



REINTEGRATION IN IRAQ

A perception survey to assess community readiness for return and reintegration of families with perceived ISIL affiliation in pilot areas

United Nations Development Programme Iraq

August 2021

UNDP is the leading United Nations organization fighting to end the injustice of poverty, inequality, and climate change. Working with our broad network of experts and partners in 170 countries, we help nations to build integrated, lasting solutions for people and planet.

Learn more at undp.org or follow at [@UNDP](https://twitter.com/UNDP).

Contents

Foreword	4
1. Introduction	5
2. Methodology	7
3. Average Results Across Four Communities	7
A. Concerns About Governance, Security, and the Economy	7
B. Perceptions of COVID-19 and Healthcare	9
C. Attitudes Toward Reintegration of Families with Perceived ISIL Affiliation.....	11
D. Awareness and Perceptions of Local Peace Committees	13
4. Qaim, Anbar	14
5. Habbaniyah, Anbar	22
6. Muhalabiya, Ninewa	31
7. Tuz Khurmato, Salah al-Din	39
8. Conclusion	49

Foreword

Launched in 2020, UNDP Iraq's *Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration in Iraq (C2RI)* project aims to contribute to durable solutions through targeted, needs-based programmatic interventions to the most vulnerable population groups in the areas most severely affected by ISIL occupation through the implementation of targeted reintegration support, the increase of community acceptance of returnees with perceived ISIL affiliation and the building of capacities of national as well as local institutions enabling sustainable peace and conflict-resolution.

Acknowledging the cruciality of a wide variety of evidence-based assessments as a starting point for UNDP reconciliation and reintegration programming for targeting, UNDP conducted this perception survey to assess the community readiness for return and reintegration of IDP families with perceived ISIL affiliation and to inform UNDP's programming on reconciliation and reintegration, and to provide a baseline for further perceptions research.

This new publication follows the *Pathways to Reintegration: Iraq, Families Formerly Associated with ISIL* study released by UNDP Iraq in March of 2021, to present the results of a community perceptions survey conducted by UNDP in September 2020 in the four targeted pilot reintegration locations of Al Qa'im, Habbaniyah, Muhalabiya and Tuz Khurmato. Backing up the original pathways report with an overview and an analysis of aggregated data, the study further highlights common trends and challenges within the four pilot locations including (1) concerns about the economy, security and governance; (2) perceptions of COVID-19 and healthcare institutions; (3) attitudes towards reintegration of families with perceived ISIL affiliation; and (4) the awareness of Local Peace Committees, enabling continued UNDP support in the area of social cohesion, reintegration and reconciliation programming to those who need it the most.

This study was made possible with thanks to generous support from the Government of Japan. UNDP would like to extend its thanks to the lead researcher for this study, Dr. Mara Redlich Revkin, who is a fellow at Georgetown's Center on National Security and the Law with extensive academic research on perceived ISIL-affiliation.

UNDP Iraq remains committed to supporting the country's transition to stability and peace with a continued vision of reconciliation, conflict prevention, dialogue, and long-lasting peacebuilding within Iraq, consistent with Goal 16 *Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions* of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and supported through strong institutional partnerships between itself, the Government of Iraq, United Nations Agencies, local and regional authorities, development partners and civil society.



Zena Ali Ahmad

UNDP Resident Representative, Iraq

1. Introduction

This report analyzes the results of a community perceptions survey conducted by UNDP in September 2020 in four pilot locations where UNDP will implement programming to facilitate peaceful reconciliation and reintegration of families perceived as formerly associated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). A related UNDP report, “Pathways to Reintegration: Iraq, Families Formerly Associated with ISIL.” provides an overview of the stigmatization of families with perceived ISIL affiliation and the difficulties they face in returning to their home communities.¹ These four communities are Qaim and Habbaniyah in the western province of Anbar, Muhalabiya in the northern province of Ninewa, and Tuz Khurmato in the north-central province of Salah al-Din (Figure 1). Qaim, Habbaniyah, and Muhalabiya are all Sunni-majority communities that were captured and controlled by ISIL for a significant period of time. Tuz Khurmato, which was not captured by ISIL despite its close proximity to the front lines, is a demographically mixed community of Shia Turkmen, Sunni Kurds, and Sunni Arabs with significant tensions between Shia Turkmen and Sunni Kurds, who live in separate neighborhoods.² This report first provides an overview of the aggregated data for all four communities, highlighting common trends and challenges, followed by an in-depth analysis of each of the four communities.

Figure 1. Pilot Survey Locations



During a recent study which inquired about potential scenarios of return in ISIL-liberated areas, the vast majority of respondents overall was willing to allow the reintegration of hypothetical individuals with family ties to ISIL who did not personally work for or support the group.³ Support for reintegration was highest for women who did not support their husbands’ decisions to join ISIL, elderly men, and young boys. Support for reintegration was somewhat lower for a hypothetical 30-year-old man whose brother joined ISIL and substantially lower for women who voluntarily married ISIL fighters. These results suggest that age, gender, and the voluntariness of a person’s association with ISIL may influence community attitudes toward reconciliation and reintegration. However, the results should be interpreted cautiously given the small size of the survey sample. The survey also shows that a significant number of individuals who initially refused to allow the reintegration of individuals with family ties to ISIL could be persuaded to change their minds and support reintegration through reconciliation mechanisms including public apologies, community service, and disavowing ISIL-associated family members in court. Importantly, sending ISIL-associated family members to prison did not increase the willingness of survey respondents to support their eventual reintegration after serving five- or ten-year sentences, suggesting either that prison may be less effective than non-carceral mechanisms such as community service for facilitating reintegration. Although the survey found high levels of support for reintegration of families with perceived ISIL association, a significant majority of respondents were still very concerned about unemployment (62% “very concerned”), corruption (59%), quality of services (53%), and healthcare (51%). Importantly, respondents were more concerned about these governance-related issues than they were about the return of families with perceived ISIL association (35% “very concerned”) and the possibility of ISIL’s resurgence in Iraq (38%). Addressing economic, governance, and security concerns would further improve community readiness for reintegration. Table 1 highlights key findings across the four communities.

1 UNDP, “Pathways for Reintegrating Iraqi Families Formerly Associated With ISIL,” (2021).

2 Salam Khoder, “Iraq: The separating walls of Tuz Khurmatu,” Al Jazeera (Apr. 18, 2016), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/4/18/iraq-the-separating-walls-of-tuz-khurmatu>.

3 These scenarios are inspired by a recent academic study of attitudes towards reintegration of hypothetical ISIL “collaborators” who were related to or worked for ISIL as civilian employees or fighters. See Mara Redlich Revkin and Kristen Kao, “How Does Punishment Affect Reintegration? Attitudes Toward Islamic State ‘Collaborators’ in Iraq,” (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3659468.

Table 1. Key Findings Across 4 Communities

Community Demographics	Qaim	Habbaniyah	Muhalabiya	Tuz Khurmato	Average
Governorate	Anbar	Anbar	Ninewa	Salah al-Din	Average
Demography	Sunni Arab Majority	Sunni Arab Majority	Sunni Arab Majority	Mixed	
Captured by ISIL	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Unemployment	22%	21%	12%	49%	
Stayed in the community during ISIL conflict (not displaced)	29 %	50 %	93 %	33 %	
Results for Key Indicators					Average
Trust in central government (Baghdad)	80%	24%	68%	46%	55%
Trust in provincial government	88%	39%	75%	28%	58%
Trust in local/district government	87%	48%	84%	34%	64%
Rule of law is strong	97%	31%	58%	75%	66 %
Community is safe in general	85%	100%	90%	97%	93 %
Community is safe for children to play outside unsupervised	33%	87%	87%	33%	60%
“Very concerned” about unemployment	62%	81%	30%	75%	62%
Very concerned about basic services	63%	81%	13%	56%	53 %
Very concerned about speed of reconstruction	62%	8%	29%	71%	43 %
Very concerned about return of IDPs with family ties to ISIL	61%	5%	58%	14%	35 %
Very concerned about ISIL resurgence	62%	5%	62%	20%	38 %
Allow reintegration of 30-year-old woman involuntarily married to an ISIL member	86%	98%	96%	89%	
Allow reintegration of 30-year-old woman who voluntarily married an ISIL member	89%	52%	87%	20%	
Allow reintegration of 30-year-old man whose brother joined ISIL	89%	96%	98%	70%	89 %
Allow reintegration of 75-year-old man whose son joined ISIL	89%	100%	99%	78%	92 %
Allow reintegration of 12-year-old boy whose father joined ISIL	89%	99%	99%	94%	95 %
Very concerned about COVID-19	58%	36%	40%	36%	43 %
Awareness of LPCs	2%	45%	19%	15%	20 %

2. Methodology

Thirteen UNDP enumerators conducted the face-to-face survey using tablets in September 2020. At that time, the prevalence of COVID-19 in the four study locations was very low and UNDP enumerators wore PPE and provided PPE to participants to minimize the risk of transmission. Enumerators followed a two-part randomization procedure to obtain a representative sample. First, enumerators used a “random walk” protocol to select random starting points in each community followed by selection of every third house on the righthand side of the street, turning right at intersections. Second, enumerators randomly selected a member of each household based on who had the most recent birthday. A total of 401 interviews were conducted in the four communities (approximately 100 interviews per community).


3. Average Results Across Four Communities

This section briefly summarizes the pooled results for all four communities in the following important areas: (1) concerns about the economy, security, and governance; (2) perceptions of COVID-19 and healthcare institutions; (3) attitudes toward reintegration of families with perceived ISIL association, and (4) awareness of Local Peace Committees. The next section provides an in-depth analysis of each of the four communities to enable comparison between them.

A. Concerns About Governance, Security, and the Economy


On average across the four C2RI pilot communities, trust in the government was moderate with trust being at slightly higher levels with local district-level government authorities than with the central government in Baghdad (Figure 2). 63% of respondents said they trust local district-level government authorities “a lot” or “somewhat”, 57% trust their provincial government authorities, and 55% trust the central government in Baghdad. When asked about perceptions of “rule of law,”⁴ around two-thirds of respondents described rule of law as somewhat or very strong (66%) in their community while a substantial minority described it as weak (34%).

Figure 2. Trust in Government



The vast majority of respondents (93%) described their communities as somewhat or very safe (Figure 4), but a smaller percentage (60%) believed that their communities are safe for children to play outside without adult supervision (Figure 5). Most (59%) reported that security had improved over the past six months and most (56%) said they expect further improvements in security over the next six months. Very few (2%) believed that security had gotten worse over the past six months and a similarly small percent (4%) expected that security will get worse in the next six months (Figures 6-7).

Figure 3. Rule of Law



⁴ The survey defined “rule of law” as follows: “Rule of law is present if the government enforces the laws equally and fairly for all people without corruption or favoritism.”

The vast majority of respondents (93%) described their communities as somewhat or very safe (Figure 4), but a smaller percentage (60 %) believed that their communities are safe for children to play outside without adult supervision (Figure 5). Most (59%) reported that security had improved over the past six months and most (56%) said they expect further improvements in security over the next six months. Very few (2%) believed that security had gotten worse over the past six months and a similarly small percent (4%) expected that security will get worse in the next six months (Figures 6-7).

Figure 4. Community Safety




Figure 6. Changes in Security: Last 6 Months




Figure 5: Safe for Children to Play Outside Unsupervised






Figure 7. Expected Changes in Security: Next 6 Months



A significant majority of respondents were still very concerned about unemployment (62% “very concerned”), corruption (59%), quality of services (53%), and healthcare (51%). A significant minority of respondents were very concerned about the pace of reconstruction (43%), the quality of education (42%), bribery by state security forces (41%), ISIL’s resurgence in Iraq (38%), return of families with perceived ISIL association (35%), harassment of women (31%), and revenge killings (31%) (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Issues of Greatest Concern



B. Perceptions of COVID-19 and Healthcare

A significant majority of respondents (86%) were either somewhat or very concerned about COVID-19 in their communities (Figure 9). 48% believe that the COVID-19 crisis is getting better in their community, 24% believe it is staying the same, and 28% believe it is getting worse (Figure 10).

