Overcoming Fear: Citizen (In)security and Human Development in Costa Rica

(SUMMARY)

National Human Development Report 2005

Index

Foreword

The concept of human development has been at the heart of the United Nations Development Program since 1990 when, under the leadership of Mahbub Ul Haq and Amartya Sen, 1998 Nobel Prize winner in Economics, the foundations were laid for a perspective on development aspirations that is today widely known and accepted. This approach not only questioned what was until recently a deeply rooted vision in development thought in which the success or failure of the development process was measured in economic terms, but also encouraged an exploration of the multiple obstacles restricting human freedom. From this viewpoint, factors that are normally overlooked, such as those having to do with the social surroundings in which people lead their lives, are now the subject of renewed interest in the extensive literature produced in this area.

For over a decade, UNDP has published global reports that deal with human beings. Each year a topic is selected whose examination leads to a greater understanding of how human options can be expanded by increasing our capacity to lead long, healthy and creative lives. Since then reports have focused on such subjects as participation (1993), gender condition (1995), technological advance, and more recently, the relationships between democracy and development (2002). Along with the global reports, UNDP prepares and distributes a multitude of regional, national and sub-regional reports worldwide.

This is, however, an unfinished and unfinishable project. Much more than an objective, it represents an ethical route for helping our societies develop the infinite, unknown and unforeseeable richness of the human will.

The notion of human development implies a committed, day-to-day defense of freedom-freedom in the face of political oppression, but also the oppression of poverty, ignorance and lack of economic opportunities. Fear of violence and citizen insecurity and their repercussions -the issues that call us together on this particular occasion for freedom- have not escaped the alert eyes of human development.

By 1994, UNDP had already pointed to the overwhelming importance of security for the generation of opportunities for people. The attempt to establish a relationship between security and human development was forged at that time in light of new needs imposed by the end of the cold war. Today we are faced with the challenge of drawing closer to the lives and day-to-day needs of people, a task that has yet to be accomplished and which UNDP-Costa Rica determined to advance throughout 2004 and 2005.

In the public's perception, citizen insecurity is a decisive factor in the deterioration of their quality of life. When the media, in their job of informing, reports an accident with firearms at a school, or the death of a woman at the hands of her companion, it is impossible not to feel a sense of vulnerability to violence and irrationality.

The fear of falling prey to aggression has very grave consequences in terms of development. It jeopardizes the exercise of fundamental rights such as freedom of movement, the freedom to work, to transact business, to meet with whomever, wherever without fearing for one's personal safety. It erodes the social fabric and even tolerance for others, making robust civic life impossible. The public and private cost of insecurity can also represent a real economic liability and an immense drain on resources which, in safer communities, would have more socially productive uses.

Citizen security has become a central concern for Costa Ricans of both genders. There are two sides to the widespread sense of insecurity felt throughout the country. First is perception, formed from the interaction of what is read and heard in the news, what is seen in the streets and public spaces of our community, the stories of family and friends and, in general, all the kinds of information that affect how one feels. Secondly, there are the events that actually constitute crimes and which on no few occasions reveal the inadequacy of State mechanisms in safeguarding the fundamental rights of the people.

People end up altering their behavior. They live in a condominium rather than open spaces, put razor wire around what was once an open garden and in their free time, bring their children to a mall instead of taking walks, going to parks or enjoying public spaces as they used to do. All of this becomes a very complex problem that feeds demagogic discourse, set to urge repressive and xenophobic pseudo-solutions.

However, none of this should be an excuse for not tackling the problem head on, as Costa Rican citizens are demanding. This is why the UNDP promoted intense national discussion to address the challenge of creating safer communities.

The National Human Development Report on *Overcoming Fear: Citizen (In)security and Human Development* is the result of that discussion, complemented by extensive research of the scope and dimension of insecurity in the country, and viable and timely alternatives for dealing with it.

This is the first in a series of biannual reports to be produced by the UNDP site in Costa Rica. Like the other nations where UNDP is carrying forward this effort, the multidisciplinary, rigorous and succinct approach adopted focuses on an issue or set of priority issues for human development in the country, inspired by a proactive intention and based on a participatory process of discussion that also ensures the editorial independence of its writers.

An integral part of this initiative was the formation of the National Network for Human Development, a permanent, mutisectoral and multidisciplinary forum for the discussion of public policy in Costa Rica, and whose activities fostered this national debate on citizen security and ways to strengthen it with strict adherence to human rights. The National Network for Human Development has complemented and gone beyond the preparation of this report, facilitating the identification of public policies and solutions to

meet the challenges of citizen insecurity in Costa Rica.

It gives us great pleasure to see that both objectives have been achieved with the publication of this report. The NHDR provides an innovative and scientific look at (in)security in Costa Rica, constructed on the basis of an independent, participatory and transparent process giving rise to all kinds of initiatives aimed at eliminating fear in the country. We believe in the possibility of replacing fear with freedom. The solutions are within our reach.



José Manuel Hermida
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December 2005

National Human Development Report 2005

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Overcoming Fear: Citizen (In)security and Human Development in Costa Rica

The possibility of approaching citizen (in)security from a perspective consistent with the postulates of human development proved viable in 1994, when the UNDP first published a report exploring the rationale and validity of official discourse on security in an unprecedented effort to reassess the concept. Despite this contribution, the authoritarian and anti-democratic connotations associated with citizen security continue to raise concerns about the convenience of grappling with this theme.

The effort undertaken by 2005 NHDR team is an outcome of the firm conviction that such reticence is a mistake. The most powerful reason for conducting this investigation is, precisely, the need to firmly highlight the importance of looking at citizen (in)security from the perspective of human development.

Secondly, coherency with one of the basic premises of human development, namely the imperative of ensuring normative and institutional arrangements that address the main worries and priorities of the people, demands attention to what opinion polls have revealed in recent years: citizen (in)security has become one of the Costa Rican population's primary concerns.

Also, in adherence to the postulates of human development the study insists on capturing and describing how the population experiences and reacts to fear. The empirical investigation presented here aims to provide a lens through which Costa Rican society can approach its fears and probe the accuracy of deeply embedded believes. We are confident that the report will contribute to unveil a number of myths that surround perceptions regarding citizen insecurity.

Three key propositions constitute the underlying arguments of this report:

1. Citizen insecurity is not the result of any one factor, but by the convergence of many, and is frequently associated with situations of intense human and social

vulnerability.

2. Citizen insecurity is an obstacle to human development in that it restricts individuals' possibilities to conceive and realize a life project and erodes the societal cooperation and civic life required for that effect.
3. It is possible to build a safer society if the conditions of social vulnerability in which violence and dispossession proliferate are addressed and collective mechanisms of protection, along with people's capacity to activate them, are strengthened.

Testing out these propositions demonstrated their potential for future studies; likewise, the relations proposed were supported and verified throughout the five parts comprising this report. The answers to questions posed in the first four allow these relations to be understood. Part 1 presents the conceptual frame serving as a point of departure for the research: Is it possible to study citizen (in)security from a human development approach? The answer offered is affirmative. In this part, the definitions and normative concepts underlying the three aforementioned propositions are presented.

Part 2 takes stock of the situation of citizen security in Costa Rica, examining in detail the current state and recent evolution of three components: victimization, perception of risk and securitability. This provides an answer to the second question: Is the population of Costa Rica more insecure?

Part 3 assesses the relevance of factors commonly associated in the literature with the occurrence of violence and dispossession. The question "Can we explain citizen insecurity?" supplies a framework to examine phenomena in Costa Rica that together affect and intervene in people's security in a complex fashion.

Our approach to the problem makes it necessary to ask as well, "Does citizen insecurity have consequences for human development?" The answers, presented in Part 4, focus on how citizen insecurity affects individual possibilities of conceiving and realizing a life project (individual sphere), as well as the impact on social cooperation and civic life

(social sphere).

The answers to these questions make it possible to identify the challenges and provide bases for constructing strategies to tackle the problem. While not intended to be exhaustive, the plan proposed in the fifth and final part takes advantage of the national dialogue established through the NHDR 2005, to address citizen insecurity in a way that is consistent with the objectives of human development.

Part One

Is it possible to study citizen (in)security from a human development approach?

The debate on citizen security has been almost absent from contemporary discussions about human development, and even in the notable effort to reconsider the concept of security. This report assumes that such indifference is mistaken; it is precisely the authoritarian tendencies frequently cropping up in discussions about citizen security that explains the urgency of examining this issue from the basis of democracy, commitment to human rights and people's exercise of freedoms.

This was our motivation for starting to clarify the concept of citizen security, making it a fundamental part of the debate on human development. Various assumptions, concepts and boundaries were explicitly defined for the purpose of our study.

A. Points of departure: human development, human security, human rights

As with all UNDP reports, the starting point for this investigation was the paradigm of human development, a powerful theoretical and normative referent whose implications for the analysis of different themes is only beginning to be explored. Citizen security is one of these. To study this issue from the optic of human development, it is first necessary to mark out the lines of this paradigm and its relation with other central concepts in the contemporary debate on development: human security and human rights.

Amartya Sen, the 1998 Nobel prize winner in Economics and a major intellectual influence on the concept of human development, warns that development requires the removal of great sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny; limited economic opportunities as well as systematic social marginalization; deterioration of public facilities as well as intolerance or the intromission of repressive states. In effect, what lends originality and ethical power to the concept of human development is its insistence on enlarging the freedoms people truly enjoy.

In this light, economic growth is a tool for human development, a means to achieve objectives of greater transcendence. By making the expansion of human capacity the ultimate end of development, the center of social action is the ethical principal proposed by Emmanuel Kant, in which human beings are considered ends in themselves and not instruments for obtaining an ulterior end. Defense of the intrinsic value of the human being is correlated with an emphasis on each person's non-transferable responsibility for his or her own destiny. Hence, human development does not consist of some external agent that delivers capabilities to people from above, but rather a process constructed within and by communities and people, who must be protagonists in the expansion of their own freedom.

Human development is an inherently optimistic notion. However, the expansion of peoples' freedoms is by no means inevitable. On the contrary, it is a process riddled with risk, threats and insecurities. The concept of human development is thus enriched by the parallel notion of human security, which reconsiders interpretations of security as protection of national territory or the stability of a given political *status quo* by moving it closer to the discussion about security and the threats people face.

The 1994 UNDP Report on Human Development, entitled *New Dimensions in Human Security*, noted that human security was not connected with arms, but with life and human dignity. This made for a broader concept of security now encompassing protection from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, as well as from sudden and harmful ruptures in patterns of ordinary life, whether in the home, the workplace or the community. In even more concise terms, the concept of human security denotes the condition of being free of fear and need.

Human security takes the form of the state resulting from the effective protection from an array of very diverse threats, as diverse as the search of human development itself. The 1994 report distinguished the concept of human development from human security in the following terms: if human development is a process of expanding the options enjoyed by people, then human security denotes the stability with which these options can actually be made use of. It thus becomes an attribute of human development- that of knowing there is a high probability that the opportunities it provides will not suddenly disappear.

Hence, the notion of human security speaks of basic conditions and minimum guarantees for human development, of a vital core that must be protected so that freedom can flourish. As Amartya Sen advises, discussion of human security is just the slightly somber flipside of the optimism underlying the concept of human development.

On this point, the concept of human security is tied to the doctrine of Human Rights which currently articulates humankind's most basic aspirations and enumerating those things that human beings, for solid reasons, consider necessary in order to forge our destiny: protection of human life and physical integrity, access to decent work and adequate health and education services, and the enjoyment of peace and a healthy environment, to mention just some. Human rights constitute a minimum floor demandable by any person and whose real protection is an inexorable condition for the expansion of human capacities. As the minimum floor demandable, human rights are, above all, a guarantee of security for people.

It is the effective protection of human rights– from the civic and political rights of individuals to the rights of collective entitlement possessed by peoples– which defines a situation of human security. Even more, this protection is not merely an objective state wherein the values and goods protected by Human Rights are genuinely in effect; it is also a subjective state of protection. When all is said and done, what allows people to live without fear is the awareness that they have minimum guarantees against vulnerability and risk.

B. The concept of citizen security

Defining the concept of citizen security and its relations with human security is a task whose resolution is far from evident. It should be pointed out that citizen security is a limited but vital part of the much broader notion of human security. If the latter addresses forms of vulnerability that compromise the enjoyment of human rights in general, citizen security refers to specific types of vulnerability– those caused by violence and dispossession– and the protection of a basic core of fundamental rights. Citizen security is understood as the personal, objective and subjective condition of being free from violence

or from the threat of intentional violence or dispossession by others. The concept of violence, in turn, denotes the use of or threat of physical or psychological force to cause damage or break someone's will. The notion of dispossession refers to the act of illegitimately depriving a physical or legal person of their patrimony.

This definition gives rise to a series of normative and practical implications making it possible to distinguish the subject of our study from other phenomena such as crime and violence, with which it is frequently confused. It also implies taking a normative stance on the content and direction of discussion about citizen security.

The first implication is that, as a specific modality of human security, what lies at the heart of the discussion about citizen security is the actual placement into force and protection of certain fundamental human rights. In essence, it refers to effective protection of the right to life and personal integrity (in its different aspects of physical, emotional and sexual integrity), as well as other inherent rights of personal privilege, such as the inviolability of the home, freedom of movement and the enjoyment of patrimony. To construct citizen (in)security on the basis of fundamental rights is to distance it from notions- often authoritarian- that define it in terms of combating crime or delinquents, wherein a rigid and questionable separation is made between society and its supposed adversary, who tends to be dehumanized and is easily detached from basic normative referents. Assuming that the protection of people's fundamental rights is the ultimate objective of any policy on citizen security is a way of ensuring adherence to the basic guarantees of a state of Rule of Law.

The second implication is that because the notion of threat (and implicitly, that of vulnerability and disprotection) is at the center of our definition, it moves away in important ways from the vision that defines citizen security exclusively in terms of criminality and offense.

Evidently, these last concepts- addressing the behaviors subject to criminal legislation- are an unavoidable and essential part of citizen insecurity, and this is reflected in our report's multi-angled analysis of the phenomenon of criminality in the country. However, equating

citizen insecurity with criminality causes other severe problems to be masked. There are non-violent criminal behaviors such as administrative corruption, bribery and "white collar" crimes not usually associated with sensations of fear, threat and vulnerability, even though their harmful effect on human development is beyond doubt. Furthermore, it is crucial that the concept of citizen security encompass non-criminalized forms of violence and dispossession that often create an intense sense of vulnerability and disprotection of core fundamental rights in a large part of the population. As examples, one need only think of certain manifestations of domestic violence and violence against women that have yet to enter criminal categorization in the juridical systems of some countries of Latin America.

It would therefore seem necessary to discontinue equating citizen insecurity with patrimonial criminality and crimes occurring in public spheres, modalities of violence that disproportionally affect the male population, as will be seen. Limiting citizen insecurity to these forms of criminality contributes to the invisibilization of the violence and dispossession occurring in private spheres or exercised through psychological intimidation, modalities that conspire more directly against the security of women. All of this signifies that certain manifestations of violent behavior not always connected with citizen security may need to be included in the analysis, while others that perhaps are, can be excluded.

