA Kapuso Foundation and Habitat for Humanity
Beneficiaries	Victims of Typhoon Yolanda mostly from coastal communities
Number of Families	14,433 families
Housing Design, Technology, Materials	Following the standard design of DPWH, i.e., use of permaform for the housing structure, core house of hollow blocks with minimum features of door, windows, roof and toilet, and with available electricity and water lines; the house design also conformed with the National Building

²⁷ A LIAC was formed for every local government unit, i.e., Leyte, Biliran, and Samar.

	Code, Design for Socialized and Economic Housing and other related laws to ensure the construction of houses that could withstand natural calamities and extreme weather conditions, specifically winds of 250 kph.
Cost of Housing Unit and Land	₱290,000
Repayment scheme and amortization	Of the ₱290,000 land and housing unit cost, ₱195,000 is waived but the remaining ₱95,000 will be amortized in 30 years; with grace period of 5 years. Amortization begins at the sixth year when an additional ₱50 is added every year until the 15 th year. A fixed amount is paid from the 16 th to 30 th year. The house and lot may be given for free pending the decision of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
Land Tenure Arrangement	Ownership of house and lot if to be paid OR usufruct if to be given for free
Project Cost	₱4.18 billion
Project Duration	<i>Not available</i>

B. Project Implementation

The NHA process. Immediately after the harrowing experience from Yolanda in many parts of the Visayas, the NHA went around Region VIII to assess the housing damage and needs in the affected areas. Many of those who lost their homes in Tacloban City came from the coastal areas. Safety was thus a primary consideration in the selection of resettlement sites. The barangays in the northern part of Tacloban were considered safe and big enough to accommodate all of NHA's 19 housing projects.

The barangays provided the initial list of beneficiaries which the city government validated. NHA then coordinated with the City Housing and Community Development Office (CHCDO) and City Social Welfare and Development Office (CSWDO) of the LGU to identify the potential beneficiaries of its permanent housing projects in Northern Tacloban. A final master list of beneficiaries was endorsed to the NHA through the LIAC, but the housing agency on its own also surveyed and gathered data about the residents in the temporary shelter sites. The primary criterion for selection of beneficiaries was partial or total destruction of their houses. Aside from verifying the families as Yolanda victims, NHA prioritized those whose family head is 40 years old and below, and considered those who have been diligent in observing the house rules in the temporary sites.

Two projects in Barangay Kawayan were fully sponsored by private organizations, namely the GMA Kapuso Foundation and Habitat for Humanity with the Philippine Institute of Civil Engineers. As such, these private companies took charge of all the tasks from the pre- to post-house construction until the beneficiaries were transferred to the permanent sites. NHA coordinated with different

developers for the other 17 projects. The first developer was assigned to develop the settlement area in Ridge View Park. Standards then were not firmly established and updated to conform with resilient housing criteria. The basis for construction followed the guidelines of old resettlement projects. Over time, other developers got interested, bought lots, and were issued permits by the concerned national agencies such as the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, particularly its Mines and Geosciences Bureau or MGB), the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAG-ASA) of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).

In relocating the Yolanda-affected families, NHA was guided by Memorandum Circular (MC) 2773 which requires the orientation of potential beneficiaries, application for housing assistance, compliance with documentary requirements, among others. A master list of qualified beneficiaries was completed and approved at the Head Office. After another approval was made with the LIAC, lots were raffled off to the qualified beneficiaries. After the houses were constructed, the transfer of the families to the houses followed. Except for the water supply and facilities owing to the location of the resettlement in the northern part of the city, all amenities such as electricity, livelihood for the community members and overall site development were available when the families moved to the permanent shelter homes

Pursuant to MC 2773, the amount of ₱195,000 per unit is waived and the family-beneficiary will pay ₱95,000 in 30 years. The beneficiaries are issued a certification of lot allocation as they are not required to make any payments for the first five years. Amortization at ₱200 per month begins on the sixth year from relocation. An additional ₱50 is added every year until the 15th year, then a fixed amount is paid from the 16th to 30th year to complete the balance.

For livelihood, the cluster agencies are the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Department of Agriculture (DA) which are responsible for coordinating the livelihood plans with NHA and the LIAC. Assistance came in the form of training, community relations programs, holding of job fairs, provision of starter kits such as for carpentry and rolling stores. Many engaged in vending and *sari-sari* or variety stores which were put up within the premises of the house.

From temporary to permanent shelters. The families in the 19 projects have their own stories to tell on how they have become beneficiaries.²⁸ Generally though, the victims were first brought to temporary resettlement sites such as the bunkhouses in lots owned by the NHA (in front of the Chinese Cemetery), the International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI), and the LGU in Barangay Abucay. In the temporary shelters, the families, then considered as internally displaced people or IDPs and placed initially under the supervision of the City Government, elected a leader from among themselves to oversee the activities in the temporary communities. The IDP leader was responsible for ensuring the delivery of basic services in the temporary areas, such as water and police security. He or she was approached by the residents in case of an emergency.

²⁸ Of the 19 projects, only two beneficiary-representatives were available for interview during data gathering: one from Villa Diana, and the other from Ridge View Park 1.

It took almost two years before the family-beneficiaries were transferred to a permanent shelter site in northern Tacloban. In November 2015, then Social Welfare Secretary Corazon Soliman and Health Secretary Janette Garin noted that two years was too long a period for the beneficiaries to stay in temporary shelter sites especially having observed that the people were acquiring various illnesses and diseases. Both secretaries urged the NHA to fast track the process of bringing the families/IDPs to permanent shelters. In April 2016, a first batch of 219 families was transferred to permanent houses in Ridge View Park.



Figure 2. Houses in Ridge View Park followed the standard design of DPWH. It uses permaform for the housing structure, core house of hollow blocks with minimum features of door, windows, roof and toilet.

Upon learning that not all identified victims had been transferred to permanent homes three years since Yolanda, President Duterte also issued a marching order to have **all** remaining beneficiaries of Tacloban transferred from the temporary sites to permanent shelter homes by December 2016. The LIAC convened. The NHA personnel had to multi-task and work overtime to be able to raffle off and transfer some 8,000 families to the permanent sites by the deadline set by the President. Among these beneficiaries were those moved to Villa Diana in two batches: the first in November and the second in December 2016.

The process laid out in MC 2773 was set aside. To comply with the President's directive, the Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) delivered water for free while the DPWH brought tanks and trucks to the sites, and put up hand pumps ("poso") for the short term. The plan was to have water pipes connected from the houses to the tanks for the medium term, and water lines installed for the long term. The Leyte Electric Cooperative (LEYECO) also did its share in providing electricity in the communities even if it meant some losses for the cooperative.

In February 2017, Pres. Duterte made another announcement about giving the housing units for free.²⁹ As of interview date in March 2017, the proposal of free housing was still for deliberation by the NHA Board, and a memorandum circular was expected to be issued in March or April 2017.³⁰

C. Chronology of Major Activities

Phase	Duration	Activities
Set-up	November-December 2013	Assessment of housing damage and needs in Region VIII
	2014	Identification of the northern barangays of Tacloban city as resettlement site for the Yolanda-affected families of the city Identification of affected families and damage assessment of damaged properties with the help of DSWD/City or Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office
	March 2014	Transfer of Yolanda victims by the City Government to temporary shelter sites in lots owned by NHA, IPI and the LGU in Brgy. Abucay
	September 2015	Election of IDP leaders to oversee the affairs and activities in the temporary shelter sites
Implementation	2014-2015	Coordination with the City Housing Office to determine the list of beneficiaries for permanent housing Conduct of data gathering activities to help finalize the list of family-beneficiaries Formation of LIAC and its subcommittees, and conduct of

²⁹ Joey Gabieta, "Duterte to check on Yolanda housing in 1 month, announces P1B aid to families," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 9 November 2016; available at <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/842456/duterte-to-check-on-progress-of-yolanda-housing-in-1-month#ixzz4ctO4zEhG> (accessed March 2017).

³⁰ Dorcas Secreto, interview by authors, 2 March 2017, Tacloban City, digital audio recording. Secreto is the Estate Management Specialist of the NHA.

Phase	Duration	Activities
		meetings to discuss list of beneficiaries and other related concerns
	November 2015	Directive of then DSWD Sec Dinky Soliman and DOH Sec. Janette Garin to NHA to fast track the process of transfer of the beneficiaries to permanent shelters.
	April 2016	Transfer of the first batch of families to permanent houses in Ridge View Park 1
	July 2016	Survey by NHA of beneficiaries in one of the temporary shelters as pre-qualification activity. The beneficiaries in this site were transferred to Villa Diana in November 2016 (1 st batch) and to Greendale Residence in December 2016 (2 nd batch).
	November 2016	<p>Marching order issued by President Duterte to have all remaining beneficiaries of Tacloban City residing in temporary shelters immediately transferred to permanent homes</p> <p>Over 8,000 units of the target of 14,433 units in Tacloban have been allocated for permanent housing as of end of December 2016</p>
	February 2017	Proclamation of President Duterte to give the housing for free, as against the earlier scheme of amortizing the amount of ₱95,000 in 30 years as payment for the house & lot.
Wrap-up/ closure		Monthly reporting to partners, e.g., sending of 2-page snapshots of the houses

Issues encountered

- Substandard houses for majority of the projects

As gathered from the beneficiaries during the focus group discussion, not all NHA-administered houses for Yolanda victims in Tacloban City were built well, having used mostly substandard materials. The quality of construction work depended on the contractor/subcontractors. Many subcontractors did not execute their work well. In Ridge View Park, for instance, while permaform was utilized, the filling in of cement was not done well, making the walls sound hollow (*"ampaw"*). The sink and the flooring in the restroom are not sturdy. Only one PVC pipe was used for the kitchen sink and the bathroom instead of separate pipes. The NHA's Estate Management Specialist, Ms. Dorcas Secreto, admitted these construction defects, specifically the sinks and unlevelled flooring of the bathrooms, which at least could be repaired.³¹ The beneficiaries of Ridge View Park have already informed the contractor about the defects, and have also requested repairs, but no action has been made as of FGD/interview date. The FGD participants though noted two post-Yolanda NHA projects in Tacloban City where houses were constructed properly. These are Villa Diana in Barangay New Kawayan and Villa Sofia in Barangay Tagpuro.

- Delays in the transfer of beneficiaries to permanent shelters

The delays were caused by the poor implementation of policies for procurement and land acquisition, coupled with the bureaucratic government procedures and the many permits and clearances required to commence a project. Directives from then DSWD Sec. Corazon Soliman and DOH Sec. Janette Garin in 2015, and President Duterte's marching order of November 2016 on expediting the transfers have prompted the NHA personnel to step up their work. To comply with the President's orders, NHA had to forego some of the agency's standard operating procedures to effect the transfer of some 8,000 families to permanent homes in December 2016. The consequences of shortcutting the processes and procedures have yet to be fully determined.

- Non-issuance of occupancy permits to date

Many of the NHA developers proceeded with the construction without fully getting the proper permits and clearances (e.g., from DAR or MGB), and without full information on the status of the lands, issuance of titles, or existence of land disputes, if any. The city government nonetheless issued development permits despite incomplete supporting documents if only to comply with the directives of the national government on providing immediate assistance to the Yolanda victims. To date, the developers have not turned over the projects to the NHA, hence occupancy permits have not been issued. Once turned over to NHA, the city government will facilitate the issuance of occupancy permits.

- Delayed and poor provision of basic services

There remains a problem with the relocated families' access to water and electricity. The areas near the relocation sites were not being serviced by LMWD. Located at the northern part of the city, the sites have a higher elevation and therefore with low water pressure. Short-term solutions included

³¹ Secreto.

delivery of water by the LGU, and installation of deep well water pumps by NHA. For the long term, the LMWD would have to put up a new water supply system in the areas. The water was also contaminated with *Escherichia coli* or *E. coli* and thus had to be treated.



Figure 3. Access to water remains a problem in many relocation sites including Villa Diana.

There were various complaints on electricity. Issues were discussed during the community assembly to prompt the elected block leaders to, in turn, report such complaints to LEYECO.

- Non-representation of IDP leaders in the LIAC

The interviewee from NHA mentioned that sector representatives were among the external members of the LIAC. The IDP leaders interviewed, however, said that they were not invited to the LIAC meetings. They believe that as residents/beneficiaries, their attendance in the meetings and hearing their inputs would have been useful for the LIAC.

Livelihood. As in previous relocation projects of the NHA, livelihood opportunities are lacking in northern Tacloban which is around 10 kilometers away from the city. Those who were employed in the city had to spend more for transportation.

D. Feedback from Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries concur that living in a safe and secure house is the most valued intervention they have received. They could not, however, fully appreciate the assistance because they have not been issued any document certifying their ownership of or legal right to the house and lot. They hoped that a clear and final decision on the President's pronouncement on free housing for the Tacloban victims be rendered soon.

As they have received a new lease on life with a new house and safe community, they shared that they have morally leveled up. From being called "squatters", they have developed new practices and

habits such as the proper use of bathrooms, proper waste disposal, observance of curfew time from 10 pm to 5 am, and having their dogs vaccinated. Several seminars and formation activities have been conducted to orient the people on safer and cleaner ways of living. Feeding programs for the children have also been beneficial for their nutrition.

E. Lessons learned

Teamwork and collaboration between local and national agencies facilitate the complete delivery of the project.

Because of the huge tasks involved, it was crucial for the concerned agencies to get their act together, to collaborate and work as a team. This was particularly manifested when President Duterte issued the marching order of immediately transferring all Yolanda beneficiaries from the temporary shelters to the permanent homes. The NHA personnel had to multi-task, and service line agencies were made to work harder to be able to deliver and award 8000 houses in December 2016. Even LMWD and LEYECO had to step up their efforts *“Kaya naman pala, basta magtulong-tulong ang mga tao para mapabilis ang trabaho”* (It can be done as long as everybody cooperates and works fast), said one beneficiary. The NHA needed to coordinate the various works.

Project beneficiaries value being consulted.

The beneficiaries hoped that they were part of the LIAC meetings since they would be the occupants of the houses. *“Sana kasama kami sa meeting, kami naman kasi ang titira sa bahay... (I wish we were invited to the meetings because we’re the ones who would live in the houses),”* said one beneficiary. They believed that their inputs would have been useful in the development and construction phases in aspects such as drainage, provision of water, and other needs in house construction.

KEY INFORMANTS

Implementing organization

- Dorcas Secreto, NHA Estate Management Specialist

Collaborating organization/s

- Leonard Tedence Jopson, Community Affairs Officer IV, City Housing and Community Development Office, Tacloban City

Beneficiaries

- Mary Ann Cablao, Ridge View Homeowners Association
- Andy Go, Villa Diana Homeowners Association

Post-Yolanda Core Shelter Project

TACLOBAN CITY GOVERNMENT



A. Basic Project Information

The Post-Yolanda Core Shelter Project in Barangay 103 (also known as Palanog) and in the northern barangays of Tacloban City is a housing project of the City Government of Tacloban jointly implemented by two LGU offices, namely the City Social Welfare and Development Office (CSWDO) and the City Housing and Community Development Office (CHCDO). The LGU received financial assistance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) through the latter's Core Shelter Assistance Program. The project provided low-income families with environment-friendly, structurally strong housing units that can withstand natural and human-induced calamities such as typhoons, flooding and mild earthquakes using locally available construction materials. Aside from providing housing assistance, the project organizes the community or a minimum of ten families into a Neighborhood Association for Shelter Assistance (NASA), and offers capacity building. The LGU contributed funds for land and site development, technical assistance in house construction, and a food-for-work program.

The house is fully made of concrete materials. It has firm footings with four wooden corner posts attached to concrete pedestals partially sunk in the ground and another four wooden side posts on midway of each wall and attached to the same concrete pedestals. The overall design is simple since it is intended to be a core or basic structure that can be improved gradually, and inexpensive since many of the materials come from local or community sources. With technical guidance and supervision on construction activities from the Tacloban LGU, and with help and cooperation from

friends and neighbors through *pintakasi*³², the affected families built the houses themselves in a period of 10 working days. Consistent with the concept of “incremental housing”, the dwellings can be upgraded by the families later, depending on their needs and resources.

The housing design of DSWD’s Core Shelter Assistance Program is single detached. The total cost of a unit is ₱100,000, of which ₱70,000 is contributed by DSWD and the balance of ₱30,000 is provided as a counterpart by the city government. For the Palanog and other Post-Yolanda Core Shelter Projects of Tacloban City, the city government opted for a duplex-type structure. The cost of a duplex is ₱268,000 or ₱134,000 per dwelling unit.



Figure 4. Houses in Palanog assisted by Post-Yolanda CORE shelter projects of Tacloban City are duplex-type structures made of fully concrete materials.

The beneficiaries of the LGU Post-Yolanda Core Shelter Project are 66 families from Barangay 103 who were affected by two catastrophes: a landslide caused by Typhoon Ofel in October 2012, and typhoon Yolanda in November 2013. The houses of these families were damaged after Yolanda, and repairs ate up the savings of the neighborhood association amounting to millions of pesos. Another 72 families affected by typhoon Yolanda alone were relocated in the northern barangays of Tacloban. The new houses built for these families cost a total of ₱9.38 million. The beneficiaries’ counterpart is 700 hours of sweat equity.

Following a holistic approach, the LGU’s Core Shelter Project has a component on community development where programs for education, health and income generation are offered. Whether it be small gardening activities, putting up a micro-enterprise such as a *sari-sari* store or training on

³² *Pintakasi* is a Filipino custom that is similar to “*bayanihan*” where members come together and participate or cooperate in a community endeavor.

carpentry skills or basket work, these activities are meant to directly or indirectly augment the incomes of the beneficiaries and help answer the daily needs of their household.

Table 2
Project Information: Post-Yolanda Core Shelter Project

Location	Barangay 103 (Palanog) and northern barangays of Tacloban City
Implementing Organization	Tacloban LGU, i.e. City Social Welfare and Development Office and City Housing and Community Development Office
Collaborating Organizations	GMA Kapuso Foundation, Inc.
Beneficiaries	Victims of the landslide in 2012 and Typhoon Yolanda in 2013
Number of Families	66 families for house repair in Barangay Palanog 72 families for new housing in the northern barangays
Housing Design, Technology, Materials	Duplex with the following basic features: (1) anchorage tying the roof to the ground, (2) four-sided roof design with roof trusses, and (3) extra bracing and anchoring on wall and ceiling
Cost of Housing Unit	₱268,000 per duplex or ₱134,000 per unit (for the 72 units in the northern barangays); ₱ 39,393.94 per house for house repair
Repayment scheme and amortization	None specified
Land Tenure Arrangement	None specified except that the land is owned by the city government
Project Cost	₱2.6 million for house repair of 66 families, and ₱9.38 million for new house of 72 families
Project Duration	October 2012 – target project end to be specified

The pre-Yolanda project context. In October 2012, a landslide caused by Typhoon Ofel (International name: Son Tinh) occurred in the resettlement area of Barangay 3, Upper Nula-Tula, leaving 52 families homeless. These families received temporary shelter at the Department of Health (DOH) building for more than a month. The CSWDO head at the time, Ms. Lilia Baltazar, proposed to the city government to request from DSWD 200 units of housing assistance under the Department's Core Shelter Program. Barangay Palanog and the northern barangays of Tacloban were chosen as potential housing sites because of the vast land available and safety of the areas. Clearances regarding safety and absence of an active fault were secured from the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) and the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS).

Social preparation led by the CSWDO followed. It conducted a survey to validate the number of families affected by the landslide. It set the criteria for the selection of beneficiaries which included: (1) a landslide victim whose house has been damaged; (2) living in a hazardous area, specifically in the coastal area; and (3) expression of interest to receive assistance. Other qualifications for consideration were a household income of ₱150 to ₱200 a day, large household size, and difficulty of the family in sending their children to school. More interviews, validations, and meetings were held until the list of 66 beneficiaries was finalized. Attendance to meetings also mattered. CSWDO then focused on the beneficiaries' compliance with the submission of requirements for the core shelter assistance.

In April 2013, the community members in Palanog were organized into a neighborhood association for shelter assistance which is similar to a homeowners' association (HOA). The association, which named itself "Mountainville NASA", opened a bank account with Metro Ormoc Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OCCCI) for the funds it would receive from DSWD.

The formal approval of the housing project in Palanog from the national office of DSWD was received in the last quarter of 2012. Mountainville NASA procured the necessary housing materials in December, and construction went into full swing in February 2013. Following the modality of the DSWD's Core Shelter Program, the city government provided technical assistance and supervision of construction activities while the resident-beneficiaries lent their sweat equity. The beneficiaries who worked were at first paid daily wages and because of the need to earn, they tended to prolong the construction activities such that completion of the houses was delayed. To make the house construction more efficient, the LGU contracted the beneficiary-workers under a fixed term and hired other skilled workers to finish the job on time. This arrangement drastically reduced the construction period from 24 days to 10.

The CSWDO, with the help of the CHCDO and City Engineering Office (CEO), monitored the construction activities through weekly visits and meetings with the association until the houses were completed in July 2013. The houses were officially awarded to the families with certificates of completion on 23 July 2013. The community continued to practice *pintakasi* by cleaning canals and surroundings occasionally, and enforcing security in the area.

B. Project Implementation

Four months after the 66 families moved into their newly built homes, on 8 November 2013, Typhoon Yolanda struck, and the houses in Palanog were destroyed. Roofs were torn off the wooden trusses of the houses, if not totally swept away. Through its Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA), the DSWD gave each family ₱10,000 as relief assistance. Fortunately, Mountainville NASA had savings of a million pesos kept with the OCCCI. The association used these funds to repair and reconstruct the houses.

From 2014 to 2015, the houses in Palanog were repaired and reinforced. The CEO initially presented the proposed reinforcements to make the houses sturdy. At the end of the orientation, the LGU, through CSWDO and CHCDO, and the community association concurred with the work arrangements where technical assistance and materials were to be provided by the LGU while the community members would contribute sweat equity. This arrangement was formalized with the signing of a memorandum of agreement between the city government and Mountainville NASA.

Other poor families were considered for housing assistance in Palanog as long as they were victims of Yolanda. One beneficiary, for instance, went to CSWDO in 2015 to seek assistance for her special child. Upon learning that her family was living in a shanty after Yolanda, and after being asked to evacuate to give way to a road widening project along the highway in Barangay Diit, the CSWDO recommended her for housing assistance in Palanog.

With repairs and reinforcement of the houses in Palanog nearly, if not totally, complete, CSWDO provided livelihood assistance to Mountainville in 2016. An amount of ₱270,000 was provided to the association as seed money to be used for running a mini-grocery. A loan of ₱150,000 was also granted as fixed capital for motorized cabs for hire, and as working capital for buying and selling of peanut butter. The loan was to be paid monthly for two years without interest charges. The monthly payments were deposited to Mountainville's account in OCCCI.

Since CSWDO had previously been able to have 200 units approved by DSWD in 2012 under its Core Shelter Assistance Program, the LGU had remaining allocated funds amounting to ₱9.38 million from DSWD for 134 units after deducting the 66 core shelter units built for the landslide victims. These funds were then allocated by the city government for the rehabilitation of homes destroyed by Yolanda. Of the 134 units targeted to be built, the construction of 62 units was shouldered by the GMA Kapuso Foundation and Habitat for Humanity, which left 72 units to be built by the city government.

The LGU decided to use 25 hectares of the 89 hectares of land it owned in northern Tacloban for housing the 72 families assisted by DSWD's Core Shelter Assistance Program who, among other beneficiaries, were brought to the northern barangays in July 2016. Clearing of the site and procurement of materials were done in August, and the duplex units were constructed from September to December 2016. Improvements in the technical design and specification of the house (e.g., welded joints of the house, additional anchorage for the roof, and use of water drip for the window) were included. The awarding of houses to the 72 families took place on 14 December 2016.

CSWDO continues to monitor the houses in Palanog and in the northern barangays of Tacloban. Because of the increasing number of projects, the CSWDO could only monitor the projects once or twice a month compared to weekly in previous years.

C. Chronology of Major Activities

Phase	Duration	Activities
Set-up	Last quarter of 2012	<p>Formal approval of the housing project for landslide affected families in Palanog from the national office of DSWD</p> <p>Submission of requirements by identified beneficiaries for inclusion in the shelter project</p>

Phase	Duration	Activities
	December 2012	Procurement of materials for housing assistance by the NASA and assisted by CSWDO and CHCDO
	February 2013	Start of construction activities by the affected families themselves with technical assistance from the City Housing
	January-June 2013	Weekly visit and monitoring of CSWDO on the Palanog project
	April 2013	Organizing of beneficiaries by CSWDO into a Neighborhood Association for Shelter Assistance (NASA) called Mountainville Opening of Mountainville NASA of a deposit account with OCCCI through which DSWD funds were deposited.
	July 2013	Completion and awarding of houses to identified beneficiaries
Implementation	November 2013	Donation of ₱10,000 from DSWD for each family affected by Typhoon Yolanda
	March 2014	Purchase of GI sheets by NASA while relief goods were continually provided as short-term assistance
	2014-2015	Repair and reinforcement of damaged houses in Palanog, particularly the roofs Re-survey of the balance of 134 houses (net of approved 200 units) in San Jose, Magallanes, and Nula-Tula, of which 62 houses were assisted by GMA Kapuso Foundation and other organizations, and the balance of 72 houses were assigned to the city government.

Phase	Duration	Activities
		Continuous monitoring of CSWDO, including regular meetings with Mountainville.
	September- December 2016	Construction of 72 units (or 36 duplex structures) in the northern villages
Wrap-up/ closure	2016 - 2017	Livelihood assistance to the NASA, Continued monitoring and assistance of CSWDO to Mountainville NASA and assisted families in northern villages

Issues encountered

- Issues on labor and sweat equity

First, the payment of wages daily to the beneficiaries and hired workers for house construction did not prove efficient because the workers tended to extend work hours to earn more, thus depleting the funds allocated by the LGU for the project. The city government then resorted to fixed-term labor contracting which reduced the number of work days for building one unit from 24 to 10 days. Second, some communities failed to complete the required number of hours of sweat equity. The CSWDO investigated the factors accounting for this underperformance, and held meetings with the community to help the latter fulfill their counterpart requirement. And third, some of the skilled workers hired skipped some days to work in other projects which paid them higher. Engr. Robert Yepes of the CEO suggested that there ought to be a reserve pool of workers. Even the women may be taught to perform tasks such as cutting the steel bars, he added.

- Lack of budget for tools and equipment, including allocations for protective gear and electricity for the tools

During excavation, for instance, the workers were forced to employ manual labor for extracting hard rocks because there were no appropriate tools and equipment. Consequently, the extraction work was completed in three weeks by manual labor when it could have been done in only two days using the appropriate equipment.

- Decreased monitoring visits in assisted communities given more housing projects, resulting in delays in addressing issues

CSWDO used to monitor the projects on a weekly basis. With the increased number of resettlement projects and the distance to the areas, the staff could monitor the projects only once or twice in a month. Hence, any issue that arose in the community got discussed or resolved later than usual. Correspondingly, any assistance coming from CSWDO was sometimes delayed.

- Difficult access to water in the resettlement site

The water source that provides continuous water supply is distant from the community. As of the date of the interview, the president of Mountainville NASA has made a request for the installation of a water pump with a church-based organization. A big tank was also put up by the LGU but because of the increasing population in the site, water has become scarce.



Figure 5. Households in Mountainville keep their empty water containers used in fetching water outside of their houses.

D. Feedback from Beneficiaries

“Amin na ang bahay (The house is ours),” said the beneficiaries when asked about the most valued or appreciated assistance they received from the project. Unlike before when their house was made of light materials, the structure is now made of concrete which provided more security to the residents. *“Malinis pa ang paligid, kasiya-siyang manirahan, at madaling ayusin (The surroundings are clean, and it is a delight to stay in the house which can be easily refurbished),”* described one beneficiary.

The community spirit is alive. Even if the residents are aware of their duties and responsibilities in the community, they complement one another when undertaking different tasks in the community. *“Kanya-kanya man ang gawain namin, nag-complement naman (We may be doing different tasks, we complement one another).”*

One of the beneficiaries expressed her gratitude and appreciation to CSWDO for accommodating her family even if it was not among the original beneficiaries of the project. Her family became qualified when CSWDO learned that she had a special child, and her family was living in a shack. The CSWDO also donated a wheelchair for her child.

Because there were no amortizations to worry about, the residents said they could now redirect their expenses to the household’s other needs such as food, health, and education.

E. Lessons Learned by the Implementing Organization

Teamwork among the local government agencies facilitated the delivery of assistance to Yolanda victims.

The clear delineation of roles and tasks of the assisting agencies (CSWDO, CHCDO and CEO) as well as the good work relations among them facilitated the implementation of the LGU's Core Shelter Assistance Program in Palanog and the northern barangays. Cooperation from the community expedited the construction of the houses further. Every Saturday, the CSWDO met with the community to discuss issues related to the construction activities as well as other concerns in the community such as the provision of basic services and livelihood. The good and timely communication between CSWDO and the community contributed to the successful implementation of the shelter projects.

Rendering sweat equity has increased the sense of ownership of the beneficiaries for their new home.

More than having to incur less costs on the part of the LGU, the sweat contribution of the beneficiaries has provided the latter with a sense of ownership to the house given the time and resources that their families have invested in the unit to make it a home that they could call their own.

Labor contracting should be done on a fixed-term basis and the construction activities need to be supervised

There was much to rebuild after Yolanda, and this meant work opportunities in construction and construction-related activities, among others. Hiring of labor, however, must be contracted with a fixed term contract modality, and the construction activities supervised well for the timely and efficient completion of the housing project. Without the proper arrangements and management, delays in house construction and completion are possible, and the resources of the city government allotted for the project can be easily depleted. As mentioned earlier, the LGU initially had to pay more daily wages as people tended to extend the work to earn more. In another instance, some laborers did not report for work to do other jobs or projects that paid more. This was done by the low-income earners and those whose livelihood had been disrupted by the typhoon.

Safekeeping and handling of funds by Mountainville NASA enhanced the sense of responsibility and management skills of the officers of the association.

Because Mountainville NASA was given the responsibility to keep and handle the funds from DSWD instead of handing the money to the LGU or any other agency, the association was given the opportunity to make decisions and the skills to manage funds, supplies and materials.

Social preparation enables project beneficiaries to understand and own the project more.

Families attended sessions on values formation twice a week in two to three weeks. These sessions allowed the beneficiaries to deepen their commitment to their families and dream for their community.

KEY INFORMANTS

Implementing Organization

- Leonard Tedence Jopson, Community Affairs Officer IV, City Housing and Community Development Office, Tacloban City
- Milagros C. Cabling, Social Welfare Officer III, City Social Welfare and Development Office, Tacloban City
- Jo-ann A. Luna, Social Welfare Office I, City Social Welfare and Development Office, Tacloban City
- Engr. Robert Yepes, Engineer I, City Engineering Office, Tacloban City

Beneficiaries

Mountainville Neighborhood Association for Shelter Assistance

- Paulita Dalore, member
- Ma. Irene Cabaluna, member
- Teresita Guazon, member
- Veronica Avila, secretary
- Norma Ligoyligoy, member

Yolanda Response Project

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME



PHOTO BY UNDP

A. Basic Project Information

1. Location

The Yolanda Response Project built a total of 232 permanent housing units distributed in four locations as follows: 55 units in Tacloban City; 55 units in Ormoc City, Leyte; 55 units in the municipality of Hernani in Eastern Samar; and 67 units in the municipality of Basey, Western Samar. This profile is based on the sub-project in Barangay 97 (also known as Cabalawan), Tacloban City.

A chartered city since 1952, Tacloban City is the capital of Leyte. As the only highly urbanized city in the region, it serves as the center of government, commerce, industry and education for Region VIII. Located in the northeastern part of the island, it has a land area of 10,297 hectares, 48% of which is classified as alienable and disposable and 52% as timberland. Certain portions of the city are vulnerable to earthquakes, floods, and coastal and slope erosion.³³ During Typhoon Yolanda, thousands of families were killed and properties destroyed in the storm surge that inundated large parts of the city.

³³ Geographic Information System (GIS) City Planning Office, Tacloban City, "Tacloban City Ecological Profile 2009" (2009); available from <http://main.tacloban.gov.ph/main/wp-content/Downloadables/ECOLOGICAL%20PROFILE.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2017).

The city has a population of 242,000 as of the 2015 census.³⁴ Barangay 97 is one of 141 barangays in Tacloban City and is in the eastern part of the city. It is classified as an urban barangay with a population of 1,213 as of 2010.³⁵

2. Implementing organization

The project's implementing organization is the United Nations Development Programme or UNDP. The UNDP has been working in the Philippines since 1965 committed to helping the country achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), now the Sustainable Development Goals or SDGs, as well as the national government's development priorities as set out in the Philippine Development Plan.

UNDP's Country Programme (2012-2016) contributes to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2012-2018 (UNDAF) outcomes on universal access to quality social services, with focus on the Millennium Development Goals, democratic governance, women's empowerment, and resilience to disasters and climate change, among others. UNDPs overall approach is to strengthen capacities of local governments and communities in sustainable management of environment and natural resources and climate change adaptation and disaster risk management, while ensuring that human rights and gender are integrated into local policies, processes, programmes and budgets.³⁶

As the project profile will show, these broad development goals articulated in the UNDAF underpin not only the objectives but also the strategies of the Yolanda Response Project.

3. Collaborating organizations

As a United Nations body, UNDP is specifically mandated to work with the government in implementing development interventions. In the Yolanda Response Project, it forged close partnerships with the local governments of Tacloban City, Ormoc City and the municipalities of Hernani and Basey. The local governments had the principal role of identifying the project beneficiaries based on the criteria mutually agreed between UNDP and the local government. In addition, the LGU also identified the land to be designated as a resettlement site, facilitated the issuance of the building and occupancy permits and the certification of the beneficiary families as indigents so that they would be qualified to avail of the lower fees in the application for electrical connection. The Tacloban and Ormoc LGUs also provided equipment for access road development. One of the components of the European Union (EU)- and Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)- assisted projects is resettlement of families displaced by Typhoon Yolanda. The EU project covers the Tacloban, Ormoc and Hernani projects while the KOICA provided funds for the construction of the housing units in Basey.

³⁴ Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), "Population of Region VIII - Eastern Visayas (Based on the 2015 Census of Population)," (2 June 2016); available from <https://psa.gov.ph/content/population-region-viii-eastern-visayas-based-2015-census-population> (accessed 12 April 2017).

³⁵ PSA, "Philippine Standard Geographic Code (PSGC): Tacloban City (Capital)," (31 March 2015); available from <http://nap.psa.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/municipality.asp?muncode=083747000®code=08&provcode=37> (accessed 12 April 2017).

³⁶ UNDP, "About UNDP in the Philippines"; available from http://www.ph.undp.org/content/philippines/en/home/operations/about_undp.html (accessed 12 April 2017).

