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THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY AND ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY IMPACT MONITORING SURVEY - MOLDOVA 2019

Chisinau 2019



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SNIA (NATIONAL INTEGRITY AND ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY) 2017-2020 GRADE OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT INDICATORS

AIM OF THE STRATEGY: INTEGRITY IN PLACE OF CORRUPTION

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	Public agents	General average
1	C3 / A4	F2.18/F3.4	The share of respondents who consider that the phenomenon of corruption is not a problem in Moldova <i>1= Corruption in Moldova is a very serious problem....</i> <i>10 = Corruption in Moldova is not a problem at all</i>	% grades 8-10	I - 2017	2%	6%	8%	5%
					II - 2019	2%	2%	9%	4%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value					
2	C3 / A4	F2.18/F3.4	Perception of corruption as a problem in Moldova <i>1= Corruption in Moldova is a very serious problem....</i> <i>10 = Corruption in Moldova is not a problem at all ...</i>	Average grades 1-10	I - 2017	1.9	2.2	3.1	2.4
					II - 2019	1.8	2.1	3.3	2.4
				Target: gradual increase in average value					
3	C4 / A5	F2.19/ F3.5	Five most important causes of corruption in Moldova	Scale 0% - 100%					
			• Low salaries in the public sector		I - 2017	44%	51%	76%	57%
					II - 2019	43%	43%	66%	51%
			• The mentality of asking for and giving bribes (money and / or goods)		I - 2017	42%	59%	55%	52%
					II - 2019	46%	56%	45%	49%
			• Corrupt persons are not sanctioned / punished		I - 2017	44%	45%	27%	39%
					II - 2019	57%	51%	40%	49%
			• The wealth gained from the corruption of the officials is not confiscated		I - 2017	43%	39%	33%	38%
	II - 2019	46%	48%	36%	43%				
			• Mild punishments, which do not discourage involvement in acts of corruption	I - 2017	43%	37%	28%	36%	
				II - 2019	48%	45%	31%	41%	
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value					
4	C5 / A6	F2.20/F3.6	The share of respondents who consider that the level of corruption in Moldova has decreased (slightly / considerably)	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	14%	23%	39%	25%
					II - 2019	8%	18%	18%	17%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value					
5	D1	F2.22	Share of respondents consider any corruption situation unacceptable: 7 corruption situations for the population and 5 for business	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	45%	61%	-	53%
					II - 2019	62%	83%	-	73%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value					
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on indicators 1, 2, 4, 5: <i>Percentage values transformed into scores from 1 to 10 (for example 2% = 0.2; 39% = 3.9)</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017	2.0	2.8	2.6	2.5
					II - 2019	2.2	3.3	2,0	2.5

GENERAL OBJECTIVE 1: DISCOURAGING INVOLVEMENT IN ACTS OF CORRUPTION

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
6	G2	F2.31	The share of respondents who believe that the fight against corruption in Moldova is effective (<i>quite effective / very effective</i>)	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	15%	20%	18%
					II - 2019	12%	17%	15%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
7	E1.1.3	F2.28	The share of respondents who paid bribes in the form of money during the last year	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	11,3%	3,6%	8,9%
					II - 2019	7%	4,7%	6,3%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
8	E1.1.6	F2.29	The share of respondents who paid bribes in the form of goods during the last year	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	6,2%	3,0%	5,2%
					II - 2019	2,1%	1,8%	2,0%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
9	E1.1.3, E1.1.6	-	Bribe volume (in money and goods) estimated within one year <i>Extrapolation universe: 2 219 352 people aged 18 and over (Census 2014); 52 300 enterprises (National Bureau of Statistics (BNS), 2016), 56 300 (National Bureau of Statistics (BNS), 2018)</i>	MDL	I - 2017	278 millions	127 millions	405 millions
					II - 2019	319,4 millions	197,3 millions	516,7 millions
				Target: gradual decrease in value				
10	E1.1.4	-	Frequency of bribe in money - over a year, on average for a natural / legal person who offered bribe	Average	I - 2017	3,7	6,1	4,5
					II - 2019	5,4	3,5	4,8
				Target: the gradual decrease of the average value				
11	E2	-	The share of respondents who paid bribes (money and / or goods) to women and men (<i>out of total respondents</i>)	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	W - 5,9%	W - 1,0%	W - 4,4%
						M - 3,3%	M - 2,2%	M - 2,9%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
	INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR		Integrated indicator based on indicators 6-8 <i>Percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example 2% = score 0.2; 39% = score 3.9). For the specific indicators with diminution target, was taken the opposite value when calculating the integrated indicator.</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017	3.4	2.9	3.2
					II - 2019	3.2	3.0	3.1
				Target: the gradual decrease of the average value				

GENERAL OBJECTIVE 2: RECOVERY OF PROPERTY FROM CORRUPTION OFFENSES

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
12	H1	F2.32	The share of respondents who believe that public agents are forced to return money and assets from acts of corruption (often / very often / always) <i>Percentage average based on 11 categories of public agents</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	7%	3%	5,7%
					II - 2019	5%	2%	4,1%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
13	H1	F2.32	Perception on imposing the public agents to return the money and the goods from acts of corruption <i>1 = Never ... 6 = Always</i> <i>Average based on 11 categories of public agents</i>	Average score 1-6	I - 2017	1.8	1.7	1.8
					II - 2019	1.5	1.5	1.5
				Target: the gradual decrease of the average value				
14	H2.1	F2.33	The share of respondents who have faced corruption situations in 12 months and have been reimbursed the damage caused <i>Integrated percentage based on 7 corruption cases for the population and 5 corruption cases for the business</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	14%	14%	14%
					II - 2019	17%	8%	14%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on the indicators 12-14 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.2; 39% = score 3.9)</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017	1.3	1.1	1.2
					II - 2019	1.2	0.8	1.1
				Target: the gradual decrease of the average value				

GENERAL OBJECTIVE 3: ETHICS AND INTEGRITY IN THE PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND NON-GOVERNMENT SECTORS

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
15	E1.1.2.	F2.27	The share of respondents satisfied (satisfied / very satisfied) with the interaction with public agents <i>Percentage average based on 29 (categories) public institutions</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	48%	59%	51%
					II - 2019	52%	56%	53%
					Target: gradual increase in percentage value			
16	E1.1.2.	F2.27	The level of satisfaction of the respondents by the interaction with the public agents <i>1= Very dissatisfied ... 5 = Very satisfied</i> <i>Average based on 29 (categories) public institutions</i>	Average grades 1-5	I - 2017	3.3	3.5	3.4
					II - 2019	3.3	3.4	3.3
					Target: gradual increase in average value			
17	K1	F2.41	Respondents' perception on ethics and integrity in public sector activity <i>1= Corruption, lack of ethics and integrity</i> <i>10 = Ethics and total integrity and lack of corruption</i>	Average grades 1-10	I - 2017	4.4	4.8	4.5
					II - 2019	4.7	4.9	4.8
					Target: gradual increase in average value			
18	K1	F2.41	Respondents' perception of ethics and integrity in the activity of the private sector (enterprises) <i>1= Corruption, lack of ethics and integrity</i> <i>10 = Ethics and total integrity and lack of corruption</i>	Average grades 1-10	I - 2017	4.6	5.6	4.9
					II - 2019	4.9	6.4	5.4
					Target: gradual increase in average value			
19	K1	F2.41	Respondents' perception of ethics and integrity in the mass media activity <i>1= Corruption, lack of ethics and integrity</i> <i>10 = Ethics and total integrity and lack of corruption</i>	Average grades 1-10	I - 2017	4.8	5.6	5.1
					II - 2019	4.9	5.6	5.1
					Target: gradual increase in average value			
20	K1	F2.41	Respondents' perception of ethics and integrity in NGO activity <i>1= Corruption, lack of ethics and integrity</i> <i>10 = Ethics and total integrity and lack of corruption</i>	Average grades 1-10	I - 2017	5.3	6.4	5.6
					II - 2019	5.3	6.2	5.6
					Target: gradual increase in average value			
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on the indicators 15-20 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.2; 39% = score 3.9)</i>	Average grades 1-10	I - 2017	5.1	5.9	5.4
					II - 2019	5.3	5.4	5.3
					Target: gradual increase in average value			

GENERAL OBJECTIVE 4: PROTECTION OF WHISTLE-BLOWERS AND CORRUPTION VICTIMS

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
21	H2&H3	-	The share of respondents who have faced with acts of corruption within 12 months	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	31%	30%	31%
					II - 2019	17%	20%	18%
Target: gradual decrease in percentage value								
22	J1	F2.35	The share of respondents who have faced with acts of corruption within 12 months and reported them	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	10%	7%	9%
					II - 2019	10%	9%	10%
Target: gradual increase in percentage value								
23	J3	-	The share of respondents who reported acts of corruption they faced within 12 months and did not suffer, the guilty person being held accountable	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	25%	38%	29%
					II - 2019	6%	0%	4%
Target: gradual increase in percentage value								
24	J4	F2.36	The share of respondents who did NOT report acts of corruption they faced within 12 months, because they consider that there is no protection for those who report acts of corruption	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	36%	38%	37%
					II - 2019	22%	15%	20%
Target: gradual decrease in percentage value								
25	J8	F2.40	The share of respondents who believe (<i>to a large extent / absolutely convinced</i>) that they will be protected in the event of denouncing an act of corruption which they have suffered	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	3%	4%	3%
					II - 2019	4%	5%	4%
Target: gradual increase in percentage value								
26	J8	-	The perception of the respondents on the protection in case of denouncing an act of corruption as a result of which they suffered 1= I do not think at all ... 5 = I am absolutely convinced that I will be protected	Average grades 1-5	I - 2017	1.82	1.90	1.85
					II - 2019	1.9	2.2	2.0
Target: gradual increase in average value								
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on the indicators 21-26 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.2; 39% = score 3.9). For the specific indicators with diminution target, was taken the opposite value when calculating the integrated indicator.</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017	3.2	3.4	3.3
					II - 2019	3.3	3.4	3.3
Target: gradual increase in average value								

GENERAL OBJECTIVE 5: TRANSPARENCY OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, PARTY FINANCING AND THE MASS MEDIA

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
27	L1	F2.42	The share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in the activity of the executive and legislative power as <i>Fairly transparent / Very transparent</i> <i>Percentage average based on 3 categories of central institutions (Presidency, Parliament and Government)</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	20%	18%	19%
					II - 2019	20%	20%	20%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
28	L2.1	F2.43	The share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in the activity of public institutions at central level as <i>Fairly transparent / Very transparent</i> <i>Percentage average based on 5 categories of activities (making decisions, spending public money, procurement, informing citizens, executing works of public interest)</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	17%	19%	18%
					II - 2019	15%	17%	16%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
29	L2.2	F2.44	The share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in the activity of public institutions at local level as <i>Fairly transparent / Very transparent</i> <i>1= It is not transparent at all ... 4 = Very transparent</i> <i>Percentage average based on 5 categories of activities (making decisions, spending public money, procurement, informing citizens, executing works of public interest)</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	38%	30%	36%
					II - 2019	25%	24%	25%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
30	L3	F2.45	The share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in the financing of political parties as <i>Fairly transparent / Very transparent</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	7%	7%	7%
					II - 2019	5%	5%	5%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
31	L3	F2.45	The share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in the financing of election campaigns as <i>Fairly transparent / Very transparent</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	8%	8%	8%
					II - 2019	5%	7%	6%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
32	L3	F2.45	The share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in mass media financing as <i>Fairly transparent / Very transparent</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	15%	13%	14%
					II - 2019	10%	8%	9%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
33	L3	F2.45	The share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in the financing of NGOs as <i>Fairly transparent / Very transparent</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	20%	20%	20%
					II - 2019	12%	12%	12%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on the indicators 27-33 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.2)</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017	1.8	1.6	1.7
					II - 2019	1.3	1.3	1.3
				Target: gradual increase in average value				

GENERAL OBJECTIVE 6: EDUCATION OF THE SOCIETY AND OFFICERS

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
34	D2	F2.23	Respondents' attitude towards informal payments <i>1= I prefer the system of informal payments because I have faster access to services... 10 = I prefer not to have the system of informal payments even if it would mean a longer access to services</i>	Average grades 1-10	I - 2017	8.3	7.9	8.2
					II - 2019	8.7	7.9	8.5
				Target: gradual increase in average value				
35	D3	F2.24	The share of respondents who prefer to solve problems with public authorities by officially addressing the institution, without resorting to acquaintances and gratitude	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017	73%	76%	74%
					II - 2019	74%	85%	77%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
36	D4	F2.25	The share of respondents who believe that if they denounce the fact that they gave a bribe to a public agent (voluntary or forced), then only the public agent will be held responsible	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017	16%	17%	16%
					II - 2019	14%	7%	12%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
37	M1	F2.52	Factors that would cause respondents to get involved in actions to reduce corruption (<i>Top 3 factors</i>)	Scale 0% -100%				
			To be sure that I will be protected against the official I denounce		I - 2017	43%	40%	42%
			To be sure that the justice in the Republic of Moldova is independent		II - 2019	32%	30%	31%
			To know what rights I have as a citizen in front of civil servants and their obligations towards me		I - 2017	34%	57%	41%
					II - 2019	32%	53%	39%
					I - 2017	31%	28%	30%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
38	M2	F2.53	Share of respondents who have heard / seen <i>much / very much</i> information about anticorruption activities in the last 12 months <i>Percentage average for 2 categories of information</i>	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017	30%	48%	36%
					II - 2019	36%	48%	40%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
39	N1	F2.54	Share of economic agents who have received training in business ethics and integrity in the relations with the state	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017	-	22%	22%
					II - 2019	-	19%	19%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on the indicators 34, 35, 36, 38, 39 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.2)</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017	5.1	4.8	5.0
					II - 2019	5.0	4.8	4.9
				Target: gradual increase in average value				

PILLAR I. PARLIAMENT

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
Confidence in Parliament has improved considerably								
40	B1	F2.3	The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the Parliament	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	5% 11%	8% 9%	6% 10%
Target: gradual increase in percentage value								
Improved perception about corruption within the legislature								
41	C1	F2.14	The share of respondents who appreciate the Parliament <i>Not at all corrupted or Slightly corrupted</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	13% 18%	12% 17%	13% 18%
Target: gradual increase in percentage value								
42	C2	F2.17	The share of respondents who value Parliament as <i>The most corrupt institution</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	32% 29%	32% 13%	32% 24%
Target: gradual decrease in percentage value								
Increased efficiency of parliamentary control								
43	B3	F2.7	The share of respondents who argue that Parliament controls <i>To a large extent / To a very large extent</i> how the laws it adopts work	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	10% 8%	17% 9%	12% 8%
Target: gradual increase in percentage value								
Improved quality of regulations								
44	B2	F2.6	Respondents' perception on the functionality of the laws <i>1= Laws in the Republic of Moldova do not work at all / Laws in the Republic of Moldova apply only to some... 10 = Laws in the Republic of Moldova work very well / Laws of the Republic of Moldova apply equally to all</i>	Average grades 1-10	I - 2017 II - 2019	3.6 3.3	4.4 3.7	4.0 3.4
Target: gradual increase in average value								
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on the indicators 40-44 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.239% = score 3.9). For the specific indicators with diminution target, was taken the opposite value when calculating the integrated indicator;</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017 II - 2019	2.6 2.8	3,0 3.2	2.7 2.9
Target: gradual increase in average value								

PILLAR II. PUBLIC SECTOR AND LOCAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
Confidence in the Government has greatly improved								
45	B1	F2.3	The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the Government	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	8% 12%	12% 11%	9% 12%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
Improved confidence in central and local public authorities								
46	B1	F2.3	The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the LPA (local public administration) at district level	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	15% 10%	14% 12%	15% 11%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
47	B1	F2.3	The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the Mayoralty / in the local council	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	28% 25%	22% 16%	26% 22%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
The perception of corruption within the executive has significantly improved								
48	C1	F2.14	The share of respondents who appreciate the Government <i>Not at all corrupted or Slightly corrupted</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	13% 17%	13% 19%	13% 18%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
49	C2	F2.17	The share of respondents who appreciate the Government as <i>The most corrupt institution</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	22% 23%	3% 12%	16% 20%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
The disciplinary violations of the public agents are sanctioned								
50	G1	F2.30	The share of respondents who believe that public agents are sanctioned by leaders for lack of ethics and professional integrity (<i>Often / Very often / Always</i>)	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	9% 9%	10% 7%	9% 8%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
Increased decision-making transparency and transparency of government data								
51	L1	F2.42	The share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in the activity of the Government as <i>Fairly transparent / Very transparent</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	17% 20%	18% 21%	17% 20%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
52	L2	F2.43	The share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency of public institutions at central level in the decision-making process as <i>Fairly transparent / Very transparent</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	19% 17%	22% 21%	20% 18%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
53	L2	F2.43	Share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency of public institutions at central level in the process of spending public money, public procurement and execution of works and services of public interest as <i>Fairly transparent / Very transparent</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	14%	17%	15%
					II - 2019	14%	16%	15%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
54	L4	F2.46	The share of respondents who have requested information from public institutions at central level in the last 12 months	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	5%	15%	8%
					II - 2019	4%	7%	5%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
55	L4	F2.46	The share of respondents who have requested information from public institutions at local level in the last 12 months	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	19%	36%	24%
					II - 2019	11%	27%	16%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
56	L5	F2.47	The share of respondents who have requested information from public institutions at central level in the last 12 months and have received a response	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	75%	95%	81%
					II - 2019	74%	85%	77%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
57	L5	F2.47	The share of respondents who have requested information from public institutions at local level in the last 12 months and have received a response	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	87%	94%	89%
					II - 2019	76%	87%	79%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
58	L6	F2.48	Satisfaction level of respondents who have requested information from public institutions at central or local level in the last 12 months and have received a response <i>1= Not at all satisfied ... 10 = Very satisfied</i>	Average grades 1-10	I - 2017	7.7	7.4	7.6
					II - 2019	7.9	8.0	7.9
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
59	L7	F2.50	The share of respondents who have used at least one electronic public service in the last 12 months	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	17%	70%	34%
					II - 2019	14%	69%	31%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
60	L8	F2.51	Share of respondents satisfied (<i>Pretty satisfied / Very satisfied</i>) Share of respondents satisfied (<i>Very satisfied / Very satisfied</i>) by electronic public services	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	79%	93%	83%
					II - 2019	88%	90%	89%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on the indicators 45-60 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.239% = score 3.9). For the specific indicators with diminution target, was taken the opposite value when calculating the integrated indicator;</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017	3.5	4.4	3.8
					II - 2019	3.4	4.1	3.6
				Target: gradual increase in average value				

PILLAR III. JUSTICE AND ANTICORRUPTION AUTHORITIES

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average	
Confidence in justice, in the prosecutor's office, in the National Anticorruption Center and in the National Integrity Authority, considerably improved									
61	B1	F2.4	The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in Justice	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	11%	13%	12%	
62			The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the Prosecutor's Office		II - 2019	7%	7%	7%	
63			The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the CNA (National Anticorruption Center)		I - 2017	10%	11%	10%	
64			The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the ANI (National Integrity Agency)		II - 2019	7%	7%	7%	
						I - 2017	17%	22%	19%
						II - 2019	9%	9%	9%
						I - 2017	10%	14%	11%
						II - 2019	5%	7%	6%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value					
Independence and efficiency of justice, prosecutor's office, National Anticorruption Center and National Integrity Authority, ensured									
65	B7	F2.12	The share of respondents who appreciate the activity of the CNA (National Anticorruption Center) <i>Good / Very good</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	18%	20%	19%	
66			The share of respondents who appreciate the activity of the ANI (National Integrity Agency) <i>Good / Very good</i>		II - 2019	9%	11%	10%	
67			The share of respondents who appreciate the activity of the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office <i>Good / Very good</i>		I - 2017	10%	11%	10%	
68			The share of respondents who appreciate the activity of the Courts <i>Good / Very good</i>		II - 2019	6%	7%	6%	
						I - 2017	15%	18%	16%
						II - 2019	8%	9%	8%
						I - 2017	11%	16%	13%
						II - 2019	8%	8%	8%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value					
69	B8	F2.13	Share of respondents who consider the CNA (National Anticorruption Center) as a totally independent institution	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	10%	7%	9%	
70			Share of respondents who consider the ANI (National Integrity Agency) as a totally independent institution		II - 2019	7%	5%	6%	
71			Share of respondents who consider the Prosecutor's Office as a totally independent institution		I - 2017	6%	5%	6%	
72			Share of respondents who consider the Courts as a totally independent institution		II - 2019	6%	5%	6%	
						I - 2017	7%	6%	7%
						II - 2019	6%	4%	5%
						I - 2017	7%	7%	7%
						II - 2019	6%	4%	5%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value					
73	J2	-	The share of respondents who have faced acts of corruption and reported these acts to anti-corruption agencies (CNA (National Anticorruption Center), ANI (National Integrity Agency), Anticorruption prosecutor's office)	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	44%	64%	50%	
					II - 2019	55%	67%	59%	

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
74	J3	-	The share of respondents who faced acts of corruption, have reported them, but suffered or the guilty person was not held responsible	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	75% 66%	62% 89%	71% 73%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
75	J7	F2.39	The share of respondents who would prefer to report acts of corruption to anticorruption agencies by different means	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	86% 87%	85% 87%	86% 87%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
The perception of corruption in the justice sector, improved								
76	C1	F2.14	The share of respondents who appreciate the Courts <i>Not at all corrupt or Slightly corrupt</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	11%	12%	11%
77			The share of respondents who appreciate the ANI (National Integrity Agency) <i>Not at all corrupt or Slightly corrupt</i>		II - 2019	11%	8%	10%
78			The share of respondents who appreciate the CNA (National Anticorruption Center) <i>Not at all corrupt or Slightly corrupt</i>		I - 2017	21%	19%	20%
79			The share of respondents who appreciate the Prosecutor's Office <i>Not at all corrupt or Slightly corrupt</i>		II - 2019	12%	14%	13%
80			The share of respondents who appreciate the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office <i>Not at all corrupt or Slightly corrupt</i>		I - 2017	24%	22%	23%
					II - 2019	17%	15%	16%
					I - 2017	11%	13%	12%
					II - 2019	11%	9%	10%
					I - 2017	19%	18%	19%
					II - 2019	15%	11%	14%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
81	C2	F2.17	The share of respondents who appreciate the Courts as <i>The most corrupt institution</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	21%	8%	17%
82			The share of respondents who appreciate the ANI (National Integrity Agency) as <i>The most corrupt institution</i>		II - 2019	26%	37%	29%
83			The share of respondents who appreciate the CNA (National Anticorruption Center) as <i>The most corrupt institution</i>		I - 2017	0,3%	0,8%	0,5%
84			The share of respondents who appreciate the Prosecutor's Office as <i>The most corrupt institution</i>		II - 2019	0,4%	0,2%	0,3%
85			The share of respondents who appreciate the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office as <i>The most corrupt institution</i>		I - 2017	3%	4%	3%
					II - 2019	3%	5%	4%
					I - 2017	10%	6%	9%
					II - 2019	18%	20%	19%
					I - 2017	2%	1%	2%
					II - 2019	7%	10%	8%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
86	B5	F2.10	The share of respondents who argue that justice in the Republic of Moldova is not influenced by political interests, Government and the interest of enrichment of judges <i>Integrated percentage (those who responded not to all 3 types of influences)</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	3% 6%	3% 5%	3% 5%

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR	Integrated indicator based on the indicators 61-86 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.239% = score 3.9). For the specific indicators with diminution target, was taken the opposite value when calculating the integrated indicator;</i>			Average score 1-10	I - 2017	3.2	3.5	3.3
					II - 2019	3.0	2.9	2.97
				Target: gradual increase in average value				

PILLAR IV. CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION AND POLITICAL PARTIES

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
Confidence in the Central Election Commission is improved								
87	B1	F2.3	The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the CEC (Central Election Commission)	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	12%	17%	14%
					II - 2019	7%	10%	8%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
88	B4	F2.8	Share of respondents who consider that the elections in the Republic of Moldova are <i>Rather fair and free or they Are always free and fair</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	11%	26%	16%
					II - 2019	25%	23%	24%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
Confidence in political parties has improved								
89	B1	F2.3	The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the political parties	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017	4%	6%	5%
					II - 2019	4%	5%	4%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR	Integrated indicator based on the indicators 87-89 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.239% = score 3.9).</i>			Average score 1-10	I - 2017	0.9	1.6	1.1
					II - 2019	1.2	1.3	1.2
				Target: gradual increase in average value				

