



# Report on Engendering Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism in Kenya



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# Abbreviations

<b>AMM</b>	African Media Monitor
<b>AMU</b>	Arab Maghreb Union
<b>APRM</b>	African Peer Review Mechanism
<b>ASAL</b>	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CAG</b>	Conflict Analysis Group
<b>CAI</b>	Consultancy Africa Intelligence
<b>CBO</b>	Community Based Organisation
<b>CEDAW</b>	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
<b>CEN-SAD</b>	Community of Sahel and Saharan States
<b>CEWARN</b>	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
<b>CEWERU</b>	Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit
<b>CEWERS</b>	Conflict Early Warning and Response System
<b>CEWS</b>	Continental Early Warning System
<b>COMESA</b>	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organization
<b>CSSDCA</b>	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>DSC</b>	District Security Committee
<b>EAC</b>	East African Community
<b>EACJ</b>	East African Court of Justice
<b>EAPCCO</b>	East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization
<b>EASBRIG</b>	East African Standby Brigade
<b>ECCAS</b>	Economic Community of Central African States
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
<b>EMCA</b>	Environmental Management and Coordination Act
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EVRI</b>	Electoral Violence Response Initiative
<b>EWERS</b>	Early Warning Response System
<b>FBO</b>	Faith Based Organizations
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussions
<b>FMs</b>	Field Monitors
<b>GBV</b>	Gender Based Violence
<b>GDI</b>	Gender-related Development Index
<b>GEM</b>	Gender Empowerment Measure
<b>GIS</b>	Geographic Information System
<b>GoK</b>	Government of Kenya
<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index
<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communication Technology
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>IGAD</b>	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

<b>INGO</b>	International Non-Governmental Organization
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>IRCK</b>	Inter-Religious Council of Kenya
<b>ISS</b>	Institute for Security Studies
<b>JP GEWE</b>	Joint Programme on Gender Equality and Women Empowerment
<b>KEC</b>	Kenya Episcopal Conference
<b>KIIs</b>	Key Informant Interviews
<b>KNAP</b>	Kenya National Action Plan
<b>LPC</b>	Local Peace Committee (formerly District Peace Committee)
<b>MoICNG</b>	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government
<b>MYWO</b>	Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation
<b>NAP</b>	National Action Plans
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NCCK</b>	National Council of Churches of Kenya
<b>NCIC</b>	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
<b>NCWK</b>	National Council of Women of Kenya
<b>NCEWERS</b>	National Conflict Early Warning and Response System
<b>NEPAD</b>	New Partnership for African Development
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>NPFs</b>	National Peace Forums
<b>NRIs</b>	National Research Institutes
<b>NSC</b>	National Steering Committee on Peace-Building and Conflict Management
<b>OCPD</b>	Officer Commanding Police Division
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>PBCM</b>	Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
<b>PEV</b>	Post-Election Violence
<b>PfP</b>	Partnership for Peace
<b>PM</b>	Peace Monitor
<b>PMC</b>	Peace Monitoring Centre
<b>PRSP</b>	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
<b>RAMSI</b>	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
<b>RECSA</b>	Regional Centre on Small Arms
<b>SGBV</b>	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
<b>SMS</b>	Short Messaging Service
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNIFEM</b>	United Nations Development Fund for Women
<b>UNOCHA</b>	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>UNSCR</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution
<b>UN Women</b>	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>WANEP</b>	West Africa Network for Peace building
<b>WPDC</b>	Wajir Peace and Development Committee
<b>WPS</b>	Women Peace and Security

# Translation of Terms

<b><i>Amani</i></b>	-	Peace
<b><i>Chamas</i></b>	-	An informal cooperative society that is normally used to pool and invest savings particularly among women
<b><i>Manyatta</i></b>	-	Shelters used by the Maasai community, they are built of branches, grass and mud
<b><i>Morans</i></b>	-	Young Maasai men of between the ages of about 14 and 30
<b><i>Mwambao</i></b>	-	A term for the Kenya coastal region, particularly the coastal strip
<b><i>Nyumba Kumi</i></b>	-	A homeland security system intended to create national security awareness amongst citizens at all levels particularly at the grassroots level.
<b><i>Shifta</i></b>	-	Secessionist conflict in which ethnic Somalis in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya attempted to join with Somalis in a Greater Somalia
<b><i>Sisi ni Amani</i></b>	-	“We are Peace” a project that aims to map peace initiatives in Kenya
<b><i>Uchaguzi</i></b>	-	Kenya an election incidence reporting platform
<b><i>Ushahidi</i></b>	-	"Testimony" or "witness". A platform created to empower and connect the general public
<b><i>Uwiano</i></b>	-	Connotes “cohesion”, championing a clarion call for Kenyans to “choose Kenya and to choose peace”
<b><i>Wazee</i></b>	-	Community elders

# Acknowledgment

The Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government, through the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) and the Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Directorate, has made several strides in engendering peace processes. Among these is the partnership with other stakeholders in development of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. This Action Plan aims at integrating the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 among other related UNSC Resolutions. In the same breadth, the NSC has facilitated establishment and engendering of Peace Committees; facilitated training of stakeholders on Gender Mainstreaming, and Gender in Peacebuilding; and partnered with other organizations in sensitising stakeholders on Gender Based Violence, among other topical issues. Taking stock of these initiatives, NSC was eager to ensure that the conflict early warning and response initiatives are well-engendered. It is in this regards that the NSC partnered with UNDP Kenya and UN Women conduct a Gender assessment of the conflict early warning and response initiatives and responses. This report, together with the set of conflict early warning indicators, have been developed from the belief in gender equity and gender mainstreaming with the resolve and determination of implementing Vision 2030 and the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

At the Peacebuilding Conflict Management Directorate, we recognize that gender mainstreaming requires commitment from all the stakeholders. It requires concerted efforts at instituting multi-dimensional change while consciously challenging fairly established notions about how we relate, think or work with one another.

The process of developing this report together with the attendant indicators was consultative and collaborative and would not have been possible without the rich input of the different institutions and individuals.

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# Preface

Over the last four decades, Kenya has experienced varied episodes of conflicts caused by both internal and external factors, both man-made and natural. Among these are conflicts that have an overly-gender dimension. Since conflicts and their effects disproportionately affect women than men, an engendered perspective to conflict prevention and management can, besides anchoring conflict management efforts on the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, play a big role in mitigating the severe disruptions caused by conflicts in Kenya.

By the very nature of its mandate, the National Steering Committee on Peace-Building and Conflict Management (NSC) has to devise wide-ranging measures aimed at detecting impending conflicts and forestalling them. This is achieved through the National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS). While the NSC is aware that in a general sense, research on a broad range of technical, economic and social fields may make significant contributions to the formulation and implementation of sound and practical conflict early warning and early response strategies, they may have to ensure all their interventions are not only engendered, but also anchored on the UNSCR 1325. Kenyans, both in rural and urban areas, may not have appreciated fully the indispensability of working closely with NCEWERS for the identification of areas that they would help to overcome the problems posed by incidences of conflicts.

It would therefore be valuable to strengthen the links between Kenyans and the NCEWERS, using strategies that deepen mutual awareness of the issues that underlie conflicts, perspectives and priorities in Kenya. Since conflict prevention is of immediate practical interest for all Kenyans, especially after witnessing what conflict can yield following the challenges that the country experienced during and after the 2007/08 post-election violence, the approach to conflict prevention and resolution has to be different from the conventional one of working with 'elites'. The themes and topics that would interest the conflict prevention and management establishments often depend on whom one is talking to. Establishment figures – a description that would fit most mainstream conflict handlers today – have very limited influence at present. The answers lie with the masses, thus making the concept such as *Nyumba Kumi* and working with grassroots people, the way to go.

Indeed, research has a special place in the whole of this paradigm. It has been helpful in generating the views and perspectives that have shaped this report. But research ideology has its limits: research cannot be expected to provide practical solutions to every conflict issue that crops up. Furthermore, NCEWERS needs to be aware that it may not be possible to handle immediate conflicts requiring short-term solutions without simultaneous attention to long-term perspectives and solutions, such as addressing challenges of power relations, gender inequality, poverty, inadequate access to national resources and opportunities, etc. It may well be that solutions to these major problems can come from 'fringe' establishments and people – but new types of thinking have to be opened up. Importantly, NCEWERS has to employ new approaches that would capture the attention and collaboration of 'fringe' establishments, such as *Chamas*, women groups, youth groups, councils of elders, religious councils, etc, as well as grassroots persons in ensuring that conflict early warning and early responses are effective.

# Executive Summary

This report is on engendering Kenya's National Conflict Early Warning Early Response. The goal of engendering society is not a reversal of discrimination or an attempt to make women and men similar, but a means to attain equity through equal opportunities and life chances (Woroniuk, 1999). As long as women and men make their own choices and have equal opportunities and access to resources and power, gender equality can vary according to culture and society.

The major mandate of the National Steering Committee on Peace-Building and Conflict Management (NSC) is to strengthen, coordinate, and integrate various conflict management initiatives in the country. Its Secretariat is housed at the Peace-building and Conflict Management Directorate. To be able to steer the peace agenda, the Committee developed a National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management and facilitated establishment of Kenya's Infrastructure for Peace, among other actions.

The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is a collaborative effort of the seven member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), namely Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan. It is one of IGAD's programmes targeted at mitigating and preventing violent conflicts in the sub-region. Since its establishment in 2002, CEWARN has been functioning with particular focus on cross-border pastoralist and related conflicts. In Kenya, CEWARN has been domesticated through the National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS). NSC not only doubles as Kenya's Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit (CEWERU), but also serves as the National Conflict Early Warning Centre (NCEWC) for implementation of the East African Community (EAC) Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) Mechanism.

Development of the Kenya National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security which seeks to operationalize implementation of the UNSCR 1325 is a key milestone that will contribute to the conflict early warning and response processes in Kenya. The UNSCR 1325 calls for increased participation of women in conflict prevention and peace-building. An effective and efficient conflict early warning and early response system should hence foster appreciation of the fact that women and men experience conflict in different ways at the various stages of conflict processes.

The work of the NCEWERS is based on a framework of indicators that were consultatively developed and informed both by the UNSCR and by local realities of Kenyan communities. These indicators relate to the three strategic cluster areas that are characteristic of conflicts in Kenya, namely, pastoralist areas, rural and urban areas.

Nonetheless, a broad-based assessment of the NCEWERS in Kenya based on the UNSCR 1325 revealed gender gaps. Therefore, to stay in sync with developments in the rest of the world, where efforts are being made to engender conflict early warning and early responses, a gender audit of Kenya's national conflict early warning and early response system was conducted.

The following outcomes were expected from the gender audit: (1) enhanced appreciation of the importance of engendering the national conflict early warning and early response system, (2) improved programming for conflict early warning and early response due to the integration of

gender-sensitive indicators, and (3) increased gender-based analyses of conflict situations, including early warning and early response.

The methodology and approach that were used were premised on qualitative rather than quantitative data. They included a preliminary review of global, regional and national literature on conflict early warning and early response systems, focus group discussions with peace structures and field monitors (both women and men), in-depth interviews with key informants and observation of some on-going conflict early warning and early response initiatives.

To ensure reliability, validity and adequacy of the process, equal participation of women and men was facilitated through purposive planning for their inclusion during the audit's inception stages. Frequent consultation with the client was also carried out throughout the entire process for clarity on the emerging issues and to get direction on next steps.

The audit established the following:

1. There is a general need for increased participation of grassroots women, youths and men in the Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system;
2. There is need for more awareness and information regarding UNSCR 1325, this will enhance its effective anchoring, especially as one moves to NCEWERS lower levels, such as the devolved and cascaded levels;
3. The current design of the Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system derives immense strength from Local Peace Structures. Based on the alignments brought about by the Constitution, transformation of local peace structures to Sub-County Peace Structures and cascading the same to lower levels, including with peace platforms will enhance the system's ability to effectively anticipate and prevent conflicts;
4. The Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system recognizes the role of women in peace-building and conflict management. However, there is need to increase gender balance in employment, deployment and formation of peace structures, especially with regard to the constitutional two-thirds principle that has led to a tremendous increase in the representation of women, among other gains;
5. Kenya has made strides in using technology in conflict early warning and early response. A good example is the SMS 108 platform through which early warning information can be shared. This platform, while commendable, needs further improvement to better address constraints that prevent its use by some members of society. Such constraints include literacy levels and poor electricity and internet access, literacy levels and infrastructure could form part of its implementation;
6. There is need to enhance more interactive systems. The formal design and structure of CEWERS could inhibit free information flow that is necessary for early warning and response; involvement of youths (both girls and boys) is inadequate;
7. Gender Based Violence (GBV) cases during conflicts are still perceived to be high. Mechanisms to deal with GBV with particular focus to SGBV need to be enhanced; furthermore, this reality should be taken into consideration when developing gender-sensitive indicators.
8. There is limited capacity (including resource flow) for conflict early warning and early response by women, youths and men at county levels of government and at village levels, where the battlefield for early warning is.

Based on the foregoing, the following has been recommended:

1. Anchoring the CEWERS in the social capital of women and men at the grassroots levels;
2. Empowerment of and resource-flow to grassroots women, youths and men to enhance their effective participation in conflict early warning and early response;
3. Alignment of the CEWERS to existing dynamics in communities;
4. Development of a clear and shared M&E plan with indicators that are context-specific;
5. Dealing with underlying inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities;
6. Dealing with negative influence of youths and communities to engage in violence against others can be done through increasing boarding schools, establishing peace structures up to village levels and opening up to participatory methods of conflict data collection and analysis;
7. Aligning the conflict early warning technology to the everyday life of Kenyans and as such make it adopted and easy to use.

# 1.0 Background

Interventions by state and non-state actors on conflicts in Kenya are as old as the conflicts themselves, yet conflicts continue unabated (Government of Kenya, 2011). In an effort to strengthen, co-ordinate, and integrate the various conflict management initiatives in Kenya, the government established the National Steering Committee on Peace-Building and Conflict Management (NSC) in 2001. The NSC is mandated to co-ordinate national and cross-border peace-building and conflict management initiatives. It also serves as Kenya's Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU) for implementation of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), based on the protocol establishing the CEWARN that was acceded to by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Member States, namely, Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan. Further, the NSC is the National Conflict Early Warning Centre (NCEWC) for implementation of the East African Community (EAC) Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) Mechanism.

One of the key expected deliverables of the NSC was the development of the National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management<sup>1</sup>. As of August 2015, its attendant Sessional Paper was adopted by the National Assembly. The domestication of the CEWARN and CPMR through the National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS) has demonstrated deliberate efforts aimed at implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and other attendant resolutions, including the Beijing Platform of Action. The Government of Kenya (GoK) through the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (MoICNG) has implemented a National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response (CEWER) system since 2010. The CEWER is guided by the need to strengthen national capacity for conflict prevention and peace-building. The work of the NCEWERS is based on a framework of indicators that were consultatively developed and informed by realities in Kenyan communities. The indicators relate to the three strategic cluster areas in Kenya, namely, pastoralist areas, rural areas and urban areas.

**An effective and efficient CEWARN should facilitate appreciation of the fact that women and men have different access to power structures and material resources before, during and after conflicts.**

The UNSCR 1325 calls for increased roles of women in conflict prevention and peace-building. An effective and efficient conflict early warning and early response system should hence foster appreciation of the fact that women and men experience conflict in different ways at the various stages of conflict processes.

However, a broad-based assessment of the CEWERS in Kenya based on the UNSCR 1325 has revealed gender gaps. Furthermore, as is the case with conflict early warning and response systems world-over, Kenya's CEWERS experiences operational challenges, mainly arising from inadequacy of resourcing. These challenges have to be addressed to ensure improved effectiveness and impact of the system.

<sup>1</sup> <http://practicalaction.org/conflict-management-in-kenya>.

To keep up with the developments in other parts of the world, where efforts are being made for greater involvement of women as protagonists in conflict early warning and early responses, a gender audit of Kenya's national conflict early warning and early response system was undertaken. This gender audit sought to use an explicitly gender-sensitive perspective and approach to examine the structure, processes and outcomes of Kenya's CEWERS; and to establish and recommend ways through which gender gaps in the existing design of the Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system should be filled, bearing in mind existing gender dynamics that characterize conflicts in Kenya.