4. Beneficiaries

The beneficiary families of the Cabalawan sub-project all came from Barangay 61, a coastal barangay near the Tacloban City Astrodome. With almost all the houses in the community washed out by the massive storm surge caused by Typhoon Yolanda, community members evacuated to the nearby astrodome where they stayed for about four months until March 2014 when they were transferred to NHA-built bunkhouses. Later that year, they were visited by the city housing officials and informed that they had been selected to become beneficiaries of the UNDP Yolanda Response Project. The families from Barangay 61 transferred to their new houses in January 2017.

5. Housing design, technology and materials used

The beneficiaries initially proposed a two-storey housing unit but it had to be revised due to budget constraints. The final house design was made by UNDP based on, with some improvements, the standard NHA rowhouse type design approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) as seen in most NHA-built resettlement projects. (See Appendix 2 for the perspective and floor plan of the housing unit.)



PHOTO BY UNDP

Figure 6. Rowhouse type design is implemented with each unit having a floor area of 35 square meters.

The floor area is 35 square meters (5 meters by 7 meters) and the lot size is 55 square meters (11 meters by 5 meters). Incremental development by each homeowner is allowed at the back of the housing unit. The project observed a higher standard than NHA resettlement units in the specifications of its materials. For instance, instead of using 12 mm steel bars, it used 16 mm steel bars as main reinforcement in posts and beams to comply with the National Building Code. It also improved on some building features such as replacing the commonly used galvanized iron (GI) sheet gutter with a concrete gutter to protect the eaves during strong winds. The thickness of the GI sheet was increased from 0.4 mm to 0.6 mm. Steel framing of 3x3 angle bars replaced the 1.5 single bar for trusses. It also used J-bolt attachment of the roofing to the trusses to make the roof more resistant to strong winds.

Instead of 4-inch thick hollow blocks, the project used 6-inch thick blocks for external walls for greater fire resistance. The design has wooden louvers as an added wind breaker to protect the jalousie windows. The house has a low-pitch roof, which is more wind resistant, and the ceiling is made of fiber cement boards. Compared to ordinary plywood, fiber cement board is termite proof, fire proof and does not decay when wet. It absorbs less paint which is also easier to apply on it. (See Appendix 3 for the elevation plan.)

6. Land and housing cost, repayment scheme and amortization

The cost of building the housing unit, including the water system, is ₱353,911.00. However, the project beneficiaries will not be paying for the houses provided by UNDP. The constructed houses have been turned over to the LGU which will then hand over the houses to the beneficiary-households. The understanding between the LGU and the beneficiaries is that the houses will be owned by the beneficiaries but the land tenure arrangement is yet to be formulated into a written agreement.

7. Water System

The water system's physical structure is composed of an elevated platform with two units of 5,000-liter stainless water tanks. The source is composed of two 4" diameter bored wells run by two units 1.5 Hp electric water pumps. Water is distributed to 55 housing units through 2" diameter supply pipes. Each household has its own water meter for consumption monitoring. The entire labor and material package for its construction, testing and commissioning had been contracted to the homeowners' association (HOA). Additional improvement of the platform resulted in a temporary storage space for small equipment and plumbing materials. The Level III water system (individual household connection) costs around ₱1,363,270. Operation and maintenance shall be done by the HOA. A monthly consumption fee shall be collected from each beneficiary by the HOA's water committee.



PHOTO BY UNDP

Figure 7. The elevated platform of the water tanks serves as temporary storage space for small equipment and plumbing materials.



Figure 8. Residents of the housing project source their water from a water pipe pending completion of the water distribution system. Photo taken in March 2017.

8. Power

Each individual housing unit had been installed with complete lighting, switches, convenience outlets, electrical wirings, circuit breakers and entrance cap. All the 55 permanent shelter units are expected to be connected to the local power provider (Leyte Electric Cooperative). The beneficiaries are responsible for their own application and connection to the grid after payment of application fees. Each individual household will pay for its own electrical consumption.

9. Site Development

UNDP was involved in the land preparation of the resettlement site prior to house construction. The works undertaken by UNDP included clearing and grubbing, removal of unsuitable materials, excavation and embankment. UNDP also took care of the repair and rehabilitation of the access road going to the site. After the house construction, the local government of Tacloban City undertook the concreting of the site's road network. Drainage works by the LGU had to be suspended while the funds were yet to be allocated under the 2018 LGU budget. However, the beneficiaries themselves provided the initial number of concrete culverts for cross drainage. The culverts were paid for using HOA savings from other infrastructure project contracts. UNDP incurred site development costs amounting to ₱1,176,800.

Table 3

General Specifications of the houses constructed by the Yolanda Response Project

Lot Dimensions	5m frontage x 11m length, 55 sq. m lot area, 2 meter-front and -rear easement
Shelter Dimensions	5m x 7m, 35 sq. m floor area
Structural Frame	Reinforced concrete footing, ground slab, columns, footing tie beams, roof beams and concrete gutter designed to protect roof eaves against 300 kph wind velocity
Roof Framing and Roofing	Pitch 1:3.5, steel truss framing double 1 ½" x 1 ½"x ¼" thick angle bar, 1.2 mm 2" x 4" C-purlins and 0.6mm thick pre-painted corrugated GI sheet attached by J-bolts
Exterior & interior Wall	Plaster finished 6" concrete hollow block exterior wall and 4" concrete hollow block interior wall
Finishes	Interior wall: 2-coat painted plain cement finish Exterior walls: 2-coat painted rough cement finish Ceiling: 2-coat painted fiber cement board Toilet floor: 12"x12" floor tiles Stainless kitchen sink on tiled counter-top
Doors and Windows	Smoked glass jalousie window with wooden louver wind protector 3-coat painted front and rear hardwood panel door; PVC plastic toilet door
Utilities	With 2-20w interior lighting, 2-12w front and rear exterior lighting; with 6 convenience outlet; 3-faucet, water meter ready supplied by Level III water system
Drainage and Sewerage	3" diameter downspout with catch basin connected to public storm drainage and 3-chamber common septic vault connected to public sewer line

10. Land tenure arrangement

The land used in the Tacloban sub-project is owned by the Tacloban LGU. The community will enter into a usufruct agreement with the city government which would include the deed of restrictions and estate management guidelines governing the use and maintenance of the houses and community

infrastructure. The agreement had not been formulated into a document at the time of the research and hence the details and terms of the agreement have not been determined.

11. Project cost

The total cost of the Cabalawan sub-project is ₱19,765,119.80 with breakdown as follows: Materials and Lighting Equipment – ₱13,089,258.90; Labor Contract – ₱4,135,790.00; Site Development- ₱1,176,800.00 and Water System – ₱1,363,270.70.

12. Project duration

The construction of the Cabalawan sub-project took approximately 18 months from July 2015 to December 2016 as against the target timeframe of six months. Implementation issues and reasons for the delay are discussed in the next section.

Table 4
Project Information: Yolanda Response Project

Location	Barangay Cabalawan, Tacloban City Barangay Cagbuhangin, City of Ormoc, Leyte Barangay Cancilides, Municipality of Hernani, Eastern Samar Barangay New San Agustin, Municipality of Basey, Western Samar
Implementing Organization	UNDP with funds from the European Union (EU) and the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)
Collaborating Organizations	local government units
Number of Permanent Houses Built	232 housing units: 155 units funded by EU - 55 units in Tacloban City; 55 units in Ormoc, Leyte; 55 units in Hernani, Eastern Samar 67 units funded by KOICA - Basey, Western Samar
Housing Design, Technology, Materials	Row house type; floor area of 35 square meters; height of 2.55 meters from floor to ceiling; low-pitch galvanized iron roof; concrete gutters, concrete floor and walls, fiber cement board ceiling, jalousie windows with wooden louvers protecting the front windows
Cost of Housing Unit	₱353,911.00 inclusive of the water system and lighting

Land and Housing Cost, Repayment and Amortization	Beneficiaries will not be made to pay for the housing unit.
Land Tenure Arrangement	Usufruct rights on land owned by the LGU
Project Cost	₱19,765,119.00
Project Duration	August 2015 to December 2016

B. Project Implementation

In the aftermath of the devastation left by Typhoon Haiyan, UNDP was among the international organizations that offered assistance to affected cities and communities in Eastern and Western Visayas. With funding commitment from the European Union (EU) and KOICA, UNDP implemented a comprehensive recovery and rehabilitation project in selected Yolanda-affected communities in the Visayas. The EU project had four components, namely: (1) disaster-resilient public infrastructure; (2) sustainable livelihoods; (3) resettlement of displaced populations; and, (4) support to recovery coordination and local capacities for disaster risk reduction and management. UNDP established offices in Guiuan in Samar and in Ormoc and Tacloban in Leyte. In addition to the EU support, KOICA provided similar funding support for waste management, livelihood, shelter, and disaster-resilient infrastructure like an evacuation center. Thus, the resettlement of 67 families in Barangay New San Agustin has been made possible with KOICA funding support.

The Yolanda Response Project was the first involvement of UNDP in Tacloban City. Because UNDP had already been working with the LGUs initially on debris clearance and waste management and in livelihood assets replacement, it also coordinated with the LGUs on the selection of beneficiaries to be provided with permanent housing assistance. By March 2015, UNDP had executed a memorandum of understanding with the Tacloban city government for its first Yolanda shelter project. Three other sub-projects were developed in Ormoc City and in the municipalities of Hernani and Basey in the province of Samar.

This project profile is mostly based on the Tacloban sub-project located in Cabalawan which was the only project site visited by the research team. At the time of the data-gathering, the Tacloban and Ormoc housing units had been completed and occupied; the Hernani and Basey sub-projects were under construction.

UNDP's main partners in its Yolanda Response Project are the local governments. The local government formulated the criteria for selecting the families to be assisted by the project and on this basis identified the beneficiaries of the project. The UNDP project team then met with the LGU to orient it on the modality of the housing project. It then proceeded to meet with the identified beneficiaries to explain the project modality and begin the process of identifying the workers who would be engaged in constructing the houses and organizing them into a construction workers' association.

Among the principles that guided the project are: (1) priority given to the most vulnerable households (e.g., non-beneficiaries who had disability were also hired), (2) empowerment of women by giving

them the opportunity to be employed as support staff (e.g., warehouse woman, time keeper, treasurer, auditor and providing sweat equity through manual work); and (3) beneficiary-driven construction process.

Box 1

Key Features of the Yolanda Response Project

1. The beneficiaries are identified by the LGU and endorsed to UNDP.
2. The beneficiaries of each project location identify a family member who will be involved in the construction; these workers are organized into a construction workers' association and registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) so that it will be qualified to enter into a contract with UNDP.
3. UNDP assists the workers' association with the DOLE registration.
4. The labor cost is contracted to the association through a labor contracting agreement between the workers' association and UNDP.
5. Each worker is paid for labor done for 5 days and every 6th day is sweat equity rendered by the worker.
6. If there is need for additional workers to complete the construction, the association may hire additional workers from the non-beneficiaries; UNDP guides the association in screening the workers which include skilled and unskilled workers.
7. Wage rates are based on the official daily regional wages for different categories, which at the time were ₱260 minimum for unskilled workers and ₱450 for skilled workers; the foreman was paid a daily wage of ₱600.
8. UNDP procures the construction materials.
9. Technical supervision is done by UNDP.
10. UNDP undertakes the land development.

Community contracting. Three of the four HOAs were named workers associations but only the Cabalawan group has been further organized and strengthened as a formal workers association which could engage in contracting in the future. This decision was arrived at based on the assessment that Tacloban City, being a regional center, presented greater opportunities for the association to undertake construction projects. In order to qualify as a HOA, the organization had to be registered with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). However, the process is very long, expensive, and required much documentation. For the Tacloban Cabalawan sub-project, the Barangay 61 Yolanda Survivors Construction Workers' Association (BYSCWA) was organized and elected its officers in February 2015. The community had a good number of carpenters, masons and electricians among its members. Even women became members of the association to assist with tasks such as bookkeeping and tending the warehouse. The UNDP project team assisted the workers with registering their association with the DOLE, a process that on the average took two months. DOLE registration was required for UNDP to be able to execute a labor contract with the workers' association

for the house construction. The association provided the labor while UNDP took care of procuring the construction materials. Technical supervision was done by UNDP and it set the wages for the construction workers. Skilled workers were paid a daily wage of ₱450 while unskilled workers received ₱260 for a day's work.

The workers were required to render sweat equity of one day for every five days of paid work. The average number of days of sweat equity rendered by the workers varied across the four sub-projects. It ranged from 40 days in the Basey sub-project to 72 days in the Cabalawan sub-project. Depending on the schedule of the civil works and the availability of skilled and unskilled labor from among the beneficiary families, the workers' association could employ workers who are not project beneficiaries. Failure to comply with the sweat equity requirement caused the removal of some beneficiaries from the project. Upon the organization of the construction workers' association, the beneficiary families were given a three-day seminar to be oriented on the construction work to be undertaken and trained in warehousing, bookkeeping and administering the payroll for the workers. They were also made to start a savings program and given values formation by pastors tapped by the City Housing and Community Development Office (CHCDO). UNDP's engineer assisted the association in estimating the labor requirement as well as its cost for making the contract. Payment to the workers' association was done in tranches based on identified construction milestones.

UNDP provided the construction equipment to the workers' association with the understanding that the latter could keep them after the project for use in future labor contracts. Among the equipment given by UNDP are a generator, welding machine, simple mixer, compressor and compactor. The association was also given labor contracts in other UNDP projects in Palo, Basey, and Tacloban Crisis Response Unit (TaCRU), and the wet market in the Cabalawan sub-project. The workers' association was allowed by UNDP to include in the contracts of these projects the cost of acquiring equipment such as a welding machine and one-bagger mixer which the association could keep after the construction.

The construction of the Cabalawan sub-project took approximately 18 months from July 2015 to December 2016. During the construction, members of beneficiary families went to the site to assist in the construction as voluntary workers. Women assisted with carrying water and sand. They held *pintakasi* especially toward the end of the construction as the labor budget was almost used up while much work was yet to be done.

Site selection. The process of finding the land on which to build the permanent houses of the Tacloban project took about two months. The site that was eventually selected was the second to be identified and considered. The assessment of the prospective sites was based on a hazard analysis which considered, among other things, the safe distance from the sea, i.e., observance of the 40 meter-distance from the shoreline; the site elevation not to be vulnerable to flooding; and absence of other risks (e.g., not near a dumpsite or other hazards). The land area must also be able to accommodate 55 housing units. There were some initial roadblocks encountered such as a legal issue with the boundary of the LGU property and certain parts of the land having a low elevation. These issues were eventually resolved. Landfilling was undertaken by the LGU because by then UNDP had finished the land development for the project. Ownership of the land by the LGU was certified by the Office of the Mayor and a City Council resolution allocated the land for UNDP's housing project.

(The Ormoc and Hernani sites are also LGU-owned. In the municipality of Hernani, the site of the housing project is part of the government center. As a result, the site is close to the new municipal building, a gym, health center and the community evacuation center, which was also constructed by UNDP under the EU project. In Ormoc, the land had been newly acquired by the LGU.)

Capacity building. The project's capacity building program was a major component of the project which aimed to impart skills, values and knowledge to the community members in the areas of: (1) financial management; (2) warehouse and logistics management; (3) organizational management; (4) values formation; (5) estate management; and (6) livelihood development and management.

The workers' association was trained in managing its funds, recording of transactions, paying the workers' wages and practicing the necessary financial controls and documentation. Funds for the house construction were released to the workers' association in several tranches with each release contingent on the achievement of specified construction milestones. Included in the labor contract with UNDP is that the workers' association can keep some of the equipment provided by the project for the association's future use such as a welding machine and one bagger cement mixer. The association can rent out the equipment.

Community members were trained in checking the quality and quantity of the materials delivered, for instance calculating the volume of sand and gravel in cubic meters by measuring the dimensions of the delivery trucks. Among the problems encountered were delays in the delivery of construction materials and problematic access roads.

The CHCDO provided the values formation. Community members were encouraged to practice the habit of saving or setting aside money each week for emergencies and essential household expenses such as the schooling of children, transportation and allowances. Estate management orientation was provided by UNDP, with the LGU also giving training on waste management. UNDP brought in resource persons to provide training on livelihood activities which the community members plan to engage in such as fish vending, dry goods trading and operating a *sari-sari* store or grocery.

Estate management. UNDP was conscious of the need to capacitate the community to be able to maintain the good condition of the houses and the community amenities provided by the project. Thus, the project incorporated an estate management component which involved helping the community association formulate the guidelines on such concerns as allowable extensions/development, waste management, public safety and security in a participatory way. These guidelines have been written into a formal agreement with the CHCDO and the UNDP, the "*Kasabutan*" (agreement in Waray), which each family signs. (See Appendix 4 for a copy of the *Kasabutan*.)

Livelihood support. Beneficiary families were provided with livelihood assistance to enable them to get back on their feet as they established themselves in their new community. In the Cabalawan sub-project, the families which decided to engage in fish trading were given ₱20,000 worth of working capital in the form of fish and equipment (weighing machines, tubs or *banyera*). Those that wanted to engage in dry goods buying and selling were given ₱10,000 worth of goods.

Implementation issues. Compared with other post-disaster permanent housing projects, construction of the houses in UNDP's Yolanda Shelter Project was completed within a relatively short time. Still project implementers identified some causes of delay. A major cause of delay had been the availability of workers. For instance, concrete pouring needed many unskilled laborers but if there are not enough beneficiary-workers, the project would be forced to hire even skilled beneficiary-workers to do the job. When there was shortage of labor from the beneficiaries, workers could also be hired from non-beneficiary households. Some beneficiaries that could no longer comply with the sweat equity requirement were replaced. Unfortunately, sometimes the sweat equity was not complied with, and some workers tended to extend or prolong the work so they would be paid more.

Another cause of delay was the inability of the LGU to produce the needed land documents. The site of the Ormoc sub-project was newly acquired by the LGU and had no land transfer documents, including a tax declaration under its name. The Cabalawan sub-project did not have a title under the LGU's name and had a problem with the property boundary. The issue was resolved through a certification from the Office of the City Mayor and a resolution from the City Council allocating the land for the UNDP project.

Working with the LGU must consider its own plans. In one instance, the LGU initially had its own plan on the size of the housing units and the road network and insisted that this plan be followed. The differences were eventually threshed out by UNDP through discussions and negotiations.

Land development support sometimes came late and became a significant cause of delay. In the case of the Cabalawan sub-project, there were no good access roads for the delivery of materials and passage of equipment when the house construction began. The roads were eventually put in place but only after much delay and inconvenience for the community, the workers and suppliers. There was an access road leading to a nearby housing site (that of Habitat for Humanity) which became muddy and unpassable during the rainy season. This prompted the LGU to open two additional access roads which also became unpassable during the rainy season. This underscored the need to conduct land development and concreting of the road network first. Ideally, the drainage system must also be installed early to prevent water from collecting in certain portions of the site which could also impede the construction work.

A common issue cited by informants was the delay in the delivery of housing materials and supplies. Possibly due to the high demand for these materials in the disaster-affected localities at the time, not all suppliers could deliver the materials on time. Some suppliers failed to read in the contract with UNDP that they would be paid after 30 days of the delivery of the supplies. Some suppliers refused this arrangement and so new suppliers had to be found. Again, this caused delays in the construction works. In the Cabalawan sub-project, there was a separate purchase order for every delivery of supplies, a practice which resulted in many delivery delays because stocks are not always available when an order is made. Learning from this experience, in the other sub-projects, one purchase order with a supplier covered several deliveries which minimized the delay because the supplier is informed in advance when a delivery is expected.

Finally, ownership of the units remains uncertain for the beneficiaries since there is yet no document that specifies ownership of the units. The understanding between the LGU and the beneficiaries is that the houses will be owned by the beneficiaries but the land tenure arrangement is not yet clear,

i.e. whether it will be under usufruct, long term lease, or titled to the beneficiaries, although the latter was not given as an option. In the Cabalawan sub-project, the units have been turned over by UNDP to the LGU which is supposed to hand over the units to the beneficiaries. However, it was pointed out that previous beneficiaries of some LGU housing projects, some as old as 10 years, still do not have legal documents to prove their ownership of the housing units awarded to them. The LGU could still be studying various options before formulating its policy on the tenure of LGU housing project beneficiaries.

Outputs and outcomes. The project outputs and outcomes to be presented here are limited to the shelter component of the UNDP Yolanda Response Project.³⁷

The most visible output of the project is the construction of 232 disaster-resilient houses. As a result, 232 poor and vulnerable families now live in a safer community. Equally significant is that these families know how to repair and maintain the houses that have been provided to them. The feedback from the beneficiaries shows their great appreciation for and pride in their new homes and community.

The organization of a DOLE-registered construction workers' association in each of the four beneficiary-communities is another noteworthy output. This can potentially help with the livelihood and income-earning capacity of the assisted households. With the training and experience they received, they can engage in labor contracts for small construction projects. However, they expressed a need for additional support for working capital and equipment to make their labor contracting viable.

The livelihood support provided to the households has resulted in some income-earning activities such as fish-vending, dry goods trading and retail stores. It is yet early to say if these enterprises will be sustained. A micro-grant for the construction of a wet market has also been provided to the community.

C. Chronology of Major Activities

Phase	Duration	Activities
Set-up	January 2015 to April 2015	Land search and site selection
	Tacloban: January to March 2015 Hernani: February to March 2015 Ormoc: February to April 2015	Identification of beneficiaries by the LGU
	One month	Profiling and orientation of beneficiaries
	January 2016 (ongoing as of this writing)	Securing land documents and permits from the LGU

³⁷ Examples of project outputs pertaining to the other components include evacuation centers provided to the LGU, training center for LGU disaster rescue units, *bantay-dagat* dormitory, community wet market.

Phase	Duration	Activities
Implementation		Capacity building of beneficiaries
	June 2015 to July 2015	Recruiting, screening and selection of skilled workers
	One month after beneficiary selection	Formation of workers' associations
	One month after beneficiary selection	Registration of workers' associations
	Three days training (prior to start of construction) on labor contracting, construction safety, logistics management/ warehousing, timekeeping and payroll and fund management (mentoring and coaching on the job – continuing activity)	Training of workers' associations
	HOA Capacity Enhancement Training Workshop Series (two to three days per training area (community development /planning, leadership, organization and project management, finance management)	
	Level III Water Supply System Operation and Maintenance Training Workshop (five days)	
	August 2015 to November 2016	Procurement of materials
	May 2015 to June 2015 (UNDP)	Site development
	October 2015 to November 2015 (UNDP)	
	March 2016 to July 2016 (Tacloban LGU)	
	August 2015 to December 2016	Construction of houses
	November 2016	Punch listing and identification of works for rectification (checklist is given to the beneficiaries when the house is 95% complete)

Phase	Duration	Activities
	November 2016 to January 2017	Rectification of the houses
	January 2017 to March 2017	Turn-over of housing units
Wrap-up/ closure		Project evaluation
	Two days from December 2016-May 2017	Organizational assessment of workers' associations
		Project audit
	Continuing	Assessment of continuing capacity building needs

D. Feedback from Beneficiaries

When the beneficiaries of the Cabalawan sub-project were asked what they knew about the criteria for their selection as project beneficiaries, they replied that the CHCDO was responsible for selecting them. Aside from their houses being totally damaged, among the qualifications are that the family must be of “good behavior” (*magandang asal*) or has no bad record, and must have four or more children. Women-headed households with many children were given priority.

The families from Barangay 61 transferred to their new houses in January 2017. They said that what they appreciate the most is the quality of the house that they received from the project as well as their active participation in its construction. One said, “*Sulit, maganda yung talagang kasama ka sa paggawa ng bahay mo dahil nakita mong maganda ang pagkagawa, hindi tulad ng ibang proyekto, tulad ng sa [mentioned a government housing project nearby] na maraming reklamo. ‘Yung dingding nila na hardiflex na binubuhusan ng semento sa gitna, ampaw, walang laman; pinatayo lang ang steelbars na pinagitnaan ng hardiflex* (It is worth it and good to be involved in building the house because you will see that it is weel-built, unlike in other projects where people have many complaints. Their walls made of fiber cement boards where cement is supposed to be poured in between the boards, turned out to be hollow, with only steel bars between the cement boards.)”

They spoke proudly about knowing the technicalities of the way their houses are built and why they are sure these are more typhoon-resistant: “*Ang trusses namin maganda, hindi kahoy yung nakalagay kundi purlins. Andito kami araw-araw, kaya alam po talaga namin.* (Our houses’ trusses are well built. It has purlins. We were here everyday so we saw how they were built.)”

The families’ most pressing concern was their livelihood. Although they are extremely happy about their new homes, they said they feel uncertain whether they would succeed in their new livelihood or in continuing their previous occupations. They looked forward to the completion of the wet market that is also part of the project. However, they were apprehensive that there are not that many people who would patronize the market as there are only few residents in the area. They could not help but compare their situation now with that in Barangay 61, which they claim was near the city center and

had many residents who patronize their wares. The beneficiaries expressed a desire to do some farming if land were available.

The beneficiaries, however, were not that optimistic about the prospects of their construction workers' association's ability to get labor contracts. They said they need a bigger capital and more equipment, such as a truck, to get contracts. Nevertheless, they remain hopeful that opportunities would come their way.

The beneficiaries were also concerned about the lack of clarity as to whether the city government would require them to pay an amount for their new houses. The UNDP had already turned over the houses to the city government. A lawyer from the city government had once told them that they would not be made to pay anything for their new homes. However, another city hall employee mentioned that they might be asked to pay a small amount. Nothing official has been communicated to the residents pertaining to any payment for their houses. They expect that they would be given a document along with their occupancy permit upon the handover of the houses to them by the LGU. They said that the rules and regulations for living in the community were proposed by them and would be made official by the city government. The rules prohibit renting out the houses or using the houses as vacation homes. Tending animals and pets is prohibited unless they are kept indoors.

The accessibility of schools and health facilities is seen to be not as good as when they lived in Barangay 61. Nevertheless, this was not a major concern for the residents. The nearest health center and elementary and high school are one ride away. College students, however, must travel to the city proper. The residents would like a day care center to be built within or near their community.

When asked if there had been any changes in their behavior and mindsets, the beneficiaries replied that most of them have become occupied with things to do for the project and for their own homes that they have no time for engaging in idle conversations with neighbors. According to them, there are fewer conflicts now as a result.

E. Lessons Learned by the Implementing Organization

Community contracting works.

UNDP employed a modality of community contracting which involved the organization of construction workers' associations. The beneficiary families had members or relatives that could provide the labor requirement of either skilled or unskilled labor. Although there were problems experienced with some workers, the experience has been successful in all the four sub-projects. The houses were built according to the intended quality and within a reasonably short period of time. The workers' associations that were formed have the capacity to engage in labor contracting for small construction projects, albeit needing some additional support for working capital and equipment.

The local government can greatly facilitate land acquisition for shelter recovery.

In most post-disaster permanent housing undertakings, the search for land and its acquisition is the major source of delay in starting the construction of the houses. In the UNDP Yolanda shelter project, all the sites were on land that belonged to the LGU. When the LGU can offer land at a suitable location and with the needed documentation, site development and construction can proceed right away. As

mentioned previously, the Cabalawan sub-project did not have a title under the LGU's name and had a problem with the property boundary. These issues were resolved through a certification from the Office of the City Mayor and a resolution from the City Council allocating the land for the UNDP project.

Land development and concreting of road networks must be done early.

The LGU and other government agencies (e.g., DPWH) can assist private and humanitarian organizations with land development and the concreting of road networks which facilitate house construction. LGUs have this capability although in a post-disaster situation, this capability could be overstretched or severely restricted. Without good access roads, delivery of supplies and the movement of construction equipment are hampered. In the Cabalawan sub-project, UNDP provided temporary rehabilitation and repairs to existing roads to proceed with and complete the house construction. Additional labor cost was also added to compensate workers for the manual hauling of construction materials to the construction site.

Having well-established policies on housing tenure adds to the beneficiaries' sense of security.

Beneficiaries of the Cabalawan sub-project know that they will eventually own the housing unit built for them by UNDP. However, the LGU has not clarified or decided on the terms of the tenure arrangement on the land, that is whether the beneficiaries would be made to pay anything. The beneficiaries say that this is also true of the city government's other housing projects wherein the terms of the housing award have not been put in writing in the form of a document or tenure instrument provided to the beneficiaries. While the beneficiaries enjoy actual possession of their houses and feel safe living in their new community, the uncertainty nevertheless affects their overall sense of security and their commitment to the improvement of their community.

KEY INFORMANTS

Implementing Organization

- Engr. Joel Bobis, Project Officer for Infrastructure, Yolanda Shelter Project, UNDP

Collaborating organization/s

- Leonard Tedence Jopson, Community Affairs Officer IV, Housing and Community Development Office, Tacloban City

Beneficiaries

Barangay 61 Survivors Construction Workers Association (BSCWA)

- Antonio Abude
- Maridel De los Santos
- Florentina Duma
- Marilou Mondido
- Vivian Rotia
- Marita Galanza
- Manuel Dela Rama, Jr.

Post-Yolanda Support for Safer Homes and Settlements

UN-HABITAT



A. Basic Project Information

1. Location

The project built a total of 660 permanent housing units distributed in four locations: Roxas City (288 units), the municipalities of Pan-ay (110 units) and Pontevedra (235 units) in the province of Capiz, and the municipality of Estancia (27 units) in Iloilo.

The sample sub-projects covered in this profile consist of one community in Pan-ay and another in Pontevedra. Pan-ay is a third-class municipality with a population of 43,449. Pontevedra is also a third-class coastal municipality with a population of 46,428 in 2015, located on the eastern part of Capiz Province, 10 kilometers away from Pan-ay. The main livelihood sources of the community members in both sites are fishing and farming.

2. Implementing organization

The implementing organization of the project is the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), a United Nations agency mandated to promote socially and environmentally sustainable town and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all. As a member of the United Nations humanitarian country team, UN-Habitat deploys personnel within hours of a disaster to conduct rapid impact assessments and meet with government departments and United Nations agencies. Its focus is both on securing immediate emergency shelter, as well as supporting communities to build back better and safer. UN-Habitat Philippines provides advisory services in recovery planning to local government units and manages shelter and community infrastructure construction projects in

partnership with government agencies and donors. UN-Habitat's most recent shelter program was in response to Typhoon Yolanda.³⁸

3. Collaborating organizations

One of the unique features of this project is the forging of many partnerships with institutions to fulfill specific objectives integral to the design and approach of the project. UN-Habitat's most strategic partner is the Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC). The beneficiaries of the projects are Yolanda-affected communities that have either availed or in the process of availing of a community loan under SHFC's Community Mortgage Program.

The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) was another key partner which provided additional resources to the project amounting to ₱42.7 million under its Core Shelter Assistance Program. UN-Habitat worked with the regional office of DSWD for the distribution of the individual checks to the partner-households.

UN-Habitat enlisted the support of the local government units especially for securing needed government permits and clearances. UN-Habitat sought the help of the municipal government of Panay in getting the needed clearance from the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) that the selected site is suitable to be developed as a resettlement site. The Engineering Department of the municipal government of Pontevedra extended technical support for the concreting of roads, site inspection and completion of drainage systems.

UN-Habitat forged a partnership with BDO Bank because it needed a bank to serve as conduit for the funds to be downloaded to the communities. The bank staff provided financial management training to community members. The Bank's Foundation eventually also contributed funds for the construction of multi-purpose halls in two communities.

Members of the United Architects of the Philippines (UAP)-Roxas Chapter were approached by UN-Habitat and invited to propose house designs for the communities to be assisted by the project. The Association of Structural Engineers of the Philippines was also tapped to specify the appropriate building materials and estimate the cost of constructing the units.

4. Beneficiaries

The project's beneficiaries are Yolanda-affected families that are members of the homeowners' associations that have availed themselves of a group loan under the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the SHFC. The household partners in Pawa, Panay used to live in different parts of the barangay and applied for a CMP loan in 2011 to purchase land in a new site which is a former fishpond. The loan was taken out in December 2015.

The beneficiaries of the project in Belle Village 1 in Tacas, Pontevedra had its CMP loan taken out in September 1995. Of the 246 members of the homeowners' association who are beneficiaries of the CMP loan, only 33 have been selected to avail of the UN-Habitat Post-Yolanda shelter assistance.

³⁸ UN-Habitat Philippines, "Programmes: Disaster Response" (2016); available from <http://unhabitat.org.ph/programmes/disaster-response/> (accessed 10 April 2017).

These were the most vulnerable households whose houses were most severely damaged by the typhoon.

5. Housing design, technology and materials used

In designing the houses, UN-Habitat sought the help of the United Architects of the Philippines, Capiz branch and the Philippine Institute of Civil Engineers in Capiz. The designs were based on the new standard set by the national government for resilient housing which is capable of withstanding winds of 250 kilometers per hour. The government now requires all government-provided housing to meet this standard. Aside from ensuring that the house design complies with government regulations, it must also be culturally appropriate. After the initial designs had been made by the architects and engineers, these were subjected to consultations with the target partner communities. In the end, a uniform basic design was agreed upon. Some modifications were made for certain locations, such as the houses on stilts in Barangay Pawa in the municipality of Pan-ay in Capiz because of the occasional flooding being experienced in the area. (See Appendix 5 for the perspective and floor and elevation plans.)



Figure 9. One of the houses constructed in Belle Village utilizing the core housing design.

The core houses were designed to withstand wind loads of up to 250 kilometers per hour. They measure 4.4 by 5.9 meters, with four reinforced concrete columns and four mid-wall stiffener columns, topped with a reinforced concrete roof beam. The roof, locally known as *uatro aguas*, has a wooden truss supporting the hip and common rafters, with 0.4 millimeters corrugated galvanized

iron (CGI) roofing with extra perimeter nailing and ridge roll. The lower walls are made of concrete hollow blocks; the upper walls made of split bamboo with wooden frames. Clear-glass jalousie windows are used for natural lighting and ventilation. Electricity, plumbing and sanitation systems for the kitchen and toilet are included. In some houses, the kitchen sink is found at the back outside the core house, allowing for incremental expansion later on.



Figure 10. (L-R) The ceiling of the house shows the wooden truss supporting the hip and common rafters. One of the houses expanded with its kitchen found at the back of the core house.

6. Land and Housing Cost, repayment scheme and amortization

Each core house costs ₱135,000; the on-stilt type costs higher at ₱165,000. The core houses awarded to the partner households by the project will not be repaid by the beneficiaries. Amortization on the land varies depending on the location and size of the lot. For example, in the Pawa sub-project, the monthly amortization on the land ranges from ₱395 for a 64-square meter lot to ₱541 for a 79-square meter lot. The HOA members started paying amortization in March 2016. In the Belle Village 1 sub-project in Tacas, Pontevedra, lot sizes are bigger at 100 square meters.

