



# PUBLIC PULSE

## REPORT 1



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**Chapter 5: The EU Visa Liberalisation Process**

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

**EULEX** EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

**EUSR** EU Special Representative

**EWS** Early Warning System

**GOK** Government of Kosovo

**ICO** International Civilian Office

**ICR** International Civilian Representative

**KP** Kosovo Police

**KSF** Kosovo Security Force

**LDK** Democratic League of Kosovo

**PDK** Democratic Party of Kosovo

**UNDP** United Nations Development Programme

**UNMIK** United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

## Selected Economic Indicators

Column1	Jan-Mar 2005	Apr-Jun 2005	Jul-Sep 2005	Oct-Dec 2005	Jan-Jun 2006	Jul-Sep 2006	Oct-Dec 2006	Jan-Mar 2007	Apr-Jun 2007	Jul-Oct 2007	Nov-Dec 2007	Jan-June 2008	July-Sept 2008	Oct-Dec 2008	Jan-Mar 2009	Apr-Jun 2009	Jul-Sep 2009	Jan-March 2010	Nov 2010	Trend
Population (in ,000) (a)	1,999*				2,033 **			2,07**	2,07**	2,1**	2,1**	2,1**	2,1**	2,1**	2,1**	2,2*	2,2*	2,2*	2,2*	◀▶
GDP growth rate (annual), % (a)	0.3				3.0					3.5	3.5	3.5 (o)	3.5	3.5	5.4(a)	5.4(a)	3.8** (a)	3.8** (a)	2.9 (s)	▼
GDP per capita, € (a)	1,120 (a)				1,117 (a)					1,150	1,150 (q)	1,150	1,150	1,150	1,784(a)	1,784(a)	1,731** (a)	1,731** (a)	1,795 (s)	▲
KCB (Annual), million € (b)	641.5				713.2 (l)			553** (m)	553 (m)	553 (m)		862.13	862.13	862.13	862.13	862.13	895.9 (m)	895.9 (m)	1,461 (t)	▲
Workers' remittances, million €	281.0 (a)				318.0 (a)					398	398	467 (p)	467 (p)	387.6 (r)		535.8 (q)	535.8 (q)	535.8 (q)		◀▶
Foreign assistance, million € (a)	462.0 *				465.0 *					352	352 (r)	275 **	275**	275**					132.4 (u)	▼
KPST fund, million € (c)	145.8 (Dec)				167.5 (May) (d)	177 (Sep) (k)	213.0 (Dec) (k)	230.6 (Mar)		276 (Oct)		273.8 (May)						380.7	488.8 (April)	▲
PAK fund, million € (e)	113.1 (Dec)				234.9 (Apr)	256.1 (Aug) (h)	275.0 (Dec)	291.6 (Feb)		384.4 (Oct)	399.9 (Nov-Dec 2007)	419.8 (Jan-Apr 2008)	426.1 (May)					451	463.2 (March) (u)	▲
Bank deposits, million €	704.8 (Feb)	731.2 (May)	765.8 (Aug)	809 (Nov)	844.6 (Apr) (e)	881.6 (Aug) (h)	926.4 (Dec)	973.5 (Feb)	967.6 (Apr)	1,102,740 (Oct)	1,228 (Dec) (s)	1,112 (Feb)	1,183 (p) (May)		1444.1 (r)	1,513 (q) (Jun)	1,65 (q) (Sep)	1,65 (q) (Sep)	1,77 (u) (March)	▲
Commercial bank loans, million €	356.5 (Feb)	400.1 (May)	401.8 (Aug)	435.7 (Nov)	459.7 (Apr) (e)	476.4 (Aug) (h)	490.5 (Dec)	515.1 (Feb)	560.2 (Apr)	659.9 (Oct)	891.2 (Dec) (t)	937 (Feb)	1,052.8 (p) (May)			1,281 (q) (Jun)	1,281 (q) (Sep)	1,281 (q) (Sep)	1,336.2 (u) (March)	▲
Trade balance, million € (j)	-219.1 (Jan-Mar)	-308.5 (Jan-Apr)	-723.4 (Jan-Aug)	-1028. (Jan-Nov)	-537.5 (Jan-Jun)	-761.3 (Jan-Aug) (j)	-1235.3 (Jan-Dec)	-101.92 (Jan-Feb)	-400 (Jan-Apr)	-1164.2 (Jan-Oct)	-264.6 (Nov-Dec) (n)	-360 (Jan-Feb)	-142 (May)	-1638.5 (Jan-Dec)	-142 (May)		-152 (Sep)	-152 (Sep)	-550 (March) (u)	▼
Registered job-seekers	303,095 (Jan)	311,230 (May)	314,446 (Aug)	319,721 (Dec)	323,201 (May)	324,835 (Sep)	326,026 (Dec)	331,056 (Mar)			334,595 (Dec)	336,366 (Mar 2008) (n)	336,366 (Mar 2008) (n)		338,836 (Apr)	338,618 (May 2009) (q)	339,418 (Sep 2009) (q)	339,418 (Sep 2009) (q)	338,800 (March 2010) (u)	◀▶
Consumer Price Index, % (compared to May 2002)***	101.4 (May)	100.0 (May)	98.5 (Aug)	101.9 (Nov)	102.9 (May)	101.3 (Aug) (f)	102.6 (Nov)	100.2 (Mar)	99.4 (Apr)	103.9 (Sep)	102.8 (Dec)	111.4 (Feb)	112.8 (Jul)		110,9 (Mar)		108.8 (Sep)	115.2 (Sep)	119.9 (March) (u)	▲
Basic pensions (per month), €	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40		40		70	70	70	◀▶
Voluntary returns	2,126				1,608 (g)															

\* Estimated

\*\* Projected

\*\*\* In January 2006, SOK changed the methodology for compiling CPI. Therefore the comparison of currently produced CPI with the CPI from before January 2006 is not possible

a) IMF Aide Memoire, (September 2007 and June 2009);

b) MEF (2006), Budget, MEF, Government of Kosovo, Prishtinë/Priština.

c) KPST (2005), Annual Report 2005, KPST, Prishtinë/Priština.

d) Assessment obtained from KPST through e-mail.

e) CBAK (2006), Monthly Statistics Bulletin, No. 56, BPK, Prishtinë/Priština, April 2006.

f) SOK (2006), Price Statistics Division, Consumer Price Index, SOK, Government of Kosovo, Prishtinë/Priština.

The rest of the figures are from UNDP (2006), Early Warning Report No. 12: October - December 2005, UNDP, Prishtinë/Priština, op. cit.

g) United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees Kosovo.

h) BPK (2006), Monthly Statistics Bulletin, No. 56, BPK, Prishtinë/Priština, August 2006.

i) Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, 2006.

j) This is the trade deficit for the period Jan-Feb 2007, Statistical Office of Kosovo

k) This figure is reported at KPST's website, date of release February 7th, 2007

(l) CBAK (2007). Monthly Statistics Bulletin for December 2006. No (64). Prishtina

(m) Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance

(n) Ministry of Public Services of Kosova - Quarterly Bulletin May 2008

(p) CBAK - MONTHLY STATISTICS BULLETIN May 2008

(q) CBAK - MONTHLY STATISTICS BULLETIN

(r) CBAK - Annual Report 2008

(s) SOK, Gross Domestic Product in Kosovo 2004 - 2009

(t) MEF (2011), Budget, MEF, Government of Kosovo, Prishtinë/Priština

(u) CBAK (2010). Monthly Statistics Bulletin for March 2010. No (103). BPK Prishtina

## Selected Indicators from the Opinion Poll

Column 1	Mar 2005 a)	Sep 2005 b)	Jun 2006 c)	Dec 2006 d)	Jun 2007 e)	Dec 2007 f)	Sep 2008 g)	Nov 2008 o)	Jun 2009 p)	Sep 2009 q)	Jan 2010 r)	Apr 2010 s)	Nov 2010 t)	Trend
Political pessimism, % ("very dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied" with current political trends)	38.6	41.0	43.4	48.9	54.0	41.1	36.0	35.73%	26.78%	33.03%	41.08%	37.30%	66.90%	▲
Economic pessimism, % ("very dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied" with current economic trends)	71.1	68.8	76.0	76.2	70.7	64.6	53.0	55.0	43.48%	57.07%	60.31%	53.80%	72.10%	▲
Willingness to protest due to economic reasons, %	62.9	57.4	62.8	42.8	54.9	71.3	68.3	75.7%	64.32%	66.58%	63.40%	59.2%	72.4%	▲
Willingness to protest due to political reasons, %	48.9	45.4	45.5	30.9	31.2	58.6	49.2	59.5%	45.21%	50.68%	46.06%	49.2%	58.7%	▲
Satisfaction with UNMIK's performance*, %	29.7	34.5	30.5	28.0	31.5	27.7	25.4	20.8%	28.36%	23.11%	12.58%	22.20%	18.90%	▼
Satisfaction with SRSG's performance*, %	81.2	69.8	70.5	43.6	45.9	39.6	18.4	21.1%	33.66%	25.93%	17.79%	25.30%		
Satisfaction with Gov. Kosovo (before PISG) performance*, %	81.2	48.7	43.3	27.2	35.9		49.9	55.7%	53.13%	55.83%	36.72%	29.30%	25.10%	▼
Satisfaction with Assembly's performance*, %	73.7	59.0	45.4	25.6	31.9	36.7	46.0	49.0%	53.18%	46.37%	33.34%	34.10%	32.10%	◀▶
Satisfaction with KFOR's performance*, %	81.0	84.3	81.0	77.5	81.8	83.7	84.2	86.9%	72.88%	71.90%	77.63%	69.60%	81.70%	▲
Satisfaction with KPS performance*, %	86.9	84.5	81.8	72.5	79.3	78.6	80.0	80.9%	71.14%	70.96%	74.86%	74.30%	78.50%	▲
Feelings of insecurity ("Somewhat unsafe" or "very unsafe" while outdoors)	38.1	36.7	35.5	38.6	22.6*	55.25*	21.2	18.3	26.00%	17.87%	27.64%	29.90%	30.60%	◀▶

