





Listening to Peace

*Dimensions and Variations in the
Implementation of the Final Peace
Agreement in Colombia*

The cover, with its different colors and strokes, evokes the differential implementation of the Peace Agreement. The survey reveals that inhabitants of the PDET areas value each component differently, and that satisfaction with its implementation varies across the subregions.





LISTENING TO PEACE: DIMENSIONS AND VARIATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT IN COLOMBIA

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
UNITED NATIONS
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FOR SUSTAINING PEACE

A horizontal row of 17 small, colorful dots in various colors including red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and purple.

Embajada de Noruega



Universidad de
los Andes





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Abbreviations

AADR Rural Development Agency

FTATR Former Territorial Areas for Training and Reincorporation

ANT National Land Agency

ARN Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization

ART Territorial Renewal Agency

AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

CERAC Conflict Analysis Resource Center

CINEP Popular Education and Research Center

CEV Truth Clarification Commission

CNR National Reincorporation Council

COMPAZ Peace Resource Center

DANE National Administrative Department of Statistics

DNP National Planning Department

ELN National Liberation Army

TATR Territorial Area for Training and Reincorporation

FARC Common Alternative Revolutionary Force

FARC-EP Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army

FIP Ideas for Peace Foundation

JAC Community Action Boards

JEP Special Jurisdiction for Peace

MAPS Monitoring of Attitudes, Perceptions and Support for the Peace Process in Colombia

MFA Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MPTF Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Sustaining Peace in Colombia

SDG Sustainable Development Goals

UN United Nations

OXI Public Works for Taxes

PARES Peace and Reconciliation Foundation

PDET Development Program with a Territorial Focus

PGN Attorney General's Office

PNIS Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program

UNDP United Nations Development Program

PRIO Peace Research Institute Oslo

SIVJRNR Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition

RUV Single Victims Registry

UAM Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

UARIV Unit for Attention and Integral Reparation of Victims

UBPD Missing Persons Search Unit

UCM Universidad Complutense de Madrid

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

URT Land Restitution Unit

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
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
UNDP reincorporation portfolio.

A thank you is in order for Luisa Diaz, Esperanza Gómez, Katherin Diaz, Claudia Capera, Paloma Blanch, Ximena Buitrago, Oscar Bermeo, Laura Medina, Katherine Gaitán, Juliana Cuenca, Maira Echeverry, Fabian Esquivel, Mario Alberto Ruíz, and the entire UNDP team that provided insights on the findings and facilitated discussion spaces for the adequate implementation of focus groups.

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Finally, a special thanks to all the protagonists of peacebuilding in Colombia. Thank you very much to the people who took the time to answer the survey and share their views on the Peace Agreement. We hope you feel your voices have been reflected in this report. To the people who, from the public and private sectors, civil society, academia, the media and churches, continue to work to achieve an effective implementation of the Agreement: your work made this report possible and is a source of motivation to continue working for peace in Colombia.

Foreword



Peace must lead us to a substantial reduction in violence and the consequent protection of life. But peace, in its broadest sense, does not end there. It also requires a transformation of the political and socioeconomic conditions that fuel the emergence of armed conflicts. Therefore, it will only be sustainable if it is the result of a collective effort. Thus, the involvement of social leaders, businesses, politicians, students and, in general, all communities, is key if the provisions set out in the 2016 Peace Agreement are to become a permanent reality. Without the joint work of all Colombian citizens, it will not be possible to avoid new cycles of violence.

Hence, our invitation is to listen to these citizens, in particular those who have been most affected by the armed conflict and live in conditions of vulnerability. That is the point of this report, which presents the voices of more than 11,000 citizens who reside in the regions with Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDET). Their vision of the Peace Agreement is crucial, because at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), we believe that an adequate formulation of public policies and programs must be based on empirical knowledge and the wisdom of target communities.

This is the second round of surveys conducted within the framework of the Monitoring Attitudes Perceptions and

Support of the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPS) project, in collaboration with the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and Universidad de los Andes. Through this alliance, UNDP continues to further its commitment to support comprehensive actions that promote sustainable development and, through it, the creation of more peaceful, fair and inclusive societies. Consequently, the report is not limited to the presentation of statistical results, but rather proposes a series of recommendations to the different stakeholders involved in peacebuilding so that the information can be transformed into actions. The results point out, for example, the prevailing need to build regional peace agendas, the importance of interventions focused on reconciliation and the strategic value of increased citizen involvement in monitoring the Agreement's implementation.

Five years after the execution of the Agreement, it is essential that the efforts to guide its implementation be rooted in a recognition of Colombia's enormous territorial diversity.


For this reason, the study maintains a holistic view that tries to discern to what extent the perception of implementation varies between subregions, between different population groups and between different points and commitments of the Agreement.

This study would not have been possible without the determined and unrelenting support of the government of Norway, as well as the countries that contribute to the United Nations Multi-Partner Fund for Sustaining Peace, a fund that aligns the investments of countries that support peace in Colombia with the national priorities for the implementation of the Final Agreement.

Nelson Mandela said that “everything seems impossible until it is done.” We would add that, in the case of the Colombian Peace Agreement, nothing is possible until the main beneficiaries become the architects of peacebuilding. That is why we hope that Colombian society continues to be willing to listen to the voices that demand the Agreement’s implementation and that Colombia continues to show the world that peace is not only the end of armed confrontation; it is also about achieving tangible improvements in people’s lives. We also hope that the lessons learned from this report continue to be taken into account here and in other countries that are on the road to peace.



Sara Ferrer Olivella



Executive Summary

Through a joint effort between UNDP, PRIO and Universidad de los Andes, with the financial support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations Multi-Partner Fund for Sustaining Peace, two rounds of surveys have been conducted (2019 and 2021) with more than 11,000 people in 72 PDET municipalities, in order to ask about perceptions of the implementation of the Peace Agreement. There are multiple perspectives, variations and dimensions that can be analyzed after listening to the voices from the PDET. This report highlights ten of the possible findings that, as a whole, tell a story that is both encouraging and challenging; a story of contrasts. On the one hand, the voices hint at a positive assessment of the Peace Agreement, in addition to a conviction of the importance of its different dimensions and an expectation regarding its impacts on the PDET regions. But those voices are also a call to strengthen the current efforts to implement the components of the Agreement and to recognize its insufficient and unequal development in different PDET subregions.

Findings

1. There is an increase in general satisfaction with the Agreement's implementation: people with some degree of satisfaction increased from 36% in 2019 to 48% in 2021. There is not a single factor that explains this evolution, but the truth is that among those who show some degree of satisfaction, there is, on average, a better perception of security, a perceived increase in the arrival of public works and goods, advances in the degree of reconciliation, and greater trust in the state.

The improvement in satisfaction is observed among all population groups (women, men, ethnic groups, victims and non-victims) and in each of the PDET subregions, with the exception of Catatumbo, Pacific Nariño, Middle Pacific and Upper Patía-North Cauca, areas where the general satisfaction with the Agreement decreased.

2. T. Five years after the signature of the Agreement, the certainty of its importance and relevance persists.

3. Survey respondents have partial knowledge of the Agreement. The majority (57%) know about it through the media, especially television, and 24% say they do not have information on the Agreement. On the other hand, the majority of respondents are unaware of its duration (75%), as well as of the responsibilities and duties of other levels of government, beyond the National Government in its implementation.
4. There is a generalized perception of a drop in security conditions, with significant regional variations, which is consistent with recent trends in terms of homicides and forced displacement, for example. Almost all the indicators associated with the perception of security are falling. In particular, an increase in the percentage of individuals who state that security in their community has worsened in the last 12 months stands out, going from 35% in 2019 to 43% in 2021. The decrease is observed especially in Upper Patía-North of Cauca and in the Urabá region of Antioquia (Urabá Antioqueño).
5. Reincorporation as a set of measures is valued positively, but there is no progress towards reconciliation. On the one hand, 92% agree with reincorporation/reintegration processes, and 76%, with ex-combatants receiving benefits from the State. However, on the other hand, 87% do not trust FARC ex-combatants, and close to 80% do not feel comfortable having ex-combatants from any armed group as a neighbor.
6. There is a positive assessment of the institutions associated with reparation and transitional justice, and major importance is given to clarifying the truth (68%), but few (26%) believe that the implementation of justice and reparation measures is satisfactory. In addition to this, the majority (more than 50%) expect punitive measures with prison sentences against those responsible for crimes during the armed conflict. This expectation may go against the provisions of transitional justice processes.
7. The adoption of the PDET is welcome and gives hope, but their implementation is perceived as limited. Indeed, a majority of respondents have expectations about the future of the implementation and the PDET's capacity for territorial transformation (59%). However, at the same time, there is a decrease in the perception of the arrival of public works and goods to their territories at present, which has shifted from 35% in 2019 to 27% in 2021.
8. From the perspective of the PDET voices, crop substitution is a desirable tool to deal with coca crops, but its implementation is still insufficient: 85% value the substitution of illicit crops and 77% reject forced eradication. Both perceptions remain at similar levels regardless of the amount of coca observed in each municipality. Despite this, less than 1 in 5 respondents believe that the implementation of substitution programs is on the right track.

9. The percentage of people who express a deterioration in their economic situation doubled, a change possibly associated with the restrictions and limitations derived from COVID-19 countermeasures. In this context, it is noteworthy that, if the PDET voices had the option to define public investment priorities, the main targets would be health (51.9%), education (29.5%) and roads (14.1%).

10. In the PDET territories, there is a preference for a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. The majority (86%) would rather opt for a negotiated solution to the conflict with the ELN in all the PDET subregions, and even more decidedly in areas where the ELN has a stronger presence, such as Arauca (96.4%), Chocó (95.7%) and Catatumbo (92.8%).

The results of the survey remind us of the importance of incorporating a perspective that recognizes the complexity of any peacebuilding process. The data presented in this report hardly allow for the construction of a one-sided vision of the status of the Peace Agreement. The voices are diverse and the perception of how its components are progressing is also diverse: the added value of this survey is precisely to show the disparate trajectories of the Agreement's implementation in different territories.

Introduction



Five years after the Peace Agreement's signature in 2016, it is time to assess its implementation. Five years is an important threshold for a process like this one, since 50% of conflicts tend to resume within that period (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Jarlan et al., 2020). This report is presented at this turning point, summarizing the results of the second round of surveys conducted within the framework of the Monitoring Attitudes, Perceptions and Support of the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPS) project, the result of collaboration between the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), and Universidad de los Andes. This is the second round of field work to identify perceptions about the implementation of the Final Agreement for the End of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace signed in 2016.¹ The survey reflects the views of residents in municipalities in which the Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDET) are implemented, that is, areas that suffer the convergence of a strong impact from the armed conflict, high levels of poverty, institutional weakness and the presence of illicit crops, as well as other illegal economies.

The report includes the findings from the data collected between June and August 2021 and, therefore, can be read as a continuation of the report **Lights and Shadows of the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Colombia: Attitudes and perceptions in the PDET territories**², which presents the results of the fieldwork carried out in 2019³.

Six elements make this report a valuable contribution to the country and the world:

- 1. The evolutionary perspective:** This is not just a snapshot of the current moment; it is possible to visualize how perceptions have changed or not between the two surveys. The foregoing, moreover, is based on a longitudinal panel study of a portion of the sample: over 66% of the people surveyed in the first round were surveyed again in 2021. In cases where recontact was not possible, a rigorous procedure was followed to ensure that the replacements have a similar sociodemographic profile. Additional details are presented in the technical annex. All this is relevant, not only because it allows for better monitoring of the evolution of implementation,



but because the priorities in the implementation of a peace agreement can (and sometimes must) change.

2. Representativeness: There are over 11,700 surveys in each round, which collect the perception of inhabitants from 73 municipalities through the 16 PDET subregions. The survey, as detailed in the technical annex, is statistically representative at the PDET subregion level. This allows us to make comparisons between territories and disaggregated inferences about each of the aspects associated with the Agreement's implementation. Similarly, the large sample size also allows for a comparatively low margin of error: 1.84% for the survey's main question, related to the level of satisfaction with the implementation of the Agreement.

3. A comprehensive view of the Agreement: The set of more than 90 questions asked in the survey provides an ample view of the perceptions about the Peace Agreement and its different points. Indeed, the report includes perceptions about rural development, the reincorporation of ex-combatants,

transitional justice, security, illicit crops, political participation and reconciliation, among other topics.

4. Field deployment: The surveys conducted both years were all face-to-face. This is of immense value when considering the COVID-19 restrictions still present in 2021, and the fact that in some of these areas, the security situation could prevent the free movement of survey teams. The face-to-face approach with digital recording made it possible to increase the re-contact rate and establish a relationship of greater trust between the respondent and interviewer, which, in turn, contributes to gathering more reliable information.

5. Focus groups: In addition to the surveys, 28 focus groups were carried out with beneficiaries who participate in processes or programs derived from the Agreement. In-depth conversations were held on the general implementation of the Agreement, as well as some of its specific points.

These discussions have also made their way into this report, as they serve to supplement and gather additional data, explore possible causal links and qualify or corroborate the quantitative findings. They also remind us that behind each figure presented there are hundreds of faces, that there are specific human experiences associated with each observed trend. For this reason, there will be references throughout the text to the inputs from these focus groups.

6. A communication strategy: We want this information to help foster public debate and decision-making. This does not happen automatically with the production and documentation of information; it also requires an associated outreach strategy. This will be important for the dissemination and institutional and social adoption of the results. The communication pieces derived from this exercise will be available on the UNDP YouTube channel.

Despite the aforementioned strengths, this report and its associated data have some limitations that are also important to recognize:

- Some of the findings are presented: The survey contains over 90 questions, but the report presents a summarized selection of the results. The analysis undoubtedly allows for many other comparisons, as well as statistical exercises of a different nature. This goes beyond the scope of this

report, which should be read as an invitation to ask more questions, to use the data not presented here and to carry out further, more in-depth research. For this reason, this report proposes possible, not definitive relationships between variables. Establishing causal links requires the implementation of additional instruments to those presented here.


For this purpose, the project will include a link to download the database and proceed with further analyses.

- It does not reflect the voices from the most outlying rural areas: even though more than 30% of the surveys were conducted in populated centers (many of these in remote areas of the municipalities visited). The survey team was not deployed in dense jungle areas or in the least densely populated areas of the country. For these areas, it will be necessary to continue with additional research.
- People's perceptions are often affected by immediate contexts that impact their assessment of past and present events. Both the pandemic and the economic and social havoc it has wrought, such as the national strike, which began at the end of April 2021, but whose impact marked the public debate and the living conditions of many regions over several weeks, could influence people's perceptions.

This report aims to be the first of many reflections on the data obtained, highlighting the voices from the PDET regions and their different populations. The data resulting from the survey allows for multiple interpretations and converges around the fact that this is a key moment to advance towards sustainable and lasting peace in Colombia. As the experience of other countries has also shown, peacebuilding is a complex, non-linear process. In addition, all peacebuilding processes interact with other transformations experienced by societies in the midst of transition processes. It is in this interaction between factors related to the context and factors specifically related to the Agreement that people's perceptions are built. In general, the results presented here suggest that, in the territories hardest hit by violence, support for a negotiated solution persists and satisfaction is predominant regarding the agreement reached and its components. At the same time, it is clear that expectations are high and progress is insufficient, not only regarding the Agreement, but also with respect to what the territories expect in terms of tangible transformations that improve their well-being and peace of mind. In this sense, the results presented here reveal that the Agreement provides a bar against which the actions and impacts of all state and social actors will be measured for several more years.

The report is organized into 10 chapters. Chapter 1 addresses the importance of measuring perceptions as part of monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement. Chapter 2 focuses on the central aspect of the survey: satisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Agreement. The subsequent chapters

address different thematic axes associated with the Agreement: Security (chapter 3), reincorporation (chapter 4), assistance and reparation for victims and transitional justice entities (chapter 5), the PDET (chapter 6), illicit crops and other illegal economies (chapter 7). Chapter 8 explores, as was done in the last report, the link between peace and trust in state and social institutions. Chapter 9 addresses the question about the future and local priorities in the face of a change in governments. Based on the previous sections, chapter 10 proposes a series of conclusions and recommendations to sustain the Peace Agreement's implementation over time.




Areas selected to conduct the surveys

PDET Subregion	Selected Municipalities
Upper Patía – North Cauca	Buenos Aires, Miranda, Patía, Santander de Quilichao, Pradera
Arauca	Araucuita, Fortul, Saravena, Tame
Low Cauca and Northeast of Antioquia	Amalfi, Cáceres, Caucasia, El Bagre, Valdivia
Catatumbo	El Tarra, San Calixto, Sardinata, Tibú
Chocó	Bojayá, Medio Atrato, Medio San Juan, Nóvita, Riosucio, sipi
Caguán Basin and Caquetá Foothills	Florencia, Belén de los Andaquíes, Currillo, Puerto Rico
Macarena – Guaviare	Mapiripán, La Uribe, San José del Guaviare, Miraflores
Montes de María	El Carmen de Bolívar, María La Baja, San Juan Nepomuceno, Colosó, San Onofre, Tolú Viejo
Middle Pacific	Guapi, López, Timbiquí, Buenaventura
Pacific and Nariño Border	Barbacoas, El Charco, Mosquera, Tumaco
Putumayo	Orito, Puerto Asís, Puerto Caicedo, Puerto Guzman
Sierra Nevada – Perijá	Agustín Codazzi, Pueblo Bello, San Juan del Cesar, Ciénaga
South Córdoba	Montelibano, Puerto Liberador, Tierralta, Valencia
South Bolívar	Arenal, Morales, San Pablo, Santa Rosa del Sur
South Tolima	Ataco, Chaparral, Planadas, Rioblanco, Icononzo
Urabá Antioqueño	Apartadó, Carepa, Necoclí, Turbo

Table 1. Basic survey data*

Item	Round 1 (2019)	Round 2 (2021)
Total respondents	12052	11777
Total recontacted	NA	7769
% Recontacted	NA	66%
% Men	49.5%	49.8%
% Women	50.5%	50.2%
% Indigenous	5.8%	3.7%
% Black, mixed-race or Afro-descendant	37.5%	31.9%
% White or mestizo	45.2%	30.2%
% Other ethnicities	11.6%	34.2%

* Demographic data and their percentage distribution are presented here taking into account the expansion factor. More details can be found in the fact sheet at the end of the report.



Why measure perceptions of peace in PDET areas?

Chapter 1

Measuring and quantifying perceptions may seem like a simple technical exercise, but it is particularly relevant in this case, as it concerns the PDET territories, which are home to those who should be the main beneficiaries of the implementation of the Peace Agreement. This implies a perspective that complements other monitoring reports of the Agreement that focus on the data provided by State or organized civil society institutions. Studies such as those by Pamina Firchow (2018) and by the Everyday Peace Indicators organization have systematically shown that the perceptions of target communities about the effectiveness, and even about what they understand as ‘effective’ in peacebuilding, differ from the views of the experts, State implementing agencies, international cooperation or organized civil society.

