




# PUBLIC PULSE REPORT 2



**USAID**

FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE  
NGA POPULLI AMERIKAN  
OD AMERIČKOG NARODA



Empowered lives.  
Resilient nations



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Resilient nations*

# **PUBLIC PULSE REPORT**

**September 2011**

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September 2011

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

<b>DI</b>	Democratization Index
<b>ECI</b>	Economic Confidence Index
<b>EULEX</b>	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
<b>EUSR</b>	EU Special Representative
<b>EWS</b>	Early Warning System
<b>GoK</b>	Government of Kosovo
<b>ICO</b>	International Civilian Office
<b>ICR</b>	International Civilian Representative
<b>KPS</b>	Kosovo Police
<b>KSF</b>	Kosovo Security Force
<b>PI</b>	Participation Index
<b>RAE</b>	Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNMIK</b>	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

## Selected Economic Indicators

	Jan-Mar 2005	Apr-Jun 2005	Jul-Sep 2005	Oct-Dec 2005	Jan-Jun 2006	Jul-Sep 2006	Oct-Dec 2006	Jan-Mar 2007	Apr-Jun 2007	Jul-Oct 2007	Nov-Dec 2007	Jan-June 2008	July-Sept 2008	Oct-Dec 2008	Jan-Mar 2009	Apr-Jun 2009	Jul-Sep 2009	Jan-Mar 2010	Nov 2010	Jun 2011	Trend
Population (in ,000) (a)	1,999*				2,033 **			2.07**	2.07**	2.1**	2.1**	2.1**	2.1**	2.1**	2.1**	2.2*	2.2*	2.2*	2.2*	1.733.872 (q)	▼
GDP growth rate (annual), % (a)	0.3				3.0					3.5	3.5	3.5 (a)	3.5	3.5	5.4(a)	5.4(a)	3.8** (a)	3.8** (a)	2.9 (s)	4.6 (s)	▲
GDP per capita, € (a)	1,120 (a)				1,117 (a)					1,150	1,150 (q)	1,150	1,150	1,150	1,784(a)	1,784(a)	1,731**(a)	1,731**(a)	1,795 (s)	1,850 (v)	▲
Kosovo Budget (Annual), billion € (b)	641.5				713.2 (l)			553 ** (m)	553 (m)	553(m)		862.13	862.13	862.13	862.13	862.13	895.9 (m)	895.9 (m)	1,461 (t)	1.2 (w)	▼
Workers' remittances, million €	281.0 (a)				318.0 (a)					398	398	467 (p)	467 (p)	387.6 (r)		535.8 (q)	535.8 (q)	535.8 (q)		511.6 (q)	▼
Foreign assistance, million € (a)	462.0 *				465.0 *					352	352 ( r)	275 **	275**	275**					132.4 (u)	432.6 (q)	▲
KPST fund, million € ( c)	145.8 (Dec)				167.5 (May) (d)	177 (Sep)(k)	213.0 (Dec) (k)	230.6 (Mar)		276 (Oct)		273.8 (May)						380.7	488.8 (April)	546.3 (c) (June '11)	▲
PAK fund, million € (e)	113.1 (Dec)				234.9 (Apr)	256.1 (Aug) (h)	275.0 (Dec)	291.6 (Feb)		384.4 (Oct)	399.9 (Nov-Dec 2007)	419.8 (Jan-Apr 2008)	426.1 (May)					451	463.2 (March (u)	517.2 (March (u)	▲
Bank deposits, million €	704.8 (Feb)	731.2 (May)	765.8 (Aug)	809 (Nov)	844.6 (Apr) (e)	881.6 (Aug) (h)	926.4 (Dec)	973.5 (Feb)	967.6 (Apr)	1,102.740 (Oct)	1,228 (Dec)(s)	1,112 (Feb)	1,183 (p) (May)		1,4441(r)	1,513 (q) (Jun)	1,65 (q) (Sep)	1,65 (q) (Sep)	1,77 (u) (March)	1,93 (q) (Oct)	▲
Commercial bank loans, million €	356.5 (Feb)	400.1 (May)	401.8 (Aug)	435.7 (Nov)	459.7 (Apr) (e)	476.4 (Aug) (h)	490.5 (Dec)	515.1 (Feb)	560.2 (Apr)	659.9 (Oct)	891.2 (Dec)(t)	937 (Feb)	1,052.8 (p)(May)			1,281 (q) (Jun)	1,281 (q) (Sep)	1,281 (q) (Sep)	1,336.2 (u) (March)	1,624.9 (q)(June)	▲
Trade balance, million € (j)	-219.1 (Jan-Mar)	-308.5 (Jan-Apr)	-723.4 (Jan-Aug)	-1028.4 (Jan-Nov)	-537.5 (Jan-Jun)	-761.3 (Jan-Aug) (j)	-1235.3 (Jan-Dec)	-101.92 (Jan-Feb)	-400 (Jan-Apr)	-1164.2 (Jan-Oct)	-264.6 (Nov-Dec) (n)	-360 (Jan-Feb)	-142 (May)	-1638.5 Jan-Dec	-142 (May)		-152 (Sep)	-152 (Sep)	-550 (March (u)	-925.4 (June)	▼
Registered job-seekers	303,095 (Jan)	311,230 (May)	314,446 (Aug)	319,721 (Dec)	323,201 (May)	324,835 (Sep)	326,026 (Dec)	331,056 (Mar)			334.595 (Dec)	336.366 (Mar 2008) (n)	336.366 (Mar 2008) (n)		338.836 (Apr)	338.618 (May 2009) (q)	339.418 (Sep 2009) (q)	339.418 (Sep 2009) (q)	338.800 (March 2010) (u)	335.260	▼
Consumer Price Index, % (compared to May 2002) ***	101.4 (May)	100.0 (May)	98.5 (Aug)	101.9 (Nov)	102.9 (May)	101.3 (Aug) (f)	102.6 (Nov)	100.2 (Mar)	99.4 (Apr)	103.9 (Sep)	102.8 (Dec)	111.4 (Feb)	112.8 (Jul)		110.9 (Mar)		108.8 (Sep)	115.2 (Sep)	119.9 (March (u)	130.3 (June (q)	▲
Basic pensions (per month), €	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40		40		70	70	70	70	◀▶
Voluntary returns		2,126				1,608 (g)															

\* Estimated

\*\* Projected

\*\*\* In January 2006, SOK changed the methodology for compiling CPI. Therefore the comparison of currently produced CPI with the CPI from before January 2006 is not possible

Sources:

- a) IMF Aide Memoire, (September 2007 and June 2009);  
b) MEF (2006), Budget , MEF, Government of Kosovo, Prishtinë/Priština.  
c) KPST, Key Facts Report 2011, KPST, Prishtinë/Priština.  
d) Assessment obtained from KPST through e-mail.  
e) CBAK (2006), Monthly Statistics Bulletin, No. 56, BPK, Prishtinë/Priština, April 2006.  
f) SOK (2006), Price Statistics Division, Consumer Price Index, SOK, Government of Kosovo, Prishtinë/Priština.  
The rest of the figures are from UNDP (2006), Early Warning Report No. 12: October - December 2005, UNDP, Prishtinë/Priština, op. cit.  
g) United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees Kosovo.  
h) BPK (2006), Monthly Statistics Bulletin, No. 56, BPK, Prishtinë/Priština, August 2006.  
i) Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, 2006.  
j) This is the trade deficit for the period Jan-Feb 2007, Statistical Office of Kosovo  
k) This figure is reported at KPST's website, date of release February 7th, 2007  
(l) CBAK (2007). Monthly Statistics Bulletin for December 2006. No (64). Prishtina  
(m) Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance  
(n) Ministry of Public Services of Kosova - Quarterly Bulletin May 2008  
p) CBAK - MONTHLY STATISTICS BULLETIN May 2008

- (q) CBAK - MONTHLY STATISTICS BULLETIN June 2011  
(r) CBAK - Annual Report 2008  
(s)SOK, Gross Domestic Product in Kosovo 2010  
(t) MEF (2011), Budget , MEF, Government of Kosovo, Prishtinë/Priština  
(u) CBAK (2010). Monthly Statistics Bulletin for March 2010. No (103). BPK Prishtina"  
(v) World Bank – Kosovo Partnership, March 2011Program Snapshot"  
(w) Ministry of Finance - Kosovo Budget reports and Financial Statements  
x) Ministry of Labour, LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT - Report 2010  
"y) Quarterly Report on Activities of the Privatisation Agency of Kosovo (PAK) for reporting period January –March 2011 "

