# MOZAMBIQUE

## The Mirror of Narcissus

*"Knowledge and Self-conscience for a better development of the Mozambican Civil Society"*



*'Lessons learned and Recommendations'* from Mozambique on it's experience in implementing the CIVICUS Civil Society Index

UNDP

Mozambique

*March / 2011*

# *Content*

*B*y Gustavo Toshiaki Lopes Sugahara - Economist - Independent Consultant and Associate Member Dinâmia / CET at ISCTE - Lisbon University Institute - gustavo.toshiaki@gmail.com

# Abbreviations

*Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil (*CESC*)*

*Centro de Estudos Políticos e Analises (*CEPA*)*

*Civil society (*CS*)*

*Civil Society Index (*CSI*)*

*Civil Society Organizations (*CSOs*)*

*Faculdade de Economia (*FEC*)*

*Faculdade de Letras e Ciências Sociais (*FLCS*)*

*Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade* (FDC*)*

*Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida (*GMD*)*

*Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (*IESE*)*

*Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil (*MASC*)*

*Millenium Development Goals (*MDGs*)*

*National Advisory Group (*NAG*)*

*National Institute of Statistic (*INE*)*

*Plano de Acção para a  Redução da Pobreza Absoluta (*PARPA*)*

*Plataforma nacional das organizações da sociedade civil moçambicana para a participação nos Observatórios de Pobreza/Desenvolvimento (*G20*)*

*United Nations Development Programme (*UNDP*)*

*United Nation Volunteers (*UNV*)*

*Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (*UEM*)*

# *Mozambique:* *The Mirror of Narcissus*

Knowledge and Self-conscience for a better development of the Mozambican Civil Society



CSI DIAMOND

**Civil Society Index (CSI) Key impacts in Mozambique:**

- Development of the main reference tool for the analysis of civil society (CS).
- Framework for the UNDP capacity building program.
- The process led to an awakening of the CS self-conscience.
- Starting point for the UNDP support on the revision of the legal framework for the operations of the CS.

# *Executive Summary:*

The Mozambican civil society is still characterized by a large number of informal organizations. On the formal side, the National Institute of Statistic (INE) registered 4853 non for profit institutions in 2003, most of which were religious associations.

In a situation where the state faces huge difficulties in meeting basic social and economic needs, most of the population rely on diverse forms of mutual support as their only welfare mechanism. Informal self-help organizations, growing spontaneously on a needs basis, remaining mostly unknown and surviving without external resources, constitute the major part of the Mozambican Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

The experience of implementing the Civil Society Index (CSI) in Mozambique turned out to be an important tool for the analysis of civil society (CS), benefiting donors, government, academics, and of course the CS itself. The implementation was also an important moment of self-assessment for the CS, indicating new alternatives and possibilities for its strengthening.

The impacts of the implementation process – influence in governance programming, the construction of new internal as well as inter-sectoral networks, and the opening of the wider constituency dialogue beyond the usual CSO suspects - were less significant than expected, and there was little follow-up after the release of the index report in April 2008. The underestimation of the national challenges while adapting the work methodology of the CSI, and the lack of a strong implementation agenda, were identified as the main reasons for the reduced impact of the implementation process.

The difficulties in implementing the recommendations of the index after its launch, and the failure to promote its use as a reference for programming and governance, are intrinsically related to the challenges in the country. With this conclusion, it seems clear that future initiatives should take these challenges into account, including a longer period of training and capacity building in the process.

# *Introduction*

In April 2008 the final report on the Civil Society Index in Mozambique was launched, based on a study conducted between March and December 2007. It was implemented by the Community Development Foundation (Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade, FDC), in collaboration with CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation, and supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Aga-Khan Foundation an the European Union. Based on the documentation in the "lessons learned and recommendations" regarding the implementation process of the Index, our team was contracted by the UNDP to perform an evaluation, which resulted in this report.