### **1.1 Gender Perspective in Conflict Early Warning and Early Response**

The United Nations (UN) has a unique ambition to develop effective gender-sensitive early warning mechanisms and institutions as part of the women, peace and security agenda<sup>2</sup>. Gender-sensitive early warning systems can be defined by two factors: the first is equal participation of men and women in early warning processes; the second is the inclusion of gender-sensitive indicators based on context-specific research into gender and conflict dynamics. An understanding of the different roles of women and men in conflict situations, gender dynamics in conflicts and responses, and engendering conflict early warning systems is essential. Two main arguments have been put forward for gender-sensitizing of early warning systems.

Firstly, that gender-sensitive early warning systems could result in benefits in terms of gender rights and gender equality in conflict-affected areas, and secondly, that early warning systems that are gender-sensitive could be more effective in anticipating and preventing armed conflict. Regarding women rights and gender equality, it has been observed that current exclusions of women from early warning processes results in limited attention to women's needs in conflict-affected contexts – for example, indicators developed without the participation of women may fail to include ways of measuring types of violence that particularly affect women, (Safer world, 2014). A more gender-sensitive approach can therefore assist with efforts to protect women's rights in conflict-affected areas. The UNSCR 1888, for example calls for the development of early warning indicators that specifically measure the risks of sexual violence being used against women in armed conflict in order to aid prevention efforts<sup>3</sup>. The Resolution also suggests that lack of a gender perspective can result in responses that are harmful to women or which exacerbate gender inequality (UN Women, 2012).

Regarding the second argument, consensus exists that, when done well, gender-sensitive conflict analysis and early warning systems can potentially contribute to more effective conflict prevention. This argument is premised on the following considerations:

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<sup>2</sup> United Nations, 2008-2009 United Nations System-wide Action Plan on Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

<sup>3</sup> UN Security Council (2009) Resolution 1888.

### a) Women as an untapped information source

As observed by Hill (2003) and UN Women (2012), early warning systems that fail to include the perspectives of women can miss out on important information that is more readily available to women or rated more important to women, and may, hence, fail to take account of indicators that could prove vital to anticipating conflict.

### b) Working at grassroots level

Since women tend to be more visible and active at local level as compared to national and international levels, working with women at this level draws attention to local factors that contribute to conflict and improves access to early warning information about at the local level (Arnando, 2012).

### c) Gender dynamics in conflict situations – the roles and positions of women

Why the focus on women? Gender refers to both men and women. The goal of engendering society is not a reversal of discrimination or an attempt to make women and men similar, but a means to attain equity through equal opportunities and life chances (Woroniuk, 1999). As long as men and women make their own choices and have equal opportunities and access to resources and power, gender equality can vary according to culture and society. Nevertheless, it is important to note that in most societies around the world, men have had a stronger position than women in societies, and the values and norms in these societies have been shaped by this reality (Kvunna, 2001). As a result, there is a gender bias, and gender roles diminish women's socio- economic positions in most societies (Anne, 1999). It is for this reason that initiatives targeting to promote gender equality have tended to focus largely on the advancement of women in society, economics and politics, especially through actions that aim to achieve gender balance in these sectors.

The goal of engendering society is not a reversal of discrimination or an attempt to make men and women similar, but a means to attain equity through equal opportunities and life chances.

Therefore, in as much as gender analyses must examine the gender characteristics of women and men, they must also take into account the diversity of women's roles and positions in conflict situations, with the explicit intention of getting information that will help to formulate strategies that recognize that women are not just passive victims of conflicts, but capable actors as well<sup>4</sup>.

## I. Women as peace-builders

It has been argued that women's inclusion in conflict analysis and early warning processes can facilitate their participation in designing and implementing peace-building responses (Anderlini, 2006; Arnando, 2012). Indeed, the role of women in peace-building is recognized by UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions.

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<sup>4</sup> Northrup, Terrell A., and Marshall H. Segall. Subjective Vulnerability: The Role of Disempowerment in the Utilization of Mediation Services by Women in a North Eastern Town of the United States, 1989-1990. ICPSR06357-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1995. <http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR06357.v1>

## **ii. Women as victims**

Across many communities, women are esteemed as symbolic bearers of the identity of their ethnic or national communities. In conflict situations, women can strategically be targeted for sexual violence by adversaries, if they consider this an effective means of humiliating and conquering this community through procreation. In such circumstances, women bear the brunt of conflicts as they are objectified as weapons of war. It is noted that, rape and other forms of sexual violence, have become prevalent in most contemporary conflicts that increasingly target civilian populations.

## **iii. Women as combatants**

World over, women no longer just participate in non-combative activities such as supplying of food to male soldiers during war. They also engage in active warfare on the frontline and are as motivated to fight as are their male counterparts. However, Gwartney- Gibbs and Lach (1992) have established that women experience and handle their participation in active conflict differently from men. They observe that female ex- combatants often encounter difficulties reintegrating into society. They have different emotional needs that are rarely taken into account by demobilisations and reintegration efforts. Consequently, they get despised, traumatised and ostracised.

## **iv. Women as peace activists**

Conflict situations often result in solidarity among women and with other conflict victims as a means of safeguarding their necessities. Often, due to the temporary absence of men occasioned by their front line action, women assume the responsibilities of ensuring livelihoods for their families and advocating for victims of the conflicts. Northrup and Segall's study to establish how different realities of women and men influenced their understanding of conflict and approaches to conflict resolution (1995) found that women reported feeling scared or vulnerable more often than men did. Furthermore, women were significantly more likely to feel vulnerable in conflicts with men than in conflicts with other women, and reported that concerns about children, identity and status contributed to these feelings for vulnerability.

Lack of support from their partners and lack of trust in these partners also reinforced feelings of vulnerability. Women and men also differ in the way they talk about conflicts. Women talk at length and provide in-depth context of the dispute and their involvement, while men use more linear and legalistic language to talk about their disputes. Women talk about fairness in a way that incorporates both their material interests and the network of relationships in the dispute. Women also use significantly more strategies to resolve conflicts than men do and openly talk about situations where they feel disempowered and disadvantaged when trying to resolve disputes. Furthermore, while women feel more vulnerable, their vulnerability hardly interferes with their ability to actively handle disputes. In a study by Deborah Kolb focusing on women as peace-makers in organisations (1992), the women studied acted as peacemakers within their organisations. The women got involved in other people's conflicts because co-workers sought them out. They provided a sympathetic ear to them. They also became involved because they were loyal to the organisation and cared how the organisation treated people. They provided support for people to tell their story, and reframed people's understandings of the situation. They translated people's perceptions of each other, and orchestrated occasions for private conflicts to be made public.




## **v. Women as formal peace negotiators**

Only a small number of women participate in formal peace negotiations. According to Kolb's work on how women's ways of understanding the world based on essential differences affected their conduct in negotiations (2000), women's voices were found to be uniquely different because of early social development. Kolb focused on four themes that define women's places in negotiations: (1) a relational view of others, (2) a contextual and related definition of self and situation, (3) an understanding of control through empowerment, (4) problem solving through dialogue. Women's places in negotiation were found to be different because of structural systems of discrimination. Regarding power and negotiations, Watson (1994) examined whether gender or power was a better predictor of a manager's negotiation behaviour. She found that power was a better predictor of the feelings, behaviour and outcomes of negotiations than was gender. This demonstrates that observed gender differences in negotiations are an artefact of men's and women's status and power.

## **vi. Women as coping and surviving actors**

Women have proved to have capacity to survive extremely difficult circumstances, including situations of conflict. Indeed, they have a way of coping with life and increasingly display is remarkable resilience in adapting to new living conditions, including those occasioned by conflicts<sup>5</sup>. At displaced persons camps, women develop relations across their gender and provide assistance and support to each other.

Many women in conflict situations develop community revolving funds that are in the structure of self-help saving schemes, where each woman pays a small amount of money every month; members can borrow money for different purposes such as paying school fees for their children<sup>6</sup>. They also trade in food, drinks and services (both the legal products and illegal ones). A notable perspective on sex work, as an illegal livelihood strategy, comes from Azizain Al-Salam camp, who narrates<sup>7</sup>.



I have tried all means of survival but none worked out except prostitution. That is because there is much demand for it... I earn a lot from that... I want you to know that was not my choice. This is a choice I was forced to make, in darkness and behind closed doors... It is awful to earn money from something people around you even your daily customers are ashamed to speak about. It is scary to earn a living from something your government regards as illegal. It is scary to know that you will be finished if the police catch you. On the other hand, it is a job I do to survive here, and in urban places too. In this sense, it is ok for me to do it, otherwise me and my mother would die from hunger.

<sup>5</sup>[http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20021101\\_cru\\_bouta.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20021101_cru_bouta.pdf).

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

Aziza's narrative illustrates that despite all moral, social and legal constraints, she had strong economic and social reasons to justify her involvement with this livelihood strategy, which had proven to be profitable. It is also significant to point out that where as financial support, such as a loan, is vital for starting and running livelihood strategies like businesses, this support is not always forthcoming. The following narrative from Scholl, a female who lived in Mayo Camp, illustrates how displaced persons are often disregarded by banks when they seek financial assistance (Swenson, 2011) It also illustrates that despite women's resilience, conflicts adversely affect their ability to sustain their livelihoods.



I know citizens have the right to get a loan from banks. My husband read that in a newspaper but when I went with him to seek a loan, nobody helped us...we tried many banks several times but without success.

Women as protectors A narrative by Sadia, a 60-year old woman from South Sudan, who resided in Al-Salam camp, illustrates how women take on the role of protectors in conflict situations. In her case, Sadia was married but got divorced from her husband. She spoke about her role of protector that she had to take up<sup>8</sup>.



I did not have a husband to protect me. When we moved here, he started drinking heavily. He used to beat me and make a lot of noise that my neighbours could hear. I felt so insecure and embarrassed about that. I spoke to our Sultan (leader) in the camp, who divorced us. I then became a free woman. Later I found a job and was able to take care of my children. I feed them and protect them...I have good neighbours who are always ready to help.

#### **d. Hidden causes of conflict**

A better understanding of the relationship between gender and conflict dynamics can bring to the fore drivers and triggers of conflict that may otherwise not be obvious. For example, it is opined that the promotion of violent hyper masculinity as the ideal image of manhood can be indicative of tensions leading to conflict, (Anderlini, 2006).

Different perspectives exist regarding how gender-sensitivity should be put into practice. Increasing women's participation in early warning systems is widely documented as the main strategy towards improving gender sensitivity, (Saferworld, 2014). There are other strategies

a) Incorporating gender-sensitive indicators into the collection and analysis of early warning information makes existing models more comprehensive and allows for 'early' early warning by anticipating macro-level conflict through micro-level events;

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

b) Interaction between women and men fine-tunes the formulation of political and humanitarian responses, in addressing the specific vulnerabilities of men and women and ensuring that discriminatory policies are not perpetuated in post-conflict situations; and

c) Making early warning and preventive activities more effective by utilising the untapped potential of women, women's networks and women's organisations as actors for peace. The three areas which are considered entry points for engendering conflict early warning mechanisms are collection of information, the analytical process of risk assessments, and the formulation of response options. These three areas are intertwined: good indicators emanate from good analytical models; analysis is as good as the information flowing into it; and response options need to be informed by both timely information and correct analytical insight (Schmeidl & Piza-Lopez, 2002).

### **1.1.1 Engendering the Collection of Information**

Development of sensible indicators goes beyond access to data and information. It involves analyses that identify the complex correlation of factors that signify escalation of conflicts. Engendering data and information collection can be done through developing early warning indicators that are gender-sensitive, then adding them to the existing indicator models. It can also be enhanced by involving women in the active collection and analysis of information<sup>10</sup>.

### **1.1.2 Engendering the Analytical Processes**

Both qualitative and quantitative analyses of early warning information are essential. Quantitative analysis scholars are in agreement that macro-level structural models are useful in yielding risk assessments that can effectively guide analysis, and that micro-level approaches are invaluable in the actual monitoring process and the anticipation of conflict<sup>11</sup>. Micro-level monitoring helps to inform stakeholders about the impact of micro-level factors on macro-level conflicts. However, while there has been effort to carry out both macro and micro-level analyses, they have until now not sufficiently considered the role of gender and the actions of women and men as important components in early warning analysis. A gender perspective can address this gap. Indeed, when examined together with the traditional approaches, gender analysis usually elicits different perspectives regarding the causes and effects of conflicts on different sectors of society, and their particular roles and relationships with each other (Schmeidl & Piza-Lopez, 2002).

Engendering early warning of ten prompts, analysts asked new questions about the conditions of life among different classes, age-groups, identities, etc at different levels of society. It provides a better grasp of the unequal gender and social hierarchies, and the inequality and oppression, which often characterize societies that are prone to, or are embroiled in conflict (Anne, 1999). Such action can potentially result in the inclusion of gender equity and equality as essential components of initiatives to promote sustainable peace and democratic processes. Furthermore, inclusion and main streaming of gender considerations into the agenda items at an early stage of policy making has the potential of improving the understanding of the realities on the ground.

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<sup>10</sup>For criticisms on the technical aspects of early warning see, for example Adelman and Suhrke (1996), Schmeidl and Jenkins (1998a), George and Holl (2000), Jentleson (2000 and case studies and his book), and Schmeidl (2001). For a summary of other reasons that are linked to the failure of early warning see Schmeidl (2001, 2002b).

<sup>11</sup> Gurr and Moore, 1997; Schmeidl and Jenkins, 1998; Schmeidl, 2001

This could in turn lead to 'early' early warning and/or long-term perspectives that introduce conflict prevention into development planning (Leornhardt,2002).Involving women in the conflict early warning processes also has the potential added value of countering mind-blindness by changing the traditional analytical patterns and opening new avenues for formulating response options<sup>12</sup>.

### 1.1.3 Gender-Sensitive Indicators

A gender-sensitive indicator refers to an indicator that captures gender-related changes in society over time (Beck, 1999). Therefore, while statistics disaggregated by sex provide factual information about the status of men and women, a gender-sensitive indicator provides direct evidence of the status of women, relative to some agreed normative standard or explicit reference group, in this case, men<sup>13</sup>.

Because sex and gender tend to highly correlate, sex can be a good indicator of gender for many research purposes. However, the collection of sex-disaggregated data alone is not sufficient. It is also essential to know why and for what purpose a particular indicator is needed and how it can improve early warning processes. This calls for theoretical grounding and the development of new indicators.

The first step in developing gender-sensitive indicators was the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994, which offered the Human Development Index (HDI) adjusted by gender-disparity for 43 countries. However, it was not until the 1995 edition that two significant new indicators assessing women's access to resources and their overall status and power in society were introduced for 130 and 116 countries respectively. The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) adjusts downwards for countries with poor records in gender equality, making the average achievement of each country in life expectancy, educational attainment and income in accordance with the degree of disparity in achievement between men and women (UNDP 1995).

The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) on the other hand, uses variables constructed explicitly to measure the relative empowerment of men and women in political and economic spheres of activity. This examines whether women and men are able to participate in economic and political life and take part in decision-making<sup>14</sup>.

Existing literature on early warning offers different types of long and short-term indicators, which focus on back ground, proximate, facilitating and triggering factors. While the search for a set of key indicators upon which all conflict escalation processes could be monitored has largely been abandoned, there is growing consensus that structuring information around groups of 'family' indicators is beneficial. For the purpose of early warning, all underlying—not just gendered causes of expressed violence, frustration, and demographic and behavioural changes must also be understood. Thus, gender-sensitive indicators are most beneficial when they are used in conjunction with wider socio-political analyses.

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<sup>12</sup> While it is true that early warning cannot be solely engendered by the inclusion of women, in a system that still tends to bias against women, it is nevertheless important to point out the role women could play.

<sup>13</sup> While it is true that early warning cannot be solely engendered by the inclusion of women, in a system that still tends to bias against women, it is nevertheless important to point out the role women could play.

<sup>14</sup> UNDP,1995

#### 1.1.4 The Gender Lens in the Root or Systemic Causes of Conflicts

Root or systemic causes of conflict refer to general structural and deep-rooted background conditions. According to Clark (1989), they are underlying events and conditions that have existed for many years and are mostly static or only change slowly over time. They tend to be embedded in historical and cultural contexts, such as religious conflicts, long-standing border disputes, difficulty in state building, poverty/economic exclusion or ecological degradation, etc. Root causes are thus necessary but not sufficient causes of conflict. By examining how these root causes can be instrumentalized by some sections of the society, it is possible to assess risk potentials in a country.

States with lower percentages of women in parliament are more likely to use military violence to settle disputes.

