NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN LIBYA

A BASELINE SURVEY

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ABBREVIATIONS

CDA	Constitutional Drafting Agreement
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CWL	Council of Wisdoms of Libya
GNA	Government of National Accord
GNC	General National Congress
HCLTC	High Council of Libyan Tribes and Cities
HCR	High Council of Reconciliation
HD	Humanitarian Dialogue
HoR	House of Representatives
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
KI	Key Interview
LEC	(Temporary) Libyan Elders Council / "Libyan Senate"
LNA	Libyan National Army
LNCR	Libyan Notables Council for Reconciliation
LPA	Libyan Political Agreement
LWC	Libyan Wisemen Council
NBLEN	National Board for Libyan Elders and Notables
NDPC	National Dialogue Preparatory Commission
NML	National Movement for Libya
NRC	National Reconciliation Council
NTC	National Transitional Council
OCNR	Office for Consultancy and National Reconciliation
PCi	Peaceful Change Initiative
SFL	Stabilization Facility for Libya
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TRC	Truth-Seeking and Reconciliation Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UWSC	Union of Wisemen and Shura Councils in Libya

نحو

مصالحة وطنية

في ليبيا

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In July 2017 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) selected Altai Consulting to conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis to support the "Towards National Reconciliation in Libya" project. The study aims at understanding Libyans' perceptions of reconciliation and providing preliminary information about the existing opportunities and challenges for reconciliation. This report sheds light on how national dialogue and reconciliation efforts can build upon and support local mediation efforts already under way.

1.1 OBJECTIVES

This baseline perceptions survey explored Libyans' attitudes towards and priorities for national reconciliation and transitional justice. The study probed the topic of legitimacy in local level reconciliation initiatives to draw lessons for a national reconciliation strategy.

1.2 FINDINGS

PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL AND NATIONAL CONFLICT

The Libyan conflict is generally considered as occurring on two separate planes: the national level political conflict and local level conflicts. Key stakeholders interviewed tended to agree with this dichotomy: they felt that the political stalemate was driven by politicians striving to protect their interests in a future Libyan State. In turn, the lack of governance, which results from the absence of a central authority, creates an insecure environment at the local level, allowing gangs, criminals and militias to thrive, and ancient communal conflicts to re-emerge.

Key stakeholders also perceived violence at the local level as a competition between mistrustful communities manipulated or instigated by spoilers - both security and political actors - which they referred to as "merchants of war". However, survey respondents did not seem to make a differentiation between causes of conflict at the national and at the local level. In a ranking of causes, survey respondents felt that the conflict was driven more by competition over key resources and institutions than by regional, ideological or political divisions. The survey revealed that conflicts were generally perceived either in tribal terms, particularly in the South, as part of a struggle against Islamist extremists (East), or as a combination of competition between tribes, militias and cities, especially in the West.

The study also revealed that respondents irrespective of age, gender, or region were most aware and familiar with the conflict between Misrata and Tawergha, which has resulted in the continued displacement of Tawerghans ever since 2011. Respondents considered that the resolution of the Misrata-Tawergha conflict was key for future national reconciliation efforts.

UNDERSTANDING OF JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

» In a ranking of priorities for national stability, Libyans' most common first priorities were security (37 percent) and national reconciliation (27 percent)[1]. The survey results show that security is most important to Libyans, but that national reconciliation also represents a priority.

» When asked to rank the importance of five factors for national reconciliation, Libyans were equally likely to choose "forgiveness" and "justice" as a top priority (25 percent each), indicating a certain division on which of the two factors is more important. In key informant interviews, stakeholders were most likely to favor restorative justice, based on dialogue and reconciliation, over retributive or criminal justice. Respondents were also careful to differentiate between forgiveness and amnesty. The survey revealed that Libyans remain divided as to knowing who deserves forgiveness. For example, 40 percent of respondents felt strongly that all belligerents should be forgiven, including those that have committed crimes. However, 40 percent of respondents also felt strongly that all belligerents should not be forgiven.

» Respondents were highly concerned with the accountability of perceived spoilers and criminals. However, being a member of the former regime was not a determining factor in who respondents felt should be prosecuted in a court of law or should be banned from participating in the state building process. Although the role and place of former regime loyalists is controversial in Libyan society, it seemed that respondents' desire for accountability was universal.

» Respondents were divided on whether the Libyan diaspora should have a role in reconciliation. While 50 percent of respondents said yes, 43 percent of respondents said no.

DETERMINANTS OF LEGITIMACY IN RECONCILIATION INITIATIVES

According to the survey and the interview findings, for reconciliation initiatives to be perceived as legitimate, the following must be true:

» **The reconciliation initiative must involve an element of buy-in or approval from a national or local government or security force.** Although 61 percent of Libyans strongly agreed that a peace deal should provide for the punishment of criminals through the traditional justice system, the survey also revealed that 88.5 percent of Libyans felt that a legitimate peace deal should ensure that crimes be processed through the state justice system. The two legal codes are not mutually exclusive: indeed, interviews with elders revealed that in many ways state law and traditional law in Libya often overlap.

» **The reconciliation initiative must be Libyan-led.** Ninety percent of survey respondents strongly agreed that a reconciliation agreement must be perceived as Libyan-led to be legitimate. Qualitative interviews suggested that the reconciliation initiative should also take place inside Libya for it to be considered legitimate. Foreign third-party involvement in the determination of peace agreement should take the form of training, logistical and financial support. Respondents tended to reject the idea of foreign third parties setting the agenda in local or national reconciliation initiatives. Furthermore, some interviewees suggested that in order to inspire trust in communities affected by conflicts, a simple, straightforward and localized communications and outreach strategy should be developed to keep the residents informed of the existence of negotiations and build local support for it.

» Interviews revealed that **reconciliation initiatives should be preceded by efforts to build trust, or to open channels of communication between members of the conflicting groups.** The selected interlocutors for the reconciliation initiative should be both inclusive and representative. Inclusiveness was portrayed as assuring the engagement of all components of the conflict, including members directly involved in the violence. Determining the representativeness of an interlocutor, however, is increasingly elusive – especially when it comes to influencing military realities. The survey revealed that 70 percent of respondents strongly agreed that a legitimate peace agreement would involve the conflicting groups agreeing on a common path forward, while 68 percent of respondents felt that a legitimate peace deal should restore trust between groups.

» A legitimate peace deal must make clear mention of reparations and a mechanism for them should be reviewed, approved, and implemented. Both the qualitative interviews and the survey indicated that Libyans see

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[1] *Respondents were asked to list their top three priorities for national stability from a list of nine issues. The results were then presented by how often each topic was listed as priority number one or priority number two. Given the large number (9) of options to choose from, the percentages (27 percent or 37 percent) appear less significant than they are. However, all figures included in the report were statistically significant.*

discussions on reparations as a necessary step in any reconciliation process. Sixty-four percent of respondents strongly agreed that a legitimate reconciliation agreement should include the payment of reparations. A realistic discussion of reparations and a method for determining the type and quantity of such reparations should thus be provided in any reconciliation initiatives.

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND RECONCILIATION

Civic engagement in Libya is limited by the security climate, which makes it a rather dangerous practice. However, despite the degree of uncertainty and insecurity in Libya today, 35 percent of respondents reported perceiving themselves as being active members of their communities. Sixty-four percent of the respondents that did not report being active members of their communities cited the prohibitive political climate as the main deterrent to their participation. The most common kind of activity cited by "active" respondents was community mediation and social conflict resolution. This indicates that respondents who do participate in their community are highly motivated by peace and by the potential for reconciliation.

INCLUSION OF YOUTH AND WOMEN

Younger respondents were more likely to feel unrepresented by local reconciliation initiatives than the average respondent. In the qualitative interviews, younger stakeholders were also more likely to feel excluded, especially by their elders, when engaging in reconciliation initiatives. Both the survey and the qualitative interviews indicated that youth may be stigmatized as drivers of violence. In fact, disarmament was the most popular mechanism among respondents for increasing youth involvement in reconciliation.

In general, Libyans did not perceive women and youth as being entirely excluded parties to reconciliation initiatives. For example, 51 percent of Libyans felt that youth were fully included, and 44.6 percent of Libyans felt that women were fully included in reconciliation initiatives at the national level. Libyans were more divided regarding the inclusion of minorities and of members of the Libyan diaspora. Thirty-seven percent felt that minorities were fully included in reconciliation initiatives nationally, while 22.4 percent felt that they were not at all included. Libyans thus appeared significantly more open to increasing the rights of women than to devolving the political power to minorities.

Women's participation in reconciliation-related activities in the community was also lower than other demographics. Respondents strongly supported increasing women's rights, and strongly approved of mechanisms to increase women's involvement in reconciliation. Building women's capacity to resolve conflict, and building Libyans' awareness of women's roles in reconciliation, were popular solutions to increase their inclusion.

Among the mechanisms suggested for increasing inclusion of youth and women in reconciliation, spreading awareness on their current involvement in reconciliation efforts and encouraging public discussion on their role in Libyan society, was often mentioned. Conflict prevention training among youth and women was also perceived as a good solution for increasing their inclusion. For youth, Libyans also felt that disarmament and the reintegration of combatants would be a useful tool for encouraging youth to participate in reconciliation initiatives.

THE ROLE OF LOCAL, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN RECONCILIATION INITIATIVES

Libyans perceive local level actors as the most effective in conflict resolution, with the notable exception of armed groups. Sixty-three percent of respondents felt that tribal elders are very effective at resolving conflict, while 45 percent preferred local notables. Both groups were perceived as being the most effective actors for conflict resolution across all ages and regions. Interestingly, 45 percent of respondents found that unarmed youth in the local community would also be very effective at resolving conflict, although 27 percent of respondents felt that local unarmed youth would not be very effective at all. Lastly, among the local actors proposed in the survey, Libyans were least likely to find armed groups effective at resolving conflict: in fact, 69 percent of Libyans felt that armed groups were not effective at all.

Local actors

Stakeholders interviewed perceived traditional and tribal mechanisms for conflict resolution as best tailored to communal disputes, and not to resolving large-scale issues relating to national reconciliation. However, the methods relied upon by tribal elders enjoy a high level of legitimacy among Libyans across regions and age groups and are perceived as most effective. Tribal mechanisms involve a combination of customary and State law. They were legitimized under Gadhafi, but date back to the Ottoman occupation and possibly even before.

Qualitative interviews with stakeholders indicated that traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution also have their drawbacks. Mainly, reconciliation efforts led by elders and notables tend not to be inclusive enough, particularly of youth, and as a result they are often difficult to apply. Interestingly, 42 percent of respondents found unarmed youth in the local community to be effective actors at resolving conflict, thus making youth the third most popular actor for resolving conflict.

State actors

Libyans deemed all national-level actors, with the exception of the Libyan National Army, as ineffective at resolving conflict. For example, 71 percent of Libyans felt the GNC was not effective at all at resolving conflict, and 63 percent of Libyans felt that the HoR and the GNA were not effective at all at resolving conflict. In contrast, 40 percent of Libyans felt the LNA was very effective and 34 percent of Libyans felt the LNA was not effective at all. Libyan key informants interviewed felt the role of the State should be restricted to enforcing security, providing law and order, and reviewing or approving peace deals and compensation claims.

Key stakeholders perceived the State as being responsible for supporting and implementing agreements as well as disbursing reparations. This process could be achieved through the establishment of a national truth and reconciliation body tasked with investigating and gathering claims from around the country. The idea of establishing a commission for national reconciliation was also popular among survey respondents: 77 percent felt that a national commission would be a very effective tool. A similar national mechanism, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, was established by the National Transitional Council (NTC) in 2012 and tasked with investigating and documenting crimes and human rights violations as well as establishing compensation for the victims. However, the enacting of a new transitional justice law in 2013, and the start of the civil war one year later, made the operationalization of such commission impossible.

Survey respondents and stakeholders did not envision a large role for municipalities to directly resolve conflict. Only 28 percent of respondents felt municipalities would be very effective at resolving conflict, while 36 percent felt municipalities would be very ineffective. While most of the qualitative interviews indicated that the municipalities should focus on providing services to the community, some envisioned a logistical facilitation role for municipalities to support civil society actors, elders and notables in their efforts to reconcile.

International Actors

Survey respondents perceived international actors to be among the least effective or desirable for conducting conflict resolution in Libya. The Libyans that participated in this study appeared generally resentful of foreign involvement in the Libyan conflict and tended to reject the identity of foreign entities inserting themselves in the conflict, even to facilitate its resolution. Sixty-six percent of Libyans felt that international NGOs would not be effective at all, while 62 percent of Libyans felt that the international community in general would not be effective at all at resolving conflict. By far the least popular mechanism for conflict resolution in respondents' eyes was foreign third-party-led dialogue, which 73 percent of respondents rejected.

However, the key stakeholders interviewed had a more nuanced perception of the role the international community can play in resolving the Libyan conflict. Many stakeholders praised the UN-sponsored capacity building trainings on conflict mediation as well as other trainings conducted by international NGOs. The projects implemented by the Stabilization Facility for Libya were also mentioned during interviews as positive examples of conflict-sensitive development. Besides providing capacity building trainings and services, key stakeholders also stated that the international community had a role to play in advising Libyans on transitional justice. Interviewees generally found that the UN and other international actors should support Libyan-led reconciliation initiatives in a consultative and technical capacity, rather than a political one.

1.3 RECOMMENDATIONS »

Survey respondents felt that public awareness campaigns on conflict resolution and the establishment of a national commission on reconciliation would be effective conflict resolution tools. Eighty-two percent of Libyans feel that educating the public on conflict resolution would be very effective for resolving and preventing conflict. The UN's planned national media campaign would therefore find fertile ground with a Libyan public interested in discussing and learning about reconciliation.

Without security and a legitimate national government, efforts for the resolution of specific conflicts will experience gains and setbacks, but the international community can continue focusing on supporting the efforts and capacities of Libyans at the local level. As Libya continues to work towards voting on a draft Constitution and elections, there are several factors the UN should consider when utilizing public education and local capacity building as means of preparing the ground for national reconciliation.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NATION-WIDE OUTREACH AND AWARENESS-RAISING CAMPAIGN FOR RECONCILIATION

» **A national awareness campaign on national reconciliation should be accompanied by public education campaigns on conflict prevention** through the development of educational media involving short documentaries, training materials and other resources for conflict prevention training. International donors could support Libyan efforts to develop and disseminate educational materials or carry out awareness campaigns through local television stations, local civil society organizations or local universities and schools.

» **International charity organizations specialized in media should collaborate with Libyan media and public relations companies to develop conflict-sensitive and targeted materials** such as: media segments, short documentaries, or children's educational programs.

» **Training materials should be distributed to universities and local civil society organizations specialized in community outreach.** At the local level, these materials could be used to design basic conflict prevention and mediation skills to be distributed in schools or in local recreation centers through municipalities, civil society organizations, universities, youth networks such as the Scouts, Y-Peer Libya, or the Libyan Blogger's Network (recently launched in collaboration with Deutsche Welle and Friederich Ebert Stiftung[2] [3].

» **An awareness campaign should elevate the stories of Libya's everyday "unknown heroes" to promote participation and ownership of national reconciliation at the local level.** News segments or documentaries could show how everyday Libyans are mobilizing to provide support to their communities, in order to reinforce the notion that people across Libya are already taking initiative to solve their own problems, thereby shedding a more positive light on the current situation. This could help create support for national reconciliation by highlighting the fact that reconciliation is already occurring, and that Libyans are already leading the process. The sense of ownership that may come with an awareness of reconciliation initiatives occurring across the country could help encourage active participation and reinforce Libyan buy-in for reconciliation.

» **The national reconciliation campaign should raise awareness of women and youth's role in reconciliation in Libya.** In Libyan society, youth are too often associated with violence as young men are the most likely to engage in armed conflict. As mentioned above, sensitization and media campaigns should focus on dispelling the notion that youth are violent by highlighting the positive role of youth in creating peace and in facilitating dialogue in their communities. Much like with youth, discussion of the woman's role in reconciliation initiatives should be encouraged.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CAPACITY BUILDING TO STRENGTHEN THE ABILITY OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS TO SUPPORT RECONCILIATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

» **Increase the capacity of communities to document and archive human rights violations, in view of future transitional justice processes.** The survey and interviews indicated that there is a strong appetite for justice and truth seeking. Providing civil society organizations in Libya that specialize in human rights, and universities and regular citizens, with the knowledge on how to conduct interviews with victims, collect, document and archive proofs, could contribute to ensure that abuses are not forgotten. The UN and international NGOs could contribute to facilitating these training programs, to enable Libyans to claim their rights before future transitional justice mechanisms or a truth-seeking commission.

» **Develop context-specific and sensitive means of encouraging understanding and contact between communities in conflict.** Interviews with members of peacebuilding organizations indicated that reconciliation initiatives encouraging collaboration between the conflict parties, through the process of scoping services for the community, are among the most conflict-sensitive approaches. This is particularly true when the foreign third party is only involved by providing or paying for the service (i.e. building a well, supporting small projects, or building a sports center). Festivals, workshops, sports and cultural events, as well as art shows, are other mechanisms that can serve to tame the probabilities of conflict and encourage communities to interact. Methods should vary based on the particularities of the community and the conflict to address.

» **Continue empowering Libyan civil society actors and organizations to work on the reintegration of young combatants in a community-focused way.** The international community can invest in community reintegration projects in conflict-affected zones. The programs should provide psychosocial support to young combatants and create value for the entire community.

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[2] *www.facebook.com/lybloggers/ or http://libyanblogger.net/*

[3] *A peer educator organization founded in 2010 based in Tripoli and Benghazi with a network also in Gharyan, Sebha, Zawya, Khums, Sirte, Tobruk, al Marj, Berna, Al Quba, Misrata, Janzour, Kufra, Ajdabiya. See: www.y-peer.org/y-peer-and-me/; www.facebook.com/Ypeerlibya/*

2 INTRODUCTION

In the early years of the transition, the State approach to reconciliation in Libya was generally viewed through the prism of transitional justice and based on a legalistic approach. However, with the rise of renewed conflict and violence in 2013, the focus shifted towards prioritizing national unity over the pursuit of justice and truth-seeking mechanisms, which many started to see as potentially divisive or sources of conflicts, as dramatically demonstrated by the debates around the Political Isolation Law. Multiple state-led reconciliation initiatives launched between 2012 and 2014 failed to generate a meaningful comprehensive national reconciliation process due to the politicization of the proposed legislation and the outbreak of war.

The escalating national-level conflict in 2014, and the lack of progress of state-led political dialogue, contributed to the rise of tribal elders as prominent conflict resolution and reconciliation actors. Early efforts to create national-level bodies as incubators for reconciliation seemed to ignore the tribal dimension of the Libyan society. While later criticized by a number of Libyan observers and academics, this approach corresponded to the general trend in the early days of the transition of dismissing tribalism as outdated and inconsistent with the democratic civil state that Libya was to become. At the time, many Libyans, especially urban youth, rejected tribal interpretations of their society and dismissed tribal elders as irrelevant to them. During the revolution, communities formed new local and elders' councils as basic units of local governance, and tribal leadership structures underwent multiple transformation processes from 2011 onwards.

This formation of national and regional-level councils representing Libyan tribes, which is ongoing since 2011, accelerated in 2014, resulting in a complex web of new actors and alliances. Born out of the need for local conflict resolution and social dialogue, such councils increasingly entered the political scene and dialogue, often presenting themselves as the true representatives of Libyan society, criticizing political actors while sometimes pushing for political agendas themselves. Tribal politics became a vector of influence, and interest groups that were marginalized during the transition used tribal factors as tools to get a seat at the dialogue table.

Currently in Libya, local reconciliation is often conducted ad-hoc and with the help of individual mediators rather than by involving national- or regional-level councils such as local councils, Shura councils, or elders' and notables' councils. However, it seems like most reconciliation actors – whether tribal or other – tend to be involved in both local conflict resolution and in initiatives that aim to reconcile Libyans at the national level. Until now, traditional conflict resolution[4] and mediation have led to numerous ceasefire agreements and the stabilization of some areas, such as the Western Mountain. However, in the absence of state-led efforts, these kinds of agreements are often short-lived, with deeper grievances left unaddressed and underlying tensions persisting even in seemingly stabilized areas.

To help build the groundwork for a national reconciliation strategy in Libya, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) commissioned Altai Consulting to conduct a baseline national perceptions survey on national reconciliation. This report provides a discussion of the main findings of the study. The study aimed at gaining a clearer understanding of the causes of conflict at the national and local level, in order to define tailored intervention strategies and identify the main factors of legitimacy of reconciliation and dialogue initiatives.

The report starts with an overview of respondents' perceptions of local and national conflict, before exploring their understanding of justice and reconciliation. The sixth section of the report looks into survey respondents' and key stakeholders' views on what makes a reconciliation agreement legitimate and sustainable. Section 7 and Section 8 discuss patterns of civic engagement in Libya, with a special focus on women and youth. Section 9 reviews perceptions of various local, national and international actors and their roles according to the results of the survey and the interviews. The report will end with a discussion of recommendations to support a bottom-up approach to reconciliation focused on awareness, education and technical capacity building.

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تواصل بين السلطات
المحلية و الشباب
وتعزيز الثقة بالمبادرات
المقدمة من قبل الشباب

3

METHODOLOGY

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- **To develop this study, Altai used mixed quantitative and qualitative research modules.**

- **The quantitative fieldwork consisted of a nationally representative telephone survey of 2,086 Libyan adults.**

- **The qualitative component was based on over 70 interviews with stakeholders involved in reconciliation in Libya in Tripoli, Sebha, Ubari, Zintan, Benghazi and phone interviews in Misrata.**

In July 2017, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) selected Altai Consulting to conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis to support the National Reconciliation project in Libya. The study aims to understand Libyans' perceptions of reconciliation and sheds light on how local-level reconciliation initiatives can be better supported and sustained through state-level institutions, laws and mechanisms.

Primary research for this study was conducted in partnership with Altai's Libyan partner company, Istishari Research and Consulting (Istishari), which carried out a national, computer-assisted telephone interviewing survey of 2,086 randomly selected Libyan adults in the country's 22 districts. The survey was conducted between 7 November 2017 and 11 December 2017. Quality control measures included: the administration of two preliminary pilot tests, an enumerator training, random full monitoring using silent listening methods, and targeted partial monitoring of ongoing interviews.

3.1 SAMPLING AND MEASUREMENT

Altai adopted a proportional-to-population (P2P) sampling protocol based on sex, age group (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55+) and location, using a combination of the 2006 Libyan Census and the US Census Bureau's most recent estimated population pyramid to estimate Libya's demographics by district. No control was applied for education level or ethnic background, as no reliable sample frame exists. The quota system enabled the research team to produce data representative of the sampled population aged 18 years and over with individual access to listed mobile phones with a ±2.1 percentage point margin of error, based on a response value of 50 percent to 95 percent confidence level. More information can be found in the methodological annex.

3.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 》》

To substantiate and provide insights into the quantitative analysis provided by the survey, the research team conducted semi-structured interviews in Tripoli, Sebha, Ubari, Zintan, and Benghazi, as well as phone interviews in Misrata. Altai conducted a total of 70 interviews with key individuals in Libya. Altai interviewed Libyan government officials, officials of state security and justice institutions, heads of municipal councils, heads of tribal entities, independent academics, and civil society actors, with a specific focus on those with tangible experiences in the field of reconciliation. Civil society actors also included media actors, internally displaced people, or activists in women's rights and minority rights organizations. The quantitative data collection was, however, not always fully representative and the data collected was generally based on self-reporting.

Other challenges included the limited time of interviews, and the fact that interviewees were not always able to be reconducted to confirm or clarify their points. The information provided was not necessarily objective and they may have omitted key facts. To address these issues, Altai strove to triangulate between various categories of key informants, with people of different gender and from distinct professional backgrounds. However, it was not always possible to interview parties from different sides of a local conflict. For example, it was not possible for Altai's researcher to interview any Mashashia elders while in Zintan. Likewise, it was not possible to interview tribal elders in Misrata, since the interviews had to be conducted over the phone or Skype, in Arabic, and the team was unable to travel there.

PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL AND NATIONAL CONFLICTS

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- **In a ranking of causes, Libyans interrogated felt that the conflict was driven more by competition over key resources and institutions than by regional or ideological divisions.**

- **Conflicts are generally perceived either in tribal terms, particularly in the South, but also as part of a struggle against Islamist extremists (East), or as a mix also involving competition between militias and cities, as in the West.**

- **The protracted conflict between Misrata and Tawergha, which resulted in the continued displacement of the latter's population, is the most renowned by the population across regions, ages and genders, and its resolution was considered to be the greatest priority to achieve national reconciliation.**

- **Awareness of the post-revolutionary clashes between Misrata and Bani Walid as well as between Zintan and Mashashia was also high nationwide. In the West, many also pointed out the centrality of addressing conflict in Warshafana in order to contribute to national reconciliation.**

The survey explored respondents' perceptions of conflict and its causes, while distinguishing between the national "political" conflict and local-level tensions, which the existing literature suggests have distinct political and socio-economic causes. However, the survey results indicated that respondents did not perceive the national-level and political conflicts as having distinct causes. Generally, respondents perceived the conflict in Libya as a competition between tribes, militias, cities and Islamic extremist groups for the control of resources and institutions. Rarely did respondents portray local conflicts they had experienced as being political.

The survey results also indicated that respondents were most familiar with local conflicts occurring in their region. In general, however, respondents tended to be more acquainted with conflicts from the East and West and least aware of conflicts occurring in the South, despite the South being the region experiencing the highest incidence of violence. Rather, respondents were most familiar with the Misrata-Tawergha conflict, which was flagged as being the most threatening to the success of national reconciliation. Respondents to the survey had a high degree of sympathy for the plight of IDPs in general, with over 90 percent consistently supporting the idea of allowing IDPs to return to their homes as a key condition for national reconciliation.

4.1 PERCEIVED CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN LIBYA

As can be observed in Figure 1 and Figure 2, control over oil resources, trade and trafficking routes, as well as political and military institutions rank as the most influential causes of conflict according to respondents. Survey respondents were much less likely to agree on the role of ideological and regional differences, such as the political conflict between East and West, conflicts involving Misrata, or the legacy of Gadhafi's practices and laws. These trends in perceptions remained largely constant across regions, except in a few cases. In the South, where tribes such as the Gadhadfa and the Magarha were historically favored by the former regime, respondents were slightly more likely to feel that tensions between supporters and opponents of the former regime played a large role (see Figure 33 in annex).

In the qualitative interviews, stakeholders argued that the political impasse in Libya was at the heart of instability at the local level. In the absence of a government able to ensure equal and predictable access to public goods, communitarian conflicts emerge in a competition over resources, such as access to fuel or control of trafficking routes (i.e. Sebha, Brak al Shati, Ubari and Ghat). When asked to distinguish between drivers of conflict and root causes of conflict, stakeholders were likely to admit that although historical social grievances also play a role, Libya's political and security vacuum is the main factor that allowed instability in Libyan communities to continue.