Figure 9. Concern about COVID-19






Figure 10. COVID-19: Getting Better or Worse




When asked about their views on the Iraqi government’s response to COVID-19, most believed that the social distancing measures are appropriate (54%) while 22% believed that the measures are not strict enough and 24% believe they are too strict (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Perceptions of Social Distancing Measures



A majority of respondents (76%) have some or a lot of trust in Iraq’s healthcare system and hospitals while 24% have no or not very much trust (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Trust in Healthcare and Hospitals



The vast majority of respondents (96%) said that they would bring a member of their household to a hospital if he/she became sick with COVID-19 (Figure 13), but a slightly lower percentage (88%) said they would allow a female family member to be quarantined by herself at a hospital until she recovers (Figure 14). Lower support for treatment of women at hospitals probably reflects tribal and religious norms against women traveling unaccompanied by male guardians.⁵

Figure 13. Willingness to Bring a Household Member to a Hospital for COVID-19 Treatment





Figure 14. Willingness to Allow a Female Family Member to be Quarantined at a Hospital



⁵ Alissa Rubin, “Stigma Hampers Iraqi Efforts to Fight the Coronavirus,” New York Times (Apr. 14, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/world/middleeast/iraq-coronavirus-stigma-quarantine.html>

C. Attitudes Toward Reintegration of Families with Perceived ISIL Affiliation

On average across the four C2RI pilot communities, respondents supported a strong role of the Iraqi government and state institutions in the reintegration of families with perceived ISIL association as well as an emphasis on transitional justice. When asked which actor(s) should be responsible for deciding if families with perceived affiliation can return to their communities, the most common response by a significant margin was Iraqi government authorities (93%) followed by tribal leaders (39%), UN agencies or international NGOs (26%), and religious leaders (23%). When asked who should be responsible for bringing justice to the victims of ISIL, 94% selected Iraqi state courts and only 4% selected the tribal justice system (Table 1).

When asked which condition(s) should be met by families with perceived ISIL association before they are allowed to return to their communities, psychological rehabilitation was the most frequent response (75%) followed by public disavowal of ISIL-associated family members in court (68%) and publicly apologizing (59%). Smaller percentages were in favor of community service (22%) and payments of compensation to the victims of ISIL (17%), and very few believed that serving prison sentences should be required for reintegration (Table 1).

Table 1. Preferences for Reintegration and Transitional Justice (All Four Communities)		
Number of Respondents		N=401
Who do you think should be responsible for deciding if families perceived as affiliated with Daesh should be allowed to return to this community?	Iraqi government	93%
	Tribal leaders	39%
	UN agencies or international NGOs	26%
	Religious leaders	23%
Who do you think should be responsible for bringing justice to the victims of Daesh?	Iraqi state authorities	94%
	Tribal justice system	4%
Which of the following conditions do you believe that people with family ties to Daesh should fulfill before being allowed to return to their communities?	Psychological rehabilitation	75%
	Public apology	59%
	Disavow family in court	68%
	Community service	22%
	Pay compensation	17%
	Short prison sentence (1-5 years)	10%
	Long prison sentence (5+ years)	4%

Hypothetical Reintegration Scenarios: The survey asked respondents if they would be willing to allow the return and reintegration of five different hypothetical IDPs with family ties to ISIL. 93% were willing to allow the reintegration of a woman who was involuntarily married to an ISIL member, but only 62% were willing to allow the reintegration of a woman who voluntarily married an ISIL member, indicating that communities differentiate between voluntary and involuntary association and are significantly less forgiving of the former. 92% of respondents were willing to allow the reintegration of a 75-year-old man whose son joined ISIL and 95% were willing to allow the reintegration of a 12-year-old boy whose father joined ISIL, but a somewhat smaller percentage (89%) were willing to allow the reintegration of a 30-year-old man whose brother joined ISIL, suggesting that communities may be somewhat less comfortable accepting military-age men with family ties to ISIL in comparison with elderly and children.


For hypothetical scenarios where a significant number of respondents (at least 10%) refused to allow the reintegration of individuals with family ties to ISIL, we do not take into account follow-up questions that were only asked to respondents who initially rejected reintegration due to the insufficient amount of answers required for a statistically significant analysis. These follow-up questions asked whether the respondent could be persuaded to allow reintegration of a person with ISIL-association if he or she received a punishment or offered compensation of some kind. Follow-up questions were only asked for the following two scenarios in which a significant number of respondents (more than 10%) rejected the reintegration of the hypothetical individual with families ties to ISIL: the 30-year-old woman who voluntarily married an ISIL member and the 30-year-old man whose brother joined ISIL. For both of these scenarios, a majority of respondents said they would be willing to allow reintegration if the person formally disavowed their ISIL-associated family members in court. Psychological rehabilitation was also highlighted as an effective mechanism in both scenarios.

A common trend across all five scenarios is that some respondents who were willing to allow the return and reintegration of a hypothetical person with family ties to ISIL would not be willing to share a meal with that person, and even fewer would allow their children to be friends. For example, 93% of respondents were willing to allow the return of a woman who was involuntarily married to ISIL member, but only 87% would be willing to share a meal with her, and only 77% would allow their children to be friends with her children (Table 2).

Table 2. Preferences for Reintegration of Hypothetical ISIL-Associated IDPs	
Number of Respondents	N=401
30-Year-Old Wife of ISIL Member (Involuntary):	
<p>“Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old woman from this community whose husband joined Daesh after they were married. She says that she disagreed with her husband’s decision to join Daesh and condemns the group. This woman has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?”</p>	<p>Would allow return: 93% Would share a meal: 87% Would allow children to be friends: 77%</p>
30-Year-Old Wife of ISIL Member (Voluntary):	
<p>“Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old woman from this community who voluntarily married a Daesh fighter. She has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with her returning to this community?”</p>	<p>Would allow return: 62% Would share a meal: 59% Would allow children to be friends: 53%</p>
	<p>At first refused but would allow return if the person agrees to ... N=134</p> <p>Psychological rehabilitation: 43% Public apology: 31% Disavow family in court: 52% Community service: 30% Pay compensation: 31% Short prison sentence (1-5 years): 29% Long prison sentence (5+ years): 44%</p>
30-Year-Old Brother of ISIL Member:	
<p>“Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old man from this community whose brother joined Daesh, but the man says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this man has any ties to Daesh other than his brother’s association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?”</p>	<p>Would allow return: 89% Would share a meal: 82% Would allow children to be friends: 74%</p>
	<p>At first refused but would allow return if the person agrees to ... N=31</p> <p>Psychological rehabilitation: 55% Public apology: 45% Disavow family in court: 61% Community service: 26% Pay compensation: 35% Short prison sentence (1-5 years): 16% Long prison sentence (5+ years): 19%</p>
75-Year-Old Father of ISIL Member:	
<p>“Please imagine that there is a 75-year-old man from this community whose son joined Daesh, but the man says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this man has any ties to Daesh other than his son’s association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community.”</p>	<p>Would allow return: 92% Would share a meal: 90% Would allow children to be friends: 75%</p>
12-Year-Old Son of an ISIL Member:	
<p>“Please imagine that there is a 12-year-old boy from this community whose father joined Daesh, but the boy says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this boy has any ties to Daesh other than his father’s association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community.”</p>	<p>Would allow return: 95% Would share a meal: 87% Would allow children to be friends: 79%</p>

D. Awareness and Perceptions of Local Peace Committees

On average across the four communities, 20% of respondents (80 out of 401) were aware of the presence of Local Peace Committees in their communities. Among the 80 respondents who were aware of the presence of LPCs, 35% were very satisfied, 54% were somewhat satisfied, and 12% were somewhat or very dissatisfied.



4. Qaim, Anbar

Demographics: In Qaim, UNDP surveyed 99 residents, 46% women and 54% men. 100% of respondents were born in Qaim. Most had completed only primary or secondary school (75%) and 18% had no education at all. The unemployment rate was 22% and a significant majority of respondents (83%) reported no monthly income (Table 2).

Number of Respondents		N=99	
	Gender	Women: 46% Men: 54%	
	Education	None: 18% Primary (years 1-6): 59% Secondary (years 7-9): 15% High school: 6% Bachelor's degree and higher: 2%	
	Religious Education	Yes: 2% No: 96%	
	Born in this Community	Yes: 100% No: 0%	
	Monthly Income	None: 83% Less than 500,000 IQD: 12% 500,000 IQD-750,000 IQD: 5%	
	Unemployment Rate	22%	
	Average Age	34.2 years	

Horizontal Social Cohesion: Most respondents said that their most important personal identity is being an Iraqi citizen (61%), but a significant number (22%) identify primarily as a member of their tribe. The vast majority of respondents said that the community would be very likely to accept both IDPs originally from Qaim (97%) and IDPs from other areas who want to settle in Qaim (90%). A similarly high percentage (90%) said it is very likely that someone belonging to a different religious who moves to Qaim would be able to coexist in peace with people from their religious group. A majority of respondents (75%) said that they feel completely or somewhat free to express their opinions around other community members and a smaller majority (59%) said that they trust everyone or most people in the community (Table 3).

Number of Respondents		N=99	
Most Important Personal Identity	Iraqi citizen:	61%	
	Member of my tribe:	22%	
	Member of my religious group:	12%	
	Member of this community:	7%	
If (IDPs) who are from this community return, how likely is it that the community will accept them?	Very likely:	97%	
	Somewhat likely	1%	
	Somewhat unlikely	1%	
	Very unlikely	0%	
If (IDPs) who are not from this community want to stay here, how likely is it that the community will accept them?	Very likely:	90%	
	Somewhat likely	6%	
	Somewhat unlikely	1%	
	Very unlikely	2%	

If someone belonging to a different religion moves to this community, how likely is it that they would be able to coexist in peace with people from your religious group?	Very likely: Somewhat likely Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely	90% 5% 0% 5%
Do you feel you can freely express your opinions when you are around other community members?	Completely free: Somewhat free: Somewhat uncomfortable Very uncomfortable:	38% 37% 20% 4%
How much do you trust other people in this community?	I trust everyone: I trust most people: I trust a small number of people: I don't trust anyone:	16% 43% 36% 4%

Vertical Social Cohesion: Trust in state institutions was fairly high in Qaim. 80% of respondents said that they have some or a lot of trust in the central government in Baghdad, with slightly higher levels of trust in provincial government authorities (88%) and local (district) government authorities (87%). Rule of law was perceived as “very strong” by 94% of respondents. Trust in police was very high: 92% had some or a lot of trust in local police and 91% had some or a lot of trust in federal police. The official justice system was perceived as fair by 88% of respondents and the tribal justice system was perceived as fair by 83% of respondents.

When asked about what they would do in a hypothetical land dispute, 37% would seek help from family members, 27% would turn to local authorities (the mukhtar), and 15% would turn to a community member with connections. Smaller percentages would turn to the police (10%), Iraqi government courts (2%), or rely on self-help (8%). Family members were also the most commonly selected actor in cases of theft and physical assault. 85% of respondents rated the security situation as somewhat or very safe. 46% of respondents believed that security had improved in the last six months and 53% expected that security will improve over the next six months (Table 4).

Table 4. Vertical Social Cohesion (Qaim)		
Number of Respondents		N=99
How much trust do you have in the central government in Baghdad?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	27% 53% 9% 9%
How much trust do you have in your provincial government authorities?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	32% 56% 5% 6%
How much trust do you have in your local/district government authorities?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	37% 50% 4% 7%
How strong or weak is “rule of law” in this community? (“Rule of law” is present if the government enforces the laws equally and fairly for all people without corruption or favoritism)	Very strong: Somewhat strong: Somewhat weak: Very weak:	94% 3% 1% 1%
How much trust do you have in the local police in this community?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	50% 42% 4% 3%
How much trust do you have in the federal police?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	52% 39% 4% 4%

How fair or unfair is the official justice system in this area (state courts)?	Very fair Somewhat fair Somewhat unfair Very unfair	36% 52% 4% 7%
How fair or unfair is the traditional tribal justice system in this area?	Very fair Somewhat fair Somewhat unfair Very unfair	23% 60% 8% 8%
If you were to have a dispute with another person in your community over land ownership, whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	37% 15% 27% 0% 0% 10% 2% 8%
If someone from this community stole money from you, to whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	25% 4% 23% 0% 0% 17% 4% 26%
If, God forbid, a member of this community physically assaulted and injured a member of your family, whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	26% 5% 23% 1% 0% 26% 4% 13%
How would you rate the security situation in this community?	Very safe Somewhat safe Somewhat unsafe Very unsafe	36% 49% 5% 4%
How safe is it for children to play outside without adult supervision in this community?	Very safe Somewhat safe Somewhat unsafe Very unsafe	4% 29% 9% 57%
In the last six months, have there been any changes in the security situation in this community?	Security has improved Security has stayed the same Security has gotten worse	46% 47% 6%
In the next six months, do you expect any changes in the security situation in this community?	Security will improve Security will stay the same Security will get worse	53% 43% 2%

Issues of Greatest Concern: Around 60 percent of respondents were “very concerned” about all of the social, economic, and security issues asked on the survey (Table 5).