C. The study of citizen security

Previously, we defined citizen security as both an objective and subjective condition. Any attempt to study this theme must therefore analyze and attempt to measure both victimization, understood as the actual occurrence of acts of violence and dispossession (objective threat), and people's perception of insecurity, interpreted as the probability attributed to the occurrence of such acts (subjective threat). The second is just as important as a real threat, since only a perceived threat (even without objective basis) will generate visible and very often negative alterations in individual and social behavior. No matter how grave, a real threat does not arouse fear or induce some type of response when it is not perceived.

Added to victimization and perception is a third component often left out in debates on

citizen security, which is the concept of securitability. This is understood as the array of thoughts, sensations and behaviors that allow a person to feel safe and to regain a state of security after experiencing some situation of insecurity. In other words, it denotes the personal capacity to prevent threats and cope with them. In the context of citizen security, securitability depends on the perception of people who have the resources- individual and collective, private and public, material and institutional- to prevent threats and protect themselves from them, as well as their capacity to activate such resources.

Citizen security is consequently a function of the complex interactions among these three concepts, which mutually determine one another to produce a particular configuration of threats, both objective and subjective, for each person. Diagram 1 synthesizes the directions and presumable intensities of the relations between the three concepts whose study is the main pillar of this investigation.

Diagram 1
Components of Citizen (In)security



Part Two. Is there more (in)security today?

As in other countries of Latin America, citizen insecurity is an overriding concern of the Costa Rican population, although its extent and intensity are not new. Fear has been a chronic feature of Costa Rican society for many years, calling for a look back at the objective and subjective aspects of the problem, as well as some related to securitability.

A. Criminality and victimization in Costa Rica

Statistics from the Prosecutors Office can be used to shed some light on criminality and victimization in the country. Net rates of crime at entry reveal a considerable increase (114.2%) in the rates of virtually all crimes between 1985 and 2003 (Graphic 1), but the trend leveled off somewhat from 1998 to 2003 when the possibility of comparing data improved.

During this last period, some crimes actually began to decline, such as aggression (-2%), fraud (-25%), and theft (-15%). The case was quite different for other types, particularly robbery and infractions of the Law on Psychotropics, where rates rose significantly throughout the period and into 1998. The number of rape cases grew 37% from 1998 to 2003, surpassing the 30% increase in robberies, while drug-related offenses shot up by 226%.

The distribution of cases by category of crime is also revealing. In 2003, robberies represented 29.7% of total net entries, followed at a distance by theft (8.9%), drug offenses (7.7%), aggression (4.8%), fraud (2.9%), injuries and damages (1.8% each), rape (1.3%), unintentional homicide (0.6%) and intentional homicide (0.3%), with 40.2% falling into the category of "other crimes". Viewed in two large groupings, that year crimes against property represented 43.3% of total net entries in the offices of the Prosecutors Office, and crimes against persons equaled 8.6%. These rates were similar to those of developed countries, but differed from those in other Central American countries where crime against persons is much higher. In addition, the low number of white collar crimes is worth noting, albeit some of these can have profound implications.

Graphic 1
Evolution of various crime rate in Costa Rica. 1985-2003



Source: Estimated based on data from the Ministry of the Interior, Judicial Branch.

The rising trend these numbers reflect is consistent with surveys on victimization in the country. As can be expected, the magnitude of criminality these surveys show is substantially higher than what official records imply. The percentage of households where at least one number had been the victim of a crime during the twelve months prior to being interviewed practically doubled in less than two decades, from 20% in 1986 to 26.9% in 1999, to 38.7% in 2004. As records show, in large part this last number corresponds to economic violence: while one of three Costa Rican households have fallen prey to an assault on patrimony over the past year, just one in 16, one in 14 and one in 59 households were subjected to episodes of physical, emotional and sexual violence, respectively. Nevertheless, these data should be interpreted with caution, since the usual surveys on victimization are not designed to detect widespread phenomena of physical and sexual violence.

Of the forms of victimization detected by the National Survey on Citizen Security (Encuesta Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana - ENSCR-04), robberies on public highways not only constitute the largest category (13.8%), but also indicate striking growth when

information from previous surveys is taken into account. A comparable series of victimization from robbery shows an almost fifteen-fold increase over the course of the past decade and a half. This phenomenon was not replicated in the case of home robberies; although still a significant increase, the rise in incidences was more moderate and tending to level off.

The evidence clearly indicates a rise in levels of criminal violence in Costa Rica, and in particular, rapid deterioration of patrimonial security in the recent past. However, it is critical to put this finding in perspective. Despite the increase, levels of economic violence in the country– as with other serious forms of violence such as homicide- are still low in the context of Latin America. The rate of victimization (individual, not per family) from robbery in Costa Rica is less than a third of the rate in cities such as Bahía, San Salvador, and Caracas. While rates of economic violence in Costa Rica are certainly well above those of industrialized countries (victimization due to robbery is nearly eight times higher), in other modalities- e.g. car vandalism, sexual incidents, threats and assaults, and even car theft- victimization rates in Costa Rica are not significantly different from those of developed countries, and in some cases lower.

Nothing is more helpful in putting the magnitude and deterioration of citizen insecurity into perspective than a review of intentional homicide rates, perhaps the most reliable indicator for comparing criminality. During the 1970-2004 period this indicator gradually increased from 3.9 to 6.6 cases for every 100,000 inhabitants. What is actually remarkable, however, is that homicide rates in the mid-1970s are similar to today's and the 1970 rate is virtually identical to that of the end of the 1980s, when perception of insecurity among Costa Ricans had already reached today’s high levels.

Contrary to widespread social perceptions, intentional homicide is less relevant than other causes of violent death in Costa Rica. There were fewer deaths from intentional homicide from 1993 to 2003 (2,496) than deaths by suicide (2,585) and traffic accidents (6,022). Similarly, the 1994 death rate from intentional homicides (6.6 for every 100.000 inhabitants) was lower than the suicide rate (7.6) and much less than the rate of traffic accidents (14.8).

Despite the visible increase, intentional homicide in Costa Rica is quite a bit lower than the world average (10.7 homicides for every 100,000 inhabitants) and less than a quarter of the average available most recently for Latin America (28.4). Costa Rica's rate remains among the lowest in the subcontinent, and much closer to those of OECD[1] developed nations.

Victimization does not affect everyone equally, a situation found when differences between men and women are studied. The results basically show that economic violence- and particularly intentional homicide- is increasingly and disproportionately victimizing men, whereas there are other forms of violence specifically targeting women that have no equivalent for men.

Not only are figures for men more than a third higher than for women in terms of total victimization incidences, the difference rises to over 50% in modalities of economic violence. Conversely, levels of sexual and emotional victimization are higher for women, even when the ENSCR-04's underestimation of the real magnitude of the problem in these categories is taken into account. Complementing this data, the risk of dying from intentional homicide in Costa Rica is significantly higher for men (11.2 for every 100,000 inhabitants in 2002-2004) than for women (2.0 in the same period). Furthermore, the increase identified in the national rate of intentional homicide is due to an increase in the rate for males, particularly those 15-29 years old. The homicide rate for women has remained unchanged over the past fifteen years and often has a distinctive characteristic: victim's gender as a risk factor.

Data suggest that, while male victimization occurs especially in public spaces, the household environment is less safe for women. The relatively low victimization numbers for women in the ENSCR-04 look somewhat more serious once the domestic or intimate dimensions of the relationship were included in the analysis. This was revealed in the results of the National Survey on Violence against Women 2003 (ENVCM-03), conducted

[1] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

by the National Institute of Women Studies (Instituto Nacional de Estudios de la Mujer) at the University of Costa Rica, employing detailed methodology to minimize under-recording of violence at the household level. Perhaps one of the achievements of this study is that it highlights the problems of violence and dispossession women experience day to day, showing that they are at least as widespread as those experienced by the country's male inhabitants. Thus, it is evident that the domestic dimension of violence is as relevant as its public dimension, although in discussions about citizen security the former is clearly subordinated to the latter.

Another example of how victimization and criminality affect individuals unequally is found in the differences encountered when analyzing the geographical distribution of violence and dispossession in the country's cantons. In this case, however, fewer types of crimes and forms of violence could be analyzed since geographic disaggregation was not always possible. Fortunately, data are available for 2003 for some categories of particular interest such as intentional homicide, robbery and theft (grouped together) and domestic violence. To summarize the information, a Cantonal Security Index (CSI) was prepared.

One of the significant results of this analysis was verification that the most serious problems of victimization are relatively concentrated within certain geographical areas, given that over most of the national territory- where eight out of every ten inhabitants live- insecurity problems are low, objectively speaking, or moderately serious, at most (Map 1). As will be discussed further on, these distinctions do not hold for the subjective dimension of insecurity, where levels are alarming throughout the country.

Map 1 Cantonal Security Index. 2003
(Scale 0.000 – 1.000)



Two other aspects complement the inventory of victimization and criminality, one having to do with organized crime and the other with perpetrators of violence. Regarding the first, it should be noted that because of the kind of activity involved, available information only reflects general trends, so a meticulous description of the criminal organizations involved is not possible. For this reason, study focused on three trends of singular importance in the perception of insecurity: trafficking of illicit drugs, extortive kidnapping and car theft. The findings suggest a notable increase in drug trafficking, particularly concerning circulation of crack and heroine in the domestic market. However, the other modalities (car theft and kidnapping) are found at comparatively low levels and have experienced moderate, if not downward, evolution.

Regarding perpetrators of violence, data on criminal convictions show an overwhelming majority of crimes as having been committed by Costa Rican men aged 20 to 34. Involvement of foreigners, and particularly Nicaraguans, in criminality is marginal. The information therefore indicates that responsibility for the country's insecurity problems

essentially lies with Costa Ricans.

A detailed analysis of victimization numbers provides no evidence to suggest that objective insecurity in Costa Rica has entered an uncontrollable downward spiral or reached levels comparable to those of the great majority of Latin American countries. The problem of citizen insecurity here appears perfectly controllable, making it unnecessary to resort to draconian measures in detriment of the Rule of Law.

B. Perception of insecurity

There is no doubt that Costa Ricans consider citizen insecurity one of the country's main problems. Both the ENSCR-04 and focus groups organized for the purpose of the project corroborate the intensity of these concerns. Such anxiety is not in any way new to the country. While its place on the scale of concerns in terms of the country's main problems has varied depending on circumstances (e.g., the economic situation, crimes of particular significance and their treatment by the media), citizen insecurity has ranked high on the list of all surveys for at least the past two decades.

However, when talking about the perception of insecurity, what is it people are afraid of, specifically? As with levels of victimization, perception of insecurity is not homogeneous among the different manifestations of violence and dispossession.

The essential and most striking information resulting from the ENSCR-04 is the profound separation of levels of fear as related to the factors known/unknown people and public/private space. All the dimensions of perception of insecurity are dominated by fear of being attacked by strangers and forms of violence occurring in public spaces.

The second point is that the ranking of perceived risks coincides notably with the distribution of victimization; perceived risks are, overall, considerably higher for patrimonial integrity. Ranking of the magnitude of that perception can be seen more clearly when ENSR-04 responses are translated into four indexes covering the four areas of

insecurity (patrimonial, physical, emotional and sexual). These results prove that the average index of perceived insecurity is considerably higher in the patrimonial sphere, and also much lower in the sexual sphere. Differences between men and women are not very relevant except for perceptions of sexual insecurity, where risks are perceived with greater intensity by women.

A similar phenomenon is produced among age groups. Perception of insecurity is lower among individuals over 35, especially regarding sexual integrity, whereas those under 24 are more concerned than the others. Disparities between socioeconomic segments are equally consistent: the lower strata have a less intense perception of insecurity, particularly in the patrimonial sphere. In this aspect specifically, the numbers would appear logical since those who own the most assets are more likely to be targets of patrimonial victimization and therefore more fearful.

Significantly, there are consistent, systematic differences of perception between urban and rural populations and between Costa Ricans and foreigners- again, especially concerning patrimony. A lower sense of insecurity among the rural and foreign population reflects not only that they are relatively less victimized, but also that foreigners have points of comparison that most Costa Ricans do not. This is very important in the case of Central Americans and Colombians, who constitute the majority of all migrants, as they come from environments where social violence is endemic.

In order to determine whether the indexes of perceived security are abnormally high in the country, the gap between perceived likelihood of being subjected to violence and the empirical likelihood of its occurrence was estimated according to the levels of victimization identified. The ENSCR-04, which contains ample modules covering both aspects, permits an approximate estimation to be made of this gap. The results of this exercise are astounding (Table 1).

Table 1
Gap between victimization and perceived insecurity in Costa Rica, by type of violence and socio-demographic category. 2004

Sphere	*Total*	*Sex*		*Age*			*Area*		*Socioeconomic Level*		
		Men	*Women*	*16-24*	*25-34*	*35 y +*	*Urban*	*Rural*	*Low*	*Middle*	*High*
Empirical likelihood of being victimized (1)											
Patrimonial	1/4	1/3	1/4	1/3	1/3	1/4	1/3	1/5	1/5	1/4	1/3
Physical	1/31	1/21	1/51	1/24	1/23	1/43	1/28	1/38	1/42	1/31	1/25
Emotional	1/26	1/36	1/21	1/55	1/20	1/23	1/23	1/34	1/84	1/25	1/19
Sexual	1/89	1/143	1/66	1/55	1/102	1/117	1/117	1/61	1/84	1/78	1/127
Perceived likelihood of being victimized (2)											
Patrimonial	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2
Physical	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/4	1/3	1/3	1/4	1/3	1/3
Emotional	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/3	1/4	1/3	1/3
Sexual	1/5	1/6	¼	1/4	1/4	1/5	1/4	1/5	1/5	1/4	1/5
Ratio of perceived likelihood/ empirical likelihood of being victimized (3)											
Patrimonial	2.0	1.7	2.3	1.8	1.7	2.3	1.8	2.5	2.3	2.1	1.8
Physical	9.3	6.6	15.3	8.2	7.0	12.1	8.6	11.3	11.8	9.7	7.7
Emotional	8.2	10.9	6.8	18.7	6.8	6.9	7.7	9.8	23.9	8.0	6.2
Sexual	19.6	25.5	17.1	14.7	24.1	22.3	26.8	12.5	17.5	18.0	26.5

Notes: (1) Likelihood of becoming the victim of an act of violence, according to the proportion of interviewees who said they had been victimized during the past year. For comparability purposes, not all the modalities of victimization modality covered by the ENSCR-04 are included. Data are expressed as a probability ratio: 1 probability in X. (2) Likelihood attributed to an actual act of violence according to the average index of insecurity for interviewees. For comparability purposes, not all the modalities of perceived risk covered by the ENSCR-04 are included. (3) Corresponds to the number of times the perceived likelihood of being victimized exceeds the actual likelihood according to victimization levels identified by the ENSCR-04.
Source: ENSCR-04.

In all cases, the perceived likelihood of becoming the victim of a violent act is significantly higher than the empirical likelihood. In the case of economic violence, the perceived likelihood is twice as high as recent victimization numbers.