\* includes "satisfied" and "very satisfied" (question was redesigned in June 2007, therefore June results are not comparable to earlier results)

Sources:

a) UNDP, Early Warning Report March 2005, UNDP, Prishtinë/Priština, op. cit.

b) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2005.

c) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2006

d) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Dec 2006

e) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2007

f) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Dec 2007

g) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2008

o) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Nov 2008

p) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2009

q) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2009

r) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jan 2010

s) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Apr 2010





## Foreword

This is the first edition of the Public Pulse Report, a continuation of previous Early Warning Reports – a series that commenced in August 2002. We continue to enjoy the sponsorship of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that shares the cost of the report. The report provides valuable analysis of public perceptions while Kosovo<sup>1</sup> consolidates its democracy and makes progress towards strengthening of its institutions and prudent governing. The new Public Pulse Report lifts the analysis from early warning and conflict prevention, to democratic dialogue and monitoring of institutional stability. Through this biannual analysis and related debates we hope to increase the communication between public and democratic institutions.

This edition of the report is published in a period of intensive and important developments with the Kosovo national elections, creation of new central institutions, and preparations of Pristina- Belgrade dialogue under the auspices of the European Union. In this regard, continued monitoring of public perception indicators may prove to be a necessary tool for obtaining insight into the opinion of Kosovo people on those respective processes.

As an innovation in this report we have developed 2 new indices, the Democratization Index and the Economic Confidence Index. The Democratization Index of 0.92 demonstrates that Kosovans only partially believe that democratic processes in Kosovo are going in the right direction. Similarly the Economic Confidence Index value of 0.61 demonstrates that respondents in general have an unfavourable opinion on the economic situation. The challenges and limitations of governmental or public institutions are enormous but so is the public demand and eagerness for visible improvements in Kosovo. Some important highlights of the report are:

- The latest Public Pulse Poll results show a general decline in people's satisfaction with the work of Kosovo's key executive, legislative, and judicial institutions.

- 72% of respondents of all ethnicities seem to be dissatisfied with the economic direction in which Kosovo is headed. 72% of Kosovans seem ready and willing to join public protests organized due to economic reasons as opposed to 59% of them who would do the same for political reasons. According to the survey data, Kosovans identify unemployment (30%) and poverty (29%) as the two top paramount problems that Kosovo faces. The third paramount problem that Kosovo faces is corruption (11%).
- In terms of prospects for the normalization of the interethnic relations between K-Albanians and K-Serbs, about one third of all respondents believe that these relations will normalize in the distant future.
- K-Albanians continue to be highly satisfied with the work of security institutions in Kosovo. Among K-Serbs, satisfaction with security institutions in Kosovo has seen significant increases since April 2010

While the report might be of interest to the general reader, its primary aim is to provide a platform of perceptions and mechanism to facilitate the public policy making process in an ever consolidating Kosovo democracy. All conclusions and proposed recommendations presented in this report are a result of several rounds of discussions with experts from diverse areas, backgrounds and institutional settings.

We remain confident that the set of analyses presented here will stimulate a lot of thought and further discussions among readers and opinion makers in Kosovo. It gives us great pleasure, therefore, to extend our appreciation and gratitude to the contributing experts that participated in discussions and provided insights, perspectives and interpreted the results of the poll, and to all those who supported us in the process of completing this edition.

Parviz Fartash  
Director, UNDP Kosovo

<sup>1</sup> For UNDP, all references to Kosovo on this document are made in the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The latest Public Pulse Poll results show a general decline in satisfaction with the work of Kosovo's key executive, legislative, and judicial institutions.
- Between April 2010 and November 2010, satisfaction levels with the work of the Government of Kosovo and that of the Prime Minister have dropped by about 4 and 6 percentage points, respectively, hitting their lowest ever levels since March 2007.
- The President, however, has seen the largest drop of about 24 percentage points, among all institutions, in satisfaction levels since April 2010, thereby hitting the lowest ever level of only 31% of people being satisfied with his work.
- About 67% of all respondents are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the political direction of Kosovo. Only less than 10% seem to be satisfied or very satisfied with Kosovo's current political direction, while about 20% are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.
- Over half of all respondents indicate that the primary holder of responsibility for Kosovo's present political situation is the Government of Kosovo (54%), followed by political parties (17%), and EULEX (9%).
- According to the latest poll, Kosovo's democratization index is 0.92, which means that most people do not perceive that democratization process are going in the right direction.
- On average, only about a quarter of all respondents see the Kosovo democratic processes going in the right direction and being well institutionalized as opposed to almost half of them who do not agree. Another quarter of respondents, however, either did not answer or did not have an opinion.
- About 72% of respondents of all ethnicities seem to be either dissatisfied with the economic direction in which Kosovo is headed. Only 6% of respondents, however, seem to be satisfied with the economic direction in which Kosovo headed, while some 19% are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.
- As to the question of who is primarily responsible for Kosovo's economic situation, about 71% of all Kosovans place this responsibility on the Government of Kosovo. No more than a total of 9% of respondents place this responsibility on the international community (EULEX, ICO and UNMIK combined), and only about 6% select the local government as the primary holder of the responsibility for Kosovo's economic situation, while only 2% place this responsibility on the business community.
- About 72% of Kosovans seem ready and willing to join public protests organized due to economic reasons as opposed to 59% who would do the same for political reasons.
- About 63% of respondents expect the economic situation to improve over the next two years. Some 17%, however, believe the situation will remain unchanged while another 6% believe the situation will only get worse over the next two years.
- Kosovo's overall Economic Confidence Index is 0.92, meaning that on average Kosovans do not have a favourable opinion of the economy.
- According to the survey data, Kosovans identify unemployment (30%) and poverty (29%) as the two paramount problems that Kosovo faces. The third paramount problem that Kosovo faces is corruption (11%).
- On average, 32% of Kosovans believe that family connections are the most important factor, followed by 24% who believe that bribes are the most important factor for one's chances of employment in the public sector. Only 12% of respondents believe that education is important when one seeks employment in the public sector, followed by 10% who believe that party allegiance is the most important thing.
- In terms of prospects for the normalization of the interethnic relations between K-Albanians and K-Serbs, about one third of all respondents believe that these relations will normalize in the distant future. Some 18% believe that these relations will normalize in the near future while the same proportion of respondents believes that these relations will never normalize. Only 3% believe that interethnic relations between K-Albanians and K-Serbs are already normal.
- Some 46% of K-Serbs (as opposed to 6% in April 2010) would agree to work with K-Albanians. About 45% (as opposed to 6% in April 2010) of K-Serbs would agree to live in the same town with K-Albanians, followed by 27% (as opposed to 5% in April 2010) who would agree to live on the same street with K-Albanians.
- K-Albanians continue to be highly satisfied with the work of security institutions in Kosovo. The November 2010 Public Pulse poll results show that their satisfaction with KFOR has increased by some 12 percentage points since April 2010, while their

satisfaction for the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and Kosovo Police has not increased significantly since April 2010. The satisfaction level of K-Albanians with the EULEX Police has slightly decreased by some 4 percentage points since April 2010.

- Among K-Serbs, satisfaction with security institutions in Kosovo has seen significant increases since April 2010. Indeed, their satisfaction with KFOR, Kosovo Police, and EULEX Police increased by double-digit percentage points: 18, 14, and 13,

respectively, since April 2010. Their satisfaction with KSF also increased by a total of 5.5 percentage points since April 2010.

- There seems to be a rather steep increase since April 2010 in the proportion of respondents feeling that they were discriminated against in the last six months. About 15% of K-Albanians, 22% of K-Serbs, and 32% of Other minority respondents said that they faced a situation in which they felt discriminated against.

# CHAPTER 1

## Politics and Institutions

### Satisfaction with Institutions and Political Processes

The latest Public Pulse Poll results show a general decline in people's satisfaction with the work of Kosovo's key executive, legislative, and judicial institutions.

Between April 2010 and November 2010, satisfaction levels with the work of the Government of Kosovo and that of the Prime Minister have dropped by about 4 and 6 percentage points, respectively, hitting their lowest ever levels since March 2007.

The legislative institutions, such as the Parliament and the Speaker of the Parliament, have both seen their levels of satisfaction drop by about 2 percentage points.

