

**2016 Strategic Conflict Assessment
of Nigeria**

2016 Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria

Consolidated and Zonal Reports



Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
Abuja

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Foreword

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Director-General

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja

Since her independence in 1960, Nigeria has experienced different types of violent conflicts that have negatively impacted on the country's population across the six geopolitical zones. As expected, peace and security have been badly undermined by the episodic, yet recurring conflict disorders causing harm, displacement and even death. Apart from violent community conflicts, the insurgency caused by the Boko Haram extremist Islamic sect in northern Nigeria; the militancy in the Niger Delta region; the increasing incidences of farmers-herders' violent clashes; the spate of kidnappings and violent robberies, there are also incidences of cultism and separatist agitations that have often turned violent. These conflicts, no doubt, portend harmful consequences for the country's cultural and social values; ethnic cohesion; social integration, stability and sustainable development.

It is against this backdrop that a number of measures are adopted by the government to understand and deal with the phenomenon of dysfunctional conflicts in Nigeria. One of these is the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA). This edition, being the fourth since the 2002 assessment, provides accurate and updated data on the violent conflicts in Nigeria. This SCA contains field data and analyses, including conflict prevention and management strategies for government, institutions and communities at various levels. In order to link research to policy and action, the 2016 SCA is accompanied by a National Action Plan (NAP), which focuses on multi-actor partnerships for peacebuilding and conflict regulation in Nigeria.

We sincerely acknowledge and thank the UNDP and NSRP for their financial and technical support for the conduct of this 2016 SCA study. We particularly thank Dr. Zebulun Takwa, Mr. Matthew Alao, Mr. Adam Bergman (all from UNDP), Dr. Ukiwo Ukoha and Mr. Bashiru Olasupo (from the NSRP).

The Institute is grateful to Professor Olusegun Matanmi, Professor Yohanna Gandu, Professor Umaru Pate, Dr. Naomi Akpan-Ita, Professor Hassan Saliu, Dr. Lazarus Saale; Professor Habu Galadima, Dr. Gbemisola Animasawun; Professor Carol Arinze-Umobi, Dr. Aliyu Ahmed Hameed, Dr. Abubakar Muazu and Professor Aisha Abdul-Isma'il who served as consultants to the project. Special thanks to Professor Olusegun Matanmi, Professor Yohanna Gandu and Dr. Gbemisola Animasawun for drafting the Consolidated Report and the editorial work they did on the Zonal Reports.

I commend the efforts of my colleagues Dr. Bakut Bakut, Mr. Gabriel Jiya, Mr. Peter Opara, Professor Edde Iji, Mr. Sam Abi, Mr. Emmanuel Mamman, Mr. Manshop Garba,

Ms Grace Awodu, Dr. Bosede Awodola, Mr. Adejoh Haruna, Mr. Mang Chaimang and Ms Adaeze Uju Oguike for the complementary roles they played in editing the draft reports. Mr. Emmanuel Mamman is specially acknowledged for coordinating and managing this project with admirable resilience. Let me also thank all other colleagues at the Institute who played individual or group roles during the various stages of this SCA.

I am convinced that government, development partners, civil society groups and communities will find the 2016 SCA and the accompanying NAP useful in responding to the palpable challenges that violent conflict and insecurity pose in Nigeria today. The National Action Plan (NAP) which is an addendum document to this report draws attention to the need for specific actions by all stakeholders in strengthening early warning and conflict prevention infrastructure in the country. IPCR will continue to lead research and practice that will ultimately see Nigeria become a more peaceful and secure country for everyone irrespective of geography, creed or ethnicity.

List of Acronyms

ANSA	Armed Non-State Actors
BCDA	Border Communities Development Agency
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DSS	Department of State Services
EWERS	Early Warning and Early Response System
EWS	Early Warning System
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
FOI	Freedom of Information
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HR	Human Resource
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
J/ACI	Judicial/Administrative Commission of Inquiry
JCI	Judicial Commission of Inquiry
KII	Key Informant Interview
MA	Market Associations
MASSOB	Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MNJTf	Multinational Joint Task Force
MOCs	Multinational Oil Companies
NAP	National Action Plan
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NDLEA	National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOA	National Orientation Agency
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps
NSRP	Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme
NURTW	National Union of Road Transport Workers
OBCs	Oil Bearing Communities
OPC	O'dua People's Congress
PCNI	Presidential Committee on North East Initiative
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PIC	Presidential Implementation Committee
PINE	Presidential Initiative on the North-East
PMS	Premium Motor Spirit
SALWs	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SMSE	Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises
TDU	Tanker Drivers' Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Table

Chronology of Political Regimes in Nigeria Since 1 October 1960

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Executive Summary

1. Introduction

Since 2002, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) had periodically undertaken strategic conflict assessments (SCAs) of Nigeria for the purpose of providing the Government and other stakeholders with informed and unbiased analysis of conflicts and their implications for the peace and security of the country. In carrying out this exercise, focal attention has often been paid to conflict contexts; trends of violent conflicts, stakeholders (visible and hidden), impacts and implications of conflicts for inter-group relations, state-society relations, and all spheres of human security. The 2016 SCA was conceived to develop an overview of the conflict contexts and trends of violent conflicts in specific and generic terms, identify the visible and shadow parties in conflicts, their interests, capacities, agenda and incentives as well as identify constituencies that can be mobilised for peacebuilding, covering the period from 2013 to 2016.

2. Methods of Study

In generating primary data for the assessment, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted. The respondents and participants were purposively identified representative stakeholders. Others included actors in the conflicts, the victims, formal and informal interveners. Also, ethnographic observations were carried out in the conflict settings studied. The secondary data came largely from academic publications, reports and news sources.

In conception, funding and implementation, the 2016 SCA leveraged on the existing partnership between UNDP in Nigeria and IPCR. This whole process began with the careful selection of twelve consultants and a team of thirty-six researchers from IPCR to states across the six geo-political zones of the country. Preliminary meetings were held where the instrument to be used for data generation was developed and jointly approved by UNDP, IPCR and the consultants. Towards ensuring that the 2016 edition also compares qualitatively and favourably with similar global documents, and in order to further enrich the zonal reports, three other consultants were subsequently appointed to harmonise and consolidate the output of the six zonal SCA reports.

3. General Findings

In general terms, it is noted from the summary accounts of this consolidated report of the 2016 SCA that occurrences of conflicts in the six geo-political zones of Nigeria have known no territorial or geo-political bounds; variously, from insurgency and militancy as well as a variety of other cross-cutting, forms of inter-group and communal conflicts, including conflicts borne out of youth restiveness, sundry crimes against humanity, political

conflicts, ethno-religious and inter-faith, intra-faith conflicts, conflicts across the North-Central, North-East, North-West, South-East, and South-West, to occurrences of pure, oil-based insurgency, militancy, and inter-identity or sub-identity conflicts in the South-South, including the virtually ubiquitous, and often violent conflict between herders and farmers – as further manifested across the country.

Compared with findings from the formative 2002 SCA, 2016 SCA, the current assessment update reveals far-reaching changes in actors, conflict entrepreneurs, and victims locally, nationally and internationally. Also, a significant shift has occurred in the composition, movement and capacity of actors in conflicts generally across the country, owing to an unprecedented proliferation and flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW) as a result of instability in the sub-region and globally. While the regulation of the main media restrains its involvement in stoking conflicts albeit with occasional failings, the use of the social media has sometimes tended to misinform and send out conflict-generating messages on some occasions in ways inimical to peace and stability. From being seen as the cause of conflicts in the 2002 report, this report found that the military and other security personnel have improved in the discharge of their statutory responsibilities.

Across the country, especially in the rural areas, the nexus of scarcity and conflict complicated by environmental changes undergirds the frequent clashes between the farmers and the herders. Contrary to the common reading of a clash of identity between ‘indigenes’ (farmers) and ‘settlers’ (herders), the violent clashes often stemmed from an intense struggle for economic survival of the two occupational groups; that is, the farmers and the herders, worsened by the fragility of inter-group relations. The link between criminality and conflict manifests in the form of rural banditry and cattle-rustling, with dire implications for sustainable food security. Also, across the country, political violence manifesting in pre-election, election and post-election phases were found; although with differing dimensions in tenor and drivers.

Another major shift that has occurred is the increasing challenge to religious, traditional and political authorities, especially by youth groups that hitherto held such institutions and their leaderships in awe and deserving deference. This phenomenon was most pronounced in the urban centres across the country. In some places, it manifested in the seizure of certain parts of the city and enthroning other forms of tolling and governance by armed non-state actors (ANSAs) operating as neighbourhood gangs, ethno-national cults, self-determination groups, land-grabbers (*Omo-Onile* in the South West), militants and insurgents.

The conflict between constituted authorities and the new generation of violent youths has established the relationship between criminality and conflict across the country, although in peculiar contexts across the geo-political zones. Violence between such groups on one hand and clashes between them and security agents has emerged as threats

to public peace, safety and security across the country. Also, found across the country was the resistance of commercial motorcycle operators, otherwise known as the *Okada* riders, against what they consider as insensitive proscription or reduction in the number of routes plied in the quest for urbanisation by many state governments, plus the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja.

The official government responses have been largely militaristic and administrative. Militaristically, security men are typically often deployed to settings of conflicts; while administratively, commissions of inquiry are set up to look into the remote and immediate causes of such conflicts and to make recommendations towards preventing reoccurrence. Also, humanitarian gestures towards cushioning the effects of such man-made disasters are provided by a range of actors including government, local and international donors. In the period covered by the scope of this study, the IPCR-aided by and sometimes working with (inter)national organisations – has often intervened in some of the conflicts, sometimes before and after the escalation of violence, by providing early warning signs and technical support towards exploring paths to peace and recovery.

The victims of conflicts within the geo-political zones of Nigeria have been largely the vulnerable groups; that is, women, children, the physically challenged, and the aged. However, women, children and the physically challenged were also found to be active and willing participants in some cases. Conflicts across the country have placed strains on hitherto peaceful inter-group relations, while worsening state-society relations in many other cases.

4. Specific Findings

In the North-Central geo-political zone, the herders-farmers incessant conflicts have remained dominant and features in all the states located in the zone. Land remains a scarce resource in this zone, worsened by increasing demand resulting in frequent clashes between the herders and the host communities – most of whom are farmers. Also, rural-banditry and cattle rustling are rife in this zone, characterised by armed assaults, rape, kidnapping, organised attacks and reprisals on the villages and communities. In addition, protracted disputes over supremacy and the right to chieftaincy stools are also historically-prevalent in this geo-political zone; often degenerating into indigene-settler conflicts. Furthermore, urban gangsterism and frequent clashes between these gangs over territories and illegal tolling were found in all the states of this zone. Land, boundary and chieftaincy conflicts involving communities in some states in the zone, and extending to communities within the neighbouring geo-political zones, were also found. Responses have been largely through the deployment of armed security personnel, commissions of inquiry and humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflicts. Attempts at prosecuting culprits have often not yielded much dividend. Some states in the zone have also initiated amnesty programmes, akin to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, as forms of political pardons for warlords.

In the North-East, the impact of insurgency on all aspects of human security, that is, economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, social and political security, are apparent in this zone. This has created an atmosphere of fear, despair and material lack for the displaced and those still in the states in the zone. The state of human insecurity in the zone has not been helped by allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) leveled against the managers of the camps of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The visible and invisible actors in the landscape of conflict and insurgency have cut across local and international spheres – which have made an outright defeat of terrorism quite challenging for the government.

However, the gains made in the twilight of the erstwhile administration of President Goodluck Jonathan and the consolidation of the gains by President Muhammadu Buhari administration are worthy of note. Although a plan of recovery – Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE), and a Committee to drive the recovery plan of the North-East has been constituted. These and other initiatives should be more pragmatically fine-tuned to cater for the dynamics of the war against terror and its impact. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) intervention, put together by Nigeria, Cameroun, the Republic of Niger, and Chad, is making good progress in curtailing the transnational forays of *Boko Haram*, just as Nigeria's *Operation Lafiya Dole* has recorded unprecedented success. Equally contributing to the success in the war against terror is the support from the international community and the sub-regional national government authorities. However, acknowledging and consolidating the gains should not be oblivious of an emergent phenomenon of female suicide bombers and the use of land mines by the insurgents.

The North-East is not without inter-group conflicts which have become muted by insurgency. Nevertheless, fault-line conflicts in the contexts of faith, ethno-linguistic identities and inter-communal tensions over resources and power subsist in the zone; but not attracting media and academic attention as much as insurgency.

The North-West geo-political zone has its own tapestry of conflicts; some of which are peculiar while some are not. The herders and farmers conflict is one of the conflicts that are not peculiar to the zone. Others are: indigene-settler conflicts; inter-faith tensions between Muslims and Christians; and intra-faith tension between mainstream Islam and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN). Intra-faith conflicts also persist amongst Islamic sects in states in the zone. As the immediate neighbour of the North-East geo-political zone, the North-West perhaps comes next as the most terror-affected zone in Nigeria, after the North-East.

The existence of big forests that extend across the states of the zone has facilitated the perpetration of violent acts of rural banditry by criminal gangs who use the expansive and dense forests to terrorise rural areas and commuters on the highways. The situation is further compounded by the proliferation and easy access to sophisticated light arms and ammunitions, which are easily smuggled across the porous borders of the country

as well as the fall-out of the degradation of *Boko Haram* insurgents in the North-East region. Many of such insurgents had escaped into the scattered dense forests of the North-West states. Another manifestation of conflict between youths and constituted authorities in the zone – which fuels insecurity in the North-West zone – is the easy access to, and the use of hard drugs by young people comprising male and female. As in the other geo-political zones, most responses from the government have been to contain or deter the actors by deploying the military and the use of administrative cum judicial option of setting up commissions of inquiry. Conflicts and resultant insecurity in the zone have had destructive effects on trade and commerce, inter- and intra-group relations, state-society relations and human security.

The South-East geo-political zone experiences vertical and horizontal forms of violent conflicts. At the vertical level, inter-communal conflicts exist in the zone within and between communities over land, boundaries and chieftaincy. The zone also experiences violent conflicts between communities in the geo-political zone and others from neighbouring states. The affront to constituted authorities in the zone and nationally in recent times has come first from the Movement for Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) – which are laying claim to a sovereign state of Biafra. Therefore, the South-East suffers separatist agitations and inter-group conflicts. The conflict between farmers and herders in this zone has also been persistent, bearing all the scars of such conflicts. Thus, the existence of self-determination groups (MASSOB and IPOB) in the zone has created a kind of generational conflict in the zone between the old and the young. The impact of conflicts in the zone is broad – resulting in loss of lives and property, displacement and the disruption of economic and communal life.

The South-South geopolitical zone, besides being the hotbed of oil-induced militancy in Nigeria, is also afflicted by inter- and intra-group conflict. Manifestations of conflict between youth groups and constituted authorities therein are evident in instances of youth restiveness. Chieftaincy tussles, land disputes, gangsterism and cultism, political and economic conflicts are equally common in the zone.

As the main source of national earnings, militancy in the zone has had debilitating effects on the socio-economics of the zone and the country. The destruction of critical state installations and that of the multinational oil companies (MOCs) has worsened the degree of environmental degradation in the zone – with harsh implications for food and environmental security. Every sphere of life has been badly affected by the militancy in the zone. At the base of instability and militancy in the zone are injustice, criminality, underdevelopment, ethno-nationalism and the perceived criminal short-changing of the people by the élite of this zone. In the main, the report from this zone has also confirmed the nexus between oil extractive activities and the loss of subsistence survival in the South-South.

Of all the responses and interventions in this zone, the amnesty programme – dating

back to 2009/2010 – has been the most sustained in recent times. It is also observable that successive governments have combined dialogue and force in responding to the conflicts in the zone.

While not having any pitched theatre of conflict, the South-West geo-political zone is not completely free of conflicts and tension, variously resulting from recurrent clashes between the farmers and herders. Indigene-settler conflicts, resistance against the proscription of *Okada* motorcycle operators by state governments, sundry labour disputes, and the *hijab* crisis constituted some of the recent incidences of conflicts in the zone. Increasing wave of gang and cult violent clashes – which imperil the lives of innocent by-standers and residents – was observed in urban centres across the zone. Also, clashes between commercial bus drivers and law-enforcement agents were observed as an urban phenomenon; sometimes leading to wanton destruction of government properties and loss of lives. Land, boundary and chieftaincy-related conflicts – often with long histories – are also common in the zone, and with many of such subject-matter cases pending in the civil law courts. Conflicts between organised labour and state governments over the non-payment of backlog of salaries being owed workers were found virtually across the South-West zone, with the exception of Lagos state.

In general and comparative terms, perhaps the South-West is the geo-political zone with the lowest accounted incidences of violent conflicts in recent times; although, from the state-wide reports on the zone, there are several communities therein seemingly containing conflicts that have become protracted. However, unlike what was found in previous SCAs (2002, 2008 and 2012), 2016 SCA found out that there has been a decline in the frequency of violent conflicts in the South-West zone. It remains to be seen if the relative infrequency of violent conflicts in the zone has been due to improved governance, conflict weariness on the part of the actors, the loss/lack of incentives for violence, or the presence of peace-supporting structures. The latter are some issues for further probative investigation in the future rounds of the post-2016 SCA follow-up scientific fact-finding agenda.

5. Conclusions

The overall conclusions are the following:

- (1) Compared with the previous SCA editions, changes have definitely occurred in the tenor, weaponry, actors, protraction, spontaneity, geographical scope and victims of conflicts around the country. For instance, armed non-state actors (ANSAs) from within the country and trans-nationally, have emerged in many communities – often led by communal warlords; just as community armouries are proliferating in many conflict and insurgency-affected communities.
- (2) There is also a transnational and global dimension to the sources of rage and grievances, weapons and conflict entrepreneurs in making the analysis of the

landscape of conflict and insecurity deserving of consistent multi-dimensional analysis. Apparently, the existence of militias and community armouries in many communities has rendered policing and the enforcement of law and order much more complex than it was before now. Transnationally, the permeability of borders and the easy access of non-Nigerians with kith and kin into the country have combined to make rural banditry and insurgency both complex and slippery issues of conflict as well as security to handle.

- (3) While the utility value of the notion of “prebendalism” as an analytical framework was probably indisputable within the framework of the original 2002 SCA, the demise or waned influence of notable political patrons and the ‘strongmen of politics’ across Nigeria’s national political spectrum, or what in popular parlance is described as “prebendal politics” (Animasawun, 2016), has definitely altered the socio-political equations and barometer of conflicts in all the geo-political zones of the country. In the place of centralised patron-client systems controlled by these acknowledged ‘strongmen’, bulk and retail vote-buying and selling are now being used to generally secure or elicit electoral votes in a manner that might be described as unethical, but relatively less violent. Moreover, today, popular sayings like “stomach infrastructure” and “*Edibo, ke sebe*”, i.e. “vote and cook”; in other words, “sell your votes and get money to cook a pot of soup”, have made winning elections more monetised with vote-buying less centralised and less violent in many places where political patrons held sway. However, while there seems to have been a reduction in the ‘strongmen’ syndrome in Nigeria’s national politics and its effects on “prebendalism”, or patron-client relations as an analytical framework for explaining the frequency of violent conflicts in the period covered in this study, the rate of political violence across the states and the geo-political regions has not witnessed a similar appreciable reduction.
- (4) From an amnesty programme embroiled in allegations of corruption and a failed or failing dialogue process with militants in the Niger Delta, the country’s main source of foreign exchange earnings – crude oil – has literally been held by the jugular by militants in the region. Of course, the current administration (President Muhammadu Buhari) leaves no one in doubt about its commitment to the restoration of security and order in the Niger Delta region (or the South-South geopolitical zone); and this has been amply demonstrated with the latest political initiatives and endeavours to clean-up the polluted waters of *Ogoniland*. However, there is far more to be done in continuously assuaging the fears of the militants; who are in conflict with the Nigerian state.
- (5) The fault-lines of ethnicity and religion have proven to be very divisive and destructive in Nigeria as they provide narratives of mutual hatred, suspicion and animosity – which unfortunately constitute the basis of making civic choices by the electorate. This occurs at the individual and group levels as a denominator of conflicts.

- (6) Ethnic and religious minorities have become more resistant and sometimes violent in contesting what they consider to be exclusionary policies of the government and repressive conduct of security agencies. This explains the violent clashes between such religious and ethnic groups and security agencies turning ordinarily free and neutral spaces like the streets and schools into theatres of violent confrontations.
- (7) Efforts at disarming, demobilising and reintegrating former combatants and war-lords through amnesty programmes in some states were not devoid of partiality which provided basis for allegations of political patronage, witch-hunting and selective justice in the affected states by critics.
- (8) Having used militias as enforcers in winning elections, many state governments face the risk of such ANSAs becoming threats to peace and security of their states which explains why some of the amnesty programmes look hastily contrived to serve narrow interests.
- (9) Due to paucity of funds, there has been very little that the civil society could achieve beyond advocacy. Remarkably too, they have also engaged on research and local peacemaking, according to the extent of availability of donor funds.
- (10) The media still operate under the yoke of ownership and limited resources in carrying out in-depth investigative research before going to the press – which sometimes brings about inadvertent misrepresentation not taken lightly by parties in conflict. Despite the existence of the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, the access needed to carry out in-depth investigative journalism is still denied. Also, the lack of insurance for many journalists reduces their motivations to go into certain theatres of conflicts in the country – which denies their access to primary sources and visuals from scenes of conflicts. It is also insightful that the media were not spared at the height of the *Boko Haram* insurgency in the country.
- (11) The business community constitutes one of the victims of conflicts and insurgency across Nigeria. However, they are also stakeholders who must be given important roles to play in peacebuilding and security, especially through their pursuit and fulfillment of corporate social responsibilities.
- (12) Women and children amongst the vulnerable groups were fast becoming active participants in some of the conflicts and suicide-bombings. Similarly, women were at the fore-front of protests against raids on their communities and high-handedness of some security personnel deployed to the conflict-ridden zones.

SECTION ONE

Introduction and Methods of Study

1.1 General Introduction

Indeed, peace is imperative for the development, stability and security of nations and individuals. Cognizant of critical centrality within the context of state-society and inter-group relations especially in a big and plural country like Nigeria, measures and processes must constantly be undertaken towards sustaining peace in the country. As a maturing democracy with huge socio-cultural and religious diversity, peace is *sine-qua-non* for democratic consolidation, effective security management and development. This need is not lost on IPCR and that is why with the partnership and unflinching support of UNDP and NSRP, it has regularly embarked on the systematic assessment of conflicts across the country. This is done towards providing holistic and evidence-based recommendations to Government and other critical stakeholders for the sustenance of peace, security and cohesion in the country.

Sequel to the previous editions of the SCAs, the 2016 SCA was particularly aimed at empirically aggregating an overview of the conflict contexts and the associated trends of violent conflicts, analysing the key stakeholders, and mapping-out conflict-related risks and peacebuilding opportunities; with a view to outlining a number of options, covering the intervening period of 2013 to 2016. The 2002 SCA published in 2003 was carried out with the primary objective of having a better understanding of the underlying causes of conflict in Nigeria. But, subsequent to that initial research outing, a number of intervening developments have since taken place, culminating into the 2016 SCA and Zonal Consolidated Report.

Thus, this 2016 SCA report is an incremental update on the previous series. It is worthy of note that IPCR has continued to improve on every periodic output of the SCA series, utilising innovative methodologies as well as leveraging on appropriate intellectual human capital towards keeping pace with the trajectories and dimensions of the manifestations of conflicts in all contexts across the country. Hence, for all intents and purposes, all of the inclusive zonal SCA reports, from which this consolidated report has evolved, had initially and purposively situated the highlights of the respective geographies, social structures, ecologies and the micro-economies of the six geopolitical zones. The utility value of this kind of baseline data and information-generation, therefore, lies in the field appraiser's ability to perceive the wider nexus between a deeper understanding of such background scenarios and information as well as the necessary comprehension of the inherent or embedded linkages with the real and/or perceived triggers, occurrences, and general social, cultural, political, and economic correlates of conflicts in Nigeria.

For example, in the North-Central, the zone is described as being well-endowed by

nature, with very rich vegetation and providing a lot of attraction to the transhumance herders from the northern states of the country as well as from neighbouring countries in the adjoining sub-regions of West Africa and Central Africa - including the Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Mali, Senegal, and the Central African Republic, among others. This zone is adjudged to be well endowed with irrigated and arable land, rich pasture, forest reserve, and water bodies. The zone has marked ecological diversity and climatic contrasts along with diverse biophysical characteristics, agro-ecological zones and socio-economic conditions. It is indeed the food basket of the country, where about 80 percent of the population of that zone derives their subsistence income from agriculture. Further still, this zone is also endowed with various mineral resources that offer potential for economically-viable industrial and agricultural development projects which include: tin, marble, coal, semi-precious stones, barites and aqua marine; also with vast untapped energy resources.

The conflicts therein have been mainly resource-based and identity-driven in nature. These conflicts become violently expressed in contexts of religious, ethno-religious, indigene-settler, chieftaincy, land and boundary struggles. The latest occurrences of intense herders-farmers conflicts and the associated problem of cattle-rustling and other forms of criminality driven by informal networks (Kwaja, 2013) signify the economically-induced nature of conflicts in the zone.

The current adversarial relationship between farmers and herders can be described as a departure from what used to be a cooperative and peaceful relationship which obtained between the two. As at early 20th Century, herders in Northern Nigeria have had access to vast areas of grassland. However, over time, and with the effect of climate change, urbanisation, population explosion and the practice of irrigated farming, among others, less pasture has become available to the herders (Olayoku, 2014). Hence, this reality and occupational predicament has often necessitated the southward movement of the herders to the coastal zones (i.e. the South-East, South-South and South-West of Nigeria) in search of critical pasture and water – where the rainy season has also tended to be longer.

Thus, significantly, climate change, southward migration, the expansion of farming on pastures and the invasion of crop farmlands by cattle, have been collectively identified as some of the major causes of perennial conflicts in the North-Central. Other identifiable causes of conflicts arising from the context are: assaults and allegations of rape of the non-herders women by the herders; blockage of water points – leading to freshwater scarcities; burning of rangelands; cattle theft; inadequate animal healthcare and disease control; overgrazing of fallow lands; defecation on roads and streams by the cattle; and ethnic stereotyping (*see also* Olayoku, 2014). All of these can be situated within the wider ecological context of struggle for the control and ownership of land as a scarce resource which the pastoralists and farmers depend upon for economic survival.

As a recent country-wide occurrence, the cases of farmers-herders' conflicts were confirmed in all the zonal reports. Fasona, et al (2016), reported that conflicts resulting

from cattle-grazing actually accounted for 35 percent of all reported cases between 1991 and 2005. Also, more recently, Amaza (2016) has reported that, out of a total of 389 incidents of herders and farmers conflicts that spanned 1997 to 2015, a significant chunk of 371 had occurred in the Middle-Belt region alone, also known as the North-Central geopolitical zone of the country. The North-Central states of Benue, the Federal Capital Territory, Kogi, Nasarawa, Niger, Kwara and Plateau, are reportedly the most affected areas in the country. However, there has been no hard statistically-based field evidence or consensus as to whether the farmers or the herders are comparatively worse-hit in the frequent conflict encounters.

Nevertheless, the protraction and impact of the conflict on agricultural production should be seen as a source of research and policy concern by scholars and policy makers. This is underscored by the wider security implications of the incessant clashes between the two and the recent classification of some herders as “*Boko Haram* collaborators” which should be treated as part of Nigeria’s contemporary national security challenge (Amaza, 2016).

Similarly, in the North-East zone, politically, the region has been described in the field report as very active, and sometimes outrightly restive – even before the escalation of the *Boko Haram* crises – whose roots cannot be completely divorced from the patron-client nature of politics in the geopolitical zone (Animasawun and Saka, 2013). States in the zone were found to be parts of the major flash-points of post-election violence in 2011 that greeted the victory of the erstwhile administration of President Goodluck Jonathan. Government has had to declare a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, in May 2013; and earlier in January 2012 in many local government areas of Borno and Yobe states.

In addition, the report of this zone has clearly situated the wider political economy of the entire region. Socio-economically, the North-East geopolitical zone is comprised of states that are leading amongst the dismally-performing state economies. The zone records the highest level of mortality rate; has the highest number of males with no formal education; and the second with the highest number of females with practically no educational attainment. Bauchi and Yobe states within this zone have also individually ranked among the five states of Nigeria that are characterised by absolute poverty rates as observed by Kale (2016). He further submits that 90 percent of households in the zone rely on wood fuel for cooking; desertification is serious in the zone; and 5 out of its 6 states are among the one-third of states with the highest number of under-weight children in the country. Also, despite being in the Lake Chad Basin, access to water is generally low across the entire zone (Kale, 2016).

The report of the South-East zone captures the pertinent scenarios and circumstances of human settlements therein. One of these is the effect of the accentuation of internal migration since the post-civil war period, making the zone to be increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, especially in the major urban centres, such as Aba, Enugu, Owerri, Onitsha, Abakaliki, Awka, Umuahia, Nnewi and Nsukka. The zone’s

endowments and opportunities in agriculture, trade and commerce, have also been major attractions for people of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds from across the country. Necessarily, the growing urbanisation and multiculturalism have further had impacts on the conflict climate in the various states within the zone. In addition, rapid urbanisation and high population density in major cities and towns in the zone have also thrown up the challenges of inadequate infrastructure and social services, leading to a whole range of social, political, security and conflict-inducing issues, including: congestion, inter-communal and inter-ethnic competition, unemployment, cultism, criminality, etc.

The South-South zone was carved out from the former Eastern and the Mid-West regions in 1967. This was a fallout of the Nigerian Civil War and the agitations by the southern Minorities for their own separate identities from the major ethnic groups. The South-South zone began to take its present political shape through subsequent exercises in states creation that were engineered by the Babangida and the Abacha military régimes. Five of the six states in this South-South zone: Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Delta, Bayelsa and Edo states contribute about ninety percent of oil production in the country. These five states therefore represent the core of the oil-producing states in Nigeria and contribute between 85 and 90 per cent of Nigeria's total earnings from oil, as represented in plate 2 of the zone-specific South-South report (South-South zonal report). Incidentally, the 2016 SCA exercise took place in the midst of uncertainties and concerns as oil production plummeted to about 900,000 of barrels per day from its high figure of 2 million production level before the advent of the current administration of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015 and the renewed hostilities in the South-South zone (Reuters, 2016; Amaize, et. al, 2016).

The report of the South-West zone presents the types, causes, dimensions, victims and the manifestation of the relationship between criminality and conflicts in the period covered. This was done by taking into cognisance the framework of the demands of the region's economic system and the human settlement patterns. For example, also in this zone, the reported frictions and clashes between herders and the farmers were generally highlighted as the result of contemporary security and economic/developmental challenges, like the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as well as the compulsion by the herders to progressively push inland, due to desertification and general ecological emergencies in the Northern parts of Nigeria. In addition, the SCA account of this zone had included rampant increases in the incidents and the illegal activities of oil-bunkering, pipelines vandalism, kidnapping, militancy, and the activities of the "*omo-oniles*" (or, violent land-grabbers) as criminal activities generating inter-group conflicts.

1.2 Methods of Study

The 2016 SCA had been generally anchored on the following core objectives, namely: identification of types of conflicts that are prevalent in the different parts of the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria; establishing the actors involved in the different conflicts across the geopolitical zones; determining the root (that is, historical as well as immediate)

causes of conflicts within these zones; interrogating the ways in which the local populace experience such conflicts; determining the extent to which local efforts and attempts have tended to be made to resolve such conflicts; and, interrogating the success, or otherwise, of such efforts and attempts at resolution of these conflicts.

In order to effectively utilise and optimise the available limited time, the selection of research participants for the intended assessment purposes in the inclusive geopolitical zones was guided by two basic principles. The first was to identify communities, individuals or groups that could be regarded as peaceful. The objective here was to visit, interact and interrogate indexes and indicators that could have made such locations, communities, individuals or groups to be peaceful. In other words, from that onset, there was the need to identify the indicators that tended to generate inter-group peace and peaceful co-existence. The second guiding principle was meant to aid the selection and location of individuals, groups located in violent communities and areas that are prone to incidents of militancy, violent conflicts, pipeline vandalism, oil-bunkering, general criminality, kidnapping, rape and other forms of violence in the six geopolitical zones. The objective of that second principle was to identify and interrogate indicators that tended to generate intergroup conflict and disharmony amongst groups and people in the entire geopolitical zones of Nigeria.

Beyond the foregoing conceptual, organisational and planning phases of the 2016 SCA, the specific and appropriate fieldwork methods that were adopted had basically comprised standard, composite techniques (essentially, a multi-method approach). This involved the deployment of a combination of unobtrusive methods with standard survey technique and embedded questionnaire administration; the conduct of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions in all communities visited. This was preceded by a review of relevant literature and available situation reports on the conflict situations in the communities where the studies were carried out. Formal and informal interviewees and participants at the zonal validation workshops and focus group discussions held included conflict actors, victims, critical and representative stakeholders including religious, traditional, social, political, and economic and security actors.

Thereafter, Zonal Validation Workshops were held in the designated city locations across the six geopolitical zones – with the exception of the South-South zone, where a validation workshop could not be convened as required due to unforeseen challenges. In all, the validation workshops were successfully convened and they provided avenues for feedbacks and corroboration of findings from the fieldwork. Thus, in overview, the overall thrusts and foci of data-generation for the 2016 national SCA, as enunciated in the foregoing, was guided by recognition of the very sensitive and emotive nature of conflicts and security-related matters.

Analyses of the multivariate data, aggregated from the entire SCA fields, were done by carefully taking into focal consideration the structures, actors and dynamics of each conflict type which informed the formulation of the concluding suggestions and recommendations.

1.3 Limitations and Constraints

Given the wider constraints of official logistics, planning, and organisation at the outset, the overall time available and allowable for the complete instrumentation of the 2016 SCA field research was extremely limited. This made the taking of some required general operational decisions about the exact fieldwork strategy, including the selection of locations, sites, communities and individuals and groups for general participation in the SCA somehow difficult and initially challenging. One such effect of the constricted timeframe for the fieldwork was the relative inability to engage in extensive field corroboration through meta-analysis of data and information. These isolated issues were fully addressed in the zonal reports. And, the avenue of a validation workshop, where it was actually convened, had particularly provided a solid methodological buffer for the affirmation of the totality of evidence aggregated from the research field. Overall, the fulfillment of the fieldwork agenda had been pursued with the deployment of standard and best possible approaches of fieldwork administration in the circumstances, and in ways that the primary objectives of the SCA were largely ultimately achieved.

SECTION TWO

The Background to Conflicts in Nigeria

2.1 History

Although Nigeria fought no physical war to gain political independence from the colonialists. However, in less than a decade after independence, the country was involved in a civil war from 1967 to 1970 which ended on a note of “No Victor, No Vanquished” and followed by the pursuit of three Rs of Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration which can be likened to a postconflict peacebuilding initiative. As the most populous country on the African continent, understanding conflicts in Nigeria offers a reliable window at examining a significant proportion of the continent. According to the *Time Magazine* (New York), quoted in Adebanwi and Obadare (2010: 380) ‘. . . in the long run, the most important and enduring face of Africa might well prove to be that presented by Nigeria.’ This underscores the hope and expectation of the rest of the world from Nigeria. Therefore, events in Nigeria, not the least conflicts in any part of Nigeria, cannot but be of interest to the global audience. However, despite its huge potentialities evident in the endowment of vast human and natural resources that are enough to make a global super-power and the predicted giant, conflicts and insurgency are part of the actualities torpedoing the realisation of its destiny.

Contentions and resistance have been part of inter-group relations, on the one hand, and state-society relations, on the other hand. Despite pessimistic and terse descriptions, like the ‘mistake of 1914’, Nigeria remains one entity, although troubled in a way that proves many local and foreign analyses wrong. Therefore, it is important not to ignore actualities that are torpedoing its potentialities, such as endemic conflicts. To date, the widely-reported words of Sir Ahmadu Bello which called for the understanding of our differences rather than forgetting them, remains valid as a way of transcending being a mere geographical expression as described by the late sage, Chief Obafemi Awolowo.

Respective governments, especially since the end of the civil war have been making efforts at ensuring the sustainability of the country as one through different programmes, policies and actions. Given the size and disparity of socio-linguistic identities and religious differences, the results of such efforts, albeit gargantuan, towards nationhood continue to beg for more innovative ways of addressing the national and social question of being and belonging to Nigeria. Towards nationhood, Nigeria continues to experience, and has experimented with, different political systems, ideologies and economic policies.

Each of these successive administrations has or had maintained commitment to the preservation of Nigeria as an indivisible entity, even in the face of daunting challenges. Worthy of mention amongst some of the challenges to Nigeria’s unity, which have been

surmounted since the civil war, was the 12 June, 1993 crisis which arose after the annulment of the presidential election believed to be the freest and fairest in the history of the country. It was a direct threat to the unity of the country which entailed the intervention of the international community in finding a political solution out of the logjam that arose. In the aftermath, lives and belongings whose estimate cannot be precisely determined were lost. Since then, a series of industrial actions which led to social protests and unrests have been witnessed, especially anytime the government increased the pump price of the Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), or petrol. That of January 2012 remains the most involving as it brought together Nigerians, irrespective of ethnic and/or religious differences in a setting akin to the government versus the people of the country.

Table 1: Chronology of Political Regimes in Nigeria since 1 October, 1960

Name of Head of Government	Period	Regime Type
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa	October 1, 1960-January 15, 1966	Elected Civilian
General Aguiyi J.T. Ironsi	January 15, 1966-July 29, 1966	Military
General Yakubu Gowon	July 29, 1966-July 29, 1975	Military
General Murtala Muhammed	July 29, 1975-February 13, 1976	Military
General Olusegun Obasanjo	February 13, 1976-October 1, 1979	Military
Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari	October 1, 1979-December 31, 1983	Elected Civilian
General Muhammadu Buhari	December 31, 1983-August 27, 1985	Military
General Ibrahim Babangida	August 27, 1985-August 27, 1993	Military
Chief Ernest Oladeinde Shonekan	August 27, 1993-November 17, 1993	Interim National Government
General Sani Abacha	November 17, 1993-June 8, 1998	Military
General Abdulsalam Abubakar	June 8, 1998-May 29, 1999	Military
Chief Olusegun Obasanjo	May 29, 1999 to May 29, 2007	Elected Civilian
Umaru Musa Yar'Adua	May 29, 2007-May 5, 2010	Elected Civilian
Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan	May 5, 2010-May 29, 2015	Elected Civilian
President Muhammadu Buhari	May 29, 2015-	Elected Civilian

Source: Adapted from Adebani and Obadare (2010:382).

Since 1999, election-related violence and assassinations have been common in the polity such as the one that greeted the election of former President Goodluck Jonathan in the northern parts of the country in 2011. However, anxieties generated by the analyses of many bookmakers that the 2015 elections might push Nigeria off the brink did not materialise.

While still standing and surviving as a political entity after about six continuous decades, the country, nevertheless, continues to grapple with the challenges of citizenship, belonging and being otherwise referred to as the national question – which can be described as the denominator of many of the inter-group conflicts across the country. Also, while certain academic conclusions, such as ‘the politics of the belly’ (Bayart, 1993), the ‘disorder as political instrument’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999), ‘the criminalisation of the state’ (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 1999), ‘prebendalism’ (Joseph, 1987), ‘predation’ (Lewis, 1996), ‘the politics of suffering and smiling’ (Chabal, 2009), ‘resource curse’ (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007), ‘the perils of belonging’ (Geschiere, 2009), might not be applicable in analysing the Nigerian situation in a sweeping manner, they mirror some of the challenges confronting the country at the structural or political (governmental) level.

In the context of inter-group relations, struggles and resistance against political and economic inequality have given rise to different notions and mobilisations of “we” versus “them” violence. In many instances, such conflicts speak to the framework of grievance and greed popularised by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). In many instances, what begins as real grievances over time become means of nurturing greed, leading to the emergence of many warlords posturing as defenders of their respective communities but actually bargaining for more of what the state has to offer in terms of pecuniary gains and relevance. While this may or may not be known to their foot soldiers, such violent conflicts pursued with veiled selfish interests have posed dire challenges to the peace and stability of Nigeria.

Intense struggle for natural resources tied to the survival of man (people) and animal have also made communities restive in recent times across the country, leading to rural banditry across the country in the context of pastoralists and farmers engulfed in protracted and intermittent violence. This is characterised by raids and cattle-rustling with transnational and sub-regional dimensions that make it tasking for the authorities and security agencies to contain. It sometimes conflates with indigene-settler and inter-faith conflicts in some communities; and this makes it slippery for a generic analysis, despite the similarities in the patterns of occurrence.

The Niger Delta militants and the *Boko Haram* insurgents have become the leading actors amongst ANSAs violently engaging the Nigerian state. In addition, there are other dangerous, although lesser known ANSAs across the country, operating sometimes as defenders of community rights or raging against their respective communities.

2.2 Geographical Spread and Categorisation of Conflicts

The North-Central Zone

2.2.1 Types, Actors, Contexts, Causes, Impacts and Drivers of Conflicts

2.2.1.1 Farmers-Herders Conflict

The North-Central zone, as the most ethno-nationally and religiously diverse geopolitical zone in the country, has its own tapestry of conflicts. In the context of resource-based conflicts, the geopolitical zone experiences conflicts between farmers and herders, while cattle-rustling are a conflict-generating crime in the zone. The main cause is the environmental resource scarcity-induced movement of herders from the northern part of the country southward. Other identifiable causes of conflicts between the herders and the farmers are the blockage of water points leading to freshwater scarcity, burning of rangelands, cattle theft, inadequate animal health care and disease control, overgrazing of fallow lands, defecation on roads and streams by cattle, extensive sedentarisation, and ethnic stereotyping.

The main trigger is the widespread encroachment of farmlands, destruction of farm produce and alleged raping of non-*Herders* women by the herders. The debate on grazing reserves versus ranching continues, while, informally, the top hierarchy of the umbrella body of the herders regularly intervenes to pay compensation in established cases of encroachment and destruction of produce. But in mismanaged instances, attacks and reprisal attacks have been common. All of these can be situated into the context of access to and control of land as a scarce resource and economic survival of the pastoralists and farmers.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

Cases of farmers-herders conflicts have been widespread in Nigeria in recent times. Conflicts resulting from cattle-grazing actually accounted for 35 percent of all reported cases between 1991 and 2005. Out of reported 389 incidents of herders and farmers conflicts from 1997 to 2015, 371 had occurred in the Middle-Belt, otherwise known as the *North-Central*. The *North-Central* states of Benue, the Federal Capital Territory, Kogi, Nasarawa, Niger, Kwara and Plateau, are the most affected areas in the country. There is no clear consensus on whether the farmers or the herders are worse hit.

However, the effect on arable crops, which constitutes the substantial part of Nigeria's agricultural production, has been a source of serious research and academic debate and a source of concern for the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). The security of the state and human security implications have escalated to unprecedented proportions with the recent classification by foreign and local observers of some herders as *Boko Haram* collaborators, or the next security challenge. Food and economic security have been the worst-hit, while the collateral damage to, or the adverse impact caused on, the women have become another externality of the conflict; given the extent of allegations of rape of women in virtually all communities where the conflict has occurred. Also, personal

and communal security has been adversely affected – given the increasing wave of kidnappings for ransom that have been added to the profile of the conflict. Till date, there has been no firm policy or programmed response in place in the North-Central zone to pointedly address the question.

Recommendations

Responses from security agents in proffering solution to the crises has been limited and it is suggested in this consolidated report that, rather than treating such matters enunciated in the foregoing as a crime, they should be viewed as conflicts affecting all parties involved, and for which joint-problem solving should be applicable. Cognizant of the fact that resource-based conflicts are more amenable because there is a tangible lot to be shared, managed or reallocated to all concerned; while creative joint problem-solving approaches, effective and conflict-sensitive legislations will go a long way in reconciling the neighbours turned foes.

Another conflict context in this zone is the unresolved question of belonging, framed as indigene-settler conflicts. Conflicts have been mainly resource-based and identity-related in nature. Such conflicts have been characterised by religious violence, ethno-religious conflicts, intense indigene-settler clashes/brushes as well as those directly driven by the natural human cravings for access to land and socio-economic livelihoods. This runs across the entire states in this zone, often pitching ethnic and sometimes religious majorities against the minorities within the context of rabid struggles for political and economic advantages over the “ethnic/religious others”. This is often mostly triggered during elections or when political appointments are to be made and gladiators whip up such narratives to exclude or resist, as the case may be.

2.2.1.2 Indigene-Settler Crisis

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

Indigene-settler conflicts often oscillate between the resource and value-based contexts of conflicts. Therefore, in responding to them, approaches must take note of their peculiarities. They constitute resource-based conflicts because divisive narratives of indigene-settler dichotomies have often translated to favorite campaign rhymes used by politicians in many cases of seeking for votes or when mobilising for specific selfish interests for which no rational or logical arguments can be adduced. In another vein, the value-based nature of this category of conflicts has also tended to manifest through the continuous thickening of enemy-images of ethnic and religious others, by the extended usage of folklores, music and other forms of arts to reinforce the sometimes-perceived feelings of superiority of one group over the other.

While the constitution makes no preference for so-called indigenes over the so-called settlers, social practices have remained exclusionary; using the binaries of indigeneship and settler status in accessing often scarce public resources and enhancing socio-economic and political mobility. Unfortunately, security responses and the use of Judicial Commissions of Inquiries (JCIs) have done little to resolve the crisis as their

recommendations are hardly implemented and found satisfactory by parties in such conflicts. Therefore, each episode seems like a sequel to the next one.

Recommendations

Managing and transforming a conflict that is essentially value-based and resource-driven, such as the indigene-settler type, requires ethno-national consensus for peace, mobilised and shared by the peace constituency on both sides of the conflict. Deliberate studies into each case of such conflicts will yield peculiar findings that will constitute the basis for making far-reaching interventions that may encompass a range of activities, including but not limited to legislation, the partitioning of communities, provision of shared amenities, fair/re-distribution of economic and political opportunities, amongst others. It is further instructive to state that the state/government has a pivotal role to play in managing or transforming such conflicts.

2.2.1.3 Land, Boundary and Chieftaincy Conflicts

Land and boundary conflicts within and between states are also common in the North-Central zone. Within states, many communities have been embroiled in protracted conflicts, some of which have defied litigation even by the highest court of the land. In such cases, there is a conflation of three issues; land, boundary, and chieftaincy. Owing to these contestations in such contexts, it often slows down progress at the communal level and sometimes frustrates the provision of social amenities to such communities. This is so because, sometimes, governments prefer not to trigger conflicts or create a feeling that it favours one community against or over the other.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

This becomes delicate to handle because, in many instances, solving one of the questions may not bring about a resolution of the other two. This is made more difficult by the fact that many local government areas were pronounced as such without any border delineation; therefore, the choice of the location of the headquarters of such emergent local government areas might mean encroachment into the territory of another local government. Due to the fact that there are many split-border communities in Nigeria, the elevation of a traditional ruler, whose people are found in two local government areas, often puts pressure on the state government to promote traditional rulers or create/approve new chiefdoms/emirates which most governments are not always favourably disposed to.

Some of the parties in such conflicts rely on the court process which takes a long time to be determined and when such cases are determined at the lower court, parties explore the options of appealing against ruling – which tends to create a circus show in many cases. The anatomy of this kind of conflicts can be challenging because they are sustained by a self-justifying sense of correctness which portrays the other parties in conflict as the wrong party. The conflict also promotes a sense of communal victimhood shared by parties, whether rightly or wrongly.

Recommendations

Again, the government has a major role to play in mitigating the tension associated with such conflicts, while encouraging parties to be more creative in managing such conflicts. It is important to consider the exploration of using shared development as a means of creating a new thinking amongst such communities by considering the use of such disputes boundaries as zones of shared development and prosperity. The governments should be conflict-sensitive in its conduct so as not to create an impression that it is favouring any of the sides in the conflict.

2.2.1.4 Inter-Gang Violence

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

Due to the phenomenon of urban gangsterism, many streets and neighbourhoods have become unsafe; as inter-gang violence breaks out at will and in the processes both the gang members and bystanders often lose their lives. Therefore, its impact on personal and communal security stares all in the face. While the *okada* crisis seems to have subsided, without coming up with a clear-cut replacement or the provision of alternative sources of livelihoods, such conflicts might erupt again and perhaps in wider ramifications because of their implications for security.

A relationship can be drawn in the non-provision of alternative sources of livelihoods for young men, whose *okada* have been taken away or seized by government officials; and the existence of neighbourhood gangs. This is because, over time, joblessness might serve as a “push” factor, pushing the dispossessed to join such criminal gangs, also thereby worsening public peace and security circumstances.

Recommendations

Similarly, governments must evolve inclusive mitigating strategies in view of the gangsterism that has become phenomenal in the cities, threatening public peace at will and getting away with it because of their alleged relationships with many top government functionaries and politicians; as well as proactive measures to combat banditry and the conflict-generating factor in the cities, the proscription of *Okada* riders and the attendant public disturbances it, i.e. the proscription, may create by their reactions.

The North-East Zone

2.2.2 Types, Actors, Contexts, Causes, Impacts and Drivers of Conflicts

2.2.2.1 Insurgency

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

While the causes of insurgency have continued to receive the attention of scholars and policymakers, the impact of insurgency on all aspects of human security, that is,

economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, social and political security, are apparent in this zone. This has created an atmosphere of fear, despair and material lack for the displaced and those still in the states in the zone.

The state of human insecurity in the zone is not helped by allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuses (SEA) leveled against managers of the camps of the IDPs. The visible and invisible actors in the landscape of conflict and insurgency have cut across local and international spheres which have made an outright defeat of terrorism quite challenging for the government.

However, the gains made in the twilight of the erstwhile administration of President Goodluck Jonathan and the consolidation of the gains by President Muhammadu Buhari are worthy of note. Although a plan of recovery – named the *Buhari Plan* – and the Presidential Committee on North East Initiative (PCNI) to drive the recovery plan are in place, these and other initiatives should be pragmatically fine-tuned to cater for the changes in the war against terror and its impact.

The MNJTF intervention put together by Nigeria, Cameroun, the Republic of Niger, and Chad, has made good progress in curtailing the transnational forays of *Boko Haram*, just as Nigeria's Operation *Lafiya Dole* has recorded unprecedented success. Equally contributing to the success in the war against terror is the support from the international community and the sub-regional government authorities.

Recommendations

- (1) Governments at all tiers, local and international, not-for-profit organisations, and the international community, must sustain on-going humanitarian, technical and strategic supports being given to Nigeria; while the country sustains the exploration of more of such collaborations. However, it must be realised that Nigeria is entering a new phase in its war against terrorism, rather than approaching an end to it.
- (2) There must be inclusive commitment to skillful handling of inter-group conflicts and tension, especially; indigene-settler-related, intra and inter-faith-based, and herders-farmers-induced in order not to aggravate insurgency or create another round of emergencies.
- (3) In responding to public protests, the security agencies should move from a repressive approach to a negotiated approach; by jointly agreeing with such protesting groups on the terms of such protests. This will bring about a balance in the maintenance of order and protection of the human rights of protesters as citizens of the state.
- (4) The criminalisation of dissents by groups in the state should be discouraged as a state response, because, rather than being imposed, order might have to be negotiated in some situations.
- (5) While the military and intelligence-gathering, processing and response must be sustained, it is important to fully deploy development as a means of discouraging attractions to anti-social trappings, like terrorism.

- (6) The vastness of the zone and permeability of its borders have combined in creating many ungoverned spaces in the area – which calls for a more novel approach to border-policing and effective state presence in all areas within its territory.
- (7) Peace education targeted towards enthroning a culture of peace and empowerment, based on human security needs of the people and the environment, must be given adequate attention in ensuring sustainable peace, and cordial, state-society relations must be tapped into. Recovery and peacebuilding must be women-sensitive, participatory and inclusive.
- (8) The political and religious elites in this zone must change from using divisive rhetoric and fault lines of faith, ethnicity or other forms of primordial belonging for winning elections, or forging political alliances – a change in socio-political behaviour towards a more constructive, accommodating and inclusive society.
- (9) A vision of inclusive, coherent and participatory postconflict peace process – that does not breed any form of violence – will tend to erase unjust, repressive and oppressive socio-cultural, political and religious structures through the use of peace education.

Therefore, peace education should be used to drive peacebuilding in a way that is attentive to the socio-religious and cultural plurality and peculiarities of each locale in the North-East. This form of education should aim at restoring sources of livelihoods of the IDPs towards re-establishing prosperity.

- (1) Peace-education – which emphasises new ways of teaching memories, history, narratives, and ideals of social justice, belonging and human rights (Oshita et al 2016) – should be promoted in both formal and informal spaces of learning.
- (2) The capacity of the worst-affected segment of the population, especially women, children and adolescents, should be tapped into; to facilitate peace and reconciliation in the context of people-to-people relations and state-society relations within the *North-East*, by using education. This is because educating this category of people can bring about a shared memory of the ugly past, which can play a major role in the process of postconflict/insurgency reconstruction, re-integration and rehabilitation to set the zone free from the conflict trap.
- (3) A new mode of engagement with the controllers and shapers of opinions, comprising religious, social, political and economic notables in the geopolitical zone – based on a shared vision of post-insurgency peace, should be led by the government at all levels.
- (4) Inclusive and participatory operationalisation of empowerment, situated within the context of *North-Eastern* socio-cultural and religious values – rather than imported or imposed – should be engendered.

- (5) The “push” effects of poverty, hopelessness and ignorance can be neutralised by peace-education; driven by local actors, empowered by the government, and other stakeholders.
- (6) The MNJTF – which comprises Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria – should be sustained to prevent the regeneration of *Boko Haram*.
- (7) Improvements in the early warning and early response systems (EWERS) as well as intelligence sharing to enhance interaction with the locals for the provision of appropriate responses.
- (8) Government and communities should continue to welcome, accept, de-radicalise, rehabilitate and reintegrate members of *Boko Haram* who surrender.
- (9) The sustenance and broadening of de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation, or countering violent extremism (CVE), are additionally of critical essence.
- (10) There is the need to pay more attention to the physical and psycho-social needs of victims of insurgency including IDPs.
- (11) Government must pay attention to the global and regional currents/undercurrents of violent extremism and how they connect with the local or Nigerian context.

2.2.2.2 Inter-Group Conflicts

The existence of other conflicts in the geopolitical zone cannot be ignored. These conflicts are in the contexts of indigene-settler claims, farmers and herders conflicts, IDPs-community conflicts, ethno-religious conflicts, land and boundary disputes, election and post-election violence, inter and intra-faith conflicts, and general youth restiveness.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

It is important to note that some of the conflicts have arisen because of the terrorist activities of *Boko Haram*, especially the ones between IDPs and host communities; while some had always existed prior to the escalation of insurgency. It is important to clarify that most of these conflicts occur, or have occurred, largely over clashing values and contests for access to and the control of limited resources, such as land and political power. This is because of the unrestricted access to public coffers which winning elections and holding political offices tend to offer. Thus, the denominators of most of the conflicts are access and exclusive control of resources. While insurgency might have muted or frozen some conflicts, especially inter-group types, the unity of purpose against evil – demonstrated by the people of the zone against terrorism – provides a window of opportunity which can be explored to build sustainable peace in the context of inter-group relations.

Recommendations

The recovery plan should be driven in an inclusive way that alienates practically no

group in the zone. As the underlying factors of inter-group animosity hardly go away, government will do well to address these in a very transparent and convincing way.

The North-West Zone

2.2.3 Types, Actors, Contexts, Causes, Impacts and Drivers of Conflicts

2.2.3.1 Farmers-Herders Conflict

This has also been a major and common form of conflict occurrence and regularity in the North-West zone in general, as a function of the enormous pressure on the land resource, also attributed to a combination of factors. The entire populace of the states within this zone is predominantly made up of farmers, but with a large segment of that total population also engaged in commerce and animal husbandry.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

A combination of factors, ranging from rising settler population within the geo-political zone, increased ethnic nationalism; increased pressure on the available land - which make access to farming and grazing much more difficult; cases of land speculating; the wider effects of climate change; to decreased socio-economic opportunities and the direct activities of herders; have resulted in the emergence and perpetuation of this endemic conflict. This conflict has recurrently led to frequent clashes between herders and farmers in the states within the zone, often resulting in heavy losses of lives and the destruction of property as well as the killing of livestock.

Recommendations

More fundamentally, government must generally promote peace and general development as a sustainable antidote, most particularly, against undesirable but incessant occurrences of this form of conflict.

Besides, pastoralist communities should also be trained in specialised ways, so they could begin to accept sedentary livelihoods and peacefully cohabit/coexist with local communities. Moreover, the individual governments across this zone should implement carefully thought-out grazing policies and provision of social infrastructure to minimise the continuous movement of pastoralists within the zone.

Multilateral actors, including government and the non-governmental/civil society organisations, must continue to be active and purposively work together to promote the absolutely necessary enterprise of good governance, for the absolute reduction of conflicts and possible total elimination of this form of conflict that often causes incredible devastation of lives and property across the zone, whenever it occurs. It is noteworthy that, in states, like Kaduna and Kano, within the zone, civil society organisations have

traditionally been involved in numerous conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives in collaboration with governments.

It is necessary for the government to urgently initiate the process of registering pastoralists that enter Nigerian territory; as is the case in The Gambia, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and other Francophone West African countries. This will help in ensuring that only legitimately-established economic migrants enter into the Nigerian territory. Besides, there is also a need to improve border management strategies to check the proliferation of SALWs as well as to track and ward-off criminals.

2.2.3.2 Politically-motivated conflicts

The manifested scenarios of conflict occurrences in the North-West zone, including the reported politically motivated conflicts, are also generally explainable within the context of the enduring wider social structure, the historical trajectory and political economy of the Northern region of Nigeria.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

The occurrence and frequency of this type of conflict – often propagated by politicians; political thugs and hired spokespersons (men/women) – has been attributed to the fight for supremacy by politicians, and the perceived marginalisation, social exclusion of some groups and sections of the populace within the zone.

Recommendations

The political class should play politics by the rules in order to engender confidence among the people and ensure the upholding of the rule of law at all times. Also, political authorities should respect the sanctity of traditional institutions. This may likely reduce conflicts that emanate from political interference.

Similarly, as this type of conflict occurrence is a further challenge to governance process, the government should strengthen and provide institutional support for the civil society sector to play deserving and increasing roles in conflict prevention, management and development-oriented initiatives. Furthermore, the national and state governments should particularly reinvigorate the local government system and allied institutions to play their roles more effectively.

2.2.3.3 Ethno-religious conflicts

The states within this geo-political zone have large numbers of Muslims and Christians especially in Kaduna and, to a lesser extent, Kebbi, Zamfara, and Katsina states. Two of the states, Kano and Kaduna, also particularly in their capital cities host large numbers of non-indigene population of different ethnic and religious backgrounds that have settled for generations; and, notably with many of them now fully ‘indigenised’ and claiming citizenship of these states.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

The accounting factors for this type of conflict occurrence include the fight for supremacy by religious leaders; and the bane of provocative preaching, fanaticism, the perpetration of hate speeches on radio stations and the social media inter- and intra-sect leadership tussles, etc. The circumstances of this zone have been further compounded by the effects of population pressure, through rural-urban migration and uncontrolled immigration from the neighbouring countries.

Recommendations

The existing facility of an active civil society sector within this zone should be further enhanced and leveraged to promote peace education and security awareness as well as the continuing involvement of the civil society alongside government in the primary promotion of good governance, towards necessary reduction of conflicts and wider propagation of the culture of peace as well as symmetrical human development of the zone.

The South-East Zone

2.2.4 Types, Actors, Contexts, Causes, Impacts and Drivers of Conflicts

Overall, the SCA findings from this geo-political zone have suggested that the trajectories and pervasiveness of the generality of the following and other listed conflicts in the specific zonal report have often depended largely on the availability of, and the capacity for, effective conflict management structures, and the deployment of potent resolution measures that could ideally be jointly taken by government, non-governmental organisations, and other grassroots stakeholders. Also, in generic terms, practically all of the conflict cases recorded in the study communities across this zone have had one or combinations of specific adverse impacts on the affected people, institutions and communities.

2.2.4.1 Farmers-Herders Conflict

The recurrence of farmers-herders clashes in the South-East zone, especially in Enugu state, is an affirmation of the seemingly ubiquitous nature of this type of conflict across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

The conflict between herders and farmers is borne out of land encroachments of the herders over farmlands. This conflict has been exacerbated by other factors such as the proliferation of SALWs, climate change and urbanisation. They have often resulted in the destruction of farmlands, crops and livestock, pollution of drinking water among other factors. Consequently, there have been injuries, loss of lives, other human and

physical impacts; damages to and loss of property; social displacement and disruption of communal life; and incidences of rape and other attendant crimes.

Recommendations

There is need for the following:

- (1) Strengthen capacity for conflict prevention and peacebuilding at community and institutional levels.
- (2) Multilateral action to manage and effectively reduce the adverse impact of violent conflict through synergies between communities, government, non-governmental organisations and international organisations.
- (3) Create, develop and strengthen relevant government agencies for effective prevention and management of conflicts.
- (4) Efficient and effective conflict-response and intervention mechanisms, especially at the local and state levels.

2.2.4.2 Intra- and Inter-State Land Disputes

This category of social disputes is another manifestation of the widespread struggle for political, social and economic leverage by the populace of this zone as exemplified by Umuode and Orukwu communities in Enugu state; Ikwuano and Osisioma in Abia state which also have boundary issues with Akwa Ibom and Ebonyi states; Ngbo (Enugu state) and Agila (Benue state) boundary dispute; and Ezza and Ezillo Communal Land Conflict in Ebonyi state which had lasted over five decades with the most recent escalation of hostilities occurring in 2014 and 2015.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

The remote causes of the conflict are boundary dispute, indigene-settler dichotomy, politics, culture, tradition and alleged distortions of historical facts. The immediate causes had included interpersonal conflict, abuse of power, boundary adjustment, position of the State Governments on the matters, and autonomy claims. Even though no violent conflict has been noticed in the recent time, the fundamental issues have not been sufficiently dealt with by the stakeholders. There is still high level of mistrust among the communities, and most people who were displaced during previous conflicts have not been reintegrated.

The gap noted is the lack of trust due to suspicions and allegations of partiality against governments in resolving the conflict as well as minimal involvement of civil society organisations in the peacebuilding processes.

Recommendations

- (1) State Governments should establish and equip agencies and platforms to build peace and prevent violent conflicts.

- (2) The Ministry of Border, Peace and Conflict Resolution in Ebonyi state and the Bureau for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Imo state should be strengthened through training and capacity building to make them more effective in peacebuilding processes.

2.2.4.3 Chieftaincy and Community Leadership Tussles

So long as chieftaincy (or *Eze-ship*) titles and leadership positions within human communities remain and/or are perceived as positions of enormous socio-political power, authority and influence, then, chieftaincy and general leadership titles and positions will be increasingly attractive; and people within communities and human societies will aggressively crave for the attainment or acquisition of these titles – as manifested in the zonal SCA report on the South-East. Hence, and expectedly, chieftaincy and community leadership tussles will continue to escalate and result in avoidable threats to enduring societal peace and security.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

Since the return of democratic governance in 1999, and in particular since 2011, there has been a gradual proliferation of conflicts arising from contestations for chieftaincy positions in communities across the South East zone. As at the end of 2016 when the survey was carried out, about 60 percent of Imo state communities were caught up in various tussles over chieftaincy (*Eze-ship*) as a result of carving out of more autonomous communities in the state by further breaking up of existing autonomous communities. For instance, from just over 100 autonomous communities that existed in 2011, the 2016 survey found that there is over 600 percentage increase in autonomous communities in the Zone. This trend has therefore led to multiple contestations over *Eze-ship* in the South-East zone.

Recommendations

- (1) The Ministries and Agencies responsible for chieftaincy affairs should streamline the processes and procedures of establishing autonomous communities.
- (2) Government should check the proliferation of autonomous communities by ensuring that they are not created for political patronage.

2.2.4.4 Youth Restiveness

Youth restiveness resulting from unemployment, frustration and exclusion which manifests through various anti-social acts, such as, thuggery, electoral violence, involvement in other acts of criminality. For example, youth involvement in communal land and boundary dispute, chieftaincy and leadership tussles, farmers-herders conflict, electoral violence, self-determination protests, environmental resource-related conflict, cultism and other anti-social activities have resulted in arrests and detention of the youths.

2.2.4.5 Self-Determination Agitations and Civil Protests

Effects of violent agitations and protests have typically impeded governance process and the delivery of public services; caused the disruption of school programmes, etc. In the same vein, self-determination agitations are also often products of unfavorable perceptions and the feelings of resentment against unpopular government policies and practices. Oftentimes, the objective circumstances of segments of the Nigerian population, including feelings of alienation, marginalisation and general development neglect are active triggers of self-determination agitations and endemic civil protests.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

Major towns and commercial centers (such as Onitsha, Aba, Nkpor) across the South-East zone have witnessed sporadic agitations and protests by people who identified themselves as members of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), since 2013/2014. These protests and demonstrations, which sometimes turned violent, have become more frequent and large-scale, following the arrest and detention of the leader of IPOB, Nnamdi Kanu, in 2015. Since then, several protests have turned violent. A number of casualties were reported across the states in the zone following clashes between the Pro-Biafran agitators and security agencies. Some of these protests occurred in Ukwa West and Aba South (Abia state), Nkpor and Onitsha (Anambra state) between January and May 2016.

Recommendations

- (1) Government should consider dialogue and constructive engagement in resolving issues of self-determination and civil agitations within the zone.
- (2) The deployment and conduct of security agencies to conflict situations should conform to international best practices.
- (3) Government at all levels should strengthen inclusive and accountable governance to prevent feeling of alienation.
- (4) Government should invest more in infrastructural development, human security and well-being.
- (5) Practical measures should be taken to address the widespread erosion in the zone.

2.2.4.6 Oil-related Conflicts and Cultism

In addition to the conflict disorders afflicting the zone, the oil producing communities of Awara, Ochia, Obile, Umuapu, Obosima, Abacheke, Assa and Obiakpor (Imo state) and Osisioma (Abia state) are faced with the problem of cultism. Some of the cult groups include Debam-Niger Delta Red Squad and Dewell-Niger Delta Rescue Squad.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

The violent activities of these cult groups include raping, killing, destruction of property, closing down of schools and churches, and destruction of oil installations which made

majority of the people, including the traditional authorities (*Ezes*), religious priests, school teachers and oil workers to flee the communities. The communities are considered unsafe, as even the security agents are reluctant to venture into those communities because of the cultists who are reputed to have ample supply and control of sophisticated weapons. On the other hand, these cultists do not consider themselves to be such but rather as agitators against development neglect, unemployment and lack of infrastructure and social amenities within their communities.

Another dimension to the oil-related conflict is the reported struggle over what is called the “MOU” (Memorandum of Understanding) which is an agreement signed between oil companies and host communities but which terms are sometimes not respected by the parties.

Recommendations

- (1) The traditional authority should be empowered to exercise their traditional roles.
- (2) The law enforcement agencies and judiciary should live up to their responsibilities in sanctioning acts of criminality.
- (3) Government at all levels should create job opportunities to engage the youths in creative endeavours.
- (4) There should be strategic investment in the education and training of the youths towards self-reliance and entrepreneurship.

The South-South Zone

2.2.5 Types, Actors, Contexts, Causes, Impacts and Drivers of Conflicts

In general, conflicts within the South-South zone tend to take expressions in the form of protests, agitations, militancy, kidnapping, vandalisation of oil pipelines, piracy, trafficking of persons, oil theft, political violence, armed robbery, cultism, land and chieftaincy disputes.

This study is anchored on the premise that a long-term resolution of the conflicts can only be achieved through a proper contextual historical understanding of the issues. Foremost among which is the structural paradox of poverty in the midst of riches – which continues to fertilise objective conditions that induce youths in the Niger Delta region to subscribe to militancy and political violence as a way of expressing their discontent.

2.2.5.1 Manifestations of Conflict

In the Niger Delta communities, there are various forms of litigations bordering on

ownership of land, royalties, chieftaincy and environmental degradation. The major litigation in the zone is between the oil producing communities and the Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs).

Some of the significant phases of conflict emerged in the early to mid-1980s and took the form of legal actions by the communities against the MNOCs for compensation due to environmental degradation. Another phase was characterised by peaceful demonstrations and occupation of flow stations to get the oil companies to pay compensation and fulfil their corporate social responsibility (CSR).

There was also the militant stage in the 1990s characterised by occupation of oil flow stations, kidnapping of oil workers, seizure of tug-boats and vessels belonging to MNOCs.

The overt agitation for resource control began in the early 2000s stretching to 2016 when it took the form of outright demand for an independent Niger Delta Republic.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

This research took place amidst uncertainties and concerns as oil production significantly plummeted from 2.2million barrels per day (mb/d) to 1.4-1.6 mb/d. This was due to renewed hostilities in the zone, by the Niger Delta Avengers, Niger Delta Reformed Avengers, Adaka Boro Avengers, Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate, Bakassi Strike Force, etc. Participants and informants agreed that the zone is 'boiling' because key recommendations in the Willinks Commission's Report of 1957 and other successive national palliatives have not resolved the peculiar problems of the zone.

Recommendations

- (1) There should be dialogue and constructive engagement with all the stakeholders in the zone with the aim of finding lasting solution to myriad of development challenges in the region.
- (2) Government at all levels should ensure that Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) established for the development of the region should be well-funded and monitored to deliver on their mandates.
- (3) Government should ensure quick passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) pending in the National Assembly.
- (4) Education and training should be leveraged to develop the required human competences to facilitate full participation of the indigenous population in the oil and gas sector.
- (5) All laws that alienate local people from the control of resources generated from their immediate environment such as the Land Use Act should be abrogated.

- (6) For communities whose environment have been degraded, adequate compensation and remediation mechanisms should be put in place.
- (7) Government should pursue the clean-up of Ogoniland and other oil-polluted areas.
- (8) There is a need to entrench the culture of transparency, accountability in governance.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

As was reported in the previous SCA studies, the typical response of MNOCs is the use of state security to secure their platforms, which often resulted in the extensive destruction of lives and property. The consequence is further alienation of the stakeholders.

Recommendations

- (1) The structural development neglect of the Niger Delta region resulting in environmental degradation and destruction of sources of livelihoods should be urgently addressed.
- (2) A long-term Marshal Plan should be put in place for the development of this volatile region.

2.2.5.5 Other types of conflicts

Other types of conflicts identified in the South-South which have impacted negatively on the socio-economic, political and well-being of the people of the region include youth restiveness, chieftaincy tussles, land disputes, gangsterism, cultism, thuggery, piracy and political violence.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

For rural economies in the South-South zone, whose major sources of livelihood are fishing and farming, the loss of subsistence and occupational means of survival has been at the root of incessant and endemic conflicts in the zone. With the occupational displacement comes rural-urban migration. And, worse still, in an economy in recession, the displaced persons who migrate to the urban centres are also not able to easily secure employment opportunities; thus, hopes of alternative sources of livelihood are dashed. This is the source of the phenomenon of '*Ijaw boys*' who migrate from the South-South region into other adjacent coastal states of Ondo, Lagos and Ogun (in the South-West) – but, within which these young migrants from the South-South readily resort to sheer banditry, oil bunkering, kidnapping, other criminality and anti-social activities in the coastal areas of the South-West Zone of Nigeria.

These challenges also further compound the economic and ecological circumstances of other adjoining zones of Nigeria.

Recommendations

- (1) Government at all levels, particularly the state and the local governments, should take urgent measures to focus development action on the zone, including acting on the past official reports and recommendations on how to address the genuine agitations by oil-bearing communities.
- (2) Responsive and reciprocal dialogue that will deepen understanding between the stakeholders in the zone and the government is recommended.

The South-West Zone

2.2.6 Types, Actors, Contexts, Causes, Impacts and Drivers of Conflicts

The taxonomy of conflicts in the South-West Zone includes the following broad types: violent conflicts between herders and the farmers; conflicts over boundary disputes, chieftaincy tussles, pockets of electoral violence, civil protests, conflicts related to cult-violence, gang-violence, transnational conflicts between miners and host communities; employment-related conflicts between organised labour and state governments across the zone; violent conflicts perpetrated by key operators and members of some industrial unions; inter-communal conflicts; and, inter-group conflicts manifesting in religious confrontation between Muslims and Christians.

2.2.6.1 Farmers-Herders Conflict

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

As attributed in the mentions about several other zonal reports, the conflicts between herders and farmers captured in this report have also manifested as the most prominent, violent conflict incidents, by far, in several states of the zone. This type of conflict has been largely borne out of the problems of land encroachments by, and the transgressions of, itinerant herders, over the farmlands of sedentary farmers. The conflict is exacerbated by the availability, easy access, and the use of SALWs by herders in their compulsive movement in quest of pasture across the country. The causes of the south-ward movement of the herders are attributable to desertification and the associated ecological emergencies in the northern Nigeria and the Sahel region.

The consequences include over-grazing, reduction of arable land to the detriment of the sedentary farmers, and attendant destruction of human settlements and lives, including rape, burning of farmlands and houses.

Recommendations

- (1) There is a need for awareness creation and sensitisation among the key occupational groups on sustainable ways of resource sharing.

- (2) Farmers and herders should be further engaged, educated on conflict prevention, peaceful co-existence and security of lives and property.
- (3) State Governments in the zone should establish Peace Committees at both state and community levels comprising key stakeholders to address the farmers-herders conflict and other conflicts; and where such exist, should be strengthened.
- (4) State Government should put in place measures for an enduring engagement of the herders and farmers, including structural facilities to enhance joint use of resources.
- (5) Development of well-resourced grazing reserves for animal production
- (6) Communities, entrepreneurs should be encouraged to establish ranches for agro-business.
- (7) Protection of small-holder/peasant farmers through the establishment of farm reserves.
- (8) Promoting effective communication between the occupational groups in the zone.

2.2.6.2 Conflicts arising from militancy and criminality

There is a relationship between criminality and conflicts in the zone. In many instances and communities, participants reported that criminal activities such as: illegal oil bunkering, pipeline vandalism, kidnapping, rape, cultism often result into violence.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

The geographies of Lagos state, metropolitan Lagos and Ogun state, for example, within the South-West region, have typically contributed to the accentuation of the region's potential to generate anti-social activities and acts of economic sabotage – which include: militancy, pipeline vandalism, illegal oil-bunkering, kidnapping, cultism, rape, and other kinds of criminality and violence. Given that, on a daily basis, urban centres of Lagos and Ogun states, typically receive huge inflow of population both from within Nigeria and the outside world. This pluralism of ethnic nationalities often generates frictions and conflicts of interest – as people compete for scarce resources and space. This conflagration of people and competing demands make stretches of the South-West zone, most especially Lagos and Ogun states, including their metropolitan satellite cities and towns a hotbed of inter-group skirmishes. In particular, based on the geographical location of Lagos state, within the Gulf of Guinea – linking the volatile Niger Delta region, the Atlantic Ocean, Lagos state cluster of islands, creeks in locations (including Ikorodu, Ajah, Epe, and Badagry), the totality of the geographies of Lagos also actually provide fertilising grounds for the fueling of criminality and violence.

The zonal report on the South-West has further revealed that the economic recession is biting very hard and Nigerians are, generally, resorting to desperate strategies and actions as well as exploring various possible means to eke out livelihoods for survival – which

has further led some inhabitants to invest in various illicit and clearly uncharitable anti-social activities.

A related important finding in the South-West was the source of sophisticated SALWs used by militants. Participants were unanimous that the “*Omo-oniles*” (land grabbers) fight with literally anything – from charms to other dangerous ammunitions. It was the opinion of participants in the South-West FGDs, especially in Lagos state, that probably the only force that the “*Omo-oniles*” are afraid of is the Nigerian military, and the Mobile Police Force. Participants noted that militants, especially the “*Omo-oniles*” in Ajah and Ikorodu areas of Lagos state, get their weapons through their relationships with powerful elite in the society – who also doubles as the ‘entrepreneurs of conflict’. The availability and easy access to these weapons by the militants as well as refusal on the part of security agents, especially the police, to be responsive to the citizenry was also blamed for the fuelling of activities of kidnappers in Lagos state, within the South-West.

Recommendations

- (1) Law enforcement should be strengthened.
- (2) Effective policing of land borders and water-ways.
- (3) The criminal justice system should constantly be reviewed to reflect the contemporary changes and dynamics in the society.
- (4) Quick determination of cases in the court to reinforce people’s confidence in the administration of justice.
- (5) Creation of more employment opportunities for the unemployed, especially the teeming youth.
- (6) States and Local Governments should strengthen their governance structures to ensure inclusiveness.

2.2.6.3 Trans-Border Crimes

Criminal activities by elements from neighbouring countries and the Gulf of Guinea continue to generate tension and conflict. Some of these include smuggling, illicit oil bunkering, trans-border armed robbery, trafficking in persons, drug and arms.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

The proximity of portions of several states within the South-West zone (like Lagos, Ogun) to the western borders of Nigeria has made some stretches of this zone quite vulnerable to trans-border conflicts. For example, goods stolen from Nigeria are easily transported across the border to the neighbouring Republic of Benin, and vice versa resulting in confrontations with security agencies and local communities. The trans-border crimes that are prevalent in Lagos, Ogun and Oyo states have reportedly ranged from trafficking of products of illicit oil-bunkering business, drug-peddling, cross-border

armed-robbery activities, trafficking in small arms and ammunition, to human-trafficking and kidnapping. Smuggling of goods across Idi-Iroko and Seme borders is one crime taken for granted within the context of this region, as criminals have devised innumerable tactics of circumventing border security – thereby rendering the security agencies at the borders somehow ineffective.

Recommendations

- (1) There is the need for better and more effective border policing and maritime management to deter smuggling and other trans-border crimes.
- (2) The Border Communities Development Agency (BCDA) should be strengthened to effectively deliver on its mandate.

The Federal Government should resuscitate and empower the Border Guard Units (BGUs) of the relevant agencies.

2.2.6.4 Other Intergroup Conflicts

Similarities were found in the trends and patterns of conflicts in the zone with the exception of a few differences and variations that are depicted in the state-specific report.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

The variants of conflicts in the zone involve security personnel and communities, religious and communal conflicts. In Ibafo, Ogun state, for example, it was alleged that Police provided cover for oil bunkering, kidnapping, raping and forceful takeover of people's houses and homes. In Lagos and Osun states, the *hijab* issue created tension, distrust, street protests and litigation. In Ondo, Ekiti, Ogun and Oyo states the relatively more prevalent conflicts include political violence-driven conflicts, supremacy conflicts/ chieftaincy tussles and land disputes.

However, findings from the zone revealed the laudable governance efforts made in specific contexts to deliberately build peace and implement a governance policy of strategic inter-group dialogue, as in virtually all states within the South-West Zone.

Recommendations

- (1) Re-orientation of the Nigeria Police to protect lives and property.
- (2) Strengthen Police-Community partnership for effective law enforcement.
- (3) The existing inter-religious platforms such as Nigeria Inter-religious Council (NIREC) and its state and local government equivalents should be more proactive in addressing inter-faith issues.

2.2.6.5 Labour and Employment Related Conflicts

Across the zone, inability to pay salaries and wages, with exception of Lagos state government, was found to have precipitated industrial conflict and civil unrest.

Despite the bailout and the refund of over-deduction of interest on loans by the Paris Club, these states were indebted to public sector workers for upwards of eight months. For example, the concentration of industries, companies and the huge working population often result in adversarial labour and employment relations that impact negatively on socio-economic life of the people due to picketing, strikes and public demonstrations.

Analysis, Impacts and Gaps in Responses

Labour and employment related conflicts were found across the zone, particularly in the public sector workforce in Ekiti, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states.

Recommendations

State and Local Governments should ensure transparent, accountable, prudent and judicious use of public resources for the benefit of the people.

2.3 Emerging Forms of Conflict Dynamics

Compared with the findings in the previous editions of the SCA, the 2016 edition reveals some degree of changes in drivers, actors, dynamics, complexity and issues.

Furthermore, new insights have been gained in the dramatic transnational dimensions of conflicts, just as the media and social media have impacted on the tenor, language and mobilisation of rage and sentiments for violence. The flow of weapons used in conflicts has been affected by local and transnational events globally and in the sub-region. From being seen as the perpetrators of conflicts in the 2002 report, the security agencies have improved in the discharge of their statutory responsibilities.

Different from the phenomenon of political corruption, described as the outcome of inter-ethnic group elite rivalry in the 2002 SCA reports, the manifestation of political corruption, inadequate or compromised security during elections, retail vote buying and selling have become new modes of threats. Next to corruption is the reliance on primordial sentiments as basis for seeking electoral support rather than civic rhetoric. This has made elections in the country more divisive than uniting. This is promoting and sustaining the “*we*” versus “*them*” perception, thereby breeding negative reciprocities.

Another major shift that has occurred is the increasing challenge to religious, traditional and political authorities by groups, especially the youth groups that hitherto held such institutions and their leaderships in awe. This phenomenon was most pronounced in the urban centres across the country. In some places, it manifested in the taking over of certain parts of the city and enthroning other forms of tolling and governance by ANSAs in forms, ranging from gangsters, cultists to insurgents. Clashes between such groups and security agents or among them over territories and tolls have emerged as new threats to public peace, safety and security concerns across the country. The rage of the subalterns, led by the motorcycle riders – otherwise known as the *Okada* riders, has also become ubiquitous across the country.

The inability of several state governments (1999-2007), many of whom initially hinged their poverty alleviation programmes on a narrow-conception of poverty which did not take long-term, environmental, health, and public safety concerns into consideration, on the one hand, and the use of *Okadas* as vote-buying commodities, on the other hand, have now combined to make urban governance a source of conflict between this group of the marginalised and different state governments.

In parts of the country, the okada riders have become conveyor belts for various forms of criminality.

Similarly, the inability of many seekers of public office, who relied on the use of thugs and other groups of outlaws, whom they had armed to rig elections, have also contributed to the continued emergence of many gangs in several cities, as empirically revealed generally during the 2016 SCA fieldwork.

Insurgency in the *North-East* zone has also muted some conflicts that existed before it and in this context; be it indigene-settler conflicts, inter-faith conflicts between the religious majorities and the minorities in the zone, etc. that appeared to have taken the back-seat, or perhaps temporarily hushed down, due to the far-reaching effects of the *Boko Haram* insurgency. Nevertheless, it is important not to lose sight of such conflicts and the potential ones which exist in many parts of the country.

Conclusion

In this section, it is evident that drivers of conflicts in the six geo-political zones of Nigeria are context-specific, but also largely inter-connected and mutually reinforcing, irrespective of geographical spread.

SECTION THREE

The Structural Causes of Conflicts

Conflicts do not occur in a vacuum. Therefore, structure, agency, collective and individual actions and inactions can go a long way in determining whether a conflict will be violent or peaceful. A holistic analysis of conflict must pay detailed attention to the proximate and structural factors propelling it. Identifying the structures of a conflict entails a macro-micro analysis. Common to inter-group conflicts in many ill-defined federal states with plural identity groups is the skewed distribution of socio-economic and political resources which breeds inequalities amongst culturally and sometimes religiously different groups. Such practices constitute the structure within which certain groups perceive injustice and marginalisation leading to the construction of enemy images of the government and other groups who appear to be favored by it.

Without recognition of such structures which differ from place to place, responding to conflicts will only be like addressing the symptoms while neglecting the causes. This is why the structural analysis of the cause of conflict must cover the social, economic and political spheres towards identifying the grievances that might make taking to violence inevitable for groups that feel maligned. This helps to understand how socio-economic and political needs intersect with ethnic or/and religious identities in providing a shared narrative of exclusion and marginalisation that might provide self-justifying rationalisation for violence.

This has also informed the approach of analysis of the structures and actors in such conflict contexts, like the social, economic, political, and security dimensions, as categorised thematically.

3.0 Methodology Issues for Conflict Assessment

The present SCA focuses substantially on the structural causes of conflicts across the country using a multi-method approach. This entailed the extensive review of literatures, use of interview guide, questionnaires, Key Informant Interviews (KII), Observations and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). This took into account the historical and prevailing socio-economic and political turns that the country has taken and how it has contributed to the current manifestations of conflicts in the country (Matanmi 2016; Fashoyin, Matanmi and Tawose, 1994:1; Phillips and Ndekwu, 1987; Fashoyin, 1989: 168-170; Matanmi, 1996: 17-30).

The need for a broader understanding of the factors and actors in the immediate and larger conflict settings, and how these interact has influenced the adoption of the approach used in analysing the structure of conflicts in the 2016 SCA.

3.1 Security-related Manifestations of Conflict

3.1.1 Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs)

Across the zones, one of the conspicuous drivers of violent conflicts is the presence of militias many of whom enjoy the covert and in some cases the overt support of their communities.

They thrive on sentiments of representing the interests of their communities by providing similitude of what the state is not able to provide such as police functions, defending the community against external attacks, and serving as guards during communal activities. They constitute a threat to the stability of such communities as well by forcefully extorting the residents and jeopardising public and personal safety anytime they are on a collision course with the security agents or rival militias.

Their presence and activities serve as market for narcotics and means of disorienting the youths in such communities. They continue to be relevant in many communities because they also serve as thugs for politicians who sustain them as enforcers of their wishes especially during elections. In some communities, vote seekers are compelled to patronise them because of the popularity and influence they wield in such communities as a way of endearing themselves to voters. Also, they are linked to community manufacturers of arms, charms and ammunition in creating an illegal/parallel defence industry in many communities. With this kind of setting, the combustibility of conflicts or degeneration of minor disagreements or altercations into violent exchanges becomes spontaneous. This explains why in many cases they are able to melt into communities in evading arrests by security agents; although in some cases they eventually become a source of security threat to such communities. For example, the *Ombatse* in Nasarawa state in the North-Central zone, the *Boko Haram* in the North-East, the *Niger Delta Avengers* in the South South, and *IPOB* in the South East, among others.

The import of the findings is that the identified actors have latched on to the seeming lacuna in the governance space.

3.1.2 Neighbourhood Gangs

Unlike militias most of which are in the rural areas, gangs have become an urban phenomenon across the country. Operating clearly against all laws and norms of social behavior, they have become perpetual and acquired territories in different cities constituting threats to neighbours, residents and the security agents. While in cities, they are products of such communities, in many others they migrate from other parts of the country and even sometimes outside the country. In Niger state, membership of the notorious '*Yandaba*' was traced to Kano state. In an account, respondents revealed that many of them usually come to Minna, the capital city, from Kano and other core northern states anytime the farming season ends but over time many of them stayed back in the city and only go back to Kano when there is need to initiate new members.

In many other cities, they start first as neighbourhood cults or youth groups and after a while they start appropriating territories or making their residential areas inaccessible for youths from other neighbourhoods. Subsequently, they acquire codes/symbols of identification, become armed and go into forcefully extorting residents and traders. In many cities, they have become threats and nuisances to residents. The security agents often storm their dens to carry out arrests but it does not take long before they regroup. Although, they are rarely in direct conflicts with communities, however, due to their persistent involvement in turf wars with rival gangs, they imperil the lives of residents and passerby.

Overtime they become the determinants and providers of safety because many have to abide by their unwritten codes in order to be safe in neighbourhoods where they operate. Like militias too, they are often courted by politicians especially at the peak of seeking votes and equally serve as enforcers given the violent nature of elections. They have remained permanent in many neighbourhoods and some since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999. Due to their presence many residents have been compelled to relocate while those who remain are bound to endure living under the yoke of their fearful presence.

3.1.3 Bandits and Cattle Rustlers

Although not completely new, the main actors are the nomadic pastoralists and the farmers across the country. The transhumance activities of the nomads upon which their economic survival and lives of their cattle depend serve as a push factor that has been worsened by effects of climate change leading to frequent violent clashes with the farmers especially from the North-Central southwards. Associated with these violent clashes are crimes, like kidnapping and rape, as reported in many parts of the country. A number of factors have accentuated the frequency of the clashes. Some of these are the absence of comprehensive policy on agriculture, the change in agrarian practices, environmental decline, and the inability to find common grounds of mutual dependence between the herders and the farmers.

3.2 Political Manifestations of Conflict

3.2.1 Election-Related Conflicts

In the period covered in this study (2013-2016), there was observed reduction in the rate of political assassinations. However, elections remained indicators of early warning of violence in many states in both rural and urban settings. The introduction of the Permanent Voters Card (PVC) and Card Reader brought about decrease in the frequency of electoral violence. The conduct of primaries for the selection of candidates was also another source of conflicts but in most cases aggrieved candidates ended up moving to another party.

The relationship between the legislature and the executive in some states also heated up the polity in these states and sometimes, resulted into violence. There was also a reduction

in the tension between governors serving their second term and those seeking to take over from them, especially their deputies. Remarkably too, the demise and weakening influence of political ‘strongmen’ in parts of the country brought a reduction in tension and violence which had defined the polity in their respective states. However, the reluctance of many state governors to conduct elections into local government councils in their states was further seen by many opposition members as stiffening of the democratic space; which is not conducive for peace and security, especially at the third-tier.

3.2.2 Inter- and Intra-Party Conflicts

Across the six geo-political zones, political parties jostled for power and those struggles bred violence in many instances.

At the inter-party level, political parties made scapegoats out of the election management body and the security agencies in trading blames and allegations. In such cases the judiciary also gets implicated during such exchanges.

Another common cause of conflicts is the absence of internal democracy in the process of selecting candidates by political parties.

3.2.3 Politico-Religious Conflict

The *Boko Haram* and its agenda to establish a so-called Islamic Caliphate defines Nigeria’s war against terrorism and it represents an eloquent example of a violent politico-religious conflict. On the other hand, the use of religious rhetoric for mobilising political support was also observed across the country.

Another example of politico-religious conflict was observed in Kaduna state between the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the Nigerian Government. The desire of the group to exist as a parallel ‘state’ in Nigeria and the government position to outlaw the group, as well as banning of its procession by some states in the North, reflects how religious groups can clash with secular authority.

3.2.4 Self-Determination Agitations

With the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, groups affiliated to ethnic nationalities have been agitating for self-determination. While the OPC in the South-West could be said to have acquiesced the agenda of self-determination, such assumption does not apply to an area like the South-East geo-political zone. This is evident in the fact that MASSOB and IPOB have sustained agitations for self-determination for a ‘State of Biafra’.

3.3 Economic Manifestations of Conflict

3.3.1 Industrial and Organisational Conflicts

Given the inability of many state governments to pay the salaries of their workers, there was tension and infrequent conflicts that turned violent in some states between organised

labour and such state governments. With the exception of the January 2012 protests over the hike in the pump price of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), there was no major government-labour feud from 2012-2016. However, a split occurred in the ranks of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) leading to the emergence of factions.

3.3.2 Conflicts Over Natural Resources

The discovery of natural resources specifically crude oil in some split-border communities led to communal clashes between communities from neighbouring states. It drew the attention of the former President, Dr. Ebele Goodluck Jonathan before the violence that involved communities in Kogi and Anambra states could be brought under control. Violent conflicts arising from the struggle over the ownership of lands were found across the country including communities without natural resources.

3.3.3 Conflicts in Market Places

With the understanding that contention for resources provide motivation for engaging in conflicts, the place of economic benefits in sustaining violent conflicts cannot be ignored. Violent conflicts instigated by economic gains occurred in places like local commodity markets in a way that degenerates into indigene-settler conflicts that could have led to cycles of reprisals across the country. For instance, the leadership and space contests in Ladipo International Spare-parts Market in Lagos state degenerated into Igbo versus Yoruba ethnic conflict which is still ongoing as at the time of this study. Similar issues play out in markets across the country. The contentions in most of the markets were over perceived gains associated with headship and space between the traders who in most cases leveraged on their ethnic identity in seeking advantages.

Another round of violence common in the markets is caused by gang-leaders who often try to extort money from the owners of the stalls and when such is resisted, violence ensues. In Ibafo market, Ogun state, gang-related extortions were reported.

3.3.4 Conflicts between *Okada* Riders and State Governments

The presence and activities of *Okada* riders across the country generate tension between them and state governments. Over the years, there has been continued increase in the categories of *Okada* operators. Due to the economic downturn, disasters and influx of IDPs from insurgency-affected states, the profile of the *Okada* riders has expanded into these categories: The first are those who augment their meager income after close of work by using their personal motorcycles for commercial purposes; the next are those whose livelihood depends solely on it who work on full-time basis and the most recent are IDPs from disaster, conflict and insurgency-affected parts of the country (Animasawun, 2016).

By having a vibrant presence in each part of the country, the *Okada* riders have become critical actors in the socio-political and economic life of Nigeria to the extent that they cannot be ignored, thereby making decisions affecting them can generate violent conflicts.

3.4 Social Manifestations of Conflict

3.4.1 Conflicts originating from multi-ethnic and multi-religious diversity

Given the size, diversity and population of Nigeria, social conflicts cannot be wished away as people of different ethnic and religious inclination must live together. However, it must be stated that diversity, population and size are not sufficient to generate conflicts and instability if they are well managed. Nevertheless they constitute factors that cannot be neglected in taking a structural analysis of conflicts.

Nigeria has an estimated population of over 180 million making her the most populous country in Africa. The country is a federation of 36 states and FCT Abuja; about 250-521 different ethno-linguistic groups and huge numbers of Muslims, Christians and Traditionalists cutting across ethnic groups.

Nigeria also provides a context for the exploration of the concepts of equality and diversity, with its multi-ethnic and multi-religious identities.

3.4.2 Frontiers and Boundary-related Conflicts

Although not obviously presented as economically or resource-instigated, at the base of most of the ethnic, ethno-religious, religious and communal conflicts are resources. Most of these conflicts have long and sometimes contested histories that often make it to have a mono-causal explanation of their root causes. Also, some of them seem to have acquired a life cycle of their own as several efforts at resolving or transforming them have yielded very minimal results while some of such efforts have actually protracted.

Common to most of the ethnic conflicts are clashing claims of being the 'sons of the soil' in specific places and in such cases each side mobilises all resources to reinforce such claims. A peculiar pattern of frontier and boundary-related conflicts exist in some states where such conflicts involve communities from different states but sharing frontiers and borders as neighbours. States, like Kogi, Anambra, Benue, Enugu, Cross River and Ebonyi, are amongst the states with such communities. In many of such cases, hitherto friendly communities suddenly go up in arms against each other when natural resources are discovered over contestations on whose land such resources are found.

3.4.3 Religious Conflicts

As an ideology that offers adherents something to live and die for, the propensity of religion to lead to violent conflicts is established. Religious tension exists in most parts of Nigeria given the domineering nature of most religious majorities over the religious minorities. Similarly, there exist a number of sects in some parts of the country from both the Christian and Muslim intra-faith contexts.

Tussles between or within religious groups and state governments on the mode of dressing, ownership of schools and curricula were found to be common in the North-

Central and the South-West. Tension leading to violence exists at the intra-faith level over doctrinal correctness amongst the Muslims, mainly in the north.

3.4.4 Conflict between Youths and Constituted Authorities

This was found across the cities in the country. Youths have turned against the traditional ways and values in many cities. It was common to find pre-teens involving in frontal challenge to constituted authorities openly. Also, protests in hallowed places like the palaces and prayer ground occurred in Ilorin in the North Central in sharp contrast to what people and communities in such places like Ilorin were known for. While it appeared to have been curtailed, the occurrences of such events are pointers to the emergence of a generation of youths challenging orthodoxies.

3.4.5 Suicide Bombing

Suicide bombing has become a recurring feature of the Boko Haram insurgency. Contrary to generally held view that women are merely victims of conflicts and insurgency, recent reports showing that women carried out suicide bombing point to a new phenomenon. This is so in the light of increasing frequency of the activities of female suicide bombers on behalf of the *Boko Haram* insurgents.

3.4.6 Ungoverned Spaces

The proportion of security personnel vis-à-vis the size and population of Nigeria has inadvertently turned some areas in the country into insecure and unsafe spaces. Similarly, there are other areas even in urban centers when both the civilian public and security personnel are aware that non-state actors are the one governing such areas because they determine accessibility, they extort, they bear arms and narcotics. Sometimes they do this with the endorsement of conflict-affected communities where they present themselves as the ones protecting the communities especially where such communities feel that interventions of government in conflict have been biased against them.

Nigeria has vast difficult terrains (forests, mountains, water ways and caves) which are left unmanned by security agents across the country. In some parts of the country, such places have been turned into enclaves of criminal activities. The existence of such places provides hide-out for warlords, militants, insurgents and other criminals who might seek the protection of communities during conflict by claiming to be protecting the interests of the communities.

3.5 Conflict Actors

The following groups/individuals were identified as key actors in conflicts across the states and geo-political zones.

3.5.1 Security Operatives and ANSAs

- (1) Security Operatives

- (2) Militias
- (3) Bandits
- (4) Cattle Rustlers
- (5) Neighbourhood Gangs

Actors in this category cut across the formal and the informal. In the formal category are officials of security agencies saddled with statutory responsibilities to protect lives and property, as enshrined in the constitution of Nigeria. However, ANSAs have also emerged as key actors in the security arena due to a number of factors and not the least the disenchantment of a large section of the population against the state which serves as the basis of attraction to the ANSAs; who unfortunately overtime turn around to hurt most communities. This has been the trend of many ANSAs ranging from bandits, insurgents, militias and neighbourhood gangs.

On the part of the constitutionally recognised security agents, inter-agency rivalry remains a bane to their optimum efficiency. It was observed that inter-agency rivalry and lack of cooperation amongst security agencies hampered the effectiveness of these agencies.

Also, the civil-military relations in many parts of the country presents a fundamental challenge given the fact that security agents must strike a balance between respect for human rights and ensuring that they are not found wanting in their duties. In addition, loss of confidence in the security agencies by communities was prevalent leading to disharmony between them.

The management of ex-warlords or militants in many states of the country deserves a focal attention. This is because many states have initiated what they termed 'Amnesty Programmes' but critics and commentators and respondents revealed that in actual fact many of such programmes were conceived and implemented towards serving the interests of specific groups and individuals while long-term security takes the back seat. Furthermore, respondents claimed that many of such programmes end up as means of siphoning funds out of the state coffers in the guise of security. Practices like that deny the state the trust and confidence of parties concerned.

3.5.2 Political Actors

- (1) Political Parties
- (2) Politicians
- (3) Thugs

Comprising those in public offices and politicians with influence as well as voters, the actions of political actors has always had direct impact on the stability, peace and otherwise of communities. As men of resources, power and influence, political actors at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels are crucial in constructing societal consensus for peace and security and this stems from the way they express their differences and pursue their ambitions.

A critical look at the frequency of political assassinations and other negativities that defined elections since 1999 has pointed to a shift away from the 'do or die' mentality. However, that is not to say there has been a complete acculturation of sound democratic values and norms that are basically required for the consolidation of democratic tradition. Holding and exercising power without being monstrous is still a challenge which calls for a more humane or humanistic and responsible usage of political power. This is also critical in the deployment of security agencies during elections by many incumbents. In such situations, the security agents are torn between obeying lawful commands and upholding ethics of their respective professional codes. The reliance on political thugs flows from the fear by opposing politicians that impartiality on the part of security agents might reduce their chances of winning elections.

Across the states, a relationship was found between the emergence of neighbourhood gangs and periods of elections. Security agents expressed their frustrations arising from the relationship of political actors and such outlaws. The maintenance of such groups by political actors is the reason why most grievances and differences are expressed violently

3.5.3 Economic Actors

- (1) Labour Leaders
- (2) Traders
- (3) Okada Riders
- (4) Market Associations
- (5) Government Representatives

The actors in the economy comprise the formal and informal players. Perhaps more than any other category, they are the ones most desirous of peace and stability. While the organised labour seems to have found a less adversarial way of handling conflicts within its fold, the story is different in the informal sector. Whether in managing differences within its fold or with the government, issues of enforcement and collection of taxes and even extortion from operators in the informal economy usually degenerate to violence. The informal economy is also a site where Nigeria's fault lines get mobilised violently for economic gains. The organised private sector stands at a strategic position to mobilise for peace but its potentials in maximising this has not been fully activated.

3.5.4 Social Actors

- (1) Traditional Rulers
- (2) Ethnic/Opinion Leaders
- (3) Religious Elites
- (4) The Clergy
- (5) Youth
- (6) Women

The traditional rulers are custodians of tradition and culture, who command the respect of all. The huge social capital possessed by traditional rulers constitutes a source of threat and peace which can be deployed in equal measure. This is one of the factors that make communal conflicts intractable and protracted because the traditional rulers as the highest beneficiaries in some communal conflicts that are tied to issues of land, boundary, chieftaincy and contests over supremacy/seniority of stools. In many cases, they were/are victims of violent conflicts during which they lose belongings and lives. However, they were found to be very instrumental in the preservation of peace in many communities which calls for more support to them as the nearest source of influence to the people.

Religious Leaders

As people of influence and charisma, religious leaders are at a vantage position to influence the peace of their communities. Much more, given the additional roles they now play during election when seekers of votes throng their sanctuaries to seek endorsements and blessings, their conduct and utterances can be crucial in shaping the peace or otherwise of a community.

Across states in Nigeria, especially in the urban centers, clerics of the two dominant faiths in Nigeria were found to be active in setting the mood for peace or tension. A lot of faith-based not-for-profit organisations have consistently engaged in peace-promoting activities across the country resulting in the initiation of reconciliation and peacebuilding processes.

In parts of the country, where the relationship between the religious majorities and minorities has been tenuous, key religious actors and platforms provided room for the aggregation and articulation of grievances, demands and resolutions depending on the situations. Therefore, in initiating peace processes, religious actors at all levels are people of immense influence who can be mobilised for such initiatives.

Ethnic Leaders

These are influential people with substantial followership and sometimes serving as gatekeepers and conflict entrepreneurs across communities. As leaders of their respective ethno-linguistic groups, they occupy a strategic position to serve as promoters and guarantors of peace. However, in some instances they are not able to dissuade their followers from violence for fear of being seen as having sold out. This compels them to sometimes follow the popular opinion in some cases even when such do not conform to their own personal views; yet in such situations the rest of the society expects them to wield their influence in stemming the tide of violent conflicts.

The Youth

Constituting the most active part of Nigeria's population, this category is the most potent for bringing about a stable and peaceful society. Disturbingly, they have been portrayed more as agents of conflicts than agents of peace.

Not-for-Profit Organisations

These are the silent promoters of peace in many conflict-affected, postconflict and insurgency-affected communities in Nigeria. While the foreign-based ones have been more active due to having more funds, the local ones have been consistent in playing complementary roles in peace processes and advocacies for peace, early warning and non-violence.

The Main and Social Media

The media, particularly, the print and electronic are positioned to play influential roles in promoting peace or escalating tension into violence. As connectors, information churned out by the media sometimes connects parties in conflict as allies or adversaries. However, a less recognised fact is that they are also prone to being victims of violence as the case was when the *Boko Haram* insurgents attacked some media houses in the country. A related phenomenon, especially in the North-Central, Bauchi and Taraba states in the North-East, has been the existence of online platforms defending ethnic interests. Given the reach and spontaneity that accompanies the reports on the social media and other online platforms, several communities in conflict have opened Facebook and Twitter accounts to reinforce their positions, even when it is divisive.

3.6 Conflict Dynamics

3.6.1 Linking the Causes

Across the six geo-political zones, a typology of causes of conflicts can be drawn based on similarities in actors, terrain, history and outcome of responses. Certain commonalities in causes of conflicts were found in this study. Although for most conflicts, a mono-causal explanation would be inadequate, similarities were found in terms of grievances, motivations, drivers and actors across the six geo-political zones of Nigeria.

For example, stoking the fire of many conflicts across the country are the challenges posed by horizontal inequalities defined as inequalities between groups defined by fault lines such as culture, religion and language (Parr et al, 2013). Next to this is the flagrant or inadvertent display of conflict insensitivity by the state in most cases. The third and not the least stem from the crisis of fear and want summed up as the lack of human and environmental insecurity.

A type of conflict found in all the zones is the fractious relationship between those who define themselves as ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’. Critical analysis of all these types of conflicts revealed the fact that such divisive consciousness gets promoted whenever a group feels marginalised in having access to power, state resources and patronage. As a country with disparate identity groups with manifest fault lines where politics and control of government resources have been the most assured source of economic prosperity, positions of power are sought largely by whipping up primordial sentiments. This is

done consciously because it perceived that having someone of your ethnic or religious stock in office assures you of access to state resources.

The findings in this study give credence to the concept of “prebendalism”, a European feudal practice utilised in explaining the contradictions of affluence and underdevelopment in Nigeria as observed by Joseph (1977). Overtime, “prebendalism” as a form of dysfunctional governance, has promoted horizontal inequalities making governance and the allocation of state resources, conception and allocation of resources, to be done in a way that is conflict-insensitive. Consequently, it is advanced in this segment of the report that this constitutes the main structural context for most inter-group conflicts and insurgency as manifested or experienced in different parts of the country.

3.6.2 Triggers

Triggers are events or situations that serve as sparks which give vent to the violent expression of deep-seated animosities by groups. On many occasions, the immediate causes seem too far flung or not intelligibly linked to the spontaneous violence and the kind of weapons that are used during such conflicts.

For example, the disputations over space or stall in the market, would degenerate into indigene-settler or Christian-Muslim clash sometimes assuming ramifications beyond the imagination of those who are primarily involved in such altercations. For instance, clashes involving *Okada* riders around the Mile 12 market of Lagos spread into the market and adjoining neighbourhoods in March 2016 and subsequently degenerated into a clash between the Hausa and the Yoruba communities during which sophisticated weapons were used (Animasawun, 2016a; Animasawun 2016b). Instances like these were found in many parts of the country where the immediate causes appeared so trivial and negligible to have warranted the extent of destruction and violent mobilisations that accompany it. Elections, also serve as triggers of violence in communities with histories of protracted conflict. Irrespective of whether such elections are well managed or not, parties in conflict use such days of elections to avenge or initiate new attacks.

SECTION FOUR

Responses to Conflict

4.0 Methodology

Responses to conflicts, based on local and international practices have informed the classification of responses into three main tracks of responses as follows: “Track One” – Government; “Track Two” – Non-government actors and civil society; and “Track Three” – International responses.

4.1 Track One: Government Response

As the institution, whose main responsibility is the protection of lives and property, the government at all levels bears the primary responsibility and take the lead in the preservation of peace, order and security of all within its sovereign territory.

However, this also comes with its own complications given the sense of alienation from the state expressed by many during interviews which provides the basis for many unconstitutional but community-approved self-help initiatives of self-provisioning of security.

4.1.1 Policy Response

The major Federal Government policy response at the return to democratic governance in 1999 was the creation of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) in the year 2000, which represents the will and determination of government to respond to the myriads of conflict across the country.

4.1.2 Security Response

One of the first and immediate implications of violent conflicts is that it creates an atmosphere of insecurity which applies to both humans and the environment. Given the prevalence of low intensity conflicts in Nigeria, and the proliferation of SALWs the implications of these have heightened fear and insecurity arising from these conflicts irrespective of the remoteness of the location or the actors involved.

In the period under focus (2013-2016), similarities were found in patterns of response, effectiveness, gaps and implications which were considered useful for identifying lessons learnt. Given the size of Nigeria and preponderance of communal conflicts and rural banditry, the federal government has had to deploy the Mobile Police units and the Nigerian Army to such theatres of conflict. While the effectiveness of this will have to be measured in the contexts of immediate and long term implications, the practice is fraught with a number of operational, logistics, civil-military and human rights challenges.

First, as most of these have to be done as emergency responses, poor situational analysis arising from inaccurate mapping and intelligence often put the lives of the deployed

security personnel at great risk. Such was the case in the 2013 killing of security personnel by *Ombatse* militias in Nasarawa state. The deployment of security personnel to these communities also strains relations between communities and the security agencies at the official and informal levels. On many occasions, state governors and the commanding hierarchy of the security agencies found themselves working at cross-purposes or inadvertently undermining each other during operations. Allegations of biases are usually leveled against the deployed personnel by the communities and in response, such communities mobilise to resist rather than cooperate with the deployed personnel.

Lack of inter-agency cooperation also makes the security responses from Track 1 to communities experiencing violent conflicts stressful and under-achieving. For instance in Kpaidna, Legbe, Dagama, Bambe, Kopa and Lunku communities in Niger state in July/August 2016 in the aftermaths of a clash between the herders and Gbagyi, men of the Nigerian Army responded to a security alert in the community. The communities resisted this response alleging that Army were disguised herders militia. In a situation where first responders were the Army instead of the police, highlights the lack of synergy among the security agencies. This was corroborated by key informants and participants during the zonal validation. If there had been a more cooperative relationship in the security sector, such operations could have been tidier.

On some occasions, the deployed personnel are often constrained by language and poor knowledge of the terrain – which makes them vulnerable and putting such operations in jeopardy. However, in some communities with local security formations, they offer to complement the activities of the security personnel.

While the deployment of security personnel as a security response is always inevitable, the government at all tiers acting as Track 1 must begin to see human security issues as the drivers of conflicts and alienation between it and the people. This boils down to the need for a deliberate accent on human and environmental security by the state as a first step of reconciling the state with the citizens so that when the state deploys security personnel, they are seen as agents of a state that cares.

4.1.3 Relief Response

The North-East and the North-Central come readily to mind in fully appreciating the need for relief. In the two zones, a significant percentage of their rural and urban populations have been adversely affected by violence. Although they have also attracted international support, the extent of the destruction done by the violence on their minds and spaces point to the need for more.

4.1.4 Political Response

This becomes inevitable as one of the options of establishing, ascertaining and recommending appropriate actions or sanctions towards achieving sustainable peace. The most known of such political responses is the setting up of Judicial/Administrative

Commissions of Inquiry (J/ACIs). Another form of political response that is gradually emerging as an option is negotiation which governments at the federal and state levels are now exploring towards enthroning sustainable peace in different contexts. The federal and state governments have also implemented different context-specific amnesty programmes as part of alternative ways of resolving conflicts. Others include the creation of administrative units, creation of emirates and chiefdoms and making political appointments in order to create wider sense of belonging as may be needed in some cases.