In all other cases, the magnification of the gap is astonishing. Perceived emotional insecurity is over eight times higher than victimization, a number exceeded nine times in the case of physical violence, and nearly twenty-fold[2] in the case of sexual violence. The divergence between a relatively small gap in the case of non-patrimonial security and the

[2] In the case of sexual violence it should be expected, however, that the ENSCR-04 may significantly underestimate actual victimization levels.

enormous difference found in all other dimensions suggests that the high likelihood attributed to the occurrence of events of economic violence– a likelihood that does indeed reflect the reality of the problem– is extrapolated to other categories of violence with lower victimization levels. In the public's perception, patrimonial victimization– the most widespread and visible form of victimization– functions as an approximation of outright victimization. A definitive, practical conclusion may be drawn from this: if perceived insecurity is to be reduced in Costa Rica, it is urgent to control and reduce levels of patrimonial victimization.

Another question this study has sought to answer is: "Who lives in fear due to insecurity in Costa Rica?" Analysis of the gap between actual and perceived victimization makes it evident that perceived insecurity affects different socio-demographic groups with different intensity. All in all, the various degrees of fear do not neatly respect social groups; fear and tranquility are not defining features of any social segment. When interviewees are grouped taking into account indexes of perceived insecurity (using an analysis of conglomerates) four groups could be identified, with increasing degrees of fear and ranging from "calm" to "besieged" (Table 2).

Each group has its own socio-demographic result. Women are over-represented in the "calm" group, along with individuals over 35, inhabitants of rural areas, foreigners, and- with a significant difference- the lowest socioeconomic stratum of all the socio-demographic categories, which shows lesser degrees of victimization. Meanwhile, the group of "nervous" citizens not only includes the broadest segment of the sample, but also represents its socio-demographic distribution almost perfectly, except for a slight over-representation of men. The segment of "frightened" citizens includes a disproportionately large group of persons under 25 living in urban areas and belonging to the middle strata. Finally, the "besieged" group of citizens is essentially made up of upper and middle class women residing in urban areas.

Table 2
Classification of interviewees by levels of fear
(averages of indices of perceived insecurity)

Index	*Fear groups*			
	Calm	*Nervous*	*Frightened*	*Besieged*
Patrimonial	26.5	44.5	54.9	68.3
Physical	12.8	28.6	47.0	64.3
Emotional	11.5	26.1	43.6	65.4
Sexual	8.2	16.5	33.9	57.8
Percent of the sample (%)	25.1	36.6	28.5	9.8

Source: ENSCR-04.

It is necessary to put a face to the danger with some level of precision in order to defend oneself and in a certain sense, to maintain the hope that insecurity can be easily resolved by placing the chosen offender "in quarantine." Thus, through more thorough investigation, the faceless person is replaced by an expression of certain widespread social prejudices and through the endless repetition of messages transmitted by the media. To the open-ended question, "What kind of people commit violent or criminal acts the most?", ENSCR-04 interviewees mentioned several categories (lower class, foreigners, the unemployed, uneducated people) and dissatisfied persons (drug addicts, youth); in the words of focus group members, "…people with tattoos, piercings or long hair"; "…people taking or sniffing coke, smoking marihuana"; "…the classic juvenile delinquents". In particular, the omnipresent figure of the drug addict- which is inconsistent with drug consumption figures for the country, as will be seen later on– is in all likelihood represents something broader. The drug addict is a symbol of a society in the process of transformation where traditional mechanisms of social control have been relaxed, which makes it threatening. It epitomizes the loss of the country as "it used to be"– perhaps the primary reason for the anxiety expressed in all the focus groups.

The loss of the Costa Rica "it used to be" is linked with the threatening presence of foreigners. In both the ENSCR-04 and the focus groups, young adults (aged 24-35) of both sexes tend to be harsher about holding foreigners responsible for the deterioration of security in the country. It is crucial to note, however, that such strident expressions of xenophobia are voiced when insecurity is explicitly associated with the nationality of those

accused of crime, something repeatedly practiced by the news media. Only 1.5% of interviewees said Nicaraguans are basically responsible for the country's crime and violence in response to the open-ended question. However, the situation changes radically when interviewees are specifically asked about the nationality of perpetrators of violence. In this case, Nicaraguans and Colombians are mentioned predominantly, even though the reality is otherwise. The conclusion is as disturbing as it is important: xenophobia in Costa Rica is an induced, rather than a spontaneous phenomenon.

C. Elements of securitability in Costa Rica

Among aspects related to the concept of securitability, an investigation was made of public perception of the performance of state institutions that should more evidently contribute in preventing threats to citizen security and protecting the population (i.e. the police, court, and prison system), along with the ability of the public to mobilize these institutional resources. While it is obvious that these are only part of the resources enabling citizens to cope with threats to security, they are also particularly important components insofar as they are collective mechanisms whose adequate performance would make less desirable forms of privatizing citizen security unlikely to be adopted.

Overall, citizens feel that State security mechanisms are not giving them protection. With few exceptions, confidence in state institutions is low, particularly in the case of public law enforcement. Overlapping the lack of confidence expressed by half the population toward this entity is a generally negative assessment of its performance. In fact, 86.9% of the ENSCR-04 interviewees said that the police are partially responsible for the insecurity in the country, and almost half (49.4%) believe they are highly responsible. Even more disturbing are the reasons behind this assessment, which can be grouped in three major perceptions about the police force: police officers are corrupt (31.5%), not properly trained (33.9%), and work under extremely precarious conditions (20.9%). It should be noted, however, that this negative perception has not worsened over recent years, nor does it translate into a sense of being threatened by their presence.

Table 3
Relation between victimization, levels of fear and perception of police performance

Variable	*Average index on police performance (1) (scale 0-100)*	*Has public law enforcement improved over recent years? (%)*		
		Yes	*No*	*Total (2)*
Have you been victimized over the past 12 months?				
No	43.1	54.6	43.5	100.0
Yes	39.0	43.2	55.6	100.0
Fear Groups				
Calm	45.0	55.8	41.9	100.0
Nervous	41.6	48.0	49.9	100.0
Frightened	40.5	43.0	54.5	100.0
Besieged	37.2	39.4	59.7	100.0

Note: (1) Higher scores denote a higher evaluation. (2) Does not include percentages answering "DK" (don't know) and "NR" (no response).
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ENSCR-04

Opinions of the police are clearly associated with the population's levels of both objective and subjective security (Table 3).

As can be expected, interviewees who had been recently victimized and had an intense sense of insecurity rated police performance worse and gave a lower score of improvement over recent years. Though the direction of the causality of this relation is uncertain (i.e., whether a poor opinion about the police makes for a high sense of insecurity or, vice versa, this sense of insecurity actually fosters the former), data suggest that Costa Ricans do not feel the police protect them effectively against violence and dispossession. Such a widespread perception obviously creates a vacuum society naturally tends to fill with alternative forms of protection.

The negative image of this institution is reinforced by a pronounced skepticism concerning the performance of other institutions involved in the task of citizen security, including the Judiciary. In this case, 41.3% of ENSCR-04 interviewees said they had "little" or "no confidence" in this State branch; 40.0% said they had "some" confidence, and only 16.7% claimed to be "very" confident. This marks a significant increase in lack of confidence in the Judiciary, traditionally quite minor in the country. In particular, criminal judges elicit

heavily negative perceptions due to their slowness of action and the alleged leniency of the sanctions imposed on criminals (Table 4).

Within the framework of the NHDR 2005, some objective foundations for this perception have been analyzed through a fairly detailed examination of the current state of the police force community, as well as certain aspects in the performance of criminal courts and the prison system. This analysis produced some important results.

Table 4
Opinions about judges and other Judiciary agencies

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	*Percentage results of positive - negative opinions (Difference in percentage points) (1)*
Judges are generally honest	-13.2
Judges perform their functions well	-13.6
Judges are swift to punish criminals	-45.6
Penalties imposed by judges are adequate	-42.1
The Prosecutors Office goes after wealthy criminals as much as poor criminals (2)	-46.7
The OIJ (Judicial Investigation Bureau) abuses its authority (3)	-27.2
The OIJ responds promptly	-2.0
The OIJ acts professionally	-16.2
Judges are generally honest	3.5

Notes: (1) Corresponds to percentage of the sum of positive options "agree" or "highly agree" and the subsequent subtraction of the sum of negative options "disagree" or "highly disagree". (2) ENSCR-04 data were collected prior to the Prosecutors Office's work related to cases of political corruption involving top-level government officials at the end of 2004. It is very likely that the balance of opinions on this issue has significantly changed since then. (3) Because of the way the question was worded, in this case the positive opinions "agree" and "highly agree" were subtracted from the negative opinions "disagree" and "highly disagree".
Source: ENSCR-04.

While it is true that Costa Rica has experienced notable progress in regulating its police model, particularly with the 1994 General Law on Police (*Ley General de Policía)* and by creating twelve law enforcement bodies, certain organizational problems prevent it from fulfilling its obligations. These include deficient coordination of the entire police community, lack of national policy on citizen security, absence of a systematic effort in the area of police intelligence, disparities in police corps training, lack of institutional support for some police corps, and deficient budget.

The budget issue is critical since insufficient funds are allocated for the police to carry out its duties. While the government spending on security has increased slightly since 1985- albeit, base levels were extremely low- police forces lack the human, technical, and financial resources to carry out their duties in the best way possible. Providing the police with adequate funding has not been and still is not a public policy priority in Costa Rica, creating a practical contradiction of serious consequences for the mid- and long term.

An overwhelming portion of the Ministry of Public Security budget is allocated to salaries and administration; very limited resources are available for police training, specialization and professionalization and investment in communications equipment, transport and provisioning. Recent administrations have made significant efforts to increase the educational and professional level of the police force and improve its relations with the public. In the context of this effort, strengthening the National Police School and creating community security groups have had decisive impact.

Concerning the performance of the Judicial Investigation Bureau (Organismo de Investigación Oficial -OIJ), criminal courts and the prison system, the information collected by the ENSCR-04 suggests a rapid reduction in OIJ efficiency in the recent past, a significant increase in the duration of criminal trials, and significant, though not increasing, rates of recidivism among offenders. A more exhaustive study shows there are serious operational issues among the major actors in the penal system that foster the impunity of offenders, such as flaws in the preparation of police reports, inconsistencies by the Prosecutors Office when requesting provisional measures against offenders, and very serious deficiencies in the Judiciary's information systems.

While social reactions to this perceived lack of protection are multiple, at this point it is interesting to delve into three of them: not reporting crimes, widespread and growing use of private security resources, and a generalized sense of powerlessness concerning citizen insecurity. Each of these may be directly associated to problems regarding State protection resources.

The first of the above reactions is worrisome, in that only 32% of violent acts are reported to the competent authorities. Overall, denunciation rates in Costa Rica are considerably lower than in developed countries, and a great majority of citizens think crimes will not be solved even if reported, and that "the authorities don't do anything."

The second reaction involves recourse to home security measures (Table 5). Of the various measures investigated, almost two-thirds of Costa Rican households have adopted at least one. The most common include putting bars on the house (64.2%), never leaving the house alone (59.9%), and using watchdogs to guard the house (39.2%). It is worth noting that 30.3% of the sample has adopted five of the nine measures, and 7.3% has adopted more than ten. On average, Costa Rican families have adopted four of the measures included in the poll.

Table 5
Description of security measures adopted by Costa Rican households by years. 1986, 1999 and 2004. (Percentage of households)

Measures taken	*Year*		
	1986	***1999***	***2004***
Put bars on the house	38.4	31.7	64.2
Leave someone in the house when you go out	--	45.4	59.9
Get watchdogs to look after the house	20.0	22.2	39.2
Build a garage to protect the car	--	--	32.9
Install special residential locks	--	11.0	32.8
Install at least one security door	--	--	31.7
Install a car alarm	--	--	22.4
Buy car theft insurance	--	--	18.4
Organize with the neighbors (1)	15.0	--	19.8
Put barbed or razor wire around your property	--	2.5	13.2
Install a home alarm	--	7.2	12.5
Buy home insurance against robbery	--	--	12.5
Pay for a private guard in your neighborhood	12.0	9.1	12.4
Take self-defense courses	--	2.7	12.4
Install neighborhood alarm in your area	--	--	11.6
Install an electric gate	--	--	7.5
Buy firearms	10.0	8.3	6.2
Electrify the fence	--	--	1.8

Note: (1) In the ENSCR-04, interviewees were specifically asked about community security groups.
Sources: 1986: Rico *et al* (1988); Chinchilla, ed. (1999); 2004; ENSCR-04.

Nevertheless, the significant growth and greater formalization and regulation of private security agencies over the last few years are worrisome. The number of private security agencies is at least similar to those in the Police Force and, according to some unofficial estimates, far greater. The effects of the increased number of private security companies on the security of the population appear to be very limited due to the low levels of confidence their members generate in the population.

The third reaction is a widespread sense of powerlessness concerning citizen insecurity. In other words, Costa Ricans are extremely pessimistic about this phenomenon and the ability to do something to solve it. The number of respondents who felt there was little or nothing they could do was double the number who thought they could do something or a lot, and only one in ten respondents said there was a lot they could do.

Costa Rica is not only a frightened society, but has also accepted fear as something inevitable. Citizens have learned to live with fear and regard it as a natural part of life. The population, or an important part of it at least, has fallen victim to a *pathos* as real as that defining any type of abusive relationship: insecurity is hated because a day never goes by without being assaulted, but the victim has stopped contemplating any possibility of living differently and accepts it as part of his fate. In other words, fear is winning out.

Part Three: Can citizen insecurity be explained?

Contemporary literature on crime and violence offers a variety of theories on the causes of these two phenomena. In Costa Rica, studies on the factors associated with insecurity are incipient and delving more deeply is beyond the exploratory analysis intended here.

Rather than attempting to identify the causes of insecurity, an epidemiological approach is used to investigate the factors associated, under the assumption that there is no one explanation for the occurrence of violence and dispossession or perception of their intensity; it is the result of multiple interacting factors whose convergence augments their effects. Particular attention is given to the relationship between citizen insecurity and the news, urbanistic factors, economic factors, substance abuse and firearms.

A. The perception of insecurity and the news

How do the media affect perception of citizen insecurity? This has been the central question in cultivation theory, which looks at the media's participation in shaping the social imagery audiences form of their surroundings. According to the theory, this is achieved through a relatively common set of attitudes and values that very intensive television exposure tends to cultivate. Representation of violence is one of the most disturbing aspects from this viewpoint, which argues that greater exposure to violent contents leads to a perception of reality as more threatening, while developing anxieties and a sense of victimization.

Based on information from the ENSCR-04, no association was established between reading about crime in the newspapers and respondents' assessment of insecurity in the country. However, the findings are different regarding information transmitted on television, in that this does, indeed, tend to generate a more insecure perception of the environment (Table 6). 78.3% of the people who watch TV to keep informed consider the country "not at all safe" or "a little safe" versus 66.7% for those who do not watch television for this purpose. Although both percentages are high, there is a nearly 12-point percentage difference between the two groups, thus making it possible to affirm that television contributes to a perception of the surroundings as

more insecure and threatening. Nevertheless, this does not mean denying the existence of other factors not investigated here which can also have an impact on perceptions.

The effect of television on perception of the surroundings can be better understood taking into account that, according to the ENSCR-04, television is the media used most often to keep informed and is considered by the interviewees to have greater credibility.