The President, however, has seen the largest drop of about 24 percentage points, among all institutions, in satisfaction levels since April 2010, thereby hitting the lowest ever level of only 31% of people being satisfied with his work.

to the survey data, about 67% of all respondents are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the political direction of Kosovo. Only less than 10% seem to be satisfied or very satisfied with Kosovo's current political direction, while about 20% are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.

When asked to indicate who, in their opinion, is the most responsible for Kosovo's present political situation, respondents' answers seem to slightly differ based on their respective ethnic backgrounds. For instance, a significantly larger portion of K-Serb and Other minority respondents find EULEX more responsible for the political situation in Kosovo than do K-Albanians. On other counts, however, respondents seem to share similar views. On average, over half of K-Albanians (55%) and more than 44% of K-Serbs and 45% of Other minority respondents put this responsibility on the Government of Kosovo.

Overall, according to the survey data, over half of all respondents indicate that the primary holder of re-

**Table 1.1:** Satisfaction with Kosovo's Key Institutions (in percent)

		Mar-07	Jun-07	Oct-07	Dec-07	May-08	Jul-08	Oct-08	Apr-09	Junw-09	Sep-09	Jan-10	Apr-10	Nov-10
Satisfaction with executive government	Government	30.50%	35.99%	28.12%		46.85%	49.85%	55.71%	38.00%	53.13%	55.83%	36.72%	29.21%	25.06%
	Prime minister	54.00%	66.00%	61.00%		72.00%	63.23%	63.12%	39.81%	53.84%	51.98%	41.50%	36.36%	30.65%
Satisfaction with legislative	Parliament	31.00%	31.96%	36.19%	36.76%	51.36%	46.00%	49.03%	33.63%	53.18%	46.37%	33.34%	34.05%	32.10%
	Speaker of parliament	35.43%	33.23%	37.14%	35.10%	56.48%	43.55%	46.97%	32.77%	51.59%	49.45%	40.30%	36.03%	33.25%
	President	52.00%	64.00%	59.00%	61.00%	74.00%	68.09%	69.93%	45.66%	61.72%	60.75%	56.63%	54.88%	30.84%
Satisfaction with judiciary	Court	20.00%	20.00%	18.00%	18.00%	21.00%	19.52%	19.71%	20.04%	32.65%	25.60%	14.73%	27.21%	18.50%
	Prosecutor's office	22.70%	19.79%	17.70%	18.27%	22.66%	22.79%	21.05%	20.46%	31.74%	25.74%	14.81%	26.85%	15.06%

The judiciary is no exception to this overall drop in people's satisfaction with the work of Kosovo's key institutions. The satisfaction level with the work of Kosovo courts has also dropped by about 9 percentage points since April 2010. A drop of about 12 percentage points marked the level of satisfaction with the work of the Prosecutor's Office, bringing it down to only 15% compared to 27% in April 2010.

The majority of Kosovo's population, according to the latest Public Pulse Poll, seem to be quite concerned with Kosovo's political direction. Indeed, according


**Table 1.2:** Satisfaction with Kosovo's political direction, by ethnicity (in percent)

	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
Very satisfied	1.9%		2.8%	1.8%
Satisfied	8.4%	1.4%	8.5%	7.9%
Neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied	20.0%	8.2%	26.8%	19.7%
Dissatisfied	31.3%	50.7%	36.6%	32.8%
Very dissatisfied	35.2%	31.5%	21.1%	34.1%
Don't know	2.6%	5.5%	1.4%	2.7%
No answer	.7%	2.7%	2.8%	1.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

sponsibility for Kosovo's present political situation is the Government of Kosovo (54%), followed by political parties (17%), and EULEX (9%).

of them expressed no readiness to join such public protests. In general, according to the survey data, K-Albanians and Other minority respondents seem


**Figure 1.1:** Who is most responsible for Kosovo's political situation?



In regards to the latest political crisis that took Kosovo into the extraordinary elections that were held on 12 December 2010, respondents seem equally to blame both governing coalition partners, PDK and LDK, for causing the crisis. About 30% of respondents blamed PDK, while some 28% blamed LDK for causing the latest political crisis in Kosovo. Less than 10% of respondents, however, blamed the opposition and the international community for the latest political crisis.

It is interesting to note, though, that while K-Albanians put more blame on PDK than LDK for the latest political crisis, both K-Serbs and Other minority respondents held the opposite opinion placing more blame on LDK than PDK.


**Figure 1.2:** Responses on the question of who is responsible for Kosovo's latest political crisis.



Moreover, respondents were asked whether they would join public protests organized due to political reasons. Overall, more than half of all respondents answered positively, while slightly more than one-third

more ready and willing to join political protests than do K-Serbs.

**Figure 1.3:** Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons, by ethnicity (percent of "YES" responses)



**Table 1.3:** Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons, by urban/rural divide

			Ethnicity			
			K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Urban	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	60.0%	48.5%	50.0%	58.6%
		No	34.5%	36.4%	42.0%	35.2%
		NA	5.5%	15.2%	8.0%	6.2%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Rural	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	61.2%	36.6%	33.3%	58.7%
		No	35.8%	53.7%	61.9%	37.8%
		NA	3.0%	9.8%	4.8%	3.5%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When divided based on their place of residence, one can see that over half of urban and rural respondents, regardless of ethnicity, would join public protests for

political reasons. While this division is not significant for the K-Albanians, one can see that more urban than rural K-Serbs and Other minority respondents are willing to join such protests.

When the same data is broken down by region, Pejë/Peç (69%), Gjakovë/Djakovica (68%), and Gjilan/Gnjilane (62%) turn out to be the top three regions in terms of having the most number of respondents

**Table 1.4:** Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons – by gender

			Ethnicity			
			K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Male	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	62.3%	36.1%	51.0%	60.1%
		No	35.4%	50.0%	44.9%	36.8%
		NA	2.4%	13.9%	4.1%	3.1%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Female	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	58.8%	47.4%	31.8%	57.0%
		No	35.0%	42.1%	54.5%	36.2%
		NA	6.2%	10.5%	13.6%	6.8%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The poll results also show that more male than female respondents, regardless of ethnicity, are willing to join public protests for political reasons. About 60% of male and some 57% of female respondents expressed their willingness to join such protests. In the case of K-Serbs, however, more females (47%) than males (36%) are willing to join public protests due to political reasons.

who expressed their willingness to protest for political reasons. The top three regions, however, with the highest number of those not willing to protest are Ferizaj/Uroševac (46%), Prishtinë/Pristina (41%), and Gjilan/Gnjilane (35%).

### Democratization and Public Participation in Political and Civic Life

**Table 1.5:** Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons – by region

Region			Ethnicity			
			K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Prishtinë / Pristina	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	56.9%	52.2%	33.3%	55.4%
		No	39.7%	39.1%	66.7%	41.1%
		No Answer	3.4%	8.7%	.0%	3.6%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mitrovicë / Mitrovica	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	59.6%	47.1%	33.3%	56.3%
		No	30.1%	41.2%	50.0%	33.0%
		No Answer	10.3%	11.8%	16.7%	10.8%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Prizren	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	61.0%	.%	46.4%	59.5%
		No	33.9%		42.9%	34.8%
		No Answer	5.1%		10.7%	5.7%
		Total	100.0%	.%	100.0%	100.0%
Peje / Peç	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	70.5%		50.0%	69.4%
		No	27.5%		37.5%	28.0%
		NA	2.0%		12.5%	2.5%
		Total	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%
Ferizaj / Uroševac	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	48.9%	25.0%	100.0%	48.6%
		No	45.9%	75.0%	.0%	46.4%
		No Answer	5.2%			5.0%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Gjakovë / Djakovica	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	68.0%		71.4%	68.3%
		No	30.7%		28.6%	30.5%
		No Answer	1.3%			1.2%
		Total	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%
Gjilan / Gnjilane	Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons	Yes	68.8%	20.0%	50.0%	61.9%
		No	31.3%	60.0%	50.0%	35.4%
		No Answer		20.0%	.0%	2.7%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



Based on the data shown in figure 1.4, a democratization index has been calculated. The democratization index which ranges from 0 to 3 is designed with the aim of measure the perceptions of Kosovans on issues pertain to democratization processes. A democratization index of below 1.5 points represents the assessment that Kosovans do not perceive that democratization processes are going in right direction, specifically more respondents have negative opinions on the democratic process than positive assessment. On the other hand, democratization index of above 1.5 points means that perceptions on democratization are generally positive, more respondents believe that democratic processes are going in the right direction.

**Table 1.7 :** Mean of the Democratization Index composition

	Are the elections in Kosovo democratic and in accordance with international standards?	Does the Parliament monitor the Government performance?	Is Judiciary System in Kosovo independent on its decisions?	Does media in Kosovo enjoys the freedom of expression?	Does Civil Society in Kosovo serve as, a truthful monitor of democratic developments in Kosovo?	Is your Local (municipal) Government working according to priorities of Kosovo citizens?	Is Kosovo Government working according to priorities of Kosovo citizens?	Is Kosovo Constitution as well as Laws in power democratic and do they respect the Human Rights?
Mean	1.04	0.91	0.60	1.10	0.95	1.01	0.59	1.08

According to the latest poll, Kosovo's democratization index is 0.92, which means that most people do not perceive that democratization processes are going in the right direction.