According to the Terms of Reference, the main objective of the evaluation was to compile a selection of best practices/lessons learned in Mozambique which could be shared with donors, other MICs, UNDP and the civil society in general, and trying to answer the following questions: (i) What were the main benefits of involving UNDP in the CSI projects? (ii) How has the CSI benefited civil society and UNDP (iii) Has the CSI been an entry point for governance programming?

Given the methodological suggestions given in the draft concept note, the tight deadline, and the available resources, we chose to use interviews with key stake holders as the primary source of information. The interviews were conducted in two separate stages. The main purpose of the first stage, the "exploratory interviews", was to obtain a general overview of the implementation process of the CSI in Mozambique, and to test some of the questions which would be part of the second stage of the interview process (the "final interviews".)

With the draft concept note as the main reference, supplemented by a series of other documents related to the CSI process in Mozambique, a draft questionnaire was created and shared with the international team, and UNDP Mozambique. This questionnaire was then adapted for each of the interviews, depending on the role and participation that the interviewee had had in the CSI process.

In agreement with the UNDP team, we identified a short list of stake holders that had key roles in the CSI implementation process in Mozambique, to be contacted for the "exploratory interviews". A list of candidates for the "final interviews" was compiled based on indications in the reference documents, of input from the UNDP staff, and from the interviewees.

The main criterion for the selection of interviewees was their involvement in the CSI implementation process. Due attention was also given to assure the representation of various levels of participation, macro, meso and micro. The following actors were interviewed: (i) the principal responsible of the implementation and coordination of the project in Mozambique, (ii) representatives of the local implementation team, (iii) UNDP staff with responsibility for the follow up of Civil Society, (iv) professors and intellectuals involved in the debate on this topic; (v) Civil Society organizations which participated in the process[1]. The interviews were conducted between October and December 2010, mostly through interview meetings, some also through telephone.

One of the main methodological challenges during the process was to identify and isolate the effects of the implementation of the index (as opposed to other efforts conducted to strengthen the Mozambican civil society), as well as to identify possible responses and alternatives to overcome the challenges found.

---

[1] *For a complete list of interviewees, see annex.*

As we will see, the results of the implementation of the CSI in Mozambique were generally quite positive. This is especially true when taking the national context into account, recognizing the significant challenges that the Mozambican Civil Society is facing.

# The Civil Society in Mozambique

The last Human Development Report, launched by the UNDP in November 2010, placed Mozambique in the bottom 5 of 169 countries of the Human Development Index (HDI). The challenges posed to a nation that suffered three decades of almost continuous war[2], which the last ending in 1992, is also reflected in the challenges faced by the country's civil society (CS). The Civil Society Index (CSI) revealed that the Mozambican civil society has weak structure and values, and operates in a constrained environment. Structurally, the main weaknesses are due to limited human and financial resources available to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). In terms of values the weaknesses are mainly related to a lack of transparency, gender equity and diversity.

The Mozambican CS is still characterized by a large number of informal organizations, which operates in the entire country. With a predominantly rural population, spread over 399.400 km2, and where the state faces huge difficulties in meeting basic social and economic needs, citizens still rely on diverse methods of mutual support as their only way of social protection. These mutual support groups, constitute the major part of the Mozambican Civil Society. They are created spontaneously on a needs basis, remain mostly unknown, and survive without external resources.

Historically the space for CSOs intervention was very limited, first by the colonial power, later by the revolutionary government. Only in 1990 with the new Constitution, and with the approval of the Association's Law in 1991, the Mozambican CSO was legalized as an entity. For a long period only certain religious institutions and organizations providing hunger relief were allowed to operate in the country. Nowadays, the legal framework for associations still constitutes a big barrier for the formalization of many CSOs. UNDP, in partnership with CSOs, took on the reformulation of the legal framework as one of its priorities to support the strengthening of a free civil society.

The Mozambican CSOs already work on a wide spectrum of activities, but in general still face big challenges to overcome the status of being simple "service providers". They also face challenges in reducing their dependency on donors. Whereas 2007 and 2008 were perceived as a successful period for the consolidation of important platforms, groups and networks, with a strong sense of progress, the following years have registered some "impasse". Reports suggest that the momentum has significantly diminished for some of the most important groups, and some civil society platforms have been criticized for a lack of communication with its associates.

