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PUBLIC PULSE REPORT III

March 2012

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CONTENT	Foreword	8
	Executive summary	9
	CHAPTER 1	10
	Political and Institutional Stability	10
	CHAPTER 2	16
	The Socio-Economic Situation	16
	CHAPTER 3	21
	Interethnic Relations	21
	CHAPTER 4	25
	Public and Personal Safety and Security	25
	Chapter 5	30
	A Brief Overview of the Employment Situation in Kosovo.....	30
	Methodology	41

LIST OF ACRONYMS

DI	Democratization Index
ECI	Economic Confidence Index
EULEX	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
ICO	International Civilian Office
KP	Kosovo Police
KSF	Kosovo Security Force
PI	Participation Index
RAE	Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

Selected Economic Indicators

	Jan-Mar 2005	Jan-Mar 2007	Jan-Mar 2009	Nov 2010	Jun 2011	Nov 2011	Trend
Population (in ,000)	1,999*	2.07**	2.1**	2.2*	1.733.872	1.733.872 (f)	◀ ▶
GDP growth rate (annual), % (a)	0.3		5.4	2.9	4.6 (a)	4.2 (a)	▼
GDP per capita, € (a)	1,120		1,784	1.795 (a)	1.850 (v)	2.383 (a)	▲
Kosovo Budget (Annual), billion € (b)	641.5	553	862.13	1.461	1.2	1.520 (c)	▲
Workers' remittances, million €	281.0				511.6 (q)	393.3 (b)	▼
Foreign assistance, million €	462.0 *			132.4	432.6		▲
KPST fund, million €	145.8 (Dec)	230.6 (Mar)		488.8 (April)	546,3 (June'11)	588,1 Mar'12 (e)	▲
PAK fund, million € (e)	113.1 (Dec)	291.6 (Feb)		463.2 March	517.2 March	517,2 March 2011 (d)	◀ ▶
Bank deposits, million €	704.8 (Feb)	973.5 (Feb)	1.4441(r)	1.77 (u) (March)	1.93 (q) Oct	2.10 (b)	▲
Commercial bank loans, million €	356.5 (Feb)	515.1 (Feb)		1.336.2 (March)	1624.9 (June)	1.689.1 (b)	▲
Trade balance, million € (j)	-219.1 (Jan-Mar)	-101.92 (Jan-Feb)	-142 (May)	-550 March	-925.4 (June)	-2.166.8 (b)	▼
Registered job-seekers	303,095 (Jan)	331,056 (Mar)	338.836 (Apr)	338.800 (March 2010)	335.260	335.905 Jan '12 (g)	▲
Consumer Price Index,	101.4 (May)	100.2 (Mar)	110,9 (Mar)	119.9 March	130.3 June (q)	100 (a) Nov 2011	▼
Basic pensions (per month), €	40	40	40	70	70	70	◀ ▶

Sources:

- a) SOK, Gross Domestic Product in Current Prices
b) Figure for the three first quarters of the year. CBAK, Monthly Statistics Bulletin, No. 124, BPK, Prishtinë/Priština, December 2011.
c) The information was received by the Information Office-Ministry of Finance
d) Report on Activities of the PAK of the Jan – March 2011
e) Official webpage of Kosovo Pension Savings Trust <http://www.trusti.org>
f) Official webpage of Statistical Office of Kosovo <http://esk.rks-gov.net/eng/>
g) Annual Review 2011 on Labor Relations and Social Dialogue in South East Europe: Kosovo: available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/belgrad/08909.pdf>

Selected Opinion Poll Indicators:

	Mar 2005 a)	Sep 2005 b)	Jun 2006 c)	Dec 2006 d)	Jun 2007 e)	"Dec 2007 f)"	"Sep 2008 g)"	"Nov 2008 o)"	"Jun 2009 p)"	Sep 2009 q)	Jan 2010 r)	Apr 2010 s)	Nov 2010 t)	Jun 2011 v)	Nov 2011 g)	Trend
Political pessimism, % ("very dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied" with current political trends)	38.6	41.0	43.4	48.9	54.0	41.1	36.0	35.73%	26.78%	33.03%	41.08%	37.30%	66.90%	57.50%	60.8%	▲
Economic pessimism, % ("very dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied" with current economic trends)	71.1	68.8	76.0	76.2	70.7	64.6	53.0	55.0	43.48%	57.07%	60.31%	53.80%	72.10%	69.70%	73.00%	▲
Willingness to protest due to economic reasons, %	62.9	57.4	62.8	42.8	54.9	71.3	68.3	75.7%	64.32%	66.58%	63.40%	59.2%	72.4%	66.9%	72.4%	▲
Willingness to protest due to political reasons, %	48.9	45.4	45.5	30.9	31.2	58.6	49.2	59.5%	45.21%	50.68%	46.06%	49.2%	58.7%	55.4%	59.1%	▲
Satisfaction with UNMIK's performance*, %	29.7	34.5	30.5	28.0	31.5	27.7	25.4	20.8%	28.36%	23.11%	12.58%	22.20%	18.90%	15.90%	14.80%	◀ ▶
Satisfaction with SRS's performance*, %	81.2	69.8	70.5	43.6	45.9	39.6	18.4	21.1%	33.66%	25.93%	17.79%	25.30%				
Satisfaction with Gov. Kosovo (before PISG) performance*, %	81.2	48.7	43.3	27.2	35.9		49.9	55.7%	53.13%	55.83%	36.72%	29.30%	25.10%	32.60%	30.20%	▼
Satisfaction with Assembly's performance*, %	73.7	59.0	45.4	25.6	31.9	36.7	46.0	49.0%	53.18%	46.37%	33.34%	34.10%	32.10%	41.00%	40.50%	◀ ▶
Satisfaction with KFOR's performance*, %	81.0	84.3	81.0	77.5	81.8	83.7	84.2	86.9%	72.88%	71.90%	77.63%	69.60%	81.70%	82.10%	78.80%	▼
Satisfaction with KPS performance*, %	86.9	84.5	81.8	72.5	79.3	78.6	80.0	80.9%	71.14%	70.96%	74.86%	74.30%	78.50%	78.30%	79.10%	◀ ▶
Feelings of insecurity ("Somewhat unsafe" or "very unsafe" while outdoors)	38.1	36.7	35.5	38.6	22.6*	55.25*	21.2	18.3	26.00%	17.87%	27.64%	29.90%	30.60%	31.40%	20.66%	▼

Sources:

- a) UNDP, Early Warning Report March 2005, UNDP, Prishtinë/Priština, op. cit.
b) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2005.
c) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2006
d) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Dec 2006
e) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2007
f) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Dec 2007
g) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2008
o) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Nov 2008
p) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2009
q) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2009
r) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jan 2010
s) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Apr 2010
g) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Nov 2011

FOREWORD

This is the third edition of the Public Pulse Report, a continuation of previous Early Warning Reports. The report provides valuable analysis of public perceptions while Kosovo consolidates its democracy and makes progress towards strengthening of its institutions and prudent governing. The new Public Pulse Report shifts the analysis from early warning and conflict prevention to democratic dialogue and monitoring of institutional stability. Through this USAID-funded project we hope to increase the communication between government institutions and their constituents, civil society and media. This edition comes at a time of important developments in Kosovo, namely the continuation of Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue, increasing calls for reforms in various sectors and important developments with regard to Kosovo's prospects in the European Union. The indicators and statistics generated for this report shall complement efforts of international agencies to assist Kosovo institutions and shall serve as tools for obtaining insight into the opinion of Kosovo people on the aforementioned processes.

Following the release of report fast facts in December last year, our research and policy team worked closely with the Association of Professional Journalists on a follow-up action plan to address the negative public perceptions on freedom of expression and media development in Kosovo. This marks a new approach of the Public Pulse project: to not solely serve to inform public policy options but also actively engage with respective partners in providing solutions to noted shortcomings in the public policy sphere. Public Pulse report also includes two new indices on democratization and economic confidence. According to the latest poll, Kosovo's democratization index is 0.91, slightly lower than in the previous June 2011 reporting (0.95). The index indicates that most people perceive that democratization processes are not going in the right direction. Kosovo's Economic Confidence Index is 0.79, indicating that Kosovans do not have a favourable opinion of the economy. Both indices have seen a downward trend in 2011. The challenges and limitations of governmental or public institutions are enormous but so is the public demand and eagerness for visible improvements in Kosovo. Some important highlights of the report are:

Compared to June 2011, the data show that there is a decrease in people's satisfaction with the work of Kosovo's key executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. The institution of President remains the only positive exception, the satisfaction level for which has nearly doubled compared to last year.

About 72% of respondents of all ethnicities seem to be dissatisfied with the economic direction in which Kosovo is headed. Somewhat lower percentages of respondents (60%) said they were dissatisfied with Kosovo's political direction.

Unemployment, poverty and corruption were identified as the top paramount problems that Kosovo is facing.