4.1.5 Economic Response

Against the backdrop of the interrelatedness of development, conflict management and peacebuilding, economic responses to conflicts cannot but be appreciated as a veritable response to conflicts. This must be viewed in its macro-, meso- and micro-impacts on preventing, resolving and transforming conflicts as well as its impact on pre- and postconflict peacebuilding. Tied to economic responses is the availability of resources. Apart from apparent situations demanding reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes all of which rely heavily on economic (development) inputs, economic response can also serve as a preventive response and ameliorating response to conflict. Conversely, such responses can aggravate a tensed situation if not handled with sensitivity which points to the need to ensure that, in conception and implementation such programmes must be participatory and inclusive (IPCR, 2006).

The North-East and the North-Central where insurgency and rural banditry have led to the destruction of many communities were found to have received varieties of such interventions from the government and international not-for-profit organisations. Also, economic responses are susceptible to be seen as partial if/when mismanaged.

Nigeria has acquired a track record of attempting to address conflict through development which has led to the creation of agencies, like the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs amongst others. The process of establishing the North East Development Commission is also afoot.

4.1.6 Social Response

Social responses have been carried out on behalf of the government through its agencies such as the National Orientation Agency (NOA) and the government-owned media. These have been through campaigns and advocacies to discourage violence and to enlist support for government's efforts at promoting peace. However, for this to be effective, the social capital of notable and respected individuals can be tapped into especially from communities affected by conflicts and insurgency as it maybe.

4.1.7 Conclusion

The Nigerian state responds to conflict in different ways as enumerated above. However, the impact of such interventions on the conflicts reveals the need for more proactive

approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The gaps inherent in the design and implementation of most of the interventions by the government explains the recurrence of violence after initial deployment of troops to most communities affected by conflicts. This is why most conflict-affected communities in Nigeria suffer from postconflict protection and empowerment needs.

When these two are missing, the hope of sustainable peace dims as the people are not likely to have a sense of belonging and trust in any peace process put in place.

After recognising these interventions, further attention can be paid to each one to identify the gaps in conception, implementation/deployment, duration/span, financing/budget line and other variables. How such interventions impact in reducing/stabilising/increasing the spate of violence, reconciliation and peaceful co-existence can offer useful basis upon which to draw an informed conclusion. This is where the IPCR comes in as a think and 'do' tank focused on thinking, planning, advising and working on peace.

4.2 Track Two: Non-Government Response

Globally, not-for-profit institutions, generically known as Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), have increasingly become relevant such that they have taken some responsibilities of the state. Akin to promoting democracy and good governance, their peace-promoting activities come next as their main area of engagement.

Despite not being partisan in conduct and outlook, the civil society in Nigeria has had to engage governments and political class in ensuring that the peace and stability of the societies wherein they work and that of the country at large is not jeopardised. This has been done on a sustained note as many of the respondents recalled instances of such. Worthy of note in facilitating some of these interactions are the roles played by the IPCR and UNDP through workshops which serve as venues for unrestricted interactions between the political class and the civil society.

4.3 Track Three: International Organisations

In the period under focus (2013-2016), the international not-for-profit-organisations were found to be very active in Nigeria's conflicts and insurgency-affected states through local/community based organisations in different communities across the country. These international organisations have provided necessary funding support, capacity building and advocacy towards peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Nigeria.

In this regard, UNDP, NSRP, UNHCR, UNICEF, DfID/UKAid, USAID, EU, ECOWAS, AFDB, World Bank and others come into reckoning.

4.4 General Conclusion

In retrospect, the findings of the 2016 SCA have particularly confirmed that the landscape of conflict and insecurity in Nigeria has actually changed, in various respects, from what

it used to be as at the timing and coverage of the 2002 SCA. For instance, ANSAs in several forms have emerged just as community armories and militias have become actors on the scene. There is also a transnational and global dimension to the sources of rage and grievances, weapons and conflict entrepreneurs in making the analysis of the landscape of conflict and insecurity deserving of consistent multi-dimensional analysis. The existence of militias and community armories in many communities now make Law and Order enforcement more complex than it was before. Trans-nationally, the permeability of borders and the easy access of non-Nigerians with kith and kin in the country combine to make rural banditry and insurgency very complex and delicate conflict and security issues to handle.

While the utility value of “prebendalism” as an analytical framework was probably indisputable within the framework of the 2002 SCA, however, the demise or waned influence of notable political patrons and ‘strongmen of politics’ across Nigeria’s national political spectrum; or what in popular parlance is described as “prebendal politics”, (Animasawun, 2016) have definitely altered the socio-political equations and barometer of conflicts in all the geo-political zones of the country. In the place of centralised patron-client systems controlled by ‘strongmen’, bulk and retail vote-buying and selling are now being used to secure or elicit electoral votes in a manner that might be described as unethical, but less violent. Moreover, today, popular political slogans like ‘stomach infrastructure’ and ‘*E dibo, ke se’be*’, that is, ‘vote and cook’; in other words, literally, ‘sell your votes and get money to cook a pot of soup!’, have made winning elections more monetised with vote buying less centralised and less violent in many places where political patrons held sway. While there seems to have been a reduction in the ‘strongmen’ syndrome in Nigeria’s national politics and its effects on “prebendalism”, or patron-client relations, as an analytical framework for explaining the frequency of violent conflicts in the period covered in this study, the rate of political violence across the states has not witnessed a similar appreciable reduction.

From an amnesty program embroiled in allegations of corruption and a failed or failing dialogue process with militants in the Niger Delta, the country’s main source of foreign exchange earnings – crude oil – has literally been held by ‘the jugular’ by militants in the region. There is far more to be done in continuously assuaging the fears of the militants; who are still at daggers-drawn with their communities and the Nigerian State.

Fault lines of ethnicity and religion have proven to be very divisive and destructive in Nigeria as they provide narratives of mutual hatred, suspicion and animosity which unfortunately constitute the basis of making civic choices by the electorate.

Civil society could play a major role in addressing the challenges of peace and conflict in Nigeria, however, due to paucity of funds, there has been very little that they could achieve beyond advocacy, research and mediation.

Despite the passage of the Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill, the access needed to carry out in-depth investigative journalism is still denied. The media still operate under the yoke of ownership and limited resources in carrying out in-depth investigative search before going to the press which sometimes brings about inadvertent misrepresentation not taken lightly by parties in conflict. This is because the media is generally perceived to be subjective because it still operates under the yoke of ownership and limited resources in carrying out indepth and objective investigation before going to the press. This brings about inadvertent misrepresentation not taken lightly by parties in conflict. The lack of life insurance for many journalists reduces their motivations to go into certain theatres of conflicts in the country which denies them access to primary sources and visuals from scenes of conflicts. The media is also implicated in some instances of conflict escalation through conflict-insensitive reportage. In the period under study, the social media, especially Facebook and Twitter became avenues for communities in conflict to promote hate narratives and self-justifying account of the conflict.

The business community constitutes one of the victims of conflicts and insurgency across Nigeria. However, they are also stakeholders who must be given important roles to play in peacebuilding and security especially through their corporate social responsibilities.

SECTION FIVE

Recommendations

5.1 Achieving Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

As the 16th goal of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions are central to the pursuit and attainment of sustainable peace. The SDGs, especially the 16th goal, provides strategic guidance for identifying means and ends towards having sustainable peace and development that is people-oriented.

Going by findings from the six geo-political zones, it has become imperative to generate specific recommendations for each Track of Response.

In the final analysis, while all of the six zonal SCA reports have embodied more comprehensive recommendations for the tackling of the multifaceted challenge of managing conflict occurrences and their overriding impacts, the following recommendations are hereby made.

5.1.1 Recommendations for Track One: Government

Strengthening the Capacity of the IPCR

- (1) As the apex agency of government with the statutory mandate of analysing, preventing, managing, resolving/transforming conflicts and promoting peace, the IPCR should be strengthened in all ramifications towards effectively delivering on its mandate.
- (2) Establish the Peace Fund as contained in the National Peace Policy and IPCR Act 34 of 2007.
- (3) **Promoting sustainable human development:** Government should mainstream human development and people-oriented strategies in implementing all policies and actions.
- (4) **Reducing Poverty:** Sustainable policies and programmes targeted at reducing poverty should be pursued by all tiers of government in order to discourage people from anti-social behaviours such as violent conflicts.
- (5) **Equitable Distribution of National Wealth:** Government at all levels should ensure equal access to opportunities that will enhance people's prosperity/well-being in order to discourage the narratives of exclusion. **Women Sensitivity and Inclusion:** in due recognisance of the UNSC Resolution 1325 translated into Nigeria's National Action Plan 2012 on strategies for implementing the UNSCR 1325 in Nigeria should be implemented.
- (6) **Sustainable Environmental Development:** Government should domesticate international treaties and resolutions tailored towards meeting peculiar environmental challenges and impact of climate change.

- (7) **Effective Management of Humanitarian Assistance:** The administration of humanitarian assistance should uphold the tenets of the 'Do No Harm' principles.
- (8) **Good Governance and Human Security:** Institutions and structures of governance should be strengthened to serve the people.
- (9) **Civic Participation:** Government should support citizens' empowering initiatives.
- (10) **Youth-Sensitive Policies:** Deliberate youth-sensitive policies should be mainstreamed into all government initiatives.
- (11) **Tackling the menace of drugs and narcotics:** Special interventions should be designed to address the menace of availability and abuse of narcotic substances in ungoverned spaces.
- (12) **Effective Transhumance Policies:** Government should ensure that in domesticating the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol of 1998 and the ECOWAS Protocol of free movement of persons in West Africa, human security is not compromised.
- (13) **Enhanced border management:** Innovative and cooperative approaches aimed at enhancing the security of borders should be explored towards changing borders from barriers to bridges.
- (14) **Promoting Conflict-Sensitive Preaching:** The activities of preachers across the religions should be monitored in order to check provocative and dangerous preaching.
- (15) **Separating State from Religion:** Conscious efforts should be made to separate the Nigerian state from religion in the conduct of all state affairs.

Inclusive Approach in Managing the Herders and Farmers Conflict

- (1) The practice of ranching should be encouraged.
- (2) Government should review the Land Use Act 1978 to encourage agricultural activities and ensure the protection of local communities.
- (3) Protection of small-holder/peasant farmers through the establishment of farm reserves.
- (4) Special interventions to protect women farmers.

Constructive response to agitations for restructuring

- (1) Government should consider dialogue and constructive engagement in resolving issues of self-determination and civil agitations in the South-East zone.
- (2) Increasing agitations for the restructuring of the country should be given constructive engagements rather than utter dismissal.
- (3) **Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of blighted communities:** Communities ravaged by conflicts and insurgency should be reconstructed to facilitate the return to normal life. This should be complemented with the provision of social amenities and life-enhancing gestures like scholarships for the youths, the provision of quality schools, housing, healthcare and social services including psycho-social

intervention and support geared toward addressing the effects of trauma associated with violent conflict.

State Level Conflict Management Structures

- (1) Respective state governments should institutionalise conflict management and peacebuilding structures that will proactively respond to early warning signs of conflicts.
- (2) Identify the ‘peace constituency’ in each community towards enhancing and mobilising their capacities for peace.
- (3) **Peace-education and Strategic Communication:** Peace-education and Strategic Communication should be encouraged at both formal and informal learning spaces.

Capacity Building on Conflict Sensitivity for Security Agents

Security personnel should be trained adequately in conflict sensitivity and management techniques.

Track Two: Recommendations: Civil Society Organisations

Institutional support for the civil society

- (1) The civil society should form stronger coalitions around specific issues to maximise their resources.
- (2) **Civic Participation:** The civil society should support citizens’ empowering initiatives
- (3) **Transparency and accountability:** The civil society should intensify their role as watchdog in ensuring transparency and accountability in governance. Equally, civil society should demonstrate leadership in being transparent accountable.
- (4) **Stimulating Public-Private Partnership for Peace and Development:** Increased means of collaboration should be explored towards impactful initiatives to sustain peace, reconciliation and development.
- (5) **Corporate Social Responsibility Interventions for Peace:** Local and transnational players in the corporate space should support peace-promoting initiatives as a cardinal point of their corporate social responsibility.
- (6) **Monitoring and Evaluation:** Civil society actors should be more alive to their responsibilities in monitoring and evaluating all initiatives, programmes, funds and activities related to conflict management and peacebuilding.

Track-Three Recommendations for International Organisations

- (1) International development partners and agencies should be conflict-sensitive in their activities and focally support peacebuilding initiatives and institutions.
- (2) Supporting capacity building for peace and conflict resolution.
- (3) Ensure standardisation and best practices in peacebuilding and conflict management through knowledge sharing.
- (4) Supporting norms around peace, security and human rights through advocacy.

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ZONAL REPORTS

North-Central Geo-Political Zone

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List of Acronyms

AMAC	Abuja Municipal Council
ASUU	Academic Staff Union of Universities
BENGO NET	Benue NGO Network
BSPC	Benue State Planning Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
EDF	Elohim Development Foundation
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
GERI	Gender and Environmental Risk Reduction Initiative
HDWs	Hand-Dug Wells
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
JCIs	Judicial Commissions of Inquiry
JRI	Justice and Rights Initiative
JDPC	Justice Development and Peace Commission
LGAs	Local Government Areas
MACBAN	Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria
NBC	National Boundary Commission
NDLEA	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NOA	National Orientation Agency
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps
NBA	Nigerian Bar Association
NPF	Nigeria Police Force
NGOs	Non-Governmental-Organisations
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
ODU	Oro-Ago Descendants Union
STDs	Sexually-Transmitted Diseases
STF	Special Task Force
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

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Executive Summary

The states in the North Central zone of Nigeria are Benue, Nasarawa, Niger, Kogi, Kwara, Plateau states and the Federal Capital Territory. The area has a high socio-political and religious plurality and a large percentage of ethnic minorities in Nigeria which makes it a melting pot of identities and fault lines.

In line with the objectives of the 2016 SCA, this study generated data towards having an up to date analysis of the causes, actors, impacts, dynamics, responses and gaps in the literature on the conflicts in the North-Central zone of Nigeria. This is deepened by situating them within the contexts of security, political, economic and social causations, ramifications and implications using the framework of human security.

Data generation was largely qualitative given the sensitive and emotive nature of conflict and security matters and such data were corroborated and queried by comparison with secondary sources. Thus observations, interviews and Focus Group discussions were held in each of the conflict-affected settings in each state of the zone. Participants and respondents included actors in conflicts, victims, religious and political stakeholders and security agents many of whom later came to participate in the validation exercise held as climax of the field work.

Indeed, the ripeness of the North-Central for a study of this nature cannot be ignored with a sleight of hand as this zone comes next to the terrorised spaces of North-Eastern Nigeria in the number of internally-displaced persons. While some findings, especially causes of the conflicts, could be described as generic in the zone comprising the six states of the North-Central zone, responses to conflicts, attendant tension and humanitarian crises generated by some of these conflicts are peculiar.

The farmers-herders conflict has remained a dominant feature in all the states in the North-Central. Land remains a scare resource in the zone, worsened by increasing demand resulting in frequent clashes between herders and host communities; most of whom are farmers. Rural-banditry and cattle-rustling are rife in the zone, characterised by armed assaults, rape, kidnapping, organised attacks and reprisals on villages and communities. Protracted disputes over supremacy and rights to chieftaincy stools are also rife in the geo-political zone; often degenerating into indigene-settler conflicts. Urban gangsterism and frequent clashes between these gangs over territories and illegal tolling were found in all the capital cities of the six states. In Abuja, resistance of the motor cycle riders popularly called 'okada riders' against attempts to enforce laws restricting and proscribing them from certain areas often degenerate into violence.

With the exception of Kwara and Nasarawa states, all other states including Abuja, the FCT, suffered attacks by the Boko Haram terrorist organisation – akin to a spillover of the conflict between the sect and the government from the North-East. The

mismanagement of civil-military relations and inter-faith relations worsened the already fragile relations between the Gbagyi and the Herders and the Muslims and Christians in different places in Niger state; generating clashes that claimed lives and belongings. Militaristic and humanitarian responses were found to be common in all the states, including Judicial Commissions of Inquiry (JCIs) – some of which went further to recommend the initiation of peace and reconciliation processes, such as the one chaired by Justice Sikirulai Oyinloye, in the aftermath of the Erin-Ile and Offa clash in 2013.

Kogi state has the lowest record of government interventions in reconciling communities in conflict because the conflicts in the state have had trans-border dimensions involving communities in the state and neighbouring communities from other states, like Anambra and Enugu. Despite the frequency of conflicts resulting in insecurity and humanitarian crises, only Plateau state has an institutionalised conflict management mechanism; while others respond on *ad hoc* basis. Interventions from the civil society have not been sustained in the geo-political zone, except in Plateau; while the religious and traditional institutions have sustained their advocacy as well.

Towards improving inter-group relations and establishing sustainable peace, it is recommended that state governments should take cognisance of the inevitability of differences and struggles that could easily degenerate into violence and put in place proactive structures that are firm, sincere and transparent to build confidence and trust of parties in conflict. Therefore, respective state governments should institutionalise conflict management and peacebuilding structures that will proactively, civilly and effectively collate and respond to early-warning signs of potential and impending conflicts, in line with extant laws, while enacting new ones where none exists. This should not preclude the need to identify and isolate “spoilers and conflict entrepreneurs” in each conflict setting and relating with them as the issues and settings dictate. Equally important is the need to identify the “peace constituency” in each conflict setting as well, towards enhancing and mobilising their capacities for peace. This reinforces the need for closer working relationships between state governments, security agencies, the socio-political and economic notables, the civil society and the IPCR – the latter being the appropriate agency of government; towards providing informed analysis and pragmatic suggestions.

SECTION ONE

Introduction and Historical Background

The North Central zone is composed of six states: Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, along with the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The FCT has been assigned the status of a state by the Constitution. The zone is strategically situated in the middle of the country between the north and the south and has a large concentration of minority ethnic groups in the country. Like the confluence of the River Niger and the River Benue, it provides attraction to all ethnic nationalities in the country thereby making it the most ethnically heterogeneous and culturally diverse geo-political zone in the country. It provides a converging point for western and eastern civilisations, which often result in violent religious conflicts.

The zone is well endowed by nature with very rich vegetation and provides a lot of attraction to the transhumance herders from Northern states of the country as well as from Mali, Senegal, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Niger, Chad among others. It is well bestowed with irrigated and arable land, rich pasture, forest reserve, and water bodies. The zone has marked ecological diversity and climatic contrasts along with diverse biophysical characteristics, agro-ecological zones and socio-economic conditions. It is indeed the food basket of the country. About 80 percent of the population derives its income from agriculture. The zone is also endowed with various mineral resources that offer potential for economically viable industrial and agricultural development projects which include: tin and columbite, marble, coal, semi-precious stones, barites, iron ore and aqua marine. There are also plenty of untapped energy resources.

The North Central zone given its plurality has numerous conflicts that have become intractable. The conflicts have been mainly resource based and identity in nature. It has been characterised by religious violence, ethnoreligious conflicts, 'indigeneity' and 'settlement,' as well as access to land and livelihoods. The latest being the herders-farmers conflicts and cattle-rustling defined as an economically based form of criminality driven by informal networks (Kwaja, 2013).

The production potentials of grassland and livestock in the arid and semi-arid region is constrained by low and variable rainfall (Ifatimehin, 2008). In the early 20th century, cattle herders in Northern Nigeria had access to vast areas of grassland. Over time, and with the introduction of irrigated farming in the savannah belt, less pasture was available to herders (Olayoku, 2014). This necessitated southwards movement of the herdsman to the coastal zone where the rainy season is longer, in search of pasture and water.

Climate change, southern migration, the expansion of farming on pastures and invasion of farmlands by cattle has been identified as some of the causes of conflicts. Others are assaults and allegations of rape of non-herders women by herders, blockage of water

points leading to freshwater scarcity, burning of rangelands, cattle theft, inadequate animal health care and disease control.

Over-grazing of fallow lands, defecation on roads and streams by cattle, extensive sedentarisation and ethnic stereotyping (Olayoku, 2014). All of these can be situated into the context of access to and control of land as a scarce resource and economic survival of the pastoralists and farmers.

Cases of farmers-herders' conflicts have been widespread in Nigeria in recent times. According to Fasona et al (2016), conflicts resulting from cattle grazing actually accounted for 35 percent of all reported cases between 1991 and 2005. More recently, Amaza (2016) reports that out of reported 389 incidents of herdsmen and farmers conflicts from 1997 to 2015, 371 occurred in the Middle Belt otherwise known as the North-Central. The North-Central states of Benue, the Federal Capital Territory, Kogi, Nasarawa, Niger, Kwara and Plateau, are the most affected areas in the country. There is no clear consensus on whether the farmers or the herdsmen are worse hit. However, the effect on arable crops, which constitutes the substantial part of Nigeria's agricultural production, has been a source of serious research and academic debate and a source of concern for the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). The security implications have escalated to unprecedented proportions with the recent classification of some Herders herdsmen as Boko Haram collaborators or the next security challenge by foreign and local observers (Amaza, 2016).

The North-Central states emerged from the old Northern Region, which was an autonomous center of power within Nigeria, distinctly different from the southern part of the country. It had independent customs, foreign relations and security structures were slightly different from the south. On 27 May, 1967 the regions were dissolved and 12 states created instead. Benue-Plateau state and Kwara state were created along with North-Western state, North-Eastern state, Kano state, North-Central state. In 1976, North Western state was divided into Sokoto and Niger, while Abuja (FCT) was carved out of Niger, Kwara and Plateau states. North Eastern state was divided into Borno, Gongola and Bauchi. Benue-Plateau was separated into Benue and Plateau. In 1987 Katsina was carved out of Kaduna. Kogi was carved out of Kwara in 1991 and Nasarawa was created from Plateau state in 1996.

Other than the Tiv riots of 1960 and 1964, the Northern Region was largely peaceful. The crisis actually began to brew in 1959 during the build up to elections. The United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) had actively mobilised popular support in the length and breadth of Tivland. As a result of this popular support from the people, the opposition UMBC won 85 percent of Tiv votes cast while the Northern People's Congress (NPC) won only 10 percent. Unfortunately for the UMBC, their votes could not push forth their aspirations as they had no influence upon the nature of the government that prevailed at the local level.

As new states emerged, new fault-lines also appeared on the horizon to create violent conflicts in each of the states that constitute the North-Central states. Cognisant of the centrality of peace in the context of state-society and inter-group relations for democratic consolidation, security and development on one hand and the inevitability of conflicts on the other hand, the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) with the support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Nigeria and other development partners, has been embarking on regular assessment of conflicts across the country towards providing a holistic and evidence-based suggestions to the government and other critical stakeholders to the peace, security and cohesion of the country.

As a sequel to previous editions, the SCA 2016 aimed to develop “an overview of the conflict context and trends of violent conflicts, analyse the key stakeholders, and map out conflict related risks and peace-building opportunities, with a view to outlining a number of options . . .”, covering from 2013 to 2016. Dating back to 2002 when the first Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) of the country was undertaken. The IPCR continues to improve on every edition of the exercise utilising innovative methodologies towards keeping pace with the trajectories and dimensions of conflicts in all contexts across the country.

SECTION TWO

Methodology

The methodology adopted for the 2016 SCA was a combination of unobtrusive methods; which made room for the administration of questionnaire, conduct of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions in all communities visited. This was preceded by a review of relevant literature and situation reports on the conflict situations in the communities where the studies were carried out. This informed the design of the research instruments. Specifically, the instruments were tailored towards generating responses from actors, victims, formal and informal interveners. Analyses of the data were done by taking into focal considerations, the structure, actor and dynamics of each conflict which subsequently informed the suggestions. This is followed by a presentation of the impact, responses from tracks one, two and three and conclusions. This report also identifies gaps in literature, responses, general conclusion and recommendations.

SECTION THREE

Conflict/Peace Case Studies

This section provides a report of the multiple cases that were studied in the North Central, with each state treated as a single case. The North Central zone, given its nature, has numerous conflicts that have become intractable. The conflict cases have been mainly resource based and identity in nature. It has been characterised by religious violence, ethno-religious conflicts, 'indigeneity' and 'settlement,' as well as access to land and livelihoods. The latest being the herders-farmers conflicts and cattle rustling. Competition-driven conflicts between arable crop farmers and cattle herdsman have become common occurrences in many parts of North Central. Cases of farmers-herders' conflicts have been widespread in the zone in recent times. Benue, Kogi, Nasarawa, Niger, Kwara, Plateau and the Federal Capital Territory have been identified as the most affected areas in the country. A detailed contextual analysis of specific conflict types and episodes in each state are presented and each case conclusions are used as information contributing to the whole study, but each case remains a single case.

FCT Abuja (Centre of Unity)

Modern Abuja's root can be traced to the Abuja Emirate formed in 1825 partially as a result of the Herders Jihad (Adebanwi, 2006). The initial residents then, were ethnic nationalities of the Habe (Hausa), Gwari, Koro, Gade and Ganagana. Also, there were the Gwandara, Bassa and Herders but the aborigines (the Gwari, Gade, Gwandara) and settlers (Hausa, Herders, etc.) were to be properly resettled in adjoining areas of the FCT as part of compensations for their dislocation, but was haphazardly done (Adebanwi, 2006).

According to Adebanwi (2006), a 'virgin land' was acquired in the center of Nigeria in 1976 in the geographical centre of Nigeria with the intention of building a new Federal Capital Territory (FCT) because of the need to create a center of unity as publicly articulated. There was also a moral dimension to idea of a center of unity in that it was intended to be a symbol that will transcend Nigeria's disparate and contending primordial identities and to project a national essence that all will be implored to subscribe to (Adebanwi, 2006). So, on 3 February, 1976, late head of state General Murtala Muhammed announced in a broadcast to the country the decision to relocate the capital of Nigeria from Lagos to Abuja and 48 hours after, Decree No. 6, of 1976 (Federal Capital Act) was enacted thereby giving birth to a new city from the lands of Niger, Plateau and Kwara states. A Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) was one of the first institutions created to monitor the preparation of a comprehensive master plan for the city which stands on 8,000 sq. km. of land approximately two and a half times the size of Lagos (Adebanwi, 2006).

It is bordered in the north by Kaduna state, the west by Niger state, the east and South-East by Nasarawa state and the southwest by Kogi state. The FCT's natural endowments such as; its rolling hills, isolated highlands and other endearing features make it a delight. The savannah grassland of the north and the Middle Belt, the richness of the tropical rain forest of the south and an equable climate all combined to make the FCT a soil-rich agricultural haven.

Since it officially became the capital of Nigeria in 1991, successive regimes have been making conscious efforts to ensure that it lives up to its intended vision of a 'centre of unity.' The physical landscape of the city reflects the diversity of Nigeria as it has the National Mosque and the Nigerian National Christian Center amongst other features bearing testimonies to Nigerian's unity. As a means of preserving memories and creating memories (Adebanwi, 2012), the naming of streets in Abuja reflect the past and present heroes and notables of the country. Despite its allure, the city has its own poorly developed areas mostly on its outskirts. The influx of Nigerians from all parts of the country has also led to the emergence of towns like Karu Urban Area, Suleja Urban Area and the growth, Gwagwalada, Lugbe, Karchi, Jukwuyi, Kuje and other hitherto smaller settlements. Metropolitan Abuja is made up of Apo, Garki, and Wuse, etc.

Insurgency in the FCT

Abuja as the seat of power and Nigeria's centre of unity has been deliberately targeted on a number of occasions by the *Boko Haram*. Some of these have both national and global significance. The attack on the United Nations (UN) headquarters and other symbols of state power, authority and national security in the city just as the insurgents did not spare other soft targets like public mass gatherings such as markets and bus terminals. Below is a reflection of the trends in the attacks carried out by the insurgents in the city.

Farmer-Herder Conflict in the FCT

Just as other states and communities in the North Central suffer from herdsmen attacks, communities outside the Abuja municipal also suffer violent confrontations between herdsmen and Gbagyi farmers. Most of these attacks are initiated by the encroachment of the Herders into the Gbagyi's farm with their flocks eating up the farm and destroying their crops.

In one of such confrontations between the Gbagyi people and Herders in December 2012, 27 communities were sacked and there was the displacement of over 1500 persons in Gwako, Gwagwalada LGA (*PM News*, 2012). A similar conflict occurred on 7 June, 2014 which led to the death of 5 people while 21 people sustained injuries in a clash between Gbagyi farmers and herdsmen in Paiko, Gwagwalada Area Council, in the Federal Capital Territory (ICIR Nigeria, 2014).

Table 1: Distribution of Attacks by Boko Haram in Abuja as at February 2016

States	Dates	Types of Attacks	Monthly Attacks	Soft Targets	Hard Targets	Injured	Civilian Deaths	Security Agents Deaths	BH Deaths
Abuja	Dec 2010	Bomb attacks	2	Soft			15		
	May 2011	Bomb attack	1	Soft			3		
	June 2011	Suicide Attacks	1		Hard		8		
	Aug 2011	Bomb Attack	1		Hard				
	Mar 2012	Death in prison	1						9
	Apr 2012	Suicide Attacks	1	Soft			4		
	May 2012	Bomb attack	1		Hard	80	23		
	June 2012	Bomb attack	1						
	July 2012	Bomb attack	1	Soft					
	April 2014	Bomb/Suicide Attacks	1	Soft		200	75		
	May 2014	Bomb attacks	1	Soft	Hard	60			
	June 2014	Bomb attacks	1	Soft		17	21		

Source: Animasawun, 2016

On 14 August, 2014, there was another clash between herdsmen and farmers in Gawu Ward, Abaji, which led to the loss of lives and property. Another clash was reported on March 2, 2015 still in the context of farmers and herders. An account has it that the conflict was reprisal after a farmer was attacked and killed in his compound by unknown herdsmen at Pegi village in Kuje. On 25 March, 2016, there was another clash between herdsmen and farmers where it was alleged that the herdsmen intruded into the farmland of a Sukuku farmer destroying his crops with their cattle and when the farmer questioned the herdsmen, they became violent and threatened to kill the farmer who was with his son in the farm. In the cause of the hot exchanges, one of the herdsmen fired a gunshot into the air which made the farmer and his son run away out of fear. The herdsmen did not stop there. They chased them into their village (Sukuku) and started shooting sporadically at the residents; as a result 7 people were hacked to death and 3 missing. The incident happened in Yangoji ward of Kwali Area Council. On 25 April, 2016 there was a clash between the herdsmen and farmers. A Gbagyi farmer had a clash with a herdsman and he died. His brother went after the herdsman. In the process the herdsman was killed. This took place in Shazi village, a suburb of Kuje Area Council.

Indigene-Settler Conflict

Kaida-Tsoho community in Gwagwalada Area Council is a community populated by both Bassa and Gbagyi indigenes. Paradoxically, members of the ethnic groups pay allegiance to two contending traditional authorities, a situation which has polarised the community into two (Arinze, 2014). Gbagyi natives claimed their ancestors were the first to discover and settle on Kaida-Tsoho, having migrated from Zaria. According to the Sarkin Gbagyi, Mallam Mohammed Alabara “Hausa people in Zaria did not like us so my ancestors had to leave. Being farmers, when they came to this land and discovered a river, they decided to settle here”.

Gbagyi people in the community rely on the history of the land in making their claims that the land belongs to them, arguing that Bassa people came and met them after several years.

They said Bassa people deceived them because “They were well known for fishing and sometimes when they caught fish they brought some to us. We, on the other hand, we were known for farming. However, they do a little bit of farming,” explained the Sarkin Gbagyi. The community used to be under the rule of the chief of Zuba, but crisis started when he appointed Alabara the village head of Kaida-Tsoho. Bassa people were not comfortable with the appointment, kicked against it and refused to pay allegiance to Alabara. They asked for the appointment of their own leader and got one from the ruler of Zuba.

The secretary of Bassa indigenes in the community, confirmed the leadership tussle, describing it as “an age-long conflict.” “We have two chiefs in this community because everyone wants to be represented since there are two different tribes. That’s the main reason there are two chiefs in the community”. He confirmed that the members of the two ethnic groups were not living in peace.

Findings revealed that Bassa people laid claim to the ownership of the land due to traces of ‘ganuwa’ in the community, that is, war trenches common among Bassa communities used as a protection during invasions by enemies. Such thinking is reinforced by the following mention by a field participant: “Ganuwa is the heritage of Bassa people. We have it in this community and that was where our ancestors hid during wars in the past. This is our community and nobody can claim it.” However, it is worth noting that students from both Gbagyi and Bassa homes attend the same schools, use the same Primary Healthcare Centre (PHC) and drink from the same source of water, but this does not signify communality for the people as their houses are distinctively separated and one can easily discern the demarcation between Gbagyi and Bassa homes (Arinze, 2014).

Ethnic Conflicts

On 11 June, 2014, the body of a Gbagyi youth was found at notorious spot which the youths converted into a venue for consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs. The youths

suspected the Herders community who live around the vicinity to have murdered him. In anger, one of the youth got a machete and attacked two Herders men ridding on a motorcycle. One of them died and the other was taken to the hospital by an onlooker, thereby creating inter-ethnic tensions.

Other Criminality Induced Conflict

In addition to the interviews conducted, two sessions of FGD were held. The first FGD was done at the Nyanya Federal Housing Authority (FHA) junction just opposite St. Mary's Catholic Church Karu/Nanya. The session generated data on the types of conflicts in the town which do not get reported by the media. FGD found out that on 4 August, 2013 an altercation between a commercial motorcycle rider popularly known as *Okada* rider and a soldier, over obstructive manner of parking by the *Okada* rider which the soldier allegedly drew his attention to. The soldier was said to have insisted that the *Okada* be properly parked but further told the *Okada* rider to lie down inside drainage! This attracted the attention of fellow *Okada* riders who demonstrated their usual 'team spirit' (Animasawun, 2017) by collectively haranguing the soldier and other motorists around. The soldier escaped from the scene and returned with soldiers who overpowered the *Okada* riders and took them away in military vehicles although some of them escaped with injuries.

The second FGD was held at Gbazango pipeline area in Kubwa and this was informed by the observed propensity of the rate of crimes that have led to inter-group skirmishes and sometimes violent confrontations. One of such conflict-generating crimes was the killing on 9 July, 2016 of late Mrs. Eunice Olawale whose daughter said 'they just killed her like a chicken and left her there' (Omonobi, et al 2016).

Impact of Conflicts and Insurgency on Human Security

Insurgency in Abuja really manifested as a conflict that pitched the Boko Haram insurgents as one side against the Nigerian state, her people and the residents of the city and global interests present in the city. Within the period under focus, this has had more telling effects on physical and psychological security of the people in the city. Next to insurgency, inter-group conflicts also exist in the city in ways that mirror deeper fissures along class and identity fault lines. The frequent and violent demonstration of team spirit by the *Okada* riders reflect the impression held of those they consider better off and oppressive in the city. Also, the clashes between the farmers and herders speak to the ubiquity of the crisis and struggle over access and control of natural resources.

Conflict Actors' Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities and Incentives

The conflict and security landscape of the city has a number of actors ranging from formal and informal players. However, due to the absence of any protracted conflict in the FCT, the clashing interests of the actors can be mediated and reconciled through fair, accessible and transparent governance.

Intervention/Responses

Track 1

The government of the FCT has consistently cooperated with security agents in ensuring that anything that portends ill for the peace and stability is nipped in the bud. Nevertheless more can still be done in this direction.

Track 2

Despite the visibility of local and international not-for-profit organisations in the FCT, not many of them are working or funding activities on peace perhaps due to the infrequency of conflicts.

Conclusion

The FCT is not immune from insurgency just like many other parts of northern Nigeria. Also, the farmers-herders conflict rears its ugly head in the suburbs as well as the intermittent disturbances of public peace by the conduct of *Okada* riders. While the suicide attacks are signpost of established threats, the farmers-herders conflict and the spontaneous mobilisation of group violence by *Okada* riders deserve attention by the government and relevant stakeholders in the city. Criminal acts that could be read as attacks are potential sources of inter-group conflagrations. The murder of Mrs Eunice Oyewale a Christian who was on early morning neighbourhood evangelism could have degenerated into an inter-faith and inter-ethnic crisis for which the women's ethnic and religious identities could have been mobilised to set the city on fire.

While attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents in Abuja have waned, the city must not play down the potential of space, identity and uneven distribution of wealth in the city amidst a growing number of marginal population to giving vent to violent expressions. The impacts of the terrorists attack in the FCT are loss of lives and properties, Insecurity and distrust amongst everyone. It also succeeded in creating road blocks and barrier on so many roads and organisations in FCT as well as increase religious intolerance. The impact of this on women was the loss of their means of livelihood, lives and loved ones.

Gaps in Literature, Policy and Responses

While events and happenings in capital cities and especially Abuja are often top of news items, detailed studies into how such cities contend with conflicts and tensions arising from its complex and plural nature have not been greatly investigated. As a centre of unity, the management of Abuja can greatly impact positively or negatively on inter-group relations and peaceful co-existence because it houses all identity groups in the country. Therefore policies and programmes to enhance this must be explored and promoted.

Recommendations

Given the peculiar inter-relatedness of criminality and conflict in the FCT, government, stakeholders and security agents must creatively explore novel ways of first keeping every space safe and free of criminal elements whose activities might be read as ethnic attacks when they are actually criminal. Proper, fair and just handling of the farmers-herders conflict in the city is crucial.

Benue State (Food Basket of the Nation)

Capital: Makurdi



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

<http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Introduction and Historical Background

This section is based on information gleaned from the official website of the Benue state government. The history of Benue state dates back to when it was carved out of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria at the start of the 20th century. It was first known as Munshi Province until 1918 when it was named after its most geographical feature, the River Benue. On 3 February, 1976, Benue state was part of the states created by the administration of General Murtala Mohammed as one of the states that swelled the number of states in Nigeria from 13 to 19. Further alteration was done to its boundaries in 1991 with the creation of Kogi state. Presently the state has 23 local government areas.

The state lies within the lower river Benue trough in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. Benue state shares boundaries with five other states, namely: Nassarawa to the north, Taraba to the east, Cross-River to the south, Enugu to the south-west and Kogi to the west. The state also shares a common boundary with the Republic of Cameroun on the south-east. Benue has a population of 4,780,389 (2006 census) and occupies a landmass of 32,518 sq. km.

Benue state is ethno-nationally plural and some of the main ethnic groups are the Tiv, Idoma, Igede, Etulo, Abakpa, Jukun, Hausa, Akweya and Nyifon. The Tiv are the

dominant ethnic group, occupying 14 local government areas, while the Idoma, Igede and others occupy the remaining nine local government areas. Christians make up the religious majority with a sprinkle population of Muslims and traditionalists.

Occupationally, most of the people are farmers while the inhabitants of the riverine areas engage in fishing as their primary or important secondary occupation. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, engaging over 75 percent of the state farming population. The state also boasts of one of the longest stretches of river systems in the country with great potential for a viable fishing industry, dry season farming through irrigation and for an inland water highway. The vegetation of the southern parts of the state is characterised by forests, which yield trees for timber and provide a suitable habitat for rare animals. The state thus possesses potential for the development of viable forest and wildlife reserves.

The state is blessed with both mineral and natural resources across the Local Government Areas of the state. Of these mineral resources, only limestone at Tse-Kucha near Gboko and kaolin at Otukpo are being commercially explored. In terms of natural resources, it is acclaimed as the food basket of the country because of its rich agricultural produce which includes yams, rice, beans, cassava, potatoes, maize, soya beans, sorghum, millet and cocoyam. The state also accounts for over 70 percent of Nigeria's soya bean production.

Conflict in Benue State

Cattle rustling are common in Agatu, Apa, Gwer and Guma Local Government Areas of Benue state. These are executed with sophisticated weaponry. The Tivs are also in bloody battles with Hausa communities in Azara in Nasarawa state over land ownership. The herdsmen and Tiv militia extended their confrontations by turning Kadarko, Kwara and other villages in Giza Development Area of Keana Local Government (Nasarawa state) and other villages on the Benue side into a conflict zone.

Arising from the armed violence in 2010, between the herdsmen and Tiv farmers in Guma Local Government Area of Benue state, the displaced herdsmen moved from Benue state and took refuge in Akpanaja, Rukubi and Doka in Doma Local Government Area of Nasarawa state, on the fringes of the boundary with Benue state. Shortly afterwards, the Tiv militia attacked the Akpanaja, Rukubi and Doka communities, while in pursuit of the herdsmen. The herdsmen waged a ferocious attack on a number of Tiv communities that destroyed many lives and property. The armed confrontation involved the use of SALWs, including sophisticated assault rifles, such as AK47.

Impacts of Conflict on Human Security

The peace and stability of Benue state has, in the last one decade, been threatened by violent and volatile clashes between farmers and herdsmen. The resultant effects on human security, economic well-being and socio-cultural practices of the people of the

state have been devastating. For instance, between 2010 and 2013, it was estimated that 3,000 people were killed in violent conflicts between Tiv farmers and herdsmen, while over 5,000 residents were displaced in the affected communities (HRW, 2014). Also, in 2013, about 30 farmers were killed in armed clashes that occurred between herdsmen and Tiv farmers in Guma LGA Benue state. The herdsmen severally attacked the Agatu communities killing over 111 people in retaliation for the killing of 112 cows by the communities within the Agatu LGA of Benue state.

Between January and April 2014, Herders herdsmen attacks led to the death of five (5) soldiers and seven civilians in Agatu LGA, 35 people in Gwer West LGA, 8 people in Tiv community along Makurdi, 28 people in Ukpam village of Mbabaai. Also, the Former Governor of the state, Suswan, narrowly escaped from herdsmen attacks on his convoy on March 10, at Umenger. Other clashes between the herdsmen and the communities in Benue state led to the dead of 50 people in Agatu LGA, 15 people in Gwer LGA and 16 in Logo LGA where herdsmen always put up a surprise attacks on the unexpected villages who were able to put up little or no resistant (*National Accord*, 2016).

Between January and March 2015, over 100 herdsmen in several attacks stormed Abugbe, Okoklo, Ogwule, Ocholoyan villages all in Agatu LGA and killed over 95 people including women and children. Other attacks on smaller villages and refugee camps at Ukura, Gafa, Per and Tse-Gusa, Logo LGA left over 100 of dead persons, while 13 others were killed in Bururku LGA and Kwande LGA (National Accord, 2016).

In 2016, violent conflict between residents of Adagbo, Akwu, Alla, Oduegbebo Ogboju, and Okokolo communities of Agatu Local Government and herdsmen resulted in the death of 500 people, displacement of about 20,000 individuals and the destruction of properties worth millions of Naira (Financial Nigeria, 2016).

Thirteen (13) Local Government Areas (LGAs) out of the 23 LGAs of Benue state have experienced various types of conflicts and conflict-related crimes as groups battle themselves over land, border, access and control of natural resources like the case of the herders and farmers conflict which has remained a reoccurring conflict with the scope expanding and widening on yearly basis (BENGONET, 2016).

The conflicts that occurred during this period had both positive and negative outcomes. Therefore some of them qualify as functional conflicts because of the long term positive changes that arose out of the way they were managed by the communities involved, the security agencies and the government. However, the fact that inter-gang violence still breaks out with adverse implications for the public and bystanders in such areas portends negativity for the handling conflict and security issues in the state.

In Benue state, across Agatu, Buruku, Logo and Tarka LGAs, the violent conflicts between herders and farmers have affected access to education and violated educational rights of school age boys and girls. School enrolment figures of Local Government

Education Authorities of selected LGAs believe that prior to the full escalation of violence in the communities, an average of 1 out of every 3 boys; and 1 out of every 5 girls of school age were not in school due to extreme poverty and other socio-cultural inhibitions in Agatu. The enrolment level in Buruku and Logo LGAs prior to the conflict was 1 out of every 4 boys; and 1 out of every 6 girls while that of Tarka was 1 out of every 6 boys; and 1 out of every 8 girls.

In Logo LGA, the conflicts inhibited access to education in four council wards namely Mbagber, Nenzev, Tombo, Turan and Ukemberagya/Tswarev Council Wards. It is believed that these wards were targeted for attacks because they border River Benue which is used as entry point for transhumance and grazing herders immigrating from North-East and North West Nigeria to the Benue valley. In Mbagber council ward, Mbawar kindred was worst-hit with Tseke village as biggest theatre of violence. The council ward has about 16 public primary schools. However, the high level of violence has resulted in a shut-down of 8 of these public primary schools. These affected schools are located in *Ushalegh, Kwaghneer, Goosu, Kinekaa, Ordi, Abinki, Sev-av and Demelu* (otherwise called *Vue*) communities. The Mbawar Community Secondary School which was built through 100 percent community effort was completely burnt down and demolished forcing long term closure of the only affordable closely located post-primary school in the ward. Insecurity was still high as children, women and men were observed to be living in perpetual fear and suspicion of every movement.

In Nenzev Council Ward, public primary schools are located in Gbon, Tse-Aluor, Shakume, Anyibe, Tyokyaa, Boikpa, Utuhaikyegh and Jiji. There are also private nursery and primary schools in Kyor, Tsuwega and Diba communities; as well as a Universal Basic Education Junior Secondary School in Kyor. The violence however resulted in closure of all schools in the communities above. It was observed that no school was functional in the council ward. In addition, primary school structures and instructional materials in Tse-Aluor, Anyibe and Gbon communities were vandalised.

The conflict had the biggest impacts on Tombo Council Ward, where 67 women, men and children were killed and dumped in Hand-Dug Wells (HDWs) to pollute water sources. The Ward has about 103 primary schools though some of the schools were not in areas affected by violence. All the schools located in each of Ikyumen, Puuravure, Anyibe (also called Aman), Tse-Ibor, Azege, Uzer, Ikyungwa, Gbeleve, Tse-Mku, Mbazar, Genyi Angura, Anungwa, Tyogbihi, Mbakighir, Tizaand Audu communities where violence was recorded were partially burnt down, destroyed and school materials vandalised. No school in the above mentioned conflict-prone areas is functional.

There are 14 public primary schools and a community secondary school in Turan Council Ward. None of these schools is functional as children from the community have been displaced as a result of the insecurity. In most of these schools, desks and blackboards were destroyed and teaching aids exposed to rains. The primary school in Pav which was built through 100 percent community effort was razed down and demolished.

A total of three council wards were affected by the conflict in Buruku LGA. These are Binev, Mbaapen and Mbayar. In Maapen Council Ward, there is a public primary school in each of Kegh, Udwer, Batur, Sev-av, Tyoambiir, Agyo, Gbanyam, Nyor, Gbor, Yarkwan and Shom communities. There are also nursery and primary schools in Deke and Agwabi communities as well as three secondary schools, two of which are located in Agwabi and one in Tyoambiir. Although none of these schools were burnt or demolished, it was observed that doors were burgled and teaching and learning materials destroyed, stolen or vandalised. All the schools have shut down as a result of insecurity such that both pupils and teachers have left the communities. The community was still recording triggers to the extent that respondents were tensed up during FGDs for fear of being attacked in the course of their engagement with our team.

A documented Report¹ of the impacts of the conflict in Mbaapen and Mbaya Council Wards, jointly prepared by stakeholders of the two LGAs under the auspices of Mbatie Community Development Association, was received for desk review. The report shows that all public primary schools (over 12 in total) in Mbatsaase, Mbaagir, Mbajor, Mbaatindi and Kendev communities of Mbaapen council ward were shut down as pupils and teachers fled in fear. Similarly, violence resulted in a shutdown of schools located in Mbakundu/Mbaju, Mbagbagh, Mbatsuwa.

A total of four council wards were affected by violence. Severe cases of violence were recorded in Mbanyagbe, Mbaayo and Mbakwakem wards while houses, schools and other infrastructure were vandalised following massive displacement of inhabitants of Mbakyaa council ward. There are over 58 Adult literacy centres and 73 public primary schools in the LGA. Out of this number, adult literacy centres in Akende-Ikyo, Kontyen, Tinekyura and Manger communities as well as public primary schools in Usombo, Mbaali, Tse-Tia, Kpev, Aboho, Mbakyura, Tindikyura, Avande were affected. It was observed that the Primary school in Avande was used as a camp for military officers deployed for internal security operations (ISO) in the area.

It was gathered that children who were displaced from the schools are living with family relations in safer parts of the LGA and other LGAs like Gboko and Makurdi; while very few were in cities with relations and guardians. In Tombo ward, classes were organised in safe spots of the ward under trees to provide continuous education. However, only few pupils attended these make-shift classes as majority of them were displaced from the communities.

The situation in the communities presents an enigma of challenges in achieving educational development in affected LGAs. There are worrisome evolving trends such as early marriage and prostitution of adolescent girls in nearby towns like Gboko, Katsina-

1 Mbatie Development Association (2016). Summary Report on the Ongoing Herders Invasion of Mbatie Community. A Printed analytical report on impacts of the conflict on Mbaapen and Mbaya council wards of Buruku LGA.

Ala and Makurdi which portend to increase school drop-out cases. Community members suggested that government should increase security presence and action in affected wards for proper governance of spaces exploited for violence. They further solicited the support of government, private sector and international organisations to rebuild the community secondary school destroyed as communities were impoverished by the conflict and cannot be able to finance reconstruction of the post-primary school. Local Government Education Authorities advocated for expansion of primary schools in safer neighbouring towns through construction of additional classrooms and increased supply of teaching and learning materials so that in times of violence, displaced boys and girls can be transferred to the schools and teachers displaced from the schools in violence hit areas reposted to provide continuous education for the pupils. Furthermore, they solicited emergency and relief agencies to integrate learning and teaching materials into their procurement chains as these are hugely deficit in current relief assistance of state and non-state actors.

Generally, violent conflicts create imbalances in psychological attitudes, cultural practices and traditional coping mechanisms. These in turn affect resilience building and sometimes a veritable source of second generational conflicts. As part of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA), the state of psychological stability was assessed. In Logo local government, most respondents agreed that the violence recorded in the community has resulted in psychological disorders. Women and children were associated with anxiety and fear while youth, the aged and women were associated with depression. Participatory observation of reactive behaviour of children and women affirmed this submission. In Ukemberagya-Tswarev, Tombo, Nenzev and Mbagber council wards, there were cases of anxiety, depression, and fear of unusual sounds especially among women and children. In all the council wards visited, young persons also displayed apprehensive behaviour to strangers and strange vehicles. Children speedily ran for cover upon sighting vehicles for fear it might be another set of disguised attackers. Cases of heart attack and stark madness as a result of the conflict were reported amongst youth and men in Tombo and Turan council wards but none was recorded in Mbagber and Nenzev council wards.

Cases of depression, anxiety and extreme fear were equally reported in the three council wards visited in Buruku local government area. The manifestations of these psychological disorders were similar to those in Logo local government area. In Binev ward, cases of mental disorders were reported. However, in Maapen and Mbaya council wards, no such case was reported. It was discovered that more women were living with mental illness than men in Buruku than in Logo where the ratio was balanced.

Across conflict-hit wards of Tarka local government area, anxiety, fears and depression was equally widely reported although only one case of mental illness was recorded in Mbanagber Council Ward. In Mbaayo Council Ward, two women were reported to be living with depression which had started manifesting in their social behaviour. This was the same with another woman in Mbanagber Council Ward; and another in Mbakwakem Council Ward.

In Agatu local government, too, several cases of depression, hypertension and anxiety were recorded in Agbugbe, Okokolo, Akwu, Adagbo and Aila Council Wards where violence occurred. Although in Akwu and Adagbo Wards, no case of mental illness was reported, two men from Agbugbe and Aila Council Wards were identified to have cases of mental illness. More of such cases were recorded in Okokolo Council Ward.

The inhabitants of local communities that recorded violent conflicts between herders and farmers in Agatu, Buruku, Logo and Tarka LGAs depend on crop farming, fishing and petty trading for livelihood. Women and youth constitute the most productive age groups. However, many of them lack skills in multiple income generating activities. This partially explains the reasons for trauma, depression and the difficulty faced by communities in coping, recovery and resilience building. The loss of livelihoods has resulted in emerging dynamics such as increased participation of girls and young women in commercial sex in neighbouring towns, early marriages, child labour in female-headed homes and rise in criminal activities.

In Logo local government, income generating activities of inhabitants of Tombo, Mbagber, Nenzev and Ukemberagya/Tswarev Council Wards includes, farming of yam, cassava, rice, guinea corn, sesame seed. These crops were largely destroyed on-farm by cattle, and in-stock by herders who vandalised, burnt or demolished houses where stocks were kept as well as barns. Though the exact value of farms destroyed could not be ascertained, focus groups stated that an estimated total cultivated area of 257,000 hectares; crop and animal stock valued at 242 million were destroyed across the four Council Wards. During the conflicts the Abeda, Ayilamo, Iorja, and Wende local markets were burnt down and destroyed, sparing only Anyiin and Gondoza markets in Ukemberagya/Tswarev Ward. Although Anyiin and Gondoza markets were not burnt or destroyed, it was observed that very minimal transactions were on-going in the markets due to desertion and displacements for fear of attack.

In Tombo council ward, beans and millet are produced in large quantities in addition to those produced in Ukemberagya Tswarev. In Tombo Council Ward too, Anyebe, Azege, Tomatar, Iwuendyer and Uzer markets were burnt and destroyed. It was observed that all buying and selling activities had ceased in Tomatar while minimal activities were recorded in other markets. The crops produced in Ukemberagya/Tswarev and Tombo Council Wards are also produced in Mbagber Council, in addition to Melon. There are 4 local markets in the Council Ward; namely Iorza, Ayilamo, Azege and Jortar. Among these, Jortar Market was burnt and destroyed while the others were spared. However, buying and selling activities in the markets were significantly low due to fear of attack and mass displacement from the communities in the Ward. Dusa and Dooshima are the only markets in Turan Council Ward of Logo LGA. During the conflicts, these markets were razed down and destroyed. All activities in the markets have ceased. In Nenzev Council Ward, the only market – Ikyor, was destroyed and transactions were just beginning to pick up. The profiles of markets destroyed were affirmed by the Head of Revenue

Department of the local government, as follows:

Ayilamo, Iorza, Chembe, Jootar, Azege, Anyibe, Tsekuungu, and Tse Getim markets representing over 90% of markets in the Gambe Tiev area covering the affected communities were destroyed [KII, HOD Revenue, Logo LGA].

Economic rights were also violated during the conflict in Buruku local government area. Leaders of the communities stated that the communities were unable to stop encroachment on their farms by herders due to the arms they were carrying resulting to total destruction of farms and stock barns of 189 households in Mbaapen Council Ward and 51 households in Mbaya, in addition to partial destruction on-farm and in-storage of crops. It was also noted that larger proportion of the people store yields in residential houses.

In Binev, Mbaapen and Mbaya council wards of the LGA, there were market infrastructures in Adogo, Usen, Ortese Mbaatsua, Agwabi, Ortese Mbatsaase, Tsighe, Tafi, Jingir, Abuku, Ikyume. However, the conflict has led to destruction of Adogo, Usen, Ortese Mbaatsua, Agwabi, Ortese Mbatsaase, Tsighe, Tafi markets thus reducing access to buying and selling services by over 72 percent.²

Tarka local government area is renowned for production of vegetables, tomatoes, pepper and other spices. They also produce rice, groundnuts, cassava, and yam in significant quantities. The supply chain of these agro products in the state has suffered setbacks as a result of the conflict which affected rural communities. Aboho market which is the only point for commercial activities in Mbaayo Council Ward was burnt. In Mbakwakem Council Ward, all the four markets in the community namely Ijor Imenger, Kontyen, Tomatar and Uavande were destroyed. Also, two of the four markets in Mbanyagber Council Ward were partially destroyed. They include Oravander and Angbaaye. Tiotu and Tarhembe markets were spared because of their location by the busy Makurdi-Gboko highway and continued to operate normal commercial activities. The Wannune, Uchi, Gwarche, Wergba, Karmem, Asukuya and Tomatar markets were also spared due to their location along federal highway.

In Agatu local government area, fishing and farming are the major income generating activities. The LGA is located by the bank of River Benue with tributaries that are rich in marine protein and resources. The uplands of Agatu are fertile and suitable for crop farming and grazing. The people sell their products through local markets within communities as access roads are in deplorable state and inaccessible during rainy season. It is noteworthy that markets were targeted mostly in Agatu LGA comparatively with Buruku, Logo and Tarka LGAs. This may be as a result of the social system of Agatu people which recognises central markets for entire council ward. Other community

² KII with Head of Revenue Department, Buruku LGA.

members believe that the targeting of markets was to increase collateral damage in the conflict as markets accommodated mass of unarmed vulnerable persons at a time.

The head of revenue department of the LGA said internal revenue that Agatu local government generated collapsed in May by over 85 per cent due to the conflict. Agbugbe Council Ward was one of the wards attacked. The conflict led to destruction of farms of over 342 households. Apart from personal properties and livelihoods, the Agbugbe market which is the only market in the Ward was razed down. It was observed that commercial activities were yet to pick up in the market following the destruction. Several farms estimated to be 10,000 hectares were destroyed in Okokolo in addition to Ochononya and Okokolo markets which are the only points for buying and selling in the Council Ward. Similar situation was recorded in Akwu council ward where fish and crops stored in houses as well as those in the farm were destroyed. The Akwu market which is the only market in the council ward was razed down. In Adagbo council ward, the magnitude of destruction was equally big. In addition to over 12 million Naira worth of loss in property and stock, the Adagbo market, which is the only market in Adagbo Council Ward as well as Aila main market and Aila Night market which are the only markets in Aila Council Ward, were destroyed. The revenue department of the LGA noted that only Obagaji, Oshigbudu, Okpagabi markets were spared in recent attacks but noted that Oshigbudu and Okpagabi markets had witnessed attacks in previous years and are only recovering. Obagaji is the local government headquarters with security formations of the military, police and other para-military institutions which may be the reason why it was spared in the attack.

Due to the desertion of several settlements and consequent abandoning of economic activities across the four LGAs, the conflict has left impacts and introduced dynamics that will likely affect the income generating activities for a long time, as fear exist among the people. Poverty level is soaring towards disturbing dimensions as marriages were being broken in households where men were unable to finance household needs as expected of them in the social systems. There is an increase in the number of women and girls from affected LGAs who are commercial sex workers in the brothels located in Gboko, Katsina-Ala, Makurdi, Naka and Otukpo while some of the girls hang around in motor parks and drinking joints in above mentioned towns to provide commercial sex services for travelers who do not know locations of brothels or do not want to patronise organised sex-selling places. The girls are extremely poor and lack bargaining power; thus increasing their vulnerability to risks associated with commercial sex, e.g. Sexually-Transmitted Diseases (STDs) and unplanned parenthood.

Focus groups reported resurging cases of rape, crime, forced marriages, child trafficking and child labour amongst women, girls, boys and youth in displaced communities. This was affirmed in Tombo ward where focus groups noted that the slogan: “*Gber-ayem, gber-tyo!, Atem tyô Atem-tyô*” – meaning ‘sex in return for protection enjoyed’ has become popular amongst youth and men in communities hosting internally displaced girls and women.

The herders reported huge loss of cattle as a result of the conflict. Though the exact number of cattle lost could not be ascertained, officials of MACBAN Benue state Chapter stated that they had received reports of over 4,000 cattle lost in Agatu LGA, Buruku, Logo and Tarka LGAs altogether. Currently, over 40 families who owned cattle for livelihoods across Agatu, Buruku, Logo and Tarka LGAs have been thrown out of business.

Some of the people who owned cattle and the youths that used to herd them no longer have a single cow. They have to rely on their relations and friends for food. The youth custodians also keep roaming without anything to do. This is a major way we have suffered from the violence [KII, Cattle Owner Makurdi].

They clarified however that majority of the cattle in Agatu were lost to rustlers who were not only the local farmers but also other herders who took advantage of the instability to steal from other herders. The cattle lost in Buruku, Logo and Tarka were reported to have been killed by local farmers.

Conflict Actors' Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities and Incentives

The actors in the conflict and security landscape of Benue state can be described as visible and invisible conflict entrepreneurs or shadow parties. The fertility of the land provides a transnational scope to be explored in identifying who the entire gamut of actors in the conflict and insecurity landscape. Indeed the peace agenda of all parties in Benue state is informed by a zero-sum attitude that must change towards mutual respect and accommodation through the use of joint-problem solving approaches. The capacities of the parties for violence has been well manifested however, it is time to turn the use of such capacities away from its violent deployment towards exploring the means and avenues for peaceful co-existence and mutual respect.

Intervention/Responses

Track 1

Interventions by the state and federal government have been coming but their impacts on the landscape of conflict and insecurity leave so much to desire in terms of impacts as garnered during the field. Many of the villagers want the government to show more presence, firmness and fairness in handling the matter which points to the fact that achieving sustainable peace in Benue transcends the presence of military men. The state government seems to have a grasp of the interrelatedness of criminality and conflict and how the intersection of the two has been fuelling indigene-settler conflicts in the state. This has informed the amnesty initiative which many respondents condemn as actually meant to satisfy certain narrow interests in the state. Some described it as “playing the politics of peace” instead of using it to promote the culture of peace.

Track 2

There are a number of not-for-profit organisations in Benue state working on peacebuilding and non-violence. They do this in two contexts of singly undertaking projects and sometimes working within a coalition.

Track 3

The traditional and religious rulers and other stakeholders in the state have been suing for peace and in fact some of them have been victims of the conflict while some have been misunderstood. Nevertheless, they have sustained their roles in advocating for peace and tolerance by all parties concerned.

Conclusion

The conflict in Benue state in the period covered has been mainly between the farmers and the herders. The extent of inhumanity, sophisticated weapons and conflation of interests in the conflict combine to make it a very complex one. This calls for specific analysis of the trends, patterns and actors' needs in micro and macro contexts. As the food basket of the country, the conflict has dire implications for food and economic security which underscore the need for a broad-based multidimensional approach in responding to it. In Benue state, the long protracted conflicts between Egba and Ologba communities in Agatu, were strongly linked to escalations of violence between herders and farmers. The conflict which is over ownership status of fishponds has divided the communities so much that communities do not share early warning information. In the 2014 attacks, it was reported that the communities were providing security, geographical and demographical information to the herders to aid their attacks on one another.

Gaps in Literature, Policy and Responses

Indeed, the fact that many communities still live in fear points to the enormous gaps in responses and expected outcomes by the people. This call for more and novel ways of interrogating the questions of belonging, securing, governing and managing access to natural resources towards having a more textured understanding of the ramifications, trends and patterns of the conflict between the herders and farmers which is the main source of conflict and insecurity in the state.

Recommendations


In addition to the recommendations generated in the course of the field work, we found the suggestions that emanated from a one-day dialogue on peacebuilding organised by the Angel Support Foundation (ASF) instructive, as listed below, also very noteworthy:

- (1) Provision of effective security at border posts, local *vigilantés*, Joint-Task Force established.

- (2) The need for synergy between border-states and Benue; the amnesty programme should be replicated to neighbouring states.
- (3) Engaging the telecom players in involving in corporate social responsibility by providing toll-free lines.
- (4) Imperative of a Benue state/Herders Peace Compact to sustain peace.
- (5) Enlightenment of communities across the state on patriotism and selflessness.
- (6) Fast-tracking the enactment of the legislation against open grazing of livestock in the state.
- (7) Ensuring that a census of livestock is taken at borders as interim measure pending the passage of a Bill into law.
- (8) Branding or marking of cows to avoid incidences of rustling.
- (9) Prescribed punishment for promoters and actors in the crisis.
- (10) The CSOs and NGOs and Government Agencies should have a synergy in managing the conflicts and running of the IDPs and humanitarian efforts.
- (11) Increased security presence in the local communities, especially the conflict-prone areas; i.e. establishment of barracks and other formations will be of help.
- (12) Provision of agricultural inputs to aid internally displaced persons in addition to the foodstuffs and building materials in rebuilding them rather than occasional visits.
- (13) Enlightenment of non-affected communities on security measures.
- (14) Provision of shelter for affected communities, like it is done by the UNHCR in the state.
- (15) Provision of adequate security to the IDPs.

Kogi State (The Confluence State)

Capital: Lokoja



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Introduction and Historical Background

Kogi state was carved out from Benue and Kwara states in 1991 and currently has 21 local government areas across its three senatorial districts. These are Kogi Central, comprising Adavi, Ajaokuta, Ogori/Magongo, Okene and Okehi; Kogi-East senatorial district has Ankpa, Bassa, Dekina, Ibaji, Idah, Igalamela-Odolu, Ofu, Olamaboro and Omala; Kogi-West has Ijumu, Kabba/Bunu, Kogi, Lokoja, Mopa-Muro, Yagba East and Yagba West.

According to Tenuche and Ifatimeyin (2009), the state is endowed with human and physical resources and hosts the confluence of the two largest rivers (Rivers Niger and Benue) in Nigeria. According to the head count of the 2006 National Population Commission (NPC), it has a population of 3, 278, 487, an average temperature of 28°C and annual rainfall ranges from 1016 to 1524 mm and humidity is 69 percent (Tenuche and Ifatimeyin, 2009).

Kogi state is bordered in the north by Niger, Nasarawa and the Federal Capital Territory; Benue and Enugu to the east and Edo, Ondo, Ekiti and Kwara states to the west (AOVA 2013). Kogi state has its ethno-linguistic minorities and majorities and these are evident

in the languages. The main languages across Kogi state are eight and they are Epira in Kogi, Okene, Adavi and Okehi LGAs; Igala in Ankpa, Idah and Dekina LGAs; Nupe in Kogi LGA and Yoruba in the western LGAs of Kogi state all constituting the language of the majorities. The minority languages are Kakanda in Kogi LGA; Kupa in Kogi LGA around Abugi; Basa-nge in Bassa and Ankpa LGAs; and Oko-Eni-Osayan in Okene LGA, Ogori and Magongo towns.

Conflict Landscape of Kogi State

Like any commune of people of disparate identity fault lines and aspirations inhabiting a place where resources for everyday survival are scarce and access to state support is a struggle, conflicts in the context of inter-group frictions cannot be foreclosed. Some of these have been terminated while others have been mutating or festering. These conflicts revolve around political struggles, chieftaincy disputes and land/boundary contentions.

Kogi state experiences perennial violence before, during and after elections mostly in the contexts of intra-party and inter-party clashes which often breach public peace and safety in the state. As a state surrounded by ten other states and being one of the gateways between northern and southern Nigeria with a huge population of youth, the susceptibility of the state to sporadic and protracted armed conflicts cannot be ignored.

In February 2012 Boko Haram members attacked a prison in Koton Karfe during which a security man was killed while 119 members of the sect were set free. On 7 August, 2012, Boko Haram insurgents attacked a branch of the Deeper Life Church in Okene one of the major cities in the state. Barely 24 hours after this, another major attack was carried out by the sect at the Okene Central Mosque, killing two soldiers of the Joint Task Force attached to secure the Jumat service (Kogi Reports, 2012). Also, high-ranking members of the terrorist group have been arrested in the state (Oladapo, 2012; Itodo, 2016). This qualifies the state as one of the places where conflicts exist in the context of contentious relations between the Nigerian state and disgruntled groups.

Kogi State Conflict Case Studies

Olamaboro LG of Kogi and Igbo-Eze North LG of Enugu State

The bone of contention is on where the Ette people found in the border between Kogi and Enugu states actually belong to out of the two states which drew the attention of the National Boundary Commission in 2009 (Ozor, 2012). The seriousness of this kind of conflict can be best appreciated against the background of the observation of Ojebode and Akingbulu (2012:80) that 'Africa is dotted with innumerable border-split communities single cultural, linguistic and ethnic entities slashed in two by the colonially (nationally) imposed border.' The Ette people of Kogi state can be described as a border-split community that straddles Kogi and Enugu state. The conflict dates back to 1980 when the Igalla youths in the community began the agitation to be merged with Kogi which was rejected by the government of then Governor Jim Nwobodo (Ozor, 2012; Onah, 2011).

Major violent clashes have occurred in 2011, 2012, 2014 and 2015 and have continued over the dispute on where the community belongs to in addition to those that have frequently occurred during elections or at the slightest provocations. A member of the Ete community during interaction, recalled that the president of the Ete Community Development Association (ECDA) in the wake of one of the clashes in September 2014 in a communiqué alleged that the then Deputy Senate President and Secretary to the Federal Government (Ike Ekweremadu and Anyim Pius Anyim) were the sponsors of clashes over the boundary; although the allegation will sound spurious given the fact that the conflict predates emergence of these two individuals as political notables in the country.

During interviews with security agents in the state capital visiting the two communities was considered “unsafe” during the conduct of this research in July/August 2016 in order not to trigger any untoward reactions given the permanence of mutual suspicion in the relationship between the people of the two communities in the area on one hand and the perception of security agents as biased held by the two communities on the other hand.

A precise number of lives and properties lost to the conflict remain indeterminate because each episode of confrontations is characterised with loss of lives on both sides and of by-standers. However, about 2000 people were said to have been displaced according to leading peace practitioners interviewed in the state. Despite litigation up to the level of the Supreme Court and informal interventions by associations and the Catholic Church, tension continues to pervade the air and the parties remain susceptible to violence.

Aluaja, Itale and Iru villages of Iyano Community in Ibaji Local Government: Fishpond and Chieftaincy

The feud that has entwined these communities is traceable to the ownership of fishing ponds, land and the right to rule (chieftaincy matters). At different times, the villages have had to come together in defence of the Iyano community against incursions from Aguleri community of Anambra state but in 2013, violent exchanges began in Iyano Community, pitching the Aluaja against Iru. Responses from interviewees revealed two differing accounts of the conflict held by the two communities.

The account of the Iru holds that the conflict was over the ownership and control of a fishpond which had been brewing for long. However, the Aluaja opined that violence was unleashed on Aluaja by an aide of the former governor of the state Idris Wada (2012-2016) who hails from Iru who had earlier threatened to punish them if they refused to support the party of his boss. The Aluaja community recalled that even prior to the 2015 mayhem, a group known as “Abuchaga Boys” allegedly sponsored by the aide of the former governor had unleashed violence on the community. However, the aide of the former governor denied such claim and avowed that “it is not true. Ignore them. I didn’t play any role. It was the Aluaja people who destroyed the Iruh people’s yams. The

crisis is not related to politics” (Obagboho, 2015).

Visit to the villages was also discouraged by security agents in the state capital as it was considered “ill timed” because of the pervading tension within the community on one hand and over the conflict between the Iyano community and Aguleri community on the other hand. Also, some of the displaced whom we spoke to said they were discouraged from returning to their villages by the security agents as well.

In September 2016, Governor Yahaya Bello constituted a 13-member panel of inquiry into the Iyano crisis with a mandate to proffer recommendations that will bring about lasting peace to the community. During one of the sittings of the panel, a former councilor in Ibaji local government informed the panel that five corpses including those of two traditional rulers were still being kept in the morgue because the community was not safe for their burial rites. According to him ‘the Okpale Iyeni, Ochawo Acholo and Enemene Ijoba are currently being preserved in a mortuary in Idah . . . We have equally buried eight members of our communities in borrowed lands . . .’ (Obahopo, 2016).

The cost of the conflict in terms of lives lost and properties destroyed remain indeterminable but borne by both sides and their Diasporas in Lokoja the state capital and outside the state because of the huge number of people displaced from the community. During the attacks of 22-24 May, 2015, 47 houses were burnt and many lives lost. An eyewitness recalled that as news filtered in on the death of Mr. Ejima who was killed on April 3, 2015 for burial ‘the three villages had gathered in their war regalia and started shooting at the center of Aluaja’ (Kumolu, 2016). Previous clashes on December 23, 2013 and April 17, 2014 also led to loss of lives and destruction of properties.

Echeno-Odeke communities in Ibaji Local Government Area and Aguleri-Otu in Anambra East Local Government Area

The conflict was triggered by the discovery of oil and the announcement made by former President Good-luck Jonathan in October 2012 on the inclusion of Anambra state which shares border with Echeno/Odeke communities of Ibaji local government area of Kogi state. Echeno/Odeke communities claimed the land where oil was discovered belongs to them and as such they are entitled to the royalty. Noticing what seemed to be dispossession of their land and its valuable contents, the communities took to the agitation for the reclamation of the disputed land, along with the oil wells, leveraging on the historical and archeological relics of the past people on the land as an authentic prove and confirmation that the said land belongs to them. Subsequently, protesters from the community occupied the oil field owned by Orient Oils.

However, respondents informed us that there had been earlier interface between the Ibaji community represented by a committee named Ibaji Oil and Gas Committee which was inaugurated on 22 October, 2011. This was one of the factors that irked members of the community in 2012 when the oil well was announced as a site located in Anambra

state. Another account of the contention has it that it is Enugu state and not Anambra that actually shares border with Ibaji. The matter is before the National Boundary Commission (NBC).

There were on-going talks between the governors of the two states Obiano and former governor Idris Wada on exploring peaceful ways of managing the crisis who described the agitators on both sides as “misguided miscreants.” In August 2015, the Federal House of Representatives mandated the Chief of Army Staff General Tukur Buratai and Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Ibok-Ete Ibas to deploy military personnel to the border communities to restore peace (Odaudu, 2015). Another source of clash between Echeno/Odeke communities and their neighbours from Anambra is the alleged encroachment of their fish pond by the people from Anambra state which also claimed lives. On both sides, lives continue to be lost alongside destruction of properties. Interactions during field work with civil society actors and key informants from the security agencies revealed that “they must not see us and if you go there, you are on your own”.

Farmers and Herdsmen Conflicts across Kogi State

As a state located in Nigeria’s north-central, farmers and herders frequently draw daggers in many local government areas of the state. Earlier in a related study, Tenuche and Ifatimehin (2006:362) identified communities in different parts of Kogi where violent clashes had taken place around the state. Some of these are Ogbagbala, Ibaji, Ogbogbo, Odolu and Okpakpata, Egga, Icheke, Isanlu and Ejiba. Our field work revealed that the worst hit communities are Ankpa, Ogani Enugu in Dekina, Abejikolo-ife, Idah, Ibaji and of recent Ogugu Olamaboro and Umomi in Ofu LGAs. The cause of the clashes has been the allegation of destruction of crops by cattle and retaliatory killing of cattle which often draws the ire of the herders leading to communities rising in self-defence. The murder of the Kogi state Chairman of the Miyeti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, Mr Ibrahim Jalido, on 29 October, 2016 by unknown gun men has thrown fear into the hearts of the residents of Lokoja (Agency Report, 2016). Interviews with security agents revealed that the conflict seems to have defied all interventions and pleas by the government. Although security men are deployed to the affected communities anytime clashes are reported, there has been the formation of community Vigilanté Groups as community structures of security to ward off invasion of farmlands by the herders.

Inter-Cult/Inter-Gang Clashes

During field work in the state respondents and key informants also revealed the incipient trend of what they called ‘cult clashes’, especially in Idah, Kabba and Adakolo and Ganaja areas of Lokoja. Such groups comprise male and female and some as young as 13 years old. The membership of such cults cuts across both the students of post-primary schools and tertiary institutions and artisan like taxi drivers and *Okada* riders. One of the groups arrested goes by the name “*Bobos*”, made-up of young people including teenagers. A new pattern of killing which has surfaced as a trademark of cult/gangs,

especially in Lokoja, takes the form of visits to the residences of those they want to kill to murder them in the presence of their parents/guardians or their hosts in case they get caught where they have gone to seek refuge (Egwu, 2016). As at April 2016, seven lives were already lost to the clashes, according to respondents.

Legislature-Executive Crisis

The election of a new Speaker for the House of Assembly of Kogi state on February 16, 2016 by 5 out of the 25 members of the Assembly led to a friction within the legislature on one side and between the legislature and the executive; alleged to have had the backing of the executive governor of the state. While it lasted, the impasse heightened tension as the governor was faulted for allegedly supporting a side in the conflict and enlisting the support of the Nigerian army accused of providing cover for the 5 members who carried out the impeachment while barring the other members from having access to the chambers. This got to a head on one occasion when an exchange of gunfire nearly ensued between the soldiers guarding the five and the police on the premises of the House of Assembly. The Federal House of Representatives was also drawn into the matter as it constituted a 10-member committee that later recommended that the legislative functions of the House should be taken over. While it lasted the crisis heated up the polity as it drew in the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General of the Federation, the Inspector General of Police and the Army. However, the matter was later resolved through political means.

Human Security Implications of Conflicts in Kogi State 2012-2016

Loss of Confidence in Security Agents: In conflict-affected communities with pervading tension as at the time of our fieldwork in Kogi state, security agents were declared as *persona non-grata* in those communities. The security agents drawn from all the security agencies equally expressed fear of visiting the communities. This stems from a perception that security agents deployed to feuding communities in the past took sides and therefore could not be trusted to be impartial forces. This has negatively affected personal and communal security in the state.

Emergence of Armed Non-State Actors: Perhaps in displaying the loss of confidence in government security apparatus, many communities have ended up inadvertently supporting the proliferation of community-based security outfits, as a sort of community bulwark to defend the community. Consequently, this is promoting community armories in many communities and the proliferation of light arms and weapons.

Ungoverned Spaces/Sites of Limited Security Governance: The emergence of armed non-state actors as sources of security to communities portends the lack of legitimacy for government security agencies. This implies that such communities have become sites of limited governance. For instance in Ibaji local government, it has become impossible for the displaced to return to the communities to perform the rites of burial

for the interment of traditional rulers despite the existence of constitutionally elected government in the state.

Inter-Agency Conflict: What could have turned out to be a bloody inter-agency clash between the soldiers and police was averted while the crisis in the legislature lasted. A security operative who was at the scene of the confrontation that was averted revealed that the scene mirrored the rivalry and mutual disdain between the army and other security agencies especially the police. According to him ‘the soldiers met our Mopol there and maybe they felt they could intimidate them, my brother if not for instruction from the CP, our boys were ready.’ According to Odogun (2016) the former Commissioner of Police said “he withdrew his men in order to prevent a clash that might result in the loss of lives.”

Social and Political Security Implications of Conflicts in Kogi State

While political tension and conflicts are not new to the state, its intensity has been on the increase further worsening the fragility of security and inter-group relations in the state. Rather than dialogue being the medium of political exchanges and settlement of differences, violence seems to be preferred by parties involved. The emergence of gangs across the state speaks to the loss of social authorities hitherto held by people like religious and traditional leaders who cannot easily call recalcitrant young people to order any longer. During communal clashes, sacred symbols and respected individuals of opposing communities get attacked and this has gone a long way denying the traditional authorities the leverage to rein in fighting youths who sometimes unleash terror on their own communities.

Ghettoisation of Security

Akin to other major cities where people are safe only in selected areas described as ‘ghettoisation of security by Hills (2009). This has become a social phenomenon because even security agents are conscious of where to go and when in order not to incur the wrath of militias controlling specific places.

Neighbourhood Insecurity: This has been the fall out of the killings and reprisal killings amongst rival gangs/cults in the state. Due to this, some neighbourhoods in Lokoja have become unsafe for residents and visitors alike. Areas such as Adakola, Kabawa and Ganaja have become flashpoints of the gang war in the capital city.

Economic Security Implications of Conflicts in Kogi State

The economic implications of the conflicts have denied the state the contributions that could have accrued from uninterrupted economic relationships of parties and communities in conflict. The air of fear and mutual distrust pervading in most of these communities point to dire economic consequences given that farming and fishing are the leading economic activities of the people and most of these take place in places where people have become displaced due to conflicts.

Conflict Actors' Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities and Incentives in Kogi State

Given the inter-communal nature of most of the conflicts in the state with the exception of attacks carried out by the Boko Haram, the actors in the conflict are typically, community warriors or militias and the several development associations in the state. The security agents are also part of the actors and in some cases they have been alleged as taking sides in the conflicts. Governments at the first and second tiers have also been indirectly involved in some of the conflicts especially when security agents such the police and soldiers are drawn in. The executive and the legislature are also actors in some conflicts.

In most of the communal crisis in the state, the narratives embody deep seated desire for the affirmation of rights which many parties feel are trampled upon. For instance, most of the protracted and violent clashes in Kogi involve local communities of the state with neighbouring communities from other states and in many of these cases the communities in Kogi have gone up in arms using local militias based on the conviction that they are pursuing a cause of the community. Therefore their interests as parties in conflict might include recognition, demand for economic rights, and preference for freedom to chose where they want to belong to like in the case of the Ette people.

While parties in the conflict have maintained rigid positions which might be far from their real interests as it typical of parties in conflict to behave, deciphering the peace agenda of the parties involved in the crises in the state without initiating a peace/reconciliation process in the communities involved might be hasty.

However, the capacities and incentives of the parties to enthrone and preserve peace is huge going by the level of their alleged involvement in many of the protracted crises. Not minding the protraction and bestiality that have characterised some of these conflicts and lack of trust in state mechanisms for intervention, the communities have huge capacities that can be converted for use as a driving force in many of the communities especially cognisant of the fact many of these once lived together peacefully in the past.

Impact of Conflicts in Kogi State

While it might seem too hasty to measure the impacts of the conflicts on state, human security, inter-group relations and state-society relations, doing same will equally serve well the purposes of planning and executing interventions. Apparently, the conflicts have left many communities in ruins across the state and many people displaced. Worst hit are women and children being the most vulnerable groups in times of emergencies and conflicts.

Intervention/Responses

As a state that has had two governments of two different political parties within the

period under review (2012-2016), there have been responses from government in terms of pleas, military deployment to affected communities and recently the setting up of a panel of inquiry to look into one of the cases by the current administration. However, it is noteworthy that some of the communities through their development associations have been calling on the government to intervene in their crises. One of such is the Odochala community in Ujeh ward of Ibaji local government (Steven, 2016). Therefore, the responses from the government have responded more by deploying security personnel and lately the setting up of an inquiry panel.

The Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have had limited interventions largely due to their limited finances. Interactions with a leading figure revealed that NGOS doing peace practice in the state have been working selflessly but they could do more if there is increased financial enhancement. The traditional and religious institutions too have also been hampered by the increasing influence of untoward aspect of foreign culture which is increasingly weakening their moral authorities on the youths in particular. Some of the traditional rulers also pointed to the profitability of political violence and how politicians in the state have been encouraging violence as one of the factors responsible for the weakening of traditional authorities which in turn has become one of the banes of peace in the state.

Conclusion

The causes of conflict occurrence in Kogi state in the period covered in this study cannot be described as markedly different from what existed prior to 2012, however in tenor and weapons used, a noticeable shift could be seen. Also, an unprecedented rise in activities of gangs speaks of a direct challenge and conflict with core values of the society marking a generational conflict along demographic lines. In essence the overwhelming control held by the religious, traditional and political class over the youths has been eroded and today, from the home front to the public space. A major consequence of this is the availability of mass pool of youths who can be easily and spontaneously mobilised for acts inimical to public peace and safety.

Gaps in Literature, Policy and Programmatic Responses

The literature on conflicts in Kogi state has focused more on the farmers-herders conflict while not much attention has been paid to the interstate types of conflicts in the state which play out in peculiar ways and which could have far-reaching implications for national peace and security. However, the press has been consistent in bringing all incidences of conflicts to the public domain while many communities owned online news platforms have pitched their tents with their respective communities.

As a result of that, most reports on conflicts involving communities available on the internet are usually communal narratives that are slanted. Therefore, there is need for more studies on the conflicts in Kogi state in a dispassionate manner that treats most of

the reports especially available on the internet as part of data providing insights into the positions and interests of respective communities. By generating objective research findings, policy makers will have reliable basis to launch peace-oriented initiatives that will make the desired impacts.

Recommendations

There is need for more effective collaboration between the state government and the National Boundary Commission (NBC) towards exploring lasting solutions to many of the lingering crisis with neighbouring states.

The state government should be more proactive, committed and transparent in handling conflicts within its borders in order to retain the confidence of all parties in conflict.

Efforts should be made to restore trust in civil-military relations in the state because according to respondents, there are communities in the state where security personnel are not welcome.

The state government should identify not for profit organisations with expertise in early warning generation and management towards being able to intervene before tension degenerates into violent exchanges of hostilities.

Kwara State (State of Harmony)

Capital: Ilorin



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

<http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Kwara state was created on 27 May, 1967. Presently, it stands midway between northern and southern Nigeria. The state is bordered on the north by Niger state, Benin-Republic on the west and Kogi state on the east. The southern borders of Kwara state is shared with Ekiti, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states. The state has a diverse ethnic and religious mix and bears the national appellation of “State of Harmony” perhaps owing to the relative level of peaceful co-existence and infrequency of conflicts. Administratively, it has sixteen (16) Local Government Area Councils with 193 political wards. The sixteen Local Governments are: Asa, Baruten, Edu, Ekiti, Ifelodun, Ilorin-East, Ilorin-South, Ilorin-West, Irepodun, Isin, Kaiama, Moro, Offa, Oke-Oro, Oyun, and Patigi.

Conflict Landscape of Kwara State

As covered by previous SCA reports up till 2012, Kwara state is not immune from conflicts although most of these have been in the context of inter-group with hard to come by instances of insurgencies, that is, groups violently engaging the state. Inter-group conflicts in the state has been in the context of communal clashes arising from boundary disputes, political violence, industrial disputes, chieftaincy conflicts, herders and farmers confrontations.

Kwara State Conflict Case Studies

Conflicts in Kwara state from 2012-2016 covered in this study are not markedly different from the ones covered in previous reports of 2003 and 2012. However, in terms of tenor, successes and failures of interventions and emergence of new actors the conflict landscape in Kwara state warrant being given a second look. Apart from known adversarial relationships, there was an observed increase of youth rebellion against traditional, government and religious authorities in many parts of the city which was considered as unheard of before and an aberration signifying an emergent conflict along class and generational lines. Such was the clash between the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and youths at Agbarere and Ita Ore which later spread to Oke-Kura, Oja-Oba and Popo-Igbonna quarters in Ilorin metropolis in April 2015. According to the alleged mastermind of the attack, Olatunji Ibrahim popularly called “Ariyo”, after he was arrested:

“I did not fight with *Agbarere* people intentionally. It was because one of my boys was ‘dropped down’ (killed) by the NDLEA men during the exchange of gun fire in a conflict. The officer came to our camp that he wanted to smoke weed, and one of my boys discovered that he was an undercover officer, disguised to be weed smoker. My boys tried to fight him and he ran out. He was given hot chase by my boys but he was lucky to be rescued by his colleagues. That was how the trouble began. I lost one of my boys to those officers during a cross-fire. I was hinted that one of their officers lived at *Agbarere* and we went to destroy his house too (Ajikobi, 2016).

Another instance described as unheard of, which might have implications for the public and stability in the state in the near(est) future, was the stoning of the Senate President Dr. Bukola Saraki, son of former foremost politician in the state, Dr Olusola Saraki, on 24 September, 2015, during prayers marking the end of the Muslims’ Ramadan fast for that year. The place and status of the target of the expression of rage by the displeased crowd, spoke volumes of the weakening of both formal and informal authorities – as both the Governor, the Senate President and other *crème de la crème* of the society did not attend the 2016 Eid-Fitri prayers held on 5 July, 2016. It was also observed that the prayers were hurriedly observed and many could not participate contrary to what had obtained in the past.

A fracas was also reported in the palace of the Emir of Ilorin when midway into the prayer, a cleric rose to defend the failure of the government to pay salaries of workers which sent the congregants berserk leading to an abrupt termination of the program during the Ramadan of 2016 held in July 2016. Occurrences like these ones might have dire consequences for public peace in time to come if not addressed. While it might not be immediately predictable how these emergent signs might progress, it is important to note that other communal conflicts like that of Ilofa and Odo-Owa, the students and Offa community and cult clashes involving students of tertiary institutions in the state appear to have simmered. However, communities affected still live in the fear of renewed attacks in places like Baboko and Ita-Amodu within the metropolis where reprisal killings

between rival cult groups threw the neighbourhood into chaos.

Early-warning signs of latent conflicts also exist across the state based on our observations and interactions with security agents, academics and opinion leaders. For instance, security agencies in the state are working round the clock to ensure that differences and alleged infractions do not snowball into violent confrontations between the Christ Evangelical Mission and the Tabligh, a Muslim group in Asa local government area. Similarly, key informants revealed that the Rhema Chapel and the Ahmadiya Muslim Jammah whose relationship was once a model of peaceful inter-faith relations was experiencing hiccups at the time of our field work. A chieftaincy dispute in Jebba also deserves skilful handling to prevent from degenerating into violence.

Erin-Ile and Offa Boundary Disputes

Offa and Erin Ile community are situated in the southern senatorial district of the state. Prior to the creation of Offa local government in 1991, the two communities were together in Oyun local government but with the creation of Offa local government, Erin-Ile remains in the Oyun local government, while Offa became the headquarters of the new Offa local government (Gbadeyan, 2012). The conflict is a protracted conflict with the first violent confrontation traced to 1961, followed by another in 1982, 2006 and 2013. Amidst claims and counter-claims on the ownership of the disputed boundary, the state government has sustained the pursuit of peace although this cannot be seen to have changed the narratives of the conflict which is what has sustained the tensed relationship between the two communities.

For instance, reflecting the mood of the Erin-Ile community a respondent drew attention to the constant appropriation of land 'rightly belonging to Erin-Ile and other communities around it by the Offa people' he brought out an advertisement purportedly signed by the traditional ruler of Offa community wherein a property situated in on Ilemona land which was wrongly described as 'Ilemona, Offa.' He went on cite many other instances to corroborate the allegation that Offa community is fond of and actually pursuing an expansionist move relying on the influence of her sons and daughters in high places.

The ineffectual impact of government interventions was evident in the bestiality of the killings that characterised the 2013 episode of the violence that has characterised the crisis between the two communities. The violent involvement of associations of commercial drivers that are supposed to be professional/civic platforms in the conflict reveals the extent to which the conflict has permeated every stratum of the two communities.

***Share* in Ifelodun LG and *Tsaragi* in Edu LG: Boundary and Chieftaincy Conflict**

Share and *Tsaragi* are two communities belonging to the Yoruba and Nupe ethnic stocks respectively. *Share* is located administratively in Ifelodun local government while *Tsaragi*

is in Edu local government. The two contiguous communities lived peaceful together since 1808. The creation of Ifelodun local government and the naming of Share as its headquarters in 1976 put Share in Kwara South Senatorial district and Tsaragi in Edu local government in Kwara North Senatorial District. As a matter of fact the cause of the conflict has not changed from the one highlighted in past SCA Reports and that is the large expanse of farmland of over 200 hectares called “Fiangiawa” being claimed by the two communities. Since then, the two communities have intermittently engaged in violent conflicts over ownership of boundary, certain areas, allegations and resistance of forceful acquisition and construction of clashing narratives on who is indigene and who is the settler. Between 1976 and 2015, there had been six reports of judicial commissions of inquiry into to the crises and in the aftermath of the December 19, 2015, clash, the state government went a step further by implementing some aspects of the White Paper on the last commission.

However, interactions with élite drawn from the two communities during the field work in July/August 2016, revealed the deep-seated nature of mutually held animosity and also the capacity of Diasporas and community associations on both sides for peace. In all the interviews conducted with natives, security agents and residents in both communities, the efforts of the government might achieve little in reconciling the two communities given the thickness of enemy-images mutually held at the communal and individual levels in the two communities. Reconciliation efforts by the current government of Abdul-Fatai Ahmed no matter how altruistic are being seen as partial by the Tsaragi people who hold the view that as a native of Share, the governor will and ‘is doing everything to favour his community.’

The conflict has been characterised by episodic clashes leading to killings and destruction of valuables on both sides. But most disturbingly, each episode of conflict comes in to scuttle or set back processes of reconciliation which are regularly on-going initiated either by the government or by the people. Such was the occurrence of 3/4 August, 2016 at a time of high optimism of reconciliation, a young man alleged to have been of Share extraction shot and killed five farmers of Tsaragi extraction which heated up the polity in the state and stalled both formal and informal peace processes being made by both the government and élite on both sides of the conflict. Respondents on both sides shared the view that the act should be treated as a criminal act of one man and not as an action carried out in the interest of the community. Despite the mutual understanding, the drawback on the reconciliation process between the two communities was palpable as security agents discouraged visiting the community. Also, natives of the communities spoken to in Ilorin discouraged the visit and a respondent from Share reiterated it by citing the refusal of the traditional ruler of Tsaragi to allow a visit from Share to come and commiserate with the community for the killing of the 5 farmers from Tsaragi on 3 August, 2016.

Ganmo and Ganna in Ifelodun LG

Ganmo is a community in Ifelodun local government of Kwara state embroiled in a tussle between the Oluganna and Oluganmmo of Ganmo. The Oluganna of Ganmo whose ascendancy is linked to the Igbomina community consider themselves as the autochthons of Ganmoland while there is the Ilorin Oluganmo of Ganmo whose ancestry is traced to Afonja house in Ilorin. The clashing claim of ownership of the stool and land has been the bane of peace, stability and development in the community. To this end, the Igbomina community, a larger part of the Kwara South senatorial district built Igbomina House, an edifice to serve as the landmark of the boundary between the Ilorin community and Igbomina putting the major part of Ganmo land on their side. Each round of clashes is characterised by killings, maiming and destruction of properties of residents/natives and by-standers because of a major road plied by travelers to Abuja from Ilorin which divides the two communities.

According to our respondents, in 2013, there was an unprecedented violent clash that exposed the extent of mutual hatred between the two communities and their respective capacities for violence. This was in the wake of the elevation of the Oluganna by the government to a fourth-class status. A lawyer had accompanied a police officer who is a native of Ganmo to assess a piece of land when youths of Ganna pounced on him and the police officer. In fleeing for their lives they fled into a family compound known as Idi-Ogun and in the ensuing rage, the attackers torched the house because they offered refuge to the fleeing. Our respondents went further to clarify that the main bone of contention in the conflict is the land and that the chieftaincy tussle is secondary. At the height of the 2013 clash, the two monarchs were remanded in prison by a Kwara state magistrate court. Since then, there had been loss of lives of known supporters and family members of the rival factions ascribed to the crisis between the two. In 2014, a son of the Oluganna was shot few minutes after he left his father's palace. This led to the arrest of the Oniganmo with whom his father had been having a running battle by the Police. Another respondent revealed that a seeming reprisal was carried out after the killing of the son of the Oluganna as a prominent supporter of the Oluganmo was also found dead days after the killing of the son of the Oluganna.

Alapa and Herdsmen Clash in Asa LG

Alapa is a community in Asa local government area of Kwara state that houses the Yoruba, herdsmen and those described as Bororos and kindred of the herdsmen residents. According to KII respondent, the 2013 conflict occurred during the Muslim yuletide when some Bororos were seen “exhibiting some sexually explicit behaviors openly in the community which the Yoruba frowned at.” The alarm raised by the person to what was considered a socio-cultural aberration led to attacks that took identity lines during which the Yoruba man was killed. This degenerated for days as both parties went for each others' lives and belongings including animals.

Oro-Ago and Herders in Ifelodun LG

Oro-Ago is a community in Ifelodun local government area of Kwara state. The main groups in the community are the Yoruba natives and the Herders minority. The most recent clash between the two communities was on 13 April, 2015. All the interviewees rendered the same account that the tension began to mount when some herdsman youths disregarded the rule of the community put in place by the new traditional ruler who ascended the throne in September 2014 that barred public barring or display of arms and ammunition to the market on market days or anywhere in the town. Some herdsman traders were reported to have flouted the rule and their weapons were subsequently seized by the vigilante group of the community. After the seizure, a factional leader of the herdsman community was said to have gone to where the weapons were kept and to have returned them to the herdsman owners. The hunters and vigilantes of Oro-Ago attempted to re-seize the weapons and this precipitated violence and in the melee, two people were reportedly killed while properties worth millions of naira were destroyed including five vehicles and 10 motorcycles.

According to the president of the Oro-Ago Descendants Union (ODU), the herdsman have lived peacefully with the Yoruba in the community since 1973 when they came into the community but things started going in the 1980s when the herdsman started playing host to the Bororos. First was the frequent report of raping of Yoruba women by the Bororos who often ambushed and raped them in the bush paths on their ways to the farms. This was followed by the invasion of farms to cart away farm produce of Yoruba farmers and giving some of the farm produce as feeds to their animals. After a while this discouraged the Yoruba farmers from planting because it seemed they were just planting for the animals of the herdsman to consume. Moreover there were instances of farmers clubbed to death or killed with machetes by herdsman on their farmlands for daring to challenge the invasion of their farmlands. The herdsman now carry AK 47 rifles. As at now, 'we are compelled to buy all grains from them, except yam – which they cannot plant because they have been able to scare our people away from farming' (Interviewee, 2016).

Asked when all of these started, a respondent recalled that it began in 1983. Since then, there had been pockets of conflicts which were informally resolved within the two communities by the chiefs and traditional rulers of both communities. A power tussle between a group known as Meshede group and another one known as Ndagogo group degenerated into a conflict within the herders but when the Police came to make arrests, it was the Yoruba in the community who were arrested in 2007 and remanded in prison. Further checks by the Oro-Ago community revealed that the arrest was on the instruction of Ndagogo who felt the Yoruba took sides with the Meshede group and eventually the case was thrown out by the court because Ndagogo failed to show up as the complainant after the trial went for over a year.

In 2015, just after the elections in April on a Monday market day, the Yoruba in Oro-Ago observed that Herders women did not come to the market despite the fact that they sell virtually all grains we consume to us and after the attack they came to the conclusion that their non-appearance at the market was pre-planned according to a respondent. So on this day, a herdsman was spotted with machete in the market by a Yoruba vigilante man who subsequently accosted him for flouting the law and in response he was hacked in the neck. There was immediate mobilisation on both sides and the whole town was engulfed in commotion.

Impacts of Conflicts on Security in Kwara State

More than anything else, security remains the worst affected aspects of life in communities that have experienced violent conflicts. The realities in communities affected by conflicts in Kwara are not different. While most of the conflicts have histories predating 2013, the degree of intensity since then has had both positive and negative effects on security in different places. With the exception of Share and Tsaragi, all other communities affected by conflicts in Kwara state have established stronger ties with the security agencies and this has made their activities more effective.

Political Security

In this regard, the Kwara state government has been found wanting by one of the parties in the Oluganmo and Oluganna feud because they query why the state government continues to recognise one of the traditional rulers in the community. Also, respondents from Oro-Ago and other conflict-affected communities took exception to the provision of humanitarian support to victims of the conflict involving *Share* and *Tsaragi* while such gesture was not extended to victims of other communities wherein violent conflict took place and commissions of inquiry set up. However, it is noteworthy that there is no conflict in the state in which the government has not waded in either singly or in concert with security agencies.

Socio-Economic Security

This is by far the commonest scar on relationships of hitherto friendly communities. In communities in Ganmo, Oro-Ago, Alapa, Share and Tasaragi, the socio-economic activities of the people have suffered adversely as a result of the conflicts in the communities. This is because residents of these communities are farmers and traders who rely on daily income for their survival. Also, certain goods, services and farm produce are sold largely to people of other ethnic identities and when they are not available to buy such goods and service, the producers of such goods lose their incomes.

Conflict Actors' Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities and Incentives in Kwara State Conflicts

The actors in these conflicts are mainly the youths most of whom serve as community

vigilantes or militias, ethnic associations and security agencies. Identifying the peace agenda of these actors is difficult because many of them have a zero-sum attitude to the issues in conflict. However, during interviews with many leading figures in the communities, it became discernible that the elites have strong influence and in some cases a resolution of such conflicts might make them to lose relevance. They occupy a critical and strategic place because they serve as gatekeepers between the government and their respective communities. This is why identifying elites' agenda on both divides in conflict and reconciling might hold a promise in generating a cross-cutting agenda for peace in communities affected by conflict. Indeed, the elites most whom operate under the umbrella of their respective town associations have huge capacities because they can also mobilise support for the community based on their understanding of the situation at any point in time. As observed, such capacities by the town unions are often diverted in furtherance of the conflict or violence in most cases.

If not for the persistence of the state government in formally and informally intervening before, during and after conflicts in the state, the impact would have been worse. However, the impacts of these conflicts have been felt within their immediate communities and beyond. The fact that most of the conflicts have not been fundamentally received keeps most of the communities on the edge because in most of the communities the core issues are lingering.

Interventions/Responses

Most of the interventions from the government have been basically tailored towards immediate containment of the conflicts by deploying police or military troops, setting up commissions of inquiry and providing humanitarian palliatives to affected people which in some quarters has described as done discriminately. The Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the state have sustained their advocacies and exploration of means of collaborating with the government with limited success.

Conclusion

The trend and patterns of the occurrences of the conflicts and public breaches of peace that have occurred during the period covered by the scope of this study come in two categories. First, are some that appear to have been pre-planned and waiting for the trigger or a set time; while, some were spontaneous.

Gaps in Literature, Policy and Programmatic Responses

Not a few studies have been done on conflicts and their impacts in Kwara state but future studies should pay more attention to how government pronouncements and position affect the tenor of conflict. Future studies on conflicts in Kwara state should also pay focal attention to the impacts of the conflicts on women and children because of the many cases of rape reported to have characterised the farmers-herders conflict. Kwara state has one of the highest number of JCI's with recommendations, so studies should

begin to interrogate how the JCIs affect the cycle of conflicts in some cases. It is also one of the states where a JCI recommended a peace process in the aftermath of the 2013 episode of violence in the Offa and Erin-Ile crisis.

Recommendations

The state government should pay more attention to issues of boundary delineation in as part of the means of finding lasting solution to many of the boundary crises in the state.


There should be increased collaboration between the state government and other security agents in preventing conflicts arising from criminal activities.

The firm presence of the not for profit organisations in the state should be harnessed by the government in deepening peace advocacy and discouraging the use of violence as a means of expressing and settling disputes.

The government should be consistently neutral and impartial in interventions in conflicts.

Nasarawa State (Home of Solid Mineral)

Capital: Nasarawa



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Introduction and Background

The area, which is today known as Nasarawa state, was formerly a geo-political unit under Benue and Plateau Provinces of Northern Nigeria and was carved out by the General Sani Abacha-led military government, on 1 October, 1996. The state is structured into thirteen (13) Local Government Areas (LGAs) namely: Akwanga, Awe, Doma, Keana, Keffi, Kokona, Karu, Lafia, Nasarawa, Nassarawa-Eggon, Obi, Toto and Wamba.

The state is made up of over 30 ethnic groups each with its distinct cultural heritage; living in harmony with one another. These include the Alago, Eggon, Gbagyi, Gwandara, Egbura, Migili, Kantana, Rindre, Herders, Hausa, Kanuri, Tiv, Afo, Gade, Nyankpa, Koro, Jukun, Mada, Ninzam, Nakere, Basa, Agatu, Arum, Kulere, Ibo, Yomba, etc. People from other parts of the country coexist peacefully with the indigenes. The diverse people of the state have very rich cultural heritage, which they uphold religiously. These manifest in the many festivals, which, serve as source of inspiration, recreation and entertainment all the year round. These festivals are also veritable tools of unity along the ethnic nationalities in the state. These customs and traditions are also platforms through which perceptions, ideas, aspirations and philosophies are transmitted as well as commune with their creator.

Conflict Landscape of Nasarawa State

Ombatse Crisis in Eggon

Nasarawa state has experienced a number of armed violence between the Egbura and communities in Toto Local Government Area, the Herders and farmers, the Tiv and Kwala ethnic groups in Azara, Awe Local Government Area, and the Eggon, Herders and Gwandara violent conflicts, which climaxed on the 7 May, 2013 incident in Alakyo, at the outskirts of Lafia, where about 74 security operatives were murdered by Ombatse militia. It is claimed that about 534 persons were killed in some communities across the state between 2012 and 2013. On Tuesday, 7 May, 2013, a joint security team, composed of the Police and Operatives of the Department of State Services were deployed to seal-up, search and recover all arms, dangerous weapons and ammunitions in the possession of the Ombatse militia group in *Alakyo*, in Nasarawa-Eggon LGA. It was in the course of carrying out the assignment that all members of the team were ambushed and brutally murdered (Tukur, 2013).

Currently, the most militant group in Nasarawa state is the Ombatse militia. The group has been involved in a number of armed violence, even before the 7 May incident. Between 30 May and 1 June, 2012, the *Ombatse* militia attacked the *Alago* community in *Assakio* and killed fifteen (15) people, as well as destroyed about four hundred and six (406) houses. Similarly on 21 November, 2012, the *Ombatse* militia attacked the *Migli* community of *Agyaragu* in Obi Local Government Area, and killed nine (9) people, as well as destroyed their houses and other property. Furthermore, in January 2013, the Ombatse attacked a number of communities, including: Iggah in Nassarawa Eggon Local Government Area; Burum-burum in Doma Local Government Area; Yelwa-Bassa in Kokona Local Government Area as well as Kwandere in Lafia Local Government Area. On 13 January, 2013, the Ombatse militia attacked and shot some Army personnel at Awonge, along Lafia-Doma road and also at the military check point along Akwanga-Keffi road. This violence is attenuated by the availability of sophisticated SALWs.

In our interaction with some government agencies such as National Orientation Agency (NOA), the Nigerian Police, NGOs, groups and individuals across the state, we discovered there were conflicts in the state which includes: Farmer-herders communal conflicts, ethnic conflict, electoral/political violence and even labour conflicts. There were no terrorist attacks but it was an area for tension as suspects of Boko Haram have been arrested on some occasions.

Herders and Farmers Crisis in Ekye Development Area

The farmer-herder conflict is a major crisis in the state. However, it has escalated and assumed a deadly dimension. It is a conflict that has kept reoccurring in many of the communities with a cycle of reprisal attacks from one area to other areas. For example, the attack of the Alakyo Community by suspected herders was said to be a reprisal attacks.

The actors involved are herdsmen, farmers and politicians. On 6 January, 2013 in Agbashi,

the headquarters of Eyke Development Area, there was an attack by a herdsman who drove his cattle into the farm of one Alhaji Zubairu Epo destroying his guinea corn harvest for storage. When Alhaji Zubairu complained, the herder quickly brought out his machete and in the process of blocking his head, one of the Alhaji Zubairu's hands was chopped off. The herder then took to his heels but the community youths on hearing the news fished him out and he was attacked. Both the herder and Alhaji Zubairu were taken to different hospitals in the state to receive treatment. Joint task force was mobilised to the Area to forestall further breakdown of law and order but they left the area barely after an hour leaving the people to the possibility of violent confrontation.

On 17 February, 2014, attack and counter attack in Kadarko district of Keana Local Government Area between the Tiv farmers and herdsmen. On 24 February, 2014, the continuous Tiv-herders conflicts in Awe Local Government Area and Ekye Development Area of Doma Local government extended to Keana Local Government Area. On 22 August, 2014, there was a violent clash between herdsmen and Eggon farmers in Lafia East Development Area, Nasarawa Eggon and Obi Local Government Areas. On 13 October, 2014 violent conflicts between the herders and Eggon farmers in Nasarawa South Senatorial zone – in which there was invasion into Lafia, the state capital on the 14 October, 2014 by the Ombatse militias in pursuit of the herdsmen. On 24 April, 2015, two herders were said to have gone to Dauda, a Tiv settlement which is a boundary between Nasarawa and Benue state for cow business but could not return that same day. Their dead bodies were discovered the following day after a thorough search by their relations from Keana town where they came from. The case was reported to the police for proper investigation. Then on 25 April, 2015, some Tiv communities surrounding Keana town were attacked by unknown persons suspected to be Herders, leaving people dead.

The Eggon-herders ethnic feuds that started in early February 2013 in Basa village of Kokona Local Government Area had spread to Doma and Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Area. Peace which had started returning to the affected areas was disrupted on 17 March, 2013, when some suspected herders invaded two villages in Nasarawa Eggon Local Government Area (i.e. Ladi- Ende and Ambana-Egga). Two people were killed with several others injured including women and children. The attack was a revenge mission by the herders who wanted to avenge the death of their people who were earlier attacked by youths from both communities mentioned above. Also on 19 March, 2013, Suspected herdsman attacked and killed two people identified to be Eggon youths. The attack was connected with the Ladi-Ende clashes earlier mentioned. Security personnel were deployed to the affected areas to curtail the spread of the conflict to other areas.

Eyke Development Area witnessed series of conflicts where scores of lives and properties worth millions of naira were lost at the end of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013. Unfortunately, barely few months after the return of peace to the area, another violent conflict erupted on 4 June, 2013 at Rukubi town. The conflict started as a result of the

Tiv people suspecting Agatu people of Rukubi town to be harbouring herdsmen that have been attacking them. The Tiv people also accused the people of Rukubi of removing and stealing roofing sheets (Zinc) from their abandoned houses as a result of the herdsmen attack. Many people were killed and houses were destroyed in this conflict.

On 10-14 September, 2013, there was a renewed clash in Obi Local Government which involved Tudun Odo, Odo Alago, Obi Town, Bukan Sidi, Tudun Kauri, Shinge and the people involved were the Eggon Militia and the Alago youths. The remote cause was the discovery of a beheaded body of an Eggon man at Opada in Obi Area and the Eggon people suspected the Alago people over the dead. The Eggon militia mobilised themselves alongside hired mercenaries to follow the Alago settlements and unleash terror. Lives and properties were destroyed, people were displaced, commuters were obstructed from movement and tension was created in other towns such as Doma, Keana and Agwatashi. On 1 and 2 December, 2013, there was hostility over previous crises between Alago and Eggon in Obi Local Government/Asakio in Lafia East Development Area. The crises started when a suspected Alago youth was apprehended by the security agents for attempting to steal two bags of rice from an Eggon farm. He was arrested and punished and later released after the alleged property was returned to the owner. Not satisfied with the action, some unidentified people suspected to be Eggon armed with sophisticated weapons attacked the sleeping community, shot sporadically and burnt houses belonging to Koro (Miligi), Alago and Sayawa (Bauchi people) who reside in the area. No life was lost but properties were lost and panic was instilled in residents and passers-by in the area.

On 2 February, 2014, there was attack on Gidan Babu Village in Ugah-Ashigye ward which involved *Ombatse* militias and herders youths. Two Herders youth on a motorcycle for the Eid Maulud celebrations were killed claiming they were robbers. One out of the three victims escaped to narrate his ordeal. The cause of the conflict was connected to robbery cases along Ashigye-Gidan Babu-Ugah and Alawagana road, the on-going *Ombatse* trend and general apathy and suspicion.