PILLAR V. COURT OF ACCOUNTS

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
The confidence in the Court of Accounts has improved								
87	B1	F2.3	The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the Court of Accounts	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	10% 6%	16% 9%	12% 7%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
The independence of the audit carried out by the Court of Accounts, ensured								
89	B6	F2.11	The share of respondents who consider that the audit carried out by the Court of Accounts at public institutions is independent	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	11% 8%	15% 9%	12% 8%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on the indicators 87-89 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.239% = score 3.9).</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017 II - 2019	1.1 0.7	1.6 0.9	1.3 0.8
				Target: gradual increase in average value				

PILLAR VI. PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE (OMBUDSMAN)

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
Confidence in the People's Advocate has improved								
92	B1	F2.3	The share of respondents who have <i>Enough or Very much confidence</i> in the People's Advocate	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	11% 9%	13% 11%	12% 10%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
Respect for fundamental rights, insured								
93	A1	F2.1	Respondents' perception of respect for common human rights in the Republic of Moldova <i>1= They are not respected at all ... 10 = They are fully respected</i>	Average grades 1-10	I - 2017 II - 2019	3.6 3.3	4.8 4.4	4.0 3.6
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
94	A2	F2.2	The share of respondents who are aware that any corruption case automatically leads to human rights violations <i>Integrated percentage of 5 statements (those who answered Total agreement to all 5 statements)</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	73% 73%	79% 94%	75% 80%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
The share of people who fail to report corruption for fear of persecution, reduced								
95	J1	F2.35	The share of respondents who have faced acts of corruption in the last 12 months and have NOT reported them	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	82% 80%	80% 74%	81% 78%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
96	J4	F2.36	The share of respondents who have faced acts of corruption in the last 12 months and did NOT report them because of <i>fear not to suffer later on a personal or professional level</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	34% 14%	32% 16%	33% 15%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
97	J5	F2.37	The share of respondents who would NOT report acts of corruption, <i>if they would face them</i> (Probably not / Of course not)	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	32% 27%	31% 23%	32% 26%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
98	J6	F2.38	The share of respondents who would NOT report acts of corruption, <i>if they faced them</i> because of the <i>fear not to suffer later on a personal or professional level</i>	Scale 0% - 100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	40% 29%	47% 22%	42% 27%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on the indicators 92-98 <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example, 2% = score 0.239% = score 3.9). For the specific indicators with diminution target, was taken the opposite value when calculating the integrated indicator;</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017 II - 2019	4.7 5.2	5.0 5.9	4.8 5.4
				Target: gradual increase in average value				

PILLAR VII. PRIVATE SECTOR

#	Question code	Figure number	Measurement indicator	Value	Value number	Population	Business	General average
Reduced risks of corruption and bribe level offered in the private sector, diminished								
99	N4	F2.62	The share of economic agents who say they have not faced corruption in the interaction with public agents	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	- -	53% 74%	53% 74%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
Business freedom from corruption, ensured								
100	N2	F2.60	The share of the economic agents who claim that the <i>phenomenon of corruption in the judicial, fiscal, customs quality control system of products and in public procurement procedures</i> is among the main obstacles in their activity	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	- -	32% 29%	32% 29%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
101	N3	F2.61	The share of the economic agents who claim that their activity <i>It is not affected at all</i> by political interests	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	- -	51% 64%	51% 64%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
102	N6	-	The share of economic agents who have a code of ethics within the company <i>Sampling basis: small, medium and large enterprises</i>	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	- -	81% 82%	81% 82%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
Risk degree on money laundering, reduced								
103	M3	F2.56	The share of respondents who prefer to purchase goods and services by bank / card transfer	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	24% 19%	- -	24% 19%
				Target: gradual increase in percentage value				
104	M3	F2.57	The share of respondents who do NOT prefer to purchase goods and services by bank or card transfer, because it is uncomfortable or they do not trust banks	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	61% 62%	- -	61% 62%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
105	N7	F2.58	Share of economic agents who use cash as a means of payment in the activity of the company in a proportion of 20% and more	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	- -	48% 55%	48% 55%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
106	N8	F2.59	The share of economic agents who consider that the use of cash as a means of payment offers the possibility of avoiding the payment of taxes	Scale 0% -100%	I - 2017 II - 2019	- -	19% 17%	19% 17%
				Target: gradual decrease in percentage value				
INTEGRATED GENERAL INDICATOR			Integrated indicator based on the indicators 99-106: <i>The percentage values are converted into scores from 1 to 10 (for example 2% = 0.2, 39% = 3.9). For the specific indicators with diminution target, was taken the opposite value when calculating the integrated indicator;</i>	Average score 1-10	I - 2017 II - 2019	3.2 2,9	6.4 7,0	4.2 4.2
				Target: gradual increase in average value				

Introduction

This report serves as a tool for assessing the impact of the National Integrity and Anticorruption Strategy 2017-2020. The report includes the results of the end-line study, which serve as a basis for assessing the results of the National Integrity and Anticorruption Strategy 2017-2020 in relation to the baseline study, which serves as a starting point for assessing the implementation of SNIA (National Integrity and Anticorruption Strategy).

The study was carried out within the Project "Curbing Corruption by Building Sustainable Integrity in Moldova" implemented by the UNDP Moldova with the financial support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The purpose of the study is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the efficiency and impact of the implementation of the National Integrity and Anticorruption Strategy (SNIA) 2017-2020, based on the impact and progress indicators stipulated in the strategy, as well as to better understand the public's experience and perception about corruption.

The questions formulated in the questionnaire were based on the purpose, the general objectives, the pillars and the impact and progress indicators set out in Annex 3 of SNIA (National Integrity and Anticorruption Strategy) 2017-2020.

- In general, the study focused on the following general topics:
- Assessing the perception of the level of corruption
- Assessing the experience with the phenomenon of corruption
- Assessing the level of stability of anticorruption values in the society
- Assessing the population's knowledge of the main mechanisms for preventing corruption and the degree of satisfaction with the state anticorruption policy
- Assessing the level of knowledge among the public agents of the 14 main anticorruption policies, in accordance with Priority II. 1 Promoting the integrity of public entities, according to the Action Plan of SNIA (National Integrity and Anticorruption Strategy):
 1. Employment and promotion of public servants on the basis of merit
 2. Compliance with the incompatibilities regime, restrictions in the hierarchy and limitation of advertising
 3. Respecting the regime of declaring the wealth and personal interests
 4. Respecting the regime of conflicts of interest and not accepting favoritism
 5. Respecting the gift regime
 6. Non-admission, denunciation and treatment of undue influences
 7. Non-admission, denunciation of corruption and protection of whistleblowers
 8. Intolerance to incidents of integrity
 9. Ensuring transparency in the decision-making process
 10. Ensuring access to information of public interest
 11. Transparent and responsible management of public assets, reimbursable and non-reimbursable finances
 12. Compliance with the rules of ethics and deontology
 13. Compliance with the legal regime of restrictions and limitations in relation to the termination of mandate, employment or service relationships and the migration of public servants to the private sector (post-mandate employment of the deputy)
 14. Implementation of corruption risk management

The report includes three main chapters:

Socio-demographic profile of respondents;

Results of general population and economic agents survey (structured in 13 paragraphs);
Results of the survey of public agents (structured in 14 paragraphs).

STUDY METHODOLOGY

This study was conducted on the basis of three representative national surveys for the following target groups:

The implementation methodology for each type of survey is described below.

Survey of general population and economic agents

Research method: representative national survey (excluding the Transnistrian region) for the general population and economic agents.

Research technique: face-to-face interview at the place of residence (for the general population) and the job (for economic agents) of the respondent, based on a structured questionnaire.

Method of interviewing: CAPI – Personal interview with the application of the computer.

Target groups:

1. The general population aged 18 and over
2. Active economic agents (who reported activity in 2017)

Target respondent in the case of economic agents: senior management. In most cases were interviewed the persons with the position of director, deputy / executive director, general manager, financial director or the owner of the company. In some cases, were questioned the accountant and other managers.

Sample size:

- The general population aged 18 and over on a sample of 1,120 respondents. Sample error +/- 3%.
- Active economic agents (who reported activity in 2017) on a sample of 506 enterprises. Sample error +/- 4,5%.
- Public agents from the central public administration in Chisinau municipality (ministries, offices, agencies), at the level of district centers and villages on a sample of 606 respondents. Sample error +/- 4%.

Research tool: structured questionnaire, presented by the Client, based on the questionnaire applied in the baseline study. The questionnaire included 503 item-questions for the general population and 522 item-questions for economic agents, including demographic. The questionnaire was pre-tested before working on the field. The working language was Romanian and Russian, depending on the respondent's preferences. 74% of the questionnaires were completed in Romanian and 26% in Russian for the population, and for the economic agents 69% of the questionnaires were completed in Romanian and 31% in Russian.

Average length of the interview: 31 minutes for the general population and 32 minutes for the economic agents.

Period of data collection: 10 iulie – 6 august 2019.

Geographic area: urban and rural environment. The study included 86 localities in the case of the general population and 65 localities in the case of economic agents.

Sample design for the general population

- stratified - 2 stratification criteria were used:
 - region – „13” regions, similar to the former counties;
 - type of the settlement - villages, cities and municipalities;
- volume of the layers - the layers resulting from the stratification included the number of persons aged 18 years and over in the sampling universe.
- probabilistic - the settlements and the respondents were selected according to a probabilistic scheme, each having a probability greater than the zero value of being included in the sample;
- multiple steps - to reduce the research costs was used the sample with multiple stages:
 - the primary sampling unit (UPE) (settlement) – the settlements in each layer were randomly selected according to the principle of probability proportional to size. In total were selected 86 settlements;
 - secondary sampling unit (USE - routes / streets) – USE (secondary sampling unit) from the sampled settlements were randomly selected based on the principle of simple random selection;
 - tertiary sampling unit (UTE - household) – households within USE (secondary sampling unit) were randomly selected based on the principle of simple random selection (no more than 5 households were surveyed within USE (secondary sampling unit));
 - last sampling unit (UUE – respondent) – within the household the respondent was selected according to the principle of the nearest birthday from the date of the visit.

The reference population: all households and persons within the country. The reference data for the sampling scheme were taken from the 2014 population census.

The substitution criterion: in case the initially selected person refused to answer or was not possible to contact after several visits, then was selected the next household on the route.

Sample design for economic agents

- stratified - were used 3 stratification criteria:
 - development region – „4” regions - north, center, south and Chisinau municipality;
 - type of settlement - villages, cities and municipalities;
 - the size of the enterprise - micro (up to 9 employees), small (10-49 employees), medium (50-249 employees) and large (over 250 employees).
- the volume of the layer - the volumes of the layers resulting from the stratification process by region, the type of settlement and the size of the enterprise included the number of enterprises, taken from the database of the National Bureau of Statistics; Only the enterprises that reported economic activity for 2017 were taken into account in calculating the volume of the layers.
- probabilistic - the settlements and enterprises were selected on the basis of a probabilistic scheme, each settlement and enterprise having the probability of being included in the sample greater than the zero value; ➤ with multiple stages - to optimize the costs of the survey, was used the multistage sampling scheme:
 - primary sampling unit (UPE) (settlement) – the settlements in each layer included in the sample were randomly selected based on the principle of proportional probability at the size of the settlement.
 - secondary sampling unit (USE – enterprise) – the enterprises in the settlements included in the sample were randomly selected based on the simple random selection procedure.

The sampling frame: the list of all settlements at the first sampling stage and the list of all the enterprises within each primary sampling unit (UPE).

The substitution criterion: in the event that the initially selected enterprise refused to respond or could not be contacted after several visits, then was selected the next enterprise from the list.

Weighting: The profile of the obtained sample was weighted according to the official statistical data - for the population were weighted the variable sex and age groups, and for the economic agents was weighted the size of the enterprise.

Survey of public agents

Research methods: representative national survey for public agents.

Research technique: face-to-face interview at the respondent's workplace, based on a structured questionnaire.

Method of interviewing: CAPI – Personal computer-assisted interview.

Target groups:

1. Public agents from the central public administration from the Chisinau municipality (ministries, offices, agencies)
2. Public agents at the level of district centers and villages

Sample size: 606 respondents.

Research tool: structured questionnaire, developed by the CIVIS Center in collaboration with the Client for the base-line survey in 2017. The questionnaire comprised 290 item-questions, including demographic. The questionnaire was pre-tested before working on the field. The working language was Romanian and Russian, depending on the respondent's preferences. 90% of the questionnaires were completed in Romanian and 10% in Russian.

Average length of interview: 37 minutes.

Geographic area: urban and rural environment. The study included 85 settlements.

Sample design:

Sampling for the target group 1:

300 questionnaires were distributed in proportion to the number of public agents from the central public administration from the Chisinau municipality. Within each institution were interviewed public agents from different job levels: management level (minister, deputy ministers, directors, vice directors); average level of management (heads of departments, directorates, sections); ordinary public agents (with execution function).

Was drawn up a list of all institutions with the number of employees for each institution. The institutions were structured according to the following groups: Central public authorities; Subordinate authority; Enterprise in which the ministry is a founder; Courts; Managed institution; Subordinated institutions; Prosecutors' Offices; Deconcentrated public services.

The selection of the respondents was made according to the principle of probability proportional to the size and the method of simple random selection within each of the above groups.

Sampling for the target group 2

300 questionnaires were distributed equally for the public authorities / local public agents of level 1 and level 2. The following categories of respondents were interviewed: Level 1 - primary; employee of the mayoralty; professor; family doctor; police officer; Level 2 - management of the district council, employees with execution functions of the district council.

Within each institution was interviewed a representative from the management level and 2-3 representatives of ordinary civil servants.

The procedure for selecting the respondents was similar to that for the target group 1.

Data collection period: 10 July – 6 September 2019.

I. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

1.1 General population and economic agents

Table 1.1 presents the sub-samples resulting from the groups made according to the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample among the population.

Table 1.1. The size of the sub-samples according to the socio-demographic characteristics of the population

		Number
Total		1120
Gender of the respondent:	Male	470
	Female	650
Age of the respondent:	18-35 years	283
	36-59 years	439
	60 years +	398
Respondent's studies:	Primary	140
	Secondary	735
	Higher	240
Residence environment:	Urban	516
	Rural	604
Region:	North	305
	Center	344
	South	256
	Chisinau	215
Ethnicity of the respondent:	Moldavian / Romanian	937
	Russian	45
	Ukrainian	57
	Other	81
Income level:	Low	337
	Average	330
	High	326
Confrontation with acts of corruption:	Yes	170
	No	950
Experience with non-formal payments:	Yes	78
	No	1042

Figure 1.3. Socio-demographic structure of the population sample





Table 1.2. The size of the sub-samples according to the characteristics of the economic agents

		Number	%
Total		506	100,0%
Residence environment:	Urban	432	85,4%
	Rural	74	14,6%
Region:	Chisinau	283	55,9%
	North	84	16,6%
	Center	81	16,0%
	South	58	11,5%
Size:	Micro	338	66,8%
	Small	130	25,7%
	Medium / Large	38	7,5%
Type of enterprise:	Private	467	92,3%
	Other (public, joint venture)	39	7,7%
Form of organization:	LLC (Limited Liability Company)	380	75,1%
	JSC (Joint Stock Company)	34	6,7%
	Other	92	18,2%
Activity sphere:	Construction & Transport	30	5,9%
	Trade	194	38,3%
	HoReCa	52	10,3%
	Other services	45	8,9%
	Another field	185	36,6%
Seniority in activity:	Up to 3 years	58	12,5%
	3-10 years	167	36,1%
	More than 10 years	238	51,4%
Use of cash:	0% (transfer only)	130	25,7%
	Up to 50%	244	48,2%
	More than 50%	132	26,1%
Confrontation with acts of corruption:	Yes	100	19,8%
	No	406	80,2%
Experience with non-formal payments:	Yes	30	5,9%
	No	476	94,1%
Gender of the respondent:	Male	277	54,7%
	Female	229	45,3%
Age of the respondent:	18-35 years	157	31,0%
	36-59 years	270	53,4%
	60 years +	79	15,6%
Level of education:	Secondary	167	33,0%
	Higher	339	67,0%

Figure 1.2. The structure of the sample of economic agents




1.2 Public agents

Table 1.3 presents the sub-samples resulting from the groupings made according to different characteristics of the sample among the public agents.

Table 1.3. The size of the sub-samples according to the characteristics of the public agents

		2017		2019	
		Number	%	Number	%
Total		611	100%	606	100%
Gender of the respondent:	Male	290	47,5%	222	47,5%
	Female	321	52,5%	384	52,5%
Age of the respondent:	19-35 years	191	31,3%	180	29,9%
	36-50 years	237	38,8%	246	41,0%
	51 years +	183	30,0%	173	29,1%
Level of education:	Secondary Level	59	9,7%	53	8,2%
	Higher Level	552	90,3%	553	91,8%
Residence environment:	Urban	487	79,7%	491	81,1%
	Rural	124	20,3%	115	18,9%
Region:	Chisinau	325	53,2%	296	48,5%
	North	110	18,0%	97	16,0%
	Center	104	17,0%	119	19,7%
	South	72	11,8%	94	15,8%
Type of authority:	Central level authority	117	19,1%	141	23,6%
	Level 2 authority	107	17,5%	87	14,3%
	Level 1 authority	126	20,6%	133	22,5%
	Other institutions at central level	155	25,4%	148	23,9%
	Other institutions at local level	106	17,3%	97	15,7%
Function category:	Senior-level management public office (Minister, Deputy Minister)	22	3,6%	5	1,1%
	Medium-level public management function (head, deputy department head, directorate, section)	262	42,9%	255	44,1%
	Public execution function (senior / principal consultant, consultant / specialist, accountant)	327	53,5%	346	54,8%
Duration of activity:	Up to 2 years	96	15,7%	127	21,4%
	3-5 years	110	18,0%	115	19,5%
	6-10 years	113	18,5%	123	20,7%
	More than 10 years	292	47,8%	238	38,4%

Figure 1.3. Structure of the sample of public agents



II. POPULATION AND ECONOMIC AGENTS SURVEY


2.1. General perceptions

Most of the respondents consider that, in general, in the Republic of Moldova human rights of the ordinary citizens are not respected. Within the studies conducted in 2019 and 2017, the degree of respect for human rights was assessed on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1= are not respected at all, 10 = are fully respected (Figure 2.1 and Table 2 in the annexes 1 and 2). Both studies show similar trends, 83% population (82% in 2017) and 67% business (69% in 2019) have offered scores between 1 and 5. Thus, in the case of the population, approximately every 4th subject considers that human rights are not respected in Moldova.

The average score calculated for this indicator is 3.3 (3.6 in 2017) for the population and 4.4 (4.8) for the business environment. The overall average score on both subsamples in the current study is 3.6 (4.0 in 2017).

The low values for both scores, as well as the decreasing trends recorded in relation to the previous study denote a very low level of the perception of the population and the economic agents on the respect for human rights in Moldova.

Figure 2.1. In general, how much are human rights in the Republic of Moldova respected? (A1)
10-point scale, where 1 - They are not respected at all, and 10 - They are fully respected




Along with measuring the perception of the respect for human rights, the study also measured the level of awareness that any corruption case is a violation of these rights. In this context, both the general population and the economic agents in the majority expressed their agreement with some „everyday / ordinary” corruption situations proposed for the assessment in the study, the share of being over 87% in all cases. The

results of the assessment according to socio-demographic groups are presented in Tables 3-5 in annexes 1 and 2.

It should be mentioned that a share of about 73% of the general population (in both studies carried out) and 94% (79% in 2017) of economic agents are aware that any corruption case implicitly leads to human rights violations, being in agreement with all the 5 statements from Figure 2.2. The general average share constitutes 80% with an increase of the awareness level by about 5 percentage points (p.p.) (75% in 2017).

Noteworthy is the lack of notable differences between men and women in the perception and definition of corruption cases in the light of human rights violations (annex 1, table 3).

Figure 2.2. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (A2)



2.2. Confidence in public institutions

The results of the study reflect a general low level of confidence of the population and the business environment in public institutions in the Republic of Moldova. Considerable share of the respondents mentioned that they have little or no confidence in public institutions (Figure 2.3).


The population gives the highest degree of trust to the *Mayorality / local councils*, which have accumulated about 25% answers *enough confidence / very high confidence*, followed by the *presidency* with 15% such answers. About 12% have accumulated *mass media*, *NGOs*, *Government / ministries*, 11% - *Parliament*, 10% - *LPA (local public administration) at district level (district council)*. The other institutions obtained a confidence level below 10%.

The biggest mistrust the population offered to political parties, 75% answers *I don't trust at all / a little trust*, these being followed by *parliament and prosecutor's office* with 67%, *Central Election Commission* 65%, *Presidency*, *Government / Ministries* with 64%, *Anticorruption prosecutor's office* with 60%. The other institutions have accumulated less than 60% negative connotation responses, i.e. *I don't trust at all / a little trust*.


About the same trends are observed in the case of **business** respondents. The highest confidence was expressed in relation to the *NGOs*, which obtained 17% answers *enough confidence / very high confidence*, followed by the *Mayorality / local councils* with 16%, the *Presidency* and *LPA (local public administration) at district level (district council)* – 12%, *Government / ministries* and *People's Advocate* - 11% such answers, *mass media* and *Central Election Commission* – 10%. The rest of the nominated institutions have accumulated less than 10% affirmative answers.

The **business** expressed the greatest mistrust for the *political parties* with 69% answers *I do not trust at all/ low confidence*, followed by the *Prosecutor's Office* with 62% and the *Courts* with 60% answers with negative connotation. Other institutions have accumulated a vote of no confidence below 60% (Figure 2.3. and Tables 6-13 in the annexes 1 and 2).

Figure 2.3. How much confidence do you have in the following institutions / organizations? (B1)



Business



The study reports on the fact that the population has less confidence in the state institutions in relation to the economic agents, this is observed from comparing the share of the answers *not at all / little trust*.


Also, the „enough / very high confidence” options were expressed by the respondents quite modest. In the case of the **population** these ranged from 14% -30%, and the highest share was accumulated by the mass media. In the case of the **economic agents**, the respective indicator varied between 19% -33%, also the mass media being the institution that enjoys the highest level of trust.

A relatively small number of survey participants could not express the level of trust in relation to certain public institutions, noting that they do not know about their existence. Thus, less known are ANI (National Integrity Agency) (12% population and 16% business) and People's Advocate (10% population and 28% business) (Tables 6-13 in the annexes 1 and 2).

According to the integrated indicators, is observed a decrease in confidence in the law institutions (Figure 2.4). Thus, the degree of confidence in **justice** has decreased by 5 percentage points (p.p.) (7% in 2019 versus 12% in 2017), **prosecutor's office** with 3 percentage points (p.p.) (7% in 2019 versus 10% in 2017), **ANI (National Integrity Agency)** – with 5 percentage points (p.p.) (6% in 2019 versus 11% in 2017). **The National Anticorruption Center (CNA)** has obtained about 9% answers *enough confidence / very high confidence* from the **population** and **business** representatives. In both sub-samples, the degree of confidence is also decreasing, and the overall average of the indicator decreased by 10 percentage points (p.p.) (9% in 2019 versus 19% in 2017)¹.

¹ The trends are also confirmed by the BOP (Barometer of Public Opinion), <http://bop.ipp.md/ro/result/liniar>, in January 2019, compared to the previous study in May 2018, very much confidence / some confidence 17.2% versus 23.4%.

Figure 2.4. Confidence in justice, in the prosecutor's office, in the National Anticorruption Center and in the National Integrity Authority



The general perception expressed by the majority of the participants in the survey is that the laws in the Republic of Moldova do not work. Opinions regarding the degree of operation of the laws were measured on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = the laws don't work at all, 10 = the laws work very well. Thus, 84% (81% in 2017) population and 78% (68% in 2017) business chose values 1 - 5 on the scale, which denotes a low level of population confidence in the functionality of the legislation. (Table 14 in the annexes 1 and 2).

The average score calculated based on the grades allocated for the indicator „the laws in the Republic of Moldova work” is 2.7 (3.8 in 2017) in the case of the population and 4.0 (4.6 in 2017) in the case of the economic agents (Figure 2.5).

In the case of the population, higher average scores were registered in the case of young people aged 18-35, with a high level of education, from Chisinau and South. In the case of the business environment, were recorded higher average scores in the responses of men, young people aged 18-35, from the South, medium / large enterprises, with a working age of up to 3 years, who do not use cash, as well as those who have faced acts of corruption.