For the purpose of engendering root causes of conflict, a basic hypothesis is that the more inclusive a society is, the less likely it will resort to force as a means of conflict resolution. Limited research suggests that cultures which limit women's access to resources (economic, political, social) and decision-making power, and which characterise women as inferior to men, treat women as property and accept domestic violence as a norm, are more prone to repression and violent conflict in the public arena. In the secultures, men who do not fall within the traditional masculine ideal of strength and domination also tend to suffer and might become outcasts.

Exclusion and discrimination, however, need not be limited to social and cultural structures; they can also occur in the economic sphere. The exclusion of groups that are low in status from important resources could be considered an additional indicator of a deteriorating societal situation that can lead to conflict in the future. It is important to re-emphasise that root causes are only necessary, but not sufficient factors for conflict. They cannot be used in isolation from other indicators. Some of the gender sensitive roots causes are political, economic and social equality.

Research suggests that states with lower percentages of women in parliament are more likely to use military violence to settle disputes, and that a 5 percent decrease in the proportion of women in parliament renders a state about five times more likely to resolve international disputes using military violence. Female suffrage is also a significant predictor of state bellicosity. Given two states, for example, the state having twice the number of years of male suffrage will be nearly five times more likely to resolve international disputes without military violence (Caprioli, 2000). Further, the level of women's participation in the labour force can be interpreted as the extent to which women are integrated into the public sphere and other forms of participation such as voting or political activism (ibid).

Regarding social equality, an overall measure of female fertility rate would indicate the extent to which women's access to reproductive health services is constrained by their broader social deprivation, including the lack of resources for, or priority to their health, restrictions on social participation, and limited access to information due to illiteracy (ibid). Through multiple years of child bearing and child rearing, women get tied to the home, excluding them not just from the labour force, but also education and community or public decision-making processes (UNDP,

1995.) Thus, countries with a high fertility rate and lower gender equality are also more likely to engage in violence. For example, decreasing the fertility rate by one-third makes a state nearly five times less likely to use a military solution to settle international disputes (Caprioli, 2000). Also, societies with high levels of family violence are more likely to be involved in wars compared to societies with lower levels of family violence (ibid).

Proximate causes reflect medium term conditions and emerging socio-political and economic trends. Jointly with root causes, they can create the sufficient conditions for conflict. In the context of conflict early warning, much attention has been paid to trends in income disparity, patterns of political oppression and particularly human rights violations (Fein, 1992). It is critical to assess whether governments are able and willing to cope with unfavourable background conditions, e.g. failure to introduce legislation that allows equal access to political and economic resources in an ethnically heterogeneous environment, if there is an attempt to overcome gender imbalances or if there is a tendency to manipulate inequalities for political gain.

Specific indicators for proximate causes of conflict include gender-specific human rights violations, including rape, domestic violence, other forms of violence and presence of military operations; abrupt changes in gender roles in society, including a move from open to closed societies, imposition of restrictive laws, especially for women, increasing restrictive interpretation of existing laws, regard for aggression behaviour and propaganda emphasising hyper-masculinity. Deviation from behavioural trends and demographic patterns include gender-specific refugee emigration and disappearances, and gender-specific unemployment; and changes in economic patterns, such as sale of jewellery and other precious materials, increase of remissions from outside being sent home and hoarding of goods (Schmeidl, 2001).

Conflict intervening factors, sometimes also called accelerators can either increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict or peace-building. Intervening factors can be grouped as: obstacles to conflict prevention or peace building; external or internal influences that either fuel conflict or aid conflict resolution; alternatives to conflict; or coping strategies on dealing with transitional difficulties. For example, the media may play a role in catalysing action through their sudden exposure or reporting of events hitherto unknown. At the same time, the media can play a critical role in fueling public anger and triggering conflicts. The portrayal of women in the media can be a key indicator, as violence is often expressed verbally, through propaganda. For example, in Rwanda, as early as 1990, extremist Hutu press and radio began to target Tutsi women as seductresses, spies, and a threat to Hutu society (Human Rights Watch, 1996). Thus, the media can be a good early warning indicator for a society that is gearing up for war and trying to create in-versus out-groups. Intervening factors are therefore extremely important indicators for identification of trigger events, for formulating policy options and mobilising effective response interventions (ibid).

Often these response interventions are performed by women's organisations. These factors are only visible with a micro-level analysis. It is always essential to consider organisations working to diminish violence and identify grassroots and women's organisations. Nevertheless, while doing this, one should not ignore spoilers of peace or those that benefit from conflict and therefore work to escalate it.

## **1.2 Rationale for Engendering the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response in Kenya**

In Kenya, the roles of women and men at the conflict prevention stage have become increasingly important. Specifically, more consideration is being given the ways in which information about, and from women and men, can be used to prevent conflict and build peace in a gender-sensitive way<sup>15</sup>. This is why engendering conflict early warning and early response in Kenya is important.

Both the Beijing Platform for Action and the UNSCR 1325 have called for increased roles for women in conflict prevention and peace-building. While Kenya has made considerable strides in engendering its conflict early warning and early response system, there are still some gender concerns that still need to be addressed. For example, there is room for improvement of the programming indicators, the NCEWERS structure; processes, such as data collection and analysis as well as early warning responses and financing of the responses. In addition, involving more women in practice, especially in planning, decision-making processes and structures, as well as in financing and reporting mechanisms within the national response by all stakeholders, including government, implementing and development partners at the national and county levels has yet to achieve the two-thirds constitutional gender principle.

With these considerations, the Directorate of Peacebuilding and Conflict Management decided to conduct a gender audit of the conflict early warning and response system in Kenya, with the aim of improving gender integration in the NCEWERS. The activity was as a result of discussions between UN Women and the Directorate of Peacebuilding and Conflict Management during the 2013 elections.

## **1.3 Aim and Rationale of the Gender Audit of NCEWERS**

The gender audit aimed at enabling a deeper understanding of the extent to which gender has been integrated in the structures and processes through which the conflict early warning and response system is prioritised, monitored, evaluated and supported in Kenya.

This audit will inform the development of gender-sensitive indicators, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, which can effectively and accurately measure the difference in the impact of any action on women and men. With it will be possible to adjust programmes and policies to respond to specific gender issues and needs. Development of gender-sensitive indicators also has a high potential of stepping up gender mainstreaming. Finally, the development of a gender-sensitive conflict early response frame work can allow for 'early' early warning by anticipating macro-level conflicts through micro-level events, (Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez, 2002).

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<sup>15</sup> United Nations Development Fund for Women (2006), Engendering conflict early warning, [http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/UN/unifem\\_earlywarnsolomonislands\\_2006.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/UN/unifem_earlywarnsolomonislands_2006.pdf)

The expected outcomes of this work are:

1. Enhanced appreciation of engendering the National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System;
2. Improved programming for conflict early warning and response due to integration of gender-sensitive indicators; and
3. Increased gender-based analyses of conflict situations, including warning and responses.



## 2.0 Contexts for Conflict Early Warning and Response

### 2.1 Anchoring the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted UNSCR 1325, a first of a kind resolution which seeks to acknowledge the impact of conflicts on the lives of women. It recognizes the importance of utilizing women's contribution and active participation in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building. UNSCR 1325 acknowledges women as proactive agents for peace, and calls UN Member States to promote full participation, equal participation and recognition of women in all peace and security initiatives.

#### Key Provisions of SCR 1325

- \* Increased participation and representation of women at all levels of decision-making
- \* Attention to specific protection needs of women and girls in conflict
- \* Gender perspective in post-conflict processes
- \* Gender perspective in UN programming, reporting and in SC missions
- \* Gender perspective & training in UN peace support operation


#### 2.1.1 Components of the Resolution

The UNSCR 1325 addresses not only the unwarranted impact of war and conflict on women and girls, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, but also the pivotal role women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace<sup>16</sup>.

The resolution is the outcome of concerted efforts by international women's organizations and grassroots networks, working in partnership with supportive governments and United Nations entities.

The Resolution recognizes the different experiences women and men have in conflicts and wars and the value of women's contributions in the analysis of conflicts and provision of peace building strategies that focus on creating ties across opposing factions and increasing inclusiveness, transparency, and sustainability of peace processes. The Resolution has served as a mobilisation and negotiation platform for monitoring peace agreements, as well as other post-conflict programs and activities.

The Resolution's goals are supported by the following four pillars:



<sup>16</sup> [http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/BasicWPSDocs/annotated\\_1325.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/BasicWPSDocs/annotated_1325.pdf)

It pushes for increased participation of women in decision-making, in national, regional and international institutions; in mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict; in peace negotiations; in peace operations, as soldiers, police, and civilians; and as Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General.

Reiterating the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action of 31st May 2000 on mainstreaming a gender perspective in multidimensional peace support operations, the Resolution addresses protection by reiterating the obligation to multilateral intervention under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, which states that “the Security Council may decide what measures, but not involving armed force, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures.”

The Resolution further notes the need for data, institutional arrangements, and training focused on prevention and women's special needs and human rights. These are said to be necessary for ending Gender-Based Violence (GBV) during post-conflict. It specifies that GBV should be prosecuted and is thus excluded from consideration for amnesty during peace negotiations and post-conflict constitutional and legal reform negotiations. Regarding relief and recovery, the Resolution calls for advancement of measures aimed at addressing international crises through a gendered lens. This includes respecting the civilian and humanitarian nature of refugee camps, and taking into account the particular needs of women and girls in the design of refugee camps and settlements. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), through a statement in 2005, called on its Member States to continue implementing Resolution 1325 through the development of National Action Plans (NAP) or other national level strategies. The NAP process helps countries to identify priorities and resources, determine their responsibilities and commit to action.

## **2.2 The African context**

Of the 47 countries that have to date developed and launched NAP, only thirteen are African countries. These are Liberia, Nigeria, Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal, (Miller et al., 2014).

At the regional level, the African Union (AU) is one of the inter-governmental organizations that have developed UNSCR 1325-related action plans, (Barnes, 2006). The Peace and Security Council was formed as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa<sup>17</sup>. The prevention of conflict has been found to be more cost effective in terms of cost and saving of lives, which prompted formulation of Article 12 of the Peace and Security protocol to provide for the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

Continental Conflict Early Warning System is responsible for facilitating the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa. It works in close collaboration with the regional bodies in information gathering. All information is collated in the situation room at the headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Eight regional bodies form part of this architecture. They include:

1. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD),
2. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),

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<sup>17</sup> Article 2(1) of the Peace and Security Protocol of AU, 2001.

3. The Southern African Development Community (SADC),
4. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU),
5. The East African Community (EAC),
6. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),
7. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and
8. The Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD).

The Economic Community of West African States and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development have been the most progressive. IGAD's early warning unit is said to have the most sophisticated electronic mechanism and tools<sup>18</sup>. IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), whose focus is on the Horn of Africa, has developed community-led peace initiatives, which serve as a tool for reducing violence and enhancing peaceful interaction and resource sharing among communities<sup>19</sup>. IGAD bases its information on field officers and employees of local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in pastoralist areas.

The focus of CEWS is diverse. For example, in the IGAD member states, CEWARN initially focused on pastoralist regions but has expanded to other regions, while the East African Community emphasises security among the member states, interstate defence and intrastate conflicts that emanate from cattle rustling, smuggling and illegal trade; poverty and economic inequalities; human rights violations in partner states and sharing of cross border and intrastate natural resources and land<sup>20</sup>.

Another useful tool for the prevention of conflict across the African continent is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) that was established under the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and adopted by African states in 2001. The APRM is a self-monitoring tool, which aims at promoting and reinforcing high standards of governance by analysing systemic or structural problems in countries under review, with a view of providing advice and recommendations before the eruption of crises<sup>21</sup>. Even though the APRM is voluntary in nature, participation and mutual agreement and implementation of the recommendations formulated at the end of the review processes remains a challenge. For example, in the cases of Kenya and South Africa, the APRM meetings discussed the early warning signs prior to the violence that erupted in both countries in 2008. In Kenya, the 2005 review pointed to the historical nature of issues that the country was grappling with. These issues were part of what was alleged to have served as driving factors of the post-election violence in 2007/2008. The same observation was made with regard to the South Africa peer review of 2007.

The Continental Early Warning System is rooted in a new concept defined as 'human security'. The principle underlying this concept is the responsibility to protect. Its analytical framework covers three key elements as outlined in the diagram below.

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<sup>18</sup> Cillers, J., *Towards a Continental Early Warning System*, 2005.

<sup>19</sup> CEWARN, "CEWARN convenes peace gathering for neighboring communities of Ethiopia and Kenya," available at [www.cewarn.org/indez.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=92-cewarn-convenes-a-peace-gathering-for-neighbouring-communities-of-Ethiopia-and-Kenya&cat.id=110:2010-archive&itemid=133](http://www.cewarn.org/indez.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=92-cewarn-convenes-a-peace-gathering-for-neighbouring-communities-of-Ethiopia-and-Kenya&cat.id=110:2010-archive&itemid=133).

<sup>20</sup> Draft Protocol of the East African Community, 2004.

<sup>21</sup> NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency, "African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)," available at [www.nepad.org/economic-and-cooperate-governance/African-peer-review-mechanism/about](http://www.nepad.org/economic-and-cooperate-governance/African-peer-review-mechanism/about).

**Figure 1: The Three Elements of the Continental Early Warning System**

The third element relates to the formulation of recommendations through scenario building, development of response options, and their validation and verification.

The second element is concerned with early warnings that include analyses of conflict-related structures, actors, and dynamics that identify trends and conditions conducive to conflicts.

The first is the collection and monitoring of information on potential conflicts through alerts that consider contexts, actors and events to prepare profiles and baselines for assessing vulnerability. Following the development of gender-based indicators by the CEWS and the AU Women, Gender and Development Directorate, the collection of conflict information also reflects a gender perspective. (International Peace Institute, Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response, 2012 ).

The Continental Early Warning System is hence perceived as an effective action tool which encompasses information collection, information analysis, formulation of best/worst case scenarios and response options and communication to decision makers. The African Union in its meeting to develop a manual for formulation of indicators, came up with nine objectives that can guide indicators for the early warning system in the region. Mainstreaming of women and other target populations is not included in this manual<sup>22</sup>.

With regard to early warning tools, the Continental Early Warning System relies on analytical and news sources such as Oxford analytica and British Broadcasting Corporation Monitoring, as well as online news sites such as the African Media Monitor (AMM). The African Media Monitor is a tool for gathering data in real time from a variety of sources. The software is able to read 40,000 articles simultaneously and is updated every ten minutes. Another handy tool is the African Reporter. It is tailored to the Continental Early Warning System indicators and templates. It facilitates monitoring and gathering information primarily from the African Union field missions and liaison offices. The Continental Early Warning System also uses the Live-Mon tool, which performs automatic geo-localisation of news items so that events can be displayed on a map. Additionally, the Continental Early Warning System collects data on actors and structural factors, as well as from information on events, incidents, and situations. This information is analysed with the view of reinforcing conflict prevention efforts by identifying trends.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

However, popular uprisings witnessed in Northern Africa in 2011 and the crises witnessed in Mali and Guinea-Bissau raised fundamental questions about the capacity of the AU to successfully prevent violent conflicts in Africa. In Mali, for example, the military coup in March 2012, which ousted President Amadou Toumani, occurred barely two days after a ministerial meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council to consider the situation in the Sahel region and the Tuareg rebellion in the northern part of the country. The equally unforeseen crisis in Guinea-Bissau in April 2012 erupted less than a month later, while an Economic Community of West African States Mediation and Security Council ministerial meeting was taking place in Abidjan

According to the first report by the United Nations Secretary General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict in Africa, member states and civil society actors are the primary conflict-prevention actors<sup>23</sup>. The United Nations conflict prevention and early warning work also derives from the process relating to the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), which consolidates the African Union's work in the areas of peace, stability, security, development and cooperation through creating synergies between the various activities undertaken by the union. More collaborative work is especially co-ordinated by the United Nations through its agencies at individual country levels. This work includes destigmatising early warning systems, for example, by highlighting the existence of such systems, which include national intelligence systems. Particularly, the United Nations Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are the two United Nations agencies working to build national capacity for conflict prevention. The UN works with governments and civil society to facilitate dialogue on emerging issues with the aim of forestalling the need for violent interventions at later stages. Trainings are also usually conducted to equip local actors, such members of parliament with negotiation skills. Kenya and Ghana are two examples of the UN's engagement in conflict prevention at country level.