Similar to the democratization index, based on the data shown in figure 1.5, a participation index has been calculated for Kosovo. The participation index which ranges between 0 and 3 measures the level of people's participation in Kosovo's political and civic life. A participation index of 0 would mean that there is no public participation in Kosovo's political and civic life, while a participation index of 3 would mean that there is complete public participation in Kosovo's political and civic life.

According to the latest poll, however, Kosovo's participation index is 0.24, meaning that the public participation in Kosovo's political and civic life is very low. In-

deed, when broken down by gender, the average participation index seems to be slightly higher for males (0.27) than it is for females (0.21).

**Table 1.6:** Democratization and Participation Indexes

	Min	Max	Kosovo Average
Democratization Index	0	3	0.92
Democratization Index (Male)	0	3	0.94
Democratization Index (Female)	0	3	0.89
Participation Index	0	3	0.24
Participation Index (Male)	0	3	0.27
Participation Index (Female)	0	3	0.21


Democratization index is composed as presented on the table below:

Some indicators of democratization for which the Public Pulse poll gathered data demonstrate that only about one-third of Kosovans believe that the Kosovo Constitution and Kosovo laws are democratic and respect human rights, that the municipal governments work according to priorities of their residents, that the media enjoys the freedom of expression, and that the elections are democratic and in accordance with the international standards.

Moreover, a very small proportion of Kosovans, about 15%, believe that the Government of Kosovo works in accordance with the priorities of the Kosovans, and that the Kosovo judiciary is independent in decision-making.

About 27% of Kosovans, however, believe that the Kosovo civil society serves as a truthful monitor of democratic developments in Kosovo, and that the Parliament of Kosovo does indeed monitor the performance of the Government of Kosovo.


**Figure 1.4:** Percentage of affirmative responses to Democratization Index questions (percent of responses who "agree fully or mainly")



In an effort to measure the public participation in Kosovo's political and civic life, the Public Pulse poll asked respondents to answer questions about their participation in activities deemed public, political, or civic within the last six months.

Participation in activities of a political party (15.50%) turns out to be the most popular way of participation in Kosovo's political and/or civic life. This is followed closely by participation in public discussions (15%), as well as participation in an NGO (13%), a citizens' initiative and projects implemented by the local government (11% each).

**Figure 1.5:** Affirmative responses to questions on participation during the last six months (percent of responses of active or not active participation)




Only about 5% of respondents, however, indicated their participation in projects implemented by the central government.

Given the fact that the poll was taken during an election year, the respondents were asked whether they believed that their votes could realistically change the situation in Kosovo.

The poll results show that about half of K-Albanians along with 40% of Other minority respondents as well as some 5% of K-Serbs believe that their votes can realistically change the situation in Kosovo. Of an opposite

opinion, however, are some 31% of K-Albanians along with some 62% of K-Serbs as well as some 37% of Other minority respondents. On average, some 46% as opposed to some 33% of Kosovans in general believe that their votes can realistically change the situation in Kosovo. About 21% of Kosovans have no answer or do not know whether their votes can indeed change anything.

**Figure 1.6:** Will your vote change the situation in Kosovo, by ethnicity (in percent)



Finally, the respondents were asked about their expectations in terms of the direction and institutionalization of Kosovo's democratic processes as a transition society. About 27% of K-Albanians along with 34% of Other minority respondents as well as only 1% of K-Serbs believe that the democratic processes are headed in the right direction and are being well institutionalized. Of an opposite opinion, however, are about 48% of K-Albanians along with the overwhelming majority of K-Serbs (77%) and 37% of Other minority respondents.

On average, only about a quarter of all respondents see the Kosovo democratic processes going in the right direction and being well institutionalized as opposed to almost half of them who do not agree. Another quarter of respondents, however, either did not answer or did not have an opinion.

**Table 1.8:** Views on the direction and institutionalization of democratic processes, by ethnicity

Regardless of daily politics and looking forward to the future, do you agree that the democratic processes in Kosovo are instituted and are going towards the right direction?	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
Yes	26.6%	1.4%	34.3%	25.6%
No	48.4%	76.7%	37.1%	49.4%
Don't know	21.9%	15.1%	22.9%	21.5%
NA	3.1%	6.8%	5.7%	3.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%



## CHAPTER 2

### The Socio-Economic Situation

#### Satisfaction with the Economy and Expectations

**Table 2.1:** Satisfaction with Kosovo's economic direction

	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
Satisfied	6.5%	1.4%	8.3%	6.3%
Dissatisfied	71.9%	80.8%	66.7%	72.1%

Similar to their satisfaction with the political direction in which Kosovo is presently headed, 72% of respondents of all ethnicities were dissatisfied with the economic direction in which Kosovo is headed. Only 6% of respondents were satisfied with the economic direction in which Kosovo headed, while some 19% were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.

**Table 2.2:** Who is most responsible for Kosovo's economic situation, by ethnicity?

	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
EULEX	4.8%	8.1%	9.7%	5.3%
ICO	1.1%		1.4%	1.0%
UNMIK	2.5%	6.8%	4.2%	2.8%
Kosovo Government	72.7%	54.1%	58.3%	70.8%
Local governments	5.8%	6.8%	4.2%	5.7%
Business community	2.0%	2.7%	5.6%	2.2%
Other	2.5%	6.8%	1.4%	2.7%
Don't know	8.1%	12.2%	12.5%	8.6%
NA	0.6%	2.7%	2.8%	0.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

As to who holds the primary responsibility for Kosovo's economic situation, 71% of all Kosovans place this responsibility on the Government of Kosovo. Less than 9% of respondents place this responsibility on the international community (EULEX, ICO and UNMIK

combined), 6% select the local government as the primary holder of the responsibility, and only 2% place this responsibility on the business community. When it comes to joining public protests due to economic reasons, the proportion of those willing to do so is higher than that of those willing to join political protests. 72% of Kosovans seem ready and willing to join public protests organized due to economic reasons as opposed to 59% of them who would do the same for political reasons. Once again, just like with political protests, K-Serbs exhibit the lowest percentage among all ethnicities of those willing to join economic protests.


Furthermore, when the data is broken down, the poll results show that on average some 77% of those living in an urban setting as opposed to 73% of those living in a rural setting are willing to protest for economic reasons, across all ethnicities.

**Table 2.3:** % of respondents willing to join public protests due to economic reasons – by urban/rural divide

		Ethnicity			
		K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Urban	Yes I will join public protests	79.2%	50.0%	66.0%	76.8%
	No I will not join public protests	20.8%	50.0%	34.0%	23.2%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Rural	Yes I will join public protests	75.8%	41.0%	52.6%	72.9%
	No I will not join public protests	24.2%	59.0%	47.4%	27.1%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Based on gender, however, more males (76%) than females (73%), across all ethnicities, are willing to join public protests for economic reasons. In the case of K-Serbs though there are more females (51.5%) than males (36%) who would join such protests.

**Figure 2.1:** % of respondents willing to join public protests due to economic reasons, by ethnicity



**Table 2.4:** % of respondents willing to join public protests due to economic reasons – by gender

		Ethnicity			
		K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Male	Yes I will join public protests	79.5%	36.4%	66.0%	76.4%
	No I will not join public protests	20.5%	63.6%	34.0%	23.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Femra	Yes I will join public protests	75.0%	51.5%	52.6%	72.9%
	No I will not join public protests	25.0%	48.5%	47.4%	27.1%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When broken down by region, the poll results show that the regions with the highest number of those willing to protest for economic reasons are Pejë/Pec (81%), Gjakovë/Djakovica (80.5%), and Prizren tied with Prishtinë/Prishtina (77%).

But, what are Kosovans' expectations in terms of the economic outlook? In the short-term (i.e. over the next six months), almost half of Kosovans believe things will not change. One third of them, however, have a positive attitude and believe that the economic situa-

**Table 2.5:** Readiness to join public protests due to economic reasons – by region


		Ethnicity			
		K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Prishtinë / Prishtina	Yes I will join public protests	79.8%	52.4%	55.6%	76.7%
	No I will not join public protests	20.2%	47.6%	44.4%	23.3%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mitrovicë / Mitrovica	Yes I will join public protests	72.3%	48.4%	40.0%	66.9%
	No I will not join public protests	27.7%	51.6%	60.0%	33.1%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Prizren	Yes I will join public protests	78.2%		65.4%	76.9%
	No I will not join public protests	21.8%		34.6%	23.1%
	Total	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%
Pejë / Peč	Yes I will join public protests	82.3%		62.5%	81.3%
	No I will not join public protests	17.7%		37.5%	18.7%
	Total	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%
Ferizaj / Uroševac	Yes I will join public protests	68.3%	25.0%	100.0%	67.4%
	No I will not join public protests	31.7%	75.0%		32.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Gjakovë / Djakovica	Yes I will join public protests	81.3%		71.4%	80.5%
	No I will not join public protests	18.7%		28.6%	19.5%
	Total	100.0%		100.0%	100.0%
Gjilan / Gnjilane	Yes I will join public protests	76.8%	25.0%	50.0%	70.6%
	No I will not join public protests	23.2%	75.0%	50.0%	29.4%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

On the other hand, the three regions with the lowest number of those willing to protest for economic reasons are Ferizaj/Uroševac tied with Mitrovicë/Mitrovica (67%) and Gjilan/Gnjilane (71%).

tion of Kosovo will improve over the next six months, while some 10% believe that the situation will only get worse.