Another general perception expressed is that the laws in the Republic of Moldova are not applied equally to all citizens. This opinion is shared by 84% (85% in 2017) population and 85% (77% in 2017) businessmen, who opted for answers 1-5 to the respective question (Table 15 in the annexes 1 and 2).

The average score calculated for the indicator „the laws in the Republic of Moldova apply equally to all” is 3.1 (3.3 in 2017) for the population and 3.3. (4.1 in 2017) for economic agents (on the 10-point scale, where 1 = laws do not apply equally to all, 10 = laws apply equally to all) (Figure 2.5).

In the case of the population, higher average scores were recorded in the responses of young people aged 18-35 years, with a high level of education, from the South, who had the experience of informal payments. In the case of the business environment, higher average scores were recorded in the responses of the residents from the South, medium / large enterprises.

And in assessing the degree of functionality of the laws, as well as their application equally to all citizens, the women and men participating in the study gave similar ratings (the distributions of the answers are very similar).

Thus, the integrated indicator with reference to Respondents’ perception on the functionality of the laws is decreasing in 2019 compared to 2017, on both samples, and the general average was 3.4 in 2019 compared to 4.0 in 2017 (Figure 2.6)

Figure 2.5. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (B2)

Estimate on a scale from 1 to 10 points, where 1 - The laws in the Republic of Moldova do not work at all, and 10 - The laws in the Republic of Moldova work very well. Estimate on a scale from 1 to 10 points, where 1 - The laws in the Republic of Moldova apply only to some, and 10 - The laws in the Republic of Moldova apply equally to all. The average value





Figure 2.6. Respondents perception of the functionality of the laws




The degree to which the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova has control over the functioning of the laws it adopts remains to be very low in the perception of the respondents. About 84% (85% in 2017) population and 82% (76% in 2017) business said that the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova has virtually no control (*has little / very little control / not at all*) on the laws it adopts (Figure 2.7 and Table 16 in the annexes 1 and 2).

Thus, there is a tendency to diminish the efficiency of parliamentary control, expressed by the share of respondents who argue that Parliament controls *To a large extent / To a very large extent* the functioning of the laws it adopts.


The respective indicator constituted in the current study about 8% population (10% in 2017) and 9% economic agents (17% in 2017)

Figure 2.7. To what extent does Parliament control how the laws it adopts work? (B3)




Most of the respondents have not trust in the correctness of the elections in the Republic of Moldova, maintaining a fairly high share of the answers with negative connotation in both 2019 and 2017 studies. Thus, about 69% (74% in 2017) population and 67% business, in both studies, stated that elections in the Republic of Moldova *are always / rather forged* (Figure 2.8 and Table 17 in the annexes 1 and 2). The share of those who believe that the elections *are rather / always correct and free* constitutes 25% (21% in 2017) population and 23% (26% in 2017) business, with a slight positive trend in the case of the population sub-sample.

Figure 2.8. What do you think about the elections in the Republic of Moldova? (B4)




Justice in the Republic of Moldova does not enjoy citizens' trust, being considered influenced by external factors. Respectively, about 75% population and 83% business (83% population and 87% business in 2017) stated that justice is influenced by *political interests*, 66% population and 73% business consider the justice influenced by the *Government* (72% population and 76% business in 2017), and 69% population and 73% business (80% population and 79% business in 2017) - by the *interest of enriching the judges* (Figure 2.9 and Table in the annexes 1 and 2).

Figure 2.9. Is the justice of the Republic of Moldova influenced? (B5)



The related integrated indicator remains quite low, although it has a positive dynamic. About 6% (3% in 2017) of the population and 5% (3% in 2017) economic agents consider that justice in Moldova is totally independent, i.e. it is not influenced by *political interests*, *Government* and the *interest of enrichment of judges*.

Figure 2.10. The share of respondents who argue that justice in the Republic of Moldova is not influenced by political interests, Government and the interest of enrichment of judges




The financial control carried out by the Court of Accounts in public institutions is not considered independent by most of the respondents. Thus, 56% population and 65% business (62% population and 54%

business in 2017) state that the audit of public institutions is politically influenced, and 30% population and 41% business (each third participant in both categories in 2017) considers that the audit is influenced by the Government (Table 19 in the annexes 1 and 2).

Only 8% population and 9% business (11% population and 15% business in 2017) considers that the Court of Accounts shows independence in the auditing process of public entities, the general average decreasing by 4 percentage points (p.p.), by 8% in 2019 compared to 12% in 2017 (Figure 2.11.). According to the profile of the respondents from the **population** sample more pronounced share, exceeding 10%, of those who consider the independent audit is observed among the respondents from the North, those of Russian and Ukrainian ethnicity, with high level of income, and from the **business** - among those from North and South, representatives of medium / large enterprises, of public / joint venture type, of constructions / transport, who only activate by transfer (Table 19 in the annexes 1 and 2).

Figure 2.11. The share of respondents who consider that the audit carried out by the Court of Accounts at public institutions is independent




The current activity of the various authorities with anticorruption attributions have been appreciated quite low. Thus, with the ratings „bad / very bad” were appreciated all the institutions in a proportion of about 40% -48% in the under-**population** sample (30% -40% in 2017) and 36% -41% in the under-**business** sample (24% - 33% in 2017).

Most negative assessments were in relation to the courts within both studies, with 48% population and 41% business in 2019 and 40% population and 33% business in 2017.


The share of those who positively assess the activity of the various authorities with anticorruption attributions is considerably lower, registering a decrease compared to 2017. About 1/10 (1/5 in 2017) of the respondents of both categories assessed positively the activity of the CNA (National Anticorruption Center) and the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office, and the least positive appraisals were expressed in relation to ANI (National Integrity Agency) and the courts. (Figure 2.12 and Tables 20-21 in the annexes 1 and 2).

Figure 2.12. How do you assess the current activity of the following authorities with anticorruption powers? (B7)



The most independent is considered the National Anticorruption Center in relation to other institutions. About half of the population and business representatives consider the CNA (National Anticorruption Center) to be totally or partially independent. At the same time, there is observed a decrease in the perception of the degree of independence for all institutions included in the study in relation to the previous study, the largest decrease by 16 percentage points (p.p.) was observed for the CNA (National Anticorruption Center) and the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office in the case of the **population** and for the Courts in the **business** case (Figure 2.13 and Tables 22-23 in the annexes 1 and 2). The lack of independence of these institutions is asserted by approximately every third (fourth in 2017) respondent of the study.


Figure 2.13. To what extent do you think the following institutions are independent? (B8)



2.3. Perceptions and attitudes about corruption

The perception of the level of corruption in public institutions remains a negative one. Data from studies show that every second respondent believes that in Moldova there is no public institution that is not corrupt. Over half of the surveyed **population** states that the following institutions are quite / very corrupt: Political parties - 53% (63% in 2017), Medical institutions 53% (56% in 2017), Courts 52% (55% in 2017), Police 51% (52% in 2017), General and territorial prosecutor's office 51% (52% in 2017), Customs service 50% (56% in 2017). The degree of corruption of the other institutions is also high and varies between 20% -50%, with the lowest value of 20% for NGOs. (Figures 2.14-2.16).

Figure 2.14. How would you describe the following institutions in terms of the level of corruption? (C1)




Approximately the same institutions are also considered very corrupt by the respondents in the **business** sector, but with lower percentages in answers: Courts 52% (41% - in 2017), Medical institutions 51% (44% in 2017), Police 49% (44% in 2017), General and territorial prosecutor's office 49% (41% in 2017), Political parties 48% (51% in 2017), Customs service 48% (39% in 2017), Anticorruption prosecutor's office 45% (35% in 2017), Border Police 42% (30% in 2017). The other institutions were below 40% by the degree of corruption, with the lowest value of the indicator is also registered for NGOs - 15% (Figures 2.14-2.16).

Less corrupt are considered the institutions that have accumulated the highest shares of the answers Not at all / slightly corrupt, these being in the case of **population** LPA (Local Public Administration) 1 (at settlement level) with 31% (36% in 2017) and Fire prevention inspections 28% (35% in 2017).


In the case of the respondents from the **business** sector, a larger number of institutions were considered not at all / slightly corrupt, accumulating share of about 1/3 of these answers in the current study, such as: Economic agents, Banks / microfinancing institutions, Fire prevention inspections, Labor inspection.

Figure 2.15. How would you describe the following institutions in terms of the level of corruption? (C1)



As in the previous study, the „quite / very corrupt” options were more pronounced in the population’s responses, and the „not at all / slightly corrupted” options prevailed in the responses of the economic agents. Thus it is observed that the business sector demonstrates a slightly more positive perception about the institutions in the Republic of Moldova in terms of the level of corruption, in comparison with the general perception of the population (Figures 2.14-2.16).

Figure 2.16. How would you describe the following institutions in terms of the level of corruption? (C1)




The answers to the question „From the mentioned institutions, choose three that you consider the most corrupt” show that, in the case of the **population**, these are the Police, the Medical Institutions, the Parliament (approximately 1/3 of the answers for each entity), all these being also mentioned in the 2017 study, only with trips (displacements) in the ranking. Men tend to mention considerably more often among

the top three most corrupt institutions the police (40.6% versus 32.2% in the case of women), the courts (28.8% versus 23.5%) and the prosecutor's office (23.5 % versus 13.6%). At their turn women almost three times more often have referred to educational institutions 13.1% versus 4.8% (annex 1, tables 42-43).

In the case of **economic agents**, the most corrupt are considered to be the Courts (37%), Police (32%) and Medical institutions (27%). It should be mentioned that in 2017 the Parliament (32%), the Medical institutions (26%), the Government / Ministries and the Courts (with 25%) were placed on the first places - Figure 2.17.


Figure 2.17. From the institutions mentioned in question C1, choose three that you consider the most corrupt (C2)



The survey participants were asked to assess the severity of the corruption phenomenon in Moldova, assigning grades on a 10-point scale, where 1 = corruption in Moldova is a very serious problem, and 10 = corruption in Moldova is not a problem at all.

Figure 2.18. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Corruption in Moldova is a problem? (C3)

Average - Estimate on a scale from 1 to 10 points, where 1 = Corruption in Moldova is a very serious problem, 10 = Corruption in Moldova is not a problem at all



The average score calculated for this question is 1.8 (1.9 in 2017) for the population and 2.1 (2.2 in 2017) for the business environment (on the 10-point scale). The low average grades confirm the overall negative

Over 70% population and over 60% business respondents (about 2/3 of both categories in 2017) consider the phenomenon of corruption in Moldova as a very serious problem, granting the grade 1, without discrepancies depending on the gender of the respondent (Table 46 in the annexes 1 and 2).


perception of the corruption phenomenon in Moldova (Figure 2.18). It should be mentioned that Public Agents gave higher scores than 3.1 in the current study and 3.3 in 2017, and the overall average for all three sub-samples in both studies constitutes 2.4 points (Figure 2.18).

On the first four places are the same causes of corruption both in the case of the population as well as of the economic agents, only with a change of ranking. Thus, the **population** identifies as the main causes the fact that the *corrupt persons are not sanctioned / punished* with 57% affirmative answers (44% in 2017), *soft penalties that do not discourage involvement in acts of corruption* 48% (43% in 2017), but also that *the wealth accumulated through corruption is not confiscated* 46% (43% in 2017) and the *mentality of asking and giving bribes* 46% (42% in 2017).

The economic agents classify the causes of corruption as follows: in the first place is *the mentality to demand and give bribes* 56% (59% in 2017), *corrupt persons are not sanctioned / punished* by 51% (5% in 2017), *non-confiscation of the assets of civil servants, acquired from acts of corruption* 48% (39% in 2017), as well as *gentle penalties that do not discourage involvement in acts of corruption* 45% (37% in 2017).

It should be mentioned that in both sub-samples *the small remuneration of work (small salaries) in the public sector* moved to the middle of the distribution of the causes of corruption, and the smallest share were observed in the case of *the lack of ethics / moral values*, in both studies and both sub-samples (Figure 2.19).

Figure 2.19. In your opinion, what are the main causes of corruption in Moldova? (C4) Multiple response, minimum 3 answers




The opinions of the respondents on the evolution of the corruption phenomenon in the Republic of Moldova were divided, the tendencies being different under the samples. Thus, about 28% of the **population** (31% in 2017) considers that there are no changes in the evolution of the level of corruption during the last 12 months preceding the studies, among the representatives of the business the share of such answers is 50% (34% in 2017).

Another 59% population (52% in 2017) and 27% business (39% in 2017) consider that the phenomenon of corruption *has increased slightly / considerably in the last year*, proportions valid for both men and women. In the case of the **population**, this perception was more frequently invoked by people aged 36-54, with a high level of education, from the urban environment, inhabitants of the Center region, with the low income level, those who have faced acts of corruption. Among those in the **business** more pronounced shares of the respective answers were registered for the respondents from the North area, those who work in *construction & transport*, with a seniority of activity of *up to 3 years*, who have faced acts of corruption, with experience with informal payments, young people aged 18-35 years (Table 48 in the annexes 1 and 2).

Positive perceptions on corruption have decreased in relation to the data from the previous study. Only 8% of the **population** (13% in 2017) considers that the phenomenon of corruption *has reduced slightly / considerably*, among the **economic agents** the opinions are slightly less pronounced and constitute 18% (23% in 2017). Therefore, the trends are that in the case of the population compared to 2017, the situation has not changed considerably, while the business reports a stabilization (increasing the share of responses „remained at the same level” from 34% to 50%), which, most probably was determined by the uncertainty caused by the change of government.

Figure 2.20. Do you consider that in the last year the level of corruption in the Republic of Moldova ...? (C5)



2.4. Stability of anticorruption values


The studies carried out also relate to a reduced level of stability of anticorruption values among the population and economic agents, expressed by the degree of acceptability or unacceptability of certain situations that invoke the phenomenon of corruption.

Thus, in the current study, the shares of those who consider unacceptable the situations mentioned in the questionnaire on acts of corruption vary between 68% -94% in the case of the population and 89% -97% in the case of the economic agents (Figure 2.21 and Tables 49-51 in the annexes 1 and 2).

The level of tolerance to different corruption situations is different, maintaining similar trends in both studies. Thus, for 94% (89% in 2017) population and 97% (96% in 2017) economic agents it is unacceptable *to be paid for the vote in favor of a particular political party or electoral competitor*, 93% (84% in 2017) population and 89% economic agents do not *never give / would not give money to employees from social assistance / social insurance to obtain allowance, pension, indemnities, other social benefits*. For 85% (80% in 2017) population and 92% (84% in 2017) business it is inadmissible *to give money to a judge to make a decision in favor of the respondent*.

A higher level of tolerance among the **population** is found in the situations of *paying a doctor for better care* with 32% (47% in 2017) answers *always acceptable / in certain situations*, as well as 15% (27% in 2017) agree *to pay a police officer to „close his eyes” to certain violations he or she has committed*, the latter being more acceptable also in the case of *economic agents* with 9% affirmative answers in the case of the current study (Figure 2.21.).

Figure 2.21. To what extent do you personally accept the following situations? (D1)



At the same time, an increase of about 20 percentage points (p.p.) compared to the previous study of the level of unacceptability in this regard, measured by the general average of *unacceptable* responses in both sub-samples (73% overall average in 2019 compared with 53% in 2017).

Thus, according to the integrated indicator on the general unacceptability of acts of corruption, it is observed that about 62% (45% in 2017) of the **general population** and 83% (61% in 2017) of **economic agents** consider any corruption situations unacceptable, i.e. they do not accept to give bribes in any situation, regardless of personal benefit (Figure 2.22.)

The opinion survey also assessed the general attitude of the respondents towards the informal payments, an indicator, measured on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1= *I prefer the system of informal payments because I have faster access to services*, 10 = *I prefer not to have the system of informal payments even if it would mean a longer access to services* (Figure 2.23 and Table 52 in the annex 1 and Table 51 in the annex 2).

The results of the study indicate that the participants in the survey have a negative attitude towards non-formal payments in general, with positive trends in this regard. The overall average score is quite high with 8.5 in the case of the current study (8.2 in 2017). In the case of the population, the negative attitude increased from 8.3 to 8.7 points, in the case of the economic agents being the same, 7.9, in both studies.

These indicators report that respondents would rather *accept that the system of informal payments does not exist even if it would mean a longer access to services*.

Figure 2.22. The share of respondents who consider any corruption situation unacceptable (D1)

7 corruption situations for the population and 5 situations for the business





Figure 2.23. What is your attitude towards informal payments? (D2) Estimate on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = I prefer to have the system of informal payments, because thus I have faster access to services, 10 = I prefer not to have the system of informal payments even if it would mean a longer access of services




Being asked in what way they prefer to solve problems with public authorities, most of the respondents stated that they officially address the institution, without resorting to acquaintances and gratitude, with about ¾ such answers among the **population** in the case of both studies and 85% in the study current (76% in 2017) in the sub-sample of **economic agents** (Figure 2.24). The overall average is increasing, with 77% in the case of the current study and 74% in 2017.

In the case of the **population**, they are, predominantly, among persons over 60 years of age, from the central area, with a low level of income, faced with acts of corruption (Table 53 in the annex 1).

In the case of **economic agents**, this answer variant was more pronounced expressed by those from the South area, medium / large enterprises, with the form of organization – JSC (Joint Stock Company), from *HoReCa* and *Other services*, which use more than 50% cash, women, those aged 60 and over (Table 52 in the annex 2).

Figure 2.24. How would you rather solve your problems with public authorities? (D3)




The respondents expressed a high degree of awareness that the bribe leads to the liability of both parties involved, both the public agent who took the bribe and the person who gave the bribe, with 73% **population** in both studies and 80% (72% in 2017) **business** (Figure 2.25). In the case of the **population**, more pronounced shares that exceeded 75% are among young people aged 18-35, from the Center, with high incomes (Table

54 in the annex 1). Among the **economic agents**, shares greater than 85%, such responses were observed among the respondents from Central and South, from public or joint venture enterprises (Table 53 in the annex 2).

At the same time, 14% (16% in 2017) population and 7% (17% in 2017) business supported the view that if a person gives a bribe to a public agent, only the latter will be held accountable, and 7% (6% in 2017) population and 5% business in both studies believe that only they risk being sanctioned for bribing a public agent (Figure 2.25).

Figure 2.25. How do you think, if you DENOUNCE the fact that you gave a bribe to a public agent (whether you were forced or on your own initiative), who is to be held responsible? (D4).



2.5. Experiences of corruption


The research also assessed the interaction with various public institutions in the Republic of Moldova, both of the population and of the economic agents. The data indicate that the population has interacted to a lesser extent with public institutions during the last 12 months, predating the study. More frequently, the population contacted the medical institutions (42% in 2019 and 60% in 2017), community service providers (20% in 2019 and 41% in 2017), educational institutions (15% in 2019 and 25% in 2017), LPA (Local Public Administration) at settlement level (13% in 2019 and 27% in 2017), customs (10% in 2019 and 15% in 2017). Less than 10% respondents contacted with the other institutions assessed in the last 12 months prior to the current study (Figure 2.26 and Tables 55-58 from the annex 1).

In the case of the economic agents it is observed that they interacted more frequently with different institutions, in relation to the general population. Most often their interaction was with the fiscal inspectorates (61% in 2019 and 67% in 2017), the communal services providers (28% in 2019 and 57% in 2017), LPA (Local Public Administration) at settlement level, Sanitary-epidemiological inspections, police (22% in 2019 and respectively 35%, 43%, 32% in 2017). The economic agents interacted in proportion of less than 20% with the other institutions mentioned in the study. (Figure 2.26 and Tables 56-59 from the annex 2).

Both the population and most of the economic agents who interacted with various institutions presented in Figure 2.26 remained largely satisfied with the interaction with the public agents in these institutions. (Figure 2.27).

The frequency of contact with a number of state institutions decreased compared to 2017 for both target groups of the study. The overall average percentage of interaction with 29 (categories) public institutions constituted 53% (51% in 2017), with 52% (48% in 2017) population and 56% (59% in 2017) business.

Figure 2.26. Have you interacted with the following institutions in the last 12 months? (E1.1) (only affirmative answers)




Thus, in the case of the **population**, the highest shares of the positive answers (somewhat satisfied/ very satisfied) were accumulated by the *Public Services Agency* 66% followed by *educational institutions* with 65%, the *cadastral offices* 63%, *the border police and the customs* with 62%. The lowest shares were observed for the *police* (40%), *the communal service providers* (50%), *LPA (Local Public Administration) at settlement level* (50%), *medical institutions* (52%).

The economic agents positively appreciated, in more pronounced shares, *the cadastral offices* with 78%, the *Fire prevention inspections* with 76%, *he Public Services Agency* with 74%, *the sanitary-epidemiological inspections* 73%, but also the *LPA (local public administration) 2* and the *Labor Inspection* with 71% such appreciations. The lowest shares were registered for the *Courts* 34%, *the police and the customs* with 56%. The degree of satisfaction allocated to other institutions ranged from 59% -71% (Figure 2.27).

The overall average level of satisfaction was assessed with 3.3 points (3.4 in 2017). In the case of the general population this one constituted 3.3 points in both studies and 3.4 points (3.5 in 2017) for economic agents, on a 5-point scale, where 1 = Very dissatisfied and 5 = Very satisfied.

Figure 2.27. Have you been satisfied with the interaction with public officials in the last 12 months? (E1.2), (data presented for institutions that have accumulated more than 10 responses)




Data on the degree of satisfaction of the interaction with public agents according to the socio-demographic and economic profile of the **population** are presented in Tables 60-65 in the annex 1, of the economic agents - in Tables 61-68 in the annex 2.

Relatively small shares of respondents made informal payments when interacting with public institutions. Thus, such informal payments during a year preceding the study made about 7% (11.3% in 2017) of the general population and 4.7% (3.6% in 2017) economic agents, and the overall average on both sub-samples constituted 6.3% (8.9% in 2017).


It should be mentioned that the population offered the respective payments, especially when accessing public institutions such as: medical institutions 13%, Public Services Agency 12%, educational institutions 10%, police 8%, customs and 6% district LPA (local public administration). Other institutions were mentioned by shares under 16% respondents of the study.

In the case of the economic agents, about 11% paid unofficially to the police, 9% to customs, about 4% to medical insurance and fire prevention inspections. The other institutions were offered informal payments of shares under 4% of the representatives of the business (Figure 2.28). For more detailed information, see Tables 66-69 in the annex 1 (population) and Tables 69-73 (business).

Figure 2.28. Have you paid unofficial money in the last 12 months?² (E1.3) (only affirmative answers and with more than 30 contact cases)



² For the institutions located at the bottom of the diagram (haunted) no conclusions can be drawn based on the study data due to the small number of answers (respondents who contacted the institution and asked the question about the unofficial payments).



The values of the informal payments in the form of money varied between 50 lei and 20000 lei, both for the economic agents (Table 74 in the annex 2) and the population (Table 70 in the annex 1). In 2017 the amounts varied between 100 lei and 500 000 lei for economic agents and between 50 lei and 8 000 lei for the general population.

In the case of the population the largest amounts, but also the largest number of affirmative answers were observed for the medical institutions, in the case of the economic agents the highest amounts were indicated for the courts and the CNA (National Anticorruption Center), most cases - for the police.



The frequency of bribes in money, during one year, on average for a person who offered bribes is 4.8 times on average (4.5 in 2017), in the case of the population one person offered bribes on average of 5, 4 times (3.7 in 2017), in the case of an economic agent - 3.5 times (6.1 in 2017).

Additionally, respondents were asked to comment on whether there were offered gifts in the last 12 months prior to the study.

The population declared that it offered bribes in the form of gifts in educational institutions 8%, Public Services Agency 3%, in medical institutions 3%, police 2%.

The share of economic agents who have given gifts to institutions is up to 4%, and the mentioned institutions are the police, the Courts, the sanitary-epidemiological inspections, the anti-incendiary inspections, the fiscal inspectorates, Customs (Figure 2.29). Detailed information is presented in Tables 76-79 in the annex 1 (population) and Table 77 (business).

Figure 2.29. Have you offered any gifts in the last 12 months? (E1.6) (only affirmative answers)




2.6. Discouraging involvement in acts of corruption

In the current study, the general perception of the survey participants is also maintained that the public agents in the Republic of Moldova are not generally sanctioned by their leaders for the lack of professional ethics and integrity. (for example rude behavior, giving favors to acquaintances, receiving gifts, etc.) (Figure 2.30).