Table 5. Issues of Greatest Concern (Qaim)		
Number of Respondents		N=99
How concerned are you about unemployment and lack of job opportunities in your community?	Not concerned at all	36%
	Somewhat concerned	1%
	Very concerned	62%
How concerned are you about the quality of basic services in your community (e.g. water and electricity)?	Not concerned at all	27%
	Somewhat concerned	8%
	Very concerned	63%
How concerned are you about public health problems and healthcare in your community?	Not concerned at all	14%
	Somewhat concerned	23%
	Very concerned	61%
How concerned are you about corruption at the national government level (Baghdad)?	Not concerned at all	3%
	Somewhat concerned	33%
	Very concerned	62%
How concerned are you about corruption at the province level?	Not concerned at all	3%
	Somewhat concerned	34%
	Very concerned	62%
How concerned are you about corruption at the local government (district) level?	Not concerned at all	3%
	Somewhat concerned	34%
	Very concerned	62%
How concerned are you about corruption at the local government (district) level?	Not concerned at all	3%
	Somewhat concerned	34%
	Very concerned	62%
How concerned are you about the quality of schools and education in your community?	Not concerned at all	3%
	Somewhat concerned	35%
	Very concerned	61%
How concerned are you about the speed of reconstruction of roads and houses in your community?	Not concerned at all	3%
	Somewhat concerned	34%
	Very concerned	62%
How concerned are you about bribery by state security forces in your community?	Not concerned at all	2%
	Somewhat concerned	36%
	Very concerned	61%
How concerned are you about violence against civilians by state security forces in your community?	Not concerned at all	2%
	Somewhat concerned	35%
	Very concerned	61%
How concerned are you about harassment of women in your community?	Not concerned at all	2%
	Somewhat concerned	36%
	Very concerned	61%
How concerned are you about revenge killings or other violent acts of revenge in your community?	Not concerned at all	2%
	Somewhat concerned	35%
	Very concerned	62%
How concerned are you about the return of people who have families ties to Daesh in this community?	Not concerned at all	3%
	Somewhat concerned	35%
	Very concerned	61%
How concerned are you about the possibility of a Daesh resurgence in Iraq?	Not concerned at all	3%
	Somewhat concerned	34%
	Very concerned	62%

Reintegration Policies: When asked about their views on different policy options for dealing with ISIL-associated IDPs, 66% of respondents were in favor of allowing them to continue living in camps temporarily until their home communities decide they can return—an option that will become increasingly impossible as the Iraqi government prepares to close remaining IDP camps in 2021. Another 21% favored permanent relocation to

other communities away from their homes and 16% favored mandatory psychological rehabilitation before IDPs are allowed to return home (Table 6).

Reintegration Scenarios:⁶ Support for reintegration of different hypothetical ISIL-associated IDPs was generally high across all five scenarios, at least 86% (Table 6). Unlike in the other three communities, Qaim respondents were not more likely to support reintegration of elderly, IDPs, children, and women who were involuntarily married to ISIL fighters. This lack of differentiation between different types of association with ISIL could be due to the fact that Qaim was one of the last communities to be liberated from ISIL, and the population has generally been very resistant to reintegration of IDPs.

Table 6. Reintegration of Families with Perceived ISIL Affiliation (Qaim)		
Number of Respondents		N=99
Many people with family ties to Daesh were displaced during the conflict. There have been several proposals about what to do with people who have family ties to Daesh but did not personally commit any crimes. Do you agree with any of the following proposals? Select all	• Permanently relocated to other communities (not home)	21%
	• Live in camps temporarily until home communities decide they can return	66%
	• Psychological rehabilitation before being allows to return home	16%
Which of the following conditions do you believe that people with family ties to Daesh should fulfill before being allowed to return to their communities? Select all.	Psychological rehabilitation program	60%
	Public apology	51%
	Formal disavowal through court	41%
	Community service	6%
	Pay compensation to victims of ISIL	2%
	Short prison sentence (1-5 years)	0%
Who do you think should be responsible for bringing justice to the victims of Daesh?	Long prison sentence (5+ years)	0%
	Iraqi state courts	95%
Who do you think should be responsible for deciding if families perceived as affiliated with Daesh should be allowed to return to this community? Select all.	The tribal justice system	1%
	Iraqi government and security forces	76%
	Tribal leaders	1%
	Religious leaders	0%
	UN agencies or international NGOs	21%
	Local Peace Committees	0%

Table 7. Reintegration Scenario 1: Woman Involuntarily Married to an ISIL Member (Qaim)		
Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old woman from this community whose husband joined Daesh after they were married. She says that she disagreed with her husband's decision to join Daesh and condemns the group. This woman has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?		
Number of Respondents		N=99
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	86%
	No	3%
	Refused to answer	9%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	78%
	No	4%
	Refused to answer	17%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	76%
	No	4%
	Refused to answer	19%

⁶ For hypothetical scenarios where a significant number of respondents (at least 10%) refused to allow the reintegration of the person with family ties to ISIL, we do not analyze the series of follow-up questions that were asked only to respondents who initially rejected reintegration because the number of responses was too small for statistically significant analysis. These follow-up questions asked whether the respondent could be persuaded to allow reintegration of the ISIL-associated person if he or she received a punishment or offered compensation of some kind and are analyzed only for the two scenarios in which a significant number of respondents (more than 10%) rejected the reintegration of the hypothetical individual with families ties to ISIL: the 30-year-old woman who voluntarily married an ISIL member and the 30-year-old man whose brother joined ISIL.

Table 8. Reintegration Scenario 2: Woman Voluntarily Married to an ISIL Member (Qaim)

Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old woman from this community who voluntarily married a Daesh fighter. She has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with her returning to this community?

Number of Respondents		N=99
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	89%
	No	2%
	Refused to answer	8%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	85%
	No	0%
	Refused to answer	15%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	79%
	No	3%
	Refused to answer	17%

Table 9. Reintegration Scenario 3: Young Man Whose Brother Joined ISIL (Qaim)

Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old man from this community whose brother joined Daesh, but the man says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this man has any ties to Daesh other than his brother's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?

Number of Respondents		N=99
Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?	Yes	89%
	No	2%
	Refused to answer	8%
Would you share a meal with his family?	Yes	80%
	No	2%
	Refused to answer	17%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	78%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	20%

Table 10. Reintegration Scenario 4: Elderly Man Whose Son Joined ISIL (Qaim)

Please imagine that there is a 75-year-old man from this community whose son joined Daesh, but the man says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this man has any ties to Daesh other than his son's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community.

Number of Respondents		N=99
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	89%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	9%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	85%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	13%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	84%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	14%

Table 11. Reintegration Scenario 5: Young Boy Whose Father Joined ISIL (Qaim)

Please imagine that there is a 12-year-old boy from this community whose father joined Daesh, but the boy says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this boy has any ties to Daesh other than his father's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community.

Number of Respondents		N=99
Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?	Yes	89%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	9%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	79%
	No	0%
	Refused to answer	20%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	78%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	20%

Conflict-Related Casualties and Property Damage: Most survey respondents (61%) were displaced from Qaim during the conflict with ISIL, but 29% stayed in Qaim for the duration of the conflict. 41% reported that their property was damaged by ISIL (Table 12).

Table 12. Conflict-Related Casualties and Property Damage (Qaim)

Number of Respondents		N=99
Did you stay in this community when it was captured by Daesh or did you displace to somewhere else?	I stayed	29%
	I displaced	61%
Did your household (the people who live in this house) experience any of the following harms committed by Daesh?	My house or land was damaged	41%
	My house or land was confiscated	19%
	I was injured	4%
	A member of my household was injured	7%
	A member of my household was killed	5%
Did Daesh commit any acts of sexual violence or harassment in this community?	Yes	44%
	No	45%
	Refused to answer	7%
Did Daesh commit any acts of sexual violence or harassment against a member of your family?	Yes	1%
	No	90%
	Refused to answer	6%
Did your household experience any of the following harms during the military operation to liberate this area from Daesh? Select all	My house or land was damaged	60%
	My house or land was confiscated	5%
	I was injured	2%
	A member of my household was injured	4%
	A member of my household was killed	1%
	Member of household experienced sexual violence	0%
If yes to any of the previous harms, whom do you believe was responsible	Daesh	71%
	Iraqi armed forces	14%
	United States armed forces	4%

Perceptions of COVID-19 and Healthcare: 89% of respondents were somewhat or very concerned about the spread of COVID-19 in the community. 79% believed that the COVID-19 crisis is getting better and 13% believe it is getting worse. 99% approved of the response of local government authorities to COVID-19 and 98% approved of the response of the UN and humanitarian organizations. Trust in hospitals was very high (95%) and the vast majority of respondents (97%) said that they would bring a family member to a hospital if he or she becomes sick with COVID-19. A similarly high percentage (92%) would allow female family members to be quarantined overnight at a hospital (Table 13).

Table 13. Perceptions of COVID-19 and Healthcare (Qaim)

Number of Respondents		N=99
How concerned are you about the spread of COVID-19 in your community?	Not concerned at all:	11%
	Somewhat concerned:	30%
	Very concerned:	58%
Do you believe that the COVID-19 crisis is getting better or worse in this community?	Getting better:	79%
	Staying the same:	7%
	Getting worse:	13%
The Iraqi government has introduced several measures including a curfew and closing airports to reduce the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Do you think that these measures are too strict or not strict enough?	Too strict:	51%
	Appropriate:	47%
	Not strict enough:	0%
How positive or negative of a role are state security forces playing in the enforcement of government decisions related to COVID-19?	Very positive:	53%
	Somewhat positive:	45%
	Somewhat negative:	1%
	Very negative:	0%
To what extent do you approve of the response of local government authorities to COVID-19?	Strongly approve	53%
	Somewhat approve	46%
	Somewhat disapprove	0%
	Strongly disapprove	0%
To what extent do you approve of the response of state security forces to COVID-19 in this community?	Strongly approve	52%
	Somewhat approve	44%
	Somewhat disapprove	2%
	Strongly disapprove	0%
To what extent do you approve of the response of the UN and other humanitarian organizations to COVID-19 in this community?	Strongly approve	62%
	Somewhat approve	36%
	Somewhat disapprove	1%
	Strongly disapprove	0%
How much trust do you have in the government healthcare system and hospitals?	A lot of trust	46%
	Some trust	48%
	Not very much trust	5%
	No trust	0%
If (God forbid) a member of your household were to become sick with COVID-19, would you bring him or her to a hospital?	Yes	97%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	1%
If (God forbid) a female member of your family were to become sick with COVID-19, would you allow her to be quarantined by herself at a hospital until she recovers?	Yes	92%
	No	4%
	Refused to answer	3%

Awareness of and Perceptions of Local Peace Committees: Awareness of LPCs was very low in Qaim: Only two of the 99 respondents had heard of the LPC. Both of these were very satisfied with the LPC's work.

Table 14. Awareness and Perceptions of Local Peace Committees (Qaim)

Number of Respondents		N=99
Have you heard of the "Local Peace Committee" in this community?	Yes	2%
	No	97%
How satisfied are you with the work of the Local Peace Committee in this community?	Very satisfied	100%
	Somewhat satisfied	0%
	Somewhat unsatisfied	0%
	Very unsatisfied	0%

5. Habbaniyah, Anbar

Demographics: In Habbaniyah, UNDP surveyed 96 residents, 25% women and 75% men. 93% of respondents were born in Habbaniyah. 28% had completed primary school and 38% had completed a bachelor's degree or higher. The unemployment rate was 21% and most respondents (89%) reported a monthly income below 100,000 IQD (Table 2).