This assessment seeks to reduce the frequent invisibilization of the inhabitants of rural areas and those areas most affected by violence or socioeconomic vulnerability in studies underlying the formulation of public policies. Thus, this survey gives voice to the recipients of interventions aimed at peacebuilding. This fulfills the duty of the Agencies of the United Nations System and of States to take into consideration the knowledge and expertise at the subnational and local level in the design of the interventions that affect them (Autesserre, 2021).

This report offers a holistic view that stems from the recognition that the 2016 Peace Agreement is complex in that it is comprised of six points that must be executed comprehensively throughout the Colombian territory and differentially within different populations. For this reason, the survey was designed to observe the extent to which the perception of the levels of progress in implementation varies among PDET

subregions, among different population groups and with respect to different points and commitments of the Agreement. That is why the report does not refer to the ‘voice’ of the PDET territories, but to the ‘voices’, deliberately in the plural, with the purpose of indicating the variations and different levels of execution in the Agreement’s implementation.


In designing the survey and in the preparation of this report, it was taken into account that peacebuilding requires both the reduction of levels of physical violence (measured with variables such as the perception of security) and processes of economic, political and social transformation (measured with variables such as satisfaction with public works built or with coverage in certain public services) that generate opportunities and a sense of belonging and rootedness. By distinguishing between these components of peacebuilding—the short-term security component and the medium- and long-term component related to social transformation—this survey provides inputs for a more precise and situated design of interventions, programs and public policies aimed at the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

The report **Listening to Peace: Dimensions and Variations in the Implementation of the Final Agreement**, is, ultimately, not a UNDP report, but rather facilitated by UNDP. It is a report by the voices from the territories, who use the technical and administrative platform made available by UNDP and, through it, establish a dialogue with the country’s decision-making nodes. Measuring is, in itself, a form of political advocacy: it reveals and synthesizes information that can be used in public debate.

Beyond the foregoing, collecting the data by directly asking those who should have benefited the most serves as a complement to the rigorous existing reports based on public investments and regulatory developments (such as those by CINEP/ CERAC, Kroc and control bodies).

All of this makes it possible to identify where substantial progress has been made that must be protected, and where it is necessary to correct, shift perspectives or focus additional efforts. At the same time, it promotes the generation of elements of analysis about the context that can affect perceptions beyond the specific actions evaluated. This is crucial if we take into account that the Agreement's implementation is a long-term commitment, of at least fifteen years, which will coincide with other parallel transformations and for which, therefore, various local and national governments will be responsible, with the support of international cooperation and civil society.

In summary, this report seeks to provide tools for an informed and empirically supported discussion that allows to identify the conditions needed to make what has been achieved so far irreversible and accelerate what is still pending or insufficiently implemented.



Satisfaction with the Agreement's implementation

Chapter 2.

There are multiple ways to measure the status of the Peace Agreement's implementation. It is not a simple task, since the Agreement is comprised of a complex fabric of issues, some of which arouse more interest (or face less resistance) than others. In addition to this, the implementation does not occur in a vacuum; it is just one of the country's many structural problems and existing efforts by national and local institutions. Indeed, Colombia has spent more than two decades developing an institutional scaffolding around peacebuilding, which addresses, among others, care for victims and demobilized persons, and the construction of truth and historical memory. In this sense, 'isolating' the impacts of the Agreement's implementation requires the combination of multiple instruments. Fortunately, there are numerous follow-up mechanisms to the Agreement that try to monitor these specific actions. This report seeks to contribute to these monitoring efforts with the perceptions of some of the people who are, or should be, its main beneficiaries.

This, always based on the recognition that what is understood as the "implementation of the Agreement" by those who designed it or its implementation, will not necessarily be the same as what the inhabitants of the PDET zones identify and expect. It is precisely because of the existence of this difference that this survey is of great relevance. Understanding the convergence or divergence between perceptions and 'objective' execution (measured in number of public works or expected beneficiaries, or in terms of approved investments), a classic problem of public policy (Monroe, 1998), is also relevant for the Agreement's implementation. In this sense, it is important to take into account that perceptions may be shaped by factors that have little or nothing

to do with the policies directly associated with peace. At the same time, perceptions can shed light on what communities consider important and a priority, what they know or do not know, and therefore, where their expectations are focused.


After five years, the follow-up reports on the Agreement's implementation show an ambivalent balance. Different advances are highlighted, but, as the most recent Kroc Institute report (2021) points out, these are happening at a slow pace, particularly in 2020: That year, the percentage of unaddressed provisions was reduced from 24% to 19%. Provisions at the lowest level of implementation remained at 35%, and those in an intermediate level of implementation went from 16% to 18%. Similarly, the most recent report of the Attorney General's Office (2021) describes, for example, the activation of more than 7,000 PDET initiatives⁴, acknowledges the advances in indictments by the JEP⁵, although expressing concerns about the deterioration of the security conditions in some regions, points out deficiencies in the implementation of the National Rural Plans and the lack of institutional coordination to comply with the requirements of the Comprehensive Rural Reform and Transitional Justice.

Is all of this expressed in changes in perception about the Agreement's implementation? This report offers some first impressions on the answer to this question. And it does so by collecting the perceptions of the same people surveyed in 2019 (66% of initial respondents were recontacted).

Even though 34% of the people surveyed in 2021 are not the same as in 2019, these are two very similar universes in terms of socio-demographic profile or key

opinions/decisions. This is evidenced by the distribution of respondents' votes in the 2016 plebiscite (see Figure 1): the difference in the percentages of those who voted 'yes' between the two survey rounds is less than 1 percent. This result, moreover, is a good indicator of the robustness of the database, since this distribution is similar to the actual voting in the plebiscite, where the majority of the population from the PDET regions also voted 'yes', at 64.1%, according to data from the National Registry Office.

Figure 1. Self-recognition of vote cast in the plebiscite



The analysis of the data is structured as follows: first, the respondents' satisfaction with the content of the Agreement and its components. Then, their satisfaction with

the implementation of the Agreement. Third, possible determinants of satisfaction are identified using data from other survey variables (security, arrival of public works, perceptions of reconciliation, among others llegada de bienes, percepciones sobre la reconciliación, entre otros).

The voices from the PDET are satisfied with the content of the Agreement

In the PDET territories, the majority of people (56.9%) express some degree of satisfaction with the content of the Agreement. This is true for both survey rounds, although in 2021 there is a slight increase in those who indicate being very satisfied (+1.5%) and satisfied (+3.8%) (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Satisfaction with the content of the Agreement




Table 2. Degree of satisfaction with components of the Agreement

Category	Satisfaction (Agree / Strongly Agree / Somewhat agree)										
	Full Sample	Man	Woman	Indigenous	Raizal of the Archipelago	Palenquero	Black	White or mestizo	None of the above	Non-victim	Victim
Disarmament of Ex-Farc	91.6	92.5	90.6	92.4	67.8	100	92.1	90.7	91.8	90.2	92.7
Improvement of security for social leaders	95.1	95.3	94.9	94.4	100	0	96.4	95.7	93.6	94.3	95.8
Crop Substitution	85	86.1	84.1	79.2	67.8	100	87.2	84.3	84.5	83.5	86.5
Including the Farc in elections	37.5	42.8	32.3	30.2	29.3	0	35.9	37.4	39.9	36.3	38.3
Improvement in health and education services	96.5	96.9	96	95.1	100	100	96.7	96.9	96	96.5	96.7
Building and improving rural roads	97.5	97.7	97.2	96.8	100	100	97.6	97.6	96.9	97	97.9
Issuance of land titles	95.6	96.1	95	95.8	100	100	94.5	96.1	96	94.4	96.8
Providing truth and justice to victims	97.1	97.6	96.8	96.5	100	100	97.8	97.6	96.3	96.6	97.8
Improve women's security	97.6	97.7	97.5	97.1	100	100	98	97.8	97.1	97.3	98
Inclusion of women in land titles	97.3	97.5	97	98	100	100	97.6	97.1	97	97.3	97.5
Account of events and search for missing persons	96.5	96.7	96.3	96.8	100	100	96.8	96.9	95.8	96	97.1
Reincorporation of former Farc-EP members	81.6	84.6	78.6	76.4	67.8	100	81.1	85.7	79	81.1	82.3
Education in conflict-ridden areas	97.2	97.6	96.9	97.5	100	100	97.7	97.8	96.1	96.8	97.8

It is worth noting that the percentage of people who say they do not know also increased (from 3.7% to 15.3%), a percentage that is relatively evenly distributed among different population groups and PDET subregions.

The perception of satisfaction with different components of the Agreement is much more evident. As shown in Table 2, reincorporation, crop substitution and transitional justice mechanisms receive overwhelmingly positive ratings, over 80%. We are, therefore, in a scenario where the majority of people value the Peace Agreement and consider its different dimensions valuable (with the exception of the FARC's participation in elections).


The inhabitants of the PDET show an increase, although nuanced, in their satisfaction with the Agreement's implementation

This is the only variable where consistency is observed between satisfaction with the content and satisfaction with the implementation. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, in cases such as reincorporation or the PDET, the tool, is valued, but there is no matching satisfaction with its implementation.

The analysis of the collected data shows that between 2019 and 2021 there is an increase in satisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Agreement: those who express to be somewhat satisfied go from 36% to 48% (see Figure 3). This increase is observed regardless of the population group taken into consideration: it increases in men, women, white persons, black persons, indigenous persons, victims and non-victims (see Table 3).

However, it should be noted that this increase in satisfaction is nuanced. Although the number of people who say they are 'not at all' satisfied with the implementation drops by more than 19 percentage points, this reduction in dissatisfaction occurs at the same time as a 6.7-point increase in the number of people who indicate 'not knowing' and 6.5-point increase among those who say they are 'somewhat' satisfied. The percentage of people who say they are satisfied or very satisfied increases by only 5.2 percentage points.

Figure 3. Satisfaction with the implementation of the Agreement



Perceptions in the PDET territories are more optimistic about the Agreement's implementation than those expressed in large cities. The most recent Invamer survey⁶ (October 2021), with telephone coverage in five cities, shows that 71% of respondents are dissatisfied with the implementation of the Agreement. A similar perspective was raised by most of the people who participated in the focus groups who, in general terms, valued the Agreement for its provisions, but see its implementation as slow, insufficient or "still just on paper"⁷.

Table 3. Satisfaction with implementation of the Agreement by population groups (very satisfied/satisfied/somewhat satisfied)

Category	2019	2021	Variation
Men	38%	49%	+11%
Women	34%	48%	+14%
Indigenous	36%	47%	+11%
Raizal of the archipelago	48%	64%	+15%
Black	33%	41%	+8%
White or Mestizo	37%	45%	+8%
None of the above	35%	57%	+23%
Non-victim	35%	47%	+12%
Victim	37%	49%	+12%

There is no single factor that explains the increase in satisfaction with the implementation

An initial exploration of the data allows us to establish that there is not a single determining variable that can fully explain the change in the perception of satisfaction with the Agreement's implementation. Multiple dimensions are associated with this satisfaction and encompass aspects of both security and social development. So far, at least four key variables have been identified, as satisfaction is greater:

- Among those who perceive an improvement in security in their community.
- Among those who believe that the country is moving towards reconciliation.
- As will be seen in chapter 5, among the victims who state having received some type of reparation.
- This is consistent with findings from recent work on the material base and the role of trust in reconciliation and peacebuilding processes. In short, these works show that reconciliation does not occur in a social or State-based insulated vacuum, and that people change their perception when they feel that something favorable and tangible is happening in their immediate surroundings.
- Among those who perceive an increase in the arrival of public works to their territory.
- Among those who report having more trust in State institutions.

To identify the possible associations between different variables and the level of satisfaction with the Agreement, a logistic regression model (logit) was estimated, in which factors such as gender, age and educational level were controlled⁸, always with the understanding that the evidence of an association does not in itself prove any causal relationship. Figure 4 shows, in blue, variables that have a statistically significant relationship, and in orange, additional variables that could possibly be associated with satisfaction but that are not statistically significant in the model. Thus, it is observed that variables such as knowledge of the Agreement, economic situation, receipt of state aid, or being a victim are not related to satisfaction, but security is, as well as the perception of increased arrival of public works and trust in state institutions⁹.


Regarding security, the relationship is positive, that is, the greater the perception of security, the greater satisfaction with the Agreement (Figure 4). However, there is a significant dispersion of the data (Figure 5) which, in turn, highlights the need to consider additional variables to explain the increase in satisfaction.

In any case, the data seem to indicate that security plays an important role, perhaps not as a fulfilling condition, but rather necessary for there to be any degree of satisfaction with the Agreement. In fact, among the subregions that perceive the strongest deterioration in security (or stability in the levels of insecurity), there are the only four subregions in which a decrease in satisfaction with the Agreement is observed: Catatumbo, Middle Pacific, Pacific and Nariño Border (see Map 1 and Figure 5).

Something similar occurs, although with less intensity, when cross-referencing the satisfaction regarding the Agreement with the perception of arrival of public works. In general terms, there is greater satisfaction among those who perceive an increase in the arrival of public works and less satisfaction among those who have not perceived such works (Figure 4). This is the case of the Middle Pacific, Pacific and Nariño Border and Upper Patía regions, which share a negative perception of the arrival of public works and low satisfaction levels (see Figure 6).¹⁰

In any case, the importance of a comprehensive analysis of the

Figure 4. Factors associated with increased satisfaction with the Agreement



F=16.40
N=19705

Map 1. Changes in satisfaction with the implementation of the Agreement





Figure 5. Comparison between perception of security and satisfaction with the Agreement



implementation of the Peace Agreement should not be forgotten, since the failure in one of its dimensions may negatively impact the agreement as a whole.

The case of Catatumbo is striking in this sense, as there is a relatively higher

perception of the arrival of works (Figure 6), but this does not result in greater satisfaction (Map 1), possibly because rising insecurity is also perceived in the area (Figure 5).

One could also think that satisfaction with the Agreement is ultimately an expression of trust in State institutions. In fact, the MAPS

Figure 6. Comparison between the perception of arrival of public works and satisfaction with the Agreement





Figure 7. Correlation between perceptions of reconciliation and satisfaction with the Agreement



*Slope= 0.41 (significant at 99%), P.-value= 0.000, R-squared= 0.73

data show that the relationship between both variables is also positive and statistically significant (Figure 4). In this case, even less dispersion of the data is observed. Desde esta premisa, también en el capítulo 9, se explora la relación de la confianza con la satisfacción en mayor detalle.

Based on this premise, Chapter 9 further explores the relationship of trust with satisfaction in greater detail.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that an equally strong association is observed between satisfaction with the Agreement


and the perception of progress towards reconciliation. Not only the tangible or material dimensions of the Agreement are important: the coexistence between different groups and the provisions associated with facilitating social cohesion may be fundamental as well.

Studies such as those by Firchow (2018) precisely indicate that in areas with material peacebuilding interventions, the demand for non-material interventions, such as those that seek to promote social cohesion, can increase. A recent publication by Fescol and GIGA points in the same direction in the Colombian case, by identifying respect and tranquility as the main elements that people associate with peace, according to a survey of Colombian citizens (Daniels and Kurtenbach, 2021). In this case, the correlation between

the reconciliation and satisfaction variables allows for a better explanation of the behavior of subregions such as South Córdoba and Montes de María, where there is much satisfaction with the Agreement, as well as a more positive assessment of the progress towards reconciliation.

This reaffirms the importance of a comprehensive interpretation of the Agreement and the satisfaction component, also recognizing the immense regional diversity: the voices from subregions such as Montes de María and Pacific Nariño offer a very different account of the Agreement's implementation and some of its associated variables (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Two subregions, two different accounts of the Agreement's implementation



Citizens in the PDET have partial knowledge of the Agreement

Although the majority of the inhabitants of the PDET surveyed show some degree of knowledge of the Agreement, more than half (57.7%) declare knowing it through the media (see Figure 9). Among those who know it this way, the majority (92%) indicate that television is the preferred medium to find out what is happening with the Agreement’s implementation.

Knowledge of the Agreement is said to be partial since, when asked about the duration of its implementation, an overwhelming majority (75%) stated not being aware and only 7% pointed out that it takes 15 years (see Figure 10). This is important as various future governments will continue to bear responsibility and to be held accountable for the Agreement’s implementation.

On the other hand, not only the National Government is responsible for implementation. That is why it was also asked at what level of government the respondents believe that there is a constitutional duty to fulfill the Agreement. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the highest percentage corresponds to those who answer that they do not know (43.5%), followed by those who believe that it is only the National Government (30.7%), and then those who believe that there is a shared responsibility between the national, departmental and municipal levels of governance (14.2%) (see Figure 11).

These data are essential from the perspective of the long-term sustainability of the Peace Agreement. This depends largely on knowing its provisions and demanding compliance, and for these demands being made at

Figure 9. Knowledge of the Agreement






Figure 10. Perceptions about the duration of the Agreement’s implementation




the levels of government responsible for implementing the Agreement. In this regard, greater pedagogical efforts will be necessary in years to come.

Figure 11. Perceptions about the level of government that has the constitutional duty of implementing the Agreement



Future research may use the data presented here to better specify the determinants of satisfaction with the Agreement. What has been presented so far underscores the importance of contemplating the multiple dimensions of peace when explaining the levels of satisfaction and, therefore, also the provisions set forth in the different points of the Peace Agreement. These results leave two important lessons for programmatic planning:

- It is essential to address the Agreement comprehensively, since it is the simultaneous implementation of its components that seems to result in greater satisfaction.
- Intervention designs should reflect the different needs and priorities of each subregion.



Local Security and Justice

Chapter 3.

Insecurity in the PDET municipalities has persisted even after the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP. Between 2017 and 2020, for example, clashes between armed groups and the Public Forces increased year after year (Garzón, 2020). Before November 2016, the FARC-EP concentrated nearly 80 percent of its armed actions in these municipalities. Once the Agreement was signed, different armed groups sought territorial control in these areas: the violent actions were carried out to a greater extent by the ELN, FARC dissidents and the Clan del Golfo, among other groups. According to Gutiérrez, Guerrero, and Tobón (2021), in 2019, the average homicide rate in the PDET municipalities was 56.2 per 100,000 inhabitants, which was well above the national average (24.3). This indicates that, although Colombia has reported the lowest homicide rates in the last ten years, violence still persists in the PDET municipalities.

Violence in the PDET municipalities is, in part, the product of the competition between armed groups for control of illicit economies, be they illegal mining, coca crops or drug trafficking routes. The harmful impacts of this territorial war are many. First, security affects local social leadership. A recent report by the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación Ideas para la Paz) (2021) highlights that security risks are one of the main obstacles to the implementation of activities by the driver groups, that is, the citizen groups that help promote PDET initiatives. The risk is clear if one takes into account that since 2017 there was evidence of a concentration of killing of social leaders in the PDET territories, according to a report by Indepaz, Iepri, Cinep and the Colombian Justice Commission (2017).