7. Land tenure arrangement

Since the beneficiaries are enrolled under the CMP, they are amortizing payment to SHFC for the land. Upon full payment of their housing loan, they will have ownership of the land.

8. Project cost

The project was made possible through a US\$2.5 million (approximately ₱ 90 million) grant from the Government of Japan. It also received an additional amount of ₱42.7 million from the Core Shelter Assistance Program of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).

9. Project duration

The project was officially launched in July 2014 while the construction activities were completed in November 2015.

Table 5
Project Information: Post-Yolanda Support for Safer Homes and Settlements

Location	Capiz Province (Roxas City; Municipalities of Pan-ay and Pontevedra) and Iloilo (Municipality of Estancia)
Implementing Organization	United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) is an organization of the United Nations mandated to promote socially and environmentally sustainable town and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all.
Collaborating Organizations	Social Housing Finance Corporation, United Architects of the Philippines (Capiz Chapter), Banco de Oro Foundation, Banco de Oro Bank, Hilti Foundation
Beneficiaries	Yolanda-affected families that are members of homeowners' associations that are beneficiaries of the Community Mortgage Program
Number of Permanent Houses Built	660 units (235 in Pontevedra; 110 in Pan-ay; 288 in Roxas City; 27 in Estancia)
Housing Design, Technology, Materials	Part concrete, part wood; GI sheet roofing; some houses (Barangay Pawa, Pontevedra) on concrete stilts; 26 square meters floor area
Cost of Housing Unit	₱135,000 for the flat houses; ₱165,000 for houses on stilts
Land Tenure Arrangement	Beneficiaries acquired the land through a Community Mortgage Program (CMP) loan from the Social Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC)
Project Cost	US\$2.5 million from the Government of Japan and ₱42.7 million from the Core Shelter Assistance Program of DSWD
Project Duration	July 2014 – November 2015 (Completion of construction activities)

B. Project Implementation

Within days after Typhoon Yolanda struck the Visayas, UN-Habitat deployed teams to Regions VI and VIII to assess the damage caused by the typhoon. Responding to requests from local and national governments for technical assistance, UN-Habitat decided to focus its engagement in post-Yolanda recovery in Capiz and Iloilo in Western Visayas, and in Tacloban, Ormoc and Guiuan in Eastern Visayas.

UN-Habitat launched the Post-Yolanda Support for Safer Homes and Settlements Project in July 2014 with the objective of building permanent houses for Yolanda-affected communities in the provinces of Capiz (Roxas City and the municipalities of Pan-ay and Pontevedra) and Iloilo (Municipality of Estancia). In pursuing this objective, the project was guided by the following principles:³⁹ 1) communities take the lead in their development and make the important decisions in the project ; 2) partnerships are forged with all possible stakeholders by involving them in the project according to their expertise and mandates; 3) transparency especially to the community; 4) alignment with government strategies, policies and standards; and, 5) the project must be enabling in that it must aim to equip the community to be able to stand on its own after a disaster.

A hallmark of the project is the adoption of a community-driven approach that in the Philippines has been termed as “people’s process.” The process of housing provision is led and managed by the community, organized as a community association, with support organizations like UN-Habitat providing technical, financial and organizational assistance. UN-Habitat adopted the process by facilitating self-recovery of shelter and community facilities by the people themselves through the strengthening of the community’s technical and institutional capacities. A key element of the approach is the practice of community contracting in the construction of the houses and community facilities. It also espoused and promoted the principle of “building back better.”

Box 2

Five Stages of the People’s Process

The People’s Process as implemented in the Post-Yolanda Safer Homes and Settlements Project consisted of five stages:

1. Socialization and Integration

- courtesy call with local government (city/municipality, province) and community leaders
- community orientation and profiling
- discussion with possible design partners
- shelter needs assessment
- design conceptualization
- preliminary schematic drawings

³⁹ Warren Ubongen, interview by authors, 2 February 2017, John J. Carroll Institute on Church and Social Issues, Quezon City. Mr Ubongen is a Project Manager at UN-Habitat.

2. Community Project Identification and Prioritization

- community action planning
- formation of community project committees
- shelter household-partner profiling
- household-partner shelter application
- household-partner validation
- community association/household-partner posting
- community/partners consultation on house design
- house technical assessment
- drafting of construction drawings, details, work plan

3. Community strengthening

- community contracting
- finalization of household-partner listing
- community training on project and financial management
- construction of model unit
- assessment of model unit
- adjustment of design
- presentation and approval of the house design

4. Project Implementation and Monitoring

- site preparation
- house construction
- ocular inspection
- workers' orientation
- site clearing
- actual construction
- house construction and punch listing (checklist of items to inspect)
- house turnover
- toolbox meetings (In these meetings held once a week, the engineer and community organizer meet with the community leaders and construction workers to review the target output, identify the causes of any delays and agree on courses of action to avoid further delays)

5. Participatory project evaluation

- community workshop to gather challenges and lessons learned
- final funds audit

Source: People's Process in Shelter Recovery, Executive Summary, Volumes 1-6

Through its partnership with SHFC, the project identified communities in Capiz and Iloilo that have become SHFC's partners under the CMP. Some of CMP projects were in arrears and some were still to be taken out (i.e., the loan approved). The CMP extends affordable loans to informal settler

communities through their community association for the acquisition of land so that they will have secure tenure. One advantage of this partnership is that it enabled the swift identification of land on which to build the permanent houses. Since the communities are CMP-assisted communities, the people had been the ones who selected the sites and in some cases, had already built their houses in them before Yolanda struck. Moreover, because the sites have been approved for mortgage financing under the CMP, these would have been subjected to scrutiny as to the authenticity of their titles and their safety against geo-physical hazards. The partnership was also advantageous to SHFC because the payment of CMP loan amortization was made a condition for the release of the funds for the house construction.

Among the prospective communities to be assisted by the project, UN-Habitat gave priority to the most vulnerable and underserved communities affected by Yolanda, including informal settlements. Within these communities, households with the greatest need were given priority, including those living in tents and camps or residing with host families. Among those identified as most vulnerable are elderly or persons with disability with no family support, women-headed households with low income, widows, women living in temporary shelters/camps, low-income laborers and poor families housing orphans and displaced families.

Potential household partners or project beneficiaries were profiled and subjected to a validation and background investigation process. After the validation, a tentative list of household partners is posted in the community for vetting by the community members themselves. Complaints or objections were handled by the officers of the community association based on the criteria set by UN-Habitat. The list of household partners was finalized after the objection period lapsed.

Depending on the status of the CMP project, the UN-Habitat housing process varied. In the Pawa project in Pan-ay, the project site was a vacant land that would be turned into a resettlement site. The CMP loan had not yet been approved because the land still needed to get the necessary clearance from the MGB as suitable for housing. Since the landowner gave his consent for the site development to proceed pending payment for the land, the land acquisition process happened simultaneously with the site development and house construction. In this project, all the community members were household beneficiaries of the project. In the Barangay Tacas, Pontevedra project, the site is a taken out CMP project and the families are already amortizing CMP borrowers. However, not all the community members became beneficiaries of the UN-Habitat housing project. Only the most vulnerable families and those with severely damaged houses were selected to be partner households.

Among the benefits attributed to the people's process are the reduction in the construction costs of up to 30%, the injection of cash into the local economy and the creation of employment and income opportunities because of the hiring of local carpenters and laborers. To these advantages, project manager Mr. Warren Ubongen also adds the faster pace of construction, a higher level of acceptance and ownership of the project by the communities and assurance of the quality of the houses.

Empowerment through community contracting. Community contracts with the partner communities are a key component of the project reflecting the basic principles of community-driven development. The contract signifies that the communities assisted are not mere beneficiaries but are active agents and partners in their own rehabilitation. As stated in the community agreement signed by UN-Habitat and the partner community or homeowners' association (HOA), the latter is the project implementer

while UN-Habitat provides the funds and technical guidance. The HOA receives the funds in tranches based on scheduled completion of works with supporting documentation.

Upon a community association's entry to the project following a community planning process and the formation and training of community project committees, funds for the construction of the houses are downloaded to the community association. Four committees are formed in each community: construction and labor, purchasing, finance and audit. The community also determined what site development project or community infrastructure it wants to build based on its community development plan. A partner community must open a bank account with Banco de Oro (BDO) to which funds would be downloaded.

The head of the finance committee of each organization underwent a financial literacy training given by BDO which covered the procedures for opening and maintaining a bank account, deposit and saving schemes, and filling out finance and audit forms. While UN-Habitat is not a signatory to the check since only HOA officers are signatories, a special process was agreed between the bank and UN-Habitat where UN-Habitat clears checks drawn by the HOA before the bank proceeds with the payment. Decisions on how and where the money would be spent were made by the community. Fund withdrawals were done in tranches, depending on the need as verified by UN-Habitat, to guarantee proper utilization of the funds.

Actual construction began with the preparation of the construction site. The UN-Habitat and the HOA committees conducted ocular inspections and undertook the necessary preparatory steps, including the identification of lot boundaries and demolition of existing structures, before starting the house build. Each community chose a foreman from the pool trained by UN-Habitat and contracted him and his team of carpenters and laborers for constructing the houses. The HOA oriented the team on the work expected and the timeframe.

Assisting in the rebuilding of their houses became part of the daily routine of the household-partners, as the project beneficiaries were called. Women played a particularly active role in some projects such as in Pawa. They took care of receiving and checking the delivery of construction materials to ensure the correct quantities and specifications and sometimes even physically carried the materials such as lumber and hollow blocks to the storage rooms. They also checked the actual construction according to the checklist for resilient housing and did some of the carpentry works.

During construction, the HOA decided on the sequence of tasks, including which houses are to be built first. UN-Habitat teams monitored the construction for quality assurance, particularly with regard compliance to resilient housing standards. The homeowners, the construction committee, and the foreman were given a checklist of the standard specifications to be checked. So-called toolbox meetings were facilitated by the UN-Habitat implementing team and held once a week with the household partners, the community, and the workers for sharing daily construction activities including incidents, hazards and work processes. Issues were discussed and strategies to address them were identified in these meetings. Houses were handed over upon completion of all the works, accompanied by proper documentation, an expenditure sheet and bank statement.

Forging partnerships. Aside from its adoption of community contracting, the forging of multi-stakeholder partnerships was another key element of UN-Habitat's strategy in implementing the

project. The partnership with SHFC was the most strategic. After Yolanda, SHFC was finding ways to extend assistance to informal settler communities affected by the disaster. However, given its mandate of providing housing finance, it tried to look for a way to extend help within this core mandate. Logically it had its sights on its own CMP communities that needed help with house reconstruction. SHFC wanted to help these communities recover and return to a state of normalcy as quickly as possible.

SHFC's existing programs, the CMP and the High-Density Housing Program, also adopt a community-led approach to providing secure tenure to poor informal settler families. Its programs therefore fitted well into the people's process approach of UN-Habitat. SHFC President Ana Oliveros knew Mr. Warren Ubongen of UN-Habitat, who himself is well acquainted with the CMP process, having worked with an NGO that assisted communities access the program. This personal relationship paved the way for an institutional partnership between two organizations whose development approaches were highly compatible.

The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) was another key partner and provided additional resources to the project under its Core Shelter Assistance Program. Because of the additional funds, the quality of the houses could be upgraded to become structurally flood- and disaster- resilient. UN-Habitat worked closely with the regional office of DSWD for the distribution of the individual checks to the partner-households.

UN-Habitat knew that the support of the local government is crucial to the project's success, especially for securing needed government permits and clearances. As far as relating with the LGU is concerned, connecting with the Provincial Governor proved helpful in getting the cooperation of the city and municipal mayors. UN-Habitat sought the help of the municipal government of Pan-ay in getting the needed clearance from the MGB that the selected site is suitable to be developed as a resettlement site. The municipal government also knew the people in the communities and helped with informing the people and conducting the initial consultations. Pan-ay Municipal Administrator Mr. Rey Cordenillo⁴⁰ described the role played by the LGU in the project as that of facilitating clearances (e.g. MGB and DENR⁴¹), assisting the community in checking the deliveries of the construction materials and providing heavy equipment. He said that the LGU took on a facilitative role and preferred not to intervene in the implementation. It was enough that it was informed of the progress of the project and it was ready to come in to help resolve issues when asked to do so. He said that a distinct advantage of the LGU vis-à-vis organizations coming from outside is that it is familiar with the people and their culture and can exercise some clout and authority when the people's cooperation is needed.

The Engineering Department of the municipal government of Pontevedra extended technical support for the concreting of roads, site inspection and completion of drainage systems. It committed to including the maintenance of the community infrastructures built in the annual municipal budget. It also gave fishing gears obtained from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) for

⁴⁰ Rey Cordenillo, interview by authors, Pan-ay Municipal Hall, 13 February 2017. Cordenillo is the Pan-ay Municipal Administrator.

⁴¹ According to Mr. Cordenillo, there was an instance when the supplier of wooden products or logs was accosted by the DENR for not having acquired the needed clearance from the agency. The LGU had to intervene to resolve the issue.

families engaged in fishing and helped in obtaining the necessary clearances from the municipal planning office.

Mr. Esteban Francisco Contreras, Municipal Administrator of Pontevedra, appreciated the speedy and transparent manner of implementing the construction of the houses. *“Hindi napupulitika,”* [not subjected to politics] was how he described the procurement process. He welcomed the building of new roads and the continuing road development in some communities. He attributed the project’s speedy implementation to the collaboration among the LGU, the community and the NGOs.⁴²

UN-Habitat forged a partnership with BDO bank because it needed a bank to serve as conduit for the funds to be downloaded to the communities. The bank then mobilized the BDO Foundation through its national office. The Foundation’s President Ms. Maureen Abelardo and Program Director Ms. Rose Espinosa relayed the national office’s support to BDO’s branches. BDO Roxas City Branch Manager Mr. Genesis Ambrosio recalled that after Yolanda, the bank responded in the usual way by distributing food and relief goods to affected families.⁴³ But the bank already realized that many families needed rehabilitation. Following BDO Foundation’s partnership with UN-Habitat, he conducted briefings with HOA presidents and officers on opening and maintaining checking accounts. The bank’s manager and staff were instructed to immerse themselves in the rehabilitation project. The Foundation donated multi-purpose halls in the Milibili, Roxas City project and the Pawa Project in Pan-ay municipality. It was the first time for the branch to be involved in such an undertaking.

Members of the United Architects of the Philippines (UAP) Roxas Chapter came to be involved in the UN-Habitat housing project through the Roxas City Mayor and the Capiz Governor who had been approached by UN-Habitat. The Office of the Governor had an existing relationship with NGOs. UAP architects in Roxas City were invited to propose house designs for the communities to be assisted by UN-Habitat. They then submitted design proposals and recommendations for approval by NHA and DPWH based on the budget set by UN-Habitat. The Association of Structural Engineers of the Philippines was also tapped to specify the appropriate building materials and the cost. The criteria used in coming up with the design were 1) typhoon-resilience; 2) use of locally available materials; and, 3) resistance to termites and the elements. The HILTI Foundation which was experimenting with bamboo technology for housing was tapped for the Estancia sub-project. Some of the UAP architects were hired by the project. Although initially not accustomed to dealing with informal settler communities, the architects came to appreciate their role as an intermediary balancing the requirements of the funding agency and the needs of the community in coming up with technically sound and culturally acceptable housing designs.

In forging relationships with all these partners, UN-Habitat acted strategically. It knew the strengths and resources of each potential partner. It made a list of the resources and expertise it needed for the project and identified which actor could provide them.

⁴² Esteban Francisco Contreras, interview by authors, 14 February 2017, Pontevedra Municipal Hall, Pontevedra, Capiz.

⁴³ Genesis Ambrosio, interview by authors, BDO Roxas City office, 15 February 2017. Ambrosio is the BDO Roxas City branch manager.

Implementation issues. The different stakeholders encountered different issues in carrying out their respective purposes and roles in the project.

UN-Habitat Project Manager Mr. Warren Ubongen shared that not all city or municipal mayors were initially enthusiastic or willing to give active support to the project. Convinced that local government support was crucial to the success of this undertaking, UN-Habitat sought the help of the governor in one instance, and the DSWD Secretary in another, to try to persuade the local officials to give their active support. Through UN-Habitat's persistence, the project secured the full cooperation of 16 barangay governments and 1 city and 3 municipal governments.

Another challenge encountered was having divisions within the HOA which sometimes impeded or delayed decision-making by the HOA. In one instance a faction within the organization went to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to question the leadership of the association. Such organizational conflicts and dynamics could cause problems when the homeowners association needs to make decisions concerning the project. In this situation, UN-Habitat asked the mayor to intervene.

In another instance, some re-blocking needed to be done to widen a one-meter pathwalk to three meters which some community members opposed. UN-Habitat once again went to the mayor who then dispatched the city engineer and the police to resolve the issue.

The security of leaders handling the payroll of the construction workers also became a concern. In an incident that occurred in the Pawa sub-project, rumors went around that pirates were about to attack the community purportedly to steal the payroll money. Fortunately, the women leaders were alert and immediately asked help from the UN-Habitat project team which promptly sent security personnel and the mayor sent policemen to guard the finance committee members. The rumor proved to be false but the incident brought up the need to set up a financial system that would not endanger the safety of community members such as utilizing automated teller machines (ATMs) for disbursing cash.

Project outputs and outcomes. Beyond constructing houses and community facilities to replace those that were lost or damaged by Typhoon Yolanda, the Post-Yolanda Support for Safer Homes and Settlements Project was primarily a capacity-building initiative which sought to strengthen the capacity of community organizations and local governments to prepare for disasters and build and maintain resilient housing. Among the significant results of the project are the following:

- Accelerated recovery for target communities

The project initially targeted to assist 20 communities in their recovery and rehabilitation of housing and community facilities. The damage assessment conducted by UN-Habitat's teams showed a more extensive need as well as opportunity to assist more communities which were beneficiaries of the SHFC's CMP in the province of Capiz. The project ended up reaching out to as many as 28 communities.

- Permanent housing for Yolanda-affected families

From an initial target of building 610 permanent houses for families that lost their homes to Yolanda, the project was able to construct 660 permanent houses complete with water and sanitation facilities.

Building the additional 50 houses was made possible by funds amounting to ₱42.7 million from the DSWD under its Core Shelter Assistance Program.

- Training semi-skilled artisans in construction and disaster risk reduction

The project targeted to train 250 semi-skilled workers to upgrade their skills in construction and disaster risk reduction. With some savings from the project due to more efficient use of project funds, the project was able to train 323 semi-skilled artisans and 31 foremen. Of those trained, over 100 carpenters/masons and over 20 foremen were hired to construct the houses. Others were able to get construction jobs outside the project.

- Improved community facilities

The project aimed to construct community facilities for its initial target of 20 communities. Additional funds from government and non-government organizations were tapped and partner LGUs extended counterpart in the form of equipment for community infrastructure construction. BDO Foundation provided funds for multi-purpose centers in two communities. The community facilities were built with the homeowners' associations hiring private builders, many of which voluntarily built more or better than the agreed building specifications as their donation to the community. As a result, 54 community infrastructure projects were built for 28 partner communities. The infrastructures included road gravelling or concreting, drainage facilities, streetlight installation and rewiring, water system installation and multi-purpose halls.

- Enhanced disaster risk reduction know-how

Over 170 volunteer Household Self-Assessors and Guides were trained to conduct DRR training and house (vulnerability) assessments in their respective communities. Families who were not able to avail of the new houses built by the project participated in the training. With an original target of 4,000 households assisted in this manner, the project was able to train 4,594 households and their houses assessed.

- Increased awareness for building back safer

With the communities and LGUs having been capacitated in DRR and rehabilitation, they have become articulate and knowledgeable champions in DRR and shelter recovery, steeped in the people's process, and eager to share their knowledge with other communities. Because of the impressive results demonstrated by the people's process approach, the partner communities have been visited by groups coming from various parts of the country. The project has also attracted the attention of media, government and NGOs. This project was presented at the National Summit on Housing and Urban Development organized by the Joint House of Representatives and the Senate Committees on Housing and Urban Development in 2015. Discussions with the National Housing Authority have been conducted to explore the possibility of replicating and scaling up the project in identified Yolanda-affected municipalities.

C. Chronology of Major Activities

Phase	Duration	Activities
Set-up	June 2014	UNH publication for new hiring
	July 2014	Project Approval
	July-August 2014	Hiring of staff Establishing partnership with stakeholders. As early as February 2014, UN-Habitat started exploring partnership with SHFC for possible assistance. Selection of communities; technical assessment of sites
Implementation	June-July 2014	Shelter needs pre-assessment
	August 2014	Community profiling
	September 2014	Shelter needs final assessment Community action planning
	August-September 2014	House design conceptualization
	September-October 2014	Household-partner profiling in PAWA
	October 2014	Formation of community project committees
	November 2014	Household-partner profiling in Belle Village Community consultation on housing design
	December 2014	Community contracting Community training on project and financial management Construction of model unit Approval of house design
	Dec 2014 - January 2015	Site preparation
	December 2014	Start of house construction in Belle Village

Phase	Duration	Activities
		Weekly toolbox meetings
	January 2015	House turnover in Belle Village
	February 2015	Start of house construction in PAWA
		Weekly toolbox meeting
	March 2015	House turnover in PAWA
Wrap-up/ closure	February 2015	Project evaluation of Belle Village
	March 2015	Funds audit of Belle Village
	April 2015	Project evaluation and funds audit of PAWA

D. Feedback from the household partners

Household partners in Barangay Pawa, Pan-ay consider as the most valued and appreciated assistance they received from the project the safety and security they feel in the house they now live in and own. *“Hindi na namin inaapakan ang tubig; hindi na pinoproblema ang bahay,”* [We don’t step on water anymore; we don’t worry about our house.] says a member of the Pawa Homeowners Association. Appreciation for the marked improvement in living conditions is shared by practically all the household partners. Having money to spend on household needs instead of paying for rebuilding their lost homes is something they are all extremely grateful for.

Another highly valued outcome is the knowledge gained about house building and repair and disaster preparedness. Because they were involved in constructing their own house, they know how to maintain it and fix anything that could wear out or is damaged. They also learned how to protect their houses from typhoons, says a community member of Belle Village 1 in Tacas, Pontevedra. They now understand what resilient housing entails and realize its importance and the role they ought to play in building their community’s resilience to disasters.

There was also much appreciation for the confidence acquired in being able to accomplish the tasks assigned to the committee members, particularly the finance, purchasing and construction committees. The women charged with inspecting the deliveries learned how to assess the supplies and materials if they met the specifications in the purchase order. Handling and safekeeping millions of pesos was an unbelievable experience for poor women and fisherfolk family members who could hardly make ends meet. Entrusted with the cash and equipped with the needed financial literacy and financial controls, the community members felt more confident and respected in the community.

Community members also valued the increased cohesiveness and sense of community. *“Mas kilala namin ang isa’t isa; mas mapasensiya sa isa’t isa, at natuto kaming sumunod sa mga patakaran,”* [We

know each other; we are more patient with one another and we have learned to obey rules.] says another Pawa HOA member.

Mr. Noe Bebita, President of Belle Village 1 Homeowners Association in Barangay Tacas, Pontevedra, noticed that beneficiary households seem to be more motivated and driven in their livelihood efforts because they want to improve their new houses. They want to beautify their neighborhood and even improve their community chapel.

These positive results notwithstanding, community members consider sustaining the members' active participation in their organizational activities, such as attending meetings, as the biggest challenge now. The HOA officers observed that although the members realize that being organized as a community was a major factor in having been selected as a project partner, taking care of their livelihood needs and improving their own houses sometimes took precedence over attending organizational meetings and activities. The officers acknowledge that livelihood continues to be a major concern of all households.

Areas for improvement. According to Mr. Warren Ubongen, the project could have intensified its capacity building program on estate management had there been more time. He considered this particularly useful for helping project partners maintain the improvements in the houses and community infrastructure provided by the project. Part of this would be developing systems within their organizations and generating resources through savings or other means for the maintenance and repair of the houses and facilities.

Another area of improvement which in a way was echoed by the project partners is giving more attention to livelihood support. Mr. Ubongen believes this could have been addressed through the formation and capacity building of a committee on livelihood within the HOAs. UN-Habitat could have linked the partners with groups in the private sector in the same way that it mobilized multi-stakeholder partnerships for the construction of houses and community facilities. Funds for start-up capital could have been mobilized as well.



Figure 11. Some homeowners utilized the front of the core house to set up a sari-sari store as a source of livelihood.

G. Lessons Learned by the Implementing Organization

The lessons learned by the institutions that implemented and collaborated in this project have been written up in the six-volume publication “People’s Process in Shelter Recovery” of UN-Habitat and SHFC. These and other lessons shared by project manager Mr. Ubongen are summarized below.

The community-driven approach can be utilized for post-disaster rehabilitation.

The project has demonstrated that enabling families affected by a disaster to drive the process of recovery and rebuilding considerably speeds up, rather than slows down, post-disaster rehabilitation. The project has developed a systematic method for instilling community participation and accountability through procedures that allow communities to make the major decisions and be responsible for them. These procedures succeeded in balancing flexibility with adherence to standards and protocols. Community contracting can be an empowering tool for giving communities ownership of a project. Capacity building and financial oversight are indispensable for ensuring the performance of expected roles.

Multi-stakeholder partnerships greatly facilitate post-disaster housing rehabilitation.

UN-Habitat’s partnership with SHFC made possible the swift identification of sites where houses for disaster-affected families could be built. Other post-Yolanda projects were considerably delayed by the inability to find and acquire land for housing. Making CMP beneficiaries as household partners for this project ensured that the new houses would be built in locations that are safe and had been chosen by the beneficiaries themselves. Collaboration with the LGUs brought into the project counterpart resources, especially in the form of equipment, which brought down the cost of site development. This also facilitated the inclusion of other community infrastructure in future LGU infrastructure development plans and budgets. Tapping the private sector for technical training expanded further the resource base of the project. BDO, which was tapped to provide financial literacy training to the community finance committees, made additional donations of multipurpose halls. Professional organizations such as the United Architects of the Philippines (Capiz Chapter) and the Philippine Institute of Civil Engineers in Capiz, for their part, provided the needed technical expertise to bring the house design up to the latest standard for resilient housing.

Capacity building of community partners is integral to resilience-building.

The community-driven approach entails a heavy investment in capacity building. The project deliberately made the development of the capacities of communities and local governments an explicit project objective. This means that resources were made available specifically for the salaries of community facilitators, organizers and trainers and training activities. Building resilient housing is not only about making houses that meet certain technical standards but is also, and more importantly, about empowering the families who will live in them to maintain, repair, and if necessary rebuild them. Making the communities realize the value of having a capable and accountable organization will make them resilient for future disasters.

Financial literacy and controls are an effective tool for building community trust.

The experience of handling money and accounting for how it is used enables community organizations to earn the trust of its members. All the household partners of the project are poor families yet their organizations were entrusted millions of pesos to manage and use to build houses and community infrastructure. The houses were all built and the funds all properly accounted for. In some cases, savings were even generated for additional community projects. Financial literacy and the institution of simple but effective financial controls in the project implementation design taught community members how transparency and accountability could be operationalized through systems and procedures that in the end would be beneficial for everyone. The finance committee members might have been overwhelmed by the amount of cash they were made to handle and account for, but with the assurance of a good financial management system in place, they acquired the confidence to perform their work. More importantly, the trust of community members that have had a bad experience with officers running away with community funds had been regained.

Technical development must go hand in hand with community development.

The delivery of the main output of the project which is permanent houses for Yolanda affected poor families is strictly speaking the result of a technical process consisting of site development, house construction and construction of community facilities. However, the delivery of the outputs required a process which the project decided would be a community development process involving the community in a significant way. Conflicts could sometimes arise between the technical and community development processes. To avoid such conflicts, the project decided to have a community organizer and a technical person as partners in a team in each sub-project. The technical and community development activities are therefore better harmonized and synchronized at the community level.

Partnerships at the regional level are effective for speedy implementation.

UN-Habitat developed partnerships with the regional office of DSWD for downloading the Core Shelter Assistance Program funds and distributing the individual checks to the household partners, and with the regional office of DPWH for the approval of house design plans and getting other clearances. Dealing with the regional offices greatly speeded up transactions with the national agencies.

KEY INFORMANTS

Implementing Organization

- Warren Ubongen, Project Manager, Yolanda Shelter Project, UN-Habitat

Collaborating organizations

- Rey T. Cordenillo, Municipal Administrator of Pan-ay, Municipality of Pan-ay
- Esteban Francisco Contreras, Municipal Administrator of Pontevedra, Municipality of Pontevedra
- Genesis Ambrosio, BDO Roxas City Branch Manager, Banco de Oro
- Noe Bebita, President of Belle Ville 1 Homeowners Association

Beneficiaries

Household partners in Barangay Pawa, Pan-ay

- Nora B. Verbo, President
- Emilyn B. Barrena, Member, Construction Committee
- May A. Dellona, Member
- Ma. Girly Dalanon, Member
- Mary Cris Dela Cruz, Member, Construction Committee
- Nita Diamante, Member
- Jacqueline Sonsona, Stockwoman

Household partners in Belle Ville 1, Barangay Tacas, Pontevedra

- Annie Iglesia Construction Committee / Auditor
- Rose Marie Borbon Stockwoman
- Liberty B. Diestro Stockwoman

Resilient Recovery Program

CORDAID



A. Project Information

1. Location

Guiuan is a municipality in Eastern Samar with a population of 52,991 in 2015. It has the second largest population in Eastern Samar next to the City of Borongan.⁴⁴ Calicoan Island, where *Barangay* Ngolos and Sulangan are located, is one of the islands and islets (such as Manicani, Tubabao, Homonhon, Suluan) that make up the municipality of Guiuan.⁴⁵ The population of *Barangay* Ngolos in 2015 is 1,455 while *Barangay* Sulangan has 4,020 people.⁴⁶ Typhoon Yolanda first made land fall in Guiuan and affected 11,609 families in 60 *barangays*. According to the NDRRMC, 11,609 houses were damaged by the typhoon, with 10,008 houses totally washed out.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ PSA, “Highlights of the Philippine Population 2015 Census of Population” (19 May 2016); available from: <https://psa.gov.ph/content/highlights-philippine-population-2015-census-population> (accessed 11 April 2017).

⁴⁵ National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) Regional Division VIII (Eastern Visayas), “Guiuan: Gateway to Pacific Adventure” (no date); available at http://www.nap.psa.gov.ph/ru8/profiles/Municipal_Profile/CALICOAN_ISLAND_municipal_profile.pdf (accessed 11 April 2017).

⁴⁶ PSA.

⁴⁷ National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), “Final Report Re Effects of Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)” (6-9 November 2013); available from: [http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1329/FINAL_REPORT_re_Effects_of_Typhoon_YOLANDA_\(HAIYAN\)_06-09NOV2013.pdf](http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1329/FINAL_REPORT_re_Effects_of_Typhoon_YOLANDA_(HAIYAN)_06-09NOV2013.pdf) (accessed 11 April 2017).

2. Implementing organization

The Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid (Cordaid) is one of the largest development aid organizations in the Netherlands and has offices in nine countries.⁴⁸ After Typhoon Yolanda hit in 2013, Cordaid Philippines developed a recovery program in Coron, Palawan and in Guiuan, Eastern Samar focusing on housing, water, sanitation and hygiene, and livelihood in 2014. The Resilient Recovery Program aims “to assist vulnerable communities affected by typhoon Yolanda to increase their resilience to future disasters”.⁴⁹ While Resilient Recovery Program was implemented by Cordaid in Coron and Guiuan, this project profile is only limited to the experiences in Barangays Ngoles and Sulangan in Guiuan.

The Resilient Recovery Program has two phases: early recovery (first year of the project) and recovery leading to resiliency (second year). The goal of the program is for the families to have safe and resilient houses in a secure natural environment, to improve their access to water, sanitation, and hygiene and school and health facilities, to diversify livelihood opportunities, and to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters. Initially, the target of the project is to assist 1,235 households in *Barangays* Ngoles and Sulangan.⁵⁰ The project eventually expanded to the Poblacion of Guiuan in 2015 and to *Barangays* 9, 10, 11, and 12 under the Urban Resiliency Program⁵¹ where recovery activities are combined with disaster risk reduction (DRR) and urban planning.⁵²

3. Collaborating organizations

Cordaid, with Caritas Germany through the Diocese of Borongan, conducted a scoping in which it studied the impact of Yolanda in Guiuan. After the scoping, Cordaid and the Diocese of Borongan identified what assistance was most needed in *Barangays* Ngoles and Sulangan in Calicoan island.⁵³ Cordaid coordinated with the LGU to proceed with the implementation of the program. After securing its go signal, Cordaid coordinated with the *Barangay* council of *Barangays* Ngoles and Sulangan to conduct community consultations.

Cordaid also worked with Build Change⁵⁴ and KVCC, an architectural firm in Guiuan, for the design and construction supervision of the houses. Build Change developed housing concepts and constructed 3 pilot houses of concrete core houses which also serves as community evacuation space. Under the partnership with Build Change, four timber houses were retrofitted and 50 houses were built. KVCC

⁴⁸ Cordaid, “About us” (no date); available from <https://www.cordaid.org/en/about-us/> (accessed 11 April 2017).

⁴⁹ John Ievers and Doc Imelda Pagtolun-an, “Evaluation of Cordaid’s Philippines Haiyan (locally named Yolanda) Resilient Recovery Program” (unpublished report, 10 January 2016), 1.

⁵⁰ Cordaid, “Resilient Communities in Guiuan” (2014); available from <https://www.cordaid.org/en/projects/resilient-communities-in-guiuan/> (accessed 11 April 2017).

⁵¹ Amillah Rodil, interview by authors, digital audio recording, Quezon City, 7 March 2017. Ms Rodil was the Urban Resilience Project Manager of Cordaid from February to December 2015.

⁵² Cordaid, “Urban Resilience Philippines” (2014); available from <https://www.cordaid.org/en/projects/urban-resilience-philippines/> (accessed 17 April 2017).

⁵³ Rectito Melquiades, interview by authors, digital audio recording, Guiuan Recovery and Rehabilitation Group Office, Guiuan, Eastern Samar, 1 March 2017.

⁵⁴ Build Change designs disaster-resistant houses and schools in emerging nations and trains builders, homeowners, engineers, and government officials to build them. For more information, visit the website <http://www.buildchange.org>.

provided technical assessment of the Yolanda affected houses and design and site supervision services. Ten houses were built under Cordaid's partnership with KVCC.

Funding for the housing was provided by *De Stichting Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties* (SHO), a consortium of Dutch organizations that jointly raises funds to assist disaster-affected populations, and CAFOD, the official aid agency of the Catholic Church in England and Wales.

4. Beneficiaries

The project's intended beneficiaries are families from *Barangays* Ngolos and Sulangan whose houses were severely or partially damaged. Previously, the beneficiaries' houses were made of light materials. The project is *in-situ*, thus the need for beneficiaries to either own the land or secure rights from the legal land owner. Cordaid provided legal assistance to beneficiaries so they could prepare the needed documentation to secure their land tenure. The land must also not be located in a no-build zone. The beneficiaries mostly engaged in fishing and related activities as the source of their livelihood.

