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Perspectives from Local Communities on Stabilization and Building Peace in the Lake Chad Basin

Discussion Paper

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	3
Background.....	5
Rationale.....	5
Methodology	6
Limitations.....	8
Main Findings.....	8
Regional Stabilization	8
Stabilization – Security Dimension	9
Recommendations.....	10
Stabilization - Early Recovery Dimension	11
Recommendations.....	12
Reintegration	13
Recommendations.....	15
Reconciliation & Justice.....	15
Recommendations.....	17
Other Key Findings	17
Women.....	17
Recommendations.....	18
Youth.....	18
Recommendations.....	19
Environment	20
Recommendations.....	20
Drug Abuse.....	20
Recommendations.....	20
Governance.....	21
Recommendations.....	21
Education.....	21
Recommendations.....	22
Forced Migration and Displacement	22
Recommendations.....	23
International Assistance.....	23
Recommendations.....	23
Annex I – Location of Community Consultations	24

Executive Summary

This paper synthesizes the outcomes of over 100 focus group discussions held with over 1,100 people in the four riparian countries of Lake Chad affected by the Boko Haram insurgency – Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Consultations were conducted by UNDP¹ with different segments of the population (women, men, youth) in March and April 2018, based on a uniform questionnaire.

The consultations and the present paper are based on the premise that marginalization and unaddressed grievances by communities in the region provided a fertile ground for the ensuing violence, and that any solution to the conflict and efforts toward stabilization and recovery therefore must take into account the conflict-affected communities' perspectives of the situation, their experiences and suggestions for the path forward towards peace and development.

Key Findings:

Security is still one of the foremost concerns of communities across the four Lake Chad Basin countries. Calls for more troops and security forces that are better equipped and trained were unanimous. Equipment and training was also requested for vigilante groups, on which many communities rely for their security, seeing them as complementary to armed forces and formal security actors.

Participants highlighted a number of grievances and perceived shortcomings vis-à-vis security actors, which can be summarized as a general feeling of absence of the rule of law, lack of professionalism, alleged misconduct, and mistrust and insufficient communication between security forces and communities.

In terms of livelihoods that would allow for early recovery, communities rely heavily on agricultural activities (farming, livestock, fishing) which presume access to arable land, pastures and water. However, such access has been restricted, due to various counter-insurgency operations and displacement management efforts – for example, restrictions on fishing in Lake Chad and on movement outside of villages in Nigeria for security reasons, or the setup of IDP camps on arable lands in Cameroon and Niger.

Communities noted **an inherent tension between the continued need for security and the limitations thus imposed on agricultural activity, hampering early recovery.** Adding to that, participants cited the negative effects on economic activity of market and border closures, as well as of a lack of infrastructure (roads, bridges) and limited electricity provision. Finally, limited access to capital is a key challenge for communities in resuscitating the local economy.

Moreover, missing economic perspectives, which became even more limited with border closure, are seen as a central reason for youth joining Boko Haram. Besides a purely financial/economic incentive, voluntary recruitment is also seen to be driven by a general quest for a better life and a vision of the future. Drug abuse was noted as an aggravating factor in this, making youth more receptive to

¹ Research was undertaken by the UNDP country offices of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.

radical ideologies. Youth are also frustrated at the absence of political participation, and what they perceive as instrumentalisation by politicians.

As far as reintegration is concerned, **communities showed reluctance to the idea of welcoming Boko Haram fighters back**, based on a perception of reintegration as a reward rather than a punishment for the damage inflicted by the fighters on communities. Many feel that a condition for a reintegration process must be that victims and communities are first adequately supported before reintegration of former fighters. If reintegration were to work, the need for screening and complete disarmament of former fighters by the government was stressed, coupled with community involvement from the very beginning of the process. The return of IDPs adds additional pressure on communities, often resulting in conflict over housing and land.

A slightly different, but equally important topic discussed was the **reintegration of vigilante groups**. While they are still essential to community security in many parts, they are looking towards the future, and expect to be supported in any transition towards a post-insurgency context. Should they feel that no action is taken in this sense, then some may become spoilers vis-à-vis peacebuilding and local reconciliation.

Beyond reintegration, the **theme of reconciliation revealed deep wounds and trauma experienced by parties from all sides of the conflict in the Lake Chad Basin**. Many focus group participants highlighted the need for broad-based and robust psycho-social support, linking to a longer process of healing, which may include a truth-telling process, before reconciliation was possible. It was stated that the indirect consequences of the conflict, such as a general increase in crime, and intra-family violence equally needed to be addressed. However, participants perceived of the justice system as partial and not prone to be part of the solution in the short- to medium term.

Local peace committees by contrast are seen as a resource for reconciliation and peacebuilding. **Religious and traditional leaders were named as the most trusted source of justice, albeit the exclusion of women from these institutions is notable. Indeed, the role of women in the Lake Chad Basin is paradoxical: frequently marginalized and excluded from decision-making and access to justice, they are perceived as playing an essential role when it comes to early-warning, providing psycho-social support to victims and peacebuilding more generally.** Women have also been affected differently from men by the widespread violence, with limited recourse for victims of sexual and gender-based violence, and widows needing to provide for their children as sole breadwinners.

Other recurrent themes of the consultations include: the negative impact of climate change on farming and access to water; drug trafficking (with complicity by security agencies) and a resulting drug epidemic; absence of or unequal access to government services, including justice; and the role education can play in both preventing, but also promoting radicalization. Finally, migration and displacement are seen as fuelling competition around already limited resources, a perception that is amplified by the feeling that the international community mainly caters for IDPs and refugees, leaving host communities behind.

Background

The Boko Haram insurgency has entered its ninth year and continues to exact a tremendous toll on the people of the Lake Chad Basin. At its peak, the violence displaced some 2.7 million people across the region². The conflict further precipitated a devastating humanitarian crisis, ranked by UN OCHA as one of the four worst humanitarian crises globally in 2017. As of today, 2.3 million people remain displaced, with an estimated 10.7 million people in need across the affected areas of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, and 5.8 million food insecure people at crisis and emergency levels. Violent incidents causing casualties among civilians, humanitarian workers and State armed forces also continue to occur, as of late mostly concentrated in Nigeria's Borno State and Cameroon's Far North.³

Efforts to mobilize support and seek solutions to the crisis have been broad. National governments, along with state and regional governments, have made significant efforts to respond to the needs of the affected people. This engagement has also come with international support – financial and technical, as well as political. In March 2017, the United Nations Security Council visited the Lake Chad Basin countries with the aim of receiving a first-hand understanding of the challenges on the ground. The visit resulted in the UN Security Council Resolution 2349, providing an international framework for addressing the crisis and begin building sustainable peace and development for the region. Complementing this resolution have been various conferences and high-level events, such as Oslo (February 2017), Berlin (September 2017), N'Djamena (November 2017), and Abuja (February 2018). Notwithstanding the essential roles that national governments play, the conclusion continues to be that as a regional crisis, the Lake Chad Basin crisis demands a holistic and regional response.