## Selected Indicators from the Opinion Poll

	Mar 2005 a)	Sep 2005 b)	Jun 2006 c)	Jun 2007 e)	"Dec 2007 f)"	"Sep 2008 g)"	"Nov 2008 o)"	"Jun 2009 p)"	Sep 2009 q)	Jan 2010 r)	Apr 2010 s)	Nov 2010 t)	Jun 2011 v)	Trend
Political pessimism, % ("very dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied" with current political trends)	38.6	41.0	43.4	54.0	41.1	36.0	35.73%	26.78%	33.03%	41.08%	37.30%	66.90%	57.50%	▼
Economic pessimism, % ("very dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied" with current economic trends)	71.1	68.8	76.0	70.7	64.6	53.0	55.0	43.48%	57.07%	60.31%	53.80%	72.10%	69.70%	▼
Willingness to protest due to economic rea- sons, %	62.9	57.4	62.8	54.9	71.3	68.3	75.7%	64.32%	66.58%	63.40%	59.2%	72.4%	66.9%	▼
Willingness to protest due to political rea- sons, %	48.9	45.4	45.5	31.2	58.6	49.2	59.5%	45.21%	50.68%	46.06%	49.2%	58.7%	55.4%	▼
Satisfaction with UN- MIK's performance*, %	29.7	34.5	30.5	31.5	27.7	25.4	20.8%	28.36%	23.11%	12.58%	22.20%	18.90%	15.90%	▼
Satisfaction with SRSg's performance*, %	81.2	69.8	70.5	45.9	39.6	18.4	21.1%	33.66%	25.93%	17.79%	25.30%			
Satisfaction with Gov. Kosovo (before PISG) performance*, %	81.2	48.7	43.3	35.9		49.9	55.7%	53.13%	55.83%	36.72%	29.30%	25.10%	32.60%	▲
Satisfaction with Assem- bly's performance*, %	73.7	59.0	45.4	31.9	36.7	46.0	49.0%	53.18%	46.37%	33.34%	34.10%	32.10%	41.00%	▲
Satisfaction with KFOR's performance*, %	81.0	84.3	81.0	81.8	83.7	84.2	86.9%	72.88%	71.90%	77.63%	69.60%	81.70%	82.10%	◀▶
Satisfaction with KPS performance*, %	86.9	84.5	81.8	79.3	78.6	80.0	80.9%	71.14%	70.96%	74.86%	74.30%	78.50%	78.30%	◀▶
Feelings of insecurity ("Somewhat unsafe" or "very unsafe" while outdoors)	38.1	36.7	35.5	22.6*	55.25*	21.2	18.3	26.00%	17.87%	27.64%	29.90%	30.60%	31.40%	◀▶

\* includes "satisfied" and "very satisfied" (question was redesigned in June 2007, therefore June results are not comparable to earlier results)

### Sources:

- a) UNDP, Early Warning Report March 2005, UNDP, Prishtinë/Priština, op. cit.
- b) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2005.
- c) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2006
- d) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Dec 2006
- e) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2007
- f) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Dec 2007
- g) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2008
- o) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Nov 2008
- p) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jun 2009
- q) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Sep 2009
- r) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Jan 2010
- s) UNDP, Opinion Poll: Apr 2010



## FOREWORD

This is the second edition of the Public Pulse Report, a continuation of previous Early Warning Reports. The report provides valuable analysis of public perceptions while Kosovo<sup>1</sup> consolidates its democracy and makes progress towards strengthening of its institutions and prudent governing. The new Public Pulse Report lifts the analysis from early warning and conflict prevention, to democratic dialogue and monitoring of institutional stability. Through this USAID-funded project we hope to increase the communication between government institutions and their constituents, civil society and media.

This edition of the report is published in a period of intensive and important developments with the Belgrade-Pristina and developments in the northern Kosovo. In this regard, continued monitoring of public perception indicators may prove to be a necessary tool for obtaining insight into the opinion of Kosovo people on those respective processes.

Following the initial release of report fast facts in June this year, our research and policy team worked closely with Kosovo Judicial Council on a follow-up action plan to address the negative and low public perceptions towards Kosovo judiciary. This marks a new approach in that the Public Pulse project is not solely about informing public policy options but also actively engaging with respective partners in providing solutions to noted shortcomings in the public policy sphere.

Public Pulse report also integrates two new indices on democratization and economic confidence. According to the latest poll, Kosovo's democratization index is 0.95 which means that most people do not perceive that democratization processes are going in the right direction. Kosovo's overall Economic Confidence Index is 0.90, meaning that on average Kosovans do not have a favourable opinion of the economy.

The challenges and limitations of governmental or public institutions are enormous but so is the public demand and eagerness for visible improvements in Kosovo. Some important highlights of the report are:

- Contrary to the November 2010, the June 2011 Public Pulse Poll results show a general increase in people's satisfaction with the work of Kosovo's key executive, legislative, and judicial institutions.
- About 70% of respondents of all ethnicities seem to be dissatisfied with the economic direction in which Kosovo is headed. More than half of all respondents (55%) are ready to join public protests for political reasons, while some 70% would do so for economic reasons.
- According to the survey data, Kosovans identify unemployment (40%) and poverty (20%) as the two top paramount problems that Kosovo faces. The third paramount problem that Kosovo faces is corruption (6%).
- On average, 33% of Kosovans believe that family connections are the most important factor, followed by those (19%) who believe that bribes are the most important factor for one's chances of employment in the public sector. Only 15% of respondents believe that education is important when one seeks employment in the public sector, followed by 10% who believe that party allegiance is the most important thing

While the report might be of interest to the general reader, its primary aim is to provide a platform of perceptions and mechanism to facilitate the public policy making process in an ever consolidating Kosovo democracy. All conclusions and proposed recommendations presented in this report are a result of several rounds of discussions with experts from diverse areas, backgrounds and institutional settings.

<sup>1</sup> For UNDP, all references to Kosovo on this document are made in the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).

We remain confident that the set of analyses presented here will stimulate a lot of thought and further discussions among readers and opinion makers in Kosovo. It gives us great pleasure, therefore, to extend our appreciation and gratitude to the contributing

experts that participated in discussions and provided insights, perspectives and interpreted the results of the poll, and to all those who supported us in the process of completing this edition.

Steliana Nedera  
UNDP Deputy Resident Representative

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Contrary to the November 2010, the June 2011 Public Pulse Poll results show a general increase in people's satisfaction with the work of Kosovo's key executive, legislative, and judicial institutions.
- Among all key institutional offices of Kosovo, the Speaker of the Parliament of Kosovo currently enjoys the highest level of people's satisfaction at 61% (as opposed to 33% in November 2010) and has marked the highest increase in people's satisfaction with the work of Kosovo's key institutions between November 2010 and June 2011 (28 percentage points).
- Similarly, satisfaction with President of Kosovo has increased by 23 percentage points between November 2010 and June 2011, currently standing at 54%.
- People's satisfaction with the Government of Kosovo has increased by 8 percentage points (moving from 25% in November 2010 to 33% in June 2011). Courts, too, have seen an 8 percentage-point increase in people's satisfaction with them, currently standing at 27%. A similar increase (of 7 percentage points) has been seen in people's satisfaction with the Prime Minister of Kosovo – moving from 31% in November 2010 to 38% in June 2011.
- Only some 13.5% of Kosovans seems to be either satisfied or very satisfied with Kosovo's political direction, while more than half (57.5%) seem to rather be either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Kosovo's political direction.
- As has been the case since July 2008, the Government of Kosovo and Political Parties have been selected by some 78% of respondents as the entity being most responsible for Kosovo's political situation. Some 19% of respondents indicate that EULEX is most responsible for Kosovo's political situation, while a minority of only 4% of respondents attribute this responsibility primarily to UNMIK.
- According to the latest poll, Kosovo's democratization index is 0.95 which means that most people do not perceive that democratization processes are going in the right direction.
- Kosovo's participation index is 0.13, meaning that the public participation in Kosovo's political and civic life is very low.
- About 70% of respondents of all ethnicities seem to be dissatisfied with the economic direction in which Kosovo is headed.
- As to who holds the primary responsibility for Kosovo's economic situation, about 67% of all Kosovans place this responsibility on the Government of Kosovo. No more than a total of 12% of respondents place this responsibility on the international community (EULEX, ICO and UNMIK combined), and only about 3% selected the local government as the primary holder of the responsibility or Kosovo's economic situation, while only 2.5% place this responsibility on the business community.
- More than half of all respondents (55%) are ready to join public protests for political reasons, while some 70% would do so for economic reasons.
- Some 59% of respondents expect economic conditions to improve (be better) over the next two years as opposed to 25% of them who see no change coming and some 16% who expect the situation will worsen.
- Kosovo's overall Economic Confidence Index is 0.90, meaning that on average Kosovans do not have a favourable opinion of the economy.
- According to the survey data, Kosovans identify unemployment (40%) and poverty (20%) as the two top paramount problems that Kosovo faces. The third

paramount problem that Kosovo faces is corruption (6%).

