A large decorative graphic on the left side of the cover features three overlapping, teardrop-shaped elements: a gold one at the top, a red one at the bottom, and a circular patterned one in the middle. The circular pattern is a colorful, intricate design with a central gold circle, surrounded by concentric rings of blue, red, and green, and a grid of smaller gold circles.

DISCUSSION PAPER

SNAPSHOT OF TRILATERAL COOPERATION WITH CHINA

Voices from Chinese
and International
Development Actors

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Acronyms

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AIECO	Agency for International Economic Cooperation
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CABC	China-Africa Business Council
CADF	China-Africa Development Foundation
CAITEC	Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation
CANGO	China Association for NGO Cooperation
CCECC	China Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation
CDB	China Development Bank
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CFPA	China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation
CHINCA	China International Contractors Association
CICETE	China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchanges
CIDCA	China International Development Cooperation Agency
CIKD	Center for International Knowledge on Development
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DFA	Department of Foreign Aid (China, MOFCOM)
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (EC)
DITEA	Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs (China, MOFCOM)
DRC	Development Research Center of the State Council
EU	European Union
EXIM Bank	The Export–Import Bank of China
FAO	The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FECC	Foreign Economic Cooperation Center
FOCAC	Forum on China-African Cooperation
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IPRCC	International Poverty Reduction Center, China
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEE	Ministry of Ecology and Environment

MEM	Ministry of Emergency Management
MOARA	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce (China)
MOHRSS	Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
NHC	National Health Commission
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SIIS	Shanghai Institute for International Studies
SSC	South-South Cooperation
SSCAF	South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund
TrC	Trilateral Cooperation
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNOSSC	United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

Notes on terminology:

- Trilateral and triangular are used interchangeably throughout this Discussion Paper.
- The reference to *traditional providers* means those countries that previously engaged with China through bilateral aid and are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC).
- Although *emerging donors* is often used for countries that have recently graduated from receiving official development assistance (ODA) or are still eligible to receive it, but are at the same time funding development projects in other countries, this Paper chose to use the more neutral term of *provider*. Hence, China is noted as a South-South provider in this Paper.
- A country where a trilateral initiative or project is implemented is referred to as a *beneficiary country*.
- The Discussion Paper is written in the context of a rapidly changing development cooperation landscape where *partnership* and *solidarity* are becoming key concepts and countries are increasingly becoming providers and beneficiaries at the same time.

Executive Summary

China has been a South-South cooperation provider since the early 1950s. While China's foreign assistance is largely bilateral and implemented by Chinese entities, the last few decades have witnessed a shift. Beginning in the 1980s, the Chinese Government has worked with different United Nations (UN) Agencies to provide technical assistance to other developing countries. In more recent years, it has become increasingly involved with other stakeholders in development cooperation abroad. Chinese institutions, including government departments, policy banks, think tanks and academics as well as civil society organisations (CSOs), are now actively engaged in South-South Cooperation (SSC) and trilateral cooperation (TrC) with a variety of international partners.

This Discussion Paper focuses on the trilateral cooperation between China and international development partners engaging in third countries. The Paper includes two independent mappings: Independent Mapping I - Voices from Chinese Development Actors, and Independent Mapping II - Voices from International Development Partners in Beijing. The first mapping identifies some of the current Chinese institutions active in trilateral cooperation to understand how they work with international partners, including the UN. 28 key Chinese Government entities and institutions were interviewed, and an overview of existing engagement modalities based on provider perspective is provided. This mapping also highlights key lessons and some recommendations for all actors when engaging China as a new development provider.

The Independent Mapping II provides a snapshot of international development actors' existing

engagement with China, based on semi-structured interviews conducted with around 35 interviewees from 20 organisations in the international community in Beijing. Key lessons are summarised from past and ongoing engagements and recommendations are proposed for international development actors for their future development engagement with China.

The purpose of the Discussion Paper is to describe the "state of play" of Chinese institutions' engagement in trilateral cooperation with international development actors and discuss lessons learnt and effective means of engagement. The findings are intended to help strengthen the engagement and cooperation between Chinese and international development actors on development cooperation, and thus contribute to better development results and the realisation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in provider and beneficiary countries.

A key lesson noted in both mappings is that the starting point of trilateral cooperation should be the national strategies and interests of the beneficiary country. Extensive research and analysis should be conducted to understand the development needs of the beneficiary countries to ensure assistance is appropriate, targeted, and contextualised.

A second essential factor is the importance of having adequate time and capacities in place when deciding to engage in trilateral cooperation. The number and diversity of partners in China and partner countries increases the transaction costs in coordination and communication during the planning and implementation phases. Extra time and resources to plan and identify partners,

expected results, and complementarities between the various partners, are noted to be key aspects for building trust and establishing a solid foundation for project implementation.

A third significant element is the need for solid project management, including earmarking financial and technical support for Chinese actors and implementing agencies to strengthen management capacities in development cooperation. If building the capacities of partners, including development project management skills is an objective, this would need to be factored into design and resource allocation.

As trilateral cooperation is a relatively new development cooperation modality that is expanding across sectors, this Discussion Paper also highlights the need to document good practices and lessons learned from trilateral cooperation initiatives. This can help determine the possible benefits and complementarities for bilateral and other development modalities, as well as institutional frameworks and arrangements that reduce transaction costs and increase efficiency.

The Discussion Paper is complemented by annexes that illustrate past and ongoing international development actor cooperation with China. The annexes include lists of Chinese and international actors covered by the mappings.


The Paper was commissioned by the UNDP China Country Office, building on a UNDP Discussion Paper on Trilateral Cooperation from 2017.¹

¹ UNDP 2017 Discussion Paper – Trilateral Cooperation with China - Sharing China's Development Experience through Innovative Partnerships, <https://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/library/south-south-cooperation/trilateral-cooperation-with-china-.html>



The Discussion Paper covers only a snapshot of current engagement and is not intended to be all encompassing. As the engagement on trilateral cooperation between Chinese and international development actors is evolving quickly through new partners and initiatives, this Paper aims to facilitate further discussions on trilateral cooperation among all development actors.

Trilateral cooperation



01 What is trilateral cooperation?

Triangular, or trilateral, cooperation is a development cooperation modality involving three or more partners, and allows for a high degree of diversity in terms of actors and roles. Although trilateral cooperation is not a new cooperation modality, there is no internationally agreed definition. In a UNDP Discussion Paper from 2017 entitled “Trilateral Cooperation with China - Sharing China’s Development Experience through Innovative Partnerships”, trilateral cooperation is defined as

“development cooperation projects that aim to transfer Chinese hardware, share technology and technical expertise and promote mutual learning, closely involving Chinese institution(s), traditional or international development agencies, and host country institution(s) throughout the project cycle, from project initiation, design and implementation, to management and monitoring and evaluation (M&E), with each party contributing financial resources and/or technical expertise and/or in-kind support.”

The recent outcome document (A/73/L80) of the Second UN High-Level Conference on South-South Cooperation in Buenos Aires (BAPA+40) underlined the additional value that trilateral cooperation can bring to development gains:

[...]triangular cooperation is a modality that builds partnership and trust, between all partners, and that combines diverse resources and capacities under the ownership of the requesting developing country, to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals; and that it provides added value by leveraging and mobilising additional technical and financial resources, sharing a wider range of experience, promoting new areas of cooperation, and combining affordable and context-based development solutions under flexible arrangements and agreed shared modalities.³

Held in March 2019, the BAPA+40 marked the 40 years since the global South formally defined the objectives and principles of South-South cooperation in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. Today South-South cooperation has expanded in scope and reach and is viewed as integral to the development landscape and the realisation of the 2030 Agenda, in particular Goal 17 on partnerships for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Trilateral cooperation is now viewed as a significant part of South-South cooperation, and both modes are considered supplementary to traditional North-South aid in mobilising resources and results for the SDGs.

² ECOSOC, Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) Policy Brief No.19, September 2017: “Promoting Sustainable Development through Triangular Cooperation”.

³ <https://undocs.org/en/A/73/L.80>

Another often-quoted definition is that of the UN Economic and Social Council.

What is trilateral (triangular) cooperation?

Triangular development cooperation involves a division of labour between three or more partners, with some of them playing the role of enabler (through financial contributions, convening power, technical support), others the role of provider or contributor (through technical assistance, capacity building, training) and still others the role of associate (as beneficiary of programmes, projects, events). The roles of enabler, provider and associate may change over time in a given initiative, or from one triangular cooperation initiative to another, as participants fully employ their differing comparative advantages.

The basic tripartite structure accommodates a growing diversity of actors.²

Trilateral cooperation, like South-South cooperation, is guided by core principles such as: respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs, and mutual benefit between the involved parties.⁴ According to a recent UNOSSC commissioned paper, there is an expectation that solidarity, reciprocity, horizontal relationships, efficiency and effectiveness, and regional integration, all of which are pertinent to South-South cooperation, should be extended to trilateral arrangements that involve a participant from the global North.⁵

Like trilateral cooperation, South-South cooperation lacks a globally agreed definition. There are different views on whether it should be seen as part of the development effectiveness agenda or not, as it is perceived as different from traditional aid. It includes a wider range of support compared to ODA, such as person-to-person exchanges, loans and technology transfers.⁶

02 Who is engaged in trilateral cooperation? Global trends

According to a 2015 OECD survey, triangular cooperation has increased across all sectors of cooperation and parts of the world, and in terms of the number of projects, their duration and the amount of resources. Triangular cooperation is also

expanding in scope to include multi-stakeholder relationships among governments, international organisations, civil society and the private sector.⁷ It can be an innovative and valuable modality that connects continents and contributes to achieving the SDGs by making use of the complementary strengths of different partners who together co-create development solutions.⁸

The OECD survey indicates that the top three motivations for engaging in trilateral cooperation are: (i) learning and sharing experiences with South-South partners, (ii) responding to partner countries' demands, and (iii) capitalising on the comparative advantages of South-South cooperation, such as more relevant expertise and technology, and cultural proximity. Many OECD/DAC members have indicated that strengthening relationships with providers of South-South cooperation is an important incentive for triangular cooperation. Partners in trilateral cooperation are often pursuing mutual gains. Thus, fostering mutual trust very much depends on the close consultations among partners during the project life cycle. This is essential for effectively pooling resources, leveraging comparative advantages and sharing experiences.⁹

In the past, there was a common understanding that triangular cooperation needed to include one so-called traditional partner from the North. This

notion is changing, however, including through the emergence of providers and actors from the global South, China among them.

03 Particularities of trilateral cooperation: transaction costs and value added

A precondition for all development cooperation, including trilateral, is that the beneficiary country gives consent and has a well-defined interest in what the project is offering. A clear expression of interest should be sent to the two other participating countries.¹⁰ As in any form of development cooperation, a trilateral project must support the beneficiary country's overall development strategy and avoid overburdening national systems. Demand, however, can still be limited given the low awareness of trilateral cooperation. As one interviewee among the international partners noted, "It is difficult for a country to ask for something they don't know is a possibility."¹¹

Germany, along with Japan and Spain, has a long history of working on trilateral projects, mainly in Latin America. A 2013 strategy paper that guides Germany's involvement in trilateral cooperation, comments on different challenges for all partners. One apparent complication is the increased coordination and transaction costs compared to direct bilateral development cooperation. The strategy paper underscores the importance of establishing clear value for all partners, particularly the beneficiary country, and that triangular cooperation should not be an end in itself.¹¹

¹⁰ BMZ, 2013.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² OECD, 2015.

¹³ Ibid.

Finding value added and the right partnership arrangement requires time and resources, especially in the first stages of a project. Yet both the literature and the interviewees argued that properly developed partnership arrangements provide more stability and allow for more efficient management of resources later on, which can compensate for the expected higher initial transaction costs. Both literature and the interview materials emphasise that partnership arrangements need to be underpinned with good communication and information flow.¹²

One possible value added from trilateral cooperation is the facilitation of a closer partnership between the parties, not only to achieve development results on the ground, but also to develop horizontal partnerships, build trust and facilitate joint learning. Even so, it is expected that each partner's engagement in a trilateral cooperation project will follow foreign policy and related strategic perspectives, which might or might not be included in the project design from the beginning.¹³

The lack of universally recognised definitions for South-South and trilateral cooperation makes it complicated to gather and aggregate data on these modalities for comparative analysis of what works well or not. Whether these exercises are more cost-efficient than other modes of cooperation remains to be established. As the BAPA+40 outcome document notes, there is a need to enhance the understanding of triangular cooperation and provide more evidence and rigorous information around its particularities.

⁴ UN Office for South-South Cooperation, 2019.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The BAPA+40 outcome document states (para. 18): "[...]including technical cooperation, the sharing of knowledge and experience, training, capacity building and technology transfer on mutually agreed terms, aimed at achieving sustainable development through the promotion of, inter alia, economic cooperation, including trade, investment, infrastructure development and connectivity, agriculture and rural development, food security and nutrition, food safety, health, energy, disaster risk reduction, addressing climate change, as well as mutual learning and the coordination of development policies and strategies among developing countries." ...

⁷ OECD, 2015.

⁸ Global Partnership Initiative, 2018.

⁹ Economic and Social Council, 2017.