By the end of December 2015, the project assisted 400 households in the reconstruction of their houses and 9 households received house repair assistance. This number includes 11 pilot houses in *Barangay* Ngolos and ten pilot houses in *Barangay* Sulangan.

5. Housing Design

Cordaid provided a range of design options for the beneficiaries. In partnership with Build Change and KVCC, concrete incremental core houses are designed with a concrete roof slab that can be expanded into a second floor. These are fully concrete and designed to be used as evacuation during typhoons. In the town center of *Barangay* Sulangan, about 60 houses were built using this design.

Another prototype designed was timber houses. This has a concrete slab floor, coco lumber wooden framing, plywood walls, and metal roofing. Each homeowner is consulted by Cordaid's architects on their preferred house design. This explains why there are variations in the design of the houses constructed especially in *Barangay* Ngolos. Some houses had a half-concrete wall; some also use good lumber instead of coco lumber for wall framing. Some beneficiaries used good lumber instead of coco lumber, since they believe it is sturdier. For the walls, some used wood planks instead of plywood. The house frame was designed to resist strong winds through proper sizing of members, diagonal bracing, and strong connections through straps and bolts. To balance the construction costs and target number of beneficiaries, the design of the house used mixed-materials (e.g. half-concrete wall, coco lumber or good lumber for wall framing).⁵⁵

The house constructed by the beneficiaries followed the option chosen by them from the range of designs proposed by Cordaid. In *Barangay* Ngolos where most beneficiaries followed the timber house design, they often refer to it as "unique" (*kakaiba*).⁵⁶ According to the beneficiaries and Guiuan LGU, one distinct characteristic of the housing design by Cordaid is the noticeably large size of the bathroom. Cordaid designed the toilet to be a separate concrete structure inside the house to serve

⁵⁵ Ievers and Pagtolun-an.

⁵⁶ Analiza Bagasin, interview by authors, digital audio recording, *Barangay* Ngolos, Guiuan, Eastern Samar, 1 March 2017. Ms Bagasin is a project beneficiary.

as an evacuation structure in case the whole house collapsed. Most houses with this design were built in *Barangay Ngołos*. The overall house design has the capacity to withstand wind speeds of up to 250 kph.⁵⁷ The floor area of the houses varies, but beneficiaries reported that their floor area ranges from 16 square meters to 18 square meters, including the bathroom.⁵⁸



Figure 12. Houses built through the Resilient Recovery Program of Cordaid in Sulangan, Guiuan.

6. Land and Housing Cost

There is no land cost for this project as it is *in-situ* (on-site). However, the beneficiaries needed to show a tax declaration on the land. The project cost per beneficiary who had a severely damaged house is ₱132,000 including the construction of the bathroom. This financial assistance is provided in three tranches. The first tranche is given for the construction of the foundation of the house and the floor. The second tranche is released for the construction of the house framing and roof while the third tranche is for the walls, door, and windows.

The assistance includes costs for both the materials (e.g. cement blocks and coco-lumber) and labor for constructing the house. To save on the cost of labor, some beneficiaries opted to build the house themselves while some exchanged labor with their neighbors in building their houses.⁵⁹

For the house repair, the assistance given to the beneficiaries likewise varied. House repair was done for only 9 houses and was customized depending on the assessed status of the house. Usually, house framing, connections, and roofing were improved.

⁵⁷ Ievers and Pagtolun-an.

⁵⁸ Analiza Bagasin and Raul Lagramada, interview by authors, digital audio recording, *Barangay Ngołos*, Guiuan, Eastern Samar, 1 March 2017. Ms Bagasin and Lagramada are project beneficiaries.

⁵⁹ Bagasin and Lagramada.



Figure 13. The roof of a core house in Barangay Ngolos. Upon the construction of house framing and roof, the second tranche of financial assistance was provided to the beneficiaries whose houses were severely affected.

7. Project Cost

Project cost	€ 207,347.00 ⁶⁰
Cost of house construction for severely affected beneficiary	₱ 132,000.00

8. Project Duration

The project started on 01 April 2014 and ended in 31 December 2016. The length of time devoted to building the house varied per beneficiary. On the average, it took from a month to a month and a half. The construction of the houses was targeted to be completed in December 2015 for the project to proceed to its second phase (recovery leading to resiliency) through livelihood support and disaster risk reduction capacity building. The time frame envisioned by Cordaid for the shelter component is one-month for house repair and three-months for the reconstruction.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Cordaid, "Resilient Communities in Guiuan" (2014); available from <https://www.cordaid.org/en/projects/resilient-communities-in-guiuan/> (accessed 11 April 2017).

⁶¹ Rodil.

Table 6
Project Information: Resilient Recovery Program

Location	Barangay Ngolos and Barangay Sulangan, Guiuan, Eastern Samar
Implementing Organization	Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid (Cordaid)
Collaborating Organizations	Cordaid worked with Caritas Germany through the Diocese of Borongan for scoping the impact of Yolanda in Guiuan. Cordaid also worked with Build Change and KVCC, an architectural firm in Guiuan, for the design and construction supervision of the houses.
Beneficiaries	400 households
Housing Design, Technology, Materials	Various designs: (1) Fully concrete; (2) Mixed-materials (e.g. half concrete wall, coco lumber or good lumber for wall framing)
Cost of Housing Unit	₱132,000 per unit for house reconstruction
Land Tenure Arrangement	In-situ, beneficiaries own the land and/or have tax declaration
Project Cost	€ 207347,00
Project Duration	April 2014 to December 2016

B. Project Implementation

Cordaid is one of the first NGOs that provided disaster response to Guiuan after Typhoon Yolanda. Initially, Cordaid provided affected households with shelter kits which included coco-lumber and plywood.

Cordaid employed what it termed as the *resilient recovery approach*. This approach is anchored in community ownership of the recovery process. The project evaluation report noted:

Building on community capacities and engaging other stakeholders, resilient recovery strengthens the resilience of people by addressing capacity gaps in different interconnected elements that support resilience. Resilient recovery fully integrates multi-hazard risk analysis and addresses gaps in resilience as observed in the recent disaster through recovery efforts towards longer term development.⁶²

⁶² Ievers and Pagtolun-an, 11.

In early 2014, a community-led risk assessment of Yolanda-affected households was conducted by Cordaid with the Diocese of Borongan. Meetings were held in each *purok* (communities within the *barangay*). The households were asked about their experiences before, during, and after the onslaught of Typhoon Yolanda.⁶³ The community members identified their priority needs which may not be limited to housing but can include livelihood and community facilities.

In the assessment, the houses were tagged as either “red” which means the house is totally damaged and washed out or “yellow”, meaning the house only needs repair. The people expressed that having a safe place to live in is of utmost priority.⁶⁴ Cordaid found out that most of the families sought safety in their bathroom during Typhoon Yolanda. Thus, Cordaid included in the house design a bigger bathroom area.

Cordaid presented its proposed project to the LGU in early 2014. Upon the approval by the LGU, Cordaid conducted its own social preparation including the assessment of affected households. In selecting its beneficiaries, one condition is ownership or rights on the land where the house would be constructed. The beneficiaries were also required to submit a tax declaration in lieu of a land title.

Model houses were constructed in mid-2014. The beneficiaries purchased the materials (e.g. cement blocks) in Guiuan Poblacion and transported them to Calicoan Island. They supervised the implementation of their house restoration. Some undertook the construction of the houses themselves to cut down on the cost of labor. Others sought the help of their neighbors and provided labor for building their neighbor’s house in return. One beneficiary recounted that she used a portion of the assistance intended for housing to buy rice since her husband worked in the construction of their house and therefore could not go fishing. Most of the beneficiaries engage in fishing as a primary occupation.

To equip beneficiaries with the necessary skills in house construction, Cordaid in partnership with TESDA conducted a 15-day training in carpentry. After the training, the beneficiaries received a certificate from TESDA. The TESDA training was a big help as a source of livelihood since other NGOs providing housing assistance to other communities hired them in the construction. Beneficiaries who hired other beneficiaries to construct their houses paid the latter ₱450 for a day’s work.

Cordaid provided both financial and technical assistance in building the permanent houses. The ₱132,000 financial assistance was provided to the beneficiaries in tranches as they successfully built the agreed upon parts of the house. For the technical assistance, the design options of the house had been provided by Cordaid. Architects from Cordaid consulted with each homeowner on their preferred design and on proposed variations to the prototype designs (e.g. materials to be used).

Architects and engineers hired by Cordaid checked the procurement of materials as well as the phasing and quality of the house construction every week. A beneficiary reported that architects and engineers

⁶³ Cordaid, “Resilient Communities in Guiuan” (2014); available from: <https://www.cordaid.org/en/projects/resilient-communities-in-guiuan/> (accessed 11 April 2017).

⁶⁴ Ievers and Pagtolun-an, 1.

used to visit her house during its construction at least thrice a week. The Cordaid staff also monitored the construction almost every day.

The assistance of the LGUs to the Cordaid beneficiaries was limited to conflict resolution at the level of the *barangay*, if there was any conflict or grievance (e.g. issue on beneficiary selection), and securing a re-connection of a household's previous electricity line with Eastern Samar Electric Cooperative (ESAMELCO).

Within the framework of *resilient recovery*, Cordaid facilitated a process of community planning where priority community projects were identified, resulting in a Resilient Community Action Plan (RCAP). An RCAP includes both recovery initiatives and mitigation projects. Cordaid provided funds for these priority community programs. In *Barangay Ngolos*, the *barangay* hall and health centers were reconstructed. In addition, water pumps were also installed to restore the community's access to water. It also provided a generator set since electricity supply in the *barangay* is intermittent even after electricity had been restored by the ESAMELCO. The gasoline for the generator was a counterpart of the *barangay*. For waste management, the repair of the garbage truck of the *barangay* was funded by Cordaid. Disaster preparedness trainings and drills were conducted to mitigate the impact on the community in case of the occurrence of another natural disaster. Rescue boats and handheld radios were also procured for the use of the *barangay*.

The second phase of the program proceeded to diversifying livelihood options for the beneficiaries. As previously mentioned, most of the beneficiaries engaged in fishing and related activities. Cordaid helped beneficiaries start different livelihood activities such as livestock raising, sea shell crafts and other handicrafts, and sea weeds processing.

One beneficiary interviewed is part of a livelihood group organized and assisted by Cordaid. He belonged to the livestock raising group. These beneficiaries do not necessarily have to be a beneficiary of housing assistance. Cordaid provided the beneficiaries with training to arm them with knowledge on how they can effectively raise their hogs. They were also provided with start-up capital to purchase the piglets and to construct pigpens. However, after just one cycle of livestock raising, the beneficiaries in the group decided that it was no longer worthwhile to continue the activity as a group; they wanted to individually pursue their own livelihood project. Hence, he was the only one left to continue raising livestock; the other members of the group engaged in other livelihood activities.

Another beneficiary of livelihood assistance, who is also a beneficiary of housing assistance, received from Cordaid machines for his handicraft business. He also underwent training in business planning and records keeping sponsored by Cordaid.



Figure 14. A beneficiary of Cordaid engages in a handicraft business supported by the program.

Project Outcomes

The magnitude of Typhoon Yolanda's impact provided a window of opportunity for building resiliency in the process of recovery because of changes in people's attitude towards disaster and risks.⁶⁵ The resilient recovery approach gave primacy to the community's ownership of its recovery process. It engages different stakeholders: the community members, the *barangay*, and the Guiuan LGU.

The beneficiaries received the financial assistance from Cordaid and managed the purchase of the construction materials and the phasing of reconstruction. The process of developing the RCAP not only strengthened the social cohesion in the community but also provided an avenue for participation of previously voiceless community members. They determined the community projects that were most needed and prioritized those which were most important to them. This approach placed the community at the forefront of the recovery process.

The *in-situ* model of the housing assistance also ensured that the community remained intact. While initially apprehensive of the mixed-material model of the housing design because of their preference for concrete houses, they saw the value of the availability of materials and speed of construction as considerations in the choice of housing materials.

The Resilient Recovery Program of Cordaid did not only reconstruct houses and community facilities, but also enhanced the community's resilience and diversified the households' livelihood options. The carpentry training capacitated the beneficiaries to construct and own the houses and provided them with the opportunity to be hired in other house construction projects. Although some livelihood activities did not prosper, the organizing and creation of livelihood groups has proven that community

⁶⁵ levers and Pagtolun-an, 10.

organizing and capacity building support increase the likelihood that collective livelihood endeavors would be sustained.⁶⁶

C. Chronology of Major Activities

Phase	Duration	Activities
Set-up	January 2014	Conduct of community-led risk assessment
		Submission of proposal to LGU to implement the Resilient Recovery Program
Implementation	June 2014	Training organized in partnership with TESDA in carpentry
	July 2014	First permanent houses in <i>Barangay</i> Ngolos are constructed
	July 2014	Community Workshops
	October 2014	30 timber houses in <i>Barangay</i> Ngolos are occupied by beneficiaries
	December 2014	17 concrete houses in <i>Barangay</i> Sulangan are occupied by beneficiaries
Wrap-up/ closure	December 2015	End of project

Source: Cordaid (www.cordaid.org)

D. Feedback from Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries recounted that when Cordaid arrived in their communities, it offered them housing. Cordaid assessed the extent of the damage (*"Inalam talaga nila, purok by purok kung ano yung damage"*) and held meetings first with the *barangay*, then with the community members per *purok*. The beneficiaries said they passed certain documents as proof that either they owned the land or the land owner allowed them to use the land for a certain number of years (e.g. 20 years). They also submitted a tax declaration.

They were anxious (*"aburido"*) about their ability to reconstruct their houses. But since Cordaid had provided them with housing assistance to rebuild their houses they could take advantage of DSWD's Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA) to make improvements and buy appliances for their houses. (*"Kung aasa kami sa government, matagal. Kung walang Cordaid, wala pa kaming bahay [ngayon]."*)

One beneficiary who received both housing and livelihood assistance is thankful that Cordaid's approach is a "package deal"; housing comes first then livelihood comes next. This enabled them to bounce back from the impacts of Typhoon Yolanda. A former member of the *barangay* council noted

⁶⁶ Ievers and Pagtolun-an, 6.

that Cordaid did not only bring housing but also livelihood and disaster risk reduction trainings to their *barangay*. When Typhoon Ruby (Hagupit) hit their community in 2015, beneficiaries felt safer in their new houses and sturdy bathrooms.

E. Lessons Learned by the Implementing Organization

Transparency ensures better community acceptance of project-related decisions.

Issues in the selection of beneficiaries arose during implementation. This demonstrates the need to improve the transparency of the beneficiary selection process. For instance, one beneficiary noted that not all community members whose house was washed out received assistance from Cordaid. There were questions on why they were not included as beneficiaries. Others wondered why the housing assistance for repair did not come as promised. One explanation given to them, according to one beneficiary, is the devaluation of the Euro which reduced the funds available for the project.

LGUs are open to adopting housing technologies and approaches introduced by INGOs.

For the LGU, particularly the Guiuan Recovery and Rehabilitation Group Office, the approach implemented by Cordaid exemplifies the value of grassroots planning in recovery and disaster mitigation, both at the level of the *barangay* and community. The technology of the housing design developed by Cordaid is another learning by the LGU Engineering Office which found the housing model especially appropriate for island *barangays* in Calicoan because it can withstand strong winds.

Creation of an inter-organizational working group at the municipal level makes the delivery of post-disaster assistance efficient.

The presence of INGOs such as Cordaid in Guiuan paved the way for the creation of a shelter group that enabled the LGU, international aid agencies and local NGOs providing housing assistance to affected households to synchronize their efforts. For the LGU, this made the delivery of aid more efficient and systematic.

KEY INFORMANTS

Implementing organization

- Amillah Rodil, Urban Resilience Project Manager (February-December 2015), Cordaid

Collaborating organization/s

- Rectito Melquiades, Guiuan Recovery and Rehabilitation Group Office, Municipality of Guiuan

Beneficiaries

- Analiza Bagasin
- Francasio Ogardo
- Raul Lagramada

ACTED Eastwinds Residences

ACTED



SOURCE: ACTED PHILIPPINES TWITTER

A. Project Information

1. Location

The project is in the same site as the NHA Eastwinds Residences in Barangay Cogon, Poblacion, Municipality of Guiuan, Eastern Samar. Guiuan is a municipality in Eastern Samar with a population of 52,991 in 2015. It has the second largest population in Eastern Samar next to the City of Borongan. The municipality is subdivided into 60 *barangays*. The beneficiaries of the ACTED Permanent Shelter project came from two *barangays* in the town proper or the *Poblacion*: *Barangay 7* with a population of 990 in 2015; and *Barangay Hollywood* with a population of 2,006.⁶⁷ In 2015, the Guiuan local government unit (LGU) estimated 1,200 families for relocation from no-build zones.

Typhoon Yolanda first made land fall in Guiuan in 08 November 2013 and affected 11,609 families. According to the NDRRMC, 11,609 houses were damaged by the typhoon, with 10,008 houses totally washed out.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ PSA, "Highlights of the Philippine Population 2015 Census of Population" (19 May 2016); available from <https://psa.gov.ph/content/highlights-philippine-population-2015-census-population> (accessed 11 April 2017).

⁶⁸ NDRRMC, "Final Report Re Effects of Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)" (6-9 November 2013); available from: [http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1329/FINAL_REPORT_re_Effects_of_Typhoon_YOLANDA_\(HAIYAN\)_06-09NOV2013.pdf](http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1329/FINAL_REPORT_re_Effects_of_Typhoon_YOLANDA_(HAIYAN)_06-09NOV2013.pdf) (accessed 11 April 2017).

2. Implementing Organization

ACTED is a French NGO that started in 1993 in Afghanistan. It is currently working in 35 countries all over the world and describes its mission as “committed to immediate humanitarian relief to support those in urgent need and protect people’s dignity, while co-creating longer-term opportunities for sustainable growth and fulfilling people’s potential around the world.”⁶⁹ It has offices in Manila, Tacloban, Guiuan and Cotabato.

In 2012, ACTED responded to the devastation wrought by Typhoon Pablo. It then provided relief to Typhoon Yolanda in 2013 based on its experiences and learnings in responding to Typhoon Pablo by mobilizing assessment and response teams. ACTED contributed to the first Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) of the impact of Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines, an initiative conducted by more than 40 agencies two days after the typhoon hit the country. MIRA is a tool for mapping the needs of affected populations and areas during the initial response phase. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) served as the coordination lead for the MIRA while the World Food Programme (WFP) served as the technical lead.⁷⁰ ACTED has been assessing and responding to major typhoons in the Philippines, namely Typhoons Hagupit (Ruby) in 2104, Melor (Nona) in 2015, and Haima (Lawin) and Nock-ten (Nina) in 2016. ACTED is also launching the Rapid Response Mechanism in Mindanao to address the multi-sectorial needs of conflict-affected and disaster-affected populations.

Shelter is only one component of ACTED’s disaster response. ACTED’s projects focus on rehabilitation and longer-term development activities and have evolved with the needs of communities in the Eastern Visayas region. ACTED’s project includes coordinated and mainstreamed DRRM approach, improving community access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), resilient shelter, and supporting the restoration of livelihoods by training farmers in diversified livelihood skills and facilitating linkages to markets to boost household incomes.

3. Collaborating Organizations

ACTED collaborated with the Guiuan LGU and the National Housing Authority (NHA) in implementing the project. The funds were provided by *Agence Francaise de Developpement* (AFD) and Alstom Foundation.

The Guiuan LGU supported the identification of the relocation site and helped in the preparation of necessary documents, particularly government permits, for the house construction. For instance, the Municipal Assessors Office checked the land valuation of identified possible housing sites. The Municipal Social Welfare Department (MSWD) provided a list of families in the identified communities where the beneficiaries are to be selected and assessed by ACTED. It also conducted social preparation among the families within the vicinity of the site to prepare them for possible exposure to noise and smoke during construction. The Guiuan LGU negotiated with the water service provider – Guiuan

⁶⁹ Tonja Klansek, interview by authors, digital audio recording, ACTED Office, Guiuan, Eastern Samar, 27 February 2017. Ms Klansek is ACTED’s Shelter Program Manager.

⁷⁰ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment: Philippines, Typhoon Haiyan” (November 2013); available from: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MIRA_Report_-_Philippines_Haiyan_FINAL.pdf (accessed 19 April 2017).

Water District – for the water connection.⁷¹ Eastern Samar Electric Cooperative (ESAMELCO) would be the electricity provider while the electric posts and transformers would be the LGU's counterpart. In March 2017, ESAMELCO started installing the electricity connections. The construction of the local access road is also the counterpart of the Guiuan LGU. For the streetlights in the housing project, coordination with *Barangay* Cogon is yet to be done at the time of the research team's site visit.

The NHA purchased and developed the land in *Barangay* Cogon where the ACTED Permanent Shelter would be constructed.

4. Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries of the housing project are 126 families or 878 people (444 males and 434 females) from *Barangays* 7 and Hollywood in Guiuan. The houses of the families are on stilts and very near the sea; hence they are on the No-Build Zone (NBZ), i.e. areas within 40m of the sea. The units built by ACTED have two floors. Families with more than four members are given priority as beneficiaries. Other families living in the same community were selected to be beneficiaries of an NHA project built on the same site. According to ACTED, this decision was made to ensure maintenance of social networks after relocation. Aside from the family size, the beneficiaries said that ACTED also considered other criteria such as the current condition of the housing structure and the source of livelihood of the household.

5. Housing design



Figure 15. ACTED Eastwinds Residences are two-storey row houses with a balcony.

The 126 units built by ACTED are located in *Barangay* Cogon, on the same site where NHA built 203 single-storey units known as NHA Eastwinds Residences. The house built by ACTED is a 36 square-meter two-storey row house with a balcony, indoor bathroom and indoor kitchen sink. The foundation of the house is made of concrete with cement hollow blocks walling and lipped channel (LC) purlins for joists with plywood flooring. The roof is made of 0.5mm pre-coated corrugated galvanized iron

⁷¹ As of interview time, the Guiuan Water District constructed another well as water source.

sheets. Galvanized iron pipes are used for the stairs railing and balcony railing. The house is designed by ACTED to resist winds, rains, and floods. It can resist winds with a velocity of 350 kmh, the same velocity as that of Typhoon Yolanda.⁷²

6. Land and Housing Cost

The two-storey housing unit, with a lot size of 40 square meters, will be given to the beneficiaries for free, but the beneficiaries will pay a monthly amortization to NHA for the land over a period of 30 years. This is a standard scheme for NHA projects. Payment will start on the 6th year at ₱200 per month (graduated amortization with ₱50 increment every year). After construction, ACTED will donate the housing units to the Guiuan LGU, which in turn will donate the units to the beneficiaries.

7. Land Tenure Arrangement

The land was purchased and developed by the NHA. It is subdivided into individual lots of 40 square meters (4m x 10m) each. The beneficiary will own the land after the completion of payment to NHA for the land and site development. However, given the number of no-build zones in Guiuan, it took more than a year for NHA to identify and acquire land in the municipality on which to build the houses.

8. Project Cost

The project cost for each housing unit could not be provided to the research team. The house construction was supported by *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD), the financial institution and main implementing agency for France's official development assistance, and Alstom Foundation, an international organization espousing global humanitarian initiatives for economic development of local communities, environmental education and awareness, social support, and nature preservation. ACTED also entered into a partnership with LafargeHolcim, a cement manufacturing company and the second French company to support the construction of permanent shelters after the Alstom Foundation. LafargeHolcim provided 41,000 bags of cement for the construction of the houses.⁷³

9. Project Duration

The duration of the project is two years starting on 15 April 2015. However, there were challenges encountered before the construction even started. The initial plan was to build 250 transitional housing, but with the shift in the National Government's policy to building permanent shelter, the project also shifted to permanent housing. The challenge of finding land where permanent houses could be constructed also considerably stalled the construction.

⁷² ACTED, "Philippines: ACTED finishes its first permanent shelter!" (no date); available from <http://www.acted.org/en/philippines-acted-finishes-it-s-first-permanent-shelter> (accessed 18 April 2017).

⁷³ ACTED, "On-Going construction of permanent shelters reinforced through a new partnership with LafargeHolcim" (no date); available from <http://www.acted.org/en/going-construction-permanent-shelters-reinforced-through-new-partnership-lafargeholcim> (accessed 19 April 2017).

Table 7
Project Information: Eastwinds Residences

Location	Barangay Cogon, Guiuan, Eastern Samar
Implementing Organization	ACTED
Collaborating Organizations	Guiuan LGU and National Housing Authority
Beneficiaries	126 families
Housing Design, Technology, Materials	36-square meter two-story row house with balcony, indoor bathroom, and indoor kitchen sink
Cost of Housing Unit	<i>Not available</i>
Land Tenure Arrangement	Ownership after complete repayment of the land to NHA
Project Cost	<i>Not available</i>
Project Duration	April 2014 to 2017

B. Project Implementation

ACTED's overall goal is to reduce communities' vulnerability to disasters and to increase their resilience. Coordinated and mainstreamed DRRM is employed as an approach through the improvement of community access to water and sanitation (WASH), resilient shelter, restoration of livelihood and diversification of livelihood skills, and linkages to markets. This approach – Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) – aims to contribute to a sustainable reduction in vulnerability, address and reduce risk, and improve the social and economic conditions of vulnerable populations. Thus, housing or the provision of permanent shelter to Yolanda-affected beneficiaries is only one component of the overall LRRD design of ACTED's initiative.

In the second half of 2014, ACTED Philippines Country Director proposed an *in situ*, transitional housing project to the Municipal Government of Guiuan. This transitional housing project is for 250 families living in island-barangays of Guiuan. Mayor Christopher Sheen Gonzales of Guiuan responded that with the National Government's shift from emergency relief assistance to rehabilitation, projects

of transitional housing are to be replaced with permanent housing. Mayor Gonzales suggested to ACTED to consider building permanent housing instead.⁷⁴

French President Francois Hollande visited the Philippines in February 2015 as part of his preparation for the world conference on climate change in December 2015 (COP 21). He specifically visited the municipal hall of Guiuan, the public market, relocation sites, and coastal communities where he met community members. In his official visit, he announced his government's commitment to provide aid to disaster-vulnerable communities. Also during his visit, the Mayor of Guiuan assured ACTED and French authorities that the LGU had land available where the housing projects could be built and it had been confirmed upon field visits. However, after the signing of the agreement with ACTED, the LGU decided to use the land it intended for the ACTED project as a relocation site for Yolanda-affected families coming from *Barangays* Tagporo and Maricum upon the advice of the NHA. Instead of *in situ*, relocation was deemed as more appropriate because the beneficiaries came from the two barangays on the NBZ identified by the national government. The project unfortunately did not allocate any funds for the purchase of land. One of the primary concerns encountered by ACTED aside from the lack of funds for the purchase of land is the difficult and prolonged search for land for the housing project, sometimes due to conflicting claims over ownership.

While the Guiuan LGU was already relocating a large number of households from the NBZ, ACTED decided, upon the request of the Guiuan LGU, to direct its assistance to two communities in two *barangays* in support of the LGU's relocation initiatives. In the municipality's land use plan, the communities identified in *Barangays* 7 and Hollywood are designated as "open spaces". These two communities are on the shores or on the water with the houses on stilts. To ensure that the beneficiaries would have access to proper sanitation, water and electricity, it was decided that a large land area would be purchased and developed.

To ensure that the project would proceed, ACTED and the Guiuan LGU decided to enter into a partnership with NHA. The NHA agreed to find and acquire the land where ACTED and NHA could build their housing units. Since NHA also intended to construct housing units on the same site, it assumed responsibility for site development. The road would be constructed by the Guiuan LGU. ACTED, Guiuan LGU, and NHA signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in February 2016. The site acquired by NHA is in *Barangay* Cogon, almost 3 kilometers away from *Barangay* 7 and almost 4 kilometers away from *Barangay* Hollywood. It was selected due to its proximity to schools and a main public road. It was also assessed to be safe from natural hazards (e.g. absence of sinkholes, far from the sea and other bodies of water, and predominantly flat terrain).

Throughout the construction phase, ACTED's relationship with the NHA was professional. The government agency was cooperative and provided ACTED with ample space in the area to construct its houses. However, given the strict NHA guidelines where decision-making was concerned, any modifications took time to be deliberated and to secure approval from the National Government. In April 2016, ACTED started training the enumerators to conduct a profiling of affected families in *barangays* 5, 6 and 7. These three *barangays* had already been identified by the MSWD for relocation.

⁷⁴ During that time, the DSWD-implemented and IOM-funded transitional housing project in Guiuan with 133 units was 90 percent completed. Families in the transitional housing project were from the so-called "tent city". This transitional housing project is converted to permanent housing through the DSWD Core Shelter Program.

However, prior to the assessment, *Barangays* 5 and 6 have relocated to a NHA housing project. MSWD suggested including residents of *Barangay* Hollywood as the new target beneficiaries. ACTED requested from the Guiuan LGU's Municipal Social Welfare Department (MSWD) a list of names of families needing shelter assistance in the identified communities. During the assessment, ACTED validated the list by profiling the households and conducted community consultations in *Barangays* 7 and Hollywood. The beneficiaries were also asked to apply to the NHA, after which NHA verified the beneficiaries before the final selection. This proved to be difficult for the beneficiaries. One requirement is the submission of all family members' birth certificates. For beneficiaries who were born in provinces far from Guiuan, securing a birth certificate after a disaster is very challenging.

In June 2016, the beneficiaries were informed that they had been qualified for relocation. Beneficiaries then realized that the ACTED Permanent Shelter prioritized large families with very young members, had limited or lacked regular source of livelihood, and lived in unsafe housing structures. Relocation was purely voluntary and the beneficiaries were asked whether they would be willing to participate in the project and render service hours or what they call *pintakasi* which they can complete in four weekends. They could help in the construction by painting metals for the units.

In the community, ACTED did not experience any difficulty inviting beneficiaries to participate in project activities. They feel incentivized with the knowledge provided to them. But the difficulty was more in providing answers to questions about which unit is theirs as the assignment of the unit would be determined through a raffle to be conducted by the NHA which is fully responsible for it.

ACTED is committed to constructing permanent houses that meet Sphere standards⁷⁵ which is to have at least 3.5 square meters living space per family member, while keeping within 50% of the lot area so that the beneficiaries would benefit from good ventilation and are free to partition the space within the unit in a variety of ways. Construction of the housing units started in September 2016. The design of the two-storey row housing also took into consideration gender security, such as making an enclosed space for women and girls. The 126 ACTED units are being constructed on the same site where the 203 units of the NHA are also being built. Some of the workers in the housing construction are beneficiaries, while others are from Guiuan and Mercedes (a municipality adjacent to Guiuan).

Another important aspect of the project is livelihood resumption and development. ACTED organized business development training conducted by trainers from Eastern Visayas State University (EVSU) and Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The business development training is attended by beneficiaries from 45 families; 38 business plans were selected and given financial and technical support by ACTED.

⁷⁵ The Sphere Project or 'Sphere' framed a Humanitarian Charter and identified the most widely known and internationally recognized sets of common principles and universal minimum standards for the delivery of quality humanitarian response. See <http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/what-is-sphere/>.



Figure 16. ACTED built a market and rolling stalls within the site and provided business development training and financial support to some beneficiaries. (Source: ACTED Philippines Twitter)

To ensure that the business plans would be executed, ACTED built a market and four rolling stalls with WASH within the housing site. The construction of the market inside the housing site, which was completed in February 2017, did not only ensure that the business plans would be pursued but also improved the access of the beneficiaries and the whole community to essential consumer goods. The people planned to engage in fish and vegetable vending, rice retail, bakery, meat and chicken vending, coconut milk vending, *sari-sari* store tending, etc. in their new community.⁷⁶ ACTED also plans to construct a materials recovery facility (MRF) within the housing project.

C. Chronology of Major Activities

Phase	Duration	Activities
Set-up	Second half of 2014	ACTED Philippines Country Director proposed an in situ, transitional housing project to the Municipal Government of Guiuan
	27 February 2015	French President Hollande visits Guiuan
	15 April 2015	Official start of the project
	June-December 2015	Land identification by Guiuan LGU Start of negotiation with NHA
	22 February 2016	Signing of memorandum of understanding (MOU) between ACTED, NHA, and Guiuan LGU
	14 April 2016	Training of enumerators and start of assessment for beneficiary selection

⁷⁶ ACTED, "Philippines: 38 families are launching their new business in Guiuan!" (no date); available at <http://www.acted.org/en/philippines-38-families-are-launching-their-new-business-guiuan> (accessed 18 April 2017).

Phase	Duration	Activities
	11 & 18 August 2016	Submission of final list of beneficiaries to NHA Kick-off meeting with beneficiaries
	3 March 2016	Launch tender for engineering consultancy and building design
	May 2016	Purchase of the land by NHA in Barangay Cogon
	13 June 2016	Ground breaking ceremony
Implementation	6 September 2016	Start of house construction
	14 October 2016	Selection of beneficiaries for income generating activities
	10 January 2017	Orientation of 126 families by ESAMELCO on how to apply for electrical connections for their new home
	7 February 2017	Selection of 38 business plans for ACTED grant
	28 February 2017	Completion of market construction
	13 March 2017	58 of 126 housing units completed
	29 March 2017	Installment of electricity connection by ESAMELCO
	9 April 2017	Finalization of income generating activity in the permanent housing project
	End of April 2017	42 housing structures are completed and 67 houses are finished
	9 May 2017	Beneficiaries' orientation is conducted by NHA on their occupancy rules
	May 2017	126 permanent shelter are completely finished ready for occupancy of the beneficiaries
Wrap-up/ closure	September 2017	Target date of inauguration of Eastwinds Residences with donors, partners, and French and Philippine authorities ⁷⁷

⁷⁷ ACTED, *ACTED in the Philippines* (Issue 24, May 2017), 2; available from <http://www.acted.org/en/acted-philippines-monthly-newsletters> (accessed 15 June 2017).

D. Feedback from Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries came to know ACTED through the relief operations and hazard mapping it conducted immediately after Yolanda. They participated in the profiling and community consultations conducted by ACTED and in June 2016 learned of their inclusion in ACTED's permanent shelter project. The beneficiaries were very happy to have been included in the housing project but recounted that some of their neighbors were not included as beneficiaries because they were either absent during the profiling, not in the pre-list provided by MSWD, or had sufficient capacity to build a house in a safe area.

During construction, the beneficiaries rendered service hours or *pintakasi* for the construction and visited and inspected the houses. The beneficiaries find the houses very spacious. They also note that their new houses are safe based on their inspection and participation in its construction. One beneficiary noted that she initially preferred the bathroom to be built outside the unit. Ms. Tonja Klansek of ACTED explained to her that it is unsafe for a woman or a girl to go outside the house when she needs to use the bathroom in the wee hours of the night. Beneficiaries said they could express a grievance, if any, on how the construction went since they would be the eventual owners of the house (*"Pwede kami magalit [kung hindi matibay]"*) and they inspected and participated in its construction.