- On average, 33% of Kosovans believe that family connections are the most important factor for one's chances of employment in the public sector, followed by those (19%) who believe that bribes are the most important factor. Only 15% of respondents believe that education is important when one seeks employment in the public sector, followed by 10% who believe that party allegiance is the most important thing.
- Some 43% of K-Serbs would agree to work with K-Albanians. About 31% of K-Serbs would agree to live in the same town with K-Albanians, followed by 20% who would agree to live on the same street with K-Albanians. As far as interethnic marriages are concerned, no K-Serbs show willingness to marry K-Albanians.
- Similarly, some 41.5% of K-Albanians would agree to work with K-Serbs, while some 43.5% of them would agree to live in the same town with K-Serbs, and some 37% would agree to live on the same street with K-Serbs.
- K-Albanians continue to be highly satisfied with the work of security institutions in Kosovo. The current poll results show that their satisfaction with KSF has increased by some 7 percentage points since November 2010, currently standing at 91%, while their satisfaction for the Kosovo Police and KFOR has not changed significantly since November 2010. The satisfaction level of K-Albanians with the EULEX Police has significantly decreased by some 11 percentage points since November 2010, currently standing at 32%.
- Among K-Serbs, satisfaction with some security institutions in Kosovo, namely KFOR and the Kosovo Police, has significantly increased since November 2010. Indeed, their satisfaction with KFOR has increased by 17 percentage points, currently standing at 36%, while their satisfaction level with the Kosovo Police has increased by 8 percentage points, now standing at 23%. There has not been a significant change in K-Serbs' satisfaction with EULEX Police while their satisfaction with KSF has decreased by some 4 percentage points to a current low of 2% since November 2010.
- Overall, there is no significant change in the proportion of those who believe they were discriminated against in the last six months between November 2010 and June 2011.

# CHAPTER 1

## Politics and Institutions

### *Satisfaction with Institutions and Political Processes*

Contrary to the November 2010, the June 2011 Public Pulse Poll results show a general increase in people's satisfaction with the work of Kosovo's key executive, legislative, and judicial institutions.

According to the poll results, people's satisfaction with the legislative institutions of Kosovo has seen an increase between November 2010 and June 2011. In what follows, a comparative analysis of the relative increase in people's satisfaction for these institutions is presented.

Among all key institutional offices of Kosovo, the Speaker of the Parliament of Kosovo currently enjoys the highest level of people's satisfaction at 61% (as opposed to 33% in November 2010) and has marked the highest increase in people's satisfaction with the work of Kosovo's key institutions between November 2010 and June 2011 (28 percentage points).

The Speaker of the Parliament is followed by an increase of 23 percentage points in peo-

ple's satisfaction with the President of Kosovo between November 2010 and June 2011, currently standing at 54%.

The institution that has seen the third highest increase between November 2010 and June 2011 is the Parliament of Kosovo. People's satisfaction with the work of the Parliament of Kosovo increased by 9 percentage points since November 2010, currently standing at 41%.

People's satisfaction with the Government of Kosovo has increased by 8 percentage points (moving from 25% in November 2010 to 33% in June 2011). Courts, too, have seen an 8 percentage-point increase in people's satisfaction with them, currently standing at 27%. A similar increase (of 7 percentage points) has been seen in people's satisfaction with the Prime Minister of Kosovo – moving from 31% in November 2010 to 38% in June 2011.

And, as has usually been the case, the Prosecutor's Office continues to lag behind all other institutions with only 20% of the people being satisfied with it, which marks an increase of only 5 percentage points since November 2010.

**Table 1.1: Satisfaction with Kosovo's Key Institutions**

		Mar-07	Jun-07	Oct-07	Dec-07	May-08	Jul-08	Oct-08	Apr-09	Jun-09	Sep-09	Jan-10	Apr-10	Nov-10	Jun-11
Satisfaction with executive government	Government	30.50%	35.99%	28.12%		46.85%	49.85%	55.71%	38.00%	53.13%	55.83%	36.72%	29.21%	25.06%	32.60%
	Prime minister	54.00%	66.00%	61.00%		72.00%	63.23%	63.12%	39.81%	53.84%	51.98%	41.50%	36.36%	30.65%	37.60%
Satisfaction with legislative	Parliament	31.00%	31.96%	36.19%	36.76%	51.36%	46.00%	49.03%	33.63%	53.18%	46.37%	33.34%	34.05%	32.10%	41.00%
	Speaker of parliament	35.43%	33.23%	37.14%	35.10%	56.48%	43.55%	46.97%	32.77%	51.59%	49.45%	40.30%	36.03%	33.25%	60.90%
	President	52.00%	64.00%	59.00%	61.00%	74.00%	68.09%	69.93%	45.66%	61.72%	60.75%	56.63%	54.88%	30.84%	54.10%
Satisfaction with judiciary	Court	20.00%	20.00%	18.00%	18.00%	21.00%	19.52%	19.71%	20.04%	32.65%	25.60%	14.73%	27.21%	18.50%	26.90%
	Prosecutor's office	22.70%	19.79%	17.70%	18.27%	22.66%	22.79%	21.05%	20.46%	31.74%	25.74%	14.81%	26.85%	15.06%	20.00%

While a significant number of Kosovans seem to be satisfied with the work of their key institutions – i.e. on average, about 37% of Kosovans seem to be satisfied with their institutions (legislative, executive, and judiciary combined) – the picture changes significantly when they are asked about their satisfaction with the political direction in which Kosovo is headed. Only some 13.5% of Kosovans seems to be either satisfied or very satisfied with Kosovo’s political direction, while more than half (57.5%) seem to rather be either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Kosovo’s political direction. 27% are neither satisfied or dissatisfied with Kosovo’s political direction.

Broken down by ethnicity, K-Albanians and Other minority respondents seem to be, on average, more satisfied or very satisfied with Kosovo’s political direction than the K-Serbs, out of whom only 1% are satisfied or very satisfied with Kosovo’s political direction.

**Table 1.2: Satisfaction with Kosovo’s political direction**

	Ethnicity			
	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
Very satisfied	3.4%	.6%	.4%	3.0%
Satisfied	10.9%	.4%	14.2%	10.5%
Neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied	28.4%	11.0%	20.4%	26.9%
Dissatisfied	24.5%	48.3%	38.7%	26.9%
Very dissatisfied	31.1%	36.4%	18.2%	30.6%
Don’t know	1.1%	2.3%	7.1%	1.5%
NA	.6%	1.1%	.9%	.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


When broken down by gender, the results do not differ much between male and female respondents. The only two statistically significant differences between the two genders show up in the neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and the very dissatisfied categories, in which more female (30%) than male (24.5%) respondents are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with Kosovo’s political direction, and less female (29%) than male (33%) respondents are very dissatisfied with Kosovo’s political direction.

**Table 1.3: Satisfaction with Kosovo’s political direction, by gender**


	Ethnicity		
	Male	Female	Total
Very satisfied	4.0%	1.9%	3.0%
Satisfied	10.9%	9.9%	10.4%
Neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied	24.5%	29.6%	26.9%
Dissatisfied	26.4%	27.3%	26.8%
Very dissatisfied	32.3%	28.7%	30.6%
Don’t know	.9%	2.2%	1.5%
NA	.9%	.4%	.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Apart from their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Kosovo’s political direction, respondents were also asked to indicate who, in their opinion, was most responsible for Kosovo’s state of politics. The frontrunner in this category, as has been the case since July 2008, continues to be the Government of Kosovo and Political Parties, which has been selected by some 78% of respondents as the entity being most responsible for Kosovo’s political situation. Some 19% of respondents indicate that EULEX is most responsible for Kosovo’s political situation, while a minority of only 4% of respondents attribute this responsibility primarily to UNMIK.



**Figure 1.1: Who is most responsible for Kosovo's political situation?**

Given this mixed picture of people's feelings towards their institutions and the state of politics in Kosovo, respondents were asked whether they would join public protests organized due to political reasons. Overall, just like according to the November 2010 poll, more than half of all respondents answered positively. In general, according to the survey data, almost twice as many K-Albanians (58%) as K-Serbs (31%) seem more ready and willing to join political protests, whereas of the same opinion are also some 38% of Other minority respondents.

**Figure 1.2: Readiness to join public protests due to political reasons**

### *Democratization and Public Participation in Political and Civic Life*

Based on the data shown in Table 1.4, a democratization index has been calculated. The democratization index which ranges from 0 to 3 is developed with the aim to measure

the perceptions of Kosovans on issues pertaining to democratization processes. A democratization index of below 1.5 points represents the assessment that Kosovans do not perceive that democratization processes are going in right direction; specifically it means that more respondents have a negative assessment of the democratic processes in Kosovo than a positive assessment. On the other hand, a democratization index of above 1.5 points means that perceptions on democratization are generally positive, i.e. more respondents believe that democratic processes are going in the right direction.

According to the latest poll, Kosovo's democratization index is 0.95 (as opposed to 0.92 in November 2010) which means that most people do not perceive that democratization processes are going in the right direction.

Similar to the democratization index, based on the data shown in Table 1.4, a participation index has been calculated for Kosovo. The participation index which ranges between 0 and 3 measures the level of people's participation in Kosovo's political and civic life. A participation index of 0 would mean that there is no public participation in Kosovo's political and civic life, while a participation index of 3 would mean that there is complete public participation in Kosovo's political and civic life.

According to the latest poll, however, Kosovo's participation index is 0.13 (as opposed to 0.24 in November 2010), meaning that the public participation in Kosovo's politi-

cal and civic life is very low. Indeed, when broken down by gender, the average participation index seems to be significantly higher for males (0.18) than it is for females (0.07). This finding may speak to the continued inequality of public participation in politics and civic life between men and women in Kosovo.