Table 6
Assessment of security in the country in relation to exposure to TV news on crime (1). (in percentages)

Assessment of security in the country	Watches news about crime		Difference (2)
	Yes	No	
Number of interviews	2,270	90	
Total	100.0	100.0	
Not very/not at all secure	78.3	66.7	11.7
Very secure/secure	21.7	33.3	-11.7

Notes: (1) The Chi squared test was used to analyze the relation between watching crime news and perception of the environment. (2) % respondents answering "yes" minus % answering "no"
Source: ENSCR-04.

This investigation of the communication media holds that television's credibility lies in the verisimilitude of the image, which generates a feeling of "being there" at the site of the event and therefore tending to become the equivalent of truth. In other words, the image is convincing and is accepted not so much as the most reliable account of an occurrence, but as the occurrence itself, thus making it difficult to distinguish "actual" reality from the media's. The result of this investigation coincides with cultivation theory: TV news cultivates perceptions of insecurity in its most regular viewers.

What are the most prominent discursive elements of accident and crime reports in terms of citizen insecurity? To answer this question, crime and accident reporting in a major national newspaper and a widely-viewed television channel were analyzed in an attempt to examine the media's construction of crime and notions prevailing in journalistic narrative on citizen insecurity.

In the written media, the type of content classified as "others" covers 30% of the total and constitutes the most extensive section of the newspaper. Reports on crime and accidents comprise 13% and slightly exceed national news, with 12% of available space. In contrast, 25% of each television newscast is dedicated to crime and accidents, 25% to commercials, 18% to national news, 15% to sports and 12% to news categorized as "other". This signifies that the structure of the TV media gives priority to crimes and accidents over other types of news, providing even more coverage than the press. It can thus be said that a large number of television viewers are potential recipients of TV news, which in turn places special emphasis on crime and accidents and can heighten the sense of insecurity.

The predominance of topics connected with acts of violence (especially homicide, "migrant criminality," robbery and different forms of physical aggression) shows how the media rank crime. As mentioned previously, Costa Ricans fundamentally stay informed about the news through television and the press; they take "media reality" as "the reality of their surroundings," not considering that the media offer a version of reality, not reality itself. In addition, audiences depend on media discourse giving crime and accidents a predominant place in news programming, meaning that the dissemination of topics related to citizen insecurity affects the collective imagination and contributes to altering perception about events in and outside the nation.

B. Urbanistic factors

Recent studies looking at the relation between urbanistic factors and citizen insecurity, have proposed that social aggressiveness increases with the growth of population agglomeration in closed or limited geographic spaces. This was later refuted by those who claim that urban design and usage of public space have equal or greater importance than urban growth with respect to increasing citizen insecurity. Both approaches are discussed below.

To study urban growth, an analysis was made of permits issued for housing projects over the last fifteen years. It was determined that, unlike private projects, which have remained unchanged over time, in the initial period of public housing programs (1986-1994) the large projects

constructed were dramatically concentrated in a few districts of the Greater Metropolitan Area (GMA). This produced a certain demographic pressure on some of these zones, leading to higher concentrations of crime and situations of social exclusion. The data collected suggest that this urban expansion has had an impact on insecurity, since the annual rate of urbanization shows a high correlation (0.90) with intentional homicide during the 1990-2003 period (Graphic 2).

Graphic 2 Behavior of the homicide rate and percent of urbanization. 1980-2003



Source: EHPM for the years cited, INEC. Judicial Branch, Planning Departament, Statistics Section.

The subject of urban growth and its consequences goes hand in hand with urban segregation. Within the GMA and specifically in the San Jose metropolitan area, the last two decades have witnessed growing segregation of urban spaces. This slow but steady process resulted from a pattern of urban spread that took an archipelago of small towns and cities situated in a sea of high-quality agricultural land, and turned it into the Greater Metropolitan Area. For nearly a decade, segregation of urban space in the cantons and districts of the GMA considered insecure led to "entrenchment," or little islands of security. This phenomenon has had two manifestations: the construction of walled-in communities or horizontal condominiums (units with 200 or more square meters) and vertical condominiums (apartments measuring 200 square meters and up) (Table 7).

In many countries, it is common for those with the highest incomes to want to separate themselves from the rest of society. Nonetheless, impacts can vary depending on how this is accomplished. Due to their scale and design, condominiums and walled communities considerably reduce possibilities for interaction with other people and for the mixed uses of the city that are essential in improving people's quality of life.

There has been no parallel increase in public spaces in the GMA during recent years. As the city becomes larger and larger, public and private spaces that are relatively easy to access in the farming zones around urban centers are disappearing. Meanwhile, parks in the Greater Metropolitan Area and other cities in the throes of urban development are not maintained and lack adequate lighting. Although public parks have been constructed by different government administrations in the past, Costa Rica has generally not recognized the need and opportunity to convert non-urban zones into urban and regional parks. Furthermore, in the housing programs implemented after 1986, urban developments either did not include sports areas or they were very small.

Table 7
Housing units and apartment construction in square meters, by physical dimensions of construction per year, 1999-2004
(in absolute numbers and rate of inter-annual growth)

Dimension	Year					
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Houses	**862,340**	**1,180,075**	**1,440,992**	**1,333,708**	**1,456,127**	**1,609,186**
Under 100	510,087	730,326	884,759	698,433	793,940	847,309
100 to under 200	169,442	237,844	309,942	350,909	372,685	426,103
200 and over	182,811	211,905	246,291	284,366	289,502	335,774
Apartments	**30,862**	**180,899**	**253,983**	**183,263**	**249,505**	**206,900**
Under 100	18,016	157,385	222,508	66,196	193,284	158,195
100 to under 200	10,165	17,950	28,066	72,191	40,959	26,136
200 and over	2,681	5,564	3,409	44,876	15,262	22,569
Rate of growth			**1999 base=100**			
		2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**
Houses		**36.8**	**67.1**	**54.7**	**68.9**	**86.6**
Under 100		43.2	73.5	36.9	55.6	66.1
100 to under 200		40.4	82.9	107.1	119.9	151.5
200 and over		15.9	34.7	55.6	58.4	83.7
Apartments		**486.2**	**723.0**	**493.8**	**708.5**	**570.4**
Under 100		773.6	1135.1	267.4	972.8	778.1
100 to under 200		76.6	176.1	610.2	302.9	157.1
200 and over		107.5	27.2	1573.9	469.3	741.8

Source: Prepared by the authors based on construction statistics from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, online data, www.inec.go.cr

It should be pointed out that this neglect or deterioration of public spaces does not affect everyone alike. High-income individuals have their own places for recreation and in fact, private clubs have existed in and outside the GMA for many years. These spaces are little havens of security for the recreation of more economically advantaged sectors, but which obviously exclude the rest of the population.

In terms of citizen security and urbanism, there is a dangerous vicious circle that needs to be broken: the desolation of existing public spaces makes them a more likely staging ground for acts of violence, which in turn produces greater neglect of these public spaces and a notion that no new spaces should be created since they are prone to being overrun by crime. Furthermore, the poor condition of these spaces generates a sense of social deterioration, with obvious effects

on perceptions of insecurity. This holds for most public assets and even public transportation within the GMA, which has also been the target of criminal activity in recent years.

Perhaps one of the most illustrative examples of the relation between inadequate urban design and citizen insecurity is the deterioration of public space and growth in confined geographical areas, as in the case of the so-called "Street of Bitterness" (Calle de la Amargura). This is the name by which Third Street, in the city of San Pedro, canton of Montes de Oca, is commonly known. It is the commercial and residential area visited most by young people to get together and express themselves without pressure or restrictions. It is also an area where the convergence of several situations has made for a bad reputation.

It is impossible to ignore these conditions. Alcohol is served in bars and restaurants with little supervision of permits, a situation that has worsened in recent years. Drugs are sold and consumed, and according to data from the Ministry of Public Security, one apprehension was made every 54 hours during the first half of 2004. This is not an unsubstantial number given that such data is in general highly underestimated.

A look at sidewalks and road conditions is sufficient to verify the growing physical deterioration of this zone. The many pedestrians detour around piles of garbage- and the unpleasant odors - resulting from commercial activities. Nor is it possible to ignore the visual contamination: in some places, the dilapidated buildings and infrastructure are bestrewn with a proliferation of power lines and an exaggerated number of signs advertising this or the other not only jar with the surroundings, but block sight of the landscape. There is intense and incessant noise from traffic during the day, music blaring from business establishments and peoples' voices, all generating high levels of sound pollution.

Third Street was given a name whose connotation, for obvious reasons, is reinforced by the collectivity. The aforementioned problems create a perception that this is a dangerous area, but in fact, real acts of delinquency and insecurity do occur. This is why, with support from the UNDP, the Municipality of Montes de Oca and the University of Costa Rica are launching a comprehensive effort to change the situation.

C. Consumption of licit and illicit drugs

In Costa Rica, consumption of alcohol- a licit drug- is relatively low compared with the rest of the world (Graphic 3). Nevertheless, the problems associated are serious, making it necessary to examine patterns of consumption, not just the amount.

Graphic 3 Per capita alcohol consumption in the population aged 15 and over in developed countries, developing countries and Costa Rica. 1960-2000



Source: WHO, 2004. Costa Rica data obtained from different documents by IAFA (Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence).

Regarding the prevalence of alcohol consumption in the country, three polls conducted by Costa Rica's Institute on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (Instituto Costarricense de Alcoholismo y Fármacodependencia - IAFA) between 1999 and 2000 pointed to a significant decrease in the percentage of the population that has consumed drugs or alcohol at least once in their lifetime.

This reduction is probably associated with the preventive measures taken by the State in recent years, aimed especially at delaying the onset of consumption among youth. Active intake (consumption within 30 days of the survey) remains at 1990 levels (Table 8).

Table 8
Percentage of persons aged 12-70 years that have consumed alcohol at some point in their life and active consumption (within the past month). 1990, 1995 y 2000

Year	At some point in life	Active consumption
1990	66.0	27.4
1995	62.3	24.8
2000	54.3	26.6

Source: Bejarano y Ugalde, 2003.

Polls conducted over the last 20 years indicate a relatively low consumption of illicit drugs (roughly 6%), slightly increasing during the last decade and then leveling off. Marihuana is still the drug consumed most and, along with cocaine, shows the greatest rise in lifetime use over the years. However, this represents an increase in the number of individuals experimenting with this substance, but not necessarily continuing to consume over time, as verified by the most recent data on consumption (used within the last year) and active consumption (within the last month). The characteristic pattern in Costa Rica has been that of every five individuals who experiment, two continue in contact with this drug for at least twelve months.

Patterns of licit and illicit drug consumption among children and adolescents warrant special mention. Information collected by IAFA constitutes a representative sample of what is occurring in the country, illustrates the problem and highlights early onset of consumption during secondary school, a phenomenon occurring for some years in both sexes. It has been documented that the average age of initiating alcohol consumption is 11.3 years. Roughly one-quarter of children in their fourth year of primary school have consumed alcoholic beverages at some point and 7% indicated active consumption of tobacco. This has implications for consumption of other drugs, since the relation between alcohol and tobacco consumption and between these and the consumption of illicit drugs has been extensively demonstrated. There would be a high probability of psychological and physiological consequences from consumption at an early age due to chronological considerations as a result of getting started early, as well as effects on a young, more vulnerable organism in the process of development.

In general, exploration based on several sources of information reveals some type of connection between consumption of both licit and illicit drugs and violence. Investigation involved studies

conducted at treatment centers for alcoholics and drug-dependent individuals, forensic medicine, hospital emergency rooms, and prisons. Significant numbers were revealed for the population committing crimes to obtain drugs, testing positive for alcohol in cases of homicide, receiving hospital treatment for traumas related to alcohol consumption, committing crimes under the influence of alcohol, and others.

A question remains in this regard as to whether the association is between being a delinquent and a user of psychotropic substances, or between being arrested and consuming these substances. In any case, a review of studies conducted in this country shows an association between violence and consumption of alcohol for the most part, thereby pointing to alcohol as a primary factor of risk for violent behavior.

D. Economic aspects and insecurity

Numerous investigations have studied the connections between criminality (homicide, robbery and theft) and socioeconomic phenomena such as poverty, unequal income distribution and unemployment. Findings have varied both within countries and internationally.

In research for this report, no evidence was found of a connection between poverty and the homicide rate (Table 9). As for robbery (1989-2003) and theft (1996-2003), correlation shows a connection with poverty in general, although weak for robbery and not sufficiently strong in the case of theft. Consistent with other studies internationally, poverty is not itself a factor associated with violence during the period studied, at least. This means that no future reduction of violence could be anticipated from lowering poverty (or vice versa). Although observations are scarce, theft might be the only exception insofar as a reduction of total poverty might be expected to translate into lower numbers of this crime.

Table 9
Correlation coefficients between homicide, robbery and theft rates and variables related to poverty and inequality. 1987-2003

Variables	Homicides 1987-2003	Robberies 1989-2003	Thefts	
			1989-1994	1996-2003
Poverty				
Incidence of total poverty	-0.85	0.39	-0.29	0.53
Incidence of extreme poverty	-0.82	-0.39	-0.42	0.05
Inequality				
Gini coefficient	0.66	0.16	0.33	-0.89
Average income tenth decile/first decile	0.48	0.06	-0.24	-0.76
Average income fifth quintile/first quintile	0.55	0.00	-0.28	-0.88

Source: Calculated by the authors

As for inequality, correlation was indeed found. As anticipated, the greater the inequality, the higher the homicide rate. There are differences in the magnitude of correlation coefficients, and the Gini coefficient is the inequality indicator showing the highest correlation with the homicide rate (0.66), which is consistent with international studies.

Nonetheless, the case is different when inequality indicators are correlated with robbery and theft rates since, generally speaking, the relation is the opposite of what would be expected. The only exception is for theft in the 1989-1994 period, but the correlation coefficient is still not as high (0.33) as that obtained for homicide.

Other variables generally associated with delinquency are employment and the two categories of underemployment. In this case, rates were used for open unemployment, visible underemployment (individuals who work less than full time and want to work more hours), invisible underemployment (individuals who work full time or more and earn less than the minimum salary)[3], and total underutilization rate, which is the sum of the other three.

Results for robbery and theft were as anticipated for both the kind of relation and the magnitude of the coefficients, which show significant correlation. At least for the 1990s, then, it may be

[3] Rates of visible and invisible underemployment are equivalent, i.e., they are the result of converting the missing hours and salaries of the unemployed into full-time jobs.

asserted that increases or reductions in robbery and theft rates were associated with variations in unemployment and underemployment. Moreover, in the specific case of robbery, although the correlation coefficient is low, in general terms there was a relation among the variables considered in the 1989-2003 period. This result is consistent with international empirical evidence.

E. Firearms and insecurity

There is a certain consensus in the literature about the relation between citizens' acquisition of firearms and intensification of violent behavioral patterns. It will thus be seen, first, how fear is associated with firearm possession in the population and then, how this contributes to victimization.