Second, there has been an increase in the number of massacres. The year 2020, according to the Organization of American States (2020), ended with a higher number of massacres nationwide than in 2019, an upward trend that continued in the first months of 2021. Although the number of confrontations between the Public Force and armed groups decreased, violence against civil society increased in the PDET municipalities. For instance, the number of homicides recorded in the first four months of 2021 exceeded the number of homicides recorded in this same period in 2019 (before the pandemic).

Confrontations related to coca crops are an aggravating factor of the violence in the PDET municipalities. Since the signature of the Peace Agreement in 2016, the number of coca crop hectares has decreased. However, the capacity to obtain cocaine per hectare planted has increased (UNODC, 2020). In 2019, the average number of hectares of coca crops in each of the PDET municipalities was 111.6, higher than the national average (Gutiérrez, Guerrero, Tobón, 2021). According to UNODC, as illicit crop substitution programs are implemented, illegal armed groups seek to maintain control over territories with illicit crops, whose decrease in numbers has led to an increase in the number of clashes over these cultivated territories (which are now scarcer). It has also been found that a large number of killings of social leaders would be associated with the presence of illicit crops in these municipalities (Indepaz, et al., 2017).

The MAPS survey can confirm or enrich this perspective in terms of security and justice. In other words, it is unclear whether the power vacuum left by the FARC-EP in PDET municipalities has caused an increase

in perceptions of insecurity within the communities, and how these perceptions might vary across PDET subregions. It is also unclear how the arrival of the State has taken place in these areas, and what its impacts have been. For this reason, this chapter examines, among other things, perceptions of security, competition between the State and armed groups to control the population in PDET zones, and trust in the National Police and the Army. For each of these themes, it focuses on the observation of change over time—between the first round in 2019 and the second one in 2021—, as well as some factors that could explain the variation in these perceptions.


Perceptions of Security

Citizens’ perceptions of security are not always correlated with ‘objective’ security conditions as described in administrative databases. There are multiple explanations for this phenomenon. First, perceptions of crime and insecurity do not tend to change much over time.¹¹ Second, perceptions not only result from actual insecurity, but are based on psychological processes derived from exogenous factors such as the media and contact with other people, among others. For example, people who spend more time listening to news about violent events may be the ones who feel the most insecure.

General perceptions of security in the PDET municipalities are worrying. Although the percentage of those who say that the security situation is ‘very bad or bad’ did not change between 2019 and 2021 (50.4% versus 50.7%, respectively), the percentage of persons that say that the security situation is either ‘good or very good’ has dropped from 17.5% in 2019 to 10.4% in 2021. We see significant setbacks in places with frequent armed confrontations

—as is the case of Urabá Antioqueño, Catatumbo and Upper Patía (Northern Cauca)—, but also in more stable areas such as the South of Tolima. Some PDETs either observed improvements (Sierra Nevada de Perijá) or remained stable (Montes de María, Caguán Basin and Caqueta Foothills).

Figure 12. Perceptions of Security




N= 23,615. Excludes 209 “don’t know” or “no response” observations

The survey reveals even more noticeable changes over time, by using a question in which respondents reflect on changes in security conditions in their community over the last 12 months. In 2019, 35% of those surveyed reported that in the last 12 months the security situation in their community had worsened, 55% stated that the security situation had remained the same, while close to 10% said that it had improved in the last 12 months. The outlook in 2021 is even gloomier. The number of people reporting a deterioration in security increased, reaching 43%. At the same time, the number of people

who indicated that the security situation has remained the same dropped to 51%. A very small minority, 6%, report an improvement in security conditions. These changes are more noticeable in a few PDETs: respondents report a marked deterioration in Upper Patía-North of Cauca and Urabá Antioqueño, for instance.

A useful way to ask about security in post-conflict contexts is to go beyond the current situation and ask the respondent to reflect on the future. The MAPS survey includes the following question: “Could the armed conflict return to your community in the future?” Respondents answered with three options: yes, no, or the armed conflict still persists. In 2019, 53.1% of those surveyed responded that they were concerned about the possibility of the armed conflict returning to their communities; 27.7% reported that they did not think that the armed conflict would return to their community; and 19.2% said that the armed conflict persists where they live. The landscape changed drastically in 2021: although the optimistic percentage remains unchanged, the number of people who said that the armed conflict could return has dropped substantially, while those who report the persistence of the armed conflict have risen surprisingly: 38.5% (a difference of 19.3% percentage points compared to 2019). In some cases, it would seem that the 2019 forecast of a return to armed confrontation materialized in 2021.

Figure 13. Perception of possibility of the conflict returning in the future



What kind of municipalities have negative perceptions about security?

The presence of armed groups and/or competition between these groups and the State for territorial control can exacerbate citizens' perceptions of insecurity. For example, monopolistic control by an armed group (areas where only one armed group rules, without competition) can lead to increases in security and predictability, even if decisions made by armed groups are illiberal and undemocratic. The MAPS survey includes several questions about territorial and social control by armed groups.

For example, it is asked whether in the last 12 months an armed group was in charge in their community (FARC, ELN, criminal gangs). Given that respondents may have been afraid to report that an armed group was 'ruling' in


their community, the survey also includes questions about ‘granting justice’—both by authorities and armed groups—which is a good indicator of monopolistic territorial control and an answer that respondents may be less reluctant to give (Arjona, 2016). The data shows an increase in the number of people who answer that the state authorities are mainly responsible for administering justice: while in 2019 that figure was 65.8%, in 2021 it climbed to 73.8%. At the same time, a slight increase is observed in the percentage of people who report that it is the armed groups that mainly administer justice.

In this regard, the persistence in the percentage of people who express greater control of the FARC dissidents is striking, although with a considerable variation among regions. Nearly 22% of all 2021 respondents across all PDETs report that FARC dissidents ‘ruled’ their community in the last 12 months, 7 percentage points higher compared to responses in 2019. This growth was more pronounced in Arauca, Lower Cauca and

Northeast Antioquia, Catatumbo, South Bolívar, South Tolima, Chocó, Macarena-Guaviare, Pacific Nariño Border and Urabá Antioqueño. The survey also makes it possible to explore if there is a relationship between the perception of territorial control of FARC dissidents and general perceptions of security. Thus, for example, among those who state that in their territory dissidents exercise control in their community, the perception that security has worsened reaches 53%, compared to 48.5% of people who do not report such control. When using econometric models that control for individual characteristics of the respondents (sex, age, economic activity), with consistent effects for each PDET and round of the survey (which allows comparing people within these groups), similar findings arise, as shown in Figure 14:

People who report that FARC dissidents ruled their communities feel less safe. These results also suggest that men tend to feel safer, compared to women and older people.

Figure 14. Effect of territorial control of dissidents on security perceptions




Data on control by other armed groups—such as the ELN and criminal gangs—shows similar patterns. Compared to 2019, there is an increase in the number of people who report control by the ELN: it goes from 11.8% to 14.8%. The increase in perception of ELN control is observed in 9 of the 16 PDETs, with particularly significant changes in Arauca, Catatumbo, Urabá Antioqueño, Chocó and Sierra Nevada-Perijá. On the other hand, econometric models that control for the same factors described above yield similar results: having been exposed to ELN control reduces the respondent's perception of security by 6% on average. The expansion of control by armed groups between 2019 and 2021 is also seen with criminal gangs, although this expansion is much more geographically localized. While in 2019 24% reported control by criminal gangs, in 2021 that number rose to 31.2%. These increments in criminal group activity are concentrated in Lower Cauca and Northeast Antioquia, South Córdoba, Chocó, Urabá Antioqueño and Montes de María regions. Econometric exercises show that the control exercised by criminal gangs

undermines perceptions of security by 8.9%, an impact that is larger compared to that of FARC dissidents and ELN members.

It is possible that the communities that now have a greater presence of the State are precisely those that have experienced an increased perception of security. Although it is difficult to isolate the causal effect—given that a strong State presence can be either a cause or a consequence of positive security perceptions— it is possible to use statistical models to control for some factors that may affect this relationship.

If we compare communities where the state is identified as the primary authority delivering justice with communities where other authorities administer justice, some interesting patterns emerge. On the one hand, the perception of security is higher among people who mention mediators or Community Action Boards as the main authority, compared to communities where it is stated that the State is the main authority to administer justice. In general, as will be seen

Figure 15. Effect of territorial control by the ELN on perceptions of security



N=20.234

in Chapter 8, the survey reflects a greater trust of people in local authorities and leaders than in the State.

On the other hand, people who report that they do not know or do not want to answer, who say that things are settled directly, and that there is no authority (or there is another authority that is not mentioned in the question) report lower perceptions of security compared to places where state authorities carry out activities aimed at making justice. The impact of the provision of justice by armed groups on the perception of security is not statistically significant.


The consolidation of state authority is not only measured with the provision of justice, but also with the provision of public works. What impact has the arrival of public works had on perceptions of security in the PDETs? In 2021, in communities where there has been no change in the construction of public works, the percentage of people who report that the security situation ‘has worsened’ and ‘has remained the same’ is almost identical: 34.5% and 34.2%, respectively. But in communities

where an increase in public works has been reported, respondents are twice as likely to report that the security situation has ‘stayed the same’ (16.6%) rather than ‘worsened’ (7.8%). Although it is impossible to assign causality to this correlation, even when controlling for individual and contextual factors using econometric models, this relationship between public works and more positive perceptions of security is maintained.

Trust in the Police and the Armed Forces

Control by armed groups can also have an impact on the people’s trust in State authorities: if the FARC dissidents, for example, take on some of the functions that are usually borne by the State authorities, there can be an effect of substitution of trust. This can produce a vicious circle in which the Public Force is not able to encourage the denunciation of the actions of criminal groups and, therefore, it is difficult to uproot these groups, which in turn further undermines trust in state authorities.

Figure 16. Impact on security of the perception of who is administering justice



In this regard, it is notorious that there are no significant changes between 2019 and 2021: few citizens report trusting the National Police “a lot”, while the vast majority say that they either trust the Police “somewhat” or “a little”. As is the case with other Latin American countries, trust in the Armed Forces is higher compared to trust in the Police (Pion-Berlín and Carreras, 2017): although a slight deterioration in levels of trust can be seen between 2019 and in 2021, a relative majority responds that they “somewhat” trust the Armed Forces.

Although it is difficult to identify the causal effect of control by armed groups on the perceptions about the Police and the Army –and we must interpret any results in this regard with care– the places where most respondents answered that the FARC dissidents ruled in the last year also have higher levels of distrust in the Police and the Army. If we run econometric models that control for individual characteristics of the respondents (sex, age, economic activity)¹², we can see that people who report having experienced control by FARC dissidents, for example, have less trust in the National Police. The size of this effect corresponds to a reduction of 4% on a Likert scale of 4 confidence points. When the exercise is repeated for the Armed Forces, there is no statistically significant decrease in trust towards them between people exposed to control by FARC dissidents and those who were not.


How malleable are these perceptions of trust towards the National Police and the Army? Is it possible that a sharp deterioration in the security situation systematically changes the citizens’ trust in the Police and the Army? The results –once again controlling for factors outside the individual sphere that can

influence this relationship– show that people who report improvements in security in the last 12 months are much more likely to trust the Police and the Army, as shown in Figure 17.

Local justice

Access to justice continues to be an important challenge in the PDET municipalities. Less than 4% of people who participated in the survey answered ‘yes’ in 2021 when asked if they had had to go to court in the last 12 months, which meant a decrease of 1% compared to the 2019 round. This rate turns out to be low if we take into account that crime rates in the PDET municipalities continues to rise and that little access to justice hinders close and permanent contact between citizens and the State, which in turn promotes impunity.

Regarding the question about the judicial authority to which citizens turn to guarantee their right to justice, there was no significant variation between 2019 and 2021. Of the people who answered that they did access some kind of institution of justice in recent months, 41.4% in 2019 and 42.8% in 2021 relied on the Attorney General’s Office. To a lesser extent, 17.9% of those surveyed in 2019 decided to approach the National Police, a figure that dropped to 13.1% in 2021. The most substantial variation to this response was recorded in the case of Family Police Stations (Comisarías de Familia): while in 2019, 5.8% reported having resorted to this office, in 2021 the figure rose to 11.8%. This change could be understood as an increase in coexistence issues within the household or the desire to seek concrete solutions to resolve these situations.


Figure 17. Effect of trust in the Police and Armed Forces on security

When asked whether or not there was an adequate resolution of the process that was brought before the justice authorities in both 2019 and 2021, the number of people who answered that the problem was resolved is low (Figure 18). In 2019, 26.5% stated that the problem had been resolved, a percentage that remained stable at 27% in 2021. However, in 2021 there was an increase in the number of people who responded that the process 'did not help at all', which went from 30.8% in 2019 to 40.9% in 2021. This increase is quite worrying and can dissuade citizens from initially filing complaints. Access to justice becomes more relevant for the PDET municipalities. When asked about the most serious problem affecting their municipality, 20.9% in 2019 and 29.1% in 2021 of the people surveyed indicated common crime as their main concern. Without a timely response from the state and the justice system, these crimes will go unpunished and the required crime deterrence will not be achieved.


Figure 18. Perception of the outcome of resorting to justice

The result of the process...

- It helped me, I solved the problem.
- The process was advanced, but the issue was not resolved.
- It didn't help me at all.



The security situation in the PDETs remains critical, and there is evidence from the MAPS surveys that the perception of security has deteriorated since the first round of data collection in 2019. But there are nuances that are important to point out: although the presence and even control by armed groups represent great challenges for the State, state activities seem to be able to reverse these trends. With concrete actions—the provision of public works and improvements in security—trust can be fostered in institutions of the security and justice sector, which could give rise to a virtuous circle aimed at reducing criminal activity.



Reincorporation in the PDET Territories

Chapter 4.

Reincorporation is a long-term and multidimensional process. For this reason, after more than four years after the FARC-EP laid down their arms, it is not surprising that there have been important advances, but also some challenges that remain and others that emerge as its implementation evolves.

Among the advances, the most recent report from the United Nations Verification Mission (2012) highlights the number of entrepreneurial projects of which ex-combatants are beneficiaries. Indeed, as of September 2021, 3,288 projects between groups and individuals have been approved, benefiting 7,327 ex-combatants. Income generation, however, continues to be a challenge, as these projects currently cover 54% of ex-combatants. In this context, the monthly allowance of those who continue to benefit from the program is significant, being close to 90% of a current legal monthly minimum wage (Ministry for Stabilization and Consolidation, 2021).

Although according to data from the Ministry for Stabilization (2021), the Government states that it has allocated 1,370 hectares for housing or entrepreneurial projects, the most recent report from the Attorney General's Office (2021) urges the Government to create more housing projects for this population group, particularly outside the Former Territorial Areas for Training and Reincorporation (FTATR), as well as to identify rural properties for FTATR pending resettlement.

On the other hand, security continues to be among the main concerns, given the persistent assassination of ex-combatants. According to the Verification Mission, as of October 14, 2021, 296 ex-combatants have been killed (Verification Mission, 2021).

With the continuous implementation of reincorporation actions, new challenges also emerge: both the Government and ex-combatants and the Attorney General's Office agree in identifying sustainability, particularly of entrepreneurial projects, as one of the central axes of the future reincorporation agenda. Sustainability not only implies generating lasting sources of income in the long term; it also has a social dimension to it: achieving the integration of ex-combatants into host communities, a central element in reintegration processes (Kaplan and Nussio, 2018). In this regard, it must be taken into account that of the 12,910 ex-combatants who are part of the reincorporation route, according to the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN), 75% reside outside the FTATR, so that achieving effective reincorporation in predominantly urban settings has increasingly become a challenge.

This survey is not specifically aimed at collecting the perception of ex-combatants. What is analyzed here is the communities' perception in the territories regarding:

- The degree of trust in reincorporated persons.
- How implementation is assessed by those who are not directly involved in the reincorporation process.

These questions are, in turn, important for another fundamental process in peacebuilding: reconciliation. It should not be ignored that all FTATR, except for the one located in Icononzo (Tolima), are also PDET territories, and in 152 of the 170 PDET municipalities there are almost 7,000 people in the process of reincorporation (54% of the population), in addition to more than

1,200 people from previous reintegration processes.¹³.

In this sense, these territories have not only been victims of multiple forms of violence, but have also become hosts to the ex-combatant population. This social proximity between victims and perpetrators poses challenges for coexistence and the recovery of trust, which is why the PDET consider reconciliation, coexistence and peacebuilding as one of their pillars (pillar 8). Consequently, it is important to measure:


- How progress towards reconciliation is perceived in these territories: the possibility of forging relationships with surrounding communities becomes an enabling factor for reconciliation processes and for ex-combatants to access opportunities for education, leisure, production or employment,

a necessary step for citizen exercise and peaceful coexistence (Kaplan and Nussio, 2018).

The voices from the PDET regions value reincorporation

Consistently in both surveys, people residing in the PDET territories express a positive assessment of the reincorporation process. The majority, both in 2019 and 2021, agree with reincorporation as a measure and with the possibility of ex-combatants receiving economic benefits from the State within the framework of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs. Figure 19 shows levels above 70% in the acceptance of both statements and an increase in this positive assessment between both survey rounds.

Figure 19. Support to the reincorporation process




The PDET voices express distrust for ex-combatants

Despite the assessment of reincorporation as a valid tool, this does not naturally translate into greater trust in this population group. Trust here is understood as a belief about the character or probable conduct of other people and, in this way, it is also an attitude that anticipates people’s risks with respect to a person or an expected outcome. As Lahno (2001) rightly points out, since trust has an emotional foundation, it is to a certain extent independent of objective information. It is in this light that the results should be interpreted.

In the survey, the people who say they do not trust the ex-combatants of the former FARC-EP ‘at all’ climb from 80% in 2019 to 87% in 2020 (see Figure 20).

Figure 20. Trust in Reincorporated Persons



There is no significant variation between victims and non-victims regarding this perception, and only a slight difference

between women and men (88% vs 84% in men for the second round). Levels of mistrust above 80% are observed in all the subregions, with the notable exception of Macarena-Guaviare (66%).

All of this differs from the levels of mistrust that exist, for example, with respect to the respondents’ neighbors: less than 26% of the population says that they do not trust their neighbors “at all” (See Chapter 9).

Although this portrays a still distant scenario of reconciliation, those who have studied peacebuilding processes in the world, such as Paul Lederach (2008) or Bauer et al. (2016) insist that it is normal for mistrust to be deeply rooted in societies affected by violence. This survey precisely shows that mistrust remains at high levels when asking about former members of other armed groups, such as paramilitary groups or the ELN. In these cases, mistrust is expressed in the refusal to have ex-combatants from these groups as neighbors by more than 70% of respondents (See Figure 21 and Figure 22).

Figure 21. Would you be comfortable having an ex-paramilitary neighbor?





Figure 22. Would you be comfortable having an ex-ELN member as a neighbor?



One could think that, following the logic of community reintegration, those who have more direct interaction with ex-combatants are more likely to forge relations of trust. For this reason, it was decided to explore whether mistrust is lower among people who say they have known ex-combatants: the results show that knowing an ex-combatant meant a slight 'gain' in trust in 2019 of 7 percentage points. In 2021, the same effect is possibly observed, although to a lesser extent: among those who know ex-combatants, mistrust is reduced by 5 percentage points, going from 87% to 82%.