Figure 1: Potential causes of the Libyan political conflict

Q8. For each of the following potential causes could you please tell me whether you feel it played a large role, small role or no role at all in the *political* conflict in Libya? (n=2,086)

Figure 2: Potential causes of local conflicts in Libya

Q8. For each of the following potential causes could you please tell me whether you feel it played a large role, a small role or no role at all in the local conflict in Libya? (n=2,086)

Prepared by Altai Consulting for UNDP

4.2 MAIN TYPES OF CONFLICTS

Almost 4 in 10 Libyans surveyed reported that their area had experienced a local conflict, illustrating the widespread impact that war has had on the population. Nonetheless, significant geographic disparities appeared, with over half of respondents in the South reporting that they had been affected, as opposed to 30 percent in the East, and 40 percent in the West.

The contrast was even starker at the district level. The turbulent South includes Sebha, where more than three in four respondents said their neighborhoods had witnessed fighting. But this result is mitigated by what appears as 'islands of peace' such as the city of Ghat - one of the seemingly most peaceful localities, in which only one in ten respondents reported experiencing clashes in the past (Figure 3). To the contrary, the South-Eastern district of Kufra stood out as one of the most conflict-prone in the country, especially when compared to other Western localities (4 in 10 respondents in Benghazi, less elsewhere). Significant majorities of survey respondents in the coastal areas of Zawiya and Niquat al-Khums were likely to report having experienced combat in their vicinity, even more so than in the Sirte district, which had suffered intense fighting and widespread destruction in 2011 and in 2016.

Figure 3: Incidence of local conflict, by region and district
Q9. Has your area experienced any local conflict – yes or no? (n=2,086)

When asked to specify the nature of the conflict that had impacted their area, the 38 percent of respondents that had been affected mentioned a plethora of conflicts, which can be categorized into three primary types: conflicts of a tribal nature; conflicts between militias or cities: or conflicts involving Islamic extremist groups. Five percent of respondents only mentioned the overarching political power struggle as the main conflict they had experienced, thereby demonstrating the importance of localized conflicts in Libyans' perceptions of insecurity. Similarly, respondents were highly unlikely to cite the struggle between revolutionaries and former regime 'loyalists' that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the revolution as a key conflict, confirming that this dichotomy is no longer the main factor explaining recent turmoil[5].

By contrast, almost 17 percent of those affected by conflict in Libya perceived their principal adversaries in tribal terms[6]. This was particularly the case in the South, where tribes were mentioned by over 4 in 10 respondents, as compared to 10 to 15 percent of respondents in the rest of the country. Notably, respondents cited the rivalries between the Awlad Suleiman and the Gadhadfa in Sebha; as well as Tebu clashes with other tribes such as the Tuareg and the Awlad Suleiman[7]. Mention of tribal or clan actors was particularly prevalent in the Zawiya area (where tribes include the Awlad Hneish, Awlad Khadrawi, Awlad Saqr and Awlad Abu Hamira). A few Eastern respondents also mentioned fighting involving the Awagir or Murabiteen tribes, among others (Figure 4).

---

[5] All responses mentioning national-level players or conflicts referred especially to Libya Dawn, Dignity Operation, Haftar, Serraj, the GNA, the GNC; and the 'airport war'.

[6] Any conflict involving the word 'tribe' or 'tribal'. When a conflict mentioned a city and a tribe, the conflict was treated as a conflict between tribes. The category also included any response that included the 'Tebu', 'Tuareg' or 'Amazigh' minorities.

[7] See Methodologies section. Tuareg, Amazigh and Tebu respondents tend to self-report these forms of identification as their tribe.

Figure 4: Most significant local conflict experienced by respondents, by region and gender

Q10. Could you please specify the most significant local conflict you have experienced? (n=792)

Legend:
- Yes, Conflict between tribes
- Yes, Conflict between militias and/or cities
- Yes, Conflict involving Islamic extremist groups
- Yes, Political conflict
- Yes, Other
- No
- Do not know
- No answer / Refused to answer

More than a third of respondents in the East reported having witnessed conflicts involving radical Islamist elements[8], mainly clashes between LNA units and the Islamic State organization, the Benghazi Defense Brigades or the Benghazi and Derna Shura Councils. Conflicts between militias and/or cities[9] were most common in the Western region, garnering 17 percent of responses, as opposed to under five percent elsewhere. Among these antagonisms, the Misrata and Zintan rivalry featured prominently, as did the various turf wars between the spectrum of armed groups in Tripoli (e.g. Special Deterrence Forces, Tripoli Revolutionaries' Brigade) (Figure 4)[10]. For a consolidated list of the self-reported conflicts mentioned in question 10, please see Annex 16.

The Misratans interviewed described the tensions between Misrata and the LNA/Eastern tribes as a primarily political issue as opposed to a social one and emphasized that the two regions are strongly linked through familial and commercial bonds, among others. These stakeholders felt that the portrayal of the issue as a conflict between cities or tribes was misleading and that hardline factions on each side, as well as politicians, were to blame.

4.3 CONFLICTS RELEVANT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Respondents were asked about their awareness of nine local conflicts from different areas of the country[11], in order to gauge which ones had the greatest impact on perceptions at the national level. Two conflicts involving Misrata stood out from the interviews: the city's longstanding dispute with Tawergha, and its thorny history with the Warfalla tribal stronghold of Bani Walid.

Figure 5: Self-reported awareness of various conflicts

Q13. Could you please tell me whether you know a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all about the conflict? (n=2,086)

Legend:
- A great deal
- A fair amount
- Not very much
- Nothing at all
- Do not know
- No Answer/ Refuse to answer

> **Focus box 1:**
> **Perceptions of social conflict versus political conflict**
>
> " The political divide impedes progress on some files. Why did we make progress on the relations between Misrata and Zintan and not on relations between Misrata and the East? The reason is political. Both Misrata and Zintan are in western Libya, both are under the internationally recognized GNA. The East differs. "
>
> – M. H., Male, Misratan politician, November 2017
>
> Stakeholders differed on whether deep-rooted, social conflicts or more recent political conflicts were most relevant to Libya's civil turmoil. Elders and mediation experts in Zintan distinguished between recent factional wars and deeply-rooted conflicts. Elders noted that deeply-rooted conflicts typically involved forced displacement and expropriation. The differences in perception of conflicts that emerged from the qualitative interviews may have been linked to the age of the stakeholders. While elders tended to be more involved in deeply-rooted disputes over land and past injustices, younger actors are more focus on present-day political problems.
>
> Views on how to address the more deeply-rooted local conflicts seemed to differ between cities as well. Elders in Zintan, for instance, thought that historical conflicts were much harder to address than the more recent factional wars. According to a leaaing reconciliation actor: "there is a historical background to most current conflicts. The smallest issue can have wide repercussions because underlying problems resurface. The number of casualties [in an armed conflict] is not necessarily the defining factor. Maybe in a historical conflict there is only one dead. But this conflict is much harder to resolve than a more recent one where dozens died. Political disputes are relatively easy to solve. […] Like what is happening in Sabratha. Same thing in Ubari: there was no historical conflict, just political manipulations"38. Stakeholders in Misrata, on the other hand, tended to view older conflicts as increasingly irrelevant, given more recent events, although they conceded that social reconciliation would still take time. A recurring notion in these interviews was that "time heals old wounds".
>
> In the words of a Misratan jurist: "The passing of time since 2011 automatically solved a lot of problems. Feelings of hatred gradually dissipate with time. In the past, it was difficult even to communicate the importance of reconciliation to the population. Now, there are fewer obstacles. Issues that were sensitive in the beginning have been accepted. Reconciliation is now on the table"23.

Nationwide, four in five Libyans surveyed claimed to be familiar with the Misrata-Tawergha conflict, possibly due to the continued displacement of most of the Tawerghan population in camps throughout the country, which has exposed a greater share of citizens to the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, as well as international and local media coverage over the years. Key figures in Misrata appeared divided regarding this ongoing reconciliation process between both parties: one civil activist described it as a success story mainly in need of government support for compensation and rebuilding infrastructure,67 while an ambassador from Misrata dismissed it as a "make-believe reconciliation" process due to political manipulations and an excessive focus on financial reparations[12] .

After the Misrata-Bani Walid tensions (of which 69 percent of respondents knew at least a fair amount), the Zintan and Mashashia conflict, which also spawned internal displacement, was evoked by a clear majority. By contrast, respondents reported limited knowledge about the Tebu-Zway clashes in Kufra and knew even less about the perceived more or less direct conflict between Misrata and the Awagir in Benghazi.[13]

All conflicts, except the two best-known (Misrata-Tawergha, Misrata-Bani Walid), were significantly better known in the region where they took place – further

> " The issue that is still a disgrace to successive governments is the issue of the Tawergha, the displacement of the people of the city".
>
> – H. A., Male, Former GNC member for Ubari, November 2017

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[8] *Every time a conflict mentioned ISIS, Ansar al-Sharia, Shura Councils (when juxtaposed to the army), al-Qaida, and the Muslim Brotherhood.*

[9] *The category was selected each time the word 'militia', 'armed group', or 'gangs' were mentioned, includes all answers naming specific militias, armed groups or militia leaders, and was chosen whenever a respondent reported the conflict as being between two cities. Conflicts occurring in Tripoli or involving Misrata were always included in this category, even when one of the actors was a tribe (otherwise conflicts citing tribes were included in the previous category).*

[10] *For a consolidated list of the self-reported conflicts mentioned in question 10, please see Annex16.*

demonstrating the unique impact that both conflicts have had on the public psyche nationwide. It also displays the centrality of Misrata in perceptions of conflictuality around the country. The relative lack of awareness surrounding the Misrata-Awagir tensions, however, may have several explanations. Firstly, tensions between these two groups never emerged as a direct conflict in the way that other conflicts listed in the question had (i.e. Misrata-Tawergha). Secondly, tensions between the Awagir tribe and the Misratans might be perceived as a "conflict" between Misrata and Benghazi more generally.

Figure 6: Self-reported awareness about the Misrata - Tawergha conflict, by region

Q13. Could you please tell me whether you know a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all about the conflict? (n=2,086)
[Misrata and Tawergha]

Region	A great deal	A fair amount	Not very much	Nothing at all
West	64%	17%	5%	14%
East	67%	16%	5%	12%
South	61%	20%	2%	16%
Libya	64%	17%	5%	13%

■ A great deal ■ A fair amount ■ Not very much ■ Nothing at all ■ Do not know ■ No answer / Refuse to answer

By contrast, awareness of conflicts in the South of the country tended to be much lower on conflicts outside the South (over 25 percentage point difference), with a stronger regional awareness also appearing for the Tebu-Zway conflict in the East. Key informants from the region, particularly in Sebha, emphasized the scale of local disruption resulting from the wars between Awlad Suleiman and Tebu, Awlad Suleiman and Gadhadfa or the Tebu – Tuareg fighting, which paralyzed movement and fostered lawlessness in the city. They also insisted that these conflicts posed a threat to national security "because of the opening of the borders and the rise in illegal immigration" (in the words of an Awlad Suleiman elder).

Regarding almost all these conflicts, a significant gap in awareness emerged between generations and between male and female respondents. Indeed, self-reported awareness of different conflicts tended to rise with the age of the respondent, and female respondents always claimed to know less than males about the conflicts (with an average discrepancy of around 10 percentage points). These differences were robust except for two conflicts, the most well-known (Misrata-Tawergha), and the least known (Misrata-Awagir).

GREATEST THREATS TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

When prompted to choose among the same nine conflicts, over half of respondents considered the Misrata-Tawergha case to constitute the greatest threat to national reconciliation. The conflict was mentioned more often by Eastern respondents than in the West and tended to be cited the most by women and younger Libyans surveyed. The Misrata-Bani Walid file was considered the second most detrimental conflict, but by a much lesser margin of respondents (10 percent). Furthermore, several interviewees from Misrata considered relations to have normalized to a certain extent since 2012[23].

Only in the South did other antagonisms gather a quarter of mentions, most notably the Awlad Suleiman tensions (with Tebu and Gadhadfa) along with the Tuareg-Tebu strife. Once again, these results demonstrate the centrality of both these conflicts involving Misrata to public opinion, but they also reveal that the resolution of the Tawergha issue is considered a priority to achieve reconciliation at the national level.

Figure 7: Conflicts perceived as the worst threats to national reconciliation, by region

Q15. Of these conflicts, which would you say has the greatest negative effect on national level reconciliation? (n=2,086)

Region	Misrata and Tawergha	Misrata and Bani Walid	Misrata and Awagir	Tebu and Awlad Suleiman	None of the above	Don't know	Refused to answer
Libya	50.4%	9.9%	3.4%		8.8%	12.9%	7.3%
West	49.2%	11.3%	1.9%		9.4%	13.8%	7.8%
East	55.7%	7.2%	6.7%		7.8%	11.4%	6.4%
South	42.4%	7.6%	3.3%		7.6%	10.9%	7.1%

■ Misrata and Tawergha ■ Misrata and Bani Walid ■ Misrata and Awagir ■ Tebu and Awlad Suleiman
■ Gadhadfa and Awlad Suleiman ■ Zintan and Kikla ■ Zintan and Mashashia ■ Tebu and Zway
■ Tuareg and Tebu in Ubari ■ None of the above ■ Don't know ■ Refused to answer

---

[11] *The conflicts were: Gadhadfa – Awlad Suleiman; Zintan – Mashashia; Tebu – Zway; Tuareg – Tebu (Ubari); Misrata – Tawergha; Misrata – Awagir; Misrata – Bani Walid; Zintan – Kikla; Tebu – Awlad Suleiman.*

[12] *Skype interview with F. A. current Libyan Ambassador to Bahrain, former Interior Minister 2011-2012, December 2017.*

[13] *Low national awareness of the Misrata-Awagir conflict may be due to the way the question was asked. If—instead of asking specifically about Misratans and the Awagir the question had inquired about the tensions between Misrata and Benghazi more generally respondents would have been more likely to recognize the conflict.*

4.4 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Respondents were united in their perceptions of internal displacement. Figure 8 indicates that support for IDPs varies very little across the three regions. Respondents also greatly supported the measures proposed in the survey for increasing IDPs' inclusion in reconciliation initiatives.

The qualitative interviews revealed that displacement was central in determining the notoriety and relevance of a conflict. Interviewees in the Western Mountains were particularly concerned about - and often personally affected by - the Mashashia issue and the displacement of Zintanis from Tripoli and other coastal cities (as a result of the 2014 escalation of hostilities). In Misrata, the

> "We need specialized centers to take the traumatized...to rehabilitate them and reintegrate them into society. In this field, local and foreign know-how need to be combined."
>
> **– M. G., Male, Tuareg elder**

conflict with Tawergha was the most frequently mentioned. A Misratan jurist argued that the displacement issue in Benghazi was much less serious than the Tawergha case, because most IDPs had left due to the fighting, not because of ideological differences, and that their return was therefore possible[23]. Temporary displacement in parts of Sabratha due to clashes between armed groups was also an issue particularly pressing to solve for elders in Zintan who were involved in mediation efforts.

Figure 8: Support for allowing IDP return, by region
**Q20. I'm going to read you some statements about justice and reconciliation in Libya today.
Do you agree, disagree or feel neutral about the following statements? Strongly or somewhat?**
[IDPs should be allowed to return home]
(n=2,086)

	Strongly agree	Agree
Libya	92%	6%
South	95%	5%
East	94%	5%
West	91%	7%

■ Strongly agree ■ Agree ■ Neutral ■ Disagree ■ Strongly disgree ■ Do not know ■ No Answer/ Refuse to answer

Despite the widespread sympathy for populations affected by displacement, displaced communities sometimes feel that they are not sufficiently consulted or included in reconciliation. In Zintan, only a minority of those displaced from Tripoli in 2014 remain, while most returned to Tripoli following talks between stakeholders in Zintan, Tripoli and Misrata. Yet, representatives of this minority, which has a strong voice among Zintan's community and security forces, describe themselves as having been completely sidelined by the talks[14]. Journalist W. A., who himself fled Tripoli in 2014 and does not want to return due to fears for his security there, claimed: "The reconciliation process with Misrata and Tripoli was not inclusive. Those IDPs with real grievances were let down. Those who negotiated are now comfortable in the capital and forgot about the rest of us. Some of them only spoke on behalf of the displaced community to advance their position, gain influence in the GNA, and be offered government jobs and money".[15] Although IDPs may feel excluded by reconciliation initiatives, a majority of respondents felt they are either fully or somewhat included (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Inclusion of IDPs, by region
**Q29. For the following groups, could you please tell me whether you feel
they are included in reconciliation initiatives at the local level?** (n=2,086)
[IDPs]

	Fully	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	Do not know
Libya	45%	15%	7%	24%	8%
West	43%	16%	7%	25%	8%
East	48%	13%	7%	23%	7%
South	46%	17%	4%	27%	7%

■ Fully ■ Somewhat ■ Not very much ■ Not at all ■ Do not know ■ No answer / Refuse to answer

---

[14] *The potential danger became apparent when the LNA's Special Operations Force in Zintan, led by Emad al Trabulsi, announced in mid-2017 that they would return Zintan IDP's to Tripoli by force and establish an armed presence in Tripoli to protect them. UNSMIL and UNDP facilitated a dialogue between all concerned parties to ensure the peaceful return of these IDPs as part of the national reconciliation project.*
[15] *Altai interview with W.A. Journalist, IDP from Tripoli, Zintan, November 2017.*

5 UNDERSTANDING OF JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- **In terms of priorities for national stability, Libyans tended to prioritize security before national reconciliation, and national reconciliation before justice;**

- **When establishing priorities for national reconciliation, respondents were torn between prioritizing forgiveness and justice. In other words, respondents were equally likely to feel that justice and forgiveness were the first priority for national reconciliation;**

- **Respondents were highly concerned with accountability of perceived spoilers and criminals. However, being a member of the former regime was not a determining factor in determining who should be prosecuted in a court of law and who should be banned from participating in the state building process.**

- **Respondents were divided on whether the Libyan diaspora should have a role in reconciliation. While 50 percent of respondents said yes, 43 percent of respondents said no.**

Gaining an understanding of how Libyans perceive justice and reconciliation was the central objective of the national perceptions survey. The data suggests that there is fertile ground for national reconciliation in Libya. However, establishing security and restoring order may be prerequisite for national reconciliation. Respondents seemed to agree that security and reconciliation are important priorities for the country, but the priorities for national reconciliation itself were less clear.

Respondents' strong desire for order, truth, and justice emerged strongly at various points throughout the survey. This section will discuss what respondents felt was most important for the future, and for stability and reconciliation of the country.

"In the first years after 2011 there was a lot of anger and zeal. But since 2014, there is a clear trend of war-weariness. People no longer want to see blood. They are fed up with the situation. They want cash from the bank, security, to drive to places without fear. Even youth on the frontlines feel this way. Most of them want to go back to their civilian lives... There is fertile ground for peace building."

–A. S., Female, Misrata Civil Society Activist, December 2017

5.1 IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR THE FUTURE: TRUTH-SEEKING, ELECTIONS, AND ENDING IMPUNITY

When reacting to various important factors for Libya's future, most respondents agreed that truth seeking, holding elections and holding militias accountable were important concerns. Figure 10 indicates that respondents were most likely to support establishing the truth about crimes committed after the revolution, organizing national elections, and dissolving post-revolutionary brigades.

In contrast, respondents were most divided on the idea of banning members of the former regime from participating in politics. Although the role of former regime loyalists remains a divisive issue, the relatively low level of support for banning former regime members might suggest that respondents' desire for accountability is not dictated by the offenders' perceived relationship to Gadhafi.

Figure 10: Factors shaping the future of Libya

Q7. I'm going to read you a list of some things that different people feel must occur to construct the future of Libya. For each one, could you please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree feel neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree? (n=2,086)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
	Strongly disagree	Do not know	No Answer/ Refuse to answer	

The results to the question displayed in Figure 10 were largely constant across gender, age and region. Only trends regarding truth-seeking and banning members of the former regime from participating in politics seemed to vary by age. Although establishing the truth about the past was important to respondents in all the age categories, interest in truth-seeking was positively correlated with age. Younger respondents were slightly less interested in truth-seeking as compared to older respondents, but 18- to 24-year-olds were least interested in establishing the truth about crimes committed before the revolution, while respondents above the age of 45 were most interested in the truth about crimes occurring before 2011 . Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 years were also slightly more in favor of banning members of the former regime from participating in politics than older respondents. This might indicate that younger respondents, which came of age in the post-revolutionary period, might be less forgiving of former regime supporters.

Focus box 2:
Militias and the future army

The fact that respondents were more likely to support the idea of dissolving militias and ending their impunity than the idea of incorporating them into a future army also suggests that accountability, security and order are of great importance to respondents (Figure 10). Despite militias' apparent unpopularity, a large minority (40 percent) of respondents also found that post-revolutionary militias should be incorporated into a future army. The idea of incorporating militias into the army was most popular among individuals with poorly educated respondents and least popular with highly educated individuals (See Figure 40 in Annex).

While acknowledging the difficulty of containing and disarming brigades, several stakeholders interviewed for the qualitative component of the study felt that a political solution would also resolve the issues of militias, which "are rarely actors on their own, they are tools for political groups[67]". Views on armed groups among stakeholders interviewed were generally negative, although some felt that they can play a constructive role in the future. A Zintani elder, for instance, thought that: "if the political conflict is settled, then the security sector can also be sorted out. Current militias can work as support forces to the police and army, at least temporarily, following military orders. This way we can build a state"[17].

Across the board, the stakeholders interviewed for the qualitative research viewed the unification of the military under one leadership as being the first step to achieve stability and move to the next phase, although their views on who this leadership should be differed. According to a former Interior Minister interviewed, "the only way forward for Libya is to unify the military institution as a first step, before we discuss any further. For as long as the military is disunited under several leaderships, there will be no solution to the Libyan conflict. We must implement, not remove, power. The idea to collect weapons and disarm all forces in Libya as a first step is not realistic"[12]. Others, on the other hand, believed that Libya needs outside help to dismantle armed groups before forming a national army. According to a Warshefana tribal leader and academic: "The only way to conduct disarmament in Libya now is through a UN peacekeeping mission, not as military forces stationed in country but a limited mandate to organize the collection of heavy and medium sized weapons across Libya simultaneously"[18].

5.3 SECURITY IS A PREREQUISITE FOR RECONCILIATION

Prior to requesting that respondents define national reconciliation, the survey explored whether Libyans viewed national reconciliation as a national priority for Libyan stability. As Figure 11 indicates, national reconciliation was a priority for survey respondents, although security was respondents' most common first priority. Interestingly, respondents were more likely to prioritize national reconciliation than justice or even issues related to the economy.

During qualitative interviews, stakeholders argued that security is a prerequisite for reconciliation, because no reconciliation agreement, whether local or national, could hold in a security vacuum. Likewise, none of the interviewees felt that justice should be pursued immediately. As the Mayor from Zintan stated: "In the current circumstances, we cannot speak about transitional justice, the conditions are not there. For the sake of the nation we may need to accept that we cannot seek justice now"[19].

"In order for justice to be done and true reconciliation to be achieved, we need a unified central state and unified security apparatus… Of course, we need to continue working towards reconciliation and justice but there is little that can be achieved soon. There is no solution right now that can bring together all the political factions and that would allow us to form the right state bodies. The road is still very long. I think that if we reach a political agreement there will be renewed focus on justice".

- F. S., Male, Misratan lawyer and er and human rights activist, December 2017

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[17] *Interview with A. B., tribal elder, member of Zintan Social Committee, Zintan, October 2017.*

[18] *Interview with M. B., Head of High Council of Warshefana Tribes and Member of the High Council of Libyan Tribes and Cities, Tunis, December 2017.*

[19] *Interview with M.B., local government official in Zintan, Zintan, November 2017.*

Figure 11: Priorities for national stability, first priority

Q18. Among the following which are the most important priorities for Libya to transition into a stable State? Could you please tell me which you think is the first priority, the second priority, and the third priority?
(n=2,086)
[Priority 1]

5.4 JUSTICE, FORGIVENESS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

Unlike with national stability, respondents were divided on priorities for national reconciliation. The survey asked respondents to choose between various pillars of national reconciliation, which could help shed light on how Libyans perceive the concept of reconciliation. Figure 12 indicates that no one factor - justice, forgiveness, unity, peace, or truth-seeking - emerged as a clear priority. Respondents were equally likely to rate justice and forgiveness as first priority.

In juxtaposing justice and forgiveness when seeking to establish priorities for reconciliation, the research team sought to glean some preliminary insight on the kind of transitional justice approach Libyans may be amenable to, whether restorative or retributive. UNDP, UNSMIL and the research team used the terms peace, unity, justice and forgiveness to gain a general understanding of perceptions on national reconciliation, and thereby also of transitional justice.

"The term "reconciliation" is often misappropriated and used by political actors to misguide public opinion. Most Libyans don't have a deep understanding of reconciliation; they see it purely from the angle of forgiveness. Forgive the one who wronged you and that's it. The way I see it, reconciliation is a more comprehensive process that must involve justice seeking in order for it to be 'true' reconciliation."

– O. G., Male, Misratan civil society activist, November 2017

When compared to how highly respondents valued truth-seeking for building a future for the country (Figure 10), it is interesting how few respondents in Figure 12 felt truth-seeking should be the top priority for national reconciliation. A factors' analysis found that justice, forgiveness and unity were highly correlated: if a respondent chose one of these three options as a first priority, they were likely to choose one of the other two as second or third. This indicates that respondents were not interested in establishing the truth about past crimes and grievances for the sake of truth-seeking, especially in a ranking of priorities for reconciliation. Justice was a more popular option. In the qualitative interviews, stakeholders stated that truth-seeking at this stage of the Libyan crisis would increase animosity and could even be counter-productive for reconciliation.

Figure 12: Priorities for national reconciliation, priority 1

**Q21.What do you think is most important for national reconciliation, in order of priority.
Could you please tell me which you think is the first priority, the second priority, and the third priority?**
(n=2,086)
[Priority 1]

Respondents' split perceptions towards the importance of justice and forgiveness can be interpreted in several ways. The most obvious interpretation might be that respondents felt that justice and forgiveness were equally important for reconciliation. Figure 14 indicates that a strong majority of respondents felt that forgiveness was essential for moving forward. Similarly, respondents recognized that sustainable peace and security are more important than justice for victims, thus indicating that respondents might be willing to compromise justice if it meant ensuring lasting peace.

The qualitative interviews provided some context for why respondents might feel split between forgiveness and justice. Despite their strong desire to hold spoilers and criminals accountable, the stakeholders argued that Libyans recognize that the judicial system is unable to enforce the rule of law at this time. Conflict resolution agreements are difficult to enforce in a security and justice vacuum. Most stakeholders agreed that justice could not be pursued at the current moment in Libya. One human rights activist from Misrata argued: "It will be extremely difficult to pave the way for transitional justice in the absence of a political agreement... We need a unified government to lead the process, to review the legislation and to implement it"[69]. Respondents might also possess limited knowledge of transitional justice itself and might hold a misperception of the term due to past legislation in Libya[20].

Therefore, Figure 13 might indicate that respondents feel torn between their desire for justice and the realization that at this point in time, seeking justice in Libya could be fruitless or even counter-productive. Perhaps respondents sensed that forgiveness might be more effective (although less desirable) at ensuring that all parties to the Libyan conflict - alleged criminals and perpetrators included - participate in the reconciliation process.