In close partnership with the Governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, UNDP is facilitating the establishment of the Lake Chad Basin Governors' Forum with support from the Governments of Germany, Sweden and Norway. The Forum constitutes a regional political mechanism that offers Governors in the region a platform to engage on solutions to the Boko Haram crisis to jointly define a lasting, comprehensive solution jointly with national, regional and international partners. In the lead up to the first meeting of the Lake Chad Basin Governors' Forum, UNDP held consultations across the Lake Chad Basin to better understand how communities affected by conflict and key stakeholders in the region perceive the crisis as well as what their proposed solutions are. The consultative process had the overarching goal of providing a voice to those on the front line of the crisis, who will need to own any sustainable solution to the crisis that restores peace and development in the region. It is hoped that this discussion paper will provide useful elements and inputs into the decision-making process for Governors and policymakers.

Rationale

The Boko Haram insurgency emerged as a result of structural development deficits. An acute sense of grievance vis-à-vis the government, and lack of trust in the police and security apparatus, are prominent among voluntary recruits.⁴ Identified root causes of the conflict include unequal access to basic services

² UNOCHA: Lake Chad Basin, Crisis Overview as of 3 June 2016

³ UNOCHA: Lake Chad Basin, Crisis Overview as of 16 March 2018

⁴ UNDP: Journey to Extremism in Africa, 2017

and justice, ineffective governance, low human security, lack of economic infrastructure and opportunity, as well as environmental degradation, all resulting in communities in the region feeling marginalized and aggrieved.⁵ Any solution to this conflict necessitates that communities themselves play a lead role in transforming the conflict and collectively shaping a different future for the Lake Chad Basin. To that effect, it is critical to understand the perspectives and perceptions of conflict affected communities in the region, to begin a discussion of what a viable path towards peace and development looks like for the region.

Methodology

Focus group discussions were held in 25 communities in Cameroon (5), Chad (6), Niger (4) and Nigeria (10), undertaken by UNDP offices in each of the four countries. The communities were selected based on a high number of conflict-affected persons living in or around these areas, including high populations of IDPs. The geographical distribution of the communities consulted also reveals the logistical and security challenges that needed to be taken into consideration. The sensitive nature of some of the focus group discussions meant that some communities, in particular in northern Borno, could not be drawn upon in the exercise.

At the community level, UNDP leveraged its existing networks (having in many cases previously set up similar consultations structures) to enable a breakdown into four different sub-groups (aside from Cameroon where a fifth group of village chiefs, religious leaders was also held): men, women, young men and young women. The distinction by gender was justified by the different types of challenges that the Lake Chad Basin crisis presents for men and women and by the different roles and positions men and women have in the respective contexts. Additionally, the consultation process aimed to tap into how the younger generation – frequently cited as part of the problem – view the situation and can be engaged to help transform it.



In addition to the community-level consultations, key stakeholders were engaged in Diffa, Niger and in Maiduguri, Nigeria.⁶ These consultations contributed by adding additional perspectives from different key interest groups, such as civil society organizations, traditional rulers and religious leaders, women's groups etc.

A common methodological approach guided all the consultations, which helped structure the consultations in a uniform manner across the Lake Chad Basin, and ensured the ease of reporting and comparisons between the different countries. The facilitator asked participants to discuss a catalogue of questions around the rule of law, local governance and basic service provision; livelihoods; radicalisation; security; reintegration; reconciliation. They were encouraged to discuss both challenges, as well as possible solutions of how these can be addressed. The notetaker then reported these discussions in a reporting framework. The reports and notes from the various consultations form the basis for findings and recommendations put forward in this discussion paper.

⁵ For a detailed analysis, see Federal Republic of Nigeria, European Union, United Nations, World Bank Group: Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment, North-East Nigeria, Volume I, 2016, p.20.

⁶ In Niger, traditional rulers, members of the peace committee, and CSOs were engaged in three separate discussions; in Nigeria, traditional rulers and religious leaders, women's groups, CSOs, INGOs and the Civilian Joint Task Force were engaged in five additional focus group discussions.

With four focus group discussions held in twenty-seven communities, as well as the additional eight held in Niger and Nigeria, the findings presented in this paper come from over 100 focus group discussions held across the Lake Chad Basin during the months of March and April 2018. The community-level focus group discussions involved between eight and fifteen participants. Taken together with the stakeholder discussions in Diffa and Maiduguri, over 1100 people were consulted as part of this process, with the below demographic breakdown.



This extensive consultation in both breadth and depth is meant to provide an important glimpse of how some communities are coping with the ramifications of the Boko Haram insurgency, and its attendant consequences.

Limitations

The extensive nature of the consultation process entailed challenges that are important to bring to the fore. The consultations were undertaken by different teams in the different countries, in different languages (English, French, Hausa, Kanuri), and by different facilitators. Also, the teams that undertook the consultations varied both in composition (some were carried out by national staff, others by international staff), and experience. These factors invariably affect the resulting discussions and the uniformity of the data gathered throughout this process.

It should also be noted that a consultative process, such as this one, aims to highlight the perceptions and understandings of various dynamics at the community level. Some of these perceptions may be the result of misinformation or misunderstanding. However, these perceptions need to be considered since they reveal how the conflict is perceived and understood at the community level, as well as the solutions that are proposed.