**Table 1.4: Democratization and Participation Indexes**

	Value	
	Nov-10	Jun-11
Democratization Index	0.92	0.95
Democratization Index (Male)	0.94	0.99
Democratization Index (Female)	0.89	0.91
Participation Index	0.24	0.13
Participation Index (Male)		0.18
Participation Index (Female)		0.07


Some indicators of democratization for which the Public Pulse poll gathered data demonstrate that only about one-third of Kosovans believe that the media enjoys the freedom of expression and that the elections are democratic and in accordance with the international standards (29%).

About 28% of Kosovans believe that the Kosovo Constitution and Kosovo laws are democratic and respect human rights, and that the municipal governments work according to priorities of their residents (27%).

A rather small proportion of Kosovans, however, between 16% and 19%, believe that the Kosovo judiciary is independent in its decision-making (16%), that the Government of Kosovo works in accordance with the priorities of the Kosovans (16%), and that civil society serves as a truthful monitor of democratic developments in Kosovo (19%).

About 21% of Kosovans, believe that the Parliament of Kosovo does indeed monitor the performance of the Government of Kosovo.

**Figure 1.3: Percentage of affirmative responses to Democratization Index questions**



In an effort to measure the public participation in Kosovo's political and civic life, the Public Pulse poll asked respondents to answer questions about their participation in activities deemed public, political, or civic within the last six months.

Participation in activities of a political party (10%) turns out to be the most popular way of

participation in Kosovo's political and/or civic life according to the June 2011 poll results, despite the 5.5-percentage-point decrease since November 2010 (15.5%). This is followed closely by participation in public discussions (9% as opposed to 15% in November 2010), as well as community based initiatives (7%), participation in an NGO (6% as opposed to 13% in November 2010), projects implemented by




the central government (6% as opposed to 5% in November 2010), a citizens' initiative (6% as opposed to 11% in November 2010), and projects implemented by the local government (2% as opposed to 11% in November 2010).

These significant decreases in affirmative responses to questions on public participation

may be the reason behind the drop in the Kosovo participation index from 0.24 in November 2010 to 0.13 in June 2011. However, we should recall the fact that that November 2010 marked an election period, which could have played a role in people's higher participation rates.

**Figure 1.4: Affirmative responses to questions on participation**



## CHAPTER 2

### The Socio-Economic Situation

#### *Satisfaction with the Economy and Expectations*

While some 57.5% of respondents are dissatisfied with the political direction in which Kosovo is presently headed, about 70% (as opposed to 72% in November 2010) of respondents of all ethnicities seem to be dissatisfied with the economic direction in which Kosovo is headed. Only 8% (as opposed to 6% in November 2010) of respondents, however, seem to be satisfied with the economic direction in which Kosovo is headed.

**Table 2.1: Satisfaction with Kosovo's economic direction**


	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
Satisfied	9.07%	1.52%	6.22%	8.41%
Dissatisfied	68.44%	86.36%	71.11%	69.71%

When respondents were asked as to who holds the primary responsibility for Kosovo's economic situation, about 67% (as opposed to 71% in November 2010) of all Kosovans place this responsibility on the Government of Kosovo. No more than a total of 12% (as opposed to 9% in November 2010) of respondents place this responsibility on the international community (EULEX, ICO and UNMIK combined), and only about 3% (as opposed to 6% in November 2010) select the local government as the primary holder of the responsibility or Kosovo's economic situation, while less than 3% place this responsibility on the business community.


**Table 2.2: Who is most responsible for Kosovo's economic situation?**

	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
EULEX	7.0%	12.3%	3.6%	7.1%
ICO	1.5%	1.3%	.4%	1.3%
UNMIK	3.7%	11.4%	.9%	4.0%
Kosovo Government	68.7%	42.2%	65.3%	66.9%
Local governments	3.1%	2.7%	5.3%	3.3%
Business community	2.4%	.2%	4.9%	2.5%
Other	2.5%	6.3%	1.8%	2.7%
Don't know	7.4%	17.6%	12.0%	8.3%
NA	3.6%	6.1%	5.8%	3.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

While 55% of Kosovans seem ready and willing to join protests due to political reasons, in general, some 67% of them seem ready and willing to join public protests due to economic reasons. Broken down by ethnicity, some 75% of K-Albanians, 40% of K-Serbs, and 59% of Other minority respondents are ready and willing to join public protests due to economic reasons. Once again, K-Albanians continue to be the ethnicity with the highest proportion of respondents willing to join public protests due to economic reasons since April 2009. Whereas K-Serbs continue to be the ethnicity with the lowest proportion of respondents willing to join public protests due to economic reasons since April 2009, while the Other minorities continue to rank between K-Albanians and K-Serbs in terms of the proportion of their respondents willing to join public protests due to economic reasons since April 2009.

**Figure 2.1: Readiness to join public protests due to economic reasons**

Little change is expected by Kosovans in terms of the changing state of the economy in Kosovo over the next six months. Slightly more than 60% of all respondents believe that no change will occur in Kosovo's economic situation over the next six months, while slightly less than 20% of them believe that the situation will get better and worse, respectively.

**Figure 2.2: Expectations about the economic situation over the next six months and the next two years**

### The Economic Confidence Index

Similar to the Democratization Index (DI) and the Participation Index (PI), an Economic Confidence Index (ECI) was also calculated for Kosovo. The ECI ranges between 0 and 3 with an index of 0 to 1.5 meaning that majority of Kosovans have no confidence in economy (i.e. view economic conditions unfavourably; are less optimistic about the future of the economy). On the other hand, an ECI of 1.5 and above means that majority of Kosovans have confidence in the economy, (i.e. view economic conditions favourably; are more optimistic about the future of the

Expectations about a longer term, i.e. over the next two years, in regards to the state of the economy of Kosovo seem to be more favourable than those over the next six months. Some 59% of respondents expect economic conditions to improve over the next two years as opposed to 25% of them who see no change coming and some 16% who expect the situation will worsen.

economy). While an ECI of 3 means that all Kosovans have confidence in economy.

Based on the current Public Pulse poll data, Kosovo's overall ECI is 0.90 (as opposed to 0.92 in November 2010), meaning that on average Kosovans do not have a favourable opinion of the economy.

**Table 2.3: Economic Confidence Index**

	Min	Max	Kosovo Average
Economic Confidence Index	0	3	0.90
Economic Confidence Index (Male)	0	3	0.88
Economic Confidence Index (Female)	0	3	0.92


ECI has been calculated based on the responses given to a series of questions as presented in figure 2.3.

Overall, only between 10% and 12% of respondents have a favourable (optimistic)

view of the current business conditions (10%), expectations about employment conditions six months from now (12%), and expectations regarding family's income six months from now (12%). Moreover, only 3% of respondents have a favourable view of the current employment conditions.

These low proportions of people's favourable views on economic conditions in Kosovo are the reason behind Kosovo's low ECI. If, for instance, these proportions were much higher, the ECI would have been higher as well.

**Figure 2.3: Economic Confidence Indicators**



### *Employment and Perceptions of Large Scale Corruption*

Unemployment continues to be the paramount problem that Kosovo faces. According to the poll results, 40% of Kosovans identify unemployment as the paramount problem that Kosovo faces, followed by 20% who select poverty as the paramount problem.

Given the rather weak state of Kosovo's economy and an underdeveloped private sector, the public sector remains an important source of employment. But, getting a job in the public sector has shown to be quite a challenge, especially in terms of perceived fairness of recruitment process.

For the analysis of the recruitment procedures, the poll asked respondents to identify the institutions / entities that they believe implement fair recruiting policies. According to the poll results, the private sector (21.5%, no change since November 2010), followed by international organizations (11%, no change since November 2010) and municipalities (11% as opposed to 8%

in November 2010) are believed to be the top three institutions that implement fair recruiting. Only between 5% and 7% (no significant change since November 2010) of respondents believe that the Government of Kosovo, the public sector (KEK, PTK, etc.), and NGOs implement fair recruiting when hiring new employees.

**Table 2.4: Fair recruiting in selected institutions / entities**


	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total Weighted
Municipalities	10.20%	14.40%	13.80%	10.60%
Government	4.80%	4.70%	10.20%	5.10%
Public sector (KEK, PTK, etc.)	5.40%	7.00%	4.90%	5.60%
Private sector	21.80%	22.70%	16.00%	21.50%
International Organizations	10.50%	10.60%	22.20%	11.20%
NGOs	7.10%	7.60%	3.60%	6.90%
Don't know	29.10%	25.00%	20.00%	28.30%
No answer	11.00%	8.00%	9.30%	10.80%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Moreover, as to what factors account for one's getting a job in the public sector, the poll results once again provide us with similar disturbing results as in November 2010.

On average, 33% (no change since November 2010) of Kosovans believe that family connections are the most important factor, followed by 19% (as opposed 24% in November 2010) who believe that bribes are the most important factor for one's chances of

employment in the public sector. Only 15% (as opposed to 12% in November 2010) of respondents believe that education is important when one seeks employment in the public sector, followed by 10% (no change since November 2010) who believe that party allegiance is the most important thing. However, it is worrisome that in total only 24% of respondents think that education, professional experience and vocational training are important for getting a job in public sector.