Figure 13: Perceptions of justice and reconciliation

**Q20. I'm going to read you some statements about justice and reconciliation in Libya today.
Could you please tell me whether you agree, disagree or feel neutral about
the following statements? Strongly or somewhat?** (n=2,086)

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
[20] *For more information see Annex 17.*

Stakeholders argued that in Libya, the term "reconciliation" is easily confused with forgiveness and impunity. Ahmed, an activist from Benghazi, warned: "Many in Libya confuse reconciliation with forgiveness and pardon… The premise of forgiveness and forgetting grievances is still not acceptable or possible at the current stage with all the painful memories still vivid in people's minds"[70]. Confusing reconciliation with forgiveness might also be due to the traditional meaning of forgiveness in Libyan conflict resolution mechanisms. More specifically, elder-led conflict mediation mechanisms tend to be restorative and forgiveness-based due to their historical purpose of facilitating coexistence between pastoralist and nomadic communities.

The term ashab dam, or awaliya' al dam[21], which refers to the relatives of people killed in the conflict, cropped up often during the interviews. Stakeholders warned that imposing forgiveness onto families that have lost relatives to the fighting would create more instability and be counter-productive for reconciliation. On this point a Misratan activist, O. G, stated: "The decision to forgive these people lies with the owners of the blood. If they don't want to forgive, you cannot force them by means of a law. Amnesty also requires that the perpetrator confesses and apologizes. Only then he can be forgiven." [67]

5.5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF FORMER REGIME SUPPORTERS

The role of former regime loyalists undoubtedly remains a divisive issue in Libya. However, the study results suggest that respondents' desire for justice and accountability was not determined by the offender's relationship to the former regime. In fact, respondents appeared open to the idea of members of the former regime participating in politics. Figure 13 indicates that as many as 56 percent of respondents felt that former regime officials should be allowed to participate in a future Libyan state. Seventy-four percent, however, accepted to only allow former regime figures who had not committed any crimes to participate in the state-building process.

On the other hand, respondents felt that all perceived spoilers and offenders should be held accountable before the law. Figure 14 suggests that having violated the law, abused human rights and acted as a spoiler in the post-revolutionary period determined who should face justice - not involvement with the former regime.

Qualitative interviews revealed a similarly widespread demand for accountability. While some interviewees recognized that it might be necessary to guarantee perceived criminals temporary amnesty in order to prosecute them, stakeholders tended to agree that most Libyans would not approve of the measure. Stakeholders recognized the validity of partial or temporary amnesty, but they also warned that Libyans might perceive such decision as allowing impunity for the sake of reconciliation. Stakeholders also agreed that figures suspected of having abused human rights or committed crimes should have to face the law to ensure that the rights of victims are protected.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE DIASPORA

In the qualitative interviews the issue of diasporas mostly came up in the context of former regime supporters and officials living in exile. Several interviewees recognized the need to include former regime supporters in reconciliation efforts in order to reach stability. From these stakeholders' perspective, the pro-regime diaspora is primarily a spoiler group that threatens national unity and state building. According to a pro-revolutionary religious figure from Zintan, "there are regime opponents abroad who are stirring trouble inside Libya, and who need to be given the possibility of playing a positive part in Libya's future. In this respect, the HoR's amnesty law and the abolition of the Political Isolation Law were positive measures. I do not want to exculpate Gadhafi regime representatives who committed serious crimes, but the vast majority of those who live in exile now were merely profiteers, who appropriated public funds and have since been afraid to return… Those who emptied state coffers should be held accountable, but this should be done at a later stage and should not endanger the stabilization and reconciliation processes"[24]. For other interviewees, including exiled Gadhafi loyalists is a legitimately necessary step for national reconciliation, not just a necessary evil to contain spoilers.

Survey respondents were also divided on the idea of involving the diaspora in the reconciliation process. When asked whether the Libyan diaspora has a role to play in helping reconcile Libya, 50 percent of respondents selected yes, while 43 percent said no. Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 were nearly 13 percent more likely to oppose the idea of members of the Libyan diaspora participating in reconciliation, as compared to individuals aged 45 years or above (Figure 14). Attitudes toward the diaspora did not vary greatly by region, although respondents in the East were more open to the diaspora than the rest of Libya (Figure 65).

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[21] Term meaning owners or guardians of the blood.

Focus box 3:
Views on amnesty from qualitative interviews

The stakeholder interviews generally suggested that reconciliation would not be popular if Libyans saw themselves forced to forgive their wrongdoers without feeling that justice had been served. "We need general amnesty but not unconditional. There needs to be consensus on the terms of this amnesty… It requires that victims and their families do not seek retribution on their own… but instead resort to the judiciary. Self-administered justice would unleash a renewed cycle of violence. Libyans must have the right to return to their homeland and cities without fearing for their lives. At the same time, criminals and oppressors must be brought to justice whether crimes occurred before or after 2011. This must be done through the courts, not by force"[22].

In line with international law, stakeholders tended to distinguish between the kinds of crimes that can be met with amnesty and those that could not. For example, some of the individuals interviewed argued that a general amnesty should be granted to regular combatants fighting for Gadhafi, who at the time of the revolution were merely following orders. During an interview, Mohamed J., a Misratan jurist stated: "Regular combatants and people who just supported the former regime did not commit crimes so they do not require amnesty. Before the transitional justice law was passed, the idea was that all regular combatants and supporters would be forgiven and only some high-ranking figures, maybe 5, 7 or 10 people, who gave orders and committed human rights violations would be prosecuted[23]. Similarly, an activist from Misrata stressed that: "General amnesty can only apply to ordinary fighters. Those who killed outside the battlefield, who gave orders to kill, tortured and executed prisoners of war, cannot fall under an amnesty law [67]".

Similar statements were made by key interlocutors in Zintan[23]. A tribal elder from Zintan stated: "Those who committed serious crimes should go to court. But for now, our utmost priority is stabilizing the country, and this requires general amnesty". The interviewee here may be suggesting that members of the former regime could fear arbitrary and extreme punishment, and thus should be afforded a certain degree of legal protection while being tried on a case by case basis. The absence of a neutral arbiter embodied by a state justice system capable of enforcing the rule of law is a major deterrent in Libyans' willingness to engage in transitional justice. As a result, some respondents feel that some form of blanket amnesty - albeit temporary - should be considered for the sake of stability and expediency[24]. A Misratan politician spoke of "painful concessions", which had to be made for the sake of stability, adding: "Unfortunately, this means letting criminals get away, including former regime people and people who committed serious crimes" because the state does not currently have the capacity to enforce the rule of law[23].

Only one interviewee (a local government official in Zintan) called for unconditional amnesty. During his interview, he stated that: "Each group considers the others [to be] criminals, and when you voice blanket accusations against the other camp it basically means half the Libyan population [is criminal]. It's a never-ending story… In my view the only solution is comprehensive amnesty for everybody"[19].

> "Now there are calls for absolute amnesty, but the problem is that this in a way is helping the criminal get away with his crimes, by giving him impunity. This sends the wrong message: you can do whatever you want and won't be punished. We need amnesty, for sure, but it needs to be partial, conditional, well studied. You need to consider the types of crimes. Even international practice forbids absolute amnesty."
> **-M.d A., Male, Tribal elder, Zintan, November 2017**

[22] Interview with M.D., Male, Member of Zintan Crisis Committee, Zintan, November 2017.
[23] Skype interview with M. J., Male, member of the Libyan Jurists Organization, Misrata, December 2017.
[24] Interview with T. J., Male Sufi religious figure, public and Islamic notable, Zintan, November 2017.

Figure 14: The diaspora and reconciliation, by age

Q36. Do you think the Libyan Diaspora has a role in helping reconcile Libya? (n=2,086)

Age	Yes	No	Do not know
18-24	44%	49%	7%
25-34	47%	47%	5%
35-44	52%	41%	8%
45+	55%	36%	9%
Libya	50%	43%	7%

■ Yes ■ No ■ Do not know ■ No answer/ Refuse to answer

Respondents who felt the Libyan diaspora should participate in reconciliation were asked to specify which kinds of diaspora groups should be allowed (Figure 15). In general, this subset of respondents favored the inclusion of all types of diaspora members. However, dissidents of the former regime were the least popular diaspora group, particularly among respondents in the East (Figure 62). This may be due to the fact that respondents who were in favor of including the diaspora may not have been supporters of the revolution in 2011 (Figure 15). Openness towards supporters of the former regime tended to increase with age: the youngest respondents were nearly 12 percent more likely to want to exclude Gadhafi regime supporters than the oldest respondents (Figure 63).

Figure 15: Attitudes towards diaspora groups

Q37. Do you think the following types of Libyan diaspora groups should have a role in national reconciliation? (n=1,043)

	Yes	No	Do not know
Dissidents of the previous regime living abroad	68.6%	28.0%	
Supporters of the previous regime living abroad	74.2%	22.6%	
Libyans that emigrated after 2011 for political reasons	76.8%	19.0%	
Libyans that emigrated after 2011 for economic reasons	77.2%	20.6%	
Regular Libyan refugees that fled after 2011	83.1%	14.6%	

■ Yes ■ No ■ Do not know ■ No answer/Refuse to answer

مجموعه 2

س1 - مصادر طائفية الصراع؟ الطائفي

ج - الاطراف الرئيسيه من الصراع؟ الطائفي
السنه - العلويين - الشيعه

الاطراف الثانويه؟ مسائل الاعلام - القوى الاقليميه المجاوره
اللاعب لوجبه

المقاطع الرئيسيه الكامنه وراءه؟ حرب طائفيه - تغليب الطوبي على الاطراف الاخرى

س4 - ماهي التكتيكات او التكتيكات التي يستخدمها الخصم ضد الطرف التاخر؟
- اعتقال افراد السنه من قبل النظام واستبلاد العلويين في مناطقهم السنه.

س5 - ماهي التغيرات الهامه (نقطه تحول - بلغ) في ضلا الصراع؟
2 - دمج قوات الشبيحه مع العلويين وردهم للنظام؟
3 - اجراءات المجيب الى القتال بعد استهداف عسكريو
1 - تروح اصف الاذنبه بعد استهان كانشهرم.

س6 - ماهي النظريات التي ادت الى توسيع الصراع على مر الزمن؟
- دخول مناطقهم آمنه لغت لفخ رفعه القتال على مر الزمن؟
- تحول دور العباده الى شراعد عسكربو
- قوات النظام مجبرت عم تأسيم الاعتلاءات من الدوله

الطراف جديده: المجيب

س ، مدخله الاطراف الثالثه التي لعبت او لعبت دور
دوله الجوار والقوى الاقليميه والدوله
ماص تاثير الاطراف الاقليميه والدوليه؟
اطاله نتره ا

س، ماص النتائج المحتمله؟
- اذا نشاطه ضد الشيعه من وجهه نظر النظام
- ترسيخ النظام مفهوم اس طائفي وتحول لا الصراع من الان؟
- المتقدم السنه بهذا القوات سينتقوم الصراع
- الترحيبه ولرس الكراهيه والانتقام ضد السنه حرب ضد العلويه
- كيف نشاطه
ادت الى تغير لكل معروف منذ بهد الصراع؟ الا انتزت على طائفي من الصراع

DETERMINANTS OF LEGITIMACY IN RECONCILIATION INITIATIVES

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- The qualitative and quantitative data indicated that in order for a reconciliation initiative to be perceived as legitimate, the following must be true about the reconciliation process:

- It involves an element of buy-in or approval from a national or local government or a security force;

- It is Libyan-led;

- The selected interlocutors for the reconciliation initiative should be both inclusive and representative. Inclusiveness means engaging all components of the conflict, including members directly involved in the violence. Representativeness is increasingly elusive, especially when it comes to military realities;

- It is preceded by efforts to build trust or open channels of communication between members of the conflicting groups. Stakeholders indicated that centring the mediation on public service delivery rather than on grievances could encourage collaboration and build trust while leaving more sensitive topics to a later stage;

- It involves a discussion on reparations and a clearly defined method of determining the type and quantity of such reparations.

> "The parties involved are at the basis of any initiative… They are what makes the initiative legitimate or illegitimate, effective or ineffective… Then comes the role of the sponsor and the location of the initiative".
>
> **– O. Q., Male, Head of Administration, Municipal Council, Ubari, November 2017**

Determining which kinds of reconciliation tools, mechanisms and methods Libyans perceived as legitimate and sustainable was another key objective of this research. This section pulls primarily from data that emerged during qualitative interviews with stakeholders, but it opens with a discussion of related trends that emerged from the survey. The results indicated that in the eyes of the respondents, a legitimate reconciliation initiative:

» Is Libyan-led (Figure 16) and involves minimal foreign interference;

» Involves an element of buy-in or approval from a national or local government or security force;

» Is preceded by efforts to build trust or open channels of communication between members of the conflicting groups (Figure 16);

» Is inclusive of all components of the parties to the conflict, including members directly involved in the violence (Figure 16);

» Is brought to the attention of the community directly affected by the conflict;[25]

» Involves a discussion of reparations and a method for determining the type and quantity of such reparations (Figure 16);

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[25] *Qualitative finding.*

The continued insecurity in Libya makes speaking to specific examples of permanent conflict resolution difficult. In the absence of a State able to impose a legitimate monopoly on the use of force, all peace agreements or resolutions remain vulnerable to the actions of spoilers. Without a central arbiter capable of sanctioning individuals who break local reconciliation agreements, few mechanisms are likely to guarantee the sustainability of peace. However, the research indicated that actors leading or providing support to reconciliation initiatives can take certain steps to protect the negotiations and to ensure that an agreement is reached, regardless of how long the ceasefire holds. Some of the strategies that emerged from the qualitative interviews included:

» Performing extensive research on past reconciliation initiatives and actors before launching a new reconciliation initiative for an old dispute;

» Closely managing, staggering and timing communication with the community affected by the conflict;

» Keeping information and communication on the initiative as local and low-profile as possible, to avoid exposing the initiative to criticism or suspicions;

» Designing a reconciliation initiative whose success does not depend on the participation of specific individuals.

Figure 16: Factors related to effectiveness of reconciliation initiatives

Q41. How important do you think each of the following factors are in ensuring the effectiveness and sustainability of a reconciliation agreement? (n=2,086)

6.1 ELEMENTS OF A SUSTAINABLE AGREEMENT

The survey results indicate that most Libyans associate reconciliation between groups with the restoration of trust, a shared belief in a common path forward, and State administration of justice and reparations, both financial and symbolic (Figure 17). Figure 17 also indicates that Libyans were most likely (77 percent selecting "strongly agree") to equate reconciliation with signing a ceasefire, seeing it as a minimal requirement. This also reflects a trend that emerged from the key informant interviews.

During the qualitative interviews, stakeholders were more likely to describe shorter-term coexistence and conciliation[26], or "negative peace", than a more permanent conflict resolution . This may be due to the fact that traditional conflict resolution mechanisms may be better tailored to halting immediate violence than addressing deeper historical grievances, especially in the absence of a functioning central State. Short-term "coexistence" agreements are also those more commonly observed in the literature on Libya[28].

Stakeholders sometimes distinguished between political (or formal) reconciliation and social reconciliation. For former Misrata Local Council member Mukhtar J., stressed that: "Meetings between local dignitaries and delegations may be good efforts, but this is not real reconciliation. Real reconciliation is when the road between Bani Walid and Misrata reopens, it's when people communicate and visit each other. Formal reconciliation has no value" . For M. B., Head of High Council of Warshefana Tribes, "real reconciliation" means "paving") the way for a more stable phase in which we can... allow for victims to seek justice."[18]

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[26] Using the word musalaha.

[27] Using the term sulh.

[28] Virginie Collombier, Ahmed Khaled (2017). "Mapping of existing reconciliation initiatives in Libya: Lessons learned, actors, challenges, and way forward", UNSMIL, September 2016.

Respondents strongly associated justice with reparations. Figure 17 indicates that 64 percent of Libyans strongly agreed that "payments of reparation" are a definition of reconciliation between groups. The term "reparations" here is used to encompass different approaches to redressing past grievances, including restitution and compensation, with the latter generally being understood as financial[30]. Interviewed stakeholders highlighted the importance of diya - or blood money - as a form of compensation for damages suffered by a family who has lost a family member to a conflict. This form of compensation is particularly important in the South, where blood money has remained an important form of compensation.

Although both survey respondents and interviewees conceived of reparations in financial and non-financial terms, interviewed stakeholders emphasized that most Libyans would remain unsatisfied with a reparations package that only involved non-financial reparations.

> "With regards to peace agreements that have not been implemented and succeeded, in my view is because there isn't an official sponsor that has financial authorization and the power to suppress the saboteurs. As I see it, the agreements that have been implemented are those that involved the payment of reparations, such as the Tebu and Tuareg agreement in Ubari.
>
> **– H. R., Male, member of the Tribal Elders Council of Sebha, November 2017**

Some forms of non-financial reparations that survey respondents did support, however, included an exchange of apologies and acknowledgment of responsibility between groups. In fact, 67 percent of Libyans strongly agreed with reconciliation being defined as "when both sides accept responsibility for their role in the conflict and apologize for violations committed". The stakeholder interviews revealed that mutual public apologies are reparation mechanisms typically associated with tribal forms of reconciliation. Figure 17 also suggests that respondents associate the restoration of trust and support for a common future closely with sustainable reconciliation between conflicting groups (Figure 17).

Legal prosecution of crimes also emerged as an important component of legitimacy of reconciliation deals. The second most popular definition of reconciliation in Figure 17 is "when state justice is administered (i.e. when perpetrators who committed crimes are tried in a state court of law by a judge)". Seventy-six percent of Libyans "strongly agreed" with this definition. This emphasis on State-led arbitration might suggest that while tribal dispute resolution is widespread and popular in Libya, ultimate legitimacy rests with the State's stamp of approval. This however, does not negate the effectiveness and legitimacy of bottom-up reconciliation. Figure 16 indicates that as many as 61 percent of respondents also felt that an enforceable reconciliation agreement ensures that crime be punished through traditional justice mechanisms. As is discussed more in detail in Section 9 of this report, the State has in the past adjudicated disputed legal matters that were arbitrated through traditional mediation mechanisms, giving extra-judicial arbitration an official approval. As a result, encouraging civil society actors, not just elders and notables, to engage in bottom-up reconciliation efforts is not incompatible with the fact that any arbitration or dispute resolution should ultimately include an element of State approval.

Figure 17: Definition of reconciliation between groups
Q19. Do you agree, disagree, or feel neutral about the following definitions of reconciliation between groups? If you agree or disagree do you feel this way strongly or somewhat? (n=2,086)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
When two groups sign a cease fire	77%	13%	3%	5%
When state justice is administered (e.g. when perpetrators who committed crimes are tried in a state court of law by a judge	76%	14%	4%	4%
When two groups agree on a common path forward/common future	70%	16%	5%	5%
When trust is restored between two groups	68%	17%	6%	6%
When both sides accept responsibility for their role in the conflict, and apologize for violations committed	67%	16%	4%	8%
When the payment of reparations is made	64%	16%	6%	10%
When two groups form strong social and economic ties	59%	16%	7%	11%
When intermarriage occurs between members of the two groups	45%	17%	10%	21%
When one side of a conflict achieves a victory	20%	10%	11%	46%

Legend: Strongly agree · Agree · Neutral · Disagree · Strongly disagree · Do not know · No answer/ Refuse to answer

Some form of official State or military recognition gives the agreement a semblance of legal legitimacy and therefore enforceability. Many stakeholders interviewed tended to conflate state recognition and enforceability with military power. These respondents argued that in the absence of an effective judicial system, the only actor capable of enforcing a peace agreement would be an undisputed military force capable of sanctioning violators. Therefore, the existence of a security force seemed to be a necessary precondition for an agreement to last, irrespective of community support for the initiative.

One stakeholder did specify that a "military force is not always needed to implement a peace agreement. Especially if the problem is a social one". However, without a "neutral guarantor" capable of providing guarantees when the agreements are violated it is difficult to keep the spoilers accountable[36].

The following section explores respondents' perceptions of various actors' roles in pursuing national reconciliation. The survey results indicated that respondents find local level actors to be the most effective at resolving conflict. Respondents felt that local stakeholders such as elders, notables, and even youth are best placed to engage in local reconciliation efforts - more so than municipal councils.

By contrast, all national institutions and actors, except for the LNA, were perceived as largely ineffective at resolving conflict. The qualitative interviews indicated indeed that the State's responsibilities lay more in the provision of security and the payment of reparations. With regards to international actors, respondents preferred that foreign states do not act as third-parties in reconciliation initiatives. Stakeholders in qualitative interviews felt the international community should play a technical, advisory role to support Libyan-led efforts, rather than mediate directly.

> " In my view [reconciliation] is divided into two tracks. One track pertains to the state, because reconciliation involves work at the national level - guarantees, compensation, etc. – that only the state can be in charge of. The other track is conducted by social and political leaderships, local and international organizations, and municipalities. Reconciliation has political and social aspects that complete one another. "
>
> **–F. A., Male, Libyan Ambassador, Misrata, December 2017**

6.2 LIBYAN "OWNERSHIP" »

From Tripoli, Zintan, Misrata and Benghazi to Sebha and Ubari stakeholders interviewed for the study tended to agree on what renders reconciliation initiatives and agreements legitimate or illegitimate. Factors that determined the legitimacy of any reconciliation initiative and, by default, any resulting agreement, included: who was sponsoring the initiative, how representative the participants were of their community, and the location of the initiative.

The notion that a legitimate reconciliation initiative and resulting agreement must be Libyan-led was mentioned consistently in qualitative interviews. However, stakeholders did not necessarily argue that all foreign assistance to reconciliation initiatives is unwelcome or illegitimate. The key element that emerged from qualitative interviews was that a foreign state or state affiliated entity should not be seen as dictating the priorities of a local reconciliation initiative. This was particularly true of foreign governments, whose interest and involvement in a local level reconciliation initiative raises suspicions. In the words of one stakeholder who is a member of the Coalition of Jurists in Sebha: "Sponsorship[31] from any outside party [would be perceived as] illegitimate, and [the reconciliation agreement would] not last because it [would] be imposing the ideologies and policies of the… sponsoring state"[32].

Distrust of foreign state involvement was echoed by a high-ranking local government official in Sebha who was involved in the Italian-led reconciliation efforts between the Awlad Suleiman, Tebu and Tuareg in his town in 2017. When asked to comment on legitimacy he stated: "The reconciliation must be achieved through the Libyan state… Reconciliation initiatives led by countries that have agendas in Libya are illegitimate in my opinion because they are guided by specific [foreign] interests"[33]. As a high-ranking member of local government, this stakeholder participated in the foreign-led reconciliation talks despite his scepticism of the process. This stakeholder may have seen himself obliged to participate in the talks or was eager not to be left out. Regardless of the motivation, this kind of contradiction suggests that allowing a foreign state to lead a local reconciliation initiative is problematic.

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[29] *Phone interview with M. J., Male, former Misrata Local Council member (2011-2014), Misrata, November 2017.*

[30] *According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's 2003 "Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook" (p.146) restitution refers to the "re-establishment of the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed," while compensation refers to the payment of money as a recognition of the wrong done and to make good the losses suffered".*

In the words of a Libyan mediation expert interviewed for this survey, "the process of reconciliation is all about trust. If people don't trust your process you cannot succeed"[34]. Foreign involvement, especially if openly publicized, may undermine Libyans' trust in a reconciliation initiative and in the mediators involved in it. If the community does not understand the process or has not been somehow made aware of the process, it will be difficult for it to be perceived as legitimate.

The mediation expert interviewed pointed to the Italians' agreement in Sebha as a prime example of an internationally sponsored statement that the extended community was not made aware of until after the agreement had been signed[35]. The qualitative interviews revealed that many Libyans view mediators posing as representatives in foreign-led reconciliation initiatives as opportunists seeking the recognition that accompanies interacting with foreign statesmen. The respondents were sometimes inclined to perceive the mediators collaborating in foreign-led initiatives abroad as receiving some sort of monetary compensation for participating. This unsurprisingly would question the neutrality of the initiative.

> "We have a Libyan proverb which goes: nothing scratches your back better than your own fingernails. So it's imperative that the solution is Libyan and Libyan sponsored".
>
> **– H. A., Male, Head of state Radio and TV networks, Benghazi, December 2017**

The location of the initiative was another important determinant of legitimacy, effectiveness, and inclusiveness that emerged from qualitative interviews. In general, stakeholders felt that keeping the reconciliation initiative local makes including additional interlocutors easier, especially if the initial list of participants reveals itself to be not representative enough. Therefore, keeping the initiative inside Libyan territory (but not necessarily in the exact location of the conflict) is more likely to allow for the inclusion of more legitimate and representative participants.

6.3 INCLUSIVENESS IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN REPRESENTATIVENESS

> "When reaching out to mediators never, ever take for granted that anyone is the catch-all representative of his community".
>
> **– T. E., Male, Mediation expert and peace network builder, speaking about Kufra, October 2017**

Finding the most representative interlocutor of a community is not always straightforward because involving the right parties requires engaging with the community rather than waiting for candidates to put themselves forward. To increase the viability of a reconciliation process, third parties lending support to reconciliation initiatives should ensure that the interlocutors they chose to engage with are varied and inclusive of different stakeholders from the community and conflicting parties. In other words, besides engaging with elders due to their role as representative of their community, third parties should make sure to include youth and other civil and military actors.

Although parties seeking to involve themselves in mediation should strive to involve representative interlocutors, the success of their roadmap should not depend excessively on the participation of specific individuals. Mediation experts from both the Peaceful Change Initiative (PCi) and Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) cautioned against overemphasizing the participation of individual interlocutors due to their perceived "representativeness". What makes an individual representative or legitimate varies across conflicts, contexts and social groups. Furthermore, in conflict contexts, leadership might change constantly. Mediators should therefore refrain from viewing "representativeness" as being the single most determinant factor when choosing interlocutors. According to a mediation expert, the most successful reconciliation initiative is one organized with the idea that the mediators can be changed[34]. Developing a similar reconciliation process involves an in-depth analysis of past reconciliation efforts and what caused them to fail as an essential preparatory first step[36]. Part of this preparation phase also involves speaking to the community to build local support and identify the correct interlocutors.

The stakeholders interviewed suggested that non-Libyan actors often lack the contextual knowledge and familiarity to conduct the preparatory research. They are poorly equipped to recognize the legitimate representatives of a community. This puts foreign sponsors at risk of inviting unrepresentative delegates to

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[31] *"Sponsorship" here is intended as "leadership" or "direction" of an initiative by a foreign state rather than just financial and logistical support.*

[32] *Interview with A. A., Male, attorney and member of the Coalition of Jurists in Sebha, Sebha, November 2017.*

> "[The legitimacy of a reconciliation initiative] is all about their [the parties to the conflict] leaders. Who is representing their parties? Who is the person you will bring to the table? You must be sure he will be the one who will make the executive decisions not a 'messenger' or 'representative'. All the communities know who can represent them [and] the head of the tribe is not always the one who can make the final decision.
>
> You have to go looking for the [true representatives]. That's why you should not remove the reconciliation effort from the area where the conflict is occurring".
>
> – **T. E., Male, Mediation expert and peace network builder, speaking about Kufra, October 2017**

the negotiating table, which decreases the odds of the agreement being accepted. Representatives of foreign states also tend to lack the ability to communicate effectively with the conflict-affected communities at the centre of the reconciliation agreement. In the words of one mediation expert, the ability to network with the right people in the affected communities is key to a legitimate reconciliation initiative. When asked to comment on foreign-led reconciliation initiatives - such as those organized by the Italians - the interviewee stated: "They are involving the wrong figures. Why? Because they have an issue with networks"[34].