Main Findings


Regional Stabilization

The focus group discussions across the Lake Chad Basin revealed a number of opportunities as well as challenges for regional stabilization. The discussions pointed to a cyclical sequence of events that presents the main challenge for any stabilization effort. Continued insecurity across the region warrants ongoing (and in some places possibly even a scaling up) of counter-insurgency efforts. However, the restrictions, bans and limitations in place in the various countries as part of these counter-insurgency efforts are severely impeding the region's economic activities and, per extension, the region's ability to progress into an early recovery stage and restore food production. In this context, it is noteworthy that much of the region's economic activity relies on access to natural resources – land, pastures, water and firewood - for agriculture, fishing and pastoralism. In North-East Nigeria for example, it is estimated that 40% of households rely on farming as their main source of income.⁷ Access to land and water resources has been especially affected and limited through various counter-insurgency operations and displacement management efforts. In Kolofata (Cameroon), residents reported that IDP camps have been set up on agricultural lands, reducing the ability for nearby communities to cultivate this land to support the increased population. In Guitte (Chad) restrictions on where and when fishing can take place severely impacts the amount of fish that can be caught. In Niger, communities noted that the ban on urea – a chemical commonly used in fertilizer but that is also oftentimes banned due to its possible use in explosive devices – has reportedly resulted in a drastic reduction in the crop yield. In Nigeria, restrictions on movement outside villages and communities restricts the amount of land that can be cultivated for farming, thereby capping both food production and the prospects of livelihoods for many. Taken together, these measures provide common limitations at the regional level for communities to increase food security, generate livelihoods, and begin the early recovery phase. In these limitations, youth emerge as particularly affected to the point where they become a driver of the conflict. Faced with limited options of making a living, pervasive food insecurity at the community level (which are further exacerbated due to security measures in place), along with their aspirations and visions for a

⁷ UNDP: Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Assessment, 2017.

better life, uneducated youth reportedly turn to Boko Haram, both to elevate their social status, but also for financial gain. This fuels the conflict, and the cyclical relationship illustrated below.

Figure 1: Dilemma for Stabilization in the Lake Chad Basin



The illustration above highlights a key dilemma that stabilization efforts need to tackle in the region in order to begin to transition from a humanitarian and conflict-affected environment, to one where early recovery efforts can begin to impact the lives of millions. Although simplified and not taking into account a range of other root causes and drivers of the conflict, it illustrates one of the central and recurring tensions that represents a challenge for stabilization efforts.

Stabilization – Security Dimension

Despite this cyclical dilemma, there were consistently calls for increased security for the entire region. The insecurity at the community level resulted in calls for deploying more troops and security forces – especially in the island areas of Lake Chad and the Godali mountains perceived to be a Boko Haram stronghold. In many Cameroonian and Nigerien communities, the perception is that border communities on the Nigerian side have a prevalent Boko Haram presence (whether true or not, this perception and high levels of suspicion could inhibit efforts at revitalizing cross-border trade). Unanimous across the Lake Chad Basin is also the reliance upon community vigilante groups as a central actor in the community security architecture. A majority of communities noted that these were not

sufficiently supported, and called for more equipment, support and training for these groups to complement the role of formal security agencies.

Although an increase in formal military presence is deemed important, many communities also highlighted perceived shortcomings of the security forces. A lack of professionalism of security forces and their alleged misconduct was cited severally, reportedly resulting in insufficient trust between security forces and the communities. On numerous occasions it was noted that patrols by security agencies were only done during the day time (leading to Boko Haram attacking at night) or that previous knowledge or predictable patterns of patrols enabled insurgents to plan around these patrols. In Cameroon, relations between security agencies and communities seemed particularly strained by sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated by members of the security agencies. In Limani, for example, a woman gave birth to a child that was fathered by a soldier, resulting to her being excluded from her home due to the taboos associated with this incident. Other girls and young women in the area have left villages with soldiers without undertaking the traditional or civil marriage processes, aggravating community sentiments against security agencies. Such sentiments feed into experiences and interactions with security forces, such as at checkpoints and borders, where focus group participants noted frequently being harassed or extorted into paying arbitrary fees for grant of passage. This fuels the divisions and mistrust between communities and security agencies – particularly among youth. In Niger this has resulted in tensions between youth and security services, and some communities perceive as being caught in between state security services on the one hand, and Boko Haram on the other. In Chad, residents felt that the breakdown of trust between communities and security agencies had led to the latter not taking credible information on Boko Haram whereabouts seriously.

The stresses of the conflict and breakdown of law and order was reported to have led to an increase in domestic violence and abuse in some communities (particularly Ngwom in Nigeria). Simple infrastructural investments, such as using solar powered solutions to provide electricity and light to rural communities were also highlighted as important in aiding in the community security efforts.

The consultations clearly show that there is a need to continue to invest in security and building of trust between communities and security agencies. This should not only include an increased and more effective presence of military and other security agencies, but also a community-based approach to security and policing – including trust-building measures between communities and armed forces.

Recommendations

- Sustain well-trained and equipped military and security presence, adhering to a code of conduct, and expand the geographical coverage to rural communities;
- Improve government oversight and accountability of counter-insurgency operations across the Lake Chad Basin for enhanced effectiveness;
- Set up community-level platforms for members of the community to liaise and interact with counter-insurgency operations as a means to bring counter-insurgency operations and communities closer together in the fight against Boko Haram;
- Build capacities and increase salaries for security officials (police, gendarmes, border guards) in an attempt to prevent corrupt practices at border crossings that hamper trade;
- Post and publicly display applicable taxes for goods at the border crossings to avoid arbitrary fees and taxes. Additionally, there should be clarity as to which documentation is needed to avoid harassment when crossing over the border. Consider setting up a hotline or anonymous tip mechanism where people can raise suspected customs and police scams for further investigation and review by internal review systems;

- Review bans, limitations and restrictions in place for people and goods to move around in the region. Keeping these in place may be warranted, but needs to be economically justifiable and not result in massive reduction in food production and livelihoods. This review could also enhance the oversight of checkpoints to determine which ones are official and which ones may have been set up arbitrarily.

Stabilization - Early Recovery Dimension

There exists a multitude of early recovery efforts in place across the region to help support conflict affected communities. Many support agricultural production, including support to fisheries and livestock value chains, as a main source of livelihood across the region. As mentioned above, this main source of livelihood is being challenged by a multitude of restrictions, bans and other impediments that make it harder for communities to sustain themselves off agriculture, livestock and fishing. Closure of waterways with neighbouring countries and a ban on crossing Lake Chad were cited as challenges to the fishing industry in Chad which, along with a reported five-fold increase on fishing tax, renders this trade an increasingly unviable solution for sustainable livelihood. In light of these challenges, communities around Lake Chad are increasingly looking to transform the shrinking waters of the Lake into an opportunity.