On 8 February, 2014, the Eggon people attacked the kwalla and Dumak people of Mankwar village Lafia East of Lafia Local Government. Mankwar village is blessed with thick forest with timber as the most revenue generating commodity. The Eggon people of Rafin Pa'a (a small community along the route) are not happy that revenue is been collected by the district head of Mankwar so the Eggon youth intercepted a truck loaded with timber demanding for revenue but the owner of the truck pleaded he had already done that at Mankwar but the response did not go down well with the youth. Later that evening, the Eggon youth mobilised themselves and attacked Mankwar with weapons kill two persons, burnt houses and farm produce. Many people have been displaced including the district head of Mankwar.

Igga Community and Eggon Militias Crisis

On 25 and 26 April, 2014, there was a renewed in Igga community attack by the Eggon militias (Ombatse) on a Gwandara dominated settlement that have been staying together with other Eggon people for decades. The cause of the conflict was the claim of ownership and possession of a farmland between an Eggon and a Gwandara man. Over forty lives were lost and dumped in wells, houses and properties were destroyed, mass movement of people to neighbouring places for safety, infliction of undue tension in Burum (a nearby village) which also caused mass movement of people out of the Burum village for safety and there was disruption of economic activities at Igga village and its environs.

On 13 and 14 April, 2016, there was a conflict at Daddare Odobu and Tudun Odobu communities in Obi Local Government Area. The conflict was between the Alago and Eggon as well the Alago and Gwandara. The conflict emanated from farmland disputes, interpersonal suspicion and the resultant effect of previous conflicts.

Impact of Conflict on Security in Nasarawa

One of the immediate impacts of the killing of security personnel in the state was the bad image it gave the state which before was not known for such. Also, inter-group relations, personal and communal security were strained. Economic and food security also suffered a bad fate going by the huge loss recorded in the aftermath of the conflicts in the state.

Intervention/Responses

Track 1 Responses

Peace and reconciliation meeting was held between farmers and herders, Eggons, Alago among others. The convener of the meeting was a member, House of Assembly representing Doma North Constituency. The essence of the meeting was to chat the way forward on the need to maintain peaceful co-existence among the people as the raining season draws closer, to always report matters affecting them to the security and not resort to taking laws into their own hands. Federal Ministry of Tourism, Culture and National Orientation organise peace talks and programme on peaceful coexistence amongst communities by drama presentations, comedy, paper presentation and discussions. Also, Talking Point used by NTA Lafia to the general public to educate and sensitise the people on the need for peaceful coexistence. This was done by appealing and calling on the people to support the security agencies in their respective communities and promising not to disclose the identity of any reporter of security threats. Radio talks on Peace, Tolerance and Satiation by the National Orientation Agency, the general public. The instruments used were phone in questions and answers as well as contributions to discussions. Awareness creation on peaceful coexistence by Media stations and the National Orientation Agency (NOA) to the general public, herdsman, Tiv and Farmers through Radio and Television talks.

Track 2 Responses

Peace and Reconciliation Forum by the National Orientation Agency, Christian Association of Nigeria and Jama'atal Nasril Islam (JNI) to rub minds with Traditional title holders, Religious organisations, CSOs, Para-military Agencies, Police, Ethnic groups, Artisans, and the Press towards charting a course for Peaceful coexistence in the state, as well as map out new mechanisms in addressing present and future security challenges in the state by using Paper presentation, discussions, role play, testimonies, questions and answers.

Multi-Track Responses

Visits by National Orientation Agency, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), to the Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs) to sympathise and give them humanitarian supports, assure them of protection of lives and properties and encourage them to go back home when peace is restored. This was done by providing them relief materials and using the preaching of peace, unity and coexistence by clerics.

One-day stakeholders' sensitisation programme on sustaining peaceful coexistence: Stakeholders, such as traditional leaders, religious bodies, security agents, wives of House of Assembly members, commissioner, permanent secretaries, National Council of Women Society (NCWS), etc. were brought together – using paper presentations, drama presentations, interactive session. Goodwill messages were used also to sensitise them on peaceful coexistence. Town Hall Peace Forum by the NOA, where traditional title holders, religious organisation, CSOs, para-military agency, Police, ethnic groups and artisans are brought together to rub minds to ensure total restoration of peace in the state as well as fashion out a new mechanism in addressing security challenges in the state using tools such as discussions, role play, testimonies, questions and answers. Security meeting with okada riders, security agents, traditional and religious leaders, youth organisation, press by NOA and Karu Local Government Area, due to the insurgent attacks, theft and ritual activities in the society which have been traceable to okada riders. The meeting was an interactive session to sensitise okada riders on security consciousness, gather tips from trained personnel on security matters, and device ways of combating sequence activities of heinous crimes in the area.

Town hall meetings by British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and National Orientation Agency (NOA) on peace with herders and farmers with traditional title-holders, religious organisations, CSOs, para-military agency, police, ethnic groups, press and government officials using Discussions Testimonies, Questions and Answers, filling of Questionnaires as instruments. Sensitisation and awareness creation on 2015 General Elections by the National Orientation Agency to equip women and members of the press people with disabilities with requisite knowledge of the electoral process as well as sensitise and educate the people on voters' education using paper presentation and role play. A 2-day

Community Dialogue Meeting by the National Orientation Agency and other CSOs, with Traditional Leaders, Religions Leaders, Politicians, Youth, Women Associations etc, to mobilise the entire citizens towards peaceful conduct of 2015 elections, to educate and sensitise the communities through their leaders on the need to vote wisely. The instruments used were Interactive discussions, Drama presentations, Questions and Answers. One-day Community Dialogue by the National Orientation Agency to increase awareness and sensitise Leaders of Various Political Parties, Security Agencies, Community Leaders, Religious Leaders, women and Youth Association, etc. on Voters Education and mobilise the populace towards the 28, March General Elections by using interactive sessions.

Conclusion

The conflicts in Nasarawa state were in the context of people-to-people and insurgency going by the number of security personnel who lost their lives during the Ombatse attack. However it is one of the states with lowest frequency of attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents.

Gaps in Literature, Policy and Programmatic Responses

Studies on conflicts in Nasarawa state have been substantial however, more can still be done to examine policies and programmes of government in responding to conflicts on whether they are mitigating the conflicts or not.

Recommendations

The government should put in place a system of early warning and early response in both the conflict prone and not-too-prone local government areas in the state.

There should be a proper prosecution of perpetrators of violence to ensure that the confidence of parties in the neutrality and impartiality of the government is not lost

The government should not be too quick to forcefully respond to protests and dissents especially by organised labour.

Niger State (The Power State)

Capital: Minna



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Introduction and Background

Niger state was created on 3 February, 1976, from the defunct North-Western state during the regime of General Murtala Ramat Mohammed; however, the state actually began functioning on April 1st of that year. There were originally Nine Local Government areas (LGAs), namely: Chanchaga, Rafi, Bangi, Gbako, Etswan, Suleja, Mariga, Magama and Lavun. Agaie and Lapai LGAs were later created out of Etswan Local Government Area.

Between 1979 and 1983 when Malam Muhammadu Awwal Ibrahim was Executive Governor of the state, eighteen LGAs were managed by the administration, namely Kuta, Paikoro, Chanchaga, Rafi, Gbako, Katcha, Lemu, Lapai, Agaie, Suleja, Mariga, Bangi, Magama, Auna, Lavun, Mokwa, and Jima-Doko. But when the military came into power in 1984, it returned to the original LGA structure.

Chanchaga was however divided into two: Minna Municipal Council, with headquarters at Minna; and Shiroro LGA, with headquarters at Kuta. The LGAs in Niger state became Nineteen (19) in 1991, when President Ibrahim Babangida created nine (9) states and additional LGAs in Nigeria. However, by 1996 when late General Sani Abacha created six (6) additional states and 182 LGAs, in the entire country, Niger state got additional

six (6) LGAs, namely, Katcha, Munya, Mashegu, Edati, Tafa and Mariga, bringing the total to 25 LGAs.

The state is bordered to the North by Zamfara state, West by Kebbi state, South by Kogi state, South-West by Kwara state, North-East by Kaduna state and South-East by FCT. The state also has an International Boundary with the Republic of Benin along Agwara and Borgu LGAs to the North-West. The aborigines of Minna are mainly the Gbagyis and the Nupes, with minority Hausas – who have been cohabiting peacefully with other tribes.

Conflict Landscape of Niger State

The update of the 2008, 2012/2013 Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) did capture some level of conflict under intra- and inter-conflict community within and outside Minna in Niger state; others are post-political conflict in the North of Niger state in 2011; the fuel-subsidy crisis led to a number of deaths and casualties and the Boko Haram bomb blast at Catholic Cathedral Church Madalla. Also, inter-gang violence is another phenomenon in the state capital, Minna which has seemingly defied all measures applied. The state also experienced its share of insurgency and terrorism in December 2014, when suspected members of Boko Haram attacked the Minna Medium Prison yard, releasing over 270 inmates and carting away with weapons (Nigerian Eye, 2014). Similarly, a female suicide bomber attacks the Federal College of Education in Niger state, on 12 November, 2014, killing herself with several students reportedly injured (Sean, 2014).

In September 2015, there was a violent clash between Herders and vigilante group of Lambata in Gurara Local government of the state that led to the death of three persons. The crisis started between herdsman and Talba Vanguard (Local VIO) at a roundabout where the herders were ordered to stop on their motor cycle but they refused and proceeded to the market. The Talba Vanguard followed them to the market and this led to the beginning of the crisis. The crisis degenerated into a violent conflict which eventually led to the loss of three lives and the market was closed down.

The vigilante members that were alleged to have killed the three persons were detained at the State Criminal Investigation Department (CID) pending the outcome of further investigation. The Lambata market, where the crisis happened, was relocated to a neutral place.

Conflict also broke out over a Facebook interaction between Christian and Muslim youth. An account has it that the Muslim youth mobilised other Muslims in the town on the pretext that the Christian youth spoke blasphemously against Prophet Muhammad, leading to violence. Three persons, including personnel of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) lost their lives. Also houses and shops were burnt while 25 other shops were looted following the violence. The hoodlums embarked on further violence blocking the Lagos-Kaduna road, a major highway connecting the northern

and southern parts of the country. Arrests were made in connection with the incident, and the suspects handed over to the police. The army and other security agencies commenced confidence building patrols in all the nooks and crannies of the area toward restoring peace. As part of measures to de-escalate tension and ensure lasting peace in the town, the military began working with the local government council authorities and community leaders, including the Kagara Emirate Council, to pacify all aggrieved parties.

Since June 2016, Niger state witnessed very high level of violent conflict creating so much tension that made villages involved deserted their communities. Barkuta community in Bosso Local Government Area witnessed two violent conflicts between herders and Gbagyis. The Herders communities comprises Herders from Borgu, Dindimawa and Katsina state who have been coexisting peacefully with Gbagyis in Bar-kuta. Though there had been clashes between herders and farmers but at a very low level. The main source of conflict has been that of encroachment of grazing route by farmers which herders are aware of, and invasion of farmland by herders which has sustained the tensed relationship among them over time, leading to suspicion and distrust.

The conflict was sparked off when a lady thought to be the wife of a Herder fled into the house of an elderly Gbagyi man. The conflict degenerated when the herder demanded for the release of the woman from the Gbagyi man. A respondent told us that a brawl ensued between the Herder and the children of the elderly Gbagyi man leading to Herders losing his life. This led to reprisal attacks which recorded loss of lives and properties such as economic trees, farms and houses were burnt down in addition to the displacement of virtually entire communities in the area.

The violent conflict of August 2016 involved five communities of Kpaidna, Legbe, Dagama, Bambe, Kopa and Lunku who claimed that they were simultaneously invaded by men of the Nigerian Army at about 1:00 am. These communities have not been involved in any serious conflict except few months ago, when criminals invaded the community whom the villagers identify as herders, who raided the village by destroying properties and looted villagers of their goods, amidst other casualties.

Security sources claimed that there was a notorious gun-runner in the neighbourhood based on intelligence report which informed the military operations in the communities. Residents of the communities claimed they mistook the soldiers who came around 1:30 a.m. for armed robbers wearing military uniform; which made them to resist and attack them. The communities called for help from other villagers around stating they were under heavy attack by invaders. The conflict degenerated causing tension, death and destruction of properties. The communities were completely deserted during visits.

Impact of Conflict on Security in Niger State

The conflicts in Niger state during the period covered by this study exposed the limitation of the infrastructure of security in the state as a whole and the communities affected

while there has been the manifestation of the capacity of the people to initiate means of providing security on their own. For instance prior to the conflicts that occurred in August 2016, the Niger State Police Force in Minna established community safety partnership under the platform of community policing where the police held meetings meet with all stakeholders on monthly basis to discuss challenges and issues mitigating against peaceful coexistence in the state. This has led to an improvement in the relationship between the police and many communities in Niger state police as a result of the monthly meetings that were held.

The involvement of the army and the airforce in the alleged invasion by residents of *Kpaidna* and neighbouring villages throws a fundamental question about the order/manner of responses to intelligence by security agencies. Should cordon and search operations be done jointly or with the information of sister or relevant agencies within the security sector? Should the community be informed? Although the matter is still on-going but lessons learnt on it might serve useful purposes on how to act on intelligence and how to coordinate inter-agency operation amongst other critical issues.

The activities of the *Yan-Daba* boys in the metropolis have not been curtailed by security agencies largely because of their alleged reciprocal relationship with those in authorities. In substantiating the claim that the *Yan Daba* boys have a 'special' relationship with politicians in the state, a respondent referred to the employment of these boys to carry out the interlocking of roads in the city a project meant to modernise the roads in the state with the ostensible claim by the government that it was meant to rehabilitate them. Another resident also informed that they are usually seen as part of the motorcade of notable politicians in the state.

Most of the conflicts that were devastating in the state occurred in rural communities and had direct impact on traders, markets and farmers. This led to the relocation of a market in an instance which fractured relations. Also, so many barns and other traditional food reserves were torched in communities where the military had a clash with the residents.

The actors in the conflicts in Niger state differ from context to context and setting to setting. But in all cases they involved the security personnel, the community vigilantes, herdsmen and farmers.

Intervention/Responses

Track 1

In all cases reviewed there was none without a response from the government even though the humanitarian support and palliatives provided to victims of conflicts were nothing to write home about in the communities visited. For instance, in *Kpaidna* a bag of rice was to be shared by almost 50 people. However, the communities expressed confidence in the police in the way they have related with them. The government has

also been consistent in expressing determination to get to the roots of all the instances of conflicts in the state.

Track 2 Responses

The Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and traditional authorities in the state enjoy a warm relationship with the government and security agencies. However, this is yet to be fully translated into a structured system of responding to conflicts effectively and sustaining peacebuilding interventions from national and international sponsors in the state which have not been rare.

Conclusions

For long, Niger state has enjoyed stable intergroup relations until some of the cases presented in this reported reared their ugly heads marking a break away from the norm in the state. The state also suffered instances of attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents. Responses by the state government to inter-group conflicts, local and international organisations have had positive impacts in ameliorating the conflicts. However, more should be done to ensure that such inter-group relations are restored to its usual state of peaceful co-existence.

Gaps in Literature, Policy and Programmatic

The literature on conflict and peace studies in Nigeria can be richly expanded with attention to Niger state given its relative stability and how recent conflicts in the state became bloody. The policies and programs of the state government were able to stem the tide of violence in the cases covered. However, it is important for the state to pay more attention to the threat posed by the existence of gangs and the attendant breach of public peace anytime a turf clash occurs amongst rival gangs.

Recommendations

Politicians in the state must be seen to, and actually distance themselves from the gangs because of the threat that these gangs pose to peace.

Plateau State (Peace and Tourism)

Capital: Jos



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Introduction and Historical Background

Plateau state, with its capital in Jos, was created out of the then Benue-Plateau state on 3 February, 1976 by the Murtala Mohammed régime. Plateau state shares borders with Kaduna state to the North, Kaduna and Nasarawa states to the East, Benue to the South and Taraba state to the East. Plateau state is ethnically heterogeneous and religiously diverse state. Plateau state has over forty ethno-linguistic groups but no single group large enough to claim majority position. Some of the indigenous tribes in the state include: Afizere, Amo, Anaguta, Angas, Aten, Berom, Bogghom, Buji, Challa, Chip, Fier, Gashish, Goemai, Irigwe, Jarawa, Jukun, Kwagalak, Kwalla, Meryang, Miango, Miship, Montol, Mushere, Mupum, Mwaghavul, Ngas, Piapung, Pyem, Ron-Kulere, Rukuba, Taletc, Taroh, Youm. Each ethnic group has its own distinct language but some of them interact in Hausa or English. The people of the state are predominantly farmers and have similar cultural and traditional ways of life.

Plateau state, once regarded as a home of peace, soon acquired the notoriety of home of violent conflicts. There have been violent conflicts in several local government areas in addition to Jos, including Wase, Langtang North, Langtang South, Shendam, Mikang, Qua'an Pan, Barkin Ladi, and Riyom.

Conflict Landscape of Plateau State

Plateau state has harvested a number of armed violence in various degrees of intensity. Jos, the capital city, once known for its peace and serenity, was violently robbed of its peace repeatedly in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2010. It has also experienced series of multiple bomb blasts by the dreaded Boko Haram terrorists. These conflicts have brought about extensive destruction of lives and properties.

A number of armed violence have occurred outside Jos between the Tarok and the Hausa/Herders in Wase, Langtang North and Langtang South local government areas in 2004, the Geomai and the Hausa-Herders in Shandam local government area in 2002, the Quan Vs Pan in Quan'pan local government area of Plateau state in 2006, the Berom and the Herders in Jos South, Riyom and Barikin Ladi, since 2006 to 2014.

The conflict has been mainly between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes” at the different locations. There is an added religious dimension to the violence as the identities of the indigenes coincide with the Christian faith and the “non-indigenes” with the Islamic faith. Faith became an important variable in the consideration of identity. An additional dimension in this context is the presence of Herders cattle herders in many parts of Plateau state. The Herders, who are nomadic and predominantly Muslim, are resented by many “indigenes” because they allow their cattle to graze on their land and cause damage. There have been numerous cases of cattle rustling, where cattle belonging to Herders have been stolen by members of other communities, leading to revenge attacks by Herders on these communities, followed by counter-attacks by these communities against the Herders. Politics in the state has been extremely competitive and elections are perceived as zero-sum game leading to increased militarisation of the communities. It is not surprising that a number of the armed violence occurred shortly before and after elections: local, state and federal.

Although, the issue of ethno-religious conflict in Plateau state has significantly reduced, residency remains segmented on the basis of religion and ethnic identity as is the case especially in Jos South and Jos North. The farmers-herdsmen conflict has also become a reoccurring decimal in the state with regular attacks by herdsmen in unguarded and loosely unsecured villages as is the case in Kwata, Bukuru and recent killing of first class traditional ruler in Bokkos. The *Saf Ron Kulere*, the traditional ruler of Bokkos and Chairman, Bokkos Traditional Council, in Bokkos local government area of Plateau state, *Lazarus Agai* was murdered in his home village of *Sha* by suspected gunmen on Monday evening, 18th July 2016. This was at the wake of the murder of the *Saf Manguna* (the traditional head of Manguna chieftom) in June 2016. These murders generated tensions and violent conflicts that affected inter-community relations between Bokkos natives and Herders.

The conflicts in Plateau state and their protracted nature are largely influenced by a combination of endogenous and exogenous variables. According to Krause (2011),

historical, regional, and religious dimensions of conflicts in Plateau state are crucial to the understanding of their escalation and their protracted nature. The escalation of the conflicts have been aided by spread of terrorist insurgency that have since 2003 been threatening the sovereignty and territoriality of the Nigerian state. Plateau state has also not been isolated from its spread.

While various measures have been adopted in the management and resolution of the conflicts such as the establishments of settlements like *Dadin Kowas*, among others, the conflicts have continued to escalate beyond the capacities of local security agencies, community initiatives, CBOs and CSOs to handle.

A scoping assessment of the conflicts in Plateau state was conducted in view of the vast work that has already been done and available by the Plateau Peace Practitioners' Network; JDPC; other Civil Society, Non-Governmental Organisations and Faith-Based Organisations. It was established that 17 LGAs in the state are all at the level of Emergency Preparedness with the Special Task Force (STF) personnel prominent in the state.

In Mungu, Pankshin and Taroak North also, conflicts are recorded. In general, Plateau state is bedevilled with various types of conflicts. These conflicts include the Resource based conflicts; Identity related conflict; Farmers-Herdsmen conflict escalating due to weak state capacity to respond coupled with the breakdown in community relations. Consequently, this conflict is influencing and re-enforcing the trends of Identity and Resource based conflicts as Communities seek ways of defending themselves through Vigilanté groups; Political Conflicts; Turf conflicts induced by drugs – Gangs fight each other and rape women; as well as, rape of an 8-year old by a 13-man gang in Gangare.

Human Security Implications of Conflict in Plateau State

Conflicts in the state have negatively affected every aspect of human security. However, the most affected aspects are personal and communal security, food, social and economic security in both rural and urban settings in ways that will still require deliberate studies and analysis to measure. However, the scars of conflicts are conspicuous as debris of torched buildings is not hard to find the capital city while palpable fear and trust still hunt relations.

Responses/Interventions

The state has enjoyed the support of local and international not for profit organisations in facilitating peacebuilding and recovery in the different contexts of conflicts in the state. Plateau is one of the states that has experienced interventions in conflicts from local, state, national and international organisations as well as governments at all tiers and even embassies. This attests to the degree of destruction wrought by conflicts in the state.

Track One: Government Response (Federal/State/LGAs)

- (1) Police and Para-Military Agencies deployed to maintain order in affected areas.
- (2) Deployment of Military presence.
- (3) Distribution of Relief materials.
- (4) State Governments initiating and advocating dialogue between conflict parties.
- (5) LGAs set up camps but lack adequate facilities to accommodate all the victims.
- (6) State (Plateau) Government had set up Commissions of Inquiry, Deployment of Military, Police and other Security Agents through the Special Task Force (STF) as well as instituted and organise mediations/dialogue forums such as Peace Talks, Football matches and medical outreach.
- (7) Security Agents mobilised against Gangs and arrest 110 – some of which were not involved but their arrest, help the Security Agents in identifying the real culprits.
- (8) National Emergencies and Management Agency (NEMA).
- (9) The Nigerian Police.
- (10) The Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC).
- (11) Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC).
- (12) National Orientation Agency (NOA).

Track 2: Responses

The state has witnessed substantial interventions by both local and foreign not-for-profit organisations however, interactions with many of them revealed the need for more collaborations. The following groups and stakeholders have been active in conducting sensitisation campaigns and advocacies:

- (1) The Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) and Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) had mediated in the conflicts in Plateau state.
- (2) Institute of Governance and Security Research (IGSR) liaising with Security Agents, Community and Religious Leaders and Youth to ensure peace and the arrest of criminals elements among the Youth.
- (3) Institute of Governance and Security Research (IGRS) organise and run Peace Camps for Youth.
- (4) Institute of Governance and Security Research (IGSR) also have Women for Peace groups similar to the Youth for Peace Corps.

Track 3: Responses

The traditional, religious, social and political institutions have been active in advocacies against the use of violence. These leaders appeal for calm (and sanction) and mediate

between the conflict actors and have also been reaching out to youths to harp on the dangers of violence. It is important to state that women have also played pivotal roles in advocating for peace and justice in the state.

Conclusion

In Plateau state, the dominant discourses in the conflicts refer to political exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and religion as well as fears of religious and cultural domination. A key element of the dispute is over which groups are represented in government and have access to the state, with much controversy over how state and local governments exercise power. At the root of the conflict in Plateau state is the competition between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes”. Central to many of the conflicts is the notion of “indigeneship”, which has brought groups who consider themselves the “indigenes”, or the first inhabitants of an area, against those viewed as “settlers”. In the state, groups considered “indigenes”, or the original inhabitants of an area, are granted certain privileges, including access to government employment, scholarships for state schools, lower school fees, and political positions. To secure access to these privileges, they have to produce an “indigene certificate” which is granted by the local authorities. “Non-indigenes” or “settlers” are denied these certificates and the accompanying privileges. Different groups are considered “indigenes” or “settlers” in different areas. Next is the issue of herders and farmers which sometimes conflates with the indigene-settler rift in the state

Gaps in Literature, Policy and Programmatic Responses

While there have been a plethora of studies on conflicts in Plateau state, there are gaps in measuring the impact of interventions and what the impacts of JCI have been on the conflicts in the state. The fast mutating nature of the conflict in Plateau deserves nuanced analysis so that recommendations that can form the basis of policy and programmatic actions will be profound and spot-on.

Recommendations

There is a need to take stock of all interventions so far by all stakeholders in order to know where the gaps are and how to plug them. This is because, sometimes, actors act inadvertently at cross-purposes; thereby reducing the gains that would have accrued from their collective efforts.

The citizenship question must be addressed socially and politically.

There is need for increased and firmer presence of security personnel across the states with special emphasis with communities that more prone to attacks and raids.

There is a need to consciously embark on the deconstruction of hate narratives mutually held against each other by groups in the state.

Government at all tiers must be seen and be actually neutral and impartial in their interventions in conflicts.

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North-East Geo-Political Zone

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

API	Adamawa Peace Initiative
ADSEMA	Adamawa State Emergency Management Authority
ATR	African Traditional Religion
ANPP	All Nigeria People's Party
AUN	American University of Nigeria
ANSAs	Armed non-State Actors
BBOG	Bring Back Our Girls
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CVDPV2	Circulating Vaccine Drive Polio Virus Type 2
CJTF	Civilian Joint-Task Force
DPO	Divisional Police Officer
FCE	Federal College of Education
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IIDs	Individual In-Depth
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
JIBWIS	<i>Jama'atu Izalatil Bid'ah Wa'lkamatis Sunnah</i>
JNI	Jamaatul Nasrul Islam
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
MSF	Medecine San Frontier
MAUTECH	Modibbo Adama University of Technology
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NOA	National Orientation Agency
NSCDC	Nigerian Security Civil Defence Corps
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
SHEDA	Shani Development Association
SEMAs	State Emergency Management Agencies

SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
SUM	Sudan United Mission
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USIP	United States Institute for Peace
VNSAs	Violent Non-State Actors
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WPV	Wild Polio Virus
WPSN	Women Peace and Security Network
WHO	World Health Organization

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Executive Summary

The northeastern geo-political zone of Nigeria comprising Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states is unarguably the worst-hit part of the country in Nigeria's war against terrorism. Also, the zone has its own type, context and tenor of fault line conflicts pitching identity groups against one another but they have taken the back-seat since the escalation of insurgency. Therefore, the two contexts of conflicts in the zone are people-to-people or inter-group violent conflicts and Islamist insurgents (Boko Haram) battling the Nigerian state.

In line with the objectives of the 2016 SCA, this study generated data towards having an up to date analysis of the causes, actors, impacts, dynamics, responses and gaps in the literature on the conflicts in the zone from 2013 to 2016. This is deepened by weighing their impacts on the scale of aspects of human security.

Data generation was largely qualitative given the sensitive and emotive nature of conflict and security matters and such data were corroborated and queried by comparison with secondary sources. Thus observations, interviews and focus group discussions were held in each of the conflict-affected settings in each state of the zone. Participants and respondents included actors in conflicts, victims, religious and political stakeholders and security agents many of whom later came to participate in the validation exercise held as climax of the fieldwork.

Findings

While the cause(s) of insurgency have continued to receive the attention of scholars and policymakers, the impact of insurgency on all aspects of human security, i.e. economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, social and political security are apparent in the zone. This has created an atmosphere of fear, despair and material lack for the displaced across the zone.

The state of human insecurity in the zone is not helped by allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) levelled against managers of the camps of the internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The visible and invisible actors in the landscape of conflict and insurgency cut across local and international spheres which have made an outright defeat of terrorism challenging for the government.

However, the gains made in the twilight of the erstwhile administration of President Goodluck Jonathan and its consolidation by President Muhammadu Buhari are worthy of note.

Although a recovery strategy named the 'Buhari Plan' and a Presidential Committee on the North east Initiative (PCNI) to drive the recovery plan of the Northeast are in place,

these and other initiatives should be pragmatically fine-tuned to cater for the changes in the war against terror and its impact.

The Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) intervention put together by Nigeria, Cameroun, Republic of Niger and Chad is making good progress in curtailing the transnational forays of Boko Haram just as Nigeria's *Operation Lafiya Dole* is recording unprecedented success. Equally contributing to the success in the war against terror is the support from the international community and the sub-regional governments.

Recommendations

Governments at all tiers, local and international not-for-profit organisations and the international community must sustain on-going humanitarian, technical and strategic supports being given to Nigeria while the country sustains the exploration of more of such collaborations. It must be realised that Nigeria is entering a new phase in its war against terrorism rather than approaching an end to it.

There must be commitment and skilful handling of intergroup conflicts and tension especially indigene-settler, intra and inter-faith and herdsman-farmers in order not aggravate insurgency or create another round of emergency.

In responding to public protests, the security agencies should move from a repressive approach to a negotiated approach by jointly agreeing with such protesting groups on the terms of such protests. This will bring about a balance in the maintenance of order and protection of the human rights of protesters as citizens of the state.

The criminalisation of dissents by groups in the state should be discouraged as a state response because rather than being imposed, order might have to be negotiated in some situations.

While the military and intelligence gathering, processing and response must be sustained, it is important to fully deploy development as a means of discouraging attractions to anti-social trappings like terrorism.

The vastness of the zone and permeability of its borders have combined in creating many ungoverned spaces in the zone which calls for a more novel approach in border-policing and state presence in all areas within its territory.

The place of peace-education and empowerment based on human security needs of the people and the environment must be given adequate attention in ensuring sustainable peace and cordial state-society relations must be tapped into. Recovery and peacebuilding must be women-sensitive, participatory and inclusive.

The political and religious elites in the zone must change from using divisive rhetoric and fault lines of faith, ethnicity or other forms of primordial belonging for winning election or forging political alliances. There should be a socio-political paradigmatic shift towards having a more flexible, accommodating and inclusive society.

The North-East of Nigeria

Introduction and Background

The states in the Northeastern geo-political zone of Nigeria are Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. These states can be traced to the North-Eastern state which was divided into three states, namely: Borno, Bauchi and Gongola states in 1976 in order to bring the government closer to the people according to the politics of state creation then. These states were later divided into two each: Borno was divided into Borno and Yobe states in 1991; Gongola was divided into Adamawa and Taraba states in 1991; and later, Bauchi was divided into Bauchi and Gombe states in 1996.

Population and Landmass of the North-East

The North-East is a vast area and by comparison it is bigger than many countries in Europe or Africa. In terms of size Borno is the biggest in the zone covering an area of about 70,000 sq. km, which almost two and a half times the size of all the five states of the South East combined. The population of the North East by state is as follows: Adamawa, 3,168,101; Bauchi, 4,676,465; Borno, 4,151,193; Gombe, 2,353,879; Taraba, 2,300,736 and; Yobe, 2,321,591 (2006 Population Census).

Occupations of the Peoples of the Northeast

The geo-political zone is well known for agriculture, crop, livestock and forestry and the main occupation of the people are farming, herding and fishing (Kale, 2016). The crops commonly grown are guinea corn, millet, maize, rice, wheat, groundnut, cassava, beans and cowpeas, onions, okro and tomatoes over an arable land of about 1,794,400 ha that is also rich in salt and potash, limestone kaolin deposits, iron ore, uranium, quartz, magnesite, mica and granite (Kale 2016). Animal rearing (cattle, sheep and goats) and fishing are also some of their economic activities. There is abundant land in the north east most of which is arable and supports human and animal life. The prominent rivers in that part of Nigeria are: Benue, Donga, Gongola and Komadugu-Yobe including many that are either seasonal or have become part of the receding river regimes. The Lake Chad has been a major source of supporting livelihoods for the population in Borno, on the Nigerian side, and Niger, Chad and Cameroon in the sub-region of West Africa.

The global weather change has affected the Lake Chad such that fishing which was a major activity on the lake is giving way to other forms of agricultural production such as rearing of animals and cultivation of crops, particularly beans. The cultivation of the land which is done side-by-side with the rearing of animals has bred its own form of conflict context and actors that is, resource-based conflicts between the farmers and nomadic animal herders. Despite the receding of the Lake Chad it still remains a major area for the provision of smoked fish and beans to other parts of Nigeria.

Ethnic and Ethno-Linguistic Groups in the North East

According to the 2006 national population census, the zone houses 18.9 million people who constitute 7 per cent of the national figures with Bauchi and Borno accounting for 50 percent of the population of the geo-political zone. The borders being artificial creations of the European colonial overlords actually mask relationships across the borders as people of the same ethnic and cultural groups were divided. The Kanuri and the Shuwa (Arab) ethnic groups exist in Borno state and in the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger; in Adamawa and Taraba states, the Herders and the Chamba ethnic groups are found in the Republic of Cameroon. It is important to note that the Herders also exist in Niger Republic. So the North-East is both an area of great cultural diversity and affinity with Nigeria's neighbours. Some ethnic groups still have presence in nearly all states. For instance the Herders exist in all the six states and the Kanuri exist in all the states, except Taraba.

Hausa is the most widely spoken language in all the states with Fulfulde being a major language spoken in Adamawa and Taraba states that makes it take on the status of a lingua franca. Other ethnic groups are the Shuwa, Marghi, Higi, Shuwa, Bachama (Bwatiye), Mbula, Wurkun, Jukun, Kanakuru, Tera, Gudduri (a mix of Herders and Kanuri), Tula, Waja, Tangale, Jara, Babur/Bura, Chibok, Kilba, Bolewa, Karai-karai, Ngamo, Ngizim, Vere, Gude, Yungur, etc. Around the Gwoza Hills, which connects to the Mandara Mountains, there are about 33 ethnic groups in there alone with some of them spilling into the Cameroons. In terms of ethnic composition the North-East is significantly diverse. For instance, of the over 500 ethnic groups in Nigeria, Adamawa state has 80 ethnic groups while Taraba state has 77 ethnic groups.

Across the geo-political zone, Muslims make up the religious majority while the Christians are the religious minority. Ethno-linguistically, the Hausa-Herders and the Kanuri are the main groups while there are other groups like Shuwa, Marghi, Higi, Marghi, Shuwa, Bachama (Bwatiye), Mbula, Wurkun, Jukun, Kanakuru, Tera, Gudduri (a mix of Herders and Kanuri), Tula, Waja, Tangale, Jara, Babur/Bura, Chibok, Kilba, Bolewa, Karai-karai, Ngamo, Ngizim, Vere, Gude and Yungur amongst others.

Socio-Economic Index

Socio-economically, the geo-political zone comprises states that are leading amongst the dismally performing socio-economically. The region records the highest level of mortality rate, has the highest number of males with no formal education and the second with the highest number of females with no educational attainment. Bauchi and Yobe states rank amongst the five states of Nigeria with absolute poverty rates. According to Kale (2016), 90 percent of households in the zone rely on wood for cooking, desertification is serious in the zone and 5 out of its 6 states are amongst the one-third of states with the highest number of under-weight children in the country. Despite being in the Lake Chad basin, access to water is low across the zone.

Out of the bottom 10 states with lowest number of students completing primary six, 4 of them are in the northeast amidst high level of religious extremism. Further, Kale (2016) reports that from 2009 to 2015, the northeast gross domestic product (GDP) fell from \$17 billion to \$8 billion amidst the shrinking of the economies of Borno and Bauchi which constitute 50 percent of the geo-political zone's economy just as the zone's share of the national GDP declined from 5 percent to 2 percent during the same period. As at 2010, the National Poverty Profile produced by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported that 69 percent of the entire population of the zone can be categorised as "Absolute Poor" (NBS, 2012:16).

Having arguably seen the worst of Boko Haram insurgency, the geo-political zone can be described as being on the way to recovery. There is increased presence of international and local organisations assisting and facilitating the return of civil authorities, reconstruction of dilapidated infrastructure, return and resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and return of socio-economic institutions (Kale, 2016).

Politically, the region can be described as very active and sometimes gets restive even before the escalation of the Boko Haram crisis whose roots cannot be completely divorced from the patron-client nature of politics in the geo-political zone (Animasawun and Saka, 2013). States in the zone were parts of the major flash points of post-election violence in 2011 that greeted the victory of the erstwhile administration of President Goodluck Jonathan. Government declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa in May 2013 and earlier in January 2012 in many local government areas of Yobe and Borno states.

Methodology

This report is a sequel to the 2012 Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) conducted by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Abuja, Nigeria. A research team comprising 8 research assistants and 2 consultants was constituted to generate data from the field from the six states that make up the North-East zone over a period. The research instrument used was a multi-method one to elicit information from respondents in each of the six states. The research instrument was designed with an inbuilt flexibility for the purpose of conducting Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), Individual In-Depth or Key Informant Interviews (KIIs/IIDs).

The research instrument was administered on purposively selected segments of the population made up of actors in the security sector, significant members of the community, traditional, religious and political leaders; civil society actors, non-governmental organisations, faith-based organisations and community development organisations or associations; and in IDP camps in each state based on their occupation, involvement and experiences of the conflicts. The field work was done between August and September 2016 over a period in all the states in the geo-political zone during which a validation exercise held in Gombe on 20 August, 2016 at the Gombe International

Hotel. The findings were presented to the participants. The key findings were followed by the presentation of each states key research findings which corroborated and revealed further details and dimensions of the conflicts and their contexts. This provided the participants with a broader and in-depth view of the key research findings.

The participants were given the opportunity to make comments on the key aspects of the research findings presented. To further elicit more information on the conflict situation in the zone, the participants were divided into three groups to further deliberate on the findings and undertook group exercises on the conflict situation in the zone. Each group made a presentation in plenary and raised observations and made comments that refined the presentations and helped the research team to validate the findings from the data analysed and presented to the participants. The workshop not only gave validity to the findings, the participants were able to straighten context to some of the conflicts. It is important to note that the research team had to reach out to some respondents at the end of the validation workshop. The responses after the workshop from the remaining few respondents in Gombe state further supported the findings.

Landscape of Violent Conflicts of North-Eastern Geo-Political Zone of Nigeria Since 2013

Just like the Boko Haram crises, all other conflicts in the geo-political zone have their peculiar trajectories and tenors. The major incidence of conflict that has occupied the radar of reportage of conflicts from the northeast since 2009 is the conflict between the Nigerian state and the *Jamaatu Ahlil Sunna Lidawati wal Jihad* meaning people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and jihad popularly referred to as the Boko Haram loosely translated as "Western education is forbidden." Boko Haram has been unleashing violence against state and society in its self-defined mission of Islamising Nigeria and establishing an Islamic state governed according to its own version of the Sharia.

However, that is not to ignore the realities of the existence of other conflicts in the geo-political zone. These conflicts are in the contexts of indigene-settler claims, farmers and herders conflicts, IDPs-community conflicts, ethno-religious conflicts, land and boundary disputes, election and post-election violence, inter and intra-faith conflicts and general youth restiveness. It is important to note that some of the conflicts arose because of the terrorist activities of Boko Haram especially ones between IDPs and host communities conflict while some had always existed prior to the escalation of insurgency. It is important to clarify that most of these conflicts occur largely over clashing values and contests for access to and control of limited resources such as land and political power because of the unrestricted access that winning elections and holding political offices offer to public coffers. So the denominators of most of the conflicts are access and exclusive control of resources.

Visible Conflict Actors in North-East Nigeria

The conflict theatre of the geo-political zone comprises gladiators made up of men and women, youths, members of religious sects, herdsmen, farmers and communities. The youths are described as the direct foot soldiers of conflicts and are often visible in most conflicts that involve violence or the use of force. However, at the peak of the menace of the Boko Haram, it made use of women and children as sources of intelligence and a number of women and children actually carried out suicide attacks especially on soft targets.

Conflict Entrepreneurs in the North-East

The respondents were convinced that important people were behind the conflicts who mostly manipulate the unemployed youth, community leaders, religious leaders and extremists, innocent followers of religion, children (especially teenage girls), poor people and illiterates. Although the main perpetrators of conflicts could be found in the communities in which they occur, there are cases where strangers/outsideers were accused of perpetrating conflicts. For instance, some respondents felt that the Boko Haram conflict was being perpetrated by “outsiders” that is, non-indigenes and non-Nigerians in many of the communities. The view that non-indigenes were behind Boko Haram attacks in some communities reflects the extent of boundaries and mutual suspicion between groups despite years of staying together.

Women and Conflicts in the Northeast

Women have been involved in violence both as perpetrators and victims and less as stakeholders in the resolution of conflicts (Animasawun, 2016). Most respondents stated that women were not directly involved in most conflicts. However since the violent activities of Boko Haram, women and young girls have continued to feature in conflicts not just as victims. For instance they are engaged in suicide bombing, physical combat, espionage, trafficking and hiding of weapons and supporting the perpetrators. In one instance of attack in late January 2016 in Dikwa in Borno state, after three attacks had been carried out, ‘a third would-be assailant in that attack, a teenage girl strapped with explosives, had a last minute change of heart, confessing that she did not want to kill her parents, who were residents of the camp’ (Cooke, 2016:2). Sometimes women are abducted and forced to join the insurgents where they are forced to labour as cooks or get raped. A telling instance that enraged the world against the country was the abduction of over 200 secondary schoolgirls in Chibok in Borno state on 14-15 April, 2014 by the Boko Haram insurgents.

Rather than being excluded, most participants during FGD sessions agree that women were involved in peace and reconciliation efforts on a low scale. Towards addressing this, the Women Peace and Security Network (WPSN) has seized the initiative and continued to engage in peace, reconciliation and security efforts despite the poor definition of the role of women in brokering peace. The group and other like-minds

have been advocating for more roles for women in reconciling communities, facilitating meetings and dialogues with politicians, leading enlightenment campaigns especially on effective parenting and serving as witnesses in court. They should also be used as carriers of positive messages and networking for peace by forming women's association speaking against insurgency in the media and other avenues. All these can be achieved and sustained with increased peace education, enlightenment, empowerment and support.

Weapons Used in Conflicts in North-East Nigeria

As a region, there has been increase in the frequency, inhumanity and ramifications of violent conflict in northern Nigeria in micro and macro contexts in the last thirty years. Weapons ranging from crude to sophisticated ones are freely used during these violent clashes. Some of these are locally manufactured guns, illicitly imported weapons such as AK-47 assault rifles, Beretta and Browning pistols, carbine rifles, double-barrelled shotguns, sub-machine guns, knives, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), sticks, clubs and incendiaries.

Victims of Conflicts in North-East Nigeria

Helplessly sandwiched within these violent exchanges are the women, children and the elderly who constitute the victims of the crises. In terms of human security, they have been forced to master the art of living in fear while for many, the loss of their husbands have rendered them in perpetual want (Animasawun, 2013). Most of the women, children and the elderly live in perpetual fear of violence from security agencies of the government on one hand and the ANSAs on the other hand.

Although violent deaths from the conflicts are in thousands, the World Health Organization (WHO) reports that as at October 2016, 14,800,000 have been affected by conflicts, 2,230,000 internally displaced, 187,126 refugees and 3,700,000 languish in need of health (WHO, 2016) to underscore the fragility or near absence of human security in the zone. Levan (2016) expressed the feelings of the residents in the zone thus: "Boko Haram took our children, the government took our votes".

Invisible or Unreported Conflicts

By invisible or unreported conflicts, we mean conflicts that have become less or unreported because of the prominence that insurgency has attracted. Such conflicts also include those exploding in spaces that are inaccessible or difficult to access for researchers and the media personnel. Hence, they are not known or reported outside the immediate environment in which they occur despite the fact they also constitute threats to peace and security. More than half of the respondents with access to main and social media disagreed that there are conflicts that are not reported in the media. However, those who alluded to the existence of such cited communal clashes, activities of gang members, murders and political conflicts that are not in the media. Such unreported conflicts are only known to those residing in areas where they occur.

Impacts of Conflicts in the North-East of Nigeria

Attendant crimes that have accompanied conflicts in the geo-political zone are rape, robbery and banditry. State responses have been militaristic, humanitarian and the zone has also produced the first form of informal and non-state led counter-terrorism outfit known as the Civilian Joint-Task Force (CJTF) which can be described as a complementary armed non-state group to the government (Idler 2012).

Responses and Interventions

Tracks One

As a zone that started battling and coping with terrorism since 2009, understanding the responses to conflicts in the northeast must keep this in focus. Therefore, the zone can be said to have become a conflict theatre between the Federal Government and the Boko Haram insurgents since 2009. During this period, responses were largely militaristic led by the Joint-Task-Force. This was because the Boko Haram carried out more of hit-and-run on the police, prisons and military formations in rare instances in its early days. From 2009 to 2015, the inhumanity of the attacks on the Boko Haram informed stronger military responses to reclaim the territories occupied by the insurgents and to facilitate the return of normalcy to the zone.

Since the twilight of the administration of former president Goodluck Jonathan the Boko Haram began to show signs of a weakened force in attestation to the efforts of the Nigerian military and the sub-regional collaboration to defeat terrorism. This victory has been consolidated with the assumption into office of President Buhari and this has created an atmosphere conducive for track-two (not-for-profit organisations) actors to come into the zone.

The administration has also succeeded greatly in restoring traditional institutions and other structures of governance in the zone. This informed the establishment of the committee called the Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI) which had existed and been working before its formal inauguration by the President on 26 October, 2016. The imperative of harnessing all responses to rebuild the northeast had never been lost on the committee as expressed by chairman of the committee who had earlier reasoned that:

The rebuilding of the North-east requires considerable planning and coordination . . . this task, we must discharge transparently and accountably . . . the task would involve massive reconstruction of physical infrastructure . . . and the more challenging one is the rebuilding of peace and social cohesion” Lt. Gen. T.Y. Danjuma (rtd.), Chairman, Presidential Committee on Northeast Initiative (*The Vanguard*, 3 February, 2016).

Perhaps as an indication that the government at the executive and legislative levels are not oblivious of the severity of the situation in the geo-political zone and the need for institutionalising a well articulated development plan, there exists a document called the ‘Buhari Plan’: “Rebuilding the Northeast” and a recent legislative nod for the

Northeastern Development Commission Bill (Nyako, 2015) which was amended at the time of approval on 19 October, 2016 to include Plateau and Kano states both of which have been severely affected by insurgency and intergroup conflict since the inception of the Fourth-Republic in 1999. Also, on 20 October, 2016, a webcast was hosted by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington DC where Governors of the entire northern region pledged their unflinching commitments to the imperative of rebuilding the northeastern region (Strasser, 2016).

The Federal Government working in concert with the state governments, have responded by ensuring that victims of insurgency were provided with relief materials, health services and counseling. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) with the cooperation of the State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) have maintained an active presence providing relief materials. The organisation of the camps has led to a situation where volunteers from the communities and beyond could step in and help. Some volunteers were helping to teach children in the IDP camps to ensure that they did not lose out on school.

The military has also stepped in by establishing a radio station, Radio Dole, in Maiduguri to propagate peace and earn the confidence of the communities in which they operate. This has been followed up by holding town hall meetings which gives it an avenue to interact and gain the support of the communities. This is helping the military to achieve success in its objective of working to restore law, order and security in the North-East by “winning hearts and minds”. The military is providing escort to both private and commercial vehicles to Biu in the south and to Gamboru in the north of Borno state.

Track Two: Community Leaders and Civil Society Organisations

Communities are taking proactive steps to ensure that peace returns and maintained in the North East. It is important to note that some traditional leaders have taken the initiative and responded by organising meetings and seminars on peacebuilding through their development associations. For example the people of Shani Development Association (SHEDA) organised a meeting on peace during which various speakers emphasised dialogue among conflicting parties, bringing community elders and youths to talk on the importance of peace and formation of vigilante groups for community protection. Religious leaders have also responded by preaching tolerance and accommodation, calmness, mediation in conflict, praying for peace and engaging the community generally on issues of peace.

Track Three: International Organisations/Donor Agencies

International development partners have been responding by raising awareness and conducting sensitisation campaigns, researches, assisting internally displaced persons, giving support and provision of relief materials. Some European countries have come together with the Americans and the Canadians to support the work of Civil Society

Organisations and NGOs providing humanitarian services. This has helped in coordinating their efforts and the support they provide to individuals in the IDP camps. Some organisations have stepped in to document the conditions of the victims of the conflict with a view to making their plight known to the world so as to attract more humanitarian support to the conflict victims.

Transnational Dimensions of Instability in the North-East

As an area, the northeast of Nigeria affects and is affected by happenings in neighbouring countries especially Chad, Cameroon and Niger. As explained by Bangura (2015) transnationalism as explained by Randolph Bourne in the 20th century was a new way of thinking about intercultural relationships. Just as scholars of transnationalism use the concept to analyse how the flow of ideas, peoples and goods between/amongst regions affects globalisation, we consider it an appropriate term in deepening the comprehension of how proximity and interactions between states in the northeast and neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon can affect and be affected by conflicts and instability in a bi-linear way.

The lake, mountains, forests, vast arid land and long ineffectively policed borders between Nigeria and these countries have created spaces that are left ungoverned which have made it possible for criminal activities to thrive including smuggling of goods, drugs, weapons and illegal crossings into and out of Nigeria. The many years of political instability in the Republic of Chad and the free movement of rebels across the border has made the importation of small arms and light weapons easy. Chadians running away from the conflict in Chad have taken refuge in Maiduguri some of who could be run-away rebels. At one time, the Chadian ex-President, Mr. Goukouni Waddeye, was also staying in Maiduguri until his death.

The consequence of the influx of small arms and light weapons has become a security threat with the rising tide of armed robbery along the major highways in the zone. Expectedly, the geo-political zone has also been affected by the instability in Libya as some weapons used by the Boko Haram were believed to have flown from Libya. The occupation and conversion of the Sambisa forest into an impenetrable enclave by the Boko Haram speaks to the existence of vast ungoverned spaces in the geo-political zone.

Conclusion

The impact of insurgency defined as a conflict between the Nigerian state and the Boko Haram insurgents has turned the northeast into a theatre of conflict. Victims cutting across the civilian population and the security agents have been generated. There has been increasing outpour of humanitarian support although the entire geo-political zone cannot be declared as fully recovered from the insurgency. Apart from insurgency, there are other contexts of people-to-people conflict wearing the garbs of religion and ethnicity in most cases which have received less attention in terms of management and media

reportage since the advent of insurgency. The impact of insurgency has been harsh and will take time to be fully realised given its ramifications and reach across the zone.

Gaps in Literature, Policy and Responses to Conflicts and Insurgency

As a zone that is largely not conducive for field work, gaps indeed exist in the literature on the conflicts and insurgency in the zone specifically within the period in focus 2013-2016. This danger makes the carrying out of field work in the zone which would have positively impacted policy recommendations and programmes dependent only on the views of people in IDP camps; thereby making the conduct of studies in the actual places affected by insurgency impossible. Allegations of corruption and sexual exploitation and abuses (SEA) have also been brought to the attention of government authorities. Such practices reveal the gaps in the existing structure of providing for the needs of the IDPs. It is important to state that conflicts that existed before the escalation of insurgency in states in the zone have merely been frozen as they have assumed less importance. Nevertheless, there should be programmes and policies in place to ensure that they do not undermine recovery and post-insurgency peacebuilding process in the country.

Recommendations

A vision of inclusive, coherent and participatory postconflict peace process which does not breed any form of violence, erases unjust, repressive and oppressive socio-cultural, political and religious structures through the use of peace education.

Therefore, peace education should be used to drive peacebuilding in a way that is attentive to the socio-religious and cultural plurality and peculiarities of each locale in the north-east. This form of education should aim at restoring source of livelihoods of the IDPs towards re-establishing prosperity.

Peace-education which emphasises new ways of teaching memories, history, narratives, issues of social justice, belonging and human rights should be promoted in both formal and informal spaces of learning.

The capacity of the worst-affected segment of the population especially women, children and adolescents should be tapped into to facilitate peace and reconciliation in the context of people-to-people relations and state-society relations in the North-East by using education. This is because educating this class of people can bring about a shared memory of the ugly past which can play a major role in the process of post-conflict/insurgency reconstruction, reintegration and rehabilitation to set the state free from the conflict trap.

A new mode of engagement with the controllers and shapers of opinions comprising religious, social, political and economic notables in the geo-political zone based on a shared vision of post-insurgency peace should be led by the government at all levels.

Inclusive and participatory operationalisation of empowerment situated within the context of Northeastern socio-cultural and religious values and not imported or imposed ones.

The push impact of poverty, hopelessness and ignorance can be neutralised by peace-education driven by local actors empowered by the government and other stakeholders.

The regional Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which comprises Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria should be sustained to prevent the regeneration of Boko Haram.

There should be improvement in the gathering and response to intelligence and enhanced interaction with the locals for the generation of intelligence through confidence building.

Governments and communities should initiate reconciliation with returning and repentant members of the Boko Haram.


De-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation or countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives should be broadened and sustained.

More attention should be paid to the physical and mental health needs of IDPs.

Government must pay attention to the global and regional current of terrorism and how they connect with the local or Nigerian context of sectarianism.

Adamawa State (Land of Beauty)

Capital: Yola



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

Introduction and Historical Background

Adamawa state was created in 1991. Prior to its creation, the present Adamawa was part of the defunct Gongola state, which itself was created in 1976. According to the 2006 census, Adamawa has a population of 3,106,585. Although there are over 80 ethnic groups in the state which attests to its ethnic and ethno-linguistic plurality, the major languages spoken are Fulfulde and Hausa. Adamawa is bordered by Gombe to the west, Borno to the north and Taraba to the south and shares an international border with the Republic of Cameroun to the east. There are 21 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Adamawa state: Demsa, Fufore, Ganje, Girei, Gombi, Guyuk, Hong, Jada, Jimeta, Lamurde, Madagali, Mayo-Belwa, Michika, Mubi-North, Mubi-South, Numan, Shelling, Song, Toungo, Yola-North and Yola-South.

The major occupation of the people of Adamawa is farming, cattle rearing and fishing. Adamawa is known for its contribution to the nation's food supply owing to its production of maize, rice, millet, sugarcane, cotton, groundnuts, gum Arabic, tea, kolanuts and guinea corn. Adamawa has abundant mineral deposits such as marble, mercury, zinc, emerald, diamond, limestone, coal, tin, ruby, graphite, and many others.

The literacy rate among urban women is 51 percent while that of urban men is 54 percent and in the rural areas the literacy level of women stands at 38 percent and 42 percent for men (ACAPS, 2015). The National Poverty Profile (2010) puts the incidence of poverty in the state at 59.0 percent. However, the state boasts of a number of tertiary institutions: Adamawa State University, Mubi; Modibbo Adama University of Technology (MAUTECH), Yola; Federal College of Education (FCE), Yola; State Polytechnic, Yola; College of Legal and Islamic Studies, Yola; College of Agriculture, Ganye; and College of Education, Hong.

Conflict and Insecurity Landscape of Adamawa State

Indeed no community is immune from conflicts but it becomes threatening to stability and security when it is expressed violently. Paying attention to the broader landscape of states in the northeast besides the known Boko Haram insurgency which led to the declaration of a state of emergency in the state on 14 May, 2013 will be useful in presenting a fuller and comprehensive picture of conflicts in the country.

Animasawun (2016) categorises the conflicts into two broad contexts. First are conflicts between ANSAs or insurgent groups and the Nigerian state on one hand and inter-group conflicts which wear the garb of ethno-linguistic, ethno-religious, intra- and inter-faith conflicts but mostly resource-driven and rarely ideological in different states of the country including Adamawa state prior to and since 2013 when the last SCA was done. Violent clashes have not been infrequent in places like Numan, Demsa, Guyuk and Lamorde local government areas in contexts of Muslim herders and mostly Christian local farmers in the communities (Abdul 'Aziz, 2012). An interviewee provides an analysis of the intersection of criminality, banditry and communal violence based on his long years of service in the state:

There appears to be a relationship between criminality and conflicts in our society. Armed robbers, armed political thugs, ethnic militias are all stoking the conflicts in the state. Once criminal groups are not making much gain from crimes, they resort to communal violence to increase their economic gains. This they do by being hired by rival ethnic group or on their own attack local communities to loot homes and in the process kill and destroy. This makes it difficult to distinguish between normal crime and communal violence (Senior Police Officer in Adamawa state, 10th August, 2016 Key Informant Interview).

Inter- and intra-party crises across political parties in the state also contributed to the breach of public peace and security. For instance, local government elections have been

conducted in August this year but that of Michika LGA Adamawa North has been postponed indefinitely due to insecurity. Also, the chairman of Lamurde LGA Adamawa South has become a *persona non grata* in the area forcing him to operate from the state capital in Yola. In 2014, Adamawa state also made the news as one of the states where the executive and legislature locked horns against each other and this led to the impeachment of the then Governor (Admiral) Murtal Nyako.

Interactions with journalists who have been reporting on Adamawa state since 1999 also revealed that the scarcity of farmlands have led to increase in conflicts in the state within the period in focus (2013-2016). According to them, owing to the shrinking of arable farmlands, there has been a compelled movement into the hinterlands of the state especially by farmers in search of arable lands. In the process there has been inadvertent encroachment on areas designated as grazing routes. This is because in some cases large expanse of land is cleared and the herders are either forced to find alternate routes or trespass on previously unoccupied lands belonging to farmers.

Other instances of violent conflicts are reprisal attacks based on sad memories and rigid enemy images of ethnic or religious “others.” Many respondents cited tardiness and perceived insincerity in government-led initiatives as reasons why disgruntled groups often resort to violence. However residents of the affected communities expressed contrary views as they blamed the state government and security agencies for not coming to their aid while they were under attacks by those they referred as “herdsmen”. Girei local government area has experienced some of such instances depicting how not responding to early warning signs or the inability of relevant security agencies to decode them appropriately can lead to bloody communal conflict.

Conflicts and Insurgency in Adamawa State

In what some sources described as another episode in the conflict between the Koh community and the herders, attacks were recorded in August 2016 in Demsa local government. An eyewitness told a correspondent of *ThisDay* newspaper that “Herdsmen unleashed terror attack on Kodomum village and some neighbouring villages on Monday at about 6 pm when the villagers were resting after a burial of an old woman” (Sani, 2016).

Ganye local government is one of the local government areas with least incidences of violent conflicts in 2012. However, this changed in 2013 when in February herders allegedly invaded a farm leaving one man dead at the end of the attack (Fund for Peace, 2014). This precipitated a reaction from local farmers who stormed the Herders settlement in retaliation leading to the reported death of ten people. The frequency of violence in 2012 in Ganye was higher in the context of clashes and reprisals carried out by herders and local settlers. It was in the first half 2013 that violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram insurgents began to rise and in March 2013 suspected militants stormed a police station, a bank, and also caused a jail break. Many respondents interviewed revealed

that civilians, the police and the JTF personnel were the prime targets of the raids in Ganye. Another account of the March 2013 conflict has it that “it was indeed a revenge attack by those suspected to be herdsmen against the Chamba farmers who killed one of their kin” (Adamu and Ben, 2015).

According to Anwar (2016), the elders of Koh community in Girei local government had written to alert the security agencies perhaps reasoning like the typical African elders who knew the implication of violent reciprocities that went on between their wards and the herdsmen from neighbouring community:

The petition dated January 12, (2016) was triggered by the refusal of the police to arrest suspects after some reported incidents including the killing of the Herders boy by some youth from the affected communities, the killing of a young Bata man by the Herders as well as the killing of a bull belonging to the herdsmen by the locals. Samuel Buba Tonmageino, Hosea Plakpane, Christopher Tommageino, Living One Ethan and Joab H. Sahma signed the petition which was addressed to the DPO, Viniklang Division and copied to the DSS, the Army and the Girei Local Government Council. The Lamido Adamawa, Dr Muhammadu Barkindo Aliyu Mustapha, told the Commissioner of Information Ahmad Sajoh . . . that tension had already mounted in the affected communities before the attack. He said after receiving reports from the traditional authorities in Girei he alerted security personnel on the matter two weeks before the attacks.

However, despite all the steps taken by the traditional authorities and elders in the community, the dreaded still happened:

Witnesses say the attackers, suspected to be Herders invaded the villages at 5:30 am on Sunday (24 January, 2016), killing and torching property. Koh, Demsare, Tabongo, Fawure, Noyine and Ndikajam villages were completely burnt down by the attackers. The villages are dominated by the Bata ethnic group with a sizeable number of Herders.

A look at the events that played out before the attacks points to the existence of an adversarial relationship between the Herders and the other communities which the elders and the traditional authorities seem to have been trying to contain. And as leaders conscious of their responsibilities as guarantors of peace and security, they took it upon themselves to inform the relevant security agencies whose response did not come until after the attacks had been carried out with lives and valuables destroyed. Sadly the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) of Viniklang Division, CSP Okozie Okoriofo was killed during the conflict while there were different accounts of the number of lives lost. The Police records pointed to 19 deaths while other sources claimed that over 80 people died (Garba, 2016). Another episode of attack also happened in July 2016 during which 6 lives were lost (Yusuf, 2016).

Hong was not spared in the array of attacks carried out by the Boko Haram insurgents. There were series of attacks in the area which targeted churches, students' residence and bombs directed at the JTF (Fund for Peace, 2014). In January 2012, armed men

shot 17 people at a burial which many believed seemed more like an episode in the ethnoreligious crises in the area than an attack by the Boko Haram insurgents. In October 2012, alleged Boko Haram insurgents attacked residential facility occupied by students killing forty-eight students and injuring fifteen (Fund for Peace, 2014).

During the period covered by this study, some local government areas were found to be conflict-prone and volatile. These are Madagali because it shares borders with Gwoza local government in Borno state. The nearness of Michika to Madagali also predisposed it to insecurity arising from the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents. Mubi North and South, and Maiha were also at risk due to threats by insurgents. Jimeta in Yola North and Girei became tensed due to the presence of IDPs and restive youths.

Violent Conflicts in Mubi North and South

According to the Fund for Peace (2014), incidents of violence declined in the early part of 2013 in the two local government areas. Earlier in 2012, Boko Haram insurgents were believed to have attacked an Igbo community town hall during which 12 people all of Anambra state origin lost their lives. The “Mubi 12” as they were subsequently known were taken to Anambra state for burial amidst eulogies and tears. The “Mubi 12” included Amaechi Onwudike, Obinna Akukwe, Osita Aforka, Ukamaka Aforka, Uchenna Okpala, Ugochukwu Ezenwekwe, and John Obiakonwa. Others were Patrick Aghachi, Job Mgbemena, Bede Anagbado, Simeon Asoh and Sunday Okoye (Ujumadu, 2012). In October and November 2012 the Boko Haram insurgents targeted explosions at the Joint Task Force patrols which killed 22 people. The elections into students’ union offices in the Federal Polytechnic also recorded dozens of deaths in October 2012.

Throughout second half of 2012 till the first part of 2013, Maiha was embroiled in insecurity as a result of the raging crisis between the forces of the federal government and the Boko Haram insurgents (Fund for Peace, 2014). In December 2012, militants suspected to belong to the Boko Haram attacked local government buildings and a police station where they killed about 30 people and freed 35 prisoners. Also, in May 2013, a village market and a church were attacked in Jilang a village in Maiha. The police released a statement after the attack indicating the attackers came in through illegal routes from Cameroon. According to the spokesperson of the Adamawa state police command Mr. Ibrahim, the said gunmen rode on motorcycles “. . . slaughtered six people in the village market and another four in a church” (*Premium Times*, 2013).

Violent Conflicts in Madagali

Madagali local government also experienced sustained attacks in 2012 from solo actors and groups believed to belong to the Boko Haram. According to the Fund for Peace (2014), there were three major attacks on different local police stations and one of these was completely razed. In April 2013, there was a deadly attack on Midlu a village in the local government which left at least eleven people dead and many others wounded in an

attack on the home and neighbourhood of the then Deputy Governor of the state. Explanations for the sad event pointed in two directions. One was that it was from the Boko Haram while another account attributed it to the tension between the Deputy Governor and the Speaker of the Adamawa State House of Assembly because the two of them were vying for the sole gubernatorial ticket of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). The daughter of the Deputy Governor was kidnapped during one of the attacks and was later released unhurt (Fund for Peace, 2014).

For Larmude local government, the year 2012 was also frightening. The Fund for Peace (2014) reports that attacks in January and May 2012 claimed the lives of 50 people. The attack in May 2012 was described as a reprisal by Herders herdsmen in retaliation to earlier violence unleashed on them by the villagers. The May reprisal attack was also characterised by the looting and burning of farm produce and homes including the carting away of animals. In October, after one Friday Prayers, IEDs were detonated in an apparent attack against the JTF in another seeming retaliatory attack after a previous gun duel with the insurgents in the same month.

In Yola North and South, according to the Fund for Peace (2014), assailants were reported to have attacked a church leaving 12 people dead in January 2012. Also, in January there were reports of coordinated attacks carried out by suspected Boko Haram insurgents on pubs and public drinking spots. In May 2012, nine traders of Igbo extraction were killed in three separate attacks by insurgents. In February 2013, eleven people lost their lives in sectarian clashes in the local government.

Herders and Bachama Community Clash in Karim Lado Local Government Area

In a classical case of a relationship hinged on negative reciprocities, the adversarial relationship between the herders and farmers also rears its head as a conflict between Muslims and Christians depending on what is given accent in any episode. This is because the Herders who are also Muslims while the Bachama who are farmers are mostly Christians. The crisis which has its roots in grazing route and destruction of farm crops and farm produce by the herders reached its peak in January 2012 when about 12 Bachama Christians were killed in a night raid by gunmen at the Christ Apostolic Church in Jimeta in the state capital.

The herdsmen alleged that about 50 of their people were killed while their livestock and mosques burnt in citing what precipitated the reprisal attack on the church. Their women and children were also reportedly held hostage, while access to corpses for burial was denied by the Buchama people (Abdul'Aziz, 2012). Consequently, there has been reprisal and counter-reprisal attacks by the two parties leading to displacement of over 5,000 persons and total destruction of about 12 communities, namely Bukutu, Luwafuti, Furtu, Wamsa, Suwa Bariki, Sulne, Wurki, Bang, Kullani, Murai, Kiza and Ninge (Abdul'Aziz, 2012).

Impact of Conflict and Insurgency on Security in Adamawa State

That the main conflict in Adamawa state in the period under study was between the forces of the Nigerian state and the people on one side and the Boko Haram insurgents on the opposing side had far reaching effects on people, infrastructure and relationships both in the context of inter- and intra-group and state-society relationships. Therefore, there is need to analyse the impact of violent conflicts in Adamawa state using specific indicators within a clear-cut framework. So the impact of the conflict between the Nigerian state and the Boko Haram insurgents on lives, infrastructures and relationships would be done by identifying how the conflict impacted on specific aspects of human security.

The definition of human security as espoused by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994 summed up as freedom from fear and want becomes instructive in this instance (UNDP 1994). This is because the gravity of the destruction wrought by the insurgents was an affront to security whether from the perspective of the Okada rider, the barber or suya seller just as it threatened the security of the technocrat, the politician and the academic. According to UNDP (1994), there are seven aspects of human security and these are economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. Indeed all of these were destructively impacted upon while the Boko Haram held the state by the jugular. The following section examines the impact of the conflict between the Nigerian state and the Boko Haram on human security in the period 2012-2016.

Impacts of Conflict on Economic and Food Security

As a state where most of the people are farmers and where many of the rural communities were sacked by the Boko Haram insurgents, the implications on the economy and livelihood of the people cannot be over-emphasised. In a similar vein, attacking and sacking communities negatively affected food and livestock production in communities which the state relied on for food production. As was found in a study by the FEWSNET (2014), the agricultural season of 2013/2014 was severely disrupted and by January 2014, about 65,760 rural dwellers had been displaced in Borno and Adamawa states.

This meant the farms were empty and nobody to till the ground. The conflict brought destruction of farmlands and vital infrastructure leading to a decline in household incomes because the conflict denied people pre-season economic activities and the typical seasonal increase in demand for labour. Given that there were no produce to take to the market, there was a lull in the local economy and purchasing power of individuals as a result of the conflict. The closure of the border with Cameroon as a result of the conflict also meant that a temporary but prolonged cessation of trade and loss of livelihood for those who depended on cross-border trade while the conflict raged. In 2014, about 20 million people were estimated to be at risk of food insecurity out of which 2.5 million people needed immediate lifesaving food provision (OCHA, 2014).

The harsh realities of economic and food insecurity brought upon Adamawa state as a whole and especially communities sacked by the Boko Haram insurgents where life was yet to return to normal fully could be felt even at the time the field work was done in 2016. Many respondents recalled that the effects of the conflict food security was most pronounced during the Ramadan of 2016 as the prices of fruits and other foodstuffs sky-rocketed while their qualities were a far cry from what obtained in pre-Boko Haram days. On their own part, traders complained of low patronage which they attributed to decline in the purchasing power of the people caused by the insurgency to illustrate the impact of the insurgency on economic and food insecurity. It is suggestible that in the long term, there would be a worsening of conjectural poverty that is, poverty caused by “momentary deprivation caused by ill-fortune or personal failure” (Lliffe, 1987 quoted in Hoechner, 2015: 274).

Impacts of Conflict on Community and Personal Security

Although inter-group relations in some communities in the state were fragile, one of the impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency was that it kept a lid on such inter-group tensions and conflicts such as indigene-settler, inter-faith, pastoralists-herders conflicts although it bred another form of conflict between the IDPs and their host communities at some point. Many rural communities were sacked by the Boko Haram. According to ACAPS (2015) there were 123,600 IDPs as at December 2014 whose displacement could be directly linked to the Boko Haram insurgency.

The report revealed further that the IDP population increased by 78 per cent between December 2014 and February 2015, when 220,000 IDPs were reported. These 220,000 were mainly people who lived in the urban centres including Yola. The report states that 10 per cent of IDPs were first displaced in early 2015 and the rest in 2014. The severity of the impact of the conflict between the Federal Government and the Boko Haram on communities in Adamawa could be better appreciated given that about 90 per cent of the IDPs generated by the Boko Haram crisis stayed back in the state. This meant that by April, Adamawa had the largest proportion of households that experienced multiple displacements although, around April and June, some people started returning to their place of origin in Adamawa, resulting in a decrease to 113,000 IDPs (ACAPS 2015). Also, the low level of personal security in Adamawa and many of the terror-affected states could be measured against the scale of abductions and kidnapping and other forms of criminality carried out by the terrorists. Part of the personal comfort that was denied at the height of the Boko Haram crisis was inability of people to use their cell phones.

From 2015 to 2016 when this study was done, life was gradually returning to many terror-affected communities in Adamawa state. But from 2012 to early 2015 the Boko Haram appeared to be having the upper hand as it consistently sacked and took over communities in Adamawa state. During a Press Conference in February 2015, the former Director-General of the National Orientation Agency (NOA) and Coordinator of the

National Information Centre, Mike Omeri revealed that 10 ten towns in Adamawa had been “liberated” from the grip of the sect (NwaBufo, 2015). The names of the towns are Hong, Mubi North, Mubi South, Maiha, Michika, Shuwa, Wuro Gyambi, Gombi, Vimtim, Uba and Bazza. As at the time of the interaction, the DG revealed that Madagali, Gulak, Wagga-Mildo, Shelini/Vapra, Sabon-gari and Gubla were still under Boko Haram presence. Therefore, the Boko Haram-federal government conflict caused dislocation of communities, unprecedented number of IDPs and a peculiar form of displacement as many chose to remain in Adamawa state instead of fleeing to other states.

Impacts of Conflict on Political Security

As an insurgency whose ultimate goal is the replacement of secular authorities with one based on a its own notion of a divine order, the conflict between the Nigerian state and the Boko Haram insurgents can as well be located in the context of a political conflict because the overall aim of the insurgents is political power. While this was the issue between the federal government and the insurgents, states and communities in northern Nigeria were the theatres of this conflict. Being politically secure entails freedom from dictatorships, repression, torture, ill-treatment, unlawful detention, imprisonment and denial/withdrawal of human rights.

By replacing existing structures of power in each of the communities it sacked with its own form of Islamic rule, the Boko Haram was directly taking away the political security of the people in the sacked communities. A telling example of how the conflict impacted negatively on political security in the state was the declaration of a state of emergency in the state on 13 May, 2014 and several attacks on state actors and symbols including facilities known to belong to the Nigerian state. The attack on hard targets in particular demonstrates the intention of the Boko Haram as out to abolish the Nigerian state in order to establish its own form of an Islamic state. However as an attestation to the political resilience of the people the 2015 general elections held in 13 local government areas in Adamawa state although amidst fears. By 2016, there had been substantial restoration of political structures that were in place before those communities were sacked by the insurgents.

Impacts of Conflict on Health and Environmental Security

As a disruption of the normal pattern of living, the impact of conflicts and wars are often quickly felt in the area of health and well-being and given the focus placed on individual well-being as an index of measuring security, the impact of the conflict between the federal government and the Boko Haram insurgents on the health of the people cannot be discountenanced.

In Adamawa state, it has taken efforts of local and international not-for-profit organisations and the governments at all tiers to mitigate the effects of the crisis on the health of individuals and that of the system in the state. By March 2015, malaria was

reported as one of the major health security challenges confronting the people. Others identified were diarrhea, cough, and fever, measles and pregnancy-related. Also, access to health amongst the people was put at 4.8 per cent (ACAPS, 2015) in the first half of 2015. In March 2015, there was no single health facility open in Gujba, Adamawa and in many parts of the state where the health facilities were opened doctors were hardly on ground; only one third of surveyed health facilities were offering maternal and reproductive services (ACAPS, 2015). There were also cases of outbreaks reported in the northeast including Adamawa state. During the years covered by the scope of this study that is 2012-2016, outbreaks of cholera, meningitis and Lassa fever were reported in Adamawa state.

Conflict Actors' Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities and Incentives

The conflicts in Adamawa state from 2013-2016 have their own visible actors and shadow parties also referred to as shadow parties in other literature. The interest of the Boko Haram was and has always been the abolition of the Nigerian state for it to be replaced with an Islamist state in line with its version of the Sharia. The interest of the federal government since the insurgency began has been constant, that it the cessation of attacks, restoration of normalcy and defeating or reaching a peace agreement with the insurgents. The agenda for peace, i.e. the programme of action towards achieving this was not specific during the administration of former President Jonathan as it appeared that the government kept oscillating between full-fledged military action and negotiating with the group until 2015.

In a similar but markedly different way, the administration of President Buhari has expressed its predisposition to negotiation but that has not deterred it from sustaining full scale military action which has yielded remarkable results as evident in reclaimed territories. The capacity of the administration to engage in negotiation can be attested to going by the negotiated release of 21 out of the over 200 secondary school girls abducted by the Boko Haram. The capacity of the Adamawa state government does not come close to that of the federal government but it should sustain cooperation with the federal government in fastening the recovery process in the state.

Responses and Interventions

Track-One

By track-one responses, we mean the responses or interventions carried out by the government at any tier which may not necessarily be militaristic. In Adamawa state like other terrorised spaces in the northeast, the presence of federal and sub-regional forces constitutes the boldest of all responses. Also, there are initiatives that qualify as multi-track peacebuilding approaches such as collaborations involving the state government, religious and traditional rulers and similar ones put together by the American University of Nigeria. For instance it is also instructive to note that in response to the spate of violent conflicts in the state, the state government inaugurated a Conflict Resolution

Committee for each of the twenty-one Local Government Areas in the state on 13 October, 2013 and they were charged to “work selflessly towards identifying and resolving conflicts through dialogue in their areas” (Daniel, 2013). The UNHCR and the IPCR in collaboration with the Adamawa state Government are working on community peacebuilding by building a pool of 600 volunteers for peacebuilding and community resilience in an on-going initiative (Adebowale, 2016).

Multi-Track Responses

In addition to local responses, international development agencies have been very active in supporting recovery, community coping strategies, capacity building for conflict management and various forms of relief assistance. Notable amongst these agencies are the UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, EU, DfID, USAid, etc.

Also, an Inter-Faith Mediation Centre jointly coordinated by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the Muslim Council exists in the state. Another platform put in place in the state is the Adamawa Peace Initiative (API) which is a classical example of multi-track peace-building effort coordinated by the American University of Nigeria (AUN) but having on board local religious leaders, community and business leaders. Members of the API which was set in the aftermath of the nationwide protests that greeted the removal of fuel subsidy in January 2012 are representative of the Lamido of Adamawa, the traditional ruler of the Adamawa Emirate, Jama’u Nasril Islam, the Society for Support of Islam, Christian Association of Nigeria, Inter-Faith Mediation Centre, Christian-Muslim Forum, Muslim Council, Traders Associations and the American University of Nigeria (Campbell, 2016). These responses speak to the fact that there had been different types of conflicts in the state before the coming of the Boko Haram crisis. Some of these are the clashes that occur between the Suwa communities in Lamurde LG and the Dadiya over land. Also, in Numan, Demsa, Guyuk and Lamorde local government areas of the state occasional violent clashes between the mainly Muslim Herders and the mostly Christian local farmers in the affected communities are not unheard of in the state.

Conclusion

Adamawa state enjoyed relative peace until the escalation and spread of the conflict between the federal government and the Boko Haram; although inter-group conflicts had always existed in the state. The escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency had a destructive effect on virtually all the local government areas of the state particularly in the rural communities. Although the recovery process was on as at the time of the field work for this study, there are still telling signs of the impact of the insurgency on the people across the state. Despite the existence of structures for conflict management, many respondents during interviews and FGDs still decried the role of many politicians in setting groups against one another for political reasons which had always existed before the insurgency and which they fear might get worse in the recovery stage that the

state currently seems to be. However, it is remarkable that the state is not denying or shying away from the realities of the danger of not having conflict management structures in place. In order to maximise the benefit of this, it is important for the state to ensure that all forms of bias which might make stakeholders to lose interest and trust in such initiatives must be eschewed.

Gaps in Policy and Responses to Conflicts and Insurgency

As a state that had been troubled by a plague it had never experienced and one that depends largely on the central government to meet financial obligations, responses to conflicts in the state prior to the coming of the Boko Haram and to insurgency should be separated. This is because the two are ideologically and practically different types of conflicts. Despite the progress made in managing conflicts existing in the state prior to the Boko Haram insurgency, many respondents condemned the failure of the government to pay attention to early warning signs which were imminent in the context of the conflicts between the farmers and the herders. This is because in most cases, the government ought to have taken notice of the obvious encroachment of the grazing routes by farmers in search of land due to the increasing scarcity of land as a result of climatic changes. However, the escalation of the insurgency changed the dynamics of the conflict in ways that proved too difficult for the government to respond to effectively.

While the American University in Nigeria (AUN) has been pro-active and responsive in facilitating programs and initiative geared towards peaceful co-existence in the state, the government can take it further by playing more active supportive roles. It is also commendable that the state is one of the places where the IPCR and the UNHCR have a target to build a team of 600 volunteers as a programmatic response.

In terms of programmes, the state enjoys fair presence of multi-track approaches but this can be enhanced if backed up by policies of government which are more enduring and on this score the state government can do more. For instance, laudable as having a committee on conflict management across the state might be, this might serve the state more if designed as a policy.

Gaps in the Literature

Literature on the conflicts within the period covered can be divided into two. These are largely reports by not for profit organisations and academic papers. However, most academic papers lumped the North-East together largely relying on news sources and less on ethno-graphic studies. While this is understandable in the light of the difficulties in gaining access to Adamawa state, it calls for restraint in over-reliance on the analysis of such studies. The reports on the situation produced since late 2015 also point to the restraint caused by inaccessibility to certain areas for data collection. So, studies and reports on Adamawa in the period covered by the study may not be able to make far reaching analysis on inter-group conflicts that had existed before the coming of Boko

Haram just as their analysis of the Boko Haram on the state should not be taken without restraint.

Recommendations

Having a conflict management committee in place in all the local government areas in the state is commendable but should be institutionalised through a legislation. Cooperating with all government agencies to ensure that normalcy is returned to villages and communities devastated by the insurgency.

Given the way the Boko Haram crisis brought all and sundry together to be on the same page, the state government should sustain this form of cooperation and build on it. Special attention must be paid to the needs of vulnerable groups (women, children and aged) especially so that they will not be available for untoward assignments.

The capacity of the committees on conflict resolution should be updated periodically towards making them veritable means of early warning structures.

Bauchi State (Home of Peace and Hospitality)

Capital: Bauchi



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

Introduction and Historical Background

According to Higazi and Lar (2015), Bauchi state was part of the Bauchi Province during the colonial period from 1903-1960 within the vast Northern Region of Nigeria. The area became part of Northeastern state in 1967 sequel to the creation of states. The next phase of state creation in 1976 led to the division of the Northeastern state into Bauchi, Borno and Gongola in 1976 and in 1996 Bauchi was further divided into two with the creation of Gombe state. It is bordered by seven states in a clockwise direction by Yobe, Gombe, Taraba, Plateau, Kaduna, Kano and Jigawa. There are 20 Local Government Areas in the state and they are Alkaleri, Bauchi Bogoro, Dambam, Darazo, Dass, Gamawa, Ganjuwa, Giade, Itas Gadau, katagum, Kirfi, Jama'are, Missau, Ningi, Shira, Tafawa Balewa, Toro, Warji and Zaki. The state occupies about 49,259 km² with a population of 4,653,066 according to 2006 census.

According to Jahun (2015), there are six Emirates in Bauchi traceable to the Jihad of Shehu Dan Fodio and each of them was given a flag of allegiance except Dass. The Emirates are Bauchi, Katagum, Misau, Jama'are and Ningi with each having District

Heads (Hakimai) and each District Head having villages (Gundumomi) below him. Following that, each Village Head has a number of War Heads (Mai Littafi) to supervise and Ward Heads have Mai Unguwas under them. As at the end of the administration of Governor Isa Yuguda in 2015, there were 193 District Heads from an initial 37 and 987 Village Heads from 121 and over 9,000 Ward Heads.

The traditional rulers were very instrumental in the resolution of boundary disputes. Such was the role played in the dispute between the Jambil in Tafawa Balewa local government and Zungur in Bauchi local government caused by undefined boundaries which was settled with the direct involvement of the two traditional District Heads (Jahun, 2015). Another instance that could have degenerated into wanton violence was the one between Gwaran local government of Jigawa state and Giade local government in Bauchi state. Others are Marbini in Ganjuwa local government area of Bauchi and Zumburum in Gwaran local government area of Jigawa state; Shira in local government area in Bauchi state and Gwaram local government in Jigawa state; Gamadadi in Ganjuwa local government areas and Ganjigina in Darazo local government area of Bauchi state; Gula, Dewu Villages in Kirfi District, Kirfi LGA and Kediya in Ganjuwa District, Ganjuwa local government area in Bauchi state and Unguwan Ribina and Toro in Toro local government area both in Bauchi state (Jahun, 2015).

The state is heterogeneous and the predominant ethnic groups are the Hausa, Herders, Jarawa, Tangale, Waja, Balewa, Sayawa and Tarewa although there is about 55 ethno-linguistic groups Hausa language is most widely spoken language across the state. The entire western and northern parts of the state are generally mountainous and rocky due to Jos (Plateau state) and Cameroon mountains. The southern part of the state and Bauchi city are predominantly Christian dating back to the evangelical activities of the Sudan United Mission (SUM), while the north is heavily Muslim, with a minority of followers of traditional religions throughout the state (AOAV and NWGAV, 2013).

Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy in the state. Famously known for its arts and crafts of embroidered caps and gowns, fibre crafts and decorated calabashes, it is also versatile in production of metal works, agricultural tools, pottery, leather works and mat weaving. It is a festival loaded town with a beautiful game reserve which attracts tourists from and outside the country (The Yankari Game Reserve).

However, as with its neighbours in Nigeria's northeast, the poverty level is the fourth highest in the country at 49 percent and the rate of unemployment is 30 percent placing it amongst the worst in the country. Amongst the employed, 19 percent are females and 87 percent males. The youth bulge in Bauchi's population is evident in the percentage of the youths in the state population put at 55.4 percent comprising those below 19 years of age or younger; which is also considerable and feeds into the potential for unrest there (AOAV and NWGAV, 2013).

Violent Conflicts and Insurgency in Bauchi State

As one of the states in the northeast, the first impression will be to conclude that the conflict between the Boko Haram and the Federal Government of Nigeria is the only conflict in the state. Such a position might be justifiable because it is the one that has been dominant in the news coming from the northeast since 2009. However, just as a tapestry of conflicts has defined Nigeria's Fourth-Republic inaugurated on 29 May, 1999, Bauchi state has its own variants of conflicts occurring in the contexts of inter-group contests for control of resources, resistance against exclusion, value-based conflicts amongst faith groups and violence directed against symbols and representatives.

Another setting of fierce conflict in Bauchi state which does not fall into the radar of the time scope of this report is the communities located in the pastoral corridors that intersect with other states. These are Gamawa, Zaki, Ita/Gadan, Jamare, Misau, Kirfi and Kuddu local government areas. It has been a type of the herders and farmers conflict which recorded huge casualties and strains on relationships that were hitherto cordial and cooperative made worse by the involvement of the Udawa and the Bokoloji militant groups. Interactions with security agents in the state revealed that the Bokoloji and Udawa militant herders used guns and other sophisticated weapons, new communication gadgets in their banditry and unleashing violence on communities especially from 1997 to 2002. The source of the conflict during this period was non-adherence to the delineated grazing routes by farmers and this led to destruction of communities, crops, irrigation facilities, animal and human lives.

The conflict and insecurity landscape of Bauchi state will not be complete without taking cognizance of the breach of public peace and safety that arises from the clashes sects in the state. In 2007, it was reported that violent clashes erupted between the Shiites and Jamaatul Nasrul Islam (JNI) at the Kofar Ran district in the city of Bauchi although the situation was quickly brought under control by security agencies.

There are conflicts in Bauchi state that have persisted for decades such as the case between the religious majorities (Muslims) and the religious minorities (Christians) in the state and by extension the Hausa-herders and the Zaar in the state. This has made ethnicity and religion exploitable for selfish political reasons by conflict entrepreneurs in the state due to the discontent between the two. The Zaar otherwise called the "Sayawa" constitute the largest Christian minority in Bauchi state with a firm presence in Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro local government areas which shares border with Plateau state. The friction between them and the Hausa community plays out in virtually all contexts. For instance Tafawa Balewa means Black stone in Fulfulde but the Sayawa prefer to call it the equivalent in their own language which they have given it (Puji).

During these conflicts and attacks, small and light weapons are freely used. The ACLED data on political violence recorded 93 instances of armed violence in the state from 2000 to August 2013 (AOAV and NGWAV, 2013) while the Nigeria Security Tracker

recorded 169 violence and conflict-related deaths between May 2011 and August 2013. Most of the conflicts in Bauchi are inter-communal and over resources especially land and political positions which become spiral because of the reprisals they generate. These were made worse with the advent of the Boko Haram conflict with the federal government leading to broader insecurity of people, buildings and places across the state. Some conflict flashpoints and issues in the state are the 'ownership' crisis of Tafawa-Balewa in Southern Bauchi which spontaneously degenerates into violence at the slightest provocation. Higazi and Lar (2015) posit that the:

The case of Tafawa Balewa demonstrates how cultural and traditional practices that hitherto had other roots and purposes are mobilised in new repertoires of identity and belonging, and serve as reference points for the creation and maintenance of boundaries. The Bauchi case also shows how political authorities can exacerbate local feuds, and how the mismanagement of such local feuds can in turn destabilise a wider political field (p. 117).

The Sayawa being the main Christian population alleged governor Isa Yuguda 2007-2015 of bias and exclusion/marginalisation in the allocation of developmental projects and social services to the detriment of Christians in Bauchi city and Tafawa Balewa to the advantage of less qualified Muslims. Since the escalation of the Tafawa Balewa conflict, intermittent violence in the state has been traced to the historical and continued struggle for the control of the area which has always been violent and affecting other parts of the state. There have been episodes of violent clashes in 1959, 1977, 1991, 1995, 2001 and 2012 leading to hundreds of deaths.

The conflict and adversarial relationship has been sustained by three types of discourses arising from relationships between the Sayawa and the Hausa at different times. These are the historical relationship between Sayawa and the Bauchi Emirate; their relationship with the Bauchi state government and their relationship with Muslims in Tafawa Balewa (Higazi and Lar, 2015). Violent clashes occur in two contexts in Tafawa Balewa. The first are clashes between the Sayawa and the Hausa while in the rural areas the clashes occur between the Sayawa farmers and the herders. The Sayawa justify their attacks on Herders on the grounds that anytime there are clashes in the villages, the Hausa fight on the side of the Herders in solidarity. The Herders posit that they only fight in self-defence and do not initiate attacks against the Sayawa.

From 2001 to 2011, there was no record of violent clash although not because the underlying causes were addressed. In 2011, there was mass violence in Tafawa Balewa which engulfed the surrounding areas and it marked a new pattern because before then, violence between the two did not extend to the rural areas of Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro local government areas. Since 2011, the duration of each episode of clash has become prolonged and assumed wider spatial ramifications because it affects villages. Also, sporadic shootings, killings, raids and ambushes on the road to Bauchi have become frequent. Furthermore, during the 2011 violence, Muslims were driven out of Tafawa Balewa local government. At this juncture it is pertinent to X-ray the positions of the

two parties for a fuller appreciation of the complexity of the conflict.

Given the protraction of the conflict, it is observable that some issues have been resolved while some are still knotty. The Sayawa are demanding for a chieftdom that will include Tafawa Balewa as its headquarters thereby removing it from the Bauchi Emirate. However, the Hausa-Herders consider this to be unthinkable because they hold the position that they established the town. On this demand, the two sides have remained rigid.

The issues that have been resolved over the years were the disagreements over the timing of the market day which the Sayawa community who are mostly Christians disliked because it was on a Sunday. At a time the local authorities changed it to Friday which was also to the chagrin of the Muslims and it was eventually changed to a Thursday. Practices in the abattoir also revealed the polarity between the two because the Sayawa rejected the monopolisation of the right to slaughter animals exclusively enjoyed by the Hausa butchers. This brought about the establishment of a separate abattoir for Christians in 1991 after the riots. It suffices to state that most of these were parts of the Judicial Commissions of Inquiry on the conflicts at different times and in a way point to the potentials of development in mitigating violent conflicts.

Responses by the state government cannot be seen to have ameliorated the degree of animosity and the adversarial relationship of the two. For instance, the Sayawa allege that the government deliberately takes away social amenities from the community in order to favour the Hausa-Herders. They cite the stripping of Tafawa Balewa its status of local government headquarters and relocating it to Bula a Hausa-Herders Muslim district of Bununu as a justification for this. The Tafawa Balewa district headquarters was also transferred to the village of Zwall (Higazi and Lar, 2015). The House of Assembly gave the bill empowering the governor to change the headquarters of the local government an accelerated passage as the first, second and third readings of the bill were taken at the same sitting (NBF News, 2012). The former state Governor Isa Yuguda justified the relocation as quoted by Edeh (2015) that:

The relocation has halted the spate of destruction of lives and properties which was almost spreading to neighbouring states. Since the relocation of the headquarters to Bununu, peace has returned to the area as people now go about their normal businesses and development is gradually coming back to the area due to the peaceful atmosphere in the area

Also, the divisional police office was relocated to Bununu and many secondary schools were equally closed down in the aftermath of the 2011 crisis for security reasons according to the Bauchi state government although the Sayawa rejected the reason given by the state government claiming that all these were done to deny of them of social services and security.

Patronage politics also feeds into existing ethno-religious and the youth bulge to put the state perpetually in tension. The patronage politics encourages a form of patron-client

relationship between the politicians and armed gangs in perpetuating violence. Such armed gangs linked to politicians are locally known as “Sara Suka” (Cut or Stab). All of these existed in Bauchi state before the advent of the Boko Haram crisis in 2009 in the state. Post-election violence of 2011 after the presidential elections in Katagum, Bauchi, Misau, Danbani and Alkaleri left untold ruins with many people killed and valuables destroyed.

Bogoro and Tafawa Balewa are two local government areas whose names have become synonymous with violent conflicts in Bauchi state. Ethnicity, religion and politics conflate in keeping the local government area on the edge perpetually. In 2011 there were 7 episodes of violence in the local government and 3 in 2012 (Adamu and Ben, 2015: 31). However, tension arising from the adversarial intergroup relations still subsists in the area.

Tafawa Balewa town qualifies as one of the places that can be referred to as conflict-prone prior to the last SCA in 2012 and since then. In the period covered by this study, the community was still smarting from the effects of the last episode of clashes which occurred in 2011 and 2012 during which Muslims were driven away. An account of the 2011 conflict has it that after the crisis, the state governor threatened to destroy the town if the violence reoccurred (Edeh, 2015). Perhaps during the governorship, the violence recurred on January 22, 2012 at about 2am in the midnight when two pick-up vans loaded with bombs, assorted rifles and ammunitions found their ways into the town and accompanied by fighters in their hundreds on motor bikes, vans and foot to inflict violence on the town. During the raid, the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) lost his life, a number of residents and a family of six had its residence blown up by one of the bombs detonated in the town (Edeh, 2015). In 2011, there were about 17 episodes of violent conflicts in Tafawa Balewa which claimed lives and properties (Adamu and Ben, 2015: 30-31). In 2012, Tafawa Balewa experienced 8 episodes of violence with its attendant destruction of lives and properties.

As a means of dousing tension and building confidence in the community, the governor of the state from 2007 to 2015 invited members of the Sayawa community in 2015 to the government house. In a move which many saw as ostensibly meant to ease his quest for the Senatorial seat in the 2015 election, Yuguda’s meeting with the elders of the community who themselves expressed surprise by the invitation provided a time and space for assessing how well the conflict in the community had been managed and the impact of the steps taken.

On the desire of the people to have a Sayawa kingdom which the governor had earlier approved and for which they thought the visit will be an opportunity to know when the staff of office will be presented to their Chief, Gung Zaar or if it would even be presented during the visit. However, the expectation was dashed as the governor explained to them that “. . . if it is the will of God that your chief will be given his staff of office during my tenure, then so be it. But if not there is nothing we can do about it” (Edeh, 2015). The governor blamed members of the Sayawa community who initiated a litigation

process after the Chiefdom which was one of the recommendations of one of the past commissions of inquiry was signed and gazetted. He concluded by reminding his audience that “We can’t be talking about Chief now because your people have taken the matter to court. Therefore, talking about it now will amount to violation of the constitution” (Edeh, 2015).

Another subsisting source of tension in the state is the relocation of the headquarters of the local government which pitched a lawmaker Ms. Rifkatu Samson Dannah in the state House of Assembly against the then governor who picked hole in the speedy manner the bill was passed and the fact that the sponsor and co-sponsor of the motion were Herders who did not even hail from Tafawa Balewa (Edeh, 2015). Other local government areas that have experienced and remain prone to violent conflicts are Alkaleri and Bauchi metropolis where the violent conflicts arise from often. The preceding became imperative in order not to ignore the fact that apart from the Boko Haram crisis that turned some parts of the north into a theater of war, other contexts and actors in adversarial relationships had always existed in the region. In the next section, the study presents a nuanced analysis of the manifestation of the Boko Haram crisis in parts of Bauchi state. As a state having pre-Boko Haram inter-group tension and conflicts, the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in the state cannot be discountenanced as presented in the next section.

Dimension of the Boko Haram versus Federal Government Conflict in Bauchi

Analysis of secondary data based on newspaper reports of the frequency of Boko Haram attacks in Bauchi state shows that the insurgents carried out more attacks on hard targets in the state than soft targets (Animasawun, 2016) although in July 2009 the insurgents were arrested while trying to poison the main source of potable water for the state. The table presents a distribution of the attacks carried out in the state at February 2016.

Leading in these attacks are hard targets that is, security formations and personnel with the prisons suffering more than any of the security formations and facilities. This began on the September 7, 2010 when the insurgents attacked the Bauchi prison and freed 700 inmates amongst whom were 100 members of the organisation. The intent was to set free their members who were arrested in the previous year. The attacks around Bauchi did not completely spare non-military soft targets as communities, churches and banks were attacked and robbed in Azare, Misau and Alkaleri, amongst others.

Impacts of Conflict and Insurgency on Security in Bauchi State

Virtually all aspects of human security were adversely affected by both insurgency and intergroup conflicts in the state during the period under review. The most visible of these impacts have been on personal and community security because of the heightened fear in the minds of the citizens because by attacking security installations, symbols,

facilities and personnel, the insurgents struck fear into the minds of the people. Also, it strained community security given the way it sacked communities while creating further disaffection in communities where tension had earlier existed in the context of inter-communal crisis over issues such as indigene-settler divide and supremacy contests over traditional stools. These informed an earlier erroneous perception in some parts of the state that the insurgents were waging war against Christianity until much later when it became clear to all that the Boko Haram was an ill wind boding no good for anyone. The economic security of *Okada* riders was directly affected by the ban on their night operations and the curfew imposed on some towns in 2012 after the horrendous attack on the bus-station in Azare.

Responses to Conflicts and Insurgency

Track 1

Given the domino effect of the insurgency on the state, responses by both the deferral and state governments have been towards stamping out insurgency in the state. Respondents traced the reduction in the spate of attacks by insurgents and other criminal elements in the state since late 2015 to the time of this research to increased inter-agency collaboration amongst the security agencies. Security personnel corroborated this during interactions with them by pointing to the sustained cooperation and support they received from the immediate past and current state government. For instance, cognizant of the fact that the dislodgment of the Boko Haram from the Sambisa forest forced some of the Boko Haram insurgents into the Lame/Bura forest which transverse Ningi and Toro LGA last in 2015, the state government met with security agents and successfully dislodged the Boko Haram insurgents from the forest in 2015.

According to a respondent, the move was informed by intelligence available to the state government that some of the insurgents were lurking in the forests and planning to infiltrate the state by posing as private security guards and fruits hawkers. The federal government through the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA) also set up a camp for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the state.

In terms of responses to intergroup conflicts successive governments in the state have tried to implement in part some of the recommendations of panels of inquiry set up to look into the causes of some conflicts in the state. However, not all of these have been given attention in a way that will convince all parties in the conflict of the impartiality of the state government. A number of key informants spoken to expressed their reservations against the state government in the handling of the conflict in Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro citing the removal of vital social amenities and especially the relocation of the capital of the local government. Remarkably, the state government has been able to utilise the good office of the traditional rulers in the state in managing boundary disputes within the state and with other states.

Conflict Actors' Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities and Incentives

It is important to distinguish parties in conflicts from criminals. This is because of the extent of criminality veiled as expressions of violent conflict and insurgency in some parts of the state. The actors in the conflicts in the state can be categorised as the conflict entrepreneurs and the foot soldiers or the visible actors in conflict. The interest of the Boko Haram insurgents is known and that is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate based on their own self-concocted notion of Islam. However, the stakeholders and entrepreneurs of inter-group conflicts in the state seem to have adopted a zero-sum approach in the pursuit of their demands which has shaped their notions of how to resolve the conflicts in the state. As elites in a society where the poor are in the majority and where the capacity of the state to meet the existential needs of the people has been weakened, they stand in a position of huge influence to determine whether there will be peace or not in the state. The prebendal cum patron-client nature of politics in the state makes it a fertile ground for brigandage and other forms of criminality by groups such as the Sara-Suka boys and bandits like the “Kwantakwanta” whose activities are inimical to peace and security in the state.

Conclusion

While the conflict between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram might have relegated intergroup conflicts in terms of priorities, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that whether people-to-people or insurgents-to-state, violent conflicts are always inimical to human and state security and development. Therefore, it is important not to lose sight of the existence of inter-group conflicts especially because they have the potentials of escalating if the government is seen as taking actions or decision insensitive to the demands and aspirations of the parties in conflict. As the state seems to be recovering from insurgency, it is pertinent not to wait for another round of conflicts in the state before initiating processes that will facilitate the peaceful resolution of pending conflicts in the state.

Gaps in Policy and Responses

While the state government can be seen to be trying its best in providing support to the security agencies, there are gaps in terms of policy and programmatic actions. This is because quite a number of these actions may not be sustained if they are not institutionalised. While a camp exists in the state for IDPs, the state government in concert with the federal government should go further to ensure that there is a separation of people displaced as a result of the conflicts in the state and those displaced from other states as a result of insurgency. Beyond providing temporary shelter and other humanitarian support for the displaced in the camp, there is need to provide tailored responses based on the needs of the two categories of the IDPs. The fact that attacks by insurgents in Bauchi state were more on hard than soft targets speaks to the need for more attention to all security formations and facilities in the state. Also, the foiled attack

Table showing distribution of attacks by Boko Haram in Bauchi State Nigeria as at February 2016

Dates	Types of Attacks	Attacks per Month	Soft Targets	Hard Targets	Injured	Civilian Deaths	Security Agents Deaths	BH Deaths
Jul 2009	Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard			28	22
Sept 2010	Prison attacks	1						
Oct 2010	Gunmen Attacks	3		Hard			2	1
Jan 2011	Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard			1	
May 2011	bomb and Gunmen Attacks	2		Hard		73		26
Sept 2011	bomb and Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard			7	4
Dec 2011	bomb and Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard			3	
Jun 2012	suicide /gunmen attacks	1	Soft		9	12		
Sept 2012	Gunmen /Suicide Attacks	2	Soft		9	8		
Feb 2013	Gunmen Attacks	1			7			
Apr 2014	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft			1		
June 2014	Bomb attacks	1	Soft			11		

Source: Animasawun (2016)

on the source of water supply to the state in 2009 points to the need for enhanced attention to the protection of all vital installations of the government in the state.

Gaps in Literature

Given the highly contemporary nature of the Boko Haram insurgency, scholarly works and policy papers have focused more on the causes and impact while not many works have been done to disaggregate the nature and targets of attacks towards providing a state by state analysis of the insurgency. However, Animasawun (2016) provides a breakdown of Boko Haram attacks vis-à-vis attacks on hard and soft targets across the country in filling the gap. The conflicts in Bauchi state have generated series of scholarly analysis and policy recommendations however; the literature needs to pay more attention to the implications of conflict-generating policies and legislations such as the one that changed the headquarters of the Tafawa Balewa local government.

Recommendations

Beyond just buying security gadgets and vehicles for security agencies in the state, the

state government should put in place a security trust fund to ensure that support for the security agencies in the state would not be dependent on the whims of the helmsman of the state at any point in time and this underscores the need for legislation.

Policing of the forests and hinterlands in the state should be given more attention and this calls for increased inter-agency collaboration amongst all the security agencies in the state.

In order to fully convince the Sayawa people of the sincerity of the government in meeting their demands, the state government should pursue an out of court settlement of the on-going litigation over the appointment of the traditional ruler for the people.

De-radicalisation anchored on peace education and empowerment should be given serious consideration as a state policy and part of the curriculum in the state especially at the primary and secondary school levels. The state must explore means to quickly provide gainful employment for its teeming youth.

Religious, traditional and political leaders at all level should be enlisted in resolving the conflicts in the state by involving them in Peace talk “builds” in each local government area to promote peaceful coexistence the disparate identity groups.

Constant reminders of the dangers and implications of violence as a way of discouraging its use as a means of expressing displeasure or seeking justice should be promoted.

Prompt prosecution of criminals and perpetrators of violence during conflicts should be promoted as a way gaining the trust and confidence of the people and discouraging the quest for self-justice.

Inclusion of women in peace processes at all levels should not be treated with levity by initiating capacity building programs in conflict management and advocacy for women.

Borno State (Home of Peace)

Capital: Maiduguri



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

Introduction and Historical Background

Historically, Kanem Borno used to be one of the great kingdoms of Central Sudan also known as Bilad al Sudan (the land of blacks) which stretched from Darfur in Sudan to the Lake Chad Region in the east and the great bend of River Niger and the Western Coast of the Atlantic Ocean on the west (Ahmad and Saleh, 2011). The location of Kanem-Borno made it strategic in the in the trans-Saharan trade routes and this also facilitated early interaction with the Muslim world of Tunisia in the northwest of Africa and Nubia on middle mile and Egypt in the northeast of the continent (Ahmad and Saleh, 2011). The Kanem-Borno was at the height of its glory in the 16th and 17th centuries when its face as an Islamic state became conspicuous to vast regions including Western Sudan, the Maghrib and the Nile valley. Mustafa (1992) recalls that it was the

fourth of superpowers in the then Islamic world the other three being Egypt, Turkey and Baghdad and to date it remains the “. . . one area in the whole of Nigeria which can be accurately described as a Muslim state with an Islamic dynasty and tradition.” (Abdurrahman and Canham, 1978 quoted in Ahmad and Saleh, 2011:2).

Modern Borno state whose appellation is “Home of Peace” stands on a landmass of 61,435 km² which makes it the largest in Nigeria in terms of landmass with neighbors such as Adamawa to the south, Yobe to the West and Gombe to the South-West. Based on the 2006 census, the state housed 4.3 million people.

The climate of the state oscillates between hot and dry for most of the year but its southern part is slightly milder. The rainy season lasts from June to September in northern Borno and May to October in southern Borno. The rainfall varies from 700 to 1000 mm in the southern part of the state and 300 to 500 mm in the North.

Religiously and ethnically, the state is highly pluralistic with the Muslims being the religious majorities in the state followed by Christians as the religious minorities and a handful of adherents of African Traditional Religion (ATR) (Ahmed and Saleh 2011). Although the Kanuri are today the leading ethnic group in the state, Tijani (2005:21) chronicles the existence of groups like the Sao, Gamergu, Marghi and Bura (Pabir) who had made socio-economic impact in the area before the invasion of the Kanuri. Presently, over 30 languages are spoken by the people and other ethnic groups in the state are Babur/Bura, Shuwa, Marghi, Herders, Hausa, Chibok, Ngoshe, Guduf, Mandara amongst others.

It is an agrarian state where crops like millet, sorghum, maize, cowpea and groundnut are widely grown. The state prides in housing many historic places of interest to tourists. Some of these are Shehu's Palace in Maiduguri, Sanda Kyarimi Park (zoo) (in Maiduguri), Lake Alau (about 14 km from Maiduguri along Maiduguri-Bama Road), The Gwoza Hills (in Gwoza LGA, 130 km from Maiduguri), Sambisa Game Reserve (14 km off Kawuri village along Maiduguri-Bama Road), Rabeh's Fort at Dikwa (about 80 km north-east of Maiduguri) and Tombs of the First Four Shehus of Borno at Kukawa.

Conflict and Insecurity in Borno State

Given the tragedy arising from the pain inflicted on the state by the conflict between the Nigerian state and the *Jamaatu Ahlil Sunna Lidawati wal Jihad* (Boko Haram), any other context of conflict pales into insignificance in analysing the conflict and insecurity landscape of the state. Never the less, it is important to keep in sight the fact that apart from the conflict between the Boko Haram insurgents and the Nigerian state, inter-group conflicts are found in all human communities. Conflict in Borno state prior to the emergence and escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency was mainly between the religious majorities (Muslims) and religious minorities (Christians) and occasional political violence.

Therefore, the state could be described as largely peaceful until the advent of the Boko Haram crisis whose origin, trajectories and future directions have attracted local and international pontifications. The last episode of inter-group violence in the state before the escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency was in 2006 triggered by the outrage that greeted the cartoon considered derogatory to Prophet Muhammad first published by a Danish newspaper – *Jyllands-Posten* – in 2005 and republished in 2006 by a Norwegian newspaper. Although accounts differed on the actual number of lives lost they ranged between 16 and 51 while 40 churches were reportedly burnt (Hill and Anathna, 2006). The state has its own share of the herdsmen and farmers conflict. However, the context and actors of conflict changed in Maiduguri changed gradually as the Boko Haram became more monstrous. It is widely believed that the crucible of Boko Haram could be traced to a patron-client relationship that failed between late Mohammed Yusuf and erstwhile governor of the state Alhaji Ali Modu Sherif. The subsequent arrest, killing and escalation of the Boko Haram have changed the conflict and insecurity landscape of not only Borno state but also a substantial part of northern Nigeria and the West African sub-region. At a time the Boko Haram was the most lethal terrorist group in the world and it controlled territories as vast as 20,000 square miles. Boko Haram attacks spared neither civilians nor security agents including holders of public offices in its daring move to abolish the Nigerian state and have it replaced with an Islamic caliphate based on its own imagination.

The group has carried out some attacks to gain in global attention. Some of these are the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria's capital in 2011, kidnapping of over 200 secondary school girls in April 2014 which attracted. In March 2015, the Boko Haram became affiliated to the Islamic State and in August 2016, IS announced Abu Musab al-Barnawi would assume the leadership of Boko Haram. Perhaps sensing that he was about not be edged out:

Shekau released statements that Barnawi's followers were manipulating IS leadership in order to cut him off in a sort of coup; he said that he and his followers would not follow Barnawi, which reportedly led to splits within Boko Haram. It is currently unclear to what extent Shekau or Barnawi has power over Boko Haram militants, but the group remains affiliated with IS (www.web.stanford.edu)

Currently, the coherence and formidability of the group is in doubt although that is not a pointer that the war against terror in Nigeria has ended rather it could be seen as entering a new phase. The reality of the next phase of war against terrorism does not seem to be lost on the government given the new approach, commitment and tact that have defined its engagement with the problem and the actors. Evidences abound to buttress this as stated in an interview granted by the minister of defence that:

Within one year, the coming of our president has changed the game. Look at what was happening before whereby three states, the whole eastern region, was under the terrorists.

Now we may have maybe two local governments (Dan-Ali, Nigeria's Minister of Defence on March 30, 2016 while speaking to Voice of America).¹

Also, twice, the government has negotiated the release of some of the kidnapped secondary school girls.

The implications of the preceding for Borno state cannot be discountenanced because the origin of the group, its impact and scars of attacks are everywhere in Borno state. Some of the attacks carried out during the period covered by the scope of this study are presented below to show that unlike in places like Bauchi where more attacks were carried out on hard targets than soft targets, the attacks in Borno made no distinction between hard and soft targets across the state.