Another reason why a successful mediation strategy should not depend on the involvement of any single individual or representative, is that representativeness might not translate to decision-making power, particularly when dealing with tribes[41]. A mediation advisor for Libya with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue provided an example from his experience conducting mediations in Sebha. He explained that several influential families of the Awlad Suleiman exist in Sebha, however not even the most influential family among them - the Seif al-Nasr - have the clout to make peace or war without the buy in of the other influential families" . The mediator argued: "The individuals who negotiated on behalf of the conflict parties from Sebha were for the most part relevant and representative of their communities, the problem is not necessarily that. Sometimes the negotiators just do not speak on behalf of those that are fighting on the frontlines. Some of the fighting factions were not actually from the local community, for instance the Tebu fighting in Sebha, many were from Chad and from Tebu clans that were not the ones based in Sebha". This was one of the reasons why, the expert argued, the Italian Sebha deal was not recognized as legitimate. The Tebu figureheads involved may have been "educated and reasonable," but did not "have much influence among the Tebu armed factions"[37].

As a result, it may be more important to ensure that as many cross-sections of each conflict party are represented and included in the initiative as possible. To ensure inclusivity, it is important for organizers of a reconciliation not to only speak with the top-level representatives of the disputing parties, such as tribal elder or notables. The youth and militias engaging in active conflict have a different perspective on grievances and on what the priorities of a potential reconciliation initiative might be. For example, officially speaking the conflict in Sebha is between the Gadhadfa, Awlad Suleiman and the Tebu. However, the Libyan stakeholder from PCi insisted that: "if you speak to the people engaging in conflict on the ground, the problem is access to fuel, not tribal issues". The individuals in these communities actively engaging in conflict are not many, but are capable of catapulting communities into protracted conflict[41]. Instead of asking a tribe to keep their youth and militias in check, engaging those parties in a dialogue directly is a more effective means of drawing up a roadmap for reconciliation.

The Humanitarian Dialogue Centre mediator argued that the Italian's failure to engage military leaders was also a reason for the perceived illegitimacy of the deal. By contrast, military actors and youth were invited to participate in the Ubari negotiations in Qatar, which somehow elicited slightly more positive reactions from the stakeholders interviewed, despite having been conducted abroad and under the auspices of a foreign third party. Some of the Zintani elders interviewed for this report suggested that the reason for the Qatari-brokered deal having held for longer than the Italian one in Sebha is due to the payment of reparations, even though the actual amount provided remains unclear. The elders interviewed cited rumours that the Qataris had paid compensation to the conflicting parties, whom in turn had laid down their weapons.

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[33] *Interview with M. K., Male, participant in the March 2017 Rome peace agreement between Tebu and Awlad Suleima, Sebha, November 2017.*

[34] *Interview with a Libyan mediation expert involved in developing peacebuilding networks throughout Libya, October 2017.*

[35] *Tebu body rejects Rome deal with Tuareg and Awlad Suleiman. (2017). Libya Herald. Available at www.libyaherald.com/2017/04/06/tebu-body-rejects-rome-deal-with-tuareg-and-awlad-suleiman/.*

[36] *Interview with M.G., Male, Member of the national Movement for Libya, Head of the Supreme Tuareg Council, Tunis, October 2017.*

6.4 TRUST AND TIME

A reconciliation initiative should focus on building trust between disputing parties as a crucial first step. When asked to discuss the factors that affect a peace agreement's ability to stand the test of time, stakeholders cited the disputing parties' true commitment to reaching an agreement as a determining factor. Although seemingly obvious, the interviewees agreed that trust, the disputing parties' commitment to peace and consequently, the success of the peace agreement depends on the circumstances that led the parties to seek an end to the violence.

Interviews with three Zintani tribal elders with decades of experience mediating disputes throughout Libya highlighted the need for the conflict to reach "an equilibrium." This equilibrium, or "ripe time for mediation", occurs when the two disputing parties reach a point of exhaustion or when one of the two parties militarily subjugates the other. Although the tribal elders did not argue that a military equilibrium was necessary for peace, they suggested that the greater a side's odds of gaining the military upper hand, the less inclined the party would be toward negotiating. "If there is no balance of forces, reconciliation has little chance, because each side hopes to make further gains," explained the elder[38]. The window of opportunity for an effective reconciliation initiative to take place only lasts as long as the military "equilibrium". The volatility of military conflict makes building trust between disputing parties all the more necessary to take advantage of the "ripe moment" for reconciliation.

> "Building trust is the most important step in a reconciliation process. Once it has prepared its intervention, the mediating party needs to convince the conflict parties of accepting it as mediator. The mediating party must be strong and trustworthy. It must present a clear roadmap and discuss it with all conflict parties."
>
> **–M. G., Male, Tuareg elder, October 2017**

> "We try to have them speak directly to each other. What are the mutually beneficial things they can agree on? For example: public services…we avoid discussion of historical issues and put the humanitarian concerns to the forefront… Historical grievances cannot be dealt with in the absence of a national government."
>
> **– Mediation expert and peace network builder, October 2017**

Different strategies exist with regards to sequencing discussion of grievances when designing a negotiation. However, stakeholders felt that centring the mediation on the delivery of public services or good rather than on grievances encouraged collaboration, built trust, and left discussion of the most difficult topics to a time when greater solidarity has developed between the parties. The first step in this case would be to draw up a list of demands from both sides of the conflict. To do this, mediators must also consider the perspective and demands of their entire community, including those engaged in conflict, which are often the youth. Examples of development projects that rely on the participation of a community in conflict include rehabilitation of public facilities, such the school, hospital, women's centre and the public market in Ubari that were financed as part of the UNDP Stabilization Facility[39].

Whether to utilize a direct or third-party mediation depends on the complexities of any given dispute. To facilitate the establishment of trust, one expert signaled a preference for direct mediation with as little third-party involvement as possible. Some respondents, including the elders from Zintan, cited third party mediation as a useful tool. However, some other stakeholders, including the Libyan mediation expert and a tribal elder from Sebha, expressed a preference for direct talks. The mediation expert cautioned that third party mediation provides the two disputing parties with a platform to complain about the other side, which is inefficient and counter-productive

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[37] *Interview with M. J., Male, Mediation advisor for Libya, Humanitarian Dialogue, October 2017.*

[38] *Interview with S. M., Male, Head of Zintan's Social Committee, experienced mediator, October 2017.*

[39] *As a part of the Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) led by the GNA and supported by UNDP and the international community: www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/operations/projects/sustainable-development/stabilization-facility-for-libya.html.*

[40] *Romanet Perroux, J et al (2017). Libyan Local Governance Case Studies (Rep.). EU Delegation, Libya.*

[41] *Interview with Libyan mediation expert with Peaceful Change Initiative, October 2017.*

A member of Sebha's Elders Council also seemed to provide a cautious approval of third party mediation by a neutral tribe. The Elder explained that a delegation of tribal elders from Zintan travelled to Sebha to help begin talks between the Awlad Suleiman and the Tebu. The deal centred on reopening the Sebha airport, which had been closed since fighting between the two groups began in 2014. When asked what should or should not be replicated from that reconciliation initiative, the tribal elder praised the fact that the negotiations had been face-to-face. However, he also stated: "What cannot be repeated is having the involvement of a mediator between the disputing parties in any reconciliation. The mediator should only have a preliminary role helping the parties sit down and openup to each other".

Focus box 4:
Building community trust through effective communication

Transparency and effective communication with the community affected by the conflict is an essential aspect of building trust. According to one Libyan mediation expert, in the case of foreign-led initiatives, a community might learn of an agreement once the signing of a peace deal appears on the news. One can imagine a community's surprise upon seeing delegates they do not necessarily recognize sign an agreement in a foreign capital on their behalf. Alternatively, informing the community of the existence and progress of a reconciliation initiative during a town hall meeting or through a local radio station is a more sensitive, discrete, and gradual means of keeping the community informed. A recently published report on local governances in Libya echoes this sentiment: "Municipalities that extensively utilize multiple media channels to publicly communicate their challenges, decisions, and achievements to their constituencies, and open direct channels of communication with them are most able to cement their popular legitimacy"40.

Nevertheless, a Libyan mediator with the PCi stressed the importance of not opening the floor up for discussion. A town-hall announcement regarding the existence and progress of a reconciliation initiative should be limited to a simple statement of fact41. The mediation expert even stressed the importance of not involving the media in any reconciliation initiatives. He argued that involving the media can politicize the issues at the heart of a local dispute, especially given the polarizing nature of contemporary Libyan media outlets. Media involvement also exposes the initiative to criticism and suspicion before an agreement can be reached. Lastly, the mediation expert explained that publicized reconciliation initiatives are often perceived by Libyans as "publicity stunts", which threaten the legitimacy of the initiatve34.

" It's not only about people's reluctance to forgive, but also the lack of trust in each other. People will not hand over their weapons to any force, because they distrust and fear their enemies and neighbors, and they feel the need to defend themselves. "

– T. G., Male, Journalist, IDP from Tripoli, Zintan, October 2017

7 UNDERSTANDING OF JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- **Sixty-four percent of respondents did not consider themselves active members of their community. The most common reason for not participating actively was the prohibitive political and security environment;**

- **However, the 35 percent of respondents that did consider themselves active members of their community were most likely to be engaged in conflict resolution and least likely to be involved in political activism.**

Another objective of the study was to understand the self-reported level of civic engagement among respondents. The survey probed how and why survey respondents engage in their communities in order to draw conclusions about the kinds of mechanisms that might help to sensitize Libyans to national reconciliation and to support bottom-up reconciliation efforts throughout the country. The survey indicated that although most respondents did not consider themselves active participants, those who did consider themselves active participants were most likely to participate in conflict mediation-related activities.

7.1 TRENDS IN CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

The survey revealed that 35 percent of the sample considered themselves active members of their communities (Figure 18)[42]. The 62 percent of respondents who perceive themselves as non-active members of their communities cited the prohibitive political and social climate as the reason for not engaging actively in their communities. However, those that did consider themselves active members of their community were most likely to engage in conflict resolution (Figure 20). Active community engagement tended to be higher in the South and among male respondents. This is unsurprising considering the higher incidence of conflict reported by respondents from the South (see Section 4). The survey indicated that generally, levels of participation in the South tended to be higher than in the rest of the country. Education also tended to be correlated with levels of participation. Respondents that possessed a tertiary degree or had technical training were most likely to participate in their community. In fact, they were almost twice as likely to engage than respondents with no formal education (Figure 18).

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[42] *The question was phrased:* "هل تعتبر أنك تلعب دورا فاعلا في مجتمعك؟"

Figure 18: Level of civic engagement, by region, education and gender
Q23. Would you say you play an active role in your community – yes or no?
(n=2,086)

	Yes	No
Libya	35%	62%
West	33%	64%
East	38%	61%
South	43%	55%
Higher education	39%	59%
Vocational / technical training	39%	57%
Secondary education (high school)	31%	67%
No formal / Primary education	21%	75%
Female	30%	68%
Male	40%	58%

Legend: Yes | No | Do not know | No answer / Refuse to answer

The survey results indicate that the most common activity among Libyans were community mediation initiatives and social conflict resolution. Around 49 percent of respondents reported participating in conflict resolution (Figure 20). Political activism and local government participation were the least common kinds of participation. Men were the most likely to participate in both kinds of activities (Figure 36). Besides participating in women's groups, women tended to participate slightly more in activities involving human rights activism. Participation in human rights activism was also an activity that was positively correlated with level of education. As indicated in Figure 19, women tend to have more time to dedicate to civic activities and in the current labor market, educated women may have greater chances of applying their skills by participating in humanitarian-related activities than by participating in local government. For the activities that could be analyzed by region, participants in the South were consistently more likely to participate actively. Southern respondents were 16 percent more likely to participate in community gatherings and youth organizations, 14 percent more likely to participate in local government meetings, and 18 percent more likely to participate in arts groups than the national average[43].

Figure 19: Reasons for lack of civic engagement, by gender
Q26. If you do not consider yourself an active participant in your community, why not? (n=1,303)

Reason	Male	Female	Libya
The political climate prevents me from participating	25.16	27.393	26.324
There are no opportunities for me to participate	22.596	33.579	28.319
Don't know of any community activities	19.391	16.053	17.652
Do not have time	17.308	6.333	11.589
I am prevented from participating	5.769	8.395	7.137
Do not know	4.167	2.356	3.223
Not interested	1.442	2.356	1.919
Other	1.282	1.473	1.381
No answer / Refuse to answer	2.885	2.062	2.456

[43] Figures detailing the breakdown of participation in the activities listed in Question 24 of the survey can be found in Annex 16.

Figure 20: Level of participation by activity type

Q24. Which of the following activities do you participate in? (n=735)

Activity	Yes	No
Community mediation or social conflict resolution facilitation	49.8	48.6
Community gatherings	48.2	51.0
Sports organizations	43.1	56.2
Youth organizations	39.7	59.5
Human rights activism	38.5	61.0
Women's groups	32.5	66.5
Arts groups	28.2	71.2
Local government meetings	23.8	75.1
Political activism	22.6	76.7

Legend: ■ Yes ■ No ■ Do not know ■ No answer / Refuse to answer

7.2 MECHANISMS FOR NATIONAL AND BOTTOM-UP RECONCILIATION

Most Libyans strongly agreed that all the proposed conflict resolution mechanisms and activities would be effective at resolving conflict, with the notable exception of "foreign third party-led dialogue," which 73 percent of Libyans strongly felt would not be an effective mechanism for reconciliation. As Figure 21 indicates, the mechanisms most respondents felt would support conflict resolution were public awareness and education campaigns. As will be discussed later in the report, respondents were in great support of public education campaigns for increasing the inclusion and participation of women, youth, and IDPs in reconciliation initiatives. Other national level mechanisms for reconciliation that proved popular among survey respondents included the establishment of a commission on national reconciliation and the payment of reparations. As indicated in other points of the survey, elder and notable-led reconciliation initiatives were more popular than municipality-led ones (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Perceived effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms and activities

Q42. In your opinion, how effective would the following mechanisms/activities be at resolving conflict?

(n=2,086)

Mechanism	Very effective	Somewhat effective	Not very effective at all
Educating the Libyan public on conflict resolution	82.8%	9.6%	5%
Establishing a commission for national reconciliation	76.6%	12.6%	7.5%
Reparation for the victims	75.3%	12.5%	8.8%
Elder led dialogue between parties	74.8%	14.9%	6.8%
Local notable led dialogue between parties	72.9%	15.1%	7.9%
Truth seeking commissions	70.5%	12.1%	11.9%
Providing technical/logistical support on the ground to Libyan dialogue-parties	68%	14.5%	9.8%
Tolerance between the parties for crimes committed by each side	64.8%	15.2%	15.8%
Libyan third party-led dialogue	58.4%	14.2%	21.4%
Municipal council led dialogue	56.9%	20.7%	16.3%
Prisoner swap	55.8%	16.3%	20.3%
Foreign third party-led dialogue	12.7%	8.7%	73.3%

Legend: ■ Very effective ■ Somewhat effective ■ Not very effective ■ Not very effective at all ■ Do not know ■ No answer/ Refused to answer

Figure 23 indicates that a large minority of Libyans feel fully represented in the reconciliation initiatives that have occurred in their communities. Respondents in the East were six percent more likely to feel initiatives "fully" represented their interests than the national average. Women were more than seven percent less likely than men to feel fully represented, but this varied only by three percent from the national average. Degrees of satisfaction with reconciliation initiatives was positively correlated with age: the older the respondent, the greater the likelihood of the respondent feeling satisfied.

8 INCLUSION OF YOUTH AND WOMEN

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Younger respondents were more likely to feel unrepresented by local reconciliation initiatives than the average respondent. In the qualitative interviews younger stakeholders were also more likely to feel excluded, especially by their elders, when engaging in reconciliation initiatives;

- Disarmament was the most popular mechanism to increase youth's involvement in reconciliation;

- Women's participation in reconciliation-related activities in the community was lower than other demographics;

- Respondents strongly supported increasing women's rights and strongly approved of mechanisms to increase women's involvement in reconciliation. Building women's capacity to resolve conflict and building Libyans' awareness of women's role in reconciliation were popular mechanisms to increase inclusion.

This section will discuss perceptions of inclusion of youth and women in reconciliation and useful mechanisms to increase inclusiveness. The study revealed that the average Libyan's perceptions were different from the views of youth and key stakeholders. Over 50 percent of survey respondents perceived women and youth as being fully represented in reconciliation initiatives (Figure 22). As this section will discuss, however, younger survey respondents and stakeholders did not feel particularly included in reconciliation efforts in the country.

Similarly, almost 50 percent of respondent felt that women were fully represented in reconciliation initiatives. Interestingly, women were only five percent less likely than men to feel their interests were fully represented in them (Figure 23). Likewise, female respondents' perceptions of women's inclusion in reconciliation did not differ from men's perceptions. However, the data revealed that women were generally 20 percent less likely to engage in reconciliation related activities in their communities than men. The discrepancy between women's perceptions of inclusion and their level of participation in reconciliation-related activities may be due to the fact that a woman's level of engagement in public life is dictated by the level of conservatism of her community.

8.1 YOUTH

Figure 30 indicates that when given the option, 45 percent of respondents eagerly supported the idea of youth having a strong role in conflict mediation at the local level. Although respondents were most likely to cite elders as having the main responsibility of conflict resolution, it was clear that respondents were not averse to the idea of unarmed youth taking an active role in their community. The term "unarmed", however, is key. Both younger stakeholders and elder ones hinted at the discrimination youth face in Libyan society today. An activist interviewed in Tripoli stated:

Figure 22: Inclusion of youth, women, IDPs minorities, diaspora at the national levela

Q28. For the following groups, could you please tell me whether you feel they are included in reconciliation initiatives at the national level? (n=2,086)

Group	Fully	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	No reconciliation process	No answer / Refuse to answer
Youth	52%	16%	5%	15%	6%	6%
Women	45%	19%	5%	18%	7%	6%
Internally displaced persons (IDPs)	46%	14%	6%	20%	6%	8%
Minorities	36%	17%	6%	22%	7%	10%
Members of the Libyan diaspora	33%	16%	7%	25%	8%	10%

Legend: ■ Fully ■ Somewhat ■ Not very much ■ Not at all ■ No reconciliation process ■ Do not know ■ No answer / Refuse to answer

"[Elders] view youth only as the fuel for war and not the fuel for peace"[44]. Since the ranks of armed groups are primarily filled with young men, older generations of Libyans tend to view youth as a destabilizing force and a driver of conflict.

The elders interviewed mentioned that the influence of the tribe does not affect the behaviour of youth and that the prevalence of weapons in Libya since the revolution have "destroyed the social fabric". For example, while describing the instability in Sebha, a Zintani tribal elder stated that: "In Sebha the problem is with youth, for the most part, not with elders. Troublemakers, petty criminals... They set up roadblocks, carjack, kidnap...[and] make the cycle of violence continue. Like the monkey war, an embarrassment... Most of the youth are reasonable but there are minor factions who have become crazy, no reasoning possible with them. When you hear 'the Awlad Suleiman did this, the Gadhadfa did that', it's not accurate, it is not the tribe acting as a homogeneous unit".

The younger stakeholders interviewed for this study were mainly civil society actors or engaged members of their communities. These stakeholders reported feeling sidelined by elders and decision makers when they tried to take initiative on reconciliation-related activities. As a result, these stakeholders felt that local reconciliation initiatives were not representative or inclusive of the youth. Figure 23 indicates that younger survey respondents also tended not to feel represented by local reconciliation initiatives in their communities. Elder survey respondents were about 12 percent more likely to feel fully represented in local reconciliation initiatives than the youngest cohort of respondents.

Figure 23: Representativeness of local reconciliation initiatives, by region, gender, and age

Q27. When there are local reconciliation efforts in your area, to what extent do you feel your interests are represented and respected? (n=2,086)

Group	Fully	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	There are no reconciliation initiatives
Libya	43.2%	21.3%	7.2%	8.4%	16.7%
West	40.4%	21.6%	8.2%	9.0%	17.5%
East	49.0%	20.2%	5.3%	6.6%	15.9%
South	45.1%	22.8%	6.0%	10.3%	13.6%
Male	46.5%	22.1%	6.0%	7.5%	15.2%
Female	39.6%	20.4%	8.5%	9.5%	18.3%
18-24	36.8%	24.5%	8.9%	10.0%	16.7%
25-34	39.8%	22.4%	7.2%	10.3%	17.1%
35-44	45.2%	19.8%	6.5%	7.7%	17.9%
+45	48.5%	19.6%	6.7%	6.4%	15.4%

Legend: ■ Fully ■ Somewhat ■ Not very much ■ Not at all ■ There are no reconciliation initiatives ■ Do not know ■ No answer/ Refuse to answer

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[44] *Interview with O.F., Male, civil society activist with the Libyan Organization for Justice and Equality, Tripoli, October 2017.*

The qualitative interviews indicated that an inter-generational split exists between in the field of civic engagement. The idea that elders might attempt to undermine or capitalize on youth reconciliation initiatives to bolster their own relevance emerged frequently during the interviews. One young activist from Misrata stated: "Youth do not play a strong role in reconciliation. Generally, youth do not have much influence in society but are exploited by political and military leaders". He argued that this feeling of abuse has led young Libyans to become disengaged from politics and civil activism. He called for training and inclusion to increase youth participation. He reiterated that: "For greater youth participation, we need a State framework. Many youths have become disillusioned…. But youth should play a greater role because we need new ideas, new approaches. The capacities of youth must be raised through training"[44].

> "Youth should play a much greater role. They represent most of Libya in numerical terms and they have fought the country's battles, but if you look at the current leadership-- They are the old generation… [who] generally don't care about the future as much, their interests are short-term.
>
> **– W. A., Male, journalist, Zintan, November 2017**

Another interviewee recounted how elders often discourage youth from initiating conflict mediation. He explained: "Elders dislike it when youth initiate dialogue… Sometimes they sabotage initiatives that are not their own. A few of us journalists and activists went to Yefren when there was fighting with Zintan and people here said, 'you can't go there'. We sat with people in Yefren and discussed solutions. When we got back to Zintan, we were called traitors by the elders and military commanders. They said, 'how can you meet with the enemy and compromise our position?' Shortly after, they signed an agreement with Yefren. So, you see their true motivation? They just wanted all the credit for themselves"[73]. Another young activist from Zintan shared a similar experience. When trying to facilitate dialogue with youth in Misrata and Amazigh towns of the Western Mountain, local decision makers were not only unsupportive but also obstructionist. "I encountered a great deal of resistance… They accused me of acting irresponsibly and being a traitor, only to shake hands with their adversaries in Misrata, Zawiya and other places shortly after. They benefited from our courage but didn't give us any credit"[45].

Several stakeholders agreed that youth are essential to the resolution of conflict and should be trained and encouraged to do so. One high-ranking Libyan civil servant argued that youth are best placed to initiate reconciliation due to their presence on the frontlines. "Take two youth from each side, they meet, they agree on a ceasefire and next thing they have dinner and play football together. Meanwhile, the politicians are looking on clueless, wondering what happened". Even if these youths are accused of treason by their respective communities, this stakeholder argued that "ultimately they impose the ceasefire upon the politicians". Although elders have the experience and mediation skills required to discuss grievances and find solutions, they do not the power to influence realities on the ground[12].

Asia S., a civil society activist from Misrata, made the point that youth in her area would be open to working on peace and reconciliation, but need support to do so. During her interview she stated that: "Social initiatives [for peace and reconciliation] are all welcome and can succeed. Across our region youth are very responsive to these initiatives, we sense a real willingness to work for peace. The problem is the lack of cash…. We can support youth psychologically and morally but to get them away from the war there needs to be State support and facilities like sport clubs. We cannot promise the youth anything, we cannot give them any guarantees. Even existing sports facilities are not operating due to the lack of cash. People have very concrete needs that are not being satisfied at present"[46].

> The people's number one enemy are these scattered weapons… Armored tanks and weapon mounted-vehicles are driving through the streets of Tripoli in the hands of militias. Weapons should be controlled by the army and police only.
>
> **– Dr. A. S., Male, former Minister of Interior, Benghazi**

MECHANISMS FOR YOUTH PARTICIPATION

Most of the proposed mechanisms for increasing youth involvement received a lot of support from survey respondents. Mechanisms included disarming youth, increasing awareness and creating dialogue about the positive way youth can contribute to Libyan society.

As Figure 24 indicates, the most popular mechanism among respondents was disarmament: 91 percent of the respondents felt disarmament would be very effective for increasing youth involvement in reconciliation. The overwhelming popularity of this mechanism among respondents might help to illustrate the degree to which Libyans associate youth with violence (Figure 24).

One stakeholder working with returning combatants also stressed the importance of providing youth with psychosocial support. Asya S., the Misratan civil society activist stated: "We approach [youth] directly, in cafés, in shops, any place where youth spend time… It is important to proceed slowly… by talking with them informally. This way, we tried to convey ideas of peace to them, step by step. We also help them reintegrate into their former schools and workplaces… One has to bear in mind that the youth are paid to go to the frontline. Our role is to make them understand that this is not in their interest and that they have other opportunities"[46]. According to Asya, many of the beneficiaries of her programme had left for the front before reaching the age of 18. So, she stressed the idea of advocating for her beneficiaries to be accepted into their schools or by their former employers, in order for them to reintegrate successfully. Finding jobs for former and current combatants was also a popular measure among respondents, 74 percent of which felt the measure would help a great deal. Support for this latter measure was almost 10 percent more popular among respondents with a lower level of education than among respondents with a higher level of education (Figure 52).

"We worked on a number of conflicts, such as… the conflict between Zuwara and Rigdalin. We started by reaching out to youth in both cities, going to cafés and gauging people's opinion on the issue. We held closed and public meetings. We worked in coordination with the municipal councils of both cities, which was very helpful, but we did not engage much with the elders".

**– Civil society activist
from Rigdalin**

The second most popular mechanisms that respondents felt would be very effective at increasing youth involvement in reconciliation included increasing the visibility of youth already involved in reconciliation efforts, in a bid to provide positive role models for Libyans youth or to help repair the reputation of youth in Libyan society. Other popular mechanisms included providing conflict prevention training to youth and holding community dialogue on the role of youth in modern Libya.

Figure 24: Mechanisms for increasing youth involvement

Q30.To what extent do you think the following mechanisms would be effective for increasing youth involvement in reconciliation? (n=2,086)

Legend:
- A great deal
- Not very much
- Youth should not participate in reconciliation efforts
- No Answer/ Refuse to answer
- Somewhat
- Not at all
- Do not know

Mechanism	A great deal	Somewhat	Not at all
Disarmament	92%	3%	3%
Increasing awareness of youth active in reconciliation efforts	87%	7%	3%
Conflict prevention training for youth	86%	7%	4%
Community dialogue on the role of youth in Libyan society and future	82%	10%	4%
Appoint more youth in government position	79%	11%	5%
National Youth dialogue forums	79%	11%	5%
Finding jobs for current and former militia members (i.e. reintegration)	75%	10%	8%

Another interesting mechanism that emerged from the interviews was the idea of creating shared spaces in communities divided by conflict to increase interaction between youth from the conflicting parties. Hassan Y., a member of the Gadhadfa tribe and lecturer at Sebha university suggested providing community resources where youth from different tribes could interact with each other. He stated: "My goal is to support initiatives that bring … young people from the different tribes together in safe spaces that allow them to interact and breach the divide… We need to offer the youth leisure activities and educational opportunities that bring them together naturally. For instance, a football club at a location that different tribes can access, English lessons, IT lessons. The organizers can then use the access they have to the youth to convey positive thoughts, show the videos about reconciliation etc."[47]. However, Yusuf cautioned that in order to succeed, these initiatives require significant outreach efforts to cross tribal lines.