**Figure 2.4: Importance of factors that affect one's chances of employment in the public sector**




Apart from unemployment (40%) and poverty (20%), corruption (6%) is the third paramount problem that Kosovo faces.

In terms of people's perception about large scale corruption and according to the current

poll results, KEK, Customs, and Courts are the top three institutions with the highest public perception of large scale corruption. The institutions with the least public perception of large scale corruption are Education institutions, International Organizations, and NGOs.

**Figure 2.6: Perceptions of large scale corruption**



### *Correlations: Perceptions of Democratization, Participation, Economic Confidence and Education*

In what follows, a brief analysis of correlations between the perceptions of democratization, participation, and economic confidence (as measured by the Democratization Index, Participation Index, Economic Confidence Index) and Education will be presented. These Pearson correlations<sup>1</sup>, however, should not be interpreted as causal relations in any way. According to the poll results, a positive and statistically significant (at the 0.01 level) correlation exists between PI and ECI, PI and DI, and PI and Education (a variable giving the number of years of education completed per individual). In other words, this may mean that a higher PI depends on a higher ECI, a higher DI, and a higher number of years of completed education.

Moreover, the correlation analysis shows a positive and statistically significant (at the 0.01 level) correlation exists between DI and

ECI as well as PI. This may mean that a higher DI depends on a higher PI and/or a higher ECI. No statistically significant relationship, however, seems to exist between DI and Education.

Given the existence of a positive and statistically significant (at the 0.01 or 0.05 level) correlation between ECI and PI, DI, and Education, a higher ECI seems to depend on a higher PI, a higher DI, and/or a higher level of Education. In other words, the higher the DI the higher the ECI may be. Or, the higher the level of Education, the higher the ECI may be.

Finally, there also exists a positive and statistically significant (at the 0.01 or 0.05 level) correlation between Education and ECI as well as PI. This may mean that a higher level of Education depends on a higher ECI and/or a higher PI. There is no statistically significant relationship between Education and DI. In other words, the higher the PI or the ECI, the higher the level of Education may be. In concrete terms, this correlation between Education and PI and ECI suggests that people will tend to complete more years of educa-

<sup>1</sup> See Annex

tion when the PI and / or the ECI is higher. For instance, as people see an increase in the Economic Confidence Index (i.e. favourable prospects for a better economy), they may complete more years of education (i.e. be-

come more educated) so that they may have a better chance of enjoying the benefits of a better economy (in terms of getting a better-paid job or just getting a job at all).

**Table 2.5: Pearson correlation coefficients between PI, ECI, DI, and Education**

		Economic_Confidence_Index 0-3	Participation Index 1	Democratization Index	Education (years of completed education)
Economic_Confidence_Index 0-3	Pearson Correlation		.102**	.188**	.063*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.014
	N		1530	1533	1535
Participation Index 1	Pearson Correlation	.102**		.115**	.136**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000
	N	1530		1517	1531
Democratization Index	Pearson Correlation	.188**	.115**		-.016
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.524
	N	1533	1517		1523
Education (how many years of school did you complete?)	Pearson Correlation	.063*	.136**	-.016	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.014	.000	.524	
	N	1535	1531	1523	

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\*.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

## CHAPTER 3

### Interethnic Relations


#### *The State of Interethnic Relations*

Interethnic relations remain an important determinant of Kosovo's path towards progress (development) forward. While there are tensions among different ethnicities in Kosovo, there are also prospects that these relations will normalize.

The current Public Pulse poll results show a significant decrease in the K-Serbs belief that

interethnic relations are tense and not improving. As for the K-Albanians, however, the poll results show a significant increase in their opinion for this matter. For the K-Serbs, however, this indicator has dropped by some 16 percentage points since November 2010, while for the K-Albanians the indicator has increased by 12 percentage points since November 2010.

**Figure 3.1: Trend of respondents considering that interethnic relations continue to be tense and not improving**




To get a better understanding of interethnic relations in Kosovo, we now turn to the specifics of interethnic life, such as one ethnicity's willingness to work, live with, or marry members of another ethnicity.

According to the current poll results, some 43% of K-Serbs (as opposed to 46% in November 2010) would agree to work with K-Albanians. About 31% (as opposed to 45% in November 2010) of K-Serbs would agree to live in the same town with K-Albanians,

followed by 20% (as opposed to 27% in November 2010) who would agree to live on the same street with K-Albanians. As far as interethnic marriages are concerned, no K-Serbs (as opposed to 4% in November) show willingness to marry K-Albanians.

Overall, the poll results show a general decrease in the K-Serbs' willingness to either work or live with K-Albanians and to marry K-Albanians.




**Figure 3.2: K-Serbs willing to live and work with K-Albanians**

Turning to the attitudes of K-Albanians vis-a-vis living or working with K-Serbs and marrying K-Serbs, we see that changes have occurred between November 2010 and June 2011.

According to the current poll results, some 41.5% (as opposed to 48.5% in November 2010) of K-Albanians would agree to work with K-Serbs, while some 43.5% (as opposed to 47% in November 2010) of them

would agree to live in the same town with K-Serbs, and some 37% (as opposed to 42% in November 2010) would agree to live on the same street with K-Serbs. Only 1.5% (as opposed to 5% in November 2010) of K-Albanian though would marry K-Serbs.


Overall, just like for the K-Serbs, the poll results show a general decrease in the K-Albanians' willingness to either work or live with K-Serbs and to marry K-Serbs.

**Figure 3.3: K-Albanians willing to live and work with K-Serbs**

Combining the K-Serb and K-Albanian responses, expressing their respective attitudes towards living, or working with one another or marrying one another, we are able to develop interethnic trends of social acceptance, as shown in figure 3.4. The interethnic social

acceptance trends for both K-Albanians and K-Serbs confirm the preceding analysis – that between November 2010 and June 2011, there has been a decrease in both the K-Albanians and K-Serbs willingness, to either work or live with and to marry one another.

**Figure 3.4: Interethnic social acceptance trends**



**Table 3.2: Reasons for interethnic contacts**

	Ethnicity			Total Weighted
	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	
I met them in the marketplace	37.89%	30.09%	12.50%	32.87%
I have business relations with them	14.74%	30.97%	18.75%	17.02%
I have family relations with them	1.58%	2.65%	6.25%	2.33%
We live in the same neighbourhood	16.84%	9.73%	42.50%	20.28%
Friendship	7.89%	20.35%	12.50%	9.56%
Other	18.95%	4.87%	3.75%	15.38%
NA	2.11%	1.33%	3.75%	2.56%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

### *Prishtinë/Pristina-Belgrade Dialogue*

In terms of the ongoing dialogue between Prishtinë/Pristina and Belgrade under the auspices of the EU in Brussels, only a quarter of the respondents view it as beneficial for Kosovo, whereas some 20% view it as harmful for Kosovo. Another quarter of the respondents view the dialogue as neither harmful nor beneficial (so-so). Moreover, only 3% of respondents view the dialogue as very beneficial for Kosovo, while some 9% view it as very harmful for Kosovo.

It is important to note that K-Serbs avoided the answers on the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. Some 40% did not answer and 22% responded that they do not have an opinion on this issue. Other minorities have a rather positive perception about the dialogue with 40% reporting that the dialogue will benefit Kosovo; with around 29% of K-Albanians sharing this opinion, followed by 16% of K-Serbs.

**Table 3.3: Do you consider beneficial (profitable) or harmful (maleficent) for Kosovo the dialogue that is actually going on between Kosovo and Serbia?**

	Ethnicity			Total Weighted
	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	
Very beneficial	3.00%	6.30%	6.70%	3.40%
Beneficial	25.90%	10.20%	32.90%	25.40%
So-so	26.60%	6.80%	25.30%	25.30%
Harmful	21.60%	7.60%	9.80%	20.10%
Very harmful	9.30%	7.00%	3.10%	8.80%
Don't know	12.80%	22.00%	20.00%	13.80%
No Answer	0.70%	40.20%	2.20%	3.20%

## CHAPTER 4


### Public and Personal Safety and Security

#### *Satisfaction and Relations with Security Institutions*

K-Albanians continue to be highly satisfied with the work of security institutions in Kosovo. The current poll results show that their satisfaction with KSF has increased by some

7 percentage points since November 2010, currently standing at 91%, while their satisfaction for the Kosovo Police and KFOR has not changed significantly since November 2010. The satisfaction level of K-Albanians with the EULEX Police has significantly decreased by some 11 percentage points since November 2010, currently standing at 32%.


**Figure 4.1: K-Albanian satisfaction with security institutions**



Among K-Serbs, satisfaction with some security institutions in Kosovo, namely KFOR and the Kosovo Police, has significantly increased since November 2010. Indeed, their satisfaction with KFOR has increased by 17 percentage points, currently standing at 36%, while their satisfaction level with the

Kosovo Police has increased by 8 percentage points, now standing at 23%. There has not been a significant change in K-Serbs' satisfaction with EULEX Police while their satisfaction with KSF has decreased by some 4 percentage points to a current low of 2% since November 2010.