However, the effect is clearer if those who know an ex-combatant are asked whether

they would be comfortable having them as a neighbor: among those who know an ex-combatant, 36% would feel comfortable, compared to 17% of those who do not know one (see Figure 2. 3). Areas with a high concentration of ex-combatant population, such as Macarena-Guaviare show the highest value of this figure: 40% would feel comfortable having an ex-combatant as a neighbor. This highlights the importance of deepening the analysis on the promotion of community integration activities aimed at getting citizens to know ex-combatants in order to foster their ability to empathize with former combatants.

If violence is related to mistrust, it is possible that the perception of deteriorating security could contribute to perceptions that stigmatize the ex-combatant population. The MAPS survey seems to go in that direction: Figure 24 shows that there is an association between satisfaction with reincorporation and perceptions of security. The correlation is positive and statistically significant, that is, the better the perception of security, the greater the satisfaction with reincorporation.

Along these same lines, it is worth noting how, in areas under the control of an armed actor, such as the FARC dissidents, it is even greater: among the people who state that in the last 12 months the FARC dissidents

Figure 23. Would you be comfortable having an ex-FARC member as a neighbor? Differences between those who know and do not know a reincorporated person

Would you be comfortable having an ex-FARC member as a neighbor?




Figure 24. Association between satisfaction with reincorporation and security in 2021





Figure 25. Trust in ex-FARC members in territories where the violence in the last 12 months was perpetrated by dissidents




were mainly responsible for the violence in their municipality, distrust in former FARC combatants reaches 90%.

Still, respondents say they would trust those who have been through the DDR process

more. In fact, while the general question about trust in ex-combatants places us at levels of mistrust above 80%, more than 50% of respondents state that they trust people who have gone through reintegration processes (see Figure 26), that is, who have

laid down their arms and accepted the new rules of the game:

Figure 26. Trust in those who have gone through reintegration/reincorporation processes




If going through reincorporation processes can increase levels of trust, it is worth investigating what perception is held, not about reincorporation as a tool, but rather regarding the effectiveness of its implementation. The landscape in this aspect is negative: although some do not know the process (18%), only 19.2% consider that the implementation of reincorporation is going well or very well (see Figure 27).

Due to the fact that the FTATR concentrate a large part of the institutional offer provided for reincorporation, it was explored whether in the municipalities of the sample that contain FTATR (11 of 24) the implementation was valued differently: positive perception is greater in these municipalities in 2019, but although the difference persists, it is smaller in 2021 (see Figure 27).


In this regard, it is worth noting that, although the survey was not applied on ex-combatants, focus groups were held with this population group to inquire about their participation in the process. Their vision complements what

has been said so far: in general terms, they believe that reincorporation is important, they positively value the technical support that their entrepreneurial projects have received, but they consider that there have been breaches, particularly in terms of guarantees of security, access to land and housing. Despite this, they insistently point out that this does not in any way mean that they are considering abandoning the reincorporation process. Their commitment to the Agreement is unflinching: “It has been difficult, but we are not going to back down anyway, [we must] continue with this process in the future, complying with what was agreed upon”¹⁵, stated a man who went through the reintegration process. The Agreement and the reincorporation process, although faced with difficulties, are assessed positively, among other reasons, because they allowed family reunion: “I think it has been a tough challenge, but also a nice one, because I have been able to reunite with my family”¹⁶. In fact, reincorporation with a community approach also emerges as an important issue to address: “There is an important challenge because, well, let’s say that we are no longer alone, as ex-combatants who come from an army; we are with our families, and now we have a large population of boys and girls, so a different way of life arises, let’s say, to live in community, to work in the community”¹⁷. This, as will be shown in chapter 5, will be essential in promoting reconciliation between communities and ex-combatants.

Figure 27. Assessment of the implementation of reincorporation




**How is the implementation of the reincorporation of former FARC-EP members going?
Comparison of municipalities with TATR vs. municipalities without TATR**



In short, the survey reveals a positive assessment of the reincorporation process, but not of its implementation. It also reflects a situation of low levels of trust in ex-combatants by the population. Taking into account the social proximity of ex-combatants and victims in PDET territories, this chapter highlights the

importance of promoting interventions aimed at strengthening reincorporation with a community approach, that is, actions that jointly involve ex-combatants and host communities and that contribute to the reduction of stigma.



Victims and Transitional Justice

Chapter 5.

The focus on the victims has been a recurring theme in the peacebuilding process in Colombia, at least for the last fifteen years. The Peace Agreement gave continuity to this premise by incorporating and building on the measures under the Justice and Peace Law (Law 975 of 2005) and the Victims Law of 2011 (Law 1448 of 2011), to design a special institutional architecture of Transitional Justice: The Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition (SIVJRNR), now called the Comprehensive System for Peace (SIP), which is part of point 5 of the Agreement.

Two important assumptions guide the implementation of measures in favor of victims and transitional justice. On the one hand, it is based on the premise that the victims of the armed conflict must be compensated for the damages suffered. On the other hand, the SIVJRNR stems from the idea that those responsible for crimes committed during the conflict must be punished, but the type and level of punishment, that is, the possibility of accessing a plea bargain, is determined by the nature of the crime, the perpetrator's level of responsibility and his/her contribution to the truth. Similarly, in order to avoid the collapse of the judicial system, the JEP prioritizes its actions based on the selection of macro-cases and the identification of those responsible at the highest levels. Thus, the aim is to strike a balance between the victims' expectations of punishment and those of society in general, with the appropriate incentives for disarmament and the contribution of those responsible to the clarification of the truth, within a limited timeframe. Finally, the Agreement creates complementary institutions of an extrajudicial nature¹⁸ such as the Truth Commission, whose mandate is to clarify what happened

in the context of the armed conflict, and the Missing Persons Search Unit - UBPD, with the mandate to direct and coordinate humanitarian actions in the search for persons presumed to have gone missing.

According to data from the most recent report of the Attorney General's Office (2021), 6,430 victims have received legal advice for the JEP and 3,664 individual victims have been represented in court. The UBPD, for its part, has recovered 193 bodies, found four people alive, who were reunited with their relatives, and managed to appropriately deliver 123 remains (Verification Mission, 2021). The Truth Commission-CEV will deliver its report in June 2022, after being granted an extension of the deadline. It has led over 20 versions of 'Encounters for the Truth', promoted 51 private spaces for recognition of responsibility and listened to over 26,000 people to collect the testimonies of victims and witnesses of the armed conflict.

Considering the above, this survey is valuable because it is conducted in municipalities strongly affected by violence and widely reflects the voices of victims of the armed conflict: according to the respondents' answers, 58% of the people consulted recognize themselves as victims, with forced displacement being the victimizing event for most.

Otherwise, the survey is valuable because it asks about reparation, about the importance of truth and, as an innovation compared to the previous round, it asks about the level of knowledge about and trust in the institutions that make up the SIVJRNR. The analysis assumes that reparation efforts began in 2005 with the Justice and Peace Law and were consolidated with the Victims Law in 2011.


By contrast, it recognizes that the effective deployment of transitional justice work associated with the Peace Agreement signed in 2016 is, relatively, still at an early stage. It further recognizes that the scope of reparation measures and the operation of the SIVJRNR extends across the country, and is not limited to PDET regions only.

The population in the PDET areas value truth and reparation to victims (from all people)

One of the most notable findings of the survey is that the majority of respondents positively value some of the above assumptions. In the first place, 89% of those surveyed agree with the statement: “Although there are needs everywhere, the victims of the armed conflict must be redressed”, whereas only 8% consider that “it is not fair for the victims to benefit from reparation measures while all other Colombians have needs” (see Figure 28). This favorability for the cause of reparation has been stable over the last decade (Centro de Memoria Histórica et al., 2012).

Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority of respondents (more than 80%) in both rounds consider that an entity such as the Unit for Attention and Integral Reparation to Victims (UARIV) will serve their communities. This opinion is almost unanimous (94%) among those who have benefitted from reparation measures. Moreover, reparation seems to have an important effect on the perceptions of PDET residents, since those who have benefitted from this type of measure also have a higher degree of satisfaction with the Agreement’s implementation compared to those who have not been beneficiaries, and even with the general population:


Figure 28. Assessment of reparation in PDET regions




67% of these people have some degree of satisfaction, compared to 48% of the general population (see Figure 29). This may be due to the fact that reparation has the potential to contribute to a general improvement in living conditions. This was expressed by a victim interviewed within the framework of this study: “[collective reparation measures] have contributed to the transformation of my community’s living conditions”¹⁹.

However, it is notable how the favorable perception of the UARIV decreased by 8 percentage points between both rounds, a trend that, as will be seen later, is also observed in other entities like the Land Restitution Unit (URT) and the SIVJRNR institutions.

In this context, the low percentage of people (12.6%) who claim to have received some compensation in 2021 (see Figure 30) is striking, a claim that was raised repeatedly in the focus groups with the victim population: “there is still a long way to go for just 80% of the damage caused by violence to be redressed”²⁰.

Figure 29. Satisfaction with the implementation of the Agreement among redressed Victims

This figure, however, has a significant variation among territories: while in Macarena-Guaviare 23% consider that they have received some kind of reparation, this percentage drops to 4% in the Middle Pacific region (see Figure 30).

Figure 30. People who claim to have been redressed

Furthermore, respondents express they support for clarification of the truth: 68% felt they identified more with the statement “It is better to know the truth about what happened to the victims during the conflict, about who the perpetrators were and why they were victimized”, as opposed to “It is better to leave what happened to them in the past and not continue asking about it” (see Figure 32); and there are no statistically significant differences between victims and

non-victims with respect to this assessment. In this regard, it is particularly noteworthy that the population in PDET regions not only expects the truth to be clarified, but also to obtain the truth from all who are accountable. Indeed, 93% were in agreement or fully agreed with the statement “In addition to the former FARC, it is important for all the actors involved in the armed conflict to tell the truth about what happened in Colombia” (see Figure 29).

Despite the above, there are divergences between the idea of imposing alternative sentences and social expectations regarding punishment. In fact, the majority of those surveyed (66% and 55%, respectively) consider that the upper and middle-rank perpetrators should pay for their crimes with prison without any type of sentence reduction (see Graph 30 and Graph 31). In both cases, the percentage of people who claim to have this expectation increased between 2019 and 2021.

Taking this baseline into account, the importance is clear of advancing in a pedagogical effort to explain the need for a process based on the selection of macro-cases and not on the prosecution of all crimes, with alternative penalties for those who contribute to the clarification of truth. On the other hand, one of the classic trade-offs of transitional justice is exposed, between punishment of those responsible

Figure 31. Regional variation in perceptions of reparation




Figure 32. Attitudes towards the truth




Figure 33. Attitudes towards the need for all involved to contribute to the truth




Figure 34. Expectations regarding punishment of those with the highest degree of responsibility





Figure 35. Expectations regarding punishment of those with a medium degree of responsibility




and incentives for them to participate in peacebuilding (Freeman and Orozco, 2019).

The knowledge of and trust in SIVJRNR institutions.

Part of the restorative and enlightening effect of the institutions that make up the SIVJRNR is the dissemination of its work. For this reason, this survey inquired about the knowledge of these institutions in the PDET regions. In this regard, it is notable that the JEP is the best known (35.5%), followed by the UBPD (32.2%) and the CEV (24.5%) (see Figure 36). Those who are victims of the armed conflict are more direct beneficiaries of the actions of these institutions, so they would be expected to have a greater average knowledge thereof. In fact, the victims state knowing little more about the JEP (+2%), the UBPD (+2%) and the CEV (+3%).

Figure 36. Knowledge of transitional justice institutions



In the first round, no measurement was made of the levels of trust in SIVJRNR institutions, since they were still in their initial phases. In 2021 they have already been commissioned in the national and regional levels,

and the survey reflects that around a third of the people in 2021 expressed some or a lot of trust in the UBDP, the CEV and the JEP (see Figure 37). This figure is high when compared to the levels of trust in similar institutions of ordinary justice: to the question about the level of trust in judges, only 15% answered “somewhat” or “much” in 2021. Trust is around 40% when the question is analyzed only among those who state knowing these entities.

The majority of people in the PDETs is still dissatisfied with the implementation of truth and justice measures

When evaluating the actions aimed at providing truth and justice, it is observed that most people consider that their progress is bad or very bad, and that this percentage increased between both rounds, rising from

41.7% to 47.1%. All in all, the percentage of people who think that things are going well (37% and 27%, respectively) is higher than the percentage of respondents with a similar opinion of other components such as reintegration (19%) (see Figure 38). Notably, among victims who state that knowing justice institutions, satisfaction is even lower.

A similar trend is observed when analyzing progress in land restitution: the percentage of people stating that their restitution cases are in progress or have been resolved decreased slightly (-2%) (see Figure 39).

Important challenges persist in the implementation of the provisions aimed at reparation, justice and truth for victims. The associated activities and institutions are not yet well known and, although they inspire relatively greater trust, gaps are observed with respect to their degree of implementation. It will also be necessary to continue constantly redefining the scope and

Figure 37. Trust in transitional justice institutions






Figure 38. Perception about the implementation of truth and justice

possibilities of transitional justice facing a scenario with high punitive expectations.

The long road to reconciliation

Reconciliation is one of the objectives underlying the implementation of the Peace Agreement. It should not be forgotten that, as shown in Chapter 3, the territories that perceive the greatest progress in reconciliation are, on average, also those that are most satisfied with the Agreement's implementation. However, reconciliation is a concept with varying interpretations for different individuals. An approach is proposed that recognizes this complexity, but at the same time identifies some common elements amidst the diversity of meanings: it is a concept that is rooted in the idea of a peaceful coexistence between different groups, based on a combination of behavioral and psychological changes and the development of improvements in

Figure 39. Perception of progress in land restitution processes

the material economic conditions of the community²¹. It is, therefore, far from being an easy and expedited process. On the contrary, as expressed by a social leader interviewed for this study, it is a non-linear process that takes time: "Peace is an objective, a path to follow, and in that sense, reconciliation is but one of the steps... It is very hard for a country so battered, so hurt, so full of pain, to find reconciliation so easily, because there are too many open wounds, and closing those wounds is hard, and not all people want to close them"²².

This survey asked residents of PDET regions if they thought that the country was moving towards reconciliation. The data reveal that only 25% consider that progress has been made in this direction (see Figure 40), the percentage being a little higher in those who recognize themselves as victims (27% believe that progress is being made towards reconciliation) than in non-victims (23%).

This is not surprising given the punitive expectations against ex-combatants and the low levels of trust in them, a distrust that not only prevents a difficult coexistence between groups, but can also be its consequence. Studies such as the Reconciliation Barometer Analysis reach a similar conclusion, which shows the existence of a correlation between reconciliation and trust.²³

That same study establishes that reconciliation is not experienced in the same way in all areas and social contexts.²⁴ This survey is consistent with this idea, since the regional variation in the assessment of the degree of progress towards reconciliation is significant: while in southern Córdoba 51.9% perceive progress, in Upper Patía and North of Cauca, only 10.6% maintain this perception. The former is one of the territories with the highest levels of satisfaction regarding the Agreement’s implementation, and the latter is one of the few territories where a deterioration of this assessment is observed.

Similarly, it stands out that, within the victim population that has been redressed, the assessment of progress in terms of reconciliation is much higher: in these cases, those who consider that progress has been made in that direction rise to 42%.

In short, reconciliation, far from being a short-term process that automatically follows the implementation of reintegration, transitional justice or victim care measures, requires their simultaneous execution and interventions specifically aimed at furthering that outcome.

Figure 40. Perceptions about the progress of reconciliation






Figure 41. Perceptions of reconciliation by PDET subregion**Do you think the country is moving towards reconciliation?**



PDETs and rural development

Chapter 6.

The PDET can be understood as an instrument aimed at achieving the stabilization and structural transformation of the rural setting, through the faster implementation of the provisions contemplated in point 1 of the Peace Agreement (Comprehensive Rural Reform)²⁵. For this purpose, between 2018 and 2019, a participatory and consultative process took place, through which over 200,000 people identified their main needs, priorities and proposals to transform their territories. These were recorded in what are known as Action Plans for Regional Transformation (PATR). Through this channel, almost 33,000 initiatives were proposed, which have been organized into eight pillars:

- Socially-oriented zoning of rural property and land use.
- Infrastructure and land adaptation.
- Rural health.
- Rural education and early childhood.
- Housing, drinking water and sanitation.
- Economic reactivation and agricultural production.
- Right to food.
- Reconciliation, coexistence and peace.

The main aim is for the PDET to consolidate as a management instrument for 15 years, which is why they have been formally adopted as part of the land use planning of municipal governments (170 agreements)

and departmental governments (18 ordinances). One of the main challenges will be to guarantee that subsequent governments maintain the PDET initiatives as part of their planning, particularly in view of the update of the PATR, which must take place every five years, with the first update coming in 2023. According to government reports, between 2018 and 2021, 491 projects have been approved for COP 5.3 trillion through the Ocad Paz financing source. This is complemented by 508,607 million through the mechanism of public works for taxes for 68 projects in PDET regions and 351,972 million through the PDET Works strategy, led by the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART) according to the Peace with Legality Results Report (2021). Despite these efforts, follow-up reports such as those by CINEP/PPP-Cerac (2021) show the need to accelerate the effective implementation of these initiatives. Similarly, the report warns about the importance of ensuring the participation of citizens in the execution of initiatives contemplated within the PATR.

By inquiring about the perceptions of citizens in the territories directly benefited by the PDETs, this survey can shed light on how the effective implementation of the PATR is experienced, as well as the expectations it raises in people


Respondents believe that the PDET will transform their territory

As was shown in chapter 3, the citizens of these territories have a favorable attitude towards the Agreement's implementation. Indeed, 81.8% of those surveyed in the PDET regions think that the Agreement was necessary to end the conflict with the FARC EP, and 65.8% believe that it "represents the people's opinion".

This positive assessment was also heard in the focus groups, in which a participant stated, for example: “the peace process brings great hope”²⁶, to which another participant added: “when we heard that the peace process for Colombia was coming, we bet on it”²⁷.

This hope for the general implementation of the Agreement is also materialized in an expectation of transformation specifically derived from the implementation of the PDET. In fact, as Figure 42 shows, the majority of respondents (59%) believe that the PDET will transform their territory, and only 7.5% believe the opposite.

Figure 42. Perception that PDETs will transform the reality of their territory



This favorable view is shared by the majority of citizens in 12 of the 16 PDET subregions. Only in four subregions less than half of respondents have the expectation of territorial transformation through the PDET: South Tolima, Arauca, Middle Pacific, and Pacific and Nariño Border, these last two being among the few territories in which satisfaction with the Agreement’s implementation decreased (see chapter 3).


In all the other subregions, most people have an optimistic view, with the cases of Urabá Antioqueño and Chocó being particularly notable, with almost unanimous positive expectations (Figure 43).