When assessing civil society in Mozambique, it is imperative to mention the events that occurred in early September 2010. The violent demonstrations, which resulted in 10 deaths, are not only an important sign of the failed model of economic growth without distribution, but also may help us to reflect on the situation of the CS in the country. During the riots, a significant portion of the Mozambican population expressed their outrage against rising costs of living, and made use of violence to force the government to withdraw the announced rises in fuel and food prices. A similar chain of events occurred in early 2008. The absence of

[2] Hanlon, Joseph (2010) 'Mozambique: `the war ended 17 years ago, but we are still poor", Conflict, Security & Development, 10: 1, 77 - 102

interlocutors of this strong movement is an important sign not only of the gap between formal institutions (including donors, the government and its political opposition) and the 'un-organized' expression of civil society, but also of the long journey that the CS still has to make in order to build a pacific, yet strong voice to represent their claims.

This study presents the experience and lessons learned from the implementation of the Civil Society Index in Mozambique. The content of this study has been compiled through a series of interviews with stake holders from the CS, UNDP and others who were involved in the implementation process. As we shall see, they point to significant achievements, such as the consolidation of a reference document on the civil society, and the awakening of the self-consciousness within civil society. Some important challenges were also highlighted by interviewees, notably the difficulty in implementing the CSI methodology in the Mozambican context, as well as the lack of a concrete action plan to translate the main recommendations of the CSI report into actions.

# An important reference and enabling tool for creating synergies

During the collection of best practices and experiences from the CSI implementation in Mozambique, the unanimous and crystal clear message from the actors involved, was that the most important impact of the CSI has been to enhance the knowledge about the CS in the country. The CSI became the main reference tool for analysis of civil society, benefiting donors, the government, academics, and, of course the CS itself.

The information gathered and presented in the CSI report has been widely used as the main source of information, studies and debate regarding civil society in Mozambique. For the first time, the CSOs were asked to contribute to a project which was not simply "enforced upon them from the capital city". The resistance that official surveys sometimes generate, mainly due to the lack of government accountability, were surpassed with the CSI methodology, which was truly participative.

The CSI was also the first in-depth assessment of CS in Mozambique. The National Institute of Statistics (INE) had already assessed the CS, having presented the official number of 4853 non for-profit organizations in 2003. Before the CSI, this was the only information that existed about the CS in Mozambique. Departing from a sample, the CSI was the first to look at the CS from inside, providing a reliable insight different from the general perception.

The CSI report is now used as the main reference tool to identify all civil society actions in Mozambique, as the study was able to gather many pieces of previously fragmented (both documented and undocumented) information regarding CS, as referred by the Mozambique CSI Project Evaluation.

In general it is important to stress that the CSI is still the major source of information regarding CS, and is therefore important for planning decisions, such as: the structure of human resources, internal organization, international and national networks, financial sources, technological resources, etc.

Many academic papers were developed using the CSI as a basis. Professors António Francisco[3] and João Pereira, both from Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), are two good examples having already published several papers and articles using the CSI. Both agree that a lot of academic work could and should draw on the Index, but there is little interest in supporting this kind of research.

For the UNDP, it was clear that its support to the CSI project was not only complementary to its other activities aiming at strengthening civil society, but that the CSI also generated positive externalities (such as improved knowledge of the CS within the government, and the production of technical and academic articles and reports) to the whole Mozambican society. Since the publication of the CSI report in 2008, the UNDP has supported several projects focusing on CS capacity building. The creation of the Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil (CESC), supported by the FDC, was also a direct result of the CSI.