Many communities – particularly in Niger and Chad – pointed toward the opportunity for irrigated farming around areas recently uncovered by the receding lake waters. Irrigation systems have already proven effective in this area, giving rise to market gardens which provide both food and income for small-scale farmers. Efforts should be made to identify innovative irrigation solutions to maximize the potential for these areas to improve the economies of communities living around Lake Chad, especially around the Komadougou shoreline which is believed to hold significant agricultural potential. In light of the receding lake waters and a diminishing source of income and food, such efforts could prevent communities from slipping further towards food insecurity. This, however, needs to be done in a holistic manner, taking into account the usage and needs for the fishing and livestock industries, to ensure that innovative irrigation solutions become a win-win for all local industries, thereby amplifying the economic impact. Nevertheless, many of the investments require the commitment of government and partners to provide education, build infrastructure, and leverage access to new technologies and innovation, to fully harness these opportunities.

Communities across Cameroon and Niger reiterated the fact that IDPs and refugees had settled in areas previously devoted to agriculture. This was especially a challenge in Kolofata and Moskota in Cameroon, where shortage of food continues to drive up the cost of basic goods. There is a need to closely review where formal settlements are positioned to ensure that they do not exacerbate existing access to food and income for host communities. These host communities felt strongly that IDPs should be relocated or return to their communities of origin, creating tension between the two groups.

To enhance food security for the entire region, there is a far-reaching need to support the development of arable land for subsistence farming that can both provide a source of livelihoods for people as well as improve the availability of food. The restrictions on land usage mentioned above both limit the extent to which food can be produced, but also to the extent in which it generates an economic dividend. The closure of markets, commercial centres and borders further limit the options for trade and employment. Previously, young people from Cameroon would cross over for work in Nigeria, but this has become too difficult since the conflict, rendering many Cameroonian youths unemployed. Similarly, restricted movement and trade with Nigeria was highlighted as a major challenge affecting trade in Mahada, Chad. Trade becomes especially challenged during the rainy season due to the poor infrastructure available.

Significant investments need to target roads and bridges to maintain trade connections and boost economic exchange with surrounding communities. Access to electricity, and effective drainage and irrigation systems are also important early recovery areas that could have significant impact at the community level. Residents in Nigeria pointed out that poor drainage frequently results in stagnant pools of water during the rainy season, which leads to a spread of diseases such as cholera. This highlights the compounding impact that certain challenges in the communities present.

Communities across the region reported that youth join Boko Haram due to a lack of opportunity and poverty. The prospects of monetary gain in joining this group are perceived to have been an important factor in recruitment, as well as the opportunity to gain recognition and acceptance. Restoring the ability for youth to sustain themselves and help provide them with hope for the future, along with investments in education and value orientation initiatives to promote peace, would go a long way in preventing their recruitment into armed groups or their engagement in illicit activities. In one focus group discussion, the notion of dowries being too expensive to pay was highlighted as rationale for joining an armed group. The lure of Boko Haram facilitating marriages at cheaper prices is therefore also an appealing rationale for some male youths in joining the group. This example illustrates the notion that the younger generation seem not to be asking for anything out of the ordinary – they are just looking for the ability to pursue a fulfilling life.

Providing viable economic/livelihood alternatives and opportunities for, in particular youth, emerges as central to any stabilization and recovery effort. This could take the form of vocational training, skills acquisition programmes, and job creation initiatives. Many communities also noted that access to micro-financing, especially for women and youth, could go a long way in providing relief for these groups, and per extension communities at large. Lacking access to capital is a key challenge for communities in resuscitating the local economy. For example, restoring markets, shops and warehouses destroyed by the conflict entails a significant up-front investment that many do not have. Micro-financing or access to interest-free loans could have significant impact in helping jump-start businesses across the region. In some areas, the Village Savings and Loan Association was highlighted as an initiative that should be strengthened and further resourced so that communities have a basic social safety net. Investments such as these should also be coupled with opening support services to boost economic activities, such as agricultural posts, veterinary centres, and restoring access to seeds and fertilizers for agricultural input. Livestock markets, being a major source of income for many, are also particularly important in helping the local economy gain some momentum.

Recommendations

- Invest significantly in basic education, skills acquisition, vocational training and job creation across communities in the Lake Chad Basin. These should specifically target youth, women, victims of conflict and vigilante groups and should be tailored to market needs;
- Invest in infrastructure, particularly road networks, electricity, drainage and irrigation systems which all have wide-ranging economic impact;
- Roll out support packages to cater for widows and orphans of the conflict. Some figures put the number of orphans in Borno at 50,000, and without proper support these individuals will be future recruits of Boko Haram.

Reintegration

Reintegration was a topic specifically targeted in the focus group discussions to obtain a better understanding of community sentiments and perceptions around this process. Generally speaking, communities across the Lake Chad Basin showed reluctance to the idea of welcoming Boko Haram fighters back, especially without a proper accountability and justice process. This resentment is stronger amongst youth than elders, but communities are generally in agreement. There is a sense of betrayal of what these fighters have done to their own communities, as well as a widespread fear for what their presence in the community could mean. There are also concerns that reintegration of former Boko Haram members would “reward” their behaviours while victims of conflict and conflict-affected communities have yet to be fully supported and compensated for their ordeals. Reintegration as a concept itself was frequently intertwined with the notion of reconciliation and forgiveness, potentially making this process more sensitive at the community level. Although reluctance to reintegration is prevalent throughout the region, it is much more apparent and overt in communities closer to the epicentre of the conflict – especially in Nigeria and Cameroon.

Part of what is driving opposition against reintegration seems to be economic realities and a lack of perceived fairness or justice at the community level. The economic realities of many of the communities across the Lake Chad Basin is that there are very limited opportunities for making a living. With a lack of income-generating activities, the question many communities will ask themselves is what reintegrated combatants would do. Unemployment and food insecurity are two very real challenges that the region contends with, and the notion of bringing former fighters back into communities presents added competition for both livelihoods and food. In this context, reintegration of former fighters is in many communities, particularly in Nigeria, perceived as unjust, given that efforts are targeted towards former Boko Haram members, whereas victims of the conflict and conflict affected communities are still suffering.

Despite this reluctance, some community members highlighted elements of what a successful reintegration process could look like. They noted that any reintegration process must begin with true repentance and the taking of an oath. Security agencies would first be tasked with screening prospective individuals for integration, but the oath would be administered by traditional rulers. In Sangere, Girei Local Government Area in Adamawa State, male focus group discussants proposed a public statement from individuals informing the public of why they had joined Boko Haram as part of a learning process for the government and community, and allowing a better understanding of how to better prevent such conflicts in the future. Moreover, reintegration could also be phased. In some communities in Cameroon, there is a wider acceptance of reintegrating women, children and ex-hostages who have been associated with Boko Haram. The reintegration of these vulnerable and often traumatized groups into the communities need to be subject to the military, administrative and traditional authorities, but some communities (particularly in Cameroon) are prepared to accept them back, presenting a possible first step in a bigger reintegration process. The general sentiment, however, was that former fighters may need to be housed in a special detention centre while conditions within communities gradually become more conducive to their reintegration.