Independent Mapping I Voices from Chinese Development Actors

Zhou Taidong and Tang Lixia

01 Methodologies and Scope of the Study

This mapping uses a broader concept of trilateral cooperation to better understand the state of play of various Chinese institutions engaged in development cooperation. Trilateral cooperation in this study thus refers to any collaboration between Chinese institutions and international actors, including traditional development entities, in providing development assistance to other developing countries. The assistance provided by China and its partners may entail financial resources, technical expertise, knowledge, in-kind support or any combination of these.

In this mapping, traditional development actors include:

1. Government development agencies of members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), UK Department for International Development (DFID), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ);
2. Regional development agencies such as the Directorate-General for International

Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) of the European Commission;

3. Development financing institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the African Development Bank;
4. Multilateral development agencies, such as organisations within the United Nations system; and
5. International NGOs and private funders, including the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Ford Foundation, World Vision, and the World Wide Fund for Nature.

This study does not include bilateral development assistance directly provided by Chinese institutions to other developing countries.

Following a desk review, a list was developed of approximately 100 Chinese entities engaged in international development cooperation to varying degrees. While the list is not exhaustive, as more institutions are becoming engaged in development cooperation, it is nevertheless comprehensive as it covers a range of institutions, at both central and local levels.

These institutions include:

1. **Government and Party agencies:** the newly-established China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), Ministry of



28 institutions were selected, based on their accessibility and reputation for being important and active in China's international development cooperation.

Commerce (MOFCOM), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MOARA), Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) and International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party;

2. **Government-affiliated project executing agencies:** Agency for International Economic Cooperation (AIECO) and China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchanges (CICETE) under MOFCOM; Foreign Economic Cooperation Center (FECC) under MOARA, and Center of International Exchanges and Cooperation under the National Health Commission (NHC);
3. **Development banks and funds:** China Import and Export Bank (EXIM), China Development Bank (CDB), and Silk Road Fund;
4. **Associations and civil society organisations:** China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) and China-Africa Business Council (CABC);
5. **Academics, research institutes and think tanks:** Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), Center for International Knowledge on Development (CIKD) and Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS). (See Annex 3 which lists those Chinese institutions engaged in South-South and trilateral cooperation).

A questionnaire was developed to understand the status of Chinese institutions in trilateral cooperation. For institutions not involved in trilateral cooperation, the questionnaire examined their willingness to conduct future cooperation, in which priority areas, with which

type of development partners and in what type of cooperation. For institutions that have experience in trilateral cooperation, the questionnaire detailed their engagement, including cooperation timeline, sectors, geographic coverage, partners, approval and authorisation processes, origins of partnerships and benefits. It also examined challenges and future plans and expectations.

28 institutions from the list were selected for the survey based on factors such as their accessibility and reputation for being important and active in China's international development cooperation. The selection process also sought to balance the different types of institutions to ensure all five categories of institutions listed above were covered. Focal points in the institutions were asked to take part in the written survey, with follow-up telephone or in-person interviews conducted, as needed, for further information and clarification. However, it should be noted that as in any research conducted through surveys and interviews, answers might be biased or incomplete.



Key challenges include no clear policy guidance, no earmarked funds, and insufficient capacity in project management and knowledge of development contexts among Chinese staff.

02 Key Findings

Findings on institutions not engaged in trilateral cooperation

Among the 28 institutions, only four were not engaged in trilateral cooperation activities.

Four institutions that have not participated in TrC:

- ◆ International Poverty Reduction Center, China (IPRCC)
- ◆ China-Africa Development Foundation (CADF)
- ◆ Healthcare Development Research Center of the NHC
- ◆ International Economics and Finance Institute of MOF

These institutions all expressed interest in trilateral cooperation with traditional development actors, including bilateral and multilateral development agencies as well as international non-governmental organisations. In particular, UN Agencies like the World Health Organization (WHO) and multilateral development financing institutions, such as the World Bank, were mentioned as preferred partners by two institutions. The reason given was that these multilateral entities are considered to be more neutral than bilateral development actors,

including those within the OECD Development Assistance Committee.

With regard to preferred cooperation sectors, institutions proposed different priorities based on their own thematic focus areas. For example, the Healthcare Development Research Center proposed technical cooperation in health-care coverage, allocation and planning of health-care resources, and financing. The MOF's International Economics and Finance Institute mentioned joint research projects on economic growth, global governance and the Belt and Road Initiative. CADF proposed areas in agriculture, livelihoods, infrastructure and manufacturing. IPRCC mentioned village-level poverty reduction and development pilots, and capacity building in poverty reduction for developing countries.

Their preferred cooperation modalities are also diverse and include joint studies and workshops in the third-party countries, technical assistance, capacity building, and joint equity investment. One institution also noted that key challenges in trilateral cooperation from the Chinese side include no clear policy guidance, no earmarked funds, and insufficient capacity in project management and knowledge of development contexts among Chinese staff.



Most of the government institutions surveyed began trilateral cooperation after 2000, with several becoming involved only recently.

Findings on institutions engaged in trilateral cooperation

How long were the institutions engaged in trilateral cooperation and describe the first project?

(1) Government agencies and affiliated implementing agencies

Trilateral cooperation in the government institutions surveyed dates back to the 1980s when the South-South Cooperation Network, hosted by CICETE under MOFCOM, cooperated with UNDP and UNIDO in providing technical assistance to other developing countries. This cooperation resulted in the establishment of 21 regional and international research and training centres covering sectors such as solar energy, hydropower, and biogas. The Network has been maintained to date through sponsorship by the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) and focuses on providing practical technology and knowledge to other developing countries.

However, most of the government institutions surveyed started trilateral cooperation after 2000 and several have only been involved since 2018. For example, FECC worked with FAO and Nigeria in 2003 to provide technical assistance in water resource management and crop production and

management. MOFCOM started its first trilateral cooperation with UNDP in 2012, focusing on cassava planting and processing in Cambodia, which helped local small agricultural processors to benefit from globalisation through advancing their position in the global value chain.¹⁴ Other ministries such as MOFA, NHC, MEE, National Forestry and Grassland Administration, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS), and Ministry of Emergency Management (MEM) started trilateral cooperation between 2015 and 2018, largely in technical areas, including security and peace, the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, public health interventions, environmental protection, bamboo planting and processing, combatting desertification, skills development, employment and disaster management.

(2) Associations and CSOs

The Chinese associations and CSOs surveyed have been engaged in trilateral cooperation since 2009. The first projects included the joint provision of free school meals in Cambodia, building small-scale biogas digesters, conducting joint studies on issues like environmental protection practices of Chinese enterprises in overseas investment, and finding health care and digital solutions for universal health coverage in African regions.

Among them, the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) is a notable example. CFPA has established country offices in Myanmar, Nepal and Ethiopia, and has worked with UN Agencies and international NGOs to implement projects in more than 12 countries. CFPA has worked with WFP to improve nutrition and hunger relief for school children in Cambodia and Ghana, through an initiative known as the Smiling Children Project. It also cooperated with UN Agencies and international NGOs for humanitarian relief in South Sudan, Nepal, Ecuador, Haiti and Pakistan. CFPA has also worked with the Ford Foundation, Mercy Corps and the Asia Foundation to build the capacity of Chinese NGOs to operate abroad.

(3) Academics and think tanks

The Chinese academics and think tanks surveyed started knowledge cooperation with traditional development actors in 2011. Their work included joint research on the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC), a development needs assessment of Pacific countries, agricultural cooperation and development financing.

The Partnership Programme on Knowledge for Development between the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC) and DFID, initiated in 2015, is a notable example. The

Programme is committed to improving knowledge about China's experience, and to contribute to more effective development and poverty reduction policies that will benefit poor people in other developing countries. The Programme's main activities include the establishment within the DRC of a Centre for International Knowledge on Development to provide advice on international development related issues; capacity building of DRC staff including collaboration with UK and other international experts on development; research by DRC staff on lessons from China's development experience, key development issues in other developing countries, and the impact of China's policies and activities on poor developing countries; and dissemination of evidence and advice on development to other developing countries, aid agencies and the Government of China. So far, the Programme has supported joint research on topics such as industrialisation, poverty reduction, and urbanisation, to promote dialogue and knowledge-sharing between China, UK and African countries.

Which traditional development actors do Chinese institutions partner with in trilateral cooperation?

The institutions surveyed have partnered with all five types of traditional development actor outlined in section 1, including (1) bilateral development



CFPA has established country offices in Myanmar, Nepal and Ethiopia, and has worked with UN Agencies and international NGOs to implement projects in more than 12 countries.

¹⁴ <https://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/operations/projects/south-south-cooperation/overview-trilateral-cooperation-projects/china-cambodia-undp-trilateral-cooperation-on-cassava.html>



Nearly all of the trilateral cooperation of those institutions surveyed is concentrated in Africa and Asia. Only a few mentioned Latin America and the Pacific countries.

agencies like DFID, JICA and GIZ; (2) regional development agencies such as the European Union; (3) development financing institutions like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank; (4) the United Nations system, including UNDESA, FAO, IFAD, UNDP, UNICEF, UNEP, UNIDO, UNOSSC, WFP, ILO, Secretariat of UN Convention on Combating Desertification; and (5) international NGOs like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Ford Foundation, Mercy Corps, Give to Asia, The Asia Foundation, the Albert Foundation, and the International Bamboo and Rattan Organisation.

In which sectors and regions?

The sectors of engagement are broad and varied; they include agricultural development, food safety and nutrition, mushroom development, poverty reduction, disaster prevention and management, health care, maternal and child health care, malaria control, education, bamboo and rattan, combating desertification, work safety, skills development, vocational training, science and technology, new energy, infrastructure building, environmental protection and corporate social responsibility, capacity building, and technical cooperation.

Nearly all of the trilateral cooperation of the institutions surveyed is concentrated in Africa and Asia. Only a few institutions mentioned Latin

America and the Pacific countries. For example, CIKD has worked with the Inter-American Development Bank on joint research on the implications of China's infrastructure development for Latin American countries. MOFCOM has respectively worked with DFAT in Papua New Guinea on malaria control and with the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the Cook Islands on irrigation infrastructure. With regard to future locations for cooperation, most institutions mentioned that they would like to see the cooperation occurring in the Belt and Road (BRI) countries, in Asia or Africa.

What are the cooperation modalities and approval procedures?

Cooperation can be categorised into the following categories:

(1) The traditional development actors provide the financial resources and the Chinese institutions provide expertise and in-kind support. Examples include the China-UK Agriculture Technology Transfer Project, the China-UK Global Health Programme implemented by NHC, and the China-UK Partnership Programme on Knowledge for Development implemented by CIKD.

(2) The Chinese institutions provide the financial resources and the traditional development actors


implement the initiative. Examples include the South-South Cooperation Fund managed by CIDCA and CICETE, and the trust funds established by various Chinese ministries within different UN Agencies. For example, MEE in 2014 set up a trust fund with UNEP; MOHRSS set up a trust fund with ILO in 2018, and the MOFA set up a trust fund in 2016 with the Secretariat of the Security Council and UNDESA.

(3) Both the Chinese institutions and the traditional development actors provide complementary financial and technical contributions, as in the MOFCOM-UNDP-Malawi water management project.

The approval procedures can vary, based on: (1) the nature of the involved Chinese institution; (2) the nature of the involved traditional development actor; and (3) the type of project.

For government agencies and affiliated institutions, trilateral cooperation with traditional development actors, in most cases, requires endorsements from the international cooperation departments within the ministry, and the counterparts of these traditional development actors in China, unless the institution itself is the official counterpart of the agency in China. For example, if NHC wants to work with DFID on a health-related trilateral cooperation project, then endorsement from the Department of International Economic and Trade Relations of MOFCOM would be necessary. For government think tanks and academics, trilateral cooperation with traditional development actors would normally need approvals from relevant authorities in charge of international affairs within their host agencies. If international NGOs are involved, approval


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For government think tanks and academics, trilateral cooperation with traditional development actors would normally need approvals from relevant authorities in charge of international affairs within their host agencies. If international NGOs are involved, approval procedures can be more complicated.

procedures can be more complicated. In addition, if projects are funded through a trust fund set up by the Chinese authorities, endorsements from the related fund-management departments will be necessary.

How was the trilateral cooperation initiated?

Trilateral cooperation usually develops from an existing long-term working relationship between the Chinese institution and the traditional development actor. The Chinese institution is often the traditional development actor's focal point in China, such as MOFCOM with UNDP and DFID, MOFA with UNDESA, MOARA with WFP and FAO, MEE with UNEP, MHRLS with ILO, the National Forestry and Grassland Association with the International Bamboo and Rattan Organisation and the Secretariat of the UN Convention on Combating Desertification. Other channels include connecting through international workshops, academic networks or direct approaches by traditional development actors. Approximately half of the Chinese institutions surveyed stated that trilateral cooperation was initiated when they were approached by traditional development actors proposing cooperation ideas or potential funding.

What are the major benefits of trilateral cooperation?