The CSI also had a significant impact on the UNDP annual work plan for 2009[4], which main expected result was to strengthen the capacity of the government and the CS to plan, implement and monitor efforts to achieve socio-economic development in a transparent, responsible, equitable and participative manner, on national, provincial and local levels, in order to attain the MDGs

Based on the CSI results UNDP reinforced its partnership with many CSO such as Fundação para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário (FDC)[56], the implementing civil society organisation , in a Project to strengthen the capacity of CSOs in monitoring and assessment of important documents of the Mozambican planning debate, such as the Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta (PARPA), and the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs). Supporting the Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida (GMD), (CEPA-FLCS), (FEC/UEM and EDT/ UEM), the UNDP is expected to follow one of the most important recommendations of the CSI, which is increasing the CSO's capacity to conduct policy analysis based on research implemented at the community level. Additionally, the United Nation Volunteers (UNV) has been engaged in a National mechanism to promote volunteer activity, highlighted as an important need by the project.

The UNDAF extension 2010-2011[7], an important planning document for the UN system and the government, already encompasses some of the information of the CSI, but it is worth noting that the CSI was published in April 2008, when UNDAF 2007-2009 was already approved and in use. The CSI report was made available in mid 2008 during the first year of Delivering as One (DaO) and after the Annual Work Plan had been finalized and signed. This means that, for practical purposes, it was only 2009 and 2010 that the UN and specifically the UNDP could start implementing some of the recommendations, and UNDP did, together with FDC.

[3] Francisco, António (2010) 'Sociedade Civil em Moçambique: Expectativas e Desafios`, Desafios para Moçambique 2010, 51-105.
Francisco, António. (2008) `Key Triggers and Constraints for Civic Action in Mozambique: Bad Things Come in Three' Regional Workshop on Civil Society Building.
Francisco, António; Mucavele, Albertina; Monjane, Paula; and Seuane, Sónia (2008) 'Índice da Sociedade Civil em Moçambique 2007' - A sociedade civil moçambicana por dentro: avaliação, desafios, oportunidades e acção. Maputo: Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade (FDC).
[4]UNDP Annual Work Plan 2009 - Capacity Building of Civil Society Organisations - Mozambique
[5]Brito, Carlos (2009) 'Relatório de Consultoria - Diagnóstico Organizacional: Organizações da Sociedade Civil', FDC – Fundação Para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade
[6]cf. Relatório Final de Capacitação das Organizações da Sociedade Civil, FDC - Fundação Para o Des. da Comunidade, Dez. 2008
[7]With the Government of Mozambique's decision to extend the PARPA II with one year, and after a intense process of internal revision, including planning for the next UNDAF, it was decided that the current UNDAF should be extended with two more years, until 2011

# The Mirror of Narcissus

If in one-hand the Greek mythology refers Narcissus as the symbol of vanity and insensibility, on the other hand it also represents the individuality drama, that is, the process whereby the individual acquires self-conscience. Beyond the knowledge generated by the CSI, the awakening of the CS' self-conscience was also an important result of the CSI process.

Although the main output of the CSI was not particularly surprising for members of CS, revealing a very negative picture, for the first time, as Narcissus facing his own image, the Mozambican civil society took a look in the mirror and achieved self-consciousness in a deep "auto-analysis". This process was not only crucial for the legitimacy of the assessment, but it also created opportunities for debate on a higher level, where planning and decisions can take place based on a stronger framework.

It became clear to CS that even though the solutions to many of the challenges they faced were "out of their reach", there was a lot of work that could and should be done internally. When the weaknesses were diffuse, unclear, and exogenous, it was almost impossible to design a strategy for improvement. With the CSI, which analytically separates dimensions such as environment and structure from values and impact, for instance, it became clearer that the CSOs themselves also had an internal job to do, and that they had no excuses to sit passively and wait for external solutions.

In this sense, an important discovery of the CSI was the general acknowledgment that the concept of civil society in the Mozambican context should exclude the participation in political parties. For many CSOs, this process of defining the meaning of "civil society" led them to recognize that they were in fact part of it, and CSOs in some provinces dominated by a one party structure, came to realize that they were something else than a mere extension of the party structure.

A special emphasis should be given to the fact that a significant number of Civil Society Organizations have readily accepted to participate in the CSI study, even before they were officially invited. Their desire to contribute to the study, expressed through a number of contacts made by organizations that volunteered to participate in the team that implemented the CSI, can be seen as an important indicator of the previous lack of consideration and attention in the activities of the local civil society that was instantly filled by the CSI implementation process.