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[45] *Interview with Mohamed G., civil society activist, Zintan, November 2017.*

[46] *Skype interview with Asya S., Misratan civil society activist, December 2017.*

[47] *Interview with H. Y., civil society activist and IT lecturer at Sebha University, Tunis, October 2017.*

Focus box 5:
Ambassadors for peace: a youth-led conflict prevention initiative

One young civil society activist interviewed in Zintan recounted a conflict prevention initiative he had been involved in creating called the Ambassadors of Peace initiative[48]. M. G. explained: "The idea was to bring together youth from the different conflict zones... To play a role in their communities, to initiate real discussions... and to pressure decision-makers in our respective cities to engage with each other".

In order to rally support and reach out to local stakeholders, the Ambassadors organized a "peace tour" through Western Libya's mountain and coastal areas, with a large group of youth activists from 15 municipalities. The young activists would coordinate with municipalities, elders and military councils before travelling by bus to hold public events in different cities and towns[49]. M. G. recounted: "We gathered in squares calling for local youth to join and also for armed groups and local authorities to come and listen to us. We made use of religious discourse, which works well in some places. Participants included wounded ex-fighters".

Despite their efforts at coordination, the Ambassadors put themselves at risk to pursue their goal. "We went to some areas with no prior security arrangements or guarantees.... [Once], our convoy of busses was held up by locals who did not approve of our initiative and armed groups waiting for an occasion to resume the fighting"[45].

Initially, the project was successful: "[Despite] heated debates and a lot of tension, [the initiative] helped break the ice". However, the Ambassadors of Peace campaign did not succeed in spreading to the East and South, where the Ambassadors' youth network was less solid. Young activists interviewed for this study cited regional divisions as a major obstacle for youth from across the country to communicate. Some stakeholders interviewed stated that in order for them to interact with youth form other parts of the country, they had to meet in Tunisia.

One of the challenges that stumped the Ambassadors of Peace initiative was that the activists lacked a sound communications and outreach strategy. M.G. explained: "the biggest issue was with our outreach and communication strategy. It's much more complicated than people think. With different ideological currents and with conflicting parties being part of one event the question of who films, who speaks to the media, which media to speak to, etc. becomes a huge headache. Our basic rule was: no communication outside the room except what is jointly agreed to. But unfortunately, some people didn't respect this rule and disputes ensued. This drove us apart". Much like with the mechanisms cited by another activist in Sebha, issues related to coordination and communication between and among the activists caused the Ambassadors initiative to lose momentum. However, with logistical support and training, these youth initiatives can be supported.

8.2 WOMEN

In the stakeholder interviews, views on how to engage women in reconciliation differed considerably between cities and types of respondents. In Zintan, for instance, both elders and young interlocutors considered it impossible or inappropriate for women to be publicly involved in reconciliation at the local level, although some of them disapproved of the social barriers to women's engagement. Yet, Zintan elders said that they had invited competent local women to take part in meetings taking place in Tunisia. In more urban settings, CSOs provided a platform for women to engage in reconciliation. CSOs focusing on women's economic, political and social empowerment specialize in targeted public awareness campaigns for educating women on complicated issues related to national reconciliation, for example understanding the draft Constitution or raising women's awareness about their rights in case of domestic violence.

"Women also have an essential role to play in reconciliation. Women are mothers, sisters, wives and daughters. They can exert positive influence on [belligerent] youth. Sometimes young men listen to their mothers more than their fathers. Reaching out to women and gathering them is a challenge, but it is possible".

– M. G., Male, Tuareg elder, Tunis, October 2017

Generally, the degree to which women can be involved seems to depend on the degree of conservatism of the community, but also on prevailing security conditions. Nevertheless, women have taken part in mediation between tribes in Sebha – one of Libya's most dangerous cities in terms of violence and crime[50]. Tuareg elder M. G. argued that local sensitivities are not necessarily an impediment for reaching out to women: "There is no one area in Libya where women cannot gather. The mechanism is to bring the largest number of women possible to a suitable gathering place and hold open meetings. Places where women work, such as schools, hospitals, municipal buildings, can be used for this. The other mechanism to reach out to women is the media, because media reaches every household".

The stakeholder interviews suggested that women do not play an active role in their communities or in local conflict mediation. The kinds of roles interviewees felt women could play in Libyan reconciliation tended to be of a domestic nature. The survey indicated that women were nearly 10 percent less likely to consider themselves active members of the community as compared to men (Figure 18). Similarly, women were about 11 percent more likely than men to attribute their lack of community engagement to not having any opportunity to participate (Figure 19). Similarly, Figure 25 indicates that female respondents were nearly 20 percent less likely to engage in community mediation, social conflict resolution, or political activism. The only kind of activity that women were slightly more likely to engage in than men was human rights activism (Figure 54 in annex). Figure 28 suggests that rates of female participation in youth activities trail are no different than in other types of activities: female respondents were 20 percent less likely to belong to youth organizations than males.

Figure 25: Participation in local conflict mediation and political activism, by gender

Q24. Which of the following activities do you participate in?

[Community mediation]; [Political activism]

(n=735)

Figure 26: Participation in youth organizations, by region, age, gender

Q24. Which of the following activities do you participate in? (n=735)

[Youth organizations]

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
[48] *A youth-led initiative to reinvigorate reconciliation between Western Libyan cities launched in December 2016. For more details see Chapter 3.3.*

[49] *Civil society activist from Rigdalin, phone interview, December 2017.*

The lower levels of women's participation exhibited by the survey results were not matched by a high awareness of women's exclusion in reconciliation initiatives on behalf of other respondents. In fact, only 29 percent of survey respondents felt that women were excluded from reconciliation initiatives (Figure 27). Despite the lack of awareness about women's low participation in reconciliation initiatives, 63 percent of respondents felt there was a need to increase women's rights in Libya. Although gender was a strong determinant of support for women's rights, it appears that level of education was also a strong factor: individuals with no formal education were 15 percent more likely to support the idea of increasing women's rights. A factors analysis revealed that although women were more likely to be less educated, less educated men were equally likely to support increasing women's rights. Lastly, support for women varied interestingly by region, with Southern Libyans being most in support of women gaining more rights (Figure 55 in Annex). Although a clear explanation for this trend did not emerged from the survey, the greater support for increasing women's rights in the South may be related to the woman's role in Tebu and Tuareg society. According to a 2011 USIP report, the Tebu and Tuareg are matrilineal societies that include some matriarchal features, which could explain this less rigid perception of gender norms than those generally held by the Arabs[51].

Figure 27: Inclusion of women in local reconciliation initiatives, by gender and region

Q29. For the following groups, could you please tell me whether you feel they are included in reconciliation initiatives at the local level? (n= 2,086) [Women]

Fully | Somewhat | Not very much | Not at all | Do not know | No answer / Refuse to answer

Figure 28: Support for increasing rights of women, by gender

Q7. I'm going to read you a list of some things that different people find important for shaping the future of Libya. For each one, could you please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, feel neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree? (n=2,086) [Increased]

Strongly agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree
Strongly disagree | Do not know | No Answer/ Refuse to answer

MECHANISMS FOR WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION

Survey respondents demonstrated a strong support of mechanisms for increasing women's role in reconciliation. The most popular mechanisms however involved awareness raising and public education campaigns both for women and about women. Respondents felt that more light should be shed on how women are and could be actively involved in reconciliation. Similarly, respondents supported the idea of educating women on how to contribute to reconciliation in their day-to-day lives. In fact, almost 71 percent of respondents strongly agreed with raising women's awareness on reconciliation and conflict mediation practices. The survey results suggest that the public role of women in Libya remains unclear, as the average Libyan woman's role in society appear to be predominantly domestic. However, this may be a matter of changing perceptions, hence respondents' support for mechanisms focused on changing attitudes towards the woman's role in modern Libya.

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[50] *Interview with A. O., Female, academic and expert on Libyan political culture, January 2018.*

Figure 29: Mechanisms for increasing women's involvement

Q30.To what extent do you think the following mechanisms would be effective for increasing women's involvement in reconciliation?

Legend:
- A great deal
- Women should not participate in reconciliation efforts
- Somewhat
- Do not know
- Not very much
- No answer/ Refuse to answer
- Not at all

Unsurprisingly, women tended to be even more likely to feel the proposed mechanisms would increase women's participation in reconciliation initiatives. However, the data indicates that the less educated the respondent, the more likely they were to support mechanisms increasing women's participation in reconciliation. Out of the 44 respondents that had no formal education, 35 of them were women and nine of them were men. For example, respondents with no formal or primary education only were 21 percent more likely to favor increasing dialogue on the role of women than the national average. Likewise, respondents with no education were 22 percent more likely to support appointing more women in government than the average respondent.

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[51] *Taha, M. (2017). Matriarchal and Tribal Identity, Community Resilience, and Vulnerability in South Libya. United States Institute of Peace Special Report, (416), 2. Available at* www.usip.org/publications/2017/12/matriarchal-and-tribal-identity-community-resilience-and-vulnerability-south*. Accessed November 2017.*

THE ROLE OF LOCAL, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN RECONCILIATION INITIATIVES

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Respondents perceived local level actors as the most effective at conflict resolution. Elders and local notables were perceived as being the most effective and appropriate actors for conflict resolution across all ages and regions.;

- After elders and notables, youth were among the most popular local actors for resolving conflict at the local level. Forty-five percent of respondents felt that unarmed local youth would be very effective at resolving conflict in Libya;

- Respondents disapproved of third party mediation of local conflict by foreign states. However, qualitative interviews recommended that the international community continues supporting Libyan-led reconciliation efforts by providing logistical support and technical expertise;

- Respondents deemed all national-level institutions and actors as being ineffective at resolving conflict at this stage. However, stakeholders approved of the idea of setting up a national body responsible for truth-seeking and reconciliation.

The following section explores respondents' perceptions of various actors' roles in pursuing national reconciliation. The survey results indicated that respondents find local level actors to be the most effective at resolving conflict. Respondents felt that local stakeholders such as elders, notables, and even youth are best placed that municipal councils to engage in local reconciliation efforts.

By contrast, all national institutions and actors, with the exception of the LNA (which is arguably more of a local actor), were perceived as largely ineffective at resolving conflict. Rather the qualitative interviews indicated that the State's responsibilities lay more in the provision of security and the payment of reparations. With regards to actors in the international community, respondents preferred that foreign states did not act as third-parties in reconciliation initiatives, while key stakeholders felt that the international community should play only a technical advisory role to support Libyan-led efforts, rather than mediate directly.

> In my view [reconciliation] is divided into two tracks. One track pertains to the state, because reconciliation involves work at the national level - guarantees, compensations etc. – that only the state can oversee. The other track is conducted by social and political leaderships, local and international organizations, municipalities, etc. Reconciliation has political and social aspects that complete one another.
>
> **– F. A., Male, Libyan Ambassador, Misrata, December 2017**

Figure 30: Perceived effectiveness of various actors in reconciliation

Q40. How effective would you say the following actors are in resolving conflict between groups? (n=2,086)

Respondents' preference for local civil society actors (especially elders) was obvious in the survey results. Figure 30 indicates that over 60 percent of respondents felt that tribal elders would be very effective at resolving conflict. Similarly, Figure 31 also indicates that respondents preferred that tribal elders have the responsibility of resolving conflict in their local areas. This preference was stronger among respondents in the South, where tribal identity is stronger (See Figure 71, in annex). Besides being the preferred mediators, elders were also the most common actor to resolve local conflict: 68 percent of respondents reported that elders were the most likely to resolve conflict in their area (See Figure 69 in annex). Predictably, the survey found that elder-led reconciliation was more common in the South (84 percent) and the East (82 percent) as compared to the West (60 percent) (See Figure 70 in annex).

As discussed in the previous section, Libyans' respect for traditional authority and State authority are not mutually exclusive. Despite the literature's emphasis on the social and political role of the tribe throughout Libya's history, in everyday life Libyans' relationship with tribalism is less straightforward. Previous research has indicated that "despite tribal interests, as communicated by networks of notables [being] a political reality… These realities are remote for most Libyans, who possess nuanced opinions of tribalism, and if they belong to a tribe, turn to it only in extreme or unusual circumstances". A 2015 study found that when engaging in political or security issues, the "tribe" is relied upon mainly by a small elite of politicians, military leaders, and heads of families. However, the concept of the "tribe" does not loom large as an organizing principle in Libyans' minds on a day-to-day basis[52].

Figure 18 indicates that respondents were equally likely to choose tribal elders and the municipal police as having the responsibility of resolving conflict in their area. Key stakeholders interviewed argued that especially in the absence of a functioning judicial system and central government, tribal elders are better equipped at resolving local conflicts between groups than police. However, Figure 31 suggests that under normal circumstances, both elders and the police should have the main responsibility of resolving conflict.

Interestingly, Figure 30 shows local elders and unarmed youth emerging as the second most effective local actors for resolving conflict. As it is discussed in the section on the role of youth in reconciliation, the stakeholders felt that youth in Libya are perceived as unstable or inexperienced and are often marginalized in decision-making processes. Respondents' perceived effectiveness of youth at resolving conflict, however, suggests that perhaps Libyans have greater faith in youth's abilities than is generally believed.

Figure 31 indicates that respondents were unlikely to select "unarmed local youth" as having the main responsibility of resolving conflict in their area. The difference may be in the methodology of the two questions. The options to answer question 40 (Figure 30) of the survey were read out to the survey respondents, while question 39 (Figure 31) was an open-ended question. This indicates that although youth might not be leaders in resolving conflict, Libyan society at large might be amenable to youth becoming more engaged in their communities.

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[50] Interview with A. O., Female, academic and expert on Libyan political culture, January 2018.

Figure 31: Preferred actor for resolving conflict, Libya

Q39. Who do you think should have the main responsibility of resolving conflict in your area? (n=2,086)

Actor	Value
Tribes and Elders	28.9
Notables	6.9
The municipal council	7.0
The local community	4.9
Unarmed youth in the local community	1.7
The police	20.1
The military governor	1.3
LNA	7.7
Civil society actors	0.1
Brigades	0.8
Libyan third parties	0.3
GNA	4.0
HOR	0.9
GNC	0.1
Foreign states	
The UN	
No one	3.4
Other	3.8
Do not know	5.6
No answer	2.3

Besides armed groups, Libyan NGOs were the only other Libyan local actor that was not popular among survey respondents. Respondents' rejection of NGOs as viable conflict mediators may be due to the perception of civil society actors and NGOs in Libya. According to one civil society activist, Libyans began eyeing "activists" and "civil society actors" with suspicion as the country became disillusioned with the revolution. According to

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Focus box 6:
Armed groups as conflict mediators

Survey respondents did not perceive armed groups as being particularly effective actors for resolving conflict (Figure 30 and Figure 31). This negative perception of armed groups varied slightly by age and region (see Figure 67 and Figure 68 in annex). Respondents between the ages of 18 and 24 were nearly 10 percent more likely to feel that armed groups were somewhat effective at resolving conflict than the national average. By contrast, respondents in the South were nearly 10 percent more likely to feel armed groups were very ineffective. This may be due to the relatively higher incidence of conflict that the South has been experiencing compared to the West and East.

Despite the unpopularity of armed groups among survey respondents, some qualitative interviews indicated that armed groups have indeed played a key role in some of the reconciliation processes in West Libya since 2014. This includes the dialogue between Warshefana and Misrata launched in April 2015, whose outcomes included the return of Warshefana families displaced from their area in 2014. Talks were facilitated by elders from Asabaa, and included Misrata's Halbus Brigade and Jadu's Revolutionaries Brigades on one side, and Warshefana armed groups on the other[67][54].

According to a Misratan field commander who played a leading role in these talks, it was the dialogue between actors on the frontline, rather than the dialogue between tribal elders, that yielded these results. In his view, the elders were too far removed from events on the ground, and incapable of enforcing agreements by themselves. In contrast, the fighters knew who to engage with and how to ensure compliance. Yet, the Warshefana conflict, which involves several neighbouring communities and has different dimensions (regional rivalries, political allegiances, organized crime in the area), is still ongoing and Misratan forces retain a major presence in the area. The commander interviewed put part of the blame on the GNA: "Talks with Warshefana went on for over a year and we had a solid roadmap. But the GNA did not seize this opportunity. Instead, they engaged with the most rogue elements in Warshefana"[55].

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[52] *Altai Consulting and the United States Institute of Peace. Tribe, Security, Justice, and Peace: What Tribalism Means in Post-revolution Libya and its Impact on Security, Justice, and Peacemaking. December 2015.*

this interviewee, Libyans associate political and social activism with the post-revolutionary period and feel it is a foreign imposition on Libyan society. In fact, the only civil society organization that Libyans do not eye with suspicion is the World Association of Girl Guides and Boy Scouts, which was one of the only civil society organizations that was allowed to exist under the former regime[53].

9.1 THE ROLE OF THE TRIBE ≫

Tribes' traditional political role in mediation is strong in Libya. However, survey respondents' support for tribes as agents of reconciliation could also be due to the absence of viable alternatives. The literature and the interviews conducted for this study suggest that Libyans may be finding themselves in need of relying on tribal elders for mediation both for practical and social reasons.

This section will provide a brief discussion of the types of tribal actors and interventions, as well as their limitations.

TYPES OF TRIBAL ACTORS

Tribal and elder's councils exist at the local, regional, and national level. Elders engage in reconciliation as representatives of their tribe or city, or as third-party mediators in other conflicts, upon invitation. To resolve a conflict between two communities, a reconciliation committee may be set up, with elders from both sides acting as mediators. Elders may also be part of a social committee or council, which typically deals with disputes and acts of crime within the community. Individual elders may be simultaneously engaged in different roles, such as: taking part in (inner) tribal decision-making through their tribe's elders council, representing their tribe in reconciliation initiatives or regional/national level elders' councils, or mediating in a conflict that does not involve their tribe. When conducting peace talks and mediation, tribal elders frame their actions in different ways, depending on the issue at stake. Rather than representing tribal councils (local, regional or national), elders may get together as individuals, as representatives of a town or city, or as reconciliation committees set up with the approval of conflict parties to address their specific issues. Elders may also play a crucial role in initiatives that are led by other social actors, such as municipal councils or civil society groups.

One of the experienced mediators interviewed argued that engaging the right body for mediation is not always a straightforward process. For example, the mediator stated: "The Bani Walid Social Council is not the High Council of the Warfalla Tribe, although Bani Walid is the heartland of the Warfalla. This does not prevent the tribe from having councils in other cities; for instance, the Warfalla have the Social Council of Warfalla in Sebha"[37]. Not only are the leaderships of tribal authority often spread across the country despite tribes having traditional bases, but sometimes the tribal bodies also serve a purely representational role, while others gather for actual decision-making purposes. The reproduction of tribal or elder's councils might also derive from competition for influence between families within a tribe.

Furthermore, involvement of a tribe in mediation does not necessarily mean the conflict in question is tribal. For example, sometimes families might engage the tribal bodies to which they are affiliated to act on behalf of a family member. In that case the tribe is merely a network through which an issue is being addressed. Unfortunately, the system is not clearly structured, so the type of decision-making process selected depends on the nature of the problem. One stakeholder argued: "Depending on the scope of the issue, people decide at what level they will gather and discuss. If let's say Bani Walid plans to attack Misrata then they will gather at the highest tribal level but if it's about a smuggler or dealer from Bani Walid who is arrested in Misrata then only his family will mobilize through the tribal bodies they have influence in. It really depends on the issue and what is at stake".

> "Tribal elders have proven capable of mediating between warring sides in cities and towns, but what [Libya is] up against is much greater, some … issues are too sensitive [for elders to handle] such as Tawergha and Misrata, Gargour, Romi Prison [and] Bani Walid. There must be some stability and peace for anyone to be able to mediate".
>
> **– N. D., Male, Journalist from Derna, December 2017**

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[53] *Interview with N. E., Female, civil society activist from Benghazi, Tunis, October 2017.*

[54] *Collombier, V. & Khaled, A. (2017). Mapping of existing reconciliation initiatives in Libya: Lessons learned, actors, challenges, and way forward.*

[55] *Interview with a field commander in a Misratan armed group, December 2017.*

Focus box 7:
Customary forms of arbitration

The most concrete examples of non-State arbitration for dispute resolution emerged from qualitative interviews with Zintani elders. Zintan has a strong tradition of mediation that can be traced back at least to the Ottoman period. This tradition in dispute resolution is exemplified in the ammara, the precursor to the Social Committee composed of forty wise men that was used to mediate between disputing parties and oversee the implementation of agreements in the Nafusa Mountains. The Zintani elders' role as mediators of land disputes during the Gadhafi period also allowed the Zintanis to spread their influence in the region[56]. Although this section discusses forms of mediation common in Zintan, other parts of Libya may apply similar forms of arbitration.

The Zintan elders interviewed discussed tahkim 'urfi and musharatat al tahkim. These forms of arbitration can only be utilized in cases that have not already been settled by a state legislative court. The kind of arbitration utilized depends on the complexity of the dispute and the mutual preference of the parties. Tahkim 'urfi, or customary arbitration, is a form of dispute arbitration administered by a customary committee (lajna 'urfiya) that occurs entirely outside the confines of the legal state system. Generally, this form of arbitration is administered by a neutral third party which the disputing parties agree upon and whose ruling they swear to respect prior to the beginning of the process. This third party then forms a panel and reviews the claims of the two sides. In a context in which the state judicial system is virtually non-existent, this system of dispute resolution is more expedient, even though it rarely addresses the root causes of a conflict[57].

Musharatat al-tahkim is a form of arbitration that combines the state and the customary system and is administered by a special customary committee. This form of arbitration is usually preferred when there is a risk that the dispute parties might not respect the ruling of the regular customary committee of breach the agreement in the future. In this scenario, the customary committee is placed under the authority of a state court. The court then grants the committee the authority to collect evidence and pronounce a ruling within a specific time frame. After the allotted time-frame, the special customary committee's ruling is presented to the court and adjudicated.38 A tribal elder interviewed in Sebha described a similar process when asked to describe mechanisms of reconciliation: "As for mechanisms of reconciliation, there should be a just commission of inquiry that the State must approve. The committee should then submit its reports to the State"[58].

LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL FORMS OF MEDIATION

Despite their personal reservations on extra-legal or customary forms of arbitration, stakeholders felt that in the absence of a central and unified state Libyans have little choice but to rely on the intermediation of the tribes. While elders and tribal structures fulfil an important function now, the stakeholder interviews argued that traditional arbitration is not an adequate substitute for State institutions. Even the head of the High Council of Warshefana Tribes insisted that "tribes represent an antiquated form of social organization and cannot build a state".[18]

Few interviewees felt that tribal mechanisms were the key to resolving Libya's conflicts. A member of the Libyan Jurists' Organization in Misrata stated: "Generally, reconciliation agreements between tribal elders do not bring about comprehensive solutions or tackle the real issues. The elders use customary law to solve conflicts as if the latter were minor disputes… between individuals or families. The traditional approach to reconciliation is to say: the injured party makes concessions and the perpetrator acknowledges his wrongdoing and the problem is over. This may work for a minor problem but not to guide the transition from a dictatorial to a democratic regime"[23].

Better suited for small-scale conflicts

The kinds of sanctions that tribes can apply, such as compelling a member to pay compensation or by distancing themselves from one of their member, have limited impact.

"We met with the Awlad Suleiman and Gadhadfa more than seven times, and there was progress. But the process was always disrupted by people who do not want the situation to stabilize and who have hidden agendas. The elders would meet and argue and concede, and then a week later fighting would resume. In Ubari there were about 50 different [tribal] representatives from all over Libya involved in the mediation, and after a month the fighting [still] resumed".

– **A. B., Male, Member of Zintan Social Committee, Zintan, November 2017**

> *Tribal elders having lunch together and agreeing on reconciliation does not magically change people's attitudes.*
>
> **– T. G., Male, Journalist, IDP from Tripoli, Zintan, October 2017**

Stakeholders also suggested that reparations, and "blood money" in particular, cannot lead to the deeper resolution of larger conflicts since larger conflicts extend beyond the concerns of a small family or a tribal dispute. Given the complexity and breadth of more extended conflicts, there will always be a party that feels excluded by the reparations provided by a tribal reconciliation agreement.

In parts of Libya where tribal identification is more common, tribes can apply pressure by withdrawing social protection from members of the community who violate agreements or commit crimes[22]. However, as one key stakeholder noted: "All tribes have at some point declared the lifting of social protection for criminals and yet we do not see any impact"[59]. Stakeholders argued that the removal of social protection in a highly weaponized environment has little effect on offenders. During his interview, the head of the High Council of Warshefana Tribes explained: "The conflicts do not really reflect the tribes. In fact, the armed actors who are controlling the scene can be considered criminals who no longer have the support of the tribe"[18]. When those being denied the protection of the community are armed members of a militia or a gang, the loss of the tribe's approval is not a major deterrent—especially among the younger generations. A young Misratan field commander echoed this point: "the head of the Warshefana tribal council is not capable of implementing decisions across the entire Warshefana area because there are internal divisions and the elders' capacity to control youth and criminals is limited". [60]

The young man also cautioned against placing excessive importance on the role of elders in reconciliation. He argued that by engaging elders: "You are also empowering them and propping up a social structure that is not entirely positive and not applicable everywhere".[61] Rather than continuing to encourage elders to take the lead on social reconciliation, elders should be encouraged to be more inclusive in their processes.

The general trend that emerged from the key informant interviews and the survey is that Libyans recognize the expertise and tradition of tribal mediation as an institution. However, the interviews also suggest that Libyans feel tribal reconciliation has certain limits that might be addressed by greater inclusiveness.

> *"Tribes are not an appropriate prism to analyse and address the Libyan conflict. Internal divisions within tribes make their councils less representative... In the past, most Libyans didn't even know their tribal leaders".*
>
> **– Misratan field commander, December 2017**

9.2 THE ROLE OF THE STATE

> *"[The role of government should be] to apply the law, to pay compensations, to extend its authority on the ground, to act as a neutral force, to deter spoilers and defend universal rights".*
>
> **– A. L., Male, Fezzania Institute for Studies and Human Rights, Sebha, October 2017**

The roles most commonly ascribed to the government with regards to reconciliation were the provision of security, the administration of justice, and the payment and fair determination

of compensation through a clearly defined legal process. This process should be overseen by an independent national body in charge of truth-seeking and national reconciliation capable of reviewing local dispute claims in a neutral and transparent manner. Local government institutions such as municipalities should focus on providing services in their communities, as well as facilitating and supporting mediation efforts to improve service delivery in their jurisdictions.