The results of the ENSCR-04 show that, of all respondents, 3.8% of the least fearful group ("calm") possess at least one firearm, with a slightly higher percentage of 5.9% for the most fearful ("besieged"). However, the results are quite different when men and women are compared. While no particular pattern of arms possession was defined for women according to fear group, there is such a pattern for men. Not only do they acquire more firearms than women (7.8% versus 2.2%), but the proportion of men with arms increases notably as their fear of being victimized grows. Thus, 4.6% of men claiming to be "calm" said they had a firearm at the time of the interview, in comparison to 10.4% of those who feel "besieged". This indicates that for men exclusively, a more intense perception of insecurity contributes- but does not fully explain- the acquisition of firearms.

Before broaching the relation between firearm possession and citizen insecurity, it is essential to comment on the quantity of firearms in the country. This is clearly a complex task, since the only records available are for legal permits, and the number of firearms circulating illegally is therefore unknown. Even so, during the 1990-2003 period some 70,100 firearms were registered with the General Directorate of Firearms (Dirección General de Armamento) of the Ministry of Public Security, a number that increased significantly in 2000-2001 (Graphic 4).

Graphic 4 Firearms registered with the General Directorate of Firearms and the rate of homicides committed with firearms per 100,000 inhabitants. 1990-2003



Source: Ministry of Public Security, General Directorate of Firearms, Judicial Branch, Department of Planning, Statistics Division

According to the breakdown available since 1999, the arms registered most frequently in 2003 were guns and pistols: 43% pistols, 39% guns, 9% rifles, and roughly 8% shotguns. During this period, registration percentages according to type of firearm remained constant. Information for the same period also indicates that 64.9% of firearms were registered by private individuals and 35.1% by legal entities. Furthermore, registration by legal entities has tended to grow while decreasing for individuals. This is because more firearms are being registered by private security agencies, which are legal entities.

Between 1990 and 2003, 86,603 persons were issued permits to carry firearms. Of these, 64,707 persons renewed their permit at some point. The significant growth in permits recorded for the 1995-2001 period could have been because so little was known about this population before the legal framework regulating firearms possession changed. Contrary to registration between 2000 and 2003, permits were mostly requested by legal entities (42.7%), followed by police officers (34.1%), private individuals (20.3%), and the Judicial Investigation Bureau (OIJ) (2.6%). Here

again it is possible to observe a greater role of private security agencies in the proliferation of firearms.[4]

It should be mentioned that both individuals (personal security) and legal entities (private security) are issued ordinary permits to carry arms; the latter also need to present accreditation as a private security guard, as well. The law was regarded as permissive in both cases.

The influence of firearms on violence is evident: during the 2001-2003 period around 52% of intentional homicides in Costa Rica were committed with firearms. It should also be noted that such homicides are on the rise. OIJ data reveal that the 1990 rate of 1.8% for every 100,000 inhabitants grew to 3.9 by 2004. This source also provides some information that is highly important for understanding the phenomenon: during the same period, while the use of sharp instruments (knives) in homicides declined slightly, use of firearms grew considerably, becoming the weapon used most in these crimes. According to data for 2000, of 261 intentional homicides committed with arms, 42.5% involved 38-caliber guns, 16.4% were committed with 380-caliber pistols, and 7.5% with 9-mm pistols. All of these arms are permitted by the Law on Firearms enacted in 1995.

Firearms are heavily present not only in intentional homicides but in killings that occur in the context of domestic violence and violent robberies. For the 1990-2003 period, the correlation between homicides perpetrated with firearms and the number of arms registered is 0.9, thereby indicating considerable association between the two variables. Similarly, the correlation coefficient between the number of persons attacked with arms and the number of arms registered is 0.8 for 1997-2003. Increase in firearms is thus associated with the occurrence of violent acts, which is also confirmed by the spatial distribution of police reports associated with firearms, as will be seen shortly. In 2003, the police force issued 1,656 fines for violations of the Law on Arms and Explosives. Of these, 51% were for illegal possession of firearms, followed by illegal possession of knives (42%), illegally shooting a gun (2%) and other types of offenses.

[4] In this case, the private security agency customarily registers a firearm and assigns it to two or three of its agents, each of whom applies separately for a gun permit.

Map 2 shows information collected from cantons where reports were filed on illegal possession or shooting of firearms. During 2003, 59 of the county's 81 cantons reported fewer than 10, 16 reported between 10 and 19 and in only six were there 30 or more such fines reports issued.

An important finding in this regard is that during the 2001-2004 period, 22.6% of intentional homicide cases were recorded in the 13 cantons where no police reports were issued for illegal possession of arms. By contrast, cantons with higher numbers of police reports corresponded to 50% of the homicide victims. Thus, it may be inferred that in cantons reporting more illegal firearm possession, there is a greater possibility of violent acts resulting in intentional homicide from such weapons.

Another element that confirms the influence of firearms in fomenting a climate of insecurity is the connection between infractions of the Law on Arms and Explosives and the Cantonal Security Index (CSI). Clearly, as security levels fall the average rate of infractions of this law rises; vice versa, if security improves, the number of police reports associated with firearms declines.

Map 2
Police reports issued under the category of "Violation of the Law on Arms and Explosives" involving illegal possession or shooting of a firearm (1), 2003
(in absolute numbers)



Note: (1) A total of 930 reports were issued.
Source: Ministry of Public Security, Department of Planning and Operations, Statistics Division.

The findings presented in this section show that possession of firearms is associated with victimization. Consistently with the results of other studies, statistics for Costa Rica show that regardless of the reason for possessing these arms, their link with crime and death appears inevitable.

F. Overview of factors and some reflections

To provide an overview of the factors associated with citizen insecurity, representative variables were sought for the five factors addressed in preceding sections. The information available showed that one way to tackle this objective was by focusing on variables that are indicators of actual (not perceived) victimization, using year 2000 numbers for the nation's 81 cantons obtained from different records.

Eight variables were selected to encompass several aspects of interest concerning factors potentially associated with homicide, robbery and theft rates. Three variables were included for the factor of urban development: percentage of the population living in urban areas in each canton, percentage of households in overcrowded conditions, and population density. Two economic variables were chosen: the ratio between the average income of households in the tenth decile to those in the first decile (measuring economic inequality) and the rate of open unemployment. The other variables are social: permits to sell liquor, detentions for drug possession in public streets, and detentions for illegally carrying firearms in public streets (all measured per 100,000 inhabitants).

Explained simply, correlations among the different variables were calculated (Table 10), with results showing that the homicide rate is related to that of detentions for illegal drug possession in public places (0.56) overcrowding (0.55) and in a lesser degree, rate of detentions for illegal firearm possession (0.33). Elsewhere, the rate of robberies and thefts relates to that of detentions for illegal possession of drugs (0.66), number of liquor permits per 100,000 inhabitants (0.30) and, less so, percent of urbanization (0.25). As demonstrated previously, this shows that to a greater or lesser extent, victimization in its various manifestations is related to such issues as drugs, overcrowding, drug consumption, and illegal firearm possession.

Hence, the variables that turn out to be associated in some way with victimization also correlate with others whose convergence may exacerbate effects on citizen insecurity. For instance, detentions for drug possession on public streets show a particularly relevant association with the homicide rate (0.56), but also relate to population density (0.41), percent of urban population (0.32) and percent of overcrowded households (0.18), thereby suggesting that the interaction

between drugs and urbanization increases homicide rates. In other words, whenever drugs come into play in densely populated cantons also characterized by intensive urban development, there is a pattern of rising homicide.

Table 10
Pearson correlation matrix for study variables at the cantonal level. 2000

	Percent of Urbanization	Percent of Overcrowding	Inhabitants per km2	Decile ratio	Percent of Unemployment	Rate of Liquor permits	Rate ofDrug detentions	Rate of Firearm possession
Percent of urbanization (1)	1.00	-0.39	0.66	0.01	-0.33	-0.38	0.32	0.03
Percent of overcrowding (1)	-0.39	1.00	-0.21	0.41	0.50	0.31	0.18	0.44
Inhabitants per km2 (1)	0.66	-0.21	1.00	-0.02	-0.30	-0.23	0.41	0.13
Decile ratio (2)	0.01	0.41	-0.02	1.00	0.36	0.12	-0.15	0.24
Percent of unemployment (1)	-0.33	0.50	-0.30	0.36	1.00	0.38	-0.18	0.23
Rate of liquor permits (3)	-0.38	0.31	-0.23	0.12	0.38	1.00	0.11	0.25
Rate of drug detentions (4)	0.32	0.18	0.41	-0.15	-0.18	0.11	1.00	0.16
Rate of firearm possession (5)	0.03	0.44	0.13	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.16	1.00
Rate of homicide (6)	0.11	0.55	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.56	0.33
Rate of robbery and theft (6)	0.25	0.11	0.14	-0.05	-0.02	0.30	0.66	0.03

Notes: (1) Population and Housing Census 2000, INEC; (2) Based on methodology described in Madrigal, 2002; (3) Based on patent data to February 2001, from the Directorate of Municipal Management, Research and Development Division, Institute of Municipal Advisory and Promotion; (4) Based on 2001 data provided by the Unit on Information and National Statistics on Drugs of Costa Rican Institute on Drugs; (5) Based on 2003 data provided by the Planning and Operations Department, Statistics Division, Ministry of Public Security. (6) The rates of homicide and robbery and theft were constructed using a moving average for the 1999-2001 period based on intentional homicide statistics from the Judicial Branch and population data from the 2000 Census conducted by INEC.
Source: Prepared by the authors

Analysis of the interactions among variables can reveal other aspects of interest for understanding the complexity of the problem. For instance, such an analysis may show that a variable not directly related with the homicide rate is in fact indirectly related. The following case is worth examining in this regard: with respect to the homicide rate, there was very little correlation with economic variables (0.11) and moderate correlation with the percentage of overcrowded households (a variable contemplated in urbanization-related factors). However, overcrowding is also associated with the economic variables (unemployment rate = 0.50 and economic inequality = 0.44), suggesting that the economy impacts indirectly on intentional homicide. In other words, variables not directly associated with victimization, such as economic variables, may be indirectly associated when they interact with other variables.

The multiplicity of factors and their interaction is not limited solely to victimization, since the same relations also apply to perceived insecurity. While here the emphasis has been on victimization and the factors associated, there is no question that they have an effect on subjective insecurity.

Another approach to the complex interactions increasing citizen insecurity is shown in a qualitative study on the views of youth and adolescents at a reform school (Centro de Formación Zurquí), in a disadvantaged community and in a middle class community. While these results are not exhaustive and cannot be generalized for the entire population, they reveal certain trends about a situation that is difficult to explore from a quantitative point of view.

Based on a critical path of development matrix, in turn based on the individual human rights approach, specific conditions were identified that enable the protection or lack of protection that can influence citizen insecurity. The results indicate that there is a negative path, a vulnerable path, a favorable path and a positive path. The range of possibilities these paths indicate for youth development is illustrated, at one end, by situations of family conflict or aggression, expulsion from the family unit, dropping out of the school system, and survival strategies based on illegal activities- including a strong component of aggression to others and to themselves. At the other extreme are family and social conditions enabling adolescents to become fully integrated in society, as well as to be autonomous, make decisions, and carry out sustainable

life projects based on their personal education and training, with a sense of belonging and contributing to their communities. The results indicate that the combination of these factors either inhibits or heightens the ability of youth to play an important role in citizen security.

There are other factors associated with citizen insecurity that should not be overlooked. One is the interaction of violence and insecurity with gender inequality. The degree of violence against women in Costa Rica is paradoxical in light of numerous changes taking place to advance their legal and social condition. Given the greater awareness and new mechanisms to ensure compliance with the human rights of women, violence against them would be expected to decrease. One plausible hypothesis is that progress in women's rights has increased tensions within Costa Rican families, causing violence against women to continue rising. Despite the achievements, family dynamics have failed to adapt to changes in women's condition, bringing about an intensification of conflicts. While women's rights to opt for a life project of their own are being consolidated, reproductive duties, for example, are not distributed equitably between the genders, and the State remains aloof to the difficulties families face, even in the most dramatic cases- i.e., single mothers with young children.

From a more general perspective and added to the above, processes of socialization, particularly those associated with the creation of female and male identities, contribute to an understanding of the differentiated risks of violence to which women and men are exposed.

The focus groups provided interesting examples concerning the socialization of gender and its relation to violence and insecurity. On one hand, its effect on couple dynamics was evidenced. Men– especially those over 35– said they now feel very insecure with respect to their partners since women exercise rights and powers they did not have in the past. Men referred to this with annoyance and as a justification of domestic violence. Secondly, the socialization of gender also affects perception about the risk posed by others, distorting it and affecting decisions that in turn have an impact on security. Men, especially young men, expressed little or no fear for their physical or patrimonial security, even though they comprise the population segment exposed most to violent death.

Socialization can also affect other important areas of peoples' lives. Examples include the social pressure to succeed at an early age and the consequent insecurity among youth. It is assumed that such pressure can have a negative effect on personality formation by fomenting certain values, social representations and predispositions to act in potentially violent ways. Social pressure to succeed occurs at all ages, but is particularly relevant for youth since it can intensify a sense of competitiveness and a desire to stand out in various ways. If excessive, however, such pressure can have negative effects on their mental and emotional health.

While it is not possible to explain citizen insecurity to the degree desirable, evidence suggests that the factors associated are multiple and complex. The role played by media news, urbanistic factors, licit and illicit drugs, firearms, gender inequalities, and socialization processes in general are not the only factors that help us to understand citizen insecurity in Costa Rica, but we do know they clearly intensify the problem.

Part Four. Does citizen insecurity have consequences for human development?

The preceding sections showed some of the ways in which citizen insecurity compromises the expansion of individual freedoms and options. This fourth part will explore and illustrate in greater detail the impact that insecurity has on human development. The consequences are as varied as the associated factors examined in part 3 but are more concrete and easier to capture since they address the insecurity that affects people and communities in multiple ways.

A. Citizen insecurity and the pursuit of individual freedoms

Because of the direct implications for human development, it is particularly important to determine the impact of insecurity on the pursuit of individual freedoms. If we think of human development as the progressive exercise of the freedom to develop individual capacities for the benefit of society, the inhibition, retraction or renunciation of the pursuit of certain freedoms evidently jeopardizes the human development of the individual, firstly, and secondly but not less obvious, social development.

Freedom consists of the possibility to mobilize will to pursue ends and exercise the corresponding actions as the result of a decision. For now, we need to examine three facets of freedom whose importance, while not universal, is certainly very widespread in any cultural context:

- Freedom of movement. Human beings are recognized for their movement. All people need to move about in order to satisfy their most elemental needs.
- Freedom to own property. This is not only a basic freedom, but a condition for exercising other freedoms that require material support.
- Freedom of rest and leisure. The enjoyment of life and the possibility of partaking in sports and leisure activities are considered essential human needs.

The questions in the ENSCR-04 make it possible to relate interviewees' perception of insecurity to the three preceding elements, transformed into indexes (on a scale of 0 to 100). The results of this exercise are very clear (Graphic 5). In all cases, respondents' enjoyment of the three freedoms is inversely related to the intensity of his or her perception of insecurity, a relationship that is particularly marked in the case of movement and freedom of ownership.