In a rather longer term, namely over the next two


**Figure 2.2:** Expectations about the economic situation over the next six months, by ethnicity



years, Kosovans seem to have optimistic expectations. 63% of respondents expect the economic situation to improve over the next two years. Some 17%, however, believe the situation will remain unchanged while another 6% believe the situation will only get worse over the next two years. Whether in the short or long-term, K-Serbs seem to be the ethnicity with the lowest degree of optimism about Kosovo’s economic situation, namely exhibiting the lowest percentage of those that believe things will get better.

Just as the Democratization and Participation indices were calculated in Chapter 1, the Kosovo Economic Confidence Index was also calculated based on the data shown in figure 2.4. The Economic Confidence Index ranges between 0 and 3 with an index of 0 to 1.5 meaning that majority of Kosovans have no confidence in the economy. On the other hand index of 1.5 and above means that majority of Kosovans have confidence in the economy and an index of 3 meaning that all Kosovans have confidence in the economy.

**Figure 2.3:** Expectations about the economic situation over the next two years



Based on the Public Pulse poll data, Kosovo's overall Economic Confidence Index is 0.92, meaning that on average Kosovans do not have a favourable opinion of the economy.


**Table 2.6:** Economic Confidence Index

	Min	Max	Kosovo Average
Economic Confidence Index	0	3	0.92
Economic Confidence Index (Male)	0	3	0.85
Economic Confidence Index (Female)	0	3	0.99

The Economic Confidence Indicators that the poll measured included people's expectations about employment conditions in the short run (which is elaborated in greater detail in the next section of this chapter), their assessment of the current business conditions as well as their expectations about their family's total income in the near future.

Some 18% of respondents expressed favourable expectations about their near future family income while some 15% viewed their future employment conditions favourably. Only 4% of respondents, however, had a favourable view of the current employment conditions along with some 12.5% who had a favourable view of the current business conditions.

**Figure 2.4:** Economic Confidence Indicators (% of respondents who declared "Favourable")



### Employment and Perceptions of Large Scale Corruption

According to the survey data, Kosovans identify unemployment (selected by 30% of respondents) and poverty (29%) as the two paramount problems that Kosovo faces. In light of this, employment seems to be a very important way for Kosovans to move forward.

Regarding which of the following institutions implement fair recruiting, the private sector (21%), followed by international organizations (11%) and municipalities (8%) are believed to be the top three institutions that implement fair recruiting. Only 4% of respondents believe that each the Government of Kosovo


and the public sector (KEK, PTK, etc.) implement fair recruiting when hiring new employees.

**Table 2.7:** Fair recruiting in selected institutions / entities, by ethnicity

	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
Municipalities	7.6%	11.0%	8.5%	7.9%
Government	4.6%	0.0%	4.2%	4.3%
Public sector (KEK, PTK, etc.)	4.3%	5.5%	2.8%	4.3%
Private sector	21.3%	16.4%	16.9%	20.8%
International Organizations	10.3%	11.0%	25.4%	11.2%
NGOs	6.7%	9.6%	5.6%	6.8%
Don't know	33.9%	28.8%	25.4%	33.1%
No Answer	11.3%	17.8%	11.3%	11.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The survey data, however, provide us with some rather disturbing results in terms of what counts more when one seeks employment in the public sector. On average, 32% of Kosovans believe that family connections are the most important factor, followed by 24% who believe that bribes are the most important factor for one's chances of employment in the public sector. Only 12% of respondents believe that education is

**Figure 2.5:** Importance of factors that affect one's chances of employment in the public sector (% of respondents which rated each factor as the most important)



important when one seeks employment in the public sector, followed by 10% who believe that party allegiance is the most important thing.

**Figure 2.6:** Importance of factors that affect one's chances of employment in the public sector – legal/illegal (in percent)




If these factors were grouped into two categories – those required by rules and regulations and those that are deemed illegal or against rules and regulations – the poll data show that some 71% of respondents see the illegal factors as more important to gain employment in the public sector than the legal ones (21%).

According to the survey data, the third paramount problem that Kosovo faces, after unemployment (30%) and poverty (29%), is corruption (11%). In terms of people's perception of large scale corruption, KEK, PAK (Privatization Agency of Kosovo), and the Courts are the top three institutions with the highest public perception of large scale corruption.


The institutions with the least public perception of large scale corruption are Banks, Education, and NGOs.

**Figure 2.8:** Perceptions of large scale corruption



When respondents were asked whether in last six months they were in a situation whereby public officials have conditioned performing their services by asking for bribes, gifts, and other favours, 15% percent of respondents have confirmed a situation of conditioning, with "Other minorities" reporting highest conditioning (21%) while K-Serbs were conditioned the least (7%).

**Fig. 2.7** Public officials conditioning performing their services by asking for bribes, gifts, and other favours








## CHAPTER 3 Interethnic Relations

Interethnic relations remain an important determinant of Kosovo's path forward. While there are tensions among different ethnicities in Kosovo, there are also prospects that these relations will normalize. So, in terms of prospects for the normalization of the interethnic relations between K-Albanians and K-Serbs, about one third of all respondents believe that these relations will normalize in the distant future. Some 18% believe that these relations will normalize in the near future while the same proportion of respondents believes that these relations will never normalize. Only 3% believe that interethnic relations between K-Albanians and K-Serbs are already normal.

When divided based on their type of residence, out of respondents that consider interethnic relations to be tense and not improving, 20% come from the urban settings and 20% from the rural settings. Out of respondents that consider interethnic relations to be normal (not tense at all), 14% come from the urban settings while another 14% come from the rural settings.

When broken down based on the rural/urban divide, the data on perceived interethnic relations revealed no major differences. This is evidenced by the fact that


**Figure 3.1:** Prospects for normalization of interethnic relations



The November 2010 Public Pulse poll results show a slight decrease in the number of K-Serbs who believe that interethnic relations are tense and not improving. The data, however, shows no significant change in the opinion of the K-Albanians for this matter. For the K-Serbs, however, this indicator has dropped by some 17 percentage points since April 2010.

for rural and urban respondents alike, approximately 20% consider interethnic relations to be tense and not improving, and 14% consider interethnic relations to already be normal.

**Figure 3.2:** Percentage of respondents considering that interethnic relations continue to be tense and not improving



**Table 3.1:** Consideration of interethnic relations by rural/urban divide

		Ethnicity			
		K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Urban	Relations are tense and will continue to be such	17.1%	61.3%	21.6%	19.6%
	Relations are tense, but there are some improvements during recent past	26.3%	19.4%	33.3%	26.5%
	Relations are tense, but considerable improvements have been marked	20.9%	3.2%	13.7%	19.4%
	Relations are very tense	8.7%	3.2%	9.8%	8.5%
	Relations are not tense at all	15.2%	.0%	7.8%	13.9%
	Don't know	10.5%	9.7%	11.8%	10.6%
	No answer	1.3%	3.2%	2.0%	1.4%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
Rural	Relations are tense and will continue to be such	18.3%	43.9%	9.5%	19.7%
	Relations are tense, but there are some improvements during recent past	31.7%	17.1%	14.3%	30.2%
	Relations are tense, but considerable improvements have been marked	12.5%	12.2%	9.5%	12.4%
	Relations are very tense	10.8%	9.8%	14.3%	10.8%
	Relations are not tense at all	14.6%	.0%	23.8%	14.0%
	Don't know	10.3%	9.8%	19.0%	10.5%
	No answer	1.7%	7.3%	9.5%	2.4%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

When divided by age group, the poll results show that out of those respondents considering interethnic relations to be tense and not improving, almost half (46%) come from the youngest and the mid-age groups (18-24 and 31-36). Whereas, out of those respondents that consider interethnic relations to be normal, less than one-third (29%) come from the youngest and the eldest age groups.

The November 2010 Public Pulse poll results, just like previous Early Warning System polls, confirm that the reasons given for the lack of improvement of tense interethnic relations, especially between the K-Albanians and K-Serbs, remain different depending on ethnicity.