However, it is noteworthy that almost 30% of respondents answer that they “don’t know” (Figure 42). This can have two interpretations: that they do not know if the PDET will transform their territory – because they are unaware of the progress or projects under way–, or that they do not know what the PDET are. In the focus groups, it was repeatedly raised that there was not enough information about what was happening with the PDETs. For example, in Guapi (Cauca) a participant expressed: “The truth is, there are few who are informed in the communities, very few; the PDET summon meetings and those who attend do not disseminate the information”²⁸. Similarly, in Ciénaga (Magdalena), it was expressed that after the approval of the initiatives, their materialization into projects ends up taking place without consultation: “the driver group does not participate in project prioritization. They are summoned to socialization meetings, but when they arrive, the project has already been approved”²⁹. This will have to be investigated in greater depth, but it is consistent with the calls for greater involvement of the communities in the process of implementing the PDETs, which have been issued by both the Attorney General’s Office (2021) and the CINEP/PPP-Cerac (2021).

The arrival of public works to the PDET regions

In your community, have you observed an increase in the construction of community property (bridges, schools, roads, community

Figure 43. Assessment of expectations of regional transformation by the PDET by subregion (% who agree and strongly agree)



halls, etc.) in the last 12 months?" The data is less encouraging in this case: in 2021, only 27% feel that there has been an increase in the construction of public works in their territories, which constitutes a decrease of 8 percentage points compared to 2019. The regional variation in this case is significant, because while in Macarena-Guaviare, 50.5% of those surveyed consider that the construction of works has increased, in Middle Pacific and Upper Patía-North Cauca, less than 12% have a similar perception (Figure 44). It should not be forgotten that the Middle Pacific and Upper Patía - North Cauca are territories in which satisfaction with the Agreement's implementation decreased (see chapter 3), and where claims have been raised for low levels of PDET implementation³⁰.

It is possible that the perception of the arrival of public works in the territories is triggering not only a certain level of satisfaction with the PDETs, but also (or rather) an evaluation of the performance of local governments. For this reason, this report explores whether such perceptions are related to the investments or amount financed through the mechanisms specifically created for the PDET: Ocad-Paz, Works for Taxes and PDET Works. Figure 45, however, shows a disconnect between the actual perception and said investments: the high dispersion of the data indicates a lack of correlation between the variables, whose slope is not statistically significant in any case.³¹

On the other hand, Figure 46 shows that trust in local governments does have a positive,

statistically significant relationship: the greater the trust in local governments, the better the perception of the arrival of goods.


In any case, the effects COVID-19 control measures may also have had an impact on perceptions. As analyzed in chapter 9, respondents express a deterioration in the economic situation of their territories and, generally speaking, the implementation of programs and projects associated with the Peace Agreement was strongly affected by the measures implemented to contain the pandemic (Eufemia et al., 2020). Additionally, the Attorney General’s Office pointed out that in 2020 there was a delay in the construction of public works due to the pandemic, in addition to lower local participation in the entire process of

implementing the PDETs, given the limits of access to remote communication channels in these territories. (Pardo and Urbina, 2020). Figure 46 also shows that the perception of the economic situation and the arrival of public works are, in fact, positively correlated: those who perceive a better economic situation also tend to perceive a higher rate of arrival of works.

At the same time, the deterioration of the security situation can affect the perception of the State’s presence, and represents a barrier for the participation of key social leaders in socialization spaces.

As will be seen in Chapter 8, social leadership instill higher levels of trust than State institutions, so their participation and oversight of these processes is valuable.


Figure 44. Perception of increased construction of works in the territory



In any case, the findings regarding the arrival of goods are consistent with the low perception of state presence other than that of the Armed Forces in the subregions: 83% hold that there has not been much state presence since the signature of the Peace Agreement, and that it has been particularly absent in Upper Patía and North of Cauca (93.8%), Urabá Antioqueño (91.4%), Middle Pacific (89.9%) and Chocó (86%). Indeed, the presence of key institutions for the Agreement's implementation is not widely recognized: among those surveyed, 97% state that they have not been visited by the Territorial Renewal Agency, 91% have not seen the Land Restitution Unit (URT) and 87% are unaware of whether the UARIV has been in the area. In contrast, local authorities are more recognized, although the perception of absence is still predominant: 70.4% of respondents state that municipal entities "never" show their face in their territories and


87% point out the same for departmental authorities in general. Local governments, as shown, can be a key factor in changing perceptions about the arrival of public works. The rural reform not only entails the arrival of new infrastructure; it also implies guaranteeing better access to land by peasants. The survey, however, shows a trend similar to that observed with respect to the arrival of public works: in 2021, only 23% consider that the issue of land titling is going well or very well, 9 percentage points lower than in 2019 (See Figure 47). This is consistent with the slight decrease in the percentage of people stating that their restitution cases are ongoing or have been resolved (see Chapter 5).

Figure 45. Correlation between perception of arrival of public works and Ocad-Paz projects, PDET Works and Works for taxes*



*The ART made available to the UNDP its database of projects financed through these three sources: Ocad-Paz, works for taxes and small infrastructure works

Figure 46. Correlation coefficients between perception of arrival of public assets, trust in local institutions and improvement of the economic situation*




*Correlations are statistically significant at 99% confidence

In conclusion, those surveyed in the areas most affected by the conflict believe that their territories will be transformed. But, for this hope not to be thwarted, it will be important to ensure the arrival of public works to their territories and the materialization of other initiatives, such as those associated with access to land. The visibility of the PDET initiatives is not only achieved through effective execution, which may take place with greater momentum after the massive approval of Ocad-Paz projects in 2021 and the start or completion of public works in 2022. It will also depend on a greater involvement of communities and local leaders in the implementation of these initiatives. This will make it possible to exercise better control over the use of public resources, and can thus contribute to legitimizing the institutional deployment that underlies the implementation of the PDETs.

Figure 47. Satisfaction with implementation in relation to land title deeds





Illicit Crops and Other Illegal Economies

Chapter 7.

This study addresses a fundamental aspect of the Agreement related to the substitution of illicit crops, the policies to overcome this problem and the presence of drug trafficking in the territories. It also approaches the perception of deforestation processes and their links with illicit economies.

It is important, however, to point out that the survey design does not cover the Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program (PNIS)³² in all its components, and that only 21 of the 56 municipalities that are part of the PNIS are included in the survey. For this reason, its scope is only exploratory, although not statistically representative as regards the PDET-PNIS territories.

In addition to the survey, there is qualitative information obtained through three focus groups carried out with PNIS beneficiaries located in Putumayo, Guaviare and Caquetá.³³ This data delves into the results of the survey, and addresses the complexity of its possible determinant factors.

The results of the survey are analyzed below in four dimensions. The first one, the attitude towards illicit crop substitution as a policy and as opposed to the forced eradication strategy. The second dimension is the assessment of the adoption of the illicit crop substitution strategy in the Agreement's implementation, considering regional and other differential dimensions, such as gender or ethnic self-recognition. Third, the perception of drug trafficking and illegal mining within the set of problems faced by citizens of the subregions included in the survey. Finally, a brief analysis of the perception of the problem of deforestation and extension of the agricultural frontier, which takes into account the relationship between this phenomenon and illicit economies.

Attitudes towards the substitution and eradication of illicit crops

The implementation of point 4 of the Peace Agreement has the Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program (PNIS), (Decree Law Number 896, of May 29, 2017) as one of its central axes, a proposal that is integrated into the Comprehensive Rural Reform under point 1 of the Agreement.

The Colombian Government has led and implemented alternative development policies in Colombia as one of the strategies for illicit crop reduction in various regions of the country since 1985. In 2003, the policy guidelines were determined through components that sought to join and coordinate efforts to tackle the factors that led to the vulnerability of the territory (Drug Observatory of Colombia, no date). This strategy has always been subject to forced eradication, either by aerial spraying started in 1992 or manually since 2005 (Drug Observatory of Colombia, No date). In this context, illicit crop substitution under the Peace Agreement has background projects that have been implemented in 22 departments (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014). This implies that in the territories where the PNIS are implemented there may be a previous memory of other alternative development processes that may impact the expectations and assessment of the current implementation.


In the Peace Agreement, voluntary eradication and crop substitution are set forth as the main strategy in the PNIS areas, where compliance with the voluntary eradication commitment is prioritized. Forced eradication would therefore be concentrated in areas

that are not within the PNIS or as an option in the event of a breach of the agreement. The evidence obtained in the two survey rounds suggests that the communities that inhabit the PDET support the component that allows “offering money or economic alternatives and technical support for families to substitute coca crops” in all subregions. In the aggregate, favorability is at 85.1%, compared to 11.9% disapproval (see Figure 47).

Breaking down the data regionally into six of the subregions shows a higher-than-average decline in support for substitution. In three of these regions, Sierra Nevada-Perijá, South Tolima and Catatumbo, the drop in this support is significant (Figure 47).

In Catatumbo, people who agree or strongly agree with substitution in 2021 are 72.5% of respondents, 15.4% less than in 2019. This change is reflected in a proportional increase in the aggregate of people who ‘strongly disagree’, or ‘disagree’, standing at 24.9% in 2021 compared to 9.2% in 2019. As shown in Figure 43, the most relevant variation occurs among those who ‘agree’, which drop 20 points between 2019 and 2021. The 20-point variance is split between a 15 percentage-point increase in those who ‘disagree’ and 5 points in those who ‘fully agree’, a negative balance against substitution.

Figure 47. Assessment of illicit crop substitution as a tool



In the south of Tolima, the aggregate of people in favor of substitution changes from 87% in 2019 to 71.9% in 2021, although in this case there is an increase in those who ‘agree’ and a reduction in those who ‘fully agree’. In other words, although they remain in favor of substitution, there is a loss of ‘enthusiasm’ with respect to this alternative.

However, the most striking case occurs in the Sierra Nevada-Perijá region, which shows a drop from 91.4% to 65.9% in support for crop substitution, a figure that corresponds to a clear decrease in the positive assessment of the Agreement’s implementation regarding illicit crops, as will be discussed below (see Figure 52). In this case, there are drops in both those who ‘agree’ and those who ‘strongly disagree’, and an increase of close to 20 points in those who ‘disagree’.

Figure 48. Assessment of relevant cases of illicit crop substitution





Figure 49. Opinion about forced eradication by PDET subregion



The analysis of the support for substitution as a policy is complemented by evidence of rejection of forced eradication. According to the aggregate survey data, between 2019 and 2021 there is a decrease of 12.2 points in rejection of eradication. This change in attitude does not proportionally translate into acceptance, which only increases by 6 percentage points, but rather responds to an increase in people who choose not to answer.

As can be seen in Figure 44 disaggregating the data, in 12 of the 16 subregions where the survey was applied, the rejection of forced eradication (manual or by spraying) is higher than 80%. In three other regions (Arauca, Sierra Nevada-Perijá and Montes de María), rejection is higher than 53%. The most notable case is that of the South of Córdoba, where support to forced eradication is predominant, with 62.7%. This case is very interesting, because there is also

a marked deterioration in the assessment of the implementation of illicit crop substitution in the subregion (see Figure 47) and the 2021 monitoring report of the Illicit Crop Monitoring System (Simci) indicates that Córdoba is the department where coca crops grew the most, 30% more than in 2019 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - UNODC, 2021a).

A very interesting fact is that, according to the information collected, attitudes towards eradication are independent of the number of hectares of coca crops present in the municipality (see Figure 50). In this sense, it seems that this attitude is not determined by crop extension in the territories under analysis.

When comparing the attitude towards coca eradication among the municipalities that have been included in the PNIS and

Figure 50. 2021 approval of forced eradication (manual or aerial) against number of coca hectares in 2020





Figure 51. Approval of forced eradication against variations in numbers of hectares of coca



where the survey was applied and those municipalities that are not part of this program, only a minimal decrease in the rejection of eradication in PNIS municipalities can be observed, with no statistical relevance. That is, there are no significant changes in opinion. The perception of the implementation of illicit crop substitution is analyzed in detail below.

Perception of the implementation of point 4 of the Peace Agreement

The PNIS was launched with the intention of furthering illicit crop substitution through the promotion of sustainable entrepreneurial projects and Comprehensive Municipal Plans designed in collaboration and with the direct participation of the communities.

The families that signed the agreements committed to voluntary eradication and not to replant, not to be involved in work associated with illicit crops and not to participate in the illegal marketing of derived raw materials. If they honor their commitments, as 98% have done so far (UNODC, 2021b), they would benefit in the first year from: one million pesos per month as remuneration for substitution activities, preparation of land for legal planting or work on public works of community interest, one million eight hundred thousand pesos for the implementation of self-sustainability and food safety projects, and nine million pesos for the adaptation and implementation of short-cycle and quick-income projects (in the last two cases, the transfers are made only once). From the second year, families could access up to ten million pesos in entrepreneurial projects and workforce, per

family, and technical assistance throughout the process, at an approximate cost of three million two hundred thousand pesos per family.

According to statistics from the Comprehensive Monitoring Component of the Alternative Development Program of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, by the end of 2020 the PNIS had a total of 99,097 beneficiary families, of which 67,597 are illicit cultivators, 14,645 do not grow illicit crops but live in areas affected by drug trafficking, and 16,855 are coca leaf collectors. These families are located in 56 municipalities across 14 departments, where 65% of the country's illicit crops were concentrated according to the 2019 Simci census. Another 20% of these crops are found in PDET areas not included in the PNIS (UNODC, 2021c).

Official data shows that there is currently progress and compliance with the aid to families as established in voluntary eradication agreements. By the end of 2020, a total of 74,818 families were receiving assistance under the PAI (of which 58,490 had already received all the payments established by the program), which corresponds to 90.9% of farming and non-farming families included in the program (UNODC, 2021c). However, the number of families with entrepreneurial projects went from 4,286 in October to 6,757 in February 2021, which represents only 8.20% of the total number of families registered in the PNIS, a number that is still low (Technical Secretariat for Verification of the International Component, 2021). Likewise, this follow-up report indicates that implementation continues to focus on the individual component, and no progress has been made on the community component.


Since the signature of the Peace Agreement, there has been a decrease in coca crop extension in 60% of the PDET municipalities, and an increase in the remaining 40%. Within the framework of the PNIS, it is estimated that 43,711 hectares have been eradicated voluntarily and through assisted procedures, which shows high levels of compliance by peasants (98%), whereas replanting only amounts to 0.8%. However, the production of coca paste remains stable, which indicates improvements in technology and the capacity to transform the raw material (UNODC, 2021a).

In order to analyze the perceptions about the implementation of the Peace Agreement in relation to the substitution of illicit crops, the data obtained enables us to analyze different aspects of the assessment of the implementation. Additionally, the information obtained through the focus groups, although not statistically representative, provides valuable insights. Despite being located in different regions, the perceptions recorded are very similar to each other, and are consistent with the information obtained through the surveys.

The results generally indicate dissatisfaction with the implementation process, expressed by 46% of those surveyed in 2021, compared to 37.7% in 2019. Overall satisfaction also decreased from 32.1% in 2019 to 19.2% in 2021, a 12-point variation.

In the analysis of perception in the different subregions, important differences can be observed. In 2021, in all cases the perception that implementation is going poorly or very poorly is predominant, evidence that is even more concerning if the variations between the data obtained in 2019 and 2021 are taken into consideration.

Figure 52. Perception of implementation of illicit crop substitution by subregion



As can be seen, the deterioration in the positive perception is observed in 11 subregions, and in the remaining five the approval rate increases, albeit discreetly. Moreover, among the regions with a greater drop in favorability for implementation, the variation is significant, as the deterioration in perception is greater than 20 points in eight subregions. The case, already mentioned, of the South of Córdoba, with favorability falling from 40.3% to 6.7%, stands out as the lowest of all the regions, followed by Pacific and

Nariño border and Sierra Nevada-Perijá. One hypothesis that could be offered is that there is a difference of opinions between people who support crop substitution and those who do not, and that this attitude could give rise to differences in perception about implementation status. However, when these two variables are compared, the perception that the implementation is going poorly is distributed similarly between those who agree with this strategy and those who do not.

Figure 53. Variation in the perception of the implementation regarding illicit crops between 2019 and 2021





Figure 54. How is the implementation regarding illicit crops going, a comparison between PDET and PDET/PNIS areas



In analyzing this situation, it is useful to introduce the comparison between the PDET and PDET/PNIS areas contemplated in the survey, bearing in mind that only 21 PNIS municipalities are represented (Figure 54).

The increase in discontent in these territories is deeper, going from 31.9% to 45.9% compared to the non-PNIS PDETs, where it goes from 30.4% to 33.3%.

The low approval rate is even more relevant considering that the advances in the implementation in the last two years would lead the beneficiaries and their communities to increase their level of satisfaction after seeing the materialization of the processes started. In any case, it is important to take into account the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. The implemented measures may be relevant both regarding changes in the relative individual situation, as well as in the appearance of new problems and the impact of the social restrictions established to fight the pandemic on the implementation, such as operation delays, stoppage of works, logistical issues, etc. Having made this point about the impact of the pandemic, three relevant dimensions of the perceptions about implementation are analyzed below.

In the first place, it can be assumed that having received money from the State favors the positive perception of the implementation, whether in relation to its social programs or to specific aid to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic.

In this case, it is observed that among respondents who rate the implementation of crop substitution as 'very good', there is a greater participation of those who have received some kind of aid. It is important to point out that, in 2021, 50.3% of respondents

have not received aid from any State program in the last five years, and that 51.9% received no aid to deal with the crisis unleashed by the pandemic.

Another relevant dimension from the perspective of possible particularities in perception is the case of women. According to data from the UNODC (2020) and the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART), of the families included in the PNIS, 36.4% are headed by a woman, as opposed to 63.6% where a man is the head of the household. Female-headed households had a higher incidence of moderate-severe food insecurity (56.6%) compared to male-headed households (47.7%), with a difference of 8.9 percentage points. This vulnerability makes effective implementation even more important for this population group.

However, compared to the perception of the implementation of crop substitution, the result shows no relevant nuances in perception when disaggregated by gender. In general, on this specific issue, the women interviewed in focus groups show levels of discontent close to the average.

Another important component of the Peace Agreement is the Ethnic Chapter, which recognizes the damage, vulnerability and particular needs of indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples, and provides a differential approach for implementation.

This could imply a differentiated perception of the implementation among those belonging to certain ethnic groups.

Although more than four years have passed since the PNIS began, there are still significant delays, such as the agreement on the ethnic route for the substitution process

(Afro-Colombian National Peace Council (2020) and Pares (2020).

This could lead to greater discontent among people who claim to belong to ethnic communities. However, the results obtained do not show notable variations when compared against the variable of racial self-determination. In all cases, there is a predominance of 'very poor' and 'poor' options when taking a stance with respect to substitution.

Having not found relevant correlations in gender or ethnic self-determination, the hypothesis can be raised that the low rating of the implementation is the consequence of dissatisfaction with its different dimensions. The data gathered from the focus groups carried out in PNIS municipalities can provide clues about the perceptions that motivate the discontent shown by the data.