Constraints on the movements of girls and boys are particularly severe, a phenomenon that does not augur at all well for a child's personal development. The average index for restrictions of child freedoms in the overall sample is much higher (71.0) than for the other indexes (restriction of movement (50.6), restriction of the freedom to own property (53.1) and restriction of the freedom of rest and leisure (55.1). A gender-differentiated analysis of the indexes reveals that women have a greater tendency to restrict their freedoms, at an index of 57.8 in comparison to 43.3 for men. Similarly, women restrict their freedom of rest and leisure (59.4) more than men (50.8).

Graphic 5 Index on restriction of freedoms based on levels of fear (scale 0-100)



Source: Prepared by the authors based on ENSCR-04.

B. Some effects of citizen insecurity on public health

The consequences of citizen insecurity on health are not the most generalized, though they are possibly the most radical and distressful from both the individual and collective standpoint. Society's capacity to provide its inhabitants with the possibility of a long, healthy and satisfactory life depends, in part, on the frequency of premature death and physical and psychological injuries derived from violence within a given period.

From 2001 to 2004, 15,591 deaths were registered per year in Costa Rica on average. Approximately half was due to heart disease (29.7%) and cancer (22.8%), the two main causes of death in the country. External causes constitute the third most important cause of death (11.9%), a category that includes death by homicide and other acts of violence, such as traffic accidents and suicide. This category is not only highly relevant; it is also the one with the greatest percentile difference between men and women. The percentage of men who die from external causes (16.5%) is greater by almost 11 points than for women (5.8%).

A more specific analysis shows that of the four causes of death included as external causes, death by homicide occupies last place (13.7%). While there is no doubt that the impact of unintentional homicide on Costa Rica's overall mortality rate is extremely low, the case is somewhat different for age groups. Among those aged 1 to 44, deadly violence is the primary cause of death, and is especially prevalent in 15 to 24 year-olds. In this segment, external causes produced 61.3% of the deaths, with traffic accidents alone constituting nearly a fourth. Intentional homicide occupies fourth place in this same age group, but the percentage (11.2%) is seven times greater than for all age groups as a whole. The impact of homicide on people aged 15 to 24 is better understood when noting that the specific rate of mortality would fall by 12.6% if no death by intentional homicide occurred. In the case of men, specific decline in the rate for the 15 to 24 year-old group would be even greater (15%).

Because intentional homicide occurs with greater frequency among young males, it is useful to calculate Years Potential Life Loss (YPLL) as a consequence of intentional homicide.[5] Results show that the relative increment in YPLL from 1990 to 2003 is significant in men and not in women. Another way of analyzing the differences between the sexes and men's growing contribution to the YPLL is by calculating the IYPL, i.e., expressing YPLL per 10,000 inhabitants (Graphic 6). In 2003, the IYPL was 67.4 per 10,000 males, a figure 1.7 times higher than in 1990. In the case of women, in 2003 this figure was 10.4, quite similar to the beginning of the period (9.2). In sum, the IYPL shows that the relative loss of years caused by homicide is not only rising, but is occurring with particular intensity among men.

Graphic 6 Index of Years Potential Life Lost (IYPL) from homicide by sex. 1990-2003 (per 10,000 inhabitants)



Source: Development Observatory, University of Costa Rica.

If deaths from intentional homicide are the most radical consequence of citizen insecurity on private and public health, they are, of course, not the only one. Physical injuries and other types are much more widespread. In that sense, injuries requiring hospitalization are relevant because of the exceptional violence that precedes them, because records are relatively reliable and

[5] Death is premature when it occurs before a certain predetermined age, such as life expectancy at birth in the population studied. The YPLL rate from intentional homicide is the sum of the years that all the persons dying from this cause would have lived had they reached projected life expectancy.

because they provide a means to estimate, at least in part, the impact of violence on public health institutions in the country.

Results show that from 1997 to 2003, the average number of hospital releases from aggression was 1,843 per year. This means that within the study period, an average of five victims of violence were released each day from hospitals in the Costa Rican public health sector. Of total releases related to violent crime, physical aggression was the most common (69.2%), at an average 3.5 hospital releases daily. Sexual aggression was the second cause of hospitalization during the period, totaling 10.7%. This figure is striking because it signifies that approximately every two days there was a hospital release associated with the sexual violence occurring in the country. As with everything else related to sexual violence, significant underestimation is to be expected in this category since not all victims of aggression use the health system to attend the consequences of this type of violence.

To study the variation in total violence-related hospital releases during the 1997-2003 period, the study used a rate of 100,000 inhabitants for both the general population and gender disaggregation (Graphic 7). The results show that, although uneven, the overall aggression rate reflects a slightly upward trend during the period, from 45.5 hospital releases per 100,000 inhabitants in 1997, to 51.0 in 2003. In other words, more people were consistently requiring admission to attend afflictions caused by violence.

Graphic 7 Violence-related hospital release rate by gender 1997-2003 (rate per 100,000 inhabitants)



Source: Prepared by the authors based on the Department of Statistics on Health Services, CCSS

In all years, rates for males are higher than for women. The rate for men shows an erratic behavior over the period, although a downward trend is apparent (from 71.1 hospital releases in 1997 to 65.3 in 2003). However, for women there was a well-defined rising trend: while the rate was 19.1 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1997, by 2003 it had reached 36.3- in other words, practically double.

An analysis of which type of aggression contributed more to narrowing the gap between men and women produces disturbing results, since what marks the difference is sexual violence. In the case of men, the magnitude of the rate is low and shows a slight rise during the period (from 0.6 in 1997, to 1.7 in 2003). For women, however, the rate is substantially higher and practically tripled over seven years, from 4.1 in 1997 to 11.7 in 2003. In other words, sufficient evidence was found to show that hospital releases related to aggression against women are primarily the product of sexual aggression.

C. The economic costs of citizen insecurity

Citizen insecurity has an economic impact on the household. Household spending for direct security during 2003-2004 amounted to no more and no less than CR¢30.07 million per year, a per household figure equivalent to CR¢28,600 a year and 0.4% of the GDP (Table 11).

On the other hand, the State also has to pay for public security, the administration of criminal and contraventional justice and the penitentiary system. According to the Technical Secretariat of the Budget Authority (STAP) of the Ministry of Public Finances, in 2003 expenditures for "public order and security matters," which include the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, and Public Security together with the Judicial Branch, amounted to CR¢126.4 million, i.e., a little over CR¢30,000 *per capita*. Total spending in this area represents 1.8% of the GDP and 3.8% of consolidated public sector expenditures. Of that total expense, half (51%: CR¢64.5 million) corresponds to the Judicial Power, 29.4% to the Ministry of Public Security (CR¢37.14 million), 13.6% to the Ministry of Justice (CR¢17.13 million), 5.5% to the Ministry of the Interior (almost CR¢7 million), and 0.5% to construction.

Table 11
Estimation of minimum household expenditure on security. 2003-2004 (millions of CR Colons per year)

Item	Estimated amount
Private security in the neighborhood	12,600
Installation of bars	5,860
Home alarm system	3,600
Barbed or razor wire	480
Car alarm	1,065
Special locks	1,000
Home theft insurance	226
Car theft insurance	3,240
Construction of a garage to protect the car	1,100
Installation of an electric gate	900
Total	**30,071**

Source: Prepared by the authors

In terms of GDP, spending on public order and security equaled 1.5% in 1987, gradually decreasing to 1992, when it represented just 1.2%. The trend reversed over the following years

until peaking at 1.9% in 2002, and again decreasing in 2003 to 1.8%. The share of public order and security expenditures in overall public spending was 3.8% in 1987, but declined over the following years, bottoming out in 1991 (3.3%). It later recovered, increasing to 3.8% in 1996, a percentage which remained steady until 2003, with the exception of a slight decrease in 1997.

It is known that, in general, violence generates a series of economic costs for the public and society overall, which, although difficult to quantify, can be approximated. The total impact of violence is impossible to measure, which is why measurements contemplate only the most visible forms and consequences. The methodology generally utilized in these cases is to make an inventory of the possible consequences of criminal behaviors, assess their cost and add them up (Table 12).

According to estimates, the economic cost of the perpetuation and prevention of violence amounted at least to CR¢246.12 million, representing 3.6% of GDP. The main component of this cost corresponds to material loss and, within this, public spending on security and justice, representing almost half of the total economic cost.

While this amount is undoubtedly high, it is very much lower than those in other studies on the region placing this figure at 12.1% of the GDP at the end of the last decade for Latin America, and close to 25% of GDP in extreme cases such as Colombia and El Salvador. Nonetheless, 3.6% of total production is not an inconsequential figure, and equals over half of the country's yearly investment in public education.

Table 12

Economic costs of violence in millions of CR Colons and as percentage of GDP, 2003

Category	Millions of CR Colons	% GDP
Losses from health impairment	**41,013**	**0.6**
Medical attention	7,972	0.1
Years Potential Loss Life	33,041	0.5
Material Losses	**185,564**	**2.7**
Public security and justice	126,422	1.8
Private security-homes	30,071	0.4
Private security-businesses	30,071	0.4
Transfers	**19,571**	**0.3**
Total	**246,148**	**3.6**

Fuente: Prepared by the authors

Perhaps nothing expresses best the economic justification for investing in crime prevention and the reduction of crime rates than a direct comparison between the costs of public education and those related with the prison system. It has been estimated that in 2004, the State investment required to maintain one prisoner serving a sentence for certain crimes was greater than the investment involved in educating one student from preschool through college graduation. In other words, without even considering the immense positive externalities that derive from investment in education, the economic justification of guaranteeing universal access to the education system by preventing crime is much greater than for combating crime through intensive use of the penal system.

D. Citizen insecurity and social capital

The ultimate end of human development is freedom, which is not exercised in isolation but in a social context. While the focus of human development is based on the idea of the individual as potentiality, with inexhaustible capacity to conceive plans and projects, it also warns that creating a space with sufficient freedom for the possibilities human action offers presupposes a commitment by society as a whole. In other words, it is based on the premise that personal enrichment takes place in a continual process of interaction and cooperativity.

Social capital is increasingly used to analyze the quality of the collective ties that define a community. The relevant question here is, "How are the associative forms commonly referred to in the notion of social capital impacted by citizen insecurity?"

To operationalize this concept, two indexes were created: one for associativity (participation in six community activities) and another for interpersonal trust (a question). The indexes were then used to categorize people into different social capital groups.

The results of the analysis showed that while it is possible to identify the impacts of citizen insecurity on social capital, these impacts largely depend on the type of social capital referred to (Table 13).

In the first instance, it can be observed that low-intensity social capital dominates all fear groups and that indexes are quite similar for each (in the vicinity of 44%). This makes it possible to ascertain that in collectivities with low social capital, the presence of more or less fear does not generate changes in traditional patterns of behavior. At the other extreme, in the group with high-intensity social capital where both associativity and trust are very important, it can be observed that as fear increases, intensity of social capital rises (from 13.3% for the "calm" group to 22.0% for the "besieged").

We are thus witnessing a significant asymmetry: strongly rooted social networks seem to be strengthened as fear grows, which does not happen for social networks that are already fragile. This means that to some degree, strengthening of community ties provides a certain "immunization" to fear.

Table 13
Percentile distribution of social capital groups according to level of fear

Social Capital	Fear groups				Total
	Calm	Nervous	Afraid	Besieged	
Low intensity	43.0	44.0	45.5	44.5	44.2
Medium with high associativity	6.0	11.0	14.2	19.9	11.5
Medium with high trust	37.7	26.5	20.9	13.6	26.4
Alta intensidad	13.3	18.5	19.4	22.0	17.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: prepared by the authors based on ENSCR-04

On the other hand, the behavior of the intermediate social capital groups shows that the growth of fear strengthens associativity, where it exists, and severely weakens levels of interpersonal trust when high. Specifically, the percentage represented by medium social capital with high associativity grows systematically with the level of fear (from 6% in "calm" individuals to 19.9% for the "besieged"). This implies that in a collectivity characterized primarily by high associativity, growth of fear generates a greater level of association among people, reflected in the creation of organized neighborhood groups of either a formal nature (under the auspices of the Ministry of Security), or groups of neighbors on their own.

To the contrary, in the medium social capital group with a high predominance of interpersonal trust, the impact of rising fear clearly has more restrictive results: from 37.7% among the "calm" group, down to 13.6% in the "besieged" group.

These last two relationships reveal two apparently contradictory trends: while fear strengthens associativity– especially community crime enforcement efforts– it evidently also erodes trust among people. One might say that it fosters an "associativity of distrust" based on convenience more than solidarity. This finding is not so much original as verification of a long line of Western thinking on political theory that situates collective action– and that of the State itself –

within individual rationale. While not necessarily an expression of the best human values, such "associativity of distrust" generated by insecurity is better than social atomization.[6]

E. Citizen insecurity, democratic culture and the Rule of Law

Citizen insecurity directly influences the quality of democracy, the only political system compatible with the expansion of freedoms and full respect for human dignity, with effects in four types of directions. First, a democratic culture presumably maintains close adherence to certain values, such as tolerance for differences.

In this regard, the inhabitants of this country are, on average, considerably more willing to address citizen insecurity through extreme normative measures than extreme physical action, such as lynching. To a lesser degree, they are prepared to use violent methods to resolve conflict. This means that the inclinations of the majority of the population continue to be consistent with the principles of the Rule of Law, but fear fans social support for private and public conduct that is not, thus corroborating that perception of insecurity produces attitudes that place the state of Rule of Law in jeopardy.

The second way that citizen insecurity affects the quality of democracy is by heightening social capacity to channel conflict along institutional lines adhering to human rights and with a basic component of civility in human relations. Concerning this (the third direction), a democratic state presupposes that a juridical response to security issues that ensures full concurrence with human rights and broad protection of individual freedoms.

The response of the legal system to public clamor for more security has been generally respectful of human rights in the country, though not without repressive tendencies. The last decade has seen a proliferation of legislative proposals aimed at toughening criminal sanctions against the perpetrators of any crime, an increase in the average number of years of prison sentences handed

[6] As the experience of the Community Safety Committees themselves shows, such associative modalities occasionally provide a platform for collective actions that go beyond the original intention, frequently excluding and repressive, that motivate them.

down by criminal judges (Table 14), and a considerable increase in the incarceration rate. Such toughening has been offset by the active role of constitutional jurisprudence in the protection of fundamental rights.

Table 14
Average sentence in years by category of crime, 1990-2002 (1)

Crime	*Year (2)*								
	1990	1991	1992	1995	1996	1998	1999	2000	2002
Total	5.6	5.7	5.6	6.8	7.5	5.6	6.1	6.8	7.2
Against life	7.5	8.6	9.1	11.2	12.8	9.5	10.5	10.4	12.7
Sexual	7.7	7.0	6.9	8.3	10.9	9.3	11.2	12.5	11.9
Against property	4.6	4.6	4.3	5.8	6.1	3.9	4.3	4.6	5.0
Drug violations	8.8	9.8	8.5	7.4	6.6	6.1	5.8	6.5	6.8

Notes: (1) Excluded from the categories are daily fines, security measures, and probation because these penalties do not entail incarceration. (2) No disaggregated information was found for 1993, 1994, 1997, 2001, and 2003
Source: Prepared by the authors based on incarceration data published in the Judicial Statistical Yearbooks of the Judicial Branch, Planning Department, Statistics Section

The fourth way that insecurity affects democracy is through social support for public institutions and, obviously, preference for democracy as a system of government.