Not all beneficiaries of the housing units underwent business planning training. Those who did were qualified based on their income vulnerability. The start-up capital provided by ACTED depends on the business plan. For a rice stall, for instance, the capital is P20,000. The market constructed by ACTED will be donated to the Guiuan LGU which has agreed to charge a lower rent for the stalls than that charged at the central market. The Guiuan LGU will also give priority access to the stalls to ACTED's beneficiaries. They are thankful for the assistance provided by ACTED; still, some hope that there would be additional capital to expand their business.

The beneficiaries expressed that more than what they lost to Typhoon Yolanda, they feel victimized by what they perceived as the lack of an immediate response from the national government. Some expressed that given the volume of aid that came in, they – the survivors of Yolanda – received little compared to what they felt was rightfully theirs. This perception is informed by what they saw and heard from the media.

Because of their experiences during Yolanda, they are now more aware of the possible effects of a typhoon. Most of them are now willing to evacuate as a disaster preparedness response. Before Yolanda, the mentality of the beneficiaries is that they would rather stay in their houses and community rather than evacuate, thinking that the typhoon would not affect them as much. One beneficiary said, (*"Dati rati 'pag may nag-iikot [para mag-evacuate], wala lang, ngayon naghahanda na para sa paparating na bagyo (Before, when someone goes around telling us to evacuate, we would ignore the warning. Now we prepare when we know a typhoon is approaching)"*). In the case of Typhoon Ruby which happened in 2014, most of them immediately evacuated upon the advice of the LGU because of the trauma caused by Typhoon Yolanda.

Less than half of the beneficiaries (40 percent) engage in fishing and related activities based on the profiling conducted by ACTED. One beneficiary, a fisher folk leader, expressed that it would be difficult for fisherfolk like him to engage in fishing if their house is in the upland and far from the sea. ACTED's

support to income-generating activities aimed to address such worries by enabling fishing families to diversify their source of revenue and be able to have a sustainable source of income in the new relocation site. In addition, another beneficiary replied that the Guiuan LGU plans to construct a boat dock where they can leave their boats, in order to secure the boats of those fisherfolks relocated away from the sea and ensure the continuation of the activity.

E. Lessons Learned by the Implementing Organization

In post-disaster contexts, permanent housing providers must plan for additional time for project implementation.

Given all the concerns encountered by ACTED and the delay these brought, one lesson learned is to plan for additional time for project implementation and to request the paperwork to ensure the availability of the land before the final design of the housing project. There is always the likelihood of uncertainties in the various aspects of securing land, given the state of land records in most LGUs in the Philippines. With the initial plan of transitional housing, the duration of the project was set for 6 months but ACTED decided to extend it to 2 years to allow for additional time in case of delay. Since the project became permanent shelter, additional time would have been helpful in delivering the service on-time.

It helps NGOs to work with a designated point-person in the LGU who can assist with project preparation.

In working with the local government, it helped that the LGU identified a point-person from the Guiuan Recovery and Rehabilitation Group Office (GRRGO) to assist ACTED in project preparation. With the number of documentary requirements that had to be submitted, a point-person from the Guiuan LGU helped in identifying which requirements are necessary and where these could be secured.

The presence of INGOs can help LGUs focus on the delivery of their commitments.

On the part of the Guiuan LGU, the pressure exerted by ACTED as an INGO helped to expedite the construction of the housing project. Fostering a good working relationship with ACTED helped the LGU to be mindful of and to focus on delivering its commitments to the project.

KEY INFORMANTS

Implementing organization

- Tonja Klansek, Shelter Program Manager, ACTED

Collaborating organization/s

- Rectito Melquiades, Guiuan Recovery and Rehabilitation Group Office, Municipality of Guiuan

Beneficiaries

- Nelly Asibiyas-Co
- Norma Kaka

Basey Ecoville Housing Project

JULIO AND FLORENTINA LEDESMA FOUNDATION



A. Project Information

1. Location

Basey is a first-class municipality with a total population of 55, 480, according to the August 2015 census data of the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). There are almost 13,000 Yolanda-affected families in the municipality of Basey. To address their housing need, 10 permanent resettlement projects were implemented in the municipality by various international and local non-government organizations, as well as government housing agencies. Among them is the Basey Ecoville Housing Project located in Barangay Bacubac. The two-hectare site was previously a farm land that was acquired by the local government of Basey.

2. Implementing organization

The project was led and implemented by the Julio and Florentina Ledesma Foundation, Inc. (JFLFI) in partnership with the local government unit of the municipality of Basey and two foreign organizations—Chalice Canada and We Effect-Swedish Cooperative Center. Established in 1974, JFLFI is a non-stock, non-profit science foundation advocating for social transformation in urban and rural areas. The foundation has been a key player in providing secure land tenure, promoting incremental housing development for low-cost housing, and popularizing the use of earth-based construction technology in social housing construction.

In pursuit of its advocacy for social transformation, JFLFI follows the integrated area development approach (IADA). The foundation engages in the formation of community groups and self-help

organizations in the areas of cooperative development, rural development and food security, social housing and the establishment of community builders with the support of Earth-based Habitat Builders and Integrated Services and Earth-based Habitat Builders Multi-Purpose Cooperative (EHBMP). JFLFI, with the EHBMP, promotes the application of green building construction technology in all its assisted housing communities, particularly in Visayas and Mindanao. The foundation is a well-known source and provider of interlocking compressed earth block (ICEB) technology in the Philippines.

The JFLFI also collaborates with various international organizations, such as the Homeless International, City Alliance, and Slum Dwellers International through the Homeless People's Federation of the Philippines, in pursuing social housing advocacies. In addition to this, the foundation works with national networks of people's organizations and NGOs advocating for humane and affordable housing like the Urban Poor Alliance (UP-ALL) and the CMP National Congress. With the development efforts mentioned, the foundation has received recognition for its housing programs and practices from global institutions, e.g., Stockholm, Sweden Ambassador Best Practice International Award and World Habitat Award from the Building for Social Housing Foundation – UK.

3. Collaborating organizations

Aside from the JFLFI, which provided the construction technology and management, community mobilization, and administration of the whole project, there were other players in the realization of the Basey Ecoville Housing Project. The local government unit of the municipality of Basey welcomed the initiatives of JFLFI in 2013 to address the shelter needs of its disaster-affected constituents. The LGU agreed to contribute as its counterpart to the project the purchase of the land as well as its development, except for the geodetic survey and study of the area and the preparation of the subdivision plan which served as the counterpart of JFLFI in the site development. The LGU, through its Municipal Social Welfare Development Office (MSWDO), also took care of identifying the beneficiaries and monitoring their post-relocation conditions.



Figure 17. Basey Ecoville Housing Project was led and implemented by the JFLFI in partnership with the local government unit of the municipality of Basey, Chalice Canada and We Effect-Swedish Cooperative Center.

The Chalice Canada and We Effect-Swedish Cooperative Center, which had previous working engagements with the JFLFI, also extended support to the project. Chalice Canada is a Catholic charity that helps communities through their children and elderly sponsorship programs. In this project, however, they provided funds for house construction. Meanwhile, the We Effect-Swedish Cooperative Center is an organization working towards the alleviation of poverty by promoting self-help initiatives. In the Philippines, their work is mostly in support of farmer cooperatives in rural areas, housing cooperatives, and urban poor communities. Their involvement in the project was to provide capacity building of the beneficiaries and to lend support to the LGU's housing policy.

4. Beneficiaries

The project's Phase 1 has 130 housing beneficiaries. As of this writing, 81 of them (62%) have transferred to their new houses while the rest are awaiting completion of their housing units. Most of the beneficiaries who have already moved into their new homes previously lived in shanties on government-owned lands near the public market and in no-build zone areas such as river easements and near the seawall. They are families typically composed of four to six members and earning at least ₱200 a day as construction laborers, farmers, pedicab and tricycle drivers, fish vendors, or government employees. Phase 2 of the project, yet to be implemented in 2017, has 70 to 100 beneficiaries. Aside from the beneficiaries of the housing units, there are 65 locals from the municipality of Basey that have been EHBMP community builders as cooperative associate members that benefitted from the project as workers. Though some of them are still complying with cooperative requirements, majority already paid the membership dues, participated in the necessary trainings about ICEB technology, and attended the pre-membership seminar on cooperative principles, and are thus considered associate members of EHBMC.

5. Housing design and technology

The units have a duplex structural design (DSD). According to Dr. Billy Tusalem, Chief Operating Officer of JFLFI, the design is "inspired by an incremental development and conceptual structure based on a single detached unit."⁷⁸ It is designed to provide a spacious interior to encourage the beneficiaries to put up gender-sensitive home partitions. The wall system utilizes the ICEB technology, which uses load-bearing blocks, eliminating or reducing the use of vertical bars and columns. The use of ICEB technology is said to be advantageous given the location of the project, namely its closeness to the Pacific Ocean, since it can withstand a lateral force of more than 300 kilometers per hour, having a compressive strength of more than 3,000 pounds per square inch (psi). The source of the soil for making the earth blocks, however, is quite a distance from the project site. (see Appendix 6 for the floor plan)

6. Land and housing cost and repayment scheme

The land cost is estimated by the informant to be around ₱1.8 to ₱2.5 million. With an area of 18,004 square meters or almost 2 hectares, it can accommodate 200 to 230 housing units. Each housing unit costs ₱190,000 to ₱200,000, resulting in a total of ₱24 million to ₱26 million for the 130 housing units of Phase 1. With regards to the land tenure arrangement, it utilizes a usufruct agreement between

⁷⁸ Dr. Billy Tusalem, interview by authors, Makati City, 13 March 2017. Dr. Tusalem is JFLFI's Chief Operating Officer.

the municipal government and the beneficiaries with an open-ended arrangement (see Appendix 7 for the copy of the usufruct agreement). Meanwhile, the housing unit is provided as a straight grant to the beneficiaries.



Figure 18. The housing units use interlocking compressed earth block (ICEB) technology.

7. Project cost and duration

Aside from the land and house construction cost amounting to ₱26.5 million to ₱28.5 million, there are other costs for the site development such as paving the road network and the installation of utilities, which were shouldered by the LGU. Thus, the total cost of Phase 1 is approximately ₱35 million to ₱40 million. With Phase 2 to be implemented in 2017, the total project cost could reach ₱60 million. The Phase 1 of the project began in June 2015 and continues as of this writing until the completion of the remaining houses and provision of follow-through capacity building activities.

Table 8
Project Information: Basey Ecoville Housing Project

Location	Barangay Bacubac, Basey Western Samar
Implementing Organization	JFLFI
Collaborating Organizations	Local government of the municipality of Basey Chalice Canada We Effect-Swedish Cooperative Center
Beneficiaries	130 families; 65 EHBMC community builders

Housing Design, Technology, Materials	Duplex structural design; interlocking compressed earth block (ICEB) technology
Cost of Housing Unit and Land	Purchase price of ₱1.8 million to ₱2.5 million; site development cost of ₱9 million to ₱11.5 million ₱190,000 to ₱200,000 per unit
Repayment Scheme and Amortization	None
Land Tenure Arrangement	Usufruct agreement between the LGU and the beneficiaries
Project Cost	₱35 million to ₱40 million
Project Duration	June 2015 –2017

B. Project Implementation

“Housing is not a commodity, it’s a basic human right,” asserts JFLFI’s Chief Operating Officer. This has been the most important guiding principle of any housing project the foundation builds. Aside from this, the project was guided by the local participatory planning (LPP) methodology in dealing with their partners, especially with the LGU and the beneficiaries. The importance of community-led development is stressed from the beginning of project implementation during the preliminary meetings and discussions with the beneficiaries conducted in their temporary shelters or bunk houses.

Guided by the LPP, the public, private with people partnership (PPPP) framework has been used to implement the project. According to Dr. Tusalem, this framework served as the basis of the input contribution of each collaborating organization to the project implementation. The contributions of the collaborating organizations such as funds, land acquisition, and capacity building activities for the beneficiaries were to be supplemented by the sweat equity of the beneficiaries as their contribution to the project. The sweat equity asked from the beneficiaries includes participation in the construction and enhancement of the houses and site facilities since the house structure provided by the project is only a core house within the framework of incremental housing development. To be equipped for performing their expected tasks, the beneficiaries went through various capacity building activities and study circles on topics of estate management, health and sanitation, waste segregation, conflict management, building maintenance, and gender equality and sensitivity.

The institutional partnerships and coordination among the collaborating organizations began as early as the first quarter of 2014 consisting of activities like baselining of the beneficiaries, planning and formulation of the project’s program, and learning visits conducted by the JFLFI to the legislative and executive branches of the municipality of Basey. The selection of the beneficiaries was conducted by the MSWDO taking into consideration a set of criteria (see Box 3).

Box 3

Eligibility Criteria for Beneficiary Selection of Basey Ecoville Housing Project

- Must be a bonafide resident of Basey Municipality.
- A homeless beneficiary who does not own any real property.
- Families whose houses were partially and totally damaged during Typhoon Yolanda located in unsafe and no build zone areas.
- Individuals who are considered lone survivors due to the untimely demise of the other family members during the typhoon Yolanda.
- Families who are renting or sharing houses which are totally and partially damaged per official list of DSWD through the DSWD – Disaster Family Access Card (DAFAC) living within the no build zone.
- Families whose heads are employed in government or private sector but whose term of employment are not permanent or regular basis and do not have access to housing loans of both government and private sectors.
- Regular employees of government and private sectors whose houses are in the no build zone area and is not included in the list of NHA beneficiaries for permanent relocation.

Part of the formulation of the project's program is the identification and selection of the site that involved various stakeholders such as JFLFI's Technical and Management Team, representatives and officers of the EHBMP, Chalice Canada Management Team, national line agencies, i.e., Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and the legislative and executive branches of the municipality of Basey. Meanwhile, the learning visits took place in San Carlos, Negros Occidental, the work area of JFLFI, to educate the officials of the local government of Basey on the ICEB technology and motivate them to adopt it. As remarked by the JFLFI's Chief Operating Officer, "Capacitate not just the community but also the LGU. So, we did learning visits to give them an idea how to do it, the technology, the end-product, so that they will invest." The learning visits helped the municipal officials understand ICEB technology and introduced it as well to the locals of Basey. The sourcing of materials to produce ICEB and other construction materials began in June 2014 followed by the training of local associate members on the production of ICEB in January 2015.

The formalization of the partnership between JFLFI and the government of Basey took place in June 2015 through the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement after various activities have been conducted. The MOA stated that the LGU of Basey shall provide the resettlement area (the land), including its site development such as provision of a concrete road network, drainage system, water system, and electrical system. The JFLFI shall provide the materials, manpower, and the technology in the construction of the housing units. After the MOA signing, the site development and construction followed. There were issues encountered at this stage of the project such as the weather variability in the area and the delayed delivery of materials which caused difficulties for the project to meet its

target dates. Oftentimes, according to JFLFI's Chief Operating Officer the timing of the resource infusion and the work targets and schedules did not coincide which forced the foundation to advance the required financial support.

Another problem encountered was the inadequate availability of loading equipment in the project site owing to the heavy demand from construction activities in nearby project sites. To address this problem, the local and provincial government lent earth-moving equipment. Moreover, the ICEB technology, being highly differentiated from other conventional technologies, necessitated specific skills for its proper execution; thus, the training of the local associate members of EHBMP on producing and using the ICEB technology.

The construction of 75 housing units was finished in November 2016 allowing the transfer of the first batch of beneficiaries. Before their transfer, they were formed a homeowners' association (HOA) in August 2016 and went through various capacity building activities to prepare them for developing and taking good care of their new community. Follow-through seminars following the capacity building course prepared and provided in partnership with the We Effect-Swedish Cooperative Center were also conducted after the turn-over of the units. They consisted of the following topics:

Box 4

Capacity Building Courses Provided to Beneficiaries of Basey Ecoville Housing Project

1. Baseline survey and training needs assessment
2. Data validation of operational shelter plan and facilitate baseline survey in determining shelter plan
3. Strategic and operational planning with key actors of the project
4. Study circles on estate Management and Conflict Management with peace argumentation
5. Gender Sensitivity awareness trainings, workshops, and seminars
6. Gender audit and assessment
7. Gender equality training
8. Formulation and implementation of gender-equality mainstreaming action plan and organize and implement gender equality advocacy activities
9. Medical Missions (Health Care Management Activity)
10. Perception survey and octagon session

In February 2016, another batch (6 families) of beneficiaries transferred to the housing project. A gender sensitive housing model was opened that month with an exhibit to inspire the beneficiaries to develop gender-sensitive homes and make use of the lessons they learned in their previous capacity building activities on gender sensitivity (see Appendix 8 for the gender-sensitive housing model).

As of this writing, the Basey Ecoville homeowners' association (HOA) has a functional set of officers and came up with their association's rules and regulation (see Appendix 9 for the Basey HOA's rules and regulations). Through their HOA and the guidance of MSWDO, the beneficiaries have learned to improvise to address their post-relocation issues. One example is dealing with the penetration of water into their units during heavy rains due to the proximity of the site to the mountain and the yet to be completed drainage system. The beneficiaries built temporary canals to remedy the situation. The source of water has been a serious issue to the beneficiaries as well. Though they were provided

with *jetmatic* pumps in the site, the water source is shallow and dries up in days of intense heat. During those days, they buy water delivered to them from downtown which costs considerably more, adding to their daily expenses.

C. Chronology of Major Activities

Phase	Duration	Activities
Set up Phase	January-April 2014	Baselining and beneficiary meeting with the Local Inter-Agency Committee (LIAC)
	May 2014-May 2015	Technical planning, formulation of the project's work program; legislative partnership and coordination with the Local Government Unit of the municipality of Basey
	June 2015 (JFLFI and Basey LGU); June 2015 (JFLFI and Chalice)	Institutional arrangement and partnership through MOA signing
	January-December 2015	Local community participation in ICEB technology and green-building skills training among local associate members of EHBMP
	June 2014-2017	Raw materials sourcing and production of ICEB construction materials
Implementation Phase	June 2015-2017	Site development and horizontal construction
	August 2015-2017	Housing construction and ICEB technology application and management
Wrap Up/Closure Phase	August 2016	Formation of homeowner's association and committees
	October-December 2016	Conduct of capacity building activities and follow-through group study circle methodology on topics of gender equality and sensitivity, estate management, health, security, and sanitation
	November 2016 February 2017	Transfer of beneficiaries
	January 2017-June 2017	Follow-through capacity building activities through HOA regular meetings

D. Feedback from the Beneficiaries

Among the things that the beneficiaries received, they appreciate most their new house. Comparing it to their previous homes, the beneficiaries feel they are better off and safer in their new homes, “Blessing ito samin, kumpara sa dati. At saka, safe na kami sa typhoon dito. [This is a blessing to us, compared to our houses before. Also, we are safe here from the typhoon]” They are also grateful for the materials used and the speed of construction of the houses compared to other nearby housing projects, “Mas matibay ito kasi puro, hindi gaya kung hollow blocks. Maganda dito kaysa sa NHA, ito bahay talaga, doon dikit-dikit, rowhouse, saka doon hindi pa tapos. [This is more durable since it is pure, instead of hollow blocks. This is better than the houses of NHA; it’s a real house. In NHA the houses are very close to each other, rowhouse, and the houses there are still being constructed.]”

The areas of improvement cited by the beneficiaries were generally a to-do list for themselves and the local government of Basey. The lack of drainage system and source of water, though now being addressed individually by the beneficiaries through the building of temporary canals and water delivery, are the responsibility of the local government of Basey. According to the MSWDO, the local government has pledged to build the drainage system along with the concreting of the roads in the site this year. Moreover, the LGU will also install additional jetmatic pumps and an elevated water tank to address the issue of water.

Meanwhile, through their HOA, the beneficiaries plan to build another waiting shed in the site and explore hiring security guards from among their members to take shifts in guarding the community at night. Aside from the guards, they also want to construct fences to keep their community safe. With regards enhancing their housing units following the incremental housing development scheme, the beneficiaries know that there is much to improve on their core house. For the basics, they cited as their priority the installation of an electric connection and countertop basins for their kitchen.



Figure 19. Water jetmatic pumps in Basey Ecoville.

It is not only their houses that are new but also the community to which they now belong. The HOA helped them to become organized, united, and responsible in their new community, “Iyong pagkakaraon namin ng organisasyon o samahan, bago yun. Dahil miyembro na kami, nagkakaisa kami, nadidiplina na ang sarili, na-educate ‘yung mga tao, dati kanya-kanya. Sa basura dapat makikisama ka. (Being part of an organization or association, that’s something new for us. Since we’re members, we need to unite, discipline ourselves, educate people. Before, we did not mind our neighbors. For instance, in waste management, we need to cooperate.)” It is also their HOA which monitors their “pintakasi” (cooperative endeavor to clean, to construct community facilities, and accomplish other collective tasks). Moreover, the beneficiaries see the seminars and other capacity building activities as beneficial for them to develop a new mindset and set of practices: “Nakatulong din ‘yung mga seminar, orientation ba, para mag-isip at kumilos kami nang bago, halimbawa, sa

hygiene at waste management. (The seminars have been helpful; they served as an orientation for us to think and act differently, for example with regards hygiene and waste management).”

E. Lessons Learned by the Implementing Organization

LGUs play a crucial role as facilitators of post-disaster housing recovery projects.

In working with the collaborating organizations, JFLFI realized that the LGUs’ role is vital as facilitators of housing projects although the latter should not be overburdened with housing production. With several housing projects going on in the municipality, the LGU could not be made solely responsible for the construction of houses. However, it is important to tap the LGU for various resources like land (e.g. lands that were proclaimed by the President of the Philippines for social housing or acquired by the LGU for the purpose of land banking for social housing), and for the identification of beneficiaries. The informant noted that the LGU’s participation is strategic for targeting low-income families and households affected by calamities. Moreover, the engagement of the LGU as early as the conceptualization of the project is imperative to be able to identify and maximize available resources early on, to work on the things that must be improved, and ensure the sustainability of the community to be built.

Knowledge and skills sharing helps augment limited CSO resources.

There were insights as well on the operational issues encountered in the project such as the significant role of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the value of knowledge and skills sharing. The JFLFI informant cites as an example the time when the resource infusion from donor-partners got delayed vis-a-vis the set targets at the field. In this instance, JFLFI’s capacity to forge partnerships with funding sources that provided “bridge financing” i.e., banks or other CSOs such as the Peace and Equity Foundation (PEF), was put to use. The knowledge and skills sharing on green building construction had been crucial in this project. The workers of the project consisted of some beneficiaries, workers from Negros brought to Basey by JFLFI and EHBMP, and locals who have been community builders as associate members of EHBMP. The beneficiaries and the associate members needed to be capacitated first on green building construction.

Savings are vital for a community’s sustainability.

Dr. Tusalem believes that community savings should be further encouraged to develop a sustainable and independent community. Currently the community is organized as a HOA, but according to the JFLFI and MSWDO informants, the plan is for the community association to be registered as a housing cooperative. For JFLFI, housing finance through a savings and loan association is an important long-term development instrument for ensuring the livability of the community. In the meantime, the beneficiaries shared that their HOA has been collecting monthly dues to fund its initial projects for enhancing the community.

KEY INFORMANTS

Implementing organization

- Dr. Billy Tusalem, Board of Trustee/ Chief Operating Officer, JFLFI

Collaborating organization/s

- Abegail Porbus, Social Welfare Officer II
Municipal Social Welfare Development Office (MSWDO)
Municipality of Basey

Beneficiaries

- Salvacion Almaden
- Angie Dela Cruz
- Divina Bestray

SM Cares Village-Ormoc

SM CARES



A. Project Information

1. Implementing organization

SM Cares is a division of SM Foundation, Inc. that runs the corporate social responsibility programs of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. It was launched in 2004 to support the interest and advocacies of the marginalized sectors in the country, namely: persons with disabilities, children and the youth, women and breastfeeding mothers, senior citizens, and overseas Filipino workers. Its programs include making sure that the facilities in SM malls are friendly to these sectors, conducting seminars to raise public awareness on the situation of these sectors, and providing services to address their special needs. Another focus of SM Cares' work is protecting the environment and promoting ecological sustainability. Measures to conserve energy, water, and air quality are adopted in SM malls. It also leads campaigns on energy efficiency, solid waste management, air quality, and water recycling, as well as environmental rehabilitation efforts. These endeavors are done through SM Cares' collaborations with various organizations, corporations, shareholders, and people from the community.

Housing became a special project of SM Cares after Typhoon Yolanda hit the Visayas region. SM Cares initially dispensed ₱100 million for relief operations and rehabilitation of schools and hospitals. However, the management of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. recognized that housing seemed to be more relevant for Yolanda victims. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. then initiated a campaign among its tenants, suppliers, contractors, and customers to gather donations solely for shelter. Thus, the concept of SM Cares Villages was born and 1,000 housing units were pledged for Yolanda-affected families. To date,

all the 1,000 units have been constructed – 200 units each in Cebu, Iloilo, and Ormoc City, Leyte, and 400 units in Tacloban City. This project profile is based on the Ormoc City sub-project.

2. Collaborating organizations

Former Mayor Edward Codilla, his wife Engineer Violeta Codilla, and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Palo (RCAP) are the collaborators of this project. Apart from providing funding, SM Cares was responsible for the house design, hiring of contractors, and overseeing the entire project construction process. The Codillas donated the land. They were later engaged as one of the contractors for the site development of the project. SM Cares also forged a partnership with RCAP for the identification and selection of the beneficiaries, community organizing, values formation and livelihood programs for the beneficiaries. RCAP designated the said tasks to the Social Action Commission (SAC) of the archdiocese.



Figure 20. SM Cares Village-Ormoc engaged the Archdiocese of Palo for the identification and selection of the beneficiaries, community organizing, values formation and livelihood programs for the beneficiaries.

3. Beneficiaries

The project built 200 permanent housing units, 198 of which will be for housing the beneficiaries, one unit to be used as the office of the SAC as the community organizer, and one unit as a community store. As of December 2016, 56 families or 28 percent of 198 potential beneficiaries have transferred to the village. Most of them previously lived in fishers' communities and in the nearby barangays of the city. The other 142 beneficiaries have been identified, but have not been asked to transfer at the time of the research team's visit because the amenities in the village, particularly water, have not been installed in the individual units pending works of the local water utility agency.

The beneficiaries learned about SM Cares' housing project through the orientations conducted by the DSWD in their temporary homes or the bunkhouses or from friends who have been beneficiaries of

ther housing projects. In the orientations, the beneficiaries were asked to choose among the housing projects being implemented at that time.⁷⁹ The list for SM Cares was submitted to the archdiocese's SAC to be reviewed and filtered based on the criteria set by SM Cares and the SAC. SM Cares requested for the prioritization of families and individuals belonging to under-represented sectors and sectors with whom it has had previous engagements, e.g., senior citizens, persons with disabilities, and single parents. Other criteria for the selection of beneficiaries were: those living in coastal areas or in bunkhouses, have not received any housing aid, without decent houses or those willing to tear down their current houses to make sure they do not abandon the units to be awarded to them. The gathering of information on the beneficiaries involved personal interviews with the applicant-beneficiaries and their neighbors in their previous residences. After the initial interview and a series of background checks, the SAC called the applicant-beneficiaries for a final interview to confirm all the information gathered until they were advised if they were accepted or not.

4. Housing design and technology

SM Cares Villages has rainbow-colored painted row houses. According to Mrs. Elena Bautista-Horn, Vice-President for Corporate Affairs of SM Prime Holdings, row houses are cost efficient because of the shared wall which also adds to the stability of the structure. Each unit has a lot area of 23.25 square meters and a floor area of 20.25 square meters. The units are loftable and have the kitchen and bathroom at the back of the houses. The front, on the other hand, has a 3-meter distance from the street allotted for a front yard garden, if the family wishes. The wall panels are ribbed concrete precast panels while the roof is made of concrete slab with canopy for the main house with integral and exterior waterproofing. For the finishes, the houses have a hollow core flush door, sliding windows with analok frame, and 6 mm thick fiber cement board interior cladding. (See Appendix 10 for perspective and floor plans.)



Figure 21. (L-R) House design: Interior of the housing unit; roof and windows of the units

5. Land and Housing Cost and Repayment Scheme

The 15,001 square meters or 1.5 hectares of land on which the rowhouses were built was donated to SM Foundation by the Codillas. The informant could not provide the figures specifically for the cost of

⁷⁹ Other housing projects implemented at that time were those of the NHA and the Tzu Chi Foundation.

constructing the houses.⁸⁰ For the land and housing tenure, SM Cares and the beneficiaries signed a usufruct agreement for 25 years.

6. Project cost and duration

The informant estimated each unit to cost ₱320,000 but this figure includes other project expenses such as site development and engagement of the NGO partner/s. The estimated total project cost of building the 200 units is roughly ₱64 million. The project took almost two years from the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between SM Foundation and the land donors in November 2014 until the transfer of the first batch of beneficiaries in October 2016. Meanwhile, the RCAP-SAC has a 3-year engagement with SM Foundation from 2016 to 2019 for the provision of values formation and community development. (See Appendix 11 for elevation plan)

Table 9
Project Information: SM Cares Village-Ormoc

Location	Barangay Catmon, Ormoc City, Leyte
Implementing Organization	SM Foundation
Collaborating Organizations	RCAP-SAC and the Codilla family
Beneficiaries	200 families from fishing communities and nearby barangays
Housing Design, Technology, Materials	Loftable row houses; 23.25 square meter lot area; 20.25 square meter floor area; kitchen and bathroom are at the back of the houses; 3 meters frontage; wall panels are ribbed concrete precast; roofing are concrete slab with integral and exterior waterproofing; hollow core flush door; sliding windows with analok frame; 6mm thick ficem board interior cladding
Cost of Housing Unit	<i>not available</i>
Repayment scheme and amortization	None
Land Tenure Arrangement	Usufruct agreement for 25 years
Project Cost	₱ 64 million
Project Duration	March 2014 to 2019

⁸⁰ The informant approximated each house to cost ₱320,000 but this figure includes other project expenses, i.e., engagement of NGO-partner and site development. No specific amount could be given only for the construction of the houses.

B. Project Implementation

“When you give houses, it should be holistic,” asserted by the VP for Corporate Affairs of SM Prime Holdings, Elena Bautista-Horn, having learned this principle from the foundation’s previous housing projects. Before Yolanda happened, SM Cares had been collaborating with various non-government organizations for the implementation of socialized housing projects. However, they were dismayed that some of these previous projects were not occupied by the beneficiaries since there were no water or electricity connections. “Who would want to live in a house without these necessities?” was a key question for the project implementer. Getting the top management’s commitment and the staff support is important in providing holistic housing projects. As Bautista-Horn remarked, “When the bureaucracy knows that [top management’s commitment], everything works.”



Figure 22. (L-R) Holistic housing projects: Gated SM Cares Village-Ormoc; electricity connections are available in the village

Another guiding principle of the project was assuring the quality and promptness of producing the houses. SM Cares was solely responsible for designing the house, choosing the contractors, and facilitating the construction. Moreover, it opted not to work with the local government unit so as to remain non-political; instead, it chose to partner with the Codillas as private entities and RCAP-SAC for the community development.

The present 1.5 hectares in Barangay Concepcion was not the original location intended for SM Cares Village-Ormoc. The Codillas initially offered a 3-hectare land in the same barangay, as agreed upon in the first MOA between the couple and SM Cares. However, the Codillas experienced difficulty in undertaking the site development in that particular location due to the absence of developed road networks. This prompted them to instead donate a 1.5-hectare land in another location about 500 meters from the original site, closer to the highway and equipped with concrete access roads.

The first MOA for the land donation was signed in November 2014, followed by groundbreaking ceremonies in March 2015. Site development began but a change of location became necessary due to the undeveloped road networks that hindered the development. The construction of houses commenced in July 2015 and was finished in October 2016. The output of the project included concrete roads within the fenced project site and the completion of 200 housing units - 198 for the beneficiaries and the other two units for the planned community cooperative store and RCAP-SAC office. The houses were turned over to the first batch of 32 beneficiaries in October 2016 while the second batch of 24 beneficiaries moved to their new houses in December 2016. The remaining

beneficiaries are set to transfer in 2017. According to the RCAP-SAC, the activities for the beneficiaries' values formation will begin in April 2017 to be followed by the organization of a homeowners' association (HOA).

C. Chronology of Major Activities

Phase	Duration	Activities
Set-up	November 2014	MOA signing on land donation between SM Cares and the Codillas
	March 2015	Groundbreaking ceremony
Implementation	March 2015-October 2016	Site development
		House construction
	August 2016	Identification and selection of beneficiaries
	October 2016; December 2016	Transfer of 56 beneficiaries to their permanent houses
	April 2017	Conduct of values formation activities
Wrap-up/ closure	April 2017 - 2019	Formation of the homeowners' association
		Skills training and livelihood programs

Issues encountered

- Delays in site development and construction of houses

The site of the housing project was changed to a more convenient location. As of this writing, a MOA for the land donation has yet to be signed since the land to be donated had been changed. Without a formal agreement but only mutual trust between SM Cares and the Codillas, the former proceeded with the construction of the houses to avoid further delaying the construction of the houses. Another factor that impeded construction was the deferment of site development since the Codillas became busy with campaigning in the 2016 elections.

- Increased prices of construction materials and labor

The devastation of Yolanda has caused a construction boom in Eastern Visayas. Because of this, SM Cares decided to procure materials from other places due to the high prices of materials in the area. There were difficulties of finding construction workers as well with the increased demand for manual labor. The informant noted that even the base pay scheme had been disrupted since the international non-government organizations were paying higher than the normal local rates for labor.

- Difficult access to basic utilities

The village already has electricity connections. However, there were initial problems encountered in paying the connection fee because Leyte Electric Cooperative (LEYECO), the power supplier in Leyte, is a cooperative that served its members only. The beneficiaries thus joined the cooperative. However, as part of its holistic approach in providing housing assistance, SM Cares shouldered the connection fees. A problem arose from the refusal of LEYECO to put SM Foundation as the payor in the receipts it issued since LEYECO can only issue receipts to their members. It took some time before the issue was settled.

The beneficiaries do not yet have individual water connections and instead resort to getting water from a communal source in the village. The installation of the connection is expected to be accomplished in April 2017.