Donors, and UNDP, also benefited from the self-consciousness effect, in the sense that the results of the previous years of work were questioned in terms of their effectiveness.

# Adapting the Legal Framework

It is also important to stress that the launch of the CSI in April 2008 enjoyed vast coverage in the Mozambican media, highlighting the innovative method and the intense participation of the civil society in the process. This occasion was also an important boost to the debate concerning the revision of CSO's legal framework.

Seeing that the CSI clearly underlined the fundamental role of the Legal Framework, which regulates the activities of the CSO, the UNDP later decided to support the FDC in its Legal

Review process. According to the UNDP Annual Work Plan 2009, the review of the Legal Framework that regulates the activities of the CSOs was completed in 2009. This review began in 2008 and was expected to be approved by the Assembly of the Republic in 2010.

In 2010 the UNDP gave financial support to the approval and implementation of the legal framework for the operations of civil society[8]. The main expected result was the strengthening of the CSO's capacity to conduct research-based political analyses. To obtain these objectives, three activities were planned: (i) The implementation of a pilot programme in three districts, introducing tools for policy monitoring and assessment (Citizen Report Cards; Public Expenditure Tracking etc); (ii) Follow-up training on Citizen Report Cards and Public Expenditure Tracking; (iii) Assessment of the programme. The UNDP is also member of the Revision Committee, and has participated in meetings with the Parliamentary Commission for Social Affairs.

The commission which revises the Law of Associations was received by the Minister of Justice[9], in August 2010, and by the Commission for Social Issues at the Parliament[10],in October 2010, both with positive signals. Despite this fact, at the time of the completion of this evaluation it still had not been voted. According to the summary of the last meeting between the commission and the committee, Mrs. Telmina Pereira, the President of the Commission for Social Issues in the Mozambican Parliament believed that there was still a real possibility of the law being taken to vote in the Parliament during the next legislature, in mid March 2011. Both at the Ministry of Justice, and at the Parliamentary Commission, they argued that the backwardness of the process was related to the fact that the proposal would impact "sensible" issues, such as fiscal ones.

Among the main constraints that the current legislation imposes, the most limitations are: the need for each organization to obtain a government authorization (from the Ministry of Justice); the cumbersomeness and complexity of the formalization process; and the sums charged throughout the process[11]. As an example, the process demands a minimum number of 10 people, and the presentation of the criminal record of all of them, which, according to Paulo Cuinica (member of the commission which revises the Law of Associations and from G-20), is "one of the most difficult documents to obtain in Mozambique".

Cuinica also pointed out that according to Mozambican law, no crime would prevent an individual from being part of associations, which makes the demand of criminal records even more contradictory. The G-20 representative believes that the state should shoulder the costs of the Publication of the Statues in the Legal Bulletin, in recognition of the public importance of the CSOs. He also explained that the statute/categorization of "public utility", which has significant implications especially for tax purposes, can only be achieved by going though the council of ministers, which is considered a another major barrier.

---

[8] *UNDP Annual Work Plan 2009 - Capacity Building of Civil Society Organisations – Mozambique – pg. 11-12*
[9] *For further information, please consult: Síntese da audiência concedida pela ministra da justiça ao comité de revisão da lei das associações*
[10]*For further information, please consult: Síntese da Audiência concedida pela comissão dos assuntos sociais da assembleia da república de moçambique ao comité de revisão da lei das associações*
[11]*To a more complete list, please consult: "Proposta de Lei das Associações" and "Dez principais notas da proposta de alteração da lei das associações" prepared by the Comité de Revisão da Lei das Associações*

According to Paulo Cuinica, many donors still demand the existence of formal organization, remembering that "it is not even possible to open a bank account without proving the legal existence of the association". UNDP also stressed the importance of the legal reform as one of the first steps towards a wider cooperation with CS. It is important to have in mind that UNDP encourages and supports the existence of the legal framework.