Increase in the number of respondents who indicated that interethnic relations are tense and not improving. This perception is particularly notable amongst the K-Serb community.

The majority of respondents consider the following groups as being most prone to discrimination: women/girls (23%), followed by old people (20%) and Kosovo Albanians (10%) as the groups most subject to discrimination.

While the report might be of interest to the general reader, its primary aim is to provide a platform of perceptions and mechanism to facilitate the public policy making process in an ever consolidating Kosovo democracy. All conclusions and proposed recommendations presented in this report are a result of several rounds of discussions with experts from diverse areas, backgrounds and institutional settings.

We remain confident that the set of analyses presented here will stimulate a lot of thought and further discussions among readers and opinion makers in Kosovo. It gives us great pleasure, therefore, to extend our appreciation and gratitude to the contributing experts that participated in discussions and provided insights, perspectives and interpreted the results of the poll, and to all those who supported us in the process of completing this edition.

Steliana Nedera
UNDP Deputy Resident Representative

¹ For UNDP, all references to Kosovo on this document are made in the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)..

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The current poll results show that Kosovo's Democratization Index has seen a slight decrease from 0.95 in June 2011 to 0.91 in November 2011.
- Economic Confidence Index shows a similar trend; it has decreased from 0.90 in June 2011 to 0.79 in November 2011. The decline is also noted when this index is disaggregated by gender: for men, the index has decreased from 0.90 in June to 0.76 in November 2011, whereas for women it has decreased from 0.92 to 0.83.
- Kosovo's Public Participation Index is 0.16 (as opposed to 0.13 in June 2011), indicating that the public participation in Kosovo's political and civic life has increased slightly but still remains very low.
- The latest Public Pulse Report findings shows that from November 2010 to November 2011 the satisfaction level with the President has seen a remarkable increase from 31% to 61%.
- Between June and November 2011, the satisfaction level with the work of the Prime Minister of Kosovo has decreased by around 7 percentage points.
- A slight increase in satisfaction level with the work of the government may be observed only when comparing figures of the current poll with the last year's (November 2010).
- More than half (60%) of respondents claimed to be either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Kosovo's political direction, and approximately 55% of the Kosovo responded positively when asked whether they are ready to join public protests due to political reasons.
- Public dissatisfaction with Kosovo's economic direction is very high: 72% of all respondents are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Kosovo's current economic direction, while 68% of survey respondents stated that they would join public protests for the current economic situation.
- The majority of survey respondents consider the Kosovo Government (75%) to be responsible for Kosovo's economic situation.
- 41% of Kosovans (as opposed to 58% in June 2011) expect the economic situation to improve over the next two years, whereas 17% think that the situation might improve in the next six months.
- Corruption continues to be ranked as one of the key problems that Kosovo faces. Kosovo Energy Corporation, courts and customs are perceived as top three institutions with prevailing large scale corruption.
- Compared to the previous poll, there is an increase in the number of respondents who indicated that interethnic relations are tense and not improving. This trend is particularly visible amongst the K-Serb community.
- Again, November's 2011 poll highlights that K-Albanians are mostly satisfied with the performance of KSF (95%), followed by KP (85%) and with KFOR is (84%). Lower satisfaction levels were reported for the EULEX Police (36%).
- On the other hand, K-Serb respondents satisfaction with security institutions, KFOR, KP and EULEX Police is at the lowest approval since July 2004.
- When the respondents were asked regarding their opinions about which of the groups are most subject to discrimination in Kosovo, majority of them considered women/girls (23%), followed by old people (20%) and Kosovo Albanians (10%) as the groups most subject to discrimination.
- According to respondents, the top three groups with the highest tension between them are the government and opposition parties, management and workers, whereas different ethnic groups is ranked third together with the poor and rich. On the other hand, the top three groups with the least or no tension between them are considered to be men and women followed by elderly and young and different religious groups.

CHAPTER 1

Political and Institutional Stability

Political Indicators

During the period June – November 2011 developments in the Northern part of Kosovo continued to dominate political agenda. The political and institutional stability during this six-month period was also influenced by the ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Most of the political and diplomatic activities of the Kosovo government were focused on these issues and media and the public opinion paid special attention to them. The above-mentioned developments could also have had an effect on Kosovans' perceptions about the satisfaction with the performance of the key executive, legislative and judicial institutions.

The latest Public Pulse Report findings show that except for the increase in the satisfaction level with the President, for all the other key executive, legislative and judicial institutions


there is either no significant change or there is decline in people's satisfaction compared to June 2011. Specifically, between June and November 2011, the satisfaction level with the work of the Prime Minister of Kosovo has decreased by about 7 percentage points. A slight increase in satisfaction level with the work of the government may be observed only when comparing figures of the current poll with the last year's (November 2010). The satisfaction level with the parliament hasn't marked a significant change since June 2011, whereas that with the Speaker of the Parliament has declined by about 9 percentage points. The satisfaction level with judiciary is no exception in the declining trend with other key institutions. The satisfaction level with the work of Kosovo courts has decreased by approximately 7 percentage points since June 2011. Finally, the satisfaction level with the Prosecutor's Office work didn't mark any significant change. But as shown in table 1.1, satisfaction level with the Prosecutor's Office and courts is lowest compared to other institutions observed (*see Table 1.1*)

Table 1.1: Satisfaction with Kosovo's Key Institutions

		Mar-07	Oct-07	Dec-07	May-08	Oct-08	Apr-09	Jun-09	Sep-09	Jan-10	Apr-10	Nov-10	June-11	Nov-11
Satisfaction with executive government	Government	30.5%	28.1%		46.9%	55.7%	38.0%	53.1%	55.8%	36.7%	29.2%	25.1%	32.6%	30.2%
	Prime minister	54.0%	61.0%		72.0%	63.1%	39.8%	53.8%	52.0%	41.5%	36.4%	30.7%	37.6%	30.3%
Satisfaction with legislative	Parliament	31.0%	36.2%	36.8%	51.4%	49.0%	33.6%	53.2%	46.4%	33.3%	34.1%	32.1%	41.0%	40.5%
	Speaker of parliament	35.4%	37.1%	35.1%	56.5%	47.0%	32.8%	51.6%	49.5%	40.3%	36.0%	33.3%	60.9%	51.6%
	President	52.0%	59.0%	61.0%	74.0%	69.9%	45.7%	61.7%	60.8%	56.6%	54.9%	30.8%	54.1%	61.1%
Satisfaction with judiciary	Court	20.0%	18.0%	18.0%	21.0%	19.7%	20.0%	32.7%	25.6%	14.7%	27.2%	18.5%	26.9%	19.3%
	Prosecutor's office	22.7%	17.7%	18.3%	22.7%	21.1%	20.5%	31.7%	25.7%	14.8%	26.9%	15.1%	20.0%	19.7%


In line with decrease in satisfaction with executive institutions, only 8.5% of Kosovans report to be either satisfied or very satisfied and about 30% report to be neutral with Kosovo's political direction. The remaining 60% are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Kosovo's political direction. When this question was analyzed by ethnicity of respondents, results indicate K-Serbs are mostly dissatisfied with the political direction, 96% of

the respondents. Individuals aged more than 46 years are the least satisfied, followed by the age group of 25-30 and 37-45. Figure 1.1 below also shows that residents of urban areas are more dissatisfied with the political direction of Kosovo compared to those living in rural areas. When analyzed on gender basis, the data show that women are for 3% more satisfied than men with Kosovo's political direction (See Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Level of satisfaction with Kosovo's political direction, by ethnicity, age, gender and residence of respondents


Kosovans were also asked who, in their opinion, is most responsible for Kosovo's current political situation. As has been the trend over the last three years, the leader in this category continues to be the government of Kosovo and political parties, selected by 80% of respondents. 16% of respondents assign the responsibility of Kosovo's politi-

cal situation to EULEX whereas only 4% of respondents attribute this responsibility to UNMIK (See Figure 1.2.). It should be noted that since 2003, the number of respondents that attributed this responsibility to Kosovo government and political parties has increased continuously, while the opposite was the case with UNMIK.

Figure 1.2: Trends for the attribution of responsibility for the political situation in Kosovo

Furthermore, almost 56% of the Kosovo citizens responded positively when asked whether they are ready to join public protests for political reasons. In general, according to the survey data, other minorities and K-Albanian respondents seem more ready and willing to join political compared to K-Serbs (See Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3: Readiness to join public protests for political reasons



Democratization and Public Participation Indexes¹

The current poll results show that Kosovo's Democratization Index has seen a slight decrease from 0.95 in June to 0.91 in November 2011. As may be observed on Table 1.2., the index has decreased for men, from 0.99 in June to 0.90 in November 2011 whereas for women it has remained rather constant.