- Provides access to international networks, increases cooperation channels and partners and builds wider partnerships and networks with international stakeholders;
- Improves capacity of Chinese counterparts in project management and international cooperation, drawing from the practices and experiences of traditional development actors; encourages ideas for improvements in China's project management, via specific technologies and solutions;
- Promotes international information-sharing of China's technologies and practices and enhances relations between China and traditional development actors;
- Offers more platforms for introducing China's development experience and perspectives;
- Fosters a better understanding of the needs of other developing countries and the concepts and practices of traditional development partners;
- Improves the visibility and influence of the participating institutions, thus fostering increased attention from the governments of the beneficiary countries;
- Improves China's reputation and power of discourse in global governance in different

sectors, and enhances China's role as a responsible partner;

- Improves capacity of Chinese technical experts and researchers;
- Injects resources and momentum, contributing to the development of other developing countries;
- Facilitates direct communication with community and civil society groups in partner countries;
- Improves the capacity of Chinese NGOs to work in other developing countries;
- Increases understanding and application of international rules;
- Creates a more positive image of Chinese aid among partner countries and others.

What are some of the challenges of the trilateral cooperation process and also for the future?

From the Chinese side:

- Lack of clear policy guidance from Chinese authorities or uncertainty in cooperation policies;
- Lack of professional project management staff in Chinese institutions, including project design and implementation;
- Lack of sufficient financial inputs from both traditional development actors and Chinese institutions;
- Lack of capacity of Chinese experts in both language and expertise;
- Lack of streamlined rules and policies in terms of foreign exchange, foreign visits, and invitations for international partners.
- Lack of incentive mechanisms for trilateral cooperation;
- Lack of deep understanding of beneficiary countries.

From traditional development actors:

- Differences between China and traditional development actors in their concepts and approaches. For example, traditional development actors often focus on change of behaviours of beneficiary countries and/or beneficiaries, while Chinese institutions tend to focus more on "hardware" and physical outcomes;
- Complicated project management procedures and lack of flexibility by the traditional development actors, and reduced project management efficiency;
- Limited interest from traditional development actors in understanding China's practice of one-way learning.

From both providers and beneficiary countries:

- Design and implementation of initiatives is time consuming, including the coordination and maintenance of the cooperation network;
- Lack of jointly agreed and effective project monitoring and evaluation systems;
- Lack of appropriate consultants or expertise in the host countries.

From all trilateral partners:

- Differences in financial management, including overheads;
- Insufficient use of mechanisms for private sector engagement and the public-private-partnership (PPP) model;
- Insufficient participation of partners of beneficiary countries in project design and implementation; actual needs of beneficiary countries are fully reflected;
- Mismatch of information and resources and duplication of efforts.



19 of the 28 surveyed institutions expressed a strong willingness to continue and expand trilateral cooperation partnerships with traditional development partners.

Other challenges for future trilateral cooperation include:

- Changes in the international development cooperation landscape and global governance contexts will necessitate trilateral cooperation but increase uncertainty and complexity;
- Lack of coordination, harmonisation and coherence of trilateral cooperation among institutions and traditional development actors on trilateral cooperation could result in limited regional and global influence;
- Unsustainable funding;
- Lack of innovation and inability to scale up successful individual cases;
- Reluctance of beneficiary country institutions to take part in trilateral cooperation;
- The need for beneficiary countries to take ownership of the process; the need for a clear understanding of best practices, comparative advantages and requisites of each side; determination of cooperation objectives and formulation of the implementation programme, and funding and technical support provided in a timely manner;
- Time-consuming communication, coordination and management without harmonised operational rules.

Willingness to further engage in trilateral cooperation with traditional development actors.

Of the institutions surveyed, 19 expressed a strong willingness to continue and expand trilateral cooperation partnerships with traditional development partners. One institution said “no”, due to the perceived high transaction costs in building and maintaining relationships. Another institution noted limited interest as it considered the reporting procedures of traditional development actors cumbersome. Three of the institutions did not answer the question, but when approached through interviews, they indicated that they would decide on a case-by-case basis.

For future trilateral cooperation, the institutions surveyed made the following recommendations for traditional development actors:

- Increase the understanding of China’s concepts and practices in international development cooperation, and consider the value of China’s development experience, including incorporating China’s development experience into cooperation projects;
- Learn from China’s approach to assistance, rather than insist on the standards or rules of traditional development actors;
- Display a more objective and flexible attitude within the partnership;
- Streamline the reporting procedure and

make compromises in financial management, including applying standards for both Chinese and international experts, and flexibility in bidding for sub-projects;

- Ensure solid project management;
- Ensure adequate knowledge of development needs within targeted regions and groups, and provide support to identify and assess the actual cooperation needs of targeted regions and groups;
- Provide financial support or parallel resources;
- Establish a communication platform and maintain long-term relationships;
- Include investment in the capacity development of Chinese institutions;
- Share and engage with networks and local and national expertise;
- Encourage the engagement of the private sector from China and other partner countries.

03 Discussion

China’s increasing role in development assistance and the recent establishment of an independent aid agency indicates that Chinese and international development cooperation stakeholders are interesting in China’s approaches to trilateral

¹⁵ <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2014/Document/1375014/1375014.htm>

cooperation with traditional development actors. The 2014 White Paper on Foreign Aid stated that China “conducted trilateral cooperation featuring complementary advantage with multilateral and bilateral assistance providers by leveraging each party’s strengths on the premise of fully respecting the will of beneficiary countries.”¹⁵

Through the surveys and interviews conducted, the study identified the following aspects of China’s engagement in trilateral cooperation.

A wider range of Chinese institutions are now engaged in trilateral cooperation and have strong interests in continuing such partnerships.

While China’s engagement in trilateral cooperation dates back to the early 1980s, when China worked with the UN to promote technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC), there is now an increasing interest from a wider range of Chinese institutions to take part in trilateral cooperation. Only four of the 28 institutions surveyed have not participated in trilateral cooperation, and those that have been involved include a range of organisations, including government ministries, government-affiliated



The newly established CIDCA also showed strong interest in trilateral cooperation.

agencies, associations and CSOs, and academics and think tanks. Furthermore, 26 of the institutions surveyed expressed interest in either starting or sustaining such partnerships.

Notably, the newly-established CIDCA indicated strong interest in trilateral cooperation and has held regular meetings with traditional development actors. CIDCA has also announced a triangular cooperation partnership with UNIDO, under the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF), on capacity building for upgrading the animal husbandry value chain in Ethiopia. In addition, through the SSCAF, CIDCA has worked with a number of international organisations, mainly UN entities, in implementing Chinese assistance projects. The most recent engagement was the provision of support to the Cyclone Idai response in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, through UNDP.

With regard to motivating factors, many institutions noted that trilateral cooperation could promote mutual learning, networking and cooperation among partners. Such cooperation could allow them to share and build on China's experiences and know-how, facilitate the dissemination of Chinese technologies and practices, expand

financial support, increase visibility and enhance technical capacity in project management. Financial support from the traditional development actors, especially the bilateral ones, is a strong motivator and a determining factor for engaging many of the institutions surveyed.

The current trilateral cooperation partnership seems fragmented and the lack of clear policy guidance from relevant Chinese authorities constitutes one of the major constraints.

An increasing number of Chinese ministries and organisations are now involved in trilateral cooperation partnerships. In recent years, some line ministries including MOFA, MEE, and MOHRSS, have established trust funds within their counterpart agencies like UNDESA, UNEP and ILO, to carry out trilateral cooperation. Such arrangements are likely to be followed by other agencies. For example, MOF is in discussions with the World Bank to establish a trust fund to engage China in international development cooperation. With the establishment and operation of the SSCAF, managed by CIDCA and CICETE and seen as the major channel for engaging traditional development actors, various parallel

arrangements and implementation methods between line ministries and their counterparts may create confusion with the traditional development actors, and add to the workload of international cooperation departments in line ministries.

Though CIDCA, MOFA and MOFCOM all claimed that “the principle of raised, agreed and led by beneficiary countries” is a prerequisite for all trilateral cooperation, the Chinese Government has not formulated clear policy guidance. Many of the institutions surveyed, especially the non-governmental ones, noted that the lack of policy guidance or policy uncertainty is one of the major constraints for them to sustain or be active in trilateral cooperation. One mentioned that “lack of policy guidance from government authorities also makes approval processes long and complex, as relevant examining and approving departments may become cautious.”

Chinese institutions tend to engage more with UN Agencies in trilateral cooperation than with bilateral providers and INGOs.

Most of the Chinese institutions surveyed prefer working with UN Agencies in trilateral cooperation because they consider the UN to be more neutral and objective and more likely to recognise and apply China's development practices. The interviewees also said that UN Agencies have the relevant expertise, wide networks, and have built long-term cooperation and trust. Working with the UN is also consistent with China's foreign policy of becoming a responsible global power that adheres to the principles of neutrality and impartiality.

DFID, DFAT and GIZ are the major bilateral development partners. The Chinese Government has worked with DFID to initiate several substantial trilateral cooperation programmes with a number of Chinese agencies, primarily focused on agricultural development, health care and development knowledge. However, several interviewees expressed concerns, doubts and frustrations with working with bilateral development partners. The reasons they cited included complex and rigid project management procedures, including procurement, financial management and reporting; lack of understanding or appreciation of China's development approach; an unequal partnership; excessive paperwork; slow decision-making; time-consuming coordination and management; and high transaction costs. Some also mentioned that a lack of interest, and disagreements and conflicting goals between the different offices of the traditional development actors made the cooperation “non-developmental.” Nevertheless, some interviewees did recognise that the standardised project and financial management of traditional development actors could help avoid fiduciary risks in complex contexts.

Several INGOs, in particular the Gates Foundation which seems to have more legitimacy in China than others, have also become prominent participants in trilateral cooperation, engaging with non-governmental Chinese agencies. However, many of the institutions expressed concern with working with INGOs, several of them noting that it could bring more burden or scrutiny in terms of reporting within their institutions.



Many of the surveyed institutions, especially the non-governmental ones noted that the lack of policy guidance or policy uncertainty is one of the major constraints for them to sustain or be active in trilateral cooperation.

The sectors and geographic distribution of China's trilateral cooperation seem to be concentrated, but the cooperation modalities differ.

The range of sectors included in China's trilateral cooperation is largely concentrated in agriculture, health care, education, disaster management, clean energy, environmental protection and knowledge-sharing.

Africa (Malawi, Ethiopia and Uganda) is the most concentrated region, followed by Asia (Myanmar, East Timor and Cambodia). Trilateral cooperation projects have also taken place in the Pacific countries and Latin America. No other regions were mentioned.

China's role in trilateral cooperation differs from case to case. In the past, most of the trilateral projects in China were implemented as the result of initiatives from traditional development actors, while China contributed knowledge, expertise and technology in the form of technical cooperation, capacity building activities and knowledge-sharing. More recently, China has increasingly provided full or partial financial resources for projects, as is the case with the establishment of the SSCAF and the various trust funds of line ministries. Joint training conducted in China, dispatching Chinese experts to other developing countries, technical cooperation and knowledge-sharing are the major forms of cooperation.

Trilateral cooperation presents both benefits and challenges.

The Chinese institutions surveyed noted that trilateral cooperation presents major benefits, including additional financial resources, access to international networks, exposure to the practices of traditional development actors, sharing China's development experiences and practices, a clearer understanding of the actual needs of beneficiary countries, and increased visibility.

The major challenges that were cited include no clear policy guidance from relevant Chinese authorities, high transaction costs for coordination, management and communication, slow decision-making, lack of appreciation for Chinese development practices by traditional development actors, lack of professional capacity in project management and expertise within the Chinese institutions, lack of appropriate incentives, and Chinese travel restrictions. Such challenges have resulted in the reluctance of some Chinese institutions to engage in trilateral cooperation.

04 Recommendations

The sustained willingness of most of the Chinese institutions engaged in trilateral cooperation suggests that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages. The following are some of the recommendations, based on the survey, to increase the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of trilateral cooperation.

For Chinese partners

Conduct studies and deepen the understanding of the practices of traditional development actors to formulate overall policies, operational guidelines, and approval processes specific to trilateral cooperation.¹⁶ Given the wide range of institutions, sectors and regions involved in trilateral cooperation in China, and the increasing attention of international stakeholders on this issue, it is recommended that CIDCA, MOFA and MOFCOM jointly take the lead in this regard.

Ensure sufficient and relevant capacity.

This includes the ability to identify the complementarities, comparative advantages and common interests of the parties involved. It also means understanding and appreciating the nuances of the institutional and management requirements of each side, and to be flexible and adjust internal operational rules and practices accordingly.

Put the right incentives in place for more trilateral partnerships. This means incorporating trilateral cooperation projects into performance assessments (especially for think tanks and academics), removing restrictions to allow more flexibility in foreign visits, and providing sufficient financial support for project administration.

For traditional development actors

Take a proactive position and increase understanding of the Chinese system, including China's development approach in general, the key players in international development cooperation, and China's international development cooperation priorities, including the alignment of China's

Trust should be built first, with cooperation scaled up gradually.

priorities with the Belt and Road Initiative. Traditional development actors will have to continue presenting cooperation ideas, expectations and interests to different players in relevant areas within CIDCA and line ministries. Trust should be built first, with cooperation scaled up gradually.

Prepare operational guidelines and increase delegation of authority to country offices to streamline procedures. Such steps can prevent unnecessary delays and help to manage the expectations from the Chinese partners in terms of time frame and efficiency.

Earmark financial and technical support for Chinese ministries and implementing agencies to strengthen their management capacities in development cooperation. Trilateral cooperation should be addressed as a dynamic interaction rather than as a linear process. Increasing mutual understanding through the engagement process should be fully acknowledged as a project deliverable.