These community-level initiatives notwithstanding, the focus group discussions revealed a consensus around the need for government involvement and leadership in these processes. The screening and vetting of former fighters as well as ensuring their complete disarmament was repeatedly stressed as a prerequisite for any feasible process. That said, there is also an interest from the community to be involved in designing reintegration initiatives. Stakeholders in Nigeria, for example, felt that

reintegration efforts, particularly the *Operation Safe Corridor*⁸ initiative, was a process with limited public input, and that communities have only been engaged more recently. As a result, this initiative is perceived by some as faulty and less credible at the grassroots level, many noting that they felt it was empowering insurgents through training and rehabilitation, whereas victims of conflict continue to be left unattended to. This builds up new grievances, and a conflict-sensitive approach is necessary for a successful reintegration process. In this light, government efforts to address the needs and concerns of communities is essential to successful reintegration.

Community vigilante groups are a critical stakeholder in the reintegration process, but not always perceived as needing reintegration at the community level. Across the Lake Chad Basin, calls for increased support in terms of training, equipment and finances, to these groups were abundant. They are in many cases perceived as the most effective, and sometimes the only, protection that communities have against Boko Haram. For example, in Cameroon, participants felt that it is because of local vigilante groups that they had been able to return to their communities. However, since these groups are critical to the counter-insurgency operations, there are also reports of them feeling increasingly frustrated by the lack of support from government for their efforts and sacrifices. This is particularly noteworthy with the Civilian Joint Task Force in Nigeria. Although their role continues to be important, as stated by focus group discussants across the region, some members of these groups are increasingly looking towards life after supporting the armed engagement against Boko Haram. This presents an opportunity, but also risks. There are expectations that these groups will be compensated in some way by the government, given their commitment and sacrifice in counter-insurgency operations. If they perceive such compensation to not be forthcoming, then some might decide to act as spoilers against stabilization and peacebuilding efforts: upcoming elections in both Cameroon and Nigeria may present such opportunities. The International NGOs (INGO Group) in Maiduguri recommended that clear guidance be given on what will become of the CJTF as the region stabilizes and this needs to be a part of any holistic and sustainable approach for the region. Increased vocational training, skills acquisition initiatives and integration efforts with formalized security structures should be explored for members of vigilante groups. In Cameroon, it was suggested to reintegrate these groups into the municipal police force being set up in Mora, Mozogo, Kolofata and Fotokol. An additional dilemma that needs to be considered in reintegration of vigilante groups is the sustained demand for their role in the security architecture. In this sense, a full disarmament and demobilization process would be impossible without jeopardizing community security. A balance would therefore need to be struck between providing concrete assurances that these groups have a future in a post-insurgency setting, whilst allowing them to continue to play the crucial role they are reportedly playing in communities across the Lake Chad Basin.

On the whole, a significant amount of work is needed to make reintegration successful. Any efforts to move a reintegration process of former Boko Haram fighters forward would need to closely engage both state security agencies, but also communities from the onset. A precarious balance would need to be struck between catering for former fighters (Boko Haram and others), vis-à-vis other groups in the community, such as victims of conflict and people who have not taken up arms. Reintegration will only be sustainable if local economies are restored and have the absorptive capacities to provide livelihoods for both host communities and returnees and that communities are ready to accept former fighters back. In the absence of a conflict-sensitive and community-driven approach, including appropriate mechanisms for reconciliation and justice, the risk of revenge killings and further violence is high, as stated by several participants.

⁸ An initiative by the Nigerian Federal Government that aims at de-radicalizing, and reintegrating surrendered Boko Haram fighters.

Recommendations

- Begin sensitization campaigns at the community level for reintegration and dialogue, and allow communities to lead the reintegration process at the grassroots level following proper screening by relevant security authorities;
- Harmonize measures for reintegration of former fighters and support to other vulnerable groups (victims of violence, returnees, IDPs, refugees) to ensure a conflict-sensitive approach to reintegration;
- Invest in measures that can boost rural economic growth to provide an enabling environment for a reintegration process;
- Create holding spaces for housing individuals to be reintegrated until community-preparedness is adequate.

Reconciliation & Justice

The deep wounds and trauma experienced by parties from all sides of the conflict in the Lake Chad Basin demand support for a thorough and comprehensive healing process. As part of the discussions on reintegration, many focus group participants highlighted the need for support to a broad-based and long process of healing. There are clear “perpetrator – victim” sentiments in the region, and any healing process needs to be inclusive and participatory to have the desired impact. The INGO stakeholder group in Maiduguri specifically pointed to the necessity of finding a mechanism that is accepted by victims and communities and holds all parties to the conflict accountable.

Reconciliation and justice would not only need to deal with the direct consequences of Boko Haram, but also the indirect effects that this conflict has had. In Cameroon, for example, communities reported that the Boko Haram crisis has resulted in a settlement of accounts and scores between families, ethnic groups and villages that may have been at odds prior to the insurgency. Across the entire region, the conflict has precipitated an increase in crime, intra-family violence and the rupture of social ties. The conflict has, in other words, resulted in a general breakdown of rule of law and established societal norms, and opportunists have exploited this breakdown to settle other grievances or for financial or other gain. This puts significant pressures on already overstretched and weak judicial institutions.

Although the justice systems differ between the countries, there was consensus around the fact that these systems lack in fairness and credibility and there exists a perception that the application of laws is arbitrary and a general sense of lack of accountability is pervasive. Court systems are perceived to tend to favour the rich at the expense of the poor, and court proceedings to frequently drag on for long periods of time, becoming very expensive. In Bol/Matafo, in Chad, this issue was raised as a major concern. The level of confidence in the judiciary across the region is low due to corrupt practices and the sense that justice can be bought. Residents in Mora, Cameroon, highlighted the need for training of judicial and law enforcement staff on anti-corruption and respect for human rights as a means to address these challenges and enable these institutions to more effectively serve their communities.⁹ Nevertheless, with respect to a search for justice and reconciliation in the aftermath of the Boko Haram

⁹ The effective functioning of these structures become especially important given the complex need to manage conflict, especially related to lands recently made available by the shrinking Lake Chad.

crisis, these institutions may not be best placed to effectively help bringing peace and stability in the short to medium term.