According to the latest poll, Kosovo's Participation Index is 0.16 (as opposed to 0.13 in June 2011), signifying a slight increase in the public participation in Kosovo's political and civic life which remains very low nonetheless. When broken down by gender, the Participation Index seems to be significantly higher for men (0.22) compared to women (0.11), confirming in-

equality of public participation in politics and civic life between men and women in Kosovo (See Table 1.2).


Table 1.2: Democratization and Participation Indexes

	Value		
	Nov-10	Jun-11	November 2011
Democratization Index	0.92	0.95	0.91
Democratization Index (Man)	0.94	0.99	0.9
Democratization Index (Women)	0.89	0.91	0.92
Participation Index	0.24	0.13	0.16
Participation Index (Man)	--	0.18	0.22
Participation Index (Women)	--	0.07	0.11

The Democratization Index is based on respondents' evaluation of the processes listed on Figure 1.4 below. Selected indicators of this index demonstrate that only 11% of Kosovans agrees that the judiciary system in Kosovo is independent in its decisions. Similarly, a tremendously low percentage of Kosovans agrees that the central government is working according to the priorities of its citizens (14.5%). The latter is higher for the local (municipal) government, 29%.

While around one-third (33%) of Kosovans believes that the media enjoys freedom of expression, only 27% of them partly or fully agree that the Kosovo constitution and laws are democratic and respect human rights. Further, 23% of Kosovans agree that elections in Kosovo are democratic and in accordance with international standards and 19% think that Kosovo's parliament monitors government's performance. As in the previous polls, a very small share of Kosovans, 20%, responded that they believe that the civil society serves as a truthful monitor of democratic developments in Kosovo (See Figure 1.4).


¹ See Annex 1 for more information on the calculation of the Democratization and Public Participation Indexes

Figure 1.4: Positive responses to the Democratization Index questions

When analyzing the Democratization Index by region, residence and age group of the respondents, the results reveal that the residents of Gjakova/Djakovica believe in democratizations processes in Kosovo the most, DI of 1.18, whereas those in Prishtina/Prishtina the least, with a DI of 0.75.

Figure 1.5. below also shows that respondents living in rural areas believe more that the democratic processes in Kosovo


are going in the right direction, compared to respondents from urban areas. When disaggregated by age groups, the poll results show that those respondents considering that democratization processes are going in the right direction are relatively young and belong to the 18-24 and 31-45 age groups. The age groups of 25-30 years and above 46 years are less positive about the the democratization processes' direction (See Figure 1.5.).

Figure 1.5. Democratization Index, by region, age group and residence

The Participation Index is based on respondents' self-reported participation in activities listed in Figure 1.6. below during the last six months. Selected indicators of this index demonstrate that similarly to the previous poll, participation in activities such as a political party and public discussions remains the most popular mean of Kosovans' political and/or civic engagement, with 17% of the respondents participating in them. This is followed by

participation in citizens' initiatives (9.5%) and community-based initiatives (7%). While 7% of respondents declared that they participated in projects implemented by the local government, only 6.5% stated that they participated in NGO activities. Only 3% of the respondents indicated reported that they had participation in projects implemented by the central government during the last six months (See Figure 1.6.).

Figure 1.6: Positive responses to the Public Participation Index questions



Correlations of Demography Variables and Democratization Index

In order to determine which are the demographic variables of respondents that correlate with their opinions on democratization processes, a correlation analysis was conducted between Democratization Index and the following variables: employment status, ethnicity, education, age, gender, income, area of residence, and region.

Significant positive correlations were found between the Democratization Index and those working in the public sector as well as housewives. Specifically, those working in the public sector were more likely to have a positive assessment of democratization process compared to other respondents. Similarly, housewives were more likely to have a positive assessment of democratization processes compared to rest of the participants. *For details see Table A1, Annex 2.*

On the other hand, significant negative correlation was found between the Democratization Index and those employed from time to time as well as pensioners. Specifically those are employed from time to time are more likely to have negative opinions of democratization processes, as do those who are pensioners.

Finally in terms of employment, there is no significant correlation between opinions on democratization and those who are employed in the private sector, those who are unemployed both looking for work and not looking for work and students. A significant positive correlation was found between reported level of income and the Democratization Index. In other words, the likelihood of having a positive opinion on democratic processes increases with income levels; those with higher incomes have more positive opinions on democratic processes in Kosovo.

In terms of residence, respondents living in rural areas are much more likely to have optimistic opinions on democratization than those living in rural areas. While gender does not have a correlation with the Democratization Index, a significant negative correlation was found between age and opinions on democratization. Specifically, older participants were much more likely to have negative view of democratization processes than young participants. In terms of ethnicity, negative correlation was found between K-Serbs and the Democratization Index. Specifically, K-Serbs have higher likelihood to think negatively about democratic processes in comparison with other ethnicities. No significant correlation was found for K-Albanians and other non-Serb minorities.

Finally when the Democratization Index was correlated with region, significant negative correlations were found with Prishtina, Gjilan/Gnjilane, and Mitrovië/Mitrovica while positive correlation was found with Gjakova/Djakovica, Ferizaj/Urosevac, and Prizren region. The analysis showed no correlation between the Democratization Index and Peja/Pec region.

Explanatory Value of Demographic Variables

In order to isolate demographic variables that have higher explanatory value of the variance in Democratization Index, regression analysis were conducted with demographic variables as independent variables and Democratization Index as dependent variable. For details see Table A2, Annex 1. Gender, education and age were found not significant as explanatory variables. The following factors were found to provide a significant explanatory value for the Democratization Index: working in public sector, housewives, K-Serbs, place of residence (urban or rural), personal income, and region. Specifically:

- In terms of employment categories, the highest explanatory value was found for those working in the public sector and for housewives. Specifically, respondents who worked in the public sector and respondents who were housewives were more inclined to report that democratic processes are going in the right direction.
- In terms of other variables Kosovo Serbs have a higher chance of negative evaluation of democratization processes compared to other groups.
- Respondents with higher personal incomes had higher chance of affirmative evaluation of present democratic practices than did the respondents with lower incomes.
- Respondents living in rural areas had higher chance of affirmative evaluation of present democratic practices than did the respondents from urban areas.
- Finally, respondents living in Prizren, Ferizaj/Urosevac, and Gjakova/Djakovica were more likely to have affirmative evaluation of the present democratic practices than did the respondents from the region of Prishtina.

CHAPTER 2

The Socio-Economic Situation

Socio - Economic Indicators and Expectations

This chapter focuses on issues related to the economic and social stability during the reporting period July – November 2011. Public dissatisfaction with Kosovo's economic direction is higher than dissatisfaction with the political direction: 72% of all respondents are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Kosovo's current economic direction, while only about 5% are satisfied with it. Opinion poll data also indicate that the proportion of dissatisfied K-Serbs is much higher than that of K-Albanians and other communities (See Table 2.1.).

Table 2.1. Satisfaction with the economic direction

		K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
Economic	Satisfied	5.30%	0.90%	9.40%	5.25%
	Dissatisfied	69.90%	95.70%	75.10%	71.79%

During November 2011 poll, 68% of survey respondents stated that they would join public protests over the current economic situation, as opposed to 55% of those who would do so for political reasons. When responses on readiness to protest for economic reasons were analyzed by ethnicity, the results


The majority of survey respondents, 75%, consider the Kosovo government to be responsible for Kosovo's economic situation. The disaggregated data by ethnicity showed that 76% of K-Albanians, 70% of K-Serbs and 65% of other communities share this opinion. The percentage of respondents who think that the international community (EULEX, ICO and UNMIK, combined) is responsible for Kosovo's economic situation is only 6%. Similarly, only 3.4% consider the local government to be the primary holder of responsibility in this regard. (Table 2.2)

Table 2.2. Attribution of responsibility for the economic situation in Kosovo, by ethnicity

	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
EULEX	2.4%	10.0%	5.2%	3.1%
ICO	.8%		.9%	0.8%
UNMIK	1.4%	10.0%	1.4%	2.0%
Kosovo Government	76.0%	70.0%	64.8%	75.0%
Local governments	3.5%	2.2%	4.2%	3.4%
Business community	1.9%	.4%	8.5%	2.2%
Other	4.0%	1.3%		3.5%
Don't know	8.3%	4.8%	9.4%	8.1%
NA	1.7%	1.3%	5.6%	1.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

showed that it has increased in the second half of 2011 for all ethnicities. A significant increase in readiness to protest for economic reasons is marked for K-Serbs 53% (as opposed 30% in June), and other communities 71% (as opposed to 53% in June 2011) (See Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: Readiness to join public protests for economic reasons, by ethnicity




Despite the low levels of satisfaction with Kosovo's economic direction and high readiness to protest for this issue, Kosovans remain rather optimistic regarding the economic direction in the medium term future (next two years).

Slightly more than 41% of the respondents (as opposed to 58% in June 2011) reported that

they expect the economic situation to improve over the next two years, whereas 17% think that the situation might improve over the next six months. Around 19.5% (as opposed to 24% in June 2011), however, believe the situation will remain unchanged over the next two years, while another 15% (as opposed to 16% in June 2011) believe the situation will only get worse over the next two years (See Figure 2.2.).