### **Inter-Governmental Authority on Development**

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has a Secretariat, headed by an Executive Secretary, appointed by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. The Authority has formulated an extensive strategy for the implementation of its various programmes (IGAD 2003). Since the Horn of Africa is a region that is haunted by conflicts ranging from intra-state and inter-state to cross-border community conflicts, a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism was established in 2000 with a mandate to 'receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development region' (Von Keyserling K and Kopfmüller 2006:5). To achieve this, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism combines elements of the predictive model and the risk assessment models.

The rationale of Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism is to systematically anticipate violent conflicts and respond in a timely and effective manner. This – it is argued in the mission statement – is more effective and much cheaper both in terms of human and material resources than dealing with full-blown crises. Its ultimate aim is to report on all violent conflicts in a broadly defined human security area and not just on national or state security.

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<sup>23</sup>United Nations Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict.

Operationally, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism established a network of field monitors, country coordinators, national research institutes and conflict-Early Warning and Response units at the national level and began its work in two pilot areas as on pastoral conflicts in the cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya Uganda and South Sudan as well as in the second cross-border areas of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism uses a set of 52 socio-political indicators for two types of reports: (1) Violent Incident Reports within indicators on armed clashes, raids, protest demonstrations and other crimes; and (2) indicators for reports on the presence and status of communal relations, civil society activities, economic activities, governance and media, natural disasters, safety and security and social services.

The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism is supported by contributions from member states' contributions and supported by development partners such as the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) and US Agency for International Development (USAID). This has enabled it to initiate the Rapid Response Fund to help finance projects targeted at preventing, de-escalating or resolving pastoral and related conflicts in the region. The fund is intended to improve the flexibility and build up the required capacity to respond to early warning signals and address crises in a timely and appropriate manner.

With the revitalization of the IGAD in 1996, the activities of its Partner Forum and the Friends, the number of partners who work closely with its Secretariat steadily increased. According to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's own assessment, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism's achievements include<sup>24</sup>:

- ? Establishment of a sub-regional mechanism with the most developed data-based regional early warning system in Africa;
- ? Development of an effective state-of-the-art field monitoring and data analysis tool;
- ? Bringing to light hitherto unrecognised extent of violence in the pilot pastoralist areas;
- ? Conducting of capacity building for conflict prevention, management and response in the region through skill training of stakeholders at various levels; and
- ? Confidence building and collaboration amongst various stakeholders including governments, civil society organisations, and community based organisations (CBOs).

Nonetheless, challenges still abound. Like several other regional institutions, even though IGAD should take a lead on conflict management, it is severely hampered by internal and external conflicts among some of its members such as Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism also recognises that there are several continuing operational gaps of implementation, including an inadequate information base and the lack of an effective response component.

### **2.3 The Kenyan context**

In Kenya, post election violence (PEV) experiences defined the pathway for the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Following the PEV, former South African first lady Graca Machel encouraged women civil society activists to present a memorandum to the AU mediation team led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Under the banner of Kenya Women's Consultative Group

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<sup>24</sup> Republic of Kenya, Draft National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management, 2006.

(KWCG), they presented issues that had been of specific concern to women during the PEV. One of the main recommendations in the memorandum presented on 25th January, 2008 was the adoption of the UNSCR 1325 in Kenya. This was said to be the critical missing link towards ensuring women's participation in decision-making processes, and which could contribute to conflict prevention and ensuring that women are involved as equal partners in their protection from GBV and other forms of violations.

The presentation of this memorandum reinvigorated the country's interest and resolve towards adoption and implementation of the UNSCR 1325. The development of the National Plan of Action on UNSCR 1325 in Kenya began with a commitment for collaboration between the Government of Kenya and the Government of Finland through a twinning process that is mutually beneficial, whereby the global south and north would learn from one another. It then went to the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development who delegated the National Gender and Equality Commission to oversee the process of development of the Kenya National Action Plan (KNAP) with support availed by UN Women that is mandated to oversee implementation of UNSCR 1325 in member states.

KNAP is premised on the four UNSCR 1325 pillars, namely, prevention, protection, participation, relief and recovery. It is unique in the sense that it is anchored on a human security framework. This embodies efforts by government and other stakeholders in Kenya to address root causes of the economic and socio-political issues around peace and security. The overall goal of the KNAP is to mainstream UNSCR 1325 into national development, diplomacy, gender, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peace, security and reconciliation strategies and ensure implementation of existing commitments by government to promote gender equality and women's participation and leadership in public affairs at all levels.

In consideration of the three dilemmas that face effective implementation of action plans, the Kenya National Action Plan has proposed a distinct UNSCR 1325 coordination unit within a ministry that will mainstream the Resolution's strategies and plans among various institutions responsible for its implementation within the government set up.

The positioning dilemma is indeed a challenge for the plan. Initially it was hosted by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development. After further consultations with National Security Council, the organ responsible for making security decisions in the government of Kenya and various stakeholders, it was decided that the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government would host the plan given that it adopts a human security framework, which emphasises equal protection of individual citizens and endeavours to better understand and address the root causes of socio-economic and political inequalities around peace and security issues faced by women. Following the 2013 elections, however, there was need to align the new government priorities and structures (devolved structures) in the KNAP. The plan has been aligned to the Medium Term Plan II (MTP II), Vision 2030, government structure and to emerging security priorities of Kenya. It has been observed that in Western countries such as Finland, implementation of action plans has been most successful when hosted by either of the two ministries.

The stakeholder participation dilemma has not been faced in Kenya. This is because the government has been open to both national and regional civil society organizations, who have been included as members of the steering committee and as experts right from the start of the process. Furthermore, through a national consultative process, the steering committee documented the UNSCR 1325 activities that the civil society organizations were carrying out in a process aimed at strengthening the collaborative efforts between the government and the civil society in anticipating and preventing violent conflicts in Kenya.

Implementation of KNAP has been going on and can be credited for the successful conflict-prevention during electioneering in Kenya, starting with the 2010 referendum on the Constitution.



***Participants during the launch of Uwiano platform for peace in Makadara, Nairobi.***

Ahead of the 2010 referendum on the Constitution of Kenya, *Ushahidi* and *Uwiano* platforms carried out extensive conflict-prevention work with the support of UN agencies and other partners. These interventions came at a time when there were genuine fears and evidence of renewed political grandstanding and violence. The *Ushahidi* (Swahili word for 'witness' or 'testimony') platform had initially been designed for humanitarian early warning and response following the 2008 post-election violence. The platform employs crowd sourcing strategies to gather reports submitted through the web and mobile telephones. These reports help to map incidents of violence and peace efforts throughout Kenya. The *Ushahidi* platform has helped civil society organisations (CSOs) to connect with each other and exchange information. The *Uwiano* (Kiswahili word for 'cohesion') was launched ahead of the 2010 referendum on the Constitution. The initiative was designed by Kenya and international institutions including the Directorate of Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), PeaceNet Kenya, and the United Nations Development Programme in Kenya. The platform organised a system to collect up-to-date information on tensions, hate



speech, incitements, threats, and violence throughout Kenya, and to relay the information to security institutions and local peace structures that are best placed to carry out appropriate actions, including mediation. Peace advocates were trained to ensure immediate response to conflict. This joint initiative was supported by the government, local communities, local civil society and religious groups, and international development partners<sup>25</sup>.

### **2.3.1 Context of Conflicts in Kenya**

Kenya has experienced different types of conflicts in its past and present history. The conflicts manifest either violently or non-violently and range from internal disputes between different groups to cross-border confrontations with groups from neighbouring countries<sup>26</sup>. Among internal disputes, the 2008/9 post-election violence is considered to have had the greatest impact. Three types of violence that were associated with post-election violence were: organised violence, retaliatory violence and spontaneous violence, (Wamai, 2013). Most violations were experienced in the urban centres, (GoK, 2008). The government has addressed the concerns that triggered the post-election violence through the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission and enactment of the new Constitution.

#### **2.3.1.1 Conflict types, areas, causes and impacts in Kenya**

The distinct conflict environments or environment-related types of conflict that exist in Kenya include, pastoralist conflicts, cross border conflicts, boundary conflicts, sectarian conflicts, agro-pastoralist conflicts, agro-pastoral conflicts, conflicts over land, urban conflicts, gender-based violence, human-wildlife conflicts, institutional conflicts, environmental and natural resources conflicts, conflicts arising from social and political alienation, economic disparities related conflicts, inadequacy of judicious institutions, small arms and light weapons, and conflicts linked to multinational corporations. Perceived historical injustices that have resulted in social and economic marginalization is also considered a root cause of conflict (GoK, 2008).

According to the Kenya Human Rights Commission, ethnic clashes, which have mainly been fanned by politics, can be classified as governance-related conflicts<sup>27</sup>. Ethnicity has been used politically to stir ethnic disquiet, conflict and proliferation of ethnic militia. Through nepotism and cronyism, business and programmes have been implemented based on affiliation and not on the needs of the women and men in affected areas. The result has been stalled social and economic development in some parts of the country<sup>28</sup>. Ethnicity has not only been a disadvantage to those affected, but is also in contravention of the Constitution of Kenya 2010<sup>29</sup>.

Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) in the North Rift, North Eastern, and parts of Eastern and Coast regions are characterized by unpredictable weather patterns, which cause prolonged periods of drought, necessitating migration in such of pasture and water. These circumstances force people into more confined areas, and into competition for decreasing amounts of resources, which often precipitate pastoralist-related conflicts. These conflicts frequently

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<sup>25</sup> United Nations Development Programme in Kenya, "Uwiano Peace Platform Project," available at [www.ke.undp.org/index.php/projects/uwiano-peace-platform-project](http://www.ke.undp.org/index.php/projects/uwiano-peace-platform-project).

<sup>26</sup> Republic of Kenya, National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management, approved by Cabinet in 2012.

<sup>27</sup> See press statement by the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) on escalating insecurity in Moyale, which considers that Government's early warning systems have continued to be ineffective in detecting conflicts and informing timely and appropriate interventions.

<sup>28</sup> Republic of Kenya, National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management, 2006.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid

degenerate into bloody clashes within and among neighbouring pastoralist communities and result in increased social and political alienation, economic marginalisation, and proliferation of small arms emanating from regional conflicts in South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. This has in turn increased cases of banditry and made cattle rustling more frequent.

In ASALs, competition for scarce resources affects women and men differently. When men go out to protect their interests, sometimes through fighting, their capacity to secure their families is often compromised. Furthermore, families often get displaced, which puts them at risk from incidences of human rights abuses, such as rape. HIV/AIDS infections also tend to increase under such environments, and women often have to shoulder the extra burden of becoming heads of households and sole bread winners (Wamai, 2013).

In agro-pastoralist zones of Central, Eastern, South and North Rift, parts of Nyanza and Coast regions, the conflict environment is influenced by differences in the social, cultural and economic practices of farmers and pastoralists. Communities that border ranches and national parks in Kenya find themselves in this kind of environment. A common feature of the agro-pastoralist conflicts is stock theft whose indicators are escalation of conflicts in agro-pastoralist areas. They in some instances degenerate into prolonged violence when cattle thefts result in counter thefts and revenge missions. Land related conflicts are manifested in densely populated areas and pastoralist areas, where poorly defined tenure rights have precipitated clashes due to ownership of grazing lands. When the emotive nature of land is exploited during electioneering periods, there is a higher risk for emergence of land- related conflicts.

**The intangible effects of conflicts in Kenya include trauma and the consequential loss of trust by people in existing institutions and processes, including those related to conflict resolution and management.**

Land-related conflicts at the Coast and Rift Valley regions have arisen due to people residing on land that they do not hold title to as well as the call by government for those that had encroached gazetted forest lands to move out of the lands to pave way for reforestation. Recent efforts to issue title deeds to deserving Kenyans as well as settlement of internally displaced persons is one way the government has started to address these types of land-related conflicts. In Western and Rift Valley regions these types of conflicts are prevalent in places such as Mount Elgon and the Mau Forest. Often, the affected people or communities claim rights to the affected lands based on indigenous considerations or having ownership that is based on legally acquired titles from people who benefited from irregular allocation. Forceful eviction of people from disputed land has sometimes resulted in injuries and in extreme cases, deaths.

Agricultural related conflicts are common in Western, Central, Eastern and Coast regions, where large scale cash crop farming is practiced. These conflicts are characterised by industrial disputes, produce marketing crises, chaos relating to farm workers and their cooperatives, land ownership challenges, problems associated with management of companies and loss of jobs.

In urban conflicts, the poor-rich divide is prominent. Such conflicts involve communities with complex social strata and economic disparities. The conflict environment is characterized by urban crime, land lord and tenant disputes, congestion and other unfavourable conditions of informal settlement life, and industrial and labour disputes. There is mass mobilisation of

different social groups on various issues, including through mass action that can degenerate into large scale violence.

Social and gender conflict is difficult to determine. It includes gender-based violence and can take the form of sexual violence, intimate partner violence, intimidation, child labour, child abuse etc. Break down in most community infrastructure and the powerlessness and fear of victims makes it difficult to report and document this type of violence.

Human-wildlife conflict affects communities that live around national parks and game reserves. Wild animals often leave the parks and game reserves and destroy crops, kill their livestock, disrupt day-to-day activities such as going to school of pupils and in some cases cause death to community members. In some such cases, communities have been known to retaliate by hunting down the wildlife and killing them.

Kenya experiences spill-over of regional conflicts taking place in the Horn of Africa. The causes for such conflicts range from governance problems, competition for scarce resources and tribal-based rivalries. Violent conflict in Kenya is further complicated by the prevalence of small arms and light weapons. In urban areas, this is manifested in high crime affecting human security. In ASALs in northern parts of Kenya, availability of weapons fuels conflicts over natural resources such as water and pasture.

Conflicts have caused damage to property, destroyed lives and adversely impacted the development of the country. The impact of violence includes psychological, physical and emotional strife. The conflicts have registered immense political, economic, social and cultural costs, including the lowering of economic productivity, weakening of political institutions, lack of access to essential services, destruction and depletion of natural resources, loss of food production ability and capital flight. Other direct consequences of conflict are displacement of large numbers of refugees from neighbouring countries living in Kenya, as well as internally displaced persons and besieged populations. The intangible effects of conflicts in Kenya include trauma experienced by individuals and groups, and their consequential loss of trust in the existing institutional and conflict resolution and management systems.

### **2.3.1.2 Trends of conflicts in Kenya**

Violent conflicts in Kenya predate to colonial era. This period was marked by conflicts that were mainly between the colonial administration and liberation movements, who used mass action and violence to agitate for independent rule. This was typified in the protests against colonialism and clamour for independence uprisings of 1952 to 1956. The colonial powers, responded with impunity by meting out violence, arrests and detentions that generated cycles of violence in the run up to independence. Immediately after Kenya's independence in 1963, the first militia group to appear on the scene was the *Mwambao* (Swahili for 'coastline' or 'coastal') Separatist movement, contesting the allocation of the Ten-Mile Strip to Kenya by the colonial administration.

Then there was the Somali secessionist movement called *Shifita* (Somali word for 'bandit') that operated along the Northern Frontier District. While the *Mwambao* United Front conceded to the demands for a unitary state with Kenya, the Somali irredentists rejected it and decided to wage war through the *shifita* militia.

The *Shifita* War of 1963 to 1967 was a secessionist conflict in which ethnic Somalis in Kenya attempted to join with Somalis in the Greater Somalia. The Kenya government named the conflict *shifita* after the Somali word for bandit (Rhoda, 1986). Though the war ended, the violence evolved into disorganised banditry attacks, with occasional episodes of secessionist agitation. The war caused large-scale disruption of the way of life of the communities in the affected areas.

February 10, 1984 witnessed another historic conflict in Kenya's history – the Wagalla Massacre. This happened at the Wagalla Airstrip. Kenyan troops had been posted to the area to help diffuse clan-related conflict. In 2005, there were ethnic conflicts, which led to attacks of people living in the Turbi area, north- west of Marsabit. Twenty-two of the sixty victims that were confirmed dead were children. Over 6,000 people fled their homes into Marsabit town<sup>30</sup>.

Apart from the two separatist movements, traditional militia groups formed part of the challenge to civic order in the country. Significant amongst these were the Turkana and Samburu formations. The Turkana had a history of military aggression against the British using Ethiopian and Arab acquired weapons. The aggression between the two communities has been going on up to the present.

In Nairobi, 2002 saw the consolidation of *Mungiki*, *Kamjesh* and Taliban militia groups in national politics. At the coast land clashes in Likoni and south coast instigated by the *Kaya Bombo* raiders brought to the fore the militia. The *Kaya Bombo* became highly militarized after August-September 1997 when they successfully attacked police installations in Likoni and raided their armouries for firearms and ammunition. The main target of the aggression were upcountry people who were either working at the coast or had settled in what they considered as their ancestral lands.