D. Feedback from the Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries consider their new houses as the most important assistance that they received after Yolanda disrupted their lives. Aside from being situated in a safe area, the beneficiaries perceive their nice houses to be durable given the materials used, *“Lumu wag ang puso namin kasi malayo na kami mula sa trahedya at ‘yung mga bahay namin ay magaganda. Concrete pati bubong kaya hindi malilipad. Minsan nga kapag umuulan, hindi namin naririnig ang patak ng ulan.* [We now feel secure and far from danger and our houses are beautiful. They are made of concrete and the roofs will not easily be blown away. Sometimes we don’t even hear the rain falling on the roof].” They are also grateful that they need not rent anymore and now have something that they can call their own, *“Masaya ako na meron na kaming masasabing sariling bahay namin at ‘di na kailangang mangupahan pa”* shared another beneficiary.



Figure 23. Certificate of award granting the right of usufruct of the housing unit to the beneficiaries of SM Cares Village-Ormoc.

Within the short span of time that the beneficiaries have stayed in their new homes, they could cite two things to improve on their condition. First, the beneficiaries plan to enhance the units on their own such as constructing a “second floor”⁸¹ to maximize the available space, installing grills at the back of their houses where the kitchen and bathrooms are located, and painting of the interiors. Another needed improvement concerns the disposal of waste. While garbage collection is the responsibility of the barangay there are limited trucks being provided by the city government to collect their waste and their location is quite remote. As a remedy, the beneficiaries dug a pit at the back of their housing site where they could dump their waste.

Residing in their new houses has also meant new ways of doing things. For one, “*pintakasi*” or “*tulungan system*”, though introduced and regularly done in some of the bunkhouses, has been consistently practiced by their new community. It is through *pintakasi* that they maintain the common spaces in the community, “*Kapag Saturday, pintakasi kami. General cleaning, tulungan system parang bayanihan, naglilinis ng kapaligiran at mga kanal-kanal. Kami-kami lang ang naglilinis, amin naman kasi ito dapat kami ang mangalaga* (On Saturdays, we engage in voluntary work, cleaning the surroundings and the drainage canals).” The beneficiaries also mentioned that they will be starting to save money through SHeG (Self Help Group), an initiative introduced by RCAP-SAC to them. “*Okay din ‘yung mag-SHeG kami; at least makakaipon kami* (it is good to join SHeG; at least we can save some money)” says one beneficiary. They will also assign security guards per block to keep their community safe. Moreover, one of the beneficiaries shared that Yolanda was a blessing in disguise for her, citing in particular the pride in having a painted house with a flush toilet, “*Basta sakin si Yolanda ay blessing in disguise kasi dati nasa squatter area lang ako. Pero ngayon, nasa isang village na ako, de-pintura, at deflush pa inidoro namin.*”

E. Lessons Learned by the Implementing Organization

SM Cares Village-Ormoc is the last project among the pledged housing projects of SM Cares; there were various lessons from earlier projects that were incorporated in the Ormoc Village.

Donor organizations are helped in providing housing assistance in post-disaster situations by tapping people and organizations with whom they have previous working engagements.

In the SM Cares -Tacloban village the RCAP identified the beneficiaries while the Couples For Christ-Answering the Cry of the Poor (CFC-ANCOP) organized the beneficiaries and facilitated their values formation. According to the key informant, problems were experienced by CFC-ANCOP in training and educating beneficiaries with whom they have not had a prior engagement, i.e. selecting the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries in Tacloban Village, on the other hand, developed trust and became comfortable working with the coordinators of RCAP since the latter undertook the identification of beneficiaries.

Because of the experience in Tacloban village, SM Cares through RCAP engaged the SAC for the selection of beneficiaries in the Ormoc village as well as for the provision of values formation and skills training. The same was done for the Cebu and Iloilo villages wherein the lot donors had been known

⁸¹ The FGD participants said “second floor” but they could have been referring to the loft which could be built inside the housing unit.

to SM Cares before Yolanda hit the region. As the VP for Corporate Affairs of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. said, “These are people we have connection even prior to Yolanda, we have SM in these places. Our donors are actually people we know.” She pointed out that working with people who were trusted and already familiar with how SM Cares implement their projects will make the process more efficient.

Communication among the collaborating organizations and with the community is crucial.

This insight came from the coordinator of SAC who is concerned with the post-relocation conditions of the beneficiaries. Particularly, she cited the processing of the electricity and water connections as one example of miscommunication. She argued that clarity on who does what and when should the things be done is important. *“Minsan kasi mag-a-assume na lang ‘yung iba na may nag-asikaso na ng tubig at kuryente, wala pa pala o kaya pina-process pa lang, dapat malinaw ang pag-uusap* (Sometimes people assume that someone is taking care of the water and electricity, or that the application is in process. These things must be made clear).” With regards to communicating with the community, the SAC coordinator values the need to be transparent to the community and to allow the people to be engaged in the process (*“Always, tell them what’s going on, halimbawa sa situation ng tubig, bakit nadedelay, ganitong requirement ang kulang. Tapos isasama dapat sila sa proseso, hindi namin kaya ito kung hindi sila tutulong; halimbawa, ‘di mame-maintain ang kapaligiran kung hindi sila mag-pipintakasi* (for example with regards water, why is there delay? Maybe some requirement is lacking. The community members must be part of the process. We resolve things without their help. We cannot keep the surrounding clean if the members do not engage in *pintakasi*”).

Seek the support of the LGU for legislative needs.

Another lesson and recommendation mentioned by the informant is to seek the support of the LGU for policy changes that need legislation. The project implementer cites the payment of Real Property Tax (RPT) as an example. In the standard MOA between SM Cares and its beneficiaries, the latter are responsible for paying the RPT of their houses. However, in certain SM Cares villages, the local government agreed to waive the payment of RPT as a form of assistance to the disaster-affected families during the initial years of their stay in their new residences. The informant suggests institutionalizing free RPT for housing projects catering to disaster-affected beneficiaries through legislation by the LGUs.

KEY INFORMANTS

Implementing organization

- Elena Bautista-Horn, Vice-President for Corporate Affairs of SM Prime Holdings
- Gelo Sadorra, Project Engineer, SM Cares Village-Ormoc
- Maritess dela Cruz, Operations Assistant

Collaborating organizations/individuals

- Madonna Songalia, Archdiocesan Lay Coordinator of Social Action Commission
- Dorman Songalia, Staff of Social Action Commission
- Fr. Isagani Petilos, Parish Priest of Sts. Peter and Paul
- Edward and Violeta Codilla, Land donors

Beneficiaries

- Celeste Dela Cruz
- Aurora Momo
- Ariel Openiano
- Gina Sarda

GK Village – Carmen

GAWAD KALINGA COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION



A. Project Information

1. Location

The project is in Barangay Carmen, Municipality of Hernani, Eastern Samar. Hernani is a 5th class municipality, and one of the poorest municipalities in the province. Population before Typhoon Yolanda struck was estimated at 10,000.⁸² Almost 90 percent of the population of Barangay Carmen live along the coast, and majority of them lost their houses to the destructive storm surge brought by the typhoon. Barangay Carmen, along with Barangay Batang, were the worst hit areas in Hernani.

2. Implementing organization

Gawad Kalinga (legal name: Gawad Kalinga Community Development Foundation, Inc.) started as a ministry of Couples for Christ (CFC), a Filipino Catholic organization, and became an independent NGO in 2009. Through donations (either land or funds) from individuals, organizations and corporations, and by mobilizing volunteers in developing its projects, GK aims to augment current efforts of government in providing housing for the poor.

⁸² Mayor Edgar C. Boco, interview by authors, digital audio recording, Hernani Municipal Hall, Hernani, Eastern Samar, 2 March 2017. This estimate is higher than the official count by the Philippine Statistics Authority, which recorded for Hernani a population of 8,070 in 2010.

Eradicating the “slum mentality” among the poor is a pillar of GK’s approach in implementing its more than 2,000 projects that have provided free housing to 60,000 families across the country.⁸³ Such transformation in mindsets, its website states, leads to “restoring dignity, and giving back the poor’s capacity to dream and work towards the fulfillment of their dreams.”⁸⁴ A project usually commences after a land donation (the area should be at least one hectare to accommodate as many families as feasible) or a request from a local government or a community. The colorful facades of the houses have been a signature of GK, primarily to evoke hope and raise the dignity of the poor by instilling in them the idea that they can have decent homes.

3. Collaborating organizations

For this project in Hernani, GK tapped its chapter in Ateneo de Manila University (GK-Ateneo), which is directed by Jesuit priest Bienvenido Nebres. Funds solicited by GK-Ateneo were earmarked for the building of 200 units and for completing some components of site development. Another benefactor, Cebu-based businessman Manuel H. Osmeña through his foundation Hope Now Philippines, contributed funds for the completion of additional 41 units.

As in any GK project, the local government unit was also engaged. In the case of GK Carmen, the mayor facilitated the acquisition of land, which was owned by his relative. The municipal government reviewed and approved permits without any charge.

4. Beneficiaries

The project’s intended beneficiaries are families from Barangay Carmen and Barangay Batang who lost their houses to Typhoon Yolanda and had no security of land tenure. Priority was given to the families residing within the “no-build zone”; in typical GK projects, families considered to be among the “poorest of the poor” and without tenure security are the main beneficiaries. The 241 families were among those identified by the Municipal Social Welfare Department as needing assistance after their houses got totally washed out by the strong winds and storm surge brought by Typhoon Yolanda. The beneficiaries were organized into a neighborhood association which GK calls a *Kapitbahayan*.

5. Housing design, technology, and materials used

GK Carmen is among the projects that piloted the construction of the “post-Yolanda model” of houses. In past projects, GK used termite-proof fiber reinforced cement sheet for walls, but considering the need to build disaster-resilient houses, GK started using concrete hollow blocks in its communities in typhoon-prone locations. GK used to allow beneficiaries to design their houses, but until two years ago, row housing was adopted to maximize available space, generate more units, and reinforce the structures. GK Carmen houses have a shed-type roof—the ridge, connected to the face wall is protected by an aluminum sheet, while the eaves are placed at the back of the unit. Such design is intended to minimize the effect of a strong wind.

⁸³ Gawad Kalinga, “Our Scale” (no date); available from <http://www.gk1world.com/our-scale> (accessed 16 April 2017).

⁸⁴ Gawad Kalinga, “Our Model” (no date); available from <http://gk1world.com/our-model> (accessed 16 April 2017).

GK follows the standard minimum floor area (18 square meters) for row houses prescribed in *Batas Pambansa* 220; a unit in GK Carmen is 4.5 meters long by 4 meters wide (excluding the toilet and outdoor kitchen). The occupant may add a loft to expand the floor area. Extensions, on the other hand, are allowed only at the back of the unit, and alterations in the façade are strictly prohibited.

6. Land and housing cost, repayment scheme and amortization

A group of GK benefactors bought the 6.5 hectare-agricultural land from a relative of the incumbent municipal mayor. The mayor convinced the land owner to sell the property—reportedly at ₱2 million, according to the mayor—so that families affected by Typhoon Yolanda could be relocated from the danger zone to a safer location.⁸⁵ The land was then converted from agricultural (i.e., coconut plantation) to residential purpose and donated to GK.

Each unit costs roughly ₱150,000, including labor cost. Beneficiaries were given the houses for free, but in exchange, they were required to render 1,500 hours' worth of *pintakasi* or voluntary work (performed usually twice a week and included hauling of soil and hollow blocks, and painting) and to attend values formation sessions (conducted on weekends, usually in the afternoon until the evening). Compliance is checked by the *Kapitbahayan* officers.

7. Land tenure arrangement

To discourage the practice of selling the lots and to protect the “kindness” of the partners who bought the land, GK and the LGU agreed to put the property under a usufruct arrangement. In most GK villages, the families can stay in their houses for free for 25 years; in the case of GK Carmen however, it has not been settled if this arrangement would be followed.⁸⁶ Whatever the term of lease is, GK's main intention was to provide the families enough time to recover from the tragedy and lift themselves out of poverty, hence the houses are treated as “starter units” or “halfway houses” which they can choose to leave when they can afford to move to another place. (The beneficiaries, however, have a different understanding of the tenure granted to them. They believe there is no limit to the number of years that they can stay in the village as long as they comply with the rules and regulations as enumerated in their agreement called the *kasunduan*.)

Decisions on who and when to evict, and the grounds for such move, are delegated to the *Kapitbahayan*, and in concurrence with GK. As in other GK villages, residents should comply with the rules set in the *kasunduan*, which GK has introduced to communities since it started. The *kasunduan* contains the rules and regulations that guide community living, i.e., beneficiaries live as one community, able to address shared concerns, and resolve common problems. Occupancy rights can be transferred to children (and no longer required to do voluntary work) if they are in the roster of family members submitted to GK.

⁸⁵ None of the key informants from GK could confirm the actual cost of land.

⁸⁶ Dan Bercasio, interview by authors, digital audio recording, Gawad Kalinga office, Mandaluyong City, 27 March 2017.

8. Project cost

House construction	₱36,150,000 (at ₱150,000 per unit, including labor cost)
Land acquisition	₱2 million (estimated by the mayor)

9. Project duration

The project took more than two years to be completed, starting with land development activities in August 2014 and completion of the last batch of housing units in December 2016.

Table 10
Project Information: GK Village-Carmen

Location	Barangay Carmen, Hernani, Eastern Samar
Implementing Organization	Gawad Kalinga Community Development Foundation
Collaborating Organizations	GK-Ateneo and Hope Now Philippines Foundation
Beneficiaries	241 families
Housing Design, Technology, Materials	Row houses; each unit has a floor area of 18 sq. m. and with provision for loft
Repayment scheme and amortization	None
Land Tenure Arrangement	Usufruct
Project Duration	August 2014 to December 2016

B. Project Implementation

With most humanitarian aid and relief assistance concentrated in Tacloban City in the first few weeks after Typhoon Yolanda struck Eastern Samar, GK focused its relief efforts in areas not reached by other organizations. The municipality of Hernani was a logical choice because GK has an existing village in one barangay. After the distribution of relief goods to affected families, safe housing emerged as the most needed intervention. The regional team of GK, headed by an Area Coordinator, broached the idea of a resettlement project.



Figure 24. This photo shows the terrain, elevation and distance of the community site from the coastline.

The Area Coordinator and a community organizer met with the mayor, who was then serving his second term. GK encouraged him to find a piece of land where affected families could be relocated. The mayor said it was difficult to convince land owners to sell their properties that are large enough to be developed into a housing project. The LGU also does not have lands that can be used for a resettlement project, and it is very dependent on the internal revenue allotment (₱47 million for 2017) it receives from the national government for its resources. The mayor has relatives who own land and he convinced one to sell a property at a negotiated price. GK had to raise funds as well, so the relocation was not done immediately. GK purchased the land in the second quarter of 2014, and donated it to the LGU. The GK Technical Team (an architect and an engineer) was given the technical description of the land, and came up with a design that yielded 241 core units, and dedicated spaces for communal farms and other common facilities.

As plans were prepared for the resettlement project, a GK community organizer visited the area where the people were initially housed in tents and gathered community members in a meeting to introduce GK and its plan to profile affected families. Months later, GK returned and announced that they would be purchasing a property (in the current location of the project) which could accommodate families from the no-build zone or those severely affected by the typhoon. Prospective beneficiaries were invited to another meeting to get to know GK, its project, and the “conditions” of the free housing such as the contribution of 1,500 hours of sweat equity, attendance of values formation program, and willingness to abide by the value of *bayanihan*. Non-individualized landownership did not emerge as a hindrance to inviting families to participate in the project; the prospect of having permanent and sturdier houses in a safer location mainly attracted the families to accept relocation to the GK village.

The LGU provided GK with a list of potential beneficiaries from Barangay Carmen. The GK community organizers interviewed the families who were then living in bunk houses provided by government. GK managed to convince 89 families. The first 89 families were the core members of the *kapitbahayan*.

To reach the desired number, GK trained and mobilized community volunteers (called “caretakers”) to look for more Yolanda-affected families in need of housing who met GK’s and the LGU’s criteria. GK intended to relocate all the families in dangerous areas of Barangay Carmen, but the initial round of community profiling yielded fewer families than targeted. The community-based organizers helped reach the target 200 families by going from house to house in inland communities where there were also families who suffered damage to their houses after Typhoon Yolanda.

With the land secured and the initial beneficiaries identified, GK and the LGU signed a memorandum of agreement in middle of 2014. Permits were approved immediately by the LGU upon request by GK.

Land development commenced in August 2014. The area’s terrain had to be levelled to reduce the steepness of slopes in certain parts and to prevent landslides. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau was requested to inspect the site to determine the viability of constructing buildings. The LGU was supposed to carry out land development activities, but because the project was a “special case” due to its “urgent” nature, GK implemented most of the site development activities through its Gawa Program.⁸⁷ The LGU contributed an amount for the construction of the road using funds accessed from the DSWD’s KALAH-CIDDS Program. As of early 2017, however, the concrete road is still incomplete.

The construction of the housing units was supervised by a GK volunteer-engineer and undertaken mainly by skilled workers from different *kapitbahayan* in Southern Leyte. Although they were paid, these workers treated it as their way of helping others who, like them before, were in need and had to rebuild their lives after a tragedy. Some prospective beneficiaries were hired as laborers. (At that time, getting local workers was difficult, and the demand for certain skills was high. GK had to also compete with government agencies and international NGOs that implement cash-for-work scheme, which attracted people who could be masons and carpenters in the GK project.⁸⁸) Twenty units had to be completed first before building new houses. In April 2016, GK held its “Bayani Challenge” which brought in volunteers from various school-based organizations to help paint the façade of completed units. Beneficiaries also contributed minimal labor (hauling of soil, passing of hollow blocks), but elderly beneficiaries had difficulty completing the sweat equity because of mobility limitations. Weather also affected the pace of the construction. (Although as against the duration of past projects of GK, i.e., 20 units in four to six months, the one and a half years it took to complete the first set of units in GK Carmen was relatively faster.⁸⁹)

While waiting for the project to be completed, the families stayed in tents or bunk houses in their original places of residence, then eventually transferred to temporary shelters after many of them complained of the excessive heat inside the tents. These temporary shelters were provided by other local and international NGOs (e.g., Terre des Hommes), international agencies (e.g., UNHCR), as well as the national government. As the construction was ongoing, families underwent a formation program that emphasized values such as love of God, love of country, and love of family. Facilitated by community organizers and held usually in the chapel for at most half a day, the sessions revolved around family values and community living. After each session, participants (mostly couples) took an

⁸⁷ Gawa Program pools together accredited skilled workers whom GK can tap when there is a project. GK targets to link these pools of workers to construction projects in the future.

⁸⁸ Bercasio.

⁸⁹ Jed Dycoco, interview by authors, digital audio recording, Tacloban City, 26 February 2017.

oath and read the *“Panunumpa sa Kapitbahayan”*. One beneficiary recalled, *“Sabi nila, kung ano ang pag-uugali sa ibaba, kailangang hindi na madala* (They said we must not bring our accustomed way of life when we move to the village).” Marital problems, gambling, drinking sprees, and making noise should be left behind.



Figure 25. GK villages are known for houses with colorful facade. They have a shed-type roof—the ridge, connected to the face wall is protected by an aluminum sheet, while the eaves are placed at the back of the unit.

After the completion of 100 units, a turnover ceremony was held. More than 100 families, mainly those who had completed at least 1,000 hours of *pintakasi*, comprised the first batch and were supposed to transfer in December 2015; many of them, however, decided to stay or live with relatives because there was still no electricity and water in the GK village at that time. The Certificate of Occupancy, signed by the LGU, GK, and GK-Ateneo, was awarded to those who completed the required 1,500 hours. The family with the highest score was given the privilege of choosing its preferred unit.

The second batch was composed of almost 100 families who were supposed to transfer in April 2016. As with the first batch, however, not all families occupied their unit. The turnover of units to the last batch of 40 families was held in December 2016. A formal turn over ceremony was held in January 2017. As they moved in to their new houses, the families had to dismantle their bunk houses, but some did not comply with this requirement. Moreover, only those who have completed their sweat equity were given keys to their new houses. Assignment of units was done through a raffle, and as a result, there were elderly people who got assigned to units that are hard to reach.



Figure 26. Many units in the GK Carmen Village are in the elevated portion of the project site.

Majority of the beneficiaries continue to stay in their old places of residence along the shoreline communities even after the units had been turned over to them. Out of the 241 beneficiaries, only 15 have permanently resided as of February 2017.⁹⁰ Many visit their units during the day to clean and tend their plants. The absence of water and electricity was the foremost reason for not transferring to the new houses. GK admitted that it prioritized the construction of units, hoping that the installation of water and electricity supply would follow easily. According to GK, after it submitted the application, along with a *barangay* resolution, to the Eastern Samar Electric Cooperative (ESAMELCO), the LGU is expected to follow up. For GK, having a politician talk to the electric cooperative is more effective than the NGO or the association doing the follow-up.⁹¹ The mayor, however, said the ESAMELCO does not have the needed capital to put up posts and purchase transformers. The cooperative had likewise approached the National Electrification Authority (NEA) for assistance, but the agency said it does not have resources. As much as the LGU wants to bring electricity to the community, it does not have the resources to be able to advance the expenses for the installation.⁹² This forced three beneficiaries to spend at least ₱5,000 to buy drop wires and meters to connect to houses in a nearby neighborhood which they know is not legal. While waiting for the permanent supply, GK, with the help of Schneider Electric, provided families with solar lamps, but many of which are already broken. In May 2017, another partner of GK, the Stiftung Solarenergie, handed out solar panels and LED lights to families.

The demand from benefactors/funders to turn the projects over to the beneficiaries even in the absence of electricity and water supply was a consideration for holding the project turnover in batches. GK agreed, on the condition that it does not award certificates of occupancy to families who

⁹⁰ Juliet Doñuz, interview by authors, digital audio recording, GK Carmen Village, Hernani, Eastern Samar, 1 March 2017.

⁹¹ Dycoco.

⁹² All the post-Yolanda housing projects in the municipality do not have power supply, unlike in the temporary shelters or old houses.

have not completed the total number of hours required for sweat equity. Ideally also, GK would want to install all the basic services first before families moved in, but they understood if the benefactors of the donating organizations wanted to see families having moved to their now homes as evidence of where their money went.

According to the beneficiaries, the construction of the access road is a counterpart of the LGU. However, only a few meters had been paved. Acquiring the right-of-way has been difficult because of unwilling private landowners. As for the roads in the village, the beneficiaries are waiting for donors and they do not know if the road construction will be sponsored by GK.

GK does not intend to become completely detached from the community after project takeover. Reiterating one of its slogans—“*walang iwanan* (no one to leave behind)”—GK is guiding the *Kapitbahayan* in implementing community projects that will help them sustain the benefits of the project. The *Kapitbahayan* has submitted its application for registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to become a full-fledged homeowners’ association. With some families switching from fishing to farming, GK is looking at introducing livelihood projects that match the interests and capacity of interested community members. This way, the *Kapitbahayan* could maintain the organization and support its activities without relying on GK. There is a plan to build a flea market and a multi-purpose hall.



Figure 27. Until the permanent power supply becomes available, families in GK Carmen use solar-powered LED bulbs donated by Stiftung Solarenergie (StS) and the Consuelo Foundation. (Photo from GK Eastern Samar Facebook page, used with permission from owner.)

GK could see signs of empowerment in the community association—they could decide and act as a community, there is greater community cohesion, they do not wait for the local government to act on their issues. The most important factor, however, is the sense of security and safety that the housing project provided the families. The ability to sleep tight amid a typhoon and not worry that they will lose their houses from devastating winds is enough reason for the community to take care of their village. With the village as a visual reminder of their rising from a tragic event, they have learned how to become more prepared for a disaster. The sheer strength of Typhoon Yolanda traumatized the families so much that the LGU no longer has problems convincing them to evacuate when there is a storm. “*Dahil nagkaroon na ng phobia ang mga tao, kahit naka-signal number one lang ‘yan at malakas na ang hangin, para bang nag-aaklas na agad sila. Hindi na mapakali.* (Because we have developed a phobia, even if our area is under typhoon signal 1 and the winds are strong, people would scramble. They are restless.)”

C. Feedback from Beneficiaries

Typhoon Yolanda left unimaginable devastation in Hernani, but for the GK beneficiaries in this town, it was a “blessing in disguise.” Had it not been for the typhoon, most of them would continue to risk their lives residing in storm surge-prone areas. These families never thought it possible to own a home by rendering hundreds of hours of labor to building not only their own house but the homes of their

neighbors too. They still feel anxious when they hear news about typhoons coming to eastern Visayas, but the thought that they have a safer place to live in (the location of the GK village has been identified as a safe area) has given them peace of mind.



Figure 28. A project beneficiary by the door of her unit.

The project also evoked the indigenous virtue of *"pintakasi"* and in the process instilled a sense of ownership among the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries believed they can never have their own house no matter how hard they worked. *"Ito pawis lang,"* said one beneficiary, referring to unpaid labor as their personal investment. Another beneficiary had a similar insight, *"Mas masayang tumira sa isang bahay kung pinaghirapan mo. Libre man, binayaran namin ito ng aming pawis at dugo* (It is more gratifying to live in a house that you worked hard for. It is given to us free, but we built this with our sweat and blood)."

Through regular seminars and the consistent presence of "caretakers", certain positive values were enhanced. Bonds among neighbors became stronger. One beneficiary said, *"Doon kanya-kanya. Dito may bayanihan, pagsasama-sama, pakikipagkapwa-tao, pakikipagtulungan... sharing kapag may problema, mag-share ng pagkain kapag may gawain.* (In our previous place, we lived on our own. Here, we have a spirit of communal unity, solidarity, cooperation... we can turn to each other when we have problems, we contribute food when we have community activities)." Another beneficiary added, *"Kung dati hindi kami magkakakilala, ngayon magkakapatid na kami* (We didn't know one another, but now, we are like sisters and brothers)."

The absence of electricity and water, however, has discouraged many beneficiaries from occupying their units. The beneficiaries learned the provincial electric cooperative is requiring a post and transformer to connect the community to the main grid. The project developer is also required to apply for a connection which, according to GK, has been complied with and the LGU is supposed to follow up. For water, GK bought an adjacent land (owned also by a relative of the mayor) which has a water source. However, because there is no electricity, water could not be drawn using a pump. Those

who have money to buy fuel to operate the pump can use this. There was a suggestion to collect contributions from members but many families would rather spend their 50 pesos for food. The volume of water is also limited, enough to fill a concreted pond from which families who contributed to fuel the generator fetch water. Families living on the lower portions of the village would rather fetch from the highway than walk going up and risk slipping on the slope. *“Noon dati ang tubig nasa likod lang namin, ngayon maglalakad pa kami nang malayo* (Before, we get our water from a source at the back of our houses, but now, we have to walk several meters),” said one beneficiary. A manual pump was installed at the entrance of the community as part of the *Bayani Challenge* with volunteers from Palo, but as of date of visit, the pump does not have a handle; there was water when it was installed because it was the rainy season and there was enough groundwater. The beneficiaries also noted foul smell and murkiness of water from the same source, which turned out to be water stocked during construction. Residents go to a deep well along the highway to get water for cooking, and go to a spring to bathe and wash their clothes. Children bring empty gallons when they go to school, and before going home, they collect water from the faucet in the school. During the rainy season, they store water in large plastic drums. Because of these issues, families with elderly and young children opt to continue residing in their temporary shelters near or in their old community.



Figure 29. Some families wash their laundry and take a bath in a nearby creek.

Not all families engaged in fishing had relocated; they are therefore continuing their livelihood. Families that want to start home-based livelihood in the GK village, however, could not start because aside from the absence of electricity and water, the unpaved roads make it difficult for them to bring their goods in and out of the village, either by foot or by a tricycle. Beneficiaries can tend stores as long as they do not modify the façade and the front yard within the first ten years. They prefer individual livelihood assistance instead of in groups. They were also discouraged from raising pigs (*“Bawal ang babuyan kasi mangangamoy, magkakasakit kami. Pwede sa malayo”*).



Figure 30. A water pump is on standby for beneficiaries who can afford to pay for the fuel.

The beneficiaries admitted that they did not bother inspecting the quality of the materials used or checking if the construction quality followed the standards. They were confident that the GK engineers and architects would let them know if there were any defects. Defects (water penetrating walls, leaking roofs) have been reported to GK, and they were told that repairing these is their counterpart. *“Nagsabi naman sila na ready for occupancy na, so hindi kami nag-iisip na kapag tumira kami diyan ay mababasa kami... kapag umuulan na. Hindi namin malalaman kung ano talaga ang deprensya, not unless umulan na. (They told us that the units are ready for occupancy, so we expect we’d be dry there. We won’t know the defects unless it rains.)”*

D. Lessons Learned by the Implementing Organization

In a post-disaster situation, giving priority to providing families with security and safety could entail compromising on giving them immediate access to basic services.

Because of the urgency to transfer families affected by Typhoon Yolanda, GK decided to build the units as quickly as possible and take care of the basic services later. Given the demand for housing, GK accepted the compromise, even if it deviated from its usual stance of making sure that basic services and infrastructure are in place before families move in. The beneficiaries’ sense of security and safety were the foremost concern that GK addressed which, if left to government alone, would take time. It was also *“Kailangang magtayo kahit unti-unti. Kailangang may makita ang mga tao na may tumatayo na. (We had to build albeit incrementally. People should see that there’s progress in the project.)”*⁹³

⁹³ Bercasio.

Introducing new ideas and changes in attitudes or behavior that are helpful for sustaining the benefits of a housing intervention require care and sensitivity.

To do this, GK began with a small group of community members who were receptive to such changes. They were trained and exposed to other GK villages to help them become effective leaders and “caretakers” whom the beneficiaries can approach during trying personal or community situations. For GK, developing leaders is critical in transforming a community. Also, GK invests in building a relationship with the community and a commitment to “journey with them” as they rebuild their lives away from harm’s way.

An open and respectful partnership with the local government is crucial both for a smooth project start and for the sustainability of the project.

Gawad Kalinga’s point of entry is always the local government because “...at the end of the day, GK is here to bridge the gap between the government and the civil society... and [housing] is their mandate.”⁹⁴ As a non-political organization, GK keeps a non-adversarial relation with the local government. Building a working relationship with the LGU has been proven helpful in facilitating project implementation, for example, by identifying potential beneficiaries and waiving payment of permits. It also has the political capital, if not resources, to engage other stakeholders such as service providers as well as the national government.

LGUs have the capacity to extend technical assistance (e.g., planning and engineering offices) to NGOs or private organizations in providing post-disaster housing. In the case of GK Carmen, however, the LGU admitted that it could have been more proactive during project implementation. The mayor said that with the complaints he has been hearing about the project (slow provision of basic services, defects in the structure such as leaking walls, etc.), he could have requested GK to involve a technical staff from the planning or engineering offices of the municipal government to look at the plans, review the specifications, and monitor the project. He admitted, though, that it was not easy because he trusted that GK would do its work conscientiously and it might send a wrong message to GK (“*Mahirap kaming mangialam kasi hindi naman kami sinabihan... [Baka sabihin], ‘binigyan na nga kayo ng project tapos makikialam pa kayo.’*” (“It is hard to get involved because we were not told to do so... [They might say], we have given you a project and yet you meddle.”)).

KEY INFORMANTS

Implementing organization

- Dan Bercasio, Building Communities Head, Gawad Kalinga Community Development Foundation
- Jed Dycoco, Movement Building Team Leader for Eastern Visayas, Gawad Kalinga Community Development Foundation
- Mary Betuin, Christian Servande, and Mylene Servande, Volunteers

⁹⁴ Bercasio.

Collaborating organization/s

- Edgar Boco, Mayor, Municipality of Hernani
- Noi Quesada-Corneby, Director, GK-Ateneo

Beneficiaries

- Juliet Doñuz, *Kapitbahayan* President and Project Director
- Girlie Abad
- Clarita Consultado
- Agrifina dela Rama
- Crisanta Codillo
- Carmen Oprin
- Claudio Ilagdo
- Crisanta Antofina

Pope Francis Village

POPE FRANCIS FOR RESILIENT AND CO-EMPOWERED, SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES (FRANCESCO)



A. Project Information

1. Location

Envisioned as an “integrated, people-driven model community,” the housing project is in Barangay 99 (also referred to as Diit), north of Tacloban City, about a kilometer and a half away from Maharlika Highway, the city’s major thoroughfare. The location is within the preferred distance of the beneficiaries, that is, a nine-peso ride to the central business district and not more than seven kilometers away from where they would be moving from. The area is also better than the more distant resettlement areas because it is within the service area of the water district. With very low risks of flooding and storm surge, the area will serve as evacuation area for families in low-lying parts of the barangay.

2. Implementing organization

The Pope Francis for Resilient and Co-Empowered, Sustainable Communities (FRANCESCO) is a consortium of organizations composed of the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (CCO-DP), the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines—National Secretariat for Social Action (CBCP-NASSA), the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer (Redemptorist Community of Tacloban), the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Palo, Leyte (RCAP), and the NGO Urban Poor Associates (UPA).

3. Collaborating organizations

Per official website of the project, each member of the consortium performs the following tasks:

Development and Peace (D&P) – Caritas Canada (Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Raises and contributes funds for the acquisition of land and for the operations of the integrated and people-driven model community project ▪ Takes the lead in overseeing the daily operations of Pope Francis Village ▪ Performs coordinating and facilitating roles among the D&P partners and other institutions to ensure the timely delivery and accomplishment of development services
Urban Poor Associates (UPA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Takes the lead in social organization activities relative to the implementation of the integrated, people-driven model community project ▪ Leads in beneficiary screening and selection process ▪ Leads in negotiations with LGU and other government agencies in Tacloban City to obtain necessary permits or any form of transactions required by the project ▪ Provides liaison support to partner communities in leveraging support from government agencies and other potential funding institutions
Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contributes funds for the purchase of the resettlement site intended for the integrated, people-driven model community project ▪ Facilitates the completeness of lot and boundary survey including negotiations with the land owner relative to the acquisition of the property ▪ Takes part in all other activities related to the project implementation
CBCP-NASSA – Caritas Philippines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Takes part in facilitating the purchase of the resettlement site with appropriate documentation ▪ Provides technical expertise on WASH, livelihood and community organizing components of the project ▪ Provides advice and suggestions to improve the quality and appropriateness of support to the model community project
Archdiocese of Palo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assumes as the “in-trust legal holder” of the land acquired ▪ Participates in all meetings and activities relative to the implementation of the integrated, people-driven model community project

- Provides advice and suggestions on orderly, quality and timely implementation of the project
- Assists in negotiations with LGU and other government agencies in Tacloban City to obtain necessary permits or any form of transactions that need to be secured for the project

Source: The Official Blog site of Pope Francis for Resilient and Co-Empowered Sustainable Communities (FRANCESCO), (francescomodelcommunity.blogspot.com); based on the partnership agreement.

4. Beneficiaries

When completed, this permanent in-city resettlement project will be home to a total of 616 families from various coastal communities in nine barangays in the Magallanes and San Jose districts.⁹⁵ To facilitate their eventual transfer, the beneficiaries were grouped into 11 homeowner associations. Aside from giving them “decent, durable and disaster resilient” dwelling houses, the project also incorporates opportunities to help them rebuild their livelihoods and strategies to participate in disaster risk reduction and local governance through community organizing.