Figure 2.2 Expectations about the future economic situation



Economic Confidence Index² and Perceptions of Large Scale Corruption

With regard to Economic Confidence Index significant changes were observed during 2011. Specifically, the index decreased from 0.90 in June 2011 to 0.79 in November 2011. The decline was also noted when this index is disaggregated by gender: for men, the index has decreased from 0.90 in June to 0.76 in November 2011, whereas for women it has decreased from 0.92 to 0.83 over the same time period (See Table 2.3.).


The Economic Confidence indicators that compose the index assess the current business and employment conditions as well as expectations about employment and family's total income conditions in the near future (six month period). Almost 8% of respondents expect favourable employment conditions in the near future, whereas only about 4% of them assess the current employment conditions as favourable. While 8.5% of respondents have favourable expectations regarding their total family income six months from now, only 6% assessed the current business conditions as favourable (See Figure 2.3.).

Table 2.3. Economic Confidence Index, by gender

	Nov-10	Jun-11	Nov-11
Economic Confidence Index	0.92	0.90	0.79
Economic Confidence Index (Man)	0.85	0.88	0.76
Economic Confidence Index (Women)	0.99	0.92	0.83

2 See Annex 1 for more information on the calculation of the Economic Confidence Index


Figure2.3. Positive responses to the Economic Confidence Index questions



Unemployment (41.5%), poverty (22.5%) and corruption (5.3%) continue to be ranked as top biggest problems that Kosovo faces. KEC, courts and customs are perceived as top three institutions with


prevailing large scale corruption. The institutions with the lowest perceived level of corruption are NGOs, educational institutions and Kosovo Police (KP) (See Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4. Perceptions of large scale corruption



Even though a majority of citizens reports to know of corruption within main institutions, only 8% of them report to have had a personal experience with corruption in the form of being asked for money, gift or other favours

in exchange of a service. The remaining 50% reported to have been informed about corruption through media whereas 31% have heard about it through talks with relatives and friends.(See Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.5 Sources of information on corruption

Correlations of Demographic Variables and Economic Confidence Index

In order to determine which are the demographic variables of respondents that correlate with their Economic Confidence Index correlation analysis was conducted between Economic Confidence Index and the following variables: employment status, education, age, gender, income, income, family members living abroad, region, and area of residence.

Significant positive correlations were found between the Economic Confidence Index and mean years of education, respondents who have family members abroad, those working in public sector and those employed from time to time. Specifically, respondents with higher education had a more positive view of the current and future situation of the economy. Respondents who had family members abroad were also more optimistic about the economy compared to those who did not have any family member abroad. Those working in the public sector were more likely to have a positive assessment of the economic conditions compared to the rest of participants. Similarly, those working from time to time were more likely to have a positive assessment of the economic conditions compared to those who reported to be unemployed and looking for work. For details see Table A3, Annex 2.

On the other hand, negative correlation was found between the Economic Confidence Index and respondents who were unemployed and looking for work. Specifically, those who were unemployed and looking for work were more likely to have negative opinions on the economy compared to other respondents.

Income has high positive correlation with perceptions on economic conditions, that is, the higher the income the more positive opinions on economy are expressed.

In terms of region, respondents in Prizren were more likely to have negative opinions on the economic situation compared to residents from other regions. In contrast, respondents from Peja/Pec, Gjakova/Djakovica and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region were more likely to have positive opinions on the economic situation compared to others.

Finally, the analysis shows no significant correlation between opinions on the economy and age, gender, and area of residence.

Explanatory Value of Demographic Variables on Economic Confidence Index

In order to isolate demographic variables that have higher explanatory value of the Economic Confidence Index variance, regression anal-

ysis were conducted with demographic variables as independent variables and Economic Confidence Index as the dependent variable. For details see Table A4, Annex 1. Personal income, region, family size, family members living abroad and employment status were found as significant explanatory variables. Specifically:

- Respondents with higher personal incomes had higher chance of positive evaluation of the economic situation than did the respondents with lower incomes.
- In terms of respondents region of residence, Prizren, Peja/Pec, Gjilan/Gnjilane and Ferizaj/Urosevac were more likely to have negative opinions on the economic situation compared to respondents from Prishtinë/Pristina.
- In terms of employment categories, opinions on the economy of those working in the private sector differed the most compared to all the others employment categories. Those working in the private sector had the most negative opinions on economy when compared to other categories. Specifically those who were unemployed but not looking for work, employed form time to time, housewives, and students were more likely to have positive opinions on economy compared to those working in private sector.
- Respondents who had family members abroad were more likely to have positive opinions on Kosovo's economy compared to those who did not have any family member living abroad.
- Finally, respondents with bigger families were more likely to have positive opinions on the economy compared to respondents with smaller families.


CHAPTER 3

Interethnic Relations

One of the most interesting trends in the last poll is the increase in the number of respondents who indicated that interethnic relations are tense and not improving. This tendency is particularly notable amongst the K-Serb community. As shown in Figure 3.1, while in June of 2011 34% of K-Serbs and

30% of K-Albanians thought that “interethnic relations are tense and not improving”, in November 2011 the percentage increased to 90% among K-Serbs and about 60% among K-Albanians. This significant increase might be due to the recent developments in the Northern part of Kosovo (See Figure 3.1. for trend analysis since the second quarter of year 2005).


Figure 3.1. Trend of respondents considering that interethnic relations continue to be tense and not improving



Even though majority of the K-Serbs seems pessimistic about the current inter-ethnic relations, when asked about their readiness to live and work with K-Albanians, no significant changes in the results were noticed compared to June 2011 poll. Positive increases in several measures of interethnic relations can be observed for K-Serb respondents. Compared to June 2011, K-Serbs show a slight increase in their readiness to live in

the same street with K-Albanians, from 20% in June to 25% in November. In the question about willingness to live in the same town or marry with K-Albanians no change from responses of the previous poll was marked among K-Serbs. A slight decline in the trend was reported however when asked about readiness to work in the same workplace with K-Albanians (See Figure 3.2. for trend analysis of interethnic relations since 2005).


Figure 3.2. K-Serbs willing to live and work with K-Albanians



It is important to note that contrary to K-Serbs' increased readiness to live close to K-Albanians, K-Albanians have shown a lower readiness to live close to K-Serbs, a readiness which has been decreasing since November 2010. Approximately 41% of K-Albanian re-

spondents agree to work in the same place with K-Serbs, whereas 36% of them agree to live in the same street with K-Serbs. Only less than 1 % of K-Albanians have stated that they would agree to have marital relations with K-Serbs (See Figure 3.3.).


Figure 3.3. K-Albanians willing to live and work with K-Serbs



Combining the responses of K-Serb and K-Albanians, expressing their respective attitudes towards living, working or marrying one another, we have analyzed the interethnic trend of social acceptance, as shown in Figure 3.4. The interethnic social acceptance trend for both K-Albanians and K-Serbs confirms

that between November 2010 and November 2011, there has been a decrease in social acceptance of the K-Serb community among K-Albanians. On the other hand for the period June-November 2011 there has been a slight increase in social acceptance of K-Albanians from the K-Serb community (See Figure 3.4.).

Figure 3.4: Interethnic social acceptance trends



Inter-ethnic Contact

Lack of contact between K-Serbs and K-Albanian poses a problem to reconciliation and the improvement of interethnic relations. North Mintorvicë/Mitrovica poses a special problem, given that in other regions there is more opportunity for interaction between the ethnicities. The most

important obstacle according to the focus group³ participants are the lack of contact between the ethnicities. The November 2011 poll results show that overall, more than half, 64%, of all Kosovans regard-

³ The results of the opinion poll as well as other issues not captured by opinion poll are analyzed in-depth with groups of experts with the aim of providing main conclusions on developmental trends as well as providing recommendations on specific issues analyzed.

less of their ethnicity have had no contacts with other ethnic groups within the past three months. Only 8% of Kosovans have had contact with other ethnicities in one or two occasions, while 18% have had interethnic contact on more than three occasions within the past three months. Only 1% of Kosovans state that they deliberately avoid contact with other ethnic groups. When analyzed by ethnicities, the proportion of those who did not have any contact with other ethnic groups in the past three months is the highest among K-Albanians (69%), followed by K-Serbs (46.5%) and other minority respondents (11%). Among those who have had interethnic contact on more than three occasions in the past three months, the proportion of other minority respondents is the highest (70%), followed by that of K-Albanians and K-Serbs (14%) (Table 3.1.).