Mount Elgon has also had a fair share of land-related conflicts. The conflict can be traced back to a land resettlement programme initiated by the Kenya government for squatters in the Chepyuk area of Mount Elgon District in 1969. From its inception, the programme was derailed by claims and counterclaims of state favouritism and corruption, leading to a cycle of allocations, annulments and evictions. This engendered discontentment and exacerbated intra-community tensions and conflicts between the Mosop (Ndorobo) and Soy. The tipping point was reached in 2006 with the formation of the The Sabao Land Defence Force (SLDF) and affiliate and counteractive groups such as the Moorland Defence Force, the Political Revenge Movement/Orange support group the 'Jan- jaweed' Militia and the Progressive Defence Force. The militias waged violence until the Kenya Military moved in with raw power and ended the violence.

Other conflicts are the ethnic and land clashes that are normally politically motivated and occur during the general election period like it was witnessed in 1992 and 1997. Before the 2007/2008 post-election violence, Kenya was generally considered an island of peace in a troubled region characterised by conflicts in Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi (Wamai 2013). This image of a peaceful state is said to have glossed over critical issues, including political and socio-economic inequalities of the British colonial legacy (Stewart, 2010). This led to dismal

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<sup>30</sup> <http://www.knchr.org/RememberingWagallaMassacre30YearsLater.aspx>, accessed on 8 December, 2014.

development of Kenya as a nation, especially in the area of land. Feelings of discontent festered among ethnic groups that felt marginalised or disadvantaged. Alleged diversion of state resources to areas with heavyweight political leadership has nurtured this disgruntlement and precipitated conflicts. Even as the Government tries to right some of these past wrongs, partly as a result of international pressure for political and economic reforms (Troup and Hornsby, 1998; Wrong, 2009), the trend continues to mark Kenya's turbulent journey of nation- building (Oucho, 2010).

### **2.3.1.3 Women in conflict situations**

Research and information about the role of women in conflicts in Kenya is still limited. However, anecdotal evidence shows that women were active participants in post election violence both as perpetrators of the violence and as victims (Wamai, 2013). As perpetrators, they are alleged to have been involved in planning and organising retaliatory attacks against other ethnic groups. This is evidenced by the lists of female and male suspects in the investigative report on post election violence produced by the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC, 2009). At the very local level, women were said to have secretly colluded with their male family members to organise violent attacks and arson (Wamai, 2013).

Conflict trends in Kenya also show that women are increasingly suffering sexual and gender-based violence such as rape, loss of livelihoods and displacement. For example, during post election violence, over 600 women were raped, allegedly by the police and men from different ethnic groups, especially in the slum areas of Nairobi and in the violence hot spots of the Rift Valley (GoK, 2008).

## **2.4 Responses to conflicts in Kenya**

Responses to conflicts in Kenya are largely dependent on the specific geographical location of the conflict, and the prevailing socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. According to the National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management, responses can be broadly classified as traditional responses, state responses, civil society responses, private sector responses, collaborative responses, regional responses and international responses.

Traditional responses refer to those mechanisms that are based on customary practices. They include actions such as the exercise of authority by the council of elders within their community. State responses refer to mechanisms that are managed by government. The government remains a major player in conflict management and peace-building in Kenya. Its concern is primarily prevention. Based on this, it has from time to time formed commissions of inquiry to investigate causes of violent conflicts in the country. One such commission is the Akiwumi Commission to investigate politically instigated ethnic clashes of 1990/91. The government of Kenya has particularly made tremendous strides in addressing issues underlying the 2007/2008 post election violence as well as historical injustices in the country.

Notably, the government spearheaded the enactment of the new Constitution, which establishes the framework for addressing the issues that underlie conflicts in Kenya. Furthermore, the government established the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, which listened to the voices of Kenyans regarding historical injustices and developed a report that recommended remedial measures as well as injustices mitigation measures that should be put in place. Other efforts by the government aimed at preventing conflicts and injustices, include instituting

reform processes in the security sectors and in the judiciary. Efforts aimed at restructuring public institutions with the intention of promoting security and preventing conflicts are also pronounced in government.

Security operations to recover illicit small and light weapons, particularly among pastoralist communities have been handled by the state<sup>31</sup>. The approach has included voluntary disarmament and sometimes forced recovery. The state also collects intelligence that is necessary for prevention of conflicts. This early warning role is mainstreamed within government security systems. Through the judicial system, the state apprehends perpetrators of violence and prosecutes them in the courts. This deters recurrence of such violence and gives victims of violence an opportunity to seek redress in the form of damages, compensation and restitution. The legal framework treats all acts of violence as crimes against the state; however the judicial processes allows for the participation of affected persons and promotes the use of traditional peace-building rituals and negotiations.

The Government of Kenya is a member of regional structures for peace and security. This synergizes Kenya's conflict warning and response approaches. They include the African Union Peace and Security Council, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Division of Peace and Security, the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), the East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO), East African Legislative Assembly, Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), the CEWARN and the Amani Forum on Peace (Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum) – Kenya Chapter<sup>32</sup>. These augment Kenya's response towards preventing conflicts.

Responses by civil society have concentrated on reconciliation and rebuilding relationships amongst warring communities<sup>33</sup>. The activities have included dialogue, negotiations, and problem solving workshops, information, education and communication. Several initiatives including conflict early warning have played a central role in facilitating a negotiated end to violent conflicts in Kenya. In all the cases, the civil society has involved as many conflict actors as presented by each context, including government, elders, professional elites, women, religious leaders and the youth. Through collaboration with civil society, stakeholders tasked with security have developed a better appreciation of the importance of community involvement in security matters. Peace structures have become increasingly active in dealing with crime and violent conflict triggers. Civil society has endeavoured to establish institutions and structures that promote dialogue and relationships in the communities that have been divided by conflict. Generally, non-state actors' initiatives have formed the foundation upon which local conflicts have been addressed by both the government and the communities<sup>34</sup>. They however, lack a standardized framework on conflict handling and sustainability.

The private sector has played a pivotal role in enabling the take-off of conflict management interventions. Business communities in violent conflict-prone areas support some of the activities of security operations in the areas. In the northern Kenya, the private sector played an important role in resourcing the initial caucus mediation efforts that involved shuttling elders from one clan to the other. In the peace committee guidelines there is provision for inclusion and participation of the private sector.

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<sup>31</sup> Republic of Kenya, National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management, 2012.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

Collaborative responses are interventions that are fostered at various levels to address peace-building and conflict management by both government and the civil society, and to some extent, the private sector. These responses include humanitarian responses, implementation of the Peace Committee Model, community-based policing, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, the Joint Cross-Border Commissions, and the East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation initiatives<sup>35</sup>.



*A member of Westlands peace committee addressing other members at a meeting in Nairobi*

Regional responses are interventions and structures created and/or operating within the continent and across states. They are<sup>36</sup>:

? The East African Community (EAC), which is made up of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda as partner states. The East African Community Treaty established the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) to provide a platform for redress beyond national judicial systems, particularly relating to state compliance with ratified conventions and protocols;

? The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is involved in peace and security matters in the region. Its mandate is to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue. The principal mechanism in this regard is Conflict Early Warning

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<sup>35</sup> Republic of Kenya, Draft National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management, 2006.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

and Response Mechanism whose chief function is to track and inform its stakeholders on violent incidences and provide unique early warning information in addition to events that exacerbate or mitigate violence in its area of operation.

? The Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which was established under the Nairobi Declaration to tackle small arms and light weapons menace that fuels conflicts in the region.

? International responses refer to interventions by international institutions on conflicts in Kenya. These responses be categorised as judicial and non-judicial. The judicial structures are the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Principal non-judicial actors include international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the International Red Cross/Crescent (IRC), and foreign government agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department for International Development (DfID)<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.



### 3.0. Conflict Early Warning and Early Response in Kenya

The phrase 'early warning' elicits a sense of anticipation of conflict, which can be seen through fault lines. These fault lines are generally referred to as indicators. Many of these causes can be prevented. When surveying any situation, decisions are made based on observed indicators. The National Conflict Early Warning System (NCEWERS) takes into consideration some of the dynamics of a location in developing indicators that will be used as a sign of potential conflict.

#### 3.1 Why CEWERS in Kenya?

The 2007/2008 post election violence amplified the urgency of developing a harmonised conflict early warning mechanism in Kenya<sup>38</sup>. One of the initiatives in early warning being done by IGAD is the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism<sup>39</sup>. Kenya is part of IGAD and thus implements the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism protocol. The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism was established in the year 2000 following concerns over the prevalence of intra-state, inter-state and cross-border community conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

The rationale of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism is to systematically anticipate violent conflicts and respond in a timely and effective manner. This—it is argued in the mission statement—is more effective and would also prove much cheaper both in terms of human and material resources than dealing with full-blown crises. The IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism covers 8 nation states that up to date are part of the IGAD; in Kenya it covers mainly the pastoralist clusters of Karamoja and Somali. Further, the East African Community has developed a Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) Mechanism for the Region together with an attendant Conflict Early Warning and Response Indicators' Framework is considering a development of an early warning mechanism for the region.

Kenya domesticated the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism from the Conflict Early Warning and Response-CEWARN (IGAD) and developed a National Conflict Early Warning and Response System<sup>40</sup>. The framework of the Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS) applies the use of technology, Geographic Information System (GIS) technology, Peace structures, Short Message Service (SMS) as well as other sources to cross check information, thus ensuring the credibility of the system. The system is web-based and incorporates all the three sources (situation reports, media and SMS) into the platform. The online platform is called the National Early Warning Information System (NEWIS).

Kenya's Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit engages with Peace Structures and Peace Monitors to gather information from the field. Local Peace Structures have been the critical link between the grassroots and national-level peace structures. In the new constitutional dispensation, they have been transformed into Sub-County Peace Structures. The local peace structures go all the way to the grassroots level. The information from these grassroots peace structures is sent to the Situation Room in Nairobi and analysed by an analysis group, which then disseminates indicator-based early warning reports to the relevant parties.

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<sup>38</sup>Handbook on National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS).

<sup>39</sup>NSC Concept of Early Warning <http://www.nscpeace.go.ke/nsc/index.php/concept-of-early-warning> (Accessed on 25 February 2015).

<sup>40</sup>NSCPBCM Secretariat, Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Reflection Forum, 1<sup>st</sup> – 4<sup>th</sup> September, 2014.

The National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System usually take into consideration some dynamics of a location in developing indicators<sup>41</sup>. The indicators used are in three categories based on prevailing demographic and occupational characteristics. These are indicators for rural, urban and pastoralist clusters<sup>42</sup>.

### 3.2. Structure, Organs and Programmes

The Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Directorate, which is part of the *Uwiano* platform for peace, is the inter-agency committee that coordinates peace building and conflict management in Kenya. NSC is also the CEWERU. As such, part of its mandate is to domesticate the Early Warning Mechanism in the country.




Figure 2: depicts the structure of *Uwiano*.

The Committee of Principals is the highest policy organ that provides policy direction to the platform. Its roles include strategic leadership; high level contacts with strategic partners; receiving and reviewing briefs; direct media publicity and campaigns; regular media and stakeholder briefings; intervention mission to hotspots; resource mobilisation and donor

<sup>41</sup>Handbook on National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS).

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

relations; and approval of resources to be allocated to partners. The Joint Secretariat is the technical arm of the platform. Its roles include implementation of the *Uwiano* strategy; facilitating peace monitors, field monitors and civil society organizations in hotspot areas; information gathering and dissemination (collecting and collating); operationalization of the situation room; and providing regular briefing to the Principals' Committee.

The technical team, which manages data and supports the technical arm of the platform is tasked to support the Joint Secretariat and the Principals' Committee technically and analytically; identify user requirements and develop appropriate information systems; constant trouble shooting; retrieve information; verify and analyse information; disseminate data; recommend response actions; prepare briefs, press briefings and gather daily and weekly reports. The technical team gets data from various sources, including the free public SMS 108, email input through a monitored website, newspapers, radio, television, blogs, social networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc), and the established peace structures, namely the County and Sub-County Security Structures, Peace Monitors (PMs), other partners such as donor groups, CSOs and Local Peace Structures<sup>43</sup>.



***A team of Uwiano platform for peace during an observation mission of Siaya County Gubernatorial by-election***

Peace Structures are critical to the peace initiatives in Kenya. They provide linkages between the local communities, government and actors at different levels<sup>44</sup>. They also harmonise traditional and formal early warning mechanisms besides analysing information and data. Other peace platforms in Kenya include the National Peace Forum (NPF); the Regional or Cluster Peace Forums; County and Inter- County Peace Forums.

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<sup>43</sup> Liban, 2013

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

### **3.3. Processes**

Early warning information is usually relayed to the Situation Room through the system on <http://www.nscpeace.go.ke/ncewers>, which has access rights and <http://www.nscpeace.go.ke/108> which is open to the public. Information is also relayed through mobile phones and emails. After information is received in the Situation Room, it is verified for credibility. The information is then analysed and used for scenario-setting. Communication is done with relevant actors to enable their intervention and finally, follow-up is conducted and documentation done.

### **3.4. Accountability and Resource Lines**

The Kenyan EWERS is part of the CEWARN protocol and is hence accountable to not only the national agencies but also the CEWARN office. CEWARN is supported through the regular contributions from member states. It is also supported by development partners such as the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GIZ) and US Agency for International Development (USAID). It has initiated the Rapid Response Fund to help finance projects targeted at preventing, de-escalating or resolving pastoral and related conflicts in the region. The fund is designed to improve the flexibility and build up the required capacity to respond to early warning signals and address crises in a timely and appropriate manner.

With the revitalisation of IGAD in 1996, the presence of the IGAD Partner Forum and the Friends of IGAD, a group of partners who work closely with the IGAD - Secretariat, support steadily increased. The CEWARN also recognises that there are several continuing operational gaps of implementation, including an inadequate information base and the lack of an effective response component.

### **Institutional stakeholders of Kenya's NCEWERS**

The organs of the Uwiano platform are the Principals' Committee, the Joint Secretariat, the Technical Team, the DSCs, Peace Monitors, Donor Groups, CSOs and DPCs. Membership to NSC from the government includes the Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government, who house the NSC Secretariat and Chair its meetings, the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP), Kenya Police, Administration Police and National Operations Centre; Ministry of Defence – Department of Defence (DOD) and International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC); National Security Intelligence Service; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Arts, Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Information, Communication and Technology and the Attorney General's Chamber (National Crime Research Centre).

The national civil society organisations that are part of the membership of the NSC are Peace and Development Network (Peace Net Kenya), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCKK), the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), the Kenya Episcopal Conference (KEC) Catholic Secretariat and the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK). The international organisations and civil society organisations that are members to the NSC are Oxfam GB, Mercy Corps, PACT Kenya and Safer world. The women organisations that form membership of the NSC are Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation (MYWO) and National Council of Women of Kenya (NCWK). Other members include research organisations, namely, Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC), CEWERU National Research Institute (NRI) and Institute of Security Studies (ISS), UN agencies, namely, United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP Kenya), UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and UN Women. Others are development partners, Department for International Development (DFID), USAID Kenya/USAID East Africa, and MS Kenya and regional organisations, namely, the IGAD/CEWARN and the East African Community (EAC).