5. Housing design, technology, and materials used

Pope Francis Village consists of 30 blocks of two-story rowhouses with three designs but similar basic specifications—reinforced concrete and wood materials, steel roof frame and galvanized iron sheet roofing, conventional walling using concrete hollow blocks, glass jalousie windows, and panel type PVC doors. Until the DENR order discouraging the use of wood, the stair was to be made of wood lumber with steel railings. This was replaced with angle steel bars and marine ply wood. Each unit has a toilet and bath, and kitchen, and is ready for electricity and water installation.

After a structural audit conducted in December 2016 and a review of project cost, the per floor area of the three designs was adjusted in terms of shape (from rectangular with dimensions of 5 meters by 4 meters, to square with dimensions of 4.5 meters by 4.5 meters). The lot area was also reduced from 40 m² to 36 m².

6. Land and housing cost, repayment scheme and amortization

The dwelling units in the Pope Francis Village cover five hectares of the buildable area of the 12.8 hectare-property acquired from a private landowner by CCO-DP at ₱33 million. D&P then assigned the land to the Archdiocese of Palo.⁹⁶ The houses are given to the families for free. Average cost per house is ₱300,000, but this may vary depending on the location (e.g., in some parts, excavation will increase the cost). The project also accessed funds from DSWD’s Core Shelter Program that grants ₱70,000 per family. (See Appendix 12 for the perspective and site development plan.)

⁹⁵ This was 66 units more than the original 550 units, a change resulting from reducing the lot sizes and floor areas.

⁹⁶ Three hectares will be used for livelihood area, and the rest will be open spaces (roads and parks) and community facilities (chapel, community building, commercial buildings, etc.).

7. Land tenure arrangement

Land was acquired using funds from D&P (up to CAD\$3 million) and the Redemptorist Community in Tacloban (₱1 million). The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Palo stands as the “in-trust legal holder” of the property.⁹⁷ FRANCESCO will decide on the issue of landownership after the project is completed.⁹⁸

8. Project cost

House construction	Target ceiling: ₱300,000 per unit Actual (first 52 units): almost ₱1,000,000 DSWD, through its Core Shelter Assistance Program, shouldered ₱70,000 of the cost per unit (or more than ₱40 million)
Land acquisition	₱33 million
Site development (road, earth, and drainage works)	₱87 million (c/o DPWH; FRANCESCO requested a budget of ₱103 million)
Other civic and social services infrastructure	Approximately ₱44 million (c/o D&P)

9. Project duration

Launched in August 2015, the project was initially targeted to be finished in one year or in September 2016.⁹⁹ Due to various setbacks in the schedule and adjustments to the housing designs, however, the target was moved to September 2017, or more than two years since site development activities started in April 2015. Given the setbacks in the implementation experienced in the first quarter of 2017, the project is projected to be completed in December of the same year. (See Appendix 13 and floor and elevation plans)

Table 11
Project Information: Pope Francis Village

Location	Barangay 99 (Diit), Tacloban City
Implementing Organization	Pope Francis for Resilient and Co-Empowered, Sustainable Communities (FRANCESCO)
Collaborating Organizations	Development and Peace (D&P) – Caritas Canada (Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace)

⁹⁷ As stated in the Memorandum of Partnership Agreement entered by consortium members on 11 May 2015.

⁹⁸ FRANCESCO, “Project Framework and Orientation” (unpublished document, no date).

⁹⁹ Sara Susanne Fabunan, “Yolanda victims told to sign for ungiven aid,” *Manila Standard*, 18 August 2015; available from <http://manilastandard.net/news/top-stories/184863/yolanda-victims-told-to-sign-for-ungen-aid.html> (accessed 11 April 2017).

	Urban Poor Associates (UPA) Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer CBCP-NASSA – Caritas Philippines Archdiocese of Palo
Beneficiaries	616 families
Housing Design, Technology, Materials	Two-storey row houses; floor area of at least 40 sq. m.
Repayment scheme and amortization	None
Land Tenure Arrangement	For discussion; ownership is currently held in trust by the Archdiocese of Palo
Project Duration	August 2015 to December 2017 (target)

The Pope Francis Village is a response to the plan of the city government to relocate 14,000 families to various resettlement sites in the northern outskirts of the city, at least 12 kilometers away from the center of the city. A strong advocate of in-city housing for the poor, UPA initiated the creation of a group of organizations that can work together to show that a people-driven approach to resettlement can be done. It believed that moving families away from harm's way need not mean transferring thousands of families to places where there are no jobs, away from the sea where many of them get food for the day, and where basic and social services are not easy to install due to physical conditions and the distance from the service areas of utility companies.

A long process of social preparation preceded the implementation of the permanent housing project. UPA staff members are fond of recalling how people in the coastal communities they visited reacted upon learning that the NGO's four-person team had no relief goods to distribute and had only "community organizing" to offer. Those whom UPA approached knew that "community organizing", vague as it sounded to them, would not immediately fill their stomachs or shield them from heavy rains, but they received the community organizers from Manila nonetheless. Assisting the communities in accessing relief goods and assistance from "hubs" managed by the government and the United Nations (UN) was the initial objective of UPA's organizing efforts. Using a modest amount of donations, UPA complemented the relief goods with a weekly "soup kitchen" that ran for a month. What followed was a series of painstaking activities that would enhance the capacity of the communities to undertake a people-driven housing project.

Adopting the "people's plan" approach, a method conceived by Manila-based NGOs such as UPA, the project conceptualization took off from a consultation with community members. Aware of the need to transfer to a safer location after a period of living in temporary shelters, the communities, with guidance from UPA, organized workshops that brought out ideas for a prototype housing design, agreed-upon criteria for selecting a site, and screening beneficiaries. The household head and his/her spouse signed a "Covenant on the Construction of Permanent Shelter" with FRANCESCO (see Appendix 14).



Figure 31. Pope Francis Village beneficiaries live in transitional houses funded mainly by Christian Aid and support for other community facilities from other organizations.

Box 5

Other social preparation/pre-relocation interventions for Pope Francis Village beneficiaries

- With funding assistance from Christian Aid, UPA handed out marine ply woods to about 500 families. Tents for almost 1,000 families who were not able to access funds from Oxfam and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) were eventually replaced with on-site transitional housing (shelter repair or new structure), also using grants from Christian Aid. In each community, there is a water tank, common toilet and bath (with a wastewater treatment facility), chapel, play area, and a garden where people can get vegetables and fruits.
- The Holy Spirit Sisters purchased and distributed boats for 300 fishermen.
- To support the communities' collective resistance to government's policy of declaring a 40 meter-wide "no build zone" (later changed to "no shelter zone"), UPA held seminars informing residents about basic housing rights, the Urban Development and Housing Acts (UDHA), and other related topics. The said policy would prohibit them from rebuilding their structures, albeit temporary, in their communities and from receiving assistance from humanitarian organizations and government. There was also information that the city government was planning to build a tide embankment / road dike, against which communities protested because the bias was for protecting or catering to the business interests of commercial and business establishments. Following a mobilization of thousands from the UPA-organized communities in July 2014 (or June 2015), the city mayor gave verbal permission for them to stay in their communities until an acceptable housing project becomes available.

- Interested community members started a savings program that followed the model of World Vision's Community Managed Savings and Credit Association (CoMSCA). Each member in a group of at least 20 saves P50 per week. Members can borrow for capital for individual or group business or emergency expenses.

By the end of 2014, UPA found a vacant property in the hilly portions of Barangay Diit. After determining the owner and checking the owner's willingness to dispose of the land, UPA sought the help of long-time partner NGOs, international development organizations, and Church organizations to lock in the land. The rise of what UPA called "disaster capitalists,"¹⁰⁰ who increased the selling price of their properties in non-hazard prone areas knowing that government will look for possible relocation sites, had to be confronted.

The aim then was to relocate as many as 1,700 families. This ambitious target forced UPA to tap other organizations, thus the creation of the consortium, FRANCESCO, in early 2015. Coordinated by a Project Secretariat (project manager, finance officer, and project nurse), the consortium has two teams—the Technical Team and the Social Team. The Technical Team consists of architects and engineers who, with guidance from technical experts, prepared the site development plan, housing designs and construction plan, and detailed budget. It oversees the overall implementation of the project. In the first few months of the project, the consortium engaged technical professionals from another NGO called TAMPEI (the Technical Assistance Movement for People and Environment), until the architects and engineers were hired on their individual capacity. The Social Team, on the other hand, is headed by UPA which does the social preparation component of the project through community organizing.

Box 6

Tasks of the Social and Technical Teams of FRANCESCO¹⁰¹

Secretariat

- Secure all the necessary legal permits for the project
- Provide admin, finance and logistics support to the project
- Provide support to the community in the materials procurement for the project

Technical team

- Complete the site development Plan for the project
- Complete the housing type participatory designing
- Complete the detailed budgeting
- Create community workshops for construction supplies
- Implement and complete the entire construction process

¹⁰⁰ Jose Alegro Torrella, interview by authors, digital audio recording, UPA-Tacloban Office, Tacloban City, 3 March 2017. Mr Torrella is one of the community organizers of UPA.

¹⁰¹ FRANCESCO.

Social Team

- Facilitate the final selection of beneficiaries
- Facilitate the formation of community construction team
- Take an inventory of community skills and talents
- Train of community leaders
- Facilitate formation of community committees on livelihood
- Monitor construction process

Based on the assessment done by the Technical Team, the buildable portions of the property can yield a maximum of 550 units, lower than the number of families initially targeted by UPA. Other facilities in the village include common areas for livelihood activities and meetings, a chapel, parks, and day-care centers. Non-buildable portions were allocated for farming activities such as agro-forestry.

The Social Team wanted to have a good mix of residents: 60% would be those who are generally active in the community, 20% would be families with vulnerable members (persons with disability, elderly, and single mothers), and 20% would be families with members who have the necessary leadership skills. The project also included an LGU criterion for selecting beneficiaries—a family can be qualified for assistance if it has been residing in Tacloban at least six months before Yolanda. The prospective beneficiaries—then organized into community associations by UPA—then added other criteria: with regular savings, actively participates in meeting and activities (e.g., mobilization), involved in tending the community garden or the community enterprise, and able to complete the required number of hours for voluntary work. Community members elected their representatives to the Community Council (CC) which would be the “highest governing body in community affairs throughout the construction period.”¹⁰² The 20-member council was then divided into committees that would oversee the main components of the project: procurement, education and training, construction, warehousing, finance, and construction monitoring.

Box 7

Criteria for Selection of Pope Francis Village Project Beneficiaries

- Poorest of the poor victims of typhoon Yolanda whose names are on the official list of victims of Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the Local Government Unit (LGU) of Tacloban;
- Families who lost either their husbands or wives or children who became orphans caused by the typhoon;
- Not a lot owner and has not received any permanent shelter from the Government or other INGOs or any institutions (if recipient of transitional house, they must give-up the transitional house once they are transferred to their new house in the model community);

¹⁰² FRANCESCO, 11.

- Families whose members became disabled or (PWD) caused by the typhoon;
- At least 6 months residency in Tacloban at the areas now declared as “no build zone”; and,
- Member of UPA organized Peoples’ Organization (PO) and active in community activities

Because the project grants free housing, the technical staff from TAMPEI proposed that people be involved in every step of project implementation, from design to procurement and actual construction. They introduced a community-led process adopted by Indonesia NGO ArkomJogda, which assisted families who survived the tsunami in 2004. (By the time the community members reached the construction phase of the project, the community-led process proved challenging, resulting in delays.)

After drawing up a tentative list of beneficiaries, representatives of the communities underwent a “visioning workshop” in which people defined their “dream community.” By then, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) had released its Engineering, Geological and Geohazard Assessment Report (EGGAR), which was also explained to the prospective beneficiaries. It was important for them to understand that the area, though big, had only a buildable portion of five hectares, and engineering interventions are necessary to minimize the present hazards posed by the terrain. With the help of architecture students from the Eastern Visayas State University (EVSU), community members created miniature buildings and other community facilities. The outputs were consolidated, and the final scheme was presented to the communities in an assembly. This was forwarded to the geodetic engineer, and until now, there are changes being done.

For the housing design, community members underwent a participatory housing design training-workshop. They were first taught basic skills in reading architectural drawings, preparing scaled drawings, and creating models. People were so traumatized by the Yolanda floods that their first suggestion was to transfer to a house with a second story. The project had to increase the elevation of certain parts of the property by at least three meters to prevent flooding. People also wanted to have a veranda. Housing designs proposed by the community members were then presented to senior technical advisers. To break the norm of building rows of “a monotonous sea of buildings” like in government-built projects, the project proposed three designs to also accommodate different design proposals that emerged from the workshop. One group wanted a quadruplex type, while another preferred row houses. The Technical Team adjusted the designs to maximize the available buildable area, and these were consulted with the people. If one design is followed, people were told, fewer than 500 units could be constructed; one group wanted to have more families from their community included. FRANCESCO noted that “caring for others became the ultimate consideration as the row house design could still accommodate more people compared to other house designs.”¹⁰³ Keeping the cost within the budget allotted for construction was also considered.

After the groundbreaking ceremony in August 2015, selected representatives from the communities participated in a two-day procurement workshop. Resource speakers from Aceh, Indonesia were invited to share their experience in community-led procurement process. FRANCESCO envisioned these participants to be part of the procurement team that would make purchases, enter contracts,

¹⁰³ FRANCESCO, 10.

and do other aspects of the construction work with the Technical Team supporting them. The strategy, however, was eventually reconsidered because the level of skills the members attained from the workshop proved limited vis-à-vis the scope of work and the amount of time demanded from them.

Site clearing started in October 2015, which relied much on manual clearing by prospective beneficiaries. The 53rd Infantry Battalion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) later lent backhoes, soil movers and other equipment, although FRANCESCO paid for the fuel. During this time, a few community members took free courses on carpentry, masonry, and electrical installation and maintenance, and welding. They first applied the things they learned in the construction of a two-story building (named “Pope Francis Building”) with six classrooms in the nearby Scandinavian Elementary School; this is in anticipation of new enrollees once the families move in to Pope Francis Village.

After almost six months and passing the field density test, the earthworks for the first 40 units were started. Community workers who passed the screening process of the Technical Team were mobilized for this, beginning with the lay-out and excavation works, fabrication of formworks, and steel reinforcement. Site clearing and dozer works by the contractor of the DPWH followed the land development activities started by the AFP. The Notice of Award of the winning bidder was released in July 2016, although it started its activities in March 2016. FRANCESCO requested ₱103 million for site development but the DPWH approved only ₱79 million (plus 10 percent allowance, so total is ₱85 million). FRANCESCO wrote the DPWH requesting for the remaining amount to complete the inner roads and slope protection. (Site development is expected to be completed by April 2017.) Although FRANCESCO had secured the required documents such as an environmental compliance certificate and building permits (payments for which were waived by the LGU in compliance with a national government issuance), HOA officers and FRANCESCO project teams held a mobilization at the city council in August 2016 to press for the approval of the project’s development permit by the committee on infrastructure and public works. The deep well that had been serving as the project’s water source was replaced with a solar-powered water pump that would supply enough volume to produce concrete hollow blocks and completion of other construction requirements.¹⁰⁴

The onset of the southwest monsoon in mid-2016 affected the pace of construction. Rainwater stuck in the excavated holes had to be extracted first before laying the concrete hollow blocks. The weather condition necessitated the use of an excavator to finish the holes for footing in one day (which could last at least three days if left to manual laborers). Road development and benching of houses were affected by Typhoons Karen (international name: Sarika) and Lawin (international name: Haima) in October 2016.

¹⁰⁴ The housing project incorporates livelihood activities such as the production of concrete hollow block.



Figure 32. Pope Francis Village runs an in-house concrete hollow block production site. The hollow blocks are also offered to interested buyers, generating additional income for the community.

As site development activities were conducted, the Social Team concentrated on organizing the beneficiaries. In a general assembly of the 11 HOAs in June 2016, FRANCESCO facilitated the identification of the blocks where specific HOAs will transfer. The HOAs were grouped in three clusters (to facilitate the assignment of community workers to certain construction works), and the assignment of location was done by drawing lots. In another gathering, the Technical Team presented a revised program of works as a result of the clustering strategy. Each cluster had a Cluster Management Team who will form and mobilize their own “workers’ guild”, monitor the progress of construction, and record the time spent and work rendered by community workers. Beneficiaries were also required to render 700 hours of volunteer manual work called *pintakasi*. *Pintakasi* was to be performed between 8:00 am and 5:00 pm, and could include minimal labor like hauling hollow blocks. The project planned to get workers from the community, who would receive an allowance equivalent to the minimum daily wage of P260. However, it turned out that there was not enough of them. To expedite the construction and ensure quality, FRANCESCO decided to hire skilled workers, who are paid ₱450 each per day.

Table 12
List of HOAs and number of member households of Pope Francis Village

Cluster	HOAs	Number of households
1 - Prosperity	Lucky Homes HOA MSHOA	181
2 - Hope	Maunlad HOA Saruyong HOA	182
3 - Unity	Blue Lagoon HOA Cellophane HOA Wonderland HOA Disneyland HOA Happy Homes HOA Masuhay Beach HOA Buranday HOA	187

For the provision of water and electricity in the Pope Francis Village, FRANCESCO and a representative from the HOAs maximized their attendance of regular meetings of the Yolanda Recovery Partners' and Cluster Heads convened by the regional office of NEDA. In one meeting in July 2016, after prodding from the community members, NEDA Regional Office VIII committed to convey the demand of Pope Francis Village beneficiaries for electrification and water supply to the National Electrification Administration (NEA) and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). FRANCESCO was instructed to formalize its request to NEDA through a letter, together with other documentary requirements (e.g., request for permits from the Leyte Metropolitan Water District and the Leyte Electric Cooperative). With FRANCESCO having complied with these, the HOAs expect that electrification of the community and the provision of steady supply of water would be swift once the village is finished.

In late 2016, FRANCESCO contracted the services of a structural auditor to assess the prototypes of each housing design. Lapses in the structural design, such as in the proportion of the walls' thickness to the size of the unit and the columns, were reported. Here a problem with regard the structural engineer, who apparently did not practice due diligence (errors in computations, etc.), emerged and caused unnecessary wastage of resources and delay in the implementation (a period of stoppage in fact); the engineer was terminated by FRANCESCO. The consortium hired a new structural engineer.

To keep the construction cost for each unit within the ceiling, certain features were modified. The floor area was adjusted from 5 x 4 meters (rectangular) to 4.5 x 4.5 meters (square). Wood lumber had been initially planned to be used for floor joints and roof rafters in all units, but for cost reasons, the architects replaced it with steel; this will also result in less wastage because steel cuttings can still be welded unlike wood cuttings that are useless in construction. (The DENR also called the attention of FRANCESCO on its use of lumber.) The stairs are a combination of angle steel bars and marine plywood. The design of St Therese units was also adjusted to reduce the number of beams and therefore lower the cost. Instead of the gable roof, the project will adopt shed-type roof. The number of light sockets was also reduced. Interior walls will not be painted but will have plaster finish. The ground floor will have bare ceiling. Instead of installing conventional septic tank (made of concrete), the project will make use of PVC pipes. All these changes were presented to the representatives of the 11 HOAs to whom it was clarified that keeping the cost at P300,000 will necessitate these adjustments so that all the 550 units can be constructed.

In September 2016, the Social Team submitted a master list of beneficiaries to the City Housing Office. Before this, the UPA-led team assisted the HOAs in validating and updating their respective lists given the decision of some families to accept relocation in government-built housing projects or the failure of some families to meet the required labor counterpart (e.g., because of the need to get a more gainful job). The daily record kept by cluster leaders and FRANCESCO's database proved helpful in determining which families were unable to comply. Those who opted for other resettlement assistance signed waivers, prompting the HOA clusters to look for interested families in the communities who are willing to take the slots of those who backed out.

As of February 2017, 54 units were expected to have been completed by the end of April 2017. If the project proceeds as planned, UPA expects the houses to be completed and ready for occupancy (i.e., with water and electricity) by December 2017.



Figure 33. By end of February 2017, 54 units were almost completed.

As of this writing, the assignment of households per block for one cluster was started in the first week of April 2017. Those with elderly and PWD members, orphaned children, and solo parents and have completed at least 700 hours of volunteer work were the first to be assigned their units. Families with the same vulnerable members but could not render labor equity were second in the priority list. Following the criteria identified and approved by the HOAs prior to actual project construction, the Social Team and the leaders also considered the quality of participation of beneficiaries and due diligence in complying with the regulations of their savings and credit program. Dismantling their temporary shelters is set as a condition before relocating to Pope Francis Village. Once the beneficiaries have settled, a council will be formed to oversee the management of the village.



Figure 34. The Livelihood Committee has started tending a vegetable garden in the livelihood area of the community.

B. Chronology of Major Activities

Phase	Dates/ Duration	Activities
Set up	January 2015	The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed.
	April-May 2015	Representatives from communities participated in a “Community-led Site Development Planning Workshop.” The site development plan was presented for final consultation with almost all the prospective beneficiaries on May 9. The output was forwarded to the Technical Team for developing the final engineering drawing.
	May 2015	In a Participatory House Designing Workshop, community representatives were taught basic skills on house design and prepared miniature models of their preferred designs.
		In the same month, around 100 community representatives attended a “Technical Training Workshop on House Construction” in which they were taught how to read architectural and structural plans, and were given basic information about laws relevant to house construction.
		Interested community members underwent a series of training on construction conducted by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA).
	August 2015	Obtaining of Accreditation on Occupational Health and Safety in Construction from DOLE
	August 2015	In a two-day Community-based Procurement Workshop, members

Phase	Dates/ Duration	Activities
		of the Procurement Committee were trained on how to canvass construction materials, negotiate with suppliers, document purchases, etc.
	August 2015	Groundbreaking ceremony
	August 2015	Site clearing
Implementation	February 2016	Approval of building permit
	April 2016	Actual construction
	November 2016	Inauguration and blessing of model houses
	December 2016	Structural audit. This was followed by adjustments in the design and project cost.
	February 2017	Start of building of slope protection walls, reinforced concrete and CHB-lined canals in blocks under Phase 1
Wrap up	To be determined	A Community Council is established to manage the village. An estate management system will be set up.

Source: Facebook page of Pope Francis Village (<https://www.facebook.com/groups/448979068601043/>)

C. Feedback from Beneficiaries

The acceptability of the project to the beneficiaries lies in the fact that it is the nearest resettlement project to the center of the city where their jobs and source of food as well as services are within reach. *“Mas malapit siya sa downtown kaysa sa ibang relocation [na] malayo* (Unlike the other resettlement projects, it [Pope Francis Village] is near the downtown),” said one beneficiary from a community called Mahusay Beach in Barangay 39. *“Malapit sa pinaghahanapbuhayan namin, ‘yung sa iba, hindi talaga katanggap-tanggap... mas malaki [rin] dito* (This is near the places where we work, the other [housing projects] aren’t acceptable... [the units here] are also bigger),” she added, comparing the quality and size of unit her family would occupy in Pope Francis Village to what they saw in government housing projects. For another beneficiary from Barangay 86, moving to the village means safety from perennial flooding. They did not mind the sweat equity requirement; *“Iniisip namin, bahay ang kapalit nito* (We thought, we get a house in exchange of our effort).”

Ironically, although donations from many organizations poured into Tacloban City after Typhoon Yolanda, one beneficiary had developed a slight resentment towards NGOs who went to visit them but provided no long-term assistance. When a community organizer from UPA showed up in their neighborhood, she admitted she was a bit wary and said, “*Wala silang ibinibigay, organizing lang* (They had nothing to offer us, except organizing).” But they nonetheless welcomed UPA because people believed that the NGO could accompany them to ask for relief goods and assistance. Back then, they could not go to the hubs set up by government and INGOs because they were too shy. “*Sinabi nila [UPA] kung anu-ano ang pwedeng magawa ng mga tao kung sama-sama* (They told us what we can achieve if people come together),” one beneficiary shared. They realized that if they came together as one united group, they would have a single voice to appeal to the city government to let them reconstruct their structures on-site instead of putting them in bunk houses with people they barely knew and eventually relocating them to housing projects located far north of the city. The strategy worked; through community organizing and with the guidance of UPA, the residents of coastal communities targeted for relocation held a mobilization to air their demand, and got a favorable response from the city mayor. The beneficiaries appreciated UPA’s effort in going to the community, interacting with them, and getting their thoughts and suggestions on issues that matter to them. There was really an effort to build a relationship with them and gain each other’s trust. “*Halos araw-araw pumupunta [sa amin], nagpapaliwanag* (They visited us almost every day, explaining [things]).”

Unlike in other housing projects, the beneficiaries take pride in having been involved in designing their houses and community through the participatory design workshops and related seminars conducted by the Technical Team. “*Kami ‘yung tinanong sa design, kung ano’ng gusto namin—second floor, terrace... May palengke, playground, chapel.* (We were asked about our preferred design of the house, what we wish to have—second floor, terrace... There is a market, playground and chapel.)” They appreciated the new things they learned in the workshops, but most importantly, they felt valued. “*Kung dati, sa amin, sa bahay lang kaming mga nanay. Pero ngayon, alam na namin kung paano buuin ang isang bahay, ang mga materyales.* (Before, the mothers are just in our homes. Now, we know how a house is constructed, the materials used.)” The participatory process also helped them consider the needs of others. “*Kung kami ang papipiliin, gusto sana naming mas malaki. Pero magiging makasarili naman kami n’on kung gusto naming mas malaki tapos ‘ung sa iba mawawalan, so okay na na may sukat na pare-parehas.* (If we are given the choice, we wanted our new homes to be bigger. But that will be selfish of us to desire for bigger houses while some will not have their own, so we’re okay with having uniform floor sizes.)”

Aside from the houses, the skills and knowledge they gained from the training and seminars—on livestock raising, urban gardening—were also appreciated. They are now applying the things they learned in tending their common garden in their current/transitional communities. They will also be bringing these when they move in to Pope Francis Village.

Through the community savings program, there was also a revitalized community life among beneficiaries. “*Natuto kaming makisama sa community. Dati sa bahay lang, nandoon lang, ‘yung mga kapitbahay minsan hindi pa pinapansin. Dito lahat nagpapansin.* (We learned to get along with others in our community. Before we just stay in our homes, we don’t interact with our neighbors.

Here, we get to mingle with others.)” The savings program was also an appreciated assistance because it augmented their household budget.

Sticking with Pope Francis Village was a right decision, said one beneficiary. Her brother was among those who opted to move to a bunk house in a government relocation site, but he kept going back to Mahusay Beach where he could ask help from relatives and people he grew up with. *“Hindi katulad dito na kahit galing sa iba’t ibang lugar, magkakakilala na kami.* (Unlike in this project, even if we come from different places, we’ve gotten to know one another.)” One said they have become friends even before moving to Pope Francis Village.

D. Lessons Learned by the Implementing Organization

The Pope Francis Village demonstrated that the huge cost inherent in in-city resettlement can be dealt with by maximizing government resources and support (DPWH, DSWD, AFP).

This entails getting basic information about possible sources and constant engagement with these agencies. Knowledge of national policies and directives (administrative orders, memorandum circulars) is also important for “fund leveraging” to result in actual commitments.

Community organizing proved to be an effective tool in preparing communities for their smooth transition to a permanent housing site.

Participatory approaches in designing their houses and planning their new community also created a strong sense of ownership among beneficiaries. However, FRANCESCO admitted that the extent to which people can reasonably participate in project implementation posed a dilemma. At a certain point, the sweat equity condition will need to be revisited given that working in the housing project took away time which working members of the households could have used for other livelihood activities. On the other hand, the value of the assistance to be given them for free should be inculcated in them. The Social Team invested a lot of effort in social preparation. The Technical Team was of the view that if a project invests in the empowerment of the communities by making them part of implementation, the timeframe of the project will certainly suffer.

For a time-bound project such as resettlement in which management of overhead cost is crucial, innovations in the people-driven process will have to be developed.

This is a matter that the project proponents, especially the funder, should make clear at the very start. Given this realization, FRANCESCO has started treating the community workers as ordinary workers. *“Kung dalhin mo na sila dito, kailangan bayaran mo nang tama.”* The project eventually gave in to the demand of community members to hire them like ordinary workers, and pay them accordingly because the P260 minimum wage could not cover their basic needs and transportation.

Difficulty in building a relationship with local government executives can be addressed by finding champions within the governance structure.

FRANCESCO’s engagement with the LGU was through the vice mayor, who was considered more open to working with NGOs. He was the strategic partner because he presides over the city council that issues relevant resolutions and ordinances that could facilitate certain aspects of project implementation such as the approval of permits.

KEY INFORMANTS

Implementing organization

- Marlon Lovido, Community Organizer, UPA/FRANCESCO Social Team
- Jose Alegro Torrella, Community Organizer, UPA/FRANCESCO Social Team
- Rexan Ranier Cabangal, Architect, FRANCESCO Technical Team
- Andrew Buenaventura, Engineer, FRANCESCO Technical Team

Beneficiaries

- Mary Jane Yano
- Aida Barona
- Sarah Collanto

| Key Lessons and Recommendations

This chapter summarizes the lessons learned from the ten post-Yolanda housing interventions featured in this compendium. Some insights shared during the validation workshop conducted to present the key lessons from the project profiles are also cited. The lessons are organized into seven broad themes. Recommendations based on these lessons and the good practices demonstrated in the projects are presented at the end of the chapter.

Lessons Learned

1. *Community organizing aids shelter recovery and the transition to permanent housing after a disaster.*

While widely recognized as an effective method for empowering communities to steer and manage their own development, community organizing is often thought of as involving too long a process to be effective in delivering shelter recovery in a post-disaster situation. However, the experience of Pope Francis Village has demonstrated that it can be done parallel to securing the legal, physical and technical requirements of a post-disaster housing project. In other words, it does not necessarily prolong the process of shelter recovery. In fact, in the Pope Francis project, community organizing proved effective in preparing communities for their smooth transition to a permanent housing site.

The experience of UN-Habitat's Post-Yolanda Support for Safer Homes and Settlements likewise demonstrated that a community-driven approach can be utilized for post-disaster rehabilitation. The project has demonstrated that enabling families affected by a disaster to drive the process of recovery and rebuilding considerably speeds up, rather than slows down, post-disaster rehabilitation. The project has developed a systematic method for instilling community participation and accountability through procedures that allow communities to make the major decisions and be responsible for them. When communities are organized, involving them for shelter recovery becomes easier and faster.

2. *Community involvement enhances beneficiaries' sense of ownership.*

The different projects entailed different degrees of involvement in implementing the project on the part of the beneficiaries. At the minimum, ensuring that the processes and decision-making are transparent ensures better community acceptance of project-related decisions particularly with regards beneficiary selection, as experienced in the Cordaid project,.

The safekeeping and handling of funds by the Mountainville NASA in the Post-Yolanda Core Shelter project of Tacloban City enhanced the sense of responsibility and management skills of the officers of the association, according to the local government. Social preparation also enabled project beneficiaries to understand and own the project more. The families' rendering of sweat equity has made the beneficiaries feel a greater sense of ownership of their new home

Finally, project beneficiaries valued being consulted as shown in the NHA's Yolanda Permanent Housing Program in Tacloban City. They expected to be part of the meetings of the LIAC and believed that their inputs would have been useful in the development and construction phases in aspects such as drainage, provision of water, and other needs in house construction.

3. Collaboration and partnership-building are indispensable to efficient shelter recovery.

There are many complex and tedious processes involved in post-disaster shelter recovery that the cooperation of different stakeholders is crucial in facilitating the entire process. Moreover, resources are more efficiently mobilized when collaborative arrangements are forged. The Pope Francis Village project demonstrated that the huge cost inherent in in-city resettlement can be dealt with by maximizing government resources and support such as those provided by DPWH and AFP for site development and DSWD for core shelter support.

NGOs also benefit from collaborating with other NGOs. JFLFI has learned that knowledge and skills sharing with other NGOs helped augment limited CSO resources by providing assistance in the form of bridge financing and green technology. Donor organizations like SM Cares are helped in providing housing assistance in post-disaster situations by tapping people and organizations with whom they have had previous working engagements.

Collaboration between the local government and NGOs, including INGOs, has been mutually beneficial.

On the part of NGOs like JFLFI, the LGUs are seen as playing a crucial role as facilitators of post-disaster housing recovery projects by providing land and identifying beneficiaries of projects that aim to target low-income families affected by calamities. Gawad Kalinga adds that an open and respectful partnership with the local government is vital both for a smooth project start and ensuring the sustainability of the project. On the other hand, LGUs like the Guiuan municipal government learned that fostering a good working relationship with an international NGO like ACTED helped it to achieve focus in delivering its commitments to the project. ACTED learned that it helps NGOs to work with a designated point-person in the LGU who can assist with project preparation.

In implementing the Pope Francis housing project, FRANCESCO learned that it could overcome the difficulty of building a relationship with local governments by finding champions within the governance structure.

4. Capacity development builds resilience.

UN-Habitat learned that technical development must go hand in hand with community development. The project decided that the delivery of the outputs would involve the community in a significant way. Conflicts could sometimes arise between the technical and community development processes. To avoid such conflicts, the project decided to have both a community organizer and a technical person as partners in a team in each sub-project.

UN-Habitat also learned that capacity building of community partners is integral to resilience-building. Its project deliberately made the development of the capacities of communities and local governments an explicit project objective. This meant that resources were made available specifically for the salaries of community facilitators, organizers, trainers and training activities. It believed that making the communities realize the value of having a capable and accountable organization will make them resilient in facing future disasters.

Specific capacities that were found to be particularly useful particularly by UN-Habitat and JFLFI were financial literacy and financial controls, which were effective in building trust within the community, and savings.

Gawad-Kalinga cautions though that introducing new ideas and changes in attitudes or behavior that can be helpful in sustaining the benefits of an intervention requires care and sensitivity. GK did this by starting with a small group of community members who were receptive to such changes and developing a relationship with and a continuing presence in the community.

5. Community savings can be a tool for promoting accountability and sustainability.

For the UN-Habitat project, community savings mobilization was a key component of the project. Through the savings, the community associations had resources to spend for improvements such as drainage systems and concrete roads. Because the community associations had been trained in financial management, accountability was assured and members trusted their organization on financial matters.

6. Community contracting can work for post-disaster housing.

UNDP employed a modality of community contracting which involved the organization of community members into construction workers' associations that would provide the skilled and unskilled labor requirement of house construction. Although there were problems experienced with some workers, the experience has been successful in all the four sub-projects. The houses were built according to the intended quality and within a reasonably short period of time. Labor contracting has to be done on a fixed-term basis and the construction activities need to be supervised as learned by UNDP. The same lesson was realized by the Tacloban city government in its Post-Yolanda Core Shelter Project in which the use of the fixed term arrangement drastically reduced the period for building a house from 24 to 10 days.