Number of Respondents		N=96	
	Gender	Women: Men:	25% 75%
	Education	None: Primary (years 1-6): Secondary (years 7-9): High school: Bachelor's degree and higher:	3% 28% 21% 9% 38%
	Religious Education	Yes: No:	25% 75%
	Born in this Community	Yes: No:	93% 7%
	Monthly Income	Less than 500,000 IQD: 500,000 IQD-100,000 IQD: 1,000,000 IQD-2,000,000 IQD:	45% 43% 11%
	Unemployment Rate		21%
	Average Age		38.5 years

Horizontal Social Cohesion: 40% of respondents identified primarily as an Iraqi citizen, but an almost equal percentage (39%) identified primarily as a member of their religious group. A substantial minority (20%) identified primarily as a member of their tribe.

A significant majority of respondents said that the community would be very likely to accept IDPs originally from Habbaniyah (85%) and a smaller majority said that the community would be very likely to accept IDPs from other areas who want to settle in Habbaniyah (69%). 67% said it is very likely that someone belonging to a different religious who moves to Habbaniyah would be able to coexist in peace with people from their religious group. A majority of respondents (60%) said that they feel completely or somewhat free to express their opinions around other community members and a minority (28%) said that they trust everyone or most people in the community (Table 3).

Number of Respondents		N=96	
Most Important Personal Identity	Iraqi citizen:	40%	
	Member of my tribe:	20%	
	Member of my religious group:	39%	
	Member of this community:	2%	
If (IDPs) who are from this community return, how likely is it that the community will accept them?	Very likely:	86%	
	Somewhat likely	14%	
	Somewhat unlikely	0%	
	Very unlikely	0%	

If (IDPs) who are not from this community want to stay here, how likely is it that the community will accept them?	Very likely: Somewhat likely Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely	69% 30% 1% 0%
If someone belonging to a different religion moves to this community, how likely is it that they would be able to coexist in peace with people from your religious group?	Very likely: Somewhat likely Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely	67% 29% 4% 0%
Do you feel you can freely express your opinions when you are around other community members?	Completely free: Somewhat free: Somewhat uncomfortable Very uncomfortable:	6% 54% 39% 1%
How much do you trust other people in this community?	I trust everyone: I trust most people: I trust a small number of people: I don't trust anyone:	1% 27% 68% 4%

Vertical Social Cohesion: Trust in state institutions was fairly low in Habbaniyah. Only 24% of respondents said that they have some or a lot of trust in the central government in Baghdad, with slightly higher levels of trust in provincial government authorities (39%) and local (district) government authorities (48%). Rule of law was perceived as “very weak” by 47% of respondents. Trust in police was significantly higher than trust in government: 100% had some or a lot of trust in local police and 92% had some or a lot of trust in federal police. The official justice system was perceived as fair by 80% of respondents and the tribal justice system was perceived as fair by 83% of respondents.

When asked about what they would do in a hypothetical land dispute, 46% of respondents would seek help from a tribal leader, indicating the strength of the tribal justice system in Habbaniyah. 30% would seek help from someone with connections and smaller percentages would seek help from the police (11%), family members (6%), or local authorities/mukhtars (6%). In cases of theft, however, the vast majority of respondents would go to the police (90%) and only 8% would turn to tribal leaders. In cases of physical assault, the vast majority (79%) would also go to the police, but 19% would turn to tribal leaders.

100% of respondents rated the security situation as somewhat or very safe. 70% of respondents believed that security had improved in the last six months and 51% expected that security will stay the same over the next six months; another 39% expected security to improve. (Table 4).

Table 4. Vertical Social Cohesion (Habbaniyah)		
Number of Respondents		N=96
How much trust do you have in the central government in Baghdad?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	0% 24% 26% 50%
How much trust do you have in your provincial government authorities?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	1% 38% 54% 7%
How much trust do you have in your local/district government authorities?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	2% 46% 47% 5%
How strong or weak is “rule of law” in this community? (“Rule of law” is present if the government enforces the laws equally and fairly for all people without corruption or favoritism)	Very strong: Somewhat strong: Somewhat weak: Very weak:	2% 29% 22% 47%

How much trust do you have in the local police in this community?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	56% 44% 0% 0%
How much trust do you have in the federal police?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	51% 41% 8% 0%
How fair or unfair is the official justice system in this area (state courts)?	Very fair Somewhat fair Somewhat unfair Very unfair	3% 77% 19% 1%
How fair or unfair is the traditional tribal justice system in this area?	Very fair Somewhat fair Somewhat unfair Very unfair	1% 82% 17% 0%
If you were to have a dispute with another person in your community over land ownership, whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	6% 30% 6% 46% 0% 11% 0% 0%
If someone from this community stole money from you, to whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	0% 0% 1% 8% 0% 90% 0% 0%
If, God forbid, a member of this community physically assaulted and injured a member of your family, whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	1% 0% 0% 19% 0% 79% 1% 0%
How would you rate the security situation in this community?	Very safe Somewhat safe Somewhat unsafe Very unsafe	77% 23% 0% 0%
How safe is it for children to play outside without adult supervision in this community?	Very safe Somewhat safe Somewhat unsafe Very unsafe	52% 35% 13% 0%
In the last six months, have there been any changes in the security situation in this community?	Security has improved Security has stayed the same Security has gotten worse	70% 30% 0%
In the next six months, do you expect any changes in the security situation in this community?	Security will improve Security will stay the same Security will get worse	39% 51% 10%

Issues of Greatest Concern: The five issues of greatest concern in Habbaniyah were unemployment (81% very concerned), the quality of basic services (81%), central government corruption (79%), provincial government corruption (68%), and healthcare (60%). Only 5% of respondents were very concerned about the return of families with perceived ISIL affiliation, although 70% were somewhat concerned.

Table 5. Issues of Greatest Concern (Habbaniyah)

Number of Respondents		N=96
How concerned are you about unemployment and lack of job opportunities in your community?	Not concerned at all	0%
	Somewhat concerned	19%
	Very concerned	81%
How concerned are you about the quality of basic services in your community (e.g. water and electricity)?	Not concerned at all	0%
	Somewhat concerned	19%
	Very concerned	81%
How concerned are you about public health problems and healthcare in your community?	Not concerned at all	0%
	Somewhat concerned	40%
	Very concerned	60%
How concerned are you about corruption at the national government level (Baghdad)?	Not concerned at all	0%
	Somewhat concerned	21%
	Very concerned	79%
How concerned are you about corruption at the province level?	Not concerned at all	0%
	Somewhat concerned	32%
	Very concerned	68%
How concerned are you about corruption at the local government (district) level?	Not concerned at all	0%
	Somewhat concerned	44%
	Very concerned	56%
How concerned are you about corruption at the local government (district) level?	Not concerned at all	0%
	Somewhat concerned	44%
	Very concerned	56%
How concerned are you about the quality of schools and education in your community?	Not concerned at all	9%
	Somewhat concerned	53%
	Very concerned	38%
How concerned are you about the speed of reconstruction of roads and houses in your community?	Not concerned at all	18%
	Somewhat concerned	74%
	Very concerned	8%
How concerned are you about bribery by state security forces in your community?	Not concerned at all	10%
	Somewhat concerned	44%
	Very concerned	44%
How concerned are you about violence against civilians by state security forces in your community?	Not concerned at all	28%
	Somewhat concerned	65%
	Very concerned	6%
How concerned are you about harassment of women in your community?	Not concerned at all	27%
	Somewhat concerned	52%
	Very concerned	20%
How concerned are you about revenge killings or other violent acts of revenge in your community?	Not concerned at all	65%
	Somewhat concerned	30%
	Very concerned	1%
How concerned are you about the return of people who have families ties to Daesh in this community?	Not concerned at all	24%
	Somewhat concerned	70%
	Very concerned	5%
How concerned are you about the possibility of a Daesh resurgence in Iraq?	Not concerned at all	41%
	Somewhat concerned	53%
	Very concerned	5%

Reintegration Policies: When asked about their views on different policy options for dealing with ISIL-associated IDPs, 69% of respondents were in favor of allowing them to continue living in camps temporarily until their home communities decide they can return—an option that will become increasingly impossible as the Iraqi government prepares to close remaining IDP camps in 2021. Another 19% favored permanent relocation to other communities away from their homes and the vast majority (92%) favored mandatory psychological rehabilitation before IDPs are allowed to return home (Table 6).

Table 6. Reintegration of Families with Perceived ISIL Affiliation (Habbaniyah)

Number of Respondents	N=96
Many people with family ties to Daesh were displaced during the conflict. There have been several proposals about what to do with people who have family ties to Daesh but did not personally commit any crimes. Do you agree with any of the following proposals? Select all	• Permanently relocated to other communities (not home) 19%
	• Live in camps temporarily until home communities decide they can return 69%
	• Psychological rehabilitation before being allows to return home 92%
Which of the following conditions do you believe that people with family ties to Daesh should fulfill before being allowed to return to their communities? Select all.	Psychological rehabilitation program 98%
	Public apology 63%
	Formal disavowal through court 98%
	Community service 39%
	Pay compensation to victims of ISIL 31%
	Short prison sentence (1-5 years) 15%
Long prison sentence (5+ years) 5%	
Who do you think should be responsible for bringing justice to the victims of Daesh?	Iraqi state courts 97%
	The tribal justice system 3%
Who do you think should be responsible for deciding if families perceived as affiliated with Daesh should be allowed to return to this community? Select all.	Iraqi government and security forces 98%
	Tribal leaders 64%
	Religious leaders 43%
	UN agencies or international NGOs 49%
	Local Peace Committees 43%

Reintegration Scenarios:⁷ Support for reintegration of different hypothetical ISIL-associated IDPs was very high for four of the scenarios (at least 96%), but considerably lower for the woman who voluntarily married an ISIL member: Only 52% of respondents (N=43) were willing to allow her reintegration (Table 8). Among these 43 respondents, a significant majority (84%) would be willing to allow her reintegration if she denounces her ISIL-associated family members in court. Among other reintegration mechanisms, the next two most effective were psychological rehabilitation (72%) and paying compensation to the victims of ISIL (67%).

Table 7. Reintegration Scenario 1: Woman Involuntarily Married to an ISIL Member (Habbaniyah)

Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old woman from this community whose husband joined Daesh after they were married. She says that she disagreed with her husband's decision to join Daesh and condemns the group. This woman has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?

Number of Respondents	N=96
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes 98%
	No 2%
	Refused to answer 0%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes 98%
	No 2%
	Refused to answer 0%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes 97%
	No 3%
	Refused to answer 0%

⁷ For hypothetical scenarios where a significant number of respondents (at least 10%) refused to allow the reintegration of individuals with family ties to ISIL, we do not take into account follow-up questions that were only asked to respondents who initially rejected reintegration due to the insufficient amount of answers required for a statistically significant analysis. These follow-up questions asked whether the respondent could be persuaded to allow reintegration of the ISIL-associated person if he or she received a punishment or offered compensation of some kind and are analyzed only for the two scenarios in which a significant number of respondents (more than 10%) rejected the reintegration of the hypothetical individual with families ties to ISIL: the 30-year-old woman who voluntarily married an ISIL member and the 30-year-old man whose brother joined ISIL.

Table 8. Reintegration Scenario 2: Woman Voluntarily Married to an ISIL Member (Habbaniyah)

Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old woman from this community who voluntarily married a Daesh fighter. She has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with her returning to this community?