### 3.5. Successes

Key successes of the Kenyan EWERS are<sup>45</sup>:

- ? A peaceful referendum that was conducted on Kenya's new Constitution in 2010;
- ? Consolidation of partnerships at national and local levels for effectiveness in coordination;
- ? Conflict prevention and resolution through community scans and rapid response;
- ? Strengthened conflict early warning and response to potentially violent conflicts;
- ? Containment of hate speech;
- ? Facilitation of community dialogue on topical/emerging issues, including the ICC process; and
- ? Proliferation of other actors carrying out EWER and M&E among others;
- ? Baseline surveys conducted in 3 Counties leading to formation of County Peace Forums;
- ? Improved coordination and linkages between peace structures and other stakeholders in at least 25 Counties in addressing Electoral Violence Response Initiative (EVRI);
- ? At least 20 Peace Forums instituted to coordinate peace activities by October 2012;
- ? 80% of the interventions addressing EVRI are conducted jointly;
- ? Enhanced capacity of the *Uwiano* Platform Joint Secretariat and Structures to implement EVRI;
- ? Increased membership of the *Uwiano* Platform membership;
- ? Increased synergies with emerging initiatives;
- ? Linkages with at least 3 conflict early warning platforms (*Ushahidi/Uchaguzi*, *Sisini Amani* and the Administration Police);
- ? Improved level of technical capabilities of the situation room through skills enhancement and personnel;

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<sup>45</sup> Liban, 2013



***Training of members of peace committees drawn from Garissa County***

- ? 60% target population (security agencies, civil society organizations, community based organizations, peace structures and the general public) are able to interact with and use the system;
- ? At least 90% of the credible information received by the system is processed and disseminated to appropriate response units;
- ? The level of awareness and use of the system by institutions, including civil society organizations, peace structures, security agents and the general public has been raised;
- ? There are about 290 Sub-County Peace Structures in strategic hotspot counties, large numbers of representatives from security agencies and civil society organizations in the strategic hotspot counties have been trained on use and awareness of the system;
- ? Mediation team, emergency coordination and response teams and rapid response fund established;
- ? Increased ratio of response to early warning alerts by at least 3:2 and reduction of at least 60% of electoral related violence incidences;
- ? Development and launch of a peace media campaign with 12.20% of potential electoral violence prevented through peace media campaign;
- ? Reduced levels of negative ethnicity in political discourses;
- ? Increased prosecution of hate speech suspects;
- ? More issue-based political discourse;
- ? Audit of ethnic representation in county administration in 25 counties; and
- ? Increased level of awareness of minority issues.


## 4.0 Bench Marking Engendered Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms

Bench marking engendered conflict early warning and response mechanisms helps to appreciate how and what can be done better. The following section presents selected case studies.

### 4.1. CEWARN

The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) is a collaborative effort of the seven IGAD member states and one of the programmes of IGAD at mitigating and preventing violent conflicts in the sub-region. CEWARN was established in 2002 and has been functioning with particular focus on cross-border pastoralist and related conflicts. CEWARN envisions empowering stakeholders to prevent violent conflicts. Its mission is to establish itself as an effective and sustainable sub-regional mechanism that carries out conflict early warning and response, fostering cooperation among relevant stakeholders so as to respond to potential and actual violent conflicts in the IGAD region and contributing to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the sub-region<sup>46</sup>. Its mandate is “To receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region, to analyse the information and develop case scenarios and formulate options for response.” Figure 3 is an illustration of CEWARN's organizational chart.

**Figure 3: CEWARN Organizational Chart**




Source:(Weier, 2009)

<sup>46</sup> CEWARN About CEWARN [http://cewarn.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53](http://cewarn.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=53) (Accessed on 25 February 2015).

Through its national network of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders – CEWERUs; National Research Institutes (NRIs) and Field Monitors (FM)s, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism - IGAD conducts its conflict early warning and response function in three clusters or pilot areas. These are the Karamoja Cluster (covering the cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda); the Somali Cluster (covering the cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia) as well as the Dikhil Cluster (covering the cross-border areas of Djibouti and Ethiopia). The national conflict early warning and early response units are the key players in activating the response side of the mechanism. As part of the process to operationalize the units, they have been institutionalising their response initiatives in conjunction with their respective local peace structures. The following is a screen shot of Conflict Early Warning and Response's situation room report.

**Figure 4: Screenshot of CEWARN's situation room report.**



Source: <https://earlywarning.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/cewarnsitrep1.png> (Accessed 25.2.15).

To enable early response, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism has established a rapid response fund facility. Proposals for projects to be financed by the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism come from local structures, networks or sub-regional peace councils. These proposals are submitted to Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism through respective Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units. Projects funded by Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism usually focus on limited and immediate support activities and which are targeted towards preventing, de-escalating and/or resolving pastoral conflicts in the IGAD sub-region. Applicants are also required to meet specific set of criteria set by the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism unit, stakeholders and development partners. The strengths of Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism




include:

- Its existence as part of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development;
- Drawing heavily from civil society participation;
- Development of an Information, Communication Technology for peace project;
- Being more specific and focused than other Continental Early Warning System in Africa;
- Identification of focus areas based on detailed analysis of contexts;
- Credible information; and
- Development of district and local peace structures.

Technically, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism system is complex and authoritative but has not yet closed the gap between analysis, options and actions.

#### 4.2. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)



**Figure 5: Map of ECOWAS region**

The sub-regional organisation of West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, resolution, peacekeeping and security on 10th December 1999. The protocol represents the most comprehensive normative framework for confronting the threats to peace and security in the region on a more permanent basis by boosting the conflict prevention capabilities of the ECOWAS to pre-empt potential outbreak of violence, resolve conflicts when they occur and to engage more effectively in post-conflict reconstruction in places where peace has been restored. The Protocol specifies the criteria and objectives of the ECOWAS actions in conflict management in West Africa and establishes the legal framework for the development of an early warning system. Through the implementation of the mechanism, and other relevant protocols on peace and security, the office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security

coordinates the Commission's efforts towards achieving the peace and security goal of the ECOWAS. Article 23 Chapter 4 of the protocol empowers the creation of a regional observation and monitoring centre for the collection, analysis and reporting of information in away that prevents/mitigates conflict. In addition, the early warning mechanism focuses on the promotion of free movement of persons, linkage of economic and social development to security, the promotion of democratic forms of government and the protection of human rights. All of these structures have come to form a fundamental structure for understanding and cooperation between ECOWAS and its civil society partners such as West Africa Network for Peace-building (WANEP).

Since the start of the partnership with ECOWAS, in operationalization of the Early Warning Mechanism, the West Africa Network for Peace-building has galvanized support from its various national networks in the task. It has established early warning desk offices with personnel serving as field monitors reporting on issues of early warning at country level. This structure is supported by Zonal Bureau heads within the geo-political zones in the region coordinating early warning assessment reports for the West Africa Network for Peace-building and the ECOWAS Commission. At the top of the operational ladder is the Peace Monitoring Centre (PMC), which gives support and coordinates the implementation of the Early Warning System. As a lesson though, the system would be strengthened with enhanced collaborative partnership with relevant civil society actors, and networks.

### 4.3. The Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands Monitoring Peace and Conflict Using Gendered Early Warning Indicators project is one of the United Nations Development Fund Women (UNIFEM) global series of gendered early warning pilot projects<sup>47</sup>. The objectives of the Solomon Islands' early warning indicator project were to:-

- a) Develop indicators for early warning of peace and conflict, taking into account gender issues and the experiences of both men and women;
- b) Establish a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of gender-sensitive information in conflict and peace building; and
- c) Create more responsive policy and programming environment for
- d) Gender sensitive conflict prevention, and
- e) Supporting the role of women and men in peace-building.

The conflict in the Solomon Islands, known locally as the tensions, erupted in 1998 and continued until the arrival of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July 2003. The causes of the conflict were multiple and interlinked. Key issues included cultural differences between ethnic populations and increasing competition for limited resources around the centralised capital Honiara, particularly competition for land and for commercial and development opportunities. The conflict resulted in 150-200 deaths, approximately 450 gun-related injuries, and more than 35,000 IDPs<sup>48</sup>.

**One of the achievements of this project by UNIFEM was the development of a robust set of engendered early warning indicators, with a scope that combines broad application with connection to context-specific dynamics**

<sup>47</sup> Miller, et al, 2014

<sup>48</sup> Mugga, 2001

Men and women played different roles during the tensions. Men's roles included active involvement in fighting, supporting their families, and decision-making roles in mediation and reconciliation. Women's roles often overlapped with these, and included productive roles in supporting the family while men were absent, reproductive and social welfare roles in caring for family and community members, and engaging in informal peace processes. The impacts of the tensions on both men and women included being victims of multiple types of violence, including rape for women, economic impacts especially surrounding loss of income, break-down in domestic relationships and psychological impacts such as grief and anxiety. However, women also often experienced increased status and empowerment resulting from the traditionally male roles assumed during the tensions.



**Figure 6: Map shows location of Solomon Islands**

The selection of partner organisations considered expertise in peace and conflict, openness to gender sensitivity, women's organisations that could benefit from capacity building, staff with not only capacity but also adequate time available to participate; high level strategic or political leverage to encourage action on early warning data; and presence of a network of members or staff at the community level. Five field sites through which community-level data was to be collected were selected. The sites represented specific hot spots during the tensions. The communities were selected to include a variety of ethnic groups and churches, as well as rural and urban contexts. Four people from each of the communities were trained as project participants to monitor

peace and conflict using gendered early warning indicators. The selection criteria for the participants included 50 percent women and 50 percent men. A week-long training was conducted for the participants by the United Nations Development Fund Women. During the subsequent round of data collection, the field project monitors demonstrated their strong understanding of the workshop material through successfully completing their tasks and briefing project staff on developments within the communities.

One of the achievements of this project by the United Nations Development Fund Women was the development of a robust set of gendered early warning indicators, with a scope that combines broad application with context-specific dynamics. There were three stages in the analysis and reporting of early warning indicators, namely: the collation and presentation of raw data; analysis and discussion of raw data with all partners; and drafting of early warning reports based on analysis by partners and community focus groups. The reports were distributed widely in Solomon Islands, with a media and communications strategy being critical to the plan. For each of the indicators, a set of corresponding response options was developed by male and female community members and partners, taking into account a gender perspective. A final interesting point is that many of the training participants felt that the response exercise was inspiring because it enabled them to realise that they held the fate of their communities in their hands, and that they do have the answers to their issues.

## 5.0. Methodology and Approach

Auditing and engendering the NCEWERS was an evolving process and not a one-off assignment. The development of the desired indicators and system was based on qualitative rather than quantitative data collected from literature review and field information. The process included a preliminary review of the global, regional and national literature on conflict early warning and early response system, focus-group discussions with peace and field monitors (both women and men), in-depth interviews with key informants and observation of some ongoing conflict and early warning and response initiatives.

The process was participatory, ensuring reliability, validity, and adequacy. To enhance equality, deliberate effort was made to involve both female and male participants in the consultative process. The inclusive engagement at various levels ensured that the diversity of various groups was taken into consideration. Gender-specific data gathered during the interviews and focus group discussions were used in the process of engendering the indicators. In this section, the stages of implementation are described in more detail.

### 5.1. Preparatory Work

**USALAMA WA MSINGI MTAAPA**  
**WEWE NI MACHO YA JAMII.**  
**SOTE TWAKUTEGEMEA**

**Kaa Macho!** Ukisikia, ukiona au kushuku lolote la hatari dhidi ya usalama wako jirani au nchi.  
**TOA HABARI KWA NAMBARI ZIFUATAZO.**

County Commissioner (CC)	0722 824 839
County Police Commander (CPC)	0722 764 009
Deputy County Commissioner (DCC)	0728 874 344
Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD)	0722 271 792
District Administration Police Commandant (DAPC)	0723 801 038
Assistant County Commissioner (ACC)	0722 591 142
Officer Commanding Police Station (OCS)	Nyali 0725 766 291 Kimbani 0720 275 590 Bamburi 0721 229 702
Area Chief	Kongwen 0722 971 087 Kisumu 0722 771 620 Bamburi 0720 889 544
Area Assistant Chief	

**KECOSCE ALERT NO. 0726 549 400**

**KENYA COMMUNITY SUPPORT CENTRE**

**MIMI NADUMISHA USALAMA. JE WEWE?**

The consultant had an inception meeting with the Directorate for Peace-Building and Conflict Management, UNWOMEN and UNDP Kenya's designated officer(s) in which the overview of the project and its scope were discussed. This meeting represented an opportunity to discuss and seek consensus on a number of issues, such as objectives, deliverables and expected timelines, logistical and administrative arrangements. The consultant received background documents related to the assignment from the Directorate for Peace-Building and Conflict Management, a list of key contacts and informants in the field and context-specific information related to the sampled project areas.

This information enabled the development of a detailed methodology and work plan, which were also shared, discussed and agreed upon.

### 5.2. Data Collection

The data collection was carried out in various stages. In the first instance, a literature review comprising of content analysis and statistical evaluation of data from published documents, legislations, policies, unpublished reports and media reports was undertaken. The findings from the literature review form part of this report. A bibliography of published documents has been included.

Next, a gender audit of the NCEWERS was conducted. The consultant analysed the system; the extent to which gender was purposed and integrated in its design, structure, resourcing, project

plan, implementation, workings, reporting and monitoring. The audit sought to establish the areas in which more effort should be made to enhance participation of women on issues of conflict early warning and early response.

Following the desk review and gender audit, tools for information gathering were developed and shared with PBCM for perusal, input and agreement. The development of tools was informed by the target group and the objectives of the assignment, which is, "Towards engendering the NCEWERS." Tools were also determined by the data collection method to be used, i.e. key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and validation tools.

Purposive sampling was used to identify experts from various sectors such as those working on peace, conflict and gender. Purposive sampling is also known as judgmental sampling and is applied to select respondents who are known to have specific knowledge that cannot be elicited by use of typical sampling methods. Participants were specifically selected with the guidance of PBCM. The gender audit of the NCEWERS targeted specific sectors which included in the information gathering process. These sectors were: government ministries and agencies; INGO and NGOs including, conflict analysis group and individuals; and peace and field monitors both the current and those that previously worked as monitors.

The following tools were used for data collection in the field:

- ? Key informant In-depth Interview guides: The open-ended questions were used to guide interviews. They had probes/prompts to guide the respondents towards the defined course of discussion. Informant interviews were conducted at the national level, including with government ministries and agencies, peace and field monitors as well as civil society groups working on conflict issues. In-depth interviews were also conducted with members of the sample population so as to gain insight into the real life experiences and interaction with NCEWERS.
- ? Focus Group Discussion guides: The guides were unstructured so as to enable probing/prompting the focus groups towards the defined course of discussion. They were applied to groups of between 8 and 16 members. The consultant endeavoured to ensure gender sensitivity while conducting the FGDs, including facilitating an enabling space for women and girls and having same sex group sessions. With regard to the quality of data collected, gender segregation was also done to help bring out issues that would otherwise not be discussed in mixed groups.

### **5.3. Data analysis and reporting**

The collected information was analysed, capturing the voices, opinions and perceptions of the participating informants. Direct, verbatim quotes from key informants were captured to enrich the data, while at the same time, respecting and maintaining confidentiality.

The compilation of the report continued throughout the different stages of the assignment. A validation workshop was conducted with the participation of the Directorate for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, UNWOMEN, UNDP and other stakeholders' forums, during which clarifications on the report were made and feedback furnished. In the workshop, the presentation of the findings and reviewed indicators was done and reactions elicited to enhance a discussion. The feedback from this workshop was used to improve the indicators and report.

### **5.4. Input and Review of the Indicators**

Following a review of the indicators that have been in use by NCEWERS, and on the recommendations that emerged from the gender audit conducted in earlier stages of the assignment, indicators were developed to ensure informed monitoring of developments relating to the recommendations. The indicators were shared with stakeholders for their input.

## 6.0 What Emerged from the Audit

As stated in previous sections, the gender audit included not only a desk review of existing documentation on Kenya's national conflict early warning and early response system, but also a qualitative field survey. The following section highlights the results of these exercises.

### 6.1 Results of the Review of the CEWERS Documentation

The determination of the extent to which the Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system is engendered was guided by UNSCR 1325. Accordingly, review of NCEWERS documentation sought to establish the degree to which the structure, processes and outcomes of the NCEWERS measure up to UNSCR 1325's four pillars, namely participation, prevention, protection, relief and recovery. Broadly, the following captures what was established of the NCEWERS:

**Regarding Participation,** Kenya's conflict early warning and early response system partly engages with grassroots organizations, but needs to engage more those of grassroots women, youths and men as well as their informal networks. In operational terms, the mechanism is a hierarchical information collection one rather than a horizontal and multi-dimensional. The 'vertical wiring' may be premised on the assumption that the ability to collect information, make decisions on and respond to local conflicts or early warning information lies with specialists or the operatives of the national government, international NGOs and national FBOs and NGOs. As a consequence, documents analyzed do not expressly bring out the participation of grassroots women, youth and men who are themselves victims of conflicts. Furthermore, the gender dynamics involved in the collection of EWER data do not come out clearly.

There is also the valorization of systematic and positivist modes of analysis that proliferate scientific knowledge in the social sphere and institutionalize some anticipated social order, class or gender structure. Indicators of this include exclusion of critical actors, especially grassroots women and youth, cultural practices and tactics that local people, mobilize in response to early signs of conflict. Furthermore, there is shift of both the responsibility and agency of recognizing and acting on potential causes of conflict to actors perceived to have capacity to analyze and respond in certain ways to conflicts. This concretizes the privileged position of the state, certain international organizations, local NGOs and FBOs, and excludes grassroots people that bear the heaviest brunt of conflicts. Majority of these grassroots people are youth and women.