7. Flexibility is needed in dealing with implementation issues.

ACTED has learned that in post-disaster contexts, permanent housing providers must plan for additional time for project implementation. As ACTED and SM Cares have realized, there is always the likelihood of uncertainties in the various aspects of securing land, given the state of land records in most places in the Philippines.

For a time-bound project such as resettlement in which management of overhead cost is crucial, innovations in the people-driven process will have to be developed. Implementers of the Pope Francis Project had to adjust the project's wage policy for community members who contributed labor to the project from the minimum wage to a higher level aligned with prevailing local rates.

The Gawad Kalinga project in Carmen had to make a hard decision of giving priority to providing families with secure and safe houses over giving them immediate access to basic services. Because of the urgency of transferring the families affected by Typhoon Yolanda, GK decided to build the units as quickly as possible and take care of the basic services later. Given the demand for housing, GK accepted the compromise even if it deviated from its policy of making sure that basic services and infrastructure are in place before families moved in.

8. LGUs need legal and financial interventions to overcome land acquisition issues.

During the validation workshop, land acquisition issues were identified as a major cause of delay in housing recovery. For the Tacloban City government, land acquisition is "very complicated." Even after the National Government issued a memorandum to streamline the procedures for the identification of vacant lands that can be used for post-Yolanda resettlement, many of the lands

identified were problematic -- no titles, with conflicting land use, located in forest areas, located on unsafe terrain, with conflicting claims and pending court cases—and therefore difficult to acquire. An administrative order was also issued to expedite the acquisition of land but this was applicable in NHA-developed housing sites only. These issues underscore the need for a streamlining of regulations over land acquisition in a post-disaster context.

Another limitation of the LGU is the lack of resources to expropriate, i.e. for compensating the land owners. The National Government entrusted the funds for post-Yolanda housing projects to line agencies, specifically the NHA. An alternative could be to download the funds to the LGU, which can manage it with local stakeholders, particularly the communities. The Tacloban LGU's experience with the DSWD Core Shelter Program was cited as a workable scheme. However, the LGUs and the NGOs assisting the communities think that if they would take on house construction and community development, the bigger challenge would be achieving scale.

Recommendations

1. *Proactive measures to increase the availability of land for post-disaster shelter recovery*

A common cause of delay in delivering post-disaster shelter assistance is the difficulty of finding land in a safe location for building permanent housing. The difficulty is compounded by the poor state of land records or documentation of ownership. Even LGUs which presumably have access to land data sometimes find it hard to identify and acquire land for resettlement. It is thus recommended that:

- Comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) be updated to incorporate the need for post-disaster housing and resettlement by identifying lands suitable for resettlement. The Sendai Framework identifies land-use planning as a critical measure for incorporating disaster risk management into post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation processes.
- LGUs be more proactive by engaging in land banking and ensuring that the land acquisition is backed up by the necessary documents (payment of transfer taxes, titles in the name of the city government).
- Local governments, with the help of the national government, invest in the development of road networks connecting prospective resettlement sites and incorporate these in their infrastructure development plans in line with housing and resettlement components of the CLUPs.
- Mechanisms for downloading funds to LGUs be studied and created to enable LGUs to undertake land banking, land expropriation, and systematizing of data bases on land and vulnerable populations for local shelter planning.

2. *Proactive measures to facilitate delivery of basic services*

Several projects experienced delays in installing power and water connections, sometimes necessitating the transfer of the families even in the absence of basic services. It is thus recommended that in determining the location of resettlement sites, or in identifying them in the CLUP, due consideration be given to their distance to power grids and water main lines so that connecting to them could be done quickly and would be less costly.

3. Modalities of resource-sharing or fund-leveraging

Although donor funds are usually offered after a disaster, the number of families that can be assisted can be significantly increased when national government programs and resources are leveraged with funds from local and international NGOs and humanitarian organizations. Local governments which are at the forefront of responding to disasters, as well as NGOs wanting to assist affected communities, would be greatly aided by information on applicable guidelines or ways to access funds and resources made available by national agencies and programs (e.g. DSWD, DPWH, Office of Civil Defense) for disaster preparedness, response and rehabilitation.

4. LGUs and housing agencies to develop legally-binding instruments for ensuring tenure security

If post-disaster shelter recovery is to be implemented within a developmental framework, tenure security becomes an important goal. LGUs, which are normally relied upon by local and international NGOs to identify project beneficiaries and the applicable tenure arrangement, must be ready with their housing policies and corresponding tenure instruments when “building back better.”

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APPENDIX 1

LIST OF NHA PROJECTS AND STATUS OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR THE YOLANDA PERMANENT HOUSING PROGRAM NPIT-C REGION VIII, TACLOBAN CITY, AS OF 27 FEBRUARY 2017

No.	Project / Barangay	No. of Housing Units Bid out/ Awarded	% Land Development	House Construction		Units Occupied/ Awarded/ Turned over
				No. of Units 25-75% Complete	No. of Units Completed	
1	Kapuso Village, Brgy. Kawayan	403	99.34	-	403	403
2	Kawayan Ville, Brgy. Kawayan	554	99.44	-	317	317
3	Ridge View Park 1, Brgy. Cabalawan	1,000	85.86	295	615	607-
4	Ridge View Park 2, Brgy. Cabalawan	1,000	76.50	252	545	473
5	Greendale Residence Phase 1, Brgy. San Isidro (Suhi)	327	85.06	-	327	316
6	Greendale Residence Phase 2, Brgy. San Isidro (Suhi)	854	57.26	161	470	227
7	Greendale Residence Phase 3, Brgy. San Isidro (Suhi)	459	52.71	141	238	74
8	Villa Sofia, Brgy. Tagpuro	640	93.11		554	527
9	Knightsridge Residences, Brgy. Camansihay	1,000	60.48	208	82	-
10	North Hill Arbours 1, Brgy. Sto.Nino (Suhi)	1,000	93.33	-	1,000	871
11	North Hill Arbours 2, Brgy. Sto.Nino (Suhi)	1,000	85.79	130	870	767


No.	Project / Barangay	No. of Housing Units Bid out/ Awarded	% Land Development	House Construction		Units Occupied/ Awarded/ Turned over
				No. of Units 25-75% Complete	No. of Units Completed	
12	Salvacion Heights, Brgy. Salvacion (Tigbao)	532	26.04	164	36	-
13	Villa Diana, Brgy. New Kawayan	409	94.03	-	409	362
14	Guadalupe Heights 1 Brgy.San Isidro (Suhi)	1,000	87.04	587	413	290
15	Guadalupe Heights 2 Brgy.San Isidro (Suhi)	1,000	82.41	338	662	484
16	Guadalupe Heights 3 Brgy.San Isidro (Suhi)	750	55.39	282	227	13
17	New Hope Village, Brgy. New Kawayan & Brgy. Sta. Elena	1,000	95.50	33	976	859
18	St. Francis Village, Brgy. Suhi	1,000	42.48	232	368	-
19	St. Francis Village, Brgy. Suhi	505	-	-	-	-
TOTAL / AVERAGE %		14,433	76.20%	2,833	8,522	6,590

APPENDIX 2

PERSPECTIVE AND FLOOR PLAN OF THE HOUSES BUILT BY THE YOLANDA RESPONSE PROJECT, UNDP




PERSPECTIVE



APPENDIX 3

ELEVATION PLAN OF THE HOUSES BUILT BY THE YOLANDA RESPONSE PROJECT, UNDP





City Government of Tacloban and United Nations Development
Programme
EU-UNDP PERMANENT SHELTER PROJECT
Barangay Cabalawan, Tacloban City



KASABUTAN

Isip tagbalay nga nagkamay-ada katungod hin pag-ukoy ngan pagdumara hin usa nga balay/panimalay (shelter) tikang ha EU-UNDP Permanent Shelter Project ngan tuna ha Barangay Cabalawan, Tacloban City nga guinpapanagiyahan han City Government of Tacloban, ako nagsasaad han pagtuman han mga palisiya ug mga balaod nga ginhimo ngan gin uyunan namon nga tanan nga mga miyembro han Barangay 61 Yolanda Survivors and Construction Workers Association (BYSCWA), pagsunod ha mga opisyaes han amon asosasyon nga BYSCWA, ngan han Tacloban City Housing and Community Development Office. Tutumanon ko an mga sumusunod nga palisiya ngan mga balaod:

A. Gamit Ngan Sumurunod/Panag-iya Han Balay

1. Gagamiton nga urokyan han amon miyembro han pamilya an amon balay. Dire namon ini gagamiton para han mga ilegal nga burohaton sugad han droga, prostitusyon, pahuyguan ngan iba pa nga klase nga bisyo o ilegal nga hirimuon.
2. Dire namon ibabaligya, pletehan, ipahuram, ipagamit ha iba, o eprenda an amon balay ha ngatanan nga panahon labi na ha oras han kakurian.
3. An amon la mga anak an may katungod nga sumurunod han amon balay mahitabo nga mamatay kami nga mga kag-anak.
4. Kon umabot it panahon nga magbulag kami nga mag-asawa o mag live-in partner, it mabibilin ha balay ngan mga anak amo la it may katungod nga magpadayon pag-ukoy ha balay.
5. Kon dire ako mag-ukoy sulod han usa ka semana tikang han paghatag han balay ngan mapruwebahan ini nga tinuod han City Housing and Community Development Office, ihahatag ini nga akon balay ha iba nga kwalipikado nga beneficiary.
6. Kon ini nga akon balay diri ko ukyan o mabakante sulod han usa ka bulan nga waray ako pagsarit pinaagi han kasuratan ha City Housing and Community Development Office, may katungod an city government pagpili hin kwalipikado nga beneficiary nga masaliwan ha akon.

B. Renovation, Alteration and Repair

1. Magsasarit ako ha UNDP ngan ha City Housing and Community Development Office pinaagi han request letter kon magpaparenovate, magsusumpay o magpaparepair ako ha sulod o gawas han akon balay. Ipapahibaro ko kon ano nga renovation o repair nga bubuhaton ngan ano nga klase na mga materyales it gagamiton.
2. Magamit ako hin standard nga materyales ha pag renovate, pag extend o repair han akon balay.
3. Masunod ako han desenyong han extension ha likod han akon balay nga gintugot han UNDP nga guin uyonan han tanan nga miyembro han BYSCWA para dire magraot an orihinal nga desenyong han balay. Kaupod hini nga kasabutan an guinkauyunan na desenyong.
4. Masugot ako nga iparuba o idemolish an akon extension o renovation na diri subay han guinkauyunan nga desenyong ngan waray pagtugot han City Housing and Community Development Office.

C. Kalimpyo Ha Pamilya Ngan Komunidad

1. Pirmi namon limpyohan, mintenaron an pag-ayad, pagpahusay han amon balay upod an kalibungan para magin susbaranan han iba nga mga pamilya ha komunidad.
2. Diri kami magbubuhi hin mga hayop pan-negosyo man o pangkalugaringon sulod han amon balay kundi ha esakato nga lugar nga diri makasamok, disturbo o distroso han komunidad ngan kalibungan.
3. Dire kami magsasampay ha prente han amon balay, kundi maghihimo hin sampayan han mga linabhan ha likod han amon balay.
4. Dire kami mangungutod or mamumulod hin mga tanom nga kahoy ngan manruruba hin nga pampublikong pacilidades (recreational facilities, water system, chapel, day care center, wet market ngan iba pa) kundi amon ini mamangnuan.
5. Dire ako magbubutang hin ano man ha mga dalan nga makakaulang han paggamit han akon mga kaharani o han komunidad.
6. Iglalabay ko it amon mga basura ha akon kaugaringon nga basurahan ug dire bisan hain la ha kasada, drainage canal, kaharani o publiko nga mga lugar. Sisiguraduhon ko nga dire magkalat, ngan igagawas ko la ini han oras han pagkolekta han trak han basura.

D. Peace and Order (Kahumyangan ngan Kamurayawan)

1. Igsasalikway namon an mga magraot nga mga buruhaton sugad hin pag-arog hin pusil o anuman nga klase hin makamaratay nga armas, paghuygo, pagkustodiya hin mga magraot nga mga tawo ngan iba pa nga magin pamaagi hin pakasakit, pag-utod hin kinabuhig, pakahatag hin kahadlok han mga mulopyo/kapitbahayan, ngan kasamok han komunidad.
2. Likayan namon am sobra nga pag-inom, mga tsismis-tsismis, mga paglibak, away-away, o burubingkil ha pamilya nga makaangyan ngadto han iba nga pamilya.

3. Dire kami maghimo hin too much noise nga makaestorbo ha komunidad. Masarit kami ha City Housing and Development Office kon may ada kami selebrasyon na gagamiton namon it karsada para magbutang hin tent, lamesa, lingkuran, videoke. Masunod kami han regulation nga tubtob la 10 P.M. it mga selebrasyon o parties.

E. Pagtalapas

1. Mahitabo man nga amon natalapas ini nga Kasabutan nga diri namon matuman an mga nahisurat hini nga kasabutan, andam kami pagkarawat hin disciplinary action o sirot nga ipapahamtang han mga opisyaes han Barangay 61 Yolanda Survivors and Construction Workers Association ngan City Housing and Community Development Office base han sumusunod:

First Offense	-	verbal warning
Second Offense	-	written notice
Third Offense	-	written notice and community service
Fourth Offense	-	disqualification or eviction

2. Mahitabo man nga hatagan kami hin sirot nga disqualification o eviction, andam an amon kalugaringon pag-iwas ha EU-UNDP Permanent Shelter Project, upod han ngatanan ko nga mga miyembro han pamilya ngan gamit ha panimalay.

Ini nga kasabutan, amon gintutubyan an pagpatuman hin waray lipod-lipod ug balance ngan makatawo nga paghusga o desisyon han nakatalapas han kasabutan ngadto han amon tagdumara han Barangay 61 Yolanda Survivors and Construction Workers Association ngan City Government of Tacloban pinaagi han City Housing and Community Development Office.

Nagpapamatuod kami nga amon naintindihan an ngatanan nga nahisurat hini nga Kasabutan.

Ha presensiya han ngatanan, kami mapirma hini nga Kasabutan yana nga ika-15 han Marso 2017, dinhi ha Barangay Cabalawan, Tacloban City.

Printed Name & Signature of Shelter
Beneficiary


Printed Name & Signature of Spouse

City Housing and Community
Development Office

United Nations Development Programme


APPENDIX 5

PERSPECTIVE AND FLOOR AND ELEVATION PLANS OF HOUSES BUILT BY THE POST-YOLANDA SUPPORT FOR SAFER HOMES AND SETTLEMENTS, UN-HABITAT




APPENDIX 6

FLOOR PLAN OF HOUSING UNITS IN BASEY ECOVILLE HOUSING PROJECT



Floor plan of duplex attached units in Basey Eco-ville



View over a single attached unit in Basey Eco-Ville

USUFRUCT AGREEMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Usufruct Agreement made and entered into this 7th day of November, 2016 at LGU Basey, Samar between and among:

The **Local Government Unit of Basey, Samar** with office address at Executive Building, Brgy. Loyo Basey, Samar represented by **ATTY. IGMEDIO JUNJI E. PONFERRADA**, Municipal Mayor hereinafter referred to as the **OWNER**;

-and-

[REDACTED] with residence address at Brgy. Bacubac, Basey, Samar hereinafter referred to as the **USUFRUCTUARY**.

WHEREAS, the Local Government Unit (LGU) of Basey, Samar represented by the Municipal Mayor, **ATTY. IGMEDIO JUNJI E. PONFERRADA** is the lawful owner of **JF LEDESMA Housing Project** for Super Typhoon Yolanda Victims located at Brgy. Bacubac Basey, Samar, hereinafter called the **"Property"**;

Parties to this contract agree to the following terms and conditions:

1. TERM:

1.1. Such tenural rights shall remain enforce based on the standard and acceptable usufruct period.

2. OWNERSHIP:

2.1. The Owner agrees to grant the Usufructuary **[REDACTED]** the usufruct of the property, with possession, use and enjoyment of the said Property, as well as the right of management of the property.

2.2. Upon acceptance of the Property by the Usufructuary or Beneficiary, demolition of their residences (assisted by the Owner) will be done within a maximum of fifteen (15) days from turnover of the key.

2.3. The Property is for family occupancy of the usufructuary or beneficiaries only. They have no right to sell or mortgaged the Property to other individuals or families. Renters are not allowed.

2.4. In case of death of the Usufructuary prior to expiration of the rights of usufruct granted herein, this contract shall be deemed extinguished, and shall not be transferrable by way of inheritance.

3. INTRODUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURES, FACILITIES AND IMPROVEMENTS:

3.1. No modification of basic design of the unit unless there is an approval from the Office of the Building Official (OBO). Improvement will be freely allowed inside the unit only. Other amendments shall be subjected to Home Owners Association (HOA) rules and regulations as annex A of this agreement.

(Page 1 of 3)

4. MAINTENANCE OF CLEANLINESS AND PEACE AND ORDER:

- 4.1. No hogs allowed, piggery and cocks in front or at the unit's back yard.
- 4.2. The usufructuary or beneficiary must adhere with the Solid Waste Management Act.
- 4.3. The usufructuary or beneficiary must render free labor on clean-up and other activities in the site.
- 4.4. Maintain cleanliness and peace and order in the area in usufruct.

5. OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS:

- 5.1. The Usufructuary or Beneficiary must inform the Owner or the Home Owners Association of the plans for possible migration.
- 5.2. The Usufructuary shall maintain its building and/or facilities, structures and improvements in the site in accordance with local ordinance and/or national laws on environmental safety, maintenance and preservation.
- 5.3. In terms of breach of contract by one party, the other party has the right to terminate the contract.

This Usufruct Agreement shall take effect upon signing of the parties hereto and shall remain valid and existing until revoked or terminated by their mutual consent.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the herein parties having read and understood the entire substance of the contract/usufruct hereby sign their names in the presence of witnesses this ____ day of October 2016 at Basey, Samar, Philippines.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF BASEY, SAMAR

Owner

Represented by:

ATTY. IGMEDIO JUNJI E. PONFERRADA
Municipal Mayor


Usufructuary/Beneficiary

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

WELMA SACRES-CANLAS
Witness

and

ENGR. ARMONIE J. ARCOLAS
Witness

(Page 2 of 3)

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF SAMAR)
MUNICIPALITY OF BASEY)

X.....X

BEFORE ME this ____ day of _____ 2016, at Basey, Samar
Philippines, personally appeared the following persons, to wit:

Name	Comm. Tax Cert. No	Place Issued	Date Issued

Known to me to be the same persons who executed the foregoing Usufruct
and who acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntary act
and deed of the entities that they represent in this instance.

This Usufruct, consisting of three (3) pages, including the page on which
this Acknowledgement is written, signed by the Parties and their
instrumental witnesses, refers to a **Usufruct Agreement** of House and Lot
in **JF Ledesma Housing Project**.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL at the place and on the date above-written.

Doc. No. _____
Page No. _____
Book No. _____
Series of 2016

(Page 3 of 3)

APPENDIX 8

GENDER SENSITIVE HOUSING MODEL SHOWN TO THE BENEFICIARIES OF BASEY ECOVILLE HOUSING PROJECT



*View over furnished and painted house
with an alternative day time furnishing.*

BASEY ECO-VILLE COOP. HOUSING PROJECT

ASSOCIATION RULES AND REGULATIONS

FOR HOMEOWNERS

PREPARED BY

THE HOA – OFFICERS AND COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

INTRODUCTION

The social success of a community depends, in large part, on the rules, regulations and restrictions that govern how residents are expected to conduct themselves. Typically, the declaration subjects all home owners to general covenants, while the bylaws and house rules and regulations provide specific guides for day to day living. Without these restrictions and a means to enforce them, the community living experience could become chaotic indeed. The HOA - Officers has adopted the following "ASSOCIATION RULES AND REGULATIONS" hereinafter referred to as "rules and regulations" to enhance the enjoyment and tranquility for all persons living in the community

Wherever the word "owner" appears, if used in this document, it will include any of the occupants. All rules and regulations herein will apply to all occupants.

Owners shall be responsible for actions or misconduct and adherence to the Rules and Regulations of the Association. HOA Officers shall be responsible for providing each owner a current copy of the Association Rules and Regulations.

ENFORCEMENT OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

In order to enforce the Rules and Regulations, the HOA - Officers may levy, assess, and collect reasonable fines and costs as established by the association. The fines will be assessed against the Homeowner for violations by the Homeowner or members of his or her family

THE STANDARD FINES TO BE IMPOSED IN THE CASE OF VIOLATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. SCHEDULE OF NOTICES

A. First Offense: Warning Letter to Owner

B. Second Offense: Hearing Letter to Owner, Possible Fine

C. Third Offense: Hearing Called By HOA - Officers plus Fine

D. Reoccurring Offenses: Enforcement In Accordance With the Determination Of the HOA - Officers at the Hearing.

2. SCHEDULE OF COSTS

A. First Violation --- First Notice_____

B. First Violation --- Second Notice_____

C. First Violation --- Third Notice_____

D. First Violation --- Additional Notice_____

E. Fines - Subsequent Violations by Previous Offenders. As Determined by HOA - Officers.

1. The list above is not intended to be all-inclusive. Additions may be made as required. Fines etc. may vary and may increase depending upon the circumstances. Fines etc. may be at the discretion of the HOA - Officers; the amounts shall be predicated upon the severity of the violation and may include legal action.

2. Homeowners are responsible for damage caused to the common area.

3. Anyone wishing to report an alleged violation of the Rules and Regulations may do so by contacting the HOA - Officers. Violations should be reported personally or in writing. The identity of the person reporting the violation will not be disclosed to the Owner involved.

6. Failure to pay the fines in the time as set forth herein may result in the setting the appropriate action.

ASSOCIATION RULES AND REGULATIONS

GENERAL COMMUNITY

I. AREA DEFINITIONS

1. Common Area

Common areas are those outside your front property lines & back fence, including the street area & walkways.

2. Owner Area

Owner or home areas are all structures, exterior and interior surfaces of perimeter walls, ceilings, floors, roofs, windows, and doors of each home.

II. COMMON AREA

Any common street area, walkways, or passageways shall not be obstructed or used by any owner for any purpose other than entrance to and exit from the homes.

Any damage to shelter units, or any other common area property caused by an owner, his family or guests, repairs shall be at the expense of the owner.

Children eight (8) years and under must be accompanied by an adult when in the common area

After dark, no unsupervised children under the age of 16 are allowed in the common areas. Any damage to the general common areas or common personal property caused by a home owner or a child or children of a home owner or their guests or the guests of a home owner shall be repaired at the expense of the home owner.

Loitering is strictly prohibited at all times.

III. PROTECTION OF COMMON AREA

1. Ball games shall be restricted to open areas. Ball playing is not allowed in driveways and streets. No type of ball playing against walls is allowed. Damage caused by the said activities shall be the responsibility of the person caused by them.

3. Children under eight (8) years of age must not be left unattended in any common area.

4. Homeowners are responsible for any common area damage caused by them, or a member of their household, their guests, or pets.

7. Walkways shall be properly cleaned and maintained.

8. All homeowners must promptly repair and maintain their home to the extent it affects any other home. All external installations such as doors, windows, water, power, sewage, are to be maintained at owner expense and with the approval of the homeowners association.

9. No owner may modify or add to the exterior and extensions to the common area without prior approval of the HOA and the shelter committee of the LGU.

10. You may landscape your front area to your own preference as long as trees, plants and shrubs (both living and solid structural material) do not cause damage to buildings / units, fences, etc., do not affect the natural slope for drainage, and do not obviously disrupt fences, walls, pipelines sewage system, pavements or foundations.

IV. MAINTENANCE OF PROPERTY

LOT MAINTENANCE

Each home owner shall be responsible for maintenance of his Lot and improvements, the interior and exterior walls, the ceiling and roof, the windows-and doors thereof, in a first class, clean, sanitary, workable and attractive condition. Each owner shall also be responsible for the repair, replacement, and cleaning of the windows and glass of his Lot both exterior and interior. Each owner shall also be responsible for cleaning and maintaining any exclusive easements to his Lot over the common area.

The association is held entirely harmless for all past and future Lot and Improvement maintenance responsibilities.

2. Homeowners are urged to exercise restraint in using noise appliances like videoke and loud televisions during late night hours not exceeding 10:00PM and before 8:00AM in the morning.

WINDOW COVERING

All windows, doors etc. shall be properly covered with appropriate window dressing. Sheets, blankets, boards or other such items shall be specifically prohibited. Window dressing shall be of a reasonable quality and shall compliment the property. Curtains, drapes blinds etc., are recommended.

PARKING AREA RULES

MOTOR VEHICLES AND PARKING

This section includes what vehicles are permitted, what may be done with them, speed regulations and parking regulations.

1. Residents are to park their vehicles, motorcycles and pedicabs in their front areas. The common area are for the use of guests and visitors any time, day or night.
2. The speed limit is whatever is safe. There shall be NO VEHICLE REPAIRS allowed in any common area

ARCHITECTURAL RULES

All alterations, modifications or additions to the exterior of your home must have the approval of the HOA Officers with due consultation with the LGU Shelter Committee.

Permission to make any exterior modifications must be requested in writing; drawings, sketches and specifications must be attached in duplicate and submitted to the HOA Officers and LGU in writing for approval.

2. EXTERIOR MODIFICATIONS


Common area modification or additions are prohibited, except as authorized by the HOA Officers and LGU Shelter Committee. This includes the home exterior, front and side extensions, balconies, landscape planter areas, walls, etc. Written approval must be secured when exterior changes are desired. A sketch of changes must be submitted to HOA Officers for approval.

PAINTING

Painting of the exterior surface of any unit or building structure by anyone is not authorized except for the Painting activities inside the unit which is allowed.

Any exterior surface in need of paint or repair should be reported to the HOA Officers and Shelter committee of the LGU.

PERSPECTIVE AND FLOOR PLAN OF HOUSES IN SM CARES VILLAGE-ORMOC



ELEVATION PLAN OF HOUSES IN SM CARES VILLAGE-ORMOC



APPENDIX 12

COVENANT BETWEEN FRANCESCO AND PROJECT BENEFICIARIES OF POPE FRANCIS VILLAGE

POPE FRANCIS VILLAGE: COVENANT ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF PERMANENT SHELTER

THIS COVENANT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN:

MR. AND MRS. _____, WITH PRINCIPAL ADDRESS AT _____
HEREIN REFERRED TO AS A "STAKEHOLDER";

AND

FRANCESCO, A CONSORTIUM COMPOSED OF DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE (D&P), URBAN POOR ASSOCIATES (UPA), CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES- NATIONAL SECRETARIAT FOR SOCIAL ACTION (CBCP-NASSA), REDEMPTORIST FATHERS IN TACLOBAN AND ARCHDIOCESE OF PALO, REPRESENTED HEREIN BY FR. LEO ARMADA, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE "FRANCESCO",

WITNESSETH: That

WHEREAS, a consortium composed of the Urban Poor Associates (UPA); Development and Peace; Catholic Bishop Conference of the Philippines-National Secretariat for Social Action-Justice and Peace (CBCP-NASSA); Redemptorist Community in Tacloban and; the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Palo, Leyte (RCAP), herein referred to as the "FRANCESCO", is implementing the "Integrated, People –Driven Model Community Building in Post-Yolanda" in the city of Tacloban;

WHEREAS, building of permanent shelters for 550 poor survivors of the typhoon Yolanda is one of the major components of the Integrated, People-Driven Model Community Project located at Brgy. Diit, Tacloban City; and that such in-city permanent relocation site shall be called "Pope Francis Village (PFV)";

WHEREAS, the permanent shelter has a Lot Area of _____ and Floor Area of _____;

WHEREAS, Mr./Mrs. _____ is selected as one of the stakeholders of the PFV and has agreed to abide by the following terms and conditions in order for him/her to be fully awarded of the permanent shelter unit in the Pope Francis Village to wit:

1) As a form of equity, perform the following role in the Pope Francis Village:

1.1 Providing of Labor Equity. Mr./Mrs. _____ or any members of his/her family or his proxy, as a condition to be awarded Shelter Unit, shall act **as laborer or construction worker for a cumulative minimum of 1,750 working hours in the entire duration of construction.** In case of a proxy, the stakeholder has full responsibility to compel his/her proxy to complete the working hours as clearly stated in this provision. An official working hours monitoring form duly signed by the stakeholder and counter signed by any member of the "Community Construction Team" and field engineer of FRANCESCO shall be made to ensure recording of the working hours. Failure of the stakeholder to comply with this condition shall be sufficient ground for FRANCESCO to revoke her/his award of the permanent shelter unit.

2.1 Providing Support to the Construction and Procurement Process. Mr./Mrs. _____ or any member of his/her family, as a condition to be awarded Shelter Unit, shall be an active **member of the Community Support Group (CSG) and work for cumulative minimum of _____ working hours in the entire duration of construction.** An official working hours monitoring form duly signed by the stakeholder and

counter signed by the elected Leader of the CSG shall be made to ensure recording of the working hours. Failure of the stakeholder to comply with this condition shall be sufficient ground for FRANCESCO to revoke her/his award of the permanent shelter unit.

2.2 Perform Volunteer Works. In case no member of the family of the stakeholder can act as laborer or construction worker, the stakeholder or any member of the family should act as volunteer to perform any kind of construction and other related works as prescribe by FRANCESCO for not less than _____ working hours. An official working hours monitoring form duly signed by the stakeholder and counter signed by any member of the “Community Communication and Logistics Team” and field engineer of FRANCESCO shall be made to ensure recording of the working hours. Failure of the stakeholder to comply with this condition shall be sufficient ground for FRANCESCO to revoke her/his award of the permanent shelter unit.

- 2) **Obligations of FRANCESCO.** It is the obligation of FRANCESCO under this covenant to provide accident insurance to all laborers/ construction workers, CSG members including volunteers for the entire duration of construction. FRANCESCO shall also provide personal protective equipment (PPE) individually to laborers/construction workers excluding volunteers. Volunteers shall be given other types of working gears depending upon the type of works being performed by the volunteers.
- 3) **Active Participation in Community Activities.** Mr./Mrs. _____ or any member of his/her family, as a condition to be awarded Shelter Unit, should be actively participating in community activities such as mobilizations, savings program and community gardens and other form of livelihood activities to which active participation shall be evident by a duly signed certification to be issued by the **Urban Poor Associates (UPA)**. Failure of the stakeholder to comply with this condition maybe sufficient ground for FRANCESCO to revoke her/his award of the permanent shelter unit.
- 4) **Right to Possession and Use of the Shelter.** That only the selected stakeholder, with his/her spouse or common law partner, dependent parents, dependent children, and other household members shall have the right to the exclusive and continuous occupation, possession and use of the permanent shelter unit.
- 5) **Right to Possession and Use of the Land.** That the FRANCESCO hereby gives the stakeholder with his/her spouse, dependent parents, dependent children, and other household members the right to exclusive and continuous occupation, possession and use of the lot where the permanent shelter unit is built. The Shelter Unit and the lot where it resides shall not be alienated, conveyed, disposed, encumbered, sold, or in any other manner transferred, except by hereditary succession. That any such transfer made in violation of this provision shall be null and void, and shall entitle the identified stakeholder to cancel or revoke this right.
- 6) **Limitation on Use of the Permanent Shelter.** That the stakeholder, with his/her spouse, common - law partner, dependent parents and/or children, and other household members shall occupy and use the permanent shelter unit for their residence only, and is expressly prohibited from devoting or converting it to any other purpose.
- 7) **Limitation on User of the Permanent Shelter.** That the stakeholder shall not allow any other party other than his/her spouse, common -law partner, dependent children and/or parents, and household members to occupy, reside, or use the permanent shelter unit.
- 8) **Restriction of Transfer.** That stakeholder is prohibited from alienating, assigning, conveying, disposing, encumbering, leasing / renting, selling, or in any other manner transferring the possession, occupation, use and/or rights to the permanent shelter unit or portion thereof, except by way of hereditary succession;
- 9) **Restriction on Alterations and Improvements.** That the identified stakeholder may not make horizontal and/or vertical alterations, or expansion, changes, improvements, or modifications on the permanent shelter unit except on interior improvements or alterations.

10) **Maintenance and Repair.** That the stakeholder, during their occupation, possession, and use of the permanent shelter unit pursuant to their right under Section 7 above shall be solely responsible for the maintenance, upkeep, and repair (both ordinary and extraordinary) of the permanent shelter unit.

11) **Other Counterpart.** That the stakeholder shall shoulder the cost of

12) **Community Association.** That the stakeholder, or his/her/their successors, for so long as he/she/they are residents in the permanent shelter unit thereby undertake that he/she/they shall join and maintain their membership in the community organization to be organized by the Urban Poor Associates (UPA) as one of the members of FRANCESCO, and that the stakeholder shall be bound by the decisions and agreements of the said community organization. Further, that the identified stakeholder is enjoined to actively participate in the activities and projects implemented by the community organization or any of the member organizations of FRANCESCO.

13) **Cancellation of Contract.** That FRANCESCO shall have the option to terminate or cancel the permanent shelter unit and revoke the award of the permanent shelter unit to the stakeholder unilaterally, without need of judicial action, and recover the possession of the permanent shelter unit, by furnishing written notice to the stakeholder in case of the occurrence of any of the following:

(a) Violation of any of the restrictions, limitations, or prohibitions contained in the provisions of this covenant, which are hereby expressly declared to be essential and material conditions.

(b) Abandonment by the stakeholder of the permanent shelter unit. For this purpose, there is abandonment when the identified stakeholder and her/his family comprising her/his household either acquires another residence, completely ceases residing in the permanent shelter unit, or is absent therefrom for more than thirty (30) consecutive days in any month.

(c) If ever proven factual that the stakeholder is a recipient of another housing project.

14) **Effect of Cancellation.** That the stakeholder shall vacate the premises of the permanent shelter unit within thirty (30) days from receipt of the written notice terminating or canceling this Covenant furnished by FRANCESCO and the Home Owners Organization.

Signed:

(Signature over printed name of Head of the Family)

(Signature over printed name of Spouse)

Date: _____

Date: _____

Witnesses

(Signature over printed name)

(Signature over printed name)

Date: _____

Date: _____

APPENDIX 13

PERSPECTIVE AND SUBDIVISION PLAN OF POPE FRANCIS VILLAGE



Exterior perspective views of the three housing designs: St Martha (top), St Philomena (middle), and St Therese (bottom).




Site development plan of the Pope Francis Village. Note that the number of lots and the size of each have been updated.



APPENDIX 14

FLOOR AND ELEVATION PLANS OF POPE FRANCIS VILLAGE



St Therese Unit



St Philomena Unit



St Martha Unit





A FRONT ELEVATION

SCALE

1/8" = 1'-0"



A REAR ELEVATION

SCALE

1/8" = 1'-0"



A LEFT SIDE ELEVATION



A RIGHT SIDE ELEVATION