The role of traditional institutions remains fundamental. The gradual erosion of the traditional institutions was cited as a key underlying factor resulting in the multitude of conflicts across the region. The transfer of powers from traditional authorities to constitutionally mandated authorities has hollowed out the conflict preventive capacities that have historically existed at the community level. The resultant effect is a decreased ability of communities to manage conflict in a peaceful way. Despite this, however, traditional institutions continue to be seen as close to the people with significant social and cultural influence at the community level. Traditional rulers and religious leaders themselves confirmed this. However, women community members stated that they were often excluded from these institutions and their deliberations. Also, there appears to be a generational shift occurring where youth are increasingly influenced by other sources than traditional and religious leaders, such as pop culture, which infuses a different set of norms and values into society. The influence of traditional rulers and religious leaders over youth is therefore limited in some communities, and in some circumstances, such as Toumour Village in Niger, the perceived lack of justice from traditional rulers and chiefs has reportedly led to increased banditry and crime as various groups exploit the complete breakdown of rule of law.

Despite these limitations, many communities called for the empowerment of traditional rulers and chiefs to help resolve community-level disputes and tensions. They remain the most trusted source of justice, and their proximity to the community renders them more readily available than formal judicial processes. Empowerment could come in terms of capacity building of traditional rulers and religious leaders in engaging in alternative dispute resolution and dialogue to support these stakeholders. However, it could also imply legally and formally expanding their roles to bolster their abilities in upholding justice and accountability at the local level. In Cameroon, for example, communities called for conflict-sensitive appointments of customary court presidents and assessors to provide the resources and capacity for customary courts to function properly and provide a sense of justice for conflict-affected communities. However they may be empowered, it is important to ensure an increased inclusion of youth and women in these processes, as these groups frequently perceive traditional rulers and religious leaders as biased against them.

To support the longer-term peacebuilding agenda, many communities called for the creation or enhancement of local peace committees or local conflict management committees. In Chad and some parts of Nigeria, communities advocated for strengthening such structures already in place. In other areas, the setting up of these structures could be an important step in helping drive the reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts with support from trained community leaders and elders. Interestingly, many of the focus group discussions revealed the lack of recreation centres as a challenge to promoting community cohesion. In Chad, this was raised as a specific way to constructively engage idle youth who otherwise pose a risk of radicalization. Recreation centres could help build community relations, and promote a sense of collective amongst younger generations, preventing radicalization. These centres could in turn be leveraged for increased participation by youth in decision-making processes to ensure that they are part of shaping the solutions and the future of their communities.

There are also other dynamics in the communities that emerged as centrally important to any reconciliation process. Family ties were frequently cited in Chadian and Nigerian communities as a central to any dialogue and reconciliation process. In Niger, collective prayer was frequently mentioned as a means to come together in a time of adversity and find collective strength. Effectively leveraging these social and cultural dimensions will be important for any sustainable reconciliation and healing process in these communities.

Some advocated for a comprehensive truth-telling process that would help establish a common narrative and understanding of the Boko Haram crisis. This would allow communities to begin to heal, in understanding the perspectives from perpetrators and victims. However, it would also necessarily need to include governments who are an integral part in the conflict. Such a process would need to help shed light on those currently imprisoned or detained that are believed by communities to be innocent as well as a search for closure for community members whose whereabouts are unknown. The quest for truth would also involve potentially uncomfortable discussions around those accidentally or wrongfully killed by security forces.

Although there exists a general acceptance that at some point, dialogue will need to resolve the conflict and help bring peace, many communities are not yet ready to forgive and turn the page. Resentment and mistrust runs deep due to the atrocities committed, and many community members do not feel ready for a reconciliation process. To prepare communities for this difficult process, increasing capacity for existing social support networks (in particular women's networks) as well as investing in infrastructure that brings communities together (such as recreational centres) would be necessary to facilitate such a process.

Recommendations

- Strengthen and support traditional rulers and religious leaders in dialogue, coexistence, and reconciliation. Such support could also entail legally empowering such stakeholders through broader mandates to adjudicate and enforce decisions;
- Invest in and train a network of women mediators, enabling them to prevent and resolve conflict and radicalization in their communities
- Establish and strengthen local peace committees, with the participation of women and youth, and recreation centres to help foster community cohesion and leverage existing capacities for conflict prevention and resolution.

Other Key Findings

Women

The role of women in the region demonstrated an all too common paradox – women are frequently marginalized from decision-making, and are oftentimes discriminated against in dispute resolution processes at the community level, yet they are also seen as instrumental in the peacebuilding process. With respect to families, it is often women who bear the main responsibility for child care and education of their children. Especially widows and single mothers bear the double burden of work and child care, which becomes particularly challenging in a context of perceived limited support and exposure for such groups. It was stated in the consultations that schools and male role models are needed to complement the efforts of mothers' in children's education, and help restore the value system which is seen as gradually eroding.

Moreover, many communities noted that women already play central roles in providing psycho-social support to victims of trauma and suffering. In this regard, they should be capacitated in the areas of

psychosocial support to provide such support in a clinically informed way to help individuals and groups to deal with trauma effectively.

Women across the region have already come together in various associations to provide each other with financial support in light of limited micro-financing opportunities. Such associations and networks can be an important opportunity to tap into for solutions that specifically empower women both economically but also in the peacebuilding process.

Participants across the region also agreed that women have suffered – and continue to suffer – tremendously as a result of the Boko Haram crisis. Violence against women is widespread, with limited recourse and accountability for victims. Widows who become the sole breadwinners for their family, are oftentimes especially vulnerable and frequently forced to resort to prostitution or joining an armed group to make a living. In a discussion with women’s groups in Maiduguri, it was noted that the absence of mothers from the home will have longer term implications for the value system in the region, as children grow up without the proper moral guidance. Consultations pointed to an urgent need to provide significant and wide-scale support for, in particular widows, but women in general.

In some focus groups, there was a clear difference between the male and female participants. The latter were frequently more positive, engaged and excited about being involved in the process. In some cases, this was apparently due to their general exclusion from many forms of consultations at the community-level, and seized this opportunity to be heard. Women were also reportedly more interested in collective benefit and collective solutions than many of the men. Male participants more frequently needed to understand their individual role in any solution and see the possible individual rewards. This included also elder men, and was not just restricted to younger males. It was also noteworthy that many communities felt that an investment in and empowerment of women would have indirect benefits on future generations through a cascading effect on their children.