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[56] *Wolfram, Lacher & Labnouj, Ahmed (2015). Factionalism Resurgent: The War in the Jabal Nafusa. In Cole Peter & Quinn Brian (Eds), The Libyan Revolution and its Aftermath (pp.257-284). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.*

[57] *Interview with M. A., Male, member of Zintan's Social Committee, former member of the Libyan Elders Council, Zintan, October 2017.*

[58] *Interview with H. R., Male, member of the tribal elders' Council of Sebha, Sebha, November 2017.*

THE STATE AS A CENTRAL ARBITER IN TRUTH-SEEKING AND COMPENSATION

Stakeholders emphasized the need for national government to act as a neutral arbiter in the truth-seeking and compensation processes. Some respondents called for the establishment of a ministry tasked with reconciliation-related initiatives, such as a truth-seeking commission and determining, reviewing, and approving compensation payments across the country. Some key informants also felt the UN would have a key consultative role to play in transitional justice. F. S., a Misratan jurist claimed: "I discussed … with Ghassan Salame… and insisted that there needs to be a Ministry of human rights and transitional justice in a future unified government to reopen the [justice] file and oversee this process. This ministry must collaborate with the UN and human rights organizations and have a systematic approach"[69]. Another stakeholder argued: "A national truth and reconciliation commission… would benefit Libya… If perpetrators speak publicly, recognize their wrongdoings and ask victims for forgiveness, many [legal] files could be closed… Many perpetrators would not have to face judicial prosecution[23]". A national body for truth and reconciliation would create an environment conducive to discussion of non-financial reparations as well.

Although stakeholders certainly mentioned the potential for non-financial reparations, the overall sentiment among interviewees was that payment of reparations is necessary, regardless of whether the practice feeds a cycle of corruption. When speaking about the Ubari peace agreement signed between Tebu and Tuareg delegations in Doha in November 2015, a Zintani elder said: "This is a success story. I think the reason is that Qatar pledged funds. Maybe the money didn't reach the population of Ubari, but I believe it reached the decision-makers, who were able to make peace. This is not a positive thing obviously. But ultimately, if the outcome is positive… Then the Qatari intervention served its purpose. Here, the end justifies the means"[38]. A Tebu interviewee from Sebha involved in the Ubari process also confirmed that the Qataris had acceded to paying reparations in the case of the Tebu-Tuareg conflict. He stated that the Qataris had "agreed to send financial aid through the Red Crescent because they could not do this [pay reparations] as a foreign state"[62]. Whether or not the Qataris have followed through with the payment of reparations has not been confirmed.

The most obvious risk associated with the payment of financial reparations is that the fighting continues despite payment. A third party paying reparations or paying local actors not to engage in illicit behaviour sets a negative precedent that could risk becoming a prerequisite for third-party brokered deals to hold. In the words of one of the Zintani elders: "Paying compensations is no guarantee. The only guarantee is a stable security environment, a unified army. Paying compensations can also lead to competition between groups and people, and it can be exploited, further eroding trust"[38]. Furthermore, determining the amount of reparations an individual or community is entitled to is a potentially destabilizing process. Underestimating the reparations may lead to additional violence, as those who have experienced the losses may not feel vindicated. Likewise, perceived illegitimacy of the agreement determining reparations might lead to the agreement and reparations being subsequently called into question, as is expressed by the young Zintani journalist quoted below.

Determination of the quantity to be paid in reparations, however, was portrayed as highly problematic and destabilizing for the country and thus best handled and regulated centrally by the State. A mediation

"Libyans have begun associating reconciliation with compensation payments… This is not logical. You cannot expect a conflict party to be impartial and realistic when it comes to determining their own compensation claims. This needs to be done by experts who are neutral in the conflict. Agreements that include such compensation deals do not put an end to conflict, they generate conflict. There will always be a party left that considers it was not included and takes up weapons to obtain what it perceives as it's just share… I'm not saying compensation payments should not be part of reconciliation at all, but there must be a methodological and legal framework. There are a lot of details to address: who qualifies for compensation, from when do we start counting, etc. Afterwards, the Libyan state can set up a fund to which foreign governments or organizations may contribute."

- M. J., Male, mediation advisor for Libya with the Humanitarian Dialogue Centre, October 2017

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[59] *Interview with a field commander in a Misratan armed group, December 2017.*

[60] *Interview with a field commander in a Misratan armed group, December 2017.*

[61] *Interview with a field commander in a Misratan armed group, December 2017.*

expert with the Humanitarian Dialogue Centre explained that establishing a clear, standardized process by which compensation can be determined would be a first step in containing the destabilizing potential of discussing compensation at the local level.

Overall, stakeholders portrayed reparations as purely financial and as essential to the successful implementation of an agreement. In the words of a Tripolitan activist, the focus should be on "compensation and not on reconciliation. [Reconciliation is] a result, not a goal. When you are compensated it will be possible to reach a reconciliation"[63]. One of the tribal elders from Zintan did concede that alternatives may exist to the payment of reparations, stating that: "There are alternatives to compensation payments that may be less risky and more sustainable. By improving services to the community and building facilities that benefit the community, people can be appeased to some extent". As is discussed below, centering local peacebuilding efforts on service-delivery rather than reconciliation may help offset the attractiveness of using financial compensation as a reason to derail mediation efforts.

SEQUENCING OF PRIORITIES IN LOCAL LEVEL DISPUTE RESOLUTION

During the qualitative interviews, stakeholders indicated that in their experience the State's role in reconciliation at the local level should center on the delivery of administrative and social services prior to tackling issues relating to justice and compensation. A services-centered approach to peacebuilding, reminiscent of the "peace

Focus box 8:
The role of municipalities in conflict resolution

As is indicated in Figure 30 and Figure 31, respondents did not tend to cite municipalities as being key actors in the resolution of conflict at the local level. They were deemed less effective than elders, notables, and unarmed youth. Furthermore, when asked who the responsibility of should have resolving conflict at the local level, very few respondents named the municipalities.

The qualitative interviews suggested that this lack of support for municipality involvement in direct conflict resolution is due to the fact that it is not a role typically attributed to municipalities in Libya. When asked what role municipalities and the government should play in reconciliation, most stakeholders stated that municipalities should not become involved directly in mediation but should rather concern themselves with providing services to their communities in an unbiased manner. However, as mentioned above, placing service provision at the heart of local conflict resolution necessarily involves the participation of municipalities.

Examples of the way municipalities become involved in reconciliation efforts are mentioned in a recent report commissioned by the EU Delegation to Libya on local governance. The report touches upon the different dispute resolution mechanisms used in the municipalities of Zuwara, Souq Al-Juma'a, Zliten, Misrata, Benghazi, and al-Bayda. The report indicates that in a bid to enhance service delivery municipalities help set up dispute resolution mechanisms by coordinating communication between (and providing logistical support to) social actors involved in reconciliation initiatives. The dispute-settlement mechanisms vary based on the social make-up of the community and generally involved a combination of Tribal Councils, Councils of Wise Men, local notables, civil society activists and religious leaders. These committees collaborate with the municipal council to provide arbitration and to draft charters and agreements based on a blend customary and civil law. The study found that these municipality level initiatives both dealt with inter and intra-communal conflict[40].

Municipal councils typically operate in collaboration with technical advisory bodies resource persons, which typically include the Shura Council, the neighbourhood coordinator and the Council of Wise Men. As per Art. 28 of Law 59 of 2012, the Shura Council, composed of experts and scientists, advises the Municipal Council on technical decisions. The Neighbourhood Coordinator or Neighbourhood Council, on the other hand, is specialized in civil dispute settlement and reconciliation. The Council of Wise Men is another conflict resolution organization tasked with carrying out mediation and conflict resolution based on tribal or religious traditions[40]. However, the limitations of Law 59 with regards to revenue and budget present a serious challenge to the effectiveness of service delivery and mediation that can be offered at the municipality level.

> "As for municipalities, I would prefer that they do not participate directly in reconciliation because their role is service-oriented. [However], they can participate [in reconciliation] by supporting the Wise men and Shura Councils in the municipalities."
>
> – **S. D., Male, Head of the Southern Network for Reconciliation and National Accord, Sebha, October 2017**

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[63] *Altai Interview with A. S., Male, activist with the Libyan Association for Justice and Development, Tripoli, November 2017.*

[62] *Libya and its Impact on Security, Justice, and Peacemaking. December 2015.*

dividends" approach, was described by stakeholders as effective for addressing grievances that can trigger conflict while offering a means to the state to rebuild its image and legitimacy[64]. By removing the uncertainty surrounding the process of providing services at the heart of many local disputes, taking a "peace dividends approach" can lead spoilers lose ground on which to base their obstructionism.

The stakeholders interviewed that tended to praise a service delivery-focused approach to mediation had extensive conflict mediation experience in the South of Libya, where unequal access to services and employment has been a key cause of conflict. One of the major conflict zones in the South, Ubari, is also the site of several Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) projects, of which the interviewed stakeholders spoke highly. Some of these projects have included the construction of a prefabricated school, the rehabilitation of the town's general hospital, as well as the construction of a women's center and the delivery of two ambulances.[65] One of the interviewed experts stated: "[The international community should] regain the trust of Libyans by dealing with the right stakeholders and partners in Libya. UNDP is doing a great job because they are focusing on the services sector and they are building the trust of the community... We can trust them... and we can support their work[66]".

The sequencing of priorities in a peace negotiation varies from case to case. Although in some cases prioritizing service delivery leads to two parties finding common ground on which to collaborate, in some cases this strategy is less effective. For example, in the case of the Misrata-Tawergha dispute, service delivery was not an issue over which Misratans and Tawerghans could find common ground. As one civil society activist and political commentator from Misrata stated following the failed return of the Tawergha in February 2018: "The government must start by providing concrete assistance to both aggrieved communities: reconstruction, compensations... In this way, spoilers no longer have any excuse to object to the peace agreement and the return of displaced families"[67]. Although negotiations surrounding this conflict are still evolving, the issues at the heart of certain Misratans' rejection of the June 2017 peace deal included lack of compensation, the unknown fate of f missing persons, as well as the lack of accountability. The most recent Misrata-Tawergha "Charter" signed on 4 June 2018 is rooted in the two sides' shared interest in locating missing persons and mass graves, in stopping the negative media campaigns, and on not offering protection to extremist elements within their ranks[68]. However, it was also highly criticized by the Tawergha community as imposing unbalanced conditions upon their return and placing the city in a de facto state of dependency towards Misrata.

NATIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS

Stakeholders interviewed made a distinction between social and political reconciliation, implying that the conflict occurring at the national level was divorced from the conflicts occurring at the local level. According to these interviewees, social reconciliation was most commonly couched as involving Libya's social and civil actors at the local level. Political reconciliation, however, was portrayed as being an entirely separate process, which occurs between politicians and is far removed from Libyans' day-to-day lives.

One young civil society activist in Tripoli stated: "Social reconciliation is almost always solved easily... because it does not involve personal gains. Tribal reconciliation is a concession, but political reconciliation is about gains... That means that in political reconciliation the question is: 'how much I will get?' while in social reconciliation the question is: 'how much will I compromise to communicate with you?'"[63] Another stakeholder stated: "The sad reality is that while back in 2011 we needed

> " In my view [reconciliation] is divided into two tracks. One track pertains to the state, because reconciliation involves work at the national level - guarantees, compensations etc. – that only the state can oversee. The other track is conducted by social and political leaderships, local and international organizations, municipalities etc. Reconciliation has political and social aspects that complete one another. "
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> **–F. A., Male, Libyan Ambassador, Former Interior Minister, Misrata, December 2017**

[63] Altai Interview with A. S., Male, activist with the Libyan Association for Justice and Development, Tripoli, November 2017.

[64] McCandless Erin, "Peace Dividends and Beyond: Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding," United National Peacebuilding Support Office: New York, NY, 2012.

[65] Libya Stabilization Facility aids Kilka and Obari schools (2017). Libya Herald, 20 December. Accessed on 5 June 2018 from www.libyaherald.com/2017/12/20/libya-stabilisation-facility-asids-kilka-and-obari-schools/.

[66] Referring to UNDP's implementation of the SFL.

[67] Altai interview with O. G., Male, via skype, CSO activist and current affairs commentator, Misrata, November 2017.

[68] Sami Zaptia (2018). Misrata and Tawergha sign peace deal paving way for return. Libya Herald, 4 June. Accessed on 5 June 2018 from www.libyaherald.com/2018/06/04/misrata-and-tawergha-sign-peace-deal-paving-way-for-return/.

[69] Skype interview with F. S., Male, Misratan lawyer and human rights activist, December 2017.

"Social reconciliation involves social conflicts that occur internally— armed disputes and violations within tribes such as murders. [On the other hand] political conflict [centres on who] controls the reins of power, whether in the legislative or the executive branches."

– O. F., Male, The Libyan Organization for Justice and Equality, CSO activist Tripoli

national reconciliation for the Libyan people we have now reached a stage where we first need reconciliation between the political factions that are discussing our future! Here is the real tragedy. We cannot expect from them to oversee a real transitional justice process [while they are] scrambling for power"[69].

Respondents' and stakeholders' perceptions of Libyan national level political and bodies were generally negative. In particular, political actors involved in the Skhirat agreement and the UN's political dialogue were portrayed by stakeholders as using national reconciliation as a bargaining chip to promote their own relevance and interests in the future Libya. Interviewees often portrayed politicians as actors keeping Libya's security hostage to their political squabbling.

Mention of politicians and national level actors received a negative reaction from the individuals interviewed, even if the interviewees had been involved in politics themselves. Politicians and national-level political actors generally were perceived as self-interested and their actions were cited as a driver of conflict in several key interviews. Figure 30 indicates that stakeholders' disenchantment with political elites was shared by survey respondents. The survey revealed that Libyans feel few political figures play a positive role in the crisis (Figure32).

Figure 32: Perceptions of political actors

Q44. I'm going to read you a list of popular figures in our country. For each one, could you please tell me whether you think that they play a positive, neutral or negative role in resolving Libya's political and security crisis? (n=2,086)

Figure	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Do not know
Zahra Langi	28%	6%	3%	60%
Saif Islam Gaddafi	36%	17%	31%	11%
Khalifa Haftar	37%	15%	36%	9%
Basheer Saleh	37%	11%	6%	42%
Nahid Maetig	38%	7%	3%	48%
Ali al-Gatrani	40%	11%	14%	31%
Aref al-Nayed	40%	9%	5%	42%
Mohammad Sawan	50%	8%	3%	35%
Aguila Saleh	51%	16%	16%	13%
Mahmoud Jibril	52%	17%	15%	12%
Faiez al-Sarraj	53%	19%	15%	10%
Abdullah al-Thinni	54%	17%	12%	14%
Ahmed Maetig	55%	14%	8%	19%
Khalifa al-Ghweil	55%	12%	6%	23%
Basit Igtet	58%	10%	7%	21%
Abdel Rahman Shalgam.	60%	15%	10%	12%
Al-Sadek al-Kabir	60%	12%	8%	16%
Abderrahman Swehli.	62%	11%	6%	17%
Ali Zeidan	66%	12%	6%	13%
Al-Sadiq al-Ghariani	71%	9%	7%	10%

Legend: ■ Negative ■ Neutral ■ Positive ■ Do not know ■ No answer

> "Politicians are the ones fueling conflict and obstructing reconciliation efforts. Politicians have exploited reconciliation for their narrow interests without pursuing this goal. They have used reconciliation as political tactics. With all due respect, all those who have been talking about reconciliation these past years were not being sincere".
>
> **– F. A., Male, Libyan ambassador, November 2017**

The chart above indicates that the figures that the largest number of respondents felt played a positive role were also the most divisive: Khalifa Haftar and Seif al Islam Gadhafi. Support for these two figures varied by region. Gadhafi's son was most popular in the South (47.3 percent "positive") and least popular in the East (27.9 percent "positive") (see Figure 74 in annex). Khalifa Haftar also split the Libyan public opinion in a similarly predictable way. Sixty-three percent of Easterners felt he plays a positive role, while 47.8 percent of Westerners felt he plays a negative role. Southern respondents' views on Haftar, however, were more split. While 32.1 percent of respondents felt he plays a positive role, 34.8 percent felt that he does not (see Figure 75 in Annex). Respondents were less divided on Fayez al Serraj. At least 50 percent of Libyans felt he has a negative impact, even in the West, and Eastern Libyans were the most likely to feel he plays a negative role (58.1 percent) (see Figure 76 in annex).

9.3 THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Survey respondents tended to be suspicious of foreign involvement in conflict resolution. Foreign meddling emerged as a major cause of the Libyan conflict in respondents' eyes (Figure 1), and respondents did not cite international organizations or foreign states as having a main role in resolving conflict in Libya (Figure 30). Similarly, Figure 23 indicates that providing technical and logistical support to Libyan dialogue parties on the ground was 55 percent more popular of a conflict mediation strategy than foreign third-party mediation among survey respondents.

Key stakeholders interviewed held a more nuanced view of how the international community could support Libyan reconciliation, but the takeaways from the interviews were in some ways contradictory. All stakeholders recognized that the UN had a role to play in resolving the Libyan conflict, while others welcomed the idea with less enthusiasm. In their interviews, stakeholders tended to paint the international community with a broad brush, directing their criticism towards the UN and individual States in equal measure. However, stakeholders that had been involved in UN or international NGO-funded capacity building activities spoke highly of the experience and called for more support of the sort. Some stakeholders also envisioned a role for the international community to support disarmament, but the majority was weary of foreign intervention, especially of a "boots on the ground" option.

> "The international community and international organizations must play a role in spreading awareness and a message of peace... to help build bridges and trust between Libyans. Libya is a country in crisis, so we rely on the UN, we don't have other options".
>
> **– M. D., Male, Member of Zintan Crisis Committee, Zintan, November 2017**

The kind of foreign involvement that stakeholders were less enthusiastic about was political. Stakeholders were disenchanted with the political dialogue, but at the same time seemed to advocate that the UN put diplomatic pressure on member states to remain in line with the UN agenda, a statement which appeared contradictory. What did emerge clearly from the stakeholder interviews was that international actors should maintain a unified but neutral approach to Libya and should support local reconciliation efforts by providing capacity building, logistical and financial support to local Libyan CSOs, NGOs and municipalities to spread awareness about conflict prevention, mediation, and resolution. The kind of foreign involvement that was not welcome was direct third-party mediation of local reconciliation processes by foreign states specifically.

UNITY AND NEUTRALITY OF AGENDAS

The interviewees suggested that the international community should strive to form a united front in their approach to Libya to play a neutral role. Stakeholders felt that the UN should lead the way in this regard, aiming to contain the individual agendas of foreign states. When asked about the UN's role in Libya, one young civil society activist from Benghazi stated that: "If the UN is determined to end the conflict in Libya it should bring the international and regional actors together and find a middle ground... Since local actors cannot... come to an agreement, the international community must develop a roadmap to stop weapons flow and put certain politicians on a travel ban"[70]. Similarly, Abdallah N., a political figure in Zintan stated: "I am not pleading for foreign intervention in the literal sense of the word. I am not calling for troops on the ground, but for more active engagement and pressure on neighboring countries and regional powers"[71].

> "Yes, the international community plays a major role, because it hasn't united its approach on Libya. Britain, America, France have their points of view. Qatar, Turkey, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt all have different views on Libya. So, the Libyan situation cannot be decided unless the West agrees on how to face it".
>
> **– A. S., Male, civil society activist, Tripoli, November 2017**

Another common criticism that emerged from the interviews regarded the international community's biased relationship with the East and West. One Misratan interviewee stated: "The international community's approach to the Libyan crisis has not been... coherent... For instance, what message does it send when the international community gives legitimacy to the HoR and its Interim Government [back in 2014] while keeping the Central Bank of Libya under Sadiq al Kabir in the GNC-controlled Tripoli? They gave legitimacy to one side and money to the other side under the pretext that national institutions must be in the capital"[12]. One journalist from Derna accused the international community of being partial in its condemnation of war crimes: "Focusing on one person such as Mahmud al Warfalli and accusing him of war crimes and murder without acknowledging the crimes in the West or elsewhere in Libya is a prejudice", he stated[72].

Part of the discontent expressed by stakeholders may be driven by an unclear understanding of the UN's capacity to influence the behavior of member states interfering in Libya. A Zintani elder and mediator, M. A., called upon the UN to be clear about its capacity in this regard. During his interview he stated: "So what can international experts offer? This is my question to the UN. Do you have the capacity, for example, to exert pressure on conflict parties to implement peace agreements? For instance, in the case of the Mashashia, can the UN exert pressure on the Libyan government for the latter in turn to exert pressure on the conflict parties?"[57] It seems some of the dissatisfaction among stakeholders was dictated by an unclear understanding of the UN's ability to enforce policy and apply pressure.

> "While reconciliation is, in principle, a Libyan internal matter, we cannot exclude the foreign factor. Foreign states are involved in the conflict. There are Libyans displaced in Egypt and Tunisia. For it to succeed, the reconciliation process must be supported from abroad".
>
> **–M. H., Male, politician, Misrata, November 2017**

The stakeholder interviews also revealed that Libyans suspect the international community is not doing enough to protect Libyan civilians or to address the issue of disarmament. One stakeholder stated: "Where is NATO now? How are they protecting civilians now? Why didn't the international community do more to defuse the conflict earlier on? They should have had a better disarmament program, with all their experts on transition... One of the main obstacles to reconciliation is the spread of weapons. Weapons must be collected... and I'm convinced that the UN is capable of enforcing this". Abdallah N. from Zintan echoed this sentiment during his interview: "The international community must strictly enforce the weapons embargo and exert pressure on Qatar, the UAE, Egypt and others to stop funneling weapons into Libya and funding Libyan factions...The UN is mocking us when they pretend they can't stop the weapons flow. There have been incidents of intercepted weapons deliveries that were let through... In Bosnia after the war they destroyed all the weapons, throwing them straight into the dump".

A TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ADVISORY ROLE

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[70] *Interview with A. T., Male, youth, civil society activist, Benghazi, November 2017.*

[71] *Interview with A. N., Male, Populist political party leader, Zintan, October 2017.*

Stakeholders praised the training and know-how provided by the international community, especially with regards to capacity building, but tended to frown upon any other kind of involvement. Stakeholders argued that while the international community had a lot to teach Libyans in terms of technical conflict resolution, Libyans would be the best placed to apply these tools. One of the Zintani elders praised the training he had received on conflict resolution: "We [the elders] have a good basis, which we can build upon by using the advice and experience of international experts. Despite our achievements, we know that we lack knowledge of the theoretic aspects of our work. We took part in a course on peacemaking and for the first time we learned about the difference between dialogue, reconciliation, debate, advocacy, etc.". However, he continued: "Our role is to select the right tools to bring the parties closer. Foreigners wouldn't know this, maybe in their own countries but not here"[57]. Similarly, a young reporter and Zintani IDP from Tripoli stated: "As a journalist and as a person, I benefited immensely from the trainings offered by Deutsche Welle Academy... They transmitted to us not only writing skills but also taught us about the principles of ethics in journalism. Hate speech is a huge problem in Libya; the media and we journalists lack professionalism and often media coverage exacerbates conflicts"[73].

"[The role of the international community in reconciliation] will be positive when the Libyans agree that its assistance [should be] only logistical. When [the international community] sets conditions for reconciliation, its participation is negative... just like what happened in Skhirat when laws and names were imposed on the Libyans".

– H. R., Male, member of the tribal elders' Council of Sebha, Sebha, November 2017

As explained by one of the Libyan mediation experts with PCi, the international community can support Libyans in solving their own problems. The international community can empower elders, municipalities, youth, minorities, women etc. to perform their own conflict and relations mapping or to establish their priorities for a roadmap. The mediation expert from the Humanitarian Dialogue Centre (HD) went on to explain: "You have to guide them through the tools... for them to come to their own conclusions about the conflict... that way you create trust, you spark the will from their side to fix the conflict"[34]. The mediation advisor also emphasized that since foreign involvement raises suspicion, capacity-building might be better accepted than stepping in as a third-party. To this end, the stakeholder explained, "working with tribal elders and notables gave [HD] an entry into Libyan society and legitimacy. You need to justify why you as foreign NGO get involved in Libyan conflicts as mediator. Our approach was to help them from a technical standpoint and provide them with a framework while respecting their experience and approach. It was more capacity building than actual mediation"[37].

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[72] *Interview with N. D., Male, Journalist, Derna, December 2017.*

[73] *Interview with T. G., Male, Reporter for 218 TV Channel and Zintani IDP from Tripoli, Zintan, October 2017.*

10
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

On 17 December 2017 Ghassan Salame stated that: "Libyans say that they are tired of moving from one transition to another. They aspire for an effective State… They hope for a political solution, for reconciliation and for harmony "[74]. This study's findings support the idea that Libyans are most concerned with security and the return of predictable governance from a central State. The study revealed that in the absence of a central authority with the monopoly on the use of force, lasting local level stability will be difficult to achieve, enforce, or maintain.

Although the conflict is occurring on two separate planes (a national-level political conflict and local-level conflicts characterized by a competition over resources and institutions as well as deep-rooted grievances), the competition over resources were the most common causes respondents felt played a large role both at the national and the local level. Although survey respondents considered that the political conflict and the local conflict had the same main causes, qualitative interviews revealed that the political impasse between national actors is driving conflict at the local level. Indeed, the survey indicated that respondents trust local level actors such as tribes, elders, local notables and youth more than national level actors to resolve conflict in Libya.

When self-reporting specific conflicts experienced in first person, survey respondents tended to portray the conflicts as being: between tribes; between militias; involving Islamic extremists; or between/involving cities. Although only 792 respondents were willing or able to self-report the specific conflict they experienced, these conflicts followed a predictable pattern. Easterners were most likely to have experienced a conflict involving Islamic extremism, and many of these conflicts were reported by respondents as "conflicts between ISIS and the Army (LNA)". Westerners were equally likely to report having experienced conflicts between militias or between tribes, whereas Southerners were most likely to report having experienced conflicts between tribes.

The survey reveals that presently, tribes and elders are not only the most likely actors to involve themselves in reconciliation at the local level but are also often the most trusted by Libyans. In the years following the revolution, the NTC and GNC made some attempts at launching transitional justice and national reconciliation initiatives. However, the escalating national-level conflict in 2014 and the slow progress of these State-led attempts accelerated the multiplication of national and regional-level tribal councils - a process which had been going on since 2011. Traditional conflict resolution and mediation have led to numerous ceasefire agreements and the stabilization of some areas, such as the Western Mountain. Yet, agreements are often short-lived and underlying tensions persist in seemingly stabilized areas. Indeed, without a central authority or security force capable of building transitional justice institutions and implementing reconciliation agreements on the ground, these processes, regardless of their legitimacy, are unlikely to last.

Other local-level actors including municipal councils, civil society organizations and youth are involved in reconciliation, but often resort to relying on tribes and elders, either out of preference or out of necessity. Not surprisingly, tribal actors' preference for traditional methods of conflict resolution can make inclusive collaboration with other CSOs and youth difficult. Despite occasional youth-led initiatives and collaborative processes, youth tend to be sidelined in local reconciliation. Similarly, due to social norms and security concerns, women rarely play a visible role in local reconciliation, but do take part in certain civil society initiatives and in

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[74] *United National Mission in Libya. (17 December 2017). Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya Ghassan Salame [Press release]. Available at* https://unsmil.unmissions.org/statement-special-representative-secretary-general-and-head-un-support-mission-libya-ghassan-salame.

national-level dialogue. Many of the CSOs that emerged post-2011 have been involved in promoting peace and reconciliation, usually in a limited form through debate forums, awareness or information campaigns, charity for vulnerable groups, or social events. Only a few CSOs have held the same level of weight as traditional peacemakers and mediators, and usually in cooperation with elders and municipal councils. In a few cases, civil society initiatives succeeded in unblocking dialogue stalemates or opening-up new channels of communication.