Number of Respondents		N=96
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	52%
	No	45%
	Refused to answer	3%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	57%
	No	41%
	Refused to answer	2%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	52%
	No	46%
	Refused to answer	2%

For respondents who refused to allow return		N=43
---	--	------

Would you allow her to return if she completes a psychological rehabilitation program?	Yes	72%
	No	28%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow her to return if she publicly apologizes for the crimes of her family member(s) who joined Daesh?	Yes	60%
	No	40%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow her to return if she formally disavows her family member(s) who joined Daesh through a court of the state?	Yes	84%
	No	16%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow her to return if she completes several months of community service such as cleaning streets or rebuilding houses?	Yes	56%
	No	44%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow her to return if she agrees to pay compensation to the victims of Daesh?	Yes	67%
	No	33%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow her to return if she serves a short prison sentence (1-5 years)?	Yes	51%
	No	47%
	Refused to answer	1%
Would you allow her to return if she serves a long prison sentence (more than 5 years)?	Yes	49%
	No	49%
	Refused to answer	1%

Table 9. Reintegration Scenario 3: Young Man Whose Brother Joined ISIL (Habbaniyah)

Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old man from this community whose brother joined Daesh, but the man says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this man has any ties to Daesh other than his brother's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?

Number of Respondents		N=96
Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?	Yes	96%
	No	3%
	Refused to answer	1%
Would you share a meal with his family?	Yes	97%
	No	3%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	93%
	No	7%
	Refused to answer	0%

Table 10. Reintegration Scenario 4: Elderly Man Whose Son Joined ISIL (Habbaniyah)

Please imagine that there is a 75-year-old man from this community whose son joined Daesh, but the man says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this man has any ties to Daesh other than his son's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community.

Number of Respondents		N=99
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	100%
	No	0%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	100%
	No	0%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	97%
	No	3%
	Refused to answer	0%

Table 11. Reintegration Scenario 5: Young Boy Whose Father Joined ISIL (Habbaniyah)

Please imagine that there is a 12-year-old boy from this community whose father joined Daesh, but the boy says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this boy has any ties to Daesh other than his father's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community.

Number of Respondents		N=96
Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?	Yes	99%
	No	0%
	Refused to answer	1%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	99%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	96%
	No	4%
	Refused to answer	0%

Conflict-Related Casualties and Property Damage: Out of 96 respondents in Habbaniyah, half were displaced and the other half stayed for the duration of the conflict with ISIL. 22% experienced property damage caused by ISIL.

Table 12. Conflict-Related Casualties and Property Damage (Habbaniyah)

Number of Respondents		N=96
Did you stay in this community when it was captured by Daesh or did you displace to somewhere else?	I stayed	50%
	I displaced	50%
Did your household (the people who live in this house) experience any of the following harms committed by Daesh?	My house or land was damaged	22%
	My house or land was confiscated	3%
	I was injured	3%
	A member of my household was injured	6%
	A member of my household was killed	5%
Did Daesh commit any acts of sexual violence or harassment in this community?	Yes	44%
	No	45%
	Refused to answer	7%
Did Daesh commit any acts of sexual violence or harassment against a member of your family?	Yes	0%
	No	100%
	Refused to answer	0%

Did your household experience any of the following harms during the military operation to liberate this area from Daesh? Select all	My house or land was damaged	30%
	My house or land was confiscated	2%
	I was injured	1%
	A member of my household was injured	4%
	A member of my household was killed	1%
	Member of household experienced sexual violence	3%
If yes to any of the previous harms, whom do you believe was responsible	Daesh	65%
	Iraqi armed forces	10%
	United States armed forces	0%

Perceptions of COVID-19 and Healthcare: 100% of respondents were somewhat or very concerned about the spread of COVID-19 in the community. 28% believed that the COVID-19 crisis is improving, but 25% believed it was getting worse. 98% approved of the response of local government authorities to COVID-19 and 84% approved of the response of the UN and humanitarian organizations. Trust in hospitals was low (57%), but the vast majority of respondents (99%) said that they would bring a family member to a hospital if he or she becomes sick with COVID-19. A significantly smaller percentage (78%) would allow female family members to be quarantined overnight at a hospital, and this difference may reflect tribal and religious norms against women leaving their homes without a male guardian (Table 13).

Table 13. Perceptions of COVID-19 and Healthcare (Habbaniyah)

Number of Respondents	N=96	
How concerned are you about the spread of COVID-19 in your community?	Not concerned at all:	0%
	Somewhat concerned:	64%
	Very concerned:	36%
Do you believe that the COVID-19 crisis is getting better or worse in this community?	Getting better:	28%
	Staying the same:	47%
	Getting worse:	25%
The Iraqi government has introduced several measures including a curfew and closing airports to reduce the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Do you think that these measures are too strict or not strict enough?	Too strict:	0%
	Appropriate:	82%
	Not strict enough:	18%
How positive or negative of a role are state security forces playing in the enforcement of government decisions related to COVID-19?	Very positive:	58%
	Somewhat positive:	41%
	Somewhat negative:	1%
	Very negative:	0%
To what extent do you approve of the response of local government authorities to COVID-19?	Strongly approve	45%
	Somewhat approve	53%
	Somewhat disapprove	2%
	Strongly disapprove	0%
To what extent do you approve of the response of state security forces to COVID-19 in this community?	Strongly approve	52%
	Somewhat approve	44%
	Somewhat disapprove	2%
	Strongly disapprove	0%
To what extent do you approve of the response of the UN and other humanitarian organizations to COVID-19 in this community?	Strongly approve	46%
	Somewhat approve	38%
	Somewhat disapprove	14%
	Strongly disapprove	3%
How much trust do you have in the government healthcare system and hospitals?	A lot of trust	1%
	Some trust	56%
	Not very much trust	43%
	No trust	0%
If (God forbid) a member of your household were to become sick with COVID-19, would you bring him or her to a hospital?	Yes	99%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	0%

If (God forbid) a female member of your family were to become sick with COVID-19, would you allow her to be quarantined by herself at a hospital until she recovers?	Yes	78%
	No	22%
	Refused to answer	0%

Awareness of and Perceptions of Local Peace Committees: Habbaniyah had the highest level of awareness of LPCs among the four communities: 45%. Of those who were aware of the LPC, 21% were very satisfied and 77% were somewhat satisfied with its work, with only 2% somewhat unsatisfied (Table 14).

Table 14. Awareness and Perceptions of Local Peace Committees (Habbaniyah)

Number of Respondents		N=96
Have you heard of the “Local Peace Committee” in this community?	Yes	45%
	No	55%
How satisfied are you with the work of the Local Peace Committee in this community?	Very satisfied	21%
	Somewhat satisfied	77%
	Somewhat unsatisfied	2%
	Very unsatisfied	0%

6. Muhalabiya, Ninewa

Demographics: In Muhalabiya, UNDP surveyed 104 residents, 37% women and 63% men. 87% of respondents were born in Muhalabiya. 62% had completed only primary school and 4% had completed a bachelor's degree or higher. The unemployment rate was 12% and most respondents (83%) reported a monthly income below 500,000 IQD (Table 2).

Number of Respondents		N=104	
	Gender	Women: Men:	37% 63%
	Education	None: Primary (years 1-6): Secondary (years 7-9): High school: Bachelor's degree and higher:	15% 62% 16% 2% 4%
	Religious Education	Yes: No:	19% 81%
	Born in this Community	Yes: No:	87% 13%
	Monthly Income	None Less than 500,000 IQD: 500,000 IQD-100,000 IQD: 1,000,000 IQD-2,000,000 IQD:	20% 63% 13% 3%
	Unemployment Rate		12%
	Average Age		43.5 years

Horizontal Social Cohesion: 63% of respondents identified primarily as an Iraqi citizen, with smaller percentages identifying primarily as a member of their religious group (25%) or tribe (12%).

A significant majority of respondents said that the community would be very likely to accept IDPs originally from Muhalabiya (74%) and a smaller majority said that the community would be very likely to accept IDPs from other areas who want to settle in Muhalabiya (59%). 38% said it is very likely that someone belonging to a different religious group who moves to Muhalabiya would be able to coexist in peace with people from their religious group. A majority of respondents (90%) said that they feel completely or somewhat free to express their opinions around other community members and a smaller majority (73%) said that they trust everyone or most people in the community (Table 3).

Number of Respondents		N=104	
Most Important Personal Identity	Iraqi citizen:	63%	
	Member of my tribe:	12%	
	Member of my religious group:	25%	
	Member of this community:	0%	
If (IDPs) who are from this community return, how likely is it that the community will accept them?	Very likely:	74%	
	Somewhat likely	25%	
	Somewhat unlikely	0%	
	Very unlikely	1%	

If (IDPs) who are not from this community want to stay here, how likely is it that the community will accept them?	Very likely: Somewhat likely Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely	59% 26% 9% 0% 7%
If someone belonging to a different religion moves to this community, how likely is it that they would be able to coexist in peace with people from your religious group?	Very likely: Somewhat likely Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely	38% 14% 9% 17% 20%
Do you feel you can freely express your opinions when you are around other community members?	Completely free: Somewhat free: Somewhat uncomfortable Very uncomfortable:	47% 43% 7% 3%
How much do you trust other people in this community?	I trust everyone: I trust most people: I trust a small number of people: I don't trust anyone:	39% 34% 20% 7%

Vertical Social Cohesion: Trust in state institutions was moderate in Mahlabiyah. 68% of respondents said that they have some or a lot of trust in the central government in Baghdad, with slightly higher levels of trust in provincial government authorities (75%) and local (district) government authorities (84%). Rule of law was perceived as very or somewhat strong by 58% of respondents. Trust in police was slightly higher than trust in government: 86% had some or a lot of trust in local police and 89% had some or a lot of trust in federal police. The official justice system was perceived as fair by 68% of respondents and the tribal justice system was also perceived as fair by 68% of respondents.

When asked about what they would do in a hypothetical land dispute, 26% of respondents would seek help from a tribal leader, 22% would turn to local authorities (the mukhtar), 18% would turn to someone with connections, 13% would turn to the police, and smaller percentages would seek help from courts (2%), a religious leader (1%), or self-help (1%). The pattern was similar for hypothetical cases of theft and physical assault.

90% of respondents rated the security situation as somewhat or very safe. 57% of respondents believed that security had improved in the last six months and 70% expected that security will improve over the next six months (Table 4).

Table 4. Vertical Social Cohesion (Muhlabiya)		
Number of Respondents		N=104
How much trust do you have in the central government in Baghdad?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	26% 42% 24% 8%
How much trust do you have in your provincial government authorities?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	32% 43% 20% 4%
How much trust do you have in your local/district government authorities?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	55% 29% 12% 4%
How strong or weak is "rule of law" in this community? ("Rule of law" is present if the government enforces the laws equally and fairly for all people without corruption or favoritism)	Very strong: Somewhat strong: Somewhat weak: Very weak:	25% 33% 26% 14%

How much trust do you have in the local police in this community?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	36% 50% 12% 2%
How much trust do you have in the federal police?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	39% 48% 10% 1%
How fair or unfair is the official justice system in this area (state courts)?	Very fair Somewhat fair Somewhat unfair Very unfair	22% 46% 21% 9%
How fair or unfair is the traditional tribal justice system in this area?	Very fair Somewhat fair Somewhat unfair Very unfair	24% 44% 27% 4%
If you were to have a dispute with another person in your community over land ownership, whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	16% 18% 22% 27% 1% 13% 2% 1%
If someone from this community stole money from you, to whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	13% 19% 19% 28% 2% 15% 4% 0%
If, God forbid, a member of this community physically assaulted and injured a member of your family, whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	13% 17% 23% 27% 1% 13% 5% 1%
How would you rate the security situation in this community?	Very safe Somewhat safe Somewhat unsafe Very unsafe	38% 52% 10% 0%
How safe is it for children to play outside without adult supervision in this community?	Very safe Somewhat safe Somewhat unsafe Very unsafe	38% 49% 13% 1%
In the last six months, have there been any changes in the security situation in this community?	Security has improved Security has stayed the same Security has gotten worse	57% 42% 1%
In the next six months, do you expect any changes in the security situation in this community?	Security will improve Security will stay the same Security will get worse	70% 29% 1%

Issues of Greatest Concern: The six issues of greatest concern in Muhalabiya were the possibility of ISIL's resurgence (62% "very concerned"), the return of people with family ties to ISIL (58%), revenge killings (51%), bribery by state security forces (38%), provincial government corruption (37%), and harassment of women (37%).

Muhalabiya had the highest level of concern about ISIL's resurgence and ISIL-associated IDPs among the four communities.