Recommendations

- Target programmes for women to build capacity around dialogue, peacebuilding, and psychosocial support;
- Increase social protection for women, particularly focusing on preventing sexual and gender-based violence;
- Create platforms and avenues for women’s participation in decision-making;
- Scale up support packages for widows in the conflict and provide means for business start-up packages and access to capital to promote women’s entrepreneurship.

Youth

The role of youth came up in all conversations across the region – particularly since youth had been specifically sought out as participants in the focus group discussions, and because of their integral role in helping shape the future for the Lake Chad Basin. Of the voluntary recruits into Boko Haram, a large majority is younger than 30 years. Young women are much more numerous among the forced than the voluntary recruits.¹⁰ The perception amongst both older and younger groups in the communities is that those young people who join voluntarily do so because of the illusion of freedom and exuberance. There is both a monetary or financial incentive, but recruitment is equally driven by the quest for a better life and a vision of the future. Others resort to drug use, further deteriorating the social fabric of

¹⁰ See also UNDP, *Journey to Extremism in Africa*, pp.26-27.

communities. Drug use amongst youth was also identified as further exacerbating the vulnerability of this segment of the population, and their likelihood in accepting radical ideologies.

The sense of hopelessness and despair that many youth feel comes partly as a result of being left outside of decision-making processes and of various efforts to advance development at the community level. While being left behind, youth seek alternatives and strive for a better life, however joining an armed group is often the most readily available option. To provide youth with alternative options and viable solutions for income-generation, significant investments in basic education, vocational training, skills acquisition and job creation is needed at the community level. Without these options available, youth are forced to resort to illicit means of living.

Crime and delinquency, however, are not only a function of desperation, but also a manifestation of frustration at the political elite. Some young men stated during the consultations that their violation of laws and general delinquency was a means to rebel against politicians and the elite. The feeling that these young men had is that politicians make many promises during campaigns, and politicians count on people during election season, but then do nothing for them when elected. This is illustrative of the perception of political power being removed from communities, in particular youth, and is an issue that will need to be addressed for more responsive and democratic governance in the longer term.

An interesting feature of the focus group discussions with youth was that they frequently had a different timeline than elders in the community. Elders, with a robust knowledge of history, seemed to make decisions and inputs based on a longer-term perspective, and their concerns tended to be more in line with seismic and longer-term impacts on the community. Youths, on the other hand, were generally more focused on the shorter-term, making them more vulnerable to immediate gratification that recruitment into armed groups offer. In Mafoni, Maiduguri Municipal Council in Borno State, for example, elders highlighted the issues with the drainage systems as central in the community's collective capacity to manage flooding, whereas youth's immediate priority was to access jobs. Although their employment and access to income would have broad collective impacts for the entire community, the extreme struggles that many youth across the region face render them more focused on addressing their own immediate needs than viewing in a longer term perspectives. This generational difference needs to be taken into account in structuring any youth-sensitive response, with specific elements to harness the substantial peacebuilding impact that youth possess.

There was some hesitation amongst elder men to involve and include youths in the same consultative platform as elders. There was a fear of elders losing influence over key community decisions, and the diminished roles that they might have in the community. This is a major issue that will need to be addressed, and touches upon the cultural paradigm shifts that were mentioned earlier. These changes need to be carefully considered to ensure that all stakeholders are engaged and jointly contribute to a collective vision for the future.

Recommendations

- Invest in recreational centres and programmes to engage idle and restless youth. It is important that such programmes cater for their needs, including ensuring access to food, but also that they provide a different vision for the future that youth can be a part of;
- Target youth, particularly those affected by conflict and violence, for rehabilitative services, and business support packages to promote young entrepreneurship;

- Create wide-ranging psycho-social support systems for the tens of thousands of orphans of the conflict, whose future productive capacities depend on access to qualified and available support services.

Environment

In Bumsa, Gulani Local Government in Yobe State, participants claimed that farming was increasingly being abandoned due to erratic rainfall, drought and soil degradation. Farming, once a staple of the community, is gradually becoming seen as an unreliable livelihood, rendering more people unemployed and decreasing food production. Similar sentiments were expressed both from fishing communities with respect to the fishing industry, as well as communities involved in livestock rearing. The resultant impact is enhanced multi-dimensional poverty and vulnerability of these communities.

Access to water for drinking, hygiene and agricultural practices came up in a few discussions – particularly in areas where large numbers of IDPs have settled. This concerns both the amount and quality of the water available. It is seen by these communities as an integral part both in avoiding humanitarian crisis, but also in terms of supporting the early recovery and livelihoods generation through enabling irrigation systems for farming. There were also reports of cuts of electricity constraining access to water where electrical water pumps stood idle.

Recommendations

- Involve communities in the sustainable management of natural resources, to prevent conflict around competition for resources.

Drug Abuse

The challenge of drug abuse featured prominently in many discussions, particularly in Nigeria and Chad. In Chad, there is a sense of hopelessness around the drug epidemic, including the perceived impunity for traffickers, as communities blame security agencies for being complicit in the trafficking. The sense is that communities can raise awareness and specifically target youth with drug awareness initiatives, but such efforts are undermined by corrupt members within security agencies who work with traffickers for financial gain. In Nigeria, drug abuse was cited as frequently leading to broken homes and fuelling the erosion of value systems. Nevertheless, drugs are a last resort that particularly young men and women turn to in their desperation and frustration over the lack of opportunities available to them.

Communities across the region called for stronger enforcement and campaigns to counter drug abuse. Despite the fact that traditional rulers and religious leaders in some cases have limited traction with the younger generation, many communities still felt that working through these stakeholders would be key to help uphold the social and cultural norms that are eroded through widespread drug abuse.

Recommendations

- Invest in recreational centres to provide space for engagement and interaction in the community for youth;
- Leverage innovative avenues (social media, pop culture, etc) for awareness-raising campaigns around drug abuse.

Governance

Good governance surfaced as a solution to many of the region's problems, but the gap between citizens and government in many parts of the region has rendered people's trust in government very low. There were calls for decentralization of public services to make them more available to rural communities, the need to strengthen and capacitate government agents to become more independent and impartial (particularly judicial systems), as well as more robust oversight and accountability mechanisms to ensure that services are effectively provided to those who need them. Leadership integrity and civic participation were also highlighted as essential elements for stabilizing the Lake Chad Basin. The lack of participation in governance, across the whole region, was seen as a challenge, in particular for women whose role is seen – both by men and women – as limited in decision-making.