**Regarding protection,** Collection of data on the protection of girls and women from conflict situations, including GBV, marital rape, etc by Kenya's NCEWERS was found to require some improvements. There have been allegations of violation of women's rights by armed security personnel sent to respond to cross-border incursions and terrorism, but such reports have not been sufficiently reported or analyzed by the security forces. Where violations such as rape have been reported, the responses have not sufficiently addressed the concerns of women. Furthermore, where relief and recovery efforts are ongoing, such responses have been complicated.

**Regarding prevention,** for the current design of Kenya's CEWERS to gain a deeper understanding of popular, localized and everyday conceptions of what counts as early warning information, it has to improve engagement of multiple knowledge based practices that are relevant to the conflict contexts. In regard to the prevention, the system reaches out to the directorate mechanisms, key of which are the peace committees, the administrative units, various forms of dialogue and various CSOs depending on the prevailing situation. This does

not adequately tackle issues of women and youth in the prevention discourses. Although there are many initiatives targeting vulnerable people, few aim at comprehensively addressing the historical, material and political conditions of existence of certain groups in various communities as part of an early response to the threats of violent conflicts. Furthermore, responses to warning alerts by Kenya's EWERS face challenges of prompt responses to both structural and proximate causes of conflict, while paying attention to low-profile, micro-level and macro-level signs of conflict.

**Regarding relief and recovery**, There exists a culture of emergency in Kenya rather than early response. This culture appears to have been internalized by both state and non-state actors in Kenya, hence permeating Kenya's EWER. It is also noted that response in many parts of Kenya, especially with regard to relief and recovery as well as protection are dependent on the type of linkages those areas have with dominant actors at the centre. This design excludes many local initiatives in projects aimed at dealing with relief and recovery efforts.

**The gender gaps identified in the NCEWERS based on the audit of documentation**, While this study found Kenya's EWERS to be gender sensitive based on the documents analyzed, the following gender gaps were established:

A trend of dominance by men in participation in the activities and processes of the system, including employment, training activities, level of participation (the gender of senior, middle and junior officers), etc was established. Few women and youth are in senior positions compared to men, and in activities of NCEWERS, men play more senior, leading, decision-making or facilitator roles compared to youth and women who often play more passive roles or are participants;

- ? A trend of dominance by men in participation in the activities and processes of the system, including employment, training activities, level of participation (the gender of senior, middle and junior officers), etc was established. Few women and youth are in senior positions compared to men, and in activities of NCEWERS, men play more senior, leading, decision-making or facilitator roles compared to youth and women who often play more passive roles or are participants;
- ? The analysis and documentation section of Kenya's NCEWERS has not sufficiently engendered its documents;
- ? No mention of a gender unit to ensure gender main streaming in the NCEWERS was established from the documents reviewed;
- ? There is inadequate tying of macro-level early warning to micro-level citizen based early warning and response mechanisms, which reflects inadequacy in listening to grassroots (mainly women and youth) voices.
- ? Kenya's EWER to a great extent recognizes and strengthens local, community-based conflict early warning and response mechanisms by creating a link between them and the County administration, regular police, judicial and other government agencies with the capacity to respond to early warning information.

#### **6.1.1. Limited participation of women and men from the grassroots**

In operational terms, the Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system partly engages with grassroots organizations, but needs to engage more those of grassroots women,



youths and men as well as their informal networks more. In operational terms, the mechanism is a hierarchical information collection one rather than a horizontal and multi-dimensional. The 'vertical wiring' may be premised on the assumption that the ability to collect information, make decisions on and respond to local conflicts or early warning information lies with specialists or the operatives of the national government, international NGOs and national FBOs and NGOs. Use of participatory methods such as interviews, workshops, surveys or the establishment of hotlines, as was used by UNIFEM in the Solomon Islands, and which elicits the participation of both women and men was found to be limited. As a consequence, documents analyzed do not expressly bring out the participation of grassroots women and youth, who are themselves victims of conflicts. Furthermore, the gender dynamics involved in the collection of EWER data do not come out clearly.

The review also found that there is existence of significant valorisation of systematic and positivist modes of analysis that proliferate scientific knowledge in the social sphere and institutionalise theoretically anticipated social order, class or gender structures. Indicators of this include limited participation of critical grassroots actors as the youth, women, elders' councils that are custodians of community cultural practices and tactics that local people, especially women and men at the grassroots can easily mobilise to respond to early signs of conflict. Furthermore, a shift of both the responsibility and agency of recognising and acting on potential causes of conflict to actors perceived to have capacity to analyse and respond to conflicts was found to subsist. This was evident through concretisation of the privileged position of the state, certain international and local non-governmental organizations and faith-based organizations at the exclusion of those of grassroots people.

### **6.1.2. Attempts to comply with UNSCR 1235 regarding protection exist but require strengthening**

The review established that collection of data by the Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system on the protection of girls and women from violence in conflict situations, such sexual and gender- based violence, marital rape, etc is insufficient. As the statement by a key informant below illustrates, protection of citizens from conflicts arising from cross-border incursions and terrorism have been marred by some reported incidences of violation of women's rights by ~~armed security personnel intervening in such conflicts.~~



“Where cases of sexual and gender-based violence have been reported, responses have not adequately addressed the concerns of women...for example in relief and recovery concerning affected person, have often been further complicated by the nature of responses.”

### **6.1.3. The current design of the Kenyan EWERS needs to be re-examined to enhance its ability to prevent conflicts**

Because the current design of the Kenyan EWERS does not engage adequately with multiple knowledge- based practices that are relevant to conflict contexts, it could easily miss opportunities to gain deeper understanding of popular, localised and everyday conceptions of what counts as early warning information. Furthermore, since it still appears to use the dominant civil society organization and static approaches to conflict prevention, and does not sufficiently depart from the forms of abstraction and selective action that these thrive on, it may not sufficiently examine the role of women, youth and men in prevention. In addition, there is evidence that too little, if any support, is given to projects aimed at comprehensively addressing the historical, material and political conditions of existence of various groups in various communities as part of an early response to the threats of violent conflicts. One of the key informants states that:



“Responses to early warning alerts do not adequately cater for the structural and proximate causes of conflict as well as the low-profile signs of conflict that later gain momentum to be widespread conflict.”

#### **6.1.4. There is a culture of exclusionist emergency relief and recovery interventions**

Relief and recovery initiatives after outbreak of violence are well-timed and useful initiatives which also provide an example of the prevailing culture of emergency in Kenya. This culture tends to permeate response by state and non-state actors in Kenya and a key informant noted, such responses are often determined by dominant actors:



“Relief, recovery, and protection responses in some areas in Kenya appear to depend on the linkages that initiatives in those areas have with the dominant actors such as NGOs, INGOs, government officials, etc at the centre of the conflict early warning system.”

## **6.2 Results of the Field Surveys**

Three considerations were used in profiling the field findings on the participatory survey of responses from Kenyans on engendering of the Kenyan national conflict early warning and early response system. These are; the geographical location-specific findings, findings from key informant interviews and finally, the themes on engendering of the national conflict early warning and early response system emerging from the study.

### **6.2.1 Participation of women and men in the Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system, especially those at the grassroots requires to be enhanced.**

Findings from the field survey in Laikipia, Samburu and Nanyuki widely acknowledged that awareness of the importance of integration of gender issues in the Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system existed, but the degree to which this awareness is articulated by citizens, especially during pre-conflict contexts is limited. Data collected during the field survey shows that the Kenyan national conflict early warning and early response system has made deliberate efforts to include women, for example by developing guidelines for use in forming peace structures that require adherence to the two-thirds gender principle, but in practice, this threshold is not met in many regions. Furthermore, since the battlefield for early warning is the grassroots, the role of grassroots women and men, including councils of elders requires more attention than is the case presently. Particularly, enhanced motivation of grassroots women and men as critical actors in an effective and efficient NCEWERS is imperative. Whereas the current approach of data collection and analysis is quite formalized, there could be value in considering best practices that enable real-time collection and analysis of information on local conflict dynamics by grassroots women and men. An example of such a practice is captured by a member of a focused group discussion in Eldoret, who observed that:



“Practices amongst communities that recognize and value the role of grassroots women and men, such as inter-ethnic interactions or caution in the market places as indicators for peace or impending conflict need to be considered”

### **6.2.2 There is inadequate information regarding UNSCR 1325, especially as one moves to NCEWERS lower levels, such as the devolved and cascaded levels**

The study established that knowledge about UNSCR 1325 has not permeated the grassroots levels, where battlefield for conflict early warning is. Efforts to devolve NCEWERS and cascade it to lower administrative units such as wards and villages should include awareness creation about UNSCR 1325 and other attendant resolutions, as well as relevant policies and laws.

### **6.2.3 The current design of NCEWERS and its effectiveness in anticipating and preventing conflicts**

The current design of the Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system derives immense strength from Local Peace Structures. Based on the alignments brought about by the new Constitution, transformation of district peace structures to sub-County Peace Structures and cascading the same to lower levels, including with peace platforms will enhance the system's ability to effectively anticipate and prevent conflicts

### **6.2.4 The role of women is recognized but does not measure up to the two-thirds constitutional gender principle**

The Kenyan conflict early warning and early response system was found to recognize the role of women in peace-building and conflict management. In practice, however, the constitutional two-thirds gender principle in employment and deployment as well as formation of peace structures is yet to be achieved.

### **6.2.5 The SMS 108 platform, while commendable, should be reflective of ordinary Kenyan women and men's ways of life and literacy levels**

The SMS 108 platform was found to be a critical interface between citizens and the country's response mechanisms through the PBCM/NSC. It however requires to be appropriately aligned to realities of the people who use it, including their literacy levels. Furthermore, the system is not encrypted for security purposes, nor is it automated to automatically sort out incoming messages and generate reports.

### **6.2.6 The formal design of NCEWERS could inhibit free information flow, especially from women**

The formal nature in which the NCEWERS in Kenya is structured may be a barrier to sharing of important information. For example, most of the peace meetings are currently organized at the County Commissioners' administrative centres or at the chiefs' offices. Based on some cultures in Kenya, this kind of arrangement may prevent women participation, as women are not expected to travel far as narrated by a key informant in North Eastern region:



“The culture in most of the pastoralist North Eastern Kenya largely considers women as children with big feet.”



“In most of the communities in North Eastern Kenya, women are said to be '5 Km radius citizens'. This means that they are not expected to travel more than 5 Km from their homes in whichever direction.”

This limitation to travel makes women, who often have immense information on early warning not to be able to share it since the agencies that should receive such information are often far away. Suppression of women and youth based on culture and religion also reduces their exposure, hence CEWERS needs to figure out how to access such women and youth without offending culture or religion.

### **6.2.7 NCEWERS should seek to understand the varying roles youths, women and men play in conflicts in different regional contexts**

It was established that the youths, women and men play different roles in conflicts in different areas in Kenya. Working with these actors in a way that does not make them targets by conflict organizers was found to be important. For example, the Coast region focused group discussion cited the experience of leaked information about a chief that warned of impending conflict, but the police shared the information with the suspect:



“A chief wrote about certain persons that were causing conflict in the area, the culprits accessed the sent letter and brought the letter to the chief bragging and warning the chief... telling him that he is the informer. That intimidated the chief and other village elders and all [are] now afraid of giving any reports.”

Furthermore,



“In most of the communities in Coast region, whoever reports is always in danger. In Kwale for example, issues of being informers is considered dangerous.”

The Kenyan NCEWERS can learn from this and firm up guidelines to ensure confidentiality of those who give early warning information. The increased sense of vulnerability by men and women because of such incidences is reflected in the concern by a member of the FGD in Kwale, who wondered,



“If a chief can be threatened for giving information about an impending Crime and the information is leaked to the person that is planning such an atrocity by the police, how much more can a woman informer be handled in such a male-centred region?”

### 6.3. Key Themes Emerging from Document Analysis and Field Surveys

The following themes concerning engendering of the Kenyan early warning and early response system emerged from the findings of the document analysis and participatory field surveys.

- The importance of a gender main streaming role within the NCEWERS;
- The value of anchoring the NCEWERS to UNSCR 1325;
- The role of the social capital of women, youths and men at grassroots levels;
- The role of capacity-building and enhanced conflict early warning at grassroots;
- Alignment of the NCEWERS to local dynamics;
- Effective documentation, monitoring and evaluation; and
- Equitable distribution of resources and opportunities.

## 6.4 Synthesis

### 6.4.1 Participation of women and men from the grassroots level should be enhanced



“Kenya is part of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and thus implements the CEWARN protocol. The protocol started off within the pastoralist areas with a coordination mechanism that seemed to work well. In Northern Kenya, for example, women such as Dekha Ibrahim started off the peace structures. Women thus found it relevant and important to have peace structures as they recognised that they are the ones that suffer most during and after conflicts<sup>49</sup>.”

The account above by Mr. S. K. Maina, EBS, who was the Secretary, Peace-Building and Conflict Management, the head of the PBCM Directorate and NSCPBCM Coordinator, highlights the unique role played by grassroots women during the initiation of the early warning and early response system in Kenya. Review of the Kenyan early warning and early response system based on the study of existing documentation as well as analysis of data from the participatory field surveys has indicated that the system appreciates the roles played by both women and men in peace-building and conflict management, but the constitutional two-thirds gender principle has not been realized in the NCEWERS processes regarding participation, protection, prevention, relief and recovery.

Indeed, although gender refers to both women and men, the goal of engendering society is not an attempt to make women and men similar, but a means to attain equity through equal opportunities and life chances (Woroniuk, 1999). In Kenya, just as the rest of the world, as traditionally designed, men have a stronger position in societies than women, which has accordingly shaped values and norms in societies (Kvinna, 2001). Efforts exist in Kenya aimed at including women in the early warning and early response system so that the prevalent gender dynamics of conflicts is taken into account and to allow for more appropriate response options that equally benefit men and women. While the Directorate has a gender focal point, the constitutional two-thirds gender principle has not been met within the practice of the NCEWERS. This points to the need for a gender unit within the NCEWERS to support in main streaming gender issues in the structuring and operation of the system.

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<sup>49</sup> Mr. S. K. Maina, EBS; Secretary, Peacebuilding & Conflict Management, Kenyan NCEWERS during an interview conducted as part of this audit.

**Women played a pivotal role during the initiation of the Kenyan EWERS. Over time, however, emphasis on the role of women has waned.**

The need to engender the NCEWERS in Kenya was stressed during this study, with a case narration concerning the disarmament exercise that happened in Isiolo, where, as highlighted by two young women interviewed in Isiolo, male military officers conducted the exercise. After this exercise, women in the area approached the then local provincial administration with concerns about what they considered violations of their rights. As a response, only five women got included in the

inter-agency team that conducted the disarmament. For some members of grassroots communities, there is a strong feeling that the role of women is trivialized.



*A member of Peace committee emphasizing on importance of women inclusion in peace work at a training in Isiolo*



“Some members take me as a young woman and as such, sometimes do not take me very seriously as compared to my male counterparts.”



“There is no respect for women at the community level as they are mostly trivialized. For example, when I one day got to a meeting, I was told [that] I was not needed. It was a Chief’s meeting where they were talking about a woman, and they refused me to attend. When I decided to report, I was asked if the wazee [old men] have refused, what do I then want?”

#### 6.4.2 Structure, organs, processes, actors and roles, accountability and resource lines, and reporting, documentation and feedback not aligned with existing gender dynamics

The structure of the Kenyan EWERS is modelled to complement IGAD's CEWARN structure. The NSC is the multi-agency organisation mandated with the coordination of all peace related activities in Kenya, and it doubles up as Kenya's CEWERU for the implementation of the CEWARN Protocol acceded to by IGAD member states in 2002<sup>50</sup>. The Kenyan CEWERS recognizes the grassroots as the strategic areas for conflict early warning and has, since the promulgation of the new Constitution piloted on ways of devolving the CEWERS and cascading it to village levels through peace structures and peace forums.

The processes that take place at NCEWERS policy level may have a negative bearing on gender, as the represented organizations are not obliged to send representation based on a gender quota necessary for a two-thirds gender principle to be realized.

Despite there being guidelines on the gender representation in the establishment of peace structures, table 1, which shows the representation by gender of DPCs in 17 sub-counties in Kenya, illustrates that there is male domination. Out of the 17 sub-counties, only 4 peace structures have female chairpersons.