In all the focus groups, the positive perception of the signature of the Agreement and the positive expectations that it produced are highlighted,³⁴ both in relation to the respondent's security situation and in terms of the possibility of changing their situation as coca growers³⁵. However, all participants show their dissatisfaction with implementation³⁶.

In a general systematization of the information collected in the focus groups, the causes of the aforementioned discontent can be grouped into five aspects: those that have to do with delays in the payment of the different agreed fund transfers; low quality or incomplete delivery of materials, animals and supplies; management problems and unexpected expenses; the differences regarding the strategy and feasibility of entrepreneurial projects and, finally, problems related to the lack of construction of public

works and infrastructure for the communities. In all cases, at least three aspects are mentioned, the most frequent being delays in payments, low-quality inputs, and problems with the feasibility of entrepreneurial projects


Perception of the main problems in municipalities

The analysis of the data on the perception of the implementation of point 4 complements the information on illicit crops from the angle of their perception as a problem, in their relationship with other illicit economies, such as illegal mining, and with more complex issues as perceived by the respondents.

According to the data collected, in total only 1% of the people surveyed consider drug trafficking to be their municipality's biggest problem. The subregions where the problematic perception visibly increased are: Catatumbo, South Bolívar and Macarena-Guaviare. The opposite trend, that is, the decrease in perception of the issue as a 'problem' between 2019 and 2021 occurs in 10 of the subregions, in all of them with a prevalence lower than 2%.

Apart from asking about the perception of drug trafficking as a problem, the MAPS survey also asks about illegal mining, although it must be taken into account that this activity is not present in all subregions. According to the data obtained, in 2021 it is only perceived as a problem in the Middle Pacific, Chocó, South Bolívar and Upper Patía-North Cauca regions, although in all cases it is a minority statement that does not exceed 1% of responses. In fact, this perception radically decreases between 2019

Figure 55. Perception of drug trafficking as the main problem in their territory




and 2021 until it stops being mentioned as a problem in the South Tolima or Montes de María regions.

As indicated in the 2020 alluvial gold mining report (UNODC, 2020), most of the Evidence of Illicit Alluvial Gold Extraction (EVOA) is found in the department of Chocó (52% of total mining operations in the department), Nariño (50% of mining operations in the department), Putumayo, Cauca or Córdoba. These information on impacts is compatible with the perceptions reflected in the responses of the survey by subregions. However, it is worth pointing out the reduced perception of the phenomenon as the main

problem in those places where its presence is reportedly stronger.

The low perception of drug trafficking and illegal mining as problems is striking, and radically divergent with the data about their actual impacts. In this sense, it is important to reflect on the social perception of the problems by the inhabitants of the selected municipalities. As can be seen in Figure 55, in the aggregate responses of all the subregions, the main problems for the people surveyed are those that affect their daily lives, such as unemployment, crime, perceived corruption or poverty.

Figure 56. What is the main problem in your community?

Drug trafficking and illegal mining have a very marginal impact as a problem in areas where these activities are sources of income, despite the recognition of their illicit nature, relationship with armed structures and environmental impacts.

Delving into the problems of the territory and its inhabitants, it is estimated that 79% of the municipalities prioritized for implementation of the Peace Agreement have had coca crops. This fact gains greater relevance in light of the evidence provided by the municipal vulnerability index developed by Érika Lombana (2020) and its application to the municipalities prioritized by the Peace Agreement, as done by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2021). The index evaluates the degree of association of 96 variables with the establishment of coca crops. According to the results, in the municipalities prioritized in the Peace

Agreement's implementation, 58% of those with coca crops have high levels of vulnerability. The components with the greatest weight in municipal vulnerability to coca crops and other illicit economies are biophysical conditions and proximity to other municipalities affected by coca and illicit gold extraction, and a second land-related vulnerability factor consisting of the reduced yields of legal agricultural production.

In the regions prioritized in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, an average lag of 0.46 is registered, which means that the agricultural production of these municipalities is barely higher than half of the expected yield in optimal production conditions, representing a very low competitiveness of legal production (UNODC, 2021).

These data are consistent with the need to understand the link between the different phenomena that have to do with the use of the land, the most pressing needs of the population and the vulnerability conditions of each subregion. This also corroborates previous findings in terms of the coexistence and interrelation between illicit economies and the need to design public policies that address multiple fronts (Rettberg and Ortiz, 2016), (Ortiz-Riomalo and Rettberg, 2018).

Perceptions about deforestation and measures to control it

Finally, this section closes with an analysis of the data related to the perception of deforestation, its connection with illicit economies and the measures to control it. According to data from the Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies in Colombia (Ideam, 2019), the main direct causes of deforestation were forest conversion into pastures (praderización), poor extensive livestock farming practices, illegal mineral extraction, unplanned transport infrastructure, the expansion of the agricultural frontier in unplanned areas, illegal logging and crops for illicit use. In this sense, the data on deforestation and expansion of the agricultural frontier are used to complement the analysis of the perception of illicit crop substitution due to their close relationship with illegal economies in the areas where the Agreement is implemented. In the 2018-2019 period, Colombia lost 6,669 hectares of tree cover areas of high environmental value as a result of the appearance of Alluvial Gold Mining (Evoa) on land, equivalent to 7% of the extraction operations detected nationwide. This situation is distributed in 12 departments, but 71% of the high environmental value

cover that was lost by Alluvial Gold Mining was located in Chocó and Antioquia. In fact, Chocó reported the loss of 2,244 hectares of primary vegetation, which means 95% of the lost vegetation cover of the department and 52% of the total primary vegetation affected in the country. As for illicit crops, these are considered as a driving agent of the loss of forest cover, either due to the direct impact caused by the change from forest to coca crops or by the indirect impact of associated activities established around illicit crops (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018).

The MAPS survey asks about the perception of the presence of deforestation processes and their impact on production systems, access to water, loss of biodiversity and land ownership. In this case, the information obtained shows a great awareness of the impact of deforestation, in contrast to the low perception of mining and drug trafficking as problems. Given the possibility of rating the impact of deforestation on the aforementioned aspects from 1 to 5, the most frequent response in all the subregions is 5, that is, it is perceived to have a very high impact.

Regarding the deforestation control strategies that have been applied in general, and not necessarily within the implementation of the Peace Agreement to reduce deforestation and contain the expansion of the agricultural frontier, the data reflects mostly negative perceptions, although the survey does not offer more information on the type of strategies applied.

In the first case, the perception of effectiveness in stopping deforestation is positive in Arauca, Middle Pacific and Chocó. As for the possibility of stopping

Figure 57. Perception of measures to curb deforestation






Figure 58. Perception of effectiveness in reducing the agricultural frontier



the expansion of the agricultural frontier, only in the Arauca subregion about half of respondents state that the strategy has been effective.

The generally negative perception of the inhabitants of some of the most vulnerable regions of the country is especially worrying when considering the situation of increasing deforestation and the consequent environmental damage in the country. The Ideam and the Ministry of the Environment recorded that in 2020 illegal logging grew by 8% compared to the previous year, and the Amazon concentrates 63.7% of all deforestation in the country

In this sense, the concern expressed by the respondents could find answers, at least in some of the subregions, in the implementation of relevant legal provisions consistent with the priorities established in the Peace Agreement, as well as with the strategies to put a stop to the loss of forest cover and biodiversity (Dejusticia et al., 2020).



The Link Between Trust and Peace

Chapter 8.

Trust, understood as people's belief that others will not harm them or, at best, act in their best interest, is a fundamental part of society. For families, neighborhoods, communities, and even nations to interact and function, a minimum level of trust between people and institutions is required.³⁷ The armed conflict hinders and breaks that trust, so promoting it is essential when it comes to rebuilding societies affected by violence. In this chapter, we will see that trust varies substantially among the PDETs, both among the different subregions, and with respect to the different institutions and people that respondents are asked about.

The MAPS survey includes several questions related to the respondents' degree of trust in different entities. For the purposes of this chapter, a distinction is made between local and national governments, as well as between state and non-state institutions. Before exploring questions about institutional trust, we will describe some questions about trust that are not related to institutions, but to the different individuals that a person encounters in his/her daily life.

In the first place, and as might be expected, the respondents show substantial trust in those closest to them (see Figure 59). Almost 94% of respondents in the 2021 MAPS round express "a little" (17.7%) or "a lot" (76%) of trust in their family, while less than 5.5% express "very little" or no trust in their family³⁸. Likewise, 61.3% express having "a little" (43.6%) or "a lot" (17.7%) of trust in neighbors from their community. This trust in people who live in the same neighborhood has increased between the 2019 and 2021 rounds (+12.3%)³⁹. However, although there has been a general increase in trust in the local community throughout the sample, some PDETs stand out with less

encouraging figures: in both Arauca and Catatumbo, in 2021, people express less trust in their neighbors compared to 2019 data. PDETs with positive developments include Low Cauca and Northeast of Antioquia, as well as Urabá Antioqueño, where both the percentages representing "a little" and "a lot" of trust have increased significantly.

Additionally, the MAPS survey includes a question about social trust in general. In it, the respondents had to decide with which of these two statements they agree: "Most people can be trusted" or "You need to be very careful when dealing with most people" (see Figure 60). Almost all respondents agree with the latter statement, revealing a great distrust of other people across all the PDETs. Although social distrust was already high in 2019, when 93.7% of those surveyed considered that they had to be very careful when dealing with other people, it has climbed even higher in 2021, when 96.5% of respondents feel that way, a result possibly associated with the deterioration in the perception of security⁴⁰. This question is also included in the World Values Survey WVS⁴¹, whose latest measurement shows that social trust is low across Latin America. However, among the nine Latin American countries included in the WVS 2017-2020, only Nicaragua (95.8%) and Peru (95.6%) show a higher level of social mistrust than Colombia (95.5%)⁴². This, in turn, reveals that mistrust is also high in non-PDET municipalities.

Figure 59. Trust in your neighbors in 2019 and 2021






Figure 60. Trust in the general population

In summary, the two rounds of the MAPS survey show that people in PDETs trust those with whom they coexist, whether in their families or in their neighborhoods, and such trust even increased compared to 2019. But this trust does not extend to “most people” that they don’t know but may have to interact with.



Trust in national and local government

The Colombian government has made great efforts to establish a state presence in conflict-affected areas of the country, whereas the 2016 Peace Agreement includes numerous provisions that aim to channel state funding to these communities. However, like many other governments emerging

from armed conflict, Colombia also faces challenges in re-establishing state authority. Figure 61 shows the level of trust in national and local governments in 2019 and 2021. It can be observed that most government entities, at both local and national levels, are not considered particularly trustworthy. Less than half of those surveyed express “some” or “a lot” of trust in the President (23.4%), Congress (12.2%) or state institutions (29.5%). Overall, between 65% and 85% have little or no trust in these three institutions⁴³. Likewise, the people’s trust in the National Government has decreased since 2019⁴⁴. Instead, trust in local government has increased between 2019 and 2021. However, levels of trust remain low, with the increase mainly reflecting that people have gone from completely distrusting local government (“no trust at all”) to having “some” trust (no institution shows an increase in the “a lot of trust” percentage).

There is an important exception to this general rise in local trust: trust in Community Action Boards (JAC) has decreased, since the proportion of the population that expresses “a lot” of trust in the JACs went from 14% to 9.5%. While explaining this change will require additional study, it is worth noting that the first round of the MAPS survey was conducted just after the JAC elections in 2019. One possible interpretation of this behavior is that those high levels of trust in 2019 reflected an initial optimism regarding what the JACs could achieve, and the levels of trust in 2021 reflect the evaluation of what has been achieved so far by these actors. Although the decrease in the level of trust from 2019 to 2021 is significant, the JACs are trusted more than most national and local government institutions.

Figure 61. Trust in the national (top) and local (bottom) government in 2019 and 2021




The regional variation in trust levels is significant. Figure 62 presents the level of trust in main national and local government institutions in each of the PDETs⁴⁵. Most of the subregions show the same trends: on average, more trust is placed in local

institutions than national ones, and in most PDETs trust in institutions has decreased. It is noteworthy that one of the subregions with the highest levels of satisfaction with the Agreement, such as the South of Córdoba, shows higher levels of trust (30% in National

Government, 52% in local government) and, above all, an increase in trust in both the National (+15%) and local (+7%) Governments between 2021 and 2019. In Catatumbo, one

of the subregions in which satisfaction with the Agreement decreased, the evolution is negative: there is a decrease in trust in national (-4%) and local (-18%) institutions.

Figure 62. Trust in local and national government institutions




Non-state institutions

Non-state institutions are generally considered more trustworthy than government entities (Figure 63). The Catholic Church enjoys the highest trust among all the non-state institutions included in the survey: in 2021, 61% said they trust this organization somewhat or a lot⁴⁶. The United Nations is another institution that enjoys high levels of trust in conflict-ridden territories, with more than 40% of respondents expressing “some” or “a lot” of trust in the UN in 2021, similar to the 2019 results, but substantially higher than other Latin American countries included in the last WVS survey⁴⁷. It is possible that this difference is a reflection of the fact that people in the PDET interact more with the UN than citizens in other Latin

American countries, and that such interaction improves trust. In fact, by examining the levels of trust in the UN, in relation to the frequency with which representatives visit these communities, it can be established that greater interaction is associated with higher levels of trust. In communities that have never had contact with UN representatives, more than 55% express “none” or “very little” trust, while in frequently visited communities more than 60% express “some” or “a lot” of trust in the United Nations.

The decrease in people’s trust in the media is notorious, dropping from 40% in 2019 to 29% in 2021. In contrast, people’s trust in local civil leadership is on the rise: trust in social leaders (+2.8%) and in ethnic and indigenous authorities (+2.3%) has increased.

Figure 63. Trust in Non-State Institutions 2021




What can explain the trust level and its change?

Trust in institutions depends largely on their ability to provide the necessary services demanded by citizens⁴⁸. Therefore, it is worth examining the relationship between institutional performance and trust. In line with what is observed in chapter 9 of this report, which describes the respondents' priorities regarding public spending, two areas of intervention are particularly important to understand levels of trust


in conflict-ridden regions in Colombia: education and health services. The analysis in this chapter adds a third dimension that has proven to be relevant: security. As the data in Figure 64 shows, there is a clear, statistically significant relationship between performance in the aforementioned areas and the level of trust in local governments: Respondents who think that education, health services, or security have improved in the last twelve months also express significantly greater trust compared to those who perceive a weak performance in these areas.

Figure 64. Relationship between institutional performance in health care and change in trust levels (2021)*




*Basic regression data, Coefficient: 2.47, P-Value: 0.00, R Squared: 0.47

Figure 65. Relationship between institutional performance in education and change in trust levels (2021)*




*Basic regression data, Coefficient: 2.38, P-Value: 0.00, R Squared: 0.60

Figure 66. Relationship between institutional performance in security and change in trust levels (2021)*

*Basic regression data, Coefficient: 2.86, P-Value: 0.00, R Squared: 0.26

The findings from the 2019 and 2021 MAPS surveys presented here have important implications for the purpose of re-establishing or strengthening the state as an authority in these regions affected by conflict. Specifically, it follows that it is important to:

- Work jointly with local social leaders.
- Achieve an effective coordination of the National and local Government.
- Improve performance in the thematic axes of health, education and security.



Future Perspectives

Chapter 9.

A useful feature of the survey is that it not only asks about the diagnosis of the current situation, but also about hypothetical future scenarios. This is of special importance in the context of transition between governments that is approaching in Colombia in 2022 and in view of the updating of the Action Plans for Regional Transformation (PATR) that must take place in 2023 in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of Decree 893 of 2017⁴⁹.

For this, the first step is to identify the starting point: contrary to the belief that the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was focused on large cities, this survey shows that the percentage of people who consider that the economic situation of their community has worsened doubled between 2019 and 2021, by going from 31.4% to 63% (see Figure 67).

The most recent multidimensional poverty data corroborates this trend: it increased 2.6% in rural areas and 0.2% in urban areas of the country in 2020, according to Roa-Clavijo, F. (2021).

In these circumstances, it becomes crucial to investigate the public investment priorities of the inhabitants of PDET areas. To capture this, the survey framed the hypothetical scenario in the following terms: “If the Colombian State decided to allocate 10% of its taxes to one of the following projects, which one would you prefer?” Figure 68 reveals that health, education and, to a lesser extent, roads, are the top three priorities. The hiring of Public Force members appears as the lowest priority even in spite of the perceived deterioration of security condition.

Figure 67. How do you rate your financial situation?




Figure 68. Assessment of investment priorities in PDET regions






Figure 69. Investment priorities by subregion



This distribution is expressed identically in almost all the PDET subregions (see Figure 69), with the exception of South Córdoba and Catatumbo, where road development ranked second and education third; and Urabá Antioqueño, where education ranked as the top priority. The three main priorities (health, education, roads) remain the same in all cases.

This order of priority is similarly reflected through open questions. For example, to the question “If, facing the elections, you had to choose a preference in the allocation of public funds, from 1 to 6, how would you classify them?”, 63% of respondents ranked health first. Education ranked second, with 23.9%, followed by the guarantee of a minimum living wage (see Figure 70). Social and economic reactivation policies seem to be a priority even in a context of perceived deterioration of security conditions.

Figure 70. Main priority in allocation of public funds



At the political level, the survey indicates that the inhabitants of the PDET approve the establishment of the special constituencies for peace (circunscripciones especiales de paz, in Spanish), which, it is worth noting, benefit all the territories surveyed through the creation of 16 additional seats in the House of Representatives for the regions most affected by the conflict⁵⁰. The results indicate that 46% agree and only 17% disagree with their implementation. It should be noted that a significant percentage (31%) answers “I don’t know” (see Figure 71), revealing a significant shortfall in pedagogical efforts, which will be essential to address before the new elections. It will be important for this to happen particularly among voters who are not directly associated with political parties, as among those who state that they

have participated in activities with political parties, the percentage of people who say they do not know the constituencies is 21%, 10 percentage points less than the overall average.

All this places us in a context where, despite dissatisfaction with the implementation of some aspects of the Peace Agreement, there are positive expectations about its future and a favorable environment for its implementation and even for the development of new agreements. Indeed, according to survey data, not only is there a majority of people who consider that the best way to resolve the armed conflict with the ELN is negotiation (87%), but this proportion increased by 7 percentage points compared to 2019.

Figure 71. Attitudes towards the special constituencies for peace




Figure 72. Perceptions about what is best to resolve the conflict with the ELN






Figure 73. Perceptions about what is the best option to resolve the conflict with the ELN by subregion

The preference for negotiation remains at levels above 80% in all subregions, and is even higher in areas where this armed group has a strong presence, such as Arauca (96.4%), Chocó (95.7%) and Catatumbo (92.8%).