Some Boko Haram Attacks across Borno State 2012-2016

Dates	Types of Attacks	Attacks Monthly	Soft Targets	Hard Targets	Injured	Civilian Deaths	Security Agents Deaths	B.H Deaths
Jan 2012	Gunmen/Bomb attack	4	Soft			7	4	17
Feb 2012	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft			37		8
Mar 2012	Gunmen /knife Attacks	2	Soft			4	1	2
Apr 2012	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft			7		
May 2012	Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard			2	
June 2012	JTF operation	1		Hard				16
Jul 2012	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft			9		
Nov 2012	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft			2		
Jan 2013	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft					
Mar 2013	Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard		1		
Apr 2013	Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard				187
May 2013	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft					55
Jul 2013	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft			20		

1 Jola Sotubo in <http://pulse.ng/local/boko-haram-terrorists-still-control-2-local-governments-in-nigeria-minister-says-id4865280.html>. see also <http://pulse.ng/local/boko-haram-sect-still-controls-half-of-borno-senator-says-id4661653.html>

Aug 2013	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft		12		
Sept 2013	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft		142		
Nov 2013	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft		12		40
Dec 2013	Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard			
Jan 2014	Gunmen/Bomb Attacks	3	Soft		119		
Feb 2014	Arson /gunmen attacks	4	Soft		286		
Mar 2014	Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard			600
Apr 2014	Kidnapping	1	Soft	Hard	3		
May 2014	Gunmen attacks	1	Soft		336		
Jun 2014	Gunmen Attacks	2	Soft		530		100
Jul 2014	Bomb Attacks	3	Soft		1	182	15
Sept 14	Bomb Attacks	1	Soft			30	
Nov 2014	Gunmen/Suicide attacks	2	Soft			95	
Dec 2014	Gunmen/Suicide attacks	3	Soft			68	
Jan 2015	Gunmen attacks /kidnapping	5	Soft	Hard		2053	53
Feb 2015	Gunmen attacks/Gov offensive	7	Soft	Hard		89	73
March 2015	Government offensive/bomb attacks	1	Soft		143	54	
May 2015	Bomb/Gunmen attacks	3	Soft			43	
June 2015	Gunmen /suicide attacks	11	Soft			215	
July 2015	Gunmen/Suicide attacks	12	Soft		17	288	
Aug 2015	Gunmen/bomb attacks	5	Soft			26	
Sept 2015	Gunmen/bomb attacks	5	Soft		118	156	1
Nov 2015	Gunmen attacks	1		Hard			150
Dec 2015	Kidnapping/Govt offensive/gunmen attacks	2	Soft	Hard		27	
Jan 2016	Bomb Attacks	1	Soft		62	86	
Feb 2016	Gunmen attacks	3	Soft			85	

Source: Animasawun (2016)

Impact of Insurgency on Security in Borno State

The impact of the war between the Boko Haram and the federal government of Nigeria and the sub-regional force put together by Nigeria, Cameroon, Republic of Niger and Chad has been on virtually every aspect of human and state security. As at October 2016, the situation report of the World Health Organization (WHO, 2016) there was still continued insecurity, very weak infrastructure, and insufficient resources to re-establish social services in many parts of Borno state. While the impact on some aspects of human security would still need time to be measured before being ascertained, the impact on some aspect of human security are palpable as reported by Fund for Peace (2014) because many parts of the state became battle grounds with the militants. These are on economic, food, personal, community, social, political, health and environmental security to a limited degree.

Some Boko Haram Attacks across Borno State 2012-2016

Bama was one of the training camps of the insurgents. Although there were few instances of attack on Bama from 2009 to 2011, there was a change in the tide in 2012 especially around the city of Banki in April and November. Series of attacks were launched by the insurgents on military facilities, police stations and prisons. In one instance in May 2013, 22 policemen, 14 prison officers, 2 soldiers, 13 insurgents, 3 children and 1 woman lost their lives. In October 2013, 18 women were reportedly murdered when a suspected Boko Haram insurgent attacked a village with IEDs and petrol bombs which went off and destroyed homes and business outlets. Since then the violence became uninterrupted till December 2013 and eventually became one of the places taken over by the insurgents before it was liberated. The impact of the conflict on economic, health, personal, community and political security of the people cannot be quantified as the conflict sacked the entire community which caused acute human insecurity with the widespread lack, fear and displacement that subsequently engulfed the state.

Kaga was one of the worst hit areas throughout 2013. In May, two leading clerics reportedly lost their lives during attacks on Mainok by Boko Haram and another 23 civilians were killed. Hard targets were not spared in Kaga as police stations and officials of the local government were prime targets of the insurgents. The military also launched series of attacks on the insurgents in the local government which claimed sizeable number of the insurgents in air and land attacks. In the process a number of bystanders also died. The humanitarian and human security implications of the exchanges between the militants and the government forces in Kaga have left untold damage.

According to Fund for Peace (2014) Biu comes fourth as the most violent LGA on a per capita basis where the religious Muslim and Christian communities suffered frequent attacks. In 2011, a Muslim cleric was killed in his home while a church was reportedly attacked during Sunday mass in June 2012, killing two and injuring hundreds. In August 2012, people were killed in mosques. In July 2013, 13 people were handcuffed and lynched to death in a church while in August, 8 people, including teachers and clerics,

were killed during an attack. Raids by the JTF and youth vigilante groups were carried out in response, reportedly killing insurgents but also causing deaths and injuries to civilians.

Starting from the time the state of emergency was declared in 2013, an upward rise in violence started in Gwoza which is located on the border with Cameroon. The religious minorities were the worst hit in the local government as worshipers, churches and houses were torched. The military also raided the community reportedly using airstrikes on some occasions.

Konduga suffered attacks for most of 2012 which were targeted at telecommunications towers and government buildings. Also, many clerics, village heads, and traditional rulers were killed by the insurgents. This compelled collaboration between the military and the youth vigilantes who assisted as the military raided camps and hideouts of the insurgents successively in May, June and July 2013. This recorded a level of success as members of the Boko Haram fell to the superior forces of the government assisted by locals. The use of airstrikes was also reported by the federal government forces. The religious majorities that is, the Muslims suffered huge losses of members in Konduga in October 2013 as the insurgents shot sporadically at people while praying in the mosque. The following month, many villages were attacked during which many were killed which precipitated retaliations by the various vigilante groups from the community.

In April 2013, in Kukawa LGA, a huge clash between suspected Boko Haram insurgents and the JTF reportedly left close to 200 dead, with 2000 homes, 62 cars and 284 motorcycles destroyed (Fund for Peace, 2014). The WHO (2016) reports that in Monguno local government a new case of Wild Polio Virus (WPV) type 1 was reported leading to a total of four WPV1 and circulating vaccine Drive Polio Virus type 2 (Cvdpv2) recorded in Borno. Further, as at October 2016, there were still poor Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) conditions in camps and host communities especially in the newly liberated areas and other make-shift settlements in and around Maiduguri (WHO, 2016).

Conflict Actors' Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities and Incentives

Borno state as the epicenter of Nigeria's war against terrorism offers an opportunity to take a nuanced look at the actors, both local and transnational, their interests, their peace agenda if any, capacities for peace and incentives. The situation also provides a suitable setting to examine needs and capacities of the actors, conflict entrepreneurs and victims. Aggregating all of these would give a balanced picture of the inherent capacities and resources in Borno to ensure post-Boko Haram peace and human security. As a setting of asymmetric warfare, the manifestation of insurgency in Borno state has its obvious and shadow parties within and outside the country. This makes it important to pay attention to identifying the actors at different layers especially on the side of the insurgents. For instance, it might be appropriate to draw a line between the members of the group who were radicalised by Mohammed Yusuf and those radicalised by his successor

Abubakar Shekau. Next their texts of radicalisation, motivations and means of getting arms are issues that must be given focal attention towards comprehending their sources of financial and human resources. While the group has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) as its global ally, the transnational currents from the Sahel cannot be neglected in properly diagnosing the visible and invisible actors and their sources of resources. The aspiration of the Boko Haram is to impose its own version of Sharia in northern Nigeria and it has left nobody in doubt in pursuing that.

While it has now made itself open to negotiations which has led to the release of some of the secondary schools kidnapped, it is still insufficient to go to bed that an answer has been found to the problem posed by the group this is particularly so because some attacks have been carried out in Borno which makes it imperative to have a cautious optimism to the sect's disposition to negotiation. Therefore, in exploring an agenda for sustainable peace in Borno, a multi-layered approach that focuses on issues and actors that are specific to the state, transnational issues and actors and its relationship with the global community of terrorists must be taken into consideration. Doing this deserves unwavering attention and concentration towards having a reliable analysis of the capacities of the Boko Haram and its incentives as they change from time to time.

Indeed the capacity of the federal government came under severe questioning going by the stark threat that the Boko Haram became to the entire country and even the West African sub-region. Therefore, a critical and holistic appraisal of the capabilities of the Nigerian military and the entire security sector becomes imperative towards envisaging and getting ready for future internal crisis and forms of insurgency in Borno state cognisant of its socio-religious demographics and physical terrain. While the incentive and agenda of any government in place in Nigeria is constantly the preservation of Nigeria's unity wherein lies her strength; it is important to pay special attention to the needs of all security agencies who constitute the visible actors, instruments and technologies of state power towards ensuring that they are self-motivated and adequately catered for.

Responses and Interventions

Track 1

All tiers and arms of government in Nigeria have been unequivocal in their consensus that the north-east states especially Borno deserves all supports that can be mustered. While the state was under the siege of the insurgents, the international community consistently expressed solidarity with the state; many of which have been translated into action given the visible presence of many international not-for profit organisations in the state. Therefore, as the federal government of Nigeria sustains its militaristic support and all other interventions it can provide, the international community has been lending helping hand in the area of humanitarian interventions. For instance, the education corp of the Nigerian army has been playing active role in meeting the learning needs of the people albeit in the short-term.

Track Two

The not-for-profit organisations have been consistent in advocating and providing help to cushion the effect of the insurgency on the people of the state as well as blowing whistle on infractions and abuses observed. Indeed, the global civil society and local initiatives have been consistent in nudging the Nigerian state into action and drumming up global support for the plight of the people of Borno state. Notable amongst these are the Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG), amongst others.

One of the worst hit victims of the Boko Haram insurgency were the traditional, social, political and religious notables and the clergy in the state. Despite the pain and loss they suffered, they have been unwavering in putting their weight behind all initiatives of recovery in the state. This is remarkable despite the tenuous relationship between the religious majorities and minorities in the state prior to the escalation of the insurgency.

Track Three

The international community had responded to the insurgency and particularly in humanitarian assistance and mobilisation of the global community to unprecedented response. International Organisation like Medecine San Frontier (MSF), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), ICRC and various UN Agencies and Bilateral Donors.

Conclusion

As the place of birth of what has become a global menace, Borno state can arguably be described as worst hit state in the country as well as the reference point of the implication of not putting out a small fire before it gets big. Life and relationships have been destroyed and human security shattered in the state. Today, Borno state needs and deserves all support towards proper recovery. In the long run, the need to return life to normal must be persistently pursued with all hands on the plough.

Gaps in Policy Responses

Given that the responses to the insurgency and recovery are still on-going the gaps are still minimal. But going reports by the civil society and the media, many instances of sexual exploitation and abuses (SEA) have been reported as well as allegations of diversion of relief materials and food items meant for the displaced and returning families. This calls for a quick rethinking of the processes of delivering these palliatives and more protection for the vulnerable especially women and children.

Gaps in the Literature

The literature on the northeastern states affected by the Boko Haram insurgency is still emerging and not actually based on extensive fieldwork in the zone because of apparent security concerns for researchers. Also, the details of the negotiations that secured the

release of some of the girls of Chibok are not in the public domain. Therefore, most scholarly works are not empirical and most of them are based on discourse analysis.

Recommendations

Towards sustainable peace in Borno state a number of recommendations have been generated based on the experience of insurgency, the overall conflict landscape of the state and the views of participants during the FGDs conducted.

There is need to improve state-society relations and in this context, it is suggested that the state should become more actively and positively present in the lives of all. This can be done by meeting human security needs of the people and not only in Borno but across the country. By meeting the human security needs of the people and with a focus on the youths are the most pliable and susceptible to getting radicalised, the state would have denied those spreading such ideologies fertile minds to plant such ideologies.

Towards having a measured and coordinated response to ensure recovery while not forgetting the need for sustainable peace, we propose the use of a multi-track and integrated framework. The multi-track framework comprising the government, civil-society of experts in peace, security and development, the business class especially the organised private sector, eminent personalities, institutions of research, training and education, the clergy and the media.

There should be concerted efforts to provide counter-narrative to the rhetoric of Boko Haram by the Nigerian state towards ensuring that the citizens begin to see the Nigerian state and its agencies as institutions serving their overall welfare.

The Nigerian Military and the MNJTF should sustain and completely wipe out the Boko Haram insurgents in the state.

There should be deliberate efforts towards addressing socio-economic challenges facing Borno state through initiatives such as job creation, skill acquisition, soft loan scheme, etc.

Modernisation of border security through modern gadgets and capacity building for all security operatives involved in modern border security management to be able to respond to all trans-border threats and crimes.

Promotion of inter and intra-faith collaborations and joint efforts to eradicate religious mistrust, suspicion, tension and apprehension especially among minority faiths and sects in the state.

Adherence to global standard practices in the theaters of operation by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the Nigerian armed forces.

Depoliticisation and de-ethnicisation of humanitarian assistance by NEMA and SEMA should be put in place by being sensitive to ethnic and religious diversities.

There should be the creation of more and accessible opportunities for gainful employment to respond to the acute youth unemployment across the state.

The government, security and law enforcement agencies should work towards earning the trust and confidence of the citizens by guaranteeing the welfare and security of all citizens.

There is need to harmonise various efforts aimed at National Identification to check influx of foreign nationals into the country especially Borno state.

Efforts by intervening agencies should pay special attention to the plight of women and children in armed conflict and to ensure that they are not being used for terrorism acts.

Government should intensify efforts to ensure all spaces are governed, manned and properly to eradicate safe havens for terrorists.

Government and other stakeholders should intensify efforts towards responding to problem of easy availability of small arms and light weapons.

The issues of Post-Trauma Distresses that are breeding violence and community criminality should be addressed.

Government should provide assistance for communities accommodating Internally Displaced Persons.

Government should respond to the destroyed educational infrastructure and put in place strategies to encourage school enrolment among children.

Gombe State (Jewel of the Savannah)

Capital: Gombe



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

Introduction and Historical Background

The present city of Gombe was a colonial creation as the Gombe divisional headquarters in 1919 (Abba 1985 and Tiffen, 1974). The Gombe Emirate soared in importance during the colonial reign as it had the additional responsibilities to oversee new territories within Gombe Division within the larger framework of British indirect rule. In 1996 Gombe state was created from the defunct Bauchi state. It is in the north eastern zone within the expansive savannah. Gombe state shares borders with Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Taraba and Yobe states. It is characterised by two climates, the rainy/dry seasons (from April-October) and the dry season. There are eleven Local Government Areas namely: Akko, Balanga, Billiri, Dukku, Funakaye, Gombe, Kaltungo, Kwami, Nafada, Yamaltu-Deba and Shomgom. Higazi and Lar (2015) observe that the dominance of the Emirate

began waning since year 2000 with the creation of new emirates and chiefdoms in Gombe state and reduction in the size and authority of the Gombe Emirate.

The demographic composition of Gombe state is diverse despite having just eleven local government areas. The northern parts of the state namely Nafada, Dukku and Funakaye are largely Muslims with a thick Muslim population in the rural areas. The few Christians in the northern areas are civil servants posted from southern and/or central Gombe. The other Christian population comes from the Igbo, policemen and other security personnel (Higazi and Lar, 2015). The Christian community in northern Gombe owns churches in the larger towns led by pastors from outside the town. There are different sects of Islam in the areas such as the Sufi orders and reform oriented groups like the Jama'atu Izalatil Bid'ah Wa'lkamatis Sunnah (JIBWIS) Muslims who are in the majority popularly referred to as the Izala including Muslims who identify with none of them but pray in the mosques as Sunni Muslims. Gombe north is ostensibly Islamic and dominated by majority groups like the Herders, Bolewa and Hausa while Gombe central is mixed religiously; the Tera in Yamaltu Deba are reputed to have accommodated both Islam and Christianity.

Southern Gombe is politically fragmented having diverse religious configuration, a rugged area with a topography characterised by the contours of the Muri Mountains and the Tangale-Waja Plateau. The area is ethnolinguistically rich with a variety of minority languages of historically decentralised groups and clans with over-arching political authority. Although religiously plural, Christians are the majority in the major towns of Southern Gombe such as Kaltungo, Billiri, Bambam and Talasse.

Patron-client politics in Gombe is a peculiar one because of its inclusive nature and conflict-mitigating properties. The open co-optation of emirs and chiefs drawn from the eleven local governments is an example of how patronage networks have been put in place by successive administrations since 1999.

According to the population of the 2006 census, Gombe has a population of 2,857,042 and occupies a land mass of 20,265 sq km. Farming is the main occupation in Gombe state and food and cash crops are grown. Cereals like maize, sorghum, rice and wheat are common. Amongst the legumes grown are cowpeas, groundnuts, soya beans and bambara nuts. The common fruits are orange, lemon, mango, paw-paw and grapes. Popular vegetables are tomatoes, pepper, onions, okro, pumpkin and melon. The tree crops are gum Arabic, kenaf, sugar cane, sunflower and ginger. Natural resources found in Gombe include Uranium, Gypsum and limestone.

Conflict and Insecurity in Gombe State

Gombe state had no history of any major violence which could have qualified it as an exceptional state in the north east until 17 April, 2011 when riots broke out after the presidential elections in an apparent youth rage. It mutated from a political violence to

religious violence as there was a change in the objects of attack from the office of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) to churches by evening of the same day (Makai, 2015). Other conflicts in Gombe are over farmland and boundaries within and between ethnic communities. According to Blech et al (2006), conflicts in northern Gombe occur between the Udawa and the Herders herders which warranted a military intervention in 2003.

The conflicts could be explained as tensions that escalate over access to land and water between pastoralists and farmers caused by acute desertification (Higazi and Lar, 2015). Other factors generating tension and conflict are population pressure, the felling of trees, increasing cultivation of more land including cattle grazing routes all contribute to desert encroachment. Despite proximity of the state to southern Borno and Yobe, attacks by Boko Haram were few in the state. The few attacks recorded although not confirmed as having been done by the Boko Haram occurred on the outskirts of the Gombe city on 4 January, 2012 when a Deeper Life Bible Church was attacked and the 4 February, 2012 attack on police station and prison while there have been attacks on security personnel and assassination from 2012-2014 of people accused of providing useful information to the police and security forces. However these were not comparable in scale with other parts of the zone. On 31 October, 2014, a bomb blast targeted the Gombe Line Motor Part in the metropolis and 24 people were killed. On 4 November, 2014 attacks were carried out by the Boko Haram in Nafada and that was the first time despite the closeness to Yobe and Borno during which police station, military check point and the PDP office and also killed a leading Muslim preacher and four of his students.

Inter-group conflicts have been in the context of ethnic clashes and mostly in the southern part of the state. The known one has been between the people of Billiri and Kaltungo which first turned violent in November 1990 (Higazi and Lar, 2015). The enmity between the two dates back to colonial times and till date the two sides trade allegations of being favored by successive regimes in the state and struggle over rightful ownership of the Kaltungo land. Makai (2015) reports that a conflict over loaned farmlands turned violent in August 2013 between the Mada and Kalaye communities during which two lives were lost. Also, in August 2013 a dispute over boundary between Nafada local government and Yobe state resulted in the death of three people (Makai, 2015). In February 2014, a clash between the supporters of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) in Nafada over the right to erect their respective party's flags led to the loss of two lives (Makai, 2015). Remarkably it is one of the states where the then governor and now Senator Danjuma Goje refused to implement the Sharia criminal code.

The two main communities with violent conflicts in Balanga LGA are the Dadiya and Kaltungo. In the violent episode of April 2013, two persons were reportedly killed. The Dadiya and Waja ethnic nationalities in Bambam town on one side and the Maitunkun village in Kaltungo local government; news source reported that the conflict was triggered by the killing of a man in Maitunku village few days before it escalated (*Premium Times*,

2013). Also, in 2014 farmers and herdsmen clashed in May and June while there was political violence in the state in March and April 2015.

Episodes of farmer-herder conflicts have occurred intermittently in Kaltungo local government since 2014 through to 2016 as well as occasional instances of political clashes. In Kaltungo local government, farmer and herders clashed a number of times with unverified number of casualties. In Yemaltu-Deba local government, the Gwani and Kinafa communities clashed over allegations of hate speeches and political differences.

Reported although, unconfirmed attacks by the Boko Haram were heard of in the following local government areas between 2014 and 2016: Dukku; Funakaye; Gombe municipal; Kwame; Nafada and Shomgom. Below is a table containing the attacks carried out by the Boko Haram insurgents in Gombe state.

Table showing distribution of Attacks by Boko Haram in Gombe State and till February 2016

Dates	Types of Attacks	Monthly Attacks	Soft Targets	Hard Targets	Injured	Civilian Deaths	Security Agents Deaths	BH Deaths
Aug 2011	Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard		16		
Jan 2012	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft		2		4	
Feb 2012	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft			14		
Mar 2012	Gunmen Attacks	1	Soft	Hard			1	7
Oct 2014	Bomb Attacks	1	Soft		32	4		
Dec 2014	Bomb Attacks	1	Soft			27		
Feb 2015	Bomb Attacks	3	Soft	Hard	18	6		
Mar 2015	Gunmen Attacks	1		Hard		15		
July 2015	Gunmen/suicide Attacks	1	Soft			42		

Source: Animasawun 2016

Impact of Conflicts on Security in Gombe State

Gombe state has had minimal instances of violent conflict both in the context of intergroup conflagrations and insurgent strikes by the Boko Haram. However, the state is bearing the burden of neighbourhood insecurity as a result of the notoriety of the Boko Haram in the North-East. This is because it has become a place of refuge for many of the fleeing IDPs from other states in the zone. Intergroup conflicts in the state have not boiled over largely due to the inclusive and accommodating nature of the patron-client politics in the state according to studies.

Conflict Actors' Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities and Incentives

The actors in the conflicts in Gombe state with the exception of the Boko Haram insurgents have a common sense of belonging to the state and none of them feels dominated or marginalised. Therefore, there is a common interest to preserve the peace in the state. The state has shown huge capacities that it can provide a shoulder for others to lean on going by the support she has rendered to the internally displaced from other states. To a large extent, the elites in the state have sustained a practice of inclusive politics which appears to have been inspired by an agenda to sustain peace. However, this should be approached with cautious optimism given that all the states in the zone are affected by the Boko Haram insurgency presently which might not make room for the expression or escalation of any other type of conflict.

Responses and Interventions

Track One

Responses from security agents in the state have been able to curtail the spread of violence during intergroup clashes. In terms of humanitarian support to victims of insurgency within and outside Gombe state, responses from the government has been relatively commendable especially in the area of accommodation and nutritional need for the displaced. It is also worthy of note that the state had long appointed a Special Adviser to the governor on Peacebuilding and appointed a woman to hold the office before the threats to peace and security became rife in the zone.

Track Two

Interventions from the not-for-profit organisations to ameliorate the pains of the conflict-people in the state have not been high. Owing to the inclusive nature of politics in the state, traditional and religious rulers including socio-economic and political notables in the state have always lent their weight to most initiatives of the government in the pursuit of peace and security.

Conclusion

Gombe state can still be regarded as an exceptional state in the northeast geo-political zone. Although not conflict-free, the instances of violence in the state has been very rare. Perhaps this could be a plausible factor for the inability of the Boko Haram to gain local acceptance or foothold in the state. The unwritten code or élite consensus on the sustenance of the patron-client relations of inclusion has foreclosed negative reciprocities amongst religiously and ethno-nationally different groups in the state.

Gaps in Policy and Responses

Both insurgency and violent conflicts have barely left any scar on the physical space or psyche of the Gombe people. However, it is important to institutionalise an early warning mechanism in the state as a way of enhancing the activities of the office of the Special

Adviser on Peacebuilding in the state and to also ensure closer working relationship with all security agencies so that early warning will always translate to early and appropriate response.

Gaps in the Literature

Gombe state has not attracted the interest of scholars perhaps because the state has not featured on the list of those in the news for the bad reasons. Never the less, Gombe state is a place to pay attention to for policymakers and the scholars because of the sheer absence of protracted violent conflicts in the state.

Recommendations

The state government should make provision for opportunities for legitimate employment or socioeconomic advancement to help curb loosely organised criminal gangs turning into violent ones to make a living.

More reviews of conflicts in the state especially that of the Yemaltu-Deba, should be constantly reviewed to checkmate its periodic reoccurrence. Deployment of more security personnel to conflict-prone parts of the state.

Taraba State (Nature's Gift to the Nation)

Capital: Jalingo



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

Introduction and Historical Background

The birth of Taraba state was announced on 27 August, 1991 by military President Ibrahim Babangida and nicknamed “Nature’s Gift to the Nation.” The state derived its name from River Taraba, a river that transverses the central part of the state. The state has national and one foreign neighbor(s); her national neighbours are Plateau and Benue state to the west, Adamawa state to the east, her northern neighbours are Bauchi and Gombe states while her international neighbour is Cameroon.

As a gift of nature to the country, Taraba is endowed with enormous natural resources. Across the state can be found, rich alluvial soil which makes the state conducive for cultivating an assortment of food and cash crops such as cassava, yams, potatoes, cocoyam, rice, maize, coffee, tea and cocoa. According to Adamu and Ben (2015), Taraba has vast lush grassland that enhances cattle grazing while the various rivers and lakes have huge potentials for fisheries. It is also a gateway economically from the northeast to southern Nigeria especially for cattle and other farm products. Also, herders have found the vegetation in central and southern Taraba attractive for grazing and other allied economic activities.

Taraba state has sixteen local government areas and a population of 2,300,736 based on the 2006 census. The Christians are the religious majorities in the state where they constitute about 55 percent with Muslims and adherents of African Traditional Religion (ATR) making up 32 percent and 12 percent respectively as the religious minorities. However, Adamu and Ben (2015) explains that the Muslim population in the state is made up of the mainly Hausa Herders.

Taraba state is a multiethnic society sharply divided along religion, ethnicity, culture and language; leading to different contexts of conflicts involving the Jukun, Tiv, Kutep and Chamba (Adamu and Ben, 2015). Studies on inter-group relations in Taraba have generated different conclusions. To some the root of the crisis is the indigene-settler question rooted in deeper concerns of citizenship and belonging (Lenshie, 2012). In another context, it is a struggle between Islam and Christianity (Adamu and Ben, 2015). State actors at all tiers including international agencies have defined the causes of conflicts in Taraba as being about land, politics and lately linking the issues to the Boko Haram crisis (Alfred et al, 2014).

Conflict and Insurgency in Taraba State

The conflict and insecurity landscape of Taraba state has a long history but most recent incidences of conflicts that have left sad memories have been the 1997, 1999 and 2001 episodes which generated killings and destructions in huge quantum. The Boko Haram insurgency has contributed to the fragility of peace in the state just as clashes and raids traced to the herdsmen have ravaged the predominantly Christian southern part of the state where the worst attacks have taken place and generated attendant humanitarian crisis (Adamu and Ben, 2015).

The worst affected towns are those located close to Benue state namely Wukari, Donga, Isha-gogo, Tseke, Gidin-Dorowa, Nyamhina, Borkono, Takum, Jinuwa-Nyife, Ibi and Gbogudo leading to forced displacement and migration towards Jalingo the state capital. As a result of this, environmental degradation, internal migration and struggle for control and access to land are feeding into indigene-settler, resistance against domination and Christian-Muslim narratives of conflicts in the state. The tenuous peace in the state comes under intense strains anytime elections are to be held. But for two attacks linked to the Boko Haram in 2012, there have been very few instances of attacks by the insurgents in the state despite being in the northeastern geo-political zone.

Therefore, threats to peace and security in the state stem more from intergroup conflicts than insurgency. Different communities have been theaters of conflicts in the state in the period covered by the scope of this study. In many instances, the extent of destruction demonstrated at short notices go to confirm that there are deeper and unresolved grievances nursed against one another which are recalled as conflict narratives to mobilise for each episode of violent attacks. So, the episodes that occurred during 2012-2016 were not based on new causes in most places but a rehash or reprisal of past attacks

within protracted conflicts. It is also pertinent to note that while there might have been no incidence of violent conflicts in some communities from 2013-2016, reasons for this ranged from war-weariness and conflict-fatigue in some cases. Therefore, that there was no episode of violent conflict in the period covered in this study does not obliterate past episodes of violent conflicts and the fragility of peace in such communities across the state. In an exclusive report published in 2014 by the *Premium Times*, the paper says that “interactions with witnesses, community leaders and officials say hundreds of others have been massacred in seven local government areas of Taraba state . . . The death toll from the affected areas is said to be over 5,000” (Isine, 2014). Also, *The Financial Times of Nigeria* (2016) quotes from a report by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) that between 2010 and 2013, there were 3,000 deaths in incidences of clashes involving herdsmen, farmers and local communities in Taraba state.

As at the time of compiling this report the stage for another round of violence might just have been inadvertently set by the state governor state given the displeasure of the Tiv people of the state over the decision to rename some communities which hitherto bore Tiv names with Hausa, Jukun and Chamba names with examples such as: Peva (Tiv) now Chanchanji (Hausa); Tse-Amadu (Tiv) to Kufai Ahmadu (Hausa); Tortsee (Tiv) to Kunkunu (Jukun) all in Takum local government area; Genyi (Tiv) to Rafin Kada (Hausa); Tor- Damsa (Tiv) to Akete (Chamba); Ishagogo (Tiv) to Sabongida Suntai (Hausa); Igo (Tiv) to Burukunu (Hausa); Ananum (Tiv) to Wutobi (Chamba) all in Donga local government area; Waka (Tiv) to Wukari (Jukun); Tor-Ayu (Tiv) to Tsokundi (Jukun); Tinen Nune (Tiv) to Gindin Dorawa (Hausa); Tor-musa (Tiv) to Jibwaje (Jukun); Tsekaakir (Tiv) to Chudan (Jukun); Toho Abanyo (Tiv) to Adikyan (Jukun); Ikperen (Tiv) to Kemberi (Jukun); Anyam Kwevel (Tiv) to Bichi (Jukun) all in Wukari local government area and Dan Anacha (Tiv) a settlement in Gassol local government to Kwararafa (Jukun) (Akevi, 2016).

Speaking through his Senior Special Assistant on public affairs, Mr. Emmanuel Bello, the governor rationalised the action by stating that the cities and villages whose names were changed were considered as having spiritual significance as headquarters of the Jukun people. The aide of the governor cited the case of “Dan Anacha” which was Kwararafa before it was renamed by the Tiv people after a yam specie called “Dan Anacha.” Earlier the Chairman of Gassol local government had announced the change of name but he cited “confidential security reasons” as what informed the decision (Akevi, 2016).

Violent Intergroup Conflicts in Taraba state

In Ardo-Kola Local Government, violence broke out after the results of the 2015 gubernatorial and state house of assembly elections were announced as inconclusive. Ojih and Joseph (2015) quote an eyewitness as saying that immediately the pronouncement was made “the supporters of Ishaku Darius of the PDP were jubilating when the APC supporters launched attack on them.” One person was feared dead during the attack.

According to Mkom (2016) at least 13 people were killed during a clash between herdsmen and farmers in the state in April 2016 and farmers in about three local government areas became internally displaced and had to seek refuge in Gasol local government area of the state. The trigger for the violence was the reported killing of two herdsmen in the same month by armed robbers along Kyaior-Gyo Road. When the news of their death got to town, some gunmen invaded the village, attacked and chased out farmers at Kyaaior, Gindin Kerenya and Tse Gyo villages causing the death of about 13 people, injuring 5 and destroying property worth millions of naira. According to a woman, Mrs Mngueshima Nyibiam who was abducted by the herdsmen, she said her abductors were armed with sophisticated weapons and that they used her to get information about the villages that were sacked. The chief of Tiv people in Bali local government David Gbaa revealed that his people ran to take refuge at Dan-Anacha while the attack lasted. Conflicts like this erupt intermittently in addition to election-related violence.

Interactions with journalists in Taraba state revealed that episodes of violent conflicts sometimes spill from one community to the other and that sometimes when reprisals are to be carried out, such acts are visited on communities proximate or known allies of opposing communities. On 28 June, 2014, the Taraba state police command said that “unknown gunmen” had “attacked and killed 10 persons who were coming from Garba Chade to Maihula village in Gassol local government. On 19 April, 2015, 7 people were killed in clash between herders and farmers in Sabon Gida Shagogo in Donga local government. On 4 May, 2015, 6 soldiers were killed in Amar Kambari village in Karim-Lamido local government. On 11 July, 2015, 4 persons were killed in Dan-Anacha in Gassol local government. These incidences have not occurred in a vacuum but within a context of existing conflicts between the herdsmen and farmers that predate 2012. Also, in April 2016, violent clashes broke out between the Shumo and Wukum communities. According to Mustapha (2016) ‘Residents said around 2am, a village named Shumon Gwaye belonging to the Shumo ethnic group was attacked by suspected Wurkum youths. The attack on Shumo village led to reprisals attacks on Didango, a Wurkum community.’

Gashaka is one of the theaters of intermittent clashes between herders and farmers in Taraba state. In 2014, it was reported that about 45 persons were feared killed and 95 others injured when gunmen attacked Gashaka local government. During the attack, 200 houses were reportedly razed in Gashaka, Bashiri, Panwen, Barimini, Sabongida Zaga and Suntai in Bali local government by men suspected to be herdsmen in the community whose inhabitants are mostly the Tiv people. Also allegedly killed was the Chief of Tiv’s representative in Zaki Koti Anyima in Bali local government. Amidst confusion whether the attacks took place in Bali or Gashaka, the Chairman of Bali Mr. Andy Yerima was contacted and he clarified on phone that “. . . the Saturday breach of peace in some villages as reported was in Gashaka local government area of the state” (*The Leadership*, 2014). According to Post Nigeria (2016), the commissioner of Police in Taraba state told newsmen that there was a coordinated attack on two villages by:

A group of people numbering twenty, suspected to be herdsmen, invaded and attacked Dori and Mesuma villages via Garbabi ward, Gashaka LGA and burnt some thatch-houses, forcing the villagers to flee into the villages of Mayo-Selbe and Sabon Gida for safety. Eight people were killed in Dori village while seven were also killed in Mesuma.

The pattern described above is common across the state especially in Wukari, Ibi, Jalingo and Sardauna are local, amongst others. However, the tenor and protraction of such conflicts and their triggers differ.

Impact of Conflicts on Security in Taraba State

Summed up as freedom from fear and want, human security needs increase with exposure to shocks and uncertainties such as natural disasters and conflicts; the experience in Taraba state has not been different especially in rural communities. Threatened in the conflict-affected areas of the state are personal and community security as a result of several instances of sudden attacks by the herdsmen and suffice it to say that violence is not uni-directional in the state but rather a culture of negative reciprocities has been established in the state which negatively impugns on social, ethnic and religious security. This has left inter-group relations fractured in the state. The impact of conflict in the state on social, economic, food and health security cannot be overemphasised. Specially, the destruction to farm produce is a direct assault on the livelihood of the people which has dire implications for their overall wellbeing and food security of the state and the country in the long run.

Conflict Actors' Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities and Incentives

The frequent clashes between the herdsmen and farmers in Taraba state is another conflict context where there are visible and invisible actors in the conflict. In this instance the visible actors are the ones who tender the cattle while the real owners are the capitalists and economic elites who own those cattle. While the government seems disposed to the idea of acquiring lands to serve as grazing lands for the herders as a way of bringing about peace, the potential of the approach to generate another round of crisis is obvious. Indeed the federal and state governments across the country have the capacity for peace but they must ensure that this is not imposed because local ownership of such processes and outcomes cannot be discarded for sustainability in places like Taraba state. Incentives for peace and violence in this case are almost equal. This is because on both sides, the incentives and justification for the negative reciprocities that have defined their relationships are self-reinforcing. This comes from the conflation of religion, ethnic identity and solidarity and economic survival which both sides are ready to die for. Therefore, it is important to be mindful of this precarious balance in exploring ways out.

Responses and Interventions

Track One

The interventions of the state and federal governments in the conflicts in Taraba state

cannot be seen to have had the expected impacts. The responses have largely been in the form of military deployment, appeals, arrests and prosecution. Unlike the IDPs generated by the Boko Haram insurgency, the IDPs generated by the intergroup conflicts between the herders and the farmers are hardly taken care of. The state government also seems to be inadvertently mismanaging the conflict by the recent decision to rename towns and markets in the state. The action and the rationale provided smirks of conflict-insensitivity. With the exception of the IPCR which is exploring peace in non-militaristic way in place like Sardauna, the path taken by most state-led initiatives have been force-based which is in response to the volatility of the areas.

Track Two

Not for profit organisations in the state seems to have been polarised along ethnic and religious lines if a critical look is taken as some of their reports especially the ones that have online visibility. So instead of being part of the solution, some of them have unwittingly become part of problem albeit because of the slant reflective in some of their reports and analysis. The traditional institutions, socio-religious and political notables in the state have recorded little or no success in bringing about a way of the impasse between two critical groups central to the survival of the state and the country. The traditional rulers especially are torn between two divides; one, being seen as protective of the interests of their communities or being seen as cowards who are mortgaging the interests of their respective communities. This has promoted a zero-sum approach to the issues in dispute on both sides.

Conclusion

Although located in the northeast, the conflict and insecurity landscape of Taraba state is acutely complex, protracted and apparently intractable as it seems to have defied remedies so far applied. The conflation of faith, ethno-national identity, enemy images, narratives of mutual hatred and economic survival loom are discernible as the denominators of conflicts. The narratives of enmity and hatred continue to validate negative reciprocities which rigidify boundaries. Indeed, the impact of the conflict on human security has been adverse while no action can be seen as being taken towards institutionalised and efficacious conflict management and peacebuilding.

Gaps in Policy Responses

Indeed, there have been responses and in particular policy responses which have obvious gaps. For instance, while the government seems disposed towards the creation of grazing lands, its potentials to generate another round of conflict is too obvious. The responses to conflicts and tension in Taraba state cannot be seen to have been inspired by the desire to have sustainable peace but they seem to be geared towards the containment of violence while ignoring the substantial issues of peaceful co-existence.

Gaps in the Literature

The literature on conflict and insecurity in Taraba state have been overwhelmingly focused on some areas like Wukari while many other smaller communities in the state are actually small places with large issues because of the way issues in such places intersect with issues in other communities even outside the state. There is also a seeming oblivion of how issues in these smaller communities feed into larger tensions of belonging, access to resources and ownership of land in the state. The widespread risk of attacks enveloping the state is peculiar because of the way reprisal attacks are carried. Often reprisal attacks are not directed the actual communities where the initial attacks come from rather they are directed at communities known or believed to have sympathy for the communities from which the first attack comes from. So alliances, solidarities and unwritten treaties of defence have been built along faultlines in the state.

Recommendations

The need for stronger presence of security personnel in the conflict-prone areas of the state especially in the central and southern senatorial zone of the state is compelling. There should be a dispassionate and transparent initiative towards exploring and setting an agenda for peace that will be acceptable to all parties in the state.


Developmental initiatives that will promote cooperation and dependence between the herdsmen and the farmers should be explored.

The government should give serious consideration to the idea of ranching rather than acquiring lands for grazing.

Narratives of enmification should deconstructed and in this direction many online platforms of groups in the state stand at a strategic position to initiate this so that there can be a new dawn and beautiful dawn in the relationship of the people in the community.

Yobe State (The Young Shall Grow)

Capital: Damaturu



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

Introduction and Historical Background

Yobe state was created by the administration of former military president Ibrahim Babangida in 1991 on 7 August. The present Yobe state was until then, part of defunct Borno state. The state stands on an approximate area of 47,153 square km and has both national and international neighbours. Nationally, her neighbours are Borno to the east, Jigawa to the west Gombe and Borno to the south, while her only international neighbour, Niger Republic is on her northern border. The northern part of the state is characterised by desert, active sand dunes and difficult terrain, while the southern part has many mountainous and undulating hills. According to the 2006 census, the state has a population of 2,321,591.

Socio-linguistically, the languages widely spoken across the state are English, Kanuri, Hausa and Fulfulde. The state has 17 local governments and 14 Emirate councils. The Emir of Fika chairs the traditional council of chiefs in the state. The main ethnic groups are the Manga, Herders, Kare, Bolewa, Hausa and Kanuri. Religiously, the Muslims

constitute the majorities while the Christians are in the minorities. The state has 17 local governments. They are: Bursari, Damaturu, Geidam, Bade, Gujba, Gulani, Fika, Fune, Jakusko, Karasuwa, Machina, Nangere, Nguru, Potiskum, Tarmuwa, Yunusari, Yusufar. There are a total of 631 primary schools, 31 post-primary schools and tertiary institutions namely the State College of Education, Gushua Federal College of Technical Education and the State Institute of Management Studies.

Occupationally, it is reputed for agriculture and highly respected in farming, fishing and rearing of livestock. The state has rich fishing grounds and mineral deposits of gypsum, kaolin and quartz. The state's agricultural products include gum Arabic, groundnuts, beans and cotton. Also, the state has one of the largest cattle markets in West Africa situated in the capital Potiskum.

Conflict and Insurgency in Yobe State

As a former constituent of Borno state and now immediate neighbours, Yobe state has its own peculiarities in terms of conflicts before the escalation of insurgency. Inter group conflicts in the state have mainly occurred along faith lines that is, between Christians and Muslims and herders and pastoralists that have always negative implications on the security of the state. However, the escalation of insurgency which led to a situation whereby 12 of the 17 local governments in the state were captured by the insurgents brought about a change in the pattern, actors, tenor and shift from inter-group conflicts to conflict between the Nigerian state and the Boko Haram insurgents for which the state was a major battleground.

Violent Intergroup Conflicts and Insurgency in Yobe state

Indeed the conflict between the Nigerian state and the Boko Haram insurgents has had both a dilapidating effect on the state both physically and psychologically. From the May 2, 2012 to July 6, 2015, there were at least 41 attacks across the state during which the insurgents targeted virtually every aspect of life with an unmistakable intent to ruin the state. That the insurgency enveloped the entire state provides a basis to pay more attention to its impact.

The Boko Haram insurgency has affected every aspect of human security in Yobe state. This has been attested to by both government and non-government agencies from and outside Nigeria. As at 4 March, 2016, the governor of the state Ibrahim Geidam told a visiting team that the government had lost 15.8 billion Naira while over 305,499 people became internally displaced, 1,098 public buildings, 5,162 vehicles destroyed, 109,267 livestock killed, personal structures and assets of over 24,000 individuals and other infrastructural facilities were also destroyed (Musa, 2016). Further, he revealed that the insurgency as at then led to the creation of two official camps in the state in addition to residents of the state that have had to flee to neighbouring states like Gombe, Bauchi, Jigawa and Kano, amongst other places. In another interview the spokesman of the

governor revealed that an inaccurate figure of the number of lives lost but that they run into millions.

Quoting a report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Oxfam, Nnodim (2016) reveals that Yobe state was declared the most insecure state out of all the states affected by insurgency in the northeast geo-political zone. The report used indicators to measure security based on perception to arrive at the conclusion after analysis. The report also indicated that women felt more secure than men in the local governments where the study was carried out (Nnodim, 2016). Health security was dealt a devastating blow by insurgency as asthma, diabetes, cancer, liver cirrhosis, HIV, tuberculosis, and others were present in about a quarter of the households assessed.

In 2015, a rapid situational analysis was carried out in Yobe state to assess the extent of the impact of the conflict on education by USAID. The study found out that there was extreme lack of access to education owing to past and present violence, high rates of displacement, school closures, need for basic provisions and other factors confronted by the IDP learners, parents and host communities. According to the report, both parents and learners were experiencing confusion, uncertainty and fear associated with being an IDP which also affected the choices of parents and children and their willingness to access education and learning facilities. This USAID report coming in 2015 brings back the horrific memories of the pre-dawn attack of 6 July, 2013 when gunmen believed to be Boko Haram insurgents invaded a government-owned boarding school of 1200 students in Mamudo village in the state killing not at least 42 people. According to reports based on eye-witness accounts, the killings were done in the most bestial manners. The insurgents also torched the school and after the attack over 100 students were reportedly still missing. Therefore, a community that has experienced such level of inhumanity cannot but understandably be weary of learning as the USAID report revealed. ACAPS (2015) in a broader study that covers virtually every aspect of life revealed that indeed every aspect of life in the state was practically reversed by the insurgency while the aftermaths will last for an unpredictable time to come.

Next to human security that was practically kicked out of the sight and psyche of the residents of Yobe state, Christian-Muslim relations in the state was also strained. This came against the backdrop of the choices of targets hit by the terrorists especially pre-2013 which recorded more Christian victims. However, this impression changed overtime as it became obvious that the Boko Haram insurgents were foes to all in the state.

Conflict Actors' Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities and Incentives

The actors in the war between the forces of terrorism and defenders of the integrity and soul of humanity in Nigeria are not unknown completely. First on one side are the forces of the Nigerian state, the people of Nigeria and the international community. On the other hand are the insurgents, their patrons and their transnational allies. The bone of contention in this context is the attempt to turn Nigerian to an Islamic Caliphate governed

by the Boko Haram on the hand, the Nigeria, society and international community share a common agenda for peace and which is the maintenance of law and order within a multi-religious Nigerian state.

The interests of the two parties remain at variance despite the fact that the Boko Haram and the federal government have started negotiating; the likelihood that they share similar peace agenda or reconcilable peace agenda is still bleak. However, the federal government and the international community have convincingly demonstrated their capacities for peace as well as war making. The insurgents like typical guerrillas have been behaving to type as expected in an asymmetric warfare whose discernible incentives are the spoils derived from the criminality that has accompanied their activities.

Responses and Interventions

Track One

The responses from the state and federal governments have come in form of support to facilitate recovery and to ensure protection which has entailed humanitarian and militaristic actions. The Yobe state government committed the sum of #13.7 billion through payments of allowances to security operatives, procurement of vehicles, among other logistics, while medical assistance to the victims of insurgency as well as provision of relief materials brings government's cumulative expenses to #15.8 billion (Nnodin, 2016). The government has also been reaching out to all critical stakeholders in the state towards bringing all on board in quest for recovery and peacebuilding.

Multi-Track

Just like Borno state, Yobe is one of the states where the international not-for-profit organisations have been making sustained efforts towards alleviating the pains caused by insurgency and facilitating the return of normalcy. Also useful studies are being carried out towards ensuring that interventions have the desired impacts in all aspects.

The religious, socio-economic and political classes have always advocated for peace in the state. However, they were scared into silence after some of them were targeted by the Boko Haram. Nevertheless, they have provided the needed support encouragement for the government towards the recovery.

Conclusion

Yobe state presents another setting that is similar to Borno state in virtually all ramifications of the emergence, escalation and impact of the Boko Haram insurgency. The scars of insurgency are palpable in the state. Although recovery is in progress, the state must leverage on current amity between the Muslims and Christians to creatively explore and cement ways of enhancing peaceful Christian-Muslim relations to ensure that Muslims and Christians are not always at daggers drawn.

Gaps in Policy and Responses

The observed gaps in policy and programmatic responses have affected the rate of recovery and they might have implications for peacebuilding in post-insurgency Yobe state. Also, allegations of abuses by camp officials, diversion of resources meant for the displaced and insufficiency of programmes tailored to meet the psychological needs of people affected by the insurgency are some policy and programmatic gaps that the government and all stakeholders must be mindful of and address. Also, much as there is a national document detailing plans on recovery and peacebuilding, Yobe state government, given the extent of its experience ought to have its own locale-specific agenda for recovery and post-insurgency peacebuilding. The quest for inter-faith harmony and peaceful co-existence should not be relegated or ignored just because insurgency so that it does not become the next source of threat to peace and security in the state. This is so because of the history of conflicts between the two religious communes.

Gaps in the Literature

Inaccessibility as a result of insecurity in the state constitutes a major barrier to scholars and this puts a limit to which the experiences and impact of the insurgency can be studied. Also, the literature on Yobe state has not paid due attention to the tension between the religious majorities (Muslims) and the religious minorities (Christians) in the state and this portends a dangerous omen that might truncate recovery and post-insurgency stability in the state.

Recommendations

Safe school initiatives should be promoted in order to restore the confidence of the people and youths in particular.

There is the need for concerted efforts to provide counter-narrative to the rhetoric of Boko Haram narrative against western education by agencies of government such as the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, NOA, etc.

That the Nigerian Military and the MNJTF should sustain and completely wipe out the Boko Haram insurgents in the state.

There should be deliberate efforts towards addressing socio-economic challenges facing Yobe state through initiatives such as job creation, skill acquisition, soft load scheme, etc.

That Government should equip border security operatives with modern gadgets and continually upscale their capacity through training.

The welfare and security of the border communities like Yobe state should be the priority of government.

Efforts towards building inter-faith harmony and peaceful co-existence should be intensified to eradicate religious mistrust, suspicion, tension and apprehension especially among minority faiths and sects in the state.

Efforts to depoliticise humanitarian assistance by NEMA and SEMA should be put in place by being sensitive to ethnic and religious diversities.

Measures to respond to incidences of youth bulge and massive youth unemployment across the state should be put in place at the federal, state and local government levels.

The government, security and law enforcement agencies should work towards earning the trust and confidence of the citizens by guaranteeing the welfare and security of all citizens.

There is need to harmonise various efforts aimed at National Identification to check influx of foreign nationals into the country especially Yobe state.

Efforts by intervening agencies should pay special attention to the plight of women and children in armed conflict and to ensure that they are not being used for terrorism acts.

Government should intensify efforts to ensure all spaces are governed, manned and properly to eradicate safe havens for terrorists.

Government and other stakeholders intensify efforts towards responding to problem of easy availability of small arms and light weapons.

Government should work towards responding to challenges of abduction of children and women by insurgents.

Attention should be paid to the mental health and psychological needs of all affected by the insurgency.

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North-West Geo-Political Zone

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List of Acronyms

APC	All Progressives Congress
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
FBO	Faith-Based Organisation
FOMWAN	Federation of Muslim Women Associations of Nigeria
HRH	His Royal Highness
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
LGA	Local Government Area
MDA	Ministry, Department, Agency
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NDA	Nigerian Defence Academy
NDLEA	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NURTW	National Union of Road Transport Workers
PDP	People's Democratic Party
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
SCMA	State Conflict Management Alliance
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
ZMHA	Zamfara House of Assembly

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Executive Summary

The North-West zone comprises seven states, listed in the zone's strategic conflict assessment (SCA) report as follows: Kano, Jigawa, Kaduna, Zamfara, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Katsina. The rate of growth and development between the seven states has not been equal for various historical and geographical reasons. The zone is typically endowed with fertile land for agriculture and animal husbandry. Hence, the entire populace of the states in this zone is predominantly farmers, but with a large segment engaged in animal husbandry and commerce. It is a relatively volatile region that literally simmers with different forms of conflicts – some of which run through all of the states, while many others are situation-specific to the individual states. The states have a large Muslim majority and large indigenous Christian minorities in Kaduna and, to a lesser extent, Kebbi, Zamfara, and Katsina. Two states, Kano and Kaduna, host large numbers of non-indigenes of different ethnic and religious backgrounds that have settled for generations, with many of them now fully 'indigenised' and adopting the states as their home.

The manifested scenarios of conflict occurrences in the North-West, including the reported conflicts between the herders and farmers, are generally explainable within the context of the enduring wider social structure, the robust human diversity, the historical trajectory, and the political economy of the Northern region of Nigeria. Besides, this region has the second highest rate of non-western educated people as well as number of children of school-going age that are out of the formal school system. Therefore, because of the relatively low literacy level and the high figure of out-of-school children, the zone has also been rated as an educationally disadvantaged part of Nigeria. Nevertheless, the zone has dozens of institutions like Universities, Polytechnics and numerous specialised institutions, including the Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna, the Police Academy in Kano, and the Army Depot in Zaria as well as several research institutes. These institutions host a large number of highly specialised professionals who command national visibility.

The Zone, until recently, had possessed a relatively thriving manufacturing sector. Specifically, Kaduna was in the 1960s through the early 1990s the textile headquarters of Nigeria. The sector at the time was the largest employer of labour next to government in the country. Similarly, Kano was next to Lagos in the manufacturing and industrial sector until recently that most of the manufacturing concerns have closed down due to harsh operational conditions. In the same vein, there are several agro-allied industries in different parts of the zone that stopped production or, in rare cases, operating skeletally due to the hostile business climate in the country. The implications for such massive closures are high unemployment, lower government revenues, and lower returns in the agricultural sector plus a lot more consequences that affect the quality of development, the status of security in the zone and across the country.

The prevalence of big forests that extend across the states of the zone has facilitated the perpetration of violent acts and rural banditry by criminal gangs who use the expansive and dense forests to terrorise human settlements in the rural areas and the commuters on the highways. The bandits, mostly operating in gangs engaged in serial killings, kidnappings, robberies, rape, cattle-rustling and other forms of terrorism in states like Zamfara, Kano, Kaduna and Katsina – with devastating consequences for the rural population. In Zamfara, for instance, several communities have been completely displaced and the economies of many more communities destabilised. The situation is further compounded by the proliferation and easy access to sophisticated light arms and ammunitions, which are easily smuggled across the porous borders of the country as well as the fall-out of the degradation of Boko Haram insurgents in the North-East region. Many of such insurgents had escaped into the scattered dense forests of the North-West states.

Another common problem, which fuels insecurity in the zone, is the easy access to, and the use of, hard drugs by young people and, specifically, young women. Such drugs are often smuggled and openly and cheaply sold in the markets. Respondents across the states complained about the effects of drug addiction among young people with devastating personal and public consequences. The poverty index of the Zone is 71.4 percent (NBS Website, 2016). Poverty is widespread and evident in the zone as manifested in the poverty indices of the individual states. This is further exacerbated by the high population pressure, which is not matched with corresponding expansion in services and opportunities for the dominantly young population. The gloomy picture of widespread poverty is manifested in high unemployment and underemployment among young people in the zone – where unemployment rates in the seven states have ranged from 20 percent to 35 percent – with a zonal average of 30.0 percent. This obviates the existence of millions of able-bodied young men who, whether educated or not, are not productively employed, or employable. Respondents had further complained that the astronomical rise in the cost of living in recent times has in several ways also affected the general quality of life of the people in the zone, thereby correspondingly heightening the level of desperation for survival.

In more specific terms, a major and common form of conflict in the North-West zone has been a function of the enormous pressure on land caused by a combination of factors, ranging from rising settler population, increased ethnic nationalism, cases of land speculating, and climate change, to decreased socio-economic opportunities and the activities of cattle-herders. A combination of these factors has led to frequent clashes between herders and farmers in the states, resulting in the loss of lives and destruction of properties as well as the killing of animals. It is also significant to note from the SCA findings in this zone that there is the presence of an active civil society sector that has been deeply involved in the promotion of good governance, the necessary reduction of conflicts, and in the general promotion of peace and general development. For example, in states, like Kaduna and Kano, civil society organisations have been involved in

numerous conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives, while in many cases driving these laudable initiatives in collaboration with governments.

In summation, the North-West SCA has drawn the following conclusions: that the zone is one of the most volatile geo-political regions of the country, with numerous sources and manifestations of conflicts caused by a combination of complex factors. Some of the common conflicts identified as requiring immediate responses across the Zone relate to: politically-motivated conflicts, ethnoreligious conflicts, resource-related conflicts (especially, land disputes, farmers/herders clashes), governments and policy failures, the rise in criminality and criminal acts (e.g. rural banditry and kidnappings) and the phenomenal increase in social problems (e.g. resulting from drug addiction, sexual offences, the pangs of unemployment, the heightening of divorce rates, the adverse impact of illiteracy and ignorance, the trigger of abnormally-high school drop-out rates, etc.) – which eventually often all tended to translate into serious sources of conflict and insecurity.

Attributions of causation for the variety of conflicts that is prevalent in the North-West have generally included the following clusters: There are numerous factors responsible, directly or indirectly, for the types of conflicts simmering in the North-West Zone. Some of these are: widespread impoverishment, deprivations and the high cost of living – especially in a period of economic recession; high and rapid population increases but without corresponding increase in opportunities; high unemployment rates, especially among the youth; high illiteracy and widespread ignorance; the fight for supremacy by politicians and religious leaders; the perceived marginalisation and social exclusion of some groups and sections within the geo-polity; provocative preaching and intra-sect leadership tussles; fanaticism; rural-urban migration as well as uncontrolled immigration from the neighbouring countries; increased pressure and cost of land – which make access to farming and grazing much more difficult; the rise in social crimes, like the rape of girls and boys; activities of local thugs, miscreants and gangs; the perpetration of hate speeches on radio stations and the social media; widespread usage and abuse of harmful drugs (male and female); weakening of the control institutions like the family – also increasingly ridden with cases of neglect, violence, sexual molestation, etc. the latest penchant for the delay and irregular payment of workers’ wage bills, especially in the LGAs, but also in the states; the perceived insensitive policies of government, etc.

And, correspondingly, the major actors typically associated with the reported incidences and frequencies of conflicts in the North-West Zone have been narrowed down to the following: politicians; political thugs and hired spokespersons (men/women); farmers and herders; unemployed youth; ex-service personnel and the local vigilante groups; religious fanatics; factional leaders in religions, markets, etc. criminal gangs; high-profile absentee farmers; corrupt judicial, security and traditional institutions’ officials.

Finally, the following recommendations are made towards necessary mitigation of the multitude of conflict-drivers as well as the prevention of the often destructive after-

effects of ravaging conflicts:

- (1) The political class should get its acts together and play the game of politics by the rules in order to engender confidence among the people and ensure the upholding of the rule of law at all times.
- (2) The Government should be bold, creative and systematic in addressing unemployment and issues of poverty reduction among the youth and the general population, with a view to reducing their levels of vulnerabilities to criminal tendencies.
- (3) The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and other security agencies should be strengthened to tackle the menace of drug addiction and its effects.
- (4) Begin the process of registering pastoralists that enter Nigerian territory as is the case in Chad, Niger, Cameroun and other Francophone West African countries. This will help in ensuring that that only legitimately established economic migrants come into Nigeria.
- (5) Improve border management strategies to check proliferation of small and light weapons as well as track and ward off criminals.
- (6) Preachers should be strictly monitored to check provocative and dangerous preaching.
- (7) Pastoralist communities should be trained in a specialised way so they could begin to accept sedentary livelihoods.
- (8) Individual governments should implement grazing reserve policies and, in the process, provide resources like water, feeds, hospitals and road networks to minimise movement of pastoralists.
- (9) Politicians should respect the sanctity of traditional institutions. This may likely reduce conflicts in that sector.
- (10) Strengthen and provide institutional support for the civil society sector to play deserving and increasing roles in conflict reduction, prevention and development-oriented initiatives
- (10) Reinvigorate the Local Governments and other institutions to play their roles effectively.

SECTION ONE

Introduction and Historical Background

1.1 Synopsis of the North-West Zonal Report

The manifested scenarios of conflict occurrences in the North-West, including the reported conflicts between the herders and farmers, that are subsequently elaborated in the later segments of this Zonal Report are also generally explainable within the context of the enduring wider social structure, historical trajectory and political economy of the Northern region of Nigeria. For instance, throughout the Northern region, and especially in the Hausa/Herders inhabited areas as well as for several centuries running, the nomadic herders had traditionally tended to migrate west-ward, often also establishing and, correspondingly, inhabiting semi-sedentary village settlements. By so doing, herders had also established socio-economic relations with the local crop farmers through practices of reciprocal trading and the exchange of cattle with agricultural produce as well as the grant of necessary access to grazing pastures for the benefit of the cattle herders. Thus, it was not uncommon, during periods of drought and attendant pressures on the available land and water resources, for example, to experience aggravated inter-ethnic crises or conflicts. Such pressures had reportedly further peaked, historically, during the early 19th century; while the same pressures were considered as being contributory to the historical Herders-led Islamic holy war and the subsequent founding of the Sokoto Caliphate.

1.2 Structure of the North-West Geo-Political Zone

The North-West Zone comprises seven states as follows: Kano, Jigawa, Kaduna, Zamfara, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Katsina. The rate of growth and development between the seven states has not been equal, for various historical and geographical reasons. The Zone is endowed with a sizeable landmass of 216,065 sq. km and a high population density estimated at 35,786,944 (National Population Commission, 2006 Census). The zone is currently estimated to constitute 25.75 percent of the total population of the Nigeria (www.infoguidenigeria.com). The inclusive states share numerous social, political and economic characteristics, which include the wide and dominant usage of the Hausa Language, religious affinities, multiple intra and inter-ethnic group configurations and common general political orientation as often manifested in the individual states. Currently, all the states are governed by the All Progressives Congress (APC), with the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) remaining the main opposition party, but with a lower level of representation at the various states' Houses of Assembly.

The entire populace of the states in this zone is predominantly made-up of farmers, but with a large segment of that total population also engaged in commerce. Farming is the predominant occupation of most people in the zone with a large number of people also

engaged in animal husbandry and commerce. The zone has a fertile land for agriculture and animal husbandry. It is a relatively volatile region simmering with different forms of conflicts, some of which run through all of the states and many others contextually specific to the individual states. The states have a large Muslim majority and large indigenous Christian minorities in Kaduna and, to a lesser extent, Kebbi, Zamfara, and Katsina. Two states capitals – Kano and Kaduna – host large numbers of non-indigenes of different ethnic and religious backgrounds that have settled for generations, with many of them now fully ‘indigenised’ and claiming the states as their home.

The North-West region has the second highest rate of non-Western educated people as well as number of children of school-going age that are out of the formal school system. Because of the relatively low literacy level and the high figure of out-of-school children, the zone has been rated as an educationally- disadvantaged part of Nigeria. The concept and practice of the *almajiri* system has been variously observed over time as a major factor in the abuse of children which is increasingly assuming worrying dimensions with many of them reportedly engaging in illicit behaviours like drug trafficking and consumption. However, it is important to state that the zone has dozens of institutions like Universities, Polytechnics and numerous specialised institutions like the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) in Kaduna, the Police Academy in Kano, and the Army Depot in Zaria and several research institutes. These institutions host a large number of highly specialised professionals who command national visibility.

The Zone, until recently, had a relatively thriving manufacturing sector. Specifically, Kaduna was the textile headquarters of Nigeria in the 1960s through the early 1990s. The sector at the time was the largest employer of labour next to government in the country. Similarly, Kano was next to Lagos in the manufacturing and industrial sector, until recently that most of the manufacturing concerns have closed down due to harsh operational conditions in the aftermath of the protracted economic recession. In the same vein, there are several agro-allied industries in different parts of the zone that stopped production, or in rare cases operating skeletally, due to the hostile business climate in the country. The implications for such massive closures are high unemployment, lower government revenues, and lower returns in the agricultural sector plus a lot more consequences that affect the quality of development and state of security in the zone and the country.

The prevalence of big forests that extend across the states of the zone has facilitated the perpetration of violent acts by gangs who use the expansive and dense forests to terrorise human settlements in the rural areas and the commuters on the highways. The bandits, mostly operating in gangs engaged in serial killings, kidnappings, robberies, rape, cattle rustling and other forms of terrorism in states like Zamfara, Kano, Kaduna and Katsina – with devastating consequences for the rural population. In Zamfara, for instance, several communities have been completely displaced and the economies of many more communities destabilised. The situation is further compounded by the

proliferation and easy access to sophisticated light arms and ammunitions, which are easily smuggled across the porous borders of the country as well as the fall-out of the degradation of Boko Haram insurgents in the North-East region. Many of such insurgents had escaped into the scattered dense forests of the North-West states.

Another common problem, which fuels insecurity in the zone, is the easy access to, and the use of, hard drugs by young people and, specifically, young women. Such drugs are often smuggled and openly and cheaply sold in the markets. Respondents across the states complained about the effects of drug addiction among young people with devastating personal and public consequences. The poverty index of the Zone is 71.4 percent (NBS Website, 2016). Poverty is widespread and evident in the zone as manifested in the poverty indices of the individual states. This is further exacerbated by the high population pressure, which is not matched with corresponding expansion in services and opportunities for the dominantly young population. The gloomy picture of widespread poverty is manifested in high unemployment and underemployment among young people in the zone. The unemployment rate in the seven states ranges from 20 percent to 35 percent – with a zonal average of 30.0 percent (Ajakaiye, 2015). This means that there are millions of able-bodied young men who, whether educated or not, are simply not productively engaged. Respondents have also complained that the astronomical rise in the cost of living in recent times has in several ways affected the general quality of life of the people in the zone, thereby heightening the level of desperation for survival.

Furthermore, a major form of conflict in the zone has been accentuated by the enormous pressure on land caused by rising population, increased ethnic nationalism, cases of land speculating, climate change, decreased opportunities and activities of herders. A combination of these factors has led to frequent clashes between cattle herders and crop farmers in the states, resulting in the loss of lives and destruction of properties as well as the killing of animals. The zone has an active civil society sector that has been deeply involved in the promotion of good governance, reduction of conflicts and promotion of peace and general development. In states, like Kaduna and Kano, civil society organisations have been involved in numerous conflict resolution and peace initiatives, in many cases, collaborating with governments.

SECTION TWO

Methodology

In the conduct of the 2016 strategic conflict assessment (SCA) in the North-West zone, the adopted methodology had also basically involved a multi-method approach. This had necessitated the primary usage of a combination of unobtrusive methods with standard survey technique and an associated questionnaire instrument; the convening of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions in all communities visited within the North-West zone. But, at the very beginning of the SCA, preliminary activities had generally also involved a review of relevant literature and available documentary reports on the conflict situations in the inclusive communities of this zone. On the whole, the research instruments that were used during the zone's SCA were generally aimed at the aggregation of responses from a representative sample of conflict actors, the victims, persons identified to be involved in the responses to, and/or in organised interventions on matters related to conflict occurrences, general stakeholders, etc. all within the framework of the phenomenon of conflict. The specific details of the multi-method approach of data-gathering had particularly also included impromptu discussions and extended observations.

Be that as it may, it was further recognised that the overly sensitive nature of conflict and security-related subject-matter required the additional care or caution to corroborate all aggregated field evidence with such available secondary evidence and aggregate social data from official or organised sources. Besides, the field observations, interviews and focus group discussions were especially also situated within locations in each of the conflict-affected settings of states in the North-West zone. In the end, the SCA data from the zone were carefully analysed to bring out the manifested patterns of structures, actors and dynamics of each conflict type, situation or scenario. The output of the same analysis then also later influenced the direction of formulation of the suggestions and recommendations arising from the zone-specific assessment.

SECTION THREE

Conflict Case Studies

3.1 Panoramic Information about Conflict Scenarios in the North-West Zone

The occurrences of conflict and acts of insecurity, or the threats to social peace, in the zone are found to be generally common to all the states – even when each state appears to have one peculiar form of conflict and insecurity situation that seems to be its major area of challenge. For instance, in some of the states, political conflict is top on their list of worries; while, in others, it bothers more on religious and/or ethnic conflicts which the respondents had identified as troubling, or worrisome. Similarly, on the issue of insecurity, while some states are hard-pressed on the various incidences of kidnapping, rural banditry and cattle rustling, others have had to grapple with the dangers of drug-addiction among the young people. It should be acknowledged that the recent degradation of the Boko Haram terror group has significantly restored peace and reduced palpable fear and tension that were prevalent in the zone, especially in the Kano and Kaduna axes where the Boko Haram had perpetrated its terror activities. Now, with the restoration of relative peace in the North-East and the continuation of intense surveillance across the North-West, the tension has gradually eased-off and the general condition of peace restored.

The greatest challenge across the zone relates to political conflicts manifested in intense inter and intra-party conflicts. In each of the states, there are cases of intense rivalry, either between the ruling APC and the opposition as in Jigawa, or sharply dividing intra-party rivalries – especially within the ruling APC. This problem exists across the seven states, even though the intensity varies. In three states (Kano, Katsina and Jigawa), there are serious and deep disagreements between the current Governors and the predecessors – leading to, in the case of Kano, a factionalisation in the ruling party. In Zamfara state, it is a show of supremacy between the Executive and the Legislature. The two arms of the government have been having a fractious relationship, which had simmered down the line in the ruling party and the general population with people taking sides. In Kaduna, it is a fight for supremacy and community relevance between the incumbent governor and a serving senator. Thus, such disagreements have resulted in many forms of internal dissensions in the ruling and opposition parties in all the states. Most respondents appeared worried on the unpredictability of the discomfiting emerging scenarios on the polity.

Perhaps, next to political conflicts are ethnic conflicts manifested in inter-ethnic squabbles that had, in many cases, exploded into outright violent communal clashes. Of the seven states, Kaduna appears to be the most volatile for such conflicts, where the relationship

between the dominantly Muslim Hausa Christian minority ethnic groups have been experiencing rancorous encounters publicly over many issues. On many occasions, such squabbles had reached boiling points and on other occasions actually escalating to violent clashes. The Kaduna situation is attributed to the compounding effects of politics, religion and economics, herders and farmer's conflict, among others. In the other states, cases of inter-ethnic conflicts are relatively lower because of the heavy dominance of the Hausa groups. For instance, it is not uncommon for many outsiders to think that the states of the North-West zone are homogeneous in terms of language, culture and religion. But, the reality is that there are scattered indigenous ethnicities whose voices are hardly heard and have largely adopted the Hausa language as the major means of communication. Rather, there have been isolated and not-so-frequent cases of border disputes between communities mostly over communal farmlands. Such cases have been reported in Jigawa, Kaduna and Kebbi.

This zone is also noted for inter and intra-religious conflicts. All the states had reported cases of religious conflicts, although with different intensities. Kaduna state is unique in this respect because of the complexities involved in understanding the various dimensions of the intense intra and inter-religious conflicts manifested in the glaring rivalries exhibited by the adherents and the herder-farmer conflict. Equally, the situation is compounded by intra religious quarrels as represented by the Shiites who operate largely with the dominant Muslim groups and its perceived disagreement with government. The Shiites have been known to sharply disagree with most of the Islamic sects in the state and in December, 2015 had a violent confrontation with the military resulting in loss of lives and property. In the other states, the disagreements between the different Islamic sects appear to be well managed by the leaders and the traditional institutions. Such sectarian disputes are often manifested in provocative and inciting preaching while competing for popularity and superiority of dominance among the people. In states like Katsina, Kebbi and Zamfara, too, the minority indigenous Christian communities complained of marginalisation in state affairs. In cities like Kano, particularly in the Sabongari area where most of the non-indigenes Christians live, there have been reports of confrontations between residents and *Hisbah* elements (local religious police), mostly on enforcing the ban on the sale of alcohol and controlling of acts of prostitution among young people.

There is also a politico-cultural type of conflict that has been prevalent and, in some cases, leading to violent confrontations between individuals and communities. In some of the states like Sokoto, Kebbi and Jigawa, chieftaincy disputes have become common because of political interferences in the appointments of traditional rulers into positions (District/Village Heads, etc.). Specifically, respondents in Sokoto state have identified chieftaincy disputes as a major issue exemplified in frequent reports of the imposition of traditional leaders on communities. Many respondents attributed the rise to political interferences by politicians. So our traditional institutions should be left to be neutral and free of political interferences.

Farmer-Herder Conflict

This is a widespread recurring conflict that is locally handled by traditional institutions and the police in the communities. But it has remained a threat especially considering the reports of such clashes that had consumed many lives and property in some parts of the country and the southern part of Kaduna state in particular. Closely related to that is the nagging issue of cattle rustling and kidnappings across the communities. Many lives have been lost, property destroyed and huge sums of money seized. For instance, states like Zamfara, Kaduna and Kano have suffered huge losses because of the activities of criminal gangs perpetuating cattle rustling, kidnappings, robberies and other forms of violent crimes that sometime attract stiff hesitance from the communities. But recent efforts from the security agencies, communities and federal and state governments have minimised the menace. For instance, recently, the government in Kano state identified 48 armed groups that have been terrorising communities in the state. Specifically, Kaduna has been noted for high profile kidnappings for huge ransoms and herder-farmer conflict. The proximity of the state to Abuja has made it attractive to such criminal gangs who waylay people on the highways and their residents. Zamfara state has been terrorised by multiple criminal gangs that perpetuated violent rural banditry which turned the countryside into desolate areas, severely disrupting economic and social life with thousands of residents displaced.


Land Disputes

Land-related conflicts are found all over the zone. In all the states, respondents have identified different forms of land disputes. For instance, in Kebbi state, some influential and politically-connected individuals have hijacked the Government-initiated rice-farming project. On the pretense of embarking on large-scale agriculture, such powerful individuals have now taken over several traditional land areas of the *Herders* from them – forcefully ejecting them from areas that they called homes. It is said that even the state Government is involved in taking over herders' settlements and building housing schemes in these places. Respondents have identified the actions as major conflict triggers, which could result in violent conflicts. Respondents in the states also recognised existing conflicts within trade groups, specifically pointing to the frequent tussles in the National Union of Road Transport Workers, Tanker Drivers' Union, and the Market Associations. Such cases had been reported across the states, although most pronounced in Kano and Kaduna states.

1.2 State-specific Conflict Scenarios

Jigawa State (New World)

Capital: Dutse



Source: <http://nigeriazipcodes.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Jigawa-State-Postcode-Map.jpg>

Background Information on Jigawa State

Jigawa state was created out of the then Kano state in 1991, with its capital in Dutse. It has 27 Local Government Areas: Auyo, Babura, Biriniwa, Birnin Kudu, Buji, Dutse, Gagarawa, Garki, Gumel, Guri, Gwaram, Gwiwa, Hadejia, Jahun, Kafin Hausa, Kaugama, Kazaure, Kiri Kasama, Kiyawa, Maigatari, Mallam Madori, Miga, Ringim, Roni, Sule Tankarkar, Taura and Yankwashi. The state covers a land area of 22,410 sq. km. It is bordered on the west by Kano and Katsina states, on the east by Bauchi and Yobe states, and on the north by Katsina state as well as an international border with Zinder

Region in the Republic of Niger. Jigawa state is largely characterised by informal sector activities with agriculture as the major economic activity. The poverty index is 74 percent with unemployment rate of 35.9 percent (NBS, 2015). Over 80 percent of the people are engaged in subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Food crops produced include maize, millet and guinea corn, while cash crops like cotton and groundnut are also produced. A large sector of the population combines agriculture with trade and commerce. Inter border trade thrives hugely in the northern flank of the state. Arts, crafts and livestock production play a dominant role in the socio-economic wellbeing of the people, as it provides gainful employment, and compliment the economic life of farming families.

The people of Jigawa state are predominantly of the Hausa-Fulani stock. But the Hausa culture and tradition have overshadowed others; although the Fulani, Mangawa, Ngizimawa and Badawa still maintain their culture and tradition in their areas of concentration. The indigenes are predominantly Muslims with minor Christian population, mostly from other states. The state has highly fertile farmlands and multiple and varied sources of water which help to produce huge yields to farmers as well as support the high livestock population all over the state.

On a comparative note, Jigawa state has very low number of cases of violent conflicts. The two most disturbing forms of conflicts are political disagreements between the camps of the former Government in the PDP and the incumbent governor - who is from the APC, and farmers-herders clashes – which occurred occasionally due to farmland incursions by animals.

Types of Conflicts and Sources of Insecurity in the State

- (1) Inter-Personal Political Conflicts
- (2) Intra and inter-party Conflict
- (3) Farmers/Herders Conflict
- (4) Crime-Induced Conflict

Interpersonal Political Conflict

Jigawa state is one of the safest states in the country with low level of violent conflicts and cases of organised criminal tendencies, especially compared to sister states in the North-West and the North-East regions. The commonest and perhaps the most publicised conflict in the state is the one raging between the camps of the immediate past Governor (PDP) and the incumbent who is from an opposition party. Since his assumption of power, public statements and actions of the incumbent administration have been indicting to the previous political leaders (especially the Governor), which have translated into bitter inter-party disputes between the ruling APC, and the opposition PDP. This division has evidently trickled down to the followers who have been sharply divided in support of the two contending personalities. Respondents have identified the current conflict as unhealthy for the state and its people.

Inter- and Intra-Party Conflict

Alliances and factions arising from the lingering inter personal political conflict in the state have provided the basis for a wider intra and inter party conflicts. The state had witnessed more developments during the eight years of ex-Gov. Sule Lamido reign as a governor, was seen by many as a Messiah/development wizard and therefore, they acknowledged and registered their loyalty to him during any of the electioneering process. Yet, his candidate could not see the light of the day because of the emergence of Gen. Muhammadu Buhari (rtd) was seen as second to religion. There were mild clashes between the two camps of the political parties – PDP and APC – only on gubernatorial candidates if not for the reconciliation meetings that brought the major political gladiators (Sule Lamido and Badaru Abubakar) together, the issue would have escalated to violent conflict.

Farmer-Herder Conflict

In perspective, perhaps the most worrisome type of conflict in the state by far has been the Farmers-Herders conflict. The state has a large concentration of semi-settled cattle herders – who generally live peacefully with their Hausa farmers. Jigawa is an international gateway for the cattle herders as well as an attractive area to herders from the neighbouring states This had made many communities vulnerable to largely transient foreign cattle herders from countries like Niger and Mali. Such herders were occasionally involved in clashes over land and water points with devastating losses of lives and destruction of properties in different parts of the state. This, and the compounding effects of high population, climate change, high poverty and low literacy level, urbanisation and encroachment upon the gazetted cattle routes had combined to exert enormous pressure on the available land in the state. These, in many ways undermine societal peace and security.

The occurrence of the latter type of conflict in the state is seasonal; often coming up at the beginning of the rainy season when animals are on the move and farmers are planting as well as the harvesting period.

In recent time, death has also been recorded in Marma village of Kirikasama LGA of the state where some herders decided to graze at night thereby destroying about three large farmlands. A similar incident occurred in Baturiya village. The task force and the Miyetti Allah were able to trace the footprint of the animals to their owners. The Executive Secretary of Farmers-Herders Board of the state is seeking legal redress.

Crime-Induced Conflict

There are cases of kidnapping in Gwaram Forest Reserve, Gwaram LGA which is bordered with Bauchi and the recent kidnapping in Birnin Kudu local government area. The forest is very long and wide that criminal activities are said to have been perpetrated inside. The forest is a hideout for criminals of like minds. The kidnapping which is also

new in the state is said to have been emerged after more numbers of cattle rustlers surrendered their weapons to the government of the neighbouring Kano state to gain amnesty.


Jigawa like many states of the Federation has been battling with cases of drug addiction especially among young people. In the countryside, there is a sharp rise in cases of young people's access to, and the use of, illicit drugs – with very damaging consequences for personal, community and societal peace and development. This has led to the dissolution of many marriages and the rate of criminal activity like stealing has increased.

Recommendations

- (1) Clear delineation and effective monitoring of the Nigerian borders to curb the influx of foreign herders and other criminal elements into the country.
- (2) Provide specialised Rapid Response Vehicles to ease mobility and access to grazing reserves.
- (3) Ensure strict compliance of the 55.5m stock routes provision for herders.

Kaduna State (Liberal State)

Capital: Kaduna



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Background Information on Kaduna State

Kaduna state was created out of North-Central state in 1967 with Kaduna as its capital. The state was named after river Kaduna which runs through the state capital. The state is bounded by Zamfara, Katsina and Kano states to the north, Bauchi and Plateau states to the east, Nasarawa state and Federal Capital Territory to the south and Niger state to the west. Kaduna is one of the cosmopolitan states in the Northwestern part of the country. The state ranks third in population and landmass among the 36 states in the country. Kaduna has 10 million people and 23 LGAs on a land mass of 46,053 sq km. The state is populated by the Hausa, Gbagyi, Adara, Ham, Atyap, Bajju, Nikyob and Agworok, among other ethnic communities. It is also home to numerous ethnic groups from other parts of the country. Kaduna town was the political capital of the Northern

Region prior to 1967 when the twelve states were created. The industrial base of Kaduna in the past, offered employment opportunity to many people from other parts of the country. However, because of the gradual downturn in the country's economy, many of the factories and textiles in the city have closed down.

Major towns in the state like Kaduna, Zaria, Birnin-Gwari, Kafanchan and Jere have remained attractive because of their centrality in the country's transportation system, educational institutions, and commercial activities. Specifically, Kaduna town is highly attractive for its central location, favourable climate and proximity to the Federal Capital Territory. Perhaps, that can partly explain the high population density of the city and indeed the state.

The state is predominantly agrarian with high livestock presence and an active farming and trading population. There are mineral deposits across the state with illegal miners, many of whom migrants from other parts of West Africa.

Kaduna has a long history of violent conflicts and crimes with severe societal implications. In the past, the southern parts of the state and the capital, Kaduna, and to a lesser extent, Zaria, had experienced ethno-religious violence of varying dimensions and intensities. However, in recent times, the dynamics of conflict in Southern part of the state have changed from ethno-religious to herders-farmers conflicts and the isolated occasional Shiite clash in Zaria. Of course, this is not to say that the underlying ethno-religious sources of conflicts have been totally addressed. Perhaps, insecurity as perpetuated by criminal gangs in the state is the most challenging issue confronting the people as respondents noted in the course of the assessment.

Conflicts Landscape of Kaduna State

Kaduna state has numerous sources and manifestations of conflicts caused by a combination of complex factors. Some of the common conflicts identified as requiring immediate responses across the state relate to: politically-motivated conflicts, resource-related conflicts, especially, land disputes, farmers-herders clashes, governments and policy failures, the rise in criminality and criminal acts (e.g. rural banditry and kidnappings) and the phenomenal increase in social problems (e.g. resulting from drug addiction, sexual offences, the pangs of unemployment, the adverse impact of illiteracy and ignorance) – which eventually all translate into serious sources of conflicts and insecurity. The 2016 SCA report shows that the greatest challenge across the state has to do with politically related conflicts which are often manifested in intense inter- and intra-party *conflicts*. There are reported cases of intense rivalry, either between the ruling APC and the opposition or sharply dividing intra-party rivalries – especially within the ruling APC.

The state is also associated with *inter- and intra-religious conflicts*. The complexities involved in understanding the various dimensions of the intense intra and inter-religious conflicts

manifested in the glaring rivalries exhibited by the adherents makes the case a unique one. Equally, the situation has been compounded by intra-religious quarrels; as represented by the *Shiites* who operate largely with the dominant Muslim groups and its perceived disagreement with government. The Shiites have been known to sharply disagree with most of the Islamic sects in the state and not long ago had a violent confrontation with the military resulting in heavy loss of lives and property.

The Farmers-Herders Conflict has remained a serious and recurring threat in the state, especially considering the reports of such clashes that had consumed many lives and property in the southern part of the state – Southern Kaduna. Closely related to this is the nagging issue of cattle-rustling and kidnapping, across the communities in Birni Gwari; about which many lives have been lost, property destroyed and huge sums of money seized. The state has suffered huge losses because of the activities of criminal gangs perpetuating cattle-rustling, kidnappings, robberies and other forms of violent crimes that sometime attract stiff resistance from the communities. *Land disputes* are also another source of conflict in the state. Some of these are said to be as a result of government policies. Examples of these are the cases of Gbagyi Villa and Barrakallahu communities. Respondents have identified the actions as major conflict triggers.

Conflict Cases

Farmer-Herder Conflicts

As in most states in Nigeria, the menace of herders on farmers is very pronounced in Kaduna state, especially in the Southern part of the state. There has been serious confrontation between the herders and farmers in the state. The criminality that accompanies this problem is that these herders attack villages in the night thereby killing defenseless people many of whom have not had prior problem with them.

One of such conflicts happened in Fadan Karshi of Sanga Local Government Area of the state. The SCA researchers were informed that some herders had a serious altercation with some farmers about some cows which strayed into the farms and destroyed some crops. A few days later, precisely on 1 May, 2016, some gunmen suspected to be herders stormed the village and killed the District Head of Fadan Karshi along with one other person. This killing which is one out of many that were said to be carried out in the state brought about serious tension between the community and herders.

The farmers-herders conflict is sometimes given religious colouration because of the actors/victims of such conflicts. Respondents claimed that in 2014, gunmen attacked and killed some women who were returning from market at Fadan Karshi. This was in addition to a Pastor who was killed by the same gunmen on the same day. Killings were also carried out at Ungwar Ganye and Karshi Daji. All these communities are said to be Christian communities and the attacks are seen as Jihad to entrench Islam in these Christian communities.

In the Birnin Gwari Area of the state, the activities of these herders who are also suspected to be involved in cattle rustling prevented many farmers from engaging in farming activities for fear of being killed. Thus, food shortage was being expected at the end of the raining season in this area.

The Kaduna State Commissioner of Agriculture stated that the herders-farmers conflict was a conflict over right of way and grazing areas. He ruled out issues of religion on the matter.

Another conflict in this category is the crisis between Fadan Attakar and herders which occurred in April 2013. It was as a result of an altercation between a Fulani herdsman whose cow strayed into the farmland of an Attakar man. This incidence led to violent conflict that resulted into loss of many lives.

Closely related to the above is the Akuku/Biniki/Bondong versus herders' conflict which took place in March 2014. A cow was said to have strayed into a farmland and destroyed same. Seven cows were killed during the confusion that followed. The herders were said to have left the community with a promise to return. They in fact returned and the fight that followed resulted to the death of 52 people.

Religious Conflicts

As was the case in 2013 SCA, the issue of religion also came up in 2016 SCA. The major crisis in this regard is Army-Shiites clash which took place in Zaria in July 2014. The group is known as Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). While on a pro-Palestinian solidarity procession in Zaria, the group had a serious clash with the Nigerian Army which led to the death of about 34 members of the Sect including three sons of the leader. Again on 11 December, 2015, there was another clash when the same group prevented the Chief of Army Staff from passing through a road in Zaria. The convoy was said to have been attacked by the unruly elements within the group. The soldiers responded allegedly by firing some shots which led to the death of some people. The crisis that followed this problem led to the arrest and detention of El-Zakzaky their leader and his wife. This particular crisis is generating tension not only in the state but all over northern Nigeria.

Land Use and Ownership Conflicts

Conflicts related to land appear very serious and dangerous in Kaduna metropolis. The major conflict here is the Government versus Gbagyi Villa community. The Gbagyi Villa has been the ancestral home of the Gbagyi people for over 100 years. However, about 1,000 hectares of the land was acquired over a proclamation which was not gazetted. The land was to house the Kaduna Polytechnic. Being law-abiding people, the Gbagyis accepted the compensation paid for economic trees and crops and let go the land acquired. The Polytechnic demarcated the acquired land leaving the Gbagyi people in occupation of the remaining part of the land. Those who farmed on the part of the

land upon which compensation was paid, made payments to the Polytechnic for the use of the land.

In 2009, the Polytechnic went to court to take over the remaining part of the land where the Gbagyis were living claiming to have paid compensation for same. When the court requested for evidence, they had none and decided to settle out of court to which the Gbagyis are obliged. During the time of Patrick Yakowa as Governor of the state, he mediated into the crisis and the then Attorney General of the state issued a White Paper on same. The Surveyor-General of the state demarcated the land and the Polytechnic built a fence round its land, and the community and the Polytechnic thereafter lived in peace.

Some time in 2015, people from Gutalfe Matari Community encroached on the Polytechnic land and the Polytechnic took them to court. While the case was pending, the incumbent came in as the Governor whom the Rector of the Polytechnic approached to assist him recover the land within the fence. But the Governor was alleged to have extended his recovery to the Gbagyi land which does not belong to the Polytechnic. The Governor was alleged to have said that he was not bound by the agreement arrived at by Governor Yakowa. The community got an injunction from court to stop the Governor from the threatened demolition but the Governor went ahead to enumerate the houses for demolition.

About 3,500 houses were marked for demolition and about 20,000 people would be rendered homeless. As a result of the threat by the Governor, all able bodied youths in southern part of Kaduna metropolis were ready to defend the land with the last blood in their veins. This crisis is seen as ethnic cleansing and religious bigotry by the Gbagyi people.

The government on its part stated that all the buildings were illegal structures as there were no approval by government before they were erected. The people were challenged to show evidence of approval so that their buildings will be saved.

Closely related to this is the threatened demolition of a settlement along Rigachuku Road known as Barakallahu where about 700 houses were earmarked for demolition. The residents of this area who are mostly Muslims vowed to protect the place even with the last man standing. The government was however determined to demolish the houses. The government advanced the same reason as in the case of Gbagi Villa.

These two cases are hotspots in Kaduna which need urgent intervention to avoid loss of lives and property.

Social Conflicts

Social conflict in Kaduna state has emerged as a result of previous religious-induced conflict which has created a divide in the metropolis and by implication impact on the

state in general. Thus Southern Kaduna Senatorial District as well as the Kaduna South LGA which are predominantly populated by Christian perceives any action of the ruling APC Government as anti-Christian. The state was formerly governed by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) prior to the 2015 General Elections. As at the time of this field work, tension was building up due to this perceived marginalisation which could be traced to the fact that the leadership of the state is predominantly Hausa-Fulani and Muslim. This has compounded the mistrust among the people who, hitherto been divided along Christian-Muslim dominated areas in the metropolis due to previous ethno-religious conflicts. It is a thing of concern to see the people of the southern part moving to the northern part of the town where government offices are located in the morning and returning to their residences in the evening. The irony is that most recreational centres are located in southern part of the town dominated by Christians while the people from the northern part dominated by Muslims move there in the evenings for recreation only to return to their residences late at night.

Crime-Induced Conflicts

In one of the Focus Group Discussions (FGD) held at the Interfaith Mediation Centre, Kaduna, with about 18 people in attendance, some conflicts which are not generally taken note of were listed. These include conflicts generated by abandoned political foot soldiers who were used by politicians to win elections. A case demonstrated was the presence of *Kato da Gora* who were used by politicians as thugs which have now transformed to gangsters; impunity and the misuse of power by security agencies and the high incidence of kidnapping. It was revealed that this has become very common around Goni Gora axis where the people of the area serve as informants to the kidnapers. It was said that the locals do this for two reasons – fear for their lives and for reward from the kidnapers.

Causes of the Conflicts

The causes of the above conflicts can be majorly categorised into security, political, economic and socially related factors.

Political Causes

- (1) Intra-party disputes, particularly between factions loyal to the Governor and Senator Shehu Sani, within the ruling APC.
- (2) Perceived exclusion and marginalisation of certain sections of the population of the state, from the machinery of government.
- (3) Perceived ethnic “cleansing”. For instance, the Gbagyis are alleging that the current government in the state is systematically easing them out of their land, like in the case of the Gbagyi Villa.
- (4) Alleged employment of non-indigenes into sensitive political offices to the detriment of the indigenes. Respondents cited the case of the chairperson of Chikun LGA, allegedly, not an indigene of the state.

- (5) Alleged disregard for the rule of law. Respondents cited the case of the Gbagyi Villa land dispute, in which the state ignored a court injunction and pushed ahead to enumerate the houses – possibly preparatory to demolition.
- (6) Government's policies like the decision to demolish some landed properties, as was done in Zaria.
- (7) Alleged lack of transparency in screening exercises of civil servants in the state and other government affairs.

Economic Causes

- (1) Widespread poverty.
- (2) Widespread unemployment (over 30%).
- (3) Widespread intra and inter community cases of land disputes
- (4) Stiff competition for access and control of land.
- (5) Prevalent cattle rustling across the state.
- (6) Farmers-Herders clashes.
- (7) Perceived economic domination by a section of the state.
- (8) Delay and irregular payment of workers' wages especially in the LGAs.
- (9) Alleged involvement of security officials in protecting shady deals and suspects.

Social-Related Causes

- (1) Kidnappings have become rampant in the towns and the villages of the state.
- (2) Widespread drug abuse and addiction among youths (male and female) and married women in the state.
- (3) Intra- and inter-religious animosities like the case of the Shiites who have a large followership across the state.
- (4) Activities of gangsters in the state.
- (5) Weakening of social control institutions like the extended family system, which is ridden with cases of neglect, violence, sexual molestation, etc.
- (6) Rising cases of hate speeches among individuals of diverse backgrounds, particularly on social media.

Conflict-Triggers in the State

Even though Kaduna appears to be enjoying relative peace in recent years, there are some clear triggers that can easily disrupt the peace and possibly cause explosive violence. Some of these are:

- (1) Impending demolition of properties allegedly built on government lands particularly in the Gbagyi Villa and Barakallahu communities.

- (2) Prevalence of hate and dangerous speeches especially among politicians and religious groups.
- (3) Provocative sermons by religious preachers and reckless statements from politicians.
- (4) Invasion of farmlands by grazing animals all over the state.
- (5) Perceived marginalisation in appointments by some groups.
- (6) Activities of political thugs.
- (7) Impunity by agents of state.

Responses to Conflicts

Track 1

- (1) Government established committees, panels and commissions to investigate and address cases of conflicts/clashes.
- (2) Creation of 17 grazing reserves and 4 ranches to minimise friction between farmers and herders.
- (3) Building synergy with neighbouring states to combat rural banditry, cattle-rustling and kidnappings.
- (4) Intense campaigns by government against cattle-rustling and acts of kidnapping and criminality.
- (5) Implementation of social and economic activities as well as developmental projects across the state.

Track 2

- (1) Non-governmental partners like the Development Peace Initiative (DPI), Kaduna State Peace Foundation (KDPF), among others, and the media have equally evolved strategies in promoting peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots level.
- (2) Strengthening of inter-religious dialogue and consultation among leaders, involvement of traditional and community leaders in peace initiatives.
- (3) Efforts of some CSOs such as the Interfaith Mediation Centre (IMC) have been very visible all over the state through training and advocacy activities.
- (4) Southern Kaduna People's Union (SOKAPU) has served as a pressure group to prevent and manage conflicts, especially in southern part of the state.

Track 3

- (1) International organisations like UNDP, Red Cross and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), have intervened in various aspect of conflict mitigation in the state.
- (2) The DFID funded Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) has carried out intervention and peacebuilding activities in the state through the State Conflict Management Alliance (SCMA) and Community Peace Partnership (CPP).

Impact of Conflicts

By the accounts of the 2016 SCA of the North-West geo-political zone of Nigeria, Kaduna state has reportedly suffered considerably from the numerous conflicts and forms of insecurity that have ravaged the state at different times. Major among the consequences are:

- (1) The conflicts have led to loss of lives and destruction of property.
- (2) Proliferation of light arms and ammunitions which have fuelled criminality and gangsterism across the state. Some of these criminal activities include kidnapping, robbery and increase in rape cases.
- (3) Drug addiction has assumed a very dangerous and worrisome trend as married women and young girls are now deeply involved.
- (4) Increase in number of teenage mothers and emergence of incest in the state.
- (5) Widespread fears and sense of insecurity among the people in the state due activities of herders who kill and rustle cattle.
- (6) Sharp and dangerous polarisation of population along religious and ethnic lines particularly in Kaduna metropolis.

Recommendations

- (1) There should be increased support to the security agencies and all other agencies involved in protecting the society by both the government and the citizens.
- (2) Politicians across the parties should be mindful of their actions and avoid heightening the current tension among the supporters of the various factions in the parties.
- (3) The state government should evolve more productive schemes to engage the youths so as to reduce poverty and criminality.
- (4) Government should strengthen traditional and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the state.
- (5) Government should put mechanisms in place to monitor and sanction cases of hate speeches, provocative political and religious statements.
- (6) Government should organise regular consultative security enlightenment meetings at all levels across the state.
- (7) Government should uphold social justice, equity and respect for the rule of law in its dealings with the people.

Kano State (Centre of Commerce)

Capital: Kano



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria
<http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Background Information on Kano State

The city of Kano, capital of the state, is practically the economic capital of Northern Nigeria and the second biggest commercial city in the country. The state has 44 Local Government Areas with a landmass of 20,760 sq km and, by current estimates, 11 Million people – thus ranking it as the second most populous state in the country. Apart from commerce, the state is widely known for its all-year-round agriculture and the tradition of Islamic learning. Thus, because of the opportunities of Kano as a city of commerce; centre of Islamic learning; and state of agriculture; the state has developed a long history of attracting migrants from in and out of the country – thereby making it cosmopolitan, although struggling to maintain its culture and tradition. Kano state has a high youthful population, and about 30 percent of the entire state population is estimated to reside in the capital city of Kano. The state is dominantly agrarian, with

opportunities for all-year agriculture – principally because of its 12 major dams that facilitate irrigation and animal husbandry. In addition, it hosted many industrial outfits that employed hundreds of thousands of workers but, currently, the majority of them are dormant.

The indigenous people of Kano state are mainly of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, who are predominantly Muslims but with a few professing Christianity. But, Kano state, particularly the capital city, is also a host to many other Nigerians and Non-Nigerian nationalities. The city has a large presence of the Yoruba, Igbo, Nupe, Igbirra, Igala, Kanuri and many other groups that have fully settled and, in many cases, indigenised to the extent that their latter generations have adopted Kano as state of origin. There is also a sizeable representation of Lebanese and other communities from the Middle-East, with a steadily-growing Chinese community. Most of these non-indigenised Kano communities are mainly involved in commerce, industry, education and other white-collar jobs.

Conflict Situation in Kano State

Before May 2015, Kano was one of the states that, even though not in the North-East Zone, suffered heavily from the attacks of Boko Haram which killed and maimed its people, which consequently affected social and economic activities in the state. The Boko Haram insurgency had, in many ways, affected the peace of the state, disrupted social and economic progress and caused serious inconveniences to the local populace. But, with the active containment of the sect and its attacks from its base in the North-East, Kano state is now experiencing relative peace, with little fear of attacks from the sect. However, currently, the major conflicts manifesting across the state are political, social and economic in nature. In politics, major intra- and inter-party disputes and the fight for supremacy between factions, especially in the ruling APC, loyal to the incumbent Governor, Dr Umar Abdullahi Ganduje, and his predecessor, Dr Rabiu Kwankwaso (currently a senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria), have sharply and divided the party with each faction using uncompromising communication symbols on different media to push across its position. Practically almost on a daily basis, the broadcast media are inundated with combative innuendoes from the two factions. Across the parties, too, bitter exchanges between the ruling APC and the opposition PDP, particularly on the radio and social media, add up to charge the environment and heighten the tension in the state. This had clearly emerged in the bye-elections held in Minjibir LGA to replace a deceased member of that constituency. The first attempt to hold the election had failed because of intra-party violence that assumed a dangerous dimension.

Other current conflict threats that are of major concern in Kano state can be summarised, thus:

- (1) **Intra- and Inter-Religious Conflicts:** There are significant signs of tension between some Islamic sects like the Shiite and other dominant sects in the

state. But the last encounter between the Military and the Shiites in Zaria appeared to have doused the initial tension that it generated in the aftermath of the clashes. There are also lower level sect differences and struggle for supremacy among the sects (*Tijjaniya*, *Kadiriya* and *Izala*) that occasionally translated into open conflicts but often addressed at different levels. Occasional inter religious disputes are also experienced between adherents of Islam and Christianity particularly in the *Sabongari* area where the dominant residents are non-indigenes. Often, the disputes and outbursts are consequences of violation of the State Sharia'ah Code, which bans the sales, and consumption of alcoholic beverages as well as prostitution. In most circumstances, the effort by the State Vigilanté group (*Hisbah*) to enforce arrests or control had led to conflicts which assumed religious dimension.

- (2) **Farmers-Herders Conflict:** This is a widespread recurring conflict that is locally handled by the traditional institutions and the police in the communities. But, it has remained a threat, especially considering the reports of such clashes that consumed many lives and property in some parts of the country. Closely-related to that is the nagging issue of cattle-rustling and kidnappings across the communities, especially in the southern parts of the state. Many lives have been lost, property destroyed and huge sums of money seized through the activities of criminal gangs perpetuating cattle-rustling, kidnappings, robberies and other forms of violent crimes that sometimes attract stiff resistance from the communities. But, recent efforts from the security agencies, communities and the federal and the state government have helped to minimise the menace. For instance, recently, the government identified over 48 armed groups that have been terrorising communities in the state and went ahead to “forgive” rather than prosecuting the criminals.

Besides the above mentions, other types of conflict within the state include the following:

- (1) **Land Disputes** (mostly at the community and personal levels).
- (2) **Chieftaincy Tussles** on appointments of traditional rulers into different positions (District/Village Heads, etc.).
- (3) **Tussle over leadership** in some market associations.
- (4) **Intra-Union conflict** in the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW).

Katsina State (State of Hospitality)

Capital: Katsina



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Background Information on Katsina State

Katsina shares international boundary with the Republic of Niger. The state has 34 LGAs and a population that exceeds 6 million and with a land area of 23,935 km² (9,340.6 sq m). The state is predominantly inhabited by the Hausa-Fulani stock who are overwhelmingly Muslims, but with a minority Christian population. Its neighbours are Zamfara and Sokoto states to the west, Jigawa and Kano to the east, Kaduna state to the south and Maradi and Damagaram in Niger Republic to the east. The main occupations of the people are farming, hand crafts and animal husbandry. Maize, millet, guinea corn, cassava, Irish potato, yams and beans are the major food

crops; while, cotton, tobacco, sugarcane, soya beans and groundnuts are the major cash crops. The state is also one of the major producers of tomatoes, pepper and onion in the country. Hausa and Fulfude are the languages of the people.

As a border state, it serves as a major gateway for foreigners into Nigeria from neighbouring West African countries. Thus, the easy access through the porous borders has promoted trade and interactions among the various citizens, though not without negative consequences that the security agencies try to contain, at times attracting violent reactions from targets, especially smugglers and criminal gangs along the borders.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2015), Katsina state has a poverty index of 74.5 percent with an unemployment rate of above 30 percent among the youth. With the high poverty and unemployment rates, one can easily understand the connections between some of the conflicts and security challenges witnessed in the state.

Conflict Landscape of Katsina State

The state is generally peaceful as was noted in 2013 SCA. However, there are some identified flashes which include politically-motivated conflicts, farmers-herders clashes, and phenomenal increase in social problems (e.g. resulting from drug addiction, sexual offences and the pangs of unemployment) – which eventually all translate into serious sources of conflicts and insecurity. This SCA has also noted the presence of *inter and intra-religious conflicts* in the state. The intra-religious quarrels as represented by the *Shiites* who operate largely against the dominant Muslim groups and its disagreement with government is another source of worry in the state. The Shiites have been known to sharply disagree with most of the Islamic sects in the state. Such sectarian disputes are often manifested in provocative and inciting preaching while competing for popularity and superiority of dominance among the people. In addition to this, the minority indigenous Christian communities had complained of marginalisation in state affairs.

The critical stimuli for conflict occurrences in the state have been generally adduced to the combined effects of the following variables: the continued rapid growth of urbanisation/urban development, deepening poverty, inadequacy of available conflict resolution mechanisms; the continuing involvement of non-Nigerians in criminal activities, local criminal gangs and illegal aliens as well as politicians in conflict-engineering.

Conflicts in the State

Political Conflict

Currently, there is an intense political conflict between the camps of the immediate past governor of the PDP and the incumbent governor who is of the APC. The fight has been characterised by series of allegations of financial impropriety against the former governor who has also been denying the accusations. The conflict has trickled down to the followers in the towns and villages. However, as at the time of this study, there has not been any known reported case of violence between the parties.

Farmer-Herder Conflict

Katsina state has also been experiencing cases of clashes between farmers and herders in the local communities. Such conflicts often occur in the rainy season especially at the onset or towards the end when herders relocate from one point to another in search of pastures. Many of the frequent clashes are between foreign herders who come into Nigeria from other West African countries. Respondents noted that cases involving locally based herders are few.

Specifically, sometime in March 2014, some herders complained of the loss of grazing land which is crucial to their livelihood and consequently attacked Mararaban Kindo thereby killing 69 people and burning down several houses.

Farmer-herder clashes are a constant occurrence in Malunfashi town and its environs because its land is fertile and attractive for grazing. In June 2016, an altercation between a farmer and a herder over destruction of crops arising from a stray cow led to a serious clash leading to injuries on both sides.

Intra-Religious Conflicts

Perhaps, the most visible and worrying issue is that of intra-religious conflicts particularly between the growing Shiite community and other sects. There have been cases of occasional clashes and simmering disagreements between the Shiite group members and other groups. For instance, the clash between the Shiites in Zaria also extended to Katsina, though not in a violent manner. There were however fears that if the situation was not properly handled, there may be violent clash between them and other sects.

Another religious issue that came in the course of the study relates to complaints of exclusion based on religious differences. Some of the respondents particularly in the minority Christian community complained about marginalisation and discrimination in schools, appointments, land allocation and being generally excluded in state affairs. They cited the non-teaching of Christian Religious Knowledge in schools and difficulty in obtaining land for siting of Christian places of worship. Such acts, according to them, promote feelings of exclusion and breeds discontent which could lead to unnecessary conflicts in the society.

Crime-Induced Conflicts

Katsina, especially in the southern part of the state, has been experiencing violent cases of cattle rustling perpetrated by criminal gangs who invade settlements and communities of herders, especially in the expansive Rugu forest areas. Such acts, often perpetrated with sophisticated light arms, have led to loss of lives, displacement of people and devastation of local economies. The Rugu forest, which extends to neighbouring states used to be a very fertile area for the benefit of cattle herders, in the provision of feeds (fodder) and water to animals. But, in recent times, criminal gangs have established bases from where they perpetrate criminal acts of cattle rustling, armed robberies,

kidnappings and rape. However, recent efforts of the government through the security agencies have helped to significantly curtail the criminal acts and restore normalcy across the state. In June 2016, a son of a traditional leader and police personnel in Batsari village were caught in the act of cattle rustling. The government promptly suspended the traditional ruler.

Causes of Conflicts in Katsina State

Security-related Causes

- (1) Availability of small arms and light weapons (SALWs).
- (2) Infiltration by foreign criminals.
- (3) Alleged complicity of some security personnel.
- (4) Drug addiction.

Politically-related Causes

- (1) Alleged insensitivity of Government to the yearnings of citizens.
- (2) Perceived marginalisation of political opponents.
- (3) Perceived exclusion of Christians in state affairs.

Economic-related Causes

- (1) Poverty arising from unemployment.

Social-related Causes

- (1) Drug addiction leading to gangsterism.
- (2) Intra-sect conflicts especially between the Shiites and other groups.
- (3) Widespread political inflammatory speech and provocative preaching (openly and on the social media).

Conflict-Triggers in Katsina State

- (1) Presence of *Shiites* Islamic sect in the state.
- (2) Feeling of insecurity as a result of loss of confidence in the security agencies.
- (3) Activities of drug addicts who often attack people in the state.
- (4) Worsening economic condition which has soared cost of living leading to deprivation and frustration.
- (5) Opulence by a few members of the society in the face of wide spread poverty. This generates perceptions that predispose people to adversarial method of addressing dissent.
- (6) Invasion of farmlands by cattle-herders, especially in the southern part of the state.

Impact of Conflicts in Katsina State

Some of the identified effects of conflicts in Katsina state include:

- (1) Increased political division among the people.
- (2) Loss of lives and destruction of property as a result of clashes between farmers and herders, and the activities of criminals involved in cattle rustling.
- (3) Increased intra religious animosities which are being championed by the Shiites in the state.
- (4) Increase in drug addiction which has taken a new dimension because of the involvement of married women and young girls.
- (5) Increase in rape cases. At the time of this research, we were informed that there were about 15 rape cases per day in Katsina town alone.

Responses

Track 1

- (1) The government deployed security agencies to arrest criminals involved in cattle-rustling.
- (2) Government agencies have also frequently convened sensitisation campaigns, imploring people to turn away from criminality and embrace peace, law and order.
- (3) Government has been involved in peace advocacy activities in the state.

Track 2

Indigenous systems of communication and conflict resolution are being exploited by the traditional rulers in the state. Various initiatives of the Emirs and their District Heads have been helpful in settling local disputes and preventing conflicts among the people in the state.

Track 3

International organisations, like the Red Cross and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) have ongoing intervention programmes in the state.

Recommendations

- (1) The Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) model may be replicated in the state in order to reduce the level of political tension and divisions among the people.
- (2) There is the need to increase support to security agencies to further control criminal tendencies and smuggling across the borders.
- (3) The government should formulate policies to reduce unemployment and reduce political hooliganism among the youth.

- (4) The traditional institution and civil society groups should be supported to continue to promote peaceful coexistence especially among farmers and herders and adherents of different religious sects.
- (5) The government should adopt specific measures to address the fears and complains of minority Christian population.

Kebbi State (Land of Equity)

Capital: Birnin Kebbi



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Background

Kebbi state was created from part of Sokoto state in 1991 and has a population of 3.63 million people. The state has a total land area of 36,800 sq km and is bordered by Sokoto state to the north, Zamfara to the east, Niger state to the south, and Benin republic to the west. The state has 21 local government areas, four emirate councils (Gwandu, Argungu, Yauri and Zuru), and 35 districts.¹ The state capital is Birnin Kebbi. Birnin-Kebbi was headquarters of the western province of the Sokoto Caliphate as large parts of Kebbi state were parts of the caliphate. Other major towns in the state include Argungu and Yelwa.

¹ <http://www.ngex.com/nigeria/places/states/kebbi>.

Kebbi is among the states with the highest level of unemployment in Nigeria,² and it is the sixth poorest state in Nigeria.³

About 75 percent of the state inhabitants live in rural areas and agriculture accounts for a large part of the state's economy. The people are predominantly farmers and food crops produced in Kebbi state include guinea corn, rice and millet while cash crops include groundnut and cotton. Animal husbandry including fisheries also feature in the economy of the state. Fishing is predominantly in the areas with large bodies of water such as Arungu and the animals reared include cattle, camel, goats and sheep. Kebbi state hosts one of the world's famous and spectacular fishing festivals, the *Argungu Annual Fishing Festival*.

In terms of ethnic composition, Hausa and Fulani dominate the state while other groups such as Bangawa, Dakarkari, Dukawa Fakkawa, Kambari, Gungawa, and Zabarmawa. All ethnic groups have however over the years adopted the Hausa culture, outlook and even appearance and the Hausa language is widely spoken amongst all of the ethnic groups. Islam is the predominant religion, while Christianity and traditional religions are also practiced.

Conflicts in Kebbi State

Like many states in Nigeria, Kebbi has recorded varied forms of conflict in the last five years, with the most prominent being the following:

- (i) Herders-Farmers conflicts
- (ii) Cattle rustling
- (iii) Political conflicts
- (iv) Land disputes
- (v) Crime-induced conflict
- (vi) Identity based conflict
- (vii) Religious conflict.