Table 3.1: Frequency of interethnic contacts within the past three months

	Ethnicity			
	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other ethnicity	Total Weighted
On more than three occasions	14.4%	14.3%	70.0%	17.7%
One to two occasions	7.0%	19.1%	11.3%	8.0%
I haven't had any contact	68.9%	46.5%	11.3%	64.1%
Deliberately have avoid contact with person from another nationality	1.0%	3.5%		1.1%
Don't know	1.8%	6.5%	3.8%	2.2%
No answer	7.0%	10.0%	3.8%	7.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When those that had inter-ethnic contacts were asked about the reasons of their contacts with other ethnic groups, the largest share, 37%, stated that they live in the same neighbourhood, followed 21% of those that met in the marketplace and 12% that had had business and other relations

with each other. Only 11% of the respondents stated friendship as a contact reason and 4% said that they have family relations with other ethnic groups (See Figure 3.5.).


Figure 3.5. Reasons for contact with other ethnic groups



Political Developments in the Northern Part of Kosovo and Prishtinë/Pristina-Belgrade Dialogue


The northern part of Kosovo is one of the most crucial political struggles Kosovo has been facing. When asked about who is responsible for the current political situation in the northern part of Kosovo, the majority of citizens attributed this responsibility to the Serbian government (42%) and the government of Kosovo (19%). When analyzing these opinions by ethnicity, the data show that while 64% of K-Serbs and 27% of other communities that live in Kosovo attribute this responsibility to the government of Kosovo, only 16% the K-Albanians shares the same opinion. The majority of K-Albanians attribute this responsibility to the Serbian government (46%), international community (16.5%), and parallel structures (13%). None of the K-Serb respondents attributes this responsibility to the Serbian government (See Figure 3.6.).

Figure 3.6 Responsible institutions for the current political situation in the North of Kosovo



One of the most sensitive security issues during this reporting period, that has also had an impact on the ongoing political process, is the barricades in the Northern part of Kosovo. The findings show that the majority, 86% of Kosovans are concerned or very concerned with the current situation in the north. The level of concern is almost the same for both K-Albanians and K-Serbs (90%) whereas among other ethnicities it is significantly lower (47.4%) (Figure 3.7.).

Figure 3.7. Concern with the current political situation in the north of Kosovo, by ethnicity



Asked about the dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade (taking place in Brussels under the auspices of the EU), 23% of all respondents viewed the dialogue as beneficial or very beneficial for Kosovo (marking a decrease from 29% in June 2011) whereas 33.5% claimed they believe the dialogue is harmful or very harmful for Kosovo (an increase compared to 29% in June 2011). About a quarter of respondents view the Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue is neither beneficial nor harmful for Kosovo (See Table 3.2.).

Table 3.2. Perceptions regarding the ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, by ethnicity

	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
Very beneficial	6.0%	2.2%	5.2%	5.7%
Beneficial	18.0%	3.5%	19.7%	17.2%
Neither	24.7%	3.5%	38.0%	24.3%
Harmful	24.1%	7.8%	6.6%	22.1%
Very harmful	11.5%	15.2%	4.2%	11.3%
Don't know	12.9%	18.7%	16.9%	13.5%
NA	2.8%	49.1%	9.4%	5.9%


CHAPTER 4

Public and Personal Safety and Security

Satisfaction and Relations with Security Institutions

As was the case in June 2011, overall satisfaction with security institutions is relatively high among K-Albanian respondents. For the K-Serbs there has been reported a drastic decline since April 2010. A decrease in satisfaction with security institutions may also be observed for other minorities (See Figure 4.1.).


Figure 4.1. Satisfaction with Security Institutions, by ethnicity



Specifically, November's 2011 poll highlights that K-Albanians are mostly satisfied with the performance of KSF (95%), followed by KP (85%) and KFOR (84%). The lowest sat-

isfaction is recorded with the EULEX Police (36%), as may be seen in Figure 4.2 below, although it has increased since June 2011.

Figure 4.2: Percentage of K-Albanian respondents satisfied with security institutions ⁴




⁴ From July 2004 to June 2009 the trend shows satisfaction with UNMIK Police, whereas from June 2009 till to date the trend shows satisfaction with EULEX Police

When it comes to K-Serb responses regarding the satisfaction with security institutions - KFOR, KPS and EULEX Police, the current poll marks their lowest approval ratings since July 2004. Satisfaction with KFOR dropped from 36% in June 2011 to 1% in

November 2011. A high decrease in satisfaction may also be observed with the KP performance (3% as opposed to 23.5% in June 2011) and EULEX Police (1% as opposed to 14% in June 2011) (See Figure 4.3.).


Figure 4.3: Percentage of K-Serb respondents satisfied with security institutions



Respondents were also asked whether they feel safe or unsafe when out on the streets. There is a positive trend in this regard: 75% of Kosovans feels safe when outdoors as opposed to 62% in June 2011, whereas 20% feel


generally unsafe as opposed to 31% in June 2011. When this question was analyzed on gender basis, no significant differences were observed between women and men (See Figure 4.4.).

Figure 4.4. Safety in the streets, by gender



In terms of police-community relations, a significant majority of Kosovans consider them to be good or very good. Only 7% of respondents believe that these relations are


bad or very bad. The perceptions, however, are more negative among the K-Serbs, 37% of whom perceive police-community relations as bad or very bad (Figure 4.5)

Figure 4.5. Bad and very bad police-community relations, by ethnicity

Perceptions on Discrimination and Social Tensions

According to the current poll, when asked about whether they were in a situation in which they felt discriminated against (during last six month), the majority of respondents, regardless of ethnicity, responded

negatively. There has been however a significant increase in the proportion of those who believe they were discriminated against in the last six months, between June and November 2011, especially among K-Serbs (54% as opposed to 27% in June 2011) and others ethnicities (44% as opposed to 28% in June 2011) (*Figure 4.6*).

Figure 4.6: Feelings of discrimination, by ethnicity

Those who felt discriminated reported several bases upon which discrimination took place. The current poll results show that the

main bases of discrimination are ethnicity/nationality, political or other opinion, age, religion and sex/gender (*Table 4.1.*).

Table 4.1. Bases for discrimination

	Responses	
	N	Percent
Sex/gender	18	7.2%
Age	36	14.6%
Language	15	6.2%
Religion/belief	24	9.6%
Ethnicity	42	17.1%
Political or other opinion	38	15.4%
Sexual orientation	2	1.0%
Disability	1	.5%
Other	45	18.1%
No answer	26	10.4%
Total	248	100.0%

When asked about which of the groups were most subject to discrimination in Kosovo, the majority of respondents identified the following: women/girls (23%), old people (20%) and persons with disabilities (13.4%), as the groups that are most commonly subject to discrimination. When these results are disaggregated by ethnicity, it may be observed that the majority of K-Serbs (76.5%) and majority of others ethnicities (40%) considers Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians communities as the groups that are most commonly subject to discrimination. The K-Albanians on the other hand believe that women/girls and old people are the most discriminated groups in the society (*Table 4.2.*)


Table 4.2. Perceptions of people about the groups - most subject to discrimination in Kosovo?

	Ethnicity			
	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other ethnicity	Total Weighted
Women/girls	25.7%	5.2%	7.0%	23.2%
Children	5.0%	.9%	3.8%	4.8%
Youth	10.0%	2.2%	6.6%	9.3%
Old people	21.2%	3.5%	10.8%	19.6%
Kosovo Serbs	.5%	76.5%	3.3%	5.2%
Kosovo Albanians	10.9%	.9%	.5%	9.7%
Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians	2.2%	1.7%	39.9%	4.4%
Other communities (including Bosnians, Turks, Gorani, Montenegrins)	.4%		11.3%	1.0%
Lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals	.8%	2.6%	1.4%	.9%
Persons with disabilities, including those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments	15.0%		3.8%	13.4%
Other	1.8%		1.4%	1.6%
Don't know	4.9%	.4%	7.5%	4.8%
NA	1.7%	6.1%	2.8%	2.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Finally, the respondents were asked to identify whether social tensions exist between certain social groups. The top three groups with the highest tension between them, according to the poll results, are the government and opposition parties, management

and workers and different ethnic and income groups. On the other hand, the top three groups with the least or no tension between them are the men and women followed by elderly and young and religious groups (*See Figure 4.7.*).

Figure 4.7. Perceived tensions between certain social groups.



Chapter 5

Public Pulse Project offers space to volunteer contributors who express willingness to analyze the Public Pulse Opinion Poll data and to provide short analysis on specified topics. The present chapter provides analysis on employment. The analysis and data presented in this chapter do not necessarily represent those of UNDP or USAID.


A Brief Overview of the Employment Situation in Kosovo

By, Yllka Gerdovci

Unemployment in Kosovo

Unemployment and poverty in Kosovo continue to be perceived as the paramount problems by the Kosovo society. According to the latest Public Pulse survey, about 41.5% and 22.5% respectively believe unemployment and poverty are the biggest problems in Kosovo. The unemployment rate remained rather stable despite the growth in economy and foreign assistance to support economic recovery. According to the Labour Force Survey in Kosovo, the rates of unemployment have not shown significant changes over the past years.⁵

Figure 5.1 Unemployment rate in Kosovo, 2006-2009



Source: Labour force survey, Statistical Agency of Kosovo

The latest Kosovo Remittance Survey (KRS) conducted by UNDP in 2011, which also covered respondents of the labour force aged 15 – 65 years old, shows that the unemployment rate stands at 46.9%, in line with the trend from the previous Labour Force Surveys (LFS).