Some of the figures presented in this report are discouraging and show a mismatch between expectations and reality in terms of duration and quality of the implementation. At the same time, various sources suggest that the window of opportunity for peace in Colombia remains open. This survey reveals, for example, that tangible changes in the environment—especially the greater state presence through the provision of security,

works and services, as well as the recognition and reparation of victims—generate an improvement not only in the perceptions but also on the ascertainable well-being of people. In this sense, many of the findings presented here offer a clear path in terms of strengthening, accelerating and completing the implementation of the 2016 Agreement, which constitutes one of the deepest opportunities for social transformation that the country has ever had, with the potential to mitigate and prevent future violence.



**Recommendations for the Irreversibility of
Peacebuilding**
Chapter 10.

The notable regional variations in the assessment of the Peace Agreement and its components make it difficult to construct a single overarching account of its implementation. It is experienced differently in each subregion and for each of the components of the Agreement. For this reason, what the voices from the PDET regions tell us is both hopeful and challenging, a story of contrasts. And therein lies the value of this survey: it is a further step towards a comprehensive and, at the same time, disaggregated understanding of the Agreement.

The findings consistently highlight the importance that the Agreement's implementation has for citizens in the PDETs: the evaluation of its components and associated tools is overwhelmingly positive. Similarly, most people express the hope that the Agreement will lead to a transformation of their territories, even when the current security situation is perceived negatively. The window of opportunity for peace in Colombia remains open.

However, this report has also highlighted enormous challenges. Advances in the implementation of strategic components such as security, reintegration, PDET and Transitional Justice are not positively assessed by most respondents. Although, again, this varies significantly across territories.

The call in this report is to continue listening to the residents of the PDET regions throughout the years of implementation that still remain under the Peace Agreement. Listening to them will entail recognizing the regional nuances of the Agreement, as well as the differential needs and priorities that they pose. It is, in short, about making

them a part of the implementation. Policy, program and intervention design may be informed by those who are beneficiaries of the Agreement, taking into account these shifting perceptions collected across the PDET regions.

Recommendations

The implementation of the Peace Agreement is mandatory, and will be for at least two more terms of office after the current government. For this reason, it is convenient to identify some of the conditions that can help avoid setbacks in what has been achieved, make progress irreversible and respond to the various challenges raised by this survey. For this purpose, the following recommendations are proposed:

1. ***Advance in regional peacebuilding agendas.*** Taking the evident regional variation in this survey seriously also implies working on the Agreement's implementation from both municipal and departmental governments and social leadership, all in coordination with the National Government. This, in turn, must occur on the basis of a disaggregated analysis of the information in terms of local progress, needs and challenges. The survey has, in fact, revealed that there are significant gaps in the Agreement's implementation, so it is worth better understanding what conditions make people in the Montes de María region much more satisfied with the Agreement and which rather explain the drop in satisfaction observed in Catatumbo. This may guide decision-making for a regional peace agenda.

2. ***Strengthen pedagogical processes on the different responsibilities in the Agreement's implementation at the national and territorial levels.*** Enforcement by an informed citizenry will make it possible to strengthen the Agreement's implementation, but this will only take place if the residents of the PDET areas are aware of the rights and responsibilities arising from the Agreement, as well as the effective progress and bottlenecks faced. This, in turn, will only be possible if citizens have a greater participation in its implementation.
3. ***Promote joint work between the Armed Forces and the justice system to reduce violence and deterioration of security perceptions in the PDET areas.*** This must be accompanied by additional efforts in different areas, particularly health and education, with a view to increasing trust in State institutions for a more effective and legitimate presence. For this to be possible, the protection of social leaders who play important roles in promoting community cohesion and the arrival of essential goods and services in their territories must be guaranteed. As was shown, security and trust in State institutions are closely related to satisfaction with the implementation of the Agreement.
4. ***Strengthen the implementation of reintegration actions with a community approach to facilitate better integration and knowledge***

between reintegrated individuals and host communities. The generation of spaces for interaction can lead to the construction of bonds of trust, which in turn could reduce stigmatization and promote reconciliation, as well as the social and economic integration of ex-combatants. This implies conducting activities both inside and outside the FTATR, including more urban settlements hosting a growing number of reincorporated persons.

5. ***Create interventions directly aimed at promoting reconciliation.*** The measures contemplated in the Agreement in its different components aspire, as a whole, to produce the outcome of reconciliation. But this does not seem to be enough, so the creation of spaces specifically designed to pave the way to reconciliation should be actively encouraged. This implies local interventions at the community level, given the weight of immediate surroundings and social proximity in building trust.
6. ***Strengthen pedagogy and dissemination of the scope of transitional justice mechanisms.*** In particular, on restorative justice and its emphasis on the truth about what happened during the armed conflict, reparation for victims and reconciliation. Few people know the structure that supports the operation of the SIVJNR, the principles that govern it and the foundations for a

design that is based on restorative justice, with complementary retribution elements. This lack of knowledge can lead residents in the PDET regions to have punitive expectations typical of the operation of an ordinary justice system.

7. Accelerate the processes of individual and collective reparation of the population victim of the armed conflict.

The survey indicates that a low percentage of victims feel redressed so far. At the same time, the data shows that reparation has the potential to promote reconciliation and satisfaction with the Agreement. This is a measure of significant social value and with the potential to promote local development, especially in PDET areas, where more than a third of the population is a victim of the armed conflict.

8. Accelerate illicit crop substitution processes. This is a measure widely favored by residents of PDET regions, a position that stands in contrast to the generalized rejection of forced eradication. The effective implementation of the PNIS is crucial to achieve substitution, but additional measures are required. In the PDET territories, the general socioeconomic vulnerability conditions act as triggers for the development of illicit economies, and it is this precariousness that appears as the central problem for respondents (not the illicit economies *themselves*).

For this reason, the comprehensive implementation of the Agreement, in particular of point 1, can contribute to making crop substitution more efficient and sustainable, and prevent the proliferation of illicit economies.

9. Strengthen the participation of communities in the monitoring and oversight of the construction of PDET works. This will contribute to achieving greater relevance in the interventions that are financed. Likewise, it will enable the citizens of the PDET subregions to associate the activities that take place in their immediate surroundings with the Agreement's implementation and, in this way, recognize and legitimize it.

10. Continue with the issuance of land titles. The acceleration of rural reform, a central aim of the PDET, is dependent upon peasants' access to land and the formalization of tenure in rural areas. This, in turn, promotes investment and productive use of the land, and it also contributes to the generation of alternatives for illicit crop substitution. The unfolding of these processes represents an unprecedented opportunity to reduce the gaps between rural and urban areas, to materialize a territorial development approach that comprehensively considers rural areas and the communities that inhabit them. For this, maintaining a regional, decentralized and local dialogue perspective will be key.

11. *Promote the conditions for adequate implementation of the special constituencies for peace.*

There are positive expectations regarding their implementation, but there is also a lack of knowledge, especially in rural areas. The socialization process must continue in the different territories to disseminate the scope and mechanisms associated with the special constituencies for peace. Likewise, the competent authorities must offer guarantees for their adequate implementation, free from constraints or pressures.

12. *Continue efforts to advance a peace agenda with other active armed groups.* Residents of PDET regions view peace processes as a valuable tool to deal with the violence that still persists in their territories.

Survey Technical Data Sheet

This technical data sheet describes the universe, the sampling system, the data collection technique and the observed margin of error of the MAPS Survey, among other methodological aspects of the study. This sheet is applicable to the panel sample of the study, that is, it describes the data collection process carried out in the two rounds of the study (2019 and 2021), including the sample segments collected by the two polling firms in charge of the surveys (SEI and Proyectamos SAS). Each of the aforementioned aspects is detailed below:

1. Population Universe

The population universe of the MAPS Survey is comprised of all persons of legal age in the 170 municipalities prioritized in the Development Plans with a Territorial Approach (PDET). According to the 2018 DANE National Population and Housing Census, this population is equal to 3,495,781 inhabitants.

2. Sampling System

The sampling system or sample design describes the procedure used to select each of the individuals that make up the study sample from the population universe. In the case of the MAPS Survey, the sampling system implemented is probabilistic, stratified,

and multi-stage, with random selection of the sampling units for each stage

- It is probabilistic because each individual in the population universe had the same chances of being chosen for the study. That is, all individuals had the same probability of being selected to answer the survey. This was achieved from the stratification of the sample and the random selection of the sample units of each selection stage. The sample units are the conglomerates in which the individuals of the sample universe live, which, in this study, corresponded to municipalities, blocks and homes.
- It is stratified because, in order to guarantee adequate geographical dispersion of the sample, the random selection of individuals was done in population subsets (sample strata). The strata defined were the following:
 - The 16 subregions into which the 170 municipalities¹ of the PDET are grouped (See Table 1).
 - The urban center⁵¹(Urban areas) and populated centers of the selected municipalities.
- It is multi-stage because each of the sample units described above was randomly chosen.

The random selection of these units was done in three stages, namely:

- **Stage 1.** Random selection of municipalities⁵² (primary sampling units) in each of the 16 PDET subregions. A total of 73 municipalities were selected, a minimum of 4 in each region and distributed as indicated in Table 6:

- **Stage 2.** Random selection of blocks within the urban areas and population centers of the 73 selected municipalities. A total of 491 blocks (228 in urban areas and 263 in populated centers) were selected, using the block sampling frame described below.

Table 6. Distribution of municipalities selected for the MAPS 2019 -2021 Survey.

PDET Subregion	Number of municipalities selected	Selected Municipalities
Upper Patía - North Cauca	6	Buenos Aires, Corinto, Miranda, Patía, Santander de Quilichao, Pradera
Arauca	4	Araucita, Fortul, Saravena, Tame
Low Cauca and Northeast of Antioquia	5	Amalfi, Cáceres, Caucasia, El Bagre, Valdivia
Catatumbo	4	El Tarra, San Calixto, Sardinata, Tibú
Chocó	6	Bojayá, Medio Atrato, Medio San Juan, Nóvita, Riosucio, Sipí
Caguán Basin and Caquetá Foothills	4	Florencia, Belén de los Andaquíes, Currillo, Puerto Rico
Macarena - Guaviare	4	Mapiripán, La Uribe, San José del Guaviare, Miraflores
Montes de María	7	El Carmen de Bolívar, María La Baja, San Juan Nepomuceno, Colosó, San Onofre, Tolú Viejo
Mid Pacific Region	4	Guapi, López, Timbiquí, Buenaventura
Pacific and Nariño Border	4	Barbacoas, El Charco, Mosquera, Tumaco
Putumayo	4	Orito, Puerto Asís, Puerto Caicedo, Puerto Guzman
Sierra Nevada - Perijá	4	Agustín Codazzi, Pueblo Bello, San Juan del Cesar, Ciénaga
South Córdoba	4	Montelíbano, Puerto Liberador, Tierralta, Valencia
South Bolívar	4	Arenal, Morales, San Pablo, Santa Rosa del Sur
South Tolima	5	Ataco, Chaparral, Planadas, Rioblanco, Icononzo
Urabá Antioqueño	4	Apartadó, Carepa, Necoclí, Turbo

- **Stage 3.** Random selection of dwellings within the blocks chosen in Stage 2. Given that only one person was surveyed per household and only one household per dwelling⁵³, the total number of households selected is equivalent to the total number of respondents in the first round of the study (12,052 individuals).

The panel-type specification of the MAPS Survey, consisting of re-contacting and re-surveying the same respondents from round 1 in round 2, means that the sampling system for this second round is subject to that of the first. For this reason, both rounds are based on the same sample design already specified.

3. Sampling Frame:

The sampling frame is defined as the set of lists or databases used to select the sample. For round 1 (2019), and due to the multi-stage design of the MAPS Survey, a specific sampling frame was implemented for each of the selection stages:

- **Stage 1.** The sampling frame consisted of the list of 170 municipalities prioritized in the Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (PDET), provided by the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART)⁵⁴.

- **Stage 2.** The sampling frame was the National Geostatistical Framework established by the

DANE National Population and Housing Census of 2005⁵⁵, which assigns a unique code to each block of the selected municipalities.

- **Stage 3.** The sampling frame consisted of the list of dwellings with households in each of the selected blocks. Since the intended purpose of the dwellings (homes or businesses) can vary over time, this list was prepared by the survey teams at the time of the first visit to the selected blocks (round 1 of the study) and, therefore, the selection was made during field work, by visiting the listed dwellings.

For round 2 (2021), the sampling frame consisted of the list of individuals surveyed in the first round (10,498, 87% of the total), since it was established that the Round 2 sample had to be collected by recontacting round 1 respondents. The panel-type specification of the MAPS Survey was complemented with the selection of replacement individuals, exclusively for those cases in which it would not have been possible to contact the persons from round 1 again. The selection of these individuals required only the Stage 3 sampling frame described above, since such replacements were chosen and surveyed in the same blocks and municipalities selected in Stages 1 and 2 of the sampling design.

4. Data Collection Technique

In both rounds of the MAPS Survey, all the surveys were collected in person at

the homes of the selected individuals, with personal interviews lasting an average of one hour, following the above-described sampling frame. The interviewers conducted all surveys face-to-face and recorded all the answers on mobile capture devices (tablets), in which the structured questionnaire of the study was programmed with its respective question follow-ups and filters. The face-to-face collection procedure with digital recording of the answers thus allows for the reduction of typing errors (compared to surveys conducted with a paper questionnaire), while ensuring the maximum possible re-contact rate and the existence of a relationship of trust between the interviewer and the interviewee, which helps guarantee the reliability of the information collected. These aspects give a significant advantage to face-to-face data collection over remote methodologies (by telephone or online).

For round 2, Proyectamos SAS had an additional team in charge of recontacting round 1 respondents by telephone with available telephone numbers and scheduling appointments for their face-to-face visit. This team managed the list with all the telephone numbers collected in round 1 and sent the information on the appointments made with the respondents to the survey teams deployed in the target municipalities. The interviewers visited the people previously contacted according to the scheduling made, and selected replacement respondents in the same selected blocks, following

the same procedure applied in round 1 (counting and random selection of dwellings in each block).

5. Field Work Date and Survey Team

The field work of the first round⁵⁶ of the MAPS Survey was carried out between September 21 and December 16, 2019 by the firm Proyectamos SAS. Survey data was collected by 60 interviewers and 12 previously trained field supervisors. The team was organized into groups of 3 to 4 interviewers and a supervisor to visit each selected block. The field supervisors observed and verified the adequate conduct of at least 25% of each enumerator's surveys.

The field work for round 2 was also carried out by the firm Proyectamos SAS, between June 16 and August 16, 2021. The data was gathered by 58 previously trained interviewers, who were also organized into groups of 3 to 4 people to visit each selected block. Each team was accompanied by a field supervisor, who observed and verified the correct conduct of at least 25% of the surveys of each interviewer. In total, 4,026 surveys were supervised, corresponding to 34% of the total surveys collected in round 2.

6. Sample size and distribution

Round 1 of the MAPS Survey collected a total of 12,052 effective surveys (completed and validated by the UNDP and PRIO supervisory team).

The surveys are distributed evenly among the 16 PDET subregions, as indicated in Table 7, so each subregion includes between 718 and 865 surveys. For round 2, a total of 11,835 surveys were collected, of which 58 were

excluded, since they were applied to people not surveyed in round 1 and, at the same time, it was not possible to identify which of these people they were replacing. In this way, the total number of effective surveys in

Table 7. Effective Sample Size, 2019-2021 MAPS Survey

PDET Subregion	Total Round 1 (2019)	Round 2 (2021)			Total Round 1 + Round 2
		Recontacted	Replacements	Total Round 2	
Arauca	852	246	605	851	1.703
Upper Patia - North Cauca	745	565	169	734	1.479
Low Cauca and Northeast Antioquia	747	505	219	724	1.471
Catatumbo	718	468	250	718	1.436
Putumayo	730	490	220	710	1.440
South Bolivar	729	425	297	722	1.451
South Cordoba	740	590	135	725	1.465
South Tolima	865	366	431	797	1.662
Chocó	734	586	144	730	1.464
Macarena - Guaviare	738	369	358	727	1.465
Mid Pacific Region	753	485	229	714	1.467
Pacific and Nariño Border	735	393	328	721	1.456
Sierra Nevada - Perijá	740	504	224	728	1.468
Urabá Antioqueño	734	545	184	729	1.463
Caguán Basin and Caquetá Foothills	731	519	200	719	1.450
Montes de María	761	660	68	728	1.489
Total	12.052	7.769	4.008	11.777	23.829

round 2 corresponds to 11,777 surveys, homogeneously distributed among the subregions, as shown in Table 7.

Likewise, it is observed that 7,769 surveys (66% of the total) were answered by the same respondents from round 1.

7. Margins of Error

The margin of error is the value that quantifies the degree of inaccuracy in the indicators obtained from a sample, in relation to the universe that the sample represents. Said inaccuracy depends mainly on the size of the sample (the larger the sample, the smaller the margin of error will be) and the incidence observed in each variable (the more people who have given the same answer, the smaller the margin of error). This means that, for any survey, including the MAPS Survey, the observed margin of error varies according to the population segment and the variable being analyzed.

Table 8 presents the margins of error, observed with 95% confidence, for the total sample, the two rounds of the study and the stratification variables (area of residence and PDET subregions). The margins were estimated for six of the main questions of the study, which makes it possible to establish the degree of inaccuracy in the measurement of these variables. For example, for the question about satisfaction with the implementation

of the Peace Agreement, a margin of error of 1.845% was established for the total sample. This indicates that, if 100 samples equal to those of the MAPS Survey were collected, the percentage of satisfaction currently observed (10.6%) should vary between 8.7% and 12.4%, in 95 of the 100 samples collected. The foregoing reflects a high degree of precision of the sample obtained to measure satisfaction with the Agreement's implementation, a precision that is maintained in each round of the study, in municipal capitals and populated centers, and in the PDET subregions, with margins of error lower than 5.3% in all the population segments mentioned. Sample precision varies significantly according to other reported indicators, but it generally remains at levels that allow valid inferences to be made (with margins of error lower than 10%).

8. Expansion Factors

The expansion factor is a variable that quantifies the number of people represented by each of the individuals from a given sample. Thus, the construction of this variable is based on the notion that each person surveyed does not represent the same number of individuals, since their places of residence have different population sizes.⁵⁷ In the case of the MAPS Survey, these places of residence refer to the selected dwellings, blocks and municipalities, as these conglomerates

Table 8. Margins of error observed with 95% confidence, for the total sample, and by rounds, areas of residence and PDET subregions.