Good governance needs to also be enhanced through strengthened and expanded governance. In Niger, many participants noted that non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations have stepped in to support and supplement the provision of services that local governments are unable to provide, reducing public trust in government. In Matafo and Bol, Chad, residents noted that the island areas remained almost with no government presence, and limited educational institutions for residents left these areas fairly isolated and vulnerable to recruitment into Boko Haram.

There is a need to re-establish and rebuild public services to make them more functional and easily available to communities. As security continues to present a real impediment to free movement, access to public services becomes more constrained as people cannot or do not travel. Thus, the possibility of re-establishing and improving access to public services should also entail a possible decentralization of services, especially those related to issuance of ID cards, birth certificates and other key documents that may have been lost in the conflict but are essential, could help individuals recover more quickly. In boosting access to public service at the community level, and not just in metropolitan areas, government will be able to provide for affected communities in a more holistic way. The decentralization process should also include moving official staff, so that they are more embedded in the communities that they serve and avoid the restricted hours of operations due to extensive travel by responsible staff.

Recommendations

- Invest in the provision of health care and education to ensure that quality services are provided to all people in the Lake Chad Basin;
- Provide mobile centres for the issuance of ID cards, birth certificates and other key documents;
- Strengthen platforms for participatory engagement in governance, especially for women and youth in rural areas.

Education

There was also clear consensus on the role of education as a crucial aspect of a solution in the longer-term. Uneducated people, in particular youth, were cited as the most likely recruits for Boko Haram. However, the education system also emerged as one of the key elements of perceived marginalization and grievance. Participants noted that there was no tertiary educational institution and only two secondary schools in northern Borno, Nigeria. Additionally, the lack of harmonization between the Islamic and Western educational systems was repeatedly raised as a point of contention. The exclusion of graduates of Islamic schools from higher Western educational institutions was also noted as a source

of grievance. The perceived injustices surrounding the educational system run deep and is a divisive factor in the conflict that needs to be addressed for longer-term peace to hold. For example, religious leaders suggested that they participate in the development of new school curricula and/or educational reform to integrate the values of Islam in a modern (Western) education system.

The lack of a standardized and accredited system for Islamic schools was equally cited as a central challenge in preventing the spread of radical narratives. Islamic schools are playing an important role in the educational infrastructure, as well as in providing humanitarian and development support to many communities, but the lack of a framework to ensure the quality of teachings helps to undermine the longer-term prospects of a well-informed generation of youth. For longer-term prospects of addressing the radical ideologies that persist throughout the region, more needs to be done in ensuring that the Islamic and Western education offered adopts a standardized quality assurance framework to safeguard teachings and learning for children and youth. Religious leaders specifically voiced concerns about this issue, and pointed out that many new Islamic schools are perceived to be created by preachers who are not originally from their communities. They reportedly tend to bring with them a more radical interpretation of Islam that is particularly influential amongst the youth who seek a stronger sense of identity and belonging. In these schools, the youth may find a collective sense of belonging and a shared narrative of marginalization and discrimination that fuels radicalization.

Recommendations

- Expand access to education, particularly in rural areas (such as island areas in Lake Chad);
- Review (especially in Nigeria) the educational system to provide an integrated and harmonized education system with access to education for all, building on both Islamic and Western curricula.

Forced Migration and Displacement

Displacement has hugely affected the local economies across the region. Migration towards metropolitan areas have placed increased pressures on these cities in terms of competition over jobs and resources. Rural communities are further hampered by restrictions placed upon them by the military, limiting movement outside the communities. This is effectively restricting the amount of land that can be used for farming and agricultural production, which can in turn hamper the recovery efforts at the community level.

In Diffa, however, there exists a widespread perception that refugees are catered for but that very little is done for host communities. This perception is partly fuelling a push by host communities in the region to advocate for IDPs and refugees returning to their communities of origin. In Diffa, these sentiments were also fuelled by the fact that displaced persons had settled on agricultural lands (as previously mentioned) which limited how host communities could cultivate those lands.

Finally, as displaced populations begin to return, in particular in Cameroon, this return has resulted in an increased number of disputes in the community. These disputes frequently relate to access to shelter and land as returnees coming back to their communities of origin often find their houses inhabited, triggering tension between those who stayed and those who left. Those who stayed throughout the conflict oftentimes feel that returnees are more privileged due to the support they receive from NGOs and INGOs. The perceptions of unfairness between host communities and IDPs/refugees is further heightening these tensions.

Recommendations

- Harmonize measures for return and resettlement with support to victims of conflict and other vulnerable groups;
- Review the location of formal IDP camps and settlements to ensure such establishments encroach minimally on agricultural productivity.

International Assistance

The role of the international community was perceived differently across some of the different groups of stakeholders. Whereas the support was appreciated by CSOs and the CJTF, traditional rulers and religious leaders in Maiduguri questioned a range of practices by international organizations. Most contentious of these was the perception that the international community provides food and medicine to Boko Haram. This perception evoked a strong emotive response amongst this group, as they felt that the international community was here to help the victims of the conflict, not the perpetrators. Additionally, the international community was accused of working through churches but not with mosques. Islamic religious leaders felt they are not adequately consulted in the work of the international community. Given their close proximity to the communities and their influence and networks, it is important that the international community engages this group of stakeholders in a continuous and systematic manner – especially in light of their willingness to help and support.

A prevailing narrative in many communities is that humanitarian and development partners mostly target support to displaced persons. Aside from creating tensions in the community, it can actually further aggravate the situation for the host community, who in certain instances are faced with price increases as a result of an increased demand for goods and services, as well as the increased purchasing power that displaced populations have in some communities due to cash for work programmes or simply through selling items donated by humanitarian partners. An increased conflict-sensitive approach to humanitarian support was called for to ensure that humanitarian assistance targets those who most need it, whilst not furthering tensions or divisions between different groups and communities.

Recommendations

- Conduct regular engagement between the international community and traditional rulers and religious leaders should be sought. Such engagement should be both at the project level (i.e. in specific communities) but also at the strategic level (at state and regional level);
- Enhance conflict sensitivity of humanitarian and development programming through more regular consultations with communities, including leveraging conflict analysis tools to inform programming;
- Create an accountability framework for results that include communities to ensure that ownership and oversight are vested in the intended beneficiaries.

Annex I – Location of Community Consultations