In scholarly literature, there is an assumption that an increase in criminality, corruption and violence tends to undermine confidence in public institutions, particularly those in charge of law enforcement functions and the administration of justice. The results are clear in that victims of an act of violence over the past year have systematically held an unfavorable opinion of all institutions, particularly those related with citizen security, as well as political institutions (Table 15). Equally systematic is the gap that separates levels of trust in institutions among the more or less fearful groups of the population, with very extensive differences for all the institutional groups. Of note, groups of victimized individuals and those with the most intense perception of insecurity are the ones with an overall negative opinion of public institutions concerned with citizen security.

Table 15
Relation between dimensions of citizen security and trust in public institutions (%)

Dimension of Security	Type of institution								
	Security and law enforcement agencies (1)			Social integration institutions (2)			Political Institutions (3)		
	Some-a lot	None-little	Balance	Some-a lot	None-little	Balance	Some-a lot	None-little	Balance
Victimized within the last 12 months									
No	55.5	42.6	*12.9*	59.3	37.4	*21.9*	31.1	67.1	*-36*
Yes	47.0	51.6	*-4.6*	56.2	40.7	*15.5*	24.4	74.5	*-50.1*
Fear group									
Calm	59.9	40.1	*19.8*	65.1	34.9	*30.2*	33.3	66.7	*-33.4*
Nervous	54.3	45.7	*8.6*	59.5	40.5	*19.0*	30.1	69.9	*-39.8*
Afraid	56.1	43.9	*12.2*	62.0	38.0	*24.0*	31.3	68.7	*-37.4*
Besieged	48.9	51.1	*-2.2*	53.5	46.5	*7.0*	27.6	72.4	*-44.8*

Notes: (1) Includes simple average of opinions about the following agencies: Police Force, Judicial Branch, Prosecutors Office and Judicial Investigation Bureau (OIJ). (2) Includes the simple average of opinions on the following institution: CCSS (social security), INVU (housing and urban development), PANI (child protection), IMAS (social development), INAMU (women), as well as the women's delegations, the Ministry of Labor, and public primary and secondary schools. (3) Includes the simple average of opinions on the following institutions: Municipalities, Legislative Assembly, political parties.
Source: ENSCR-04

On the other hand, the evidence suggests that citizen security is, in fact, one of the stitches that if torn, could unravel the democratic pact, even in a country like Costa Rica where that pact is enormously solid. Findings in this area show that satisfaction with democracy is lower among people who have been subjected to violence or dispossession in the recent past (Table 16). But this relation appears offset by the significant percentage of people who are undecided about the matter.

Table 16
Relation between dimensions of citizen security and the degree of satisfaction with democracy (%)

Dimension of security	Degree of satisfaction with democracy			
	Satisfied – very satisfied	Undecided	Unsatisfied – very unsatisfied	Balance of opinions (1)
Victimized within last 12months				
No	18.8	50.6	28.7	*-9.9*
Yes	23.5	39.1	36.6	*-13.1*
Fear group				
Calm	59.4	16.9	22.9	*36.5*
Nervous	52.0	20.9	25.8	*26.2*
Afraid	43.6	20.2	34.4	*9.2*
Besieged	42.8	17.4	39.4	*3.4*

Notes: (1) Net difference from subtracting total "unsatisfied" and "very unsatisfied" responses from total "satisfied" and "very satisfied" responses.
Source: ENSCR-04

The figures leave no doubt in terms of fear groups, where degree of satisfaction with democracy suffers a notable and systematic decline as the perception of insecurity increases. The balance of opinions expressing satisfaction with democracy is over 30 points higher for "calm" groups versus the "besieged" one. While there is a broad majority of people who are satisfied with Costa Rican democracy, in the besieged group, satisfied and unsatisfied groups make up very similar blocks.

Equally clear– and possibly more disturbing– is a trend uncovered when abstract adhesion to democracy as a system of government is crossed with intensity of perception of insecurity. In this case, preference for democracy suffers a noticeable decline as fear increases, as do authoritarian tendencies. The proportion of "besieged" willing to accept an authoritarian regime under certain circumstances is practically triple that of the "calm" group.

F. The impact of citizen insecurity in measuring human development: a preliminary approximation

Shouldn't human development measurements reflect the affliction suffered as a consequence of citizen insecurity? Certainly, but this is anything but simple.

As is widely known, the human development measurement instrument designed by the UNDP since its first global report in 1990, the Human Development Index (HDI), is a minimum common denominator that quantifies three essential dimensions in the expansion of human capacities: access to knowledge, a healthy lifestyle and economic income.

The UNDP has made numerous attempts to refine what is in essence a very basic mechanism for measuring a complex phenomenon, and open it up to other dimensions of human development that can be quantified. There have been a great number of "adjustments" to make the HDI more sensitive to aspects ranging from gender equity to income distribution and access to cultural wealth. However, inclusion of security in the measurement of human development has barely been undertaken.

To carry out this task in the case of Costa Rica, and to observe the effects of including the variable of *citizen security* in human development measurements, it is imperative to gather a wealth of observations for making inferences. The obvious resource for more observations lies in the 81 cantons of the country, an array of cases that are surprisingly heterogeneous in many aspects.

Measurement of human development on a cantonal scale is a recent concern and it is not until now, with the help of the Development Observatory of the University of Costa Rica's, that the UNDP is advancing methodology for periodic measurement and monitoring. This methodology incorporates all of the variables included in the conventional HDI, in a way that can be monitored annually. It represents a contribution of supreme importance, not only to the debate on human development in the country, but to working out the first and most basic condition for an exercise in raising awareness about measurement of human development in terms of citizen insecurity in Costa Rica.

Based on the results from using this methodology for all the cantons of the country in 2003, within the frame of this project a first attempt was made to adjust the HDI for this variable. Methodological instruments developed for this report- the Cantonal Security Index (CSI) - were used for this purpose. Although the report's assessment of the phenomenon of citizen

(in)security is evidently partial, given that the dimensions of perception and securitability are left out, this exercise could at least be carried out at an acceptable level of refinement. It should be borne in mind that the CSI puts together cantonal victimization rates for intentional homicide, robbery and theft, and domestic violence.

Thus, to the *Cantonal Human Development Index (CHDI)*, which incorporates the known variables of life expectancy, knowledge (literacy and net primary and secondary school enrollment) and purchasing power *per capita*, the CSI adds a fourth variable with equal weight in the calculation. The result of this exercise is called the *Cantonal Human Development Index by Level of Security* (CHDIS). As will be seen below, the results obtained were striking.

The inclusion of citizen insecurity in the measurement of human development on the cantonal scale generates highly visible changes in the indexes, and truly dramatic ones at the cantonal level (Table 17). Of the top ten cantons with respect to the conventional HDI, only four (with Belen, San Pablo, Escazu and Santa Ana heading the CHDIS list) maintain this position after adjusting for security levels. Likewise, only three (Sarapiqui and the Limon cantons of Matina and Talamanca) repeatedly rank among the bottom ten in both versions of the index. In all, over half of the cantons (45) improved their positions when citizen security was taken into account, while 35 lost ground and only one remained unchanged.

Table 17
Classification of cantons according to position on the CHDI and CHDIS by province, 2003

Province	**Type of Change (CHDI - CHDIS)**			Total
	Lost position	Improved position	Position unchanged	
San José	9	10	1	20
Alajuela	2	13	0	15
Cartago	2	6	0	8
Heredia	6	4	0	10
Guanacaste	8	3	0	11
Puntarenas	7	4	0	11
Limón	1	5	0	6
Costa Rica				
Total	35	45	1	81
Percentage	43.2	55.6	1.2	100.0

Source: Prepared by the authors

In general terms, the results from applying the CHDIS evidently benefit small rural cantons and strike a harsh blow to practically all of the cantons in the Metropolitan Area, which under conventional measurements have the highest indices of human development in the country (24 of the 25 top-ranking positions on the CHDI are all in the Metropolitan Area, while the 25 lowest are outside). Of the 45 cantons whose position improved under the CHDIS, 37 are located outside of the metropolitan region. Correlatively, of the 35 that lost position, 16 are Central Valley cantons with high urban agglomeration.

In some cases, the changes are of an extraordinary magnitude. The small San José canton of Leon Cortes – one of the most backward according to the CHDI but the safest in the country according to the CSI – advanced 30 places in the classification. Something similar occurred with Acosta, Hojancha, Alfaro Ruiz, Jimenez, Poas, Guatuso, San Mateo, and Palmares, which moved up more than 20 positions. At the other end of the classification, heavily urban or tourism-oriented cantons such as Montes de Oca, Goicoechea, Limon, Aguirre, Tibas, Liberia, Garabito and San Jose declined more than 30 places on the list. The capital canton is, without doubt, the most striking case of all. With the highest victimization rates in the country, this canton lost 54 places and its HDI fell by almost a fifth.

It is evident that including citizen (in)security in the measurement can change the human development map of the country. In Map 3 it is possible to observe how use of the CHDIS darkens (reduces) levels of human development in the metropolitan and South Pacific regions of the country, just as it lightens (increases) much of the northern border zone.

Map 3 Cantonal Human Development Index (CHDI) and Human Development Index Corrected for Security (CHDIS). 2003



Fuente: Development Observator and prepared by the authors

In the form set out here, the CHDIS is only a preliminary attempt to make human development measurement better reflect actual possibilities for the expansion of individuals' capacities in a given surrounding. As we have seen, those possibilities have undoubtedly been affected by the state of citizen (in)security. This methodological contribution can and should be enhanced considerably through more comprehensive operationalization of the citizen (in)security measurement. It is adequate enough for now to provide an economical and eloquent indication of the urgency of positioning citizen security as a central component of human development.

Part Five. Ten Proposals to Overcome Fear

The realization of human potential will never be free of obstacles. From its foundations, the approach of human development has been concerned with exploring the sources of vulnerability and proposing options to expand the possibilities of every human being, conceived as an end, to realize his or her freedom. Need and fear are two manifestations of the vulnerability that the concept of human development proposes to eliminate.

This report has focused attention on fear, specifically the fear that comes from citizen insecurity, but without neglecting the close connections between vulnerability and citizen insecurity, a relation that has been amply demonstrated in this document and complemented with the life stories of Mauren and Rafael appearing in segments at the beginning of each part of the 2005 NHDR. These very different stories, one about a man and the other about a woman, contribute a qualitative and concrete look at how insecurity is experienced, what contributes to it and what the possible consequences can be. Through their moving accounts, it is possible to understand when and how their fear arose, and their resources for coping with those feelings are deduced.

To help people feel less afraid, the phenomenon needs to be placed in perspective by creating and disseminating precise and current information about citizen insecurity. There are at least four challenges facing the country: reduce fear, halt the rising trend of victimization, deal with risk factors, and strengthen institutional capacity, since otherwise nothing sustainable can be accomplished in any of the other areas. There is a considerable number of possible alternatives for tackling these challenges, but applied together, the ten proposals offered here form a comprehensive plan for addressing citizen insecurity while maintaining consistency with objectives of human development.

Attempts have been made to distance these recommendations from a rooted belief that there are two, irreconcilable alternatives to address citizen insecurity, prevention and control. Instead, alternatives have been conceived from four perspectives: prevention, empowerment, protection, and control. Security policies can be situated neatly in one or another perspective, but are frequently the result of a combination of these areas. The ten proposals for overcoming fear reflect this thinking.

The matrix below synthesizes lines of action forming part of each proposal, and their nature (prevention, empowerment, protection and control).

Matrix 5.1

Ten proposals to overcome fear, lines of action and nature of the intervention

Objectives	Proposal	Lines of Action	Nature of the proposal (1)			
			Pv	Pr	E	C
Reduce fear	1. Overcome myths: improve understanding of citizen insecurity	Carry out information campaigns, demythification of insecurity	✓			
		Promote better understanding of the phenomenon among decision makers	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Promote informed journalism committed to citizen security	✓	✓	✓	
Strengthen institutional capacity	2. Security to exercise freedoms: security policies from a comprehensive and democratic perspective	Adjustment of the normative and institutional frame toward the objective of bringing police closer to citizens		✓	✓	
		Improve coordination between the different police corps	✓	✓		✓
		Strength formation and training processes for police	✓	✓		✓
	3. Establish the Observatory of Citizen Security: timely and rigorous information about citizen insecurity	Create a system of collection, systematization and provision of rigorous information about citizen insecurity	✓	✓	✓	✓
	4. Local planning aimed at creating appropriate conditions for citizen security	Design and implement a strategy for strengthening local governments' capacity to incorporate citizen security considerations, such as planning and decision-making criteria	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Open channels of communication between the Ministry of Public Safety and IFAM; institute a line in IFAM providing support for local governments in the area of citizen insecurity	✓	✓	✓	✓
		Develop pilot experiences in municipalities with suitable conditions	✓	✓	✓	✓
	5. Generate secure urban surroundings environments	Design safe urban spaces	✓	✓	✓	
		Develop a strategy of urban enlivenment	✓			✓
		Winning spaces to fear	✓			✓

Objectives	Proposal	Lines of Action	Nature of the proposal (1)			
			Pv	Pr	E	C
Reduce victimization	6. More equality, less conflict: proposal for addressing violence against women	Establish comprehensive policies that include the creation of family care services and infrastructure	✓	✓		
		Implement a program to monitor application of mechanisms protecting against domestic violence		✓		
		Promote, among migrant women, the exercise of a life free of violence through awareness-raising programs and campaigns and mechanisms ensuring their access to justice			✓	
		Strengthen women's capacity in the family sphere through comprehensive policies				✓
		Re-instigate national discussion about rejection of violence against women		✓		✓
		Improve information records on violence against women and intensify research in this area	✓	✓	✓	✓
	7. Protect so they can grow: a society geared toward child protection	Overcome disprotection	✓			✓
		Combat domestic violence against boys and girls	✓	✓		
		An education system capable of keeping its population in the classroom	✓	✓		
		Working Participating			✓	
	8. Priority attention to youth: more opportunities, fewer jails	Foster family assistance programs	✓		✓	
		Promote community actions to expand options for youth	✓	✓		
		Provide opportunities for youth offenders	✓			
Address risk factors	9. Healthy lives: healthy habits for recreation and coexistence	Awareness raising and formation	✓			
		Push plans for immediate action	✓			
	10. Farewell to arms: keep Costa Rica free of firearms	Strengthen State oversight of companies providing private security services	✓			
		Raise the awareness of citizens and the business sector	✓			

(1) Pr: Protection; Pv: Prevention; E: Empowerment. C: Control

The process of national dialogue gave rise to all kinds of ideas that encouraged and contributed to the preparation of each part of this Report, and the UNDP proposal offers numerous fields of action to keep these from being lost. There could be no greater satisfaction than setting in motion any of these projects.