	Q35. Satisfaction (3+4) with the implementation of the Peace Agreement	Q46A. He believes that the country is moving towards reconciliation	Q55. Registered as a victim of the armed conflict	Q19_U. Trust in State institutions	P20. Has been part of an organization in the last year	P37A. Approves forced eradication (manual or aerial)
Total sample	1.84%	4.13%	3.78%	2.28%	2.58%	1.39%
Round 1	1.42%	N/A	3.92%	3.46%	3.13%	N/A
Round 2	3.16%	4.13%	4.89%	3.19%	3.46%	1.39%
Municipal Capitals	1.91%	4.67%	3.95%	2.66%	2.87%	1.55%
Population centers	2.22%	4.43%	4.12%	2.37%	3.90%	2.37%
Arauca	2.88%	7.99%	11.91%	9.14%	5.90%	1.87%
Upper Patia - North Cauca	0.93%	2.77%	4.64%	5.32%	5.92%	0.59%
Low Cauca and Northeast Antioquia	4.25%	3.78%	7.73%	3.34%	6.87%	5.87%
Catatumbo	2.37%	5.15%	10.43%	1.98%	5.97%	2.89%
Putumayo	2.43%	3.11%	4.56%	2.71%	6.57%	0.93%
South Bolivar	2.49%	5.04%	6.91%	4.15%	7.18%	0.80%
South Cordoba	5.03%	3.51%	6.88%	8.35%	2.85%	1.70%
South Tolima	4.22%	7.60%	8.07%	11.68%	4.51%	1.96%
Chocó	1.73%	2.97%	12.13%	3.62%	8.04%	0.24%
Macarena - Guaviare	0.70%	5.99%	5.49%	1.54%	4.22%	1.90%
Mid Pacific Region	1.25%	0.78%	2.56%	1.20%	1.29%	1.19%
Pacific and Nariño Border	1.09%	2.27%	2.37%	3.09%	10.27%	1.95%
Sierra Nevada - Perijá	2.85%	4.36%	14.20%	3.36%	5.89%	2.16%
Urabá Antioqueño	1.91%	4.14%	4.35%	3.10%	4.01%	0.96%
Caguán Basin and Caquetá Foothills	0.45%	0.73%	6.44%	2.22%	3.22%	0.64%
Montes de María	3.52%	5.48%	5.20%	4.56%	6.75%	5.67%

were the ones selected in each of the stages of the sampling system.

For this reason, the expansion factor of the MAPS Survey was calculated with the probability of selection of individuals in each of the three sampling stages. This varies according to the number of adults who inhabit the dwelling, the block and the municipality of each

respondent. Subsequently, and to ensure that the expansion factors are consistent with the actual population sizes of each target municipality in its capitals and populated centers, the expansion factor was calibrated based on information from the DANE 2018 National Population and Housing Census.

When applying the expansion factor to estimate any result of the MAPS survey, the answers of each respondent are weighted according to the number of adult individuals who live in their municipal capital or populated center⁵⁸.

Table 9 presents the distribution of the study sample together with the

effectively represented population, which is equivalent to the number of adults (persons over 18) in the municipal capitals and populated centers visited in each PDET subregion, according to the 2018 Census. This represented population is equal to the denominator of each of the percentages presented in the 2021 MAPS Survey report.

Table 9. Sample collected vs. population represented by PDET subregion

Category	Round 1 Sample	Population Represented in 2019	Round 2 Sample	Population Represented in 2021
Arauca	852	71.146	851	70.640
Upper Patía - North Cauca	745	119.927	734	119.442
Low Cauca and Northeast Antioquia	747	108.801	724	106.331
Catatumbo	718	37.018	718	36.809
Putumayo	730	52.510	710	52.097
South Bolivar	729	38.769	722	38.028
South Cordoba	740	105.444	725	102.862
South Tolima	865	40.498	797	36.763
Chocó	734	30.561	730	30.522
Macarena - Guaviare	738	33.020	727	32.265
Mid Pacific Region	753	187.931	714	174.567
Pacific and Nariño Border	735	95.273	721	93.733
Sierra Nevada - Perijá	740	152.767	728	152.702
Urabá Antioqueño	734	183.552	729	182.581
Caguán Basin and Caquetá Foothills	731	124.462	719	121.525
Montes de María	761	152.067	728	145.881
	12.052	1.533.746	11.777	1.496.747

Table 10 shows the distribution, in absolute and percentage terms, of the population effectively represented as a result of applying the expansion factors

to the main demographic variables identified in the MAPS Survey: sex, age groups, ethnic self-identification, and higher level of education reached.

Table 10. Sample collected vs. population represented by sex, age groups, ethnic self-identification and education level attained

	Round 1 Sample	Population Group 2019	%	Round 2 Sample	Population Group 2021	%
Sex						
Men	5.238	759.736	49.5%	4.561	746.043	49.8%
Women	6.814	774.010	50.5%	7.216	750.704	50.2%
Age Groups						
Ages 18-25	1.779	348.590	22.7%	1.209	337.630	22.6%
Ages 26-35	2.372	356.214	23.2%	2.185	347.114	23.2%
Ages 36-45	2.387	286.497	18.7%	2.389	285.721	19.1%
Ages 46-55	2.133	231.223	15.1%	2.248	228.060	15.2%
Ages 56-65	1.814	161.214	10.5%	2.069	156.661	10.5%
Ages 66 or older	1.567	150.008	9.8%	1.677	141.561	9.5%
Ethnic self-identification						
Indigenous	706	84.588	5.8%	481	55.618	3.7%
Black, Mixed-race, Afro-descendant	3.652	551.282	37.5%	3.259	477.804	31.9%
White or mestizo	5.105	665.078	45.2%	3.915	451.599	30.2%
None of the above	1.654	170.667	11.6%	4.122	511.727	34.2%
Education level reached						
Elementary (Until 5th grade)	3.736	353.222	23%	3.995	343.392	22.9%
High School (Until 11th grade)	4.587	668.984	43.6%	4.719	696.652	46.5%
Higher Education (Technician, technologist or college degree)	2.344	400.520	26.1%	2.088	384.964	25.7%
None	1.385	111.020	7.2%	975	71.739	4.8%
Total	12.052	1.533.746	100%	11.777	1.496.747	100%

9. Questionnaire Used

Due to the panel-type methodology of the MAPS Survey, it was ensured that the questions asked in both rounds of the study were identical, both in their wording and in the way they were asked to all respondents. Thus, the questionnaires of both rounds have the same structure and instructions (follow-up leaps, reading/not reading answer options, etc.), and differ only by the inclusion of question modules on specific current issues in 2019 and 2021. The seven sections in which the MAPS Survey questionnaire is divided are presented below, with a brief description of the new questions in the study (asked only in round 2 in 2021).

1. **General Information:** Includes all questions for demographic and socioeconomic identification of the respondent. The module remained identical between both rounds of the study.
2. **Trust and Participation:** Includes questions that investigate the respondent's trust in local and national institutions and non-institutional bodies, as well as participation in local protests, organizations, committees and boards. For round 2 of the study, specific questions were included (Module P19) on trust in the institutions created with the implementation of the Peace

Agreement (Commission for the Clarification of the Truth and Missing Persons Search Unit), institutions of the Public Ministry (Offices of the Ombudsman and Attorney General) and other state entities (Regional Autonomous Corporations and National Natural Parks Department). Questions were also included about respondents' relationship with their Community Action Board (question 20A) and about their perception of improvement regarding the possibility of participating in politics and exercising their rights after the signature of the Peace Agreement (question 20B).

3. **Peace Agreement and its Implementation:** This module compiles all the questions regarding satisfaction with the content and implementation of the Peace Agreement between the government and the FARC, at a general level and by specific topics of the Agreement. For round 2, questions were included about what means people use to find out about the implementation of the Peace Agreement, questions on knowledge about its implementation (duration of the Agreement's implementation and institutions with the constitutional duty to enforce it), and questions on current aspects related to the

Agreement (forced eradication of coca crops and Special Constituencies for Peace).

4. **Armed Conflict:** This module asks about personal experiences and perceptions about the current development of the conflict in Colombia and in the municipalities where the respondents live. In the 2021 round, questions were included on the specific events in which the respondent or his/her family was a victim and on the date these events occurred (Module P52_1, it was asked only if they previously reported being a victim of the conflict).
5. **Transitional Justice:** This includes questions related to perceptions regarding the importance and scope of transitional justice in the framework of the Peace Agreement, and questions about the entities responsible for its operation. This implied the incorporation of new questions in round 1 related to the knowledge and effectiveness of the Commission for the Clarification of the Truth, the Missing Persons Search Unit and the Special Justice for Peace - JEP (Modules 59_1 and 59_2).
6. **Attitudes Towards the Situation of the Community:** This module included questions in areas

such as the provision of public works, the creation of community assets and the respondents' personal economic situation and municipality of residence.

7. **Various Aspects:** This closing module of the questionnaire contains questions about the community's main problems and expectations regarding PDET implementation. For the 2021 round, questions were included about receiving state financial aid due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Question 78) and regarding the existence of deforestation processes in the municipality (Modules 89 and 90).

10. Level of disaggregation of the results

Based on the implemented sampling system and the actual size and distribution of the sample (Tables 2 and 3), it is recommended that the estimates of results (proportions, ratios, averages, etc.) be calculated only for the total sample of each of the rounds of the study and for the following groups or subpopulations of interest:

- For the 16 PDET subregions where respondents live (Table 1)
- For the set of all urban areas (municipal capitals) and rural areas (populated centers) visited.

- According to the sex indicated by each respondent (men and women)
- According to the seven age groups in which respondents are classified (Table 3).

Breakdowns by other demographic factors (municipal location, ethnic self-identification, schooling, etc.) are not recommended, since the sampling system did not consider stratification based on these variables, and the sample size obtained for some of these subpopulations is less than 100 observations, a limit under which it is not possible to say that estimates are statistically representative.

In line with this, further disaggregation on the above-mentioned segments is not recommended. For instance, it is not advisable to estimate results for urban and rural areas within PDET subregions.

Footnotes

1 Hereinafter: 'Agreement'.

2 The report is available online at: https://www.co.undp.org/content/colombia/es/home/library/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/luces-y-sombras-de-la-implementacion-del-acuerdo-de-paz-en-colom.html

3 There is, however, a difference: in this report the expansion factor is taken into account and its calculation is applied to the results of both survey rounds. For this reason, this report should be taken as a unit by itself when making comparisons between years, since no expansion factor was applied in the Lights and Shadows report (for more details on the expansion factor, see the technical data sheet at the end of the document).

4 On the occasion of the participatory process that took place for the formation of the PDET, the residents of these territories proposed a selection of priorities for the activities, investments or works that should be implemented in their territory. This is commonly known as the "PDET initiative".

5 Writs are a procedural mechanism to inform of the alleged commission of a punishable conduct by a person or group of people prior to trial.

6 Invamer (2021). Measurement #145.

7 Focus groups held between July and August 2021.

8 The objective (dependent) variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent is satisfied or very satisfied with the Agreement's implementation, and 0 otherwise. As explanatory variables, the perception of security, the perception of an increase in the arrival of goods, trust in State institutions and the perception of reconciliation were included. In the model, all relationships are statistically significant.

9 In this model, the relationship with reconciliation was not calculated, since this question was added in the 2021 round and it is not possible to compare with 2019. For this reason, a bivariate analysis of this variable will be included later.

10 Interestingly, when instead of taking into account perceptions, satisfaction was compared against the effective investment and implementation of projects financed through OCAD PAZ, Works for Taxes and Small Infrastructure Works (ART database), no significant relationship was found. This deserves to be studied in greater depth.

11 See Fraile, P. (2007). La percepción de seguridad: entre el delito, el conflicto y la organización del espacio. Retrieved from: <http://www.ub.edu/geocrit/sn/sn-24562.html>; Fratello, Jennifer,

Andres F. Rengifo, and Jennifer Trone (2013). Coming of age with stop and frisk. Experiences, self-perceptions, and public safety implications. New York: Vera Institute of Justice; Rengifo, Andres F., and Todd Foglesong. 2014. Pitfalls in the design of new indicators of police performance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Kennedy School. Pion-Berlin, D. & Carreras, M. Armed Forces, Police and Crime-Fighting in Latin America. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 9, 3-26 (2017).

12 With fixed effects for each PDET and round of the survey (which only allows comparing people within these groups).

13 Reintegration and the PDET.

14 Key regression values

Slope: 0.34

R-squared: 0.98

P-Value: 0.000

15 Focus group held with ex-combatants from Arauca.

16 Focus group held with ex-combatants from Arauca.

17 Focus Group held with ex-combatants from San José del Guaviare.

18 In the paragraph of Decree 588 of 2017, the extrajudicial nature of the Commission is defined in that “its activities will not be of a judicial nature, nor will they serve for criminal imputation before any competent authority.”

19 Focus group for victims in Unguía (Chocó), July 27, 2021.

20 Focus group for victims in Unguía (Chocó), July 27, 2021.

21 See Reconciliation: A comprehensive framework for empirical analysis.

22 Focus group with social leaders in Dabeiba (Antioquia), July 7, 2021.

23 <https://cienciassociales.uniandes.edu.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/informe3-abril3-2021.pdf>

24 <https://cienciassociales.uniandes.edu.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/informe1-2020-05-22.pdf>

25 See Decree 893 of 2017, “Whereby Development Programs with a Territorial Focus - PDET are created”.

26 Focus group with social leaders, Pasto (Nariño), July 12, 2021.

27 Focus group with social leaders, Pasto (Nariño), July 12, 2021.

28 Focus group with PDET beneficiaries in Guapi (Cauca), July 12, 2021.

29 Focus group with PDET beneficiaries in Ciénaga (Magdalena), July 18, 2021.

30 See Los líderes del Pacífico le hacen paro al PDET.

31 For indicative purposes, only the example in Figure 45 is given. However, several cross-checks were made, none of which revealed a significant relationship. Comparisons were made taking into account the value of the works, the number of public works, only one source or different combinations of financing sources, among others.

32 The Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program has the following components: 1. The Plans for immediate response and development of entrepreneurial projects (PAI) that further the agreements entered into with the communities. 2. Fast infrastructure works. 3. Sustainability and environmental restoration component. 4. Property formalization plan. 5. Plans for remote areas and areas with low population concentration. 6. Schedules, goals and indicators. (Decree 896 of May 29, 2017).

33 Focus groups were held in the municipalities of: San José (Guaviare) on 08/28/2021; Puerto Asís (Putumayo) on 08/16/2021 and in San José del Fragua (Caquetá) on 08/13/2021.

34 For example, a focus group participant from the municipality of Puerto Asís noted: “In a general context, the peace process as such is very good, the agreements are very good... The Peace Agreement is well constructed”.

35 In this sense, expressions can be found such as: “The expectations were very high in themselves” (participant in the focus group of San José del Fragua, Caquetá). “I was one of those who started out with a lot of enthusiasm, we implemented crops, planted bananas, took a load to Puerto Asís, and the truth is we got nothing from it” (participant of the focus group in Puerto Asís, Putumayo). “In the Peace Agreement there have always been high hopes: what was going to be done, what was going to be fulfilled, because there were many entities working for it to be completed successfully” (focus group participant in San José, Guaviare).

36 The following are some remarks in this respect: “There is the PNIS, which has failed to comply, it complied with one part, but the other one is halfway, so most of us peasants feel that way, as if we were conned, that is how we feel because it has not fulfilled the entire project” (focus group participant in San José, Guaviare). “(The PNIS) is a program that has been very slow, there have been many breaches by the Government” (focus group participant in Puerto Asís, Putumayo). “The government has failed us because it failed to deliver to both peasants and locals. At this time, they have been displaced from the territory and there is a lack of control because the

agreement made with the peasants was never fulfilled.

With respect to the eradication of coca and illicit crops, the only thing they did was a one-time sum, but as for the projects, we have heard nothing at all about that, that has remained quiet, time goes on and people no longer believe in the projects” (focus group participant in San José del Fragua, Caquetá).

37 There is a broad consensus among social scientists that trust is central to all levels of human organization. It constitutes an essential component of the concept of social capital, quality of life, prosperity, among others. See Delhey, J, 2014.

38 This question was not asked in the MAPS 2019 wave.

39 Less than 1% of respondents (0.89% in 2019 and 0.23% in 2021) said they did not know how to answer or did not answer this question about trust in their neighbors.

40 There is indeed a statistically significant association between both variables.

41 The World Values Survey is an international research project that conducts a globally representative comparative social survey every five years (<https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>).

42 The highest levels of social trust in the 2017-2020 WVS are found in Argentina and Guatemala, where 19.2% and 18% of respondents, respectively, agree that most people can be trusted.

43 Less than 3.5% of respondents stated that they did not know or would not answer the questions about trust in the National Government.

44 This reduction in trust is statistically insignificant for the levels of trust in the President, but significant both for those of Congress and state institutions in general.

45 For this exercise, the following categories are used as national institutions: the President, Congress, and state institutions.

46 Non-Catholic Christian churches, on the other hand, show a decline in trust comparatively between 2019 and 2021, but it is still relatively high.

47 In general, Latin American respondents in the WVS express having “not much” or “no trust” in the UN in the 2017-2020 wave. Although many respondents answer “I don’t know” to this question, in six of the nine countries included, less than thirty percent say they have “considerable” or “a lot” of trust in the UN (see <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>).

48 See: What are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in PostCommunist Societies and Three Forms of Trust and Their Association.

49 The decree in question establishes that the PATR must be updated and revised every 5 years.
 50 The Special Constituencies for Peace are contemplated within the Peace Agreement and were formalized through Legislative Act 02 of August 25, 2021. These congressional seats cover the PDET regions and seek to deepen the country's democratization processes, which is why the parties with representation in Congress will not be able to register lists or candidates for these constituencies. Candidates can only run through victims' organizations, peasant organizations or social organizations. In the cases in which it coincides with ethnic territories, the community councils, indigenous reservations and authorities, as well as the Kumpany may also nominate candidates.

51 Rural areas with non-scattered population. In other words, the people residing in outlying rural areas (veredas), according to the DANE census classification, was excluded.

52 For the second round of the study, the municipality of Icononzo (Tolima) was excluded, since this municipality was not included in the South Tolima PDET. See ART (2018). Todos somos PDET. Available at: https://www.renovacionterritorio.gov.co/especiales/especial_PDET/#TodosSomosPDET.

53 In other words, the samples were taken on non-institutional households, which implied the exclusion of people who live in prisons, schools, hospitals and military bases.

54 ART (2018). Todos somos PDET. Available at: https://www.renovacionterritorio.gov.co/especiales/especial_PDET/#TodosSomosPDET.

55 This is because the selection process was carried out during the year 2019, at which time the Census information was not available. See DANE (2020). National Geostatistical Framework. Available at: [https://geoportal.dane.gov.co/servicios/descarga-y-metadatos/descarga-mgn-marco-geoestadistico-nacional/..](https://geoportal.dane.gov.co/servicios/descarga-y-metadatos/descarga-mgn-marco-geoestadistico-nacional/)

56 Except for the 1,717 surveys conducted in the PDET subregions of Arauca and South Tolima.

57 Definition taken from: Jean-Claude Deville & Carl-Erik Sarndal (1992) Calibration Estimators in Survey Sampling, *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 87:418, 376-382, DOI: 10.1080/01621459.1992.10475217

58 Therefore, according to the calculated expansion factor, the size of the population represented is equivalent to the total adult population of the municipal capitals and population centers in the 73 municipalities visited (1,533,746), and not to the entire population universe (3,495,781). This does not affect the representativeness of the study, since it continues to represent the total number of adults residing in the 170 PDET municipalities.

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