Conduct timely and joint evaluations on trilateral cooperation projects and widely share the findings. Such evaluations can help illustrate and disseminate good practices and lessons learned, such as the types of institutional frameworks and arrangements that reduce transaction costs and increase efficiency.

¹⁶ Shunichiro and Mihoko, 2014

For both Chinese partners and traditional development actors

Conduct extensive research and analysis to understand the development needs of the beneficiary countries and ensure appropriate, targeted, and contextualised assistance. While China could possibly share similar challenges and experiences with beneficiary countries, and may have relevant know-how and expertise, the key to successful technology transfer is to understand the development differences.

Acknowledge that trilateral cooperation projects are not linear processes. Sufficient space and time for test trials should be built into the early stages of project design. In the meantime, beneficiary countries should take a lead role from the inception of trilateral projects to prevent conflicts of interest, policies and priorities with China and traditional development actors.

When possible, jointly establish a pooled fund to guarantee stable, sustained and predictable commitments from each side. In addition, formulate project management procedures to improve efficiency and reduce transaction costs.

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Independent Mapping II Voices from International Development Partners in Beijing

Sofia Ericsson

01 Methodology and Limitations

Methodology

The Discussion Paper applies a qualitative research approach using data from both primary and secondary sources. It is based on available literature, including project documentation and reviews of existing trilateral projects. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with around 35 interviewees from the international community in Beijing. The majority of the interviewees are responsible for development cooperation or related areas in their respective embassy or mission.¹⁷ The interviews were conducted in-person between January and April 2019.

Interviewees were selected based on countries that at some point have expressed interest in collaborating with China on development cooperation, including through trilateral cooperation. All countries interviewed have been or continue to be engaged in bilateral development cooperation with China.

Limitations

The Paper covers only current engagement and is not intended to be all encompassing. Engagement is evolving quickly through new partners and initiatives, some of which this Paper may have inadvertently omitted.

The data used does not include interviews with Chinese organisations or institutions. Information

relating to China's engagement in trilateral cooperation is based on secondary written material. The effectiveness and efficiency of individual projects was not assessed, but evaluations, reviews or similar assessments were included in the research.

This Paper does not assess the effectiveness and efficiency of trilateral cooperation in general for two main reasons. First, the intended outcome for trilateral cooperation is rarely articulated, and therefore not systematically monitored, beyond expected development results in the beneficiary country. Second, the sample of finalised trilateral projects was too small to make a reliable judgement.

02 Engagement with China on Global Development

Emerging providers and China's role

In 1960, there were fewer than 20 official bilateral aid agencies. By 2015, the number had grown closer to 50; only about half are members of OECD/DAC, however. In 1945, there was only one development bank, the World Bank. Today, a new development bank is established every third year.¹⁸ The rapid emergence of provider countries from the south is reshaping global development governance and practices.

China became a member of the United Nations in 1971, and from 1979 began receiving development aid from the UN system. The Government of China has expressed its intention to apply its learning, including on its remarkable achievements



The annual growth of Chinese aid averaged 29.4% from 2004 to 2009 and the country's ranking among providers has jumped from 16th in 2001 to 9th in 2013

on poverty reduction, through its development cooperation with other developing countries.¹⁹

China has provided resources to beneficiary countries since the 1950s and identifies as a South-South development cooperation partner or provider. As is the case with many emerging development players, China is not a member of the OECD/DAC. While there are no official country-based figures or annual data on China's aid, official documents suggest that China provided CNY 256.29 billion (historical USD equivalent not available from official source) in foreign aid from 1950 to 2009²⁰ and CNY 89.34 billion (approx. USD 14.41 billion) from 2010 to 2012.²¹ The annual growth of Chinese aid averaged 29.4% from 2004 to 2009 and the country's ranking among providers has jumped from 16th in 2001 to 9th in 2013.²²

A complication in comparing spending on aid is the use of variable definitions. While OECD/DAC members use the ODA definition, China includes other financial support when calculating its aid.²³ It is also sometimes hard to distinguish between foreign aid and commercially oriented financial

flows. Generally, development cooperation flows are higher than the official figures. Some organisations, such as AidData and the Lowy Institute, have tried to calculate actual flows.²⁴

China released its first White Paper on foreign aid in 2011 and its second in 2014. According to these, as well as other official documents, China will provide assistance to people of other countries to the best of its ability within the framework of South-South cooperation. China adheres to the principles of South-South cooperation by, among other things, not imposing any political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the beneficiary countries, and fully respecting their right to independently choose their own paths and models of development. Other basic principles that China upholds are mutual respect, equality, keeping promises, mutual benefits and win-win outcomes. The main forms of aid are grants, and interest-free and concessional loans.²⁵

China's aid architecture is complex, with a vast number of agencies, organisations and companies involved in delivering aid. Many changes have

17 Representatives from the following embassies or delegations were interviewed: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.

18 Meeting with the Centre for Global Development at the Norwegian Embassy in Beijing, 19 March 2019.

19 Zhang, 2017b.

20 See: China's Foreign Aid (2011) http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2018-08/09/c_261159.htm.

21 See: China's Foreign Aid (2014) http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2018-08/09/c_261152.htm

22 Zhang, 2017b.

23 See: http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2018-08/09/c_261152.htm.

24 See: <https://www.aiddata.org/china-official-finance>.

25 See: http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2018-08/09/c_261152.htm.

occurred in recent years. Until the establishment of the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA)²⁶ in 2018, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) was the custodian of China's aid. MOFCOM's Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs (DITEA) oversaw bilateral aid with China, and the Department of Foreign Aid (DFA) was in charge of Chinese aid to other countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs influences aid through Chinese foreign policy and bilateral relations. The Ministry of Finance endorses any funding. Line ministries are responsible for implementing many programmes and projects. Lastly, Chinese contractors operate in beneficiary countries. All of these actors with their diverse mandates and interests influence the direction of development cooperation financing.²⁷

China's foreign aid programme, as in any other country, has been subject to continuous but gradual reform. The logic of establishing CIDCA to coordinate increasing development spending is clear. CIDCA²⁸ is in charge of formulating strategic guidelines, plans and policies; coordinating and offering advice on major foreign aid issues; advancing reforms in matters involving foreign aid; and identifying major programmes as well as supervising and evaluating their implementation. The agency is still exploring its role and priorities, including by conducting study visits to selected traditional provider countries to learn more about legal structures, and the monitoring and evaluation of development cooperation, among other issues.²⁹

26 See: <http://en.cidca.gov.cn/index.html>.

27 Zhang and Smith 2017.

28 See: <http://en.cidca.gov.cn/index.html>.

29 Information shared at a meeting with the international community facilitated by UNDP China on 13 June 2019 in Beijing.

30 China is also providing significant funds to UN organisations and global multilateral funds.

In recent years China has made a number of development funding pledges.³⁰ One key initiative is the China South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF) announced in 2015. The Fund is still materialising in terms of funding streams and governance and has so far mainly implemented programmes through multilateral organisations such as those of the United Nations. The Fund does not pool resources with traditional providers. Where China has provided financing to trilateral projects, it has been in parallel to funding from a traditional provider.

According to interviewees, Chinese entities have, in bilateral and other meetings, expressed a clear interest in pursuing trilateral projects with other providers. So far, however, there are few examples of Chinese entities actively reaching out to other providers with specific initiatives. Several interviewees noted that it is up to them to carry out preparatory work to initiate specific discussions around trilateral projects.

Reasons for engaging China

All interviewees participating in this study stated that their governments have at some point expressed interest in pursuing trilateral cooperation with China or supporting it as a global development actor. A trilateral project is often seen as a means to work practically with Chinese counterparts. The purpose is twofold: first, to achieve sustainable development outcomes in the beneficiary country, and second, to broaden the partnership between the two provider countries in more general terms,

including to open entry points for engaging in policy dialogues on development cooperation and related issues.

A majority of the interviewees explained that a motivation for working with China is to gain a better understanding of how China pursues development cooperation. It is therefore interesting to work with China in ways beyond just trilateral projects. This also relates to South-South cooperation that does not necessarily follow conventions in traditional provider cooperation, with one example being the less strict division between aid and commercial interests due to the concept of mutual benefit.

Most interviewees highlighted that their countries' engagement with China on global development has been triggered while phasing out bilateral development cooperation with China. Many interviewees stressed the importance of building on established relationships with Chinese national counterparts when working on shared development goals in third countries and bringing domestic lessons abroad. In other words, it is seen as essential to keep and enhance good relationships and experiences.

China's development experience in successfully lifting its population out of poverty is seen by many as a great example that could be explored in beneficiary countries. Many traditional providers would also like to build on lessons learned from bilateral cooperation with China while working together in other countries. Some interviewees, however, acknowledged that to ensure that China's development experience informs and contributes to global development best practice, an effective way to share knowledge and adapt it to the

contexts of third countries needs to be established.

China is now stepping up and increasing its contribution to multilateral fora. Interviewees pointed to the importance of supporting China's engagement in international development and its contribution to global public goods. There was agreement that China is sharing the burden of achieving the SDGs, including domestically, which will have a significant global impact that could also inform future development cooperation. At least one interviewee underlined making sure that these new efforts do not end up putting current aid at risk and imposing negative consequences for development.

Other interviewees expressed a related concern around a lack of development cooperation coordination and transparency. In many smaller beneficiary countries with a few large providers, it makes sense to leverage resources, and, as one interviewee put it, "create a habit of collaboration on the ground especially if working in the same sector in a country." Long-standing problems with development cooperation not being used effectively and efficiently are further challenged by the growing number of providers.

Several interviewees emphasised the value of "being able to have a policy dialogue on development" with Chinese actors. China's engagement in other countries through aid, direct investment and trade is increasing, and it is seen as central to inspire Chinese counterparts to consider various risks and standards in their overseas operations, and ideally converge with agreed global standards. This includes thinking about both fiscal and environmental sustainability as well as

social issues. The Belt and Road Initiative has been one significant step that, if done well, could have a substantial positive impact on development in many countries. Several interviewees noted that to achieve this requires a common global rules-based system that relevant actors adhere to.

Offering practical experience at the project level—like sharing lessons learned on how to conduct assessments and feasibility studies, allocate budgets, design programmes, carry out procurement, and build individual and institutional capacities—is also an important reason to work together, according to one interviewee.

The high level of ambition in the SDGs makes it more critical than ever before to involve the private sector. One element is to focus on sustainable business conduct. Another, mentioned by one interviewee, is the value of working with China as a large importer of goods for its domestic production, as buying products may have a significant influence on the exporting country. How China applies environmental considerations as an investor in many low-income countries could also have a major positive or negative impact. One interviewee acknowledged that working with China could give market access to their country's companies.

As seen above, the reasons for countries to work with China as an emerging provider of development cooperation are wide ranging. They include gaining a better understanding of China's aid architecture and operational modalities, sharing China's good lessons, enhancing development coordination and transparency in beneficiary countries, and helping to realise the 2030 Agenda globally. Of the 16

countries represented in this study, however, only one shared a specific strategy on engaging with China as a global development actor.³¹

03 Examples of Cooperation with China

Very few countries have implemented trilateral projects with China, although all countries included in this Discussion Paper have at some point expressed an interest in cooperating with China in third countries. Some are not actively pursuing this objective. Others have implemented projects or are in the process of identifying possible projects. All countries are taking different approaches.

This Paper looks at projects supporting China's role as a global development actor and allowing traditional providers to learn more about China's way of working and applying lessons from its rapid development (see Annex I for project list). The following snapshots of individual countries describe cases where they have implemented projects or are in the process of identifying possible options. Some examples are also from countries that are not currently pursuing trilateral projects but have an interest in collaborating with China in related ways.

The snapshots explain the different approaches taken and give a picture of what is possible under the right conditions. The descriptions do not cover all aspects of any given country's collaboration with China, highlighting instead some specific examples of interest for other countries intending to develop cooperation with China.

Around half of the countries have signed Memorandums of Understanding with relevant Chinese governmental partners for international development cooperation or related issues. These

agreements state that trilateral cooperation is welcome, but often in very general terms, and at most specify regions and/or sectors of interest.

COUNTRY	ON-GOING TRILATERAL COOPERATION	ACTIVELY PURSUING TRILATERAL COOPERATION	MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING IN PLACE
Australia	Yes	Yes	2017 MOFCOM/DITEA
Canada	No	No	2016 Joint Statement to Develop Cooperation in Third-Party Markets
Denmark	Yes	Mainly through multilateral channels	2018 State Council Leading Group, Office on Poverty Alleviation and Development
European Union	No	Yes	No
Finland	No	No	No
France	No	Yes	2018 China Development Bank (CDB), Memorandum of Cooperation
Germany	Yes*	Yes	2016 MOFCOM**
United Kingdom	Yes	Yes	2011 MOFCOM 2014 CDB
Japan	No	Yes***	Annual dialogue
Mexico	No	Yes	2014 MOFCOM
Netherlands	No	No	No
New Zealand	Yes	Yes	2017 MOFCOM/DFA
Norway	No	No	2017 MOFCOM
Sweden	No	No	No
Switzerland	No	No	2019 CIDCA****
United States	Yes	Yes	2015 MOFCOM/DFA

* Only defined as trilateral cooperation if it entails joint planning, joint funding and joint implementation.

** There is an intergovernmental agreement from 1982. The Memorandum of Understanding refers specifically to the Sino-German Centre for Sustainable Development.