Table 5. Issues of Greatest Concern (Muhalabiya)		
Number of Respondents		N=104
How concerned are you about unemployment and lack of job opportunities in your community?	Not concerned at all	44%
	Somewhat concerned	26%
	Very concerned	30%
How concerned are you about the quality of basic services in your community (e.g. water and electricity)?	Not concerned at all	24%
	Somewhat concerned	63%
	Very concerned	13%
How concerned are you about public health problems and healthcare in your community?	Not concerned at all	25%
	Somewhat concerned	46%
	Very concerned	27%
How concerned are you about corruption at the national government level (Baghdad)?	Not concerned at all	21%
	Somewhat concerned	43%
	Very concerned	34%
How concerned are you about corruption at the province level?	Not concerned at all	015%
	Somewhat concerned	45%
	Very concerned	37%
How concerned are you about corruption at the local government (district) level?	Not concerned at all	19%
	Somewhat concerned	47%
	Very concerned	26%
How concerned are you about the quality of schools and education in your community?	Not concerned at all	13%
	Somewhat concerned	58%
	Very concerned	26%
How concerned are you about the speed of reconstruction of roads and houses in your community?	Not concerned at all	13%
	Somewhat concerned	42%
	Very concerned	38%
	Refused to answer	7%
How concerned are you about bribery by state security forces in your community?	Not concerned at all	10%
	Somewhat concerned	44%
	Very concerned	44%
How concerned are you about violence against civilians by state security forces in your community?	Not concerned at all	18%
	Somewhat concerned	44%
	Very concerned	31%
	Refused to answer	7%
How concerned are you about harassment of women in your community?	Not concerned at all	10%
	Somewhat concerned	45%
	Very concerned	37%
How concerned are you about revenge killings or other violent acts of revenge in your community?	Not concerned at all	10%
	Somewhat concerned	35%
	Very concerned	51%
	Refused to answer	5%
How concerned are you about the return of people who have families ties to Daesh in this community?	Not concerned at all	10%
	Somewhat concerned	31%
	Very concerned	58%
How concerned are you about the possibility of a Daesh resurgence in Iraq?	Not concerned at all	8%
	Somewhat concerned	26%
	Very concerned	62%

Reintegration Policies:⁸ When asked about their views on different policy options for dealing with ISIL-associated IDPs, 64% of respondents were in favor of allowing them to continue living in camps temporarily until their home communities decide they can return—an option that will become increasingly impossible as the Iraqi government prepares to close remaining IDP camps in 2021. Another 63% favored permanent relocation to other communities away from their homes and 42% favored mandatory psychological rehabilitation before IDPs are allowed to return home.

Reintegration Scenarios: Support for reintegration was very high in Muhalabiya (at least 96%) for four of the scenarios, but somewhat lower for the woman who voluntarily married an ISIL member, although a significant majority (87%) still supported her return (Table 8).

Table 6. Reintegration of Families with Perceived ISIL Affiliation (Muhalabiya)		
Number of Respondents		N=104
Many people with family ties to Daesh were displaced during the conflict. There have been several proposals about what to do with people who have family ties to Daesh but did not personally commit any crimes. Do you agree with any of the following proposals? Select all	• Permanently relocated to other communities (not home)	63%
	• Live in camps temporarily until home communities decide they can return	64%
	• Psychological rehabilitation before being allowed to return home	42%
Which of the following conditions do you believe that people with family ties to Daesh should fulfill before being allowed to return to their communities? Select all.	Psychological rehabilitation program	71%
	Public apology	88%
	Formal disavowal through court	68%
	Community service	43%
	Pay compensation to victims of ISIL	27%
	Short prison sentence (1-5 years)	20%
Who do you think should be responsible for bringing justice to the victims of Daesh?	Long prison sentence (5+ years)	8%
	Iraqi state courts	87%
Who do you think should be responsible for deciding if families perceived as affiliated with Daesh should be allowed to return to this community? Select all.	The tribal justice system	12%
	Iraqi government and security forces	97%
	Tribal leaders	82%
	Religious leaders	47%
	UN agencies or international NGOs	23%
	Local Peace Committees	24%

Table 7. Reintegration Scenario 1: Woman Involuntarily Married to an ISIL Member (Muhalabiya)		
Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old woman from this community whose husband joined Daesh after they were married. She says that she disagreed with her husband's decision to join Daesh and condemns the group. This woman has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?		
Number of Respondents		N=104
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	96%
	No	4%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	90%
	No	10%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	95%
	No	5%
	Refused to answer	0%

⁸ For hypothetical scenarios where a significant number of respondents (at least 10%) refused to allow the reintegration of individuals with family ties to ISIL, we do not take into account follow-up questions that were only asked to respondents who initially rejected reintegration due to the insufficient amount of answers required for a statistically significant analysis. These follow-up questions asked whether the respondent could be persuaded to allow reintegration of the ISIL-associated person if he or she received a punishment or offered compensation of some kind and are analyzed only for the two scenarios in which a significant number of respondents (more than 10%) rejected the reintegration of the hypothetical individual with families ties to ISIL: the 30-year-old woman who voluntarily married an ISIL member and the 30-year-old man whose brother joined ISIL.

Table 8. Reintegration Scenario 2: Woman Voluntarily Married to an ISIL Member (Muhlabiya)

Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old woman from this community who voluntarily married a Daesh fighter. She has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with her returning to this community?

Number of Respondents		N=104
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	87%
	No	10%
	Refused to answer	3%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	73%
	No	22%
	Refused to answer	5%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	78%
	No	15%
	Refused to answer	7%

Table 9. Reintegration Scenario 3: Young Man Whose Brother Joined ISIL (Muhlabiya)

Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old man from this community whose brother joined Daesh, but the man says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this man has any ties to Daesh other than his brother's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?

Number of Respondents		N=104
Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?	Yes	98%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	1%
Would you share a meal with his family?	Yes	97%
	No	2%
	Refused to answer	1%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	96%
	No	3%
	Refused to answer	1%

Table 10. Reintegration Scenario 4: Elderly Man Whose Son Joined ISIL (Muhlabiya)

Please imagine that there is a 75-year-old man from this community whose son joined Daesh, but the man says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this man has any ties to Daesh other than his son's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community.

Number of Respondents		N=104
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	99%
	No	0%
	Refused to answer	1%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	99%
	No	0%
	Refused to answer	1%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	97%
	No	2%
	Refused to answer	0%

Table 11. Reintegration Scenario 5: Young Boy Whose Father Joined ISIL (Muhalabiya)

Please imagine that there is a 12-year-old boy from this community whose father joined Daesh, but the boy says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this boy has any ties to Daesh other than his father's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community.

Number of Respondents		N=104
Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?	Yes	99%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	96%
	No	1%
	Refused to answer	2%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	98%
	No	0%
	Refused to answer	1%

Conflict-Related Casualties and Property Damage: Most survey respondents (93%) stayed in Muhalabiya for the duration of the conflict with ISIL; only 7% were displaced. 53% experienced property damaged caused by ISIL (Table 12).

Table 12. Conflict-Related Casualties and Property Damage (Muhalabiya)

Number of Respondents		N=104
Did you stay in this community when it was captured by Daesh or did you displace to somewhere else?	I stayed	93%
	I displaced	7%
Did your household (the people who live in this house) experience any of the following harms committed by Daesh?	My house or land was damaged	53%
	My house or land was confiscated	18%
	I was injured	6%
	A member of my household was injured	3%
	A member of my household was killed	5%
Did Daesh commit any acts of sexual violence or harassment in this community?	Yes	24%
	No	45%
	Refused to answer	31%
Did Daesh commit any acts of sexual violence or harassment against a member of your family?	Yes	3%
	No	85%
	Refused to answer	13%
Did your household experience any of the following harms during the military operation to liberate this area from Daesh? Select all	My house or land was damaged	70%
	My house or land was confiscated	8%
	I was injured	4%
	A member of my household was injured	1%
	A member of my household was killed	3%
	Member of household experienced sexual violence	9%
If yes to any of the previous harms, whom do you believe was responsible	Daesh	81%
	Iraqi armed forces	6%
	United States armed forces	0%

Perceptions of COVID-19 and Healthcare: 71% of respondents were somewhat or very concerned about the spread of COVID-19 in the community. 48% believed that the COVID-19 crisis is getting better, but 39% believed it was getting worse. 94% approved of the response of local government authorities to COVID-19 and 97% approved of the response of the UN and humanitarian organizations. Trust in hospitals was high (84%) and the vast majority of respondents (97%) said that they would bring a family member to a hospital if he or she becomes sick with COVID-19 and a similarly high percentage (94%) would allow female family members to be quarantined overnight at a hospital (Table 13).

Table 13. Perceptions of COVID-19 and Healthcare (Muhalabiya)

Number of Respondents		N=104
How concerned are you about the spread of COVID-19 in your community?	Not concerned at all:	29%
	Somewhat concerned:	31%
	Very concerned:	40%
Do you believe that the COVID-19 crisis is getting better or worse in this community?	Getting better:	48%
	Staying the same:	13%
	Getting worse:	39%
The Iraqi government has introduced several measures including a curfew and closing airports to reduce the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Do you think that these measures are too strict or not strict enough?	Too strict:	40%
	Appropriate:	54%
	Not strict enough:	6%
How positive or negative of a role are state security forces playing in the enforcement of government decisions related to COVID-19?	Very positive:	38%
	Somewhat positive:	55%
	Somewhat negative:	5%
	Very negative:	2%
To what extent do you approve of the response of local government authorities to COVID-19?	Strongly approve	37%
	Somewhat approve	58%
	Somewhat disapprove	6%
	Strongly disapprove	0%
To what extent do you approve of the response of state security forces to COVID-19 in this community?	Strongly approve	46%
	Somewhat approve	50%
	Somewhat disapprove	4%
	Strongly disapprove	0%
To what extent do you approve of the response of the UN and other humanitarian organizations to COVID-19 in this community?	Strongly approve	46%
	Somewhat approve	51%
	Somewhat disapprove	2%
	Strongly disapprove	1%
How much trust do you have in the government healthcare system and hospitals?	A lot of trust	24%
	Some trust	60%
	Not very much trust	8%
	No trust	9%
If (God forbid) a member of your household were to become sick with COVID-19, would you bring him or her to a hospital?	Yes	97%
	No	3%
	Refused to answer	0%
If (God forbid) a female member of your family were to become sick with COVID-19, would you allow her to be quarantined by herself at a hospital until she recovers?	Yes	94%
	No	6%
	Refused to answer	0%

Awareness of and Perceptions of Local Peace Committees: 19% of respondents in Muhalabiya were aware of the LPC. Of these, 85% were very satisfied and 15% were somewhat satisfied with the LPC's work (Table 14).

Table 14. Awareness and Perceptions of Local Peace Committees (Muhalabiya)

Number of Respondents		N=104
Have you heard of the "Local Peace Committee" in this community?	Yes	19%
	No	81%
How satisfied are you with the work of the Local Peace Committee in this community?	Very satisfied	85%
	Somewhat satisfied	15%
	Somewhat unsatisfied	0%
	Very unsatisfied	0%

7. Tuz Khurmato, Salah al-Din

Demographics: In Tuz Khurmato, UNDP surveyed 102 residents, 35% women and 65% men. 87% of respondents were born in Tuz Khurmato. 27% had completed only primary school and 14% had completed a bachelor's degree or higher. The unemployment rate was 49% and most respondents (65%) reported a monthly income between below 500,000 IQD (Table 2).

Number of Respondents		N=102	
	Gender	Women: 35% Men: 65%	
	Education	None: 23% Primary (years 1-6): 27% Secondary (years 7-9): 11% High school: 24% Bachelor's degree and higher: 14%	
	Religious Education	Yes: 9% No: 91%	
	Born in this Community	Yes: 87% No: 13%	
	Monthly Income	None: 16% Less than 500,000 IQD: 49% 500,000 IQD-100,000 IQD: 27% 1,000,000 IQD-2,000,000 IQD: 8%	
	Unemployment Rate	49%	
	Average Age	39.5 years	

Horizontal Social Cohesion: 65% of respondents identified primarily as an Iraqi citizen and 25% identified primarily as a member of their religious group, with smaller numbers identifying as a member of their tribe (7%) and a member of the community (3%).