With the emphasis of the federal government on the diversification of the economy, Kebbi rice farmers expanding their holdings bringing pressure on the land. This development is already generating disputes between small farmers and the big business magnates. Rural Kebbi farmers are seen contending in fierce disputes with these rich agricultural land speculators who acquire vast tracts of land leading to the disempowerment of small-scale farmers. Rich land speculators and the business class are deliberately pursuing the goal of dominating the rice farming space and by implication this is already creating tension between these distinct economic classes. In a bid to take advantage of opportunities created by the policy on diversification the big conglomerates

2 NBS (2010); CBN Annual Report and Statement of Account (various issues).

3. Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) 2014 report.

in the state have gone beyond hijacking the rice-farming project to taking over the traditional grazing fields. This presents a threat to pastoralism and animal husbandry in the state with attendant consequences for herders-farmers conflict. It is important to note that life-support resources for both animal and human survival like fresh water and cattle feeds is already over-stretched. Therefore, any policy that threatens to move the pastoralist communities from their homes will not only challenge their coping and survival strategies but also compromise the peace, security and public order of the state in the long run.

Another important issue that is presently causing friction between the pastoralist community and the government is the development plan of governments. Further compounding the fierce contest for land in the state, grazing lands are being overtaken by urbanisation.

Herders-farmers conflict is known to cut across virtually all local government areas of the state. This was attributed to the migration of pastoralists into hinterlands hitherto exclusive for farming as a result of increased desertification and reversal of grazing lands. Shanga, Yawuri, Bena, Ankuwa Wasagu, Koko, Ngarski, Bagudo and Augie were identified as flash points for cattle rustling.

Birnin Kebbi on the hand was identified as a major flash point for political violence. The youth constitute the bulk of those who execute the act of political violence. Religion based discrimination, in form of the denial of the teaching of Christian Religious Knowledge (CRK) in government schools was reported by respondents. The religious discrimination was also said to be in form of Christians being excluded from political appointments by the government. Crime-induced conflict is reported to be on the rise in the state with motorcycle theft being a typical example. Respondents attributed the phenomenon to the economic hardship being experienced across the country.

The ready availability of the youths for conflict is due to illiteracy. Further to this, it is believed that some non-Nigerians from neighbouring African countries are perpetrators of acts of violence in the state. Illiteracy was found to be a driver of insecurity, and intolerance a major conflict generating factor in Kebbi state.

Causes of Conflicts in Kebbi State

The major conflict factors in the state are:

- (i) Climate change and its impact of human displacement.
- (ii) Forceful ejection of pastoralists from grazing reserves; there are allegations that these grazing spaces have been converted for use by land crop cultivators, thereby grieving the Fulani herdsmen who consider this a form of injustice.
- (iii) Deliberate encroachment of herdsmen into pastoralists into farmlands to graze, thereby destroying crops.
- (iv) Unemployment and poverty.

- (v) Illiteracy and Intolerance.
- (vi) Drug addiction.
- (vii) Religious prejudice.

Responses

Track 1

- (1) Intervention by security agencies enables stabilisation which allows for more durable solutions.
- (2) Setting up peace committees, as well as response to emergencies and provision of palliative measures in disaster situations.

Track 2

- (1) Traditional and religious leaders are involved in sensitisation, enlightenment and advocacy on the need for peace and tolerance.
- (2) Traditional leaders also have been using their good offices in promoting negotiation and mediation.
- (3) CSOs have been involved in enlightenment campaigns, advocacies, and capacity building for conflict management and peacebuilding across the state.
- (4) Women groups such as Federation of Muslim Women Associations of Nigeria (FOMWAN) have played active roles in sensitisation and advocacy activities in the state particularly as it pertains to the care and attention received by women in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps.

Track 3

Some international development partners have supported programmes related to peaceful co-existence and community resilience.

Gaps in Response


- (1) Government failure to respond to early warning signs has been a major challenge to security and conflict management in the state.
- (2) Government interventions have been more reactive often focusing on direct violence rather than dealing with the root causes.

Recommendations

- (1) Government response to conflict should be holistic.
- (2) There should be prompt response to conflict early warning information.
- (3) Government should be proactive and focus on dealing with the root causes of conflicts.
- (4) Government should pursue a deliberate policy of Mass Literacy in the state.

Sokoto State (Seat of the Caliphate)

Capital: Sokoto



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Background

Sokoto state was created from the then Northwestern state in 1976 with Sokoto as capital. The City is the Islamic spiritual headquarters in Nigeria and the seat of the Caliphate with the Sultan of Sokoto as the spiritual leader. The state occupies 25,973 sq. km and shares borders with Niger Republic to the north, Zamfara state to the east, Kebbi state to the southeast and Benin Republic to the west.

The proximity of Sokoto state to the Nigerian border with the Republic of Niger makes it one of the states that attracts a large population of foreign nationals in Nigeria. The large cities of Sokoto, Yabo, Guddu, Ilela, Binji, Gwadabawa, Bodinga, Tumbulwal and Wurno have larger population of diverse ethnic groups in Nigeria as well as Niger and Republic of Benin nationals. With a population of 4.2 million, Sokoto state consists of 23 local government areas and is mainly populated by people of Hausa and Fulani origin with Hausa as the predominantly spoken language and Fulfude is also widely spoken.

Hausa people in the state are made up of Gobirawa, Zamfarawa, Kabawa, Adarawa and Arawa. The Fulani on the other hand are of two main groups; the *Fulanin Gida* (Town Fulani) and the *Bororo or Fulanin Daji* (Nomadic Fulani). The former includes the

Torankawa, Sullubawa and Zoramawa. The Torankawa have been considered the aristocratic class since 1804 and are the clan of Shehu Usman Danfodiyo.

Most Sokoto state residents are Sunni Muslims, with Shia (Shiite) minority as well as a minority ethnic Christians and Christians who are largely non-indigenes of the state. In spite of these diversities, violence between the religious groupings used to be uncommon as conflict in the past has been readily resolved. The state is culturally homogeneous and the Islamic religion provides the people with the code of conduct, behaviour and mode of dressing.

Sokoto state has been identified by the NBS as the poorest state in Nigeria.¹ Over 80 percent of the inhabitants of the state practice one form of agriculture or another. Sokoto state is in the Sahel region and the region's lifeline for growing crops is the floodplains of the Sokoto-Rima River Basin, which provides rich alluvial soil. They produce such crops as millet, guinea corn, maize, rice, potatoes, cassava, groundnuts and beans for subsistence and produce wheat, cotton and vegetables for cash.

Local crafts such as blacksmithing, weaving, dyeing, carving and leather works also play an important role in the economic life of the people of Sokoto; as a result different areas like Makera, Marina, Takalmawa and Majema became important. Sokoto is also one of the fish producing areas of the country. Thus a large number of people along the river basin engage in fishing. Also, Sokoto's large-scale animal rearing makes it ranked second in livestock production in the country.

Types of Conflict in Sokoto State

The most predominant types of conflict in Sokoto state are as follows:

- (i) Intra-religious/Sectarian conflict
- (ii) Herder-Farmers conflicts
- (iii) Cattle Rustling
- (iv) Chieftaincy related conflicts
- (v) Criminality-Induced conflict
- (vi) Political thuggery.

Intra-religious/Sectarian Conflict

Even though conflicts of diverse forms are experienced in Sokoto, the most serious form is the tension that has characterised relations between the Shiites and the Sunni adherents of the Islamic religion. The Shiites are the Muslim minority in the state and in Nigeria in general. Shiites (is an abbreviation of "*Shiatu* Ali" or "followers of Ali"). Though both sects (the Sunni and Shiites) believe in the Quran, they have differences in religious traditions, customs and practice. Interestingly, tension and disputes between

1 <https://www.naij.com/401470-see-the-10-poorest-states-in-nigeria.html>

the Shiites and the Sunni is becoming common in the relations between these groups in Nigeria. One of the most affected by the disputes in question is Sokoto state.

There has been minor feud between these groups in Sokoto for many decades. However, the threat of insecurity in Sokoto state as a result of the confrontation between the Shiites and the Sunni started way back in 2007. The records have confirmed that it was the murder of the anti-Shiite Imam, Imam Umaru Danmaishiyya by unknown men that exacerbated the threat immediately after. "His death marked the beginning of Shiite vs. Sunni violence in Nigeria, with the Sokoto state government launching assaults on the Shiite groups in Sokoto, which in a particular incident, culminated in the destruction of their headquarters". This challenge has continued to linger leading to open and secret confrontation between the groups. The destruction of life and property that has often resulted from this affair has challenged the peace and security of this otherwise peaceful state.

Farmer-Herders Conflict

The herder-farmers violent conflicts are attributable to a number of factors, which include Night grazing; Child pastoralist practices; and the destruction of farm produce by the cattle.

Grazing of animals at night results in the crossing of boundaries and attacks on farmlands resulting in massive destruction of crops. Children pastoralist practices on the other hand result in unintended damage to farmlands by cattle due to limited experience by the children to guide the cattle.

Cattle Rustling

Cattle rustling is a common feature of insecurity in Sokoto state due to the influx of transhumant pastoralists. The study team observed at the Nigeria-Niger border at Illela, a large body of pastoralist communities immigrating into Nigeria in search of pastures. At this time farmers were yet to harvest their crops there was therefore a possibility that livestock would pass through farmlands destroying crops. These pastoralists are known to carry arms in order to protect their cattle. The likelihood of violent clash between them and farmers could not be ruled out.

Indications that migrants have a major role to play in cattle rustling which has greatly hampered inter and intra community relations and cordiality with strangers.

Chieftaincy Related Conflicts

On the sensitive question of Chieftaincy related conflicts, the formation of alliances and fierce loyalty to different power centres is a threat to stability in the state. For example the deposition of the 18th Sultan of Sokoto; the Ibrahim Dasuki has continued to be a lingering issue in the Sokoto traditional institution as the existence of factions loyal to him create distrust and suspicion amongst stakeholders within the traditional council. This is a potential threat to the security of the state.

Crime-Induced Conflict

The conflict prone areas in the state for smuggling induced violence are Gada, Ilela and Gwadabawa; Silame and Binji for herder-farmers conflict; and Sokoto North and Sokoto South Local governments for political conflicts. Political conflicts are however also rife in other local governments particularly those bordering the Sokoto township.

Political Thuggery

The Youth are used as thugs by politicians to perpetrate all forms of violence against political opponents. Unemployed youth have proved to be ready instruments for carrying out violent attacks in the event of political conflicts particularly during elections.

Responses

Track 1

- (1) Government has organised series of sensitisation programmes for traditional and religious leaders and other stakeholders in conflict affected communities.
- (2) Security agencies have intensified efforts in curbing security threats posed by criminal elements in the state.

Track 2

- (1) Traditional and religious institutions have served as intermediaries between their communities and the government at both local and state levels in promoting peaceful coexistence.
- (2) Religious leaders committed to strengthening peaceful coexistence among the different sects.
- (3) Women organisations have engaged district heads and the Sultan on the need to reconcile conflicting parties.
- (4) Women groups have also been known to play a role in providing information to traditional rulers and security agencies for the stoppage of hostilities and promotion of peace within the state.

Gaps in Response

- (1) General lack of welfare and motivation for Immigrations, customs and other border security agencies at the Nigeria/Niger borders.
- (2) The absence of logistics and equipment for the management of Nigeria/Niger borders in the state.

Recommendations

- (1) There is need for public enlightenment and education on peaceful coexistence.
- (2) There is a need to enhance border security through the provision of adequate personnel and equipment.
- (3) Strengthen poverty alleviation policies to reduce the level of poverty in the state.

Zamfara State (Farming is Our Pride)

Capital: Gusau



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Background Information on Zamfara State

Zamfara state was created from the then Sokoto state in 1996 and has a population of 3.8 million and 14 local government areas. With an area of 39,762 sq. km, the state is bordered in the north by Niger Republic, to the south by Kaduna state, in the east by Katsina state and to the west by Sokoto and Niger states. Zamfara state is mainly populated by Hausas and Herders, with minority Gwari, Kamuku, Kambari, Dukawa, Busawa and Zabarma ethnic groups. Others include the Igbo, Yoruba, Kanuri, Nupe and Tiv. Zamfara's major towns are Kaura Namoda, Anka, Talata-Marafa, Zugu and Tsafe.

Hausa, Fulfulde and Arabic are main languages spoken in Zamfara state, while the minority population speak languages such as Yoruba and Igbo. Although there are other religions practiced particularly amongst the minority residents of the state, Islam is the major religion in the state and Zamfara was the first state in Nigeria to introduce the Sharia law in Nigeria.

Agriculture is the predominant occupation of the people and main source of income in the state. Over 80 percent of the people engage in various forms of agriculture. The fertile soil in most parts of the state has been a boost for agricultural activities. The fertile soil for farming and irrigation facilitate large-scale production of agricultural products like millet, guinea corn, maize, rice, groundnut, cotton, tobacco and beans in large quantities. Zamfara has a high level of unemployment of 42.6 percent and ranks 10th poorest state in Nigeria with over 70.8 percent poverty rating.

Big forests, high poverty rate, fanaticism, low literacy level, transhumant pastoralist movements, climate change and deep political divisions can be described as some of the major causes as well as the driving factors for conflict in the state.

Types of Conflict in Zamfara State

There are varied types of conflicts and forms of insecurity in Zamfara state. The most palpable ones are:

- (1) Violent Armed Rural Banditry
- (2) Cattle Rustling
- (3) Land disputes
- (4) Farmer/Pastoralist conflict
- (5) Political/Electoral violence
- (6) Kidnappings of traditional rulers and the political élite
- (7) Chieftaincy disputes
- (8) Intra- and Inter-religious squabbles
- (9) Rape of women and girls
- (10) Irregular payment of salaries in the LGAs and some MDAs.

For a long time, Zamfara state has been battling with serious security challenges that have unsettled and displaced people and communities. Because of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons across the country, the expanse and deep forests in the state have provided safe havens for criminal gangs who, until recently, raided villages, killed citizens, stole animals, kidnapped residents and attacked highways, thus making life insecure, brutish and very traumatising for the people. For a long time, multiple criminal gangs perpetuated very violent rural banditry that turned the countryside like Zurmi, Dansadau and other places where the phenomenon of cattle rustling and armed

banditry is most rampant into desolate areas; economic and social life almost collapsed with thousands of residents' displaced. Now, the situation is gradually being addressed with the massive deployment of the Military into the forests. On several occasions, the local vigilantes and community members have had violent exchanges with the gangs often resulting in massive loss of lives. The Military has been able to force out the bandits from their strategic locations.

As a fall-out to the prevalence of criminal gangs in the zone, kidnapping cases in the rural and urban areas of the state increased sharply with reports on how families and communities have been terrorised to pay huge ransoms to save their loved ones. Individuals comprising of traditional leaders, business people, politicians, civil servants and a lot more have been kidnapped for ransom of varying amounts.

Another related challenge that has been causing violent conflicts in Zamfara state is the transhumance movements amongst pastoralists which have largely and severally resulted in cattle rustling, intra-pastoralists conflicts, the abuse of vulnerable groups especially women and girls, armed banditry and other violence associated with unrestricted transhumance movements and proliferation of small arms and lights weapons. Dominantly, those involved in cattle rustling are of the herders stock with collaborators across other ethnic groups and foreigners from neighbouring West African countries.

Community land-disputes caused by increasing pressure and the effects of climate change have fuelled local conflicts that are sometimes fractious and divisive. Respondents admitted the local courts and palaces of chiefs are flooded with cases of land disputes.

Of recent, simmering political conflicts at several levels have erupted in Zamfara state. For a long, there has been a sharp inter-party conflict between the ruling APC and the opposition PDP. Recent indicators as signified in the fracas between the legislature and the executive leading to the detention of the Speaker and some principal officers of the ZSHA because of their differences with the governor. The conflict has also led intra-party squabbles in the ruling APC as well as the wider society with many groups taking positions with the contending forces in the party. Many respondents feared that the current conflict scenarios in the ruling party may not mean well for the state.

There are several other simmering conflicts of lesser intensity which respondents have noted as being prevalent in the state. These are differences among religious sects, fanaticism among some hard-line adherents, political interferences in appointments and removal of traditional title-holders and district heads and, importantly, the failure of the government to pay workers' salaries regularly. One of the civil society groups in the state alleged that "the governor has failed to settle over 1,400 newly recruited workers, especially graduates, their two-year salaries – a situation which causes so many security challenges in the state and again how he failed to handle the merciless killings of innocent citizens which is on the increase on daily basis" (Zamfara Central Youth Forum, September 2016).

Another major issue causing conflict relate to activities of illegal miners in the state and its attendant consequences. That has been a major source of conflict at different levels between the miners and communities as well as with security agencies. Many people take to it because of the prevailing poverty and joblessness.

Respondents had also identified gender-based violence as a major issue in this state. Women groups have complained of systematic exclusion in government and in decision-making positions.

Impact of Conflicts in the State

Conflict is perceived as being on the increase in Zamfara state. Increase in urbanisation/urban development, deepening poverty, poor government performance and inadequate conflict resolution mechanisms are some of the reasons attributed to the escalation in conflict situations in the state. Non-Nigerians, local criminal gangs and illegal aliens as well as politicians are mainly behind the conflicts because they are the beneficiaries of the situations. In addition to politicians, some government officials, such as those in forestry, and traditional rulers in the affected communities have interests and benefit from the conflicts. Herders and the uneducated youth within the communities are the foot soldiers in acts of violence.

Some of the severely affected areas are: Tsafe, Gusau and KauraNamoda for political violence, while areas most affected by cattle rustling include Dansadau, Dangulbi, Anka, Shinkafi, Zurmi-GidanJaja, Maradun, BirninMagaji and Tsafe. Weapons used in the violent conflicts include locally made and sophisticated imported riffles and other small arms, bows and arrows, sticks, clubs and machetes.

Impact of Conflicts in Zamfara are noticeable but not limited to these factors:

- (1) Loss of lives and properties.
- (2) Raping and abduction of the women folk leading to unwanted pregnancies and rapid spread of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs).
- (3) Cases of raping of boys increased with the chaotic environment created by the violence.
- (4) Numerous IDPs camps sprung up due to massive displacements.
- (5) Devastation of the local economies and social systems thereby perpetuating underdevelopment.
- (6) Sharp polarisation along political lines with people aligned to political godfathers.
- (7) Food security is increasingly threatened.
- (8) Animosity amongst the underprivileged.

Similarly, respondents have observed an increase in number of those living with disabilities, damage to infrastructure, increase in poverty and halting of the development

process because of halted farming and economic activities. Other impacts of the conflicts include damage to social relations as intergroup relations are strained resulting in loss of confidence, disunity, and distrust amongst the people.

Responses to Conflicts in Zamfara State

Responses to conflict situations in the state include:

Track 1

The Federal Government in a joint effort with the Zamfara state Government have taken steps to ensure that there is no safe haven for cattle rustlers and armed bandits. Surveillance is being significantly scaled up to address the multi-faceted human security challenges. Also, recently the Government has been actively responding to the conflicts in the form of sensitisation workshops, setting-up of reconciliation committees, and mobilisation of security personnel to curb escalation of violence.

Track 2

The religious and traditional leaders have gone to great lengths in speaking out and encouraging peaceful co-existence and tolerance within the state through meetings with affected communities, and advocacy, to government for increased security measures. Religious leaders through sermons and appeals promoting peace. Civil Society like the Zamfara Central Youth Forum is active in “watchdog” roles and speaks out against perceived injustices. Some form of good office intervention by the elderly was reported in the state. Older women, grandmothers as well as women groups have been responders to conflicts. Such efforts have been limited to cases of advocacy, mediation and reconciliation mainly within family spheres. Sometimes elderly women give advice to reconciliation committee members but are not themselves involved in decision-making processes.

Track 3

Zamfara state benefits from Intervention by International organisations like the Red Cross and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

Gaps in Responses

The general perception of the people is that the federal government and international agencies are concentrating on the revamping of the North-East to the detriment of states in the North-West.

- (1) The state Government, on the other hand, is seen as not having the capacity and commitment to tackle the multiple challenges of insecurity in the state.
- (2) Security agency interventions have largely been in the form of sharing of intelligence with relevant agencies, stoppage of violent attacks, arrests and prosecution.

- (3) Within communities, women have been conspicuously absent from peace efforts.
- (4) Many conflicts are left unreported by the media, and the media reports had often only captured escalated conflicts, involving large-scale violence and killings.

Recommendations

- (1) There is need to have functional institutions of government and CSOs.
- (2) Appeal to political actors to adhere to the rules of the game and promote consensus building mechanisms.
- (3) Creation of employment opportunities for the teeming unemployed youths.
- (4) Provision of infrastructure to rural communities to arrest rural urban migration thereby arresting criminalities due to contest for scarce resources.
- (5) The setting up of functional reconciliation committees by government is imperative to reconcile parties to conflicts.
- (6) The values of peace and harmonious existence should be integrated into the national education curriculum from the basic to the university levels of education.
- (7) Deliberately create space for women inclusion in peacebuilding at all levels of conflict prevention, conflict management and post conflict. Women should be empowered for participation in peacebuilding in an organised way and as individuals as they can play the important role of ensuring a peaceable society as family/ community moulders.
- (8) The government, civil society organisations as well as International development agencies should embark on capacity building at community level in mediation and conflict resolution.

SECTION FOUR

Causes and Analysis of Conflicts

Causes of Violent Conflicts and Crimes in the North-West Zone

There are numerous factors responsible, directly or indirectly, for the types of conflicts simmering in the North-West Zone. Some of these are:

- (1) Widespread poverty, deprivations and high cost of living (the poverty index is over 70%).
- (2) High and rapid increase in population without corresponding increase in opportunities.
- (3) Widespread unemployment, especially among the Youth (over 40%).
- (4) Widespread illiteracy and ignorance.
- (5) Fight for supremacy by politicians and religious leaders.
- (6) Marginalisation of some groups and sections resulting in feelings of exclusion.
- (7) Provocative preaching and intra-sect leadership tussles.
- (8) Fanaticism.
- (9) Rural-urban migration as well as uncontrolled immigration from neighbouring countries.
- (10) Increased pressure and cost of land which make access to farming and grazing much more difficult.
- (11) Rise of social crimes, like the rape of girls and boys.
- (12) Activities of local thugs, miscreants and gangs.
- (13) Prevalence of hate speeches on radio stations and the social media.
- (14) Widespread drug-use and abuse (male and female).
- (15) Weakening of control institutions like the family, ridden with cases of neglect, violence, sexual molestation, etc.
- (16) Delay and irregular payment of workers' wages, especially in the LGAs.
- (17) Alleged insensitive government policies.

Conflict Actors in the North-West Zone

- (1) Politicians
- (2) Political thugs and hired spokesmen/women
- (3) Farmers and herders
- (4) Unemployed youth

- (5) Ex-servicemen and local vigilante groups
- (6) Religious fanatics
- (7) Factional leaders in religions, markets, etc.
- (8) Criminal gangs
- (9) High-profile absentee farmers
- (10) Corrupt judicial, security and traditional institutions' officials.

Impact of Conflict

- (1) The loss of lives and property.
- (2) Increased polarisation of the populace along dangerously divided sharp political lines.
- (3) Increased religious intolerance and heightening of violent sectarian tendencies.
- (4) Economic regression, reduced opportunities and increased pauperisation caused by situations of insecurity and conflicts.
- (5) Heightened mistrust, suspicions and hatred in an already segmented society – as often manifested in hate speeches and the decline in empathy for individuals different from “ours”.

Responses/Interventions

- (1) Coordinated working relationship between the state Governments, security agencies and community efforts by civil society organisations.
- (2) Traditional institutions (emirs, village/district heads, ward heads and title holders) and FBOs/religious leaders.
- (3) Establishment of panels, committees and commissions to inquire and address specific conflict challenges.
- (4) The media.
- (5) Internal political party efforts.
- (6) Activities of civil society groups.
- (7) Poverty alleviation measures at different levels.
- (8) Increased individual governments' interventions in the economic and social sectors.
- (9) Activities of educational Institutions.

SECTION FIVE

Impact of Conflicts

Impact of the conflicts and insecurity situations

An assessment of the general and specific impacts of the conflicts and insecurity situations across the North-West Zone is precisely captured in the following state-wide mentions:

Kano State

- (1) Loss of lives and property.
- (2) Increased polarisation of the populace along dangerously divided sharp political lines.
- (3) Increased religious intolerance and heightening of violent sectarian tendencies.
- (4) Economic regression, reduced opportunities and increased pauperisation caused by situations of insecurity and conflicts.
- (5) Heightened mistrust, suspicions and hatred in an already segmented society as often manifested in hate speeches and decline in empathy for individuals different from “ours”.
- (6) Use of jobless to fuel politically motivated conflicts

Jigawa State

- (1) Perpetual polarisation of the people along political and emirate lines.
- (2) Rise of political hooliganism and brigandage among the youth.
- (3) Unsettled agricultural activities and animal husbandry.
- (4) Widespread abuse of drugs amongst the youth.
- (5) Widespread animosity between different groups.

Kaduna State

By the accounts of the 2016 SCA of the North-West geo-political region of Nigeria, Kaduna state has reportedly suffered considerably from the numerous conflicts and forms of insecurity that have ravaged the state at different times. Major among the consequences are:

- (1) Proliferation of light arms and ammunitions which have fuelled criminality and gangsterism across the state.
- (2) Loss of lives and property.
- (3) Slowing down of economic and social activities especially in the countryside.

- (4) Widespread fear and sense of insecurity among the people.
- (5) Widespread and deep seated mistrust among and between the people.
- (6) Sharp and dangerous polarisation of the population along religious and ethnic lines particularly in Kaduna town.

Zamfara State

- (1) Loss of lives and properties.
- (2) Raping and abduction of the women folk leading to unwanted pregnancies and rapid spread of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs).
- (3) Cases of raping of boys increased with the chaotic environment created by the violence.
- (4) Numerous IDPs camps sprung up due to massive displacements.
- (5) Devastation of the local economies and social systems thereby perpetuating underdevelopment.
- (6) Sharp polarisation along political lines with people aligned to political godfathers.
- (7) Food security is increasingly threatened.
- (8) Animosity amongst the underprivileged.

Similarly, respondents have observed an increase in number of those living with disabilities, damage to infrastructure, increase in poverty and halting of the development process because of halted farming and economic activities. Other impacts of the conflicts include damage to social relations as intergroup relations are strained; resulting in loss of confidence, disunity, and distrust amongst the people.

Kebbi State

- (1) Destruction of human lives and their properties.
- (2) Rise in animosities between citizens of diverse backgrounds.
- (3) Youth restiveness.
- (4) Stigmatisation.
- (5) Economic stagnation.
- (6) Low agricultural productivity.

Sokoto State

- (1) Loss of lives and property.
- (2) Disunity, distrust and fear.
- (3) Injuries leading to disability.
- (4) Economic backwardness, increased poverty and underdevelopment.

Katsina State

Some of the identified effects of conflicts in Katsina state are:

- (1) Increased political division among the people.
- (2) Loss of lives and destruction of property.
- (3) Increased intra religious animosities and rural banditry.
- (4) Increased criminal activities.
- (5) Drug addiction (including married women and girls).
- (7) Rape (At the time of this research, we were informed that there were about 15 rape cases per day in Katsina town alone).
- (8) Robberies.
- (9) The rise of local gangsterism.
- (10) Increase in the number of teenage mothers.
- (11) Reduction in availability of staple food because many people are unable to farm for fear of cattle rustlers who kill farmers.
- (12) High level of distrust between security agents and the general public.

SECTION SIX

Responses/Interventions

6.1 Track One: Government Responses to Conflicts

Kano State

Even before the decimation of the Boko Haram sect and its attacks across areas of the country, through a coordinated working relationship between the state Government, security agencies and community efforts by civil society organisations, government was able to significantly halt the activities and attacks of the sect within the state.

Educational institutions, like the Bayero University, Kano, have evolved several strategies to address issues of conflicts in the state and the Zone.

Other responses/interventions have included the establishment of the State Conflict Management Alliance (SCMA) – comprising all security agencies, the Emirate Council, the Hisbah Board, and CSOs; Government campaigns against cattle rustling and the rehabilitation of self-identified rustlers; introduction and sustenance of mass marriages, supported by government; and, active involvement of CSOs in the promotion of peace-building efforts at the grassroots level.

Jigawa State

The coordinated effort of the state and local governments, security agencies, traditional institutions and local civil society groups has helped significantly to prevent and address emerging cases of violent tendencies among the people. Specifically, the government under former Governor Sule Lamido set up a Farmers-Pastoralists Resolution Committee that eventually transformed into a Board under the Ministry of Agriculture. The Board handles all cases and grievances involving farmers and pastoralists. So far, the activities of the Board have facilitated the resolution of numerous conflicts between the two parties thereby reducing potentials of violent clashes.

Kaduna State

The Government and its Security Institutions in Kaduna state, for example, have also been responsible for the following favourable actions: establishment of many committees, panels and commissions to investigate and address cases of conflicts/clashes; creation of 17 grazing reserves and 4 ranches to minimise sources of friction between farmers and herdsmen; synergy with neighbouring states to combat rural banditry, cattle-rustling and kidnappings; intense campaigns by government against cattle-rustling and acts of kidnapping and criminality; implementation of social and economic activities as well as developmental projects across the state; strengthening of inter-religious dialogue and consultation among leaders; involvement of traditional and community leaders in peace

initiatives and sustenance; active involvement of civil society groups including traditional institutions in peace efforts across the state; deliberate spread of governmental appointments to cover all groups in the state.

Zamfara State

The Government of Zamfara state has also been responsive to conflict situations in the state, and within the context of the North-West Zone.

Kebbi State

Within the context of Kebbi state, the government's slow attitude in responding to conflict situations is said to have been a major factor for the escalation of conflicts in the state. Late or no response to early warning signs has been a major challenge to security management in the state. Government interventions have been more focused on containing violence and addressing post violence stages of conflicts. In most cases, interventions entailed dispatch of security personnel to stop violence and secure lives and property, setting up peace committees, as well as response to emergencies and provision of palliative measures in disaster situations.

Sokoto State

Interventions of stakeholders in conflict situations have helped in the de-escalation of violence and decrease in conflict situations in Sokoto state. Similarly in Sokoto state, government efforts are found to have mainly been to engage with traditional and religious leaders to reach the people. Moreover, security agencies are said to have been active in curbing security threats generated by criminal elements in the state, despite the challenges of equipment, logistics support and low motivation in the various security formations, like the Police, Immigration and Customs Services. Although women have not been prominently involved in conflicts, some women have organised under the umbrellas of community-based organisations to engage district heads and the larger traditional institution on the need to reconcile conflicting parties as women and children were worst affected by the conflict. Women groups have also been known to play a role in providing information to traditional rulers and security agencies on probable hostilities and promotion of peace. Other roles played by women have largely been within the homestead where they prevail on their husbands and children to abstain from violence.

Katsina State

In Katsina state, security agencies have been deployed to arrest criminals involved in cattle-rustling. For example, in Daurawa Community, the people were terrorised by the criminal gangs who had made life difficult for the residents. The gangs moved freely among the villages and perpetrated series of killings, kidnappings, rape and chased people out of their homes. Now, the government and the security agencies have responded decisively and got rid of the gangs out of the area. Government agencies have also

frequently convened sensitisation campaigns, imploring people to turn away from criminality and embrace peace.

6.2 Track Two: Non-Governmental Responses

In Kano state, the mobilisation and involvement of opinion leaders in sustaining local security has helped to curb violent situations and reduce the level of insecurity in different parts of the state. The State Hisbah Board, CBOs, FBOs and NGOs, like Unions of Herdsmen, Road Transport Workers, and many more, have contributed in supporting the security agencies to monitor, control and enforce law and order.

The traditional institution, particularly the emirates, have contributed significantly through their networks and connections with the emirs, village/district heads, ward heads and title holders as well as religious leaders and sects to maintain a very close watch and influence on potentially-violent spots, individuals and groups in their areas of influence. In particular, the Kano Emirate, under HRH Mohammadu Sanusi II, has been leading in advocating and directly gets involved in resolving conflicts between individuals, groups, employers and communities at several levels. Other agencies involved in such efforts are: CSOs/Professional Associations/Trade Unions; The media; Political parties; Educational Institutions.

Also, in Kaduna state, educational institutions like the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and Kaduna Polytechnic, have evolved several strategies to address issues of conflicts in the state and the zone. Non-governmental partners to the state, the media and CSOs have equally evolved strategies in promoting peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots level. Similarly, in Zamfara state, responses have been in the form of traditional leaders' intervention, intervention by CSOs, conflict-sensitive reportage by the media, and interventions by religious groups.

Further, in Katsina state, the traditional institution's line of communication and authority coupled with the peoples' respect for it makes it easy to pass information on peaceful co-existence. Instructions have emanated, e.g. from the Emirs of Katsina and Daura to all District Heads, who pass same to Village Heads and on to Ward Heads. This has been very helpful in maintain peace, especially in Katsina state. Various initiatives of the Emirs and their District Heads have been helpful in settling local disputes and preventing conflicts among the people in the state. And, due to incessant clashes between farmers and cattle herders, religious leaders have continued to advise their followers to avoid encroaching on grazing routes while planting their crops. This has assisted in avoiding unnecessary dashes.

Efforts of the Traditional Institution in Katsina state include what is captured in the box below:

Our visit to the Majindadin Katsina who is the District Head of Tsagero revealed that the Traditional Institution was on top of the situation in curbing drug addiction and maintaining

peace in the state. The hierarchy of authority of traditional institution makes this possible – from Emir – District Head – Village Head – Ward Head. Since the citizens hold the Emir in highest esteem, whatever instruction passed in his name is given full compliance

In Kebbi state, other responders to conflicts include traditional and religious institutions as well as civil society organisations and international aid agencies. While religious leaders mainly sermonise on peace and tolerance by way of preventive peace building, traditional leaders engage in community advocacy for peace and use their offices in promoting negotiation and mediation. CSOs as well as international aid agencies have also played significant roles by way of enlightenment campaigns, advocacies, and capacity building for conflict management and peace-building across the state. Women groups such as Federation of Muslim Women Associations of Nigeria (FOMWAN) have played active roles in sensitisation and advocacy activities in the state particularly as it pertains to attending to women in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps.

Also, in Sokoto state, traditional and religious institutions are reported to have been very active in promoting peace and public order. Through sensitisation, traditional leaders have promoted peace between estranged communities such as the herders and farmers. Traditional leaders have been serving as intermediaries between individual communities, local and state government thereby reducing tense situations that arise from time to time. That role has served as an effective early-warning mechanism or system of reporting on threats and issuing of signals to the authorities. Religious leaders have also been committed to preaching on the imperatives for peaceful coexistence between different actors in the conflicts in the state.

6.3 Track Three: International Organisations

Some other kinds of intervention in conflict mitigation and peacebuilding in the North-West have been by the international organisations, like the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), etc.

SECTION SEVEN

Conclusions

The North-West Zone is one of the most volatile geo-political regions of the country, with numerous sources and manifestations of conflicts caused by a combination of complex factors. Some of the common conflicts identified as requiring immediate responses across the Zone relate to: politically-motivated conflicts, ethno-religious conflicts, resource-related conflicts (especially, land disputes, farmers/herders clashes), governments and policy failures, the rise in criminality and criminal acts (e.g. rural banditry and kidnappings) and the phenomenal increase in social problems (e.g. resulting from drug addiction, sexual offences, the pangs of unemployment, the heightening of divorce rates, the adverse impact of illiteracy and ignorance, the trigger of abnormally-high school drop-out rates, etc.) – which eventually all translate into serious sources of conflicts and insecurity.

The general conflict architecture of the North-West zone has been characterised by the following key happenings and features. The occurrences of conflict and acts of insecurity, or the threats to social peace, in the zone have been found to be generally common to all the states – even when each state has appeared to possess one peculiar form of conflict and insecurity situation that seems to be its major area of challenge. For instance, in some of the states, *political conflict* is top on their list of worries; while, in others, it bothers more on *religious and/or ethnic conflicts* which the respondents had identified as troubling, or worrisome. Similarly, on the issue of insecurity, while some states are hard-pressed on the various incidences of *kidnapping rural banditry* and *cattle-rustling* other states have had to grapple with the dangers of *drug-addiction among the young people*.

This SCA report on the North-West has further acknowledged that the recent decimation of the *Boko Haram* terror group appears to have significantly restored peace and reduced palpable fear and tension that were historically prevalent in the zone, especially in the Kano and Kaduna axes where the Boko Haram Sect had perpetrated its terror activities when it lasted. Now, with the restoration of relative peace in the North-East and the continuation of intense surveillance across the North-West, the tension has gradually eased-off and the general condition of peace restored.

More specifically, and by the accounts of the zonal SCA report, the greatest challenge across the zone has been related to political conflicts; often manifested in intense *inter-* and *intra-party conflicts*. In each of the states across the zone, there were reported cases of intense rivalry, either between the ruling APC and the opposition as in Jigawa, or sharply dividing intra-party rivalries – especially within the ruling APC. This problem exists across the seven states, even though the intensity has varied. Most respondents to the SCA had expressed worries about the unpredictability of outcomes of these discomfiting

emerging scenarios on the polity. Next to the political conflicts have been ethnic conflicts, also manifested in *inter-ethnic squabbles* that had, in many cases, exploded into outright violent inter-communal clashes. Kaduna state has been cited as being probably the most volatile for such conflicts, where the relationship between the dominantly Muslim Hausa-Herders and dominantly Christian minority ethnic groups have been experiencing rancorous encounters publicly over many issues, and for recurrent years. On many occasions, such squabbles had reached boiling points; and on other occasions actually escalating to violent clashes. The Kaduna situation is attributed to the compounding effects of politics, religion and economics, among others. In the other states within this geo-political zone, frequencies of cases of inter-ethnic conflicts were reported to be relatively lower because of the heavy dominance of the Hausa-Herders groups.

This North-West zone has also been associated in this SCA report with *inter and intra-religious conflicts*. All the states had reported cases of religious conflicts, although with different intensities. Again, Kaduna state has been unique in this respect because of the complexities involved in understanding the various dimensions of the intense intra and inter-religious conflicts manifested in the glaring rivalries exhibited by the adherents. Equally, the situation has been compounded by intra-religious quarrels; as represented by the *Shiites* who operate largely with the dominant Muslim groups and its perceived disagreement with government. The Shiites have been known to sharply disagree with most of the Islamic sects in the state and not long ago had a violent confrontation with the military resulting in heavy loss of lives and property. In the other states, the disagreements between the different Islamic sects appear to have been well managed by the leaders and the traditional institutions. Such sectarian disputes are often manifested in provocative and inciting preaching while competing for popularity and superiority of dominance among the people. In states like Katsina, Kebbi and Zamfara, too, the minority indigenous Christian communities had complained of marginalisation in state affairs. In cities like Kano, particularly in the Sabongari area – where most of the non indigenous Christians live, there have been reports of confrontations between residents and *Hisbah* elements (local religious police), mostly on enforcing the ban on the sale of alcohol and the control of acts of prostitution among the young people.

There has also been the report of *politico-cultural types of conflict* that have triggered conflicts and, in worst cases, violent confrontations between individuals and communities. In some of the states like Sokoto, Kebbi and Jigawa, chieftaincy disputes have become common because of political interferences in the appointments of traditional rulers into positions (District/Village Heads, etc.). Specifically, respondents in Sokoto state have identified chieftaincy disputes as a major issue exemplified in frequent reports of the imposition of traditional leaders on communities. During the SCA, many respondents had attributed the rise to political interferences by politicians.

The Farmers-Herders' Conflict has remained a serious and recurring threat in the zone, especially considering the reports of such clashes that had consumed many lives and

property also in various other parts of the country. Closely related to the above type of civil conflicts has been the nagging issue of cattle rustling and kidnapping, across the communities; about which many lives have been lost, property destroyed and huge sums of money seized. For instance, states, like Zamfara, Kaduna and Kano, have suffered huge losses because of the activities of criminal gangs perpetuating cattle-rustling, kidnappings, robberies and other forms of violent crimes that sometime attract stiff hesitance from the communities. *Land disputes* have also been reported across the zone; identifying different forms of land disputes. For instance, in Kebbi state, some influential and politically-connected individuals have reportedly hijacked the Government-initiated rice-farming project. On the pretence of embarking on large-scale agriculture, such powerful individuals have reportedly acquired several traditional land areas belonging to the *Herders*; forcefully ejecting the latter from areas that they had called homes. And, further, by the accounts of the zonal SCA, even some state Governments within the zone are perceived as being involved in the forceful acquisition of land in the Herders settlement areas and the building housing schemes on the same land areas. Respondents have identified the actions as major conflict triggers, in addition to existing conflicts within the occupational and professional trade groups, including the frequent tussles within the National Union of Road Transport Workers, the Tanker Drivers' Union, and the Market Associations. Such cases had been reported across the states of the zone, although notably more pronounced in Kano and Kaduna states.

The critical stimuli for conflict occurrences in the North-West geo-political region have been generally adduced to the combined effects of the following variables: the continued rapid growth of urbanisation/urban development, deepening poverty, perceived poor government (governance) performance; inadequacy of available conflict resolution mechanisms; the continuing involvement of non-Nigerians, local criminal gangs and illegal aliens as well as politicians in conflict-engineering, etc. In addition to politicians, some government officials, such as those in forestry, and traditional rulers in the affected communities – that have interests and are benefitting from the conflicts, have also been fingered as accessories to the conflicts. Herders and the uneducated youth within the communities have additionally been isolated as prime foot-soldiers in the various acts of violence within the zone.

As a further conclusive note, also noteworthy is the mention in the North-West SCA that many conflicts have tended to be unreported by the media, while media reports had often only captured escalated conflicts, involving large-scale violence and killings. Some of the unreported conflicts and violence – which are nevertheless also significant within the geo-political zone, often included ritual killings, the rape of women, wife-battery/ domestic violence against women, and drastic increases in drug addiction and criminal activities amongst women.

SECTION EIGHT

Recommendations

8.1 General Recommendations

For elaboration at the federal government level

- (1) The political class should put its acts in order and play the game of politics by the rules in order to engender confidence among the people and ensure the upholding of the rule of law at all times.
- (2) The Government should be bold, creative and systematic in addressing unemployment and issues of poverty reduction among the youth and the general population, with a view to reducing their levels of vulnerabilities to criminal tendencies.
- (3) The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and other security agencies should be strengthened to tackle the menace of drug addiction and its effects.
- (4) Begin the process of registering pastoralists that enter Nigerian territory as is the case in Chad, Niger, Cameroun and other Francophone West African countries. This will help in ensuring that only legitimately established economic migrants come into Nigeria.
- (5) Improve border management strategies to check proliferation of small and light weapons as well as track and ward-off criminals.
- (6) Preachers should be strictly monitored to check provocative and dangerous preaching.
- (7) Pastoralist communities should be trained in a specialised way so they could begin to accept sedentary livelihoods.
- (8) Individual governments should implement grazing reserve policies and, in the process, provide resources like water, feeds, hospitals and road networks to minimise movement of pastoralists.
- (9) Politicians should respect the sanctity of traditional institutions. This may likely reduce conflicts in that sector.
- (10) Strengthen and support the civil society sector to play increasing roles in conflict reduction and development-oriented initiatives
- (11) Reinvigorate the Local Governments and other institutions to play their roles effectively.

8.2 Specific Recommendations

For elaboration at the States Level

Kano State

- (a) Increased support to the security agencies and all other agencies involved in protecting the society.
- (b) Politicians across the parties should be mindful of their actions and avoid heightening the current tension between the supporters of the various factions in the parties.
- (c) Evolve more productive schemes to engage the youth and reduce poverty.
- (d) Strengthen traditional and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
- (e) Monitor and sanction cases of hate speech and provocative political and religious statements.
- (f) Organise regular consultative security enlightenment meetings at all levels across the state.

Jigawa State

- (a) Strengthen and improve the services of the Farmers-Herders Board to continue to facilitate peaceful relations between the two dominant conflicting communities of cattle herders and crop farmers.
- (b) Support security services to check illegal border incursions.
- (c) Politicians should reduce the intensity of unwholesome (poisonous) politics that divide the people.
- (d) Initiate creative policies to address unemployment and youth joblessness.

Kaduna State

- (a) Increased support to the security agencies and all other agencies involved in protecting the society.
- (b) Politicians across the parties should be mindful of their actions and avoid heightening the current tension among the supporters of the various factions in the parties.
- (c) Evolve more productive schemes to engage the youth and reduce poverty.
- (d) Strengthen traditional and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
- (e) Monitor and sanction cases of hate speech and provocative political and religious statements.
- (f) Organise regular consultative security enlightenment meetings at all levels across the state.

- (g) Government should uphold social justice, equity and respect for the rule of law in its dealings with the people.

Zamfara State

- (a) There is need to have functional institutions of government and CSOs.
- (b) Appeal to political actors to adhere to the rules of the game and promote consensus building mechanisms.
- (c) Creation of employment opportunities for the teeming unemployed youths.
- (d) Provision of infrastructure to rural communities to arrest rural urban migration thereby arresting criminalities due to contest for scarce resources.
- (e) The setting up of functional reconciliation committees by government is imperative to reconcile parties to conflicts.
- (f) The values of peace and harmonious existence should be integrated into the national education curriculum from the basic to the university levels of education.
- (d) Deliberately create space for women inclusion in peacebuilding at all levels of conflict prevention, conflict management and post conflict. Women should be empowered for participation in peacebuilding in an organised way and as individuals as they can play the important role of ensuring a peaceable society as family/ community moulders.
- (e) The government, civil society organisations as well as International development agencies should embark on capacity building at community level in mediation and conflict resolution.

Kebbi State

- (a) Deliberate efforts should be taken to strengthen mechanisms for social integration among the diverse peoples of the state.
- (b) Implement an all inclusive youth empowerment schemes across the state.
- (c) Specific strategies to discourage land grabbing and forceful eviction of communities from their abodes.
- (d) Politicians should put their acts in order to prevent violent reactions from their followers.
- (e) Increased support should be rendered to the security agencies especially those in the border areas.
- (f) Government and politicians should avoid direct and unnecessary interferences in chieftaincy matters.
- (g) The state and local governments should designate grazing reserves and water points to minimise chances of clashes.

Sokoto State

- (a) There is need for continuous public enlightenment and education on peaceful coexistence.
- (b) Policies on poverty reduction and employment creation should be implemented across the state.
- (c) Politicians should play partisan politics according to the rule of law and respect the constitutions of their parties.
- (d) Government should uphold social justice, equity and respect for the rule of law in its dealings with the people.
- (e) Government and politicians should desist from unnecessary interference in the procedures and activities of traditional institutions.
- (f) Assist security agencies to perform their duties efficiently.
- (g). Design and implement creative strategies on addressing social problems like rape, drug addiction and violent behaviours among the youth.

Katsina State

- (a) The political class in Katsina state needs to get its acts together in order to reduce the level of political tension and divisions among the people.
- (b) Increase the support to security agencies to further control criminal tendencies and smuggling across the borders.
- (c) Implement policies to reduce unemployment and reduce political hooliganism among the youth.
- (d) Support the traditional institution and civil society groups to continue to promote peaceful coexistence especially among farmers and herders and adherents of different religious sects.
- (e) Adopt specific measures to address the fears and complains of minority Christian population.

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South-East Geo-Political Zone

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List of Acronyms

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AGN	Actors Guild of Nigeria
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CGC	Community Governance Council
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development
DSS	Department of State Services
EBSU	Ebonyi State University
EU	European Union
FUNAI	Federal University Ndufu-Alike Ikwo
GRACODEV	Grassroots Community Development Initiative
IMT	Institute for Management and Technology
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
JTF	Joint Task Force
LGA	Local Government Area
MASSOB	Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAOC	Nigeria Agip Oil Company
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Corporation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOA	National Orientation Agency
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps
P4P	Partners for Peace
SARS	Special Anti-Robbery Squad
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
SPDC	Shell Petroleum Development Company
TUC	Town Union Council
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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Executive Summary

The 2016 South-East Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) had encompassed the five states that comprise this zone, namely: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo. These states are the successors of the old Eastern Region. Being the heartland of the Igbo ethnic group, the ethnic and cultural composition of the South East zone is predominantly Igbo and Christian. And, with the growth of internal migration since the end of the Nigerian Civil War, the zone has also become increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, especially in the major urban centres like Aba, Enugu, Owerri, Onitsha, Abakaliki, Awka, Umuahia, Nnewi and Nsukka. Expectedly, the growing urbanisation and multiculturalism have also had impacts on the general conflict climate in the various states within this zone. In addition, rapid urbanisation and high population density in the major cities and towns within the zone have also tended to throw up the challenges of inadequate infrastructure and social services – leading to a whole range of social, political, security and conflict-inducing issues, including: population settlement congestion, inter-communal and inter-ethnic competition, unemployment, cultism, criminality, etc.

This zonal report noted that, but until recently, the typology and pattern of conflicts in the South-East had remained fairly consistent over the last few decades. Drawing from the earlier editions of the SCA and other literature, this report has specifically observed that most of the conflicts in the zone have been perennial in nature, and often variously related to: land ownership and boundary disputes, chieftaincy and community leadership tussles, political contestation and thuggery, and youth agitations. However, it is further noted in the report that such familiar types of conflicts have recently been joined by other more violent and insidious conflicts that are direct products of the following tendencies, namely: cultism; vigilante operations and criminality; crop farmers-cattle herders interface; people's perceptions about and the reactions to government policies; oil-related triggers; and self-determination agitations and civil protests. Significantly, it is further advanced in this report that the observed changing trend can be closely correlated to the larger national structural and political contestations and negotiations that have emerged since the inauguration of the current democratic governance arrangement in 1999. However, this zonal report also specifies that the incidence and prevalence of various types of conflicts are not uniform across the states in the zone; rather, that they are different and sometimes unique in the progression from one state to the other. By way of taxonomy, the structures of these conflicts have broadly encompassed the social, economic, political and security issues and considerations. Also, the consensus of stakeholders had affirmed the trending pattern that the South-East zone is witnessing gradual multiplication in the types and complexity of conflicts as well as escalation in terms of the frequency, intensity, impact and diversity of actors that have been involved.

Selected conflict case studies were adjudged to be significant in terms of importance, severity,

impact or persistence of the conflict occurrences in the South-East Zone. These are:

- (i) the Ezza and Ezillo Communal Land Conflict in **Ebonyi state**;
- (ii) the proliferation of chieftaincy (Eze-ship) tussles in communities in **Imo state**;
- (iii) the ubiquitous farmers-herders' conflict in Nimbo, Uzo-Uwani Local Government Area (LGA) of **Enugu state**;
- (iv) self-determination agitations and protests in the major centres **across the South-East Zone**;
- (v) oil-related and cultism conflicts in the oil-producing communities of Oguta and Ohaji-Egbema LGA, in **Imo state**;
- (vi) town unions and community governance conflicts in **Imo state**;
- (vii) inter-state boundary conflict between Ishiagu Community in Ivo LGA of **Ebonyi state** and Umulokpa Community in Isiochi LGA of **Abia state**; and
- (viii) conflicts resulting from unpopular Government policies in **Imo state**. Further still, a disaggregation of the causes, actors and impacts of these various conflicts (mostly rendered herein in-text only in tabular form by the specific states reporters, rather than as more detailed narratives) has, nevertheless, generally revealed loads of ongoing struggles and tradeoffs between individuals and groups in their bids to access and retain political, social, economic rights, privileges and opportunities. Thus, the underlining factors for many of the manifested conflicts in the South-East have been variously traceable to the struggle for political, social and economic leverage. Invariably, therefore, the trajectories of these conflicts had often depended on the availability of, and the capacity for, conflict management and resolution by government, non-government and the other grassroots stakeholders.

Finally, clinical recommendations are made in this zonal report towards the mitigation and resolution of the reported conflicts. These are:

- (1) The need for Government to put in place integrated early-warning mechanisms in order to aid prompt and coordinated response by statutory and community stakeholders.
- (2) Also, the need for Government to put in place efficient and effective conflict-response and intervention policies, especially at the local and state levels – for the purpose of reducing conflict occurrence rates to the barest minimum.

SECTION ONE

Introduction and Historical Background

The five states that make up the South-East zone are: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo. The zone is bounded in the north by Kogi and Benue states; in the south by Bayelsa, Rivers and Akwa Ibom states; in the east by Cross River state and to the west by Edo and Delta states. Being the heartland of the Igbo ethnic group, the ethnic and cultural composition of the South-East Zone is predominantly Igbo and Christians. However, with the growth of internal migration since after the Civil War, the zone has increasingly become multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, especially in the major urban centres like Aba, Enugu, Owerri, Onitsha, Abakaliki, Awka, Umuahia, Nnewi and Nsukka. The zone's endowments and opportunities in agriculture, trade and commerce have been major attractions for the people of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds from across the country. Necessarily, the growing urbanisation and multiculturalism have had impacts on the conflict climate in the various states within the zone. In addition, rapid urbanisation and high population density in major cities and towns in the zone have also thrown up the challenges of inadequate infrastructure and social services, leading to a whole range of social, political, security and conflict-inducing issues, including: congestion, inter-communal and inter-ethnic competition, unemployment, cultism, criminality, etc.

Until recently, the typology and pattern of conflicts in the South-East had remained fairly consistent over the last few decades. As documented in earlier editions of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) and other literature, most of the conflicts in the zone are perennial in nature and often related to: land ownership and boundary disputes, chieftaincy and community leadership tussles, political contestation and thuggery, and youth agitation. These familiar types of conflicts have recently been joined by other more violent and insidious conflicts such as: cultism, vigilante and criminality, farmers-herdsmen conflict, government policy-induced conflict, oil-related conflict and self-determination agitations and protests. This changing trend can be closely linked to the larger national structural and political contestations and negotiations since the inauguration of the current democratic arrangement in 1999. However, it is important to note that the incidence and prevalence of these various types of conflicts are not uniform in all the states in the zone, rather they are different and sometimes even unique from one state to the other. The structures of these conflicts broadly cover the social, economic, political and security classifications. Overall, what has emerged from the different modes of study undertaken in this research (i.e. through interviews, questionnaire administration, focus group discussions, and validation workshop) has been the consensus by stakeholders that the South-East Zone is witnessing gradual multiplication in the types and complexity of conflicts as well as escalation in terms of the frequency, intensity, impact and diversity of actors.

Having set the introduction in this section, the remainder of this report is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the methodology of the assessment; Section 3 provides overview of selected case studies of conflicts that have been deemed significant by virtue of their importance, severity, impact or persistence; Section 4 undertakes consolidated analysis of the conflicts in the five states across the zone; Section 5 looks at the impacts of the conflicts; while Section 6 looks at the pattern of responses and interventions to the conflicts; and sections 7 and 8 present the conclusions and recommendations from the assessment including the identified gaps in literature and responses.

SECTION TWO

Methodology

In line with the overall objective of the SCA to develop an overview of the context and trends of conflict and related risks and challenges in Nigeria, this South-East field research and report has adopted a two-fold methodology. The first fold involved a mix of historical and current state analysis of conflict trends through the review of secondary-source literature, reports and documentations. This also included desktop research, literature review and consultation of institutional and programme documentations that are related to the subject matter. The second fold of the methodology had involved the collection and analysis of primary data through the administration of questionnaires and the conduct of Key Informant Interviews (KII) as well as Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with selected stakeholders in all the five states of the South-East geopolitical zone.

This approach enables the research to obtain both qualitative and quantitative data on prevailing and emerging conflict issues across the zone. Building on the conflict assessment and perspectives documented in the earlier SCA editions, as well as various secondary literature on the trends of Nigeria's conflict and socio-political developments, the field research took advantage of the traversing across all the five South-East states to consult and engage critical stakeholders in order to obtain grassroots and first-hand accounts and perspectives on the trends and dynamics of conflicts in cities and communities across the South-East. The stakeholders consulted had included: federal, state and local government agencies and officials; security agencies; traditional rulers; community leaders; religious leaders, women, youth and other grassroots groups; non-government, civil society and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), etc.

A total of eleven FGDs and town hall meetings were held across the zone: two each in Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi and Enugu; and three in Imo. The research team also collated a total of 185 valid questionnaires from diverse respondents from the various stakeholder groups across the five states. The selection of respondents was purposively done to ensure appropriately diverse mix of people that cut across a wide spectrum from the target population in all the states including; traditional rulers, community leaders, youth leaders, women leaders, government and political officials from all levels, security personnel, non-governmental organisations, market women and ordinary citizens. For the purpose of analysis, 150 of the valid questionnaires (thirty from each of the states) were utilised in eliciting quantitative and qualitative data on the conflict situations in the five South-East states. The broad range of data elicited had included: types and incidences of conflict, locations, actors, causes, severity, impacts (including injuries, deaths and property destructions), the role of women, interventions and escalation or de-escalation trends (*see* Annex 2 for summary of the questionnaires).

In terms of the demographics of the stakeholders, 40.66 percent of the respondents to the questionnaires are female, while 59.33 percent are male. With respect to overall assessment of conflict trends, 58 percent of the respondents think that the specific conflicts in their domain are escalating, while 42 percent think they are deescalating. Overall, the responses to the questionnaires provided corroboration for many of the views, opinions and submissions that were made by stakeholders during the various FGDs. The data and perspectives gained from the blend of desktop research and primary data and perspectives collected during the field research was reinforced by stakeholders during the South-East zonal validation workshop which was held in the zone to further engage select stakeholders and provide opportunity for additional inputs, validation and recommendations.


SECTION THREE

Conflict Case Studies

The fieldwork and stakeholders' consultations across all the states in the South-East yielded a sizeable amount of information on cases of recent, ongoing and emerging conflicts that cut across the various conflict structures and typologies - social, economic, political and security. The following are selected conflict case studies which have been determined to be significant in terms of importance, severity, impact or persistence.

Abia State (God's Own State)

Capital: Umuahia



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria. <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Inter-State Boundary Conflict between Umulokpa Community in Isiochi LGA of Abia State and Ishiagu Community in Ivo LGA of Ebonyi State


This is a prolonged and pronounced communal conflict between the two communities in two neighbouring states within the South-East Zone. The main crust of the conflict is the disagreement over the ownership of land and quarry sites adjoining the two communities and rights to royalties from the quarry sites. The conflict was escalated by the alleged abduction and death of a youth (with his motorcycle) from Umulokpa by the neighboring community in Abia state. The incident heightened tension and mistrust between the communities and led to reprisal attacks – which resulted in the destruction of many properties and a number of deaths. The youths and community leaders from both communities were involved in the exchanges and clashes.

The conflict lasted for many years until its eventual resolution through interventions by the two state governments and other stakeholders in 2016. Several mediation and negotiation meetings were convened with broad stakeholders from the two communities and states, and eventually the National Boundary Commission delineated the boundary. Some of the stakeholders involved in the intervention and resolution include: the traditional leaders, religious leaders, local government officials, state government officials, Nigeria Police, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, and the National Boundary Commission. However, despite the positive delineation, resolution and the achievement of relative peace in the area, there is need for continuous monitoring and periodic peace advocacy programmes that target the critical stakeholders in the communities. Efforts should also be made to develop joint peace programmes for the youths of the communities in order to rebuild harmonious relationships. Also, the operations of the quarry-mining companies need to be regularly assessed to ensure that their activities and corporate social responsibilities to the host communities do not become sources of future conflicts.

Other latent land and boundary disputes between Ebonyi and Abia that have the potential of escalating into conflict flashpoints are: Iyioji Akaeze, Ivo LGA, Ebonyi state versus Item, Bende LGA, Abia state; Umuobor Akaeze, Ivo LGA, Ebonyi state versus Ugwueke, Bende LGA, Abia state; Amaeze, Ishiagu, Ivo LGA Ebonyi state versus Uru Lokpanta, Umunneochi LGA, Abia state; Amata Ishiagu, Ivo LGA, Ebonyi state versus Ukomi Umunneochi LGA, Abia state; Amata Ishiagu, Ivo LGA, Ebonyi state versus Lokpa Ukwu and Lekwasi Umunneochi LGA, Abia state; Amonyeh Ishiagu, Ivo LGA, Ebonyi state versus Amaeya Uturu, Isiukwuato LGA, Abia state; Etiti Edda, Afikpo South LGA, Ebonyi state versus Nkporo Ohafia LGA, Abia state; and Nguzu Edda, Afikpo South LGA, Ebonyi state versus Okagwe, Ohafia LGA, Abia state. In all of these cases, there is the need to design and pursue intensive inter-state peace initiative programmes. The state governments and the IPCR need to work concertedly to ensure that violent conflicts do not escalate from these identified flashpoints. The traditional institutions, especially the State Councils of the Traditional Rulers and other stakeholders such as youth and women groups, need to be engaged towards ensuring that peace is guaranteed in the identified communities.

Anambra State (Home of All)


Capital: Awka



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria. <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Ebonyi State (Salt of the Nation)

Capital: Abakaliki



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria. <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Ezza/Ezillo Communal Land Conflict in Ebonyi State

This is one of the most pronounced and long-running communal conflict in Ebonyi state or, indeed, the whole of the South-East zone. Ezillo is one of the seven sub-ethnic communities in Ishielu Local Government Area of Ebonyi state. The sub-ethnic and dialectic groups in the area are Agba, Ohofia Agba (Ntezi dialect) Nkalagu, Nkalaha, Iyionu (Nkalaha), Azuinyaba (Ezza dialect). Within some of these sub-ethnic communities are: Ezza-Ezillo, Ezza-Nkalagu and Ezza Ogboji. Due to the strategic location of Ezillo across the Enugu-Abakaliki expressway, it is host to important infrastructure and facilities such as the Ezillo Farm Settlement and Ezillo Regional Water Scheme etc. There are several schools of thought on the origin of the Ezillo


people. However, popular documented literature traced the origin of Ezillo to Mgbom Eze in Ishieke Izzi in the present Ebonyi and Ikwo Local Government Areas of Ebonyi state. According to some of these historical accounts, the Ezillos and their Ezzangbo/ Ngbo brothers regard Mgbom Eze as the ancestral father of Amaleze village in Ezillo. This ancestral brotherhood accounts for the sacred relationship between Ezillo and Ngbo on one hand and Izzi people on the other hand; hence, the abhorrence of bloodshed between these groups.

The Ezza-Ezillo people came from Ezza South and Ezza North Local Government Areas of Ebonyi state on the invitation of the Ezillo people to settle a land dispute between them and their Ngbo neighbour at Egu-Echara in the early 1930s. Ever since the end of the dispute, the Ezzas have continued to live amongst their host community, Ezillo. However, the relationships between the two groups have not been harmonious as it has degenerated to indigene-settler conundrum. Although, there have been several episodes of conflicts in Ezillo over the period of 52 years, but a major confrontational phase occurred on 10 May, 2008, following an altercation between one Ezillo boy and Ezza man over the erection of telephone booth at Isinkpuma motor park. Though the Ebonyi state Government quickly intervened to resolve the conflict, the conflict claimed so many lives, displacement of families and destruction of properties worth millions of naira and equally affected the socio-economic development of the area in particular and Ebonyi state in general. Other similar incidents had occurred in the area in the subsequent years, the most recent being 2014.

The remote causes of the conflict are boundary dispute, indigene-settler syndrome ('son of the soil' syndrome), politics, culture, tradition and biased historical information. The immediate causes were interpersonal conflict, abuse of power, boundary adjustment, position of the State Government on the matters of identity by the Ezillo people. Even though no violent conflict has been noticed in the recent time, the fundamental issues have not been sufficiently dealt with by the stakeholders. There is still high level of mistrust among the two communities, and most people who were displaced during the last conflicts have not been reintegrated back to the place. The military and police have established permanent bases around the area to ensure sustenance of peace. The Ebonyi State Government has continued to encourage peace talks among the traditional leaders, community leaders, youths and other groups in the two communities. The gap noted is the lack of trust due to suspicion and allegation of partiality against the government in resolving the conflict as well as the absence of civil society organisations in the peacebuilding process.

Enugu State (Coal City State)

Capital: Enugu



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria. <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Farmers-Herders Conflict in Nimbo, Uzo-Uwani LGA of Enugu State

The people of Nimbo community in Uzo-Uwani Local Government Area of Enugu state woke up on Monday, 25 April, 2016 to the fiery swords of irate herdsmen who occupy the bushy parts of the Local Government. The unsuspecting villagers, who are mainly agrarians, had from time to time had quarrels with cattle-herders who would always release their cattle to graze in the villagers' farmlands and defecate in their streams. Two villages, namely: Mgwogo and Onueke were first to be attacked. The people said that the cattle-herders had targeted the able-bodied men and youths, killing many and leaving others with different degrees of injuries, while many fled and settled in neighbouring towns in the Nsukka Local Government Area. Although there was no

independent confirmation, different accounts estimated that 40 indigenes of Nimbo were killed, including properties worth millions destroyed. Following the attack, economic activities in Nimbo and other affected communities were paralysed. Some community leaders indicated that they had received advanced report of the planned attack and reported to the Police, but that the Police could not stop the attack. In reaction to the incident, a group of anti-herder protesters, made up of a coalition of thirteen non-governmental organisations and women from Nimbo Community had taken to the streets to protest against the violent conflict. Subsequently, the State Government established a Committee of Judicial Inquiry to investigate, and unravel the perpetrators, while security personnel from the military, Police and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) were deployed to the community.

From the various findings made during the SCA field exercise, the root cause of this conflict had been attributed to the cattle-herders invading farmlands and allowing their cattle to graze and destroy crops, defecating into village streams - thereby polluting the source of drinking water. The impact has been the destruction of farmlands, crops, killings, maiming, rape, trauma and pollution of drinking water at the village stream, hate messages, ethno-religious resentment, etc. Some of the stakeholders that have continued to intervene include: traditional rulers, women groups, the state government, civil society organisations, security agencies, among others. The conflict has not been resolved as there remain cases of reported attacks on unsuspecting farmers in Nimbo and other communities in the area by the cattle-herders.

Imo State (Eastern Heartland)

Capital: Owerri



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria. <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Proliferation of Chieftaincy (Eze-ship) Tussles in Communities in Imo State

Since the return of democratic governance in 1999 and in particular since 2011, there has been a gradual proliferation of conflicts arising from contestations for chieftaincy positions in communities across Imo state as well as other states in the South East. Currently about 60 percent of Imo communities are caught up in various tussles over Chieftaincy (Eze-ship). The main factor responsible for the proliferation problem is the carving out of more autonomous communities in the state by further breaking up of existing autonomous communities. For instance, from just over 100 autonomous communities before 2011, there are now over 600 autonomous communities in Imo state; most of them created from existing communities. This process leads to multiple

contestations over Eze-ship thrones in the affected communities. Although government institutions and officials have insisted that the process for the creation of autonomous communities is enshrined in law, what is apparent is that the implementation of that law or policy has frequently resulted in conflicts as it pitched different factions in the communities against each other. On one hand are the leaders and supporters of the original communities who resist the potential reduction of their areas of influence, while on the hand are those clamouring for the creation of more autonomous communities in order to create opportunities for new Ezes.

Another angle to the problem of proliferation of autonomous communities is that, while ascension to chieftaincy thrones in the traditional communities is hereditary, the autonomous communities often create constitutional processes to govern the selection to chieftaincy thrones. This process typically pitches the people who prefer the hereditary system against those who prefer rotational or open democratic process. Invariably, the contestations over the right process as well as the selection of candidates for the position of Ezes in many of the new autonomous communities have tended to end in disagreements, court cases and sometimes violent clashes, which in some cases results in loss of lives and destruction of properties. Some of the communities with latent or ongoing conflicts over the creation of autonomous communities or chieftaincy selection include: Akabor Community and Mgballa Agwa Community in Oguta LGA; Umuhu Community in Ngor Okpala LGA; Orsuihiteokwa Community, Elugwu-Okabia Community and Eziawa Community in Orsu LGA; Ogwu Issima Community in Ohaji-Egbema LGA; Umulewe Community and Umueke Community in Ideato South LGA.

Oil-Related and Cultism Conflict in Oil Producing Communities of Oguta and Ohaji-Egbema LGA, Imo State

The oil-producing communities of Awara, Ochia, Obile, Umuapu, Obosima, Abacheke, Assa and Obiakpu in the Ohaji-Egbema LGA of Imo state have witnessed different degrees and levels of conflict prevalence and youth restiveness, since the discovery of oil in those communities. The youths had claimed to be agitating against the perceived neglect of their communities by the government, in spite of the oil explored from the area. Consequently, the youths have formed groups, commonly known as cult groups, as the platform to fight their cause. The most prominent of these cult groups are: Debam-Niger Delta Red Squad, and Dewell-Niger Delta Rescue Squad. Over the years, these two groups have become the dominant rivals, terrorising some of the oil-producing communities, such as Awara and Ochia. The rival groups often unleash mayhem on the surrounding communities in their quest to gain superiority over each other as well as to control the royalties and bribes from the oil companies.

Another dimension to the conflict has been the struggle over what is called the “MOU” (Memorandum of Understanding) with oil companies. Initially, the cult groups had fought among themselves for the control of the MOU between the youths and major oil

companies, such as Water Smith Oil company, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and Nigeria Agip Oil Company (NAOC), but subsequently attacked and sacked the facilities of the oil companies because of what they called the failure of the oil companies to respect the terms of the MOU. It is alleged that these cult groups have strong affiliation with similar militant groups in Rivers state and other Niger Delta states. The two major cults as well as the other smaller groups have established spheres of control in the communities and they sometimes clash among themselves. The violent activities of these groups have included raping, killing, destruction of properties, closing down of schools and churches, and the destruction of oil installations – which often made the majority of the people, including the Ezes, religious priests, school teachers and oil workers to flee the communities. The communities are considered unsafe as even the security agents are reluctant to venture into those communities because the cultists are reputed to have ample supply of sophisticated weapons. The youths, on the other hand, do not consider themselves to be cultists but rather see themselves as agitating because of perceived neglect, unemployment, and the lack of infrastructure and social services in their communities.

Town Unions and Community Governance Conflicts in Imo State

The introduction of “innovative policy” of creating Community Governance Councils (CGCs), also known as the Fourth Tier of Government by the Government of Imo state, is generating conflicts in several communities across the state. Although the declared intention of the policy is to bring development closer to the communities, the reality is that the policy is not well received because it tries to replace the widely accepted Town Union Councils (TUCs) arrangements, with a new system that is driven and supervised by the government. The officials of the CGCs are appointed by the government who also funds them, thus making them highly politicised. The TUCs, on the other hand, were led by officials elected by the people of the community and run with funds contributed by members of the communities.

The emergence of the CGCs and the processes involved in the appointment of its officials in most communities has been marred by conflicts. Given the perception that the CGCs are government-sponsored and established to serve only government’s interest, in most communities, the attempts to establish the CGCs often lead to confrontation between the leadership of existing Town Unions, who refuse to relinquish their position or collaborate with the new CGC leadership. Thus, parallel councils are created in most communities and, in some cases, there are violent clashes resulting in injuries, physical and social disruption of relationships. While the government has continued to defend and push this policy, the supporters of the CGCs system are pitched against those who prefer the former TUCs, leading to stalemate and tension in most communities. Some of the communities embroiled in this conflict include: Isiala in Mbanzo LGA; Ahiazu in Mbaise LGA and Ayanzu LGA of Imo state.

Conflicts Resulting from Unpopular Government Policies in Imo State

Although this case does not fit into the same mode as the other conflict case studies, the indication from stakeholders during the fieldwork is that the prevalence and impact of several unpopular government policies is creating conflicts between the people and the government as well as between members of the different communities and socioeconomic groups. Among such government policies and programmes that are considered to be inducing conflicts are:

- (1) the reduction of official working days for state civil servants from five days (Mondays to Fridays) to three days (Mondays to Wednesdays), while the remaining two days (Thursdays and Fridays) are to be used for farming activities as part of the government's quest to encourage agriculture;
- (2) reduction and rationing of workers' salaries by the State Government leading to hardship for the people and grievances against the government;
- (3) ongoing widespread demolition of buildings (public and private houses and offices) in the state capital as part of road expansion and dualisation work by the government, and relocation of community infrastructure (such as the Eke Ukwu Market in Owerri and the mechanic workshops in Owerri North LGA) to locations that are considered unacceptable.

The general responses from the majority of the communities and the people affected have not been positive; and, there have been several incidents of resistance and protests. Although, no violence or injuries have been recorded, the affected groups have stated their determination to resist these policies by whatever means possible including violence. There is currently tension and potential for escalation into violent conflict if those policies are pushed ahead without managing the concerns of the affected stakeholders.

Self-Determination Agitations and Protests in Major Centres Across the South-East Zone

Major towns and commercial centres (such as Onitsha, Aba, Nkpor) across the South-East Zone have witnessed sporadic agitations and protests by people who variously identified themselves as members of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) since 2013/2014. The protests and demonstrations which sometimes turn violent have become more frequent and enlarged in scale, following the arrest and detention of the Leader of IPOB, Mr. Nnamdi Kanu in 2015. Since then, several protests have turned violent: at least six fatalities were reported when police allegedly opened fire on a demonstrating crowd in January 2016; six pro-Biafran protesters were reportedly shot dead by the Police in Aba South in early February 2016 during a rally by IPOB members; and on 29 and 30 May, 2016, the military was alleged to have had confrontation with members of IPOB during a commemoration prayer in Nkpor and a protest march in Onitsha, killing several people. In response to the growing protests, the government has increased Police and army patrols in the affected cities and towns across the South-East. However, members of IPOB and MASSOB have continued to agitate for the creation of a Sovereign State of Biafra and the release of their members.

SECTION FOUR

Causes and Analysis of Conflict

Based on comprehensive review of literature, news media reports and other secondary sources as well as analysis of feedback from questionnaires, interviews and discussions with stakeholders across the five states of the South-East, this report has documented a diverse list of recent and ongoing conflicts in cities and communities across the South-East zone. Although, these conflicts are different in terms of structure and scale, they all have potential for escalation and for negatively impacting the zone and the country's conflict profile. The range of documented conflicts include: farmers-herdsmen conflict; self-determination agitations and protests; chieftaincy, Eze-ship and town union leadership conflicts; communal land and boundary conflicts; cultism and criminality; drug abuse, addiction and arms trafficking; government policy-induced conflicts; resource-related (oil) conflicts; political thuggery and electoral violence. Tables 1 to 7 below present consolidated analysis of these conflicts including: locations, incidents and dates; causes; actors; impacts; interventions and the status of the conflict across all the five South-East states.

Consolidated Analysis of Conflicts in the South-East States

Table 1: Communal Land and Boundary Disputes

S/N	Locations/Incidents/ Dates	Causes	Actors	Impacts	Interventions /Status
1	Agho/Ogbo, Amekwuru, Umuelon, Obinetiti in Isikwe Achi LGA of Enugu state – 8 September, 2015	collection of electricity bill	youths	violent conflict	NSCDC intervened/ Resolved
2	Neke in Isi-Uzo LGA and Ukpopi in Igbo-Etiti LGA of Enugu state	Building of illegal structure	Neke and Ukpopi communities	Fighting and maiming, people sustained wounds	Security agencies (Police)/ Not resolved
3	Ajame Okpete Amodu community in Nkanu west L.G.A of Enugu state – 30th October, 2013	Greediness and sale of forest land	Edeh Friday and Okeke Nkwuo	cutting of forest trees and commercial trees	Police and neighborhood watch/ Resolved
4	Umuode and Orukwu communities in Nkanu East LGA of Enugu state – 2014	Land dispute, discovery of oil, Economic benefits and Youths, Elders, politicians, conflict Entrepreneurs	Youths, Elders, Politicians, conflict	Loss of lives and properties worth millions of naira. Hatred for each other, insecurity, economic losses, trauma, instability, fear and lack of progress.	Security agencies have intervened, Elder in council, past Governors, NGO, Neighborhood watch, etc. prominent indigenes such as Prof. Barth Nnaji, former minister of power, Ogbonaya Onovo, former Inspector General of Police/ Not resolved

5	Nsukka Asadu community of Enugu state – April 20, 2015	Sale of ancestral Ohe shrine	Traditional elders, chiefs and youths	Factions and cold war. Compromise of cultural value	Police, traditional institution, Elder-in-council/ Not resolved.
6	Ndibengwu and Umulakwa villages of Enugu state- 2013	Struggle for land and economic trees. The two conflict communities	The two conflict communities	loss of lives and properties.	Petition to the IG of police, the traditional rulers, state security (neighborhood watch), government and court/Not resolved.
7	Obodongwu Umumba Achi of Enugu state- 2013	Struggle for community land.	Youths, Elders, Kings of both communities.	Discord in relationship, continuous spending of money at the court of law	Court/Not resolved
8	Umuabor Amaeze and Ogbozara Isemale communities of Enugu state – 2016	Increase in price of cashew nuts and economic benefit	The communities in conflict	fighting and injuries.	Igwe of Opi-Agu in Nsukka, government, police to demarcate the original land boundary when the communities pay ₦15,000. each, but the Igwe of Amaeze, Igwe Kelvin, refused/Not resolved
9	Akuke in Enugu South L.G.A of Enugu state – since 2007 till date	fight for commercial sand	Two youths from Akuke	Injury, discord and cold war.	Traditional ruler of Akuke
10	Ikwuano and Osioma LGAs of Abia state and along the border with Akwa Ibom and Ebonyi states	Disputed boundary and farm lands	Youths	Food shortage as people are unable to access farms freely.	ADR mechanism was applied, Women prevented clashes by mapping out farming days in Ikwuanu and Osioma LGAs that works for everyone.
11	Ezza vs Ezaa-Ezillo community in Ishielu LGA of Ebonyi state – 2008 till date	Land ownership and right of residence	Community leaders, traditional rulers, youth	Deaths, injuries, destruction of farmlands, houses, displacement, distrust among the communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. State government interventions through peace talk, panel of enquiries. ii. Security and law enforcement agencies, iii. CSOs, NGOs. <p>The violence has reduced due to the presence of the security agencies; some of the displaced families have not been reintegrated; the two groups are still living in fear and distrust.</p>

12	Nkpogororo community in Afkpo North LGA of Ebonyi state – it took place between 2013-2015	Management of the community land	The politicians, Business-men, unions, executives (past and present) youths	Injuries, destruction of properties, detention of people in the police station, disunity in the community	State government intervention, security agencies, peaceful protest to the Government House; case in court. The gap is inadequate commitment of the peace process by stakeholders and the government/ Not yet resolved.
13	Ishiagu in Ivo LGA of Ebonyi state vs Umulokpa in Isiochi LGA, Abia state – 2015 -2016	Abduction of a youth from Umulokpa. Dispute for land and quarry sites.	Community leaders, traditional rulers, state government, local government councils, youths.	Deaths, destruction of properties, insecurity, distrust between the two communities	Both state Governments, through joint mission, including National Boundary Commission, Security agencies, and Traditional institutions. Partially resolved because of the existence of fear and distrust in the communities.
14.	Ngbo Community in Ohaukwu LGA, Ebonyi state versus Agila Community in Ado LGA, Benue state. The conflict has raged for many years till date	Land ownership and border disputes.	Community leaders, state governments, youths.	Deaths, injuries, destruction of properties including houses, farmlands, displacement of families, etc.	Joint meeting between the two state governments with the National Boundary Commission. Not yet resolved.
15	Ossemoto Community versus Oguta community in Oguta LGA of Imo state	Contestation over land title and ownership. Scarcity of land for farming	Youth, Elders, community leaders.	violent clashes marked by killings and maiming.	None recorded.
16	Osina Umualaoma, Arondiziogu and Umukegwu communities in Ideato North LGA of Imo state	Erosion, land boundaries	Youths, cultists, community leaders and contesting groups.	violent clashes marked by killings and maiming.	Federal and state government, traditional authorities, religious leaders, police and DSS. Government Erosion control, traditional committee, mediation and security intervention/Ongoing.
17	Ogbaku Community in Mbaitoli LGA of Imo state – since 1926	Boundary dispute between Nsokpo, Umukanma, and Umuduru villages	Youths and members of the clan group	limited violence.	Supreme court, Bureau for peace and conflict resolution, litigation and peace talks/Not yet resolved.

18	Ohekelem in Ngor Okpala LGA versus Umuekeugo in Abor Mbaise LGA of Imo state – since 1916	Clashes between members of Umuanum village in Ohekelem community and Umuekeugo ogbar community.	Youths and members of both communities		
19	Oraifite vs Ozubulu in Ekwusigo LGA of Anambra state – 2014 to 2016	Boundary dispute.	Youths	DSS prevented violent clashes.	DSS and state government through peace panel/Resolved.
20	Ikenga Village, Nkpor-Ogidi in Idemili LGA of Anambra state – 2012-2016.	Boundary dispute.	Youths of the two communities		The DSS and the state government/Resolved.
21	Amaikwo/Agulu Awka, Anambra state June and July 2016	Acquisition of land by state government without due compensation to the land owners	State government and youths of the community		DSS/Resolved through giving back some of the lands to the community
22	Akamanato village in Anaku community of Ayamelum LGA, Anambra state	Land dispute. Coscharis farm encroached on the community land when creating access road.	Community youths		Compensation was paid by Coscharis.
23	Nibo/Isiagu in Awka South LGA of Anambra state	Boundary dispute	Youths		Security Agents and state government/Resolved through land committee set up by state government.
24	Nando/Igbariam in Anambra East LGA of Anambra state	Boundary dispute	Youths president General and the state government.	Lives were lost	State Government security/Resolved.
25	Urualla, Umuejimofo and Urukpaleri Nawfia in Njikoka LGA, Anambra state – since 2007	Land dispute (acquisition of land without due compensation to owners)	Armed forces Nawfia youths state government.		Armed forces, Nawfia youths/Unresolved.

26	Ukwalla/Owelle Ukwalla/ Inoma, Owelle/ Inoma in Anambra West LGA of Anambra state	Boundary dispute	Youths of the three communi- ties		State government National Boundary Commission/ Resolved
27	Aguleri-Otu in Anambra East LGA of Anambra State and Odeke, Achono, Irira in Ibaji LGA of Kogi state – since 1927	Boundary dispute (fishing pond)	Youths of the communi- ties	killings going on	Security agents, Boundary Commission/ Unresolved.
28	Umuoba Anam versus Aguleri communities of Anambra state – since 2015	land/ Boundary dispute	Youths	State government and security Agency/ Resolved but may escalate	
29	Ukpo and Abagana communities, Anambra state – June 2016	Land dispute.	Prominent men sponsoring the youths from the two towns.	Constructing market on the land.	Security agencies/ the market will escalate conflict in the near future.

Table 2: Traditional Chieftaincy and Leadership Tussles Locations/Incidents/Dates

S/N	Locations/ Incidents/ Dates	Causes	Actors	Impacts	Interventions/ Status
1	Ogboji in Orumba South LGA of Anambra state	Leadership tussle for president general (PG)	Youths religious leader.	Youths alienation for 35 years and lack of develop- ment. No healthcare system, high mortality rate.	NGO (Kairos Solution Foundation), sensitization workshops, Mediation (ADR). Provision of free healthcare/ resolved
2	Nando and Ikemnando/Ikemifite in Anambra East LGA of Anambra state	Autonomous community tussle; leadership of chief priest	Youths, Igwe Ayaya and Oji	One life lost, many injured and people displaced. Affects all development activities in the community	Urgent intervention needed/ unresolved. The conflict will likely escalate if not resolved.
3	Ezinifite in Awka South LGA of Anambra state	Contest for president general of the town union	Ozo title chiefs, youths		Awka youths/ Unresolved. The conflict will likely escalate if not resolved.
4	Adazi-Nnukwu in Anaocha LGA of Anambra state – August 2015-March 2016	Town union leadership (PG)	Chief B.Enemuo, youths		State government/ resolved.

5	Nkpor in Idemili LGA of Anambra state – June 2015	Town union leadership	Youths, state government, interim management committee.	Tension in the community.	State government.
6	Onitsha south of Anambra state – July 2016	Market association leadership.	Patent medicine dealers, state government.		DSS/ Disagreement over relocation of drug market to Oba amicably resolved.
7	Obosi in Idemili LGA, Anambra state	Market leadership feud.	Mike Okonkwo and Benjamin Orji		DSS used persuasion, threat and peaceful agreement to de-escalate the tension/ resolved.
8	Aboji Village Oba in Idemili LGA, Anambra state – 2014-2016	Town Union leadership (PG)	Elders and youths	Several people injured	State security agents (SARS and DSS)/ Resolved in February 2016.
9	Uraukwu Community in Idemili LGA of Anambra state	Chieftaincy tussle	Chief Pius Ezedigbo and Chief Emeka Onuorah	Stalled peace and development in the community.	State government and DSS/ Resolved and Chief Emeka Onuorah giving certificate as the traditional ruler of Oraukwu
10	Orba Ofemili in Awka South LGA of Anambra state	Chieftaincy tussle	Youths		Security agency/ resolved.
11	Osumenyi in Nnewi South LGA, Anambra state	Chieftaincy tussle/Town union leadership.	Hon. Ukachukwu and Hon. Ifedi Okonna. Youth		State government.
12	Omor in Ayamelum LGA, Anambra State	Chieftaincy tussle	Chief Oanu Chidume and Chief Emma Okafor.		Town union, State Government.
13	Amanuke in Awka North of Anambra state	Chieftaincy tussle	State Government and community youths		NOA, DSS, Police
14	Mputu in Ogbaru LGA of Anambra state	Chieftaincy tussle	Youths		State government/ Unresolved
15	Adazi-Nnukwu, Anambra state	Chieftaincy tussle and Town union leadership.	Community members and youths.		Police and religious leaders.

16	Umuhia North, Aba south, Isiala Ngwa South, Ukwu East and Bende LGAs, Abia state	Creation of autonomous communities; Imposition by government; personal ambitions and other interests	Traditional chiefs, politicians and youths.	Respect among the people in the office of Eze is reduced	Meeting with the conflicting parties.
17	Ovoko Autonomous Community in Igbo-Eze South LGA of Enugu state – June 2015	Disrespect for culture and political agenda of creating autonomous communities to compensate loyalty	Traditional institutions, Elders, youths	No more integrity in the traditional institution. Loss of friendship and relationships (marriages). Factions and bitterness	Igwe Christopher Arua appealed the case at the Appeal court sitting in Enugu state, which is yet to decide on it/ Not resolved.
18	Ulunye Autonomous Community in Enugu state – June 2015	Lack of respect in the traditional institution and existence of factions due to politics. Igwe (Emmanuel Ugwu) and opposition factions to Igwe's authority.	Igwe Emmanuel Ugwu, Elders, youths and politicians.	The community lost their entitlement for bore hole due to kingship unrest and the stealing of drilling equipment. Loss of relationships.	Rev. Fr. Paul Obayi (Okunerere)/ resolved.
19	Akabor Community in Oguta LGA of Imo state	Creation of autonomous communities, contestation over provision of community constitutions, struggle for Ezeship throne.	Youths and community leaders	Violent clashes marked by killings and maiming	Intervention by State Government, Imo State Peace Corps, Police; utilized entreaties and held peace talks.
20	Mballa Agwa Community of Imo state	Intra-community clashes over Ezeship	Youths and community leaders of the two communities.	Limited violence.	Intervention by DSS, Imo State Bureau for Peace and Conflict Resolution.
21	Umuhu Community in Ngor Okpala LGA of Imo state – 2013-2016	Contestation over Ezeship throne, a former Eze was dethroned and replaced	Ezeship contesting candidate, their supporters, youth, government intervention	Violent clashes marked by killings and maiming.	Intervention by state and local government officials, DSS, police, religious leaders, NGOs/ CBOs. Deployed security agents; held peace talks, reconciliation meetings.

Table 3: Farmer-Herder Conflicts

S/N	Locations/Incidents/Dates	Causes	Actors	Impacts	Interventions/Status
1	Irete and Obinze Communities in Owerri West LGA; and Umuapo and Ihie Communities in Ohaji-Egbema LGA, Imo state	Cattle encroaching into farmlands, attacking of Herders herders,	Community youths and herders herdsman	Tension and fear of attacks	Leaders of the two communities, religious leaders and security personnel intervened by holding mediation meetings and peace talks.
2	Alike Community in Ikwo LGA; Amasiri, Uwana, Akpoha, Nkporogoro and Ohaizu in Afikpo North LGA, Ebonyi state.	Herders herdsman trespassed and destroyed farmlands; youth alleged that traditional leaders were compromised because they collected money from the Herders.	Community leaders, youths, women, Herders community.	Restriction of movement of the Herdsman, tension and distrust.	Leaders of both communities convened community peace initiative; relative peace achieved.
3	Umuoba-Anam in Anambra East LGA, Anambra state – April 2016	Confrontation over grazing of cattle on farmlands.	Farmers, herders herdsman.	Destruction of Farmland by cows.	Intervention by DSS, Police and other security agencies. Agreement was reached between the farmers and Herders Herdsman association (Miyetii Allah) to pay compensation on the destroyed farmlands.
4	Aguleri Community, Anambra state – April 2016.	Clashes over access to grazing.	Farmers, herders herdsman.		DSS, community leaders and Anambra State Government intervened and reached agreement between the farmers and herdsman.
5	Ugbenu Community in Awka North LGA, Anambra state	Confrontation over grazing of cattle on farmlands	Farmers, youths and herdsman	Injuries and loss of lives	Security agencies; resolution reached through agreement among stakeholders
6	Ifite Ogwari in Ayamelum LGA, Anambra state – January and February 2016	Grazing of cattle on farmlands.	Farmers and herdsman.		Security agencies and Anambra State Government. Governor set up a State Cattle Menace committee to investigate the recent clashes.

7	Umumbu Community in Ayamelum LGA, Anambra state – February 2016	Grazing of cattle on farmlands.	Farmers and herdsmen.	Destruction of Farmland by cows.	DSS and Anambra State Government intervened and reached agreement for the Herders herdsmen to pay compensation to the affected farmers.
8	Nando in Anambra East LGA, Anambra state – April 2016	Grazing of cattle on farmlands.		Destruction of farmlands; retaliatory attack on Herders at Ojana Farm Settlement; cows killed, 3 deaths and several injuries.	Deployment of military; peace meeting organized by State Government and Inquiry Committee established to investigate the matter; calm has returned to the community.
9	Umuhia South, Isi Alangwa North, Ugwunagbo, Umunneochi, Isiukwuato, Bende, Ohafia and Ikwuano LGAs of Abia state – frequently since 2015	Access to grazing routes and cultural differences between the farmers and herdsmen.	Herders herdsmen, farmers, chiefs, security personnel and women.	Tension; Setback of development projects; increased discrimination and prejudice between groups.	Local government held dialogue with all the stake holders and security operatives; Deployment of security agents to the communities; Investigation by Abia State House of Assembly.
10	Nimbo community in Uzo-Uwani LGA, Enugu State – April 2016	Destruction of farmland, crops, and economic trees, killings, maiming, rape, trauma and pollution of drinking water at the village stream, hates, ethno-religious resentment etc.	Farmers and herdsmen	Killings, maiming, rape, trauma and pollution of drinking water at the village stream, hates, ethno-religious resentment, etc.	Traditional rulers, women groups, security agencies, government and non-government.

11	Okpebe Amaodu in Nkanu West LGA, Enugu state – November 2013	Trespass and destruction of farmlands.	Farmers and herdsmen.	Rape, killing, trauma, fear, ethno-religious resentment, poverty, health issues.	Security agencies and other stakeholders; Protest by women of Enugu North and East Senatorial Zones against the herdsmen and proposed grazing bill; Protest by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) Enugu Chapter.
12	Ajuona-Ogbo Community in Uzo-Uwani LGA, Enugu state – May 2016	Destruction of farmlands.	Farmers and herdsmen.	Loss of lives and disruption of economic activities.	Traditional ruler intervened and report was lodged with Police and NSCDC; conflict is not yet resolved.
13	Ohani Amofu Nkerefi in Nkanu East LGA, Enugu state	Grazing on cultivated farm.	Farmers and herdsmen.	Destruction of crops; breach of the peace.	Intervention by the NSCDC and leader of herdsmen, leading to compensation of affected farmers.

Table 4: Self-Determination Agitations and Protests

S/N	Locations/Incidents/Dates	Causes	Actors	Impacts	Interventions/Status
1	Aba South and Ukwa West in Abia state – January 2016	Protest march by IPOB members	IPOB, security agencies	6 deaths; several injuries and arrests	Security agencies; no intervention by any independent community groups. IPOB members still aggrieved over the killing and detention of their members which will still escalate the conflict.
2	Nkpor in Anambra state – May 2016	Security agencies alleged attacked IPOB members while holding commemoration prayers in a church for heroes of Biafran War	IPOB members, youths, security agencies	Undetermined number of deaths, injuries and arrests	Security agencies; no intervention by any independent community groups. IPOB members still aggrieved over the killing and detention of their members which will still escalate the conflict.

3	Onitsha in Anambra state – May 2016	Confrontation between IPOB members and security agencies during protest march at Onitsha Head-Bridge	IPOB members, youths, security agencies	Some injuries; no deaths	Security agencies; no intervention by any independent community groups. IPOB members still aggrieved over the killing and detention of their members which will still escalate the conflict.
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Table 5: Oil-Related Conflicts

S/N	Locations/ Incidents/Dates	Causes	Actors	Impacts	Interventions /Status
1	Oguta 1, Oguta 2 and Agwa communities in Oguta LGA of Imo state	Youth restiveness, cultist activities, aggrieved over neglect by government and oil companies, struggle for superiority, control of oil royalties and other benefits, proliferation of weapons, external influence from neighbouring Niger Delta states	Youths, community leaders, oil companies and government officials.	Undetermined large number of deaths and injuries.	Intervention by local and state government, NOA, NDCC, security personnel (JTF), Imo State Bureau for Peace and Conflict Resolution and NGOs. Establishment of peace committee, peace talk/meetings/ summits, with youth and other community groups, security and peace enforcement/ Ongoing.
2	Awara, Obile, Umuapu, Obosima, Abacheke and Assa communities in Ohaji-Egbema LGA of Imo state	Youth restiveness, cultist activities and agitation for control of oil royalties and MOU with the oil companies. Manipulation of groups by oil companies.	Youths, community leaders, oil companies (such as Shell, Water Smith and Chevron).	Killing, maiming, mass destruction, sacking and exiling of entire communities and their leaders.	Intervention by local and state government, NOA, NDCC, security personnel (JTF), Imo State Bureau for Peace and Conflict Resolution and NGOs. Establishment of peace committee, peace talk/meetings/ summits, with youth and other community groups, security and peace enforcement/ ongoing.
3	Ochia community in Imo state – 2012-2016	Dispute between the youths and Water smith oil company over MOU and royalties.	Youths and the oil company.	Violent clashes marked by killing and maiming.	Intervention by local and state government, NOA, NDCC, security personnel (JTF), Imo State Bureau for Peace and Conflict Resolution and NGOs. Establishment of peace committee, peace talk/meetings/ summits, with youth and other community groups, security and peace enforcement/ongoing.

4	Obiakpu community in Imo State – since 2014	Dispute between the youths and Shell oil company	Youths, the community and Shell oil company	Violent clashes marked by killing and maiming	Intervention by local and state government, NOA, NDDC, security personnel (JTF), Imo State Bureau for Peace and Conflict Resolution and NGOs. Establishment of peace committee, peace talk/meetings/ summits, with youth and other community groups, security and peace enforcement/ongoing.
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Table 6: Cultism and Criminality Issues

S/N	Locations/Incidents/ Dates	Causes	Actors	Impacts	Interventions /Status
1	Enugu City, Enugu state – 2016	Cult activities in higher institutions	Students and cultists	Killing, criminality and fear in the academic environment.	Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS)/Resolved.
2	Institute for Management and Technology (IMT) Enugu, Enugu state – March 2013	Cultism and Electoral violence	Students and cultists	Death of security Officer	Police/Not Resolved.
3	Nike Grammar School, Enugu state	Struggle for superiority, oppression.	Students and cultists	Deaths and injuries; distraction from academic pursuits; drug abuse; arms proliferation; fear and trauma, rivalry, etc.	Government through establishment talent Hunt programmes, peace activities, sports and the intervention by the security agencies.
4	Oji-River, Enugu state – 2015	Criminality, drug abuse, vices, breakdown of law and order	Students and cultists	Violent clashes; destruction of properties.	Police/Quelled.
5	Actors Guild of Nigeria (AGN), Enugu state – 2014	Appointment of non-indigene of Enugu as the President of AGN, Enugu chapter, factions and struggle for power and economic benefit.	AGN executives, supporters and various factions.	Strife and factions which limits development, in the entertainment industry.	Past Exco of AGN, Police, court, Government, other stakeholders.

6	Umuahia North and South LGA, Abia state – since 2012	Cultism by youths	Youths and security agents	Fear of youths by law abiding citizens; drug abuse	Security agents are working very hard to bring law and order to Umuahia and Environs/Not yet resolved.
7	Aba and Umuahia in Abia state – since 2012	Economic hardship leading to a life of crime.	Men, Women and Children.	This has caused enmity between affected people and suspicion over new face and people.	Security agencies are trying to clamp down on the crime while CSOs are in engaged in sensitization/ Ongoing.
8	Ebonyi State University (EBSU); Federal University Ndufu-Alike Ikwo (FUNAI); Akanu Ibiam Federal Polytechnic, Uwana and Federal College of Agriculture, Ishiagu, all in Ebonyi state	Cultism	Students in the tertiary institutions and school drop-outs.	Harassment, intimidation, injuries.	Interventions from the school authority and Student Union. The gap is the inability to constructively engage the students, lack of peace advocacy in the school/Not frequent.
9	Ukana in Ezeagu LGA of Enugu state – 2016	Kidnapping of Rev. Fr. Celestine Aniakor and Demand for N10m ransom	Kidnapping gangs	Fear, insecurity and tension in communities	Police, DSS, NSCDC/ Not resolved
10	Igbo-Eze South LGA of Enugu state – 2015	Kidnapping of high school principal, Mr. Samuel Uroko	Kidnapping gangs	Fear, insecurity and tension in communities	Police, Neighborhood Watch

Table 7: Indigenes-Settlers and Segregation Conflicts

S/N	Locations/Incidents/ Dates	Causes	Actors	Impacts	Interventions/ Status
1	Opi-Agu Community in Nsukka LGA of Enugu state	Cultural segregation between indigenes, slaves and outcasts.	Majority of betters of the community; traditional leaders and institutions.	Displacement, loss of identity, discrimination, hatred, fighting.	No specific intervention/Not resolved.
2	Achi Community in Oji River LGA, Enugu state	Segregation and confrontation between Osu and other groups.	Majority of betters of the community; traditional leaders and institutions.	Displacement, loss of identity, discrimination, hatred, fighting.	No specific intervention/Not resolved.

The summation of the findings from the foregoing analysis of the various conflict strands indicates that the main sources/types of conflicts in the South-East states are: chieftaincy and community leadership conflicts; communal land and boundary disputes; and the farmers-herders' conflicts. Also, these three main sources of conflict and, indeed, the other less prevalent or widespread conflicts could all be categorised and attributed to the political, social and economic dynamics in the communities and states under focus, as well as the larger Nigerian society. A disaggregation of the causes, actors and impacts of these various conflicts reveals that there are ongoing struggles and tradeoffs between individuals and groups in their bids to access and retain political, social, economic rights, privileges and opportunities. For instance, while discussing the nature of the Ezza and Ezillo communal/sub-ethnic conflicts, Mbah and Nwangwu (2014) note that: "unlike many multi-ethnic communities in Nigeria, it seems reasonable to assume that identity-based conflicts would be minimal in such a setting of ethnic homogeneity. To the contrary, Ezza and Ezillo have been engaged in explosive struggles dating back to the beginning of the last century". Thus, corroborating the position that the underlining factors for many of the conflicts that have manifested in the South-East could be traced to the struggle for political, social and economic leverage. Invariably, the trajectories of these conflicts had often depended on the availability and capacity for conflict management and resolution by government, non-government and other grassroots stakeholders.

SECTION FIVE

Impacts of Conflicts

As typical of most conflicts, the impacts of the conflicts identified or encountered in the course of the current SCA field exercise in the South-East have been diverse, multi-level and multi-dimensional. While the most apparent impacts are the physical and physiological ones that are apparent in terms of destruction of properties; injuries and deaths in affected communities, there are other less visible impacts that could be sociological, psychological, economical, developmental or structural. In addition, some of the impacts could be immediate, temporary and short-term, while others could be fundamental, permanent and long-term in nature. All of the conflict cases recorded in communities across the South-East have had one or more of these impacts on the affected people, institutions and communities.

The following are some of the perceived and reported impacts: injuries, deaths and other human impacts; damage and loss of properties; displacement and disruption of communal life; fear, anger, suspicion, hatred, animosity and negative social relations; social trauma and gender marginalisation; food shortages; economic hardship; disruption of market and other livelihood and economic activities; disruption of school, religious and other social activities; destruction of farmlands, crops and livestock; pollution of drinking water and damage to other communal facilities; arrest and detention of protagonists and sometimes innocent people; curfew, restriction of movement and other security measures; breach of peace and social harmony; increased intergroup distrust, disunity, discrimination and prejudice; lack or reversal of developmental activities; impeded governance and delivery of public services; loss of respect among the people for traditional rulers and institutions; growing crime and social vices among the youth; lack of communal cohesion and creation of factions and contending groups; court cases; agitations and protests.

SECTION SIX

Responses/Interventions

It is a natural process that some individual and institutional stakeholders would respond and intervene whenever there is a conflict situation. The response could be because such individuals or institutions are interested parties or simply based on their desire to promote peace and reconciliations as independent objective third parties or outsiders. Some of the identifiable parties or entities that typically respond or intervene in conflicts include: levels of government; political office holders; political parties; security agencies; traditional leaders and institutions; religious leaders and institutions; non-government and civil society organisations; youth groups; and women groups.

For the purpose of analysis, conflict interventions are typically divided into three tracks: intervention by government as Track One; interventions by non-government and civil society organisations as Track Two; and intervention by international organisations as Track Three.

Track One: Government

The various levels of government - federal, state and local - and their respective agencies have responded to conflicts in a number of ways. In almost all the conflict cases identified in communities across the South-East zone, there was evidence of responses and interventions by the different levels of government officials and agencies. Typically, where the conflict had not escalated to violent confrontation, government responses and interventions had been usually through the “good offices” of the appropriate government officials (i.e. ward councillors, local government chairpersons, commissioners, the governor), or through the processes of mediation and persuasion by the appropriate government agencies – like ministries of local government affairs, offices on peace and conflict resolution, notable among such is the effort of the Imo state Bureau for Peace and Conflict Resolution, etc. Once the conflict becomes violent and widespread, the first and immediate form of intervention has usually been by the police and other security agencies – who often mobilise to stop the violence and protect lives and properties. Thereafter, other government officials and agencies (from all levels, federal, state and local government, as appropriate) may intervene to provide support, reassure the affected communities of their security and to begin the processes of investigation, dialogue and mobilisation towards resolution and reconciliation between the affected parties. The following are some of categorizations of government interventions:

- (a) The innovative creation of the Imo state Bureau for Peace and Conflict Resolution is laudable. Also, the Bureau’s MoU with the IPCR resulting into the creation of Peace Advocates and Peace Ambassadors should be given full

- support to deliver its mandate of deepening peace and reconciliation through mediation and advocacy;
- (b) Security intervention – intervention by the police and other security agencies to stop violence, protect lives and properties and maintain the peace;
 - (c) Relief intervention – response by statutory and other government agencies and public officials to provide immediate medical, material and financial support to those affected by conflicts;
 - (d) Political intervention – intervention in form of visitation by government officials and agencies to provide political assurances and to persuade the conflicting parties. In some cases, these interventions could be taken further to include establishment of commissions and panels of inquiry or mediation by different levels of government, depending on the nature and extent of the conflict in question. This type of intervention could also be via introduction of specific social or economic policy, programmes or projects that are aimed at addressing specific needs or issues identified as the relative causes of the conflicts in question, or determined to be incentives for the removal of the sources of the conflicts;
 - (e) Social interventions – responses by different levels of government that are aimed at reconciliatory and preventive education and enlightenment of the conflicting communities with the immediate and long-term objective of moving the people away from the orientation and mindset that precipitate or foster conflict towards embracing dialogue, mediation and other peace building options.

In the course of the SCA field research across all the five states in the South-East zone, there was evidence of mixed responses to the various conflicts as well as interventions by the government agencies and officials. While the local, state and federal government institutions and officials do regularly intervene in the various conflicts, in most cases, the interventions have often not been based on consistent protocols or strategies. Stakeholders had indicated that, too often, government has tended to equate interventions by the police and other security agencies as all that are required in terms of government intervention. Only a few states have established agencies and enduring processes for ongoing and consistent interventions and resolutions of the arisen conflicts in the long-term.

Track Two: Non-government Organisations

Non-government and civil society organisations typically utilised pre and post conflict intervention mechanisms. Generally, the advocacy and enlightenment activities of these organisations seek to engage with groups and communities based on conflict signals and early warning in order to prevent conflict. Also, once conflict is in progress, non-government interventions usually kick-in, after some sort of ceasefire and peace have

been achieved through appropriate security interventions. During the postconflict stage, the range of intervention options available to non-government organisations include: relief intervention, mediation, resolution and peacebuilding, education and training and ongoing advocacy and enlightenment. These modes of intervention are essential in supporting track one interventions by government and also ensuring the long-term peace building and healing among the affected communities.

The SCA field research found evidence of intervention by many non-government organisations in many cases of conflict that were assessed. Some of the non-government organisations involved in conflict intervention in the South-East Zone, include:

- (1) The Nigerian Red Cross Society
- (2) Partners for Peace (P4P) in the Niger Delta, Imo State Network
- (3) Youth for Peace Initiative, Abia state
- (4) Kolping Center, Abia state
- (5) EGODEL Foundation (Women Empowerment), Enugu state
- (6) International Rescue Centre (INGO), Enugu state
- (7) Grassroots Community Development Initiative (GRACODEV)
- (8) Justice, Development and Peace Department
- (9) Youth-Reestablishing Values
- (10) Kairos Solution Foundation.

Track Three: International Organisations and Entities

International organisations and entities do respond to or intervene in conflicts under specific conditions, but such interventions are rarely direct interventions. Although IPOB had attempted to appeal for intervention by the European Union (EU) and other international bodies in the ongoing agitations for Biafra, there was no evidence of specific response or intervention by any international organisation in any of the conflicts in the South-East. What the SCA field research found is that some international organisations such as UNDP, World Bank, DFID, USAID, etc. have indirectly (through local non-government and civil society organisations) funded and/or implemented various conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives across the country including some of the states in the South-East Zone. However, such interventions have often been limited to undertaking policy research and advocacy and providing training and other conflict and peacebuilding supports to the target groups, including youths, women, religious leaders, traditional leaders, etc.

SECTION SEVEN

Conclusions

7.1 Gaps in Literature

There is evident lacuna in the subject-matter literature in terms of the highly restricted presence of empirical or data-based field evidence, generally on the broad subject-matter of conflicts and also on the much narrower, but equally significant, dimensions of the specific manifestations of conflict across the states of the South-East geo-political zone of Nigeria. Other than the limited series of the periodic SCAs that have so far been prosecuted, the available research monographs that are in-depth and robust in data and information content have been rather few and far between. Thus, there is a continuous need for the undertaking of rigorous field researches that are founded on composite methodology and ideally able to generate data and information to enable much-deeper understanding of the complex scenarios of multilateral conflicts in a developing, and highly diverse country, like Nigeria.

7.2 Gaps in Responses/Impact

Although the range and diversity of stakeholders who have been involved, or who have responded or intervened, in the various conflict identified in the course of this research is wide and commendable, several stakeholders have pointed to gaps in the nature of responses to, and interventions in, the various conflicts. In some cases, there is in fact no record of independent interventions beyond the responses by the security agencies. The following are some of the specific gaps identified:

- (1) Equation of security deployment to government response and intervention - which leads to relapse and resurgence of conflict upon the departure of security personnel;
- (2) Lack of integrated early warning mechanisms, limiting prompt and coordinated response by statutory and community stakeholders;
- (3) Poor conflict response and intervention policy articulation by governments, especially at local and state levels;
- (4) Inadequate conflict management knowledge by security personnel leading to inappropriate or excessive use of force in conflict situations;
- (5) Lack of coordination among statutory and non-government responding agencies and organisations;
- (6) Lack or inadequate political mechanisms for “good office” intervention by the local and state governments;
- (7) Inadequate resources for civil society organisations to provide viable responses and support services.

7.3 General Conclusion

The growth of internal migration, since the end of the Nigerian Civil War, has progressively transformed the South-East zone into an increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-cultural region – especially, given the demographic configuration of the major urban centres, like Aba, Enugu, Owerri, Onitsha, Abakaliki, Awka, Umuahia, Nnewi and Nsukka.

Also, expectedly, the growing urbanisation and multiculturalism in the region have had impacts on the general conflict climate in the various states within the zone. In addition, rapid urbanisation and high population density in the major cities and towns within the zone have also tended to throw up the challenges of inadequate infrastructure and social services – leading to a whole range of social, political, security and conflict-inducing issues, including: population settlement congestion, inter-communal and inter-ethnic competition, unemployment, cultism, criminality, etc.

This zonal report has specifically observed that most of the conflicts in the zone have been perennial in nature, and often variously related to: land ownership and boundary disputes, chieftaincy and community leadership tussles, political contestation and thuggery, and youth agitations.

However, it is further noted in the report that such familiar types of conflicts have recently been joined by other more violent and insidious conflicts that are direct products of the following action tendencies, namely: cultism; vigilante operations and criminality; crop farmers-herders interface; people's perceptions about and the reactions to government policies; oil-related triggers; and self-determination agitations and civil protests.

Significantly, it is also additionally advanced in this report that the observed changing trends in the South-East zone can be closely correlated to the larger national structural and political contestations and negotiations that have emerged, ever since the inauguration of the current democratic governance arrangement in 1999.