*** Bilateral aid is going to be phased out by 2022, and trilateral options will be discussed.

**** Signed when CIDCA Chair Mr. Wang Xiaotao visited Switzerland in 2018.

31 Only the United Kingdom's DFID has set out objectives in a business plan (2016-2019). Keeley (2017) assessed achievements of the plan.

The following is another snapshot of the projects with key information in terms of time, working area and key lessons. For full details, please refer to Annex 1.

	COUNTRY	THIRD PARTNER COUNTRIES	TIME	WORKING AREA	KEY LESSONS
1	Australia	Papua New Guinea	2016-2019	Health	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Shared interests and involvement of all three countries throughout the project. 2. Regular meetings of a Joint Programme Working Group give partners the flexibility to focus on problems as they arise.
2	Denmark	Ghana, Zambia, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka	Ghana, Zambia: 2014-2018; Ethiopia, Sri Lanka: started from 2019	Technology transfer	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UNDP's unique position provides entry points and value to the project. 2. Denmark has funded a junior professional officer (JPO) in the South-South cooperation portfolio of UNDP China for many years, a valuable approach to build closer cooperation and follow-up on trilateral projects and related initiatives.
3	European Union	Three South-east Asian countries	Started from 2019	Climate, energy	EU collected information on possibilities for TrC through its country offices
4	Germany	Africa, Asia	Started from 2017	not predetermined	The Sino-German Centre for Sustainable Development opened communication channels on trilateral cooperation with China and built on synergies with other regional and global projects of BMZ implemented in partnership with China in third countries in recent years.
5	The United Kingdom	Malawi, Uganda, Bangladesh, Nepal, Ethiopia, Myanmar, the United Republic of Tanzania	Started from 2016	Agriculture with pilot projects in Malawi and Uganda, Community-based disaster management in Bangladesh and Nepal, and Global health in Ethiopia, Myanmar and the United Republic of Tanzania.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Initiative came from the Department for International Development (DFID) office in China rather than DFID country programmes in partner countries. 2. DFID updated its business plans across all countries with development cooperation to assess barriers to development, and DFID China engages with DFID offices in these countries to highlight why China matters and define the interest of the offices in future projects. 3. Supported China's international development research and the establishment of the Center for International Knowledge on Development (CIKD).

	COUNTRY	THIRD PARTNER COUNTRIES	TIME	WORKING AREA	KEY LESSONS
6	New Zealand	the Cook Islands	Started from 2017, as of June 2019, the project was on track to be completed in 2019-2020.	Infrastructure	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A project masterplan determined infrastructure standards to ensure achievement of the project goal. 2. A governance group comprising senior officials from the three countries provides the main mechanism for oversight of the project. 3. It is important to coordinate and cooperate with other providers, while ensuring the Pacific governments take the lead in small Pacific Island developing countries.
7	United States of America	Timor-Leste, Addis Ababa	Timor-Leste: 2011-2015; Addis Ababa: developed after 2015	Health	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A separate MoU for the project outlines the objectives and scope of activities and remains a guiding document for cooperation. 2. It is important to involve like-minded organisations like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCs) working together in three countries. 3. The project is aimed at a collective global good, meaning the common interest to prevent a future pandemic.
8	France	Africa	MoU signed in 2018	Climate change and environment, debt sustainability	Initiate partnership with key Chinese actors in sustainable development such as financial institutions, institutes, think tanks and non-governmental organisations.
9	Norway	N/A	MoU signed in 2017 which opens scope for future trilateral cooperation	N/A	It is important to share information across and within Norway's systems to build knowledge about China as a global development actor.

	COUNTRY	THIRD PARTNER COUNTRIES	TIME	WORKING AREA	KEY LESSONS
10	Sweden	Currently there is no trilateral cooperation, but there are still some bilateral projects supported by Sweden.	N/A	Corporate social responsibility	Prioritise corporate social responsibility
11	Switzerland	Laos	In 2015, the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC) and MOFCOM organised a joint exchange visit on evaluation in Laos and Switzerland.	Learning and exchange	N/A
12	The Netherlands	Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda	Started from 2015, a second phase under consideration	Rural industry: Bamboo sector	<p>1. Brought bamboo to the forefront of the government development agenda in the three beneficiary countries and engagement of the private sector in the project.</p> <p>2. It links China's vast experience in developing bamboo resources for poverty alleviation and livelihood development with the Netherlands' expertise in areas such as production, marketing and standards, towards delivering development benefits in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda.</p>

04 Lessons Learned

China's aid management structure: with whom to engage?

The Chinese aid management structure is complex, and it can be challenging to understand the decision-making process. China has shown interest in learning from the experiences of traditional providers and other providers, but with a vast number of institutions/agencies, partners find it difficult to know with whom to engage and how. CIDCA is still developing in terms of its role and responsibility, and agencies such as MOFCOM (DITEA and DFA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and line ministries engaged in the implementation of aid are all important players. The Commercial Officer (under MOFCOM) in Chinese embassies is responsible, among other things, for overseeing development cooperation initiatives. These representatives play a key role in beneficiary countries and are valuable points for engagement.

As concessional loans dominate aid from China, it may be of interest to engage with the EXIM Bank or the CDB, as France and New Zealand have done. Working jointly, where China provides a loan for construction of infrastructure and the traditional provider can supplement with a grant for needs around this project, could prove effective. Early engagement is vital; partners can plan and design the project together from the start, which may increase transparency and builds trust. Although not formally part of the aid management structure, Chinese contractors in beneficiary countries may

³² Keeley (2017).

³³ This refers to high-level Memorandums of Understanding between governments interested in cooperation, not Memorandums of Understanding for specific projects.

influence the shaping of projects, and it can be worthwhile to learn more about their roles in beneficiary countries of interest to a traditional provider.

Starting point: the beneficiary country's national strategies and interests

Everyone involved in triangular cooperation underlines that the request for cooperation ought to originate from the beneficiary country. It may however be difficult for a country to request something it does not know is a possibility. A traditional provider with a pre-existing relationship with a beneficiary country may be well placed to assess needs and comparative advantages in embarking on a trilateral partnership with China.

As concluded in the DFID review,³² context matters greatly, and there is no one size fits all. As with any development assistance, experience and knowledge from one country, in this case China, cannot be transferred directly to a third country. Sharing knowledge and experience needs to be an iterative and interactive process where international experts work with local partners to determine what is useful and relevant, and how it can be adapted and applied in a different setting.

A Memorandum of Understanding: necessary or not?

A signed Memorandum of Understanding between a traditional provider and China does not seem to be a prerequisite for trilateral cooperation. Even if these agreements³³ are rather high level and general, having one can, however, serve as a useful

umbrella, giving all partners the mandate to discuss possibilities for cooperation.

One interviewee did not think that implementing a trilateral project would be a prerequisite to engaging in policy dialogue or similar exercises, as the perception is that China generally approaches countries on issues it is interested in learning more about. Other interviewees, however, stated that dialogue works better when China has been part of developing credible evidence that all partners trust. One way to build this evidence is to work together on a joint initiative.

Making it easier: thinking through the 'why'

A key message from a majority of the interviewees was to avoid trilateral cooperation purely for the sake of it. There needs to be a convergence in the willingness of all parties to move in this direction. All parties must be cognisant of why they are involved in a project and what their specific roles are. Joint planning is a foundation for working through roles and responsibilities, and for managing expectations. This is especially important if there is parallel funding as delays by one partner can be costly for another.

Where the objective of trilateral cooperation is to learn how China operates as an emerging provider, and expand scope for further cooperation and policy dialogue, it is crucial to think through what success may look like, and the most effective and efficient means to achieve it.

A majority of the interviewees noted that their countries are interested in sectors with large imprints on the global good, such as climate change, health security, and disaster management and response. These areas are also perceived as being relatively

neutral in character, with a higher likelihood that cooperation can be maintained even during political change.

As moving cooperation to the implementation stage is a timely process, interviewees suggested it can be valuable to engage in internal preparation work. For example, defining which countries may be strategic to work in; how prepared their own embassy/offices are in those countries; sectors in which they have a comparative advantage; and how to ensure the sustainability of outcomes. Having a mandate and resources approved in advance helps seize opportunities when they arise.

Stamina: forming solid partnerships takes time and effort

The process from starting a discussion on a trilateral project until it is ready for implementation may take several years. Two factors that influence the length of time are the availability of human resources (both from the traditional provider and the Chinese side) and where the decision on spending money is made—for example, at the embassy in Beijing, headquarters or the embassy in the country where the project will be implemented.

Building genuine partnerships across three or more countries or actors by necessity involves negotiation and compromise. This increases transaction costs in terms of communication and transparency compared to traditional bilateral projects. Another factor that complicates negotiations is that multiple stakeholders may be involved from within each country. This could in reality mean trilateral becoming a multitude of different stakeholders discussing the project. Here, one interviewee stressed the importance of managing expectations within their own organisational structure.

Given this lengthy process, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that political elements in all countries might change and affect prospects for trilateral cooperation. This may determine the allocation of human resources and the enthusiasm of relevant staff, as highlighted by several interviewees.

Partnering with a multilateral agency

Depending on a traditional provider's motivation to work collaboratively with China, an effective and efficient way might be to fund and work together with a multilateral agency, particularly within the UN system given its long experience in South-South and trilateral cooperation. Further, China has had a partnership with the UN system since the latter opened its first offices in China in 1979, and where China sees the United Nations as a neutral broker and platform to engage globally.

Given their global networks of offices, UNDP, along with other UN entities, can assist in matching needs and priorities in beneficiary countries with what China can offer in terms of development solutions.

Working with and through the UN system can be particularly effective if a traditional provider lacks human resources. It can have more impact than a small bilateral provider working on its own. Furthermore, it is often possible to negotiate the level of involvement with a UN organisation.

Most of the UN Agencies in Beijing have a global portfolio where they engage in China's global development cooperation, including trilateral projects.

UNDP has, since 2010, mobilised approximately USD 42 million of which USD 30 million has come

from China's aid entities, covering projects in 17 countries. The main areas of collaboration have so far been agriculture, poverty reduction, renewable and clean energy, and disaster response and management.

The World Food Programme's SSC/TrC Centre of Excellence in China helps share China's rich experience in food security, nutrition improvement and poverty alleviation with other developing countries, by facilitating policy dialogue, technical training, expert deployment, policy research and other activities pursuant to SDGs 2 and 17.

In May 2017, the Chinese Government provided a contribution of USD 3 million to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Lebanon and Somalia to benefit over 300,000 women and vulnerable children. Besides providing life-saving treatment for severe acute malnutrition for children in Somalia, and winter kits and education supplies to Syrian refugee school children in Lebanon, these projects also built capacity in the delivery of services.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) and China signed its first partnership agreement in 2012 (amended in 2016), focusing on poverty reduction in Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The ILO facilitated the transfer of China's assistance and the ILO's expertise to create more efficient labour services in matching supply and demand for jobs. At the end of the agreement, the job centres in the two countries saw significant increases in the number of registered job seekers, vacancies and placements. The project was expanded to cover international and regional exchanges on issues such as social protection and employment services.

For details of UN Agencies' South-South and trilateral cooperation with China, please refer to the Annexes.

Partnership and project management

Reviews of the Australian and British trilateral projects³⁴ elaborate the importance of strong project management in the beneficiary country, with support from corresponding mechanisms in partner countries. Careful project management ensures effective project delivery and quality control.

In documentation and the statements of high-level bureaucrats, China has expressed that it would like to work with traditional providers to learn more about aid management. This underscores that it is appropriate to focus on a solid performance management system, including monitoring and evaluation.

In designing trilateral projects, a balance between support for implementation and for effective cooperation should be built into the project time frame. Clarity on partnership objectives, including how management capacity will be built (if that is one of the purposes), should be defined and tracked through milestones and benchmarking. Three-party governance mechanisms help to enhance the credibility and sustainability of the intervention and bolster a genuine partnership.

With many stakeholders and levels of hierarchy in three countries, it is valuable to consider what information is needed for whom and when, and to write reports accordingly, especially considering time-poor bureaucrats. Timely communication and information-sharing make all parties feel involved.

Other factors to consider include striking an even balance in partnerships, as otherwise the emerging provider might find the traditional provider limits its opportunities to contribute. If the project is not of high quality, the emerging provider may feel it is jeopardising its reputation. On the other hand, there might be a need to challenge the emerging provider on the quality and design of its cooperation, and its motivation.³⁵

Monitoring and evaluation systems

Although triangular cooperation is increasing, evidence of the value compared to other forms of cooperation, especially bilateral, is limited. There is little credible data on how, where and when it is most effective and efficient to use trilateral cooperation. The lack of an internationally agreed definition of triangular cooperation hinders the collation of such information.

The specifics of triangular cooperation are still rarely captured in project design, and thus neither monitored nor evaluated. Considering that trilateral cooperation is often treated as innovative and implemented as pilot projects, it would be warranted to invest more in M&E. This Paper does not advocate for more complex and elaborate M&E systems or frameworks. What is essential is to have an M&E system that is fit for purpose and actually used, generating credible information for decision makers and stakeholders.

The first step, which is often overlooked, is to clearly articulate what success will realistically look like given the invested time and resources. A helpful question to ask when deciding on intended

outcomes at the end of the project is: Who is going to be doing what differently?