A significant majority of respondents said that the community would be very likely to accept IDPs originally from Tuz Khurmato (71%), but a much smaller percentage said that the community would be very likely to accept IDPs from other areas who want to settle in Tuz Khurmato (28%). 30% said it is very likely that someone belonging to a different religious who moves to Tuz Khurmato would be able to coexist in peace with people from their religious group. A majority of respondents (68%) said that they feel completely or somewhat free to express their opinions around other community members and a smaller majority (60%) said that they trust everyone or most people in the community (Table 3).

Number of Respondents		N=102	
Most Important Personal Identity	Iraqi citizen:	65%	
	Member of my tribe:	7%	
	Member of my religious group:	25%	
	Member of this community:	3%	
If (IDPs) who are from this community return, how likely is it that the community will accept them?	Very likely:	71%	
	Somewhat likely	28%	
	Somewhat unlikely	1%	
	Very unlikely	0%	

If (IDPs) who are not from this community want to stay here, how likely is it that the community will accept them?	Very likely:	27%
	Somewhat likely	56%
	Somewhat unlikely	17%
	Very unlikely	0%
If someone belonging to a different religion moves to this community, how likely is it that they would be able to coexist in peace with people from your religious group?	Very likely:	30%
	Somewhat likely	51%
	Somewhat unlikely	16%
	Very unlikely	3%
Do you feel you can freely express your opinions when you are around other community members?	Completely free:	7%
	Somewhat free:	61%
	Somewhat uncomfortable	30%
	Very uncomfortable:	2%
How much do you trust other people in this community?	I trust everyone:	8%
	I trust most people:	52%
	I trust a small number of people:	36%
	I don't trust anyone:	4%

Vertical Social Cohesion: Trust in state institutions was fairly low in Tuz Khurmato. Only 46% of respondents said that they have some or a lot of trust in the central government in Baghdad, with even lower levels of trust in provincial government authorities (28%) and local (district) government authorities (34%). Rule of law was perceived as very or somewhat strong by 75% of respondents. Trust in police was significantly higher than trust in government: 89% had some or a lot of trust in local police and 86% had some or a lot of trust in federal police. The official justice system was perceived as fair by 74% of respondents and the tribal justice system was perceived as significantly less fair (39%).

When asked about what they would do in a hypothetical land dispute, 30% would seek help from someone with connections. 20% would rely on self-help, 17% would turn to family members, 12% would turn to the police, 10% would turn to tribal leaders, and 10% would turn to courts. Smaller percentages would seek help from religious leaders (1%) and local authorities/the mukhtar (1%). In cases of theft, however, the majority of respondents would go to the police (54%). In cases of physical assault, 23% would seek help from family members and 17% would rely on self-help.

97% of respondents rated the security situation as somewhat or very safe. 63% of respondents believed that security had improved in the last six months and 60% believed that security will improve over the next six months (Table 4).

Table 4. Vertical Social Cohesion (Tuz Khurmato)		
Number of Respondents		N=102
How much trust do you have in the central government in Baghdad?	A lot of trust:	7%
	Some trust:	39%
	Not very much trust:	38%
	No trust:	12%
How much trust do you have in your provincial government authorities?	A lot of trust:	0%
	Some trust:	28%
	Not very much trust:	43%
	No trust:	25%
How much trust do you have in your local/district government authorities?	A lot of trust:	1%
	Some trust:	33%
	Not very much trust:	42%
	No trust:	19%
How strong or weak is “rule of law” in this community? (“Rule of law” is present if the government enforces the laws equally and fairly for all people without corruption or favoritism)	Very strong:	13%
	Somewhat strong:	62%
	Somewhat weak:	15%
	Very weak:	10%

How much trust do you have in the local police in this community?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	33% 56% 8% 2%
How much trust do you have in the federal police?	A lot of trust: Some trust: Not very much trust: No trust:	28% 58% 13% 1%
How fair or unfair is the official justice system in this area (state courts)?	Very fair Somewhat fair Somewhat unfair Very unfair	8% 66% 14% 12%
How fair or unfair is the traditional tribal justice system in this area?	Very fair Somewhat fair Somewhat unfair Very unfair	11% 28% 36% 24%
If you were to have a dispute with another person in your community over land ownership, whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	17% 30% 1% 10% 1% 12% 10% 20%
If someone from this community stole money from you, to whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	14% 18% 0% 1% 0% 54% 2% 10%
If, God forbid, a member of this community physically assaulted and injured a member of your family, whom would you go to first to seek redress?	Family members Someone with connections Local authorities/mukhtar Tribal leader Religious leader Police Iraqi government courts Self-help	23% 14% 0% 5% 6% 11% 2% 17%
How would you rate the security situation in this community?	Very safe Somewhat safe Somewhat unsafe Very unsafe	41% 56% 3% 0%
How safe is it for children to play outside without adult supervision in this community?	Very safe Somewhat safe Somewhat unsafe Very unsafe	4% 29% 42% 25%
In the last six months, have there been any changes in the security situation in this community?	Security has improved Security has stayed the same Security has gotten worse	63% 37% 0%
In the next six months, do you expect any changes in the security situation in this community?	Security will improve Security will stay the same Security will get worse	60% 36% 3%

Issues of Greatest Concern: The five issues of greatest concern in Tuz Khurmato were unemployment (75% very concerned), the speed of reconstruction (71%), corruption at the central and provincial level (62% and 61%), and the quality of basic services (56%) (Table 5).

Table 5. Issues of Greatest Concern (Tuz Khurmato)		
Number of Respondents		N=102
How concerned are you about unemployment and lack of job opportunities in your community?	Not concerned at all	12%
	Somewhat concerned	13%
	Very concerned	75%
How concerned are you about the quality of basic services in your community (e.g. water and electricity)?	Not concerned at all	6%
	Somewhat concerned	38%
	Very concerned	56%
How concerned are you about public health problems and healthcare in your community?	Not concerned at all	12%
	Somewhat concerned	33%
	Very concerned	55%
How concerned are you about corruption at the national government level (Baghdad)?	Not concerned at all	9%
	Somewhat concerned	15%
	Very concerned	62%
	Refused to answer	15%
How concerned are you about corruption at the province level?	Not concerned at all	11%
	Somewhat concerned	14%
	Very concerned	61%
	Refused to answer	15%
How concerned are you about corruption at the local government (district) level?	Not concerned at all	11%
	Somewhat concerned	17%
	Very concerned	56%
	Refused to answer	17%
How concerned are you about the quality of schools and education in your community?	Not concerned at all	20%
	Somewhat concerned	37%
	Very concerned	42%
How concerned are you about the speed of reconstruction of roads and houses in your community?	Not concerned at all	5%
	Somewhat concerned	24%
	Very concerned	71%
How concerned are you about bribery by state security forces in your community?	Not concerned at all	18%
	Somewhat concerned	33%
	Very concerned	23%
	Refused to answer	26%
How concerned are you about violence against civilians by state security forces in your community?	Not concerned at all	30%
	Somewhat concerned	43%
	Very concerned	7%
	Refused to answer	20%
How concerned are you about harassment of women in your community?	Not concerned at all	48%
	Somewhat concerned	25%
	Very concerned	5%
	Refused to answer	22%
How concerned are you about revenge killings or other violent acts of revenge in your community?	Not concerned at all	17%
	Somewhat concerned	46%
	Very concerned	8%
	Refused to answer	29%
How concerned are you about the return of people who have families ties to Daesh in this community?	Not concerned at all	10%
	Somewhat concerned	64%
	Very concerned	14%
	Refused to answer	13%
How concerned are you about the possibility of a Daesh resurgence in Iraq?	Not concerned at all	4%
	Somewhat concerned	67%
	Very concerned	20%
	Refused to answer	10%

Reintegration Policies: When asked about their views on different policy options for dealing with ISIL-associated IDPs, 63% favored mandatory psychological rehabilitation before IDPs are allowed to return home. 36% of respondents were in favor of allowing IDPs to continue living in camps temporarily until their home communities decide they can return—an option that will become increasingly impossible as the Iraqi government prepares to close remaining IDP camps in 2021 (Table 6).

Table 6. Reintegration of Families with Perceived ISIL Affiliation (Tuz Khurmato)		
Number of Respondents		N=102
Many people with family ties to Daesh were displaced during the conflict. There have been several proposals about what to do with people who have family ties to Daesh but did not personally commit any crimes. Do you agree with any of the following proposals? Select all	• Permanently relocated to other communities (not home)	5%
	• Live in camps temporarily until home communities decide they can return	36%
	• Psychological rehabilitation before being allowed to return home	63%
Which of the following conditions do you believe that people with family ties to Daesh should fulfill before being allowed to return to their communities? Select all.	Psychological rehabilitation program	73%
	Public apology	35%
	Formal disavowal through court	64%
	Community service	2%
	Pay compensation to victims of ISIL	7%
	Short prison sentence (1-5 years)	4%
Who do you think should be responsible for bringing justice to the victims of Daesh?	Long prison sentence (5+ years)	3%
	Iraqi state courts	89%
Who do you think should be responsible for deciding if families perceived as affiliated with Daesh should be allowed to return to this community? Select all.	The tribal justice system	1%
	Iraqi government and security forces	99%
	Tribal leaders	11%
	Religious leaders	2%
	UN agencies or international NGOs	12%
	Local Peace Committees	8%

Reintegration Scenarios:⁹ Tuz Khurmato had the lowest level of support for reintegration of different hypothetical ISIL-associated IDPs among the five communities. 89% were willing to allow the reintegration of a woman who was involuntarily married to an ISIL member and 94% were willing to allow the reintegration of a 12-year-old boy whose father joined ISIL, but support for the other three hypothetical IDPs was much lower. Only 20% of respondents were willing to allow the reintegration of a woman who voluntarily married an ISIL member (Table 8). Among the 77% who refused, the two most effective mechanisms for persuading them to support reintegration were disavowal of the ISIL-associated relative in court (29%) and psychological rehabilitation (23%). 70% were willing to allow the reintegration of a 30-year-old man whose brother joined ISIL (Table 9). Among the 25% who opposed reintegration, the two most effective mechanisms for persuading them to support reintegration were disavowal of the ISIL-associated relative in court (56%) and psychological rehabilitation (52%). 78% were willing to allow the reintegration of a 75-year-old man whose son joined ISIL (Table 10). Among the 19% who opposed reintegration, the two most effective mechanisms for persuading them to support reintegration were psychological rehabilitation (53%) and disavowal of the ISIL-associated relative in court (47%).

⁹ For hypothetical scenarios where a significant number of respondents (at least 10%) refused to allow the reintegration of individuals with family ties to ISIL, we do not take into account follow-up questions that were only asked to respondents who initially rejected reintegration due to the insufficient amount of answers required for a statistically significant analysis. These follow-up questions asked whether the respondent could be persuaded to allow reintegration of the ISIL-associated person if he or she received a punishment or offered compensation of some kind and are analyzed only for the two scenarios in which a significant number of respondents (more than 10%) rejected the reintegration of the hypothetical individual with families ties to ISIL: the 30-year-old woman who voluntarily married an ISIL member and the 30-year-old man whose brother joined ISIL

Table 7. Reintegration Scenario 1: Woman Involuntarily Married to an ISIL Member (Tuz Khurmato)

Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old woman from this community whose husband joined Daesh after they were married. She says that she disagreed with her husband's decision to join Daesh and condemns the group. This woman has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?

Number of Respondents		N=102
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	89%
	No	6%
	Refused to answer	5%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	80%
	No	19%
	Refused to answer	1%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	41%
	No	53%
	Refused to answer	6%

Table 8. Reintegration Scenario 2: Woman Voluntarily Married to an ISIL Member (Tuz Khurmato)

Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old woman from this community who voluntarily married a Daesh fighter. She has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with her returning to this community?