**Tabela 3.2:** Consideration of interethnic relations by age group


age group		Ethnicity			
		K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
18-24	Relations are tense and will continue to be such	22.9%	37.5%	17.6%	23.4%
	Relations are tense, but there are some improvements during recent past	25.2%	18.8%	35.3%	25.4%
	Relations are tense, but considerable improvements have been marked	16.7%	.0%	11.8%	15.5%
	Relations are very tense	8.9%	18.8%	5.9%	9.3%
	Relations are not tense at all	13.6%		5.9%	12.4%
	Don't know	11.2%	25.0%	11.8%	12.0%
	No answer	1.6%	.0%	11.8%	2.1%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

25-30	Relations are tense and will continue to be such	14.4%	50.0%	15.4%	17.5%
	Relations are tense, but there are some improvements during recent past	34.4%	12.5%	23.1%	31.7%
	Relations are tense, but considerable improvements have been marked	18.8%	6.3%	7.7%	16.9%
	Relations are very tense	7.5%	6.3%	7.7%	7.4%
	Relations are not tense at all	16.3%	6.3%	15.4%	15.3%
	Don't know	8.8%	12.5%	23.1%	10.1%
	No answer		6.3%	7.7%	1.1%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
31-36	Relations are tense and will continue to be such	20.1%	50.0%	25.0%	22.6%
	Relations are tense, but there are some improvements during recent past	25.2%	16.7%	25.0%	24.5%
	Relations are tense, but considerable improvements have been marked	18.0%	16.7%	25.0%	18.2%
	Relations are very tense	5.0%	8.3%	.0%	5.0%
	Relations are not tense at all	13.7%		12.5%	12.6%
	Don't know	15.8%	8.3%	12.5%	15.1%
	No answer	2.2%	.0%		1.9%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
37-45	Relations are tense and will continue to be such	13.4%	50.0%	21.4%	15.3%
	Relations are tense, but there are some improvements during recent past	30.8%	20.0%	35.7%	30.6%
	Relations are tense, but considerable improvements have been marked	21.4%	10.0%	7.1%	20.2%
	Relations are very tense	6.3%	10.0%	7.1%	6.5%
	Relations are not tense at all	14.3%		14.3%	13.7%
	Don't know	10.3%	10.0%	14.3%	10.5%
	No answer	3.6%	.0%	.0%	3.2%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
>=46	Relations are tense and will continue to be such	17.0%	64.7%	17.6%	19.2%
	Relations are tense, but there are some improvements during recent past	30.5%	23.5%	23.5%	29.9%
	Relations are tense, but considerable improvements have been marked	11.4%	11.8%	11.8%	11.5%
	Relations are very tense	15.8%	.0%	23.5%	15.5%
	Relations are not tense at all	16.7%		17.6%	16.0%
	Don't know	8.2%	.0%	5.9%	7.7%
	No answer	.3%	.0%		.3%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

One-third of K-Albanians believe that the main factor for tense K-Serb – K-Albanian relations is the influence of Belgrade, followed by lack of readiness of K-Serbs to be integrated in Kosovo society (selected as the main factor by 17% of K-Albanian respondents). Other minorities have a similar opinion to K-Albanians with regard to the principal factors for tense K-Serb – K-Albanian relations. Some 23% of minorities think that influence of Belgrade is the main factor, followed by

some 23% citing the lack of readiness of K-Serbs to be integrated in Kosovo society as the main factor. On the other hand, K-Serbs believe that the major factors for tense relations with K-Albanians are the attitudes of the K-Albanian leaders (selected by 41% of respondents as the principal factor), followed by the insufficient efforts on the part of K-Albanians to better foster interethnic integration (selected by 17% of respondents).

**Figure 3.3:** Factors for tense K-Serb – K-Albanian relations, by ethnicity



Another important indicator of interethnic relations is the willingness of K-Serbs to work and live together with K-Albanians. As can be seen from figure 3.4, there has been an important increase, since the April 2010 reporting period, in the readiness of K-Serbs to work with K-Albanians, live in the same town and on the same street with K-Albanians.


Some 46% of K-Serbs (as opposed to 6% in April 2010) would agree to work with K-Albanians. 45% (as opposed to 6% in April 2010) of K-Serbs would agree to live in the same town with K-Albanians, followed by 27% (as opposed to 5% in April 2010) who would agree to live on the same street with K-Albanians.

As far as interethnic marriages are concerned, about 4% of K-Serbs show willingness to marry K-Albanians.


Just like the attitudes of K-Serbs, the attitudes of K-Albanians towards either living in the same town or on the same street or working with K-Serbs have also seen important positive changes.

According to the November 2010 Public Pulse poll results, some 48.5% (as opposed to 36% in April 2010) of K-Albanians would agree to work with K-Serbs, while some 47% (as opposed to 29% in April 2010) of them would agree to live in the same town with K-Serbs, and some 42% (as opposed to 25% in April 2010) would agree to live on the same street with K-Serbs. Only 5% of K-Albanians though would marry K-Serbs.

**Figure 3.4:** K-Serbs willing to live and work with K-Albanians



**Figure 3.5:** K-Albanians willing to live and work with K-Serbs



## CHAPTER 4

### Public and Personal Safety and Security

#### Satisfaction and Relations with Security Institutions

K-Albanians continue to be highly satisfied with the work of security institutions in Kosovo. The November 2010 Public Pulse poll results show that their satisfaction with KFOR has increased by some 12 percentage points since April 2010, while their satisfaction for the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and Kosovo Police has not increased significantly since April 2010. The satisfaction level of K-Albanians with the EULEX Police has slightly decreased by some 4 percentage points since April 2010.

Figure 4.3: Safety when outside, by gender






Figure 4.1: Percentage of K-Albanian respondents which are satisfied with security institutions



Among K-Serbs, satisfaction with security institutions in Kosovo has seen significant increases since April 2010. Indeed, their satisfaction with KFOR, Kosovo Police, and EULEX Police increased by double-digit percentage points: 18, 14, and 13, respectively, since April 2010. Their satisfaction with KSF also increased by a


total of 5.5 percentage points since April 2010. Furthermore, respondents were asked to assess the police-community relations. Out of all respondents, only 7% considered the police-community relations to be bad or very bad. Broken down by gender, of this opinion were some 6% of K-Albanians along with some 34% of K-Serbs and some 8% of Other minority respondents.

Figure 4.2: Percentage of K-Serb respondents which are satisfied with security institutions



total of 5.5 percentage points since April 2010. Apart from their satisfaction with Kosovo's security institutions, the poll also asked respondents about their safety. A gender-based analysis of the data shows that slightly more men than women feel safe (60% vs. 55%) while outside. On the other hand, about 38% of women as compared to 28% of men feel unsafe while outside.


Figure 4.4: Bad or very bad police-community relations, by ethnicity



## Discrimination and Social Tension

According to the current poll, when asked about whether they were in a situation in which they felt discriminated against in the last six months, the majority of respondents, regardless of ethnicity, responded negatively. Yet, there seems to be a rather steep increase since April 2010 in the portion of respondents feeling that they were discriminated against in the last six months. About 15% of K-Albanians, 22% of K-Serbs, and 32% of other minority respondents said that they faced a situation in which they felt discriminated against.

**Figure 4.5:** Perceptions of discrimination for the last six months, by ethnicity



Those who felt discriminated against reported several bases upon which discrimination took place.

The current poll results show that the top three bases of discrimination are ethnicity, political or other opinion, and language.

**Table 4.1:** Basis for discrimination

	Number of Responses	Percent
Sex/gender	19	1.5%
Age	20	1.5%
Language	41	3.2%
Religion/belief	10	.8%
Ethnicity/nationality	71	5.5%
Political or other opinion	43	3.3%
Sexual orientation	1	.1%
Disability	12	.9%
Other: place of residence, refugee/IDP/ migrant status, nationality, social status, health status, etc.	48	3.7%
No answer	1034	79.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1299</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

As to what institution or entity respondents consider the most responsible for the perceived discrimination against them, the top three institutions selected by respondents (regardless of ethnicity) are the Central Government, Municipalities, and Kosovo Police.

For K-Albanians who perceive they have been discriminated against, the top three institutions are the Central Government, Municipalities, and Public Health institutions, while for K-Serbs they are the, Kosovo Police followed by a tie between one of the international presences in Kosovo and Municipalities.

Central Government, Municipalities, followed by a tie

between the Kosovo Police, Courts, a Public Company, and Public Health are the top three entities responsible for discrimination against the Other minority respondents.

**Table 4.2:** Institutions most responsible for discrimination, by ethnicity

	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Municipalities	3.2%	2.8%	4.2%	3.2%
Kosovo Police	1.5%	4.2%	2.8%	1.7%
Courts	1.3%	1.4%	2.8%	1.4%
Kosovo Property Agency (KPA or KAP)	.3%	.0%		.2%
A public company (KEK, PTK, Water companies etc)	.6%	1.4%	2.8%	.8%
A private Company	.5%	1.4%	1.4%	.6%
A public health institution	1.6%	.0%	2.8%	1.6%
A private health institution		.0%	.0%	.0%
A public school or academic institution	1.1%	.0%		.9%
A private school or academic institution	.3%		.0%	.2%
Central Government (ministries others services provided by them)	3.6%	1.4%	8.5%	3.8%
One of the international presences in Kosovo	.4%	2.8%	1.4%	.6%
Other	.7%	1.4%	1.4%	.8%
Don't know	1.3%	1.4%	1.4%	1.3%
NA	83.6%	81.9%	70.4%	82.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>


Moreover, the top three groups perceived by respondents as subject to discrimination include persons with disabilities, women and the elderly. While K-Albanians side with the same three groups identified above, K-Serbs identify themselves, youth, and persons with disabilities as the three groups most vulnerable to discrimination. Other minority respondents identify the RAE community, women and youth as well as persons with disabilities as the top three groups subject to discrimination.