**Figure 4.2: K-Serb satisfaction with security institutions**



A general trend of K-Serbs and K-Albanians satisfaction with security institutions in Kosovo is given below. As expected from the preceding analysis, the trend shows that, on average, between November 2010 and June


2011, there has been a slight decrease in K-Albanians' satisfaction with security institutions, while there has been a significant increase in K-Serbs' satisfaction.

**Figure 4.3: General trends of satisfaction with security institutions**



Apart from their satisfaction with Kosovo's security institutions, the poll also asked respondents about their safety. A gender-based analysis of the data shows that slightly more men than women feel safe (68% vs. 58% as opposed to 60% vs. 55% in November 2010) while outside. On the other hand, about 37% 38% of women as compared to 27% (no significant change since November 2010 for either group) of men feel unsafe while outside.


**Figure 4.4: Safety when outside**



Furthermore, respondents were asked to assess the police-community relations. Out of all respondents, only 10% (as opposed to 7% in November 2010) considered the police-community relations to be bad or very bad. Broken down by ethnicity, of this opinion were some 8% (as opposed to 6% in November 2010) of K-

Albanians along with some 34% (no change since November 2010) of K-Serbs and some 13% (as opposed to 8% in November 2010) of Other minority respondents.

**Figure 4.5: Bad or very bad police-community relations**




## Discrimination and Social Tension

According to the current poll, when asked about whether they were in a situation in which they felt discriminated against in the last six months, the majority of respondents, regardless of ethnicity, responded negatively. Overall, there is no significant change in the proportion of those who believe they were discriminated against in the last six months between November 2010 and June 2011. Yet, there seems to be an increase of some 5 per-

centage points since November 2010 in the portion of K-Serbs feeling that they were discriminated against in the last six months. However, no significant changes were recorded for

K-Albanians or Other minority respondents, between November 2010 and June 2011, in terms of their perception of discrimination in the last six months.

**Figure 4.6: Perceptions of discrimination for the last six months**



Those who felt discriminated reported several bases upon which discrimination took place.

The current poll results show that the top three bases of discrimination are political or other opinion, ethnicity/nationality, and age tied with sex/gender.

**Table 4.1: Basis for discrimination**

	N	Percent
Sex/gender	27	12.3%
Age	29	13.1%
Language	8	3.5%
Religion/belief	5	2.4%
Ethnicity/nationality	39	17.7%
Political or other opinion	51	22.9%
Sexual orientation	2	.8%
Disability	5	2.4%
Other: place of residence, refugee/IDP/ migrant status, nationality, social status, health status, etc.	55	24.8%
No answer	221	100.0%

As to what institution or entity respondents consider the most responsible for the perceived discrimination against them, the top three institutions selected by respondents (regardless of ethnicity) are the Municipalities, Central Government, and Courts tied with a Private Company.

For K-Albanians who perceive to have been discriminated against, these top three institutions are the Municipalities, Central Government, and Courts tied with a Private Company,

while for K-Serbs they are the Kosovo Police, Municipalities, Central Government tied with a Private Company. Municipalities, a Public Health Institution, and Kosovo Police are the top three entities responsible for discrimination against the Other minority respondents.

**Table 4.2: Institutions perceived as responsible for discrimination**

	Ethnicity			
	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Municipalities	2.3%	3.6%	10.7%	2.9%
Kosovo Police	.1%	6.6%	2.2%	.6%
Courts	1.1%	.9%	.4%	1.0%
Kosovo Property Agency (KPA or KAP)	.2%	.6%	.4%	.3%
A public company (KEK, PTK, Water companies etc)	.5%	1.3%		.5%
A private Company	1.0%	2.3%	.9%	1.0%
A public health institution	.6%	.8%	3.1%	.8%
A private health institution		.8%	.4%	.1%
A public school or academic institution	.7%	.4%	1.3%	.7%
A private school or academic institution			.4%	.0%
Central Government (ministries others services provided by them)	2.4%	2.5%	1.8%	2.4%
One of the international presences in Kosovo	.2%	.8%	.4%	.3%
Other	1.3%	1.7%	1.8%	1.4%
Don't know	.2%	.9%		.3%
NA	89.2%	76.9%	76.0%	87.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


Moreover, the top three groups perceived by respondents as subject to discrimination include women, the elderly, and persons with disabilities. While K-Albanians side with the same three groups identified above and the youth, K-Serbs identify themselves, persons with disabilities, and the elderly as the three groups most vulnerable to discrimination. Other minority respondents identify the RAE community, other minority communities, and persons with disabilities as the top three groups subject to discrimination.

Additionally, the respondents were asked to identify whether social tensions exist between certain social groups in Kosovo. The top three groups with the highest tension between them, according to the poll results, are the government and opposition parties, management and workers, poor and rich tied with different ethnic groups. On the other hand, the top three groups with the least or no tension between them are different religious groups, the elderly and the young, and men and women.

**Table 4.3: Groups perceived as discriminated the most**

	Ethnicity			
	K-Albanian	K-Serb	Other	Total
Women/girls	22.7%	1.3%	4.9%	20.4%
Children	6.2%	1.9%	1.8%	5.7%
Youth	14.4%	5.1%	6.7%	13.3%
Old people	18.0%	5.9%	5.3%	16.5%
Kosovo Serbs	.5%	62.9%	3.1%	4.4%
Kosovo Albanians	7.1%	.4%	4.9%	6.6%
Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians	4.0%	2.5%	34.2%	5.7%
Other communities (including Bosnians, Turks, Gorani, Montenegrins)	.6%	1.1%	9.8%	1.1%
Lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals	1.5%	2.5%	1.8%	1.5%
Persons with disabilities, including those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments	14.5%	7.0%	8.4%	13.7%
Other	2.3%	1.1%	1.3%	2.2%
Don't know	5.8%	.9%	6.7%	5.6%
NA	2.4%	7.4%	11.1%	3.3%

**Figure 4.7: Tensions between certain social groups**





## CHAPTER 5

Starting with this report Public Pulse Project will offer space to volunteer contributors who express willingness to analyze the Public Pulse Opinion Poll data and to provide short analysis on specified topics. The present chapter is the first contributions providing analysis on health chapter. The analysis and data presented in this chapter do not necessarily represent those of UNDP or USAID.

### Social Determinants of Health in Kosovo

*Fatime Arënlju Qosaj MD, MPH*

The quality of individual health care services can improve survival and prognosis of some life threatening diseases. The rationale is that people get sick and if they get the best available diagnostic, treatment and rehabilitation services they recover. But what happens to those that can not get well because of the social and economic conditions they live in. Aiming to explain how living conditions “get under the skin” to cause disease, based on recent survey findings and existing relevant data, the chapter analyses how identified paramount problems impact health in Kosovo.

Issues such unemployment, poverty and corruption remains the paramount problems facing Kosovans. From the public health perspective their ranking relates to important social determinants<sup>1</sup> of health as they reflect sensitivity of health to economic and social environment. The chapter covers briefly the knowledge on effects of social determinants of health and indicates that national health debate should go beyond providing access to health services.

#### *Why should we care about the social determinants of health in Kosovo?*

Morbidity and mortality data in Kosovo are scarce and weak, they cannot be categorized according to socio-economic status. There-

fore, we are limited in documenting differences observed in the health status of population groups according to their incomes and other relevant variables. In most of the cases<sup>2</sup> researchers cannot document that most disadvantaged groups have the poorest health and the highest exposure to health-damaging risk factors<sup>3</sup>.

The social determinants of health according to WHO are the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age. There is growing evidence that the paramount problems represented in Figure 5.1 directly or indirectly relate to health in terms of social determinants. The survey findings indicate that Kosovans are mostly concerned about unemployment, poverty, corruption, followed by electric energy supply, and prices, and the fate of missing persons. According to Figure 5.1 health is listed at the bottom of paramount priorities.

Health starts at homes, kindergartens, schools, workplaces, neighborhoods and communities. In order to stay healthy individual needs adequate housing, food, immunizations, screening tests, being active and visiting a doctor when needed. Visiting a doctor obtaining health care service is one but not the only determinant of health. This indicates that the course of the actions to maintain/improve health need to go beyond the health sector. Instead of being concerned only with the individual context or factors and health services, the concept of improv-

<sup>1</sup> Survey paramount problem findings and social determinants of health are interchangeable terms in this chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Except for well documented and analyzed immunization coverage and lead poisoning data gathered mainly by international agencies such as WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, CDC.

<sup>3</sup> Marmot, M. (1999), 'The solid facts: the social determinants of health', Health Promotion Journal of Australia, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 133-9.




ing health in Kosovo should additionally consider the context of broad public policies and environmental, group, family and community influences.

Paramount problems identified by respondents are considered very relevant social determinants of health and indicate that health services alone can not improve health status of people living in Kosovo. Moreover, health care institutions can not function in isolation, they reflect the actual political, economic and social context in which they function. Social determinants of health reflected in top ten problems identified in Figure 5.1, can be improved as they are influenced by policy choices and subsequently by the distribution of power, money, and resources at national and local levels.

logical consequences and financial problems it brings. WHO evidence from a number of countries, shows that unemployed people and their dependants suffer a substantially increased risk of premature death. As unemployment persists and becomes long-term it becomes a chronic stressor that increases sickness and health service use<sup>5</sup>.