Nevertheless, this zonal report has also specified that the incidence and prevalence of various types of conflicts have not been uniform across the states in the zone; but, rather, that they have been different and sometimes unique in the order of progression from one state to the other.

By way of taxonomy, the structures of these conflicts, as manifested in the South-East Zone, have broadly encompassed the social, economic, political and security issues and considerations.

Also, the consensus of stakeholders had affirmed the trending pattern that the South-East zone is witnessing gradual multiplication in the types and complexity of conflicts as well as escalation in terms of the frequency, intensity, impact and diversity of actors and players that have been involved.

Selected conflict case studies were adjudged to be significant in terms of importance, severity, impact or persistence of the conflict occurrences in the South-East zone. These are:

- (i) the Ezza and Ezillo Communal Land Conflict in Ebonyi state;
- (ii) the proliferation of chieftaincy (Eze-ship) tussles in communities in Imo state;
- (iii) the ubiquitous crop farmers-cattle herders' conflict in Nimbo, Uzo-Uwani LGA of Enugu state;
- (iv) self-determination agitations and protests in the major centres across the South-East Zone;
- (v) oil-related and cultism conflicts in the oil-producing communities of Oguta and Ohaji-Egbema LGA, in Imo state;
- (vi) town unions and community governance conflicts in Imo state;
- (vii) inter-state boundary conflict between Ishiagu Community in Ivo LGA of Ebonyi state and Umulokpa Community in Isiochi LGA of Abia state; and
- (viii) conflicts resulting from unpopular Government policies in Imo state.

A disaggregation of the causes, actors and impacts of these various conflicts has generally revealed loads of ongoing struggles and tradeoffs between individuals and groups in their bids to access and retain political, social, economic rights, privileges and opportunities. Thus, the underlining factors for many of the manifested conflicts in the South-East have been variously traceable to the struggle for political, social and economic leverage. Invariably, therefore, the trajectories of these conflicts had often depended on the availability of, and the capacity for, conflict management and resolution by government, non-government and the other grassroots stakeholders.

Finally, as typical of most conflicts, the impacts of the conflicts identified or encountered in the course of the current SCA field exercise in the South-East have been diverse, multi-level and multi-dimensional. Practically, all of the conflict cases recorded in the study communities across the South-East have had one or more combinations of specific adverse impacts on the affected people, institutions and communities.

SECTION EIGHT

Recommendations

- (1) That, there should be consistency in government's deployment plan of security agents to conflict zones in order to engender peace and tranquility and to evade resurgence.
- (2) That, Government should put in place integrated early warning mechanisms in order to aid prompt and coordinated response by statutory and community stakeholders.
- (3) That, Government should put in place an efficient and effective conflict response and intervention policies, especially at local and state levels. This would help in reducing conflict rate to the barest minimum.
- (4) That, security personnel should be trained adequately on conflict management and technique application. Adequate knowledge on this would enable them apply the right technique on a case-by-case basis rather than the use of force in all conflict situations. This will in turn reduce conflict rates/escalation.
- (5) And, that, there should be a synergy between government agencies and non-governmental agencies on conflict situations and resolution.

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South-South Geo-Political Zone

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List of Acronyms

ABA	Adaka Boro Avengers
ACCORD	Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACN	Action Congress of Nigeria
AKSG	Akwa Ibom State Government
ANPP	All Nigeria People's Party
APC	All Progressives Congress
BSF	Bakassi Strike Force
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CNL	Chevron Nigeria Limited
COR	Calabar Ogoja Rivers
CRISE	Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity
CRSG	Cross River State Government
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DSS	Department of State Services
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ENVIRUMEDIC	Environmental and Rural Mediation Centre
EPZ	Export Processing Zone
EWS	Early Warning System
FFP	Fund for Peace
FGN	Federal Republic of Nigeria
FNDIC	Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities
GNP	Gross National Product
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
IPI	International Peace Institute
IYC	Ijaw Youth Council
JTF	Joint Task Force
LGA	Local Government Area
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MOSOP	Movement for the Sovereignty of the Ogoni People
NAOC	Nigeria Agip Oil Company
NDA	Niger Delta Avengers
NDGJM	Niger Delta Greenland Justice Movement
NDPVF	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NDRA	Niger Delta Reformed Avengers
NDV	Niger Delta Avengers
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIIA	Nigerian Institute for International Affairs
NIPOST	Nigeria Postal Service
NLC	Nigeria Labour Congress
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NOA	National Orientation Agency
NSCDC	Nigeria Security Civil Defence Corps
NULGE	National Union of Local Government Employees
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDP	People's Democratic Party
RNC	Royal Niger Congress
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SPDC	Shell Petroleum Development Company
TNCs	Transnational Companies
UCT	Ugborodo Community Trust
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United Nations Agency for International Development
WOYCAP	Women, Youth and Children Advancement Programme

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Executive Summary

The South-South geo-political zone is made up of six states, namely: Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers. These six states are part of the nine states that constitute the Niger Delta region which is also the most strategic for the Nigerian economy and society. These six states are therefore regarded as the core of the Niger Delta region because of their strategic geographical location and overall economic importance to the Nigerian nation (Willink; 1958). Not only is this geo-political zone a major economic site with proven richness in hydrocarbon deposits (natural gas and oil mineral), it has indeed been the economic heartbeat of Nigeria for over six decades (Gandu, 2011; Ugbomeh and Atubi, 2010). Given its location on the Gulf of Guinea, the South-South geo-political zone is also a very important global energy source, economic and security hub to Africa and the world.

Plate 1: Nine Oil Producing States of Nigeria's Niger Delta Region



Source: Adapted from Iaccino (2015)

The South-South region began to be severed first from the former Eastern and the Mid-western regions through the 1967 round of state creation that was informed by the twin issues of Nigeria's Civil War and the agitations by the southern minorities for their own separate identities from the major ethnic groups. The South-South region began to take its present political shape through subsequent exercises in states' creation that were engineered by the Babangida and the Abacha military régimes.

Plate 2: Core Oil-producing States in Nigeria



Source: <http://www.nairaland.com/2709471/list-oil-producing-states-nigeria>

Five of the six states in this South-South geo-political zone which are thus: Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Delta, Bayelsa and Edo states in that order; contributes about ninety percent of oil production in the country. These five states therefore consists the core of the oil producing states in Nigeria. Together, these five states contribute between 85 and 90 per cent to Nigeria's oils earnings as can be seen in Plate 2.

With fluctuation and fall in the price of crude oil (Cordesman, 2016); the drive towards a reduction on the level of dependence on oil as well as continuous discovery of oil by other nation-states including Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Chad, among others; the preeminence of this region began to dwindle. While the fall in the prices of oil is a global phenomenon, it has created a special kind of economic and security nightmare for Nigeria (Amnesty International, 2005, 2009) as well as other oil producing nations such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, and others. Fall in oil prices in these countries manifests in budget deficits (Abounoori et al, 2014), and subsequent adoption of some economic measures to defeat recession. Nigeria, in addition to suffering from the fall in crude oil prices, has, like Angola, a violent insurgency to contend with in its South-South geopolitical region (Amaize et al, 2016) described the effects of renewed violent conflict in the Niger Delta on the Nigerian economy and society thus:

The attacks by the militant group have also pushed Nigeria's crude oil production to the lowest in 20 years, as Chevron is said to have shut-in about 90,000 barrels a day of output because of the impact on a joint-venture offshore platform that serves as a gathering point for production from several fields. Niger Delta Avengers in the last five days blew up Nigeria Agip Oil Company, NAOC, and Shell Petroleum Development Company, SPDC, facilities in Delta and Bayelsa states for ignoring its demand against carrying out repairs on their damaged pipelines until Buhari deemed it necessary to address their demands. Chevron Nigeria Limited got the first "reprisal" for a similar defiance. Nigeria's current oil output has knocked her from being Africa's number one oil producer and 13th in the world, to third in Africa behind Angola and Algeria while maintaining a likely 19th position in the world... This has become a clog in the wheel of the country's 2016 Budget, signed into law with a projection of 2.2 million bpd of oil production at \$38 per barrel. What this implies is that with the continued drop in oil output, despite the increase in international oil price, implementation of the 2016 Budget is gradually becoming uncertain.

The 2016 SCA exercise took place amidst renewed militancy driven by the new Niger Delta Avengers whose activities led to sharp drop in oil production as oil production from 2million to about 900,000 of barrels of oil per day (Reuters, 2016; Amaize: et al, 2016). Nigeria's plummeting oil production predicament thus:

Nigeria's oil production has fallen by at least half a million barrels per day (bpd), Reuters calculations show, because of militant attacks in the Niger Delta region, most claimed by a new group calling itself the Niger Delta Avengers. The group has made multiple attacks on infrastructure belonging to oil majors Shell, ENI and Chevron, vowing to reduce output to zero in what is typically Africa's largest oil exporter... The attacks have forced companies to declare force majeure on Bonny Light, Brass River and Forcados crude oil, and in May helped to push Nigeria's oil production to 22-year lows. ExxonMobil's force majeure on Qua Iboe . . . state oil company NNPC's spokesman Garba Deen Muhammad said Nigeria's production had now dropped below 1 million bpd. "Our position before the attacks was 2.2 million bpd, but the attacks have affected production to the tune of about 600,000 to 700,000 barrels, so our current production level is hovering around 1.6 million bpd (Reuters, 2016).

Directly connected to the foregoing is the fact that the 2015 general elections and their circumstances have served as a major trigger for the unfortunate resumption of insurgency in the South-South region (Iaccino: 2015). Some have blamed unguarded statements of politicians who are members of the victorious All Progressives Congress (APC) for the heightened level of insurgency. Many others have blamed the resurgence of militancy on the moribund Amnesty Programme for ex-militants which they claimed was poorly conceived and implemented. Yet others attribute the re-emergence of Niger Delta militants to rising micro-nationalism and consciousness in the South-South region for a restructuring of the Nigerian federation. This is especially so after the loss of the presidential elections by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan who came from the same region. Inevitably, the insurgency by the Niger Delta Avengers, Niger Delta Reformed Avengers, Adaka Boro Avengers, Bakassi Strike Force and others dominated this year's SCA for the South-South.

Besides being the region that is the hotbed of oil insurgency and violent conflict in Nigeria, other types of conflicts such as youth restiveness, chieftaincy tussles, land disputes, gangsterism, political issues, and economic conflicts also dot the conflict landscape of the South-South region. Like other studies have confirm (Gandu, 2011); in the course of gathering data for this study, research participants and informants were of the opinion that the South-South region is 'boiling' because since the inauguration of the Willinks Commission in 1957 and other national palliatives that came after it have not been able alleviate poverty in the Niger Delta region or resolve the peculiar problems that the oil industry has brought to the region. Most research respondents were of the opinion that the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) has not been sincere and ready to act on the tons of official recommendations that have been made in the past on how to address the continuous genuine agitations that sometimes degenerate into criminality and banditry in order to exert economic concessions from the Federal Government.

One other finding of this study rests on the stereotypical tendency by the Federal Government to dish out financial largesse to militants. According to respondents, this tendency on the part of the Federal Government has created the impression that criminality pays; because militants and the so-called negotiators have always smiled to their banks due to large sum of money being made available by the FGN to placate the restive region. The dimension of the state Governments also showed during the fieldwork where it was observed that the performance of the governors in terms of entrenching good governance leaves much to be desired. Although, pockets of projects were observed, the general feeling is that if the electoral politics in the South-South had not been compromised to the extent that ex-militants are its new face, a much higher level of development would have been delivered to the people of the region. The poor development climate that has attracted the multinational companies, Niger Delta elders and the Federal Government into the divides and the blame game is perceived as real. This perception is made worse by the high cost of executing developmental projects which is four times higher in the South-South than any other part of the country.

Injustice, criminality, underdevelopment and ethnicity are issues to interrogate in analysing and understanding the nature, character, impacts, failure and/or success of previous interventionist efforts for resolving conflicts in the Niger Delta area.

Oil exploration activities in the South-South geo-political zone, otherwise known as Nigeria's Niger Delta region, date back to 1903 (Phia, 2006, 2009). Active exploration began between 1907 and 1908 (Jones, 1981; Njeze, 1978). Large-scale commercial prospecting, extraction, production and exportation, however, began in 1957. By the 1970s, Nigerian oil industry became the main revenue generating source. Percentage of crude oil in Nigeria's total exports which was 2.7 percent in 1960 jumped to 96.1 percent in 1980 and rose to 98.2 percent in 1996. Similarly, estimated crude oil revenue accruing to Nigeria that was #2.4 million in 1960, rose to #12,354 million in 1980. By 2000, it stood at #1,340,000 million. It got to a high of #6,700,000 million in 2007. Accrued

estimated revenue from crude oil from 1958 to 2006 in Nigerian stood at about #29.8 trillion (Gandu, 2011: 10-11).

Prior to the discovery of Nigeria's crude oil potential, the country depended very heavily on the production and exports of agricultural products, mainly palm produce, cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, and hides and skin, as well as coal and tin mining (see Table 1).

Table 1: Nigeria's exports (in thousand tons): 1919-1960

Article of trade	1919	1929-1931	1933-1937	1951	1960
Palm oil	80	129	150	150	183
Palm Kernels	192	255	326	347	418
Ground-nuts	45	151	242	141	333
Cocoa*	20	53	91	122	154
Crude Oil					847
Tin ore			15	12	10
Columbite			1	2	2

*Cocoa exports are calculated in thousand pounds sterling.

Source: Frynas (2000) page, 10

The transition from agrarian to an oil economy came at a time Nigeria was transforming from autonomous regions into increased centralisation of administration and decision-making. This process was reinforced, first by civil war and later by long years of military rule that resulted in pre-eminence of the federal government over other lower tiers of government (Gandu, 2011: 11). Oil revenue contributed an estimated #3.63 trillion or 80 percent to total government national budget in 2008 alone. Non-oil sectors which include manufacturing, agriculture and solid minerals contributed N910 billion or 20 percent (Alabi, 2008:63). These figures reflect the pre-2007 levels (Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 2005:55-80). Oil and gas reserves in the Niger Delta region have been estimated at 25 billion barrels and 130 billion cubic feet respectively. With 5284 oil wells, 10 gas plants, 275 flow stations and 10 export terminals, crude oil production stood at 2.45 million barrels per day in 2007 (Alabi, 2008: 63). It is therefore no surprise that Nigeria's budgetary and developmental programs have been predicated on the gas and oil industry (Ibeanu, 2002a:164; USAID, 2006:2).

Nigeria's oil and gas reserves are found in the relatively simple geological structures along the Niger Delta coastal region of the South-South (*see* Plate 3). This makes the region highly susceptible to both on-shore and marine pollution through oil spillage and blowouts, especially in the exploration and production (E&P) stages. This combines with continuous flaring of associated gas (Nnadozie, 2001) to compromise subsistence economies (Gandu, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2006, a, b, c).

The economic benefits of crude oil exploration and production in Niger Delta have indeed been so overwhelming that, the adverse ecological devastation and environmental

deterioration and consequent social impact on OBCs are sometimes ignored (Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: 2000). Amnesty International (2005) also lamented, thus:

Niger Delta communities see little of Nigeria's oil revenues. Vast stretches of the region have erratic electricity supplies, poor water quality, a few functioning schools, health care centres, post offices . . . The only visible government presence in many parts [of the region] is a heavily-armed security apparatus [to protect oil installations]. The government provides very little infrastructure, public works or conditions conducive to employment (pp. 2-3).

Studies (Gandu, 2011; Ojatorotu, 2009 and Orogun, 2009) conducted on the region holds that perceived neglect of the Niger Delta region by the Nigerian state on one hand and sustained environmental degradation resulting from oil extractive activities continue to generate more militant protests and threat of outright rebellion against the Nigerian state. Continuous agitation for resource control, internecine squabbles over revenue allocation formulas and derivation principles, incessant disruptions of crude oil pipelines has transformed the South-South region into a regional and international energy security risk.

Decades of exploration of crude oil without accountability by the Nigerian state and Transnational Companies (TNCs) combined with repressive military dictatorships and corrupt political ruling elite cumulate to truncate the social and economic wellbeing of oil bearing communities in the South-South region. This situation has been described simply as the “amazing paradoxes” (UNDP, 2006: 25) of “want in the midst of plenty” (International Crisis Group, 2006a:19-22) or “paradox of plenty” (Orogun, 2009:259).

Ibaba and Okolo (2008) assert that the poverty in the Niger Delta fertilises the ground for violent conflicts and that the lack of capital for small and medium scale enterprises (SME) operators makes the situation worse.

Oil extractive activities engendered the collapse of the local economies of oil bearing communities and led to economic distress. The consequences are that the indigenous people are forced to give up their traditional occupations due to the destruction of land, rivers and fishes that are sources of subsistence in rural Niger Delta.

Loss of subsistence occupations, displacements and loss of means of livelihood, implies that people have been alienated from their means of production without the provision of any significant or viable alternative means of survival. The situation is better appreciated if placed vis-à-vis the failure of Nigerian government palliatives to alleviate poverty in the Niger Delta since the inauguration of the Willink Commission in 1957. Similarly, efforts by Shell to engineer community development in oil bearing communities which began in 1960 are yet to succeed in 2016. This paradox contributes to increased youth restiveness, armed militancy and counter official violence by the Nigerian state. As the vicious cycle of violence runs its course, a quarter of the youth mobilise to put

up violent resistance by sabotaging oil flow production as a way of pressing home their demands for better education, employment and social infrastructure in the region.

Massive oil revenues accruing combined with the centralisation of political power at the federal level; meant a rapid increase in the intensity of the struggle for access to, and control of the state power at the centre. Gandu (2011) submits that the unfolding social and economic effects constitute the taproot of violent conflicts, militancy and insurgency in the south-south region of Nigeria. These are some of the critical issues that generate and sustain violent conflict in the South-South region of Nigeria.

Plate 3: Oil Infrastructures in the Niger Delta



Source: Watts (2008), page 34.

Another dimension of the volatility of the South-South region is the phenomenon of migration. The polluting effects of oil extractive activities in the Niger Delta have necessitated what Opukri and Ibaba (2008:189) describes as “migration or relocation, either voluntary or involuntary”. Their study found that coping mechanisms adopted by people range from forced to voluntary migration in search of ‘greener pastures’, because in some cases, there are no alternative means of livelihood. Migration as a coping strategy takes two major forms: rural-urban migration and rural-rural migration. Those who move to the urban areas with the hope to become members of the proletariat or be employed in the public or private sectors of the economy do not always find jobs, either because jobs are not available or they are not employable due to low level of education or lack of skills. Consequently, many end up doing menial jobs, and largely settle in the slumps on the fringes of society or become easy recruits for militancy, kidnapping and oil bunkering agents along the coastal region of Nigeria into states like Ondo, Lagos, and Ogun. Some of these migrant youths from the south-south region are generally described

as 'Ijaw boys' in the South-West region of Nigeria. Another dimension of the problem faced by rural-urban migrants within the South-South region is that they are not recognised as internally displaced persons, probably because they do not live in camps as is the case with the North-East region of Nigeria.

On the coping challenges of those who migrate from one rural community to another, Opukri and Ibaba's (2008:188-189) study found that in most cases, fishermen in the South-South who migrate in search of productive fishing grounds in other parts of the zone tend to create settlements in their host communities and are clearly seen as aliens, although some do integrate with host families or communities. Opukri and Ibaba brought in a new dimension to the debate on coping strategies of oil bearing communities by stating that "even those who remain in their communities are internally displaced". The issue is that even if people do not migrate from the South-South, the loss of subsistence occupations and other forms of social and economic disturbances resulting from oil extractive activities constitute elements of internal displacement. Given the problems associated with occupational disorientation, people in the South-South live in their own communities, as if they are aliens or alienated (Opukri and Ibaba, 2008:189).

Unlike other regions of Nigeria, the situation in the Niger Delta region of the South-South is compounded by the influx of expatriate oil workers into the region and their comparatively higher income. While it is difficult to find reliable demographic data on the scale of poverty in the Niger Delta region; studies (Gandu, 2011; Hassan et al, 2002) have established that the presence of oil TNCs and oil workers contributes to skyrocketing of prices of basic services beyond the reach of the indigenous population whose source of living is largely subsistence.

The first attempt at providing an idea on poverty in the South-South region came from the colonial era in the form of the 1957 Willink Commission, which perceived the Niger Delta to be below the national average in terms of income and economic means (Willink, 1958). A World Bank (1995:2) study states that GNP in the Niger Delta was below the national average of \$280. The UNDP (2009:40) Human Development Report on Nigeria shows that the South-South political zone has both the highest Human Development Statistics as well as per capita income, yet majority of the populace live in abject poverty, uncertainty, restiveness and recurring violent conflict.

Methodology

Six researchers working along two consultants were engaged with each researcher covering a state in the South-South Zone. The researchers conducted Key Informant Interviews (KII), administering questionnaires and conducted Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Recorded materials, audio, visual and documentary evidences were carefully accessed and analysed to arrive at some of the findings of this study. The team applied due research ethics to be able to come out with this report which we hope will be a major way forward in entrenching a peaceful environment in the zone.

Background to Conflicts in the South-South Zone

The South-South region of Nigeria has a long history of conflicts wrapped up in agitations. It even predates the country's attainment of independence in 1960. The Willink Commission of pre-independence was constituted essentially to address issue of minority in the defunct Eastern Region but got its mandate expanded to include the minorities in the West and the Northern Regions. One observes that notwithstanding the jaundiced views of the British, the thrust of the report especially with respect to democratic principles, was capable of altering the history of the South-South if it had been accepted and implemented in the country. Like its successor-reports, Ogomudia report, Mitee committee's report, Niger Delta Master Plan, the 2014 Report of the National Conference, among several other reports, have not been truly acted upon by successive governments that empanelled them.

The starting point in explaining the prevalent of conflicts in the zone is the propensity of the Federal Government to set up committees but it is always short in implementing their reports. In this context, some have argued that the Nigerian nation knows what to do but has just refused to act expeditiously when it is required. Of course, when actions are not taken or delayed, there is the likelihood that the propellers of previous conflicts are going to be encouraged to instigate more conflicts in the future or deepen the existing ones.

The South-South environment has been witnessing elections but no democratic elections have been observed to have taken place. Votes are only allocated to deadlier violent agents to allow for peace to reign. Electoral officers are easily compromised to return electoral victories to the most violent groups to escape with their lives. Therefore, when you hear Comrade Oshiomhole talking about toxic votes, or President Buhari lamenting the absence of any credible elections in the Niger Delta of ever Professor Saliu talking about bogus votes, one should know what they are talking about. Not voted for by the people, a governor may really not identify himself with the popular causes. This explains why the governors, with their fattest federal allocations, are being doubted as the credible bridges between the Federal Government and the militants.

Little surprise, there is a wide gap between what people desire from their state governments in terms of development and what the governors have been able to put on ground. Beyond the excuse that project execution is very expensive in the zone due to the harsh terrain, there is nothing else justifies why there is little on ground to address the mountain of domestic challenges that are facing the zone.

The tendency by the governors to take on national programmes on behalf of their professional associations or their parties has been criticised as being both wasteful and insensitive. Seen the level of profligacy in government, the youths are determined to get their own share of the national cake by resorting to all manner of schemes, including criminality, especially having seen their senior fellows who are now fabulously rich with

financial resources after a few months of harassing the government at all levels. There is nothing to really de-motivate them

In other words, the Niger Delta region is too much conducive for perpetuating criminality and gets rewarded for it. If anything is wrong with the Yar'Adua's Amnesty Programme, it was its bent of rewarding criminality, as argued by some informants. This regime of criminality was further entrenched by the Jonathan's government who assigned some security functions to ex-militants whose fortunes ballooned to the envy of other militants who then wished and prayed for their own opportunity to profit from criminality. Thus, the cycle of militancy continues.

Not only are ex-militants prosperous, perhaps, this explains why President Buhari considers them as economy colonisers. Their overall influence and power levels have increased. Some of them have sponsored persons into governorship positions and on some occasions, as we have experienced in Rivers state, are very prominent in Local Government Councils and the State Assembly. Given the extent of reward being enjoyed in Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa states, it would be hard to convince the budding youths that militancy with a dose of criminality is not profitable. Indeed, some of them are serving as Special Advisers in Bayelsa and Thomas Government Ekpemopolu, alias, Tompolo, is said to be the godfather of the incumbent Delta state governor. It would be difficult for anybody to talk the ambitious youths out of militancy and criminality when the reality indicates that they are substantial levers for prominence.

Also compelling is the glaring failure of the Nigerian state to demand for social responsibility from the foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria. Beyond the shenanigans of the public office holders and the youths in the South-South, the apparent accord between the Federal Government that is utterly rent-seeking and the foreign oil companies that are givers of rents, has not promoted a situation in which the Nigerian state is seen, defending the rights of the oil bearing communities in terms of enforcing global standards. Steadily and consistently, the environment is being threatened with little and inadequate concern being shown by the multinational companies. This lack of respect for global standards in oil exploring and the resort to the muzzling approach by the Federal Government, instead of it being the protector of the rights of the people of the Niger Delta, have been a long-standing source of conflicts in the area.

Naturally, security has broken down in the South-south region. Apart from the *Boko Haram*-infested areas in the northeast, the Niger Delta region serves as another centre of insecurity with bombing, vandalism, kidnapping, robbery, cultism and assassinations on the increase. Apparently informed by the feeling that the military approach is the best way to react to the militancy in the region, there is heavy militarisation of the South-South. At times, security officials lobby to be posted to the region because of the doses of criminality that take place in the region and the economic opportunities that are created by the various criminal acts. Hardly can oil theft that is rampant in the region

be taking place without the security forces being critical points in the chain of criminality, aiding and abetting the rape of the nation on the expectation of good returns. Some security operatives, not minding the threats they face while working in the zone, are in the habit of lobbying to be posted to the South-South because of the opportunity of getting rich quick, even if it means compromising their security functions. How else can we explain open solicitation for security escort assignments from all manner of people, including the criminals by the sections of the official security apparatus?

Arising from the incidence of compromised official security network, it was whispered during the course of gathering data for this study that, in order to restore peace to the Niger Delta, all the current security personnel serving in the region must be posted out. While this may be too sweeping a generalisation, it, nevertheless, underscores the complex web of insecurity in the South-South region and the attendant difficulty of entrenching peace in the region. Professor Sam Ibaba, however, observed that without the presence of security forces in some areas in the region, certain communities would find it difficult to live and exist.

Electoral conflicts are also important. They have been triggered by the chain of inconclusive elections in Rivers and Bayelsa states. With no representation in the Senate, one can understand the conflicts that are building up around elections in Rivers state. Reckless statements have been noticed in the political camps. One political actor during the last re-scheduled elections in Rivers state, in July 2016, advised the electoral officials who were posted to Rivers state to write their will because they may not return home alive. This, in our view, was reckless and raises questions on the quality of leadership that is being offered in the region. On the part of the Federal Government, the statement credited to the president to the effect that he would only favour more the areas where he garnered votes in 2015 in his administration, is being latched upon by some politicians to incite the Niger Delta people against the President. Partly because of propaganda or outright misperception, the President is on the lowest rung of popularity across the South-South; his commencement of the cleaning-up exercise of the Ogoniland is being considered a token gesture (taking place in a corner of Rivers state) which has not gone deep enough to reverse the negative perception of the people against the President.

Quite unfortunately, the social fabric in most parts of South-South is breaking down. Elders in Delta, Rivers, and Bayelsa and to some extent, Akwa Ibom, have virtually lost their grip on the youths who are seeing the elders as selfish individuals that are only interested in their own pockets. This has led to palpable tension between the youths and the traditional rulers. The situation is, however, slightly different in areas with strong traditions like Urhobo and Itsekiri in Delta state, and to some extent in Calabar, capital of Cross River state.

Contrary to the perspective of the Federal Government that portrays the traditional rulers as the first line of support for quelling riots or unrest in the Niger Delta, there is a

perpetual tussle between them and the youths, leading to consequential loss of influence by the traditional rulers. Indeed, in some oil communities, the youths have registered themselves as deserving of royalties and the job allocations from the multinational companies. Thus, the spoils of office, even if being obtained illegally, have also turned succession politics among the youth organisations as a do-or-die affair especially in Delta state where the use of all means is fair and tolerated, and the substance of the spoils of office has created a situation of perpetual engagement between the youths and the traditional rulers in more volatile states in the region.

The cleaning up exercise being embarked upon in Ogoniland is surprisingly compounding the mutual distrust and tense situation among some communities in its neighborhood, such as Ekpro and Kporghor. Lives and property have been lost. The trigger was the cleaning up which some communities felt should not only be limited to the Ogoniland. Indeed, Governor Nyesom Wike has openly made a case for the cleaning up exercise to be extended to other communities in the state. We even got it on good authority that some dubious Nigerians have designed an employment form arising from the cleaning up exercise for some unsuspecting Nigerians to fill for a fee. There is therefore, the need for some enlightenment programmes to inform the people about what the cleaning up entails to ensure peaceful coexistence in the geopolitical zone.

There are people in the South-South who still nurse a grudge against the result of the 2015 presidential election that declared candidate Muhammadu Buhari as the winner. Bombing of oil facilities, vandalism, etc. are then being done to protest the loss of their brother, Goodluck Jonathan. Strengthening this belief is the perspective that the bombs that are being detonated in Delta and Bayelsa states may have been planted before the election, believing that former President Jonathan would not accept defeat so that the trigger-happy Niger Deltans could shut down the nation through its economic nerve centre. However, the decision of President Jonathan to call on Muhammadu Buhari to congratulate him after the presidential election changed the essence of the agreement and the plan that was targeted at crippling the nation through the detonation of bombs.

The South-South region is characterised by rivalry borne out of the over-compensation by governments at all levels of the Ijaw militants which Professor Ibaba observed to constitute about ninety per cent of the militants in the Niger Delta. It has been contended that the award of pipelines' protection contracts to predominantly Ijaw elements was viewed as an elevation and patronage at the expense of militants from other nationalities. Indeed, the wealth of Tompolo to the extent of him having a warship which he procured ostensibly from the proceeds of the contracts awarded to him by President Jonathan has polarised the militants as some voices among Urhobo and Itsekiri militants who were shortchanged in the deal by the ex-President are somehow always professing support for the Buhari government, while most Ijaw main militants are clearly opposed to it. The question is: how do you proceed to disarm Tompolo with all his arsenals, some of which the military cannot boast of? This over-patronisation of Tompolo and others like Asari

Dokubo, Ateke Tom, etc. whom we learnt has shielded his load of support though still popular in the air, is promoting a feeling that these ex-militants, especially Tompolo, hold the key to peace in the Niger Delta. There seems to be a convergence of opinion on this among some of our key informants.

It was further revealed that the appointment of Brigadier Paul Boroh by the Buhari government has not gone down well with most peace agents in the region. Although an indigene of the area, he is generally being seen as an 'outsider' who least understands the dynamics of the struggle and the violence that characterises it. His best credential is his military background, which in the view of many, is not what is required to manage the complex web of militancy, insurgency, criminality and genuine desire for rapid development that are wrapped up in the Niger Delta crisis. So far, the company he keeps and his preferred approaches have not gone far enough to douse the tension and make him a soothing voice in the region.

Inevitably, all his pronouncements, until recently, showed the preference for the hard option. Compounding General Boroh's assignment was the statement credited to government's sources that the Amnesty Programme would come to an end in December 2015. This pronouncement, which was derived from the timeframe for the programme, struck the wrong chord of the critical stakeholders in the Niger Delta who, having lost the presidency to the North, considered it offensive and a declaration of 'war' against the people of the South-south. The heightened violence that has been witnessed in the region in the recent past can easily be attributed to the insensitive statement. Although both General Boroh and the President have since been making soothing statements to the effect that the Amnesty Programme would continue; the deed had already been done; violence has reached a crescendo and a threat of secession being waived by some militants such as Adaka Boro Avengers, Niger Delta Avengers, among others. What all this suggests is that public officials should always be circumspect in engaging the public especially on the Niger Delta issues given the widespread perception of the regime of injustice that the region is exposed to that has promoted the widespread belief in the region that militants are pursuing a just cause.

Admittedly, the concept of ungoverned space has much more relevance to most parts of Nigeria but it is more naked and real in the Niger Delta region. Some areas have been forgotten as the reach of governance does not reach them. This is essentially what has ballooned the popularity of Tompolo. Left out of the protective hands of government, most communities have turned their face to the good Samaritans who are not in short supply especially the militants who have been providing public goods to the people. As observed during the field work, Tompolo has established some essential institutions that cater for the wellbeing of the people. Scholarships are being provided, hospitals have been built and other social services are being rendered. The rendering of public goods has made some militants to be extremely popular to the extent that people deride the government whenever it claims to be searching for some of them. Ironically, the

state security forces that claimed to be searching for them are always found providing security for the same set of people being wanted by the state. This is the dilemma of the current war against militants in the Niger Delta.

It was discovered that the concept of ungoverned space has been the lot of the Bakassi people who were relocated after the 2002 International Court of Justice that ceded the area to Cameroon. What people had expected after the judgment was that the Nigerian state would move in especially after accepting the verdict with its robust participation in the Mixed Committee that produced the Green Tree Agreement that was signed by the Obasanjo government without it first being domesticated by the National Assembly. Contrary to the expectation, both the Nigerian State and the Cross River state Government have not done all the needful as benign neglect define the existence of the Bakassi area that falls under the jurisdiction of Nigeria. As nature abhors a vacuum, the Bakassi Strike Force, a supposed militant group, is galvanising support for Bakassi people, believing that the ceding of Bakassi to Cameroon would, one day, be re-visited.

Not long ago, Professor Ben Ayade, the Cross River state Governor, shed tears after observing the poor state of things when he visited the area. He had to make a token donation of 3 million Naira for the upkeep of the inhabitants of the area. Conflicts abound in any area of perpetual neglect; the Bakassi area is not different. More fundamentally, militants who cannot withstand the heat being turned on them by the military have relocated to Bakassi to ply their trade and that has raised the level of conflict generation in the area. Kidnapping, raping and other vices have been on the ascendency. As the United Nations has observed, Bakassi people may soon become a stateless area as the utter neglect of the area is more evident.

Failure of the Federal Government to make a clear distinction between genuine agitators who are fighting for the reversal of the backwardness of the Niger Delta and the pure criminals who are out to feast their net has been a major issue fuelling violent conflicts in the South-South. From the mindset of the government, the agitators are criminals or economic colonisers who must be so treated in routing them out. President Buhari leads us into the mindset of the government on the Niger Delta crisis. He asserts that:

the objective (of militants) is to colonise the country economically by sabotaging oil and gas installations. We are trying to speak with their leaders to know how many groups there are and we are also working with the oil companies.

Mention was made of the military onslaught against Boko Haram members and a comparison between the two especially the near effectiveness of the military operations. But as advised by the French President, Françoise Hollande, the Federal Government should be careful in further militarising the region. These words of caution have also resonated in Chief Olusegun Obasanjo's advice on the way forward for the Niger Delta crisis.

To be sure, the agitation for resource control is popular and resonates even in the criminal activities of some of the militants who seemed to have pushed away the genuine agitators or relegated them to the background. The impression needs not to be formed that the government has not made efforts to reach out to the militants, including deploying the governors in the region, traditional rulers and some vocal elders. However, our field experience suggests some vital elements who hold the key to peace in the region are either not being engaged or consulted half-heartedly. Chief Edwin Clark is somehow acceptable perhaps to the Ijaws, but the South-South plays host to so many other ethnic groups with definite leaders and their militant wings. However, our observation made earlier in this report about loss of respect by the leaders is still an issue as there are a plethora of leaders most of whom are based in Abuja or Port Harcourt with little roots in the theatres of conflict that are parading themselves as friends of the Federal Government. This represents the dilemma of the Federal Government. Quite surprisingly, militancy was a factor in the installation of governors in the core South-South states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers state.

Conflict Actors: Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities, Incentives

Several actors and interest are involved in the Niger Delta crisis. Youths across the region are active in the various conflict issues. They are, at times, being used by politicians to achieve their political objectives. This was observed to be more the case in virtually all the states with Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers leading the pack. They are an integral part of the political processes in these states. Their main roles are to serve as thugs and candidates for elections as a form of reward.

There are also traditional rulers who are outwardly concerned for peace by interceding on behalf of governments but are being considered as economic agents and forces. They often clash with the youths on sundry issues such as payment of royalties, succession politics to the thrones and on political plain. Their interests are basically three: to ensure peace, get spoils of office, and recognition from political office holders most times without any consideration for how they assumed political power.

In some of the states such as Cross Rivers, Edo and Rivers, some robust peace mechanisms have been worked out. In some instances, as we have observed in Edo, the traditional institution is key and prominent in resolving conflict. A peace committee being spearheaded by government exists in Cross River state. On the part of Rivers state, an Amnesty Programme has been announced for the cult gangs who are ready to surrender their weapons. Unlike the Federal version of the Amnesty programme, this does not entail payment of stipends to cult gang members but rather the ex-cultists are to be rehabilitated through empowerment and skills acquisition programme.

Politicians represent another category of conflict actors. They are always present in conflict situations either directly or otherwise. Politicians in Rivers state are now active where all the senatorial seats remain vacant and efforts are being made by INEC to fill

them and other legislative seats at the Federal and the State Assembly levels. Normally, the interest of any politician is to contest and win an election for him/herself or his/her party. Governor Nyesom Wike is determined to win the elections for his party while the former governor of the state, Chibuike Amaechi, who is a serving Minister in Buhari government, is also desirous of winning all the seats for his party. It was observed that the disagreements that now dominate the relationship between two Ikwere brothers has given birth to so many conflicts as the gulf between them widens on daily basis on any conceivable issue that has to do with Rivers state.

In terms of capacities, the youths have the capacity to inflict injuries on the state as the easy access they have to the sea is an advantage in shipping all manner of weapons to the states. There is little to cheer in the efforts of the somewhat compromised official security forces at apprehending the importers. The horrendous security climate in the zone is easily as a result of too many ammunitions that are in circulation for wrong uses. Wanton killings, maiming and other vices have become the price being paid by both the state and the zonal political classes that had facilitated the shipment of unlicensed weapons in the first instance. Regrettably, the Nigerian State has shown terminal weakness in stemming the tide of non-state actors that are rivaling it in terms of instruments of coercion. Other governmental organs such as some public office holders who rely on the youths for their survival have also contributed to the enhanced capacities of the youths and other conflict entrepreneurs that abound in the South-South region. Apparently informed by the felt needs of the people of the region, only a few voices exist to speak against the disturbing level of militarisation of the region. Militants are generally perceived as the fighters for the rights of the Niger Delta people; champions of struggle to get the entitlements of the region for it. A respondent speaks for the militants and justifies their activities. He maintains that:

the militants are fighting a just cause. I will not say they have done anything wrong. The environment is polluted, while the allocation coming to the region is minimal and not equal to what is taken from our land.

Encouragement is coming to the conflict generators and its sustainers because no one has really been punished for taking on the state. People seem to have forgotten about the 'Ogoni nine' who were killed by the Nigerian state under General Sani Abacha. With some of the militants sitting in one of the State Assemblies and others serving as advisers and godfathers to some political office holders, there is plenty of incentives to instigate conflicts and wrap them up under the rubric of agitation for resource control. The Amnesty Programmes are other incentive packages to pardon militants and cultists without them asking for them. Cultists who have killed, maimed, robbed and raped without repenting are being begged to come forward and enjoy the government's largesse and sin no more. This, contrary to the general assumption, was not what had sustained the peace under Jonathan. The perception that one of them was in power who must be supported and the wanton deployment of financial resources to some forces in the South-South swept the multifarious crises in the region under the carpet and the subsequent loss of economic

opportunities under the Buhari government up-scaled the level of violence, perhaps to restore the unearned financial reward regime that was witnessed under President Jonathan.

Although recently both Kingsley Kuku and General Boroh have spoken glowingly about the Federal Amnesty Programme, many more youths are being encouraged to take to criminality with the hope that they can be pardoned some day without them asking for it. The payment of stipends and sponsorship to acquire skills (both at home and abroad) are contrary to the expectations of the Amnesty Programme, thus motivating many more youths to become militants.

In most of the states, governments are hand in glove with the militants. In both Bayelsa and Rivers states, militants are usually deployed during elections. Therefore, as thugs to politicians, they perpetually enjoy protection as long as nothing rocks their relationship. In situations where governments have literally forgotten some communities such as Bakassi, the conflict agents have assumed the role of kings. Little surprise, apparently because of cover for criminality due to its neglect, militants from other parts of the Niger Delta region are migrating to the area to raise its conflict profile without the likelihood of being apprehended.

Unfair governance practices as we observed in virtually all the states especially in Akwa Ibom where the Oron area that produces oil is not being noticeable in the distribution of governmental amenities. The agitation of the area for governorship seat is yet to be realised under the current republic in Nigeria. There have been tensions in the area that are accumulating. The same applies, to some extent, to Ijaws and Itsekiri in the Delta state. The more grievances are not redressed, the more the likelihood of incentives being given to start a conflict or escalate the existing ones.

Conflict Dynamics: Triggers, Scenarios/Episodes

Every conflict has its own triggers, so also are conflicts in the South-South region. Resources especially oil and gas are major issues in understanding the conflict landscape in the region. As one of the rich wetlands in the world, the South-South as a major part or core of the Niger Delta that is rich in oil and gas. Nigeria is the sixth largest producer of oil and one of the largest deposits of gas in the world. These two finite resources are being preponderantly derived from the five states of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo and Rivers states than any other zone in the country. Akwa-Ibom is the largest producer of oil. It was followed until recently, by Bayelsa that has been displaced by Rivers state due to the activities of the Avengers in the state.

The availability of oil in large quantities and the inexplicable dependence of Nigeria on oil receipts have been historically serving as a major trigger for conflicts in the region. The country as at today relies on oil sales to the tune of about ninety per cent to finance her annual budget. In some quarters, the flurry of activities that are aimed at resolving the insurgency in the South-South were borne out of the drastic fall in the prices of oil

at the global market not any long-term perspective of the Niger Delta crisis. In the literature, the country is one of the weakest links in OPEC due to her high level of dependence on oil revenue.

Succession politics is another trigger of conflicts. If the perception about the cycle of compromised elections in the South-South is anything to go by, seasons of political succession have always been occasions for conflicts to take place. This is a recurrent decimal in virtually all the states. Indeed, the last gubernatorial election held in Edo state on 28 September had to be postponed to the new date of 28 September because of the suspicion that the election might end in an inconclusive election as a result of the interests that it had generated and the do-or-die mentality of the political gladiators in the state.

The 2008 Amnesty Programme contributed to the sleepless nights that the Buhari government is facing in the Niger Delta. The pronouncements made to the effect that the programme would end in December 2015 and that the militants would be visited with military action as was done to Boko Haram, both have given prominence to the Niger Delta Avengers and other militant groups to upscale their level of insurgency partly in protest against the Buhari government and more because of the loss of economic lifelines extended to some leaders of the ex-militant groups in the region.

One can also not forget that the perceived financial returns that the traditional rulers get from their mediatory roles in appealing to the militants from governments has encouraged division among them on one hand, and between them and the youths on the other. Most traditional rulers in the region are always preferred by the Federal Government. Some of whom have been staying more in the Federal Capital, Abuja, or the capitals of their states with all the comfort and patronage that are associated with staying in such areas. Suspicion is therefore, strong that they may not be genuinely concerned about sustainable peace in the region.

Youth conflicts are rampant in the South-South region especially in Delta state where some youth organisations demand and get royalties and job allocations from the multinational oil companies, in addition to the royalties which these companies pay to the Federal Government and taxes to the state governments. This happens, however, where the traditional rulers have lost some respect from their people. Financial reward has been observed to trigger conflicts and sustain them. In some of the states especially Delta, the herdsmen and militants have struck a deal where the militants will kidnap and hide them in the remote areas where herdsmen live and whatever ransom taken will be shared. Sharing, at times, has brought about some disagreements leading to violent conflict. In Cross River and Edo states, reported cases of herdsmen clashing with the farmers and criminal gangs were reported, all informed by the apparent weakening of the Nigerian State to monopolise the instruments of coercion.

Land disputes that could not be resolved by the traditional institution often leads to violence. Some other times, as we observed in the Ogoniland, court judgments on land and chieftaincy disputes have not been strictly obeyed by the disputants. This, coupled with the assumed naira rain that would accompany the Ogoni clean-up exercise, have turned communities around Ogoni against one another, leaving in its wake, many deaths, destruction of properties and some measures of displacement of people and outright occupation of communities by the military. We must also not ignore the brutality of the military in razing down communities that were suspected to be harbouring the wanted militants. While military operations may be necessary, their not being conducted in line with the rules of engagement has created a pool of sympathisers for the militants who easily read oppression and suppression to such military efforts. The need to retaliate military offensive often leads to reprisal attacks back and forth. Payment of compensation by Shell to communities as recently witnessed in Gokana Local Government Council has been a major cause of conflicts in the area. The compensation for all the communities went without major hitches but the one meant for a section of Boro communities in the Local Government Council took a turn for the worse as allegations and counter-allegations of the misapplication of the funds rent he air with the traditional chiefs locked on in a battle with the youths on the matter.

Impact of Conflicts

The rampant conflicts that have been taking place in the South-South geopolitical zone have produced many impacts in the zone. In some instances, markets have been closed and inter-communal relationships strained. There are camps in Rivers state for internally-displaced persons who have had to flee the scenes of conflicts. Communities have been deserted in Ukpella area of Edo state. Government facilities destroyed and people's sources of livelihood destroyed and this has compounded the high poverty levels in the region.

Of great significance is the deployment of sophisticated weapons which easy access to the sea has guaranteed. They are in the nature of bombs that are being detonated at will around oil facilities. Multinational oil companies in Bayelsa and Delta have had to stop production in compliance with the threats of the Niger Delta Avengers and the failure of the Nigerian state to secure sites of production and oil facilities. Shell, in particular, has had to stop its production with the threat of withdrawing from the Niger Delta region due to its volatility. Huge sums of money are being spent by the Federal Government and the respective state governments in ensuring that peace prevails in the region.

The social system has broken down in some of the states to the extent that not much fidelity is now being shown to the traditional institutions and the elders who the Federal government often relies upon to stem the violence in the region. Cultism is on the rise and gangsterism is an entrenched culture in the zone especially in Rivers state, a menace the state government is trying hard to overcome with considerable level of fear that it

might not succeed in its declared Amnesty as the hands of government are fingered in the menace. Nothing shows this more than the reliance on persons that were suspected to be 'cultists' that were led by the Rivers state governor in shielding the arrest of a judge by the Department of State Services (DSS) in Port Harcourt on 8 October, 2016.

Militants due to their perception by a segment of the political class as champions of popular agitations, not minding their violent teeth, are being seen as wealthy people who people worship and adore. They have been giving back to their respective communities through their acts of generosity. The implication is that there are other future militants who, having seen the power and influence levels of the current militants, hope to be like them in the future. This dimension creates a frightening security climate in the zone, as there are likely to be generations of militants, insurgents and cultists and this gives the impression that all the stakeholders must deepen their concern and work concertedly to change the unpleasant future scenario of insecurity in the region.

Weapons are freely available to people without minding the official conditions under which they could be held. Huge amount of weapon litters the landscape of the South-South which calls to question the role of the security forces deployed to the area. The Rivers state government through its Amnesty Programme hopes to disarm the cultists, militants and insurgents but the entrenched culture of violence with its associated relative access to ammunitions, make one to doubt its success. If the Federal Amnesty that has lasted for eight years has not succeeded in disarming the militants, the concerned state government, definitely, has more battle to do, not minding its complicity in the arms deal and deployment. We doubt if any peace can return to the region without a successful disarmament programme. While on the field work, we came across distressing information about teenagers having access to weapons with which they terrorise the people, unhindered. Consequently, militarisation is not a wishful thinking but a fact of life in most parts of the turbulent zone.

While the Federal Government believes and relies on the military to whip the militants in the region to toe the line, there are concerns on how this can be done, as incessant military operations have, on one hand, produced devastating effects in terms of sacking some communities on the pretext of pursuing the militants, but also have raised the consciousness of the people on the real motives of FGN and this has hardened the militants in continuing to engage the Federal Government, and the oil companies.

The Federal Government is therefore, being taken to task by the United Nations and the western countries generally on the level to observe human rights in the internal security operations of the security forces. Beyond the fact that the international community is wary of continuous military operations in the South-south, there are Nigerians such as Professor Wole Soyinka who believes that the right approach has not been found by the Federal Government in tackling the heightened security concerns in the zone. Governor Seriake Dickson also shared the same perspective during this year's memorial lecture for late Diepreye Alameiyesigha at Amassoma on 10 October, 2016.

Nigerian-state has been woken up on the reality of having to diversify the economy to make it less dependent on oil for revenue. Some activities such as the new roadmap for agriculture, raising taxes and other measures, are being taken, but the verdict of the World Bank is that it is all motion without movement, as the required level of seriousness is not yet shown. This is quite a distressing verdict which the Nigerian state should view seriously.

Ultimately, oil is still the commanding height of the economy, accounting for about ninety per cent of the Federal revenue, the bulk of which comes from the Niger Delta region. Insurgency in the region has, however, forced down the production level from about 2.2 million barrels to 900,000 barrels per day, and loss of huge revenue to all tiers of government, as barely little is available for sharing in a distributive and consuming economy such as ours. For instance, in the month of July 2016, all the tiers of government shared the sum of #493 billion, a far cry from what they had shared when all was well with the oil sector. Not only was the oil revenue dwindling, the foreign reserves as at the same month was \$30.03 billion.

Indeed, the current economic recession in Nigeria is largely caused by the vagaries of the oil-based economy that has been enlivened by the South-South Zone. Two major steps that are required in this regard are to stem the tide of insurgency in the zone and the aggressive pursuit of diversification of the economy. It must be noted that the continued insurgency in the Niger Delta partly created the conditions for the creation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), as the US believed and still believes that Nigeria lacks the capacity to bring an end to insurgency in the Gulf of Guinea. The goal of Africom therefore, is to make the whole of Africa safe for more American penetration. This development had queried Nigeria's leadership role in 2007 when it got started. One observes that the external image of the country is worse now with the demonstrable inability of the country to contain the crisis in the South-South. The perception of a peacekeeper who cannot heal thyself is more apt and accurate for Nigeria in her ongoing war against insurgency especially in the Niger Delta region and *Boko Haram's* infested areas.

Responses/Interventions

There has never been a time that the South-South zone, given its inclination towards insurgency, has not been responded to in terms of interventions. The history of interventions in the zone predates the attainment of Nigeria's independence in 1960. After the independence, there have been recorded attempts to wade into the Niger Delta issues now essentially instigated by the exportation of oil and the heavy dependence on it by the country.

Civil approaches or what was generally considered non-violence approaches, characterised the agitations in the region for resource control and political objectives realised with the ascension to office of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan in 2010 as the Acting President of Nigeria

after the death of President Umar Yar'Adua on 5 May, 2010.

In the immediacy especially after the 2012 SCA, there have been interventions to respond to the intermittent series of crises in the region. At the levels of governments, one can note the following:

- (a) **Amnesty Programme:** The Federal Government has been using the amnesty programme that was expected to terminate in December, 2015, as a way of addressing agitations against injustice and in favour of resource control in the region. Recently, however, there have been calls for total control of the resources located in the zone, political restructuring and secessionist agitations though not a popular demand. Through the continuation of the Amnesty Programme started in 2008, youths are being sent for empowerment programmes both at home and abroad to learn skills such as aircraft piloting, engineering, etc. A stipend of 65,000 Naira is paid to each ex-militant who has embraced the Amnesty Programme.

Disarmament is another major component of the programme, though snail-speeding, because of the excessive arms in circulation in the South-South geopolitical zone. Opinion, however, differs on the efficacy of the programme. There are some who hold the view that the whole concept of amnesty is a bribe which addresses the symptoms of a disease, not the disease itself. There are others who share the conviction that it is the sustainer of the peace regime in the zone.

The Rivers state governor, Nyesom Wike, has equally embraced the amnesty programme, which was declared for the cult in the state. His own version of amnesty is distinguishable from that of the Federal in terms of non-provision of stipends for the militants and cultists. His emphasis is on empowerment programmes. The belief is that once the militants/cultists are granted amnesty and giving skill acquisition training, they can join the rest of the community by contributing their own quota to the development of their communities.

- (b) **The thrust of the military:** At the Federal level, the belief in the military has always been exhibited by all successive governments in the country. This got to its height under the Abacha military régime which had cause to kill some Ogoni persons because of their agitations for resource control. Currently, under the Buhari government, no one is left in doubt about the preferred official option which is to crush the militants through military operations. However, the cautious views being expressed by some critical stakeholders are the only thing that is restraining the government in going all out for it.

Meanwhile, there is heavy presence of the military in most of the states. Some communities have had a taste of the military engagement while on some other occasions, the military had been attacked and some of the military operatives killed in the process. Our verdict is that the presence of the military is still

necessary but there is the need for new rules of engagement to discourage a tendency where the military will be part of the issues to be resolved in the Niger Delta region. Already, the jail break at the Police Headquarters in early October 2016 in Yenagoa that enabled militants to escape, is raising issues about the complicity of the security forces in the overall containment policy of the insurgency in the South-South Zone. All the audible voices in the region are of the opinion that the scale of the military engagement needs to be reduced to allow for a genuine dialogue to take place between the government and the militants on how to resolve the Niger Delta crisis.

- (c) The issue of dialogue is also being waived by the Federal government. But the mutual suspicion that exists between them has not made the efforts of the governors who have tried to broker peace to be seen as much of the way forward. Elders and some traditional rulers have also tried their best in promoting conversation between the Federal government and the militants.
- (d) Judicial interventions: These are other forms of responding to the conflicts in the South-South Zone. Conflicts on chieftaincy matters across the region have on some occasions found their way to the courts. On some occasions, judicial pronouncements have done the magic, while on some others, they have escalated the conflicts. Sometimes, unresolved chieftaincy and land disputes have triggered cult activities and given birth to political conflicts. The Ogoni area is noted for the resort to the legalistic approach which is barely respected.
- (e) In some of the states such as Cross River and Edo, there are institutions that are charged with the responsibility of settling conflicts. In Edo state, for instance, it is called the peace and conflict resolution committee and it is chaired by a palace chief. The peace committee in Cross River state is, however, headed by the Deputy Governor of the state. Since most conflicts are structural in the South-South region, the institutional approach has shown some promise in resolving them. But as it is common with public institutions, poor funding and overbearing influence of governments are major drawbacks of the efforts.
- (f) In some instances, especially in communities in Delta state, Rivers state and most notably in Edo state, the traditional rulers are very active in resolving conflicts, with a palace chief as the Chair of the Edo State Peace Committee and given the fact that the Committee sits in the palace, the whole of Bini royalty is brought to bear on its work; whoever disobeys the committee is indirectly disobeying the Bini monarch.
- (g) Governors have personally intervened in some conflicts and their interventions have unlocked some conflicts especially when they are not too connected to the issues at hand. Comrade Adams Oshiomhole has been able to record some feats in this regard.

- (h) Mr. Tompolo has been intervening to call some militants to order. While on the field, we picked the information that he had given assurances to President Buhari that he would be responsible for peace in the Niger Delta, but political calculations changed the whole equation and the resultant effect was the birth of the Avengers, Reformed Avengers and other pseudo-militant groups that have sharply cut the level of oil production in the country. Notwithstanding, there is a strong feeling that Tompolo still has a big role to play in resolving the militancy that is associated with agitations in the region.

The media have also intervened to call attention to all aspects of the Niger Delta crisis. Obviously those of them that are based in the region and are owned by Niger Deltans are perceived to be more sympathetic towards the Niger Delta cause. Media houses in this category are *ThisDay*, *Vanguard*, AIT, Channels and other media outlets. Although at times, they may raise their voice against criminality in the Niger Delta, their conclusions usually would be to hold the Federal Government responsible for the deterioration in the security regime of the Niger Delta. Counterpoised to this category are the *Daily Trust*, *Blueprint*, *Leadership*, etc. who do not totally deny that there are issues in the Niger Delta, but harbour reservations on the strategy being used by the militants and criticise the hostage the militants are holding the nation.

Sometimes, they respond to the agitations for total control of the resources by claiming that it is not reasonable as the proceeds from groundnut and tins were used to develop the oil sector. As for the local media houses that are based in the Niger Delta, the sympathy for the cause of the region is known and should not be surprised when they resort to blaming the externalities for the woes in the Niger Delta. It is common, at times, to defend the governors who are generally believed not to have maximised the benefit of the fattest federal allocations they regularly receive to show some cracking in delivering development to the people. As far as most of them are concerned, the lines of marginalisation, oppression, harsh topography, and finding justifications for the agitations in the South-South Zone are constant lines in the programming of most of them.

In this age of social media, the propagation of the Niger Delta story through them is common these days. The whole concept of Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) and others were created through the media and they are looking larger than life because of their effective use of the social media. The feeling is therefore, strong among our respondents and the general public that the membership of the NDA, for example, may be less than ten, yet when it sneezes, the government catches cold, and in the process confusion is generated in government circles on how to respond to its biting activities.

One can remark that insurgency everywhere loves the media and uses them to deliver psychological blows on the government and more appropriately, the people through fear. Controlling the media space and shutting out the insurgents weaken their resolve to continue with their war. This point needs to be better appreciated by all governments in Nigeria.

We observe the active engagement of civil society groups that are working to bring about a more peaceful environment in the Niger Delta. There are many of them but in the course of this research, we were only able to speak with a few of them. The State Conflict Management Alliance (SCMA) works in the three states: Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states. Through keeping tap on developments in the South-South Zone with potential to escalate conflicts, it has rich reservoir of knowledge which government at all levels can leverage on to de-escalate conflicts in the region. The Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) has a structure for intervening in the South-South zone on conflicts. As a British Council-sponsored project, its impact is being felt notwithstanding the high-wired conflicts that dominate its landscape.

Conclusion

(a) Gaps in literature

There are some gaps that we have observed in the literature. These include:

- (1) There are copious works on the Niger Delta both from the academic point of view and the practical world. However, only a few literature exists that has not assumed the role of combatants in the crisis. Those who support the Niger Delta cause have little patience for objectivity as everything happening, including bombings, is somewhat justified. Those who oppose the strategies being used to fight environmental degradation and the general poverty levels are very strong on ascribing criminality to them and therefore, they should be treated as criminals. Nigeria should not allow any group or section to hold her to ransom, they have argued. This is a major limitation as sentiments and biases are self-evident in the literature.
- (2) Divergent opinions exist on the Niger Delta. In the session, we the consultants had with two lecturers at the Niger Delta University on 4 October, the two though, conversant with the crisis in the zone but held diametric opposed view on the progression of the spiral conflicts in the region and the role of certain individuals in the conflicts' progression. Researchers/writers, at times, have found it difficult what perspectives to present in their studies or books. Distilling issues of policy substance is always difficult from such studies.
- (3) There are so many gaps in some of the studies. Deepness of thoughts and reflections are not paid attention to. Many of the writers are greenhorns who were only anxious to release their works.
- (4) Internal dimensions of the conflicts in the Niger Delta have not been properly documented. *Ijaws* and *Ogonis* have their fundamental disagreement that predates the attainment of independence and was accentuated by the politics of creating the Rivers state. Bini and Ijaws also have their ancestral claims to contend with and that has not promoted a pan-Niger Delta platform. These historical antecedents have been lost largely to oral traditions.

- (5) The commendable work that is being done by civil society groups and some concerned indigenes of the zone on peaceful coexistence has not been adequately covered in the literature. Not everyone who talks about peace is a traitor to the concern of the region and not everyone who identifies with the plight of the Niger Delta is anti-Nigeria. In the entrenched stereotypes and labelling, the path to peace in the zone is lost by most authors.
- (6) Recommendations have been made to resolve the Niger Delta crisis, but the practicality of bringing them about is often glossed over. Our policymakers want concise and workable solutions, but most of the textbooks have only rehearsed previous solutions without reflecting on the new realities of the situation in the South-South zone.
- (7) They are inadequate because the new phase of the agitations in the Niger Delta has not been captured. Bakassi is boiling on account of the activities of the Bakassi Strike Force, the reality of collaboration between herdsmen and militants in promoting kidnapping, new phase of gangsterism in Rivers and the youth restiveness in Oron area of Akwa Ibom have not reflected deeply in the literature. So also are the other mushroomed new agitators for the Niger Delta.
- (8) The transformation of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta to Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) is missing in the literature.

(b) Gaps in Response

There are many gaps in responses/impacts. Some of these include:

- (1) There is a tremendous belief in the use of money to drive away conflicts in the Niger Delta. This has not, however, worked;
- (2) The military is considered the main line of reacting to the incessant militancy in the region but everything done by the military cannot be celebrated. As at the moment, there is a strong feeling that access to more budgetary provisions and material comfort of the officers; the role of the security forces needs to be re-examined;
- (3) Adequate planning and preparations are not being made for the Internally Displaced Persons whose population is increasing in the Niger Delta region on account of military operations and retaliatory attacks by the militants;
- (4) There is no trust between the Federal Government and the people of the South-South zone. Unfortunately, success can only come if there is a robust trust between the people and the government;
- (5) State apparatuses in the region are good and could be relied upon except that the militants have their imprints in the governance architecture in the states. The implication of this is that compromise can come somewhere along the line;

- (6) Talking from both sides of the mouth is another gap in responses. Some governors talk tough and condemn the militants in Abuja, but they are hand-in-glove with them upon returning from Abuja;
- (7) Despite the existence of avalanche of reports on the Niger Delta crisis, the need for further research has been revealed. Deep studies are still required to provide new insights into the crisis in the Niger Delta. Lack of the intellectual approach in responding to the issues is an issue;
- (8) Lack of co-ordination in what The Presidency is saying and what the military is doing is self-evident. At a point, the President resorted to begging the militants but the military was sacking communities on account of searching for militants in the region. This represents a drawback in the engagement of the Niger Delta;
- (9) General Boroh is trying his best but he seems to be standing alone. The environment seems hard for him. If he were to be an insider and an activist as Kingsley Kuku is, perhaps his strength and value would have shown more;
- (10) It is good to please Ijaws as President Jonathan had tried to do, but developing broad-based incentives for all the major social groups in the Niger Delta would surely have been better;
- (11) Traditional rulers are powerful but the scenarios in the South-south have revealed that they have lost some relevance and moral force/capital that can make them to be listened to especially in major communities in the region. Unfortunately, The Presidency is seeing them in the mould of the traditional rulers in other parts of Nigeria;
- (12) There is a new perception developing that President Jonathan did not work for all Ijaws and Niger Deltans. The Federal Government does not appear to be aware of this perception yet, let alone it being able to cash-in on the failure of the ex-President to warm its way into the area;
- (13) There are still genuine agitators in the Niger Delta whose resources have not been tapped into. Instead, the government has been reaching out to conflict entrepreneurs who appear to be making empty promises to the government; yet, fortunes are being spent on them;
- (14) After one year in office, the Buhari government is generally unpopular in the South-South region. This suggests that there is a big hole in his policy response to the agitations in the region; and
- (15) The concepts of uneven development and political categorisation have not yet been appreciated with respect to the Niger Delta. Manifesting in upland and riverine dichotomy, majority ethnic groups and minority ethnic groups, marginalisation, dominant social groups and less dominant social groups, etc. are still found missing in either addressing the fallouts of the Niger Delta crisis or working to sustain peace in the region.

(c) Highlights of the Findings of the Study

From the foregoing analysis, some key findings are worth reiterating for emphasis. These are:

- (1) The South-South geopolitical zone is still relevant to the developmental aspirations of Nigeria as an oil-rich zone;
- (2) A deeper level of reflections has not been done by the Federal Government to reflect all the diversity in the region;
- (3) A fine separation of criminality from the desire for rapid development of the zone is not possible given the interplay of forces and variables in the area;
- (4) Throwing money at the crisis in the Niger Delta crisis has not worked to achieve a sustainable level of development for the zone;
- (5) Unguarded statements by governors, presidency and other critical stakeholders on the crisis in the zone have served as an accelerator, contrary to the assumptions that promoted them in the first instance;
- (6) Generally, people of the region have seen more of injustice, marginalisation, environmental degradation and the sustained level of under-development than anything else. That is explaining why only occasional words of caution are heard and directed at the militants in the region;
- (7) Neglect incubated in ungoverned space has been promoting anti-Nigerian sentiments in the region. Most people still nurse the feeling that the South-South region is not getting its due share from the Nigerian nation;
- (8) Restructuring of the country is being discussed in the South-South zone; this remains an emerging hot issue, as is the case in the South-West and the South-East of Nigeria;
- (9) All the strands of managing the Niger Delta crisis by the Federal Government have not gone far enough, as some of its agents are seeing their interventions more as a kind of cash-cow;
- (10) Tompolo is a significant militant that has to be accommodated in the peace process in view of his popularity, borne out of his acceptability to the youths who populate the militant groups;
- (11) The reach of the NNDC is still limited as abandoned projects informed by corruption define its existence as an interventionist agency;
- (12) It is unwise to lump all the people in the Niger Delta together as they have their differences to pre-colonial history of Nigeria;
- (13) The South-South, especially the core states, have a long history of agitations and resistance dating back to colonial times and have various dichotomies existing among them;

- (14) There is still a genuine desire to remain a part of Nigeria among the generality of the people. This can be leveraged upon by the Federal Government to engage in constructive engagement with the leaders of the zone; and
- (15) Mutual suspicion exists between the Federal Government and the militants in the South-south zone that are found in every state in the region.

(d) General Conclusion

The study was conducted to examine violent conflicts, other conflicts and the extent of peace that prevails in the South-South zone of Nigeria. While conflicts are not evenly distributed in the region, oil, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, is the key driver that has turned the zone into a volatile area in the country. As the study has revealed, hardly can any conflict take place in the region without it being somehow related to the incidence of oil. Oil itself is not causing any problem but people's perception of its relevance and springboard role is the issue. The Nigerian state counts and depends on oil for its revenue. Therefore, anytime there is a threat to it as we currently have due to the activities of the Niger Delta militants that have combined with the fall in the global prices of oil to reduce the volume of rents accruing to the state, the Federal Government always feels jittery and looks more decidedly in the direction of the region.

Land, chieftaincy, youth unemployment, underdevelopment and others have been the causes of conflicts in the Niger Delta. Bakassi in Cross River state stands out as an area where international interventions in the region have sustained a conflict. Indeed, the Bakassi Strike Force is the major face of the conflict rearing its head in the state. The rivalry between Ijaw and Urhobo and Itsekiri can hardly be excused in any analysis on why about half of Delta state is somewhat peaceful, while another half is the epicenter of violent manifestations of agitation for resource control. Akwa-Ibom can be said to be more peaceful but the rumblings in Oron axis with the consequential feeling of marginalisation despite being an oil producing area, are creating the impression of paying attention to the state.

Edo state is more peaceful than most states in the region essentially, perhaps, because of the blend of royalty with modern peace engineering. However, the Ukpella area signposts the need for deepening the peace process in the state, so also is the intolerant level of politicking. Both Bayelsa and Rivers have a lot in common being one state before. However, gangsterism cum cultism has defined the current state of conflicts in Rivers state where cult gangs are alternate government which all must fear. Strangely, however, the state government – in the view of majority – is perceived to be giving oxygen to them.

Indeed, an Amnesty Programme exists to address their multifarious problems. On the part of Bayelsa state, militants are its face of insecurity. They are seeing in corridors of power and anyone that touches them may roughen some feathers in government circles. A police cell in the police headquarters in Yenagoa was broken into, in early October

2016, to free some militants being kept in the cell. How could that have happened at the police headquarters in Yenagoa without some connivance? Only the police top brass can answer the question.

We noted some impacts of the conflicts in the region, which included the reduction in the level of production, loss of revenue, militarisation, negative external image, insecurity, recession, etc. We equally examined the various responses to the conflicts. Two outstanding ones were: militarisation and half-hearted dialogue. On the side of gaps in the literature and the Federal government's responses, the study identified poor reading of the conflict causes, lack of objectivity, reliance on too many people who are conflict entrepreneurs to resolve the Niger Delta crisis, unguarded policy statements, the assumption that all agitators are militants/terrorists, half-hearted diversification drive, among others.

Although the South-South Zone looks complex and frightening in terms of its propensity to generate conflicts, we, however, argue that the image was deliberately created by the wrong-headed approaches that are being used and that have created a life for the conflicts in the zone. A good mix of genuine dialogue and aggressive pursuit of development in the zone can de-escalate conflicts in the region as everyone spoken to, wants peace in the Niger Delta. There is need for peace in every part of Nigeria. Indeed, the view is strong that instead of engaging in Amnesty of bribing the people or arm the military to its teeth, concrete development should rather be delivered to the region.

Recommendations

Based on the investigation carried out in the South-South geo-political zone of Nigeria on prevailing conflicts in the region and the need to bring down the boiling and violent points of the area, we make the following recommendations:

- (a) There is the need for more synergy between the Federal and State Governments in the South-South in finding the compass for peace in the region. They need to work more in harmony than being suspicious of each other;
- (b) The electoral system in the country should be cleaned up to allow for proper elections being conducted and those desired by people to form governments in the zone. This will enhance the capacity of the elected public officials to work for genuine peace in the state;
- (c) The mindset needs to change that everybody in South-South is pathologically afraid of President Buhari and therefore, supportive of former President Jonathan. The elections have come and gone. People are moving on with their lives. One argues that President Buhari has more chance of re-directing affairs in the region than Jonathan if he has more understanding of the dynamics of the conflicts there;
- (d) The goal of diversification needs to be pursued more with vigour as more resources will be available to make much more impact in the South-South;

- (e) Local refineries and other unofficial handling of oil by the locales in the region should be closely examined and brought under official cover. Resorting to destroying the local refineries by the military may be justified but surely not in the context of managing the volatile Niger Delta situations;
- (f) The amnesty programme of the Federal Government should be re-conceptualised and made more enduring. Intermittent threats of stopping of the programme should be stopped;
- (g) There is the need to inject more intellectual approach to resolving conflicts in the Niger Delta. There are many jaundiced reports everywhere but only few are based on scientific findings;
- (h) The Bakassi issue has attracted international attention more for bad reasons. The object neglect that has made the United Nations to predict that, in the nearest future, the area will be stateless. This is an indictment on the Nigerian state that needs to be reversed;
- (i) A lot of sensitisation is required to convince the Niger Delta youths, that there is life outside cultism and militancy. The governance environment in the zone that has been given a tacit support, if not approval to it, should retrace its steps;
- (j) Peace is hardly achievable when a lot of arms are in the hands of militants. The goal of disarmament needs to be pursued with more vigour and seriousness it deserves;
- (k) The thrust of securitisation should be re-considered. Already there is a suffocating level of militarisation that seems not to have produced the desirable result. While the use of the military may be necessary, there is to develop more appreciation for the utility of the dialogue approach. The withdrawal of Professor Wole Soyinka from the proposed dialogue between the Federal Government and the militants was understandably informed by what he called unseriousness on the part of the government;
- (l) Can Nigeria achieve peace in the South-South without currying the favour of the militants? We have our doubt. Some amenable militants are essential if peace must return to the Niger Delta;
- (m) The NDDC is an interventionist agency that has not done well in selling the Federal Government to the oil-producing states through its under-performance. The agency needs to be restructured to make it reflect the aspiration for rapid development of the Niger Delta region;
- (n) Dialoguing with the militants in the South-South should not be led by politicians, contractors, businessmen who appear to be defrauding governments as the roots of most of them are not in the Niger Delta where conflicts are rife;

- (o) Although, we are under party politics in Nigeria, we argue that looking at the crisis in the Niger Delta strictly from the party lenses may becloud the sense of judgement on the issue; and
- (p) The cleaning-up programme in Ogoniland is already a source of tension because of the perceived financial reward that is associated with it. This has made Governor Nyesom Wike to call for the replication of the programme in other communities. The Federal Government needs to clarify its essence, scope and nature for all the concerned to know.

Conflict Case Studies

This section presents state by state accounts of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) of the South-South Zone as follows:

Akwa-Ibom State

Background Information on Akwa-Ibom State

Akwa Ibom state was created out of old Cross River state on 23 September, 1987 with Uyo as capital. It is bordered on the east by Cross River state, on the west by Rivers and Abia states, and on the south by Gulf of Guinea.

Akwa Ibom has a population of about 5.451 million people according to 2016 estimates and land area of 6,900 sq km. Predominantly inhabited by the Ibibio people, the state is also home to Annang, Oron, Obolo and Eket communities. The state consists of thirty-one (31) local government areas. The people are predominantly of both the African traditional religion and Christian faith.

It is endowed with large deposits of crude oil and natural gas which are being commercially exploited. Agriculture also constitutes an important income generating activity in the state, particularly palm produce, fishing, rubber, cocoa, rice, cassava, yam, plantain, banana, and maize production. Lumbering and handcraft are also prominent economic activities. The oil and gas industry has been generating spates of security-related challenges due to countless cases of oil spillages and gas flaring (Akpan, 2014).

Conflicts Landscape in Akwa-Ibom State

Conflicts in Akwa Ibom state are categorised into land and communal issues, political conflicts, crime-induced conflicts and MoUs with TNCs. All these conflicts often result in loss of lives and property.

Political Conflicts

Akwa Ibom like most other states in the south-south sees politics as business. The application of all means to grab political power, usually lead to political violence which can be traced to the long historical and social dynamics of the state. What can be gleaned from this is the fact that social conflict often times breeds political violence.

Akwa Ibom State (Land of Fulfilment)

Capital: Uyo



Source: Nigerian Muse (2010)

In 2013 violence trended upward, with incidents reported around the capital city of Uyo, Ikot Ekpene, and the coastal Local Government Areas (LGAs) to the south. This became more pronounced during the 2015 elections. Typical incidents across some LGAs in the state are chronicled below.

Oron LGA: In 2014, tensions between political parties were recorded as two cars belonging to APC members were lit on fire by hoodlums suspected to be supporters of the PDP. In December 2014 youths staged a peaceful protest march in opposition to the

selection process for the PDP gubernatorial candidate. In October 2014, a clash between PDP supporters over a list of delegates left one dead while in December there were protests following the announcement of results of the primary elections. In 2015 elections, supporters of the opposition party, All Progressives Congress (APC) protested the results, alleging irregularities.

Ini LGA: Three persons were killed during local government election in 2013.

Abak LGA witnessed the killing of two people during the LGA PDP primaries April 2013, the Local Government chairman of PDP in May 2013 as well as a prominent politician in March 2014, which consequently heightened the political tension in the state.

Land and Communal Disputes

Mbo LGA: In May 2012, Ebughu and Effiat communities in Mbo local government area clashed killing one and in January 2013, seven died in a separate clash over farming land. In March 2013, there was a clash in Unyenge community. In November 2013, two women were killed in a renewed clash among Effiat communities.

Esit-Eket LGA: In January 2013, a land dispute between two communities in Esit-Eket local government area led to the death of one person.

Ikot-Ekpene LGA: In October 2014, a clash over land claimed one life in Ikot Ekpene LGA.

Ini LGA: Three brothers were killed by gunmen in March 2013, after a clash over the construction of a dam in their village and in 2014 communal violence between the Nkari people in Akwa Ibom and the Arochwuku people in Abia state, resulting in displacement of people and an unknown number of fatalities.

Uruan LGA: In 2014, communal clash between Anakpa and Nnaenin communities in Uruan local government area over land ownership were recorded during which indigenes deserted their communities and took refuge elsewhere. Many lives were lost, domestic and public property destroyed. Women were the most affected in the conflict. In August 2016, five persons were reported killed in a renewed dispute between Anakpa and Nna Enin communities in Uruan LGA, over the ownership of a parcel of land where an oil well is located.

Ibena LGA: Home to one of the largest fishing settlements on the Nigerian coast, Ibena LGA has been reportedly exposed to oil spills. Fishing communities have protested the criminality by youth. Several people were reportedly killed during this period, including an elderly villager in October 2012 and the local PDP chair in May 2013. In April 2013, a violent land dispute between Ibena community and another in neighbouring Eket LGA led to the deaths of five people and the destruction of dozens of homes, displacing several families.

Itu LGA: During the course of this field work it was discovered that potential crises was brewing up between Oku Iboku community in Akwa Ibom and Ikot Offiong in Cross River states. The tension was very high as youths in these two communities were ganging up to attack each other.

Crime-Induced Conflicts

Mbo LGA: criminal activities by pirates in Mbo LGA led to the kidnapping of 5 Exxon-Mobil employees by unidentified gunmen in 2013. This led to gun battle between the navy and the pirates, leading to the death of six pirates and heighten security situation. In September 2014, piracy attacks accounted for the deaths of two naval officers.

Oron LGA: In October 2013, four people died in a rivalry between the Black Axe and Vikings cult groups.

Esit-Eket LGA: A traditional ruler in Esit-Eket was abducted in late October 2013.

Eket LGA: In July 2014, an oil pipeline was attacked by Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) in Nsit Ibom. In August 2014, three suspected pipeline vandals with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were arrested by the police in Eket. In June 2014, a cult clash led to the deaths of two people, who were found in a gutter with machete wounds. In July 2016, three members of a gang of kidnappers were arrested by police in Eket, when they went to retrieve a ransom from the victim's relatives.

Uyo Municipal: Within and around the capital city of Uyo, there were series of killings in 2013, including that of a former government official in October. A violent clash among three rival cult groups was also reported in the same month with seven people dead. Also it was reported that in the same year a man murdered by a commercial motorcyclist with a machete in Onna; a police corporal was reportedly killed by robbers in Etinan and three suspected crude oil thieves were arrested by operatives of the Nigerian Navy in Uyo.

Ikot-Ekpene LGA: In 2013, there was a failed rescue operation of an abducted politician which heightens security issue. In March 2014, Cultist clash at Akwa Ibom Polytechnic, led to death of two persons.

Ibena LGA: Eight fishermen were kidnapped by pirates along the creeks of Ibena.

Violent Protests

Mbo LGA: In July and September 2013, there were violent protests over lack of amenities and compensation by companies operating in the area. In August 2014, about 100 ex-militants from Mbo LGA besieged the state government office in Uyo, over non-payments of their monthly stipends. In June 2014, protests over oil spills affecting the Nkpana community was recorded.

Eket LGA: Eket main sources of conflict are derived from localised criminal activity, unrest from extractives operations in the area, and cult violence. In October 2013, a protest against a company operating in the area over the alleged non-payment of expected compensation. In July 2014, protesting youths blocked access to a mine facility in protest to oil spill that had occurred.

Uyo Municipal: In 2013 there were multiple violent protests in Uyo, particularly the one in April against a TNC employment policies.

The University of Uyo (UNIUYO) was forced to shut down in June after a protest turned violent, destroying school property and killing several students. Students protest over management decisions not to allow students unions on campus also led to violent clashes in 2014. Also affecting UNIUYO, in May 2014, the residence of the University's Vice-Chancellor was reportedly attacked by gunmen/militants, allegedly in retaliation for inflammatory statements made by her against a known militant group and organised criminal gangs. A couple of protests and murders were also carried out in 2014. In 2016, an irate mob chopped off the hand of a robbery suspect in Uyo and a policeman was mobbed by residents for allegedly causing a road accident in Uyo.

Ibena LGA: In March 2014, road workers staged a protest against the de-unionisation of their company.

Ikot-Epkene: Consistent with the unrest on student campuses in Uyo, violent protests over student unions, Ikot Ekpene campuses of the Akwa Ibom State Polytechnic in September 2014, where several people were injured.

Abak LGA: There was violent protest and vandalism of Government infrastructure by tricyclist over the hike of tickets in 2013. Protest by women in Essien Udim and Otoro Clan over destruction of farmlands by herdsmen, in 2014 (Field work, 2016).

Arising from the armed violence between this local Governments Area of Akwa Ibom the displaced people took refuge in neighbouring communities or the fringes of the boundary with Abia state. The armed confrontation involved the use of SALWs, including sophisticated assault rifles, such as AK 47.

Impacts of Conflict on Human Security

Violence in the state was elevated during the gubernatorial elections of 2011. After the re-election of Governor Godswill Obot Akpabio (People's Democratic Party) the per capita level of violence dropped significantly. In 2013 violence trended upwards. Sixteen (16) Local Government Areas (LGAs) out of the 31 LGAs of Akwa Ibom state experienced various types of conflicts and conflict-related crimes as groups battle themselves over land, border, access and control of natural resources as well as criminality, militancy, communal conflict, and domestic violence which has remained a reoccurring conflict with the scope expanding and widening on yearly basis (Conflict Monthly Tracker, Akwa Ibom state: August-September 2016).

The conflicts that occurred during this period had both positive and negative outcomes. Therefore some of them qualify as functional conflicts because of the long-term positive changes that arose out of the way they were managed by the communities involved, the security agencies and the government. However, the fact that inter-gang violence still breaks out with adverse implications for the public and bystanders portends negativity.

Generally, violent conflicts create imbalances in the psyche on those involved, cultural practices and traditional coping mechanisms. Our Interview revealed that in Abak Local Government, most respondents agreed that the violence recorded in the community has resulted in psychological disorders in some individuals. Women and children were associated with anxiety and fear while the youth, the aged and women were associated with depression. Participatory observation of reactive behaviour of children and women affirmed this submission. Cases of depression, anxiety and extreme fear were equally reported in the three communities visited in Eket local government area. The manifestations of these psychological disorders were similar to those in Uruan local government area. Across conflict-hit communities of Ikwuano local government area, anxiety, fears and depression was equally widely reported.

The inhabitants of local communities that recorded violent conflicts between herders and farmers in Otoro Clan in Abak and women in Essien Udim LGAs depend on crop farming, fishing and petty trading for livelihood. Women and youth constitute the most productive age groups. However, many of them lack skills in multiple income generating activities. This partially explains the reasons for trauma, depression and the difficulty faced by communities in coping, recovery and resilience building. The loss of livelihoods has resulted in emerging dynamics such as increased youth participation in crime and criminalities.

In Abak Local Government, income generating activities of inhabitants of Otoro clan includes, farming of yam, cassava, rice and palm produce. These crops were largely destroyed on-farm by cattle, and in-stock by herders who vandalised, burnt or demolished houses where stocks were kept as well as barns. Though the exact value of farms destroyed could not be ascertained, focus groups stated that an estimated total cultivated area of 457,000 hectares valued at 342 million was destroyed across the five communities. During the conflicts the local markets were burnt down and destroyed, sparing only few markets, it was observed that very minimal transactions were on-going in the markets due to desertion and displacements for fear of attack.

Economic rights were also violated during the conflict in Abak and Essien Udim LGAs. Leaders of the communities stated that the communities were unable to stop encroachment on their farms by herders due to the arms they were carrying resulting to total destruction of farmland, in addition to partial destruction on-farm and in-storage of crops. It was also noted that larger proportion of the people store yields in residential houses.

Due to the desertion of several settlements and consequent abandoning of economic activities across the two LGAs, the conflict has left impacts and introduced dynamics that will likely affect the income generating activities for a long time, as fear exist among the people. Poverty level is soaring towards disturbing dimensions as marriages were being broken in households where men were unable to finance household needs as expected of them in the social systems. Focus groups reported resurging cases of cultists, militancy, piracy, rape, crime, child trafficking and child labour amongst women, girls, boys and youth in displaced communities.

These conflicts result from different value systems, aggressive competition for land, water, political resources and the unhealthy competition of some community leaders. There is hardly a year where there is no major violent community conflict in Nigeria (Banjo 1998, Obasanjo, 1999 and Etuk et al, 2006). In recent times, the situation has grown from ordinary armed conflict to hostage taking of workers of multinational oil corporations, relatives of wealthy community members, politicians during election periods as well as bombing of churches, media houses and other government buildings. These scenarios have resulted in the loss of lives and wanton destruction of properties worth billions of naira.

Conflict Actors

Given the nature of the conflicts in the state, the actors are typically, community warriors or militias and the several development associations in the state. The security agents are also part of the actors and in some cases they have been alleged as taking sides in the conflicts. Governments at the first and second tiers have also been indirectly involved in some of the conflicts especially when security agents such as the police and soldiers are drawn in. The executive and the legislature are also actors in some conflicts.

In most of the communal crisis in the state, the narratives embody deep seated desire for the affirmation of rights which many parties feel are trampled upon. For instance, most of the protracted and violent clashes in Akwa Ibom involve local communities of the state with neighbouring communities from other states and in many of these cases the communities in Akwa Ibom have gone up in arms using local militias based on the conviction that they are pursuing a cause of the community. Therefore their interests as parties in conflict might include recognition, demand for economic rights, and preference for freedom to chose where they want to belong to like in the case of the Akirika obu people.

While parties in the conflict have maintained rigid positions which might be far from their real interests as is typical of parties in conflict to behave, deciphering the peace agenda of the parties involved in the crises in the state without initiating a peace/reconciliation process in the communities involved might be hasty.

However, the capacities and incentives of the parties to enthrone and preserve peace is huge going by the level of their alleged involvement in many of the protracted crises.

Not minding the protraction and bestiality that have characterised some of these conflicts and lack of trust in state mechanisms for intervention, the communities have huge capacities that can be converted for use as a driving force in many of the communities especially cognizant of the fact that many of these once lived together peacefully in the past.

Intervention/Responses

Track 1

Interventions by the state and federal government, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), CBOs have been coming but their impacts on the landscape of conflict and insecurity leave so much to desire in terms of impacts as garnered during the fieldwork. Many of the communities want the government and multinationals corporation to show more presence, firmness and fairness in handling the matter which points to the fact that achieving sustainable peace in Akwa Ibom transcends the presence of military men. The state government seems to have a grasp of the inter-relatedness of criminality and conflict and how the intersection of the two has been fuelling oil communities and multinational conflicts in the state. This has informed the amnesty initiative which many respondents condemn as actually meant to satisfy certain narrow interests in the state. Some described it as “playing the politics of peace” instead of using it to promote the culture of peace.

Track 2

There are a number of not-for-profit organisations in Akwa Ibom state working on peacebuilding and non-violence. They do this in two contexts of singly undertaking projects and sometimes working within a coalition. For instance, COMPPART carried out sensitisation and peace education through regular community Town Hall meetings (Field Report, 2016).

Track 3

The traditional and religious rulers and other stakeholders in the state have been suing for peace and in fact some of them have been victims of the conflict while some have been misunderstood. Nevertheless, they have sustained their roles in advocating for peace and tolerance by all parties concerned. In Nigeria, as a developing country facing diverse challenges, there is a clarion call on all stakeholders to contribute towards its achievement. Peace Point Action (PPA) is a non-governmental, service-oriented organisation founded in 2005 to address the needs of vulnerable communities in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria targeting the children, youth and women on issues of environmental justice, good governance, HIV and AIDS prevention, health and gender.

Gaps in Literature and Responses

Indeed, the fact that many communities still live in penury and in fear points to the

enormous gaps in responses and expected outcomes by the people. This call for more and novel ways of interrogating the questions of belonging, securing, governing and managing access to natural resources towards having a more textured understanding of the ramifications, trends and patterns of the conflict between the oil producing communities and TNCs which is the main source of conflict and insecurity in the state.

Conclusion

The conflict in Akwa Ibom state in the period covered are multiple, ranging between land and chieftaincy disputes, disputes over royalties accrued from mineral deposits/oil, tussles over royal stools, political, cultists, kidnapping, herdsmen/farmers, tussle over headship of oil and gas peace committee set by the community, environmental, disputes over ownership of oil well, projects location/site, piracy issue among others. The extent of inhumanity, sophisticated weapons and conflation of interests in the conflict combine to make it a very complex one. This calls for specific analysis of the trends, patterns and actors' needs in micro and macro contexts. With large deposits of crude oil, condensate and gas; economic hub of the country, the conflict has dire implications for economic and security which underscore the need for a broad-based multidimensional approach in responding to it. In Akwa Ibom state, the long protracted conflicts between oil producing communities and Transnational Corporations were strongly linked to escalations of violence between the communities and TNCs. The conflict which is over the inability of Government and TNCs to adhere strictly to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has pitched the communities against the Government and Transnational Corporations. A major consequence of this is the availability of mass pool of youths who can be easily and spontaneously mobilised for acts inimical to public peace and safety.

Recommendations

In addition to the recommendations generated in the course of the field work, we found the suggestions that emanated from a one-day dialogue on peacebuilding organised by the Community Policing Partners (COMPPART) instructive, as listed below, also very note-worthy:

- (1) Recent incidents in Akwa Ibom have related to militancy, communal conflict, domestic, and criminal violence. Peace actors should monitor the situation closely to avoid further escalation.
- (2) Environmental pollution has squared the citizens versus Transnational Corporations, the Government should constitute a high level committee to look into and make necessary recommendations to the state Government for prompt actions.
- (3) Unemployment is a major source of conflict. Government at all levels should work hard to stem the tide. Youths should be empowered through the social investment programme to be entrepreneurs.

- (4) The need for synergy between border-states and Akwa Ibom; the amnesty programme should be intensify.
- (5) Engaging the TNCs players in involving in corporate social responsibility by providing toll-free lines.
- (6) Imperative of an Akwa Ibom state/Transnational Corporations Peace Compact to sustain peace.
- (7) There should a synergy among the various levels of government in providing adequate basic infrastructures, especially at the grass root levels.
- (8) Recruitment should be on local government basis to ensure fair distribution of posts and resources.
- (9) All old wounds in term of promises on issues, disasters projects should be fulfilled by the government.
- (10) There is need for the institution of a community security system with emphasis on training of people to effectively participate in the act of preventing, resolving and managing conflict at the communal level and strengthen them where they exist in LGAs. Capacities of communal security system such as vigilante groups should be enhanced. Enlightenment campaign programmes aimed at educating the people on the origins, nature and effects of conflicts on their socioeconomic life and the need to safeguard their natural resource base should be made effective at Local Government Area level. This will also expose the people to early warning signs of conflicts in order to stem them before they escalate.
- (11) Fast-tracking the enactment of the legislation against open grazing of livestock in the state.
- (12) That full wrath of law be allow to take its course on any electoral offenders, irrespective of whoever is involved, since no one is above the law.
- (13) The impunity of the security agencies and the usual ad hoc approach of government to issues any time there is breach to peace is discard with.
- (14) There is need for security outposts in every community to response to early warning and sensitises community to imbibe the sloganeering of 'know who are your neighbours as well as tenant and landlords'.
- (15) Political office should be part-time business, so that it will be less attractive and attract only those who are willing to serve and not to be served; besides, such will discourage that politician who sees politics as money spinning venture.
- (16) Politicians should desist from building thugs who are later abandon and turn nuisance to the community.
- (17) Government should involve the community in the infrastructural development of their place.

- (18) Ensure fairness, equitable or equal formula in political representatives and distribution of dividends of democracy from federal to grass root irrespective of ethnic, culture, and religion or party affiliations.
- (19) Restructuring the country to meet the yearnings and aspirations of contemporary Nigerians, besides, resource control.
- (20) Increased security presence in the local communities, especially the conflict-prone areas; that is, establishment of barracks and other formations will be of help.
- (21) The Niger Delta hiccups must be given the priority attention it deserves. The area must be developed and the youths properly trained to be useful to themselves and the country.
- (22) The leadership should address the issue of youth unemployment in the country.
- (23) Those aspiring to be leaders must be creative enough to contribute to the development of the various tiers of governance and not only to depend on allocations from the centre.
- (24) Nigerian leaders must display a high level of nationalistic spirit that transcends self and ethnic cleavages.
- (25) Politicians that provide arms to the youths for political thuggery should be made to face the full wrath of the law, and there should be no sacred cows.
- (26) The Traditional Institution is sacrosanct to every society as such should be de-politicise for effectiveness and efficiency in their mandate.
- (27) To avert further occurrence of communal conflict , it is recommended that strict adherence to Land Use Decree 1978 as amended in 1990 Act should be enforced and possible readdress to meet up with the contemporary realities.

Bayelsa State (Pride of the Nation)

Capital: Yenagoa



Source: Nigerian Muse (2010)

Introduction and Historical Background

Bayelsa state is located between Delta and, Rivers states with the Gulf of Guinea and its capital is Yenagoa. The state consists of eight (8) Local Government Areas: Yenagoa, Ekeremor, Sagbama, Southern Ijaw, Brass, Ogbia, Nembe and Kolokuma/Opokuma with an estimated population of 1,998,349 million (2015) with a landmass of about 21,110 km.

Bayelsans are mainly rural dwellers due to its terrain and lack of adequate transportation, education and urban development. There are four main local languages spoken in the state: Izon, Ogbia, Epi-Atissa and Nembe. It is also important to add that like other parts of Nigeria, Pidgin (broken) English is widely spoken. 'Bayelsa' is an acronym that was coined from the three Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Brass, Yenagoa and Sagbama in the former Rivers state. These three former local governments were later sub-

divided into the current eight (8) LGAs to make the present Bayelsa state. While the present Nembe, Brass and Ogbia LGAs were carved out of the then Brass LGA; Yenagoa, Kolokuma/Opokuma and Southern Ijaw LGA were created out of the then Yenagoa LGA; and the then Sagbama LGA gave birth to the present Sagbama and Ekeremor LGAs.

Most residents of Bayelsa state profess Christianity being the historically dominant Christian denomination in the state. The presence of Christianity has not however impeded the persistence of Traditional African Religions, as its adherence continues in the rural and the riverine parts of the state.

Geographically, Bayelsa state can be described as largely riverine as her communities are almost surrounded by water on the coast of the Atlantic ocean in the Gulf of Guinea. This geographical location makes communities almost inaccessible by road. Due to its geographical location, the local population in Bayelsa state survives through subsistence fishing and limited commercial farming activities. These activities are also a cause of conflict between the state and some neighbouring states in the Niger Delta region. Bayelsa state has the fourth largest crude oil and gas deposit in Nigeria after Akwa Ibom, Delta and Rivers states respectively.

The paradox of the state is that despite being one of the largest crude oil and natural gas producing states in the country, majority of her population live in rural areas, in poverty and in a physical environment that is very challenging and extensively polluted. The state does not have adequate basic infrastructure or facilities like transportation, health and education. Given decades of oil exploration, exploitation and perceived neglect by the governments and the International Oil Companies (IOCs or TNCs), youths in Bayelsa are as restless as other parts of the South-South zone. This is a problem that successive governments have not been able to resolve since the state's creation in 1996. Beside the exploitation of oil and gas which is outside the purview and control of the local population, Bayelsa state has an almost non-existent commerce energiser and driver.

As a major oil producing state in the South-South zone, the state contributes significantly to the national oil output and her contribution has fluctuated from about 15 percent to 30 percent since the late 1990s (CLEEN, 2012). The significance of Bayelsa state to the oil and gas industry can be traced to Nigeria's first commercially viable oil well that was drilled at Oloibiri (Schatz: 1969, Phia: 2006, 2009). Since then the state has remained a major source of natural gas, which feeds the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas complex in Bonny, Rivers state. Despite this historical and contemporary significance of Bayelsa state to Nigeria's oil and gas industry, there has not been a multiplier effect of the oil and gas industry on oil infrastructural development of the state. This partly explains why the state is generally regarded as a 'rural state' as none of the TNCs like Shell, Chevron, Texaco and Agip that explore oil in the state has a major office complex in the state. The establishment of the Brass LNG, Nigeria's second liquefied natural gas complex, was meant to mitigate this sense of economic marginalisation (CLEEN, 2012).

Table 2: Conflict Case Studies of Bayelsa State

S/N	Nature/ Types of conflict	Incidents, Locations and Dates	Causes	Actors	Impacts	Respon-ses/ Interven-tions (Interven-tions/Gaps in Inter-ventions)	Status/ Remarks
1.	Economic Conflict (Strained relationship between host communities, national/multinational oil companies and the federal government of Nigeria.)	Ogbobiri in Southern Ijaw LGA.)	Insensitivity of federal government of Nigeria and both the national / multinational oil com-panies to the needs of the people. Unemploymen t of youth of host communities by oil companies, non-payment of compen-sation for oil spillages, environ-mental degradation.	Multination al oil companies and host commu-nities)	Drop in oil product-ion, insecurity, militariliza-tion of communi-ties, devas-tated environ-ment, loss of lives, arrest and detentions of some innocent poor citizens.)	State government summons oil companies asking them to honour their obligations to host communities	1. Signing of MoUs; 2. Environ-mental Clean-up
2.	Economic conflict (Land dispute, claims over oil wells).	Aduku, Ikpidiama in Sagbama LGA	Resource control	Chiefs, elites, youth and women	Loss of lives and properties, mistrust/suspicion among the people	Case in court	Matter not yet resolved
3.	Social conflict (Violent Clashes over Chieftaincy titles)	Isongufuro and Isenagaodu and OYF Oluasiri clan in Nembe LGA	Chieftaincy tussle	Traditional rulers, elites, youths and women	Emergence of cult groups; loss of lives and destruction of properties	Case in court	On-going
4.	Economic conflict leading to Mortal Crime (Herders and Community land owners' conflict	Nomadic Fulani herdsmen and Community Land owners in Trofani, Sagbama LGA	Destruction of farm lands by Herdsmen.	Fulani Herdsmen and residents of Trofani community	Tension, death of one villager and destruction of properties	Peace advocacy by community leaders in the area	Resolved
5.	Political conflict (Electoral conflict)	Traditional rulers, political parties in all the LGAs in the state	Rigging and falsification of election results.	Politicians, traditional rulers and youths	Loss of lives, inse-curity, slow spate of social develop-ment and waste of scarce resources on legal process after election.	Interven-tions through election tribunals, appeal and supreme court, judgements	Resolved

Source: Field Reports, 2016

It is against this foregoing background, that the violent militancy activities for resource control in the Niger Delta region and Bayelsa state in particular, thrive. Significant in these agitations was the Kaiama Declaration of December 1998 by Ijaw youths, which took place in the state. The Declaration was very emphatic in demanding that oil TNCs stop further exploration, exploitation and exportation of oil and gas. This was to be re-enforced in 2005 when the Bayelsa state delegation to the Sovereign National Conference demanded that the revenue allocation derivation principle for oil producing states of the South-South be increased from 13 to 50 percent. The failure of the Federal Government to accept these and other demands contributed to a chain of violent militant activities that had remained till date.

Conflicts in the State

Conflicts in Bayelsa come under the following broad categories of development, economic, environmental, political and social issues. Conflict of development arises because the state has a riverine and estuarine setting, and most of the communities are almost surrounded by water, thereby making them inaccessible for meaningful infrastructural development.

Environmental challenges result from the mode of exploitation of the oil and gas resources without adequate protection of the natural habitat.

Conflicts in the state have a human security dimension resulting from bad governance, youth restiveness, militancy and other forms of criminalities. Mistrust and suspicion among leaders and militarisation of the state exacerbate the human security challenges.

Militarisation has become a significant derivative of the human security challenges giving rise to a security dilemma where by state and non-state actors involve in the use of arms.

Violent conflicts erupt as both youth, sponsored by some ethnic and regional politicians and other interest groups, clash with federal might. Kidnappings for ransom, assassinations, armed robbery, thuggery and cultism have also reportedly increased as observed in this study. The Bayelsa state Police Command also indicates numerous crimes and convictions that relate to these issues. Table 2 above itemises the various forms the atrocities have taken, alongside their vital details.

Responses

Track 1

- (1) Government deployment of security personnel in the state for peace and security.
- (2) The Presidential Amnesty Programme of the Federal government in collaboration with Bayelsa state and others within the region as well as the projects of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs have been helpful in meeting some of the states needs.

- (3) Vocational training is provided to ex-agitators by the government to provide essential life skills that will help them back reintegrate back into the society.
- (4) Palliative measures in the form monthly stipends are provided through the Amnesty Programme to curb restiveness and stabilise society in the short term.
- (5) The NDDC and other TNCs provide scholarships and grants to promote address educational needs and community development.

Track 2

There are not-for-profit and other civil society organisations in Bayelsa state engaged in a variety of developmental, environmental and peacebuilding activities.

The Bayelsa Non-Governmental Organisations Forum (BANGOF) is involved in coordinating the activities of Non-Governmental Organisations in the state.

Traditional institutions and Religious organisations are also present in the peacebuilding efforts.

Track 3

The presence of World Bank, UNODC and UNICEF is noticeable in Bayelsa state. With the prospects for peace and stability in Bayelsa, more development partners are increasingly showing interest to intervene in the state.

Gaps in Responses

- (1) There is trust deficit in the processes as well as among institutions involved in responding to peace and security issues in the state.
- (2) Due to the emphasis on the use of force by actors in the state there is limited space for people-driven durable solutions.
- (3) Communication barriers exist between communities and government institutions with adverse effect on community expectations.
- (4) There is deficit in the utilisation of indigenous knowledge in the management and resolution of conflicts.
- (5) There is a gap in the implementation of previous reports on the issues in the state.
- (6) There is near absence of security presence in most riverine communities in the state.

Recommendations

- (1) Urgent need to pass the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB).
- (2) There is a need for broad based confidence building measures among all the parties in the state.

- (3) There is need for inter-agency collaboration and cooperation in the state.
- (4) There is the need to strengthen Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC).
- (5) Traditional and indigenous methods for conflict resolution should be promoted.
- (6) There should be enlightenment programmes in communities across the state on patriotism and selflessness.
- (7) Engaging telecommunication service providers to provide toll-free lines for emergencies and security threats.
- (8) Increase security presence in the riverine communities.
- (9) Improve infrastructural development in the state.

Cross River State (The People's Paradise)

Capital: Calabar



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

Background

Cross River is a coastal state located in the South-South geo-political Zone of Nigeria. It is bounded on the north by Benue state, on the south by Akwa Ibom state, on the east by the Republic of Cameroon and on the west by Anambra and Imo states. Its capital is at Calabar and it is named after River Cross, which passes through the state.

It was created on 27 May, 1967 from the former Eastern Region by General Yakubu Gowon. The state has 18 Local Government Areas: Abi, Akampka, Akpabuyo, Bakassi, Bekwara, Biase, Boki, Calabar Municipal, Calabar South, Etung, Ikom, Obanliku, Obubra, Obudu, Odukpani, Ogoja, Yakurr, and Yala.

It has an estimated population of about 3 .338m (2012). Efik is very widely spoken in the state. Other Languages are Ekoi, Boki, Etung and Bechere.

Methodology

The research was basically conducted with the use of Spot Interviews, administered questionnaires and Focal Group Discussions. A total of 40 questionnaires were administered, out of which 33 were retrieved.

The data collected from the questionnaires were disaggregated in terms of Gender, Education, Types and Causes of Conflict, impacts of conflict, Women in peace and Conciliation Process, etc. Respondents also provided ratings of peace efforts by the three tiers of government, (Local, State and Federal) Non-governmental Organisations, traditional institutions and other stakeholders.

Conflict Situation

Contestation for land remains the central issue in most of the communal conflicts in the state. The preponderance of these conflicts heightens during raining seasons which stretches between January and May. Interestingly, most of these conflicts involved people who share same ancestral bonds, customs, traditions, family ties, trade in same markets, and interacted and intermarried for several decades. Other challenges are political violence, cultism, kidnapping, militancy/piracy, protests, armed robbery, Bakassi (displacement) conflict and the menace of 'Skolombo Boys'.

Communal and Land Disputes

April and May 2014, saw a spike in intercommunal violence in Abi Local Government over land. Clashes were reported between the people of Usumutung and Ediba with fatalities at about 15 persons. Three civilians were killed in similar clashes over farmland. In Yakurr Local Government Area, around April 2013, 8 persons were reportedly killed in a clash between two communities over a piece of land.

In 2016, no fewer than seven people were reportedly killed in renewed hostilities between Inyima community in Yakurr and Onyadama community in Obubra Local Government Area. The Mkpani and Nko Communities in Yakurr are also engulfed in conflict. In Yala Local Government Area, Oyoba Village in Wanikade and Ehetezi in Wanihem were not spared. Ogoja Local Government Area witnessed clashes between Ukpe and Mbagidi communities. In Obudu Local Government Area, the crisis was between Kutai and Okurtong communities while Obanliku Local Government was between Busi 1 and Busi 4. Other conflicts across the Local Government Areas are as follows:

Abi Local Government Area

In 2016, there were two reported incidents of violence. In February a pastor and his aide were killed by unknown gunmen and in May a woman was shot dead by a soldier in a raid on petrol black marketers.

Bakassi Local Government Area

In 2015, several persons were killed when youths attacked a group of exmilitants. In

December 2014, gunmen reportedly attacked a filling station, killing three. In April 2013, five persons were reportedly killed by Cameroonian gendarmes for refusal to vacate an area ruled to be part of Cameroon. In July, it was reported that police had broken up and arrested members of arms dealing syndicate. Later in August, a police officer and a civilian were allegedly killed in a revenge attack by suspected pirates.

Boki Local Government Area

Conflicts over the management of the Oil Palm Estates in Oku/Nsadop are likely to escalate as rival youth cult groups and communities fight for control. Respondents identified government appointees as drivers of the violence through proxies, intensifying the struggle for political influence and turf control among the actors.

Calabar Municipal/South Local Government Area

There were several protests by different groups in 2015. In January, the National Association of Proprietors of private schools protested against high taxes. Also, Academic Senior Staff of Universities (ASUU) UNICAL Chapter staged a protest at the office of Independent National Electoral Commission, Calabar in April.

There was a protest by members of the National Youth Service Corps to demand their allowances for activities carried out during the elections, and in June patients at the University of Calabar Teaching Hospital protested against high cost of treatment. There were also many reports of unknown gunmen attacking or robbing people of the community which remains unabated. In June, militants launched an attack on Police Marine Base and killed at least two Policemen and looted sensitive documents. Later in the month, the Airforce Bombed Waterways outside of Calabar in an attempt to target militants and pirates.

In May, 2014 students staged a protest against the abduction of Chibok school girls. Also a group of taxi drivers and women staged separate protests opposing high council and state taxation rates. In November, former public servants in the state protested over non-payment of their allowance.

Pre-election violence related to both state and federal elections were evident in 2014. Three students from the University of Calabar were killed by security forces after the group began a protest over a local election issue. In November, an explosion was reported at the PDP Secretariat. Cult clashes resulted in a number of fatalities in 2014, four people were killed in a shootout between two rival cult groups, the Vikings and K.K, in August. Crime also continued to cause insecurity in Calabar South, with gunmen attacking a petrol station killing six people in December and taking off with several millions of Naira. In May of that year, a lecturer was killed by suspected cultist at the University of Calabar.

The Menace of Skolombo Boys (Street Kids)

It started from Calabar South Local Government Area before it spread to other parts of

the city. The members numbering over 30 boys and girls in 2014 robbed a busy filling station in a commando style; shot sporadically into the air and within minutes collected all the sales proceeds. Another incident in 2015, when a lady alighted from a taxi and was accosted by two teenagers who demanded for her handbag and handset. Most of these boys and girls absconded from their homes to live in motor parks, market places, uncompleted buildings and unoccupied public buildings.

Most of the respondents were of the view that the skolombo menace gained momentum when members of adult gangs in Calabar South lured street children into the underworld and later used them as tools for wielding economic and political influence.

Odukpani Local Government Area

November 2014, three people were reportedly killed in a political clash during a PDP ward congress.

Ogoja Local Government Area

There were issues of crime and vigilante justice in 2013. A deadly clash between youths and police in October and a violent clash of two rival cult groups in November 2013.

Yakurr Local Government Area

Elections related violence sparked in early 2015. In March, there was a two day clash between Labour Party and People's Democratic Party supporters. Four were left dead and several injured. The clash began with PDP members barricading a road to stop a Labour Party rally during the Gubernatorial and State House of Assembly Elections.

Recommendations

1. Cross River state Government should use all available means to reduce communal and land disputes in the state.
2. The civil society organisations in the state should be supported to effectively utilise their wealth of knowledge on local conflicts.
3. Youth employment by the Federal and state Governments would boost security and economic development in the state.
4. Security agencies especially Military and Police should be adequately equipped to combat the menace of criminal activities.
5. The Cross River state Government, National boundary Commission and office of the surveyor General need to promptly address inter and intra boundary issues in the state.

Table of Conflict in Cross River State

S/No	Types/Nature of Conflict	Main Parties to the Conflict	Causes of The Conflict	Conflict Actors	Location and Year
1	Communal, Boundary and land disputes	Farmers, community leaders	Tussle for land, improper land agreements and poverty.	Farmers, Youths, Elders etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Nyima-Yakurr LGA and Onyadama-Obubra LGA 2013 and 2016. ii. Ediba/Osumutong-Abi LGA CRS and Amagu-Ikwo LGA Ebonyi state 2013-2015. iii. Adadama-Abi LGA CRS & Amagu-Ikwo LGA, Ebonyi State 2013-2015. iv. Ehetegi and Oyoba, Ukele- Yala LGA, 2016. v. Ukpe and Mbagidi-Ogoja LGA, 2016. vi. Mfuma Ijokom and Ngolome, Ukele-Yala LGA, 2016. vii. Nko&MkpaniCrisis, Yakurr LGA, 2016. viii. Ababeng and Iyमितet Crisis – Obubra LGA, 2013. ix. Busi I and BusiIv Crisis – Obanliku LGA, 2016. x. Gabu Community – Yala LGA, CRS and TIV Community – Konshisha LGA, Benue state. xi. Boki LGA – Oil Palm Estate communities and concessionariés.
2	Political Conflict (Political Violence)	Party officials, Party thugs.	Competition for power, politics of exclusion, lack of internal party democracy.	Politicians, Elections Officials, Youths and Elites.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Calabar Municipal LGA, 2014. ii. Calabar South LGA, 2014. iii. Odupkani LGA, 2014. iv. Yakurr LGA, 2014.
3.	Security Conflict (Militancy/Piracy)	Retired and Serving Military Personnel, ex-militants, youths and politicians.	Corruption, bad governance and greed.	Security personnel, ex-militants, youths.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Bakassi LGA, 2013 ii. Calabar Municipal LGA, 2015 iii. Calabar South LGA, 2015 iv. Akpabuyo LGA, 2015

4	Social conflict (Protests)	University Students, University Authorities, Labour Unions and State Government.	Alleged attempts to increase fees, poor facilities at campuses, high taxation, non-payment of wages etc.	Students, Labour Unions, State Government, Street Urchins, Security Forces.	i. Calabar Municipal LGA – 2014-2015. ii. Calabar South LGA, 2014-2015.
5	Security conflict (Cultism)	Students, youth gangs, security agencies	Fight for supremacy	Students, Youths, Politicians & local elites	i. Calabar Municipal LGA, 2014. ii. Calabar South LGA, 2014. iii. Ogoja LGA, 2013.
6	Security conflict (kidnapping)	Youths	Unemployment, greed	Youths	i. Ogoja LGA, 2016. ii. Bakassi LGA, 2015-2016. iii. Akpabuyo LGA, 2013.
7.	Security Conflict (Armed Robbery&Skolombo Boys Menace)	Youths, Teenage boys & girls	Poverty, Unemployment, bad governance and lack of family values.	Youths, Teenage boys & girls.	i. Calabar South LGA, 2013-2016 ii. Calabar Municipal LGA, 2013 - 2016
8	Bakassi Displacement Conflict	Bakassi Indigenes (Displaced and Refugees) Cross River State Government, Federal Government and Republic of Cameroon	ICJ Ruling/ Green Tree Agreement	CRSG, CSOs, Akpabuyo LGA, Bakassi LGA and FG.N.	i. Bakassi LGA, 2012-2016 ii. Akpabuyo LGA. 2012-2016

Source: Field Reports, 2016.