Key stakeholders indicated that high profile reconciliation initiatives involving foreign third-party actors, such as the Italian-brokered deal between the Awlad Suleiman and the Tebu in Sebha, tend not to result in tenable peace agreements either. Generally, foreign-led brokering raises Libyans' suspicions and often fails to engage representative and influential interlocutors. The high-profile nature of reconciliation initiatives led by foreign states also threatens the credibility of the deal. In general, when supporting reconciliation in Libya, foreign actors (whether State representatives or international organizations) should accept to render their support to the process invisible.

Areas of opportunity exist, however, to increase the effectiveness and resilience of reconciliation at the local level. Given the long time that political conflicts generally take to be resolved, the international community should continue to invest in building the capacities and abilities of local actors already involved in resolving conflict in and between communities. While pushing the political track forward, the UN should continue to focus on preparing the ground for reconciliation through bottom-up capacity building and top-down education campaigns. The following section outlines some key findings and recommendations for the various components of the "Towards National Reconciliation Project in Libya". The recommendations pertain to the national reconciliation strategy in general, to the national awareness media campaign, and to the UN's efforts to support local level reconciliation efforts more generally.

Key findings for the national reconciliation strategy

In a ranking of priorities, survey respondents were most likely to select security (37 percent) and national reconciliation (27 percent) as first and second most important factors influencing national stability. The study indicated that Libyans prize reconciliation almost as highly as security and find the two concepts to be related: without security imposed by a central State there can be no reconciliation.

Respondents overwhelmingly felt that national elections in the next 12 months would be an essential step in constructing the future State: 70 percent of them strongly agreed with this notion. However, Libyans did not select the elections as first or even second priority for national stability. National elections only featured as first priority 4.7 percent of the time and as second priority 7.4 percent of the time. In contrast, Libyans were more likely to prioritize voting on the draft Constitution than on holding elections: eight percent of respondents selected voting on the draft Constitution as a first priority as compared to 4.7 percent who prioritized elections.

Forgiveness and justice appear to be of equal importance to Libyans within the context of national reconciliation. Justice and forgiveness were cited with equal frequency as a first priority for national reconciliation: respondents cited both justice and forgiveness 25 percent of the time as being a first priority for national reconciliation. The study revealed some encouraging trends regarding their willingness to forgive: a large majority (88 percent) of respondents recognized that forgiveness is necessary for a common future and a smaller majority (64 percent) of respondents felt strongly that sustainable peace is more important than attaining justice for victims.

However, Libyans are highly concerned with impunity. "It is normal that there are people… who are against reconciliation… because they suffered and cannot yet forgive", cautioned the Mayor of Zintan. Like other key stakeholders, he emphasized that Libyans would remain hostile to the idea of allowing injustice to go unpunished. Qualitative interviews also revealed that a major obstacle to national reconciliation would be the idea of a general amnesty for criminals and spoilers.

Although the fate of former regime members remains a divisive topic in Libya, survey respondents appeared more concerned with punishing war criminals and spoilers active in the aftermath of the revolution than with punishing loyalty to the former regime. Although 60 percent of respondents felt that tensions between supporters and opponents of Gadhafi play a large role in the conflict, only 27 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the notion of banning members of the former regime from participating in government, while 37 percent of respondents strongly disagreed. Similarly, 56 percent of respondents strongly agreed that former regime figures should be included in the state building process of the new Libya, while only 11 percent of respondents strongly disagreed. The stakeholder interviews revealed that Libyans may feel more inclined towards granting general amnesty to ordinary people that sided with the former regime and regular combatants that opposed the

revolution under Gadhafi's orders. However, as expressed by a tribal elder in Zintan, "those who killed outside the battlefield, who gave orders to kill, tortured and executed prisoners of war, cannot fall under an amnesty law."

As a result, the study revealed that Libyans are more concerned with excluding spoilers, war criminals and human rights violators than punishing loyalty to the former regime or support for the revolution. Their relationship with the former regime appears of secondary importance to Libyans seeking punishment of criminals and human rights abusers. In fact, around 75 percent of respondents felt that:

» **Figures who committed war crimes after the revolution should be excluded from the state-building process;**

» **Former regime figures that have not committed crimes or violated human rights should be included in the state-building process;**

» **Figures that have been spoilers and caused instability following the revolution should be excluded from the state-building process**

Respondent's level of concern for justice and impunity also applied to truth-seeking. Interest in establishing the truth about past crimes appeared relatively high irrespective of the period in which the crimes were committed. Libyans appeared slightly more concerned with establishing the truth about crimes committed after the revolution (63 percent strongly agreed) than establishing the truth about crimes before the revolution (76 percent strongly agreed). However, establishing the truth about the past was the least likely factor to emerge as a first or second priority for national reconciliation; in fact, Libyans listed truth seeking as a top priority for national reconciliation much less frequently (only 10 percent of the time) than forgiveness or justice. The stakeholder interviews revealed that this relative lack of concern could stem from a fear that uncovering the truth about a painful past may only lead to greater animosity and instability. Finally, the issue of reparations and the plight of the internally displaced persons also emerged as an issue of importance to Libyan respondents.

The qualitative interviews also revealed that reparations were extremely important and were often perceived as financial. Although some stakeholders recognized that reparations did not necessarily need to be financial, informants making this distinction were few and far between. The survey indicates that 64 percent of Libyans strongly agree that reconciliation between groups occurs when payment of reparations is made. Libyans also felt strongly about compensating internally displaced persons for the loss of their homes; 92 percent of respondents strongly agreed that IDPs should be allowed to return to their homes and 86 percent of respondents strongly agreed that people who lost their properties after 2011 should have their property rights restored. As one Zintani elder explained, in Libya "the house is considered sacred" and the idea of entire communities being uprooted indefinitely is a polarizing and unsettling concept.

The international community's greatest challenge in providing support to Libyan reconciliation, however, is most likely the lack of trust with which Libyans perceive international actors and national political elites. Various portions of the survey indicated that Libyans have little confidence in the ability of international actors and national institutions such as the GNA and HoR to resolve conflict in Libya. The survey results were clear in this respect: 90 percent of Libyans felt that for a peace deal to be sustainable and effective it would have to result from a Libyan-led reconciliation process, and 73 percent of Libyans felt that a foreign-third party-led reconciliation initiative would not be very effective at all.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for a nation-wide outreach and awareness raising campaign for reconciliation:

Respondents felt that public awareness and education campaigns would be very effective tools for resolving conflict in Libya. Eighty-two percent of respondents strongly agreed that education of the Libyan public on conflict resolution skills was necessary to resolve conflict. Likewise, 86 percent of respondents felt that the conflict prevention training for youth would be a very effective mechanism for increasing youth's involvement in reconciliation. Likewise, 70 percent of respondents felt that conflict resolution training would increase women's inclusion.

A national awareness campaign on reconciliation should be accompanied by public education campaigns on conflict prevention through the development of educational media involving short documentaries, training materials and other resources for conflict prevention training. International donors could support Libyan efforts to develop and disseminate educational materials or carry out awareness campaigns through local television stations, local civil society organizations or local universities and schools. International charity organizations specialized in media could collaborate with Libyan media and PR companies to develop conflict-sensitive and targeted media segments, documentaries, short movies, or children's educational programming.

To develop educational programming and training materials on conflict resolution and prevention. Training materials for physical distribution to universities and local civil society organizations specialized in community outreach. At the local level these materials could be used to design basic conflict prevention and mediation skills for distribution in schools, or local recreation centers through municipalities, civil society organizations, universities, youth networks such as the Scouts or Y-Peer Libya[75].

To elevate the stories of Libya's everyday "unsung heroes", to promote participation and ownership of national reconciliation at the local level. Creating news segments or documentaries on how everyday Libyans are mobilizing to provide support to their communities could help reinforce the notion that people across Libya are already taking initiatives to solve their own problems. This could help create support for national reconciliation by highlighting the fact that reconciliation is already occurring, and that Libyans are already leading the process. The sense of ownership that may come with an awareness of reconciliation initiatives occurring across the country could help encourage active participation, counter the sense of hopelessness and encourage Libyan buy-in for reconciliation. These stories could focus not only on reconciliation efforts, but also tell about Libyans engaging in their communities more generally. Highlighting stories about how Libyans across the country cope despite the conflict could help create a sense of unity in the shared experience of the conflict, while also raising awareness about the plight of youth, women, and marginalized groups. Given the deep politicization of traditional media in Libya, disseminating this kind of information through national television channels might be difficult, but not impossible.

To raise awareness of women and youth's role in reconciliation in Libya: 82 percent of respondents felt that holding dialogues on the role of youth in Libyan society would be an effective mechanism at increasing youth inclusion in reconciliation. Similarly, 63 percent of respondents felt that encouraging discussion of women's role in Libyan society would have a positive impact on women's inclusion in reconciliation. In Libyan society, youth are often associated with violence, as young men are the most likely to engage in armed conflict. As mentioned above, sensitization and media campaigns should focus on dispelling the notion that youth are violent by highlighting the role of youth in creating peace and in facilitating dialogue in their communities. These stories should not shed light on ongoing sensitive negotiations, but rather on small or individual forms of peacemaking, to not endanger ongoing negotiations. Furthermore, sensitization campaigns should be designed to counter the idea that youth who initiate reconciliation are betraying their communities. At the national level, dispelling these two myths could prove an effective method for opening other generations' minds to the idea of youth taking initiative to solve their communities' problems.

Much like with youth, discussion of the woman's role in reconciliation initiatives should be encouraged. Highlighting stories of women engaged in reconciliation should be a key focus of an effort to highlight the role of women in their communities. Women's involvement in charitable work with IDPs, children, and youth should be emphasized. The survey suggests that Libyans agree with the idea of granting women greater rights, so there is fertile ground for this message.

Recommendations for capacity building to strengthen the ability of various stakeholders to support reconciliation at the local level

The survey revealed that Libyans are open to women and youth participating more actively in reconciliation. Forty-five percent of respondents felt that unarmed youth in communities across Libya could serve as effective conflict mediators, while over 63 percent of Libyans felt women should have more rights.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Increase the capacity of communities to document and archive human rights abuses and documentation. The survey and interviews indicated that there is strong support in Libya for ending of impunity, promoting justice and truth. Providing civil society organizations in Libya that specialize in human rights, but also universities, and regular citizens with the know-how to verify, document and archive proofs and testimonies on past abuses could contribute to transitional justice mechanisms in the future. Awareness raising about the functioning of transitional justice could also pave the way for a successful future engagement and for past grievances to be addressed.

Develop context-specific and sensitive means of encouraging understanding and contact between communities falling on opposing sides of a conflict. Where possible, opportunities for members of communities on opposing sides of a conflict should be created to attempt to facilitate understanding and create some trust or awareness of each other. Key stakeholder interviews with various members of peacebuilding organizations indicated that reconciliation initiatives that center on encouraging collaboration between the conflict parties through the process of scoping services for the community are among the most conflict sensitive approaches. This is particularly true when the foreign third-party is only involved by providing or paying for the service (i.e. building a well or a sports center). But the UN or foreign donor involvement should not lead the mediation efforts between parties.

Festivals, workshops, sports events or art shows are other mechanisms that can serve both as distractions from the conflict and encourage communities to interact. Methods should vary based on the volatility of the community or conflict it seeks to address. For example, one of the key informants interviewed mentioned that a festival had been planned to take place on the outskirts of Derna to bring together residents of Derna with residents living on the outskirts of the city, and to help encourage a sense of unity between them.[76]

Continue empowering Libyan civil society actors and organizations to work on reintegration of young combatants in a community focused way. The international community can invest in community reintegration projects in conflict-affected zones. These reintegration programs would provide psychosocial support to young combatants, while also benefiting the entire community. Offering economic opportunities or capacity building in addition to psychosocial support to conflict-affected communities would help reintegrate former combatants while also investing in the development of employment opportunities that might serve as viable alternatives to joining armed groups in the long run. Given that many combatants are as young as 15 years of age, providing communities with resource centers where language or other kinds of courses are offered by local educators can help youth develop skills that might enhance their earning potential.

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[76] *Mentioned as having taken place by a Libyan PCi conflict mediation expert interviewed by Altai in November 2017.*

ANNEX:
METHODOLOGY

Altai undertook a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach for the completion of this study. The table below provides more information on the sampling methodology utilized for the quantitative data collection.

Altai also tracked the success rate of interviews using the following breakdown of sampling performance. The 49,770 calls made for data collection phase of this project (7 November to 11 December) led to 8,019 'live' interviews (including all interviews except those not connected – 'switched off '/ 'not in use' - and 'no answer') and 2,091 successfully completed interviews on both networks, representing a 2.6 percent response rate. The interview drop-out rate (i.e. the proportion of respondents who started the survey but did not complete it) was 2.3 percent.

Table 1: Non-response bias

Status	Frequency	Percentage of total calls
Phone number switched off	13,991	28%
Number not in use	16,462	33%
No answer	11,307	22.7%
Refusals	2,274	4.6%
Not eligible (e.g., nationality)	3,410	6.9%
Call back later	196	0.4%
Partial interviews	48	0
Completed interviews	2,091	
Total	**49,779**	
Contact success rate	**2.6%**	
Interview *dropout* rate	**2.3%**	

Table 2: Completed key interviews in Libya

Category	Tripoli	Zintan	Misrata	Sebha	Ubari	Benghazi
Tribal elders	4	4	-	4	4	2
Politics & Government	3	3	2	3	2	1
Justice & Security	4	-	2	2	2	1
Civil Society Actors	6	3	2	2	4	4
Academics	1	-	-	-	-	1
Total	**18**	**10**	**7**	**14**	**12**	**9**
Total KIIs 72						

ANNEX:
UNDERSTANDING OF CAUSES OF CONFLICT

Figure 33: Support for banning members of the former regime, by age

Q8. For each of the following potential causes could you please tell me whether you feel it played a large role, small role or no role at all in the political conflict in Libya? (n=2,086)

[Banning members of the former regime]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
Libya	27%	11%	11%	11%	37%	
45+	26%	9%	11%	12%	39%	
35-44	24%	13%	11%	10%	38%	
25-34	28%	9%	12%	11%	38%	
18-24	30%	13%	12%	11%	31%	

Legend: Strongly agree · Agree · Neutral · Disagree · Strongly disagree · Do not know · No answer / Refuse to answer

12.1 MOST SIGNIFICANT LOCAL CONFLICTS (Q10)

Figure 34: Self-reported awareness about the Misrata - Bani Walid conflict, by region

Q13. Could you please tell me whether you know a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all about the conflict? (n=2,086)

[Misrata and Bani Walid]

	A great deal	A fair amount	Not very much	Nothing at all	
West	49%	20%	7%	22%	
East	46%	22%	7%	23%	
South	46%	21%	8%	26%	
Libya	48%	21%	7%	23%	

Legend: A great deal · A fair amount · Not very much · Nothing at all · Do not know · No answer / Refuse to answer

Figure 35: Self-reported awareness about the Tebu - Awlad Suleiman conflict, by region

Q13. Could you please tell me whether you know a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all about the conflict? (n=2,086)

[Tebu and Awlad Suleiman]

	A great deal	A fair amount	Not very much	Nothing at all	
South	61%	18%	7%	14%	
East	31%	20%	11%	37%	
West	28%	19%	9%	42%	
Libya	32%	19%	9%	38%	

Legend: A great deal · A fair amount · Not very much · Nothing at all · Do not know · No answer / Refuse to answer

OTHER IMPORTANT CONFLICTS

After being prompted about these specific conflicts, respondents were asked to name other "important local conflicts". While only a fifth were willing or able to specify one, over half of those who did respond mentioned disputes involving the Warshefana tribe, South-West of Tripoli. This demonstrates the key significance of this conflict 'nexus', which involves a range of antagonisms between the tribe and its neighbors (mainly Zawiya, Zintan, Gharyan, Janzour or Tarhouna) but also opposes pro- and anti-revolution strongholds. It also testifies to the problems that insecure roads such as those in the Warshefana area pose for Libyans in general. This applies to Wershafana but also, most certainly, to borders areas in the South and South East.

Most other respondents mentioned conflicts between cities as being most well-known, particularly between Misrata and other communities (Zintan, Tripoli, Zliten, Sirte) or between Zuwara and Jumeil / Rigdalin. A smaller number mentioned individual tribal conflicts.

Figure 36: Other local conflicts perceived to be important
Q14. Can you think of any other important local conflict? (n=2,086)

The table below presents a breakdown of the local conflicts that emerged from the open-ended question regarding significant local conflicts. The responses were noted down as they were presented by the respondents to reflect their perceptions. As a result, certain terms displayed in the table below are general. For example, the use of the term "army," which was interpreted by Altai to refer to the Libyan National Army, was often reported by respondents as "army." Furthermore, although this data was collected through the quantitative survey, too few responses emerged for a statistically significant analysis to be conducted. The results below should be treated as qualitative findings.

Q10. Could you please specify the most significant local conflict you have experienced? (n=123)

Eastern region
Involving Awaghir: • With Mreer • With Warfalla • With Al-Gatroon tribes • With other regions in Benghazi
Saiqa Special Forces and the Criminal Security Force
Involving Ansar al-Sharia: • With the LNA • With revolutionaries and militias
Al Qaeda and the army
The army and the Shura Council

Involving the Islamic State organization:
- With Abu Salim brigade
- With the Shura Council
- With the army
- With Derna
- With Salafi groups

Benghazi Shura Council

Benghazi Defence Brigades and the army (mentioned twice times)

Involving Dignity:
- With Safwa
- With the Shura Council
- With Jadhran

Derna:
- Involving Awatiya and Mreer

Egyptian air strikes

Involving Haftar and the revolutionaries

Involving Murabiteen tribes:
- With al-Harabi (Jabal al-Akhdar)
- With Abidat (2) (Derna)

Involving Zwayy and Magharba

Western region

Involving al-Serraj and Haftar

Involving Libya Dawn and Dignity

Zawiya / Jifara district:
- Involving Abu Zriba and al-Wahshi (over Zawiya refinery)
- Involving Bala'za tribe and Awlad Abu Hameera tribes
- Involving Bal'aza tribes and Awlad Saqr (mentioned twice)
- Involving Awlad Saqr and Awlad Abu Hameera (mentioned by three respondents)
- Involving Awlad Saqr and Awlad Issa (mentioned twice)
- Involving Awlad Hneish and Awlad al-Khadrawi (mentioned by five respondents)
- Involving Awlad Issa and Awlad Jarbu'
- Involving Awlad Issa and Awlad and Awlad Embarek
- Involving Awlad Embarek and Awlad Sa'oud
- Involving Awlad Musa and Awlad Atla
- Involving Al-Markaz and al-Harsha areas
- With Warshefana
- With Mutrad

Sabratha:
- Involving Al-Ammo brigade and the army
- Involving Ahmed al-Dabbashi (or "al-Ammo") and the army
- Involving Dabbashi Brigade and Brigade 48
- Involving Dabbashi tribe and al-Wadi tribe
- Involving Zawiya militias

Nuqat al-Khums:
- Involving al-'Uqba and al-Tayyari tribes
- Involving Qiyayra and 'Uqba tribes

Tarhouna / Margab:
- Involving al-Kani clan and armed groups from Souq al-Khamees
- Involving al-Kani and people from the city
- Involving al-Kani and the Ragee'at
- Al-Na'aji and al-Marghani tribes
- Involving Tarhouna and Qarabolli
- Involving Baba clan and Ghmait clan

Jabal al-Gharbi:
- Involving Amazigh and Siy'an
- Involving Gwasim and Tighirna

Involving Bani-Walid:
- Sabratha
- With the GNC

Gharyan:
- With Asab'aa (mentioned twice)
- With B'ir 'Ajaj
- With Warshefana

Involving the Islamic State organization:
- With Misrata
- With Sabratha (people) (mentioned twice)

Involving Janzour and al-Sayyad

Jufra: Involving Benghazi Defence Brigades and LNA brigade

Involving Misrata:
- With Abdul-Ghani (al-Kikli) and Kara militias
- With Tripoli militias
- With Bani Walid
- With Qarabolli
- With Sirte
- With Souq al-Juma'a
- With Tawergha
- With Zintan
- Involving al-Ziyadat and al-Dahra tribes
- Involving the Joint Force and the Counter-Crime
- Involving Awlad Sheikh and Karaghla (mentioned twice)
- Involving Hmadi tribe and Awlad al-Sheikh clan

Involving al-Qardhabiya Martyrs Brigade and former regime supporters

Tripoli:
- Involving Fashloum people and the Special Deterrence Forces
- Involving Kara and Fashloum
- Involving Special Deterrence Force and al-Nawasi
- Involving Special Deterrence Force and Souq al-Juma'a people
- Gharghour conflict between a Misratan militia and people from Tripoli
- Ghararat and Souq al-Juma'a
- Ghrarat and the Special Deterrence Forces
- Haytham al-Tajouri:
  - With Fashloum
  - With the 47 Militia
  - With Sherekhan militias
  - With Tarhouna
  - With Misrata
  - Involving Tripoli Revolutionaries' Brigade and the National Mobile Forces
- Zawiyat al-Dahmani: Sixth Brigade

Involving Tuareg:
- With Ghadames
- With Tebu

Involving Warshefana:
- With Janzour (mentioned by three different respondents)
- With Souq al-Juma'a
- With Libya Dawn

Involving Zintan:
- With Gharyan
- With Kikla
- With Mashashia
- With Riyayna
- With Warshefana
- With Yefren
- With al-Jumayl
- With Libya Dawn forces

Southern region

Involving Awlad Suleiman:
- With Gadhadfa (mentioned by nine different respondents)
- With Tebu and Gadhadfa
- With Tebu (mentioned by three different respondents)
- With Tebu and Awlad Abu Sayf

Involving Tebu:
- With Gadhadfa
- With Traghen
- With Zwayya
- Chadian Tebu in support of the Tebu against tribes in Kufra
- With Amazigh

Involving Magarha tribe:
- With Hassawna
- With Misrata

Involving the Third Force and Force 12

Involving Tuareg:
- With Ghadames
- With Tebu

Involving Ghat and Ubari

ANNEX:
UNDERSTANDING OF JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

Figure 37: Interest in truth and crimes predating the revolution, by age and region

Q7. I'm going to read you a list of some things that different people feel must occur to construct the future of Libya. For each one, tell me whether you strongly agree, agree feel neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree? (n=2,086)

[Establishing the truth]

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know	No answer/ Refuse to answer

Figure 38: Interest in truth about crimes following the revolution, by age and region

Q7. I'm going to read you a list of some things that different people feel must occur to construct the future of Libya. For each one, tell me whether you strongly agree, agree feel neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree? (n=2,086)

[Establishing the truth]

Figure 39: Ending impunity of militias, by region

Q7. I'm going to read you a list of some things that different people feel must occur to construct the future of Libya. For each one, could you please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree feel neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree? (n=2,086)

[Ending]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Libya	60%	9%	5%	5%	19%
South	60%	7%	3%	7%	23%
East	57%	8%	5%	6%	22%
West	62%	10%	5%	5%	17%

Legend: ■ Strongly agree ■ Agree ■ Neutral ■ Disagree ■ Strongly disagree ■ Do not know ■ No answer/ Refuse to answer

Figure 40: Incorporating post-revolutionary armed groups into the army, by education level

Q7. I'm going to read you a list of some things that different people feel must occur to construct the future of Libya. For each one, could you please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree feel neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree? (n=2,086)

[Incorporated]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Libya	40%	15%	8%	7%	28%
Higher education	38%	16%	9%	8%	29%
Vocational/technical training	38%	13%	9%	8%	27%
Secondary education (high school)	41%	17%	8%	7%	26%
No Formal/ Primary education	48%	13%	6%	6%	25%

Legend: ■ Strongly agree ■ Agree ■ Neutral ■ Disagree ■ Strongly disagree ■ Do not know ■ No answer/ Refuse to answer

ANNEX:
FACTORS OF LEGITIMACY

Figure 41: Attitudes towards forgiveness for all belligerents, by region

Q41. How important do you think each of the following factors are in ensuring the effectiveness and sustainability of a reconciliation agreement? (n=2,086)

[Forgiveness for all belligerents]

Region	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not very important at all	Dont know
South	40%	9%	4%	43%	3%
East	37%	9%	3%	48%	2%
West	43%	13%	4%	37%	3%
Libya	41%	11%	4%	41%	3%

- Very important
- Somewhat important
- Not very important
- Not very important at all
- Dont know
- No answer/ Refuse to answer

Figure 42: Priorities for national stability, second priority

Q18. Among the following which are the most important priorities for Libya to transition into a stable State? Could you please tell me which you think is the first priority, the second priority, and the third priority? (n=1,957)

[Priority 2]

Priority	Value
Security	20.4
National reconciliation	20.0
Justice	15.0
The economy	14.3
Approving the constitution developed by the CDA	8.6
National elections	7.4
Successful delivery of basic services	5.7
Local reconciliation	4.5
The political dialogue	4.0
Do not know	

Figure 43: Priorities for national reconciliation, priority 2

**Q21.What do you think is most important for national reconciliation, in order of priority.
Could you please tell me which you think is the first priority, the second priority, and the third priority?**
(n=2,086)

[Priority 2]

Priority	Value
Justice	26.9
Forgiveness	24.5
Unity	212
Peace	17.4
Establishing the truth about the past	9.9
Do not know	0.05
No answer	

ANNEX:
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND RECONCILIATION

15.1. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND INCLUSION

Figure 44: Inclusion of youth, women, IDPs minorities and diaspora at the local level

Q29. For the following groups, could you please tell me whether you feel they are included in reconciliation initiatives at the local level? (n=2,086)

Group	Fully	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	Do not know / No answer
Youth	53%	17%	5%	17%	7%
IDPs	45%	15%	7%	24%	8%
Women	45%	19%	6%	23%	7%
Minorities	37%	17%	7%	29%	10%
Members of the Libyan diaspora	33%	15%	7%	34%	11%

Legend: Fully, Somewhat, Not very much, Not at all, Do not know, No answer / Refuse to answer

Figure 45: Participation in community gatherings, by region, age and gender

Q24. Which of the following activities do you participate in? (n=735)

[Community gatherings]

	Yes	No
Libya	48%	51%
South	45%	54%
East	48%	51%
West	65%	35%
45+	56%	43%
35-44	50%	49%
25-34	39%	60%
18-24	46%	53%
Female	39%	61%
Male	54%	44%

Legend: Yes, No, Do not know, No answer / Refuse to answer

Figure 46: Participation in sports organizations, by education and gender
Q24. Which of the following activities do you participate in? (n=735)
[Sports organizations]

		Yes	No	Do not know	No answer / Refuse to answer
Libya		43%	56%		
Education	Higher education	51%	49%		
	Vocational / technical training	29%	71%		
	Secondary education (high school)	34%	65%		
	No formal / Primary education	33%	64%		
Gender	Female	30%	70%		
	Male	52%	47%		

Yes   No   Do not know   No answer / Refuse to answer

Figure 47: Participation in local government meetings, by region and gender
Q24. Which of the following activities do you participate in? (n=735)
[Local government meetings]