Unemployment was selected as the top priority problem by the survey respondents reflecting the fact that Kosovo has the highest unemployment rate in region. It is estimated that 45 percent of the labor force is unemployed. Unemployment rate among youth is 73 percent and among women is 81 percent. The job market also increases every year with 30.000 new job seekers<sup>6</sup>. Considering the size of the problem and its impact, un-

**Figure 5.1 Paramount problems faced in Kosovo**



## Unemployment

According to WHO<sup>4</sup> health and well-being are increased by job security. More illness and premature death are caused at higher rates of unemployment. Unemployment was listed as the top priority problem. This reflects ongoing changes in the economy and labour market which has increased feelings of job insecurity. Therefore, unemployment is known to put health at risk. The health effects of unemployment starts even before becoming unemployed, when the people feel that their jobs are threatened. Health effects of unemployment are related to the psycho-

employment in Kosovo should be considered one of the most important social determinants of health, with its long-term effects.

In order to tackle the issue relevant public policies should have three goals according to WHO: prevent unemployment and job insecurity; reduce hardship suffered by the unemployment; and restore people to secure jobs<sup>7</sup>.

Considering available resources, recent Hu-

4 WHO Europe. 2003. Social Determinants of Health. The Solid Facts, Second Edition

5 WHO Europe. 2003. Social Determinants of Health. The Solid Facts, Second Edition

6 UNDP Kosovo. 2011. Kosovo Human Development Report 2010: Social Inclusion.

7 WHO Europe. 2003. Social Determinants of Health. The Solid Facts, Second Edition

man Development Report recommends following actions to achieve abovementioned: reorient economic growth towards sustainable strengthening of the labour market; boost inclusive growth and productivity in rural areas; equip vulnerable groups with decent work; gear social protection towards social inclusion and improve targeting; strengthen targeted interventions for Kosovo RAE and women; promote economic opportunities in disadvantaged regions<sup>8</sup>.

### *Health inequalities<sup>9</sup>*

According to our findings poverty is one of major problem that Kosovo is facing today (Figure 5.1). Poor social economic context affects health throughout the life, both through material and psychological causes reflected in most of the diseases and causes of death.

Income is one of the most important social determinants of health. The level of income determines basic prerequisites for health. There is presently no data that would measure the magnitude and extent of health inequality in Kosovo.

According to WB about 15 percent of the population is estimated to be extremely poor<sup>10</sup> whereas about 45 percent report a consumption level below the poverty line, which is set at 43 EUR per adult per month<sup>11</sup>. These poverty rates are very high compared to neighboring countries and according to WB they have not changed over time<sup>12</sup>. Higher poverty incidence is found among larger households, households with female heads, lower education of the household head, 70 percent of all poor are considered either unemployed or inactive<sup>13</sup>. According to the same report quality of water and quality of health services are known to be lower in rural areas. In the absence of health inequality

data, considering the WB findings, we can not ignore that some groups in Kosovo society<sup>14</sup> have less chance of achieving their full health potential as a result of their life. Therefore, they are not to blame for their poor health status as there are many barriers in their daily lives that prevent them to follow certain requirements to remain healthy.

Health disparities can be eliminated by providing people with reasons to invest in long term health. This can be done by providing prospects for a minimum secured future, by education, secure employment with decent wage. In the Kosovo context this could be achieved by increasing rural productivity and improvement of the labor skills.<sup>15</sup> Additionally, welfare policies need to target those in need in more efficient manner, and reduce levels of education failure. Moreover, citizens should be encouraged to actively participate in community, social, economic and cultural life of the society.

### *Public Services including health - perception of corruption and satisfaction*

Today corruption is considered a global public ill and a hindrance to good governance and development<sup>16</sup>. To this end, there is growing evidence that corruption has a significant negative impact on the human wellbeing measured by the Human Development Index<sup>17</sup> which results in lower growth, decreasing the level of public budget allocations and promoting inequality and thereby poor health<sup>18</sup>. Corruption in other sectors can be a matter of achieving certain level of power or ambition, corruption in the health sector can be a matter of life and death, especially for poor people, it can affect the access, quality, effec-

8 UNDP Kosovo. 2011. Kosovo Human Development Report 2010: Social Inclusion.

9 Population-specific differences in the presence of disease, health outcomes, or access to health care

10 Individuals who have difficulty meeting their basic nutritional needs

11 In 2002 prices is set at 43 Euros per adult equivalent per month

12 WB.2007. Kosovo Poverty Assessment.

13 WB.2007. Kosovo Poverty Assessment.

14 Health disparities by ethnicity among RAE are documented by WHO and other international agencies working in Kosovo

15 WB.2007. Kosovo Poverty Assessment.

16 Department for International Development. 2010. 'How to note addressing corruption in the health sector'


17 Combines the economical aspects with some the most important social ones; health and education

18 M. Mutaşcu. D.C.Dănuleţiu (2010) 'Corruption and social welfare in the EU27 Countries' *Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica*, 12(1), 2010

tiveness and therefore equity of health care services. The Health system is particularly susceptible to corruption because of the nature of the health services such as uncertainty for diagnostics and treatment, asymmetry of information<sup>19</sup> between a physician and the patient, increased number of the actors as health providers that ease corruption and obstruct accountability<sup>20</sup>.


According to recent survey findings 83% of the respondents considered that there is a corruption in hospitals in Kosovo, of those 41% think that there is a large scale corruption in hospitals, Figure 5. 2.

**Figure 5.2 Opinions regarding corruption in Kosovo - health care - hospitals**



Half of the respondents in Peja/Pec and Gjiilan/Gnjilane have the opinion that there is a large scale corruption in Peja/Pec Regional Hospital respectively in Gjiilan/Gnjilane Regional Hospital, followed by Gjakova/Djakovica Hospital (49.6%), University Clinical Center Kosovo (43%), Prizren Regional Hospital (39.6%), Mitrovicë/a Regional Hospital (29%) and Ferizaj/Urosevac Hospital (27.1%) Figure 5.3.

**Figure 5.3 Perception of corruption in Kosovo hospitals within respondents' region**



There are no major differences in opinions related to the presence of corruption according to the age groups, gender and settlement. Seventy five percent for age group 31 – 36 years and 87 percent for age group 25 – 30, have considered there is corruption (large, medium and small scale) in hospitals Table 5.1.

**Table 5.1. Perception of corruption scale in Kosovo Hospitals according age-groups**

	Age Group					Total
	18-24	25-30	31-36	37-45	>=46	
It is not present at all	4.2%	6.0%	12.2%	6.6%	8.1%	7.1%
Present in a small scale	13.6%	16.3%	16.8%	12.8%	13.1%	14.0%
Present in a medium scale	33.2%	24.7%	20.9%	27.9%	28.7%	28.1%
Present in a large scale	39.6%	46.0%	37.2%	46.2%	37.4%	40.7%
Don't know	8.0%	5.1%	11.7%	4.5%	8.5%	7.6%
NA	1.4%	1.9%	1.0%	2.1%	4.2%	2.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

<sup>19</sup> Information is not shared equally among health sector actors


<sup>20</sup> Department for International Development. 2010. 'How to note addressing corruption in the health sector'

Both men (83%) and women (82.6%) considered that there is corruption (large, medium and small scale) in Kosovo hospitals. Whereas, 84 percent of the respondents living in urban and 81 percent living in rural areas think that there is corruption (large, medium and small scale) in Kosovo hospitals.

According to ethnicity, 85.4 percent of K-Albanians, 51.3 percent of K-Serbs and 76.4 of other ethnicities think that there is corruption (large, medium and small scale) in Kosovo hospitals.

Half (51.9%) of the respondents have noted that perception regarding the presence of corruption is based on the information they received through the media, whereas almost one quarter (23.5%) have reported that this perception is based on the discussions they had with their relatives; and more than one tenth (13.3%) had personal experience of being asked for money gift etc. in order to get a public service Figure 5.4.

**Figure 5. 4 Sources for evaluation of the extent of corruption**



Around one tenth (12.8%) of the respondents have confirmed that they were faced with the situation that public officials conditioned performing services for them only if bribes, gifts or other favors were given. Of those that were conditioned, almost half (48.2%) of them gave bribes, gifts or other favors to public officials in order to acquire a service. When the same respondents were asked to identify the services for which they gave bribes, gifts or other favours half of them 51.8% were hesitant to respond; whereas, 32.9% reported to give bribes for the health services in hospitals.


Of those who gave bribes, more than half (63%) were men and 35% were women. Most of the bribes (25.85%) were given by age group 37 – 45, whereas age group of 31 – 36 have given the least (10.92%).

From those interviewed for the survey around 4% of respondents have reported that they have given bribes, gifts or other favors in order to obtain service from health-care sector. The incidence of conditioning was highest in Peja/Pec and Prizren (for details see Table 5.2).