The complication for trilateral projects is that they often have a dual purpose. It is vital for all involved to articulate what these are. Besides achieving specific sustainable development outcomes in the beneficiary country, are there other outcomes that the parties could benefit from articulating, such as:

- Partnership outcomes
- Information to be used, for example, in policy dialogues
- Learning outcomes (for example, Chinese counterparts learning about practical aid management, and a partner country learning about Chinese aid architecture and modalities)
- Increased coordination in the beneficiary country beyond the project
- Pooling of funding in future projects

Whatever the decision on intended outcomes, they all need to be included in the M&E system. If an outcome is related to institutional behavioural changes in aid management, it ought to be planned with corresponding activities and outputs. This does not mean a sizeable formal training programme by default. On-the-job training is very efficient; however, it might be useful to build in some resources to develop capacity and enable reflection, which will require time, a budget and allocation of responsibility.

It is highly recommended to involve all partners in building a theory-of-change (logical framework) that includes all assumptions necessary to achieve intended outcomes. This will require investment in time and resources at the start, and then in regularly

revisiting the theory of change. It will likely benefit the project and partnership in the long run, in addition to steering better development results.

Policy dialogue

The majority of the interviewees stated that one reason to engage with China as a provider is to initiate a policy dialogue on development cooperation more broadly and share lessons and knowledge from past decades of implementing programmes.

Due to the recent changes in the Chinese aid architecture, and the fact that many traditional providers have yet to engage in detailed policy discussion within this new structure, it is understandable that policy discussions are high on the agenda of partners. Going forward, it might be worthwhile to consider lessons learned from other sources, including the evaluation of policy dialogues by Bazeley et al.³⁶ The evaluation highlights the importance of having a clear intent for what is going to be achieved through the dialogue as development cooperation is an expansive subject. People engaged in the dialogue need to have the ability to analyse and articulate policy options, and the confidence and authority to represent and make decisions on behalf of their organisations.

Working across different cultures with different drivers and approaches makes it unlikely that set-piece formal dialogues will reveal the whole story about each party's values and interests. Informal meetings can deepen trust and appreciation around differences in perspective. And not least, developing a shared and robust evidence base can help ground discussions and contribute to more effective dialogue.

³⁴ Keeley (2017) and Kelly (2018).

³⁵ BMZ (2013).

³⁶ Bazeley et al. (2013).

05 Recommendations

Ensure adequate time for planning and to find the best fit

Do not pursue trilateral cooperation for the sake of it. Invest resources in proportion to expectations. It is vital for the three or more countries/actors to plan together from the beginning and discuss and agree on roles and responsibilities that can be articulated in writing.

Be patient and allow adequate time

Forming a strong partnership on an equal basis with all stakeholders is likely to be beneficial over time, as illustrated by the trilateral project between Australia, China and Papua New Guinea on malaria control.

Decide what to measure, including results not related to development outcomes in the beneficiary country

If building the capabilities of partners is a purpose, then this needs to be factored into programme design and resources in proportion to the intended outcome.

Think through the strategy/purpose for working with China as a global development actor

Then develop a strategy with a theory of change and monitor this so it is possible to determine if it is working or not, and if modifications should be made. Often there are many groups involved on the traditional provider side (office in the beneficiary country, office in China and headquarters). A common strategy brings clarity to all three parties in terms of how to be involved and where to focus resources. If a goal is to have a policy dialogue on development cooperation, it is probably helpful to be clear on the aspects covered.³⁷

Consider engaging an M&E expert early in planning

The expert could assist in the formulation of a theory of change (logic model) and provide input throughout implementation, such as through regular project visits twice a year. Invest more rather than less in M&E, considering the lack of credible evidence on trilateral cooperation and the innovative nature of this approach.

Contribute to the growing literature on trilateral cooperation and share lessons

Investigate the most cost-effective ways to disseminate learning from trilateral projects or research. Topics such as where, how, and why trilateral cooperation delivered the greatest benefit to all participants could be discussed in informal workshops or seminars, mixing participants from traditional providers and South-South providers.

Lead by example and support the enhancement of provider coordination

Traditional providers should, as much as feasible, set the direction by adhering to the aid effectiveness agenda in all their endeavours. One example is to coordinate with China in selecting countries and sectors for trilateral cooperation. To save on resources, maybe assessments, if done at a deeper level in beneficiary countries, could be shared between China and traditional providers.

Chinese aid is likely to grow in the coming years

Consider working with counterparts in beneficiary countries to strengthen overall coordination and efforts to support global goods, including environmental sustainability and good governance.

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³⁷ Among traditional providers this could be clear, but it was not conveyed to the drafters of this report.

Annexes

Annex 1. Examples of international development actors' cooperation with China



Australia malaria prevention and investing in strong partnership

01

As Australia phased out its bilateral aid programme to China, starting in 2011, development efforts refocused towards working with China as a provider in the Indo-Pacific region. Trilateral cooperation was one means of cultivating this new type of partnership. The motivation was to build on good relationships developed through the bilateral aid programme in the health, environment and governance sectors, as well as to broaden the relationship. The new approaches were also in line with aid effectiveness and coordination in the region.

Australia and China are currently partnering on one trilateral project on malaria diagnosis in Papua New Guinea. The idea for “The Australia China Papua New Guinea Pilot Cooperation on Malaria Control (2016-2019)” originated in 2012. After several years of design and planning, project implementation began in January 2016.

An essential factor in getting the project started was shared interest in trilateral cooperation among the Australian health team at the High Commission in Papua New Guinea, the Australian Embassy in Beijing, health officials from Papua New Guinea, and Chinese health and aid officials. In the early days of project conception, key staff from the High Commission and the Papua New

Guinea Department of Health met Chinese health experts at conferences. These meetings, although informal, were instrumental in getting the project off the ground because the people involved had the mandate to discuss possible options.

In 2012, the Secretary of the Papua New Guinea Department of Health wrote to both Australia and China to request their support. A set of scoping visits, including representatives from all three countries, were held in 2013, and it was decided to focus on malaria diagnosis and strengthening Papua New Guinea’s laboratory systems. In 2014, a project was designed, followed by the elaboration of a management structure and governance arrangements in 2015.

The lengthy process from initiation to the start of implementation in 2016, and the involvement of all three countries throughout helped a solid partnership to take form.

A partnership broker, an independent contractor, was engaged to manage the project, along with a China-based coordinator in the National Institute for Parasitic Diseases. A Joint Programme Working Group now provides high-level oversight and decision-making for the project. It meets every six months alternating between the three participating



Denmark

close collaboration through UNDP



countries. This gives partners the flexibility to focus on problems as they arise. Working group members also have the opportunity to learn from each other and discuss the health sector in Papua New Guinea more broadly. A technical working group, based in Papua New Guinea, jointly develops annual workplans, undertakes joint research, and addresses technical challenges and barriers.

Six institutions are involved in the Joint Programme Working Group. Another nine agencies take part at the technical, advisory and implementing levels. Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is one institution in the working group, and an example of the potential complexity of decision-making, since information has to be shared in a timely and concise way between headquarters in Canberra as well as the High Commission in Papua New Guinea and the Embassy in China.

A midterm review³⁸ found the project has made significant improvements in malaria diagnosis in Papua New Guinea. It has generated strong ownership among all stakeholders, not least national officials and experts. Due to the success of the pilot phase, all three countries

³⁸ Kelly et al. (2018).

are interested in continuing cooperation. A project design team, with members from all three countries, was convened in 2019 to develop a second phase.

In 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark initiated a process of identifying potential areas and initiatives for cooperating with China. The assessment focused on development issues at the policy level and trilateral cooperation in Africa.

China and other emerging economies are playing increasingly significant roles in Africa through aid, trade, investment and political cooperation. Accordingly, the assessment noted that cooperation with China on development issues there could facilitate Denmark's long-term ability to manoeuvre in a changing international development cooperation landscape. Identified areas of cooperation included, among others, to support China's cooperation with UNDP, and to focus on climate change, renewable energy and environment as niche areas.

As a result, Denmark initiated support for two trilateral cooperation projects on renewable energy technology transfers with China, Ghana and Zambia through UNDP. This pilot proved to be successful, and in 2016, UNDP China proposed a modality and thematic area to MOFCOM to replicate the model. In 2019, two new projects, this time in Ethiopia and Sri Lanka, were launched and co-financed by China.

One initial idea following the assessment was to help Danish Government agencies build ties with Chinese authorities, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology and MOFCOM, on specific development cooperation initiatives. Little progress was made, however, due to changing priorities and a lack of human resources from the Danish side.

One significant advance, however, has been the establishment of the South-South Cooperation Centre in China. Inaugurated on UN South-South Day on 12 September 2019, the Centre will be the first of its kind to collect lessons learned on South-South cooperation with a focus on renewable energy technology transfer.

The Danish assessment also emphasised the unique position of UNDP in China. As one of the bigger international development players, it has valuable contacts and entry points there, and is trusted by Chinese authorities. Denmark has for many years funded a junior professional officer in the South-South cooperation portfolio of UNDP China. This has been a valuable approach to build closer cooperation and follow-up on trilateral projects and related initiatives.



European Union

investing in thorough study up front

03

The European Union's engagement with China on international cooperation and development is a political priority identified in the March 2019 Joint Communication EU-China—A Strategic Outlook. This entails a comprehensive policy effort to identify synergies for engagement and cooperation in third countries, with a focus on Africa and Asia. At the 21st EU-China Summit in April 2019, European Union and Chinese leaders reiterated their commitment to implement the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, increase exchanges on international development cooperation, and explore cooperation with other partner countries to advance the 2030 Agenda. The new EU-China Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which should be adopted at the next EU-China Summit, is expected to reflect a higher level of ambition in EU-China international development cooperation.

In line with this policy framework, the European Union is exploring opportunities to develop trilateral cooperation projects with China. An intention to start a formal policy dialogue with China, announced in 2017, led to initial talks around issues of interest to both parties. A formal policy dialogue materialised only after China made changes in its aid architecture and created CIDCA in 2018.

After CIDCA was established, the European Union once again pursued cooperation. CIDCA Chair, Mr. Wang Xiaotao, was involved in the domestic social protection project supported by the European Union and implemented with the National Development and Reform Commission. Through this project, he has been to Brussels and gained an understanding of the European Union's approach to development cooperation.

During the EU Commissioner's visit to China in November 2018, it was agreed that specific countries should be identified for possible collaboration. The vision was that further exchanges and trilateral cooperation would enable more structured policy dialogue in the future. In early 2019, the head of CIDCA's international cooperation department confirmed that working-level discussions would be welcomed. In that context, the vice chair of CIDCA attended the European Development Days in Brussels in June 2019. The European Union has offered to conduct workshops or similar activities to discuss development management and human resources with CIDCA.

To identify countries, sectors and potential projects, the European Union has engaged the Chinese Academy of International Trade

and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) for 18 months to conduct research. The first phase will examine lessons learned, so far, by other traditional providers in Beijing involved in trilateral cooperation. The second phase will include interviews and consultations with key stakeholders in China to identify four to five countries and conduct site visits to them. Country cases will be drafted and will indicate specific sectors in which to work together as well as possible project ideas.

Other recent research involves the Global Green Growth Institute. The research identifies gaps and options to deepen China's South-South climate cooperation in Asian countries with a focus on the energy sector, while also exploring the potential of trilateral cooperation with China and the European Union. The research also entails consultations with stakeholders in China and three South-east Asian countries to understand the dynamics and barriers in existing policy and financing instruments and defining opportunities for scaling up climate finance involving multiple actors. A policy briefing paper will be produced with recommendations.

In parallel, the European Union in Brussels is collecting information on possibilities for trilateral

cooperation through its country offices. Findings will feed into a possible agreement with China on a number of trilateral projects, based on an explicit request from the beneficiary country, and where both China and the European Union share an interest. Further, the EU Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations and CIDCA are discussing the establishment of a humanitarian affairs dialogue.

The European Union continues to implement a few bilateral projects in China, such as on social protection reform, the China-EU Law School, the EU Small and Medium Enterprise Centre, research partnerships, green cities as well as thematic cooperation through Chinese and European non-governmental organisations.

In addition, investments are a growing priority. One implementation modality has been through blending grants provided by development finance institutions to support investment in infrastructure and private sector development. Through the Asia Investment Facility in China, the European Union works with Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and Agence Française de Développement (AFD) on blended projects that promote the green economy and biodiversity.



Germany

establishing the Sino-German Centre for Sustainable Development

04

Germany is still, in some instances, using ODA funds to implement projects in China. China is no longer a beneficiary of classical bilateral development cooperation funds, however, since the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) phased out this type of cooperation in 2009. German Government line ministries implement various cooperation projects with their Chinese counterparts. The Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) is the primary implementing agency for Sino-German cooperation projects, which are funded equally by China and Germany.

Currently, GIZ is working with seven different German ministries, among them the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. BMZ is also funding regional and global programmes implemented by GIZ with the participation of institutions and partners from China.

There are currently around 14 bilateral and about eight regional and global projects with components implemented by GIZ in China. The organisation maintains a substantial presence in China with 135 staff. Having worked in China for 40 years, it has many ties to people there, an advantage in building

contacts and developing knowledge of how Chinese systems work.

Globally, Germany has engaged in trilateral cooperation for more than 10 years. So far, Latin America has been the primary focus, and much experience has been accumulated through this work. The starting point for Germany is that trilateral cooperation has to benefit the beneficiary country. Another objective is to develop a productive relationship with an emerging provider to enable constructive dialogue and help build the capacity of newly established provider agencies.