Number of Respondents		N=102
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	20%
	No	77%
	Refused to answer	3%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	23%
	No	74%
	Refused to answer	4%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	2%
	No	94%
	Refused to answer	4%

For respondents who refused to allow return		N=79
---	--	------

Would you allow her to return if she completes a psychological rehabilitation program?	Yes	23%
	No	71%
	Refused to answer	6%
Would you allow her to return if she publicly apologizes for the crimes of her family member(s) who joined Daesh?	Yes	8%
	No	87%
	Refused to answer	5%
Would you allow her to return if she formally disavows her family member(s) who joined Daesh through a court of the state?	Yes	29%
	No	69%
	Refused to answer	1%
Would you allow her to return if she completes several months of community service such as cleaning streets or rebuilding houses?	Yes	9%
	No	89%
	Refused to answer	3%
Would you allow her to return if she agrees to pay compensation to the victims of Daesh?	Yes	5%
	No	89%
	Refused to answer	6%
Would you allow her to return if she serves a short prison sentence (1-5 years)?	Yes	10%
	No	82%
	Refused to answer	8%
Would you allow her to return if she serves a long prison sentence (more than 5 years)?	Yes	39%
	No	52%
	Refused to answer	9%

Table 9. Reintegration Scenario 3: Young Man Whose Brother Joined ISIL (Tuz Khurmato)

Please imagine that there is a 30-year-old man from this community whose brother joined Daesh, but the man says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this man has any ties to Daesh other than his brother's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community. Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?

Number of Respondents		N=102
Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?	Yes	70%
	No	25%
	Refused to answer	5%
Would you share a meal with his family?	Yes	52%
	No	46%
	Refused to answer	2%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	29%
	No	68%
	Refused to answer	3%

For respondents who refused to allow return**N=25**

Would you allow her to return if she completes a psychological rehabilitation program?	Yes	52%
	No	44%
	Refused to answer	4%
Would you allow her to return if she publicly apologizes for the crimes of her family member(s) who joined Daesh?	Yes	44%
	No	56%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow her to return if she formally disavows her family member(s) who joined Daesh through a court of the state?	Yes	56%
	No	44%
	Refused to answer	0%
Would you allow her to return if she completes several months of community service such as cleaning streets or rebuilding houses?	Yes	20%
	No	68%
	Refused to answer	8%
Would you allow her to return if she agrees to pay compensation to the victims of Daesh?	Yes	28%
	No	60%
	Refused to answer	12%
Would you allow her to return if she serves a short prison sentence (1-5 years)?	Yes	12%
	No	72%
	Refused to answer	16%
Would you allow her to return if she serves a long prison sentence (more than 5 years)?	Yes	20%
	No	80%
	Refused to answer	20%

Table 10. Reintegration Scenario 4: Elderly Man Whose Son Joined ISIL (Tuz Khurmato)

Please imagine that there is a 75-year-old man from this community whose son joined Daesh, but the man says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this man has any ties to Daesh other than his son's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community.

Number of Respondents		N=102
Would you be comfortable with her returning to your community?	Yes	78%
	No	19%
	Refused to answer	3%
Would you share a meal with her family?	Yes	75%
	No	23%
	Refused to answer	2%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	22%
	No	75%
	Refused to answer	3%

For respondents who refused to allow return		N=19
Would you allow her to return if she completes a psychological rehabilitation program?	Yes	53%
	No	47%
	Refused to answer	5%
Would you allow her to return if she publicly apologizes for the crimes of her family member(s) who joined Daesh?	Yes	37%
	No	63%
	Refused to answer	5%
Would you allow her to return if she formally disavows her family member(s) who joined Daesh through a court of the state?	Yes	47%
	No	53%
	Refused to answer	5%
Would you allow her to return if she completes several months of community service such as cleaning streets or rebuilding houses?	Yes	16%
	No	58%
	Refused to answer	32%
Would you allow her to return if she agrees to pay compensation to the victims of Daesh?	Yes	16%
	No	56%
	Refused to answer	16%
Would you allow her to return if she serves a short prison sentence (1-5 years)?	Yes	26%
	No	47%
	Refused to answer	32%
Would you allow her to return if she serves a long prison sentence (more than 5 years)?	Yes	26%
	No	47%
	Refused to answer	32%

Table 11. Reintegration Scenario 5: Young Boy Whose Father Joined ISIL (Tuz Khurmato)

Please imagine that there is a 12-year-old boy from this community whose father joined Daesh, but the boy says that he never supported Daesh and condemns the group. There is no evidence that this boy has any ties to Daesh other than his father's association. He has been living in an IDP camp since 2017 and would now like to return to this community.

Number of Respondents		N=102
Would you be comfortable with him returning to your community?	Yes	94%
	No	5%
	Refused to answer	3%
Would you share a meal with his family?	Yes	75%
	No	23%
	Refused to answer	3%
Would you allow children in your family to be friends with children in her family?	Yes	45%
	No	48%
	Refused to answer	7%

Conflict-Related Casualties and Property Damage: Most survey respondents (63%) were displaced from Tuz Khurmato during the conflict with ISIL, but 33% stayed in Tuz Khurmato for the duration of the conflict. 61% reported property damage caused by ISIL (Table 12).

Table 12. Conflict-Related Casualties and Property Damage (Tuz Khurmato)

Number of Respondents		N=102
Did you stay in this community during the conflict with Daesh or did you displace to somewhere else?	I stayed	33%
	I displaced	63%
	Refused to answer	4%
Did your household (the people who live in this house) experience any of the following harms committed by Daesh?	My house or land was damaged	61%
	My house or land was confiscated	4%
	I was injured	1%
	A member of my household was injured	2%
	A member of my household was killed	10%

Did Daesh commit any acts of sexual violence or harassment in this community?	Yes	18%
	No	53%
	Refused to answer	29%
Did Daesh commit any acts of sexual violence or harassment against a member of your family?	Yes	1%
	No	76%
	Refused to answer	23%
Did your household experience any of the following harms during the military operation to liberate this area from Daesh? Select all	My house or land was damaged	56%
	My house or land was confiscated	2%
	I was injured	0%
	A member of my household was injured	5%
	A member of my household was killed	8%
	Member of household experienced sexual violence	2%
If yes to any of the previous harms, whom do you believe was responsible	Daesh	96%
	Iraqi armed forces	26%
	United States armed forces	14%

Perceptions of COVID-19 and Healthcare: 85% of respondents were somewhat or very concerned about the spread of COVID-19 in the community. 34% believed that the COVID-19 crisis is getting better, but 33% believed it was getting worse. 40% approved of the response of local government authorities to COVID-19 and 68% approved of the response of the UN and humanitarian organizations. Trust in hospitals was low (66%), but a significant majority of respondents (88%) said that they would bring a family member to a hospital if he or she becomes sick with COVID-19. A similarly high percentage (85%) would allow female family members to be quarantined overnight at a hospital (Table 13).

Table 13. Perceptions of COVID-19 and Healthcare (Tuz Khurmato)

Number of Respondents	N=102	
How concerned are you about the spread of COVID-19 in your community?	Not concerned at all:	15%
	Somewhat concerned:	49%
	Very concerned:	36%
Do you believe that the COVID-19 crisis is getting better or worse in this community?	Getting better:	34%
	Staying the same:	32%
	Getting worse:	33%
The Iraqi government has introduced several measures including a curfew and closing airports to reduce the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Do you think that these measures are too strict or not strict enough?	Too strict:	2%
	Appropriate:	35%
	Not strict enough:	63%
How positive or negative of a role are state security forces playing in the enforcement of government decisions related to COVID-19?	Very positive:	9%
	Somewhat positive:	42%
	Somewhat negative:	24%
	Very negative:	10%
	Refused to answer	16%
To what extent do you approve of the response of local government authorities to COVID-19?	Strongly approve	7%
	Somewhat approve	33%
	Somewhat disapprove	37%
	Strongly disapprove	17%
	Refused to answer	6%
To what extent do you approve of the response of state security forces to COVID-19 in this community?	Strongly approve	7%
	Somewhat approve	39%
	Somewhat disapprove	26%
	Strongly disapprove	14%
	Refused to answer	13%

To what extent do you approve of the response of the UN and other humanitarian organizations to COVID-19 in this community?	Strongly approve	31%
	Somewhat approve	37%
	Somewhat disapprove	16%
	Strongly disapprove	5%
	Refused to answer	10%
How much trust do you have in the government healthcare system and hospitals?	A lot of trust	12%
	Some trust	54%
	Not very much trust	22%
	No trust	13%
If (God forbid) a member of your household were to become sick with COVID-19, would you bring him or her to a hospital?	Yes	88%
	No	9%
	Refused to answer	3%
If (God forbid) a female member of your family were to become sick with COVID-19, would you allow her to be quarantined by herself at a hospital until she recovers?	Yes	85%
	No	10%
	Refused to answer	4%

Awareness of and Perceptions of Local Peace Committees: Awareness of LPCs was low in Tuz Khurmato: 15% of respondents had heard of the domestic LPC. Of these, 47% were somewhat satisfied with the LPC’s work and 53% were somewhat or very dissatisfied (Table 14).

Table 14. Awareness and Perceptions of Local Peace Committees (Tuz Khurmato)		
Number of Respondents		N=102
Have you heard of the “Local Peace Committee” in this community?	Yes	15%
	No	85%
How satisfied are you with the work of the Local Peace Committee in this community?	Very satisfied	0%
	Somewhat satisfied	47%
	Somewhat unsatisfied	33%
	Very unsatisfied	20%

8. Conclusion

The average results of the pilot surveys conducted in September 2020 in the four communities of Qaim (Anbar), Habbaniyah (Anbar), Muhalabiya (Ninewa), and Tuz Khurmato (Salah al-Din), suggest the following conclusions:

- 1. Communities were more concerned about governance and economic issues than about security issues related to ISIL.** When asked how concerned they are about different economic, governance, and security issues, the highest levels of concern were about unemployment (62% were “very concerned”) closely followed by corruption, services, and healthcare. Notably, people were significantly less concerned about security related issues: 38% were very concerned about the possible resurgence of ISIL and 35% were very concerned about the return of ISIL-affiliated families, indicated with the red arrow.
- 2. Communities strongly prefer that the Iraqi government be primarily responsible for reintegration accountability processes related to ISIL rather than tribes, NGOs, or other non-state actors.** On average across all four communities, 94% of respondents said that the Iraqi government should be responsible for bringing justice to the victims of ISIL, and only 6% believed that the tribal justice system should be responsible. 93% believed that the Iraqi government should be responsible for decisions about the return of families with perceived ISIL affiliation, but many also supported a role for other actors: 39% believed that tribal leaders should also be involved and 26% believed that United Nations agencies should be involved.
- 3. The perceived voluntariness of an IDP’s association with ISIL is a very important factor in their likelihood of successful reintegration.** On average across the four communities, respondents expressed a high level of support for reintegration when asked about hypothetical scenarios of IDPs who had family ties to ISIL but did not personally support the group. Between 89% and 95% of respondents were comfortable with the return of wives, fathers, and sons of ISIL members. However, in the scenario of a woman who voluntarily married to an ISIL member and did personally support the group, support for reintegration was much lower (68%). The age and gender of IDPs with perceived affiliation were less important than the voluntariness of their association. Respondents were slightly more comfortable with the return of women than similarly aged men, and also slightly more comfortable allowing the return of elderly IDPs and children than the scenario of a 30-year-old man whose brother had joined ISIL.
- 4. Communities do not demand harsh punishments as a necessary condition for return of IDPs with perceived affiliation.** When respondents were asked what they view as necessary conditions for the return of families with perceived ISIL affiliation in general (without differentiating between the gender, age, and voluntariness of affiliation), the options chosen by the most respondents were psychological rehabilitation (75%), disavowal of the ISIL-affiliated family member in court at (68%), and a public apology (59%). Importantly, only a minority of 14% of the sample demanded the harshest punishment of prison.
- 5. Support for reintegration does not necessarily mean that social cohesion and forgiveness have been achieved.** Many respondents who said they would allow the return of ISIL-affiliated families (meaning that that they are willing to tolerate their presence in the community), were not comfortable with direct social and family interactions, which indicates that stigmatization continues after return. In the hypothetical scenario of a 30-year old woman who was involuntarily married to an ISIL member, 93% of respondents would allow her to return, but a smaller number (87%) would be willing to share a meal with her family, and an even smaller number (77%) would allow their children to be friends with her children. These results indicate a need for additional programming to build trust, encouraging forgiveness, and promote social cohesion after IDP returns.



United Nations Development Programme
Baghdad, Iraq

www.iq.undp.org