Thus, over 70% of the population considers that public agents are *rarely / very rarely / never* punished by the leaders for these reasons, with a slight decrease of the respective answers in relation to the previous study. In the case of the economic agents, the share of the mentioned answers increased by 12 percentage points (p.p.) (80% in the current study compared to 68% in the 2017 study). It should be mentioned that in the case of the population more pronounced shares of the answers *rarely / very rarely / never* are observed among the people who faced acts of corruption, with experience with informal payments, and among the economic agents – among those from the rural areas, from the North and Central regions (Figure 2.30 and Table 83, annex 1, Table 54, annex 2).


Figure 2.30. As far as you know, are public agents sanctioned by leaders for their lack of ethics and professional integrity (for example rude behavior, granting favors to acquaintances, receiving gifts, etc.)? (G1)



Respectively, the proportion of respondents who consider that sanctions are applied in relation to public agents for lack of professional ethics and integrity, expressed by the answers that they are sanctioned *often / very often / always*, is 9% for the **population** in both studies and only 7% (10% in 2017) in the case of the **business environment** (Figure 2.30).

According to the majority of the participants in the survey, the fight against corruption in Moldova is **inefficient**. Thus, 82% population in both surveys and over 3/4 business (79% in 2019 and 75% in 2017) mentioned that currently the fight with the phenomenon of corruption is *not at all / not very effective* (Figure 2.31). In the sample of the population more pronounced shares of these answers were observed among those with higher education, from the Center, who faced acts of corruption, with experience with informal payments (Table 84 in the annex 1). In the case of the economic agents, the respective answers are mainly among those in the Center, who use more than 50% cash, as well as among those who have faced acts of corruption (Table 55 in the annex 2). It should be mentioned that, at the same time, there is also a tendency to diminish the share of those who consider the fight with the phenomenon *quite / very effective*, in both samples this decrease was about 3 percentage points (p.p.).

Figure 2.31. How effective do you think is the fight against corruption in Moldova today? (G2)



2.7. Recovery of property from corruption offenses

The general perception of the participants in both studies remains the same, the respondents consider that at present, in Moldova there is no concern for the recovery of the assets arising from acts of corruption, in which the public agents were / are involved.

The opinions of the majority of the respondents of both studies, current and the one carried out in 2017, persist, both among the population, as well as among the representatives of the business, that the public agents in the Republic of Moldova are not generally forced to return the money and the assets from acts of corruption (Figure 2.32).

It should be mentioned that the shares of those who declared that the recovery of the respective goods never took place increased in relation to the data observed in the previous study.


If, in the study conducted in 2017, the share of such responses varied in the case of the *population* between 43% -52%, and of the representatives of the business between 36% -47%, in the case of the current study these shares respectively varied 57% - 64% *population* and 61% -66% - business. Thus, there was a significant increase of the respective opinions among the respondents in the *population* group by about 12-15 percentage points, and of the representatives of the *business* - by 19-25 percentage points (p.p.), which denotes the degree of distrust in the population growth on the recovery of the goods from corruption activities and, respectively, the efficiency of the fight against corruption.

The same more pronounced trends are maintained regarding the fact that the recovery *never* takes place in the case of the deputies, ministers, prime ministers, presidents of districts / district councilors, as regards the *population* sub-sample. In the case of the economic agents, the highest shares of such answers are observed with reference to the deputies, judges, prosecutors, also these groups were mentioned more pronounced also in the study of 2017 (Figure 2.32).

Only about 1/5 of the respondents of the *population* group mentioned that the public agents are forced to return the respective goods *very rarely / rarely*, among the economic agents - this share is about ¼ respondents.

It should be mentioned that the share of answers with a positive connotation, that is, the assertions that the goods are recovered, is quite small and is placed below 6%, and the answers *always* have not been mentioned or constitute less than 1%.

Figure 2.32. To what extent are the public agents in the Republic of Moldova forced to return the money and assets from acts of corruption?




Respondents were asked to state whether, during the last 12 months preceding the study, they encountered situations that would have caused them some harm in different aspects and which targeted different public sectors: education, medicine, customs, police, justice, finance.

It is observed in both studies relatively small shares of the population but also of the representatives of the business environment who mentioned that they faced such situations (Figure 2.33).

Of all the fields concerned, it is observed that the medical sector is the most frequently mentioned by the population (i.e. the most situations with injury resulted from the interaction with the medical sector), about 7% in the current study (14% in 2017) of the population did not receive the necessary treatment, because they refused to pay bribes to the doctor and, therefore, their condition worsened.

In the case of the economic agents, most cases were mentioned with reference to the process of obtaining the authorizations, licenses, permits, certificates, caused by imperfect legislation or by its incorrect interpretation by the civil servants 4% (12% in 2017), as well as the loss of a case unfairly in the court because the judge received bribes from the representatives of the opposing party, 4% affirmations (6% in 2017). Other situations were mentioned by shares of 3% and less of the affirmative answers.


Figure 2.33. Have you faced the following situations in the last 12 months? (H2)



Most of the respondents who have faced such cases did not request the return of the prejudice mainly because they **did not know that it can be refunded** or **because they do not think that the damage would have been returned if they had requested**. In unitary cases, the damage was returned either voluntarily or in the criminal case, both in the case of the population and the representatives of the business (Table 94 in the annex 1, Table 89 in the annex 2).

The survey participants were asked to answer the question whether, during the last 12 months, predecessor of the study, they encountered any corruption case from public agents. The share of the answers offered by the population and business that have encountered any of the mentioned cases does not exceed 6% in the current study. It can be observed that there have been few cases, and in comparison with the previous study there has been a decrease of the shares of the affirmative answers for all the variants of answers (Figure 2.34).


Figure 2.34. In the last 12 months, have you personally encountered any corruption cases from public agents? (H3)



2.8. Protection of whistle-blowers and corruption victims

Reporting the acts of corruption faced in the interaction with public agents is not a practice neither in the case of the population nor of the economic agents. As in the previous study, the majority of respondents in both categories did not denounce the acts of corruption they faced in the last 12 months, predecessor to the studies carried out (Figure 2.35). The share of those who reported is 10% in the case of the population and 9% (7% in 2017) business representatives. Of those who reported / filed a complaint about a corruption case, most addresses were to the police (53% population and 44% economic agents), CNA (National Anticorruption Center) (30% natural persons and 33% economic agents) to one senior official (20% natural persons and 22% economic agents). The respective data cannot be presented as conclusions due to the small number of cases registered in both sub-samples (17 people population - Tables 98, 99 in the annex 1 and 9 economic agents – Tables 93, 94 in the annex 2).


Figure 2.35. If you have faced acts of corruption in the last 12 months, have you reported these acts of corruption? (J1)



The main reasons why both the population and the economic agents do not report the acts of corruption they have faced in the interaction with public agents are the belief that this is useless 24% population and 39% economic agents (49% population and 62% economic agents in the study of 2017), the fact that they did not have the necessary evidence 23% population and 15% economic agents (26% population and 21% economic agents in the study of 2017), the belief that there are no protection mechanisms for those who report acts of corruption 22% population and 15% economic agents (36% population and 38% economic agents). It should be mentioned that approximately the same trends are observed as well as in the 2017 research, except when about 1/3 respondents from both samples in the 2017 study also mentioned the fear of not suffering later on personal or professional level (34% population and 32% business) (Figure 2.36, Table 100 in the annex 1 and the Table 95 in the annex 2). Women more often than men do not report corruption

cases because they are afraid of prosecution (19.7% versus 4.7%), while men because there is no protection for those reporting acts of corruption (36.1 % versus 13.1% among women).

Figure 2.36. What were the main reasons you didn't report? (J4) MAXIMUM 3 ANSWERS




*Sub-sample: respondents who did not report acts of corruption if they were facing them:
 In 2019 - 137 population and 74 economic agents
 In 2017 - 357 population and 154 - economic agents)*

Most respondents were open to report corruption cases; in case they would face them. About 2/3 of the respondents of both categories in both studies carried out, 63% population and 66% business (62% population and 61% business in 2017) stated that, in the event of such situations, they will probably / surely report the acts of corruption (Figure 2.37).

Among the general population, more open to report acts of corruption were men, persons aged 18-35 years, from the Center area, less willing to report were found to be the respondents with experience in informal payments, from the North, 60 years and over (Table 101 in the annex 1).


In the case of the business respondents, the representatives of the medium / large enterprises, JSC (Joint Stock Companies), were more open for reporting, but few would report between those with seniority in activity of up to 3 years, with experience with informal payments.

Figure 2.37. If you faced acts of corruption, would you report these acts of corruption? (J5)




Most of the respondents in both studies mentioned as the main reason why they would not report corruption cases that this is useless, since some measures will not be taken with 33% statements in the case of the population and 52% - business (56% population, 55% business in 2017). In the second place after the share of the answers, is placed the fear not to suffer later on personal or professional level with 29% population, 40% business (22% population and 47% business in 2017), followed by the reason that there is no protection for those who report acts of corruption, about 26% statements among the population and 43% business representatives (31% population and 62% business in 2017) (Figure 2.38, Table 102 in the annex 1 and Table 97 in the annex 2). It should be mentioned that almost 20% respondents in both studies and sub-samples would not report acts of corruption because this is not encouraged by the Moldovan society.

Figure 2.38. What are your main reasons for not reporting? (J6) (Multiple response)



The trends regarding a possible reporting of acts of corruption are the same in both studies. The main reporting method, if it does, is considered the national anticorruption line. This was mentioned by more than half of the respondents in the population sample, 53% in both studies, and about 66% business respondents (55% in 2017). Each approximately the fifth respondent in both sub-samples, in both studies, would report directly to the anticorruption agencies and / or the hotline of the institution where bribery was requested. About 1 in 10 - at a mass media institution (Figure 2.39, Table 103 in the annex 1 and Table 98 in the annex 2).

Figure 2.39. If you would like to report an act of corruption, how would you prefer to do it? (J7) MAXIMUM 3 ANSWERS




In general, respondents feel unprotected if they denounce an act of corruption that they have suffered. Thus, about 38% population and 33% business (41% population and 38% business in 2017) do not think they would be protected at all, still about the same share think that they would be protected to a small extent (Figure 2.40). Only a very small number, about 4%, would feel largely protected or absolutely protected in these situations.

In the case of the general population, those with experience with non-formal payments, who have faced acts of corruption, from the North, with higher education, aged 60 and over, are perceived less protected. (Table 104 in the annex 1).

Among the representatives of the business, those with experience with informal payments, who faced acts of corruption, from the sphere of trade and HoReCa are perceived as unprotected. (Table 99 in the annex 2).

Figure 2.40. To what extent do you think you will be protected in the event of denouncing an act of corruption that you suffered? (J8)



2.9. Ethics and integrity in the public, private and non-governmental sectors


The survey participants were asked to appreciate the activity of the various entities in terms of ethics (observance of the rules of behavior) and integrity (honesty and fairness), assigning grades on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = corruption, lack of ethics and integrity; 10 = ethics and total integrity, lack of corruption.

The highest rated in terms of ethics and integrity are NGOs, with the highest overall average of 5.6 grades in both the current study and in 2017, the lowest average was estimated for the public sector, by about 4.8 (4.5 in 2017) (Figure 2.41).

Business representatives appreciated higher the private sector with a 6.4 rating (5.6 in 2017), as well as NGOs with 6.2 (6.4 in 2017).

The population appreciated higher the NGOs with an average score of 5.3 in both studies carried out, but also the mass media 4.9 (4.8 in 2017).

Figure 2.41. How do you assess the activity of the following entities from the point of view of ethics (observance of the rules of behavior) and integrity (honesty and fairness)? (K1) Estimate on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = Corruption, lack of ethics and integrity, 10 = ethics and total integrity, lack of corruption




It is noted that in the current study were assigned slightly higher grades compared to the previous study for all the entities subject to assessment, however the ratings remain still quite modest regarding the observance of the rules of behavior, honesty and fairness.

2.10. Transparency of public institutions, party financing and the mass media

The studies also assessed the respondents' opinion on the transparency regarding the activity of the state's top institutions. Most interviewees consider that the Presidency, Parliament and Government are not transparent in their work. Thus, approximately the same trends in ratings were maintained in the current study compared to 2017. The lack or reduced level of transparency of the Presidency was mentioned by more than 2/3 of the respondents of both sub-samples, of the Parliament and the Government - about 70% (3/4 in 2017) between the respondents, both representatives of the business and the population (Figure 2.42, Tables 112-113 in the annex 1 and Tables 106-107 in the annex 2).

It is noted that the total lack of transparency in the current study for the three institutions is mentioned by 1/3 representatives of the population and ¼ from business. At the same time, assessments with a positive connotation, i.e. fairly transparent / very transparent were allocated for all three institutions by about 1/5 respondents.


Figure 2.42. How would you appreciate the level of transparency in the activity ...? (L1)



It should be mentioned that the share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in the activity of the executive and legislative power as *Fairly transparent / Very transparent* (The average percentage based on 3 categories of central institutions (Presidency, Parliament and Government) is 20% (19% in 2017).

The degree of transparency of the public institutions at the central level according to certain activities is quite low appreciated by the respondents both from business and population. Thus, the share of respondents who appreciated the respective activities as not at all transparent / quite non-transparent in the current study is included within the limits 70% -75% with a substantial increase compared to 53% -65%, registered in 2017 (Figure 2.43). More transparent are considered the activities regarding making decisions with 17% positive appraisals allocated by the population and 21% - business (39% population and 32% business in 2017).

Figure 2.43. How would you appreciate the level of transparency of central level public institutions in the process of...? (L2.1)




The assessments of the degree of transparency according to the profile of the respondents are presented with reference to the population in Tables 113-115 in the annex 1, with reference to economic agents - in Tables 108-110 in the annex 2.

Thus, the share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in the activity of public institutions at central level as *Fairly transparent / Very transparent*, expressed by the percentage average based on 5 categories of activities (making decisions, spending public money, procurement, informing citizens, executing works of public interest) is 16% (18% in 2017).

And when assessing the degree of transparency in the activity of local public institutions, are observed predominantly negative perceptions. Higher shares of negative assessments are observed among economic agents in relation to the population. In higher shares, the lack of transparency is mentioned in the spending of public money and public procurement with 70% economic agents (in 2017 respectively 65% and 64%), 67% and 66% population (in 2017 62% and 61%, respectively) (Figure 2.44).

Thus, the degree of transparency for public institutions at the local level, within the current study, with reference to the assessed activities varies between 21% -28% compared to 26% -42% in the 2017 study, which denotes a reduction of the positive perception in this regard.

Figure 2.44. How would you appreciate the level of transparency of local public institutions in the process of...? (L2.2)




It should be mentioned that the aggregate indicator expressed by the share of respondents who appreciate the level of transparency in the activity of public institutions at local level as *Fairly transparent / Very transparent*, expressed by the percentage average based on 5 categories of activities (making decisions, spending public money, procurement, informing citizens, executing works of public interest) is 25% (36% in 2017), which is higher compared to the positive assessments in relation to the institutions at central level.

The assessments of the degree of transparency of the local public institutions according to the profile of the respondents are presented with reference to the population in Tables 116-118 in the annex 1, with reference to economic agents - in the Tables 111-113 in the annex 2.

And the degree of transparency of the way in which political parties, electoral campaigns, mass media, NGOs are also financed is predominantly negative (responses „it is not transparent at all / quite non-transparent”). Thus, less transparency is considered the financing of political parties but which has a slight tendency to diminish the share of the mentioned answers („it is not transparent at all / quite non-transparent”), with 83% population and 84% business (86% population and 82% business in 2017), as well as financing election campaigns with 82% such responses in both sub-samples (85% population and 81% business in 2017). These are followed by the mass media with 75% population and 78% business statements regarding the non-transparency of their financing (77% population and 74% business in 2017) and NGOs with 67% population and 69% business (66% population and 62% business in 2017) (Figure 2.45).

Figure 2.45. How do you assess the level of transparency of how they are funded ...? (L3)



Another issue with regard to transparency concerns the extent to which public institutions respond to requests for information from the population and economic agents. Generally, at the local level more information is requested than at the central level, and the requests received from the economic agents are more than double compared to the population requests, this is observed in both studies. Cumulatively, the share of requests for information from central and local public services from the population sample is 15% (24% in 2017), of the requests of the representatives of the business is 34% (51% in 2017) (Figure 2.46).

Most of those who requested information received a response from central and local public authorities, and the share of responses received by the population is lower compared to the share of responses offered to public agents. From the central level answers received 74% population and 85% economic agents (75% population and 95% economic agents in 2017), at the local level 76% population and 87% economic agents (87% population and 94% economic agents) 2017) (Figure 2.47).

In the case of the population more frequently, respondents of 18-35 years old, with higher education, from Chisinau received answers from central level, and from local level the respondents with higher studies, from the rural area, from the Center, with high level of revenue, with experience in non-formal payments (Table 122 in the annex 1).

In the case of the economic agents more pronounced shares of the answers to requests for information from the central level were received by those from the South, from medium / large enterprises, with the form of JSC (Joint Stock Company) organization, the HoReCa activity sphere, with over 10 years' activity experience. From the local level mainly the answers were received by the representatives of the North business, from

construction & transport, the HoReCa sphere of activity, which only activates by transfer (Table 117 in the annex 2).

Figure 2.46. In the last 12 months have you requested any information from public institutions? (L4) (Only affirmative answers)






Figure 2.47. If you asked for information, did you receive an answer? (L5) (Only affirmative answers)

Sub-sample: respondents who requested information



Cumulatively (population and economic agents) from the central level requested information 5% respondents (8% in 2017) of which received response - 77% (81% in 2017).

Figure 2.48. Satisfaction level of respondents who have requested information from public institutions at central or local level in the last 12 months and have received a response. Average grades 1-10



The degree of satisfaction of the respondents from the response received from the public institutions at central or local level in the last 12 months, measured on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = not at all satisfied, 10 = very satisfied is relatively high, exceeding in both sub-samples 7 points.


There is also mentioned a tendency to increase the satisfaction of the respondents with the answers regarding the requested information. The average of the grades offered by the population is 7.9 (7.7 in 2017), by the economic agents 8.0 (7.4 in 2017), with the general average on both sub-samples of 7.9 in 2019 and 7.6 in 2017 (Figure 2.48).

Appreciations of the degree of satisfaction in percentage form according to the grades offered and socio-demographic groups of the respondents are presented with reference to the population in Tables 123-125, annex 1, and with reference to economic agents – in the Tables 118-120, annex 2.

The respondents were asked to declare the type of electronic public services, used in the last 12 months, preceding the studies carried out (current and in 2017). Among the population about 7% requested documents (Identity Card / Electronic Identity Card / Foreign Passport) (6% in 2017), 5% - certificate of

criminal record (8% in 2017), 4% - duplicate of the birth certificate (8 % in 2017). In the case of the economic agents about 63% (62% in 2017) - accounting / financial reports (reports), 10% (25% in 2017) requested the verification of IDNP / IDNO, 9% (13% in 2017) - documents of identity (Figure 2.49).

Figure 2.49. What kind of electronic public services have you used in the last 12 months? (L7) (Only affirmative answers)



It is noted that in total 31% respondents (34% in 2017) used at least one electronic service, in the population sub-sample 14% (17% in 2017), among the economic agents 69% (70% in 2017) (Figure 2.50).

The satisfaction degree of electronic public services, measured by the answers *Pretty satisfied / Very satisfied*, it is relatively high, and the general average constitutes 89% in the current study with an increase compared to the previous study (83% in 2017). Among the population the degree of satisfaction is about 88% (79% in 2017), among the economic agents 90% (93% in 2017), thus the business respondents showed to be more satisfied compared to the general population by the electronic services accessed (Figure 2.51).

Figure 2.50. The share of respondents who have used at least one electronic public service in the last 12 months





Figure 2.51. Share of respondents satisfied (Pretty satisfied / Very satisfied) with electronic public services



2.11. Educating the society


The education of the society to get involved in actions to reduce corruption is of major importance, and this calls for the promotion among the population of such elements as the knowledge of the rights and obligations both as well as of the state officials, the mechanisms for detecting and combating the phenomenon, as well as the correctness of the institutions involved.

Both the population and the economic agents could be determined to get involved in actions to reduce corruption in the first place if they were confident that they would be protected against the official they denounce, with 32% population claims and 43% economic agents (30 % population and 40% economic agents in 2017).

Another factor would be the assurance that justice in the Republic of Moldova is independently related by 32% population and 34% business (34% population and 57% business in 2017), knowledge about what rights a citizen has in front of officials and what their obligations are towards citizens with 27% mentions from the population and 31% business (31% population and 28% business in 2017), to know where and how to address to report a corruption case with 25% population and 38% business affirmative answers (28% population and 16% business in 2017).

Other options have accumulated less than 20% of respondents' claims (Figure 2.52, Table 130 in the annex 1 and Table 125 in the annex 2


Figure 2.52. What might cause you to get involved in actions to reduce corruption? (M1) MAXIMUM 2 ANSWERS



An important aspect in the education of the society relates in particular to the degree of information about the anticorruption activities carried out in this context.

Most survey participants have heard information about anticorruption activities over the past 12 months, more frequently news about corruption cases, than information campaigns about integrity and anticorruption. Thus about 40% population and 52% business (37% population and 57% business in 2017) mentioned that they heard much / very much information about corruption cases in the news, and about 31% population and 44% business (22% population and 39% business in 2017) heard / saw information campaigns on integrity and anticorruption (Figure 2.53, Table 131 in the annex 1 and Table 126 in the annex 2).

Figure 2.53. Have you heard / seen information about anticorruption activities in the last 12 months? (M2)



About four out of five economic agents, participants in the 2019 and 2017 studies mentioned that they have never received training on business ethics and integrity in the relations with the state (81% in 2019 and 78%

in 2017), mainly from the South and Chisinau, micro enterprises, with less than 3 years' seniority, using more than 50% cash, who experience of non-formal payments (Figure 2.54 and Table 127 in the annex 2).

The majority of the respondents, 79%, stated that there is an ethical code in the organization where they work (81% in 2017), and higher shares of respondents who say this are observed among the economic agents with the HoReCa sphere of activity, with up to 3 years' seniority, using cash over 50%, with the respondents age up to 35 years (Figure 2.55 and Table 136 in the annex 2).

Figure 2.54. Have you benefited from training in business ethics and integrity in the relations with the state? (N1) – Economic agents





Figure 2.55. Is there a code of ethics in your organization? (N6) – Economic agents



2.12. Preferences and practices regarding payment methods for goods and services

General population

The population of Moldova is not sufficiently prepared for the use of bank cards / transfers, about 81% (76% in 2017) prefer to make cash payments for the purchase of goods or services.

Persons 60 years and over, with a low level of education, from the rural environment, with low incomes make payments by cash in more heavy share. Payments are made by bank or card transfer more frequently by young people up to 35 years old, with a high level of education, from the urban environment, from Chisinau municipality, with a high level of income, but also those who have faced acts of corruption and / or with experience in informal payments (Figure 2.56 and Table 132 in the annex 1).

The main reasons invoked by the respondents are either that it is uncomfortable with 35% answers (37% in 2017), or that they do not trust banks with 28% affirmations (30% in 2017). Other reasons in the current study have accumulated about 10% affirmative answers, these are: I do not have a card 12% (13% in 2017), it takes a long time 11% (24% in 2017), a high commission 10% (20% in 2017) (Figure 2.57).

It is worth mentioning that different population groups perceive differently the payments by bank transfer or by card. Thus, the reason that it is uncomfortable was mentioned by the respondents from the Center, those with high level of income, who do not trust banks, those who have faced acts of corruption, with experience in informal payments, who do not have the card - mainly the respondents from the rural area (Table 133 in the annex 1)

Figure 2.56. How do you prefer to make payments for the purchase of goods or services? (M3 – population)





Figure 2.57. What is the reason why you do not prefer to make payments by bank transfer or card? – population




Economic agents

The economic agents more often execute operations by transfer than in cash. Thus, about 3/4 of the respondents, 74% (73 in 2017), mentioned that they use up to 50% cash (Figure 52), and about 26% (27% in 2017) stated that they only work by bank transfer. Thus, activate by bank transfer over 40% economic agents from the North, the medium / large enterprises, JSC (Joint Stock Companies), with the sphere of activity construction & transport (Figure 2.58 and Table 137 in the annex 2).