**Table 4.3:** Groups perceived by respondents as most subject to discrimination, by ethnicity

	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Women/girls	17.4%	2.7%	9.9%	16.1%
Children	8.1%	.0%	.0%	7.2%
Youth	10.6%	5.5%	8.5%	10.2%
Old people	16.3%	2.7%	7.0%	15.0%
Kosovo Serbs	1.0%	57.5%	4.2%	4.4%
Kosovo Albanians	4.5%	.0%	.0%	4.0%
Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians	4.4%	8.2%	32.4%	6.2%
Other communities (including Bosnians, Turks, Gorani, Montenegrins)	.5%		5.6%	.8%
Lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals	2.5%	1.4%	1.4%	2.4%
Persons with disabilities, including those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments	20.1%	5.5%	8.5%	18.6%
Other	2.5%	1.4%	2.8%	2.4%
Don't know	10.0%	12.3%	14.1%	10.4%
No Answer	2.0%	2.7%	5.6%	2.3%

Additionally, the respondents were asked to identify whether social tensions exist between certain social groups. The top three groups with the highest tension between them, according to the poll results, are the government and opposition parties, management and workers, different ethnic groups tied with the poor and rich group. On the other hand, the top three groups with the least or no tension between them are the elderly and young, different religious groups, and men and women.

**Figure 4.6:** Tensions between certain social groups



This section of the report presents a brief analysis of the perceptions of citizens on importance, use, knowledge and optimism about visa liberalization, as well as perceptions of the benefits that the freedom of movement would have for Kosovans. It also includes citizens' opinions concerning the reasons why Kosovo remains excluded from the visa liberalization process.






# CHAPTER 5

## By: Atdhe Hetemi - The EU Visa Liberalisation Process

### Importance and use of visas

Year 2010 finds Kosovo as the only country in the Balkan Region that doesn't enjoy the freedom of movement in regard to EU countries and has not yet started the process of visa liberalization. Based on the opinion poll results an overwhelming majority of respondents (81%) think that visa liberalization is an important process for Kosovo citizens. Only 9% of all respondents think that, this process has little or no importance at all. (Fig 5.1)


**Figure 5.1:** Opinions on importance of visa liberalization for Kosovo citizens




There is a clear difference in opinions between K-Serbs, for which visa liberalization seems to be less important, and K-Albanians and Other minority respondents for which this issue seems to have very much importance. (Fig 5.2). When this issue was debated with the Focus Group experts, they concluded that the reason that most K-Serbs responded "don't know or has no answer", or believe that Kosovo visa liberalization has "not at all or little importance", is due to the fact that the majority of them already possess Serbian passports. When the importance of visa liberalization was analyzed on an age and gender basis, it was evident that this issue has significant importance for all generations that live in Kosovo as well as both genders.

When respondents were asked whether they "would personally benefit from the visa liberalization" 65% of them stated that they would benefit from this process, whereas 18% of them said no (Fig 5.3). It is noted that even though this process has importance for 81% (Fig 5.1) of respondents, not all of them believe that they would personally benefit from this.

**Figure 5.2:** Opinions on importance of visa liberalization for Kosovo citizens, by ethnicity




**Figure 5.3:** Perception on personal benefit from visa liberalization, by ethnicity



Again, the clear difference is visible when it comes to ethnicities, as the data reveals that a full 50% of K-Serbs believe they would not benefit from this process, along with a further 33% who answered that “maybe” they would benefit from this process. In contrast, the majority of both K-Albanians and Others think that they would benefit from this process. (Fig. 5.3)

**Figure 5.4:** Perception on personal benefit from visa liberalization, by education



When results were analyzed by level of education, the percentage of those that believe they would benefit from visa liberalization is highest among those with elementary education (63%), followed by those who with secondary education (56%) and higher education (55%). (Fig. 5.4) No significant differences in the results were noticed on this question when analyses were disaggregated by rural/urban or gender.

Continued delay of visa liberalization with the EU for Kosovans is considered a barrier for their freedom of movement beyond Kosovo’s borders. However, despite bureaucratic rules and regulations for obtaining visas in the current system, each working day there are long lines in front of almost all functional embassies in Kosovo. Even though people must endure long procedures, high costs and painful waiting hours, during the last 6 months alone, citizens of Kosovo have submitted approximately 150,000-200,000 visa applications.

**Figure 5.5:** Percentage of respondents that applied for Schengen visa in the last 6 months





Figure 5.5 shows that, during the last 6 months, 10% of respondents applied for a Schengen visa. The majority of them were youth from 18 – 36 years of age (32%), and possessed tertiary education (15%).


**Figure 5.6:** Status of application for those respondents who applied for a Schengen visa in the last 6 months



From those that applied for visas during the last six months, 50% of them were successful (fig 5.6).

When analyzed on an ethnic basis, it was revealed that most respondents who received visas were K-Serbs followed by Other communities, and K-Albanians (fig 5.7).

**Figure 5.7:** Percentage of those who received visa, by ethnicity




### Knowledge

In the case that visa liberalization was granted, it appears that 78% of respondents would use their right and travel to the European countries for different purposes. According to the survey results, 21% of them would use this for family visit, followed by 19% that would travel for touristic reasons. While for 11% of respondents education would be the main purpose of traveling to EU countries. The largest number of respondents to this question (22%) had no answer for which purpose they would use the freedom of movement to EU (Fig. 5.8).

There is a slight difference among rural and urban respondents, with those living in the cities stating that they would use the visas primarily for family visits, employment, business and education, more than those living in the rural areas.

**Figure 5.8:** The main purpose of traveling to European Countries




The most worrying result in this table is the 15% of respondents that selected employment as their main reason for travel to European countries. Taking into consideration that visa liberalization does not apply for employment purposes this result suggests this group of respondents is not well informed about the visa liberalization process and its application.

purpose of travel, followed by tourism and education reasons. Whereas when it comes to Other communities, employment would be the main purpose of traveling to EU countries. For the majority of K-Serbs, touristic visits followed by employment are the main reasons selected (Fig 5.9).

When analyzed by gender, most females would travel for family visits (27%) followed by tourism (19%). Whereas for 14% of females the main reason they would travel to EU countries is education, only 8% of males stated that they would do so for the same purpose, whereas for about 18% of males the main purpose of travel would be tourist visits and employment. (Fig 5.10).

It is worth mentioning that the European Commission has highlighted that Kosovo will be included in the visa liberalization process, but only when it meets the necessary conditions<sup>1</sup>. Although no specific conditions and no “roadmap” for Kosovo regarding visa liberalization has been announced by EU, it is quite likely that Kosovo will have to meet the minimum criteria as those of the neighbouring countries, such as management of borders, international cooperation in the field of justice (INTERPOL,

**Figure 5.9:** The main purpose of traveling to European Countries, by ethnicity




When this group of respondents was analyzed by age groups, region where they live and educational level, results reveals that most of those who declare that their main purpose of travel to EU in case of visa liberalization would be employment are 31–36 years old (24%), are from Prishtina, Prizren and Mitrovica regions and possesses secondary and elementary education (36%).

EUPOL etc), ensure biometric documentation, and human rights (freedom of movement within the country).

When respondents were asked about their opinion on who is responsible that the visa liberalization process did not start yet, 40% of Kosovans think that Kosovo government and other Kosovo institutions are responsible, fol-

**Figure 5.10:** The main purpose of traveling to European Countries, by Gender




When analyzed on the basis of ethnicity, that data shows that for most K-Albanians, family visit would be the main

<sup>1</sup> Press Release - Brussels, 14 October 2009, Kosovo\* - Fulfilling its European Perspective, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1516&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

lowed by 26% who think that the European Union holds this responsibility, while 22% do not have an opinion on this issue. Meanwhile very few respondents attributed this responsibility to Kosovo citizens, EULEX, UNMIK or ICO (Fig 5.11).


**Figure 5.11:** Attribution of responsibility for not starting the visa liberalization process




While a majority of K-Albanians (45%) attribute the responsibility to the Kosovo Government and other Institutions, the majority of K-Serbs (36%) do not know who is responsible (Fig 6.1). Analysis revealed that there were no major differences on opinions regarding this responsibility based on age. The only noticeable difference is that while all generations generally attribute this responsibility to the Kosovo Government and other Institutions (41%), about 34% of those aged 31 to 36 years old think that the EU is as equally responsible as Kosovo Government that this process did not yet start, and about 26% of those aged 18 to 24 years old don't know who is responsible for the delay in this process.

When educational background of the respondents was analyzed, results reveal that regardless of their educational background, the majority of Kosovans attribute this responsibility to the Kosovo Government and other Kosovo Institutions (Fig 5.13). However for most of the respondents, there are two major reasons why Kosovo is being left out of the Visa liberalization process: the current political situation and the fact that five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo's statehood.


**Figure 5.12:** Attribution of responsibility for not starting the visa liberalization process, by ethnicity



**Figure 5.13:** Attribution of responsibility for not starting the visa liberalization process, by education




**Fig. 5.14:** Opinions on why Kosovo is left out of Visa dialogue, by ethnicities (multiple answers)




When the responses were disaggregated by ethnicity we see that majority of K-Serbs consider that it is the “current political situation” (56%), “the bad image that Kosovans have in the EU” (29%) and “the current economical situation” (27%) as the factors that have kept Kosovo out of the visa liberalization dialogue. Whereas, for Other communities, “problems with Serbia” is the main reason why Kosovo is left out. For K-Albanians, the main reason that Kosovo is left out is due to the five EU countries that haven’t recognized Kosovo, followed by the current political situation (fig. 5.14). Analysis of this issue by educational background shows that for about 28% of those with elementary education, problems with Serbia are seen as the reason that Kosovo is left out of this dialogue, followed by 23% who think it is a result of the current political situation, whereas for the majority of those with secondary and tertiary education main reason is current political situation (Fig 5.15).

timeframe for Kosovo’s visa liberalization, more than 53% of them said that it will happen within two years (Fig. 5.16<sup>2</sup>).