5 LFS 2010 and 2011 is not available

The International Labour Organization's (ILO) standard definition of unemployment is based on fulfilment of three criteria simultaneously: 'without work', 'currently available for work' and 'seeking work'. The working age population⁷, meeting these three criteria encompass the unemployed persons within the labour force. The job search period is not a strictly defined criterion; it is rather left at national discretion and policies, depending on the organisation of labour market and labour absorption. The seeking work criterion entails the efforts of one person to find employment, including registration with public employment services, submission of job applications, seeking assistance from friends or relatives etc⁸.

The Labour Force Survey (LFS) in Kosovo defines the unemployed persons as those who: had no employment during the reference week⁹, had actively sought employment during the previous four weeks and were available to start work within the next two weeks¹⁰. Jobseekers on the other hand are defined as all persons looking for work, also including those holding a full-time or a part-time job. All unemployed persons and jobseekers registered with Public Employment Services (PES) are eligible to benefit from its services provided that they visit the employment office at least twice a year¹¹. In sit-

6 Unemployment is defined as follows in the Resolution concerning statistics of the economically active population, employment, unemployment and underemployment, adopted by the Thirteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (Geneva, 1982):

7 According to the Labour Law in Kosovo the working age population is 15 – 64 years of age

8 http://laborsta.ilo.org/definition_E.html

9 The reference week is specified as the week from Monday to Sunday prior to the interview date


10 Persons who already had found a job which was to start later are also classified as unemployed (SOK - LFS).

11 MLSW AI 05/2009 for Registration and Evidence of unemployment and jobseekers

uations where unemployment rate is very high and the capacities of employment services are unable to address the needs of this large group,

the policy makers may adopt regulations to prioritize provision of public employment services to the most vulnerable groups.

Figure 5.2 Unemployment rate, by gender, age group, ethnicity and education level of respondents



Source: Kosovo Remittance Survey 2011


Most affected groups by unemployment

Young people are undoubtedly the most affected by unemployment, continuing to make pressure to the fragile labour market in Kosovo. According to the LFS 2009, about 73 percent of the population within 15-24 age group are unemployed. The data, shown in the Figure 5.2 once again highlight that the age-group 15-24 as most affected by unemployment¹².

The unemployment rate is also particularly high among women in the labour force. KRS 2011 data show that the unemployment rate among women is twice as high as among men. According to LFS 2009, the unemployment rate among women is 11.6 percentage

points higher than the overall unemployment rate. This might be partially explained with the lower education levels among the unemployed women respondents of the survey.

Figure 5.3 Mean years of education among unemployed by gender



Source: Public Pulse Survey, November 2011

¹² According to MLSW labour market information data, about 33% of the registered unemployed with Public Employment Services belong to 15-24 age group (Dec, 2011)

The recently published KHDR 2010 identifies Roma, Ashkanli and Egyptian communities as the most socially excluded group in Kosovo. Similarly, as shown in Figure 5.2, the levels of unemployment are the highest for these communities, emphasizing their marginalization when it comes to employment perspectives. The highest unemployment rate is observed among Egyptians 69.1 percent, followed by Ashkanli and Roma, 60.5 percent and 60.2 percent respectively. Following the readmission agreements with the third countries about two thirds of the forced minority returns in Kosovo are Roma, Anshkali and Egyptians¹³, this might place an additional burden in the labour market taking into consideration the level of the absorption capacity.

Chances to access the labour market are also particularly low for people with disabilities taking into consideration the infrastructure as well as the poor implementation of the legislation in force¹⁴.

Long – term unemployment

A particular concern is the long average duration of unemployment. Nearly 85 percent¹⁵ of the unemployed in 2009 had been without work for more than one year. According to the 2010 Labour and Employment Annual Report¹⁶ of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, about 90 percent have been registered as unemployed for more than 12 months. About 74.8 percent of the unemployed respondents of the Public Pulse Survey reported to be without work for more than one year or that they have never worked before. Long term unemployment is higher among women¹⁷ and those with lower education levels¹⁸.

13 UNHCR, Office of the Chief of Mission Pristina Kosovo, Statistical Overview, update Feb 2012

14 Observation of Focus Group with Associations of People with disabilities towards implementation of the Law No. 03/L-019 ON VOCATIONAL ABILITY, REHABILITATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

15 According to LSF 2009, 6 out of 7 unemployed persons in Kosovo has been without a job for more than one year (SOK)

16 <http://mpms.rks-gov.net/Portals/0/Librat/EN%202010%20Raporti%20vjeter.PDF>

17 Long term unemployed women 78% - men 71% (Public Pulse data)

18 The average number of education years completed is 10.8 (Public Pulse data)

Long term unemployment is similarly affecting all ethnicities. It is slightly higher among K-Serbs, followed by K- Albanians and other communities.

Table 5.1 If unemployed (those who are looking for work and those who are not), when was the last time you worked?


	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other ethnicity	Total
Within the last 12 months	25.2%	21.9%	28.8%	25.6%
More than a year ago	29.8%	31.3%	33.3%	30.6%
Never worked before	45.0%	46.9%	37.9%	43.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Public Pulse Survey, November 2011

Discouraged jobseekers

The lengthy periods of job search are known to be a factor for discouragement of unemployed, leading to the inactivity of the group. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines the discouraged workers as an inactive group of work-seekers¹⁹. Discouragement may be a result of several factors including the belief that there are no jobs, discrimination or disability and lack of necessary skills, training, or experience.

Figure 5.4 Readiness of discouraged job-seekers to accept work if offered?



Source: Public Pulse survey, November 2011

19 'These are persons who, while willing and able to engage in a job, are not seeking work or have ceased to seek work because they believe there are no suitable available jobs' OECD

Out of 31.6 percent unemployed respondents of the Public Pulse survey, about half believe that lack of jobs in the labour market is the reason for their status of employment, whilst about 18.4 percent believe it's due to their lack of qualifications and skills. Discouragement is higher among the respondents with lower levels of education and the respondents above the age of 40.

The standard definition of unemployment leaves out this group of non-active jobseekers in its calculation, possibly resulting in an under-estimation of the unemployment rate considering that 32.1 percent of the 'discouraged' respondents of the survey are ready to take up work if offered.

Table 5.2 The reasons for not looking for work or able to find a job among unemployed.

	If unemployed (both groups), what are the reasons for not looking for a job or not being able to find a job?	Mean age	Mean years of education completed
Unemployed (looking for work)	My family does not want me to work	32.8	10.5
	Don't have proper qualification	37.8	8.2
	Don't have work experience	33.2	11.2
	Don't have the skills required by employers	38.0	9.7
	Don't have relatives who work	35.0	11.9
	Lack of job opportunities	35.9	11.7
	NA	36.9	11.9
	Total	35.8	11.4
Unemployed (not looking for work)	My family does not want me to work	50.3	6.4
	Don't have proper qualification	32.6	9.3
	Don't have work experience	41.3	9.9
	Don't have the skills required by employers	56.0	8.4
	Don't have relatives who work	42.5	8.0
	Lack of job opportunities	41.2	11.2
	NA	44.5	8.0
	Total	42.7	9.18

Source: Public Pulse Survey, November 2011

High levels of unemployment in general and long term unemployment in particular, is seen as a potential factor for social tensions. In order to determine the relation between employment status and readiness to join economic and political protest a correlation analyses was conducted. Referring to the Public Pulse data the readiness to join economic protests is highly positively correlated with those employed in private sector and unemployed looking for work, while those working in public sector institutions have negative correlation with economic protests²⁰. Regarding the readiness of respondents to join political protest, only those working in private sector have positive correlation differently from those working in public sector that show negative correlation.

In other words those working in private sector are more likely to join political protests than those working in public sector institutions.

Table 5.3 Readiness to join economic and political protests by employment status

Correlation	Political Protests	Economic Protests
Unemployed Looking for work versus others	.021	.088**
Unemployed not looking for work versus others	.051	.042
Working in Public sector	-.061*	-.077**
Working in Private sector	.086**	.076**
Employed from time to time	-.017	-.037

**, Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*, Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

20 Public Pulse data

Importance of Active Employment Programmes

Relevant government institutions globally struggle to find innovative measures to stimulate growth of employment especially among the most vulnerable unemployed. Active employment programmes are measures known to be introduced by many developing countries to ease the job crisis under tight fiscal/budget constraints. The impact of these measures is dependent on the capacity of the employment services as well as the available budget for activation of long term unemployed. In Kosovo, the labour market institutions mandated to provide employment services and implementation of active employment programmes are still facing difficulties, both in terms of the human and financial resource capacity.