The share of those who use cash as the main means of payment (over 75%) represents 10% (16% in 2017) more often they are from the Center, with a different form of organization than LLC (Limited Liability Company) and JSC (Joint Stock Company), from the sphere of activity - other services, with secondary study level.

Figure 2.58. To what extent do you use cash as a means of payment the activity of your company? (N7)




As a main reason for using cash as a means of payment, over half of the respondents, 57%, (48% in 2017) mentioned that this is an alternative to the poorly developed banking system and the problems that arise in relation to banks, about 29% (38% in 2017) referred to the requirement of business partners to work only with cash, and 17% (19% in 2017) stated that cash offers the possibility of avoiding tax payments (Figure 2.59).

The reason on the alternative of the poorly developed banking system and of the problems that arise in relation to the banks was supported by more pronounced shares of the economic agents from Chisinau, with the sphere of commercial activity or HoReCa, with activity of up to 3 years, those who use cash, respondents aged 18-35.

The requirement of the business partners to work only with cash was mentioned as a reason in greater proportions by the rural area, from the North, the small enterprises, with 3-10 years of seniority in activity, and the fact that the cash offers the possibility of avoiding from the payment of taxes has been mainly supported by the medium / large enterprises, from construction / transport and other services, those that only activate by transfer (Table 138 in the annex 2).

Figure 2.59. In your opinion, what is the reason for using cash as a means of payment? (N8), only affirmative answers




2.13. The interference of corruption and political interests in economic activity

Respondents were asked to state about the difficulties they face as an economic agent. The same trends are observed in both studies. Thus, the economic agents mentioned that the main difficulties they face in their entrepreneurial activity are: excessive taxation 56%, assertions (48% in 2017), unfair competition 44% (38% in 2017), frequent changes in legislation 42% (43% in 2017), bureaucracy 39% (42% in 2017), low domestic demand for products and services 30% (17% in 2017) (Figure 2.60). Each approximately 4th economic agent invoked as excessive the impediments from the state institutions 26% in both studies and non-application of the law and imperfect legislation, mentioned by 23% in both studies carried out, but also difficult access to loans with 22% affirmations (11% in 2017).


Incompetence of civil servants in interacting with economic agents (25%). The incompetence of civil servants in the interaction with the economic agents, the phenomenon of corruption (in the judicial sector and the selective application of the legal norms was mentioned by 16% respondents in the current study (respectively 25%, 22%, 18% in the study conducted in 2017). Other problems seem to be less significant, being mentioned by shares below 15% of the respondents - economic agents (Figure 2.60, Tables 128-129 in the annex 2).

Figure 2.60. What are the main difficulties you face as an economic agent? (N2) MULTIPLE ANSWER - Economic agents



Another aspect regarding which the economic agents have been asked to decide is the extent to which their activity as an economic agent is affected by political interests.

Figure 2.61. To what extent is your activity as economic agent affected by political interests? (N3) – Economic agents




Studies show that, in general, business is little influenced by political interests, over 85% respondents in the current study and 75% of that carried out in 2017 consider it so (responses not affected at all / affected to a small extent), and 64% (51% in 2017) mentioned that the politics *does not affect at all* the activity of the economic agents (Figure 2.61).

At the same time, about 11% (21% in 2017) opted for the answers *greatly affected / very affected*, which relates to the fact that political interests, however, leave a mark on the activity of a certain circle of economic agents.

About ¾ of the economic agents surveyed (about half in 2017) did not face corruption situations in the interaction with public agents (74% in 2019, 53% in 2017). It should be noted that there is a decrease in the shares of those who have faced corruption in relation to the previous study. (Figure 2.62).


However, among those who reported situation of corruption in the relations with public agents, the most frequent ones were during the checks carried out by the competent public institutions 9% (23% in 2017), in the process of public procurement, obtaining licenses and authorizations by 5% (respectively, 5% and 12% in 2017), as well as in the processes related to declarations / customs control 4% (8% in 2017).

Figure 2.62. In which of the following situations does your enterprise / organization most often face the phenomenon of corruption when you are dealing with public agents? (N4) MAXIMUM 3 ANSWERS – Economic agents



The economic agents were proposed to assess a series of measures developed by the authorities to reduce the phenomenon of corruption in the process of business interaction with public agents (Figure 2.63).

Figure 2.63. To what extent do the following solutions contribute to reducing corruption in the interaction between business and the public sector? (N5)



The results obtained indicate that all the solutions are important in this regard, with some change of priorities, observed in relation to the previous study. Thus, within the current study the most important measures are related to the implementation of electronic services with 75% affirmative answers, followed by Cultivating ethics and integrity in the private sector with 67% affirmations, as well as Sanctioning the economic agents for giving bribe - this was chosen by 65% respondents. The least important ones are considered the Increase of the salaries of the civil servants which accumulated 44% affirmative answers and the Implementation of the declaration on their own responsibility instead of certain certificates with 55% affirmations.

It should be mentioned that within the previous study the first places were - sanctioning officials for acts of corruption (83%) and improving the legislation (83%), as well as sanctioning officials by the heads for abuses and irregularities (82%) – Figure 57.

Also, the Policy of increasing the salaries of civil servants was considered to be the least effective, in relation to other measures to combat the phenomenon of corruption.

III. OPINION OF THE PUBLIC AGENTS ON MEASURES TO PREVENT THE PHENOMENON OF CORRUPTION IN MOLDOVA

3.1. General perceptions

The participants of the survey were asked to appreciate the activity of the public service (from the Republic of Moldova in general, but also from the institutions where they work) in terms of ethics and integrity. The assessments were made by assigning grades on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = corruption, lack of ethics and integrity, and 10 = lack of corruption, ethics and total integrity. It is observed that, in general, the perception of public agents in relation to this phenomenon is predominantly positive. Over half of the respondents assessed the public service activity in Moldova with values greater than 6 (less or not at all corrupted), about 90% offered the same answers with reference to the institution where they work (Figure 3.1.).


It should be mentioned that the public agents, who assessed the public service from the Republic of Moldova (in general) with values between 8-10 constitute 28%, and the share of those who attributed these values in relation to the institution they represent constitutes 80%, being registered a positive trend in relation to the results of the study conducted in 2017. Thus, the data denote significant differences between the evaluations of the own institution and the public system in general, the institutions where the respondents work being assessed positively by a considerably larger number compared to the system in general, this finding is valid for both studies conducted (the years 2017 and 2019). The average score in the assessment of the public service in general is 5.9 in the current study (5.8 in 2017), in the assessment of the own institution the average score is 8.5 (8.3 in 2017).

In the assessment of the activity of the institutions it is observed that scores with a value of at least 6 have been assigned more frequently by persons aged 19-35 years, the inhabitants of the Southern region, persons holding a public management position (over 90% respondents from the mentioned groups).

Thus, the perception of corruption is higher with regard to the public system in general, about 42% respondents assigned to the system the scores 1 - 5 (denoting total / high corruption) compared to only 8% of respondents who stated that the institutions in which they work are corrupt (Tables 2 and 3 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.1. How do you value the activity of the public service in terms of ethics and integrity ...? (A1)

Estimate on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = Corruption, lack of ethics and integrity, 10 = ethics and total integrity, lack of corruption




At the hierarchical level, within the institutions where the respondents work, about 17% people consider that the highest risk of manifestation of corruption is among the leaders and deputies of the institution, with an upward trend in the current study compared to the one made in 2017 (Figure 3.2). This opinion was expressed in particular by the public agents from Chisinau, the representatives of the central public authorities, persons who, at the time of the survey, were working in the organization for up to 2 years. (Table 4 in the annex 3).

About ¼ respondents consider that at all hierarchical levels corruption exists equally (29% in 2017). This opinion was supported especially by the people from the Southern region, those from the rural area, the local level institutions (other than the LPA (Local Public Administration)), the people who work 6-10 years.

It is noted that in the current study there is an increase in the share of public agents who did not wish to express at which level of hierarchy there is the highest risk of corruption within the institution in which they work (about 46% in 2019 compared to 34% in 2017). These answers prevailed among the people with secondary level of education, those from the Center, representatives of other institutions at central level.

Figure 3.2. At what hierarchical level is the highest risk of corruption within the institution in which you work? (A2)




The analysis of the situation from a gender perspective indicates that considerable shares of public agents consider that women and men are equally exposed to acts of corruption. About 2/3 public agents mentioned this with reference to the Public Service in general and almost half referred to the institution where they work. At the same time, men are considered to be more exposed to the acts of corruption in relation to women, their opinions prevail both with regard to corruption in general in the Public Service and in their own institution, these tendencies are maintained in both studies (in 2017 and 2019, current). (Figure 3.3.).

Generally, in the Public Service it is considered that *Men are more exposed to acts of corruption* of higher shares of respondents from rural areas (about 24% affirmative answers), those from level 1 public authorities (22.6%). In relation to the Institution where they work, this opinion is supported by higher shares of public agents from *Other institutions at local level* (13%) and *Central level authorities* (11%) (Table 5 in the annex 3).

It should be mentioned that the share of those who are uncertain or who did not want to comment in this context has increased among the respondents of the current year's study, the share of I don't know / No answer answers has doubled compared to 2017 (by 10 percentage points it has increased with regard to corruption in general and with 19 percentage points (p.p.) - referring to corruption in the institution where they work) (Figure 3.3.).

Figure 3.3. In your opinion, are men and women equally exposed to acts of corruption ...? (A3)




Public agents were asked to pronounce how serious is the issue of corruption for Moldova. Responses were assessed on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = *corruption in Moldova is a very serious problem*, 10 = *corruption in Moldova is not a problem at all*. The average score obtained in the assessments of the respondents for the severity of the corruption phenomenon for the Republic of Moldova, in the current study 2019 is 3.3 on the 10-point scale (3.1 in 2017), remaining of a higher severity.

Just over 40% of public agents (46% in 2017) consider that the phenomenon of corruption in Moldova is a very serious problem (Figure 3.4). Moreover, considering that the values 1 - 5 are associated with a high level of corruption, there is noted a general perception of the public agents according to which corruption was and is a very acute problem for the Republic of Moldova, about 77% respondents offered options 1 - 5, with a slight positive trend (about 84% in 2017).

This opinion is more pronounced among respondents from the North (87%), LPA (local public administration) 1 (84%), people with a secondary education and from the age group of 51 years and more (82%), residents in rural areas (81%) (Table 6 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.4. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Corruption in Moldova is a problem? (A4)

Estimate on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = *Corruption in Moldova is a very serious problem*, 10 = *Corruption in Moldova is not a problem at all*




The main cause of the corruption phenomenon, according to the public agents, remains the *low salaries in the public sector*, with 66% affirmative answers in the current study (76% in 2017), as well as the *mentality of asking for and giving bribes in money and / or goods*, 45% respondents support this opinion (55% in 2017). About 4 out of 10 respondents consider as corruption causes the *gaps in the legislation that allow the acts of*

corruption (38% affirmations in 2017), the fact that *corrupt persons are not sanctioned / punished* (34% in 2017). Over 1/3 of those interviewed mentioned the *lack of ethics / moral values* (34% in 2017, but also the fact that the *wealth earned by officials through acts of corruption is not confiscated* (33% in 2017). In the last place with approximately the same share of the answers in both studies was the *lack of control in state institutions* (Figure 3.5).

Depending on the gender of the respondent, certain trends are observed. Thus higher shares of the respondent men consider as causes of corruption *the gaps in the legislation, the low salaries in the public sector, the lack of ethics / moral values, the fact that the wealth is not confiscated and that the persons who denounce the corruption are not protected*. Women opt more for answers such as *punishments are gentle, corrupt people are not punished, mentality, desire to live no worse than others / greed* (Tables 7 and 8 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.5. What, in your opinion, are the main causes of corruption in Moldova? (A5)




Different trends are observed regarding the evolution of the corruption phenomenon in Moldova over the last year compared to the study conducted in 2017. About 1/3 respondents (32%) consider that the phenomenon has increased considerably / slightly (22% in 2017) and only 18% consider that it is decreasing considerably / slightly (39% in 2017) (Figure 3.6).

The increase of the level of corruption (slight / considerable) was noticed by the shares of over 40% respondents from the groups with secondary education, from the North area, from the level 1 public authorities, the inhabitants of the villages, the share of the answers in all the socio-demographic groups ranged from 24% - 44%.

The public agents that reported in shares greater than 20% that they consider that the level of corruption decreased (slightly / considerably) were from the groups of men, the central public authorities, the category of those with public management positions, as well as among those with an activity duration of more than 10 years, the variation of the shares being included between 14% - 23% (Table 9 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.6. Do you consider that in the last year the level of corruption in the Republic of Moldova ...? (A6)




3.2. Employment and promotion of public servants on the basis of merit

According to the results of the researches carried out in 2017 and 2019, the picture of the answers regarding the promotion criteria is approximately the same (Figure 3.7).

It is noted that about half of the public agents have stated that the promotion in positions within the institutions of which they belong *always* takes place on the basis of the professionalism, integrity and merits of the person promoted (47% in 2019 and 49% in 2017), and every third respondent stated that these are the criteria *often / very often* applied in institutions (34% in 2019 and 35% in 2017). Thus, in the opinion of over 80% of the respondents the hiring and promotion of public agents is usually done on the basis of merit.

More pronounced shares of respondents who support these views were expressed among women, respondents aged 51 and over, from the urban environment, from the Center and South areas, employees of other central level institutions, with a public management role, with an activity duration of over 10 years (Table 10 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.7. To what extent are applied the following criteria for promotion to positions within your institution? (B1)



Seniority in work was mentioned as another important criterion of promotion in the position, considered as being *applied often / very often / always* in the opinion of 66% of the people surveyed (63% in 2017). More often, it is considered that this criterion is applied by the young people aged 19-35, inhabitants of the South, LPA (local public administration) 2, persons with a duration of activity of 3-5 years (Table 11 in the annex 3).

The respondents acknowledged that other public promotion practices are used within public institutions. Thus, about 1/3 of the public agents (28% in 2017) thought that *relationships with the right people (with the heads, for example)* is a criterion that is often / very often / always applied in promotion, this opinion being

mainly supported by men, rural respondents, residents of the Center area, public agents from LPA (local public administration) 1 and other local level institutions (Table 12 in the annex 3).


The criterion „*belonging to a certain political party*” is often / very often / always considered in the opinion of 18% of public agents, both in the current study and in that from 2017, with more pronounced shares observed among men in the urban environment, the inhabitants of the North area, CPA (central public administration) and LPA (local public administration) 2, employees with seniority in work of up to 2 years (Table 13 in the annex 3).

A considerable share of about 67% respondents (71% in 2017) stated that in the institutions where they work there are no cases of *promotion based on unofficial payments*, only about 5% consider that this phenomenon exists. Bribery is very rarely / rarely used to be promoted. These are, mainly, men, persons over 36 years of age, with secondary education, from the rural area, from the Center and South regions, the representatives of LPA (local public administration) 1. The share of those who mentioned that the promotion is paid *often / very often / always* constitutes 5% and varies between 3% -12% (the highest rate of 12% being registered in the North). It is worth mentioning that the share of those who are not entitled to decide in this regard (answer I don't know / No answer) is particularly high, the highest shares were observed among LPA (local public administration) 2, in Chisinau and among the respondents 2, with an activity duration of up to 2 years (Table 14 in the annex 3).

In general, the gender approach, in the opinion of the respondents, is respected in the matter of promoting the staff are from the public organizations in Moldova. In both studies, most respondents stated that these are applied equally to men and women, especially professionalism (90% in 2019 study, 92% in 2017) and seniority in work (87% in 2019 and 94% in 2017). With reference to three other criteria, the data from the 2019 study shows a reduction in the respective shares and an increase in the share of those who did not want to pronounce in this context. Accordingly, the opinions regarding the equal application for men and women of the following criteria are: relations with the right people were mentioned by just over half, 52%, of the respondents (83% in 2017), belonging to a certain political party - by 43 % (81% in 2017), unofficial payments - 36% (75% in 2017) (Figure 3.8).

There are no big differences in the opinions of men and women, participants in the study, however, men are more inclined to believe that all the mentioned criteria are equally respected, the differences in male-female shares being 3-5 percentage points (p.p.) (Tables 15-17 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.8. Are these criteria applied equally to men and women in your institution? (B2)



The respondents were asked to pronounce whether the institutions where they work apply performance assessment procedures and to what extent their results influence the promotion of the staff are (noting the answers on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = does not influence at all, the staff are being promoted based on other criteria; 5 = totally influences, the staff are being promoted exclusively based on the assessment results). Of the 94% public agents (equal share in both studies), who gave an affirmative answer on the application of the assessment procedures in the institution (Figure 3.9) about ¾ offered the answers 4-5, which results that the staff are promoted exclusively based on the results of the assessments (Figure 3.10). At the same time, one in ten respondents mentioned that the staff are promoted on the basis of criteria other than the results of the performance assessment. Thus, the average score assigned by public agents for the degree to which the assessment results influence the promotion of the staff in the institution is 4.2 (4.1 in 2017) on the 5-point scale.

Figure 3.9. Are the performance assessment procedures applied in your institution? (B3)





Figure 3.10. To what extent do the results of the assessment influence the promotion of the staff are in the institution? (B4)

Estimate on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = does not influence at all, the staff are promoted based on other criteria; 5 = totally influences, the staff are promoted exclusively on the basis of the assessment results




* Sub-sample: 572 respondents – 2019
579 respondents - 2017

Most survey respondents are aware of the risks of corruption in the employment process. With major shares, in both studies, the following situations were assessed as illegal / incorrect: people to be hired thanks to the kinship / friendship links (91% in 2019, 90% in 2017); the person who wishes to participate in the employment contest in a public institution should call a friend from within it to ask him or her to favor his or her candidacy in front of the head (85% in 2019, 88% in 2017); the institution to launch an employment contest, even if the person to be hired is known in advance (70% in 2019, 79% in 2017) (Figure 3.11).

The distribution of the answers according to the socio-demographic profile of the respondents on the risks of corruption in the employment process is presented in Tables 112 and 113 in the annex 3.

Figure 3.11. Are the following situations regarding ... legal / illegal or correct / incorrect? (P1.1)




Among the respondents who assessed the actions mentioned as illegal / incorrect about 5% (10% in 2017) stated that in the institutions where they work, it happens, however, that *the people are employed thanks to the kinship / friendship links*, and 6% consider that there are cases when *the institution launches an employment contest, even if the person to be hired is known in advance and / or when a friend favors the employment by recommending someone's candidacy to his or her head* (Figure 3.12). More frequently these responses were mentioned by the public agents in Chisinau, within the CPA (Central Public Administration) and other local public institutions, by the holders of public execution functions (Tables 129 and 130 in the annex 3).

Employment cases after failing the integrity test were practically not mentioned, but only 2% of the respondents (in both studies) stated that such situations occur in the public institutions they represent (Figure 3.12).

It should be mentioned that over 60% of the participants in the survey (67% in 2017) consider legally / correctly the situation when the institution requests the integrity record of the candidate for employment (Figure 3.11), but very few confirm that this practice exists in the institutions where they work (Figure 3.12).

Figure 3.12. Do such situations happen in the institution in which you work? (P1.2)




* Sub-sample: respondents who noted **illegally** on the question from Figure 3.11

Of those who declared that there are risks of corruption in employment and such situations happen in the institutions where they work, in total there were only 7 affirmative answers. Of these only one person confirmed that measures are taken to solve or sanction the cases when *the persons are hired thanks to the kinship / friendship links*, 2 people have confirmed that such measures are insured for *the cases of launching the employment contests, even though the person to be hired is known in advance*, 3 persons - when *a friend favors the employment by recommending the candidacy of someone to the head*.

It should be mentioned that due to the few cases recorded, the data can only be interpreted as findings and cannot be used to draw conclusions in this context (Figure 70 and Table 146 p. B in the annex 3).

Figure 3.13. Were any remedial or sanctioning measures taken in relation to these situations? (P1.3)



* Sub-sample: respondents who noted „Yes” on the question in Figure 3.12

3.3. Compliance with the incompatibilities regime, restrictions in the hierarchy and limitation of advertising

The data of the current survey confirms those of the survey conducted in 2017 regarding compliance with the regime of restrictions in hierarchy in public organizations in the Republic of Moldova. About 87% of the respondents (79% in 2017) said that during the last 12 months, they did not know of cases in the institution where they work, where *the public agent has been directly subordinated to a direct relative or by affinity* (Figure 3.14). This statement was made by over 90% of the groups of people aged 51 years and over, with secondary education, rural residents, from the South and Center regions, LPA (Local Public Administration) 1 representatives, those who work for more than 10 years (Table 20 in the annex 3).

However, about 6% (9% in 2017) stated that they know about such cases, of which only about 1/3 mentioned that measures had been taken regarding the termination of the hierarchical report. About 41% respondents in both studies (2017 and 2019) stated that no measures were taken to stop these reports, and in less than 20% do not know if any measures have been taken in this regard (Figure 3.15 and Table 21 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.14. Do you know of cases in your institution when the public agent is / has been directly subordinated to a direct relative or by affinity for the last 12 months? (C1)





Figure 3.15. Have measures been taken to end the hierarchical report? (C2)



* Sub-sample: 34 respondents – 2019
58 respondents – 2017

The respective studies included a series of statements in order to test the Public Agents regarding the level of knowledge of the legal / illegal or correct / incorrect situations with reference to **Compliance with the incompatibilities regime, restrictions in the hierarchy and limitation of advertising**.


About 4 out of 5 public officials stated **correct**, that the following situations are a violation of the incompatibilities regime: *the mayor of X city signs a contract for carrying out works with his brother's company* (84% in 2019 and 86% in 2017); *the mayor of X settlement is, at the same time, the general director of a commercial company* (81% in 2019 and 84% in 2017); *the auction organized by a district council was won by the company headed by the wife of the president of the council* (83% in 2019 and 84% in 2017) (Figure 3.16 and Tables 114-116 in the annex 3).

Regarding the regime of restrictions in the hierarchy, in both surveys most respondents rated the following situations as illegal / incorrect: *the husband is the head of the Finance Directorate, and the wife is a specialist in the Human Resources Directorate within the same public authority* (60% in 2019, 62% in 2017) (**incorrect answer**, correct answers were offered by just over ¼ respondents, 26% in 2019 and 31% in 2017), *the*

accountant of the X village Mayoralty is the daughter-in-law of the Mayor of that village (78% in both surveys) **(correct answer, at the same time about 1/5 respondents in both studies consider this statement correct / legal or they did not know / did not want to pronounce in this regard)** (Figure 3.16 and Tables 114-116 in the annex 3).

With regard to the statements that measure the level of knowledge of the respondents about the regime of limitation of advertising, it is observed that most of the public agents declared illegal the following situations **(incorrect answers): a civil servant accepted, for a sum of money, to appear in an advertising spot, with the presentation of her name and function, which aimed to promote a product (79% in 2019 and 85% in 2017), in order to promote its image during the election campaign, a political party has repeatedly used the names of a number of civil servants with important leadership positions as members and supporters of the party (76% in 2019, 81% in 2017)** (Figure 3.16 and Tables 114-116 in the annex 3).


Figure 3.16. Are the following situations legal / illegal or correct / incorrect? (P1.1)



According to the data of the respective surveys, in relation to all the assertions tested, the respondents stated that, as a rule, in the institutions where they work such situations do not occur, (the share of those who supported this assertion ranged from 78% -84% in 2019 and 67% -98% in 2017) or do not know / did not want to declare if there are such cases (with 15% -22% answers I don't know / No answer in 2019 and 2% -32% in 2017) (Figure 3.17 and Tables 131-133 in the annex 3).

It is worth mentioning that, although there were few respondents who stated that such cases still occur (2-8 answers and no conclusion can be drawn), almost all stated that measures were not taken in the institution or they do not know / did not want to say about this (Table 146 in the annex 3, answer to the question: *Were any remedial or sanctioning measures taken in relation to these situations?*).

Figure 3.17. Do such situations happen in the institution in which you work? (P1.2)?



* Sub-sample of those who noted illegal / incorrect the question from Figure 3.16.

3.4. Respecting the regime of declaring the wealth and personal interests

About 4 out of 5 respondents (85% in both 2019 and 2017 studies) supported the view that the *declaration of wealth and personal interests is mandatory for all persons employed in the public sector* (Figure 3.18). This opinion was most frequently mentioned by men, persons aged 19-35 years, persons with high level of education, inhabitants of the rural environment, from the South region, representatives of CPA (central public administration), LPA (local public administration) 2 and LPA (local public administration) 1 and public agents working in the institution up to 5 years (Table 22 in the annex 3).