**Table 1: Membership of DPCs in 17 Sub - Counties in Kenya: The Gender Perspective.**

Sub-County	Total DPC Members	Women Members
Nakuru - Kuresoi	19	6
Uasin Gishu- Wareng	14	5
Nairobi-Starehe	16	4
Nairobi - Embakasi	22	6
Isiolo - Garbatulla	14	3
Marsabit - Sololo	16	3
Turkana - Loima	16	3
Mombasa - Chagamwe	14	5
Momasa - Likoni	5	1
Mombasa - Kisauni	29	13
Bungoma - Mt. Elgon	16	5
Kisumu - Kisumu East	28	5
Nyeri - Nyeri Central	15	4
Garissa - Lagdera	16	4
Mandera East	15	0
Mandera North	19	4
West Pokot	14	5

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.nscpeace.go.ke/nsc/index.php/about/mandate>.

Nonetheless, the fruits of women led peace initiatives exist in Wajir, where such an initiative saw a group of educated professionals drawn from all clans in the district to form Wajir Peace Group. This group teamed up with women in facilitating peace dialogues in the district. The initiative further inspired other groups in the district to coalesce into peace groups in the district (elders for peace, youth for peace, etc), culminating the formation of Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) in 1995<sup>51</sup>. The Kenyan NCEWERS can learn from this local initiative, which aptly mirrors the objectives of the UNSCR 1325.



***Reconstitution of Lagdera District Peace Committee***

### **6.4.3 Need to enhance coordination and action**

There appear to be many initiatives towards enhancing peace. However some members felt that there were disconnects at the grassroots level; first, due to lack of clarity of roles of various peace actors at the grassroots level following devolution, and secondly, lack of coordination of security initiatives such as community policing, *Nyumba Kumi* (Swahili for 'Ten Homestead') etc. A Peace Monitor in Mandera noted that:

“Before the coming of the County Government, the system [NCEWERS] was very nice. [Now] the Governor has his own wing of cohesion, etc and they do not contact DPCs – they go to border towns...they do not coordinate peace initiatives. There is also sidelining of persons that fall in the line of the national government by the County Government. The County Government does not listen to DPCs. They look for amani [peace] with helicopter....they just take a ride to and land at the border points and then they return.”

<sup>51</sup>[https://practicalaction.org/docs/region\\_east\\_africa/peace\\_committee\\_analysis.pdf](https://practicalaction.org/docs/region_east_africa/peace_committee_analysis.pdf)



#### 6.4.4 The challenge of voluntarism and tokenism

Peace and security should be safeguarded. It is more expensive to contain conflict once it has begun than to stop it before it materialises. This has not been considered in dealing with the people at the grassroots that collect early warning information. In fact most of the credible early warning information is sourced by volunteers, who put their lives at risk. There is need to sensitize communities on the value of conflict early warning so as to ensure community ownership.

#### 6.4.5 Elitism

It was established that the Kenyan NCEWERS inadequately incorporates gender analysis and perspectives into the formulation of response options. There is also a strong feeling by members of grassroots communities that there is prescription of ideas on conflict early warning and early response from senior government officials, who inadequately regard the ability of locals, in providing critical information necessary to avert conflicts. An Focus Group Discussion comprising of peace monitors and members of peace structures from Laikipia and Samburu observed that:



“In Samburu, cattle-rustling is rampant. The persons who will know first are women and the girls. When the morans are making arrangements [to carry out cattle rustling], they do it in the [ir] mother's hut. Young ladies on the other hand are now allowed to socialize with young men. The morans share secrets with them, particularly on impending raids. The girls often know when the morans will leave, and when they will return. [After the raids] the girls go to witness and decorate the animals.”

This account shows why there is need to put more attention on grassroots systems and structures and the culture, customs and religions of people at the grassroots so as to structure the NCEWERS more effectively and efficiently. Currently, the structure and resourcing of the Kenyan NCEWERS does not concentrate early warning at a grassroots level so that it can anticipate conflict before it spreads (sometime into high level politics). In fact, operational responses have been inadequately linked to warnings and the role of women and girls has not been given the requisite priority as it should. As found from this participatory study conflict planning is done with the knowledge of women and girls. They also organise food rations for the attackers or raiders and sing songs of heroism to those that are successful but coin stigmatizing standpoints for those regarded as cowardly. For example, the Moyale and Marsabit FDG said that in their culture:



“Women and girls sing mockery songs for those that have not raided or succeeded. They use statements such as, 'have my skirt and give me your trouser [so that you] are able to raid.’”

Although there have been responses to conflict situations in Kenya at the level of politics and humanitarian levels, there is need for these responses to adequately address the specific vulnerabilities of men and women. Indeed, as established through this survey, many responses have not gone beyond the protection of the vulnerable, especially children, women and the disabled.

## 7.0 Recommendations

### **7.1 NCEWERS should enhance the capacity of the Gender Focal Point within the Kenyan CEWERS and ensure that it is anchored on the UNSCR 1325**

To ensure that gender-sensitivity is maintained in the NCEWERS, the capacity of the Gender Focal Point should be enhanced, with future possibility of escalating it to a gender unit. The mandate of the Gender Focal Point within the system will be to ensure that gender is mainstreamed in all matters relating to the NCEWERS, NCEWERS also needs to be anchored on the UNSCR 1325, guided by the four pillars as, explained hereafter.

#### **7.1.1 Participation of women, youth and men**

The Kenyan conflict early warning and early response mechanism should continuously and effectively engage with grassroots women, youth, men and their networks. The mechanism should embrace a horizontal and multi-dimensional data collection approach and develop engendered indicators for its work. The system should also include critical actors, especially grassroots youth and women, cultural practices and tactics that local people; especially those that promote mobilisation and participation of women and youth.

#### **7.1.2 Protection of women**

NCEWERS should ensure that data and information on the protection of girls and women from conflict situations, especially GBV is prioritized both during collection and analysis. Extra effort should be – made to sensitise the security agencies to ensure that they effectively execute protection of the affected population in general but girls and women in particular during conflict situations.

#### **7.1.3 Re-orienting the EWERS for greater prevention**

NCEWERS should be re-oriented in design to enable it gain a deeper understanding of popular, localised and everyday conceptions of what count as early warning information. This would be effectively done through interactive learning efforts between the local communities and the formal peace structures.

#### **7.1.4 Transformation from the culture of emergency**

The Kenyan EWERS should increasingly nurture a culture of proactive action of dealing with signs of conflicts before they occur. Should the conflicts occur, mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that relief and recovery as-well-as protection benefit all deserving people and communities.

### **7.2 NCEWERS should be anchored in the social capital of women, youths, and men at the grassroots levels**

Social capital refers to the networks of relationships among people who live and work in a particular society, enabling that society to function effectively. For sustainability of NCEWERS, there is need to anchor it in the structures at the grassroots. Indeed, transforming the NCEWERS and promoting it among structures at the grassroots with the view of institutionalizing the concept of 'Community Early Warning and Early Response' will be making NCEWERS transit into sustainability. As women, youths and men structures form a broad base of institutions at the grassroots, relying on such systems, including *Chamas*,

fellowships, merry-go-rounds, councils of elders, etc that have been initiated and relied upon by women, youths and men for social and economic advancement will lead to sustainability of the NCEWERS. For this to happen effectively, devolving the NCEWERS and cascading it up to the village levels is critical.

### **7.3 NCEWERS should empower and ensure resource-flow to grassroots women, youths and men**

Empowering grassroots women, youth and men, and ensuring that resources flow to them, will help deal with the root causes of conflict, including GBV. Furthermore, when grassroots women, youths and men are empowered, in an effort to secure their acquired livelihoods, they will be conscious of any threats to their socio-economic progress arising from conflicts and will therefore report such threats.

### **7.4 NCEWERS should be aligned to existing dynamics in communities**

Most Kenyans are not well informed about the Kenyan EWERS and how they can participate. This denies it the richness of the diversity that is inherent in Kenyan communities. There is need to deliberately study, identify and promote best practices amongst communities that appreciate the role of women and youth in peace-building. This involves documenting and learning from existing traditional conflict early warning and early response mechanisms which may have been tested over time and whose resilience is indicated by their continued existence.

### **7.5 NCEWERS should be guided by a clear and shared M&E plan with indicators that are context-specific**

A clear and shared M&E plan is essential for an effective EWER. KNAP is an essential tool to an effective M&E, and so are well-thought indicators. The following are some of the indicators of conflict early warning used by Kenya's NCEWERS:

- ? Inter-marriages;
- ☹ Significant gifts offered to communities;
- ☹ Inter-communal ceremonies taking place;
- ☹ Warnings based on traditional or other forecasting;
- ☹ Increased/Decreased livestock sales;
- ☹ Drop in livestock prices;
- ☹ Unusual movement of all male groups;
- ☹ Pastoral movement patterns interrupted or disrupted;
- ☹ Changes in migrant workers;
- ☹ Changes in economic employment;
- ☹ Competition over trade-route access;
- ☹ Protests or challenges to local or national leadership;
- ☹ Boundary disputes;
- ☹ New government policies on movement;
- ☹ Media/press controls;
- ☹ Changes in livestock on secure grazing areas;
- ☹ Abandoned traditional grazing areas, watering points, farms or fisheries;

- ☞ Outbreak of crop, fisheries or livestock diseases or their death;
- ☞ Disclosure of information on small arms flow or availability;
  - ? Bullets used as exchangeable commodities;
- ☞ Interventions by external groups;
- ☞ Use of security escorts;
- ☞ Accessibility of roads and means of transport and health facilities;
- ☞ Interruption to student class attendance;
- ☞ Influx of IDPs; and
- ☞ Changes on accessibility and operation of relief food supplies and distribution.

While these indicators are reflective of the conflict situations that exist in Kenya, they are static and inadequately engendered. For example, the indicator on the occurrence of pre- and post-incidents such as rites or endorsements requires to be examined through the UNSCR 1324 gender lens. As such, this indicators can be disaggregated as follows:

- ? The number of women and girls participating in incidents such as rites or endorsements; etc

For such specificity, learnings from the UNIFEM project in the Solomon Islands on contextual-specific indicators is helpful.

### **7.6 NCEWERS to deal with inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities that underlie most conflicts**

There is need to deal with underlying inequalities and inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities in the country and deliberately combat poverty and unemployment, so that people are engaged in productive activities and not induced into conflicts that stem from these inequalities.

### **7.7 NCEWERS to deal with the emerging negative influence of youths and communities**

The role of women and girls, for example in pastoralist areas, where they mock men who have not raided for animals encourages men to engage in cattle raids. This role can be reversed by engaging such women and young girls in promoting peace. In parts of Kenya where young people are increasingly getting influenced into engaging into organized violence, working with the Ministry of Education to increase enrolment into boarding schools (both single sex and mixed sex schools) can help in denying those who radicalize youth time to access them. Furthermore, peace structures should be cascaded to village levels with more participatory ways of information sharing on potential conflicts, such as hotlines, workshops, interviews, surveys, etc, opened up.

### **7.8 NCEWERS to align its conflict early warning technology to the everyday life of Kenyans**

To ensure community ownership of Kenya's NCEWERS, deliberate efforts should be made to align its attendant technology, including the SMS 108, website, etc to the kind of technology and networks that Kenyans engage with every day including interactive media. There should be awareness creation on the importance of using this technology for delivering early warning information, and training on gender sensitivity in using the platform so as to increase its efficacy.

## Glossary of Key Concepts

<b>A gender-sensitive indicator</b>	An indicator that captures gender-related changes in society over time. It is the direct evidence of the status of women in relation to some agreed normative standard or reference group [here men]
<b>Conflict intervening factors</b>	Known also as accelerators, these are factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict or peace building
<b>Gender</b>	The social, historical and cultural constructions and conditioning with acceptable and preferable norms of behaviour and attitudes for both men and women
<b>Gender-sensitive early warning</b>	This is a warning that can be defined by two factors, namely, the equal participation of women and men in early warning processes, and the inclusion of gender-sensitive indicators based on a context-specific research into the prevailing gender and conflict dynamics.
<b>Proximate causes</b>	Medium term conditions and emerging socio-political and economic trends
<b>UNSCR 1325</b>	The only Resolution that focuses on the special needs of women and girls during and after armed conflict and the first formal and legal document for the UNSC requiring parties to conflict to respect women's and girls' needs, including their participation in peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction.

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# Appendix

## I. Global Indicators

The list of 26 indicators presented to the UN Security Council.<sup>52</sup>

### No. Indicator

- 1a Prevalence of Sexual Violence
- 1b Patterns of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations  
Text of recommendations section to report on:
  - Types of measures (proposed vs. implemented)
  - Types of violations
- 2 Extent to which the United Nations Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions include information on violations of women and girls' human rights in their periodic reporting to the Security Council
- 3a Extent to which violations of women's and girls' human rights are reported, referred and investigated by human rights bodies report on:
  - Number and types of cases reported, referred and investigated
- 3b Number and percentage share of women in governance bodies of National Human Right Bodies (NHRB)
- 4 Percentage of reported cases of sexual exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by uniformed, civilian peace keepers and/or humanitarian workers that a reacted upon out of the total number of referred cases
- 5a Extent to which measures to protect women's and girls' human rights are included in Peacekeeper Heads of Military Components and Heads of Police Components Directives
- 5b Extent to which measures to protect women's and girls' human rights are included I national security policy frameworks. Existing and new gender-specific language to report on:
  - Type of document
  - Context analysis of security threats to women and girls
  - Types of measures
- 6 Number and type of actions taken by the Security Council related to resolution 1325 (2000) report on:
  - Count of actions
  - Types of actions: request inquiry, setup a specific mechanism, mandate peace keeping operations, impose sanctions, authorise the use of force, establish an

international tribunal, refer a situation to ICC

- Type of document (i.e. resolution, PRST)

7. Number and percentage share of women in the Executive leadership of relevant regional and sub- regional organisations involved in preventing conflict Regional and sub-regional organisations will include those identified in A/RES/55/285.
8. Percentage of peace agreements with specific provisions to improve the security and status of women and girls.
9. Women's share of senior UN positions in field missions.
10. Percentage of field missions with senior level gender experts
- 11a. Representation of women among mediators, negotiators and technical experts informal peace negotiations.
- 11b Women's participation in an official observer status at the beginning and the end of formal peace negotiations
- 12a. Women's political participation in parliaments and ministerial positions. Report on women's share of:
  - Seats in parliament
- 12b. Women's political participation as voters and candidates. Report on women's share of:
  - Persons registered to vote
  - Persons who actually vote
  - Parliamentary candidates
13. Extent to which Security Council missions address specific issues affecting women and girls in the Terms of Reference and Mission Reports
- 14 Index of women's and girls' physical security. Survey-based indicator to measure three dimensions:
  - Perceptions of physical security of women and girls (by location, time of day)
  - Proxy variables measuring how women's and girls' ability to participate in public life has been affected
  - Proxy variables measuring how women's and girls' regular activities have been affected
- 15 Extent to which national laws to protect women's and girls' human rights are in line with international standards
16. Level of women's participation in the justice and security sector
17. Existence of national mechanisms for control of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW). This indicator reports on:

Existence of a national coordination agency on SA/LW National Focal Point (paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section II of the POA)

Record keeping on holdings and transfers of SA/LW (para9 in section II of the POA).

18. Percentage of (monetary equivalent, estimate) benefits from temporary employment in the context of early economic recovery programmes received by women and girls
19. Percentage of referred cases of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls that are reported, investigated and sentenced
20. Hours of training per capital of decision-making personnel in security and justice sector institutions to address SGBV cases
- 21a Maternal mortality rate
- 21b Net Primary and secondary education enrolment rates, by sex
- 22a Proportion of budget related to indicators that address gender equality issues in strategic planning frame works
- 22b Proportion of budget related to targets that address gender equality issues in strategic planning framework
- 23a Proportion of total disbursed funding to Civil Society organisations that is allocated to address gender equality issues
- 23b Proportion of total disbursed funding to support gender equality issues that is allocated to Civil Society organisations
- 24a Proportion of disbursed Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) used to address gender equality issues
- 24b Proportion of total spending of UN system used to support gender equality issues
25. Extent to which Truth and Reconciliation Commissions include provisions to address the rights and participation of women and girls
- 26a Percentage of (monetary equivalent, estimate) benefits from DDR programmes received by women and girls
- 26b. Percentage of (monetary equivalent, estimate) benefits from DDR programmes received by women and girls





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