		Yes	No	Do not know	No answer / Refuse to answer
Libya		24%	75%		
Region	West	23%	76%		
	East	21%	78%		
	South	38%	62%		
Gender	Female	15%	84%		
	Male	30%	69%		

Yes   No   Do not know   No answer / Refuse to answer

Figure 48: Participation in arts groups, by region
Q24.Which of the following activities do you participate in? (n=735)
[Arts groups]

		Yes	No	Do not know	No answer / Refuse to answer
Libya		28%	71%		
Region	West	27%	72%		
	East	23%	77%		
	South	47%	52%		

Yes   No   Do not know   No answer / Refuse to answer

YOUTH INCLUSION

Figure 49: Inclusion of youth in national reconciliation initiatives, by age

Q28. For the following groups, could you please tell me whether you feel they are included in reconciliation initiatives at the national level? (n=2,086)

[Youth]

Age	Fully	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	No reconciliation process	Do not know	No answer / Refuse to answer
Libya	51.7%	16.0%	5.4%	15.1%		5.8%	5.9%
+45	50.7%	16.3%	3.9%	16.3%		5.2%	7.0%
35-44	49.2%	16.0%	5.8%	17.3%		5.2%	6.5%
25-34	53.4%	15.1%	5.9%	13.4%		6.9%	5.2%
18-24	54.3%	16.7%	6.7%	12.3%		5.6%	4.5%

Figure 50: Support for disarmament, by age

Q30. To what extent do you think the following mechanisms would be effective for increasing youth involvement in reconciliation? (n=2,086)

[Disarmament]

Age	A great deal	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	Youth should not participate in reconciliation efforts	Do not know
Libya	91.6%	3.1%				
+45	94.3%	1.8%				
35-44	93.1%	1.7%				
25-34	89.1%	4.5%				
18-24	88.9%	5.0%				

Figure 51: Support for conflict prevention training for youth, by age

Q30. To what extent do you think the following mechanisms would be effective for increasing youth involvement in reconciliation? (n=2,086)

[Conflict prevention training for youth]

Age	A great deal	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	Youth should not participate in reconciliation efforts	Do not know	No Answer/ Refuse to answer
Libya	86%	7%	4%				
+45	90%	4%	3%				
35-44	87%	7%	3%				
25-34	83%	9%	4%				
18-24	81%	11%	4%				

Figure 52: Support for finding jobs for current and former militia members, by education and age

Q30. To what extent do you think the following mechanisms would be effective for increasing youth involvement in reconciliation? (n=2,086)

[Finding jobs for current and former militia members (i.e. reintegration)]

Libya	75%	10% 8% 3%
Education		
Higher education	73%	11% 9% 3%
Vocational / technical training	76%	9% 6% 4%
Secondary education (high school)	72%	12% 8% 3%
No formal / Primary education	83%	6% 4% 3%
Age		
+45	82%	8% 5% 2%
35-44	77%	9% 7% 3%
25-34	70%	13% 10% 3%
18-24	67%	13% 9% 5%

- A great deal
- Somewhat
- Not very much
- Not at all
- Youth should not participate in reconciliation efforts
- Do not know
- No Answer/ Refuse to answer

WOMEN'S INCLUSION

Figure 53: Support for "Dialogue on the role of women," by education and gender

Q32.To what extent do you think the following mechanisms would be effective for increasing women's involvement in reconciliation? (n=2,086)

[Dialogue on the role of the woman in Libyan society and future]

Libya	67.9%	15.7% 6.1% 5.8%
Education		
Higher education	63.2%	18.7% 7.2% 6.9%
Vocational / technical training	70.4%	15.2% 4.4% 3.0%
Secondary education (high school)	70.7%	14.8% 5.8% 5.6%
No formal / Primary education	80.1%	5.5% 4.0% 4.8%
Gender		
Female	73.8%	14.0% 6.0% 2.8%
Male	62.5%	17.2% 6.3% 8.6%

- A great deal
- Somewhat
- Not very much
- Not at all
- Women should not participate in reconciliation efforts
- Do not know
- No answer/ Refuse to answer

Figure 54: Participation in human rights activism, by gender and education

Q24. Which of the following activities do you participate in? (n=735)

[Human rights activism]

Libya	39%	61%
Education		
Higher education	41%	59%
Vocational / technical training	36%	64%
Secondary education (high school)	37%	62%
No formal / Primary education	29%	67%
Gender		
Female	42%	58%
Male	36%	63%

- Yes
- No
- Do not know
- No answer / Refuse to answer

Figure 55: Support for increasing rights of women, by region

Q7. I'm going to read you a list of some things that different people find important for shaping the future of Libya. For each one, could you please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, feel neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree? (n=2,086) [Increased]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Libya	63%	17%	7%		9%
South	68%	17%	8%		5%
East	63%	18%	6%		8%
West	63%	17%	7%		10%

Strongly agree ■ Agree ■ Neutral ■ Disagree
■ Strongly disagree ■ Do not know ■ No Answer/ Refuse to answer

Figure 56: Support for appointing more women in government, by education and gender

Q32.To what extent do you think the following mechanisms would be effective for increasing women's involvement in reconciliation? (n=2,086)

[Appoint more women in government]

		A great deal	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	
	Libya	56%	20%	6%	11%	6%
Education	Higher education	51%	21%	8%	13%	7%
	Vocational / technical training	62%	15%	8%	9%	4%
	Secondary education (high school)	55%	24%	4%	9%	7%
	No formal / Primary education	71%	12%	2% 6%	5%	
Gender	Female	63%	18%	4%	10%	3%
	Male	49%	22%	8%	11%	9%

■ A great deal ■ Somewhat ■ Not very much ■ Not at all
■ Women should not participate in reconciliation efforts ■ Do not know ■ No answer/ Refuse to answer

Figure 57: Inclusion of women in national reconciliation initiatives, by education

Q28. For the following groups, could you please tell me whether you feel they are included in reconciliation initiatives at the national level? (n=2,086) [Women]

		Fully	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	
	Libya	45%	19%	5%	18%	7%	6%
Education	Higher education	42%	20%	6%	20%	7%	5%
	Vocational / technical training	47%	18%	4%	18%	5%	8%
	Secondary education (high school)	48%	20%	5%	17%	6%	4%
	No formal / Primary education	50%	15%	3%	14%	6%	13%

■ Fully ■ Somewhat ■ Not very much ■ Not at all
■ No reconciliation process ■ Do not know ■ No answer / Refuse to answer

Figure 58: Support for increasing rights of women, by education

**Q7. I'm going to read you a list of some things that different people find important for shaping the future of Libya. For each one, could you please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, feel neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree?** (n=2,086) [Increased]

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Libya	63%	17%	7%		9%
Higher education	59%	18%	8%		10%
Vocational/technical training	66%	15%	7%		8%
Secondary education (high school)	64%	20%	5%		8%
No Formal/ Primary education	75%	11%	7%		6%

■ Strongly agree ■ Agree ■ Neutral ■ Disagree ■ Strongly disagree
■ No Answer/ Refuse to answer ■ Do not know

Figure 59: Support for increased awareness of women involved in reconciliation initiatives, by education and gender

Q32.To what extent do you think the following mechanisms would be effective for increasing women's involvement in reconciliation? (n=2,086)

[Increase awareness of women involved in reconciliation initiatives]

		A great deal	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	Do not know	No answer/Refuse
Libya	Libya	72%	13%	2%	6%	5%	
Education	Higher education	69%	14%	3%	7%	7%	
	Vocational / technical training	74%	11%	4%	5%	3%	
	Secondary education (high school)	73%	16%	1%	5%	5%	
	No formal / Primary education	83%	5%	4%	4%		
Gender	Female	77%	11%	1%	6%	3%	
	Male	68%	14%	3%	6%	8%	

A great deal / Women should not participate in reconciliation efforts — Somewhat / Do not know — Not very much / No answer/ Refuse to answer — Not at all

Figure 60: Support for awareness raising campaigns on reconciliation among women, by education and gender

Q32.To what extent do you think the following mechanisms would be effective for increasing women's involvement in reconciliation? (n=2,086)

[Awareness raising campaigns on reconciliation among women]

		A great deal	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all
Libya	Libya	71%	13%	6%	6%
Education	Higher education	67%	15%	7%	7%
	Vocational / technical training	71%	13%	6%	4%
	Secondary education (high school)	72%	15%	5%	5%
	No formal / Primary education	82%	5%	4%	4%
Gender	Female	74%	12%	7%	3%
	Male	67%	14%	5%	8%

A great deal / Women should not participate in reconciliation efforts — Somewhat / Do not know — Not very much / No answer/ Refuse to answer — Not at all

MINORITY, IDP, DIASPORA MEMBER INCLUSION

Figure 61: Mechanisms for increasing IDP involvement

Q34. To what extent do you think the following mechanisms would be effective for increasing internally displaced persons involvement in reconciliation? (n=2,086)

	A great deal	Not very much	Not at all
Returning and reintegrating the displaced to their former homes	91%	5%	2%
Providing the displaced with security, food, shelter	89%	6%	3%
Preparing and supporting host communities to receive IDPs	84%	9%	4%

A great deal / IDPs should not participate in reconciliation efforts — Somewhat / Do not know — Not very much / No answer/ Refuse to answer — Not at all

Figure 62: Attitudes towards dissidents of the previous regime living abroad, by region

Q37. Do you think the following types of Libyan diaspora groups should have a role in national reconciliation?
(n=1,043)

[Dissidents of the previous regime]

	Yes	No	Do not know	No answer/ Refuse to answer
Libya	69%	28%		
South	71%	24%		
East	63%	35%		
West	71%	26%		

Figure 63: Attitudes toward supporters of the previous regime living abroad, by age and education

Q37. Do you think the following types of Libyan diaspora groups should have a role in national reconciliation? (n=1,043)

[Supporters of the previous regime]

	Yes	No	Do not know	No answer/ Refuse to answer
18-24	63%	36%		
25-34	75%	23%		
35-44	78%	17%		
45+	75%	21%		
Libya	74%	23%		

Figure 64: Inclusion of IDPs, Minorities, and Diaspora members in national reconciliation initiatives, by gender

Q28. For the following groups, could you please tell me whether you feel they are included in reconciliation initiatives at the national level? (n=2,086)


|		Fully	Somewhat	Not very much	Not at all	No reconciliation process	Do not know	No answer / Refuse to answer
IDPs	Male	49.5%	11.9%	6.1%	20.9%	6.4%	5%	
	Female	41.8%	17.1%	5.5%	18.7%	6.5%	10.3%	
	Libya	45.8%	14.4%	5.8%	19.8%	6.4%	7.5%	
Minorities	Male	41.2%	16.5%	5.6%	21.9%	7.8%	6.3%	
	Female	31.4%	17.9%	6.8%	23.0%	72%	13.4%	
	Libya	36.5%	17.2%	62%	22.4%	7.5%	9.7%	
Members of the Libyan diaspora	Male	35.5%	14.8%	6.8%	26.9%	8.5%	7.1%	
	Female	31.1%	16.7%	6.9%	23.3%	8.2%	13.6%	
	Libya	33.4%	15.7%	6.9%	25.2%	8.3%	10.3%	

Figure 65: The diaspora and reconciliation, by region

Q36. Do you think the Libyan diaspora has a role in helping reconcile Libya? (n=2,086)

	Yes	No	Do not know	No answer/ Refuse to answer
West	51.1%	42.4%		
East	45.7%	45.3%		
South	54.9%	35.3%		
Libya	50.0%	42.6%		

ANNEX:
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN RECONCILIATION

Figure 66: Who resolves conflicts in Libya, most common second response

Q38. When there is a political, social, ethnic or tribal conflict in your local area, how is it usually resolved?

[Response 2] (n=774)

|	
Mediation by local notables	50.6
Mediation by the local community	18
Mediation by the municipal council	8.1
Intervention by the police	7.6
Intervention by unarmed youth in the local community	7.0
Armed intervention by the Libyan Army	3.6
Intervention by the military governor	1.7
Armed intervention by brigades	1.2
The resolution is postponed until the courts resume working	0.1
It is not resolved	0.1
Other	0.8
Do not know	0.6
No answer/ Refuse to answer	0.3
Civil society actors	0.3
Mediation by tribal elders	0
Libyan Third party actors (other municipal councils)	0

Figure 67: Effectiveness of armed groups at resolving conflict, by age

Q40. How effective would you say the following actors are in resolving conflict between groups? (n=2,086)

[armed groups]

	Very effective	Somewhat effective	Not very effective	No answer/ Refuse to answer	Not very effective at all
45+	10%	10%	2%	74%	4%
35-44	11%	11%	2%	71%	5%
25-34	12%	13%	2%	69%	3%
18-24	16%	20%	5%	57%	2%
Libya	12%	13%	2%	69%	3%

Legend: Very effective · Somewhat effective · Not very effective · Do not know · No answer/ Refuse to answer · Not very effective at all

Figure 68: Effectiveness of armed groups at resolving conflict, by region
Q40. How effective would you say the following actors are in resolving conflict between groups? (n=2,086)

[armed groups]

Region	Very effective	Somewhat effective	Not very effective	Not very effective at all	No answer/ Refuse to answer
South	7%	11%	3%	77%	2%
East	9%	9%	3%	76%	3%
West	14%	15%	2%	65%	4%
Libya	12%	13%	2%	69%	3%

■ Very effective ■ Somewhat effective ■ Not very effective
■ Not very effective at all ■ Do not know ■ No answer/ Refuse to answer

Figure 69: Who resolves conflicts in Libya, most common first response
Q38. When there is a political, social, ethnic or tribal conflict in your local area, how is it usually resolved?

[Response 1] (n=2,086)

Mediation by tribal elders	68.2
Mediation by local notables	8.1
Mediation by the municipal council	3.0
Mediation by the local community	3.9
Intervention by unarmed youth in the local community	0.7
Intervention by the police	1.9
Intervention by the military governor	0.3
Armed intervention by the Libyan Army	0.8
Armed intervention by brigades	1.7
Civil society actors	0.1
Libyan Third party actors (other municipal councils)	0.0
The resolution is postponed until the courts resume working	0.1
It is not resolved	3.6
Other	12
Do not know	4.7
No answer/ Refuse to answer	1.6

0.0   17.5   35.0   52.5   70.0

Figure 70: Who resolves conflicts in Libya, top response, by region
Q38. When there is a political, social, ethnic or tribal conflict in your local area, how is it usually resolved?
Response #1, (n=2,086)

Region	Mediation by tribal elders				
Libya	68%	8%	4%	4%	3%
South	84%	7%	2%	1%	
East	82%	3%	2%	2%	
West	60%	11%	5%	5%	4%

■ Mediation by tribal elders   ■ Mediation by local notables
■ Mediation by the municipal council   ■ Mediation by the local community
■ Intervention by unarmed youth in the local community ■ Intervention by the police
■ Intervention by the military governor   ■ Armed intervention by the Libyan Army
■ Armed intervention by brigades   ■ Civil society actors
■ Libyan Third party actors (other municipal councils) ■ The resolution is postponed until the courts resume working
■ It is not resolved   ■ Other
■ Do not know   ■ No answer

Figure 71: Preferred actor for resolving conflict, by region

Q39. Who do you think should have the main responsibility of resolving conflict in your area? (n=2,086)

[Response 1]

Figure 72: Preferred actor for resolving conflict, by age

Q39. Who do you think should have the main responsibility of resolving conflict in your area? (n=2,086)

[Response 1]

Figure 73: Perceived effectiveness of tribal elders at resolving conflict, by region

Q40. How effective would you say the following actors are in resolving conflict between groups? (n=2,086)

[Tribal Elders]

Figure 74: Perceptions of Saif Islam al Gadhafi, by region

Q44. I'm going to read you a list of popular figures in our country. For each one, could you please tell me whether you think that they play a positive, neutral or negative role in resolving Libya's political and security crisis? (n=2,086)

[Saif Islam al Gadhafi]

Region	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Do not know
Libya	33%	18%	38%	11%
South	49%	16%	24%	12%
East	29%	21%	39%	11%
West	32%	17%	39%	12%

■ Positive ■ Neutral ■ Negative ■ Do not know

Figure 75: Perceptions of Khalifa Haftar, by region

Q44. I'm going to read you a list of popular figures in our country. For each one, could you please tell me whether you think that they play a positive, neutral or negative role in resolving Libya's political and security crisis? (n=2,086)

[Khalifa Haftar]

Region	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Do not know	No answer
Libya	36%	15%	37%	9%	3%
South	32%	21%	35%	10%	2%
East	63%	13%	14%	6%	3%
West	24%	15%	48%	10%	4%

■ Positive ■ Neutral ■ Negative ■ Do not know ■ No answer

Figure 76: Perceptions of Faiez Al Serraj, by region

Q44. I'm going to read you a list of popular figures in our country. For each one, could you please tell me whether you think that they play a positive, neutral or negative role in resolving Libya's political and security crisis? (n=2,086)

[Faiez Al Serra]

Region	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Do not know
Libya	15%	19%	55%	10%
South	15%	19%	54%	12%
East	12%	17%	60%	10%
West	17%	20%	53%	10%

■ Positive ■ Neutral ■ Negative ■ Do not know

FOOTNOTES

1   Respondents were asked to list their top three priorities for national stability from a list of nine issues. The results were then presented by how often each topic was listed as priority number one or priority number two. Given the large number (9) of options to choose from, the percentages (27 percent or 37 percent) appear less significant than they are. However, all figures included in the report were statistically significant.

2   www.facebook.com/lybloggers/ or http://libyanblogger.net/

3   A peer educator organization founded in 2010 based in Tripoli and Benghazi with a network also in Gharyan, Sebha, Zawya, Khums, Sirte, Tobruk, al Marj, Berna, Al Quba, Misrata, Janzour, Kufra, Ajdabiya. See: www.y-peer.org/y-peer-and-me/; www.facebook.com/Ypeerlibya/

4   "Traditional" here is primarily used to signify when tribal elders are leading the reconciliation efforts. Not all local level reconciliation is necessarily "traditional." Non-traditional local reconciliation efforts would include reconciliation efforts led by civil society organizations or youth groups. However, local reconciliation efforts, even when they are not initiated by tribal elders, may require the participation or buy-in of elders who in many municipalities sit on reconciliation committees.

5   All responses mentioning national-level players or conflicts referred especially to Libya Dawn, Dignity Operation, Haftar, Serraj, the GNA, the GNC; and the 'airport war'.

6   Any conflict involving the word 'tribe' or 'tribal'. When a conflict mentioned a city and a tribe, the conflict was treated as a conflict between tribes. The category also included any response that included the 'Tebu', 'Tuareg' or 'Amazigh' minorities.

7   See Methodologies section. Tuareg, Amazigh and Tebu respondents tend to self-report these forms of identification as their tribe.

8   Every time a conflict mentioned ISIS, Ansar al-Sharia, Shura Councils (when juxtaposed to the army), al-Qaida, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

9   The category was selected each time the word 'militia', 'armed group', or 'gangs' were mentioned, includes all answers naming specific militias, armed groups or militia leaders, and was chosen whenever a respondent reported the conflict as being between two cities. Conflicts occurring in Tripoli or involving Misrata were always included in this category, even when one of the actors was a tribe (otherwise conflicts citing tribes were included in the previous category).

10   For a consolidated list of the self-reported conflicts mentioned in question 10, please see Annex16.

11   The conflicts were: Gadhadfa – Awlad Suleiman; Zintan – Mashashia; Tebu – Zway; Tuareg – Tebu (Ubari); Misrata – Tawergha; Misrata – Awagir; Misrata – Bani Walid; Zintan – Kikla; Tebu – Awlad Suleiman.

12   Skype interview with F. A. current Libyan Ambassador to Bahrain, former Interior Minister 2011-2012, December 2017.

13   Low national awareness of the Misrata-Awagir conflict may be due to the way the question was asked. If—instead of asking specifically about Misratans and the Awagir the question had inquired about the tensions between Misrata and Benghazi more generally respondents would have been more likely to recognize the conflict.

14   The potential danger became apparent when the LNA's Special Operations Force in Zintan, led by Emad al Trabulsi, announced in mid-2017 that they would return Zintan IDP's to Tripoli by force and establish an armed presence in Tripoli to protect them. UNSMIL and UNDP facilitated a dialogue between all concerned parties to ensure the peaceful return of these IDPs as part of the national reconciliation project.

15   Altai interview with W.A. Journalist, IDP from Tripoli, Zintan, November 2017.

16   See Figure 37 and Figure 38 in Annex.

17   Interview with A. B., tribal elder, member of Zintan Social Committee, Zintan, October 2017.

18   Interview with M. B., Head of High Council of Warshefana Tribes and Member of the High Council of Libyan Tribes and Cities, Tunis, December 2017.

19   Interview with M.B., local government official in Zintan, Zintan, November 2017.

20   For more information see Annex 17.

21   Term meaning owners or guardians of the blood.

22   Interview with M.D., Male, Member of Zintan Crisis Committee, Zintan, November 2017.

23   Skype interview with M. J., Male, member of the Libyan Jurists Organization, Misrata, December 2017.

24   Interview with T. J., Male Sufi religious figure, public and Islamic notable, Zintan, November 2017.

25   Qualitative finding.

26   Using the word musalaha.

27   Using the term sulh.

28   Virginie Collombier, Ahmed Khaled (2017). "Mapping of existing reconciliation initiatives in Libya: Lessons learned, actors, challenges, and way forward", UNSMIL, September 2016.

29   Phone interview with M. J., Male, former Misrata Local Council member (2011-2014), Misrata, November 2017.

30   According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's 2003 "Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook" (p.146) restitution refers to the "re-establishment of the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed," while compensation refers to the payment of money as a recognition of the wrong done and to make good the losses suffered".

31   "Sponsorship" here is intended as "leadership" or "direction" of an initiative by a foreign state rather than just financial and logistical support.

32   Interview with A. A., Male, attorney and member of the Coalition of Jurists in Sebha, Sebha, November 2017.

33   Interview with M. K., Male, participant in the March 2017 Rome peace agreement between Tebu and Awlad Suleima, Sebha, November 2017.

34   Interview with a Libyan mediation expert involved in developing peacebuilding networks throughout Libya, October 2017.

35   Tebu body rejects Rome deal with Tuareg and Awlad Suleiman. (2017). Libya Herald. Available at www.libyaherald.com/2017/04/06/tebu-body-rejects-rome-deal-with-tuareg-and-awlad-suleiman/.

36   Interview with M.G., Male, Member of the national Movement for Libya, Head of the Supreme Tuareg Council, Tunis, October 2017.

37   Interview with M. J., Male, Mediation advisor for Libya, Humanitarian Dialogue, October 2017.

38   Interview with S. M., Male, Head of Zintan's Social Committee, experienced mediator, October 2017.

39   As a part of the Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) led by the GNA and supported by UNDP and the international community: www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/operations/projects/sustainable-development/stabilization-facility-for-libya.html.

40   Romanet Perroux, J et al (2017). Libyan Local Governance Case Studies (Rep.). EU Delegation, Libya.

41   Interview with Libyan mediation expert with Peaceful Change Initiative, October 2017.

42   The question was phrased: "هل تعتبر أنك تلعب دورا فاعلا في مجتمعك؟"

43   Figures detailing the breakdown of participation in the activities listed in Question 24 of the survey can be found in Annex 16.

44   Interview with O.F., Male, civil society activist with the Libyan Organization for Justice and Equality, Tripoli, October 2017.

45   Interview with H. Y., civil society activist and IT lecturer at Sebha University, Tunis, October 2017.

46   A youth-led initiative to reinvigorate reconciliation between Western Libyan cities launched in December 2016. For more details see Chapter 3.3.

47   Civil society activist from Rigdalin, phone interview, December 2017.

48   Interview with A. O., Female, academic and expert on Libyan political culture, January 2018.

49   Taha, M. (2017). Matriarchal and Tribal Identity, Community Resilience, and Vulnerability in South Libya. United States Institute of Peace Special Report, (416), 2. Available at www.usip.org/publications/2017/12/ matriarchal-and-tribal-identity-community-resilience-and-vulnerability-south. Accessed November 2017.

50   Altai Consulting and the United States Institute of Peace. Tribe, Security, Justice, and Peace: What Tribalism Means in Post-revolution Libya and its Impact on Security, Justice, and Peacemaking. December 2015.

51   Collombier, V. & Khaled, A. (2017). Mapping of existing reconciliation initiatives in Libya: Lessons learned, actors, challenges, and way forward.

52   Interview with a field commander in a Misratan armed group, December 2017.

53   Wolfram, Lacher & Labnouj, Ahmed (2015). Factionalism Resurgent: The War in the Jabal Nafusa. In Cole Peter & Quinn Brian (Eds), The Libyan Revolution and its Aftermath (pp.257-284). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

54   Interview with M. A., Male, member of Zintan's Social Committee, former member of the Libyan Elders Council, Zintan, October 2017.

55   Interview with H. R., Male, member of the tribal elders' Council of Sebha, Sebha, November 2017.

56   Interview with a field commander in a Misratan armed group, December 2017.

57   Interview with a field commander in a Misratan armed group, December 2017.

58   Interview with a field commander in a Misratan armed group, December 2017.

59   Interview with J. G., Male, Tebu from Sebha living in France, involved in Sebha and Ubari peace processes, October 2017.

60   Altai Interview with A. S., Male, activist with the Libyan Association for Justice and Development, Tripoli, November 2017.

61   McCandless Erin, "Peace Dividends and Beyond: Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding," United National Peacebuilding Support Office: New York, NY, 2012.

62   Libya Stabilization Facility aids Kilka and Obari schools (2017). Libya Herald, 20 December. Accessed on 5 June 2018 from www.libyaherald.com/2017/12/20/libya-stabilisation-facility-aids-kilka-and-obari-schools/.

63   Referring to UNDP's implementation of the SFL.

64   Altai interview with O. G., Male, via skype, CSO activist and current affairs commentator, Misrata, November 2017.

65   Sami Zaptia (2018). Misrata and Tawergha sign peace deal paving way for return. Libya Herald, 4 June. Accessed on 5 June 2018 from www.libyaherald.com/2018/06/04/misrata-and-tawergha-sign-peace-deal-paving-way-for-return/.

      Skype interview with F. S., Male, Misratan lawyer and human rights activist, December 2017.

67   Interview with A. T., Male, youth, civil society activist, Benghazi, November 2017.

68   Interview with A. N., Male, Populist political party leader, Zintan, October 2017.

69   Interview with N. D., Male, Journalist, Derna, December 2017.

70   Interview with T. G., Male, Reporter for 218 TV Channel and Zintani IDP from Tripoli, Zintan, October 2017.

71   United National Mission in Libya. (17 December 2017). Statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya Ghassan Salame [Press release]. Available at https://unsmil.unmissions.org/statement-special-representative-secretary-general-and-head-un-support-mission-libya-ghassan-salame.

72   Y-Peer is a peer educator organization founded in 2010 based in Tripoli and Benghazi with a network also in Gharyan, Sebha, Zawya, Khums, Sirte, Tobruk, al Marj, Berna, Al Quba, Misrata, Janzour, Kufra, Ajdabiya. See www.y-peer.org/y-peer-and-me/; www.facebook.com/Ypeerlibya/.

73   Mentioned as having taken place by a Libyan PCi conflict mediation expert interviewed by Altai in November 2017.