It should be mentioned that the correct answer is that not all persons employed in the public sector have this obligation.

According to the provisions of the Integrity Law number 82/2017, Article 13, all public agents are required to file the declaration of wealth and personal interests. According to the definition presented in the same law, Article 3, the public agent is the person employed in a public entity and who exercises a public function, a public function with special status, a public dignity function, is employed in the office of the person with a public dignity function or provides services of public interest, as well as the local elected. In the public sector, however, there are also hired people who do not have the status of public agent (for example technical staff).

Among the interviewed persons about 85% (82% in 2017) mentioned that they submitted declarations on wealth and personal interests, with more pronounced shares of the affirmative answers observed among men, persons over 51 years, respondents with higher education, residents from the rural area, from the North and South regions, representatives of LPA (local public administration) 2 and LPA (local public administration) 1, those with public management function (Figure 3.18 and Table 23 in the annex 3).

About 11% respondents (17% in 2017) did not submit the declaration for the previous year (Figure 3.19). They are more represented in the categories of female public agents, with secondary education, from the urban area, who work in Chisinau, other public institutions at central and local level, with public execution functions (Table 23 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.18. Is the declaration of wealth and personal interests mandatory for all persons employed in the public sector? (D1)





Figure 3.19. Did you submit your declaration of wealth and personal interests for the previous fiscal year? (D2)




The study included three questions for the purpose of testing public agents regarding the level of knowledge of legal / illegal or correct / incorrect situations with reference to *Compliance with the regime of declaring personal wealth and interests*.

Most of the respondents of the current study, 81% (88% in 2017), consider the situation illegal / incorrect when *the official submits the declaration of wealth and personal interests after two years of activity within the public entity (correct answer)*, and 6% (7%) believe that this practice is legal / correct. 74% of respondents in both surveys said that it was illegal / incorrect for *the official not to declare his / her concubine's assets in the declaration of personal wealth and interests (correct answer)*, compared to 11% (17% in 2017) who believe the opposite. Also, a share of 74% (70% in 2017) of the people mentioned that it is illegal / incorrect that *at the end of the mandate / employment relationships, the civil servant does not submit the declaration of personal wealth and interests, because he or she has already filed it in this year (correct answer)*, and one in 10 (every 5th in 2017) questioned people believe that this practice is legal / correct (Figure 3.20 and Table 117 in the annex 3).


Most public officials, over 75% (over 80% in 2017) of those who provided the answers illegal / incorrect, said that such situations do not happen in the organizations where they work, the others being people who do not know or did not want to respond if such situations are present in the institutions (Figure 3.20 and Table 134 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.20. Compliance with the regime of declaring personal wealth and interests

Are the following situations legal / illegal or correct / incorrect? (P1.1)



Do such situations happen in the institution in which you work? (P1.2)



• Sub-sample of those who noted illegal situations in question P1.1.

3.5. Respecting the regime of conflicts of interest and not accepting favoritism

About 4 out of 5 respondents (81% in 2019 and 77% in 2017) believe **correct** that *the public agent is always obliged to declare a conflict of interest* (Figure 3.21). This opinion was expressed mainly by male respondents, persons younger than 51 years, with higher education, from the urban environment, from Chisinau, CPA (central public administration) and LPA (local public administration) 2, with management positions, with an activity duration of over 6 years (Table 24 in the annex 3).

At the same time, about 8% (15% in 2017) of the respondents consider the obligation to declare conflicts of interest only in certain situations (Figure 3.21). Higher shares of such responses, which exceeded 10%, were offered by women, persons with secondary education, from rural areas, representatives of other public institutions of central and local level (Table 24 in the annex 3).

According to Article 14 of the Law of Integrity, the public agent is obliged to declare in writing, within 3 days, to the leader of the public entity about the real conflict of interests that arose in his or her professional activity, explaining the nature of the conflict of interests and how it influences or can influence the impartial exercise and objective of his or her tasks;

Moreover, according to Article 12 of the Law number 133 of 17.06.2016 on the declaration of wealth and personal interests, the potential conflict of interests is also declared mandatory.

Being asked if *the public agent is entitled to make decisions, being in a conflict of interest situation*, only a little over half of the public agents gave the **correct** answer „*that he or she is not entitled*” (58% in 2019, 53% in 2017) (Figure 3.22).

According to point (4), Article 12 of the Law number 133/2016, in the event of a conflict of interests the public agent is obliged not to resolve the request / demarche, not to issue the administrative document, not to conclude, directly or through a third person, the legal act, not to take or not to participate when making the decision in the exercise of the mandate, public function or public dignity until the conflict of interests is resolved.

This opinion was expressed more frequently in the responses of women, people over the age of 51, from the North, LPA (local public administration) 2 and other local public institutions, those with an activity duration of over 6 years.

At the same time, the share of respondents who believe that the public agent is entitled to make decisions, having been in a conflict of interest constitutes 30% (40% in 2017), of these 21% (17% in 2017) stated that they can always make decisions, and 9% (23% in 2017) believe that I can do this only in exceptional cases (Figure 3.22 and Table 25 in the annex).

Figure 3.21. Is the public agent obliged to declare a conflict of interest? (E1)





Figure 3.22. Is the public agent entitled to make decisions, being in a conflict of interest situation? (E2)



Almost 90% of the respondents of both studies stated that they did not know any cases of conflict of interest in the institutions of which they belong, during the last 12 months, and only 7% (8% in 2017) noted that they know about such situations (Figure 2.23).

Higher shares of those who think that they know such a case have been registered among the public agents of 51 years and more, with secondary education, from rural, central and southern area, among the respondents from LPA (local public administration) I and the group of respondents with a duration of activity for over 10 years (Table 26 in the annex 3).

Of the public agents that have experienced conflict of interest cases during the last 12 months (41 persons in the current study and 49 persons in 2017), 52% (41% in 2017) stated that the persons in conflict situation have continued to exercise service duties (Figure 3.24 and Table 27 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.23. Do you know about any cases of conflicts of interest in your institution in the last 12 months? (E3)





Figure 3.24. Have the persons in conflict of interest continued to exercise their service duties related to the given situation? (E2)



* Sub-sample: 41 respondents – 2019
49 respondents - 2017

Public agents were asked to state what would be the main causes of non-declaration of conflicts of interest, being offered several options. The highest shares of the answers were allocated to the option *Not knowing the procedure* that accumulated 47% affirmative answers (54% in 2017), being followed by *obtaining personal benefits (financial, material or other)* with 33% affirmations (42% in 2017), *indifference* with 31% (37% in 2017). It should be mentioned that a share of 14% in the current study did not want to offer any answers (Figure 3.25). It should be noted that men more often referred to *obtaining personal benefits* (38.7% compared to 28.4% for women) (Table 28 in the annex 3).

Also, the perceptions of the public agents about the *measures needed to be taken to eliminate the favoritism situations* in the public sector were also measured. Of those surveyed, 62% (69% in 2017) thought that the *superior hierarchical leader* should be announced, 37% (41% in 2017) considered that *cases of favoritism should be reported to the CNA (National Anticorruption Center)*, and 32% in both surveys advocate for denunciation at ANI (National Integrity Agency) (Figure 3.26 and Table 29 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.25. What are the main causes of non-declaration of conflicts of interest by public agents? (E5) Multiple response





Figure 3.26. In your opinion, what are the necessary measures to be taken to remove cases of favoritism?




Most public agents have correctly identified conflict of interest situations. Thus, 77% respondents (87% in 2017) considered the following situation offered for testing as illegal / incorrect: „the local councilor is the general director of the firm X. In the local council, a draft decision is submitted that would reduce by 20% the tax on waste storage for the firm X. The local councilor votes the draft decision”. The survey participants, who gave a correct answer regarding the conflict of interests, mentioned in the majority (77% in 2019 and 96% in 2017) that situations of non-compliance with the conflict of interest regime do not occur in the organizations where they work.

Also, approximately the same shares between public agents considered the situation incorrect / illegal: „a civil servant, being the member of the commission for selecting an NGO within a financing project, observes among the files submitted an NGO with which he or she had previously worked as an expert. The official does not declare this and favors the respective NGO file because he or she is convinced that it is the most suitable for the project”. Of the people who correctly identified the situation of favoritism, the majority stated that such situations do not happen in the institutions where they work (81% negative answers in both studies). It is worth mentioning that about 15% in 2019 and 18% in 2017 stated that they do not know / refused to say if such violations with regard to favoritism are happening in public institutions (Figures 3.27 and 3.28, Tables 118 and 135 in the annex).

Figure 3.27. Are the following situations regarding ... legal / illegal or correct / incorrect? (P1.1)

Figure 3.28. Do such situations happen in the institution in which you work? (P1.2)



3.6. Respecting the gift regime

In order to identify the level of knowledge of the acceptance of the gifts by the public agents, the respondents were offered several situations to express their opinions.

It is noted that 68% of the participants in the survey (75% in 2017) **correctly** answered that it is justified for a public official to accept a gift in the situation *when it is received out of politeness or as part of protocol actions*.

This opinion was expressed primarily by men, people aged 51 and over, from the South, representatives of LPA (local public administration) 2.

A limited number of about 3% of the interviewed persons (5% in 2017) find it acceptable the receipt of gifts by a public agent in the situations *he or she solved a more complicated problem or when the gift is not intended directly for the public agent, but his or her relatives or friends* (Figure 3.29 and Table 30 in the annex 3).

Most of the respondents mentioned that in the institution in which they work, such situations are not frequent when *citizens offer gifts, services, invitations, etc. to public agents in exchange for or thanks for a service provided*. About 64% (55% in 2017) stated that citizens *do not at all* offer gifts, services, invitations, etc., about 18% (21% in 2017) say that such practices *are very rare* and only 5% (13% in 2017)) considers that this happens *rarely* or *often* (Figure 3.30 and Table 31 in the annex 3). The receipt of gifts was mentioned in more pronounced shares by public agents in the Northern region, within public institutions at local level (other than public authorities).

Figure 3.29. Of the situations described below, in what cases is it justified for a public agent to accept a gift? (F1)





Figure 3.30. In the institution where you activate how often the citizens offer gifts, services, invitations, etc. to public servants in exchange or as a gratitude for a service provided? (F2)



About 60% of the survey participants (52% in 2017) declared the existence of the gift register in the institutions where they work, at the same time almost every 3rd respondent stated the opposite (Figure 3.31). People who are confident that in their organizations there is a register of gifts prevail among men, people under the age of 51, with higher education, from the urban environment, from Chisinau, CPA (central public administration) and LPA (local public administration) 2, with management positions, with a duration of activity of more than 10 years.

Those who mentioned that there is no such registry in their institutions are more represented (over 50%) among the people with secondary education, from rural area, South area, representatives of other public institutions at local level.

People who confirmed the existence of the gift register were asked to assess its effectiveness (on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = the gifts are not declared at all, 5 = all gifts are declared and assessed correctly). Over half of the interviewees assessed the effectiveness of the registers positively (54% in both studies), assigning

maximum values 4 and 5, which results in the assertion that the gifts are *always / usually* declared in the register and assessed correctly (Figure 3.32 and Table 33 in the annex 3).

The average score calculated for the efficiency of the gift register is 4.2 (on a 5-point scale). Higher average values were attributed by 19-35-year-old young persons (4.6), from the Chisinau municipality (4.4), CPA (central public administration) (4.4), LPA (local public administration) 2 (4.3) and other institutions at central level (4,5), heads with executive functions (4.4), people with work experience up to 2 years (4.7). Lower average scores in assessing the efficiency of the respective registers were attributed by the respondents from the rural area (3.5), from the South (3.6), LPA (local public administration) 1 (3.6), those with more than 10 years' experience (3.9).

Figure 3.31. Is there a register of gifts in the institution in which you activate? (F3)





Figure 3.32. How effective is this register? (F4)
Estimate on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = the gifts are not declared at all, 5 = all the gifts are declared and assessed



* Sub-sample: 359 respondents – in 2019
 322 respondents – in 2017

Testing the situations with regard to accepting the gifts revealed that about 4 out of 5 people questioned assessed **correctly** as illegal / incorrect the situations when: (i) The civil servant accepts as a gift a set of office supplies because he or she solved an unusual and complicated problem for a citizen, (ii) The civil servant does not declare the receipt of a protocol gift within a public event / conference, and about 6 public officials consider these situations to be legal / correct. (Figure 3.33. and Table 119 in the annex 3).

It should be mentioned that about 80% of the respondents of both studies stated that such situations do not take place in the institutions where they work, and about 15% did not want to express their opinion (Figure 3.34. and Table 136 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.33. Are the following situations regarding ... legal / illegal or correct / incorrect? (P1.1)





Figure 3.34. Do such situations happen in the institution in which you work? (P1.2)



3.7. Non-admission, denunciation and treatment of undue influences

The survey respondents were asked to assess the degree to which the activity of public institutions is influenced by the interests of the political parties, on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = it is not influenced at all by the interests of the political parties, 10 = it is totally influenced by the interests of political parties.

More than half of the public agents surveyed stated that the activity of the institutions they belong to is not at all influenced by the interests of the political parties. It is observed that about 73% (81% in 2017) consider that the activity of the institution is slightly influenced by the interests of the political parties (scores 1-5), and 21% (19% in 2017) consider this influence as significant (scores 6-10) (Figure 3.35 and Table 34 in the annex).

The average score assigned in assessing the degree to which the activity of public institutions is politically influenced is 3.2 (5.8 was in 2017). Higher average values were assigned by the respondents from the North, the CPA (central public administration) representatives, these groups obtained an average score of 4.0. The lowest average score, below 3.0 points, was registered in the groups of public agents with secondary education, from the rural area, from the Center and South, other public institutions from central and local level, as well as respondents with a duration of activity of more than 10 years.

When asked how this influence manifests, respondents gave different opinions. About 1/3 public agents (29% in 2017) consider that *The decisions are made according to the political belonging of the leadership*, 28% (31% in 2017) mentioned that the influence consists in the fact that *The ideology of a particular party is promoted*, about ¼ affirmative answers cumulated the options as *The employment and appointment to positions is done according to the political affiliation* and the *Promotion to the positions is done according to the political affiliation* (Figure 3.36 and Table 35 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.35. To what extent is the activity of your institution influenced by the interests of political parties? (G1)

Estimate on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = it is not influenced at all by the interests of the political parties, 10 = it is totally influenced by the interests of political parties





Figure 3.36. How do these influences manifest themselves? (G2) (Multiple response)



* Sub-sample: 247 respondents – in 2019
249 respondents – in 2017

Another aspect assessed in the studies carried out is with reference to the fact that the employees of the public institutions of the Republic of Moldova are influenced in their electoral options. Studies indicate that this influence does not actually occur, about 96% (97% in 2017) stated that they *were not forced to vote for / against a certain political candidate in the last elections (presidential, parliamentary, local)*, only 3% affirmed this imposition (Figure 3.37).

Those who, however, were influenced in their electoral choices, prevailed among respondents from the North (9.2%), from the rural area (5.6%), LPA (local public administration) 1 (7.2%) and other institutions at local level (5.0%) (Table 36 in the annex 3).

Another aspect on the assessment of the degree of influence was reflected through the answers to the question *During the last 12 months, have you been asked, requested or required to take part in the following actions at your workplace*, being offered a number of response options. It should be mentioned that affirmative answers (Yes) have accumulated the following actions: Protectionism, support or favoring someone (2,4%), Abuse of power (1,1%), Traffic of influence (0,9%), Request / offer of bribe (0,4%), in total there were registered only 19 affirmative answers in 2019 and 18 answers in 2017 (Table 37 in the annex 3).

Only about 19% respondents (28% in 2017) stated that they denounced the actions referred to, with higher shares of the complaints observed among women, young people aged 19-35, from the Center, who work in other institutions of local level, among the respondents with execution functions (Figure 3.38 and Table 38 in the annex 3). Of these, only a few people (4 in number) stated that the situation was resolved as a result of the denunciation (Table 40 in the annex 3).

At the same time, the majority, 81% (72% in 2017) did not denounce the mentioned actions, and among the causes of their non-denunciation were named: I didn't think the situation would be resolved (47%), I had concerns about the attitude of my colleagues (24%), I had concerns about the attitude of my colleagues (13%) (Table 39 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.37. Have you been forced to vote for / against a certain political candidate in the last elections (presidential, parliamentary, local)? (G3)





Figure 3.38. Did you denounce the acts you referred to in the previous question (requested, asked or required to participate in certain actions at the workplace)? (G5)



The survey participants were asked whether there is a register of undue influences within the institutions where they work. About ¼ of the respondents (26% in 2019 and 23% in 2017) mentioned that their organization has such a register, 35% in 2019 (26% in 2017) stated that the institution does not have such a document. Considerable shares of 20% respondents (30% in 2017) stated that they do not know if the institution has the register of undue influences, every 5th public agent in general does not know what it is (Figure 3.39 and Table 41 in the annex 3).

Respondents who stated that such a register exists were asked to assess its effectiveness (on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = the cases are not declared at all, 5 = all cases are declared; 8 = I don't know / No answer). About 67% public agents (79% in 2017) expressed their opinion with reference to the respective document, at the same time 1/3 (1/5 in 2017) refused to rule on its effectiveness. Also, over half of the respondents (51% in 2019 and 54% in 2017) appreciated the efficiency of the register with grades of 4 and 5, which means that all / most cases are declared in the register of undue influences (Figure 3.40 and Table 42 in the annex).

Figure 3.39. Is there a register of undue influences in your institution?





Figure 3.40. How effective is this register?



For example, respondents were offered the opportunity to expose themselves with reference to whether *Is the following situation legal / illegal or correct / incorrect: The civil servant does not denounce his or her head's*

request to change some data in the institution's report to the European Union, to present more positive results, as well as the fact that such situations happen in the institution in which they work.

About 83% of the survey participants (92% in 2017) considered the situation illegal / incorrect (Figure 3.41 and Table 120 in the annex 3). Of these, 81% (78% in 2017) claim that there are no similar situations in the institutions where they work. About 1/5 others refused to answer or do not know if such cases occur at their jobs (Figure 3.42 and Table 137 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.41. Is the following situation legal / illegal or correct / incorrect: The civil servant does not denounce his or her head's request to change some data in the institution's report to the European Union, to present more positive results? (P1.1)





Figure 3.42. Do such situations happen in the institution in which you work?



* Sub-sample: respondents who noted illegal in Figure 3.41


3.8. Non-admission, denunciation of corruption and protection of whistleblowers

Opinion poll measured the level of knowledge of public agents with reference to whistleblowing. In this regard, the respondents were asked who is a whistleblower and what does the whistleblowing mean³.

About 70% respondents of both studies mentioned that the whistle-blower could be *any ordinary citizen*, and only about 12% (9% in 2017) considered that it would be *any employee of a public institution or private company*, about 5% affirmative answers were offered to the other answer options. This results in the finding that only about one in 10 public agents have correct knowledge of „who is the whistle-blower”, the **correct** answer being *any employee of the public institution or private company* (Figure 3.43 and Table 43 in the annex 3).


Figure 3.43. In your opinion, who can be a whistleblower (people who notice a manifestation of corruption)? (H1)

³ *Whistleblowing* – information on committing corruption and corruption related acts, acts of corrupt behavior, non-observance of the rules regarding the declaration of income and property, and violation of legal obligations regarding conflict of interest, done voluntarily, in good faith and in the public interest, in written or verbal form to the persons and / or bodies competent for receiving, recording and examining this information (Government Decision number 707 of 09.09.2013 for the approval of the Framework Regulation on whistle-blowers)



Being asked which of the three situations best describes whistleblowing, the respondents offered major shares in affirmative answers to all three options. This relates to the fact that public agents do not have a clear vision in this context, although about ¾ have given an affirmative answer to the **correct** situation: *when a public official informs the competent bodies about committing acts of corruption, about not declaring personal assets and interests, about violating the conflict of interest regime by another public official* (Figure 3.44 and Table 44 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.44. Which of the following situations best describes whistleblowing?



Most of the respondents, about 97% in both studies stated that in the last 12 months they were not witnesses of any act of corruption in the institution where they work and only 7 persons (13 in the 2017 study) stated this fact (Table 45 in the annex 3). More than half of the people who gave affirmative answers acknowledged that they did not report these cases (Table 46 in the annex 3).

All public agents, participants in the study, were asked to state the *reasons for the decision not to report corruption cases in the institution where they work*. Shares of about ¼ respondents stated that these would be: *lack of evidence, however, no action will be taken*, but also the fact that *there are no effective protection measures for whistle-blowers*. It is worth mentioning that one in ten respondents (in the previous study one in five) considers that they would suffer later, if they reported the acts of corruption (Figure 3.45 and Table 47 in the annex).

Figure 3.45. What would be the reasons for the decision not to report corruption in your institution? (H5) (Multiple response)





Figure 3.46. To what extent do you think you will be protected in the event of denouncing an act of corruption that you suffered? (H6)
Estimate on a scale of 1 to 5, where: 1: I will not be protected at all; 5: I am absolutely convinced that I will be protected



The respondents were asked to estimate the extent to which they think they would be protected in case of denouncing an act of corruption which they would have suffered, assessing on a scale from 1 to 5 points, where *1 = I will not be protected at all; 5 = I am absolutely convinced that I will be protected*. About 81% of the public agents surveyed (91% in 2017) assessed the level of trust, rating it from 1 to 5, and 19% (9% in 2017) did not want to decide whether or not he or she will be protected in such situations (Figure 3.46 and Table 48 in the annex 3).

Thus, 39% respondents (53% in 2017) are convinced that *it will not be protected at all / rather I do not think it will be protected* in situations where they would decide to denounce possible acts of corruption (values 1 and 2 on the assessment scale). The share of people who are *absolutely sure / rather convinced* that they will be protected in case of denouncing an act of corruption which they would have suffered constitutes 24% (20% in 2017) (values 4 and 5 on the assessment scale).


The average score for this question is 2.6 on the 5-point scale (2.4 in 2017), which results in the conclusion that public agents generally do not feel protected in the event of denouncing an act of corruption after which he or she would suffer.

Higher average scores, above the 2.6 average, were observed among men, young people aged 19-35, with higher education, the inhabitants of the urban area, the inhabitants of Chisinau municipality, the representatives of CPA (Central Public Administration), LPA (Local Public Administration) 2 as well as other institutions at central and local level, with execution functions, persons with an activity duration of less than 10 years. It should be mentioned that all the average scores calculated according to the socio-demographic

criteria are below the 3-point score on the applied measurement scale, which actually indicates a relatively high level of distrust in being protected.

The questionnaire also included a question regarding the preferred methods of reporting acts of corruption. The results of both studies indicate that about half of the respondents prefer to report corruption situations within the organization, about 1/3 prefer to report directly to the anticorruption agencies. About 7% (9% in 2017) generally prefer not to get involved, i.e. not to report to anyone (Figure 3.47 and Table 49 in the annex 3). Women are more likely to report cases of corruption within the organization (55.7% compared to 41.4% for men), while the latter would prefer to report directly to anticorruption agencies (42.8% compared to 28.4% among women).

Figure 3.47. If there was a corruption situation in the institution where you work, which you would report, what would be the preferred method? (H7)




Being asked to tick whether it is legal / correct or illegal / incorrect for a *public institution director to tell his or her subordinates about the warning filed within his or her institution, presenting the name of the whistle-blower as a positive example*, most respondents, 73% (80% in 2017), responded **correct** that this is illegal / incorrect. At the same time, knowledge of this fact is limited, because one in five respondents (13% in 2017) did not want or did not know what to answer, and about 8% (10% in 2017) consider this fact to be legal / correct (**which is an incorrect answer**) (Table 121 in the annex 3).

Of those who consider the situation incorrect, 82% (86% in 2017) say that such cases do not happen in the institutions where they work, and 16% (13% in 2017) did not know or refused to expose themselves in this context (Table 138 in the annex 3).

3.9. Intolerance to incidents of integrity

Confidence in the integrity of colleagues is quite high among public agents. Thus, about 3/4 of the respondents (77% in 2019 and 75% in 2017) consider that most of the colleagues are integral (Figure 3.48).

Figure 3.48. Do you think most of your colleagues are honest? (I1)



The degree of confidence in the integrity of colleagues is more pronounced among men, persons aged 36-50 years, respondents with secondary education, the inhabitants of the rural area, from the Center and South area, the representatives of LPA (Local Public Administration) 1, the holders of management positions, the persons with duration of activity of 3-5 years (Table 50 in the annex 3).