Conclusion

Cross River state is mainly agrarian with huge tourism potentials. Communal conflicts and other forms of security challenges would impact negatively on the state. The state government particularly needs to explore maximally the economic potentials of the state to boost development. Many respondents lamented the near absence of economic opportunities often, worsened by the various forms of conflict and crime. The government and other stakeholders should work towards ensuring sustainable peace and development in the state.

Delta State (The Big Heart of the Nation)

Capital: Asaba



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

Introduction and historical background

Delta state is one of the oil-rich states in the South-South geo-political zone of Nigeria. Its population of 5,663,362 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017) consists of five major ethnic groups – the Igbo ethnic group found in Delta North senatorial zone and the Urhobo, Ijaw, Isoko and Itsekiri ethnic groups found in the Delta Central and Delta South senatorial zones. Most Deltans practice Christianity while some still hold on to traditional religious beliefs. Although Delta state is greatly endowed with petroleum, gas and other natural resources like kaoline, limestone, industrial clay, silica, lignite, tar sand and decorative rocks, its citizens' main occupations are fishery and farming. The state's main revenue is sourced from federal allocations as a major oil-producing state; it hosts Nigeria's second petroleum refinery, a petrochemical plant, an oil export terminus and a number of Transnational Oil Corporations (TNCs).

Asaba, capital of Delta is located at the northern end of the state, while Warri its economic nerve center and host to offices of TNCs, NNPC and other major petro-chemical industries is at the southern extreme of the state. Delta was carved out of the former Bendel state, also formerly called MidWest state, on 27 August, 1991 after much agitation by the Urhobos, Ijaws and Isokos who form the bulk of population in the southern axis

of the state. However, the federal government's decision to merge a separate demand for Anioma state by the Igbo people of the northern axis with the demand for Delta state, and situating the capital in Asaba, an Igbo-speaking town sparked the first salvo of conflict in the state. Although there have been no physical confrontation between the two erstwhile state agitators, there were allegations that the construction of a Government House (Annex) in Warri and the perceived neglect of the development of Asaba, the state capital by previous governors who were not from that zone, was enough conflict indicator.

Delta state is bounded in the north and west by Edo state, the east by Anambra, Imo, and Rivers states, the south-east by Bayelsa state, and on the southern flank by the Bight of Benin which covers about 160 km of the state's coastline. The state has a wide coastal belt interlaced with rivulets and streams which form part of the Niger Delta in the Gulf of Guinea (Onuoha, 2016). Its coastal landscape features a vast crisscross of oil-pipelines, hosts the Chevron Escravos crude oil terminal, one of Nigeria's five oil export terminus, and the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Refinery in Warri.

Delta state is made up of the following twenty-five Local Government Areas (LGA) spread across three senatorial zones. These are:

Delta North: Aniocha North, Aniocha South, Oshimili North, Oshimili South, Ika North East, Ika South, Ndokwa East, Ndokwa West and Ukwani LGAs.

Delta Central: Ethiope East, Ethiope West, Ugheli North, Ugheli South, Okpe, Sapele, Udu and Uvwie LGAs.

Delta South: Warri North, Warri South, Warri South-West, Isoko North, Isoko South, Burutu, Bomadi and Patani.

Conflict in Delta State

Delta state in the period under review (2013-2016) had a conflict profile that put the peace and security architecture of the state under intense pressure. There were incidences of killings, destruction of properties, mass protests, many of which were led by women in communities, blockades of major roads and of offices of Transnational oil Corporations (TNCs); abductions, illegal oil bunkering, vandalism and bombing of oil pipelines and facilities, installation of parallel leadership structures leading to fierce clashes by rival youth groups, arson and gangsterism. With the Exception of Delta North, which recorded intermittent conflicts and an emerging trend of farmers-herders conflict, Delta South and Delta Central were hotbeds of conflict. This was further accentuated by the resurgence of militancy in the state which returned the Niger Delta region to the center of national and global socio-economic and security concern.

A summary of the types of conflict observed in the state are: militancy, land/boundary dispute, leadership conflict, development/empowerment induced conflict and Herders-Farmers conflict. Militancy is categorised as a conflict typology rather than an approach to conflict because of the identity that the Niger Delta conflict has assumed in global conflict narratives. It is the conflict between oil bearing communities in the Niger Delta, which includes Delta state, with the Federal Government of Nigeria and TNCs operating in the region. Criminalities such as kidnapping, raping, cultism and extortions were also recorded in the state. These numerous security challenges are directly responsible for the overwhelming visibility of security operatives and local vigilante/ethnic militia groups all over the state.

Conflict Cases in Delta state

Militancy

After a seven year lull in militant activities in the Niger Delta, Delta state emerged in 2016 as the flash point of renewed militancy targeting federal government and TNCs oil installations in the state. Within this period, there were several bombings and vandalism of oil installations and pipelines, as well as oil theft. Four militant groups were identified behind the renewed militancy. These are the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), the Niger Delta Greenland Justice Movement (NDGJM), the Niger Delta Revolutionary Crusaders (NDRC) and, the Reformed Egbesu Fraternities (REF). Of these, the NDA, which was suspected to be coordinating militant operations from unconfirmed Ijaw communities in the state, was most prominent and dreaded. Despite the palpable presence of the militants in the state, no respondent volunteered any information on their membership or actual operational base during this SCA field research in the state. Yet, the devastating impact of their operations was evident in the environment.

Between the 10 and 14 February, 2016, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) blew up the Bonny Soku Gas Line, which carries natural gas to the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) plant, an independent power plant at Gbaran (both in Rivers state), and one of the most strategic pipelines in the nation's energy network, the Trans Forcados Pipeline (TFP). The TFP transports oil, water, and associated gas from fields in the western Delta. Ten days later (23 February), the group reissued a threat that it would continue hitting oil facilities until the government addressed its grievances. Still in February, it bombed a section of the Escravos gas trunk-line behind Salvation city, near Ogbe-Ijoh in Warri South-West Local Government Area (LGA) and caused an explosion in a pipeline operated by Shell Petroleum Development Corporation, a Royal Dutch Shell subsidiary to the Shell Forcados export terminal. It also blew up the Escravos-Warri crude oil pipeline, Escravos-Lagos-Abuja gas pipeline, Alero Dibi Abiteye crude oil pipelines and also, the Escravos-Abiteye gas lines (Niger Delta Avengers, 2016).

On 4 May, 2016, the Chevron Valve Platform in Warri was blown up. The next day, Chevron Well D25 in Abiteye along with gas lines feeding the Warri and Kaduna refineries was attacked. Five months after the NDA announced its presence and mission, the

Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate (NDGJM) on 9 August, 2016 also declared its existence and threatened to destroy refineries and gas plants in Port Harcourt and Warri within 48 hours. To confirm that threat, it blew up a major oil pipeline operated by the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) in Isoko. In what it tagged 'Operation Zero', the next day, 19 August, it brought down another major delivery line belonging to the Nigeria Petroleum Development Corporation (NPDC) in Owthrode community, Udu LGA, and the Ogor-Oteri oil pipeline on the 30th of the same month. On 4 September, the group claimed it had rigged all marked oil and gas facilities with explosives and warned residents living near them to evacuate (Okafor, 2016). Other oil facilities bombed include Afiesere-Ekiugbo delivery pipeline operated by the Nigeria Petroleum Development Company NPDC/Shoreline, the Afiesere Ere-Iwhenene, Unenurhie-Evwreni delivery line" and the 42-inch delivery line operated by the NPDC/ND Western in Otu-Jeremi on 27 November, 2016.

These threats and attacks impacted negatively on Nigeria's economy as the reduction in oil production and export significantly affected the nation's national earnings.

Other salient reasons which reinforced the militants' resurgence can be summed up as follows: the 'provocative poverty level of the people of the oil-producing region, need for resource control, self-determination, environmental pollution, degradation and contamination of the soil and water which has reduced the livelihood capacity and 'cut short the lives of the inhabitants', lack of potable water, lack of electricity despite the abundance of gas wasting in the region and injustice. Clarifying their mission, spokesman, "General" Aldo Agbalaja of the NDGJM in a statement, said: "The Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate (NDGJM) is not just about causing calamity and delighting in chaos. It is rather a child of circumstance, born to correct an injustice . . ." (Amaize, 2016) According to the NDA, the crux of their agitation is contained in the Sir Henry Willinks minority rights reports of pre-independence Nigeria (1957-8), the Kaiama Declaration document, the General Alexander Ogomudia report and the Leedum Mittee headed Niger Delta Technical Committee Report.

Conflict Early Warning Signals

Prior to the resurgence of hostilities, and as reiterated by responders during this study, there were a number of Conflict Early Warning Signs which signaled an impending truce-reversal by the militants. The first emanated from President Mohammadu Buhari's May 2015 Inauguration speech, which revealed plans to review the amnesty programme; the second, was an announcement in June 2015 terminating the ex-militants' pipeline security contracts; thirdly was, the directive for a 70 percent cut in funding of the Presidential Amnesty Programme in the 2016 budget, and fourthly; government's prosecution drive against a former militant commander of the Movement of the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Government Ekpemupolo AKA *Tompola*, for contract fraud. Added to these is the protracted issue of environmental degradation of

Niger Delta communities caused by oil and gas pollution which have denied a large chunk of its population meaningful livelihood. Lastly, the review of the negotiated patronage enjoyed by the militants since the commencement of the Presidential Amnesty Programme in 2009 without corresponding incentives to sustain the peace eventually led to the declaration of 'war' by the militants beginning from January 2016 when they began attacking oil facilities in the state.

Response/Intervention

The Federal Government adopted a military option to resolve the renewed insurgency. However, this conflict management strategy rather proved defective and also became yet another major conflict driver. In May 2016, the Federal Economic Council (FEC) attributed its inability to effectively confront the renewed militancy to "lack of adequate operational vessels to patrol and secure the network of pipelines . . ." (Onuoha, 2016). In the course of pursuing the military options, incursions were made into some oil bearing communities in the state to arrest suspected culprits of these attacks, oil theft and pipeline vandalism. Some arrests were made. But, the destruction of properties that trailed these incursions generated even more controversy and sharp reactions from affected communities.

A military operation on 28 May, 2016 at Okporoza, Gbaramatu kingdom and country home of 'wanted' ex-militant commander, *Tompolo* caused a lot of devastation and left many injured including his father who subsequently died. Oporoza was reportedly, the operational headquarters (Camp 5) of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) who engaged the Nigerian security agencies in fierce armed confrontations (FFP, 2016) and launched crippling attacks on critical oil infrastructure in the area during previous militancy in the Niger Delta. Another military incursion into communities in November, 2016 led to days of massive street protests by women in four communities – Oporoza, Okerenkoko, Tebizo, Okpeleama (Soriwei, 2016), Kokodiagbene and Kurutie.

The Niger Delta Youth Forum (NDYF) described the incursion as 'an act of impunity and unacceptable' while the Save Niger Delta Group (SNDG), interpreted the military operations as using the 'sophisticated military hardware bought with our own petronaira to kill our people'. Although the groups appealed to the Niger Delta Avengers to sheath their sword and avoid further escalation of military combat since there was no better alternative to dialogue, it was noted that members of these groups were composed of ex-militants who were possibly still active, but were still open to negotiated settlement of the conflict.

The launch of a military exercise tagged "Operation Crocodile Smile" in the area by government provoked a counter-offensive tagged "Operation Crocodile Tears" by the militants. The Ijaw National Congress (INC) which had been mediating in the conflict in a statement issued in September 2016 held that 'Operation Crocodile Smile' had scuttled efforts to end militancy in the Niger Delta.

Peace Initiatives

At the time of the SCA field research, a meeting of Niger Delta Elders and leaders (Pan-Niger Delta Coastal States Stakeholders' Consultative Forum) was convened in Effurun, Warri, Delta state by a prominent Ijaw leader and former federal minister, Chief Edwin Clark in August 2016, towards finding a peaceful resolution to the renewed militancy. Traditional rulers, elders and political leaders from the region attended the conference. In deference to an appeal by the elders, a cessation of hostilities was announced by the militants. First to announce a cease fire was the Niger Delta Avengers on 20 August, 2016, followed by the Niger Delta Green Justice Movement, the Reformed Egbesu Fraternities and finally, the Niger Delta Revolutionary Crusaders. The militants who all credited their decision to the elders' intervention which they perceived as genuine however warned that their action was pending the outcome of their (elders) dialogue with the federal government.

This intervention significantly reduced the incidents of violent attacks in the state. However, criminalities such as kidnapping, rape and gang rivalry arising from proliferation of small arms and light weapons continued in the state.

Land/Boundary conflict

Ogbe-Ijoh an Ijaw ethnic group in Udu LGA and Aladja, an Urhobo ethnic group in Warri South-West are two neighbouring communities with a long history of fierce boundary conflict. The land in contention is separated from Ogbe-Ijoh by a river. The Aladja community claiming ownership of the land alleges that the Ijaws have been their tenants for about 110 years after being ejected from Warri, their original habitation. They accuse the Ijaws of encroaching on their farmlands and fish ponds despite having been magnanimous to welcome them into their community.¹

In 2014, conflict broke out between the groups over alleged extortions by Aladja youths before the Ogbe Ijohs were allowed to use the only access road constructed by the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) for them. They were also alleged to have stopped the construction of a filling station by one of its indigenes at the disputed boundary. The Aladjas on their part, alleged that the Ijaws raped their women, attacked, abducted and killed their youth, and invaded their town leaving a trail of woes behind. Other conflicts incidents which occurred between them are as follows: February-March 2016 – a gun battle at the water front triggered by the Ijaws' attack of Aladja women their farms; this led to the setting up of the Prof. Abednego Ekoko panel of enquiry. Its mandate was to delineate boundary between Warri South-West and Udu LGAs; and between Ogbe Ijoh and Aladja. The Ijaws were also alleged to have launched more attacks on the 2 and 3 June, 2016 using sophisticated weapons. The Aladjas attributed

1 FGD at Aladja community, Warri South-West Local Government Area.

their opponents' military prowess to the support from a militant commander, from the Ogbe Ijoh.

Impact of Conflict

Both sides have suffered fatalities, destruction of properties, displacements at various times since the conflict erupted. There has also been restriction of movement across certain areas for fear of being attacked by the opponents. Economic activities and social interactions have been curtailed, markets set ablaze, the divisional police headquarters in Ogbe Ijoh was overran and its armory looted by youths of the community as they made their way to take revenge on Aladja. An atmosphere of tension generally prevailed between the parties and this was evident in the level of massive vigilantés/ethnic militia who mounted sentry both on the waterway and land at Aladja. Accessing Ogbe Ijoh through Aladja was restrained as even commercial motor cyclists could not operate due to the perceived danger of travelling on the isolated road. No police presence was seen in the community either.

The Ogbe Ijoh-Aladja conflict provoked ethnic confederacies in the state and beyond. A meeting of ex-Niger Delta militant commanders of Ijaw extraction from Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Edo and Ondo states was summoned to decide an appropriate response to the 14-Day ultimatum issued in November, 2016 by the Urhobo Progressive Union (UPU-Youth wing) for Ijaws to vacate all Urhobo land. Ijaws in Udu (an Urhobo LGA) began fleeing from their homes once the ultimatum was announced. Already, this conflict has consumed Diebiri (an Ijaw community), which has been destroyed and its people displaced. Isaba, another Ijaw community caught in the fray for supporting the Ogbe Ijoh cause was also targeted in the conflict. The conflict between Isaba and Ayama is perceived as a proxy war since both are of Ijaw and Urhobo ethnic groups.

Peace Initiatives

A joint military team was stationed on the disputed land as buffer between the disputing parties (Ogbe Ijoh and Aladja). However, many of the peace processes initiated have always broken down midstream while they also often overwhelm the police due to their possession of sophisticated weapons. One of such is the collapse of the peace accord brokered by the state Governor, Dr. Ifeanyi Okowa on 24 March, 2016. Instead of abating, the conflict escalated with a bloody confrontation which resulted in the injury to security personnel and parties to the conflict. A high tension wire supplying electricity to Ogbe-Ijoh was also pulled down during this conflict. Some peace efforts initiated to resolve this conflict include: a military intervention in 1996 which resulted in the ceding of some land to Ogbe-Ijoh, the Justice Dan Azinge judicial panel of enquiry, the Frank Nwaulu judicial panel of 2009 and the Abednego Ekoku of 2016. Till date, no white paper has been produced by any of these panels.

Concerns have been expressed over the seeming intractability of the Aladja-Ogbe Ijoh

conflict. Both parties believe the state government has been playing politics with the resolution of the conflict. Other concerns expressed are the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), the disregard for negotiated settlement, inconsistency in government's policy pronouncements and parameters for settlement of land disputes.

The Aladjas argue that there was an earlier government pronouncement that a river is a natural boundary and therefore was used in the resolution of a certain conflict. They insist that same should apply in the Aladja-Ogbe Ijoh conflict. Meanwhile, Ogbe-Ijoh wants government to rely on the 1955 law, Gazette No 176 which was used to demarcate boundaries in the past, and which they believe is consistent with submissions of recent panels of enquiries in the resolution of the conflict.

Government's alleged inability to decisively resolve this conflict was blamed by both parties on lack of political will, interference by powerful political office holders, inconclusiveness and non-implementation of judicial panels of enquiry and, the stalling of the Ekoko panel of enquiry report which was alleged, has no timeline to deliver on its assignment.

Other boundary disputes recorded in the period under report were between, the Oviri Olomu and Okuawama communities both in Ugheli South LGA and, the Isselegu and Ibabu Communities in Ndokwa West and East LGAs respectively. The boundary conflict in Ugheli was checkmated through the Chairman of the LGA who summoned traditional rulers and the Executive Committee of the parties to a round table to end the dispute. Mediation was still in progress.

Ibrede (Ndokwa East) Land Conflict

An intra-communal conflict erupted on 30 April, 2014 between Ibrede community and Ugbo family over a land, identified as Odabor land and described as endowed with natural resources such as brooks and lakes which have been mutually accessed by both parties for fishing. The disputed Odabor land had been historically shared between the parties on a ratio of two to one in favor of the Ibrede community. But a Kwale High Court ruling on 25 March, 2014 restrained other parties, except the Ugbo family from carrying out fishing activities in the Lake. This injunction was however, flouted by other members of the community, thereby triggering the conflict.

Impact of Conflict

Over 50 houses were burnt, at least two people killed, another died of police gunshot in the course of arrest and many detained. One of those arrested was the Monarch, HRH Joseph Douglas Illiriomah (JP) who was said to be indisposed and on his way to the hospital. His arrest escalated the conflict, leading to the sacking of the entire Ugbo family from the community and removal of the community's President-General, who also was from the Ugbo family. At the time of this study (August 2016), the Ugbo family was still displaced and taking refuge in nearby Ashaka town.

The Ibredes are describes as Ndokwas while the Ugboos are Isokos. Both ethnic groups have however integrated over the years and see themselves as one. Although, it was agreed that the land in dispute belong to the Ugbo family, the community insists such a land cannot belong to just a family² but should be a commonwealth for the entire Ibrede community.

Peace initiatives: The Ibrede community was willing for a reconciliation and ready to accommodate the return of the Ugbo family, but on the condition that the disputed land remains accessible to all members of the community as was accepted before.

Other conflicts that occurred in Delta state between 2013 and 2016 are: The Umusadege and Umusam; Ebendo conflicts in Ndokwa West LGA over land and leadership tussles, The cases are still in court and; the Umu-Inyagbo and Obeche quarters of Iyi clan in Ndokwa East which left scores of people from both clans injured and dead.

Property Inheritance and Land Speculation

Cases involving property rights and land speculation in the state are of a continuous nature causing regular police intervention and litigations. The Ughelli Police Area Command attributed causes of these conflicts to activities of land speculators and dispute over inheritance right in polygamous families.

Leadership Conflict

In Ughorodo, Warri South-West LGA, youths, men and women took over Chevron facility in the community on 9 August, 2016, chanting and carrying placards against the company. The protest was over its refusal to recognise and negotiate with the community's appointed Interim Management Committee (IMC) in preference for the Ughorodo Trust Committee whose tenure had lapsed. They were also miffed at what they called the meddlesomeness of the company in their internal affairs, the divide and rule strategy deployed by the company against the community on their choice of who should liaise with Chevron Company for redistribution of funds meant for community development. The protesters demands included the rebuilding of a cottage hospital destroyed during the Ijaw invasion, the opening of the company's back gate to enable the community access recreational facilities and allocation of more employment slots to the community.

Conflict escalated between the rival groups as supporters of Chief Thomas Ereyitomi led Trust who was re-elected for a second term, in a process observed and endorsed by the Delta state government and the faction led by David Tonwe over who represents the community in the Export Processing Zone (EPZ). They also rejected the appointment of Mr Austine Oborogbeyi as Chairman of EPZ Interface Committee appointed by the

2 Focus Group Discussion at the palace of the Monarch of Ibrede, Ndokwa East Local Government Area.

state government following his nomination by the Olu of Warri, Ogiamwe Atuwatse II. The protesters insisted that the Oloja-Ori, the spiritual head of Ugborodo, and not the Olu of Warri had the right to nominate for them. The nomination, which was described as an imposition and usurpation of power, stalled progress on the NNPC driven EPZ project in the community (Yafugbrhi, 2016).

Meanwhile, the elected leadership of the UTC was sacked from their homes by armed group loyal to rival, David Tonwe, chairman an Ugborodo Interim Management Trust elected in a parallel election. The conflict which assumed dangerous proportion at a point reportedly claimed a life and several persons displaced from their homes. A peace initiative which required both sides to have ten members each to represent them on the EPZ project committee doused the hostility between both parties. The Committee, constituted by the federal government mandated them to restore peace to the community, resettle displaced persons, lead the community's interests in the EPZ and push for election of a generally accepted community trust.

Impact of the Conflict

The conflict claimed lives and caused displacement, stalled development of the economy and infrastructure of Ugborodo and Gbaramatu communities and caused political division in the state. The formal ground breaking of the project was delayed by President Goodluck Jonathan pending conclusion of mediation processes by the state government to conclude. However, this delay proved costly for him politically, as his action was interpreted as favouring the Ijaws (Gbaramatu), his fellow kinmen. President Jonathan was an Ijaw, but from Bayelsa state. The Ugborodu's then made a public announcement shifting support from Jonathan of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to arch rival, Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressive Party (APC).

Development-induced Conflict

Ugborodo-Gbaramatu Conflict

Prior to the intra-communal conflict in Ugborodo was a conflict which ensued between the Ishekiris (Ugborodo) and the Ijaws of neighbouring Gbaramatu over the naming of the \$16 billion Export Project Zone, the EPZ. The violence which erupted between them in April 2015 took the intervention of the Nigerian Navy before it ended. The tension generated by both by the intra- and inter-communal conflict, halted continued development of the project.

Okpai-AGIP Conflict

Indigenes of Okpai and other communities in Ndokwa East Local Government Area, Delta state continued their protest in 2016 over failure of the National Agip Oil Company, NAOC, to step down electricity to their communities; a decade after former President Olusegun Obasanjo inaugurated an Independent Power Plant (IPP) operated in the community. Although the plant provides 15 percent of the country's electricity to 9

states in the federation, the communities have not benefited from it. The community has remained restive since August 2015.

Okpai-Sterling Oil Conflict

Okpai was also in conflict with Sterling Oil Company in 2016 over non implementation of an MOU signed with the National Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) to construct roads in the community before installing the pipelines. Most of these conflicts are in form of street protests, petitions and physical blockade of official facilities.

Farmers-Herders Conflict

There was an emerging trend of farmers-herders conflict in some communities in the state. Since the kidnap and killing of the Ubulu Ukwu monarch HRM Akaeze Edward Ofulue III, in January 2016 by criminals identified as 'Fulanis' (herders), there have been other notable incidents of farmer-herders conflict. These trends featured in Ugbevwe community, Jesse clan in Ethiope West LGA; Ani Ngene, a clan in Illah, Oshimili North LGA and in Ossissa, Ndokwa East LGA. While the Ugbevwe conflict was caused by the destruction of farms by cattle belonging to Fulani herders, the conflict occurred that occurred in Ani Ngene was due to herders' attacks which led to the death of two people from the community. As a result, the indigenes stopped going to farms because of fear of being kidnapped, killed and having their women raped. There were general uprisings calling for the expulsion of the herders from communities.

The Fund for Peace May/June 2016 monthly conflict incident tracker for Delta state also reported similar cases which led to protests in Aniocha North, Ukwuani, Ndokwa West, Oshimili South and Ethiope East.

In May, tensions were reported in Obiaruku community, Ukwuani LGA, after Fulani herders were asked to leave the community because eight residents were held hostage by suspected herders.

Conclusion

With the exception of a major portion of Delta North, the rest of the state experienced militancy triggered by the 2016 policy review at the federal level, a defect in conflict management approach, measured developmental pace, and a huge livelihood challenge that has also caused the thriving of criminality and loss of social values in the state. Rape, gangsterism, cultism, usurpation of traditional authority, robberies, extortions and school dropout syndrome are indicators of more far-reaching conflict possibilities in the nearest future if efforts are not made to address the root causes. Stability of communities hosting oil and gas facilities is no doubt critical to national growth. However, they don't seem to have been factored into national planning for commensurate benefits and development. This gap has impacted negatively on the peace and security of the state and the South-South zone to a large extent, especially given that militancy as

observed in the zone is a trans-territorial operation.

Security challenge is being compounded by limited access to land for economic or livelihood purposes by communities because of years of soil and water pollution as a result of oil spillage by TNCs' operational negligence, deliberate pipeline vandalism, ungoverned modular refineries and encroachment by real estate developers. Other problematic issues identified in Delta state are inconsistency in policy, inconclusiveness of panels of enquiries, non-implementation of reports on peace agreement, alleged politicisation of peace and security issues, resort to pecuniary compensation rather than concrete welfare and development oriented programmes by TNCs and sales of community employment slots by corrupt leaders of community groups. This has not helped the cause of peace and security but promoted a token-dependency syndrome especially among youths thereby leading to group rivalries, supremacy battles and arms-running.

Responses/Interventions

Track 1 Response

The intense security challenge in Delta state which was also compounded by the proliferation of SALW seems to have informed an equally immense security and conflict management responses by both the state and federal government. Different forms of response mechanisms observed in the state were, a Joint Military Task Force (JTF), Naval patrols, and a combined team of state security machineries such as the Directorate of state services, the police, and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) constantly on alert to quell violence and arrest pipeline vandals. It was also observed that the security operatives adopted more of facilitating dialogue and mediation in conflicts between communities and TNCs despite their enforcement mandate. Also of note is the constitution of the Delta State Advisory and Peace Building Council with a statutory mandate to track the root of conflicts, prevent and mediate conflicts as well as engage in peacebuilding. It is structured to be proactive, and outlive political regimes. Other conflict responses in the state in the period under review were Panels of Enquiry, Judicial interventions and sensitisation programmes by National Orientation Agency (NOA) and the Ministry of Women Affairs.

Track 2 Responses

A number of civil society organisations (CSOs) have been working towards the peace and security of the state. These include, the Environmental Rights, anti-cultism, Human, Gender and Children Rights activists as well as Anti-cultism organisations. Notable among these are the Environmental Mediation Center (ENVIRONMEDICS) and the Academic Associates PeaceWorks (AAPW). Communities also have their internal structures for the resolution of conflict and these comprise traditional title holders, women and youth leaders. Traditionally, monarchs are the final arbiters in communal disputes, however, there seems to have been a paradigm shift as this institution have

suffered direct resistance, confrontation and sometimes overthrow, especially by restive youths.

The preponderance of vigilante groups in most of the communities is a clear indication of their general acceptance and vital roles they play in communal security arrangement. These are known to tend more towards ethnocentric than a universal security services.

Also featuring prominently and impactful in the resolution of the militancy in the state was the Pan-Niger Delta Coastal States Stakeholders' Consultative Forum, whose singular intervention as elders and leaders of note from the region, were able to secure yet another truce from the militants. Although not a permanent conflict management structure, the credibility of the leaders provide channels than can be leveraged for concerted and sustainable resolution of conflict in the state.

Track 3 Responses

Delta state's profile as an oil bearing state has made the state a destination for TNCs prospecting, extracting and refining oil. The conflicts that often arise in the sector, especially in their relations with host communities have ensured that the corporations have community relations departments to interface with the community on their demands and grievances. Shell and Chevron.

Recommendations

The security challenge confronting Delta state is being addressed with a multi-dimensional approach. The state has relied heavily on the inauguration of judicial panels of enquiry which to a large extent seems not to have achieved their objectives, while court cases have protracted conflicts. However, Delta state's peculiar peace architecture which features vigilantes/ethnic militias as security organs in most communities, augment existing gaps in security services. Arising from their commitment to pursuing more of ethnic security than a global agenda, there is a need for trust and confidence-building by the police and other state security agencies towards adherence to global best practices in the state.

The Advisory and Peace Building Council inaugurated in August 2015 was given a charge to "strengthen the foundation of the unity of Delta state in line with global trends in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and transformation, as well as postconflict reconciliation and peace management". For it to succeed, it must ensure that relevant agencies promptly implement decisions emanating from mediated settlement of conflict, peace agreements, judicial pronouncement and policies.

The proliferation of SALW such as AK 47 and high calibre weapons as RPG, "Mortar" bombs and explosives in the state does not help the path of peace but spontaneous violence. There is a need for massive mopping up of arms to give room for a civil approach to resolution of conflict. Government should therefore, initiate a Demobilisation, Disarmament and Re-habitation (DDR) programme but, with

development and empowerment programmes to precede that exercise.

The use of force as a conflict mitigation strategy so far seems to have provoked more resentment and resistance than cooperation. As has been indicated by militants and other stakeholders the federal government needs to initiate a rapprochement through dialogue with aggrieved militants or representatives, quickly address the root cause of their agitation and find commensurate palliatives as livelihood support in the interim, while negotiating a long term and sustainable solution.

The resurgence of militancy, rising criminality and frequent communal conflict call for close attention by peace actors in Delta state. While recognising that unity among the diverse feuding groups cannot be imposed on the people, there is need for government at Local, State and Federal levels sensitise on the values of peace and unity, social re-orientation and engage youth in recreational and sport programmes that would boost peaceful co-existence and tolerance.

There is also the need to put in place structures that support conflict sensitivity in the sighting of developmental projects both within Delta state and the South-South as some of the ethnic groups, especially, the Ijaw nationality have close affinity to their kinsmen in neighbouring states. Conflict in any of these areas therefore, easily engulfs the rest.

Mainstreaming peacebuilding in development is needed to avoid the type of conflict between Ugborodo and Gbaramatu communities in the state. Therefore, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) should precede the citing of projects. This is also a way to ensure neutrality and transparency and to ensure that development projects do not trigger violences in the state.

There are a number of Environmental Rights, Human Rights and Women groups that are working in the region on deescalating conflict, education, seeking legal redress for women and children, working in communities and rehabilitating problematic youth groups among others. These efforts require proper coordination to prevent duplication and over concentration of activities in a particular area.

There is urgent need for establishment of recreational facilities to develop sport, cultural activities and encourage the youth to interact and divert energy to positive use. This is a way to breed unity and integration amongst the various ethnic groups in Delta state.

There should also be integrated and articulated development policies and programs for conflict prevention.

There is need for peace education that would teach alternative Dispute Resolution options in communities.

Government agencies should empower parents at home and teachers in school to encourage the re-orientation of children on the significance of peace, peacebuilding and unity in development.

Edo State (The Heartbeat of the Nation)

Capital: Benin City



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria

(A) A Brief History of Edo State

Edo state was created on the 27 August, 1991 from the defunct Bendel state with Benin City as the Capital. Formerly known as Mid-Western Region at the time it gained regional status in August, 1963, from the then western region. Edo state is bounded in the north and east by Kogi state, in the south by Delta state and in the west by Ondo state. Edo state population is approximately 4 million (2006 National Census). Major languages spoken in the state include Edo, Etsako, Esan, Owan, Akoko Edo, Okpameri and Ijaw. Edo state is home to several ethnic groups; among them include the Bini, Esan, Afemai, Emai, and Ijaw. Others include the Igbira speaking communities found in Akoko Edo, the Urhobos, Izons, Itsekiris communities in Ovia North East and South West Local Government Areas. Also, the Ika speaking communities are found in Igbanke in Orhionmwon LGA. Its major towns are Benin city, Ekpoma, Auchu, Ubiaja, and Uromi.

Edo state also has a high presence of residents from across Nigeria and the world because of its cosmopolitan tendencies. Benin City the capital has a history of being one of the

foremost destinations of Europeans during their exploration of Africa continent many centuries ago. Some of the flash points have remained enviable tourists' attraction for the state. A good number of communities and indeed ruling dynasties in all the clans around Edo state and neighbouring states trace their roots to the ancient kingdom of Benin. Cultural similarities are in abundance in the areas of religious worships, folklore, dances, festivals, traditional modes of dressing, arts and craft.

Historically, the ancient Bini Kingdom dates back to 900 AD. History also lends credence to an ethnographic and historiography that the Oba of Benin used to send his sons to different parts of the then Bini Kingdom as vassals to establish and consolidate his imperial authority in these areas. This explains the cultural similarities of these people with the core Bini ethnic stock. This is also responsible for the political pattern and behaviour of her neighbour are based on a situation where both the monarchial and republican ideas of Edo people flourished in an integrated manner within and beyond Edo state.

Edo state's economy centers on agriculture, including food crops such as yams, cassava, rice or maize and cash crops such as rubber, palm oil, cotton, cocoa and timber. The state's capital, Benin City, is the centre of Nigeria's rubber industry. Edo also has significant deposits of granite, limestone, marble, lignite, crude oil, gold, and kaolin clay.

(B) Conflicts Landscape

The Fund for Peace Conflict Bulletin (January 2014) on Edo state reports that Edo was Niger Delta's third most violent state on a per capita basis between 2012-2013. About 78 incidents of violence that led to the deaths of almost 200 people was reported. Trigger issues stem from economic, political cum socio-cultural to criminal interest. They include but not limited to protests, kidnapping/abduction, robbery, clashes between gangs, cults, political groups, communities and chieftaincy tussles. Over half of these incidents were said to be in the Oredo Local Government Area (LGA), home to Benin City, Esan West, Uhunmwonde, and Etsako Central, East and West LGAs. It was discovered in the field research that most of these conflicts are interwoven in the sense that cult groups and gangs get involved in most criminal activities ranging from political or labour union protest and communal clashes to clashes between cult groups and gangs, chieftaincy, kingship and land tussles as well as kidnapping/abduction and even farmers/herders conflict.

Conflict Cases in Edo State 2013-2016

(1) Economic Conflict

Earlier in the background we noted that Edo state is one of the oil producing states in Nigeria and also endowed with various agriculture products including cash crops like rubber, palm oil, cotton, cocoa and timber. It is also blessed with significant deposits of

granite, limestone, marble, lignite, crude oil, gold, and kaolin clay. These natural endowments at various times have become area of conflict between communities, state versus individuals and communities and also investors.

(i) Illegal Oil Bunkering and Pipeline vandalism

Edo state is one of the oil producing states of the South-South Zone but is not a major oil-producer compared to others like Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta or Rivers states. This is because with the creation Delta state out of the old Bendel state, Edo retained the capital city of Benin and most of the physical and administrative infrastructure, but it lost substantial oil producing territory to its neighbour, Delta state. The militancy therefore associated with the South-South zone as related to oil affects Edo state as well, and constitute part of the economic conflict triggers in the state. Illicit activities like bunkering and pipeline vandalism is significant as security agents like Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) arrest and battle them daily to stem the tide in the following Local Government Areas: Ikpoba-Okha, Ovia North-East, Uhumwonde and Orhionmwon. Mr Walter Akubiroh, the NSCDC State Commander reported in an interview that community lands with pipelines running across have been taken over by such vandals and the owners of such lands harassed to accept stipends or remain in perpetual bondage. At various occasions both perpetrators and land owners have been arrested and prosecuted. They regularly conduct raids of such bunkering sites, confiscate, and destroy their equipment like the one he spearheaded in Obazagbon in Ohounwonde Local Government Area in June 2016. Most of the times the vandals elope.

(ii) Communal clash between Erhunrun-Uneme Clan in Akoko Edo vs Agute-Okpella in Atesako East LGA

These two communities have had years of lingering hostilities between them for years because the Ogute-Okpella believe the Erhunrun-Uneme people are settlers in the area who were paying royalties to them and have no ancestral claim to the land with rich timber and mineral resources. But the clash of 20 February, 2016 eschewed when a timber extractor from Ogute-Okpella went to Erhunrun-Uneme community to extract timber. This led to the death of one person and the disappearance of six from Erhunrun-Uneme clan, several houses were burnt and hundreds fled their communities. The police stepped in along with the Edo State Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee charging the Okuokpellagbe of Okkella, HRH Yesufu Disiru and Clan Head of Erhunrun-Uneme, Alhaji Braimoh to prevail on their subjects to allow due process be followed in the settlement of the conflict. While some semblance of stability has returned to the communities, however any attempt by either party to re-enter the disputed timber land triggers violence from both communities.

(iii) Youth Restiveness in Okpella Communities, Atesako East Local Government Area

Okpella is a major town in Edo, located between Auchi in Edo state and Okene in Kogi

state and known for its high deposit of varieties of limestone which explains the presence of some mineral based industries and quarries. It is reported that ironically the youths are largely unemployed. Consequently, when Julius Berger moved into Okpella to commence the construction of a cement factory on behalf of BUA Nigeria Limited they gave 50 percent employment quota to the indigenes. To ensure proper management of the quota offered by Julius Berger, HRM, Alhaji A.Y.E Dirisu, OON, the Okuokpellagbe of Okpella constituted an implementation committee. At the end of their exercise some aggrieved youths who were not favoured protested to HRM on November 10, 2012, accusing the committee of fraud and demanded for their immediate dissolution. The police came in but on 15 November, 2012, the youths lunched an attack which led to the death of an infant through the excessive inhalation tear gas, destruction of the palace of the traditional ruler in Awoyemi area under construction, desertion of the town by the indigenes and its consequential halting of all economic activities. The Federal and State Government Law Enforcement and Peacebuilding as well as Non-Governmental Organisations moved in to restore peace in the community by disbanding and setting up of another committee and sued for a better cooperation between all the stakeholders.

(iv) Death of a Sasaro Indigene in a pool within the premises of Tony Rock Quarry Company, Akoko-Edo LGA

On April 20, 2015, a youth of Sasaro working with Tony Rock Quarry died in the course of learning how to swim with a Lebanese. It was learnt that the Lebanese wanted to take the diseased to his country but possessing the swimming skill was a necessary prerequisite. When the Lebanese took the corpse to the house of the traditional ruler in an open Hilux van the youths got irritated and vandalised the vehicle and other company properties. The Police security guard opened fire and injured some of the youths who succeeded in disarming him and confiscated his gun which was deposited with the traditional ruler. When the police waded in they arrested the traditional ruler with some elders, requesting them to produce the youths who were involved in the attack. Villagers fled the community and left the place desolate until the Chairman of the Local Government, State Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee, SSS, NOA, etc. settle the matter in September 2015.

(2) Political Conflict

Before the emergence of comrade Oshiomhole as Governor of Edo state political violence and killings were very high. His government united various political groups which deflated major triggers of political violence and conflicts associated with so-called political 'Godfathers' that Edo state has been known for over the years. The introduction of the Amnesty program required that over 26,000 militants surrender their weapons in return for a presidential pardon, and access to an education, training, and rehabilitation program; paved the way for relative relief from major triggers of violent conflict not only in Edo state, but also in the entire South-South geopolitical region of Nigeria. Many of the militants moved from the creeks into the urban areas of

states like Edo, to escape their troubled pasts but with high expectations of economic fortunes, hence they became veritable tools for political thuggery and mercenaries.

In October 2014, unidentified gunmen attacked and injured a PDP lawmaker for defecting from APC to PDP in Benin, In December 2014 a PDP senatorial aspirant was attacked by unknown gunmen who killed his cousin and a police orderly. Such were rampant in the entire length and breadth of Edo state prior to the 2015 elections and cult boys were their hatchet men. In Fuga, Etsako Central LGA, an ACN official was killed, three others wounded and two houses burnt on April 10, 2013, as well as that of a prominent businessman in October 2013. By April 2013, during the local government elections, a clash between supporters of APC and PDP led to two fatalities in Etsako East and Etsako West LGAs during rallies. A violent clash was also reported between APC and PDP supporters during voting exercise in Irrua.

It was also reported by the Chairman of the Edo State Peace and Conflict Resolution, Chief Eduwu Ekhator who is the Obasogie of Benin Kingdom, that between 31 December, 2012 and 2 January, 2014 six (6) persons were found dead in different parts of Benin following a renew war among secret cult organisations, one of who was a master's degree holder from the University of Benin (*Nigerian Observer*, January 2014).

(3) Communal Conflict

Land Tussle

The conflicts recorded in this area could be ancestral claims on land or conflict arising from interests in the control of the economic components of the land like stones for quarry, trees for timber, and mineral resources in the land. In such circumstances, we find companies coming between communities who claim ancestral ownership to a given land sold to a person or company. This type of conflict seems much more predominant in Edo state than most other conflict. While some good examples would be mentioned, a few that are very critical will be X-rayed for. In February 2012 two people were killed in an intra-communal land dispute involving Ahar, Uselu, Nahor, Ewosa and Esigie communities in Uhumwonde LGA. Each community laying claim on the same parcel of land. Villagers were reported to have fled to neighbouring communities during the incident. Another is the communal conflict for land between Sasaro versus Igarra and Igarra vs Enwan all in Akoko Edo L.G.A, have been in in the High Court for some years now. We also have claim over a land by Ekpedo in Akoko Edo L.G.A vs Ogori Magongo in Kogi state.

(i) Communal clash between Bekuma and Ekpedo communities in Akoko Edo LGA

These communities share a common boundary which is not visibly delineated. It was the decision of the District Officer (DO) in 1945 that took the decision to make a small stream dividing them as boundary. The cause of the crises was that the Methodist Church

in Ekpedo crossed over this small stream to the side of Bekuna and built a ten for worship. The people of Bekuna protested and reported to the police who gave a stop work order. The order was accepted but after a few months they resumed work there. At this point the traditional ruler of Bekuna, HRH Moses Alabi, the Okpahi of Bekuna reported the matter on 15 September, 2012 to the Area Commander in Auchi and the Divisional Police Officer who ordered both communities to stay away from the disputed area near the stream but the church disregarded the order and continued work. Consequently, the Bekuna people mobilised their youths to destroy the church tent. In retaliation, the Ekpedo people marched into Bekuna and set ablaze the Anglican Church building. The then Commissioner of Police, Mr. Olayinka Balogun and the Local Government Chairman waded into the crises before greater havoc arose. The police occupied the place for a long time before the government came in to make peace through Edo state Peace and conflict resolution committee.

(ii) Communal clash between Okha and Uroho Communities, Ikpoba-Okha Local Government Area

Okha and Uroho are both in Ikpoba-Okha Local Government Area. While Okha is about 15 km from ring road Benin City, Uroho made up of Uroho I, II and III is just 2 km from sapele road, Benin City. The bond of contention is the land sold to Benson Idahosa University as permanent site for the university. Okha community sold the land to them with a mutual agreement of granting scholarship to her indigenes, provision of health care, light, and other social amenities. However, Uroho community accused Okha community for encroaching into their land while selling their piece of land to Benson Idahosa University. Sources stated that the boundary dispute first surfaced in 2002 when Omo n' oba of Benin, Oba Erediauwa intervened and adjusted the boundary. Uroho community have always accused Okha community for continually beating and molesting indigenes their indigenes over the boundary dispute. On Friday 16 November, 2012, youths from Uroho community opened fire on their attackers who they claimed were Okha indigenes. Two (2) persons were reported dead and unspecified number of people injured from the clash. Since then Uroho community has been deserted for fear of reprisal attacks from the Okha community. The Edo State Police Command was drafted into the area to maintain law and order.

(iii) Dispute between the Ijaws and Binis over perceived ownership of Benin land

The animosity and acrimony between the Ijaws of Ovia North and Ovia South-West LGAs and Binis has been age long and protracted with so much violence and bloodshed. Some Ijaw leaders like C.A Dime, Gaius J. Uroupe and Robinson Ogunkoru have over the years accused the late Bini monarchs, HRHs Oba Akenzua and Erediauwa as well as the Benin Traditional Council (BTC) of depriving them of their rights and claim to ownership of their lands in the state. This as well as the perceived neglect and marginalisation of the Ijaws have been the source of the agitations for the creation of

Toru-ebe state, to be carved out of Gelegele, Ekehuan and Ughaton in Ovia North-East L.G.A as well as some villages in Ovia South-West LGA. The traditional council and monarchs have maintained that the Jaws who were once their slaves and later settlers cannot lay claim to any land in Benin kingdom. This case was judged in favor of Benin kingdom by Justice Ekeruche (High Court of Justice Benin, Suite B/44/1970 and High Court of Justice, Benin, December 22, 1978), this was his ruling:

For avoidance of doubt, argument or controversy, I hereby state unequivocally that Gelegele village and environ as well as bushes/enclaves which are in Benin land, do not belong to the Ijaws. The Ijaws are tenants of His Highness Oba Akenzua II, Oba of Benin. Therefore, the plaintiff's claims are dismissed in its entirety.

Dissatisfied with the judgement the Ijaws appealed to the Federal High Court of Appeal Benin and lost; went to supremecourt and under Justice Muhammadu Lawal Uwais on August 19, 1983 they also lost (Suite SC/31/1982). In spite of these their agitations have not stopped as all attempts to install Benin Chiefs in Ekenwan and Gelegele comprising mostly of Ijaws from Olodiana Clan resulted in violent clashes on 25 and 31 October, 2012 leading to serious injuries on both sides as well as destruction of houses and vehicles. It took the intervention of the Police command to halt the fracas. It should be noted that this lingering animosity, claims and counter claims have been fired and worsened by the following:

- (1) Ongoing prospecting activities by Dubri Oil Company at Gelegele.
- (2) Proposed construction of a Federal Housing Estate at Ughoton by the Federal Government.
- (3) Proposed construction of a model Secondary School at Obazuwa-Iko by Edo State Government.
- (4) Proposed construction of a seaport at Gelegele by the Federal Government.
- (5) Persistent request for the creation of Toru-ebe state by the Ijaws, among others.

It is important to state that with the supreme court ruling and historical background of the land dispute, it is very likely that the new Oba of Benin, Oba Ehenede Erediauwu will toe the line of his father and grandfather on the issue and the conflict will continue indefinitely.

Land Sale

The issue of land tussle discovered in most parts of Edo state has its history in the creation of Community Development Areas (CDAs) in the early 90s. These CDAs expected to stimulate development projects in the state have over the years metamorphosed into conflict agents as a result of the impunity they exhibit in the sale of community land. Sometimes such lands are sold to two or more persons resulting in conflicts between individuals, communities, or rival cult groups. Some of the conflict

get so violent that properties worth millions and lives are lost. Examples are:

- (i) The Enogie of Idogbo vs the chiefs in Ekpoba-Okha LGA: The chiefs claim that the Enogie does not give them dividends from the sales of land since 2014;
- (ii) Multiple sales of land by the youths in Egwa community consequent upon the non-recognition of the chief of Egwa community in Ekpoba-Okha LGA who could probably have brought in some sanity in the sales of land in the community;
- (iii) Another case was that of the Okhuoromi community, Iyeke-Ogba in ward 11 in Oredo LGA in February 2016: This was a dispute over a piece of land between an indigene who claimed he bought a land and was laying its foundation stone but the community chairman rose against it. The chairman was killed in his house by unknown gunmen and violence erupted in the community which led to many more injuries and 2 deaths. The Army and Police waded in to calm the situation. Most times they stay in the community for some time before withdrawing their men.
- (iv) Land tussle between HRH Alhaji H.A. Momoh, the Ikelebe 111 of Otaru in Auchi kingdom and Mr. Julius Ikhoghode asking that HRH vacates his land in May 2016. The court ruled in favour of Mr. Julius Ikhoghode but HRH has appealed to a higher court. Findings showed that Mr. Julius seeks justice by compensation if HRH must have the land. This happens to be where his palace is situated.
- (v) Land dispute between Auchi and Uzairue Communities over the installation of stepdown transformer by the Federal Government. On arrival of the transformer, the Auchi traditional ruler donated a portion of land to site the transformer which was opposed by the Uzairue, claiming ownership of the land. Consequently, the Uzairue community also demanded that the project be named, Uzairue stepdown transformer Esako West LGA.

(4) Kingship/Chieftaincy Tussles

Just like communal tussles for land we have various incidents of tussle for kingship and chieftaincy across the state. Some of the cases are in court. While a few have decisions/court rulings taken on them but there is lack of political willpower on the part of government to implement such decisions or court rulings because of political interest. These have led to serious violent conflicts in some parts of the state:

- (i) Traditional Headship of Illushin community in Esan South-East LGA between the Onu of Oroh and HRH Christopher Ikebordih. The level of violence, bloodshed and destruction of properties led to the self-exile of HRH Christopher Ikebordih for years. The issue was that the nomination and appointment of HRH did not follow due process. The former deputy Governor

of the state Reverend Peter Obadan committee had taken a decision on that but the crises still lingered. The Edo state PCRC, DPOs of the neighboring communities and heads of surrounding communities finally put to rest the case by upholding the decisions of the former deputy Governor being that HRH Christopher Ikebordih was duly nominated and appointed as the traditional head of the Illushin community (*Nigerian Observer*, Saturday, January 30, 2016).

- (ii) There also arose a claim to the Obaship of the Benin kingdom by the Ogiamien of Utantan Bini (an acclaimed ruling house of old) with the death of the Oba Erediauwa. Though this was subdued, there is no ruling the fact that it might still raise its head again in the distant future and could be fatal then (*The Nigerian Observer*, Friday, August 14, 2015).
- (iii) Chieftaincy power tussle in Uhogua community in Ovie North East L.G.A. This was earlier handled by the Benin Monarch, Omo N'Oba N'Edo Uku Akpolokpolo, Oba Erediauwa on 23 November, 2012 but later resurfaced and resolved finally in May 2014 by the Edo state peace and conflict resolution committee. The chairman of Uhogua community Mr Monday Osayanda and his deputy, Mr John Uhiengbonwam pledged to abide by the resolutions (*Nigerian Observer*, Friday, 30 May, 2014).
- (iv) Tussle for the kingship of Ewan Community in Akoko Edo L.G.A between Chief O.C. Daoudu versus Chief P.O. Okara since 2007 is still in the Appeal Court without resolution.

(5) Criminality (Cultism, Kidnapping, and Robbery)

Increase in the spate of kidnappings, armed robberies and other forms of violent crimes in the state became unbearable in Edo state between 2011 and 2013. This conflict area cannot be separated from cult groups and their activities. It is believed that the cult groups perpetuate most of the kidnapping and robbery cases in the states. There were several cases of abduction reported in Oredo LGA including that of an Israeli expatriate in July 2013, three female teachers in August and a pastor killed in November of the same year. Additional two abduction cases were reported in August and December 2013, with two policemen killed in the first abduction and the abducted killed in the second incident. Also, there were reports of intimidation and kidnapping of six people including the wife of the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) by gunmen in Oredo. The victims were released after a ransom was paid. The kidnappers were later apprehended by the police.

In Etsako Central/East/West a series of bank robberies by a large gang of armed gunmen led to the deaths of over a dozen people in November 2012. The All Progressive Congress chief in Edo was also kidnapped in August 2013, but eventually released in September 2013 and his kidnappers arrested. Cult violence, political tensions, violent criminality, armed robbery of banks and kidnapping were the common manifestations of violent

conflict in Edo state for the month of August-September 2016 as reported by the Fund for Peace (2016). These were not unconnected with the menace posed by cult groups and gangsters that not only operated in the university community but also in secondary schools and the villages. It is feared that they have also infiltrated the primary schools. A lecturer in drawing and analogy between cultism and militancy postulated that these boys now militancy as an avenue to get rich quick. In order to be recruited into any of the militant groups you must be seen as a “hard man”, meaning a rootless. Consequently, the earlier they join a cult group and prove their rootlessness the better their chances of being recruited into militancy and getting rich quick killer. Most times these cult groups clash amongst themselves over money, supremacy and territorial control. In November 2013, the Eiye Confraternity lost some of its members through an intra-cult clash.

A concerted reaction came to the rescue when some of the cult fraternities otherwise known as the Green Circuit (a.k.a Maphites), Norsemen (aka Vikings), Black Axe, Eiye confraternity, Family Fraternity of Nigeria and Avarian came together to organise a summit of all cult members in schools across Edo state. These cult members converged at the Sand Beach Resorts, Benin, in summit tagged “Interactive Peace Summit: Strategy for Social Cohesion.” At the summit, the groups, which came together under the aegis of Rainbow Consolidated Forum, said they were not satisfied with the spate of violent crimes and insecurity in the state and vowed to fight the situation . . . In the words of Donald Edeghon, the chairman of Rainbow Consolidated Forum: If you remember, for over two decades, inter-group conflicts which often resulted in violent and fatal crisis were the attributes of Edo state communities. Innocent lives, properties of inestimable worth are taken and destroyed on a whim. Armed robbery, kidnapping, thuggery and sundry social vices rose to unprecedented levels; it became dangerous to reside and function legitimately in Edo state, and, in particular, Benin City, I hoped that their coming together to fight armed robbers, kidnappers and perpetrators of other violent crimes in Edo would yield good results. In his words: (<http://www.nigeria-news-world.com/2013/10/edo-cult-groups-unite-to-fight.html?m=1>.)

Intriguing in this saga of kidnap, abduction, robbery and cult activities is that between 2013-2016 the stretch from Auchi in Edo to Okene in Kogi state has witnessed an unprecedented increase in this form criminality. Private and commercial cars and buses have been robbed and some of them kidnapped. At the end, huge ransoms are paid before their victims are released. Juxtaposing this with reports that some of the wanted names in the Boko Haram list are from Okene and those abducted confessed hearing them also speaking some foreign languages like Chad and Niger, a lot of suspicion points to a probable linkage with the Boko Haram sect. This calls a deeper inquiry, precaution, and strategic intervention before it develops into another insurgency because by the time they get more money, they will be empowered to get more weapons and tendency for territorial occupation can manifest in this area. It should also be noted that the mountainous topology and vast unoccupied land could be an attraction to such criminality.

(6) Violent Protest

March 2013 witnessed the protest against levies and extortions from the Road Transport Employees Association of Nigeria in Benin City. This led to the death of two people as the two rival groups of Road Transport Employees Association clashed over show of supremacy. In 2015 Resident Doctors and Academic Staff Union (ASUU) of the University of Benin protested twice over issues of compensation. In the April-May 2015 there were series of protest by students of the University of Benin over the demolition of parts of the university by the Edo state government. In August 2016, there were reported protests by the state chapter of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and the National Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE) in Benin City over non-payment of salaries respectively and ex-militants also protested in Benin City over non-payment of their stipends. In the same vein, pensioners in the state under the aegis of Nigeria Union of Pensioners protested on the non-payment of their pension arrears and benefit from 2012-2016, non-payment of their gratuities from 2012-2016 and demanded that the State Pension Board be re-constituted on account of their involvement in fraudulent practices.

The Auchu polytechnic just resumed in August 2016 after being closed down for three months as a result of students' unrest. The students were asked to pay up their school fees before they would be allowed into the examination hall as against the practice before where everybody was allowed to take your exams but would not be allowed to see their result unless they show evidence of payment of their school fees. More than a hundred cars were burnt and properties worth millions of Naira. The students have been asked to pay #7,000 each before returning to school.

(9) Herdsman and Farmers Conflict

The issue of herdsmen and farmers' clashes have become emerging conflict issue in some parts of Edo state. The cause of most attacks is attributed to the killing or stealing of cattle by communities who claim their farmlands were destroyed by the cattle. Others have been connected to outright Herdsmen involvement in robbery and kidnapping. Some of them being those who have lost or sold all their cattle and have no other business in hand. It is adduced that they are those who carry huge and sophisticated weapons and get involved in robbery and kidnapping. For example:

- (i) Ubiaja in Esan South East LGA where they killed and mutilated the bodies of their victim.
- (ii) Okada in Ovie North-East LGA where a person was killed and the camp of the herdsmen burnt in a reprisal attack.
- (iii) The entire Orhionwuon LGA where some communities have been taken over by herdsmen armed with AK47, who take their cattle to even eat up farm crops, rape women and threaten members of the communities.

(C) Implications of Conflicts

The impacts of the clashes and conflict could be viewed from the economic, political or socio-cultural angles. Most of the conflicts especially those that dwelt on communal clashes, chieftaincy and kingship tussles, politics and labor union protest and criminalities like kidnapping and robbery resulted in the following:

- (1) Loss of several lives and properties worth millions of Naira. The implications include the impoverishment of families and economic hardship facing the villagers as well as an internalisation of anger and hatred against the community that effected such violence and pains on them.
- (2) Over the years, reports have been given of people ambushing each other on reprisal attacks and consequential upsurge of the same conflict. This has made some communities very unsecured as families flee such communities and become internally displaced persons within their state.
- (3) Distrust and lack of cooperation amongst the people and communities become very prominent which negatively impact on the development and social cohesion in the communities and state. This has become very troublesome because some community have become more polarised and destabilised. Any decision taken by the government committee might just be temporary because the disaffections are so deep.
- (4) Companies like Julius Berger and Tony Rock Quarry as well as Idahosa University Authorities working in some of these communities have become very harassed and rethinking on their initial employment and development programmes for the communities.
- (5) In some of the conflict affected communities it does not require much to trigger off the same violence against each other or groups. Consequently, people live in total fear and on edge.
- (6) The Auchi-Okene route has therefore attracted so much police and military presence that has also constituted a menace to road users as the military involve in some sharp and unprofessional economic practices which impinges on the image of the military and police.

(D) Conflict Actors

The Major conflict actors in Edo state are the opinion leaders in the communities (Kings, Chiefs, Community Development Agents), the youths who form most of the cult groups, the cultists/cult groups, and the politicians.

In most cases their interest are the economic benefits of the conflict actors which include land, titles, financial benefits and remunerations. At the political level their interest is the acquisition of power and its fringe benefits.

It is important to flag the contributions of the Edo State Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee set up by Governor Oshimole. He strategically selected a prominent chief in the cabinet of the Oba to head the committee, in the person of Chief Eduwu Obasogie. His integrity and the powers vested on him by the Oba and the Governor play out positively in their interventions. In as much as he is a highly-respected chief in the Oba's Cabinet, he also gives great attention and commitment to the assignment. The committee, whose aim is to bring lasting solution to all old and emerging conflict in the state, has tremendously delivered on their mandate from various reports.

(E) Intervention/Responses

Track 1

The Government has played a very significant role in the resolution of conflicts in Edo state. The establishment of the Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee headed by a distinguished chief in the palace gave so much credulity to their decisions on most issues. There are issues that have been on for decades which the committee was able to resolve and all parties' hatchets put down. The government on some occasion supported the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with relief materials as well as financial support to the joint taskforce that stationed themselves in the warring communities for as long as a seeming peace was achieved.

The efforts of the National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be commended as they are on ground in each Local Government Area to monitor and report conflicts as they arise. They also served as early warning agents in most of the conflicts and their capacity could be harnessed in Early Warning Early Response Programmes (EWERP).

Another very effective institution is the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps. They have representation in all the Local Governments as well but have little capacity for interventions as most of them are not armed. Most times they are involved in tracking conflicts and reporting same to the police.

While the Police are used more in response to violent conflict especially the joint taskforce of all arms of the military and DSS has classified information on conflicts causes, actors and interventions.

Track 2

There is huge presence of Civil Society Organisations in Edo state but most are not working in the area of peace and conflicts resolution. They are very active in the area of Human and Citizens' Rights. The Edo State Coalition of Civil Society Organisation (EDOSCO) has more than 50 CSOs as members are very active in confronting government institutions on the rights of the citizens of Edo state. However, we found the works of Partners for Peace (Edo State Chapter) very outstanding and complimenting. They carry out conflict tracking and mapping and document such in the Nigeria Conflict Bulletin of the Fund for Peace (FFP).

As earlier stated the Oba of Benin and his council as well as its ancillary bodies and other traditional stools in Edo state play substantive roles in maintaining and sustaining peace in the entire state but particularly those areas under his jurisdiction. The state government work closely with the Oba hence the appointment of one of the palace chiefs to head the State's Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee.

Track 3

We could not find interventions and responses from the international community and agencies, probably because of the nature of the conflicts we have in Edo state which are more of communal and social conflicts.

(F) Recommendations

- (1) Realising the fact that most of the communal conflict have their routes in contentious boundaries we hereby recommend an effective collaboration between the state government and the National Boundary Commission (NBC) in clearly delineating the boundaries among communities.
- (2) Where there are court resolutions and resolutions arising from Alternate dispute resolution mechanisms the government and her agencies should see to the proper implementation of the resolutions and avoid politicking with the communities and the lives of people. The problem of political will in the implementation of resolutions have been a major problem.
- (3) The role of the Edo State Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee should be commended in the resolution of many crises in Edo state. This could be traced to the capacity of the committee and the fact that the chairman is a chief in the Oba's palace. Moreover, they have been collaborating effectively with agencies like the NSCDC, NOA, Police and the CSOs. In order to improve on their performance, the capacity of the committee and the other agencies could be improved through training especially on early warning and early response, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and reporting templates.
- (4) There are situations the government have been found wanting especially where they have political interest. The state government should try to be sincere and transparent in handling conflicts within the state in order to build and retain the confidence of the citizens and other stakeholders in conflict.
- (5) We realise the importance of some Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) like Partners for Peace (P4P) Edo State and Edo State Civil Society Organisations (EDOSCO) we hereby encourage the state actors to collaborate more with these CSOs in the investigation and resolution of crises in the state.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the foregoing triggers of violent conflicts in Edo state, it can still be

argued that compared to her neighbours in the South-South geo-political zone, Edo state is the most peaceful because of the dynamism of the Peace and conflict resolution committee of Edo state and the law enforcement agencies in the state. The level of successes recorded is located in their quick response strategy they employed in attending to conflict issues and the deployment of fiscal, political and technical capabilities to bring social, economic and infrastructural development by the state government. To engage the restive youths that are attracted to cult violence, political violence, violent criminality, armed robbery and other anti-social and violent activities, the state and federal government would need to engage these teaming young people with productive educational and entrepreneurial activities.

Rivers State (Treasure Base of the Nation)

Capital: Port Harcourt



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015)

With an area of about 11,077 sq. km. Rivers state is geographically located at the heart of the Niger Delta region. The inland part of Rivers state consists of tropical rainforest; towards the coast the typical river delta environment features many mangrove swamps. Rivers state was part of the Oil Rivers Protectorate from 1885 till 1893, when it became part of the Niger Coast Protectorate. In 1900 the region was merged with the chartered territories of the Royal Niger Company to form the colony of Southern Nigeria. Rivers state is bounded to the north by the Anambra, Imo and Abia states, to the east by Akwa Ibom state and to the west by the Bayelsa and Delta states and to the south by the Atlantic Ocean. Rivers state therefore form part of the greater Gulf of Guinea.

Like other states of the South-South zone, Rivers state is home to a heterogeneous ethnic groups, related clans and sub-clans. These include the Abua, Andoni, Ekpeye,

Engenni, Etche, Ibani, Ikwerre, Kalabari, Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni, Okrika and Ogoni. While the inland part of Rivers state consists of tropical rainforest; towards the Atlantic coastal portion is the typical Niger Delta environment with features consist of many mangrove swamps (Ogbonna, 1979). Rivers state as the name connotes; is derived from the, many rivers that crisscross its territory and it divided into twenty-three Local Government Areas (LGAs); which include Abua/Odual, Ahoada-East, Ahoada-West, Akuku-Tori, Andoni, Asari-Toru, Bonny, Degema, Eleme, Emuoha, Etche, Gonaka, Ikwerre, Khana, Obia/Akpor, Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Ogu/Bolo, Okrika, Omuma, Opobo/Nkoro, Oyigbo, Port Harcourt and Tai.

Rivers state has a population of about 5 million people with a rich and unique cultural heritage. The state has a very rich heterogeneous ethnic groups, clans and sub-clans. This ethnographic reality have in itself generated violent conflicts over trigger issues which range from the struggle for political power, control over oil resources, land disputes, militancy related conflicts, chieftaincy conflicts, cult activities, kidnappings of oil workers and vandalism of oil TNCs facilities.

Types of Conflicts

Conflicts in the state can be classified under four major headings:

- (1) Environmental
- (2) Economic
- (3) Social
- (4) Political

1.1 Environmental conflict

The extraction of oil and its consequent implication on the environment have been source of conflicts in the state. For instance, in Orashi Area which is made up of Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni, Ahoada East and Ahoada West have experienced series of conflicts from 2014 to 2016. These conflicts were often caused by the grievances and frustration arising from environmental pollution, alleged exclusion from the benefits of oil, lack of employment, absence of social amenities and the divide and rule tactics used by Transnational Oil Companies (TNCs).

1.2 Failure by TNCs to honour Promises/Agreements

Obagi, Omoku, and other oil producing communities in Ogbaland have been in conflict over the non-implementation of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between Agip Oil Company and the communities. This also applied to the Egi communities. In most cases, community youths come in direct confrontation with security personnel.

1.3 Compensation/Royalties

In 2015 in Bodo Community of Gokana Local Government Area, non-participation of youths in the decision-making and negotiation process of compensation given by oil

companies generated conflict which led to the destruction of more than 8 houses belonging to the Chiefs and Elders.

2. Economic Conflict

Agriculture, the mainstay of the rural population, has declined owing to the inability of the community to access land due to pollution. This has grave implications on production capacities resulting in income deprivation, poverty and sub-standard living conditions, frustration and crimes.

2.1 Decrease in Agricultural Space

In 2016, it was alleged that Okrika people forcefully occupied Ekporo-Kporghor land belonging to the Ogoni people due to limited land space. This led to violent conflict which claimed lives and properties and sent the entire people of Ekporo-Kporghor Community on exile. Before the SCA field study, the state Government had set up Judicial Commission of Inquiry to investigate the immediate and remote causes of the conflict.

3. Social Conflict

A majority of the social conflicts in this area revolves around the struggle for chieftaincy or class of same.

3.1 Chieftaincy Struggle/Inheritance

Chieftaincy struggle to inherit throne has been a battle between the legitimate and illegitimate children; the wealthy/influential son and less privileged son, even when the contestants know the constitution of the selection and enthronement of kingship. The forceful installation of traditional Rulers on the citizens has claimed lives and properties in many communities. This study found out that in 2014 in Epara Kingdom of Obio-Akpor Local Government Area, the imposition of an alleged “illegitimate son” by the state government against the wishes of the people triggered violent conflict. This conflict was resolved by the subsequent government which reversed the previous imposition.

Similarly, in 2014 in Rebisi Kingdom, the traditional Ruler was removed by the government and replaced against the wish of the people. This resulted in violent conflict that claimed lives in the Kingdom. In Evo Kingdom in Obio-Akpor LGA, there had also been conflict over who sits on the stool of Eze Gbakaka.

3.2 Contest/Struggle over Classes of Kingship

In 2015, there were chieftaincy tussles among the Traditional Rulers in Okwale Community in Khana LGA and Obio and Akpor Communities in Obio-Akpor LGA over who should be recognised as First Class Ruler. These conflicts led to the destruction of lives, properties and mistrust among the people in the affected communities. As at the time of this study, some of these cases were subject of litigation.

3.3 Alleged Diversion of Compensation Funds

In 2015, a traditional ruler in Ogoni (Bomu Communities) was alleged to have misappropriated compensation funds from Shell Oil Company meant for the communities. As a result of the controversy, the youths went on rampage forcing the traditional ruler out of the community.

Similarly, in 2015, in Lewe and Bera communities in Ogoniland, the youths accused the paramount ruler of embezzling community funds given to them by Shell. Many lost their lives, houses destroyed and leaders chased out of their communities.

In 2016, in Kpor community, there was chieftaincy tussle between Chief Court Naabira Awanem Dube and Chief Beemene Ta-ol over shell money. Beemene Ta-ol was forced out of the community for alleged embezzlement of funds by the community. He was said to have died in exile and his son took over the fight.

In August, 2016, while conducting field assessment of the SCA, respondents highlighted an on-going conflict in Akinima, the headquarters of Ahoada West LGA. According to the respondents, the Paramount Ruler, His Royal Highness, Adide Udiomine Sunday was dethroned by the Council of Chiefs and replaced with Chief Christopher Okereke in acting capacity. The council of chiefs had accused him of embezzlement of funds and inefficiency. It was reported that the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) intervened in the conflict to avoid break down of law and order. However, the community remained polarised.

3.4 Land/Boundary/Communal Clashes

Land is very central to the conflicts in the communities. Land to the people is seen beyond being a factor of production but more importantly as the abode of the ancestors; yet, access to land remains a major problem.

The Nweebiara and Barako communities, both in Gokana Local Government Area of Ogoni, had been in conflict since 2014 over the sitting of a Model Primary School at Nweebiara by the state government. Barako people claimed ownership of the land where the school was located and prevented the contractor from executing the project. Nweebiara people reacted by disrupting activities at Barako Primary school forcing it to close down. The conflict resulted to loss of lives and properties.

Since 2014, the Deken and Deyor communities in Gokana LGA have been in conflict over a portion of farmland which has claimed many lives, though the case is in court, hostilities and killings continue.

In Kporghor community in Tai LGA and Wakama community in Ogu/Bolo LGA have had protracted boundary dispute. The resultant claim and counter claims have resulted in occasional clashes. According to respondents, Kporghor community was invaded in December, 2014 causing displacement and destruction of properties.

Communities in Eleme and Ogu/Bolo Local Government Areas have been in boundary dispute from 2012 to 2016 because of the exploitation of oil resulting in limited agricultural space.

It was also reported that from 2013 to time of this study in 2016, the Korokoro community in Tai and Afam in Oyigbo LGAs have been in communal clashes over ownership of land.

3.4 Cult related Conflict

Cultism has emerged as a driver of violent conflict in the state. This is sometimes described as 'youth militancy'. The availability and easy access to small arms and light weapons exacerbate the activities of militia and cult groups in the state. Prominent among these cult groups are *Ice Landers*, *Green Landers*, *Dewell* and *Degbam*.

Politicians, chiefs and wealthy citizens recruit the services of these cultists and fund them to fight their opponents. They use them during elections, inter and intra-communal conflicts, chieftaincy wrangling and even to harass companies operating in the state. The pathetic situation now is that these armed youths engage in all forms of violent crimes. Most communities in the state have experienced one form of cult-related activity or another. An incident occurred during the field study involving Dewell and Degbam. These two cult groups had been at war for several months in Okwale and Sogho communities in Khana Local Government. On 17 August, 2016, a man in Sogho community was beheaded on his way to early morning church service by alleged cult group. Reprisal attack resulted into indiscriminate killings, rape and burning of houses.

3.5 Herders-Farmers Conflict

Competition and struggle over resources – farmland, grazing land and water is getting more intense in the state.

There were reported cases of attacks and killings by herders in the state. On Monday 15th August 2016 a woman was reported to have been killed by herders on her farm in Bunu, Tai local government area. In Ahoada West, Emohua, Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni, Omuma and Oyigbo local government areas, there were reported cases of clashes between farmers and herders.

4. Political Conflicts

The stakes in the politics of the state have continued to heighten resulting in widespread tension evident at the time of this study in August 2016. The potential for increasing violence in the state have been noticed in previous SCAs (2003, 2008 and 2013). This trend is exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, cultism and criminality for which the political class has been implicated.

4.1 Electoral Violence

Barely one week to the re-run election slated for 30 July, 2016 in Rivers state, the

Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) secretariat in Khana Local Government Area, was set ablaze by unknown persons. The violence that followed led to the death of a number of persons including those with affiliation to APC and PDP.

4.2. Inflammatory Statements

The contest for political turf between Rotimi Amaechi and Nyesom Wike yielded a degree of altercation causing violent clashes among their followers. Also statement about the termination of the amnesty programme credited to President Muhammadu Buhari GCFR was perceived as a political move intended to alienate the South-South. These statements fuelled violent agitations among the youths.

4.3 Politicisation of Environmental Clean-Up

Following the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) report and the recommendation for the clean-up of the Ogoni environments, other communities are calling for similar environmental clean-up exercises in their areas. This situation has generated mutual distrust and tension among communities in the state. Indeed, Governor Nyesom Wike has openly made a case for the cleaning-up exercise to be extended to other communities in the state.

Conflict Actors

The actors in the conflict such as the Politicians, the INEC officials, Federal/State Government of Nigeria, the Youths, Secret Cult Groups, Multinational Oil Company, MOSOP leaders, Women, Children, Community and traditional leaders including Security personnel were evident. The discovery and existence of oil in the state is a common denominator in the interest positions and needs of conflict actors as observed in the study.

Responses

Track 1

The Federal and State Governments have undertaken series of interventions. The State Government sets up Judicial Commission of Enquiry to intervene in the Communal/Land Conflict between Ekporo and Okirika Communities. The Government intervened through the assistance of High Court and Appeal Court Judgment on Chieftaincy Tussles over who should be recognised as First Class and Second Class Ruler both in Obio-Akpor and Okwale Communities. INEC conducted re-run elections in affected areas in the state. Federal Government flagged up Clean-up in Ogoniland in 2016. Federal Government has embarked on Amnesty Programme. There is security presence in the state. Government agencies are involved in peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

Track 2

Numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society-based Organisations

including traditional institutions and religious organisations in Rivers state have been involved in Peacebuilding, Mediation, Conflict Prevention and Resolution to promote peace and security.

The Peace and Security Forum (PSF) supported by the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) through the state Conflict Management Alliance (SCMA) held community dialogue sessions on peaceful co-existence and conflict resolution in the state.

MOSOP, Centre for Integrated Community Development Action (CICDA), Family Support Initiative and other organisations carried out interventions with the objective of enhancing peaceful coexistence among the communities.

Track 3

International Donor Agencies such as United Nations Development (UNDP), United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Department for International Development (DFID), United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and International Red Cross Society have engaged in laudable peace initiatives/Programmes and development projects including humanitarian assistance.

Gaps in Responses

- (1) There has not been effective communication on the nature and processes of the cleaning up of Ogoniland.
- (2) There is gap between expectation of the people and performance in terms of infrastructural development in rural areas.
- (3) There is perceived transparency gap in the dealings of TNCs with the communities.
- (4) There is a gap in adherence to global standards by TNCs which is perceived to be exploited by various actors for personal rather than communal gains.
- (5) There are integrity gaps in the way the youth perceived traditional institutions which results into self-help by the youth.
- (6) Absence of alternative source of livelihood in the face of rampant oil pollution.
- (7) There is a gap between the problem and the scope of intervention in the Clean-up Exercise embarked upon by the Federal Government.
- (8) Inadequate funding for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) and intervention.
- (9) There is a gap in the appropriateness of response to early warnings.
- (10) There is a gap in inter-agency collaboration and coordination on peacebuilding issues in the state.

Recommendations

- (1) Government should strengthen legislation, regulation, enforcement and monitoring capacity to protect the natural environment and community rights and livelihoods in oil producing communities.
- (2) Intensify effort on the part of government to fight crime and criminality in the state.
- (3) Good practices among collaborating Security should be ensured.
- (4) There should be a proactive and responsive approach in combating security challenges in the state.
- (5) There should be funding for PCIA to mainstream peacebuilding in the development programmes of the state.
- (6) The relevant regulatory agencies in the oil and gas sector should be conflict sensitive in their operations particularly in the implementation of Global Memoranda of Understanding (GMoU).
- (7) The procedures for the selection of traditional rulers should be community driven.
- (8) The community governance structure should be enhanced.

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South-West Geo-Political Zone

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List of Acronyms

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AFAN	All Farmers Association of Nigeria
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
IPCR	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
LCDA	Local Council Development Area
LGA	Local Government Area
MAFSYE	Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Youth Engagement
MCE	Ministry of Commerce and Empowerment
MSSN	Muslim Students Society of Nigeria
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NOA	National Orientation Agency
NSCDC	Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps
NURTW	National Union of Road Transport Workers
OSCAN	Osun State Christian Association of Nigeria
SCA	Strategic Conflict Assessment
RWF	Representatives of Women in Farming
RTEAN	Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria
RWF	Representatives of Women in Farming
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

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Executive Summary

This report is an empirical account of the proceedings and findings of the country-wide Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) project for the year 2016. The current SCA is a logical follow-up to the original SCA first undertaken in 2002, and which also later attracted updates in 2007 and 2012/2013, respectively. The primary objective of the 2016 SCA was to develop a graphic template of the geography of conflicts in Nigeria, including: configuration of the embedded patterns and trends of violent conflicts; the root causes of, or the accounting factors for, the occurrences of varieties of conflict; the extent of availability of situational opportunities for peacebuilding; and, a cursory appraisal of the options for the promotion and achievement of enduring peace and security in Nigeria.

Given the extremely limited time allotted for the instrumentation of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) field research, the selection of locations, sites, communities and individuals and groups to participate in this very important exercise was difficult. To make do with the available limited time; selection of research participants in the South-West Zone of Nigeria was guided by two basic principles. The first principle was to identify communities, individuals or groups that could be regarded as peaceful. The objective here was to visit, interact and interrogate indexes and indicators that made such locations, communities, individuals or groups peaceful. That was to identify the indicators that generate intergroup peace and peaceful co-existence. The second principle was to select and locate individuals, groups located in violent communities and areas that are prone to incidents of militancy, violent conflicts, pipeline vandalism, oil bunkering, general criminality, kidnapping, rape and other forms of violence in the South-West Zone of Nigeria. The objective of the second principle was to identify and interrogate indicators that tended to generate intergroup conflict and disharmony amongst groups and people in the South-West zone.

A rapid appraisal of the South-West states – comprising Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo – was undertaken within the allotted fieldwork timeframe of fourteen active fieldwork days. Composite techniques of data and information – gathering, which basically involved the usage of combinations of qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches of field research, including: Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with critical and representative stakeholders; impromptu discussions and extended observations, for the aggregation of necessary corroborative evidence; Key Informant Interviews (KII), in classical social survey style and with the guidance of a structured questionnaire template, were deployed. Thereafter, the inclusive fieldwork subsequently culminated in the convening of an interactive Validation Workshop in Lagos, Lagos state – which essentially provided a suitable platform for the disputation and verification of the reported output and findings of the Southwest zonal SCA.

A snapshot of the Major Findings of the SCA in the South-West zone has included the following:

- (1) That, although the manifestation of conflicts in Ekiti state in 2016 had portrayed issues that are mostly political in nature, the incidence of conflicts between herders and the farmers have also generally become highlighted as a result of the contemporary security and economic/developmental challenges, like the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as well as the compulsive cravings by the herders to progressively push inland and increasingly explore grazing opportunities in the hinterland – due to the compounding problems of desertification and the prevailing general ecological emergencies in the Northern parts of Nigeria. The most prominent, violent conflict incidents in the state have been those relating to the herders-farmers conflict, and the perceived invasion of parts of the state by the Hausa-herders. Also, in Ekiti state, the toll of some dimensions and scenarios of these conflicts on the women was exhibited – as there were reported incidences of rape, especially in the areas affected by the Herders cattle herders-crop farmers’ conflict. But, for fear of stigmatisation, such incidents were barely or hardly reported to the authorities.
- (2) That, the geographical location of Lagos state, with its unique cluster of lagoons and creeks, albeit boosting the state’s economy and overall social development, has also evidently contributed to the accentuation of the state’s potential to generate social conflicts, anti-social activities and economic sabotage – which include: militancy, pipeline vandalism, oil-bunkering, kidnapping, the rape of women, and other kinds of criminality and violence. Nevertheless, despite these security challenges posed by the state’s geographies and enormous population, both the Lagos State Government and the Federal Government of Nigeria have put in place considerable security initiatives to confront, combat and curb the breakdown of law and order; thus still making Lagos state one of the most peaceful states in the Nigerian Federation, when considered against the backdrop of its hyper-heterogeneous demography and complex ecological setting.
- (3) That, the physical proximity and geographical contiguity of Ogun state to metropolitan Lagos (Lagos state) and the commercial city of Ibadan (Oyo state) have meant that the problems of Lagos and Oyo states actually also do spillover into Ogun state. Specifically, Ogun state being a part of the Gulf of Guinea on the West African coastline has also translated to possessing similar geographies that inherently generate anti-social activities and catalysts of economic sabotage which include: militancy, pipeline vandalism, oil-bunkering, kidnapping, the rape of women and other violence in this state.
- (4) That, in Ondo state, the major causes of conflict have also largely been borne out of combinations of the ripple effects of conflicts between herders and

farmers bothering on land encroachments and transgressions of the herders over the farmlands, alongside other conflict issues driven by boundary disputes, chieftaincy tussles, pockets of electoral violence, civil protests, and other forms of criminality. However, by the assessment of the collective weight of these conflicts, Ondo state remains one of the relatively peaceful states of the Nigerian Federation.

- (5) That, in Oyo state, the herders-farmers conflict was also typically identified as the major security challenge in the state, in addition to various other types of conflict that were related to cult-violence perpetrated by students; gang-violence among the “*Omo-oniles*”; transactional conflicts between miners and the host communities; employment-related conflicts between organised labour and the Government of Oyo state; the violence among the key operators and members of the industrially-powerful National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW); and, incidences of rape and violence against women. But, by the South-West team’s overall estimation of the magnitude and intensity of the reported conflicts – on the basis of empirical field evidence, Oyo state also still comparatively ranked among the relatively stable states of the Federation.
- (6) And, that, in the State of Osun, the traditionally long-drawn inter-communal conflicts between the Ife and Modakeke communities were reported in retrospect; alongside the equally bothersome Ifon-Ilobu conflict; the Oba-Oke-Oba-Isale Chieftaincy tussle; as well as the recorded skirmishes over land-ownership and boundary conflicts in some parts of the state – which resulted in violence, the loss of lives and properties were also reflected in the state’s SCA. But, in addition to the foregoing situational accounts of civil conflicts, the general profile of the most prominent Intergroup Conflicts in the State of Osun, by far, had actually involved 2 (two) other different types: the one between the herders and farmers; and, the lately much-orchestrated Hijab Dispute between the Muslim Community and the Christian community.
- (7) The general patterns and architecture of conflicts in the South-West states as portrayed in the foregoing have been quite similar and comparable. With only a few major differences and variations that are depicted in our report of the South-West SCA, there was the detection of extensive commonalities in the scope and characterisation of conflicts in the South-West Zone of the country.
- (8) Finally, in the South-West SCA Zonal Report, specific suggestions and recommendations are made in favor of sustainable conflict management and enduring peaceful co-existence among the highly-pluralistic population of Nigeria.

SECTION ONE

Introduction and Historical Background

This Report is an empirical account of the proceedings and findings of the country-wide Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) project for the year 2016. The current SCA is a logical follow-up to the original SCA first undertaken in 2002, and which also later attracted updates in 2007 and 2012/2013, respectively. More specifically, the primary objective of the SCA is to develop a graphic template, as it were, of the geography of conflicts in Nigeria, including: configuration of the embedded patterns and trends of violent conflicts; the root causes of, or the accounting factors for, the occurrences of varieties of conflict; the extent of availability of situational opportunities for peacebuilding; and, a cursory appraisal of the options for the promotion and achievement of enduring peace and security in Nigeria.

The 2016 SCA is anchored on the following core objectives, namely:

- (1) To identify the types of conflicts that are prevalent in the different parts of the South-West Zone of Nigeria;
- (2) To establish the actors involved in the different conflicts in the South-West Zone;
- (3) To determine the root (that is, historical as well as remote) causes of conflicts in the South-West Zone;
- (4) To interrogate the ways in which the local populace experience such conflicts;
- (5) To determine the extent to which local efforts and attempts have been made to resolve such conflicts;
- (6) To interrogate the success or otherwise of such efforts and attempts.

Given the extremely limited time allotted for the instrumentation of the SCA field research, the selection of locations, sites, communities and individuals and groups to participate in this very important exercise was difficult. To make do with the available limited time; selection of research participants in the South-West zone of Nigeria was guided by two basic principles. The first principle was to identify communities, individuals or groups that could be regarded as peaceful. The objective here was to visit, interact and interrogate indexes and indicators that made such locations, communities, individuals or groups peaceful. That was to identify the indicators that generate intergroup peace and peaceful co-existence. The second principle was to select and locate individuals, groups located in violent communities and areas that are prone to incidents of militancy, violent conflicts, pipe-line vandalism, oil-bunkering, general criminality, kidnapping, rape and other forms of violence in the South-West zone of Nigeria. The objective of the second principle was to identify and interrogate indicators that tended to generate intergroup conflict and disharmony amongst groups and people in the South- West zone.

SECTION TWO

Methodology

A rapid appraisal of the South-West states – comprising (in alphabetical reckoning, for sheer formatting and organisational convenience), namely: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo – was undertaken within the allotted fieldwork timeframe of some 14 (fourteen) active fieldwork days. The scope and methodology of the 2016 SCA exercise were grounded on the desire by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), in collaboration with key stakeholders, to achieve the following key objectives:

- (a) Interrogate major conflict issues;
- (b) Gain access to different conflict-prone parts of Nigeria ; and
- (c) Undertake in-depth, on-the-spot, and first-hand related data and information-gathering from the civil populace at the grassroots.

Composite techniques of data and information-gathering, which basically involved the usage of combinations of qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches of field research, including: focus group discussions (FGDs) with critical and representative stakeholders; impromptu discussions and extended observations, for the aggregation of necessary corroborative evidence; in-depth interviews, in classical social survey style and with the guidance of a structured questionnaire template, were deployed.

Thereafter, the inclusive fieldwork subsequently culminated in the convening of an interactive Validation Workshop in Lagos – which essentially provided a suitable platform for the disputation and verification of the reported output and findings of the Southwest zonal SCA. This Validation Workshop was based on field research work in the six states of the South-West zone, encompassing Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo and Ekiti; undertaken from the 10-19 August, 2016. The Validation Workshop for the South-West was anchored on five fundamental objectives, as follows:

- (a) To report key findings generated from the composite field research across the inclusive South-West zonal states;
- (b) To create an avenue for researchers, research participants and key stakeholders to interact and reflect on issues discussed during the field research exercise;
- (c) To identify gaps and omissions emanating from the reported Key Findings;
- (d) To enable stakeholders take ownership of the report and measures needed for sustainable conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the South-West zone of Nigeria; and
- (e) To make suggestions and recommendations on the way forward.

It is significant and particularly also noteworthy that the introduction of the mechanism of Validation Workshop into the general framework of methodology for the current SCA of Nigeria has been both a welcome, positive paradigm shift and a critical (and quite appreciable) methodological buffer for the qualitative enhancement of the robustness and, indeed, measurement power of the state-wise aggregate field evidence that have arisen from this year's SCA. We can confirm in this preliminary report that the totality of proceedings of the post-field Validation Workshop for the South-West – held at the Excellence Hotel, Ogba, Ikeja, Lagos, Lagos state, on Tuesday, 23 August, 2016 – had generated valuable supplementary data and information as well as stupendous corroborative evidence that had richly added tangible value, diversity and methodological credence to the overall output of the Southwest SCA fieldwork. Thus, for one emphatic thing, the Validation Workshop had expectedly served the additional end-purposes of quality assurance and integrity of the Assessment Report.

SECTION THREE

Conflict/Peace Case Studies

This Section situates state-wide accounts of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) of the South-West Zone, beginning with Ekiti state and running through to Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo and Osun as follows:

Ekiti State (Fountain of Knowledge)

Capital: Ado-Ekiti



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Background Information on Ekiti State

Carved out of the former Ondo state, Ekiti state was one of the six new states that were created on 1 October, 1996 by the then General Sani Abacha's military régime. The present two states of Ondo and Ekiti were part of the larger old Western state created in 1967. Ekiti state is made up sixteen Local Government Areas with its capital at Ado-Ekiti. These LGAs are: Ado, Ekiti East, Gbonyin, Ekiti South-West, Ekiti West, Efon Alaaye, Emure, Ise/Orun, Ido/Osi, Ijero, Ikere, Ikole, Irepodun/Ifelodun, Moba, Ilejemeje and Oye. Ekiti state is bounded to the north by Kwara and Kogi state, Osun state to the east and by Ondo to the south.

In geographical terms, Ekiti state is mainly an upland zone rising over 250 meters above sea level with a rhythmically undulating surface. Ekiti state landscape consists of ancient plains broken by steep-sided outcropping dome rocks and these rocks may occur singularly or in groups or ridges. The most notable ones of are found in Efon-Alaaye, Ikere-Ekiti and Okemesi-Ekiti. An important geo-feature of Ekiti state is the large number of hills it possesses, and these were often the site of towns in which much of her population resides. This is largely the reason why the word 'Ekiti' was derived from the local term for hill. (http://logbaby.com/encyclopedia/history-of-ekiti-state_10026.html).

The Ekiti people are genealogically a sub-group of the Yoruba, and indeed, their ancestors are said to have migrated from Ile-Ife, the spiritual home of all Yoruba. The local dialect is spoken with slight variations in the different communities, but this does not prevent Ekiti indigenes from understanding each other. Christianity, Islam and traditional religions are all practiced.

The remote origin of conflicts and their dynamics and analysis in Ekiti state are actually traceable to the creation of this state, as some of the conflicts that have existed between the settlers and indigenes of this state before and during the creation of states have somehow persisted till date.

The popular motto for Ekiti state is "*the fountain of knowledge*", as Ekiti people are reputed to be comparatively highly learned and have excelled in the pursuit and attainment of academic scholarship. The manifestation of conflicts in Ekiti state in 2016 has portrayed issues that are mostly political in nature. However, the incidence of conflicts between herders and the farmers have generally become highlighted as a result of the contemporary security and economic/developmental challenges, like the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as well as the compulsion by the herders to progressively push inland, due to the desertification and general ecological emergencies in the Northern parts of Nigeria. Although socio-culturally homogeneous, the Ekiti people have had tendencies towards low and protracted social conflicts that often emanated from affiliations with the different clans and communities of the state.

Findings of the Ekiti State SCA

- (1) The Ekitis are a homogeneous people, and this homogeneity inherently generates useful social capital for the necessary management, mitigation and resolution of conflicts among communities, as the incidence of conflicts escalating to communal violence is very low.
- (2) The most prominent, violent conflict incidents in Ekiti state in 2016 have been those relating to the herders-farmers conflict, and the perceived invasion by the Hausa herders in Ido-Orin, Ifaki, and Ikole.
- (3) The political élite in the state, in the bid to mobilise support for their cause, have tended to create political divisions within the state which could create faultlines that threaten the very homogeneity as well as polarise the Ekiti populace. Thus, political violence is rampant in Ekiti state – this field observation was also echoed by one contributor/participant at the Validation Workshop.
- (4) Institutions for the resolution and management of conflicts, such as security agencies, and the Judiciary, exist in the state – a fact that was evident from observations and interviews at the Peace and Conflict Resolution Unit of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), Ekiti state Command.
- (5) Youth restiveness and criminality in the form of frauds (referred to in the state as “*Yahoo-Plus*”) have been on the increase due to the economic downturn and the high rate of unemployment in the state.
- (6) Traditional institutions are revered in the state. However, there are supremacy conflicts and disputes between the *Olukere* and the *Ogoga* in *Ikere-Ekiti*. This type of conflict has lingered, but has not escalated into communal clashes and violence.
- (7) The political disconnect of the ruling party in the state from the ruling party at the federal level did not appear to have exerted any serious conflict-related adverse impact on the political climate in the state.
- (8) Incidences of sheer thuggery have continued to occur in the state, and it is generally believed that the NURTW/RTEAN crisis in Ekiti state was politically motivated – as these labour union groups have become easy tools in the hands of the politicians.
- (9) The elections and allied activities in the neighbouring Ondo state have apparently not generated any spillover effects in Ekiti state.
- (10) Ethnic crisis between Ekiti indigenes and other ethnic groups is not common – as both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic (communal) conflicts appeared to have had minimal occurrence in Ekiti state.
- (11) By and large, although this state has been having what can be termed as political tension, the scenarios on ground have shown no serious translation of this tension into widespread violence, or any outbursts of hostilities among the civil groups or communities.
- (12) The role of women was highlighted in the research field at Ekiti – as there were reported incidences of rape, especially in the areas affected by the herdsman-farmers conflict. But, for fear of stigmatisation, such incidents were barely or hardly reported to the authorities.

Lagos State (Centre of Excellence)

Capital: Ikeja



Source: <http://nigeriazipcodes.com/455/lagos-state-zip-code-map/>

Background Information on Lagos State

Lagos is the Land of the Nigerian dream. It is literally the ‘New York’ of Nigeria and our country depends on this city for trends, commerce, for innovation, and for everything that is good. Lagos has been called the ‘commercial capital’ of Nigeria and a ‘no man’s land’ but few people know why Lagos is the smallest state with only 3,577 sq. km. The area was called Lagos in 1427 by the Portuguese explorers, until then, it was called EKO which meant a “WAR CAMP”. During the era of the Benin Empire, trade expeditions were sent to Ghana by the Oba of Benin. At one time a merchant complained to the Oba that they were being harassed by the *Awori* people – the first settlers of Lagos. This made the Oba and in a bid to end this harassment, the Oba sent his son to war the *Awori* people. On reaching there the *Awori* people did not put up an opposition but requested that the prince of Benin remains and become their leader. The Oba agreed and provided his son with administrative support (<http://nigerianfinder.com/about-lagos-brief-history-of-lagos-state/>).

“Eko” became a major centre of Benin Empire’s trade in spices and slaves. “Eko” therefore, provided the resources for running the Empire until 1851 when British colonialism annexed it and declared it their colony. Lagos and other parts of Southern Nigeria were later merged with the Northern protectorate in the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914. With over twenty million people living in Lagos, Lagos is not only the most populated state in Nigeria but the most heterogeneous city in Nigeria, Africa and the world. This in part explains why it has usually been described as a “No Man’s Land” and

“Centre of Excellence”. It is this ethno-heterogeneous, historical and contemporary composition of Lagos that also explains the conflict risks factors that afflicts Lagos.

For Lagos state, existing data in the copious literature and on the Internet have shown that rampant increase in the incidents and activities of oil bunkering, pipelines vandalism, kidnapping, militancy, and the activities of the “*Omo-oniles*” primarily constitute the flashpoints of Intergroup Conflict. For instance, on 13 August, 2016, the Lagos state Government and Lagos state Police Command had ordered that 12 (twelve) houses be summarily shut on the *Abeokuta* and *Ibadan* Streets in the *Ilasamaja* Area of Isolo Local Council Development Area (LCDA), where landlords built illegal shallow oil wells to illegally and purposively scoop diesel from pipelines belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The oil-wells were said to have been built for the purpose of illegal scooping of diesel and selling same to members of the public. The spectacular findings by the police was that landlords constructed and build pumping machines and bore holes not only to perpetuate their crime on a large scale but to conceal their nefarious activities from law enforcement agencies. The activities of oil bunkering and pipelines vandalism posed looming danger to lives and property in residential areas. The criminal commercialising of these illegal acts by landlords represents very serious economic cost to the Nigerian economy and society. While a full, detailed study of the root cause(s) of this problem should be undertaken by the Federal Government and a permanent solution found, our preliminary investigations in the literature have revealed that the economic recession is biting very hard and Nigerians are, generally (as it were), resorting to desperate strategies and actions as well as exploring various possible means to eke out livelihoods for ordinary survival – which has further actually led some inhabitants to invest in various illicit/illegal and clearly uncharitable anti-social activities, such as oil-bunkering and pipelines vandalism.

Outcome of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) Conducted in Lagos State

Occupying a land area of about 3,577 sq km Lagos state was created on 27 May, 1967 by virtue of state (Creation and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 14 of 1967, which restructured Nigeria’s Federation into twelve states. Lagos state lies to the Southwestern part of the Nigerian Federation, shares boundaries with Ogun state, both in the north and east, and is bounded on the west by the Republic of Benin. In the South Lagos state stretches for 180 km along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. Lagos is also a metropolitan area which originated on islands separated by creeks such as in Ikorodu, Ajah, Epe, Badagry, etc. As a Port city, Lagos is the commercial centre of the nation and an international hub for business conglomerates and tourism. Badagry is a town of historical as well as immense touristic importance because it was the original site and one of the routes and camps during the Atlantic slave trade as well as an entry point into West Africa by the Christian Missionaries from Western Europe in the 18th century.

With its capital located in Ikeja, Lagos state physically consists of lagoons and creeks that empty into the Atlantic Ocean by the Gulf of Guinea on the West African coastline. Given its location, Lagos state has attracted mass immigration of population from both within and outside Nigeria. This partly explains why Lagos state is considered as ‘*a melting pot*’ as well as ‘*No man’s land*’. Known for its explosive population growth, the population of Lagos state was put at over 10 million in 2005. It was also estimated that over 20 million people lived in Lagos in 2015. Lagos state is, therefore, the most populated state in Nigeria. If compared to her massive population, Lagos state has the least number of Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Nigeria.

Lagos State Geographies of Conflict and Anti-Social Activities

In economic terms, metropolitan Lagos is Nigeria’s most prosperous city, because much of the nation’s wealth and economic activities are concentrated therein. With the highest standards of living in Nigeria, both Lagos state and its metropolitan cities can be compared to other cities in Nigeria, Africa and the world. Given the huge spectrum of wealth distribution among the people that reside in the Lagos city and its adjacent satellite towns – which ranges from the very wealthy to the very poor, Lagos state and metropolitan Lagos continues to attract many young people and families seeking a better life from all parts of Nigeria and beyond.

While the geographical location of Lagos state, with its unique cluster of lagoons and creeks, continues to boost its economy and society, and being a part of the Gulf of Guinea on the West African coastline, the geographies of Lagos state and metropolitan Lagos have also evidently contributed to the accentuation of the state’s potential to generate anti-social activities and economic sabotage – which include: militancy, pipeline vandalism, oil-bunkering, kidnapping, the rape of women, and other kinds of criminality and violence. Given that, on a daily basis, Lagos City receives people from both within Nigeria and the outside world, these different nationalities often cause friction and conflicts of interest – as people compete for scarce resources and space. This conflagration of people and competing demands makes Lagos state and its metropolitan satellite cities and towns a hotbed of intergroup skirmishes. Based on its geographical location within the Gulf of Guinea – linking the volatile Niger Delta region, the Atlantic Ocean, Lagos state cluster of islands, creeks in locations (including Ikorodu, Ajah, Epe, and Badagry), and the totality of the state’s geographies actually provide fertilising grounds for the fueling of oil-bunkering, sundry criminality, vandalism, kidnapping, and violence as well as the rape of women.

It is important to observe that, despite these security challenges posed by Lagos geographies and its enormous population, both the Lagos state Government and the Federal Government of Nigeria have put in place considerable security initiatives to confront, combat and curb the breakdown of law and order. Therefore, in relative terms and against all odds, Lagos state can still be listed as one of the most peaceful states in

the Nigerian Federation, when considered against the backdrop of its hyper-heterogeneous demography and complex ecological setting.

Outcome of the Focus Group Discussions in Lagos State

On the proliferation of oil pipelines vandalism and oil-bunkering 'business', it was the general consensus amongst research participants/respondents that this illegal business began in Ikorodu about 15-20 years ago and continues to expand unabated because of the role played by bad elements in the official security cycles. It was the submission of research participants that without the support of such elements it would have been impossible for militants who are otherwise referred to as 'Ijaw boys' to siphon fuel from the vandalised pipelines and sale such products at reduced prices in the regular open market. To the extent that these '*Ijaw boys*' enjoy some form of illegal 'security cover', vandalism of oil pipelines or oil bunkering became a normal way of life in the *Ikorodu* area of Lagos.

With the emergence of a new government at the Federal level in 2015, vandalism of oil pipelines or oil bunkering was blocked by Government. This single act on the part of the Federal Government forced militants to resolve to kidnapping and killing of prominent figures as a survival strategy. Participants at the focus group discussions submitted that officials acknowledged for the first time that there was a problem. The fact that Government reacted only when elements of the elite were either kidnapped or killed by the militants is itself a manifestation that Government has little or no regard for the less affluent in the Nigerian society. Participants further posited that the Government is more inclined to preserving and protecting the most affluent class in society. Participants expressed concerns about the constant raids on the poor communities and neighbourhoods in Lagos state by state agents, the Nigeria Police and, sometimes, the military – whenever a State Security official is kidnapped or killed. It was the contention by research participants that occasional raids on poor communities by state agents – which often culminated in the deaths of innocent lives have tended to create a state of anarchy, and heightened tension in the communities, like Ikorodu, Ajah, Epe and Badagry. A participant at the FDGs also quipped thus:

. . . When militants, criminals and psychopaths run down and kill the less-privileged in society, the government did nothing. Otherwise why did the government react swiftly when a high profile person from the Redeemed Church was kidnapped? This is exemplified bias by the Nigerian government against the poor in the country. Such act increases the dwindling confidence of Nigerians in their government.

Outcomes of the SCA conducted in Lagos state showed that key actors in the raging problem of violent conflict, militancy and kidnapping include the so-called '*Ijaw boys*' who are considered as the core vandals and their age bracket ranged from of 15-35 years. Other key-actors include politicians who patronise the services of militant elements and use them as political thugs to intimidate potential political opponents. The next

category of key actors was security operatives, especially the Nigeria Police. The victims were the very poor in our society. The effects of violent conflicts in the Lagos area are felt by the majority of Nigerians who are subjected to untold stresses. This, in part, explains why the majority of Nigerians tend to distrust security agents, and perceive Government as playing double standards as well as being corrupt.

The foregoing narrative lends credence to why research participants in Lagos state perceive security agencies as incompetent, extortionist and a part of the oil-bunkering debacle. Participants' narratives also alleged that security agents, especially, elements from the Nigeria Police often demand for and are paid commission fees from or by the '*Ijaw boys*'. Participants held that the quantum of commission money or fee usually paid to security agents for protection depended on the quantity of fuel stolen, transported and sold in the open markets. Participants averred that the presence of security agents in locations where oil bunkering takes place provides and guarantee for the '*Ijaw boys*' to go about their nefarious activities unchallenged. They also reported that security agents were just 'planted' in such locations as spies and canons to protect the illegal activities of vandals. Given general distrust of security agents by members of the public citizens flee from their homes and communities where the '*Ijaw boys*' operate.

When asked to give an outline of the effects of oil-pipeline vandalism and oil-bunkering in Lagos state, participants were unanimous that it was poor residents who bear the brunt of this state corrupt system and state of lawlessness. When probed further for specifics, participants had pointed out that women tended to suffer more because it is the women who are usually subjected to horrendous sexual violence and rape by the '*Ijaw boys*'.

Arms, Criminality and Militancy in Lagos State

One important finding of the field exercise was the source of sophisticated small and light weapons used by militants. Participants were unanimous that the "*Omo-oniles*" fight with literally anything - from charms to other dangerous ammunitions. It was the opinion of participants that the only force that the "*Omo-oniles*" are afraid of is the Nigerian military, and the mobile police corps. Participants noted that militants, especially the "*Omo-oniles*" in Ajah and Ikorodu, get their weapons through their relationships with powerful elite in the society who also doubles as the entrepreneurs of conflict. The availability of and easy access to these weapons by the militants as well as refusal on the part of security agents, especially the police, to be responsive to the citizenry was blamed for the fueling of activities of kidnappers in Lagos state. This is the way that a participant also described the situation in Lagos:

When there is a minimal theft, the Government will make so much noise. But the Politicians can steal as much as possible and get away with their loot. The Land tussle has become a major crime scene in the Ajah area because of the role played by the Nigeria Police and other elements in the security agencies. The question we should ask is who are the people

arming these “Omo-Oniles” or Criminals in our Communities? A young man was arrested for land fraud in Ajah; but, after a week, he came back into the Community a free man. This highlights the fault lines of the perceived injustice, associated with the existing justice system in Lagos state. It shows that the laws need to be more pungent or tighter, and punitive measures should be taken against Government officials found to be supporting these “Omo-oniles”. We must make Government officials accountable. An effective system of checks and balances should be put in place to check the activities of the “Omo-oniles”. Corruption within the Police circle constitutes the fuel that gingers militancy in Lagos (KII in Lagos).

Participants/respondents also reported that the “*Omo-onile*” crisis is such a major conflict in the *Oke-Ira* Community, to the extent that the *Obodo* and the *Fasakin* families continue to fight for supremacy. This contributes to the prevailing high level of crime and criminality in some communities in Lagos state. In Ajah, 30-40% of the so-called “*Omo-oniles*” are said not to have come from Ajah. Participants were worried and asked the question: Where are the “*Omo-oniles*” from? As the “*Omo-oniles*” continue to threaten people and law-abiding citizens who legitimately buy and acquire land to build their homes in Ajah and other parts of Lagos, participants posited that Government should do something to curb and ultimately stop the activities of the “*Omo-oniles*”.

Focus Group Discussion sessions with a representative sample of the youths in Lagos state had also further revealed certain other deeper dimensions or areas of Conflict. One outcome of the FGDs was the perceived disclosure about the neglect of Nigerian youths by Government. Those who participated in the FGDs lamented that the youth and young people in Lagos are not happy with the Government and the governance of Lagos state. Reasons averred by participants/respondents had included the following:

- (1) High level of youth unemployment fundamentally contributes to unrest in Lagos state;
- (2) There is the perception of injustice in the land - as the rich get away with too many crimes, while the poor are unfairly sanctioned for minor offences committed;
- (3) There is bullying and harassment by the “*Omo-Oniles*” and it is getting out of control;
- (4) The people who have tried to make peace in the community, either by way of advocacy or providing information, are eliminated in one way or another;
- (5) The youths demand that Government should explain where the militants and kidnappers get their weapons from;
- (6) The issue of vandalism and extortion is at the root cause of most of the killings in Lagos state, especially in the Ikorodu area;
- (7) *On Cultism*: that, this is a threat to the larger Lagos state society. It is a big problem in Ikorodu. The Ayé and Eiye Confraternities had clashed in the “Agric” area in Ikorodu;

- (8) That, cultists are being used by politicians;
- (9) *On the Area Boys' Menace*: that, an organised group of youths, especially in the *Mushin* and *Ijora-Badiya* areas of Lagos, often killed and maimed innocent people. These groups have been fighting over the control of the drugs and commercial markets, especially in the *Mushin* area – a commercial transport motor hub;
- (10) That, in the first quarter of 2016, several people were killed in *Mushin* before a temporary closure of the market;
- (11) *On Ethnic-based Conflict*: that, these involved the Yoruba and Hausa/Herders in the *Mile 12* Market. This problem occasionally flared up and do constitute a threat to peace and intergroup relations in Lagos state. Participants suggested that Government should address the *Mile 12* Market problem before it snowballs into a serious problem;
- (12) That, there have also been occurrences of leadership tussle among the Hausa-Herders Community in Lagos state. This problem has occasionally tended to degenerate into outright conflict and violence.

Recommendations

The Research participants/respondents had made the following recommendations:

- (1) The need to wholly-psychologically and functionally-professionally re-orientate the Nigeria Police;
- (2) That, the Nigerian Government should post military personnel to trouble areas to curb the excesses of the Nigeria Police;
- (3) The urgent need to tackle the problem of unemployment;
- (4) The need to curb activities of the 'Ijaw boys' and other misfit-youths as well as decisively stem the alarming, trending spate of kidnappings in the society;
- (5) On oil-bunkering in the *Ikorodu* area and other parts of Lagos state, that, military personnel rather than the police should be deployed or posted to guard such facilities;
- (6) That, the movement of oil-tanker drivers should be tracked and checked;
- (7) That, specific measures should be devised to check the proliferation of arms and ammunition as well as clear the creeks in the *Ikorodu* area of Lagos state from activities of the 'Ijaw boys' and kidnappers;
- (8) That, community policing should be promoted or encouraged as a way to extirpate fear and anguish often created by the activities of miscreants;
- (9) That, women should be protected from sexual violence and rape unleashed by the militants and, especially, the '*Ijaw boys*';

- (10) That, the establishment of Community Spies should be encouraged to help in nipping in-the-bud some of the activities of corrupt police officers.

Conclusion on Lagos State

(i) The Need to Consider Restructuring of the Nigerian Federation

One significant finding of the SCA in Lagos state was the call by research participants for the restructuring of the Nigerian Federation. Participants could not understand why Lagos state which is the most populated state in the Nigerian Federation was allocated fewer Local Government Areas compared to states in the Northern Nigeria which have far less population. Participants blamed this anomaly on the then Military Government administration that was led by military officers from Northern Nigeria. According to participants/respondents, both the Lagos state and the South-West Zone and Yorubas, in general, have been cheated in the existing Federal structure. Participants warned that, for the Nigerian Federation to continue to survive, there is urgent need for the possible restructuring of the Nigerian Federation. Most of the participants/respondents had lamented that the Yoruba people – with their population – are only reduced to only six states, compared with states in the Northern part of the country. That, if urgent steps are not taken to restructure, the Yoruba-speaking part of Nigeria should consider alternative options of asserting their regional sovereignty and integrity. Participants could hardly understand or accept why states like Lagos and Oyo – with comparatively high population densities – have less numbers of Local Government Areas than Kano, Katsina, and Jigawa states. A seemingly confounded participant had specifically asked, thus: “Why will Lagos, with the highest population in the country, be allocated 20 LGAs, while Kano, Katsina, and Jigawa – with far less population – are allocated 44 and 33 Local Government Areas, respectively?”