The counsellor-to-jobseeker ratio is 1:1600 and considering the constraints for recruitment of additional staff, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MLSW) has rightly identified in their strategic documents that there is a need to strengthen the client orientation of the Public Employment Services. Progress in this area has been made as the donor funded projects are supporting the MLSW to define and test the integrated concept of work with key Public Employment Service clients, following the model recommended in the assessment conducted by UNDP²¹.

In the circumstances when labour demand is low, the active employment measures have the potential to generate employment in the short run. Despite the high unemployment rate in Kosovo and the evident need for training and retraining of jobseekers, the active labour market programmes operate with limited government budget. The practice of implementation of ALMPs as known measures for short-term response to the high unemployment rate has been replicated in Kosovo, though, mostly dependent on international donors funding. Several actions were undertaken from donor funded projects to strengthen the capacities of labour market institutions to provide targeted

employment counselling and job search assistance. Active employment programmes have been tailored and implemented jointly with the Public Employment Services through donor financial assistance. The MLSW has stressed the importance of expanding implementation of active employment policies in its strategic documents²². Binding with the Kosovo Employment Strategy, the MLSW has been able to allocate funds for implementation of public works projects during 2011/2012. Efforts are being made into finalizing the legal framework for implementation of ALMPs. Through this basis the MLSW aims at enhancing the implementation and monitoring of employment measures and increasing the allocation of government funding for such employment programmes. However, if the regulation on ALMPs will not be financially binding, the issue of government resource allocation will not be tackled.

Unemployment and Education

The level of education and likelihood of finding employment are positively correlated²³. Although only about 10 percent of the unemployed respondents believe that the reasons for their unemployment is their lack of qualifications and lack of skills required by the labour market, it is evident in Kosovo that the level of education is negatively correlated with the likelihood of being unemployed²⁴. For instance, nearly 55 percent of the unemployed registered with PES possess less than secondary education. Another pressing characteristic of persistent unemployment is that around 82 percent of the registered unemployed have no working experience while only about 10 percent of the respondents believe this is an impediment in their efforts to enter the labour market. Provision of training opportunities and promotion of self-employment and entrepreneurship to the disadvantaged unemployed are means to smoothen entry in the labour market.

21 Assessment of the structure, organization and performance of Public Employment Services in Kosovo UNDP Oct 2010

22 Kosovo Employment Strategy 2010 – 2012 and MLSW Sectorial Strategy Action Plan

23 The average years of education is higher among the employed respondents (Public Pulse data)

24 UNDP Remittance study survey 2011: unemployment rate among the respondents with less than primary education and primary education only is 47.67 % and 61.13 % respectively (Fig 5.2)

Table 5.4 The level of education among unemployed and employed respondents

Education	Unemployed (looking for work)	Unemployed (not looking for work)	Working in public sector	Working in private sector	Employed from time to time
No education	.6%	5.6%			
Less than primary	5.2%	12.2%		3.2%	5.7%
Primary education	23.9%	32.2%	5.2%	12.8%	17.1%
Less than secondary	3.9%	3.3%	.6%	2.7%	5.7%
Secondary	35.6%	30.0%	31.2%	47.0%	37.1%
Tertiary	30.7%	16.7%	63.0%	34.2%	34.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Public Pulse Survey, November 2011


There are 8 MLSW regional Vocational Training Centres Kosovo wide providing training on 30 occupational profiles. These trainings are provided at no cost for the trainees, yet the number of interested jobseekers in gaining the skills has not been at the desirable level. The lack of interest to attend these trainings may also be explained by the questions so often repeated: Are these trainings responding to the demand in the labour market? or What is the belief among the private sector on the quality of skills provided at these training centres? The same issues are also frequently raised for the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) Vocational Education Training (VET) schools in Kosovo.

Education and training programmes that equip young people with skills required by the labour market are an important element in facilitating the transition of young people from school to work. These programmes should be based on broad skills that are related to occupational needs recognized by enterprises, and should include work experience components. There have been positive efforts in equipping the workshops of the VET schools through donor leading initiatives. However, the lack of contact with and experience in the labour market is one of the biggest challenges towards finding sustainable employment. According to MEST data, about two thirds of young have had no opportunity to practice the skills learned at school in the world of work due to the absence of the link with employers and the national mechanism to facilitate this professional practice. The MLSW and the MEST have both a long challenging way ahead towards policy coherence and more effective coordina-

tion across education and training systems and labour market institutions.

Employment in the Public and Private Sector

During the time of the survey about 30 percent of the respondents were employed, and less than 3 percent stated that are working from time to time. About 35.3 percent work for government institutions and public sector enterprises, while 38 percent work in the private sector enterprises.

Figure 5.5 Respondents employed by sector

Source: Public Pulse Survey, November 2011

A woring trend from the Public Pulse Survey is the perception that employment in public sector is done with corruptive practices. About 74.3 percent of the respondents believe that friends and family connections, bribe and party allegations are important for finding employment in the public sector. These results may also indicate why there is a low interest of unemployed for trainings offered by Vocational Training Centres.

Table 5.5 Perceptions of factors important for finding employment in the public sector (institutions)


	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other ethnicity	Total
Professional experience	5.8%	7.4%	8.0%	6.0%
Education	7.4%	33.9%	24.4%	10.1%
Vocational trainings	.7%	4.3%	.5%	.9%
Bribe	25.4%	17.8%	13.1%	24.2%
Family connections	38.4%	9.1%	12.7%	35.0%
Friends	5.6%	2.2%	4.7%	5.4%
Party allegiance	7.1%	20.4%	21.1%	8.8%
The appearance (clothes, makeup)	.7%	.9%	1.4%	.8%
Gender	.4%			.3%
Don't know	6.1%	1.3%	5.2%	5.8%
No answer	2.4%	2.6%	8.9%	2.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source Public Pulse, November 2011

At the same time employment in the public sector remains to be favourable compared to employment in the private sector. From the group of unemployed respondents not looking for work, about 31 percent would accept work

in public sector whilst only about 10 percent would accept work in the private sector, if offered. This preference may also be linked to the perception that employment in the public sector is more stable and longer term.

Figure 5.6 The readiness of unemployed not looking for work to accept job if offered



Source: Public Pulse November 2011

Recommendations

- Strengthen capacities of labour market institutions on budget analysis and planning.
- Strengthen monitoring and reporting capacities of labour market institutions.
- Enhance the institutional capacities to implement donor coordination mechanism and to ensure cohesion during the implementation of donor funded relevant interventions.
- Enhance the design and implementation of ALMPs through piloting and assessing the programmes targeting primarily the most disadvantaged among unemployed.
- Increase allocation of government funds for implementation of ALMPs focusing on the most efficient and effective measures.
- Invest in the quality of education and training and improve its relevance to the labour market needs through intensifying the involvement of the private sector in the relevant policy making processes.
- Increase the work experience components in the training and education system.
- Introduce and institutionalize incentives for private sector to offer apprenticeship and internship opportunities.

Concluding Remarks from the Focus Group Meeting

The UNDP Kosovo - Research, Policy, Gender and Communication Unit assembled a Focus Group meeting on 31 of January 2012 to discuss the findings of the Public Pulse poll. The following sections summarize the discussed issues and conclusions made by the participants:

Comments on Political indicators:

Satisfaction with the Parliament

- The lowest fluctuation can be observed in the satisfaction level with the Parliament while there is a decline in the satisfaction level with the Speaker of the Parliament.
 - This may be occurring because people “hold accountable” only the Speaker of the Parliament for the failures and problems of the parliament instead of the parliament itself as an institution
- A low democratization index may mean that people expect more, have more freedom to express themselves and have higher standards.
- Timing of the survey is very important and depends on the occurring events, circumstances and political situation. For example, before the barricades in the North, the indicators would have not declined by such a great amount

General remarks

- Results imply that we have a legacy from the past, run by one party, elect one president who doesn't speak, and control the public broadcaster
- Lack of awareness of the citizens on the economic development, because of fierce centralization
- Employment possibilities in the public sector: tribal politics (70% of the people still think that education and professional experience are not important for getting a job)
- Media in cooperation with civil society have shifted the attention to corruption, i.e. that if resolved it would open the way to economic development

- The low democratization index should serve as an early warning for the future
- People are more dissatisfied with the economic situation because it affects their lives directly whereas politics are believed to happen ‘further away/out of reach’
- Respondents may be giving biased answers because of the way questions are asked, too direct.
- Disaggregate the data on K-Serbs by their residence: north or south. For instance, when asking about the political situation/governance in their municipality, specifically state what government you are asking about (when asking respondents in the North)

Satisfaction with public services:

- Satisfaction with infrastructure show a surprising decline: more roads are being built, it would be interesting to explore why the satisfaction is decreasing
 - Local road infrastructure
 - Maybe occurring because of increased expectations
- Decline in water supply despite improvements and investments in the infrastructure
- Categories of public services are too different to be included under the same question
 - Education, healthcare, water supply and sanitation are basic services affecting the welfare of individuals. They should not be in the same list with PTK, RTK, etc.
- Dissatisfaction with Tax Administration of Kosovo probably occurring because of increased efforts to collect taxes

Gender

- Figures different from reality. Women report high dissatisfaction with employment in the private sector
- People worst off economically normally report higher satisfaction levels with economic conditions/direction due to low awareness
- Housewives have a higher economic confidence index compared to all the other women

Level of satisfaction with police service

- Merge all the datasets and analyze the most important variables once we have a larger number of respondents (Serbs) for other ethnicities
- A higher share of Serb respondents are dissatisfied compared to the share that report bad/poor community-policy relationships

Factors affecting employment in the private sector - Topic for the next action paper

- Data of labour force surveys: people with no working experience, education, etc., have the highest rates of unemployment
- Compare the level of education between those who believe in different categories/means of getting employment
- Check whether the new Labour Law has improved/affected the chances of women gaining employment

Safety in the roads/neighbourhoods

- Can be misreported because respondents may understand it as lack of safety because of crime or theft
- Previous surveys showed that respondents were only safe in their surroundings/neighbourhoods where they live à next time specify the question and ask about the surrounding level but also areas outside the 'comfort zone'/more homogeneous areas where they live
- People tend to think about crime, traffic, etc., when asked about safety in the road/their neighbourhoods
- If asked nowadays, even issues such as license plates could influence the reported safety level in their neighbourhoods
- People are more informed about risks in their neighbourhoods, hence may report being safe there

- Years ago, there were more direct threats than reported now, e.g. kidnapping
- Measure the safety while outside along ethnic lines so that the data are not corrupt

Issues to look into in the future/analyze in the report

- Employment (means of gaining employment)
- Check what are perceptions on the economic and political development of the 20% who believe that education & professional experience help in gaining employment
- Safety in the neighbourhood
- Visa liberalization
- Human rights
- Supervised independence
- Reciprocity
- Economy and gender
- For K-Serbs relate their satisfaction with the economic direction with the political one (or vice-versa), whereas this is not the case for K-Albanians à check for correlations

Reasons for optimism with the economic situation in the mid-term despite high levels of dissatisfaction

- Optimism is the last hope à High levels of optimism may imply that the situation cannot get any worse
- Optimism related to visa liberalization à lack of awareness and information among people
- Economic development is the main driver of positive changes in every area
- Economic development is related to confidence in institution, effective governance, etc.
- Lack of security in future developments

Methodology

These results are based on an opinion poll sample that surveyed 1283 citizens of Kosovo over 18 years of age, of both sexes and from all municipalities and regions of Kosovo, covering both rural and urban areas. The sample included 843 Kosovo Albanians, 230 Kosovo Serbs and 219 Kosovo non-Serb minorities (namely Turkish, Bosniac, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian). Multistage Random Sampling Method has been used to select the sample. The survey was conducted by ENCOMPASS (Prishtinë/Prishtina) during Nov 2011.

Annex 1.

Calculation of Indexes

Democratization Index is a composite average based on the evaluation of the respondents on how much they agree or disagree regarding the development of the following processes in Kosovo: free and fair elections, Parliament monitors the Government performance, independent Judiciary System, freedom of expression and media, existence of watchdog Civil Society in Kosovo, Government based on priorities of citizens, human rights based Constitution and Laws, and whether Local governments work according to priorities of citizens. The index is continuous measure which can range from 3 (maximum) meaning that all participants fully agreed that democratization is on good track, to 0 (min) meaning that all par-

ticipants do not agree at all that democratization is on track.

Participation Index is a composite average based on the self-reported participation rate in different public activities in last six months. Specifically, respondents report on whether they have participated in active or passive manner in the following: public discussions, citizen initiatives, any project implemented by central or local governments, in NGOs activities and political parties. The index is continuous measure which ranges between 0 (minimum) and 3 (maximum) and measures the level of people's participation in political and civic life in Kosovo. A participation index of 0 would mean that none of the citizens did participate in any of the above mentioned activities, while a participation index of 3 would mean that there is a full public participation in all activities.

Economic Confidence Index is a composite average, which is calculated based on the evaluation of the respondents on how favourable or unfavourable are the economic conditions prevailing in Kosovo. Specifically, respondent evaluate the following conditions: expectations regarding family's total income and employment conditions for next six months, assessment of the current business and employment conditions. The values can range from 0 (minimum) to 3 (maximum) with the range of 0-1.5 indicate unfavourable assessment of economic situation while values from 1.5 - 3 indicating mostly favourable assessment of economic situation.

Annex 2.

Table A1. Correlation of demographic variables with Democratization Index

Pearson Correlation	Democratization Index
Unemployed Looking for work versus others	-.026
Unemployed not looking for work versus others	-.020
Working in Public sector	.067*
Working in Private sector	-.050
Employed from time to time	-.063*
Pensioner	-.064*
Housewife	.104**
Student/Pupil	.026
Other	-.016
Serbs	-.177**
Others	.041
Albanians	.101**
Education	-.045
Log personal income	.219**
Urban	-.109**
Rural	.109**
1-Male 0-Female	-.010
Female	.010
Age	-.080**
Mitrovica	-.066*
Prishtina	-.148**
Prizren	.106**
Peja/Pec	.012
Ferizaj/Urosevac	.110**
Gjakova/Djakovica	.122**
Gjilan/Gnjilane	-.082**

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table A2. Regression of demographic variables with Democratization Index

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.088	.252		-.349	.728
	Unemployed Looking for work	.088	.092	.043	.956	.339
	Unemployed not looking for work	.164	.143	.046	1.140	.255
	Working in Public sector	.250	.077	.153	3.261	.001
	Employed from time to time	-.170	.138	-.048	-1.232	.219
	Pensioner	.154	.109	.084	1.421	.156
	Housewife	.398	.108	.187	3.700	.000
	Student/Pupil	.180	.142	.051	1.266	.206
	Other	.122	.167	.028	.730	.466
	Serbs	-.364	.175	-.102	-2.082	.038
	Albanians	-.083	.109	-.036	-.758	.449
	Education	-.013	.008	-.075	-1.610	.108
	Log personal income	.178	.036	.223	4.929	.000
	Rural	.149	.051	.114	2.910	.004
	Male	.062	.062	.045	.993	.321
	Age	-.002	.002	-.045	-.822	.411
	Mitrovica	.170	.083	.086	2.057	.040
	Prizren	.266	.075	.156	3.530	.000
	Peja	.114	.091	.052	1.259	.209
	Ferizaj	.359	.098	.153	3.675	.000
	Gjakova	.242	.108	.090	2.237	.026
	Gjilan	-.143	.080	-.075	-1.774	.077
Excluded variables						
		Prishtina				
		Working in Private sector				

A3. Correlation of demographic variables with Economic Confidence Index

Pearson Correlation	Economic Confidence Index
Urban	-.003
Age	-.038
Male	-.044
Education	.078**
Family members living abroad	.086**
Unemployed Looking for work	-.086**
Unemployed not looking for work	-.014
Working in Public sector	.094**
Working in Private sector	-.003
Employed from time to time	.056*
Personal Income	.191**
Pensioner	.014
Housewife	.003
Student/Pupil	.027
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica	.096**
Prishtinë/Prishtina	.006
Prizren	-.166**
Peja/Pec	.080**
Ferizaj/Uroševac	-.038
Gjakova/Djakovica	.091**
Gjilan/Gnjilane	-.022

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table A4. Regression of demographic variables with Economic Confidence Index

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	-.607	.260		-2.334	.020
Log personal income	.259	.043	.266	5.986	.000
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica	-.039	.096	-.017	-.407	.684
Prizren	-.519	.091	-.247	-5.716	.000
Peja	-.296	.108	-.113	-2.742	.006
Ferizaj/Uroševac	-.533	.117	-.184	-4.535	.000
Gjakova/Djakovica	-.117	.125	-.037	-.931	.352
Gjilan/Gnjilane	-.337	.093	-.149	-3.608	.000
Family size	.027	.008	.126	3.353	.001
Education	-.006	.009	-.027	-.604	.546
Family members living abroad	.131	.060	.082	2.179	.030
Unemployed Looking for work	.184	.106	.076	1.739	.083
Unemployed not looking	.490	.164	.118	2.994	.003
Working in Public sector	.154	.086	.078	1.782	.075
Employed from time to time	.396	.161	.095	2.463	.014
Pensioner	.140	.105	.063	1.336	.182
Housewife	.366	.114	.143	3.217	.001
Student/Pupil	.440	.163	.105	2.702	.007
Excluded variables	Prishtinë/Prishtina				
	Working in Private sector				



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