# *Improving the methodology*

After stating that the implementation of the CSI has had such an important role in terms of generating new knowledge and enhancing the self-consciousness of the sector, the discovery that the CSI implementation process was weak in terms of CS mobilization for change may be somewhat surprising.

The majority of respondents, institutions and individuals who were directly involved in the implementation of the CSI (including UNDP), acknowledged that the report's recommendations had little effect as an entry point for their governance programming.

Furthermore, a common experience shared by the stakeholders was the perception that the process of implementation had been weak regarding the construction of new networks, linkages and partnerships within or outside civil society. The aim of 'opening the wider constituency dialog beyond the usual CSO suspect' was also commonly considered as poorly achieved.

One of the possible explanations for the difficulties faced, may be due to the underestimation of the national challenges while adapting the work methodology. Several characteristics had to be taken into account and the methodology adjusted accordingly in the case of Mozambique. The country's internal challenges in its multiple dimensions: logistics, human resources training, language, etc. had to be addressed to the extent possible by the technical team, but the combination of CIVICUS model with budgetary constraints and the innovation represented by this approach in Mozambique had consequences.

The lack of qualified human resources at the CSO level to be able to implement the questionnaires had a clear impact on the expected effects of the process. In some provinces, for example, sessions of debate and consultation with the civil society took the form of "micro" training sessions. Without basic tools to absorb, digest, and process the debate, the opportunities that were potentially opened throughout the process, many of the likely initiatives, eventually lost momentum. Therefore, the impact of the participatory methodology ran short of expectations.

The characteristics and challenges that Mozambique has in terms of its infrastructure and logistics have been somewhat underestimated upstream and downstream in the planning of the study. To give an idea of the complexity of the organization of the fieldwork in Mozambique, one of the interviewees mentioned the lack of reliable information on the condition of roads in the country. The sudden collapse of a bridge could be a significant delay in transporting the team, increasing costs and complicating the fieldwork.

In a sparsely populated territory, the work of organizing field teams has been particularly complex. In some less populated areas, the method of choice of location could mean an hour walk to the location of the next survey. However, the interviewees give examples of how some

logistical problems were solved with the help of the local institution's own resources. Where possible, the local institutions made cars, motorbikes or bicycles available to facilitate the transport of the interviewers. It is important to stress however that Mozambique's National Advisory Group (NAG) supported an expansion of the sample beyond the one indicated by CIVICUS.

Despite the fact that the discussion on the definition of the term "civil society" in Mozambique proved extremely fruitful, deciding to, for example, exclude political parties and include many informal organizations, the mobilization of these key players has not been very effective. According to some interviewees, the method used did not allow for many of these informal organizations to be even mapped. One of the suggestions to address this shortcoming would be that the CSI team could remain for longer periods in the field. From a UNDP perspective, the direct consequence of this shortcoming becomes very clear, seeing that the institution is only able to give direct support to formal institutions.

The coincidence of the implementation of the census by the National Statistics Institute (INE) also hampered the conduct of the fieldwork leading to a delay at the beginning of the period (lack of permission to start the fieldwork) for the implementation of the questionnaire. This delay increased the pressure on both the investigators, and the National Review Group (NAG) that would validate the results.

UNDP, and most of donors, still rely on yearly allocations of funds as a basis for activities. This was considered as limiting by many of the CSO. The lack of continuity by the team of staff members that accompanied the process at the UNDP was also identified as a week point.

# The lack of a strong implementation agenda

The second major cause which is said to have diminished the impact of the CSI was the absence of a strong implementing agenda and the final report launch strategy. Although the document is a reference study on the Mozambican civil society, only a very tiny portion of the civil society has managed to incorporate the CSI recommendations on its agendas. In some interviews it was noted that after the launch, they never heard any more regarding initiatives directly related to the CSI.

On several occasions the time and format chosen for the final discussion of the document were highlighted as strategic mistakes. Although the final discussion of the report gathered representatives from all provinces, there was a shared feeling that the report was weakened due to the failure to "bring back" the results of the index through promotion events/divulgation activities in the provinces. Moreover, many of the surveyed organizations, including the UNDP, said the impact of the index in its internal planning has been weakened due to the date of disclosure of the document. Due to the fact that many of the multi-annual plans were already made, they could not readily incorporate the recommendations of the CSI.