**Figure 5.16:** Opinions about the timeframe of Visa liberalization, in percent



**Figure 5.15:** Opinions on why Kosovo is left out of Visa dialogue, by education (multiple answers)



**Optimism**

During the previous polling in April 2010 when citizens were asked about their opinion regarding the


But, according to the current poll results presented in Table 1, there has been a decrease in the level of

<sup>2</sup> This question was analyzed on the opinion poll conducted during April 2010

4.21 years for Kosovo's visa liberalization (Table 1).

How many years do you think will take for visa liberalization for Kosovo?	Mean
How many years do you think will take for visa liberalization for Kosovo?	4.21


**Figure 5.17:** Timeframe of Visa liberalization, by gender



respondents' optimism. Six months later (November 2010), respondents were asked about how many years they think it will take for visa liberalization for Kosovo, the average of their responses indicates that will take 4.21 years for Kosovo's visa liberalization (Table 1).


When gender based analysis were conducted, we see that according to females it will take less than four years, whereas for males it will be about 4.5 years for Kosovo's visa liberalization. This suggests that females are slightly more optimistic than males on this issue (Fig 5.17).

**Figure 5.18:** Timeframe of Visa liberalization, by education



There is a high correlation between those who have higher education and their expectations for visa liberalization. Those that are more educated think that the visa liberalization process will take longer comparing to those with less years of education who seems to be more optimistic in this regard. As far as educational background of the respondents is concerned, analysis reveal that with the increase in level of education the estimation of years needed for visa liberalization increase. Specifically, those with tertiary education are more pessimistic when compared to those with secondary and elementary education. (fig 5.18).

**Figure 5.19:** Timeframe of Visa liberalization, by ethnicities



With regard to ethnicity K-Serbs are the most pessimistic with the average estimation of 17.7 years for the competition of Kosovo's visa liberalization, followed by Other minorities 4.3, while K-Albanians average estimation was 2.7 years (Fig 5.19).

Analysis also revealed that those dissatisfied with the political and economical situation in Kosovo are more pessimistic regarding the timeframe of the visa liberalization process.

### Conclusions

Based on findings of the survey, the general public has considerable understanding of what visa liberalization means for the citizens of Kosovo. In addition, it is very encouraging that the majority of Kosovars have responded that they will use the visa free travel regime for family visits, touristic reasons, educational opportunities and other reasons as well; however there is quite large number of respondents who have misconceptions about the aim of visa liberalization and have stated that they would use this opportunity to seek employment.

Therefore one of the suggestions would be to start a comprehensive information campaign to inform the Kosovo citizens about the real purpose of Visa liberalization. This campaign needs to be practical and straight forward; it needs to address all communities and levels of Kosovo society. Its main focus should be to inform the citizens of Kosovo about their rights and responsibilities that come along with visa liberalization, in particular on the topic of employment, education and migration.

The percentage of rejected visa applicants is very discouraging and needs further work and debate in the Kosovo society. It needs a closer look by the respective embassies that issue visas in Kosovo and the reasons for rejection of such a big number of Kosovars.

When it comes to the responsible actors for not starting the visa liberalization dialogue it is encouraging that the citizens of Kosovo hold Kosovo Institutions responsible for the fact that the dialogue hasn't started

yet, citizens should always ask for accountability from their representatives and institutions, however it is also obvious that they are not well informed that it is the EU and it is Member States that are initiating this dialogue and not the other way around.

The findings also suggest that the scepticism was raised in the second half of 2010 that Kosovo will enter

into the Schengen White List in the near future. Significantly, delays in entering formally in the visa dialogue for Kosovo and the reason the European Commission has not yet given the Roadmap to Kosovo, is reflected in Kosovars lack of optimism that they will benefit from visa free travel in the near future as on average Kosovars think that this will take more than four years.





## Concluding Remarks from the Focus Group Meeting

The UNDP Kosovo Research and Policy Unit convened a Focus Group meeting on 16 January 2011 to discuss the findings of the Public Pulse poll.

While discussing the November 2010 poll findings and methodology, the following suggestions were made by the participants of the Focus Group in terms of questions that could further enrich the data of the Public Pulse reports:

1. Questions that should be added in the group of democratization indicators could include questions about transparency, guarantees of the freedom of expression and what do the respondents consider are the main problems for democratization in Kosovo;
2. Questions that should be added in the group of economic indicators could include some questions about the opinion of respondents on the overall economic stability of Kosovo, and how much is the new labour law being implemented;
3. The question of how do citizens view the new coalition that is about to create the new Kosovo Government;
4. Add questions that measure the corruption of all Public Companies such as PTK, KEK, Airport, Termokos etc;
5. Add questions about the opinion of respondents regarding partition and swap of territories;
6. Include more questions on judiciary and corruption and make questions on corruption and organized crime more specific;
7. Include questions on nepotism and where would you like to work when you finish University and analyze them on regional and ethnical basis.

The Focus Group also provided some suggestions as to the writing of the actual report, such as:

8. Safety and freedom of movement data should be analyzed on regional basis;
9. Every question should be analyzed from range of perspectives (gender, ethnicity, region etc.);

The participants of the Focus Group identified the following concerns raised by the poll data:

1. Increased economic and political pressure (willingness to protest);
2. A very concerning finding at the time when the prices are going up while salaries remain flat

3. Decreased satisfaction with government, legislative and judiciary;
4. Poverty/unemployment, readiness to protest for economic and political reasons – increased public frustration.

Among key scenarios for concern that the Focus Group participants discussed are:

1. The increased readiness to protest for economic and political reasons along with the high rates of poverty and unemployment are a clear risk that may lead to general unrest;
2. This rising frustration with the political and economic situation, which is mainly directed toward the government, has the potential to become misdirected at minority communities if only a minor incident occurs.

Other developments that were perceived as worrying by the participants of the Focus Group include:

- The fear for a re-establishment of barriers between K-Albanians and K-Serbs, especially in light of the latest report adopted by European Council and written by Dick Marty.

According to the participants of the Focus Group, factors that have contributed to the increased dissatisfaction among population include:

- Economic problems and unemployment;
- Reports on crime and corruption and lack of prosecution of those involved;
- Discrimination against Kosovo in terms of regional cooperation;
- Exclusion of Kosovo from the EU visa liberalization process;
- Problems with nepotism;
- Low quality of public services.

In relation to the judiciary the general observation was that the situation remains worrying despite a few positive developments in the past years. For example, the appointments of judges is very slow and stagnating, there is a lack of support staff for judges, and in most courts there is an issue with lack of space, while in general there is a lack of general support for the judiciary, the rule of law and decisions made by the judiciary.



### **Opinion poll**

These results are based on an opinion poll with representative sample for Kosovo citizens. Sample size of 1290 above the 18 years of age, of both sexes, all age groups and from all municipalities and regions of Kosovo, covering rural and urban areas. The sample included 830 Kosovo Albanians, 230 Kosovo Serbs and 230 Kosovo non-Serb minorities (namely Turkish, Bosniac, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian). Multistage Sampling Method has been used to frame the sample. This survey was conducted by ENCOMPASS (Prishtinë/Pristina) during 7 – 25 November 2010.

### **Calculation of Indexes**

Democratization Index is a composite average based on the evaluation of the respondents on how much they agree or disagree regarding the development of the following processes in Kosovo: free and fair elections, Parliament monitors the Government performance, independent Judiciary System, freedom of expression and media, existence of watchdog Civil Society in Kosovo, Government based on priorities of citizens, human rights based Constitution and Laws, and whether Local governments work according to priorities of citizens. The index is continuous measure which can range from 3 (maximum) meaning that all participants fully agreed that democratization is on good track, to 0 (min) meaning that all participants do not agree at all that democratization is on track.

Participation Index is a composite average based on the self-reported participation rate in different public activities in last six months. Specifically, respondents report on whether they have participated in active or passive manner in the following: public discussions, citizen initiatives, any project implemented by central or local governments, in NGOs activities and political parties. The index is continuous measure which ranges between 0 (minimum) and 3 (maximum) and measures the level of people's participation in political and civic life in Kosovo. A participation index of 0 would mean that none of the citizens did not participate in any of the above mentioned activities, while a participation index of 3 would mean that there is a full public participation in all activities.

Economic Confidence Index is a composite average, which is calculated based on the evaluation of the respondents on how favourable or unfavourable are the economic conditions prevailing in Kosovo. Specifically, respondent evaluate the following conditions: expectations regarding family's total income and employment conditions for next six months, assessment of the current business and employment conditions. The values can range from 0 (minimum) to 3 (maximum) with the range of 0-1.5 indicate unfavourable assessment of economic situation while values from 1.5 - 3 indicating mostly favourable assessment of economic situation.