The same logic is used for partnering with China, with a focus on establishing a dialogue on development cooperation and piloting trilateral cooperation to benefit beneficiary countries. There is less emphasis on capacity-building for China. The interviewee noted that as China is a new partner in trilateral cooperation, there is a need to foster a general understanding between the countries and explore how the two can complement each other. For example, German development cooperation worldwide focuses heavily on building institutional capacity, while China in many countries stresses infrastructure, trade and investment. A partnership therefore might revolve around working with beneficiary countries on issues such as job creation.

In May 2017, China and Germany established the Sino-German Centre for Sustainable Development on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding signed by ministers from BMZ and MOFCOM. GIZ and China's Trade Development Bureau, which is affiliated with MOFCOM, jointly run the Centre. The Centre is tasked with supporting and facilitating dialogue on development policy and cooperation with China and identifying trilateral projects that could generate practical examples and experiences to feed back into the discussions.

During its first year the Centre established structures, defined criteria for project selection, identified modes of cooperation, assessed a large number of potential project ideas, and identified cooperation opportunities to explore. The Centre's Steering Committee, consisting of BMZ and MOFCOM representatives, meets twice a year to decide on ways forward.

The Centre builds on synergies with other BMZ regional and global projects implemented in partnership with China in third countries in recent years, for example, in the textile industry, on regional integration and trade issues, and on engaging China in a global dialogue on sustainability in emerging markets. In the German system, these regional and global projects are not classified as trilateral cooperation, since the requirement is to have all

elements of joint planning, joint funding and joint implementation in place. The two running triangular cooperation projects (Laos, Ethiopia) use parallel financing of equal contributions of joint planning and implementation.

The Centre has reportedly opened communication channels on triangular cooperation (traditionally, China is not part of provider meetings); GIZ's presence and contacts within the Chinese system, along with its field structure in countries targeted for trilateral cooperation projects, facilitates discussions with Chinese counterparts. The latter, however, usually have a rather narrow mandate, e.g., implementing a specific project, and thus are not involved in discussions on broader cooperation areas.

China and Germany have agreed that the request for cooperation should originate from the beneficiary country. But the opportunity to work with China and Germany in a trilateral project is not widely known in African or Asian countries. Thus, the Centre will also conduct outreach in partner countries. Possible projects could be in either Africa or Asia (the current focus being Africa); the sector is not predetermined. A likely approach will be to assess comparative advantages and consider countries where both China and Germany are already working in similar fields but not together.



The United Kingdom

testing a range of different approaches and gaining lessons

The United Kingdom ended bilateral aid to China through the Department for International Development (DFID)³⁹ in 2011. Phasing out bilateral cooperation opened up possibilities for working with China as an international development actor. The 2016 DFID business plan states the following objectives:

- To engage China to maximise the development impact of China's aid and investments in developing countries;
- To support China's engagement in the international development systems and its contribution to global public good;
- To ensure China's development experience informs and contributes to global development best practice, primarily through effective knowledge and experience sharing.

DFID has taken various approaches to achieving these objectives. One is to implement trilateral cooperation projects. To date, three projects in different sectors and countries using different approaches have been implemented:

- Agriculture with pilot projects in Malawi and Uganda,
- Community-based disaster management in Bangladesh and Nepal, and

- Global health in Ethiopia, Myanmar and the United Republic of Tanzania.

A review of the three projects in 2017⁴⁰ found that the motivation for pursuing them was to work with China. To a large extent, the initiative came from the DFID office in China rather than DFID country programmes in the beneficiary nations. Implementing three projects in three different sectors and with different approaches and governance structures generated many valuable lessons and recommendations. The review concluded that the trilateral projects had contributed to strategic objectives, and "much has been achieved, but there have also been many bumps in the road, and there are now a cluster of lessons to offer guidance on future directions." The review pointed out that:

- An intervention should build on strong demand in the beneficiary country, including from the DFID country office (which should ideally also allocate staff time to follow the project). It is also important that sector and thematic focus fit well with key institutional strategy documents.
- Realistic timeframes for implementation are important to ensure a good match between what the partnership with China can provide

and what is needed in the country. Sharing lessons from China's development experience is a complex process, requiring dialogue and time to identify opportunities and appropriate interventions. It is an iterative and interactive process with Chinese experts working with local staff to see what works in a specific context.

- A trilateral governance model can improve the quality of interventions and enhance credibility and sustainability. Strong management and coordination in the beneficiary country help to troubleshoot problems associated with implementing complex, multi-partner projects across different cultural contexts.
- There is a need for clarity about partnership objectives, including how management capacity will be built if this is the aim. Trilateral projects can support capacity-building but need to be structured to foster effective learning.
- It will be important for DFID China to leverage learning about China as a provider across DFID globally.

The review stated that it would be beneficial to engage with China on practical, concrete initiatives that can enable policy dialogue and learning on international best practices, and for DFID to learn how China implements its aid.

All three trilateral projects have ended and, at this point, only the global health project will continue in some form. While DFID is pursuing trilateral cooperation, it does not foresee this as a large component of its portfolio.

To achieve the objectives in the business plan, DFID is also looking at other ways to support China as a global development cooperation partner. Some support goes to research through the China International Development Research Network, which links academics focusing on international development issues. The aim is to pair this network with international equivalents (mainly British). The China Agricultural University chairs the network, and MOFCOM is part of the steering committee (the hope is that CIDCA will also join).

DFID supported the establishment of the Centre for International Knowledge on Development (CIKD)⁴¹ and still provides core funding. The Centre is affiliated with the Development Research Center of the State Council, which has focused on domestic development experience. The portfolio of the CIKD is expected to include international experience.

³⁹ The United Kingdom has provided ODA funding to China through the Prosperity Fund since 2016.

⁴⁰ For details of projects, see Keeley (2017).

⁴¹ The Centre for International Knowledge on Development seeks to promote global sustainable development through advancing and sharing country-specific development knowledge. Its mission includes to pool Chinese and international resources to advance development studies; to undertake research on country-specific development practices and theories; and to promote research and knowledge-sharing on international development issues, including the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.



New Zealand cooperating on infrastructure

06

New Zealand engages in trilateral cooperation as a means to encourage well-coordinated, efficient, and effective development cooperation that advances development priorities. Trilateral cooperation provides useful opportunities for New Zealand to learn about other partners' approaches and share learning from our own experiences.

In the Pacific, where 60% of New Zealand's official development assistance is delivered, New Zealand cooperates with all significant donors operating in the region, including China.

In 2017, New Zealand and China signed an Arrangement on Strengthening Exchanges on International Development Cooperation. This Arrangement, initiated at the time by China's Ministry of Commerce's (MOFCOM) Department of Foreign Assistance, provides a framework for "strengthening exchanges building on existing international development cooperation", includes a focus on the Pacific region and provides a framework for regular discussion on development issues, including on potential cooperation. New Zealand and China hold regular consultations on Pacific issues. These meetings have provided an opportunity to exchange information on their respective development cooperation programmes in the Pacific, including potential areas for collaboration.

The Te Mato Vai (TMV) water reticulation project in the Cook Islands is New Zealand's first joint development cooperation project with China, and China's first trilateral project with an OECD-DAC donor in the Pacific. The project originated in 2009, when the Cook Islands Government engaged the China Civil Engineering and Construction Company (CCECC) to develop a concept design for upgrading Rarotonga's water supply infrastructure. The EU and ADB were subsequently invited to prepare concept designs and investment packages. In 2012, a multi-donor technical workshop assessed all concept designs and endorsed the CCECC design as technically appropriate.

Subsequent negotiations between representatives from the Cook Islands, China and New Zealand confirmed a tripartite partnership, to complete a water system upgrade on Rarotonga ("Te Mato Vai"), at an estimated cost of NZD60m. The project goal was the provision of safe, clean drinking water to the households and businesses of Rarotonga.

The project comprised two "stages" or phases: the first stage involved an arrangement between Cook Islands and China for the laying of water ring mains. Finance was through a loan from EXIM Bank (NZD25.9 million); implementation was by Chinese

state-owned enterprise China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC). The contract between the Cook Islands and CCECC was signed in 2009 however implementation of Stage 1 (construction of the water ring mains) did not begin until 2014. The second stage involved an arrangement between Cook Islands and New Zealand for upgrading water intakes and introducing water treatment. This work did not start until 2017 due to delays in negotiations with landowners for access to build the water intakes infrastructure, and changes in the main contractor for construction. Finance was through a NZD15 million grant from New Zealand, and Cook Islands' own funds, with implementation by a contractor selected via open tender.

In addition, a project masterplan was funded by New Zealand and prepared by a New Zealand company selected via an open tender process conducted by Cook Islands (with support from New Zealand).

A governance group comprising senior officials from the three parties was the main mechanism for oversight of the project progress and outcomes. The governance group met as required to discuss progress and technical issues, but at least six-monthly in Rarotonga, Wellington, or Auckland.

The last governance group meeting was held in Auckland in February 2020. In addition, meetings of a more technical nature were held among partners in Rarotonga. A Project Management committee comprising representatives from government and contractors meets monthly.

In 2017 the ring mains was commissioned. Following the identification of some quality issues, Cook Islands has undertaken repairs of critical sections of the ring main. As at July 2020, construction of Stage 2 was on track to be completed in August 2020. While repair works on the ring main are completed the remaining part of the contract to repair roads affected by the ring main works is scheduled to be completed by September 2020.

New Zealand's view is that in small Pacific Island countries, it is important to coordinate and cooperate with other donors, while ensuring that Pacific governments take the lead. Lessons from this project will feed into future cooperation.



United States of America

funding mutual 'global good' projects

07

Discussions to pursue trilateral cooperation between China and the United States began in the mid-2000s through conferences between scholars and meetings between officials to discuss possible areas of collaboration. The United States began providing aid to China via multilateral organisations in 1980 and directly via the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2001. In 2008, USAID created a Development Counsellor position at the US Embassy in Beijing to gain a better understanding of China's aid structure and strengthen the working relationship. This resulted in the signing of a 2015 Memorandum of Understanding between China and the United States for engagement in regular development policy dialogue and to explore areas of possible programmatic cooperation.

China and the United States have engaged on global issues such as health, the environment, food security and humanitarian emergencies. Their first trilateral project was implemented in the agricultural sector in Timor-Leste. Discussions among the three countries started in 2011, and a scoping mission with Chinese and US experts took place in 2013. This project was aimed at building human capacity through training and technical assistance to increase the production of maize, beans, onions and garlic. China focused on maize,

and the United States on beans, onions and garlic. Both countries worked with their contractors and co-hosted training sessions. The project ran for one year, until early 2015.

China and the United States are currently working in parallel to support a project based in Addis Ababa to assist the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Counterparts include the Chinese and American CDCs, which have an extensive professional relationship. The project was developed after USAID and MOFCOM signed the Memorandum of Understanding on development cooperation in 2015. The purpose of the Africa CDC project is to strengthen technical capacity for surveillance and response, and to enhance the ability of member states of the African Union to address infectious diseases.

MOFCOM insisted on a separate Memorandum of Understanding specifically for this project, which was signed by MOFCOM and USAID, as well as the US Department of Health and Human Services and China's National Health and Family Planning Commission in 2016. The agreement is not legally binding, but outlines the objectives and scope of activities, and remains a guiding document for cooperation.

The respective embassies in Addis Ababa conduct regular meetings and work in parallel to support the project. The ambition for the future is to go beyond surveillance and response and focus on investigation to find out where the next pandemic could emerge. This would be done, for example, by collecting and studying animal viruses. No decision has been made on where the headquarters for such an agency would be situated.

This discussion regarding future cooperation would not necessarily have happened without trilateral cooperation, particularly since it involved like-minded organisations like the CDCs working together. The work is also aimed at the collective global good, meaning a common interest in preventing a future pandemic.



France

focusing on banks (for sustainable development and climate)

08

The French aid organisation, Agence Française de Développement (AFD), incorporates all aid modalities, including sovereign and non-sovereign loans and grants. In China, the focus is on sovereign loans. Outside China, AFD works with the CDB, with which it signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2018 in the presence of the Presidents of both countries.

With China's growing significance as a provider, the two countries have a mutual interest in developing a closer relationship, especially in Africa, where the AFD has extensive experience. While working together can be complicated and time consuming, as with any partnership, the opportunity to learn and achieve better outcomes is the prevailing consideration. The long-term goal is to deliver loans to third countries together with the CDB. These can involve co-funding or parallel funding depending on what works most effectively for the beneficiary country.

The partnership will mainly focus on climate change and Africa. One aim is to define agreed standards, as AFD is working with best practices in terms of environmental and social performance safeguards, transparency and accountability principles, and bidding processes, to name a few. AFD is aware of the importance of examples

on the ground and, without compromising on standards, can be pragmatic in designing loans as long as these work for all parties based on the needs of the beneficiary country.

Another area of common work, on a broader scale, is to assess the indebtedness of beneficiary countries in line with the rules of the Paris Club, of which China is not yet a member. Both AFD and CDB share a focus on debt sustainability and a commitment to avoiding loans to countries where debt is not sustainable.