Moreover, taking into account the characteristics of Mozambican civil society, the final format of the report, some 110 pages, was regarded by respondents as being too complex and difficult to access for most Civil Society Organizations. Faced with a high degree of informality and difficulties in retaining staff, most of the CSOs are unable to use the index in the form of its final report as a tool for self analysis and programming.

The heavy reliance on external resources for the financing of most Civil Society Organizations also leaves them vulnerable in terms of the orientation of their strategies. The CSO know the themes and priorities set by donors, including topics such as child labour, HIV-AIDS, etc. Being dependent on donor resources, the CSO strategy often turns out to be directed at raising funds, and not necessarily geared to the findings of the index and the strengthening these institutions.

Even thought the UNDP and the FDC established a common agenda for implementing some of the recommendations of CSI, the national implementation turned out to be ineffective. The lack of continuity in the UNDP staff involved in the work with the CSI weakened its institutional memory and ability to pass on the experiences with the project to the evaluators.

# *Conclusions and Recommendations*

Although it has been difficult to single out and isolate the precise effects of the Index in different levels,  the collective benefit derived from the involvement of the UNDP in the implementation of the CSI project became quite clear during the interviews. As discussed, the main outcomes were the production of an important source of information regarding the CS, as well as the involvement of multiple stakeholders in the debate on civil society.

This achievement is particularly important in the Mozambican context, where the implementation of a process of this magnitude in itself is a major challenge. With the awakening of the consciousness of the CS, it was possible to identify clear and varied alternatives, making all stakeholders aware that their actions towards the improvement of civil society not only depends on external factors. In this sense, UNDP was able to advance the goal of strengthening the Mozambican society, generating a wealth of useful information, which can even be used to inform their own future actions.

The difficulties in implementing the recommendations of the index after its launch, and the failure to promote its use as a reference for programming and governance, are intrinsically related to the challenges in the country. With this conclusion, it seems clear that future initiatives should take these challenges into account, including a longer period of training and capacity building in the process.

It is important to remember that the logistical challenges of the Mozambican reality, together with the huge challenges facing the general population, were identified as the main causes for the lower-than-expected impact of the mobilization of the CS during the process. As mentioned, the existence of a significant group of informal organizations require a much greater degree of permanence and involvement in order to deepen the knowledge about the informal organizations and enhance the capacity of all parts of civil society to participate throughout the process. For an eventual return to the field, reinforcements in the preparation and resources made available for the study, both for the researchers and the CSOs are recommended.

The above mentioned need for resources also warrants a more demanding and concrete plan for the implementation of the recommendation of a future CSI report. Part of the difficulty in understanding and using the index could possibly have been overcome with the use of more accessible/easily understandable material, which should be oriented to address the specific needs of the organizations. It was noted that the establishment of research fellowships for young researchers who have interest in developing scientific papers based on data from the index, would also be a fundamental style/push to enhance its use.

If the Mozambican experience with the implementation of the index is compared to that of other countries, we could easily be led to think that the progress was modest, and that many of the expected targets were not met. However, a more in-depth analysis reveals that given the Mozambican context and the challenges that the Mozambican Civil Society is facing, the implementation of the index represented very significant and important achievements.

# *Annex*

## *List of interviewees:*

### *Fundação para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário (FDC):*
1.Albino Maria Francisco e Cristiano Pernambuco

### *Plataforma nacional das organizações da sociedade civil moçambicana para a participação nos Observatórios de Pobreza/Desenvolvimento (G20)*
2.Paulo Cuinica

### *Programa das Nações Unidas Para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD)*
3.Naomi Kitahara
4.Alice Madeira
5.Els Berhgmans

### *Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil (MASC)*
6.João Pereira

### *Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE)*
7.António Francisco

### *Fundação Aga-Khan*
8.Agostinho Mamade e Djamila Carvalho

### *Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil (CESC)*
9.Paula Monjane e Albertina Mucavele