**Table 5.2. Incidence of giving bribes by region.**


Region	Percent of those who have giving bribes, gifts or other favors in healthcare sector
Prishtina	1.4%
Mitrovica	4.4%
Prizren	4.6%
Peja	5.1%
Ferizaj	0.0%
Gjilan	1.6%
Kosovo	4.2%

Of those who gave bribes more than one third (36%) work in the private sector, more than quarter (26%) were unemployed and looking for work and less than 10% were working in public sector (9%), 9% were pupils, 7% were housewives, other (5%), retired persons (2%) and unemployed not looking for job (2%).

**Figure 5.5 Distribution of reported bribe given for services - case based**

Electric power supply services (63.3%), followed by health care (46.6%), water supply

(34.7%) and sanitation services (39.1%) are the least satisfactory services in Kosovo.

**Figure 5.6 Performance of the public services and utilities (with highest level of dissatisfaction) in Kosovo**

The high level of dissatisfaction with public services (Figure 5.6) correlates with 36% of households without access to at least one service such as tap water, sanitation and electricity<sup>21</sup>. It is interesting that health has remarkable sensitivity to such services, therefore they represent powerful social determinants of health. Considering Kosovo's demographic potential<sup>22</sup> they may become more important in the longer term.

When satisfaction level with health services is analysed as a continuous variable with one being very dissatisfied and five being very satisfied with health care services in Kosovo, the Kosovo average is 2.5. Age group 31 – 36 shows 2.88 highest level of satisfaction as compared to lowest score 2.40 reflected by age group of 25 – 30 years. The lowest level of satisfaction with health care services 2.39 was found in Peja/Pec followed by Gjakova/Djakovica 2.46, Gjiilan/Gnjilane 2.47, Ferizaj/Uroševac 2.50, Prishtina/Pristina 2.51, Prizren 2.62 and Mitrovica with the highest score 2.77 (Figure 5.7). People living in rural areas have the satisfaction score of 2.62 as compared to those living in urban areas with 2.48. Females are less satisfied with the health care services and score 2.46 as compared to men who are more satisfied and score 2.62.


According to the survey data those who are unemployed and are looking for work have the lowest level of satisfaction with health care services 2.32, followed by pensioners 2.39 and housewives 2.46. Whereas the category employed from time to time with 2.83 shows the highest level of satisfaction followed by those working in public sector 2.78, students/pupils 2.72, unemployed looking for job 2.63 and unemployed working in private sector 2.50.

The level of satisfaction with health services increases with the favorable forecasts of family incomes for the next six months. Those who have unfavorable forecasts show the lowest level of satisfaction scoring 2.33 as compared to those with favorable forecasts that score 2.85.

An understanding of the level of satisfaction with health services will lead to more effective health care delivery through offering of needed services. Understating those, considering best affordable and available resources will lead to efficient health care delivery.

Analyses of survey data related to satisfaction of health care services indicate that un-

**Fig. 5.7 Perception of the level of satisfaction with health care services according to the regions**



21 UNDP Kosovo 2011. Kosovo Human Development Report 2010: Social Inclusion.

derstanding of the level of satisfaction with health services is important but is not sufficient to influence access to health services. In order to influence access to health services enforcement of the rule of law and continuous monitoring by including more specific variables<sup>23</sup>, is required.

## Conclusions

1. Paramount problems identified by respondents are considered very relevant social determinates of health and indicate that health services alone cannot improve health status of people living in Kosovo. Moreover, health care institutions cannot function in isolation, they reflect actual political, economic and social context in which they function. Social determinants of health are influenced by policy choices and subsequently by distribution of power, money, and resources at national and local levels; therefore, they can be improved.
2. Social determinants of health in Kosovo are not widely understood and recognized work on health information system should be intensified in order to provide bases for informed decision-making in health sector.
3. Issue of corruption and conditionality in health sector should take a special attention as number of those who perceive large scale corruption in hospitals is high as well as more than 4% of respondents have reported that they were conditioned to give bribe, gift or other favors in order to get healthcare service.
4. National debate about health should broaden beyond providing access to health services.

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<sup>23</sup> that act and interact to influence health services utilization such as predisposing, enabling and need variables



## Concluding Remarks from the Focus Group Meeting

The UNDP Kosovo Research and Policy Unit convened a Focus Group meeting on 3 August 2011 to discuss the findings of the Public Pulse poll.

While discussing the June 2011 poll findings and methodology, the following issues were discussed and the following conclusions were reached by the participants of the Focus Group:

- Respondents (mainly K-Albanians) have expressed increased economic dissatisfaction, but are nevertheless optimistic about the prospects of economic development and their wellbeing. This speaks for further investigation of the matter so as to better understand the reasons behind it.
- The high importance of family connections and bribes for employment are not at all surprising. Moreover, one could expect even higher importance of these factors for employment than expressed in the survey. The reasons for the importance of these factors deserve further elaboration.
- The high proportion of “Don’t know” and “Do not answer” (Fig. 8, Fast Facts) with regard Serb respondents attitude towards Serbia-Kosovo dialogue begs further, deep elaboration.
- The question on the readiness of the respondents to participate in protest for economic and political reasons needs further specification with regard the initiators of the protest. One reason could be that people will be more unwilling to participate in the protests organized by the parties while more eager to participate in the protests organized by NGOs, individual activists, community organizations, etc.
- A surprising result is that 25% of unemployed respondents look for work through employment office.
- Employment factors (high importance of bribes and family) are very bad for Koso-

vo’s future and the prospect of European integration.

- It would be interesting to know whether knowledge of language is a basis for employment discrimination.
- While asking about feeling secure on the street why don’t you ask about perceptions of security at home?

The Focus Group also provided some suggestions as to the topics and issues that on an ongoing basis could affect the public:

- From a democratization perspective, it is important to observe the respondents’ perceptions on whether Kosovo should proceed with the direct or indirect election of the president.
- The debate about Guaranteed vs. Reserved seats for minorities in the Parliament should also be investigated through questions in the survey.
- Environmental issues should make up an additional theme of the survey.
- From an interethnic relations perspective, it is important that questions in regards to having had a jeopardizing experience with representatives of other ethnicity are added to the survey questionnaire.

The participants of the Focus Group identified the following concerns that the poll should look for in the next survey:

- Results of Kosovo-Serbia negotiations.
- Whether the satisfaction level enjoyed by the Prime Minister or other public figures will change because of the events in the North.

According to the participants of the Focus Group, factors that may cause alarming scenarios in Kosovo include:



- The North Problem: Beside the developments in the Northern part of Kosovo, the Government of Kosovo should be careful not to allow the situation to escalate in the Southern part of the country, as this may cause a deeper crisis and risk rather normal interethnic relations in other municipalities of Kosovo.
- Elections: Kosovo should keep the open party list electoral system, but it should increase the number of electoral districts, as continued manipulation of elections may further decrease voter turnout and diminish Kosovo's prospects for a full-fledged democracy.

## Methodology

These results are based on an opinion poll sample that has included 1580 citizens of Kosovo over 18 years of age, of both sexes, all age groups and from all municipalities and regions of Kosovo, covering rural and urban areas. The sample included 827 Kosovo Albanians, 528 Kosovo Serbs and 225 Kosovo non-Serb minorities (namely Turkish, Bosniac, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian). Multistage Sampling Method has been used to frame the sample. This survey was conducted by ENCOMPASS (Prishtinë/Prishtina) during May-June 2011.

## Annex 1.

*The Pearson correlation coefficient is sensitive only to a linear relationship between two variables (which may exist even if one is a nonlinear function of the other). The Pearson correlation is +1 in the case of a perfect positive (increasing) linear relationship (correlation), -1 in the case of a perfect decreasing (negative) linear relationship (anticorrelation) and some value between -1 and 1 in all other cases, indicating the degree of linear dependence between the variables. As it approaches zero there is less of a relationship (closer to uncorrelated). The closer the coefficient is to either -1 or 1, the stronger the correlation between the variables. If the variables are independent, Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0, but the converse is not true because the correlation coefficient detects only linear dependencies between two variables. For example, suppose the random variable X is symmetrically distributed about zero, and  $Y = X^2$ . Then Y is completely determined by X, so that X and Y are perfectly dependent, but their correlation is zero; they are uncorrelated. However, in the special case when X and Y are jointly normal, uncorrelatedness is equivalent to independence. If we have a series of n measurements of X and Y written as  $x_i$  and  $y_i$  where  $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ , then the sample correlation coefficient can be used to estimate the population Pearson correlation r between X and Y. The sample correlation coefficient is written*

$$r_{xy} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{(n-1)s_x s_y} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2 \sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - \bar{y})^2}},$$

*where  $\bar{x}$  and  $\bar{y}$  are the sample means of X and Y, and  $s_x$  and  $s_y$  are the sample standard deviations of X and Y. This can also be written as:*

$$r_{xy} = \frac{\sum x_i y_i - n \bar{x} \bar{y}}{(n-1)s_x s_y} = \frac{n \sum x_i y_i - \sum x_i \sum y_i}{\sqrt{n \sum x_i^2 - (\sum x_i)^2} \sqrt{n \sum y_i^2 - (\sum y_i)^2}}.$$