(In)security and Human Development. Some data

1. General Data

COSTA RICA

2004 DATA

General Information
Extension (km2): 51,100 [1]
Administrative Division: 7 provinces, 81 cantons, 470 districts
Capital: San José
Currency: colon

Population [2]
Total population: 4,248,508 [3]
Population density (persons/ km2): 83.1
Population under 15 years: 29.0%
Population 60 and over: 8.0%
Urban population: 59.0%

Health [4]
Life expectancy at birth: 78.7 [5]
Gross reproduction rate (births per 1000 inhabitant): 17.0
Gross mortality rate (deaths per 1000 inhabitants): 3.8
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 births): 9.2

Education [6]
Literacy (population 15 and over): 95.0%
Population 5 and over with primary schooling: 90.0%
Population 5 and over with secondary schooling: 36.8%
Population 5 and over with university education: 11.7%

Economy [7]
Households in poverty: 21.7%
Unemployment rate: 6.5%
Economically active population (EAP): 1,768,759 [8]
Net participation rate: 54.4%

Production [9]
GDP in millions of dollars (at market prices): 18,351.7
GDP per capita in dollars (at market prices): 4,353.3

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[1] Administrative territorial division of the Republic of Costa Rica. Instituto Geográfico Nacional. San José, 2001
[2] Web page Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC), www.inec.go.cr
[3] Estimated to July 1, 2004
[4] Web page Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC), www.inec.go.cr
[5] Web page Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), http://ccp.ucr.ac.cr/observa/CRindicadores/evida.htm
[6] INEC, IX Censo de Población y V de Vivienda, year 2000
[7] Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC), Household and Multi-purpose Survey 2004, www.inec.go.cr
[8] Population 12 years and over
[9] Preliminary data to September 16, 2005. Web page Central Bank of Costa Rica, http://indicadoreseconomicos.bccr.fi.cr/indicadores economicos/Cuadros/frmVerCuadro.aspx?Idioma=1&CodCuadro=184

2. Description of the Process

Participatory process for the preparation of the NHDR 2005

1. Participatory processes and human development

The paradigm of human development transcends the economic sphere to encompass all dimensions of life in society; pays particular attention to political, cultural and social factors; considers individual and collective empowerment one of the four basic pillars of a holistic vision of development; and enables people to exercise their options and become genuine agents of change in their surroundings. As such, during the preparation of the *National Human Development Report (NHDR 2005)* and in the frame of the *National Network for Human Development (*Red Nacional de Desarrollo Humano – RNDH), mechanisms were established to support and invigorate participation by facilitating opportunities for analysis, knowledge and discussion on different issues of national importance, but primarily on the focus of this report.

2. Organization of the NHDR 2005

Before describing the activities involved in preparing the NHDR 2005, it is useful to know the different components and entities involved and how they were involved in the process.

The organizational structure of the project consisted of a steering committee, an advisory committee and a coordination team.

The Steering Committee consisted of the Resident Director and Adjunct Director of the UNDP, the NHDR 2005/RNDH Project Coordinator and the Minister of National Planning and Economic Policy of the Government of Costa Rica. The consultant body for the report was the advisory committee, comprised of 16 members from different sectors. The coordination team administered, executed and coordinated planning, preparation and dissemination of the NHDR 2005/RNDH, along with the formation and maintenance of the RNDH. This nine-member group coordinated a technical team consisting of 22 specialists who provided research inputs for the NHDR, and coordinated the RNDH network in order to complement and go beyond the preparation of the report. This group was originally made up of 40 people, later joined by representatives of the five local governments (San Carlos, Escazú, San José, Montes de Oca and

Limón) where the network's initial discussions and activities took place. This collection of communities was called the Cantonal Network.

3. Consultation, investigation and writing of the NHDR 2005

3.1 Consultation

The previous consultation phase centered on determining what theme would motivate and encourage preparation of the NHDR 2005, based on the different criteria and opinions of an assortment of people. Possible subjects arose in a series of workshops with representatives of UNDP-Costa Rica, the UNDP Programs Unit and the NHDR 2005 Coordination Team, in September and October of 2003. The national situation was analyzed based on qualitative and quantitative indicators and pertinent studies, and the priority themes identified for human development were:

- Sustainable cities, local governance and human development
- Youth and education, priorities for ensuring human development
- Costa Rican culture and identity in the context of globalization

Once the main problems for each theme were defined, during October and early November of 2003 the Coordination Team put together thematic profiles to facilitate selection. A meeting was held with academicians and specialists in each area established, to enrich the vision of the NHDR 2005 Coordination Team and Programs Unit and ascertain the level of knowledge and research on the respective subjects.

Once the thematic profiles were done, criteria for selecting the topic were established based on UNDP Corporate Policy for the preparation of this type of report.

The topic was chosen on the basis of two consultations, one with the Steering Committee (October 2003) and another with the NHDR 2005/RNDH Advisory Committee (November

2003). Each person was given the thematic profiles and a matrix with evaluation criteria. The opinions of those absent were gathered during a last meeting held in December 2003.

During the first week of January 2004, "Citizen Security, Violence and Human Development" was selected as the topic satisfying most of the criteria contributed by participants during the consultation, who considered this an urgent issue with great impact on Costa Ricans' quality of life.

3.2 *Process of investigation*

- Investigation activities: national scope

The theme of the NHDR 2005 was first divulged at the opening meeting of the Cantonal Network attended by mayors and municipal representatives. The activity was held with the support of the Institute for Municipal Promotion and Advising (Instituto de Fomento y Asesoría Municipal - IFAM) on January 23, 2004.

During February 2004 a series of talks took place between the NHDR 2005 Coordination Team and national specialists in the field of citizen security and violence, to gather inputs on research design for the report and, in particular, a conceptual proposal.

Participating in the conversations were Laura Chinchilla, former Minister of Public Safety; Douglas Durán, Director of the Masters Program in Criminology at UNED; Elías Carranza, Director of ILANUD; José Manuel Arroyo, Magistrate of the Third Court of the Supreme Court of Justice; Fernando Cruz, Appeals Court Judge; Marco Vinicio Fournier, former Director of the Institute of Psychological Investigation at UCR; Guido Miranda, former Executive President of the CCSS; José María Rico, criminologist and international consultant; Gonzalo Elizondo, consultant in human rights and Teresita Ramellini, Director of the Masters Program in Women's Studies at the UCR.

The objectives of the NHDR 2005 and RNDH along with the conceptual proposal for the project were presented to the public in the workshop-seminar "Vanquishing Fear: Violence, Citizen Insecurity and Human Development in Costa Rica," held at the Radisson-Europa Hotel February 26-27, 2004. Sixty-three people in different working groups discussed the conceptual document on notions of violence and insecurity proposed for the report, and reflected on the different approaches to be involved.

Later, on March 30, April 12 and June 2, 2004, workshops were organized with the technical team of the Unimer polling firm, the Vice Minister of Pubic Security and the UNDP coordination team to prepare and then refine the questionnaire for the National Survey on Citizen Security (Encuesta Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana - ENSCR-04), which would be conducted in June of that same year. In the meantime, the Coordination Team and Steering Committee established terms of reference pertaining to national and local investigations for the preparation of NHDR 2005. Members of the research group to be incorporated in the Technical Team were designated at this stage.

The first session of the Technical Team took place June 11, 2004, when members presented the objective and methodology of their investigations. On June 21 the Coordination Team, Technical Team and Steering Committee participated in a workshop to discuss relevant data sources and present the preliminary findings of the ENSCR-04. On August 27 these same participants attended a workshop in which members of the Technical Team presented research advances at that point.

Another fundamental input for the report were the results of qualitative exploration through focus groups. From August 28 to September 2, 2004, 12 sessions were organized, with an average of six participants in each group (72 people in all). On October 8, the coordinator, Ana Brenes, presented the results to the Coordination Team and an important number of members of the 2005 NHDR Technical Team

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Concluding the investigation process on November 17-18, 2004, at the Radisson-Europa Hotel, a seminar was held on "Citizen (In)security and Human Development in Costa Rica: Results of

Investigations for the NHDR 2005." Around 60 people participated from civil society organizations, along with government representatives, academicians and competent authorities.

Finally, on April 1, 2005, a workshop was held to discuss the results of the investigation entitled "Citizen Insecurity, Social Disprotection and Violence in Children and Adolescents in Costa Rica," commissioned to Dina Krauskopf and Sergio Muñoz by the UNDP and UNICEF. Present were representatives of PANI, the Council on Youth, IMAS, Fundación Paniamor and academicians involved in the theme of children and adolescence in Costa Rica.

- Investigation activities: local scope

The research process for the NHDR 2005 included local participatory consultations in each location comprising the Cantonal Network (Escazú, Limón, Montes de Oca, San Carlos and San José -Table 1). The first step was to contact the local governments and present the objectives of the studies to community authorities and members. Different methods of investigation and consultation were then employed with the population to ascertain the impact of citizen insecurity on their lives.

In May and September of 2004, the findings were presented to municipal authorities and in some cases, members of the respective communities, to serve as input in defining local public policy on citizen security.

- Information and dissemination activities

Parallel to the investigation process, different activities were organized to present the advances and scope of some of the research underway to a broader public.

With UNED and the Municipality of San Jose, a session of reflection was held on July 12, 2004, called "Strengthening Secure Surroundings. A Look from the Perspective of the Community." Contributing to the discussion was Tony Peters, Criminology professor and Director of the Masters Program in European Criminology of the University of Lovaina, Belgium. On that

occasion the invitation was directed particularly to people in community security committees and public with an interest in secure surroundings. Participating and adding their comments were the Vice Minister of Public Security, María Fulmen Salazar; Vice Mayor of San José, Mauren Clark; Alfredo Chirino, Director of the Judicial School and Johnny Araya, Mayor of San José.

On September 10 an "Activities Report" was presented to the Consultative Council of the NHDR 2005/RNDH to report on the process followed by the Coordination Team during the ten months of work (November 2003- September 2004). In addition, the project's statistics expert, Johnny Madrigal, presented the main findings of the ENSCR-04.

On November 3, in the conference room of the Municipality of San José, a second session of reflection was held on the theme of secure surroundings. A report was given on results of the study, "Perception of Security and Insecurity in School-age Children in the Central Canton of San Jose," commissioned to Fundación Paniamor at the request of the San Jose City Council. Ligia Quesada, Director of Human Development of the Municipality, presented the background for this work and Paniamor's Milena Grillo presented the results of the study and a framework of proposals to improve the situation of children in the communities studied. In the afternoon, work groups made up of representatives from the communities involved discussed the results and the viability of the proposals.

In 2005, on February 15-15, a seminar-workshop took place at ICAES entitled, " The Role of Local Governments in Creating Conditions of Security for Their Inhabitants," also attended by the Minister of Public Security and IFAM, with the participation of 30 mayors and municipal representatives from all over the country. Pablo Sauma and Rosendo Pujol, members of the Technical Team, presented their findings on incidences of insecurity at the cantonal level. They also reported on some experiences generated by local governments whose dissemination could further future execution of lines of action. Last, participants analyzed local impact of citizen insecurity and examined the responsibilities that rest on municipalities in this area.

3.3 Writing of the report

The Coordination Team was in charge of writing the report. Members of the Advisory Committee and Steering Committee reviewed the preliminary versions and made recommendations. Four referees were chosen, each responsible for a different approach to the report (conceptual, legal, gender and statistical). Outside of the Coordination Team, the writing of the report was thus supervised by 22 people.

Table 1. Meetings during 2004 in the five cantons participating in the investigation process

Canton	Contact meeting	Presentation of objectives	Consultation with the local community	Return of results
Escazú	**March 30:** Municipal mayor and representatives of the Office for Women	**June 9:** Municipal mayor, representatives of the Office for Women and Security Comptroller of the canton	**July 2004:** 80 people interviewed	**September 6:** Municipal mayor, representatives of the Office for Women and Security Comptroller of the canton
Limón	**January 23:** Municipal mayor, members of the Municipal Council, representatives of the Prosecutors Office, police force and PANI	**April 23:** Municipal mayor and members of the police force	**November-December 2003:** 188 people interviewed	**May 20:** Municipal mayor, members of the Municipal Council, representatives of the Prosecutors Office, OIJ and Police Force
Montes de Oca	**March 27:** Municipal Mayor and Vice Mayor, representatives of social organizations (youth and women)	**May 6:** Municipal mayor, residents, business representatives, members of the police force, members of the Inter-institutional Committee and representatives of social organizations	**June:** In-depth interviews of 12 key people in the community	**September 9:** Municipal mayor and vice mayor, Rector of the UCR, officers of the UCR ad PRODUS
San Carlos	**March 24:** Municipal vice mayor and representatives of the Office for Women	**May 11:** Representatives of the Office for Women, members of the Police Force, social organizations, members of community security committees	**August 2004:** Interviews of qualified representatives of 10 community security committees in the area	**September 7:** Municipal vice mayor, representatives of the Office for Women, members of the Police Force
San José	**March 24:** Director of the Department of Human Development and other Municipal officers	**June 18:** Director of the Department of Human Development and other Municipal officers, representatives of Fundación Paniamor	**July-August 2004:** Exploratory study with 230 children, 50 adolescents participated in the TECNOBUS project	**September 14:** Director of the Department of Human Development and other Municipal officers, representatives of Fundación Paniamor

4. Sectors participating in the preparation of the NHDR 2005

The greatest number of people possible were brought into the preparation of this report: both women and men, representatives of the public sector and organized civil society, academic organizations, etc. Table 2 shows the diversity of the 435 persons participating at different stages of the process. As planned at the start of the project, most collaborated in the research phase and during reports on the specific investigations commissioned to members of the Technical Team.

Table 2
Participants at different stages of the preparation of the 2005 NHDR by sex and sector

Sex/Sector	Stage of NHDR			Total	
	Selection of the theme	Investigation process **(5)**	Writing of the report	**Abs**	**%**
Total	**21**	**429**	**22**	**435**	**100.0**
Sex					
-Men	12	240	16	242	55.6
-Women	9	189	6	193	44.4
Sector					
- Public Sector (1)	2	96	3	97	22.3
-Municipalities	1	82	1	82	18.9
-Community organizations (2)	---	77	---	77	17.7
-Academic and technical organizations (3)	4	42	6	42	9.7
-NGOs and representation bodies	4	35	4	35	8.0
-Inter-governmental organizations (4)	7	23	2	28	6.4
-Not determined	---	24	---	24	5.5
-Others	4	50	4	50	11.5

Notes: (1) Includes agencies of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Powers, and autonomous institutions except for state universities. Does not include municipalities or local governments. (2) Includes neighborhood committees, local development associations and local organized groups. (3) Individuals associated with the academic sphere, independent researchers and consultants associated with the research centers of state universities. (4) UNDP officers taking part in the process have been included in this category. (5) The persons interviewed or consulted for studies by the Technical Team were not included.
Source: NHDR/NHDN project archives

Of the people who participated in preparing the report, 55.6% were men and 44.4% women, indicating an adequate balance in terms of gender. With respect to sector, there was an important presence of the public sector (22.3%), followed by the municipalities (18.9%) and different types of community organizations (17.7%).

These results suggest that within the NHDR 2005 /RNDH, an effort was made to carry out participatory processes with civil society in which men and women were engaged in the analysis

of citizen insecurity in the country. Participation of public officers was also significant. This was an important achievement, because the possibility of transforming the results of the report into institutional policies and actions advancing the human development of Costa Rican society is in their hands.

3. Results of the ENSCR-04

Excel File

4. Human Development Indicators for Costa Rica

Excel File