(ii) Other specific Pronouncements/Recommendations by the Lagos State SCA Respondents

- (1) While the *immediate enemies* in Lagos state appear to be the militants; the *main enemies* are perceived to be the Politicians.
- (2) The issue of cult crisis should be addressed seriously.
- (3) Politics and its practice should be made unattractive.
- (4) Need for an increase in political education.
- (5) Increased sensitisation of the youth on political education is imperative.
- (6) There should be easier access to justice as well as fair and equitable treatment for all.
- (7) Jobs for the youth should be paramount.
- (8) The youths should be included in state governance.
- (9) Better and increased public awareness on the culture of peace.

- (10) There should be a platform for the youths to express their opinions properly, such as the creation and operation of a public Website.
- (11) Government, such as the person of the president, should be responsive and accountable.
- (12) That, there should be adequate and continuous interface by Government with the people, especially the youths.
- (13) The Youths of Lagos state must have a meeting with the Governor of Lagos state, in order to collectively proffer immediate solutions to some of the contemporary and impelling problems of the youths.

Ogun State (The Gateway State)

Capital: Abeokuta



Source: <http://nigeriazipcodes.com/465/ogun-state-zip-code-map/Nigerian>

Background Information on Ogun state

Created on 3 February, 1976, with the capital in Abeokuta, Ogun state is one of the six states in the South-West of Nigeria. The state is named after the Ogun River, which runs right across it from the northern part to the southern part. Given its geographical pathway to the commercial cities of Lagos, Oyo and Osun as well as the rest of the country, Ogun state is popularly known as the 'Gateway State'. Its border with the Republic of Benin to the west makes it an access route to the expansive market of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS); and it is bordered to the south by Lagos state and by the Atlantic Ocean the South, Oyo and Osun states to the North, and Ondo state to the East. Abeokuta is the capital and largest city in the state. According to the 2005 census, Ogun state has 4,054,272 million people.

Ogun state is largely inhabited by the Yoruba Ethnic group of South-West Nigeria and also by sub-groups namely the Ikale, Ilaje, Anago, Ketu, Ohori, etc. English is the official language, while native languages include Yoruba, Egun and several dialects of the sub-groups. There are twenty (20) Local Government Areas in Ogun state namely Abeokuta North, Abeokuta South, Ado-Odo/Ota, Ewewkoro, Ifo, Ijebu East, Ijebu North, Ijebu North-East, Ijebu- Ode, Ikenne and Imeko. Others are Afon, Ipokia, Obafemi/Owode, Odeda, Odogbolu, Ogun Waterside, Remo North, Sagamu, Egbado North and Egbado

South. Tourist attractions in the state include the Olumo Rock in Abeokuta, Bisikisu Sungbo Shrine at Oke-Eri, Yemojji natural swimming pool at Ijebu-Ode, Oyan dam in Abeokuta, Iwopin Boat Regatta and Ebute-Oni in Ogun waterside.

Like Lagos state, Ogun state also stretches along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean with island creeks such as in Ebute Ibafo and other areas that link it by water to Ikorodu, Ajah, Epe, Badagry. Its proximity to metropolitan Lagos and the commercial city of Ibadan means that the problems of Lagos and Oyo states do spillover into Ogun state. The geography of Lagos state is similar to Ogun state. For instance, being part of the Gulf of Guinea on the West African coastline also means that the geographies that generate anti-social activities and economic sabotage which include: militancy, pipeline vandalism, oil bunkering, kidnapping, rape of women and violence are also present in Ogun state. Like Lagos state, Ogun state receives people from both within Nigeria and the outside world.

Findings in Ogun State

It is worthy to note that the research team found more cases of criminality induced insecurity than conflicts in Ogun state.

The presence of different Nationalities in Ogun state constitutes triggers that often cause friction and conflicts of interest – as people compete for scarce resources and space. Those who are unable to settle in Lagos due to the cost of living easily relocate or migrate into the neighboring satellite towns and sub-urban areas in Ogun state. Easy migration of by those refers to as ‘Ijaw boys’ from the Niger Delta region through the creeks and lagoons along the Atlantic Ocean along the Gulf of Guinea into Ogun state contributes in the phenomenology of militancy, pipeline vandalism, oil bunkering, kidnapping, violence and rape of women in communities like *Ebute-Ibafo* and adjacent towns. Elements from the volatile Niger Delta region who roam the pieces of islands, creeks in locations such as Ikorodu, Ajah, Epe, and Badagry; also find their way into parts of Ogun state. It is this very geography that placed Ogun state and provides the grounds that fuels oil-bunkering, criminality, vandalism, kidnapping and violence and rape of women.

Prominent sons and daughters have been produced by the state. It has over the years evolved as the political and intellectual ‘Mecca’ of the country. For example, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Chief Moshood Abiola, former Nigerian President Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, Chief Ernest Shonekan, Noble Laureate Professor Wole Soyinka, Dr. Tai Solarin, Madam Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti (nationalist and colonial activist), Fela Anikulapo-Kuti (Afro-music legend), among many others are from the state. It is also reputed to be the host of nine universities and several headquarters of religious organisations in Nigeria.

The main sub-nationalities or composition of the state includes the *Ijebu*, *Egba*, and *Awori*. Politics and self-determination of the people brought further division to this composition and the result is/are the *Remo* from 'Ijebu' stock and *Yewa* from the 'Egba' stock. The people are predominately farmers and traders. Education and literacy level is very high and this explains the hyper involvement of citizens of Ogun state in Nigeria's national political consciousness. Administratively, the state is divided into 20 Local Government Areas.

The geographical location of Ogun state, among other South Western states, is regarded as the gateway state because it is the only pathway and through route to transact business in the economic and commercial nerve of the country in Lagos state. Moreover, Ogun state consists of two of the most volatile international border communities in South-Western Nigeria. These are the Idiroko and Seme border communities. These two border communities contribute to violence and insecurity that thrive in Ogun state. The presence of these border communities has made Ogun state an entry-point for small arms and light weapons. Worthy of note is the reckless nature of the *Tokunbo* drivers and cartels that operate at the border communities as many citizens of the state have lost their lives through crossfire/stray bullets in the fight between security forces on the one hand and smugglers on the other. Smugglers traffic in all manner of illegal goods including small arms and light weapons. Ogun state has also witnessed other forms of violence which is manifested in the following ways: Chieftaincy tussle; *Omo-Oniles*; *Eru-Iku*, *Tobalase*, *Tokunbo* drivers/cartels; herders/crop farmers conflict; inter and intra-party rivalry; entrepreneur land-grabbers; and road traffic unions/Okada riders tussle.

Chieftaincy Tussle is conflict brought about by the divine rights of the king. The divine rights of the king simply mean that some people are born royal, and therefore have the right to rule their community as a result of their lineage or ancestral prowess. This group of people is referred to as *Omo-Oye*, meaning those that are next in line to the throne after their father is gone. The issue of who should be next in line to the throne has continued to raise more conflict and violence among the people of Ogun state, and the Yoruba nation in general.

Chieftaincy Tussle can be traced to the patriarchal nature of the Yoruba culture. Most times, it is fueled by the deep practice of polygamy, especially within the royal family. The nature of this violence makes it to span for years without an immediate remedy. Most of these cases of violence, due to contest for the throne, has been attended to by the police, and the court of law with little or no success. This is because the Nigerian legal system has little or no say on ancestral and traditional rights. Chieftaincy tussle has been a worrisome cause of violence within some communities in Ogun state; an example of this community being Ado-Odo, which is under the Ado-Odo-Otta Local Government jurisdiction. This community is seriously in need of peacebuilding activities, re-orientation, reconstruction, and rehabilitation. The youth of this particular area have actually been used by different royal bodies to achieve their selfish aim, and purpose.

The *Omo-onile* phenomenon is a concept and activity that became popular as the demand for housing increased. Basically, the formation and activity of the *omo-onile* group has been due to land shortage within Lagos state that spreads into Ogun state and other states in the South-West region of Nigeria. Inability to access cheap and cost-effective land within Lagos has brought high demand for land within Ogun state; and the nearest destination to Lagos is Otta, Sango, Mowe, Ibafo and environs. *Omo-onile* groups simply mean members of a given family that inherited a portion of land. It is more complicated and more violent when you have different groups from the same family, mostly an extended family, contesting for land that is scarce and in short supply. The name *Omo-onile* is fast becoming a generic name for two groups of violence, namely 'the real family lands owners', and 'the land speculators/agents'. These two groups are referred to as *Omo-Onile*; however, the land speculators or agents work on behalf of a family or family members.

Eru-Iku refers to groups of hired personnel or, better still, a dangerous highly-aggressive group of jobless young men that take fighting, militarism, defence and security of others as a part of their part-time job. The age group of these young men often ranges between 18 years of age, and 40 years. They are highly aggressive and they make use of small arms and light weapons. Their timing and mode of operation are based on the terms of contracts which they receive from the land speculators and agents. The *Eru-Iku* constitutes the main source where the foot soldiers of the *Omo-oniles* are drawn from. They are paid basically by these land agents and speculators on a work rate/percentage basis known as 'commission'. The group is one of the most powerful groups disturbing the peace in Ogun state. Their activities can only be stopped through massive job creation, skill acquisition, and financial empowerment.

Tobalase is another associated group that is mostly regarded as a rivalry group to the *Eru-Iku*; they engage the same *modus operandi* to implement their activities. Their operations are basically for financial gains that accrue from land sales. They make use of weapons such as machetes, guns, and various charms and sticks. This group is known to be highly dangerous not only because of the weapons they use but because they are believed to possess metaphysical or supernatural powers.

Herders are groups of migrant nomads that are involved in illegal animal grazing, and land grabbing to the detriment of indigenous land owners that are predominantly farmers. Peculiar to this group is the form of weapon which they use to perform their dastardly acts against farmers. It is alleged that herders use poisoned knives and bows/arrows in their fight against farmers. As they are constantly moving, their activities cannot be pinned-down to a particular community but this crisis is more rampant in some local government areas within Ogun state.

Inter- and intra-party rivalry is another source of conflict in Ogun state. This conflict is largely due to the aggressive nature of Nigerian politician. Very recently within the *Ewekoro-Ifo* senatorial district there has been record of death due to intra-party violence,

the constituency meeting of Senator Obadara was stormed by highly-armed youths declaring that the meeting will not hold, in the process there were sporadic shooting and many people took to their heels, while many were injured. This type of violence is recurrent within the state especially during campaign and electioneering period. It is very important that both government and non-governmental organisations and international partners take steps to preventing the potential for blood-letting in Nigeria's polity.

Entrepreneurial land-grabbers are groups of people that also sponsor violence within the Ogun state. Due to their undue economic prowess, they have the power to sponsor violence for their business interests. They have connections with politicians, and they are known to give loan to sponsor politicians in order to protect their land grabbing interest. Therefore, they sponsor political violence as well as the violence associated with land-grabbing.

Road traffic unions/*Okada*, or motorcycle riders' tussle, is also a crisis that usually erupts from road traffic drivers and *Okada* riders – which arises from the need for supremacy between the union members when there is need to fill a vacant position, mostly the union leader. This group has also been a major source of touts within the community. The group is also often manipulated and controlled by politicians, entrepreneur land grabbers, to inflict violence in the environment. The age bracket of people that are involved in this group of people are the youth, mostly because they seek self expression and determination, and because violence is a lucrative source of survival to many youths in an economy and society that is characterised by crisis of economic recession, hyper-inflation and unemployment.

Chieftaincy Tussle in Ogun State: The Case of Awori/Owu

The Owu Egba-Awori Otta clash of April 2006 was said to have been triggered by the alleged imposition of monarchs on the Awori people by the Olowu of Owu, Oba Adegboyega Dosunmu. Consequently, the two groups became charged and their domains became battle-ground of a sort. Otta, the commercial nerve-centre, became completely paralysed as motorists deserted the roads and industries and markets could not open for a long period.

In the fracas between the Aworis and Owu, no fewer than sixteen (16) people lost their lives while others were severely injured in the Sango-Otta clash. An Assistant Superintendent of Police, Mr. Sunny Ukata, was reportedly shot in the eye by the protesters, who were armed with cudgels, machetes and other forms of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). The then Governor of Ogun state, Otunba Gbenga Daniel, declared a dusk-to-dawn curfew in the Ado-Odo/Ota Local Government Area and this gave some respite.

Farmer-Herder Conflict in Yewa, Ogun State

Herders came from different countries and states into Yewaland with large numbers of cattle. They go into the area of grazing which the farmer cultivated their crops without demarcation of portion and destroy the farmlands. The herds were controlled by teenager boys who are incapable of effectively monitor about 300 to 400 cows. The explosion of the number of herdsmen and cattle in the area put more pressure on local farmers in Yewaland. As farmers expanded their farming activities the pasture area available to herdsmen kept shrinking and land in short supply. With an estimated number of about twenty five thousand cattle brought to Yewaland by the herdsmen the stakes for conflict were high.

During the Focus Group Discussions, the question was asked thus: how many are you expected this year? The *Sarkin Herders* disclosed that an estimated 500,000 cattle is expected to be brought to the area for grazing from Northern part of Nigeria alone, while another 250,000 is expected from Mali, Niger, Chad and others countries for sale. But, before selling them, the cattle will still graze and be moved about. The implication is that, with the new arrivals expected, the volume of land available for local farmers will drastically be reduced – with the potential for more conflict, if measures are not put in place by government agencies to pacify the groups.

Other problems associated with farmers-herders conflict in Yewa, Ogun state can be traced to lack of communication and understanding between the two groups. This single factor has widened the gap for possible reconciliation between the two parties. One other finding during the Focus Group Discussions was that while herdsmen do inflict damages on farm lands by grazing their animals on farmlands, the researchers found that in some cases both herdsmen and farmers were blamed for overreaction particularly in the nature of their retaliation. Both groups were said to use tactics of using dangerous weapons guns. Other dangerous tactics employed by herdsmen against farming communities include rape of innocent women, burning down of farms and houses of farmers.

Another source of conflict between farmers and herdsmen is source of water for domestic use and cattle. Apart from the destruction to farmland the cattle after grazing go to the streams to drink water in which the indigenes fetch their drinking water, bath, wash their clothes, and draw water for other domestic purposes. With massive invasion by herders, the water dries up and the streams began to disappear. This is a very significant source of conflict. Some participants suggested that bore holes be dug for the farmers. In response to the suggestion that bore holes be dug for the farmers; a participant quipped in anger, thus: “this is not enough; are we saying our people (Yoruba farmers) should not have any contact with their God-given endowments, environment and nature? This is absolutely unacceptable!”.

Criminality Induced Insecurity

This study found more cases of criminality induced insecurity than conflicts in Ogun state. This is exemplified by the following narratives.

Focus Group Discussions in the *Ebute-Ibafo* Community of Ogun State

The Strategic Conflict Assessment research team visited the *Ebute-Ibafo* Community in Ogun state and met with the *Baale* of the Community. *Ibafo* is a border town in Ogun state, a few kilometers into Lagos state. *Ibafo* population is made up of migrants from Ogun state and Lagos state. Due to the high cost of living in metropolitan Lagos, people migrated into *Ibafo* – thereby contributing to a surge in the population of *Ibafo* and its environs. The massive migrant population, combined with inadequate basic facilities like housing, potable water, road network, electricity, educational and health institutions, poor resources and security to cater for its rising population have tended to push the Community into the brink.

On arrival at *Ibafo*, the research team met with the *Baale*, his Council and some community members who participated in focus group discussions. Participants were drawn from varied groups of residents and members of the *Ibafo* Community comprising members of the traditional council of the *Baale*, Elders, the youth, women, representatives of the market women, community leaders, representatives of the media, and religious leaders. Participants listed the challenges that have confronted the *Ibafo* Community and its environs, within the past six months to one year, to include violent militancy and oil-bunkering – all masterminded by the '*Ijaw boys*' who are alleged to have connived with elements of the Nigeria Police. Other associated collateral conflicts, reportedly masterminded by the '*Ijaw boys*', included kidnapping of women and young girls, sexual violence and rape against women and girls, trespassing and forceful occupation of homes and residential quarters, molestation and harassment of *Ibafo* residents, displacement and forced out-migration of residents as well as the alleged use of thugs by the police to loot the *Ibafo* Market. Other challenges include the absence of public schools, hospitals, electricity, and overhead bridge across the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway – which physically separates *Ibafo* Township into two halves.

At the time of the South-West team's visit, more than half of the population of *Ebute-Ibafo* had fled the town due to the activities of the '*Ijaw boys*'. Houses and Streets were virtually empty. A good number of residential houses showed physical marks or signs of gunshots. Participants posited that, although the police were present in *Ibafo* town, the same police were perceived as an integral part of the problem. Participants alleged that the police fuels violence in *Ibafo* because elements within the police connive by shielding the '*Ijaw boys*' from prosecution. Some participants averred that some policemen actually joined militants in the harassment, displacement and forced migration of people out of *Ibafo*. Respondents vividly pinpointed specific residential houses from which owners were forcibly evicted by the '*Ijaw boys*'.

The Nigeria Police and alleged involvement in violent conflict at the Ibafo Market

Participants at the FGDs had reported alleged constant police harassment of traders at the Ibafo market. In the words of a participant, thus:

... The Police would enter the market at will, beat up traders and loot their goods. Due to fear and tension generated by the 'Ijaw boys' and elements from the Nigeria Police, this had often caused a large number of our residents to feel insecure and, as such, vacate the entire area as an escape from insecurity (FGD Participant).

The *Ibafo* main Market is located along the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway, about two and half kilometers from the Mountain of Fire and Miracles (MFM) Ministries and its affiliated University, the Mountain Top University (MTU). Just like any informal market in the informal sub-urban settlements in Nigeria, the Ibafo Main Market is the major economic center of the town, serving all residents from both sides of the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway and beyond. People come from both Lagos state and other parts of Ogun state to patronise the market. Passers-by also park and do their shopping. The market, therefore, contributes to the traffic gridlocks often witnessed on the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway. As if that is not enough, the Police Station of *Ibafo* is located directly on the other side of the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway.

From an ordinary visitor's observation, the location of this Police Station, it would seem, was meant to provide a 24-hour security and protection of lives and properties in the market. But the stories and narratives by market women and residents of Ibafo had conveyed a very bleak picture. One of the biggest challenges to enduring peace in *Ibafo* town and the immediate environment is, reportedly, the market itself. The market that is supposed to function and provide for the smooth running of economic activities in Ibafo has, over the years, been the source of insecurity and elusive peace (as it were) in the town. This predicament had also, unfortunately, been largely attributed to the existing Police station in *Ibafo* – which is located directly opposite the market.

One of our research participants had graphically described alleged police banditry at the *Ibafo* Market in the following way:

“The policemen from the Ibafo Police Station usually act as invading armed thugs, or official armed robbers, who have at various occasions invaded the market any time they want to loot our market. Their mode of operation is usually to invade the market by force. They do this by blowing siren and shooting their guns into the air with the main objective to scare away both owners and shoppers. The intimidating sound from both the siren and their guns is so frightening that people are forced to run for dear lives. The invading police use this strategy to cart away goods, foodstuff, other valuables and, in some cases, money hurriedly abandoned in shops, tables, cars and handbags. Meat abandoned on butchers' tables as well as live animals, including goats and chickens brought to the market for sale, are also not spared by the invading police”.

Part of the problem was traceable to the fact that *Ibafó* is a border town between Lagos state and Ogun state. While *Ibafó* is literally a stone-throw from Lagos, it is more than 100 km away to Abeokuta, the capital of Ogun state. Most people who cannot afford the high cost of living, housing and other basic facilities in Lagos have been forced to relocate to *Ibafó*. Given that *Ibafó* is close to Lagos but is physically located in Ogun state territory, the Police Command in Lagos does not have direct jurisdiction on security of *Ibafó*. This makes it extremely difficult for any form of intervention by the Lagos Police Command and, by extension, gives room for the alleged or perceived police banditry to flourish at the market.

The irony of the foregoing lamentation by citizens of *Ibafó* can only be appreciated if placed against the fact that the Nigeria Police force stationed in *Ibafó* is meant to protect lives and properties. For years, negative activities such as banditry, oil-bunkering, kidnapping, violence, and the excessive human rights abuses visited on the *Ibafó* Community, but allegedly carried out by some bad elements in connivance with the '*Ijaw boys*' and the Nigeria Police force, continued unabated until the arrival of the military, posted to that location in July 2016.

This is the way that a research participant had described the timely intervention of the military:

I know that the military posted to *Ibafó* was not meant to protect our market, but their presence and patrol in our community has greatly help in checkmating the occasional criminal invasion of our market by the police. We are grateful to the Federal government for taking this step because we can buy and sale our goods in the market without fear of intimidation and extortion by the police. Police brutality and criminality is now a thing of the past. Business is now booming in our market. It is our prayers that the military will stay permanently in *Ibafó* (KII, *Ibafó*).

There is only one public Health Centre in *Ibafó*, serving a population estimated at almost two million people. The Health Centre is not only small, ill-equipped in terms of medical personnel and availability of drugs, but does not have electricity supply, also because of the total lack of electricity supply in *Ibafó* Town. Therefore, basic medical supplies and equipment are absolutely not available at the *Ibafó* Health Centre. The medium-sized generator in the hospital was epileptic.

There were only two beds and one dilapidated pediatric bed for children. This could not be regarded as a Health Centre.

***Ibafó* Community Secondary School**

There is almost absolute dearth of public schools in *Ibafó*. The only existing school is a Community Secondary School serving a population estimated at about one million people. Participants reported that a class in the School holds between 400-500 students. Besides being grossly inadequate for any impactful learning, it presented a health hazard to the

pupils. Although the School was founded and is sustained through community efforts, the Ogun state Government claims it provides free education. Parents pay school fees to sustain the school.

Absence of an Overhead Walk-Bridge On the Very Busy Lagos-Ibadan Expressway

Research participants lamented that the ever-busy Lagos-Ibadan Expressway which has truncated *Ibafó* Township into two halves has contributed to the sudden deaths of both adult and children trying to cross the road. The lack of an overhead walk-bridge over the very busy highway makes it extremely difficult for children to access the Township School, which is located on the other side of the expressway.

Other Observations by Participants/Respondents at *Ibafó*

- (1) There was the finding of a high level of unemployment; and, that, regardless of community efforts, the Government seemed to be inattentive. Since October 2015, *Ibafó* and its neighbouring communities have not had electricity power distribution and supply – which has negatively impacted on the business in the area and led to high rate of crime.
- (2) Residents complained that, due to inadequate population statistics, both the Government and private citizens are unable to plan adequately. This continues to have negative impact on the development of infrastructure and greatly affected resource management and control. This is a contributing factor for the aggravation and sustenance of militancy being witnessed in the Community. Fiscal policies are centered around oil and gas resources gotten from a certain territorial sector of the country and the sector is not taken care of; leading to frustration and the resultant migration of the militants because their environment is no longer conducive for their criminal activities. The '*Ijaw boys*' therefore, apparently tended to migrate to soft locations, like *Ibafó*.
- (3) That, the unitary system of Government in Nigeria does not seem to be working for the people. This system of channeling resources to the centre, and the corruption associated with those resources, has caused politics to be attractive.
- (4) That, Governance has generally not often carried the local government areas along, or involved them, in the formulation of its policies. That, even the traditional rulers have a limit to their authority.
- (5) The militants and criminal elements, contrary to popular belief, are very well-informed about the events going on in the communities and have used such information to their advantage.
- (6) In trying to rid communities of one crisis, other issues of conflict can be triggered. For example, the stoppage of the bunkering in the *Ibafó* area has led to some

people's means of livelihood to be drastically altered – causing them to resort to other criminal activities for sustenance; even though the people initially enjoyed patronising the illegal fuel peddlers because they could not afford the petroleum products at the increased rates as sold in the filling stations.

Suggested Ways Forward

- (1) Appropriate statistics should be made available to ensure and enable adequate planning – which will in turn address issues of resource control and management, structural development and other basic amenities.
- (2) Electrification of the *Ibafó* Community should be reworked to revamp the business and economic life of the community.
- (3) In response to the bunkering crisis, the people of the *Ibafó* area were happy with the intervention of the military, and had commended their presence. However, they are calling on the Government to provide better for the military stationed in the area; especially, regarding a proper camp for the soldiers who have been relegated to having make-shift accommodation in abandoned houses and open bars in the area.
- (4) Efforts, such as by the *Ibafó* Community Development Association, should be assisted and encouraged in maintaining peace at the local level.
- (5) The residents and people of the Community have invited the State Government to take over some abandoned expanse of land to build a structure or structures (modern market, skills acquisition center, etc.), that will provide employment and other useful benefits to the community as well as help to provide a sustainable means of internally generated resource for the community.
- (6) A walk-bridge, connecting the Community with the School and Health Centre, should be constructed over the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway.
- (7) A completion of the School building project, with an improvement in the educational facilities of the School.
- (8) An improvement in the current structure of the Health Center, with additional and adequate medical facilities – including an alternative source power in the event of a power failure. Also, the composition of the medical service team should be revisited and improved upon.
- (9) State Governance should take into cognizance the very critical role(s) that the traditional rulers play in the community, and include them in governance and policy formulation.
- (10) A call for Local Government Autonomy was also sounded by participants/ respondents.

Trans-Border Crimes and the Menace of Tokunbo Drivers in Ogun State International Border Areas

The proximity of Ogun state to the western borders of Nigeria has made it vulnerable to trans-border crimes. Goods stolen in Nigeria are easily transported across the border to the neighbouring Republic of Benin. The trans-border crimes prevalent in Ogun state range from drug peddling to armed-robbery to human smuggling and trafficking to kidnapping. Smuggling of goods across Idiroko border is one crime taken for granted in the state as criminals have devised innumerable tactics of beating border security rendering the security agencies at the borders practically ineffective.

The inadequacy of border posts along Nigerian international borders with its neighbors has exacerbated the situation as smugglers ply unmanned international borders transporting their illegally imported goods into and out of the country with the collaboration of residents of these border communities. The situation is rife in Ogun state being a gateway state. Goods enter and exit through many border communities like Ilara.

One intractable and salient conflict that has raged for many years is the menace of Tokunbo Drivers in Ogun state international border areas. The menace of *tokunbo* couriers have proven so powerful and intractable. Most regulatory agencies particularly the Nigeria Customs Services (NCS) have been found to be ineffective in controlling the rate at which unlicensed cars are smuggled through *Seme* and *Idiroko* borders of the country. These socio-economic invaders enter the country with an endless convoy of fully-lighted cars shooting sporadically as they advance until they disappear at their different destinations. All government agencies along their way run for cover as they make their 'triumphal entry' into the country. The presence of these couriers is heavily felt in Otta which is about a 35-minute auto-drive from the *Idiroko* border. Citizens of that area cannot ignore the record of death of innocent residents crushed by ruthless reckless and deadly drivers and those hacked down by their stray bullets.

Research participants/respondents had suggested that the Nigerian Federal Government should establish border guard units to checkmate the activities of cross-border criminals, armed robbers, kidnappers, small arms and light weapon smugglers, international gun running kingpins, international drug smugglers, counter the menace of Tokunbo Drivers and protect Nigerian communities residing at international borders. The participants/respondents recalled that recently one of the suspects on gun-running, Mr Sikiru Oyebanji, had reportedly brought arms for his ten-man gang from the Republic of Benin. His ten-man gang were said to have roamed streets and perpetually wreaked havoc in different communities in Ogun state. A participant/respondent observed that, at least, one armed robbery case is recorded every day in Ogun state. In a similar vein, the Ogun state Special Anti-Robbery Squad team, led by the Officer-in-Charge (SP), burst into a crime group in Sagamu and recovered 20 bags of weed suspected to be Indian hemp and some weapons suspected to have been used for various operations by the hoodlums.

In a desperate appeal, the Commissioner of Police and the Governor of Ogun state were reported to have in 2012 called for a decisive action against armed robbers in Otta. One of our research participant claimed that armed robbery syndicates terrorised law citizens According to him:

... armed robbery has reached an alarming level in this industrial town. Robbery operations are freely carried out at Joju, and Ojuore, Borehole, Oko Baale, Etere, Shell Gas Company, and many communities along Ojuore/Ilogbo Road. Others areas that are frequently visited by armed bandits are: Ewupe Bayo Blocks, Koro Ottun and Itele roads. Cars and motorbikes are frequently snatched while people's homes are attacked.

The Menace of “*Omo-Oniles*” in Ogun State

Research participants traced the menace of “*Omo-Oniles*” in Ogun state to its proximity to the continuous expansion and development projects in Lagos and environs. The spate of development in Lagos – which spread to Otta and several other adjacent border-towns and communities in Ogun state – are reasons that account for the question ‘who owns the land’. Out fieldwork reveals that the menace of *Omo-Oniles* (Owners of Land) came into existence as a result of massive urbanisation in Lagos – which results in the scarcity of land. A participant, however, traced the historical origins of the phenomenon of “*Omo Oniles*” to cultural factors. For this participant, hunters were initially the first set of people that discovered and settled in a particular place during their hunting adventure. This narrative holds that the first settlers on any land are therefore regarded by culture as the rightful owners of the land. This is a major factor that generated the existence of *Omo Onile*. In common parlance of the 21st century, the term *Omo Onile* has always been derogatively used to mean touts or area boys, etc. This abuse led to the re-categorisation and classification of the term *Omo Onile*, or land owner, into two, thus:

- (1) The real family landowner
- (2) The land speculator/Agent

While the original owners (*Omo Oniles*) of the land could be members of the same extended family who trace their ownership through ancestral history, conquest, inheritance or settlement has a link with a particular location or places as claimed. In a nutshell, claim to land ownership is historical link to original settlers on the land – which bestows the rights to ownership.

Speculators/agents are agents employed by feuding families or individuals to sell or reclaim ownership of disputed land. A research participant drew example from *Ejigbadero* who was the first land agent in Lagos – which was to be followed by several other cities and towns of Southwestern Nigeria. Such agents or land speculators always apply force by all means to gain possession of land. Field research participants unanimously agreed that the origins of land speculators/agents or the “birth of land speculators/agents” can be traced to the failure of litigation and litigants to obtain some form of legal redress on

cases of land matters. Over the years, some of these *Omo-Oniles*, or speculators/agents, have grown to become a terror to the existence of peace-loving people and communities across the South-West region of Nigeria.

Modes of Operation and Social Outcomes of the “*Omo-Oniles*” in Ogun State

The mode of operation of *Omo-Oniles* is to fight any case of land disputes through the use of physical force and dangerous violent weapons, charms, sticks and other local violent instruments to achieve their objectives. *Omo Oniles* also operate through hired miscreants in society otherwise known popularly in Nigeria as ‘area boys’. In Ogun state *Omo Oniles* are also known as Eru-iku, Tobalase, who work either day or night as operation demanded. A research participant also quipped thus:

Some of these ‘area boys’ also double as members of Oduduwa Peoples’ Congress (OPC). Some are cult members from higher institutions and their power comes from the use of charms, guns and other physical weapons. They are paid on commission/percentage or a certain portion of land may be allotted to them on illegal sales or reclamation rendered. Sometimes, they are paid cash as negotiated before operation.

The activities of *Omo Oniles* have led to migration of ‘area boys’ from Lagos to Sango and Otta in Ogun state - as in other parts of the South-West. Conflicts between the *Omo-Oniles* often resulted in further divisions among the group into three main sub-groups. This also tended to further aggravate the problem of insecurity of lives and property in the area. The *Omo Oniles* are therefore, sub-divided as follows:

- (1) Federal boys
- (2) State boys
- (3) Local

Under this sub-division of the *Omo Oniles*, no construction of property, either for domestic or cooperate use, can succeed without payment being made to these three groups, otherwise violence will erupt. The negative effect of this group on the education of young people and youths is enormous – as many of them continue to abandon schools to join the activities of the *Omo Oniles*. The *Omo Oniles*, therefore, propagate anxiety and insecurity as part of the strategy to instill fear on children to join the activities of their cults and encourage laziness among the youths in local communities.

Ewekoro Local Government

Interview with His Royal Highness (HRH), the *Towulade Akinale, Oba Femi Ogunleye*, had provided the research team with an opposite perspective of the woes afflicting the *Ibafo* Community. Information from the Oba had noted that the most predominant conflicts in the *Akinale Community* included land issues; specifically, land- grabbing (“*omo onile*”) matters. Since his ascension to the throne of Oba-ship, however, there has been sustained

peace due largely to the *Oba's* traditional and peaceful means of conflict resolution. The *Oba* said that he has constituted a forum of 80 *Obas* and 70 *Baales* to address problems that could snowball into violent crises. The *Baales* and *Obas* used to meet fortnightly but, due to certain challenges, now meet monthly to deliberate on matters as they arise before they get out of hand. The *Oba* revisited the issues of Farmers-Herders Conflict in the Community and listed several options he employed in resolving those conflicts. *Kabiyesi*, the *Towulade Akinale*, *Oba Femi Ogunleye*, emphasised that although the herders are intruders, the conflict can be resolved peacefully.

Ondo State (The Sunshine State)

Capital: Akure



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Background Information on Ondo State

Located in south-west geopolitical zone of Nigeria, Ondo state covers a total area of the former Ondo Province, created in 1915 with Akure as the provincial headquarters. Ondo state consist of the nine administrative divisions of the former Western state, which then were Akoko, Akure, Ekiti Central, Ekiti North, Ekiti South, Ekiti West, Okitipupa, Ondo and Owo. Ondo state proper was created on 1st April 1976 out of the

defunct Western state and it originally included what is now Ekiti state that was also carved out in 1996 by late General Sanni Abacha. Ondo state has 19 local government areas which include Akoko-Northeast, Akoko-Northwest, Akoko-Southwest, Akoko-Southeast, Akure-South, Akure-North, Ese-Odo, Idanre, Ifedore, Ilaje, Ile-Oluji-Okeigbo, Irele, Odigbo, Okitipupa, Ondo West, Ondo East, Ose, and Owo.

Ondo state is predominantly occupied by the Yorubas who speak various dialects of the language such as the Akoko, Akure, Apoi, Idanre, Ijaw, Ikale, Ilaje, Ondo and the Owo. Ondo state, which is indeed a microcosm of the Nigerian nation, is blessed with resourceful, industrious and hospitable people and classified as one of the most educationally advanced states in Nigeria. Major cities and towns include Akure, Owo, Ore, Ondo, Oka-Akoko, Okitipupa, Ile-Oluji, and Ikare.

The Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) in Ondo state, South-West Nigeria, had further provided opportunities to improve the effectiveness of the development interventions in contributing to conflict prevention and reduction in Nigeria. The assessment aimed at the analysis of long-term factors underlying conflicts: security, political, economic and social. The research covered actors' interests, relations, capacities, peace agenda and incentives. It also analysed long-term trends of conflicts, triggers for increased violence and capacities for managing conflicts as well as likely future scenarios. The following data-collection approaches were similarly leveraged in the research field: in-depth interviews with critical stakeholders and key informants; focus group discussions; and guiding questions as embodied in the structured survey questionnaire.

Ondo state was created on 3 February, 1976, from the former Western state. Ondo state originally included the current Ekiti state, which was carved out in 1996. Akure is the capital of the state. Ondo state has a population of approximately 3.44 million, according to the 2006 National Census. It covers an area 15,500 km² (6,000 sq mi.). The state contains eighteen (18) Local Government Areas; the major ones being Akoko, Akure, Okitipupa, Ondo and Owo. There is also the Ijaw minority, such as Apoi and Arogbo. Ilaje population inhabits the coastal area; while a sizable number of the populace of Ondo state who speak a variant of the Yoruba language, similar to Ife dialect, reside in Oke-Igbo. The state derives most of its revenue from the production of cocoa, palm oil, rubber, lumber and cassava. Approximately, 65 percent of the labour force of the state is employed in the agrarian sector. The state is also rich in oil and solid minerals (e.g. bitumen, and others).

Although in recent times, Ondo state has been relatively peaceful or violent-free, yet, there have been few incidents of conflict in the state. The conflict issues reported in the state – which were often resolved by the conflict resolution mechanism of the state, through synergies with critical stakeholders like the traditional institution, security personnel, and non-governmental organisations – included conflict between cattle herders and farmers, boundary disputes, chieftaincy tussles, pockets of electoral violence, civil protests, and other forms of criminality.

Conflicts in Ondo State

Herders and Farmers Conflict

Akoko North-East, Akoko North-West, Akoko South-East, and Akure North Local Government Areas have witnessed incessant conflicts between the farmers and the herders. The conflicts were conceptualised as an interaction between herders and the farmers. There have been several reported cases of rape and brutality perpetrated by the herders in these areas. The causes of the conflicts were traced largely to the destruction of crops and other farm produce by the cattle of the herders in the farms of the local farmers. Several clashes were recorded between the herders and crop farmers in Akunnu-Akoko, Ikakumo-Akoko, Ise-Akoko, Iboropa-Akoko, and Oke-Agbe within the Ikare-Akoko. Encroachments upon the farmlands by the herders are responsible for the clashes. In 2013 and 2015, the herders and the Isua and Sosan communities had clashed over encroachment on the farmlands. The herders always set their cattle loose to destroy farmers' crops. Similar conflict in the Akure Local Government Area had led to the kidnapping of the former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Chief Olu Falae.

The intervention of the state Government, through the instrumentality of traditional rulers in the respective communities, has reduced the hostility between cattle herders and the crop farmers. These interventions often led to amicable resolution of conflicts. In fact, the Chairman of Akoko North-East Local Government Area had engaged the herders to sign undertaking to live in peaceful harmony with the farmers. In Ogbeda and Igbara-Oke, in Ifedore Local Government Area of the state, farmers are constantly being chased away from their farmlands by the herdsman who are often armed with sophisticated weapons. This negative trend has tended to create tensions and fear in some parts of the state.

Land Disputes

In the Akure-South Local Government Area of the state, there were reported cases of boundary disputes between the people of Akure and Idanre. It is an age-long conflict which is yet to be fully resolved. In the Idanre Local Government Area, there is a boundary dispute between Idanre and Olokuta as well as Halorun and Ala Elefosan. Ifedore Local Government Area of the state also experiences boundary disputes. The affected communities in the dispute are Igbara-Oke in Ifedore and Owena/Ikeji-Arakeji of Oriade Local Government in the State of Osun. Several attempts have been facilitated by the two neighboring states involved as well as the National Boundary Commission, yet, the conflict has persisted. In the Ose Local Government Area, there is currently a land dispute between the people of Elirinla/Ebute Camp. The people of Ute, Ijagba, and Okeluse Communities have laid claims to the Camp. The Local Government has set up a Conflict Resolution Committee to resolve the conflict.

Electoral Violence

In the past, electoral violence permeated virtually all the 18 (eighteen) Local Government Areas of the state. But, recent developments have indicated that the nefarious activities of some politicians and political thugs have reduced considerably. In the last Local Government elections in Ondo state, there were instances of violence in Akure-North and Ifedore Local Government Areas of the state between some candidates of the participating political parties who were angered over the imposition of candidates on them. There were also reported cases of clashes between the supporters of the main political parties prior to the 2015 general elections, but it did not escalate to violent conflicts as recorded in previous elections.

Chieftaincy Tussles

There were Oba-ship tussles in isolated places, but it has not resulted in extended violent conflicts in recent times. The dethroned Deji of Akure, Oba Adepoju Adesina, had challenged his removal in court – which was still pending. There is conflict in the Igbuowo Community between the Oba of the Community and the people of the Community. The Oba was chased out of the Community by the youths of the same community. In Owo Local Government Area, there was Oba-ship tussle at Ipele in 2015. That conflict is yet to be resolved.

Protests

The people from the coastal area of Ondo state, Ese-Odo and Ilaje Local Government Areas had recently protested the nominee for the Niger Delta Development Commission (NNDC) representative in Ondo state, Mr Tokunbo Ajasin, who hails from Owo Local Government Area of the state. The agitation was predicated on the ground that a non-Ilaje person from another Local Government Area should not be appointed as the representative of Ondo state on the NNDC Board, because of the feeling that the position should be the exclusive preserve of the people that are located in the oil-producing area of the state.

Criminality

There had been frequent armed robbery incidents at Ifon road in the Owo Local Government Area. The incessant attacks had led to the death of some policemen recently. Odigbo Local Government Area also faced the challenge of armed robbery. It is a densely populated town and gateway to the eastern states – which actually attracts people from different states to *Ore* Town. There were also reported cases of kidnapping for ransom in some parts of Ondo state. Similarly, Irele Local Government Area had experienced the kidnapping of Oba Oyewumi Abiodun, the Laragunsi of Ode Omi. He was, however, released after a ransom had been paid. There were also reports of occasional robbery incidents in the Okitipupa Local Government Area. In the Riverine Local Government Areas of *Ese-Odo* and *Ilaje*, the challenge facing the area has also included the activities

of sea-pirates. But, by the accounts of key informants and the respondents, the local security personnel have been tackling that challenge. Synopsis of Conflict Situations from Various Local Government Areas of Ondo state.

Ose LGA

The people of Elerinla/Ebute camp in Ose LGA are currently in a dilemma as three different communities, *viz*: Ute, Ijagba, and Okeluse are laying claim to the camp. This has gotten to the notice of the local government council and the State Boundary Adjustment Committee in the office of the Deputy Governor. Representatives of the state Government were on 21 July, 2016 at the LGA to look into the case. The meeting took place at the local government conference hall, where all the stakeholders that include the security personnel, traditional rulers, Local Government Chairman, NOA and the representatives from the state Government were in attendance. The State Committee also made another visit to the disputed site however, the case is still pending. Meanwhile, In December 2012, there were clashes between herdsmen in Ikaro and Ifon communities.

Ile-Oluji /Okeigbo LGA

There are no conflicts presently in the LGA, though there used to be boundary dispute over Temidire-Larere Camp by Ile Oluji in Ondo state and Osun state. A good number of the conflicts have either been resolved or all hostilities reduced to the barest minimum as they all live in peace with each other. In the same vein there are also boundary dispute between Okeigbo in Ondo state and Ifetedo in Osun state (both border towns) over boundary issues. The dispute though had not been totally resolved and still with national boundary commission, the people have since been living together in peace and harmony without breach of peace.

Owo LGA

In the recent times, the area has not witness either conflict or dispute but in the past there was conflicts such as: Farmers-Herders clash at Asolo camp, Uso, in December 2015. The issue was quickly resolved without escalating to violence. Also, there was *Oba-ship* (i.e. traditional rulership/chieftaincy) tussle as a result of sudden change in the mode of selection at *Ipele* in 2015. Although the matter had not been completely resolved as at the period of fieldwork in the South-West zone, it has been prevented from turning into full-blown violence between the ruling houses. In the recent times, there has been frequent armed robbery along Ifon road, after Molege village; which, of recent, led to the death of some policemen and many sustaining various degrees of injury.

Akoko Northeast LGA

The LGA has not witnessed any boundary dispute in recent time, but witnessed conflict between farmers and herdsmen which led to the intervention of the local government chairman. This intervention led to the signing of an undertaking by both parties that all

forms of social vices happening in the local government will stop henceforth. NOA on its part organised a program on peaceful co-existence between cattle herders and their host community on 24 November, 2015, which brought together farmers, herders and community leaders; and it was a successful program. Several clashes were recorded between the herders and the Ikakumo Akoko, Ise Akoko, Iboropa Akoko, Akunnu Akoko and Oke Egbe communities in Ikare-Akoko.

Ifedore LGA

The boundary dispute between Osun and Ondo states is over Owena/reserve forest axis presently in Osun state that is been challenged by Ondo state. Prior to the creation of Ondo state in 1976, then it was Ondo state vs Oyo state, but in the recent times it is Osun state versus Ondo state. Series of reconciliation had taken place as facilitated by the involved LGAs, i.e. Oriade LGA of Osun state and Ifedore LGA of Ondo state. Additionally, several attempts have been facilitated by the two states involved and the federal government involving the areas concerned opinion leaders, community leaders, traditional leaders and the political leaders from time to time. It is important to submit that the reconciliatory move is still in process without any clue of perfect resolution at the moment. At the moment, the forest reserve of the disputed axis is currently under the administration of the federal government most especially in the area of revenue generation. The most directly affected communities in this boundary dispute are: Igbara Oke in Ifedore LGA of Ondo state and Owena/Ikeji Arakeji of Oriade LGA of Osun state.

Akure North LGA

The major challenge in the LGA is the activities of herdsmen that always set their cattle loose to destroy farmers' crops. Conflicts between farmers and herders were recorded in Itaogbolu, Oba-Ile and Ilu-Abo communities. The height of the nefarious activities of these herders was the kidnapping of the former Secretary to the Government of the Federation and a chieftain of Afenifere, Chief Olu Falae. As at today these nefarious activities have greatly reduced.

Ondo-West LGA

Ondo West LGA can be said to be peaceful in recent time, but there was a conflict in Igburowo community in Ondo West between the Oba of the Community, Oba Pius Akinfesola Adewola and the people of the Community. The Oba was chased out of the community unceremoniously half naked since 26 August, 2013, and was later suspended by the council of traditional rulers. The suspension was later challenged at the Ondo High Court sitting in Ondo town. The case is still in court till today. The *Kabiyesi* Oba Pius never came back to the community. The *Kabiyesi* was said to be extradited by his subjects as a result of his unlawful and forceful habit of taking the people's landed properties for himself.

Ondo East LGA

There has been no recent case of unrest or disturbance or any conflict within the LGA except that of January and February 2016, between herders and *Igbo-Oja* community. The herders grazed their cattle on farm lands, thereby destroying the farmers' crops. An attack by the herders in *Igba* camp took place in January this year, but through the effort of the Local Government Chairman, security agents and Elders of the community, the herders were sensitised and warned not to graze their cattle at night in the community.

Akoko Southwest LGA

Akoko Southwest is a peaceful LGA. The people have been going about their normal businesses peacefully. The LGA being the host to Adekunle Ajasin University where students are domicile has had pocket of student-related conflicts over time. The traditional stool of Akungba community has become a pending crisis as the ruling houses had not been able to resolved among themselves to select a substantive king for the throne.

Odigbo LGA

The major conflict being experienced in the LGA is armed robbery. The local government being a gateway to the eastern and western states attracts people from all walks of life to Ore town thereby making it densely populated. Ebijor Ward 4 has been noted for violence during elections in the LGA.

Idanre LGA

Destruction of farmers' crops by herdsmen is one of the conflicts that need to be addressed in the LGA. Several complaints are being lodged by farmers along Atosin/Owena roads. Boundary disputes between Idanre and Akure South LGAs over Olokuta, Aponmu Lona, Ala Elefosan and Itaolorun needs quick intervention of government.

Akure South LGA

The boundary dispute between Akure and Idanre is yet to be resolved. Also the dethroned Deji of Akure Oba Adepoju Adesina who was dethroned because of an allegation bordering on assault, challenged his removal by instituting a case in the court which is still pending in court. Armed robbery attack in some areas and communities within Akure is now rampant.

Irele LGA

Kidnapping and armed robbery attack is the major conflict being experienced in the LGA. The abduction of His Royal Highness Oba Oyewunmi Abiodun, the Laragunsi of Ode-omi who was later released is one of the high profile attacks in the local government.

Akoko Northwest LGA

Herders' encroachment on farmlands has become a major conflict confronting the people of the local government area. Traditional rulers' intervention has reduced hostility between the farmers and the herdsmen. These interventions always lead to amicable resolution of crisis. There are land disputes among some communities in the Local Government such as: Arigidi versus Ogeye in Imo quarters, Ikaram versus Gedegede, Arigidi vs Ikare Akoko, Ikaram vs Imo quarters. Majority of these land disputes are pending in court.

Akoko South East LGA

Destruction of farmers' crops by herdsmen has been brewing conflict between the farmers and the herdsmen. This is always quelled by the traditional rulers and the security agencies. Clashes were recorded in Akoko Southeast LGA between Herders herdsmen, Isua and Sosan communities between the last quarter of 2013 and February, 2014. In March 2016, Herdsmen chopped off the hands of two men in Epinmi Akoko when the men were chasing out cattle from their farms.

Ese-Odo LGA

This is a riverine local government area. The major challenge facing the area is the activities of sea pirates.

Ilaje LGA

Restiveness in the LGA was the aftermath of Ijaw/Ilaje war. The youths that were predominantly fishermen left their occupation to embrace the new trend of violence. After the war, the politicians find them more useful in manipulating electrical process. Since the major occupation is fishing in the local government, sea pirate is the greatest obstacle. Many fishermen have had their engine stolen while some were killed in the past. But recently the Nigeria Navy has increase surveillance along the shoreline and within sea thereby forestalled the activities of the sea pirates.

Okitipupa LGA

Oba-ship tussle in Iju-Odo community and Okitipupa is the major reason for conflict in the local government area. The Okitipupa crisis has been settled by the Supreme Court, however the members of the community are not satisfied with the supreme court ruling as they refuse to give allegiance to the current Jegun of Idepe Kingdom. Another crisis in the LGA is armed robbery attacks.

Cultism

The activities of secret cult have been reduced to barest minimal in the state since the emergence of the Anti-Cultist Squad (a department in Nigeria Police Force). Their major habitations are Ondo and Owo town. The Anti-Cultist squad was formed on September 2014 as a result of the recklessness of secret cult group that led to loss of lives and property in the state.

Another issue that might led to youth unrest in the state is the refusal of the state Government to swear in the acclaimed winner of Joint Campus Committee (JCC) election. The acclaimed winner of the election was Comrade Atolusi Damilola Anthony, but the state Government sworn in another candidate, Comrade Falegan Samson. This action of the state Government is brewing crisis among the student union hierarchy.

Causes of Conflicts

The major causes of conflicts in the state as noted from the various LGAs are the illegal encroachment of the herdsmen on farmlands thereby destroying farm produce. One of the major reasons for this problem is the fact that the herdsmen now leave the duty of leading cattle to little children who usually leave the animals unchecked.

Another challenge that could trigger further crisis is the alleged involvement of the herders in various robbery attacks in the state. The former member, Ondo State House of Assembly, representing Akoko North West state constituency 1, Hon. Bansa, once moved a motion on the floor of the House to save the people of Akoko North West from constant armed robbery attacks from herders operating along Erusu-Ajowa-Akunnu to Kogi state boundary. The activities of these herders should be checked to avert an eruption of violent crisis.

It is evident from the accounts of the fieldwork in Ondo state so far that the major causes of conflict in the state have been largely borne out of: the ripple effects of land encroachments and transgressions of the herders on the farmlands – thereby destroying farm produce. The herders are accused of habitually leaving the responsibility of leading cattle to graze to younger herders, or, sometimes, even little children, who usually loosen the animals to roam freely and unchecked. It is paramount to address the activities of the cattle herders in order to avert the imminent trigger of even more severe violent conflicts in this state.

Conclusions

- (1) Community leaders should be encouraged to organise constant meetings with the herdsmen and farmers with representatives of security agents in attendance.
- (2) The leaders of the herdsmen in various communities should be made to control the activities of the herdsmen.
- (3) Ondo state remains one of the most peaceful states in Nigeria. Various mechanisms put in place by the state government and the National Orientation Agency's peace education led to the relative peace being experienced in the state. Meanwhile, the inconsistency in the payment of the salaries of the civil servants in the state poses a greater challenge in the relative peace being experienced in the state. Cases of the yahoo boys and ritual killers are another threat to the peace being enjoyed in the state.

- (4) Although there are minor conflicts experienced by the state, Ondo state can be counted among the relatively more peaceful states in Nigeria.
- (5) The state has comparatively been spared the conflicts of the scale or magnitude experienced in other parts of the country. For instance, as noted earlier in this section of the Report, perhaps the major conflict by far in Ondo state has been the incessant clashes between the farmers and the herders.
- (6) Other conflict issues, such as the chieftaincy or Oba-ship conflict, land disputes, criminality, and civil protests, are relatively low in the order of occurrence or intensity.

Recommendations

- (1) The state Government should, as a matter of urgency, set-up a Conflict Resolution Committee in all the 18 Local Government Areas of Ondo state, to address the herders-farmers' conflict. Such Committee should comprise the traditional rulers, representatives of the herders, the youths, security agencies, and relevant stakeholders. Chairmen of the respective Local Government Areas should head such Committees.
- (2) Sensitisation programs should be organised periodically to educate the youths on the benefits of peaceful coexistence in the communities. Such enlightenment programs would reduce incidences and frequencies of violence and conflict in all ramifications.
- (3) The state Government should create employment opportunities for the teeming unemployed youths in the state, as youth empowerment through entrepreneurial re-orientation, among others, are key to sustainable peace in any human community.

administration of the old Western Region, Nigeria since the days of the British colonial rule. Other notable cities and towns in Oyo state include Oyo, Ogbomoso, Iseyin, Kisi, Okeho, Saki, Eruwa, Lanlate, Sepeteri, Iloro, Awe, Ilero, Igbeti, Igboho and Igbo-Ora.

Oyo state is the biggest state in southwest Nigeria in terms of land mass. It covers a total land area of about 28,454 km². Its estimated population of 6,617,720, according to the 2006 Nigerian population census figure, makes the state the most populous in the South-West, after Lagos state. Oyo state is bounded in the south by Ogun state, and in the north by Kwara state. The western limit is bounded by Ogun state and the Republic of Benin, while the eastern border adjoins Osun state. The state was established in 1976 and it originally included Osun state, until the latter was created as a separate state in 1991. The people of Oyo state are generally divided into five broad groups, which are: Ibadan, Ibarapa, Oyo, Oke-Ogun and Ogbomoso. There are 33 local government areas (LGAs) in the state, and the capital city is Ibadan.

This report was based on a fieldwork conducted in Oyo state between 10 and 18 August, 2016. Data were obtained through techniques of observation, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and a guiding, standard structured survey questionnaire. Informants and respondents were purposively selected from two communities: Ibadan, the capital of the state, and Iseyin, a major town in the Northern part of the state. *Iseyin* is a major town in the Oke-Ogun area where herdsmen/farmers conflict had been rife. Respondents to the survey questionnaires were drawn mainly from postgraduate students of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan; while some questionnaires were distributed among the civil servants who represented different communities that make up the state. Seven FGDs were conducted and each session had involved between six and twenty-five participants.

Findings in Oyo State

Oyo state can be generally described as a relatively stable state but for the herders-farmers conflict that is prevalent in the Oke-Ogun and Ibarapa areas of the state. The Herders/Farmers Conflict was identified by nearly all informants, FGDs participants, and questionnaire respondents as the major security challenge in the state. The most affected areas were *Shaki*, *Iseyin*, *Eruwa*, *Igboora*, *Lanlate*, *Igangan* and other remote settlements in *Oke-Ogun* and *Ibarapa* areas of Oyo state. A visit to farm settlements (Akaje, Arowomole, Ajibija, Mogaji, Arowomole II, and Olomodudu) in Iseyin confirmed the vast devastation caused by cattle-rearing. Other notable conflicts are related to cult violence perpetrated by students around *Agbowo* and *Orogun* areas of Ibadan, gang violence among “*Omo-oniles* – “who (reportedly) extort money from people under the guise of collecting “*isakole*” (land rent), curiously again, allegedly on behalf of the *Alaafin of Oyo*, a revered traditional ruler in the South-West region of Nigeria; encounters between miners and host communities; and a recent altercation between organised labour and the Government of Oyo state. Interestingly, few mentions are made of the violence among members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). The

preponderance of opinions suggested that the NURTW violence has, however, subsided across the state.

There were no clear demographic indicators for actors in the different conflicts in Oyo state, although it was generally believed that most instances of conflicts were instigated by men. There was, however, the clear case of herders-farmers conflict – which involved the herders and the Yoruba farmers. Generally, actors of conflicts are designated and identified by the nomenclature of the particular conflicts.

Most of the conflicts identified are economic in nature. Except for the cult-related violence among students, other conflicts tended to have stemmed from competition for scarce resources. The herders-farmers conflict, which was the most obvious example that was manifested in the field, pertained to encroachment on, or the violation of, an economic space. There were further suggestions of ethnicity and economic sabotage as additional triggers. For instance, the Yoruba farmers in *Iseyin* claimed that the farmlands owned by the *Herders* were never grazed on by the herders. Furthermore, the conflict between the organised labour and the Oyo state Government was connected with the backlog of salaries owed workers in the state. Informants and FGDs participants claimed that the Government provoked the labour unions into taking confrontational measures at securing their livelihood.

There were a number of existing measures at resolving most of the conflicts mentioned during the study. The Nigerian Police was said to be the major institution that had been addressing the spate of violent conflicts among cult groups and local gangs in the state. In the case of the “*Omo-onile*” phenomenon, the *Alaafin of Oyo Kingdom* was widely acknowledged to have denounced them in the recent past. The Police also had been involved in settling matters for herders and farmers. Informants in *Iseyin* had suggested that the Police often compelled herders whose cattle destroyed farms to pay compensation to the affected farmers, and that herders usually returned to such farms to cause bigger devastation. According to a Key Informant, the herders often based their latter action on the fact of having already duly paid for the cost of crops destroyed in such farms. Sometimes, the informants alleged that the compensations paid by the herders, and meant for the victims, were often not completely handed out to the purported victims. Generally, the preponderance of opinion among informants in *Iseyin* was that the herders-farmers conflict would only be fully resolved when herders are completely separated from *Iseyin* and the entire Oke-Ogun landscape, or environment.

Informants decried the low-level of involvement of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the efforts to resolve conflicts in Oyo state. Many had complained that the civil society practically showed little commitment to intervention activities, unlike what is experienced or practiced in the other conflict-ridden states. It was further observed that women organisations were not too visible or forthcoming, generally, in conflict resolution activities.

All the conflicts mentioned in this study of Oyo state were considered as being disruptive of the social and economic order of the immediate and larger polity. In the most pertinent example, informants and FGD participants in *Iseyin* had described the impact of herdsman-farmers conflict as devastating on their economic activities and overall security. They explained how the conflict had led to low-level farming activities – a situation they claimed amounted to an abomination in which farmers now buy foodstuff, instead of primarily producing these. In many of the farm settlements visited during the fieldwork, it was obvious that the farmers had deserted the farmlands and relocated to the township. Apart from the economic threat to farmers, the conflict also impacted adversely on the erstwhile peaceful relationships and economic cooperation which the *Yoruba* ethnic group in Oke-Ogun area had traditionally maintained with the *Herders* of Ilorin extraction, who the informants claimed had had a long history of settling in the Oke-Ogun area. Most opinions on the herdsman-farmers conflict had also differentiated between the Herders *Bororo* and Herders *Ilorin*. According to informants, the conflict at inception was typically between the Herders *Bororo* and the Yoruba farmers. As expressed by the informants, it was only recently that some of the *Herders Ilorin* had become increasingly aggressive.

The decline in incidences of violent conflicts among members of the NURTW was generally attributed to the recent interventions by the current administration in Oyo state. Although most people appeared not to know exactly what the Oyo state Government has done in this regard, they believed that such measures have been quite effective and had expressed wishes that the periodic rampaging activities of the NURTW members be put under permanent check. Official sources emphasised the practice of continuous, proactive engagement with the NURTW members, awareness campaigns, collaboration with law enforcement agencies, and the provision of operational infrastructure to the Police as mechanisms to facilitate the stemming of the tide of violent conflicts among road transport workers. On the herders-farmers conflict, the Police and Community leaders were reported to have been relatively successful in curbing reprisal attacks. Government has also engaged with Stakeholders through Committees that comprised traditional rulers, herders, and the farmers. Recently too, the Oyo state Government had established what is called the “Health Post”, as a way of identifying cattle that are reared into the state. Government sources in Oyo state also emphasised the solutions that have been proffered in addressing the conflict between the state and organised labour. According to an informant, the state has become more transparent with her finances, such that the workers unions are necessarily communicated about the inflows and outflows of public funds.

The herders-farmers conflict has also lately taken the dimension of rape in Oyo state. Concerns about the safety of women on the farms were recurrent themes in the interviews and FGDs conducted at *Iseyin*. There were claims that Yoruba women who were alone on their farms often suffered rape in the hands of the herders, especially those of the *Bororo* extraction.

By far, this has represented a recent dimension to the conflict. There were few explanations on the rape phenomenon, but it was suggested that such act was aimed at humiliating the women and scaring them away from their farmlands. A culture of silence tended to have been developing around incidences of rape. Perhaps, due to the often associated stigma, victims in the research field were quite reticent or out-rightly unwilling to talk about their personal experiences. Rather, the typical response was often in a generalised manner.

Conclusions on Oyo State

A number of conclusions can be reached from this study. First, it was obvious that the experience of violent conflict was dominant in the *Ibarapa* and *Oke-Ogun* areas of Oyo state; and, second, that the herdsman-farmers conflict in the state appears to have received less than adequate attention, particularly, in terms of publicity and coverage. Third, the Government of Oyo state has been quite successful in handling the NURTW conflict, and there will be need to extend similar intervention mechanisms to other conflict domains, or flashpoints, in the state.

State of Osun (State of Living Spring)

Capital: Osogbo



Source: Nigerian Muse (2015): Maps of Various States and their Local Governments in Nigeria <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20100527092749zg/sections/pictures-maps-cartoons/maps-of-various-states-and-their-local-governments-in-nigeria/>

Background

The struggle for the creation of Osun began as early as 1950. At that time, the present senatorial districts namely Osun West, Central and part of Osun East were subordinated towns under the administration of Ibadan District Native Authority. In their determination to get independence, traditional rulers and citizens of Osun Area submitted a petition to the British Colonial Administration in Nigeria demanding autonomy for Osun Division, with Osogbo proposed as the headquarters.

To realise their aim, they pursued this agenda further in 1951, when a Commission of Inquiry was set up the colonialists, headed by H.L Butcher primarily saddled with

investigating the crisis in Ibadan District Native Authority between Chief Salami Agbaje and Olubadan-in-Council. At this commission, named H.L Butcher Commission of Inquiry, a representation was made by people of Osun Area reiterating their resolve for autonomy. This demand was granted on March 17th 1951, thus recommending autonomy for Osun District Towns on April 1st 1951. The resilience and doggedness of the founding fathers and crusaders for the creation of Osun was rewarded on August 27th 1991, when the administration of the then military General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida created nine states with Osun created out of Oyo state and Osogbo was made the capital. It was a dream fulfilled and hope achieved.

Osun emboldens the history of a people whose quest for freedom, self-actualisation, determination and hope for a better tomorrow fought and won the battle for its creation. It was a dream fulfilled and hope achieved. The state has a considerable number of highly urbanised settlements. Some of the major towns are Osogbo, Ile-Ife, Ilesa, Ikirun, Iwo, Ede, Ila-Orangun and Ikire. Others include: Ipetumodu, Ejigbo, Ilobu, Gbongan, Okuku, Inisa, Ijebu-Ijesa, Ipetu-Ijesha, Ifon-Osun, etc. (<http://www.nairaland.com/1898164/land-people-osun-history-facts>).

Findings in Osun State

(a) Highlights of Previous Security/Conflict issues

- (1) Ife-Modakeke Conflict.
- (2) Historical efforts were made by key actors, which included the Government of State of Osun, the former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Chief Olusegun Obasanjo) as well as groups and individuals, to curtail the inter-communal conflicts, and cultivate and sustain peace).
- (3) Ifon/Ilobu Conflict.
- (4) Oba-Oke/Oba-Isale Chieftaincy tussle.
- (5) State of Osun also recorded skirmishes over land-ownership and boundary conflicts in some parts of the state – which resulted in violence, the loss of lives and properties.

(b) Highlights of State and Ooni of Ife's Interventions

Government Interventions

- (1) However, the establishment of the Peace Committee for *Herders, Bororo* and the farmers in the state has helped to settle most of these issues.
- (2) They have local organisations that consist of memberships by representatives of the *Herders, Bororos, Monarchs* and the farmers in the state.
- (3) The local organisations meet weekly in their areas and also meet in Osogbo whenever issues arise.
- (4) They are very pleased with the current Governor on this initiative and have advised other states to do the same.

- (5) Governor Rauf Aregbesola and his wife had invited the *Herders* and *Bororo* community and their women to the Government House.
- (6) The Governor entertained them and subsequently announced the inauguration of the Committee on Peaceful Co-existence between *Herders/Bororo* and Farmers in the State of Osun – which was established in June 2014.
- (7) The Committee consists of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Youth Engagement (MAFSYE), All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN), Representatives of Women in Farming (RWF), the Chairman of *Herders* in the state, Chairman of *Bororos* in the state, and Ministry of Commerce and Empowerment (MCE).
- (8) That, the establishment of *Herders, Bororo* and Farmers Committee, at the Local Government level has helped communication and reduced crisis.
- (9) The Committee, which meets regularly, has handled over 5,000 cases and that has helped to sustain peace between farmers and the herders.
- (10) The Governor recently signed an Act that bars animals from roaming the streets in the State of Osun; Government is also presently taking stock of the population of *Herders* and their heads of cattle.
- (11) The Government also issued identity (ID) cards to all herders in the state.
- (12) The Governor also embarked on the '*Saturday Walk-to-live Project*'. Through this project, the Governor operated an open street-walk assembly where he and citizens with complaints and conflict issues had open-air discussions and dialogue on emerging critical issues that could degenerate into full-blown conflicts.

Ooni of Ife's Interventions

- (1) The new *Ooni of Ife* has deliberately put-in efforts to construct and consolidate lasting peace between the Ife and Modakeke Communities.
- (2) It should be added that Ife and Modakeke has been experiencing sustainable peace since the emergence of the present *Ooni of Ife*.
- (3) *Ooni's* policy of regularly personally visiting *Obas, Baales* and lower-ranked chiefs to cultivate, solicit and consolidate peaceful coexistence.
- (4) Ife and Modakeke are locations that can presently be considered as one of the most peaceful locations/areas/communities in the State of Osun and the South-West Geo-Political zone visited by the research team.

Profile of Intergroup Conflicts in the State of Osun

Herders-Farmers

- (1) Herdsmen are accused in the State of Osun of grazing their cattle on farm settlements and destroying both food and cash crops.
- (2) This has led to attacks between farmers and herders, following the former's efforts

- to stop the herders from further destroying their farmlands and crops therein.
- (3) Committee on Peaceful Co-existence of *Herders*, *Bororo* and farmers in the State of Osun has classified *herders* into three categories:
 - (i) The *Herders*,
 - (ii) The newly-settled *Bororo*,
 - (iii) The migrant *Bororos*.
 - (4) The *Herders* are perceived as being generally peaceful, land-owners and often married to locals.
 - (5) Rather, the *Bororos* are perceived as new settlers, who usually do not or hardly understand the local language, appear to be violent in countenance, and are further perceived as being rarely reasonable.
 - (6) The itinerant or migrant *Bororos* are perceived to be dangerous and emotionally erratic.
 - (7) *Herders* do not understand the language of the *Bororos* – who, by origin, are mostly from the neighboring countries.

Narratives by the Research Participants or Respondents

The South-West team had met with the head of the *herders* in the company of his chiefs and followers in *Iwo* town, and made the following findings:

- (1) That, the *Herders* have been in the State of Osun for a long time and abide by the rules of the land and have no problems with their hosts.
- (2) That, they always comply with their hosts' directives to dwell on unused farmlands.
- (3) That, the herders that mostly graze on the Farmers' crops were the itinerant *Bororos* who generally graze across Southern Nigeria.
- (4) That, some of these itinerant *Bororos* continue to cause conflict between farmers and the *Herders*.
- (5) That, farmers have the tendency to exaggerate the volume and quantum of crops destroyed.
- (6) That, the farmers often demanded outrageous compensation whenever their crops were destroyed.
- (7) That, farmers always resolve to call for eviction of the herders, on grounds that the herders settled on the hosts' lands without proper notification.
- (8) That, farmers have the tendency to deny the herders and their cattle access to water.
- (9) That, some of these herders have settled in their present locations for several years.

The Hijab Dispute between the Muslim Community and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)

Background to the Hijab Dispute

- (1) On February 2013, the Muslim Community filed a case in court against Osun state government and Principals seeking to allow the use of hijab in public schools of State of Osun.
- (2) CAN subsequently filed an injunction to enable it to be joined as a party in the case.
- (3) The case dragged in court for close to 3 years.
- (4) By 3 June, 2016, a judgment was made in favor of the Muslim Community.
- (5) The CAN organised protests against the judgment and instructed Christian students to wear Christian garments/costumes to school.
- (6) The CAN had later appealed against this judgment in the Court (of Appeal) at Akure, Ondo state.
- (7) It is important to state here that the Government of the State of Osun did not appeal the judgment.
- (8) The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) followed up its appeal at the Court of Appeal in Akure, with street agitations and peaceful protests.
- (9) CAN encouraged Christian students to wear garments/costumes to school.
- (10) However, those who did were reported to have been suspended by the Schools authorities.

(a) Key Actors Encountered During the Field Research on the Hijab Dispute

- (1) Key actors encountered during the research on these conflicts were Muslim and Christian representatives.
- (2) In-depth interviews were also conducted on this issue with representatives of the Security agencies.
- (3) Media reports on the hijab dispute between the Muslim Community and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) have tended to be presented in legal and religious terms.
- (4) Our research findings, however, point to some low-level political manipulation of this conflict by various political gladiators in the state.

The South-West team's primary findings showed that, while there were genuine concerns by both groups in the conflict, the conflict can be explained in two opposing ways, as follows:

Osun State Christian Association of Nigeria (OSCAN)

- (1) First the Christian groups saw the phenomenology of the court ruling on the hijab as a formal encroachment into former Christian Missionary Schools by the Islamic faith.

- (2) That the Hijab problem began four years ago, when the state government started the Classification and Merger of Schools program.
- (3) OSCAN holds that these schools established by Christian missionaries and taken over by the government still belong to them.
- (4) That the faith, beliefs and heritage of the missionary schools are being eroded by the reclassification process.
- (5) That, the reclassification process amounts to moves to eradicate and eliminate their Christian mission.
- (6) That, by so doing, the Government has a hidden agenda to Islamise such schools.
- (7) That, otherwise, why is the government asking missionary schools to take loan from SUKKUK, an Islamic Bank, which imposes Islamic conditions before such loans are released to recipients?
- (8) OSCAN views the Judge (Justice Saka Falola) as a fanatical Muslim.
- (9) According to OSCAN the judgment gave rights to propagate an Islamic mission and agenda by its legalising the hijab.
- (10) OSCAN believed that the Judge made a biased judgment by instructing students to wear hijab.
- (11) OSCAN submitted that the initial suit filed by the Muslim Society did not seek for the legalisation of the hijab as contained in the Court ruling.
- (12) OSCAN filed for a stay of execution at the High Court but later withdrew it because they did not have faith in the Judge.
- (13) OSCAN representatives also held the view that the hijab represented a form of Islamic Jihad against Christianity, Christian values and all that the Christian missionary schools stood for in the past.

Muslim Stand on the Hijab in the State of Osun

- (1) The Muslim presented a completely contrary view.
- (2) That, prior to Prince Oyinlola becoming Governor, public school students were not allowed to wear hijab to school.
- (3) That, in 2004, however, Prince Oyinlola had published guidelines on administration and disciplines in public school – part of which says the use of Hijab is allowed in Muslim public schools but not compulsory and should not be allowed in other schools.
- (4) The Muslim Community holds that such position was unfair and complained to the government.
- (5) The then Government of Prince Oyinlola promised to address the matter but failed to do so until Governor Rauf Aregbesola came into government in 2010.
- (6) Muslim Students Society of Nigeria complained to the government that students were punished for wearing Hijab and wrote a letter in 2012 to the government seeking for approval to allow the use of *hijab* in all public schools.

- (7) The Government did not respond to the letter.
- (8) The Muslim Community subsequently directed students to wear hijab to school - which was resisted by teachers.
- (9) Several unsuccessful meetings were held until the Muslim community filed a case in Court in February 2013.
- (10) The Muslim Community had directed students to wear hijab to school.
- (11) Several meetings also were held, all to no fruitful result.
- (12) In February 2013, the Muslim community then filed a case in court against the state Government and school principals.
- (13) The Legal Counsel to the Muslims had posited that, as a secular Nation, Nigeria recognises that citizens are entitled to their belief and freedom to practice their religion.
- (14) That, hijab is part of Islamic attire and is stated in the Quran and the Hadith.
- (15) That Muslims are directed by their Creator to act in particular moral/religious ways and the hijab is one of such injunctions.
- (16) Their position is that given that these schools are also funded by government, every Muslim student and child has a right to wear the hijab because the hijab is also mandatory for every Muslim faithful.
- (17) Muslim representatives also tended to argue that the hijab is restricted to only Muslim Faithfuls and does not in any way affect non-Muslims.

Conclusions

Salient Issues Brought Out at the FGDs on the Hijab Dispute in the State of Osun

- (1) The hijab dispute is an under-belly issue and should be handled with great care and sensitivity in order to avoid escalation.
- (2) The official stand by both Government and the two parties to take and pursue an absolutely legal option on the Hijab dispute do not stand the chance of bringing about a lasting peace in the State of Osun.
- (3) The pursuant of the legal option should be complemented by encouraging other human-driven options by encouraging round-table dialogue and compromises on the part of the parties in the conflict.
- (4) Other human security-driven options should also be put in place to help check likelihood of political manipulation and intrigues by political agents, political gladiators, overzealous religious entrepreneurs who may want to use the Hijab dispute to advance political agendas and selfish ends.

SECTION FOUR

Causes and Analysis of Conflict

4.1 Conflict Structures

The following snapshots of pertinent field-based information about the South-West are provided under these sub-heads, as listed hereunder.

Security

The overall perception of the causation of conflicts, but from the perspective of purely security attribution, was generally manifested only in the findings on 4 (four) states of the larger South-West zone; and, these were Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, and Osun, respectively. In those particular states, specific security-related drivers of conflict, or outright security breaches, were exceptionally reported by the field respondents and participants in the various focus group discussions (FGDs) across our assigned Study zone. There were specific mentions of some uncharitable role behavior and practical public conduct of some bad elements of the Nigeria Police, in particular, involving various incidences of the extortion of money, the collection of commission fees, the occasional but clearly illicit invasion/looting of social markets, alleged connivance to unfairly shield the perceived criminals and harass, displace, or forcibly evict residents from the communities, etc. The latter forms of behavior were decried or condemned out-rightly and conclusively interpreted as having amounted to “accessories” to the surreptitious perpetration of community violence, or the aiding and abetting of crimes – whether by acts of omission or commission on the part of the accused security personnel.

Political

- (1) The remote origin of conflicts and their dynamics and analysis in Ekiti state are actually originally and structurally traceable to the creation of this state, as some of the conflicts that have existed between the settlers and indigenes of this state, both before and during the subsequent additional creation of states in Nigeria, have somehow also persisted in Ekiti state, till date.
- (2) The disclosure in the Lagos state SCA about the perceived neglect of Nigerian youths by Government. Those who participated in the FGDs had lamented that the youth and young people in Lagos are not happy in this regard with the Government and the governance of Lagos state.
- (3) In Ogun state, a multiplicity of factors has also been adduced as causal factors of the occurrences of conflict. These are: inadequate population statistics, which has often tended to hamper both the Government and private citizens from achieving the benefits of strategic public and organisational planning – hence, the concomitant negative impact on the development of infrastructure, with additional

unfavourable effects on necessary resource management and control.

- (4) In Ogun state, the same adversity as mentioned above has been fingered as a contributing factor for the aggravation and sustenance of militancy being witnessed in the Communities. In more specific terms, fiscal policies and practices that currently center around oil and gas resources gotten from a certain sector of the country – which sector is generally perceived to be often neglected development-wise, are held accountable for the attendant frustrations and resultant out-migration of the militants (e.g. “*Ijaw boys*”) to other conducive locations in the country, like *Ibafo*, where they perpetrate their criminal activities.
- (5) In the same vein, another political attribution for the occurrences of conflict in Ogun state has been the nature of the unitary system of Government in Nigeria – which is not perceived to be working for the people. Respondents had argued that this system of channeling resources to the nation’s Centre, and the corruption associated with these resources, have caused politics to be attractive. In addition, there is the perception that governance has generally not often carried the Local Government Areas along, or involved them, in the formulation of its policies; including, that, even the traditional rulers are restricted in the control and latitude of their jurisdictional authority.
- (6) In Ondo state, like the other South-West states, the political causes of conflict have been largely borne out of an inter-play of factors. For example, the people from the coastal area of Ondo state, Ese-Odo and Ilaje Local Government Areas had recently protested the nominee for the Niger Delta Development Commission (NNDC) representative in Ondo state, Ms Tokunbo Ajasin, who hails from Owo Local Government Area of the state. The agitation was predicated on the ground that a non-Ilaje person from another Local Government Area should not be appointed as the political representative of Ondo state on the NNDC Board, because of the feeling that the position should be the exclusive preserve of the people that are physically or territorially located in the oil-producing area of the state.
- (7) Another political dimension of conflicts in Ondo state has involved *Oba-ship* tussles in isolated places, such as the dethroned *Deji of Akure*, Oba Adepoju Adesina, who challenged his removal in court – and was still pending as at the duration of the zone’s SCA. Also, there was reported conflict in the Igburowo Community of Ondo state, between the Oba of the Community and the people of the Community. The Oba was chased out of the Community by the youths of the same community. In Owo Local Government Area, there was Oba-ship tussle at Ipele in 2015. That conflict is yet to be resolved.
- (8) In Oyo state, other notable conflicts are found to be related to Cult violence perpetrated by students around *Aghowo* and *Orogun* areas of Ibadan, gang violence among “*Omo-oniles*” – who extort money from people under the guise of collecting “*isakole*” (land rent) allegedly on behalf of the *Alaafin of Oyo*, encounters between

miners and host communities. Further still, the latter-day conflicts between organised labour in Oyo state and the state Government was intricately connected with the backlog of salaries owed workers in the state. Informants and FGDs participants claimed that the Government provoked the labour unions into taking confrontational measures at securing their livelihood. Albeit being a clearly economic incident, this wage-driven conflict that is also directly attributed to the current financial distress of the state Government has extended the attributed causation of this kind of conflict to the political realm.

- (9) In the State of Osun, the conflict associated with the use of the Hijab had had obvious politico-social/religious causation and connotations. Other than the foregoing mention, Ife-Modakeke Conflict and similar other inter-communal conflicts, for example, between the Ifon/Ilogu Communities, and the Oba-Oke/Oba-Isale Chieftaincy tussles as well as the occurrences of skirmishes as reported over land ownership and boundary conflicts in some parts of the State of Osun – which variously resulted in violence, loss of lives and properties – also had fundamental political causation and undertones.

Economic

- (1) The most prominent violent conflict incidents in Ekiti state in 2016 have been those relating to the herders-farmers Conflict, as well as the perceived invasion of the state by the Hausa-herders in the specific situations at Ido Orin, Ifaki, and Ikole – again, largely a function of economic determinism and the natural human craving for economic survival.
- (2) Rather, the “*Omo-onile*” crisis in Lagos state has been such a major conflict in the *Oke-Ira* Community, to the extent that the *Obodo* and the *Fasakin* families continue to fight for supremacy. This contributes to the prevailing high level of crime and criminality in some communities in Lagos state. In Ajah, 30-40 percent of the so-called *Omo-oniles* are said not to have come from Ajah; prompting worried participants/respondents to have asked the question: where are the *Omo-oniles* from? Thus, as the *Omo-oniles* continue to threaten people and law-abiding citizens who legitimately buy and acquire land to build their homes in Ajah and other parts of Lagos, participants posited that Government should do something to curb and stop the activities of the *Omo-oniles*.
- (3) The Ogun state SCA had confirmed the prevalence of a high level of unemployment in the state; and, the respondent sample’s perception that, regardless of community efforts, the Government seemed to have been inattentive to the yearnings and economic demands of the populace. In more specific terms, the Ogun state SCA had revealed that, since October 2015, *Ibafé* and its neighboring communities have not had electricity power distribution and supply – which has consequently also negatively impacted on the business opportunities and practices in the area as well as led to the high rate of crime.

- (4) Further, in Ogun state, residents complained about the dearth of empirical population statistics, with the consequent outcomes that have rendered both the Government and private citizens being unable to plan adequately for the economic development futures of areas of the state. Hence, as revealed in the state's SCA, this handicap has also continued to have negative impact on the development of infrastructure and greatly affected wider resource management and control. The ramifications of the foregoing have been adduced as some of the contributing structural factors in the aggravation and sustenance of militancy being witnessed in the Community.
- (5) In Ondo state, selected geographical areas, including *Akoko Northeast*, *Akoko Northwest*, *Akoko South-East*, and *Akure North* Local Government Areas, have witnessed incessant conflicts between the farmers and the herders. The conflicts were also generally conceptualised by the South-West SCA team as an interaction between cattle herders and the crop farmers. Besides, there have been several reported cases of rape and brutality perpetrated by the cattle herders in the same areas. The causes of these conflicts were traced largely to the destruction of crops and other farm produce by the cattle of the herders that regularly and habitually transgressed on the farms of the local farmers. Several clashes were recorded between the cattle herders and crop farmers in *Akunnu-Akoko*, *Ikakumo-Akoko*, *Ise-Akoko*, *Iboropa-Akoko*, and *Oke-Agbe* within the *Ikare-Akoko*.
- (6) In the same vein, most of the conflicts as manifested in the Oyo state SCA were primarily economic in nature – again, basically also underscoring the variable of economic determinism as a major accounting factor in the general reckoning of the causes and rendering of the analysis of conflicts. For instance, other than the cult-related violence and conflicts among the student groups in Oyo state, other conflicts tended to have stemmed from competition for scarce resources.
- (7) In the State of Osun, apparently the purely economic causation of conflicts had been attributed to the conflictual problem of the herders-farmers – in which case the herders are accused of grazing their cattle on farm settlements and destroying both the food and cash crops. This has often led to attacks between the farmers and herders, following the former's efforts to stop the herders from further destruction of their farmlands and the crops therein.

Social

- (1) In Ekiti state, psycho-sociological background explanation was advanced for the comparatively low frequencies of conflicts that ever escalated to full-blown communal violence in the state. *Inter alia*, in this Report, the *Ekitis* have been described as a homogeneous people, and which homogeneity also inherently generates useful social capital for the necessary management, mitigation and resolution of conflicts among the component communities of the state.

- (2) The fact that traditional institutions are reported to be revered in Ekiti state is also remarkable. However, there remain occurrences of supremacy conflicts and disputes between the *Olukere* and the *Ogoga* in *Ikere-Ekiti* – which has persisted, but are reported not to have escalated into communal clashes and violence.
- (3) The political disconnect of the ruling party in Ekiti state from the ruling party at the federal level was not found to have exerted any serious conflict-related adverse impact on the political climate in the state.
- (4) Incidences of sheer thuggery have continued to occur in the state, and it is generally believed that the NURTW/RTEAN Crisis in Ekiti state was politically motivated – as these labour union groups have become easy tools in the hands of the politicians. But, the elections and allied activities in the neighboring Ondo state were also found to have not generated any spillover effects in Ekiti state.
- (5) Similarly, ethnic crisis between Ekiti indigenes and other ethnic groups that are settled in the state was not common – as both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic (communal) conflicts appeared to have had minimal occurrence in Ekiti state. But, by and large, although this state has been having what can be termed as political tension, the scenarios on ground have shown no serious translation of this tension into widespread violence, or any outbursts of hostilities among the Civil groups or Communities.
- (6) For Lagos state, there were reports of *bullying* and *harassment* by the “*Omo-Oniles*” and this is perceived as getting out of control; also, the people who have tried to make peace in the communities, through some means of advocacy or the provision of useful information, are eliminated in one way or the other. Further, findings in Lagos state revealed that the issue of *Cultism* is also considered as threatening to the larger Lagos state society; and, as a big problem in the Ikorodu area of the state where the “Ayé” and “Eiye” Confraternities were reported to have clashed in the “Agric” area of Ikorodu; as well as the related perception that cultists are being used by politicians for sheer political ends.
- (7) Still on Lagos state, the menace of the “*Area Boys*” (as a social phenomenon) – an organised group of youths, especially in the Mushin and Ijora-Badiya areas of Lagos, often killed and maimed innocent people. These groups have been fighting over the control of the drugs and commercial markets, especially in the Mushin area – a commercial transport motor hub; further suggesting additional attribution linkages with economic causality. By the state’s SCA accounts, within the first quarter of 2016, several people were killed in the Mushin area before a temporary closure of the area’s market.
- (8) Besides, another social variant of the Lagos state typology of Conflicts has been the *Ethnic-based Conflict*: which involved the Yoruba and Hausa-herders ethnics in the Mile 12 Market. This problem occasionally flared up and do intermittently constitute a threat to peace and intergroup relations in Lagos state. Participants

suggested that Government should address the Mile 12 Market problem before it snowballs into a serious problem. Also added to this are the reported occurrences of leadership tussle among the Hausa-herders community in Lagos state – which problem has occasionally tended to degenerate into outright conflict and violence.

- (9) In Ogun state, other associated collateral conflicts, reportedly master-minded by the '*Ijaw boys*', included kidnapping of women and young girls; sexual violence and rape against women and girls; trespassing and the forceful occupation of homes and residential quarters; molestation and harassment of residents, e.g. as reported at *Ibafé*; the displacement and forced out-migration of residents; as well as the alleged use of thugs by the police to loot, e.g. again, at the *Ibafé* Market. Other challenges considered to be inherently threatening to enduring social peace and the general quality of life (or living) in the state involved the general dearth of necessary social infrastructure, including the absence of public schools, hospitals, electricity, and overhead bridge across the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway – which separates *Ibafé* Town into two halves.
- (10) For Ondo state, the social dimensions of the causation of conflicts include: issues of chieftaincy tussles, social protests, sheer criminality, etc. However, whereas there were reported incidences of *Oba-ship* tussles in isolated places, it was found that these had not resulted in extended violent conflicts in the state in the recent times. For example, the dethroned *Deji of Akure*, Oba Adepoju Adesina, had challenged his removal in court – which litigation process was still pending as at the proceedings of the South-West SCA. Besides, the reported conflict in the Igburowo Community between the *Oba* of the Community and the people of the Community was another case in point in this regard. The *Oba* was actually chased out of the Community by the youths of the same community. Similarly, in the Owo Local Government Area, there was an occurrence of *Oba-ship* tussle at Ipele in 2015 – which conflict was also yet to be resolved by the timing of the state's SCA.
- (11) Still on the socially-derived protests in Ondo state, the people from the coastal territories of Ondo state, *viz*: the Ese-Odo and Ilaje Local Government Areas, had recently in 2016 protested the nominee for the Niger Delta Development Commission (NNDC) representative in Ondo state, Mr Tokunbo Ajasin, who hails from Owo Local Government Area of the state. The agitation was purportedly predicated on the grounds that a *non-Ilaje* person from another Local Government Area of the same state should not have been appointed as the representative of Ondo state on the NNDC Board – because of the feeling that the position should be the exclusive preserve of the people that are geographically and singularly located in the oil-producing area of the state. And, further, on the social derivatives of the occurrences of conflict in Ondo state, the issue of criminality was also manifested. There were reported notable high frequencies of armed robbery incidents, especially on the Ifon Road in the Owo Local Government Area. The

incessant operation of armed robbers in the area had reportedly led to the death of some policemen recently. In specific terms, Odigbo Local Government Area (LGA) has reportedly also faced the challenge of armed (violent) robbery. This LGA is typically densely populated and the locational gateway to the Eastern states of Nigeria – which, therefore, regularly attracts migration or demographic inflow from the different remote and adjoining states to *Ore Town*.

- (12) For Oyo state, the other notable Conflicts are related to Cult violence perpetrated by students around the *Agbowo* and *Orogun* population settlement areas of Ibadan; as well as gang violence among the “*Omo-oniles*” – “who (reportedly) regularly extort money from people under the guise of collecting “*isakole*” (land rent), but curiously again, allegedly on behalf of the *Alaafin of Oyo, a revered traditional ruler in the South-West region of Nigeria* (who would never condone such social criminality, and is on public record to have vehemently condemned and outlawed such a social vice).
- (13) Finally, on this variable as manifested in the State of Osun, perhaps the two prominent social variants of the causes of conflict in this state had comprised: the hijab dispute – which seriously pitted the Muslim community against the Pentecostal mission of the Christian community.

4.2 Conflict Actors and Interests

- (1) In Ekiti state, the identifiable Conflict Actors generally encompassed the following: the herders-farmers conflict; the Hausa-herders settlers in selected areas of the state; the political elite in the state who regularly mobilise support for their self-interested political causes and adventures; various youthful groups that are often used literally as cannon fodders in the unfortunate conflagration or perpetration of intergroup violence and communal conflicts; political thugs and adversarial labour union splinter groups, e.g. elements from within the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), and the Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (RTEAN); some traditional rulers that tended to propagate supremacy conflicts and disputes, etc.
- (2) Nevertheless, various institutions for the resolution and management of conflicts also exist in Ekiti state, such as *security agencies*, and *the Judiciary*; hence, also as conflict actors, but in a positive or more constructive sense, *the traditional institutions*, *the security agencies* – including the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and *the Judiciary* remain veritable socio-cultural and political institutions that contribute to the strengthening of existing, albeit still developing, social-structural machineries that are meant to drive the wider normative peace process in Nigeria.
- (3) In the Lagos state SCA, the principal Conflict Actors are summarised to comprise the following categories of people: Oil-bunkers, pipeline vandals, kidnappers, militants, land-grabbers (in the typical characterisation and action-tendencies of “*Omo-oniles*”); unscrupulous landlords, who illegally build shallow oil wells

(pumping machines and boreholes) to scoop diesel from NNPC pipelines; while, also in Lagos state, the next category of key actors was security operatives, especially the Nigeria Police. Finally, In the general sense, the Sheer Drivers of Anti-Social Activities that often ramify into intergroup and communal conflicts are hereby also included as being among *Conflict Actors* – e.g. persons in this infamous category (are inclusive of affluent owners of Cattle heads, who are also suspected as being the very financiers of the sophisticated weapons that are regularly used by herders), and which the South-West SCA team has described in earlier mentions in this Report as “*Entrepreneurs of Conflict*”!

- (4) Furthermore, arising from the Ogun state SCA, the findings in respect of the Conflict Actors were that, in as much as fiscal policies in the Nigerian Federation have tended to centre around the crude oil and gas resources that are gotten from certain regional areas of the country – while those regional sectors are hardly additionally developed or taken good care of – the attendant frustrations and harsh, impoverished environments often triggered out-migration of the militant “*Ijaw boys*” to seemingly softer and more conducive locations, like Ibafo, in their bid to continue to perpetrate their criminal activities. Other trigger issues and actors in Ogun state include Chieftaincy tussle; *Omo-Oniles*; Eru-Iku; Tobalase, Tokunbo Drivers/Cartels; herders-farmers conflict; Inter and Intra Party Rivalry; Entrepreneur Land Grabbers; and Road Traffic Unions/Okada Riders Tussle.
- (5) Also, it is evident from the accounts of the fieldwork in the Ondo state SCA that the major causes of conflict in the state have been borne out of the ripple effects of land encroachments and transgressions of the cattle herders on the farmlands – thereby destroying farm produce. The cattle herders are accused of habitually leaving the responsibility of leading cattle to graze to younger people, or even little children, who usually loosen the animals to roam freely and unchecked.
- (6) In Ondo state, encroachments upon the local farmlands by the herders were responsible for the civil clashes between the former and the local Crop farmers. For example, in 2013 and 2015, herders and the *Isua* and *Sosan* Communities in Ondo state had also clashed over encroachment on the farmlands.
- (7) Again, in the Oyo state SCA, although there were no clear demographic indicators for actors in the different conflicts, it was generally believed that most instances of conflicts therein were instigated or perpetrated by the men, or the male actors. There was, however, the clear case of the herders-farmers conflict, which involved the herders and the Yoruba farmers. Generally, actors of the various conflicts had tended to be designated and identified by the nomenclature of the particular conflict.
- (8) Then, in the State of Osun, scenarios in the state had generally portrayed the composition of major Conflict Actors as follows: the various civil communities and political groups that had been involved in long-drawn intergroup and communal conflicts, including the *Ife-Modakeke* bloody conflicts; the herders (inclusive of

the *Herders* and *Bororo* variants) versus the local farmers; representatives of the Christian and Muslim communities as well as their affiliated Religious Associations, e.g. the Osun state Christian Association of Nigeria (OSCAN), and representatives of the Muslim Community, including the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN).

4.2.1 Peace Agenda (including Capacities and Incentives)

- (1) The crafting and effective driving of an enduring and sustainable peace agenda represents the required potent antidote for the holistic propagation and robust acculturation of peace-based values that engender reciprocal social empathy and intergroup/communal co-existence among the complex diversities of, not only the South-West Zone, but across the unified geopolitics of Nigeria. Thus, the recent establishment of the *Peace Committee for Herders, Bororo and the Crop Farmers in the State of Osun* is considered highly commendable and deserving of emulation and constructive replication across the entire geopolitical landscape of Nigeria. With the emergence of the present Government in the state, the policy of strategic intergroup dialogue was made as the cornerstone of peacebuilding across the state by the Governor.
- (2) This singular governance action in the State of Osun, as an illustrative example, has helped to settle most of these long-drawn and emergent conflict-laden issues that have been identified in the South-West Zonal SCA. The operationalisation of this peacebuilding agenda through an inclusive Committee System is appreciable, especially as this Committee is also functionally disaggregated into the local (grassroots) organisations that primarily consist of memberships by the representatives of the *Herders, Bororo*, the Monarchs and Crop farmers, etc. in the state, as critical stakeholders. These local organisations meet on weekly basis in their areas and also meet in Osogbo – the administrative seat of Government – whenever conflict-related issues arise.
- (3) Notably, the Committee also consists of officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Youth Engagement (MAFSYE), representatives of *All-Farmers Association of Nigeria* (AFAN), *Representatives of Women in Farming* (RWF), the Chairman of *herders* in the state, the Chairman of *Bororos* in the state, and officials of the Ministry of Commerce and Empowerment (MCE). It is further significant that the establishment of this Committee, at the Local Government level, has facilitated intergroup and community-wide communication as well as achieved the desired reduction of crises in the State of Osun. This Committee, which meets regularly, has handled well over 5,000 conflict-embedded cases, and which has immensely contributed to the sustenance of peace between the local Crop farmers and the Cattle herders. And, as part of the holistic agenda of robust peacebuilding, the state Governor has also recently signed into law an Act of the State House of Assembly that bars animals (including cattle) from roaming the

streets in the State of Osun; while Government is also presently auditing the stock of population of *Herders* and their heads of cattle, in addition to the Government issuing personalised identity (ID) cards to all cattle herders in the state.

- (4) The Governor of the State of Osun has also embarked on the '*Saturday Walk-to-live Project*'. Through this project the Governor operated an open street-walk assembly where he and citizens with complaints and conflict issues had open-air discussions and dialogue on emerging critical issues that could degenerate into full-blown conflicts.
- (5) Within the framework of the required synergies in favor of the catalysation of a formidable Peace Agenda, it is also noteworthy and commendable that the new (current) *Ooni of Ife* (His Imperial Majesty, *Oba Enitan Adeyeye Ogunwusi, Ojaja II*), has deliberately put-in efforts to construct and consolidate lasting peace between the Ife and Modakeke Communities. It should be added that Ife and Modakeke has been experiencing sustainable peace since the emergence of the present *Ooni of Ife*. The *Ooni's* policy of visiting *Obas, Baales* and lower-ranked Chiefs to cultivate, solicit and consolidate peaceful coexistence. Ife and Modakeke are locations that can be considered as one of the currently most peaceful locations/ areas/communities in both the State of Osun and the entire South-West Zone, as visited by the research team during the proceedings of the SCA.

SECTION FIVE

Impact of Conflict

5.1 Effects of Occurrences of Conflicts on Communities/Groups in the South-West States

The generality of respondents had precisely identified and graphically accounted for the occurrences of conflicts in the South-West communities as follows:

- (1) Violence and crises have resulted in the killings of innocent people and sudden deaths/the breakdown of law and order/the loss of lives and property.
- (2) The general experience of stagnant growth/the lack of development and resultant retarded development /development setbacks in the communities.
- (3) Devastation/destruction of infrastructural facilities and individual properties/the decimation of farmlands, blockage of access roads, etc.
- (4) The uproar and chaos that often accompany the onset of such conflicts.
- (5) Adverse (negative) impact on indigenous investment drives or endeavors/The disruption of economic activities/Low output/produce or acreage from the farmlands who had often been scared away from productive work on their farmlands.
- (6) Occurrences of such conflicts had often sent the wrong signals and conveyed the wrong social values to the community youths.
- (7) The attendant fear and psychological disturbance; especially, the fear of the herders.
- (8) The externality of projecting (or casting) the entire specific state (within the South-West zone) in bad light, contrary to the earlier positive perception of the state by the general public.

By the accounts of the South-West Zonal SCA, the perceived effects of various Intergroup/Community Conflicts on general social and communal relations were negative, but more specifically in the form of manifestations as follows:

- (1) The lack of physical or visible development.
- (2) Paralysis of the daily human activities of the populace, including desertion of the farmlands.
- (3) Resultant social disaffection, especially against the *Herders/Bororos*.
- (4) The forced restriction of social movements within the home, and which also tended to prevent reasonable sleep.

- (5) The mistrust, mutual suspicion, or the lack of trust that tended to block, or outrightly threaten, intergroup/community relations, and resulting in the polarisation of the Local Government Areas (LGAs) and Communities/Strained community relations/Chilling effect on ideal relations/Cold war, etc.
- (6) In another sense, such common experiences of Conflict had also often unified the Communities for concerted efforts towards tackling the root causes and challenges of intergroup or communal conflicts.
- (7) Low economic inter-activity between the adjoining communities/groups.
- (8) The expression of palpable psychological fear of the herders, especially for the intending or aspiring land speculators or buyers for settlement purposes.

SECTION SIX

Responses/Interventions

6.1 Track One: Government Response

On the perceived overall responses of Government (Federal, State and Local) to the various occurrences of conflict:

- (1) An insignificant proportion of respondents had reported that nothing specifically was perceived to have been done by Government.
- (2) State Governments and Local Governments are acknowledged to be reportedly responsible for the provision of security, and the maintenance of law and order. In the particular cases of land disputes, the local governments routinely hold meetings to resolve land disputes.
- (3) The brokering and/or facilitation of peace talks/meetings with stakeholders for peaceful settlement and peace reconciliation.
- (4) The enactment of appropriate public legislation forbidding indiscriminate and illegal mobility as well as timing of cattle movement by the herders, generally across the South-West states, including Ekiti, Osun, etc. in more specific terms.
- (5) The provision of security surveillance as well as purposive mounting of road blocks by the Government-aided security agencies (e.g. Nigeria Police, the Military, etc.).
- (6) Legislative arm of state Governments (States' Houses of Assembly) have often initiated public bills for the minimisation/control of conflicts as well as the specific management of conflicts.
- (7) The supply of relief materials as palliatives for the pangs of communal and intergroup conflicts.
- (8) It is also noteworthy and significant that some field respondents had further mentioned other latest avenues for the acknowledged intervention by Government as having included the latter financial bail-out of several distressed states (including the South-West) by the Federal Government – towards relief in the payment of outstanding arrears of the salaries of public servants.
- (9) In some other dimensions, security agencies have also often intervened in matters of conflict. For one thing, security agencies of Government have continued to propagate the message of enduring peace and the necessity to maintain the ideal climate of peace – across the communities/states/states, through facilitative meetings with the relevant/concerned stakeholders.

- (10) The specific things done in this regard by the security agencies include:
 - (a) Urgent intervention to curb the violence as well as particularly preach the message of peace and maintain peace at the local government areas/states;
 - (b) The mounting of emergency road blocks and stop-and-search regimes to track the illicit movement of arms and ammunition (dangerous weapons) across the respective states and Local Governments of the South-West;
 - (c) Specific efforts/services by security agents have involved situation reporting by the Department of State Security (DSS); protection of private and public (Government) properties in the affected communities by the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and exercise of general policing function by the Nigeria Police;
 - (d) Effecting the required arrests of the offending perpetrators of conflicts; and,
 - (e) Ultimate restoration of peace to the erstwhile conflict-driven communities/LGAs/states.
- (11) Among other groups, the National Orientation Agency (NOA) has also continued to embark on sensitisation and public enlightenment programs on conflict resolution and peace campaign/peaceful intergroup and/or community co-existence.
- (12) These groups have also increasingly promoted the available contemporary means of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as opposed to the longstanding, but, often tortuous civil litigation platforms.
- (13) Also, the youth groups (e.g. Muslim Students Society of Nigeria, or MSSN) have involved themselves in the broad sensitisation and enlightenment processes, with particular reference to youth enlightenment about appropriate social values and constructive youthful activism for wider environmental, states' and national development consciousness.

6.2 Track Two: Non-Government Response

- (1) Generally, at the non-Governmental level, the traditional institutions have also been active in the mitigation of conflict incidences. For example, findings from the zonal field have advanced the following specific impact of these institutions in this connection:
 - (a) The convening of peace meetings/talks with parties that are involved (e.g. the farmers and herders) towards resolution of prevailing conflicts and achievement of peaceful settlement as well as to necessarily call their subjects to order, as it were;

- (b) The periodic sensitisation programs, specifically by the traditional institutions, for the settlement/resolution of land disputes;
 - (c) The discharge of sheer mediation function or role;
 - (d) Usage of the news media to propagate and preach the benefits of peace, unity and reciprocal empathy and mutually beneficial co-existence.
- (2) Further, at the non-Governmental level, the religious institutions have also been performing as follows, through:
- (a) Continuous peace-making meetings and the propagation/preaching of the values of peace, love and unity, including through prayers;
 - (b) Specific preaching and enlightenment in the churches and evangelism against violence; and
 - (c) Facilitating the inclusive processes of mediation and settlement.
- (3) In another vein, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)/Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), etc. have also tended to perform the following subject-matter roles:
- (a) Mediating peace between warring or factional community/group leaderships;
 - (b) Community mobilisation and public enlightenment;
 - (c) Participation/attendance in the series of public hearings often undertaken by States Houses of Assembly, e.g. on the instrumentation and passage of bills (Acts of Parliament) meant for the creation of cattle ranches across the states;
 - (d) Promoting community dialogue; and
 - (e) Promoting an enduring culture of peace, e.g. by the “Peace Corps of Nigeria”.

6.3 Track Three: International Organisations

- (1) Selected other regional and/or cross-national organisations, like the *Myetti Allah Cattle Breeders/Rearers’ Association*, are reported to have also always attended or participated in Community-led and Government-initiated reconciliation meetings in favour of the mitigation of civil/political conflicts and the attendant violence.
- (2) Further in this regard, the multilateral development assistance and support of agencies of the United Nations, like the UNDP to the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria towards the required continuous building and strengthening of existing institutional capacities – in favor of the necessary longitudinal acculturation of tenets of democratic governance – was additionally acknowledged by some of the more enlightened and cosmopolitan field respondents from the South-West zone.

SECTION SEVEN

Conclusions

7.1 Gaps in the Literature

While appreciating that the extant literature, to date, has depicted various gaps and deficits of empirical data and information on the inclusive dimensions of the conflict phenomenon, especially as applicable to the Nigerian circumstances as a developing nation and an emerging political democracy and model in the African continent. Such gaps and deficits have been manifested in earlier seminal works on the subject-matter, either individually by political scientists and governance experts, or also through the initiatives of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR); for example, as accounted in the 2002 Consolidated Report of the Strategic Conflict Assessment (see Federal Government of Nigeria, October 2002). The identified gap and deficit issues were related to: security sector reforms, particularly pertaining to the Nigeria Police and the nation's Judiciary; imperatives of the mechanisms for conflict predictability (or proactive forecasts) and early warning and sensitisation; the equally-required human capacity-building in the methodology of conflict analysis; the development of competencies on the rigorous and precise audit of the aggregate impact of incidences of conflict; the control and management of public information about conflicts, including responsible journalism and appropriate media roles; the functional integration of the totality of key conflict actors; the obvious gender imbalance in both the aggregation and analysis of information on the multidimensional variables of the phenomenon of conflict; etc.

However, the findings and outcomes of the South-West SCA have provided objective and credible grounds for a relatively improved understanding of the afore-mentioned gap issues – as some of these issues, especially the gender nexus – are being increasingly better advanced and comprehended also as critical components of the multi-faceted subject-matter of conflicts in such a complex, heterogeneous socio-political structure as the Nigerian nation.

7.2 Gaps in Responses/Impact

Similarly, on this sub-set of information presentation in this Report, the erstwhile gaps in the responses to the phenomenon of conflict also appear to be gradually reducing and closing up – in the sense of being gradually breached. For one thing, and as just previously elaborated in Section Six above, it is appreciable that the various roles of Government, public security agencies, Non-Governmental Organisations, and various other civil society organisations (CSO) have been perceived from the South-West SCA as necessarily complementary to the roles of the multilateral and international development agencies. The additional fact that the clamor for the promotion of synergies of efforts, by these various organisations and groups was also advanced in the South-West fields, is an indication of the beginnings of gradual improvements in the general and specific responses to the issues of conflict.

SECTION EIGHT

Recommendations

8.1 Recommendations for Government Action at the Federal Level

On the basis of the fieldwork in the South-West Zone of Nigeria, the following recommendations are made:

- (1) The need to re-orient the Nigeria Police;
- (2) The urgent need to tackle the problem of unemployment in the South-West states, and across the Nigerian nation;
- (3) The need to curb activities of the '*Ijaw boys*' and other misfit-youths as well as decisively stem the alarming, trending spate of kidnappings across the entire country.
- (4) That, the movement of oil-tanker drivers should be tracked, audited and generally checked.
- (5) That, specific measures should be devised to check the proliferation of arms and ammunition as well as generally clear the Creeks across the vast coastline of Nigeria.
- (6) That, community policing should be promoted or encouraged as a way to extirpate fear and anguish often created by the activities of social miscreants;
- (7) Appropriate statistics should be regularly gathered and made available to ensure and enable adequate planning – which will, correspondingly, address issues of resource control and management, structural development, other basic amenities, etc.
- (8) Efforts by the Non-Governmental Associations should be assisted and complemented or encouraged by the various Governments towards sustainable maintenance of peace, especially at the local levels.
- (9) The urgent need for general development of social infrastructure, e.g. School-building projects, improvements in educational facilities, the improvement of health infrastructure and provision of medical facilities, the instrumentation of alternative power generation – as catalysts for commercial and entrepreneurial development, etc.
- (10) State Governance should also particularly take into cognizance the very critical role(s) that the traditional rulers do play in the Communities, and include them in the direct governance and policy formulation processes.
- (11) The issue of, and clamor for, Local Government Autonomy should be given due consideration and possible actualisation – as lately being requested by the

local communities.

- (12) There should be social safety net and youth empowerment programme to address the prevalent youth restiveness in the zone.
- (13) Government should communicate policies on grazing reserves in the zone clearly to avoid misinterpretation and heightening of tensions.
- (14) Government should take a careful look at the clamor for wearing hijab to avoid a religious crisis.

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Specimen of Standard Survey Questionnaire

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Abuja

2016 Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA)

Research Instrument

Based on a Mixed-Method Approach entailing the following: In-depth Interviews, Questionnaire and Observation, the following questions could be asked:

1. Can you identify the conflicts in your community? _____

2. Which is the most serious of these conflicts? _____

3. Who are the people involved? _____

4. What was the conflict about? _____

5. What caused the conflict? _____

6. What are the people (groups) saying about the conflict? _____

7. Who made efforts to resolve the conflict? _____

8. What was done to resolve the conflict? _____

Experience of the conflict

1. Do you think the violence has been increasing (escalating) in recent times? _____

2. Do you think there has been a decrease (de-escalating) in recent times? _____

3. Why do you think there has been an increase (escalation)? _____

4. Why do you think there has been a decrease (de-escalation) in violence? _____

5. Who is/are behind this conflict? _____

6. Are there important people behind the conflict? _____

7. Who are they using? _____

8. Are the people involved in the conflict only from this community? _____

9. What can be done to stop the increase (escalation)? _____

10. How do you think the conflict can be resolved? _____

11. What do you think can be done to resolve the conflict? _____

Impact of the Conflict

1. How was your community/group affected by the conflict? _____

2. Do you know anyone affected by the conflict? _____

3. Were people injured? _____

4. Were lives lost? _____

5. How has the conflict affected inter-group/community relations? _____

6. Who are the people carrying out the attacks? (Youths, Vigilantes, Neighbourhood Gangs, Militias, Political Thugs, Religious Extremists, Ex Service Men, any other)

7. Which kind of weapons were/are used? _____

Responses

1. What has government done (federal/state/local)? _____

2. What have the traditional institutions done on the conflict? _____

3. What have the religious institutions done on the conflict? _____

4. What have the NGOs/CBOs done on the conflict? _____

5. What has any other group done on the conflict? _____

6. Did any security agency intervene in the conflict? _____

7. What did the security agents do? _____

Invisible Violence

1. Are there conflicts not reported in the media? _____

2. Which conflicts are they? _____

Specimen of Standard SCA Reporting Format

REPORTING FORMAT

[The Approved Guiding Template for the Zonal SCA Reports]

Executive Summary

1. Introduction and historical background
 2. Methodology
 3. Conflict/Peace Case Studies
 4. Causes and Analysis of Conflict
 - Conflict Structures: Security, Political, Economic and Social
 - Conflict Actors: Interests, Peace Agenda, Capacities, Incentives
 - Conflict Dynamics: Triggers, Scenarios/Episodes
 5. Impact of Conflict
 6. Responses/Interventions
 1. Track One
 2. Track Two
 3. Track Three
 7. Conclusions
 - Gaps in literature
 - Gaps in Responses/Impact
 - General Conclusion
 8. Recommendations
- References/Annexure

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