However, there is also a significant share of public agents, about 8% (12% in 2017), who states that most of their colleagues are not integral, and those who did not know / did not want to pronounce on integrity of their colleagues is 15% (13% in 2017).

According to the interviewees, the public functions most often involved in integrity incidents within the institutions where they work are the heads and deputies of institutions with 27% affirmations (25% in 2017), followed by the public functions for execution / provision of public services with 12% affirmative answers (28% in 2017). At the same time, 29% of the survey participants (38% in 2017) stated that none of the specified functions within the institution where they work are involved in integrity incidents (Figure 3.49 and Table 51 in the annex 3).

Officials showing disciplinary violations within the institution are sanctioned, opinion supported by 71% respondents of the current study (75% in 2017). This opinion is supported by higher shares among men, respondents from the South, LPA (Local Public Administration) 2, respondents with a public management position, those with an activity duration of over 10 years (Figure 3.50 and Table 52 in the annex 3).

It should be mentioned that one in ten respondents (in both studies) considers that officials who manifest disciplinary deviations within the institution are not sanctioned.

Figure 3.49. Which of the following public functions are most often involved in integrity incidents within your institution? (I2)





Figure 3.50. Are the officials who manifest disciplinary misconduct within the institution where you activate sanctioned? (I3)



About 46% of the participants in the study (58% in 2017) consider it illegal / incorrect for the examination of integrity incidents within a public entity to be carried out by different subdivisions, by rotation. At the same

time, about 13% (19% in 2017) stated that this would be a legal / correct practice (**correct answer**). It should be mentioned that the level of knowledge of the legality of such situations is low, as 41% of the respondents (23% in 2017) did not know whether or not such situations are correct (Figure 3.51 and Table 122 in the annex 3). About 87% (89% in 2017) of the respondents who stated that it is correct the examination of integrity incidents to be done by rotation, claiming that this practice does not apply in the organizations where they work (Figure 3.52 and Table 139 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.51. Is the following situation legal / illegal or correct / incorrect: Is the examination of incidents of integrity within the public entity X done by the subdivisions by rotation? (P1.1)





Figure 3.52. Does such situation happen in the institution in which you work? (P1..2)



* Sub-sample: respondents who notes illegal at P1.1


3.10. Ensuring transparency in the decision-making process

Positive assessments (*fairly transparent / very transparent*) prevail in assessing the level of transparency of central public institutions. The share of respondents who offered these ratings ranges from 51% -67% (48% - 62% in 2017).

Thus, on the first place after the share of positive appraisals is placed the *information of citizens on the activity of the institution* (67% in 2019 and 62% in 2017), followed by *making decisions* (65% in 2019 and 60% in 2017).

Less transparent is considered *spending public money* with 37% (43% in 2017) answers *it is not transparent at all / quite non-transparent*, followed by *public procurement* with 32% (39% in 2017) such answers (Figure 3.53 and Tables 53-55 in the annex 3).


Figure 3.53. How would you appreciate the level of transparency of central level public institutions in the process of...? (J1.1)



The assessment of the level of transparency of the local (community) public institutions, on the same components also denotes the tendency towards the prevalence of positive assessments (*fairly transparent / very transparent*), and the shares of positive ratings range from 58% - 67% (52% - 61% in 2017).

As in the case of central and local public institutions, the degree of transparency is greater regarding *informing citizens about the activity of the institution* (67% in 2019 and 61% in 2017), followed by *the adoption of decisions* (65% in 2019 and 58% in 2017), and in the last places with the highest negative appreciation of the degree of transparency (*it is not transparent at all / quite non-transparent*) are placed the *expenditure of public money* (with 28% in 2019 and 37% in 2017) and *public procurement* (with 25% in 2019 and 35% in 2017) (Figure 3.54 and Tables 56-58 in the annex 3).


Figure 3.54. How would you appreciate the level of transparency of the local (community) public institutions in the process of...? (J1.2)



Public agents were asked to assess the level of transparency of several institutions in the country, assigning notes on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = not transparent at all, and 5 = total transparency. For a more pronounced picture of the assessment results, the answers were grouped into three categories: scores 1 and 2 represent a low degree of transparency of the institution, scores 3 and 4 - average transparency, scores 5 and 6 - high degree of transparency / total transparency.

The lowest degree of transparency was allocated to the political parties, almost half of the respondents assigned grades of 1 and 2 to them, being considered the most transparent institutions. About 1/3 of these answers were allocated to the Information and Security Service, the Prosecutor's Office, the courts, almost 30% - the Central Election Commission, the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office, the Police, the Court of Accounts, the Presidency, ANI (National Integrity Agency), and the other institutions have accumulated below ¼ scores of 1 and two. With the highest degree of transparency were noted the Mayoralties (27% grades of 5 and 6), followed by LPA (local public administration) 2 (24% such answers), government / ministries (22%) NGOs (21%). The other institutions accumulated below 20% grades of 5 or 6, which would indicate a high degree of transparency (Figure 3.55 and Tables 59-67 in the annex 3).


Figure 3.55. How do you assess the level of transparency in the following institutions? (J2)



For each institution, the level of transparency was estimated by calculating the average grade based on the grades assigned (1-6 in 2019 and 1-5 in 2017). Approximately the same trends in both studies are observed with reference to the assessed institutions while some differences in assessments are also observed. In the current study the highest scores were allocated to the *People's Advocate*, *NGOs*, *Mayors*, in 2017 – *NGOs*, *CNA (National Anticorruption Center)*, *Mass media*.

The lowest grades in this study were assigned to the *Political Parties*, *the Prosecutor's Office*, *SIS (Information and Security Service)*, in the 2017 study the respondents offered the lowest ratings to the *Political Parties*, *the Prosecutor's Office*, *the Presidency* (Figure 3.56).

Figure 3.56. Distribution of institutions from the point of view of the average degree of transparency (J2c)




The methods most commonly applied by public institutions to ensure decision-making transparency, according to the respondents of the current study, are *the publication of draft legislative and normative acts on the websites of the institutions* (57% of the „always” response variant), *the publication on the official pages of the institutions of the annual report on transparency in the decision-making process* (51% of „always” affirmations) and *the publication on the institution's website of the approved documents* (the share of such answers is 48%).

The method most rarely applied to ensure transparency is considered by public agents’ invitation of *mass media to record and broadcast their content on TV and radio stations* (27% of „always” responses) (Figure 3.57 and Tables 68-74 in the annex 3).


It should be mentioned that the same methods of ensuring the transparency of decision-making in the state institutions were also mentioned in the same context in the study conducted in 2017, only with a slightly lower percentage of the respective affirmations.

Figure 3.57. How does your institution ensure transparency of decision-making? (J3)



About 71% of the public agents surveyed in the current study (73% in 2017) stated that in their institutions there are persons responsible for ensuring transparency in the decision-making process.

Figure 3.58. Are there people in your institution responsible for ensuring transparency in the decision-making process? (J4)



(Table 75 in the annex 3).

At the same time about 12% (8% in 2017) mentioned that such persons are not provided in the institution where the respondents are working. It should be mentioned that a considerable share of almost 1/5 of those interviewed generally does not know if there is a person designated in the institution in which they work to ensure decision-making transparency (Figure 3.58).

Less informed about their existence (the persons who answered I don't know / No answer) are the young people aged 19-35 years, those with secondary education, respondents from Chisinau, CPA (central public administration) and representatives of other public institutions of central and local level, with public execution functions, with a duration of activity up to 2 years

A share of 69% of public agents (79% in 2017) believes that in the situation described below, transparency in the decision-making process is not ensured (which is the **correct** answer) (*the draft law elaborated by public entity X was not placed on the official web page of the institution for consultation, considering that its content is related to the regulation of the field specific to the institutional administration and less to the public interest*) (Figure 3.59 and Table 123 in the annex 3). More informed in this context are the people aged 51 years and over, from the rural area, from the Center and South, LPA (local public administration) 1, with management positions and those with a duration of activity of 3-5 years.

At the same time 10% of the respondents (12% in 2017) support the opinion that the situation described is correct / legal. It is noted that 4 out of 5 public agents consider that in the institutions where they work the transparency in the decision-making process is always ensured, and about 14% (16% in 2017) have refused to answer or do not know if in the institutions where they work it happens that the principle of decision-making transparency not to be respected (Figure 3.60 and Table 140 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.59. Is the following situation legal / illegal or correct / incorrect: *The draft law elaborated by public entity X was not placed on the official web page of the institution for consultation, considering that its content is related to the regulation of the field specific to the institutional administration and less to the public interest?* (P1.1)





Figure 3.60. Does such situation happen in the institution in which you work? (P1.2)



* Sub-sample: respondents who noted illegal at P1.1

3.11. Ensuring access to information of public interest

Data from both studies (current, from 2019 and that drawn up in 2017) relate to the fact that institutions provide access to information of public interest, about 92% respondents have opted for the answers *always / very often / often*. Of them about 2/3 (65%) stated that the answers from the institution are offered always. The survey participants who stated that the institutions of which they belong have deficiencies in providing answers to requests for access to information of public interest represent 7% (5% in 2017) (Figure 3.61 and Table 76 in the annex 3).

The way of ensuring access to information of public interest by placing it on the web page of the organization, according to the respondents, is frequently used by public institutions: 81% of the respondents (78% in 2017) offered the answers *always / very often / often*. However, opinions still persist that the institutions they

represent do not usually place information of public interest on their web pages (the share of responses rarely / very rarely / never constitutes 12% in 2019 (15% in 2017) (Figure 3.62 and Table 77 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.61. To what extent does your institution provide access to information of public interest, providing answers to requests for access to information of public interest? (K1)






Figure 3.62. To what extent does your institution place information of public interest on the organization's website? (K2)



The main reason for not publishing the information on the official website of the organization remains the fact that the respective institution does not have a web page with 29% affirmations in the current study (55% in 2017). Another reason indicated by about ¼ respondents is *the lack / insufficiency of staff who know how to place the information* (14% in 2017), almost 1/5 indicated *the lack / insufficiency of time for this activity* (11% in 2017), but also the *conviction that publishing on the web page is pointless because no one accesses this kind of information*, reason supported by 13% respondents (9% in 2017).

Figure 3.63. What are the reasons for not posting the information on the web page? (K3)



* Sub-sample: 139 respondents - in 2019
95 respondents - in 2017

Most respondents consider it illegal / incorrect to insure access to information of public interest. Thus, 83% of the public agents surveyed (89% in 2017) mentioned that the situation is not legal / correct when *after*

examining citizen X's request for access to information, the official does not submit a response stating the irrelevance of the request (it does not fall within the competence of the institution) (Figure 3.64 and Table 124 in the annex 3).

Of these 85% (86% in 2017) mentioned that there were no such cases in the institutions they represent. It should be mentioned that insignificant shares have confirmed the existence of such situations in the organizations where they work (Figure 3.65 and Table 141 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.64. Is the following situation legal / illegal or correct / incorrect: after examining citizen X's request for access to information, the official ascertains the irrelevance of the request (not within the competence of the institution) and does not submit an answer? (P.1.1)





Figure 3.65. Does such situation happen in the institution in which you work? (P1.2)




* Sub-sample: respondents who noted illegal at P1.1

3.12. Transparent and responsible management of public assets, reimbursable and non-reimbursable finances

Another aspect assessed within the study concerns the opinion of the respondents on how the public patrimony is managed and the reimbursable and non-reimbursable finances. In both studies, in general, two categories of answers prevailed: those with a positive connotation (the answer *never*) and „I don't know” (Figure 3.66 and Tables 79-85 in the annex 3).

Thus, about half of the public agents in all situations stated that in their institution there are never so many cases with more pronounced tendencies of the share of the answers regarding the *authorization without foundation of demolition of immovable property, illegal allocation of resources from external assistance projects*. The existence of situations *often / very often / always* is more often perceived in the situations of *avoiding public auctions in the process of privatizing public property* as well as auctioning off public real estate at a reduced price.


Figure 3.66. When it comes to managing public heritage, how often do the situations described below occur in public institutions? (L1)



Public agents were asked to explain how efficiently public money is spent in the institution where they work. The assessment was performed on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = absolutely inefficient, 5 = maximum efficiency.

Figure 3.67. In your opinion, how effective is the spending of public money in your institution? (L2)

Estimate on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = absolutely inefficient, 5 = maximum efficiency



It is noticeable that most public agents consider that the organizations they represent are spending money effectively, 72% assigned the values 4 and 5 (81% in 2017) and only minor shares of about 4% in both studies opted for inefficiency, noting the answers 1 and 2 (Figure 3.67).


Those who believe that public money is spent efficiently by the institutions are more represented among the respondents aged 51 and over, those from the rural area, from North and South, who represent LPA (local public administration) 2 and LPA (local public administration) 1, from the public management positions, as well as among those who work 6-10 years (Table 86 in the annex 3).

The average score calculated with reference to the efficiency of public money spending is 4.3 (4.4 in 2017). According to the socio-demographic criteria of the respondents, higher average scores were assigned by women, persons over 36 years, respondents from North and Center, LPA (local public administration) 2,

LPA (local public administration) 1 as well as other institutions at central level, respondents with public function of management, with an activity duration of 6-10 years.


Transparency in the management of financial resources by fields was assessed with about 23% -41% „high / total transparency”, being assigned the grades of 4 and 5. The highest transparency was related in relation to *Education*, 41% such statements, followed by the *Local Administration* with 35%, as well as the *Fiscal and Public Order* fields, both cumulating 30% people who opted for transparency in the management of financial resources. The lowest degree of transparency in this context was estimated for the *Customs* field (Figure 3.68 and Tables 79-82 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.68. How do you assess the degree of transparency in the management of the financial resources allocated to the fields? (L3)




According to the answers provided by public agents, it is observed that many of them know what transparency means transparency in the management of public heritage and public finances. Thus, the following situations were considered illegal / incorrect: *from the financial resources not wasted from an external assistance project, the head of the institution distributed prizes to the employees* (76% in 2019 and 75% in 2017), *the civil servant first examines the request of the person from whom he or she received little attention (for example a packet of coffee) and then deals with the other requests, even though the others have been submitted before* (91% in 2019 and 95% in 2017) (Figure 3.69 and Tables 125-126).

Figure 3.69. Are the following situations ... legal / illegal or correct / incorrect? (P1.1)



Of the respondents who consider these circumstances illegal / incorrect, the vast majority say that similar situations do not happen in the organizations they come from, and the others either do not know about such cases or refuse to answer (Figure 3.70 and Tables 142-143 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.70. Do such situations happen in the institution in which you work? (P.1.2)




* Sub-sample: respondents who graded illegal at P1

3.13. Compliance with the rules of ethics and deontology

In both studies, about 72% of the respondents stated that their institutions have a code of ethics, and another 20% (22% in the 2017 study) referred to the *Law on the code of conduct of the civil servant* (Figure 3.71). The degree of knowledge about the existence of the code of ethics in the institution where he or she works is higher among young respondents aged 19-35, from the urban area, from Chisinau, LPA (local public administration) 2 and other institutions at central and local level, people with an activity duration of more than 10 years (Table 93 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.71. Is there a code of ethics in your institution? (M1)



Of the respondents who know about the code of ethics, almost all, about 95%, mentioned that the document is brought to the attention of new employees, no significant discrepancies are observed according to socio-demographic groups (Table 94 in the annex 3).

Of the respondents participating in the study 63% (77% in 2017) stated that in their organizations there is a structure / person responsible for ethics, at the same time 21% (14% in 2017) mentioned that there is not one, and 16% respondents (9% in 2017) do not know if there is such a structure / person in the institution where he or she works (Figure 3.72).

The degree of knowledge of this aspect is more pronounced among the respondents with higher education, residents from the urban environment, from the Center and North areas, representatives of other public institutions of central and local level, with public management positions, persons with an activity duration of more than 10 years. The people with secondary education, from the rural area, from the South, LPA (local public administration) 1 know less about this (Table 95 in the annex 3).

Most public agents who have confirmed the existence of a structure / person responsible for ethics, are satisfied with his or her activity. The degree of satisfaction was assessed on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = not at all satisfied, 5 = totally satisfied. Thus, about 86% of the respondents in both studies assigned the values 4 and 5 on the satisfaction measurement scale (Figure 3.73 and Table 96 in the annex 3).

The average score estimated with respect to the degree of satisfaction regarding the activity of the responsible person for ethics is 4.5 (4.4 in 2017). Depending on the socio-demographic criteria of the respondents were registered higher average scores assigned by the respondents with secondary education, from the rural area, the lowest score was observed in the case of LPA (local public administration) 2.

Figure 3.72. Is there a structure / a person responsible for ethics in your institution? (M3)





Figure 3.73. To what extent are you satisfied with his / her activity? (M4) Estimate on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = not at all satisfied, 5 = totally satisfied



Most of the public agents questioned do not know cases when ethical and deontology norms have been violated in the last 12 months in the institution where they work, about 70% (64% in 2017) have answered negative to this question. However, a certain share, about 16% (29% in 2017) stated that such cases would have taken place (Figure 3. 74 and Table 97 in the annex 3).

About 61% respondents who declared the existence of the violations in the last 12 months preceding the study (80% in 2017) mentioned that they were sanctioned, and a considerable proportion of 40% (20% in 2017) either believe that sanctions have not been applied or that they did not want or did not know what to answer the question concerned (Figure 3.75 and Table 98 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.74. Do you know of cases, within the institution in which you work, when ethics and deontology rules have been violated in the last 12 months? (M5)






Figure 3.75. Have such violations been sanctioned? (M6)



* Sub sample: 96 respondents – in 2019
180 respondents – in 2017


The public agents participating in the survey were offered several situations, to be assessed in terms of professional ethics. Thus, over 90% respondents considered the following situations to be *unethical*: a public agent replaces the actual reports and figures with some false ones to go well with the assessment (93%), a public agent solves, in priority, a request submitted by a friend, although there are many requests waiting in line (91%), a public agent goes to a delegation and asks the persons from the hotel to pass the meal expenses to the room bill, but not to mention this in the invoice in order to be able to bring home the daily money (91%), a public agent countersigns a document at the insistence of his or her hierarchical superior, although he or she knows that the document is not correctly prepared (91%). Three other situations have accumulated less than 90% of these affirmations, and several cases have been registered that would assert that they would be ethical (Figure 3.76 and Tables 99-102 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.76. In general, do you think it is ethical or unethical (moral) for a public agent to ...? (M7)



In the last years of activity only about 56% respondents participated in some trainings on ethics and integrity norms (Figure 3.77).

Figure 3.77. In the last 2 years of activity, have you participated in trainings on ethics and integrity rules? (M8)



Depending on socio-demographic groups, certain differences are observed. Thus more pronounced shares of the respondents who benefited from informative actions regarding the ethics and integrity norms were registered among men, persons aged 19-35 years, of the respondents with higher education, the residents of the urban environment, those from Chisinau, CPA (central public administration) and other institutions of central and local level, the persons with management positions, with a duration of activity between 3-5 years (Table 103 in the annex 3).

Considerable shares of public agents did not benefit from information actions on ethics and integrity rules (44% in 2019 and 36% in 2017) (Figure 3.77).

3.14. Compliance with the legal the regime of restrictions and limitations in relation to termination of the mandate, employment or service relationships and the migration of public servants to the private sector (post-mandate employment of the deputy).


Respondents were asked to pronounce with reference to restrictions and limitations with regard to employment relationships.

Most of the survey respondents stated that there are no post-employment restrictions (employment at the next job) for the employees of the institution where they work (73% in 2019 and 80% in 2017), only about 5% gave an affirmative answer. At the same time, the number of those who are not informed in this context is very high, 22% (16% in 2017) mentioned that they do not know this aspect (Figure 3.78).

More pronounced shares of the respondents who mentioned that there are post-employment restrictions are observed among persons aged 51 and over, from rural areas, LPA (local public administration) 1 and other institutions at central level, persons with public management positions (Table 104 in the annex 3).

Of the participants in the study about 37% (44% in 2017) mentioned that *it is not legal / correct* for a public agent to be hired by transfer from a state agency to a ministry (which represents a **correct** answer), 38% consider that such cases are not illegal / incorrect, and 18% do not know how to answer this question (Figure 3.79 and Table 127 in the annex 3). Of those who mentioned that transfer situations are not legal /

Figure 3.78 Are there any post-employment restrictions (employment to the next job) for the employees of your institution? (N1)



correct, the vast majority stated that there are no similar cases in their organizations (88% in both studies) (Figure 3.80 and Table 144 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.79. Is the following situation legal / illegal or correct / incorrect: a public agent is hired by transfer from a state agency to a ministry? (P1.1)





Figure 3.80. Does such situation happen in the institution in which you work? (P1.2)



* Sub-sample: respondents who graded illegal at P1.1


3.15. Implementation of corruption risk management


Only about half of the public agents mentioned that there is an integrity plan in the institution, about 44% in 2019 and 51% in 2017. Almost one in five in both studies states that the respective plan does not exist, and about 1/3 do not know whether or not the institution has an integrity plan (Figure 3.81). Those who do not know this are more represented among people aged 51 and over, respondents from villages, residents of the South, representatives of LPA (local public administration) 1 and other local level institutions, holders of management positions, employees with a seniority of over 10 years (Table 105 in the annex 3).

Most of the respondents, 87% (92% in 2017), who mentioned that this plan exists in the institution where they work claim that this document is implemented, only a few support the opposite, at the same time every tenth does not know about the applicability of the respective plan (Figure 3.82 and Table 106 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.81. Is there an integrity plan within your institution? (O1)

Figure 3.82. Is the integrity plan within your institution implemented? (O2)





* Sub-sample: 263 respondents – in 2019
314 respondents – in 2017

Another related document is the corruption risk register. About 40% (34% in 2017) of the public agents interviewed say that the institution they represent has a registry of corruption risks (Figure 3.83). More stressed shares are observed among the employees up to 50 years old, the respondents with higher education, from the urban environment, from Chisinau, the representatives of CPA (central public administration) and LPA (local public administration) 2, the holders of the management positions, the employees with activity duration of more than 10 years (Table 107 in the annex 3).

The survey participants were asked to assess the efficiency of the registry of corruption risks, on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = the registry is not completed at all, 5 = the risks are registered, renewed and actions are taken to resolve them. Thus, of the respondents who confirmed the existence of the risk registry in the institution, about 62% (52% in 2017) highly assessed the efficiency of the document, assigning the values 4 and 5. Another 12% (18% in 2017) of the surveyed subjects mentioned that the registry is not completed at all, and just under 1/5 respondents of both studies do not know or did not want to give any opinions (Figure 3.84 and Table 108 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.83. Is there a corruption risk register in your institution? (O3)





Figure 3.84. How effective is this register? (O4)

Estimated on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = the register is not completed at all, 5 = the risks are registered, renewed and actions are taken to solve them




* Sub-sample: 243 respondents – in 2019
210 respondents – in 2017

The estimated average efficiency score of the corruption risk registry is 4.1 (3.6 in 2017). Higher average values on the measurement scale were assigned by men, persons aged 19-35 years, high-level public servants, city respondents, Chisinau and Centre residents, CPA (central public administration) representatives and other central level institutions, holders of executive management functions, employees with a duration of activity up to 2 years.

At least 1/4 (1/3 in 2017) of the survey participants would need additional information on different issues regarding ethics and integrity rules. The main areas with reference to which public agents want to improve their level of information are the following: sources of information on ethical norms (41% in 2019, 51% in 2017), employment relationships (39% in 2019 and 42% in 2017), whistle-blowers (38% in 2019 and 46% in 2017), incompatibilities, restrictions in the hierarchy and limitation of advertising (37% in 2019 and 43% in 2017), sanctions applicable for non-observance of the rules of conduct, declaration of assets and personal interests (36% in 2019 and 45% in 2017). Other fields accumulated less than 35% affirmative answers, and the lowest information needs in the current study were mentioned with reference to the *rules of conduct* (24%) (Figure 85 and Tables 109-111 in the annex 3).

Figure 3.85. In what field do you think you need additional personal information? (O5)



GENERAL FINDINGS

General population and economic agents

General information

The study data report on the particularly low degree of the respect for human rights in the Republic of Moldova. The respondents rated on average 3.3 points in the case of the population sub-sample and 4.4 points – in the business environment (on a 10-point scale, where 1 = it is not respected at all, 10 = it is fully respected), registering tendencies towards diminution in relation to the previous study (3.6 population and 4.8 business environment in 2017). The overall average score on both sub-samples in the current study decreased by 3.6 in the current study, 2019, and 4.0 in 2017.

Trust in institutions

There is also observed a generally low level of confidence of the population and the business environment in public institutions in the Republic of Moldova. The population manifests the least confidence in political parties, Parliament, Prosecutor's Office, Courts, followed by the Central Election Commission, Presidency, Government / Ministries. The economic agents have the least confidence in Political Parties, the Prosecutor's Office and the Courts, but also in the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office, CEC (Central Election Commission), Presidency. Thus, in both sub-samples the degree of trust (answers *enough confidence / very high confidence*) is decreasing, and the general average of the indicator decreased by 10 percentage points (p.p.) (9% in 2019 versus 19% in 2017).

The general perception of the survey participants is that the laws in the Republic of Moldova do not work, also with a decrease in positive perceptions. The average score calculated on the basis of the grades allocated for the indicator „the laws in the Republic of Moldova work” is 2.7 (3.8 in 2017) in the case of the population and 4.0 (4.6 in 2017) in the case of the economic agents (on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = the laws don't work at all, 10 = the laws work very well), also with a decrease in the indicator.

According to the respondents, the laws are not applied equally to all citizens, average scores also in decrease, being 3.1 (3.3 in 2017) in the case of the population and 3.3 (4.1 in 2017) in the case of economic agents (on the 10-point scale, where 1 = the laws do not apply equally to all, 10 = the laws apply equally to all).

The degree to which the parliamentary control over the application of laws in Moldova is maintained remains to be reduced or totally lacking, this fact being mentioned by 84% population (85% in 2017) and 82% business (76%), thus more negative opinions are registered among the business representatives.

Most respondents do not trust in the correctness of the elections in the Republic of Moldova. In the opinion of the respondents their correctness leaves to be desired, maintaining a fairly high share of the answers with negative connotation in both studies of 2019 and 2017. Thus, about 69% (74% in 2017) population and 67% business, in both studies, stated that elections in the Republic of Moldova are *always / rather falsified*, and only about ¼ states the opposite, that elections *are rather / always correct and free*.

Nor does the justice enjoy the confidence of the citizens, being considered to be influenced mainly by political interests, but also concerns of the judges for enrichment, influences from the Government. However, there is a slight positive trend in the judgments on justice, compared to the previous study. According to the related integrated indicator, about 6% (3% in 2017) of the population and 5% (3% in 2017) economic agents consider that the justice in Moldova is totally independent, i.e. it is not influenced by *political interests, Government and the interest of enrichment of judges*.

The financial audit of public institutions by the Court of Accounts is not independent, being influenced politically or by the Government. Only 8% population and 9% of business (11% population and 15% business in 2017) consider that the Court of Accounts shows independence in achieving the financial control of public

entities, the general average decreasing by 4 percentage points (p.p.) compared to the previous study (8% in 2019 compared to 12% in 2017).

And the activity of the various authorities with anticorruption attributions were appreciated quite low, with a tendency to increase the negative ratings. Thus, with the ratings „bad / very bad” all institutions were appreciated in a proportion of about 40% - 48% below the sub-sample population (30%-40% in 2017) and 36%-41% in the sub-sample **business** (24%-33% in 2017).

General perceptions about corruption

Corruption in the Republic of Moldova is considered a serious problem, being graded very low by the respondents. Thus, the gravity of the phenomenon is assessed by 1.8 points (1.9 in 2017) by the population and by 2.1 points (2.2 in 2017) by the business (on the 10-point scale, where 1 = corruption in Moldova is a very serious problem, 10 = corruption in Moldova is not a problem at all).

Over 70% population and over 60% business respondents (about 2/3 of both categories in 2017) consider the phenomenon of corruption in Moldova to be a very serious problem, **without discrepancies depending on the gender of the respondent.**

The most corrupt institutions, according to the population, are the medical institutions, the political parties, the courts, the police, the prosecutor's office, the Customs Service, with over 50% *quite corrupt / very corrupt* appraisals. In the opinion of the economic agents, the most corrupt institutions are the Medical Institutions, the Courts, the police, the prosecutor's office, the Customs Service, the political parties with about 50% such appraisals.

Men tend to mention considerably more often among the most corrupt institutions the police (40.6% versus 32.2% in the case of women), the courts (28.8% versus 23.5%) and the prosecutor's office (23.5% versus 13.6%). Women in exchange almost three times more often referred to educational institutions 13.1% versus 4.8%.

Stability of anticorruption values

The opinions of the respondents on the evolution of the corruption phenomenon in the Republic of Moldova were divided, the tendencies being different by sub-samples. Thus, about 28% of the population (31% in 2017) considers that there are no changes in the evolution of the level of corruption during the last 12 months preceding the studies, among the representatives of the business the share of such answers is 50% (34% in 2017). Another 59% population (52% in 2017) and 27% business (39% in 2017) consider that the phenomenon of corruption has *increased slightly / considerably* in the last year.

The level of tolerance to different corruption situations is different, maintaining similar trends in both studies. According to the integrated indicator on the general unacceptability of the acts of corruption, it is observed that about 62% of the general population (45% in 2017) and 83% of economic agents (61% in 2017) consider any corruption situations unacceptable, i.e. they do not accept to give bribes in any situation, regardless of personal benefit.

On the other hand, both the general population and the economic agents are aware that bribery entails the punishment of both parties involved, with 73% **population** in both studies and 80% (72% in 2017) **business**.

Experiences of corruption

The study shows a reduction in the interaction with public institutions.

More frequently, the population contacted the medical institutions (42% in 2019 and 60% in 2017), community service providers (20% in 2019 and 41% in 2017), educational institutions (15% in 2019 and 25% in 2017), LPA (Local Public Administration) at settlement level (13% in 2019 and 27% in 2017), customs (10% in 2019 and 15% in 2017).

In case of the economic agents, the most frequent interaction was with the fiscal inspectorates (61% in 2019 and 67% in 2017), the municipal services providers (28% in 2019 and 57% in 2017), LPA (Local Public Administration) at settlement level, Sanitary-epidemiological inspections, police (22% in 2019 and respectively 35%, 43%, 32% in 2017).

The overall average level of satisfaction was estimated at 3.3 points (3.4 in 2017). In case of the population it constituted 3.3 points in both studies and 3.4 points (3.5 in 2017) for economic agents, on a 5-point scale, where 1 = Very dissatisfied and 5 = Very satisfied.

The overall incidence of non-formal payments is relatively low. Such payments during a year preceding the study made about 7% (11.3% in 2017) of the general population and 4.7% (3.6% in 2017) economic agents, and the general average on both sub-samples constituted 6.3% (8.9% in 2017).

The frequency of bribes in money, over a year, for a person who offered bribes is on average 4.8 times (4.5 in 2017). In case of the population, a person offered a bribe on average 5.4 times a year (3.7 in 2017), in case of an economic agent - 3.5 times (6.1 in 2017).

The population offered bribes in the form of gifts mainly in the educational institutions, the Public Services Agency and the medical institutions. In case of economic agents, the percentage of those who have given gifts to institutions is below 4%, and the mentioned institutions are the police, the Courts, the sanitary-epidemiological inspections, the Public Services Agency, the Fiscal inspectorates.

Discouraging involvement in acts of corruption

The general perception of the survey participants is that the public agents in the Republic of Moldova are not generally sanctioned by their superiors for the lack of professional ethics and integrity. In the opinion of the respondents, over 70% of the population considers that the public agents are *rarely / very rarely / never* punished by the superiors for these reasons, with a slight decrease of the respective answers in relation to the previous study. In case of the economic agents, the share of the mentioned answers increased by 12 percentage points (p.p.) (80% in the current study compared to 68% in the 2017 study).

The opinion is reconfirmed that the fight against corruption in the Republic of Moldova is considered to be almost / totally inefficient, with 82% population in both surveys and over 3/4 business (79% in 2019 and 75% in 2017) who mentioned that at present the fight with the phenomenon of corruption ***it is not at all / is not very effective.***

Assets recovery from corruption offenses

The general perception of the survey participants is that, at present, there is no concern in Moldova for the recovery of the assets stemming from corruption offenses, in which public sector actors were / are involved. According to the opinion of the majority of the respondents (population and business), the public agents from the Republic of Moldova are not generally forced to return the money and goods from the acts of corruption. The share of assertions that the goods are recovered *often / very often*, is quite low and is placed below 6%, and the answers have *always* been or were not mentioned or constitute less than 1%, registering a decrease of this share in relation to the study carried out in 2017.

The citizens of the Republic of Moldova who have faced situations that have damaged their physical or moral well-being as a result of the interaction with public agents from different sectors, have preferred not to request the recovery of the damage. The main argument of this decision, invoked by the majority of the study participants, is the mistrust that the damage will be refunded.

Protection of whistle-blowers and corruption victims

The citizens of the Republic of Moldova prefer not to denounce the cases of corruption they face in interacting with public agents, with the same trends compared to the 2017 study. Only 10% population in 2019 and 2017 and 9% business (7% in 2017) stated that they reported such cases.

At the same time, the majority of respondents were open to reporting corruption cases, if they would face them. On average, about 87% respondents of the study (86% in 2017) stated that, in case of confrontation with such situations, they will probably / surely report the acts of corruption to the anticorruption agencies by different means.

At the same time, the main perception is the lack of protection in case of denouncing an act of corruption that the person suffered or the guilty person was not held responsible. This is mentioned by about 66% of the population and 89% of business (75% population and 62% business in 2017).

Women more often than men do not report corruption cases because they are afraid of consequences (19.7% versus 4.7%), whereas men because there is no protection for those who report acts of corruption (36.1% versus 13.1%).

Ethics and integrity in public, private and non-governmental sectors

The appraisals regarding the observance of the rules of integrity and honest behavior by the employees from public, private and non-governmental sectors are slightly more positive, in the current study were given higher marks compared to the previous study (on the 10-point scale). Thus, the private sector was rated higher with an average of 6.4 points (5.6 points in 2017), lower by 4.9 points in the public sector (4.8 points in 2017). The same grades were allocated to both NGOs and the mass media.

Transparency of public institutions, party financing and the mass media

The perception of most respondents is that the Parliament, the Presidency and the Government show a reduced degree / lack of transparency in their activity. Only one in five respondents considers their activity to be *quite / very transparent*.

According to the respondents, a higher degree of transparency in the activity is provided by the Local public institutions compared to the central ones. In case of LPA (Local Public Administration), one in four respondents noted their activity as *quite / very transparent*.

The lowest degree of transparency, both with regard to the CPA (Central Public Administration) and the LPA (Local Public Administration), is perceived in the case of public money management, public procurement, in both sub-samples, i.e. among the population and the economic agents.

The general perception of how political parties, mass media, NGOs and election campaigns are funded is also negative. The lowest level of transparency is attributed to political parties and electoral campaigns, with only 5% positive opinions (7% in 2017).

Another issue with regard to transparency concerns the extent to which public institutions respond to the requests for information from the population and economic agents.

It should be mentioned that the business sector requests information from public institutions to a greater extent than the general population. At the same time, requests for information from local public authorities are more frequent. In 2019 about 11% of the population requested information at the local level, 4% - at the central level (in 2017 the requests constituted 19% local and 5% central). Business representatives requested 27% from the local level, 7% from the central (in 2017 36% local, 15% central).

The study shows a quite high level of receptivity of public institutions to the requests for information from the population and business, and the level of satisfaction with the answers offered (promptness and usefulness) is quite high, the overall average being of 7.9 per 10-point scale in 2019 (7.6 points in 2017).

The popularity of electronic services remains low, being lower in population compared to the economic agents. Thus, they used at least 14% electronic service in the population sub-sample (17% in 2017), among the economic agents 69% (70% in 2017). Overall, about 1/3 respondents reported that they used at least one electronic service. Most of the respondents 89% (83% in 2017) showed to be *Pretty satisfied / Very satisfied* of electronic public services.

Educating society and officers

The main factors that could determine the involvement of citizens in the activities to curb corruption are the confidence that they will be protected if they denounce a public agent for acts of corruption, about 32% population (43% in 2017) and about 30% business (40% in 2017), as well as the security regarding the independence of justice, 1/3 population and over half business in both studies.

Respondents are familiar with information on anti-corruption activities, undertaken over the last 12 months in proportion of over 40% population and over 50% business, and more often the source of information is news compared to information campaigns on integrity and anticorruption.

Freedom of business from corruption

Although corruption is considered to be a very serious problem, compared to other obstacles in the activity of the business environment it is placed on the secondary level, with less than 20% affirmations (under 25% in 2017). Among the main difficulties faced by the economic agents were mentioned: excessive taxation 56%, with an increase of about 8 percentage points (p.p.) compared to 48% in the 2017 study, unfair competition with 44% statements compared to 38% in 2017, but and frequent changes in legislation 42% (43% in 2017), bureaucracy 39% (42% in 2017).

According to the respondents, the activity of the business sector is less influenced by political interests, with 86% affirmations *not at all affected / affected to a small extent* (75% in 2017).

The main solutions that would contribute to reducing the level of corruption in the interaction between business and the public sector are electronic services (75% affirmations), cultivation of ethics and integrity in the private sector (67%), sanctioning economic agents for giving bribes (65%). In 2017, improvements of the legislation and the sanctioning of public agents for acts of corruption, these cumulating 83% affirmations, were mentioned as the most important. It is worth mentioning that in both studies the respondents consider as less effective the increase of the salaries of civil servants.

Public agents

General perceptions

Corruption in the Republic of Moldova is considered by public agents to be a particularly serious problem. The average score with which the public agents assessed the severity of the phenomenon is 3.3 (3.1 in 2017) on a 10-point scale (where 1 = corruption in Moldova is a very serious problem, 10 = corruption in Moldova is not a problem at all).

On the other hand, the public service in general, but also the institutions in which the public agents were active at the time of the survey, were positively assessed in terms of respecting the principles of ethics and integrity. Over half of the respondents assigned the values between 6-10 with reference to corruption in the country in general, and about 90% with reference to the institution where they work (on the 10-point scale, where 1 = corruption, lack of ethics and integrity, 10 = lack of corruption, ethics and total integrity).

The main causes of corruption in Moldova are the low salaries of the public sector 2/3 statements in 2019 (about 3/4 of the respondents in 2017) and the mentality of demanding and giving bribes in money and / or goods 45% (55% in 2017).

As for the evolution of the corruption phenomenon in Moldova over the last year, this seems to be expanding (in the opinion of the respondents). Only 18% of the respondents (39% in 2017) believe that there is a slight or considerable decrease, 36% (34% in 2017) - that it remained at the level of the previous year, and 32% (22% in 2017) believe that corruption increased.

With regard to the hierarchical level of extension of the phenomenon, the opinions were divided. About 25% (29% in 2017) of public agents state that in the institutions to which they belong, corruption is manifested at all hierarchical levels equally. Of those who have specified a certain hierarchical level, the trends are identical

in both studies. Most - 19% (17% in 2017) referred to the level of management as being most exposed to the risk of corruption.

According to the majority opinion, women and men are equally exposed to acts of corruption (both in the Public Service in general - 66% (71% in 2017) and in the institution where the respondent works - 48% (60% in 2017)).

Hiring and promoting at the workplace of public agents

The employment and promotion of public agents in the workplace is usually done on the basis of merit, mentioned about 83% (84% in 2017). At the same time, the opinion that favoritism (about 30% in both studies) and political membership (about 18% in both studies) are often practiced is maintained.

The performance evaluation procedures are applied in almost all cases in public institutions (94% in both studies). The average score assigned by public agents for the degree in which the assessment results influence the promotion of the staff in the institution is 4.2 (4.1 in 2017), on a 5-point scale, where 1 = does not influence at all, the staff are promoted based on other criteria; 5 = totally influences, the staff are promoted exclusively based on the results of the assessment.

Criteria such as relations with the right people, belonging to a certain political party, unofficial payments are usually avoided / excluded in public institutions, the same trends are observed in both studies.

Incompatibilities and restrictions in the hierarchy

The regime of restrictions in the hierarchy is generally respected in the public sector of Moldova. The majority of the respondents public agents, 87% (79% in 2017) stated that, during the last 12 months, there were no cases when, in the institution to which they belong, an official was in the direct subordination of a relative.

However, the study finds a low level of knowledge of the legal / illegal situations regarding Compliance with the incompatibilities regime, restrictions in the hierarchy and limitation of advertising, less than 1/5 public agents offered correct answers to all possible corruption situations in the process of observing the regime of incompatibilities, restrictions in the hierarchy and limiting the publicity.

Declaration of personal property and interests

There is also noted a certain degree of ignorance of the obligation with regard to the declaration of wealth and personal interests. A considerable share, 85%, of the participants in both studies claim that the declaration of wealth and personal interests is mandatory for all persons employed in the public sector. It should be mentioned that this is not the correct answer, because not all public sector employees have this responsibility (for example, technical staff is not subject to these obligations).

The majority of the public agents participating in the surveys (85% in 2019 and 82% in 2017) submitted the declaration on property and personal interests for the previous fiscal year.

Public agents have a fairly high level of knowledge on legal / illegal situations regarding compliance with the regime of declaring property and interests, over half have provided correct answers to all possible corruption situations in the process of observing the regime of declaring property and personal interests.

Conflicts of interest and favoritism

About 4 out of 5 respondents (81% in 2019 and 77% in 2017) **correctly** believe that *the public agent is always obliged to declare a conflict of interest*.

At the same time, one in two public agents (58% in 2019 and 53% in 2017) is unaware that a public agent is not entitled to take decisions in a conflict of interest situation.

Conflicts of interest rarely occurred in public institutions during the last 12 months (or were not declared by respondents). Thus, about 9 out of 10 people, respondents of both studies, mentioned that they did not know of cases of conflict of interest in the institutions they belonged to.

The main causes of non-declaration of the conflicts of interest by public agents are the lack of knowledge of the procedure (47% in 2019, 54% in 2017) and obtaining personal benefits (financial, material or other) (33% in 2019, 42% in 2017).

The public agents have a high level of knowledge regarding the legal / illegal situations on the Respect of the regime of conflicts of interests and the non-admission of favoritism: about 87% (77% in 2017) of public agents offered correct answers to all possible situations of corruption in the process of respect of the regime of conflicts of interests and non-admission of favoritism.

Gifts regime

About 30% (20% in 2017) of public agents do not know in which situations a public agent can receive a gift, and 68% (75% in 2017) of the respondents have correct knowledge about the gifts regime, considering that a public agent can accept a gift when it is received out of politeness or as part of the protocol actions.

A share of 64% (55% in 2017) among public agents states that in the public institutions in which they work, there are no gifts from citizens, as a gratitude or in exchange for a service provided. At the same time, one in four (every 3rd in 2017) respondents say that such situations happen in public institutions, but rarely / very rarely.

About 60% (52% in 2017) of public agents said that in the institutions in which they work there is a gifts register. This is considered an efficient document by more than half of the respondents of both studies.

Public agents have a high level of knowledge on the legal / illegal situations regarding Respecting the gifts regime, most of the public agents offered correct answers to all possible corruption situations in the process of observing the gifts regime.

Undue influences

The activity of Moldovan public institutions is not politically influenced. This is considered by 73% (81% in 2017) of the respondents, who assigned values between 1 and 5 on the 10-point assessment scale, where 1 = it is not influenced at all by the interests of the political parties, 10 = totally influenced by the interests of political parties. The average score attributed in the assessment of the degree to which the activity of the public institutions is politically influenced was reduced - 3.2 in the current study (5.8 in 2017).

In the public service the undue influences are mainly manifested by the fact that the decisions are made according to the political belonging of the management, this opinion is supported by 33% respondents (29% in 2017).

Cases of the undue influence in public institutions almost did not exist during the last 12 months. Only 3% of public agents stated that they were affected by the undue influences at work during the last 12 months, but **81% of them (72% in 2017) preferred not to report the cases. The main argument in this regard is the belief that the situation will not be resolved.**

Protection of whistle-blowers

The results of the study demonstrate a low level of knowledge on whistle-blowing by public agents. About 1/4 of public agents, participants in both studies, do not know what the notion of „whistle-blowing” means. At the same time, the fact that over 60% of public agents also referred to other erroneous situations as whistle-blowing leads to the conclusion that most public agents cannot make a clear differentiation of the whistle-blowing cases.

At the same time, only 12% (9% in 2017) of public agents have a correct knowledge of „who can be a whistle-blower”.

During the last 12 months, only a limited number of public agents surveyed declared that they witnessed corruption in the institution in which they work, but more than half of them did not report the cases. One of

the main reasons of not reporting the cases was the lack of evidence, the belief that no action would be taken anyway, but also the lack of effective protection measures for the whistle-blowers.

About 40% (over 50% in 2017) of the respondents show total / great mistrust that they will be protected in case of denunciation of possible acts of corruption. The average score on the security of public agents in denouncing acts of corruption is 2.6 (2.4 in 2017) on the 5-point scale (where 1 = I will not be protected at all; 5 = I am absolutely convinced that I will be protected).

Integrity incidents

Confidence in the integrity of colleagues is quite high among public agents. About 77% (75% in 2017) of public agents say that most of their colleagues are integral. On the other hand, 46% (62% in 2017) confirmed that the employees of the public institutions to which they belong are involved in integrity incidents (heads and deputies of the institutions, holders of executive functions).

In the cases of disciplinary deviations within the public institutions, sanctions are usually applied (71% affirmations in 2019, 75% in 2017).

Transparency in decision-making, access to information and management of public assets and finances

Most public agents assess *as fairly / very transparent* the central and local public institutions, in the decision-making processes, spending the public money, public procurement, informing the citizens about the activity of the institution and performing the works and services of public interest, being also registered an increase of the respective opinions in relation to the study conducted in 2017.

The institutions considered the most non-transparent are the political parties, the Information and Security Service, the Prosecutor's Office, the Courts, CEC (Central Election Commission). The institutions assessed as the most transparent are the media, NGOs, Government / ministries, mayoralities.

The transparency of the decision-making process is ensured through the responses to the requests for access to information of public interest (92% in both studies) and by publishing on the web page of the organization the information of public interest (80% in 2019, 78% in 2017).

The information is not published on the official website of the organization because the respective institution does not have a web page 29% affirmations in the current study (55% in 2017), but also because of the lack of staff who knows how to place the information (23% in 2019, 14 % in 2017).

In assessing how public assets and finances are managed in Moldovan by public institutions two categories of responses prevailed in both studies, maintaining the same trends: those who appreciated these processes as being transparent and responsible (about half of the opinions) and those who did not know how these processes are administered (about 40%).

At the same time, almost one in five (one in four in 2017) public agents acknowledge that the institutions in which they operate apply abusive practices in the management of public assets, due to the lack of transparency / reduced transparency in their management.

Compliance with the rules of ethics and deontology

About 72% of the respondents from both studies said that their institutions have a code of ethics, and this is usually brought to the notice of the new employees. However, at least 1/3 of the survey participants would need additional information on different issues regarding ethics and integrity standards.

A 63% share (77% in 2017) of public agents stated that in their organizations there is a structure / person responsible for ethics, and his or her activity is highly appreciated (with an average satisfaction score of 4.5 (4.4 in 2017) on a 5-point scale, where 1 = not at all satisfied, 5 = totally satisfied).

About 16% (29% in 2017) of public agents know situations when ethics and deontology rules were violated in their organization, and most of them were sanctioned (61% in 2019 and 80% in 2017).

Corruption risks management

Most public agents declare that the requirements of the institutional integrity are respected in the institutions where they work. The data from the studies carried out indicate that there are (very) rare cases when property and personal interests are not declared, when situations of favoritism and conflict of interests are admitted, when gifts are received from citizens - other than those allowed by the legislation in force.

About half of the public agents mentioned that there is an integrity plan in the institution, and of these 87% (92% in 2017) claim that this document is implemented.

The registers of corruption risks, gifts, undue influences are applied in public institutions, these being evaluated as efficient management tools. About 62% (52% in 2017) of the respondents assessed highly the document's efficiency, assigning the values of 4 and 5, where 1= *the register is not completed at all*, 5 = *the risks are registered, renewed and actions are taken to resolve them*. The estimated average efficiency score of the corruption risk register is 4.1, with an increase compared to the previous study (3.6 in 2017).

Annex 1. Tables: Opinion of the population on the phenomenon of corruption and measures to prevent corruption in Moldova (separate file)

Annex 2. Tables: Opinion of the economic agents on corruption phenomenon and corruption prevention measures in Moldova (separate file)

Annex 3. Tables: Opinion of the Public agents on the phenomenon of corruption and measures to prevent corruption in Moldova (separate file)