AFD is increasing the financing of projects in China, with a strategic focus on climate change and the environment, towards full alignment with the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Projects include, for example, initiatives related to urban heritage, regional parks, wetlands, energy efficiency, green credit lines, and water and sanitation. Grants are only provided in specific cases as a leveraging tool, and to finance expertise and technical assistance to ensure the best appraisal or implementation of a project. From AFD's perspective, implementing projects in China builds relationships and allows the sharing of ideas of mutual interest, including concepts and standards on working with environmental issues.

AFD's interventions in China also aim to initiate partnerships with key Chinese actors in sustainable development, such as financial institutions, institutes, think tanks and non-governmental organisations. One recent partnership has been with the Institute of New Structural Economics of Beijing University. A conference co-organised with the CDB addressed the role of national and regional financial institutions in achieving the SDGs and mobilising behind climate action. Joint research work may also be carried out in the future with the CDB and the Institute, with the support of the International Development Financial Club.

AFD's operations are growing globally, and it has recently created 16 regional hubs across the world. A comparative advantage in relation to the CDB is this global network of offices.



Norway

achieving the SDGs and engaging with China as a development cooperation partner

Norway has a strong commitment to the SDGs as they apply to every country and all sectors. If China achieves the SDGs, it will have a significant impact globally due to its size. Norway therefore still implements a bilateral programme in China that focuses on climate change, the environment, sustainable agriculture and aquaculture, and governance, with a particular emphasis on the Nordic welfare model. The aim is to strengthen capacity and competency in the Chinese public sector, using sought-after Norwegian experiences and expertise. In 2018, Norway spent approximately USD 11 million (NOK 94.2 million) on development cooperation in China, mainly facilitating technical and institutional collaboration between Norwegian and Chinese institutions.

Both countries are interested in trilateral cooperation and in April 2017, a Memorandum of Understanding on technical and economic cooperation was signed between Norway's Foreign Minister and MOFCOM. During the visit of the Norwegian Development Minister to Beijing in 2018, meetings were held with both MOFCOM and CIDCA to follow-up on development cooperation and initiate a possible dialogue with China as a global development actor.

While the Memorandum of Understanding opens up scope for trilateral cooperation, much remains to be done to find the most effective and efficient development cooperation modality for all parties. This is expected to take time.

Norway has come to realise the importance of sharing information across and within its systems to build knowledge about China as a global development actor. It is increasingly exchanging information with other embassies, the United Nations and other multilateral entities where Norway has a strategic interest in terms of large development cooperation programmes.

Norway also supports the Centre for Global Development, which held its 2019 Development Leaders conference in Beijing, the first time the event has taken place outside London. This indicates the importance of emerging providers, not least China.



Sweden

prioritising corporate social responsibility

Sweden does not have any trilateral cooperation and is not actively pursuing it at this time. However, like other countries, Sweden is interested in learning more about China as a provider. There have been a few initial discussions between Chinese and Swedish embassies in African countries, but as the Chinese embassies did not have a mandate to make decisions, there was no further discussion. There are still some bilateral projects supported by Swedish development cooperation in China, mainly the activities carried out by the Raoul Wallenberg Institute.

In 2010, the Corporate Social Responsibility Centre was established at the Swedish Embassy in Beijing as part of bilateral cooperation between China and Sweden. The Centre promotes sustainable business in China, and works closely with Swedish companies as well as Chinese ministries, industry associations and companies. The Chinese official counterpart is MOFCOM.

The Centre conducts different activities with various counterparts, such as training and conferences. Swedish companies are very involved in making operations more sustainable both environmentally and socially, and many are active in China. With China taking a more prominent role in the international arena in the last several years, especially within the Belt and Road Initiative, the Centre has supported the production of a report around related sustainability challenges for Swedish companies.

Another Swedish-funded organisation, the Swedish Institute, oversees the Swedish Institute Management Programme, which advances responsible leadership and sustainable business practices. A decade of training has shaped a network of people with whom the Corporate Social Responsibility Centre can engage. These include people at a number of leading industry associations, including the China International Contractors Association formed in 1988 by enterprises and organisations engaged in international project contracting, manpower and other forms of international economic and technical cooperation. It drives sound development and progress in China's international investment and economic cooperation and has 1,300 members.

The China National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC) is a national textile association and intermediary for the industry. The Corporate Social Responsibility Centre works with the CNTAC to promote sustainable textile industries across Asia. According to the CNTAC website, 80% of investment in textile-related industries has gone to Belt and Road Initiative countries and regions in the last five years. The Centre also engages with the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals (under MOFCOM) established in 1988. The Chamber of Commerce includes importers and exporters and has a membership of 5,700 companies.



Switzerland

the first country to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with CIDCA



Switzerland is mainly active in China through its Global Programme for Climate Change and Environment. It is also interested in observing China as a development actor and signed its first Memorandum of Understanding on development cooperation with MOFCOM in 2011. A subsequent 2018 Memorandum of Understanding with CIDCA, the first of its type for the new organisation, aims to strengthen exchanges on international development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

In 2015, the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC) and MOFCOM organised a joint exchange visit on evaluation in the Lao People's Democratic Republic and in Switzerland. Subsequently, representatives from MOFCOM and CAITEC visited SDC to discuss humanitarian aid, project cycle management and cooperation with the private sector. More recently, SDC has been working with CIDCA to develop joint activities and training linked to international development cooperation.

Regarding trilateral cooperation more specifically, a joint project between China, Switzerland and the World Health Organization, aimed at the elimination of Schistosomiasis in the Mekong region, is under discussion.



The Netherlands

tapping the potential of a commercial product: bamboo



The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China's State Forestry Administration and the International Network for Bamboo and Rattan announced a partnership in 2015 to stimulate bamboo business development in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The purpose was to boost rural incomes through pro-poor industrial value chains, restore degraded landscapes and combat climate change as well as generate benefits for European and Chinese investors and consumers.


China's innovations and policy support have seen its domestic bamboo sector grow from a subsistence activity in the 1980s to a vast industry, now worth some USD 30 billion a year. It employs 7.75 million people and has restored over 3 million hectares of degraded land. Internationally, China dominates bamboo export markets, accounting for over 60% of the trade. The Netherlands is home to Moso International, Europe's biggest importer and distributor of bamboo products. Europe has become the largest bamboo product importer, accounting for 38% of the total market, more than double the share of the United States, the second-largest importer, at 18%.

The bamboo project is a South-South business initiative. It links China's vast experience in developing bamboo resources for poverty alleviation and livelihood development with the Netherlands' expertise in areas such as production, marketing and standards—all towards delivering development benefits in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. This experience with triangular cooperation shows how expertise can be combined to bring real, practical development results to beneficiary countries.

The project, implemented by the International Network for Bamboo and Rattan,⁴² has been instrumental in bringing bamboo to the forefront of government development agendas in the three beneficiary countries, evidenced by the development of bamboo policies, strategies and action plans. A small bamboo private sector is starting to emerge. As partners still require significant technical, financial, and policy assistance to upscale and improve the quality of products so that they can access domestic and export markets, a second phase is now under consideration.

⁴² The International Network for Bamboo and Rattan is a multilateral development organisation of 41 member states headquartered in China for the promotion of bamboo and rattan. The network plays a unique role in supporting its members to find and demonstrate innovative ways of using bamboo and rattan to protect environments and biodiversity and alleviate poverty. The Network operates globally, connecting partners from government, private and not-for-profit sectors to define and implement a global agenda for sustainable development.

Annex 2. List of organisations/countries of people interviewed for Independent Mapping II – Voices from International Development Partners



Annex 3. List of Chinese Institutions in South-South Cooperation and trilateral cooperation

	ENGLISH NAME	CHINESE NAME	WEBSITE
1.	China International Development Cooperation Agency	国家国际发展合作署	http://www.cidca.gov.cn
2.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	外交部	https://www.fmprc.gov.cn
3.	Ministry of Finance	财政部	http://www.mof.gov.cn
4.	Ministry of Commerce	商务部	http://www.mofcom.gov.cn
5.	National Health Commission	卫健委	http://www.nhc.gov.cn/
6.	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs	农业农村部	http://www.moa.gov.cn/
7.	National Forestry and Grassland Administration	国家林业和草原局	http://www.forestry.gov.cn/
8.	Ministry of Ecology and Environment	生态环境部	http://www.mee.gov.cn
9.	Ministry of Science and Technology	科学技术部	http://www.most.gov.cn
10.	Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security	人力资源和社会保障部	http://www.mohrss.gov.cn
11.	Ministry of Water Resources	水利部	http://www.mwr.gov.cn
12.	Ministry of Emergency Management	应急管理部	https://www.mem.gov.cn
13.	International Department, Central Committee of CPC	中央外联部	https://www.idcpc.org.cn
Government-affiliated Project Executing Agencies			
14.	Agency for International Economic Cooperation (AIECO), MOFCOM	商务部经济合作局	http://jjhzj.mofcom.gov.cn
15.	China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchanges (CICETE), MOFCOM	商务部国际经济技术交流中心	http://www.cicete.org.cn
16.	Academy for International Business Officials (AIBO), MOFCOM	商务部国际商务官员研修学院	http://www.china-aibo.cn

	ENGLISH NAME	CHINESE NAME	WEBSITE
17.	Foreign Economic Cooperation Center (FECC), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs	农业部对外经济合作中心	http://www.fecc.agri.cn
18.	Center of International Cooperation Service (CICOS), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs	农业农村国际交流服务中心	http://www.cicos.agri.cn/
19.	Center of International Exchanges and Cooperation, National Health Commission	卫健委国际交流与合作中心	http://www.ihecc.org/
20.	Development Center for Medical Science and Technology, National Health Commission	卫健委卫生科技发展研究中心	https://www.dcmst.org.cn/
21.	Center for Project Supervision and Management, NHC	卫健委项目资金监管服务中心	http://www.nhc.gov.cn/
22.	Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange (CSCSE), MOE	教育部留学服务中心	http://www.cscse.edu.cn/
23.	Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban)	国家汉办	http://www.hanban.org/
24.	International Poverty Reduction Center in China	中国国际扶贫中心	http://www.iprcc.org.cn
25.	The Administrative Center for China's Agenda 21	科技部21世纪议程管理中心	http://www.acca21.org.cn/
26.	China Science and Technology Exchange Center (CSTEC)	科技部中国科学技术交流中心	http://www.cstec.org.cn
27.	International Cooperation Center of the National Development and Reform Commission (ICC)	国家发改委国际合作中心	https://en.ndrc.gov.cn
28.	National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation	生态环境部国家应对气候变化战略中心	http://www.ncsc.org.cn

	ENGLISH NAME	CHINESE NAME	WEBSITE
29.	Environmental Development Centre (EPC), Ministry of Ecology and Environment	环保部环境发展中心	http://www.china-epc.cn
30.	International Center on Small Hydro Power (ICSHP)	国际小水电中心	http://www.icshp.org
31.	Center for Environmental Education and Communications (CEEC), Ministry of Ecology and Environment	环境保护部宣传教育中心	http://www.chinaeol.net
32.	Belt and Road Construction Promotion Center	发展改革委“一带一路”建设促进中心	N/A
Development Banks and Funds			
33.	Silk Road Fund	丝路基金有限责任公司	http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn
34.	The Export Import Bank of China (EXIM)	中国进出口银行	http://english.eximbank.gov.cn
35.	China-Africa Capacity Cooperation Fund	中非产能合作基金	http://www.cafic.com.cn
36.	China-Africa Development Fund	中非发展基金	https://www.cadfund.com/
37.	China Development Bank	国家开发银行	http://www.cdb.com.cn/
38.	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank	亚洲基础设施投资银行	https://www.aiib.org/
39.	New Development Bank	新发展银行	https://www.ndb.int/
40.	China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO)	中国国际民间组织合作促进会	http://www.cango.org
41.	China International Contractors Association (CHINCA)	中国对外承包工程商会	http://www.chinca.org
42.	China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (CCCME)	中国机电产品进出口商会	http://www.cccme.org.cn
43.	China Gezhouba Group International Engineering Co.	中国葛洲坝集团国际工程有限公司（纵横五洲研究院）	http://www.gzbgj.com
44.	SynTao - Sustainability Solutions	商道纵横	http://en.syntao.com

	ENGLISH NAME	CHINESE NAME	WEBSITE
45.	China Development Research Foundation	中国发展研究基金会	https://cdrf-en.cdrf.org.cn
46.	China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation	中国扶贫基金会	http://www.cfpa.org.cn
47.	China-Africa Business Council	中非民间商会	http://www.cabc.org.cn
48.	Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), MOFCOM	商务部国际贸易经济合作研究院	http://www.caitec.org.cn
49.	China Association of International Engineering Consultants (CAIEC), MOFCOM	中国国际工程咨询协会	http://caiec.mofcom.gov.cn
50.	China Center for Contemporary World Studies, International Department of Central Committee of CPC	中共中央对外联络部当代世界研究中心	http://www.idcpc.org.cn
51.	International Strategic Research Institute, Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC	中共中央党校国际战略研究所	https://www.ccps.gov.cn/bmpd/gjzlyjy/
52.	International Economics and Finance Institute, Ministry of Finance	财政部国际财经中心	http://iefi.mof.gov.cn
53.	Development Research Center of the State Council	国务院发展研究中心	http://www.drc.gov.cn
54.	Center for International Knowledge on Development	中国国际发展知识中心	http://www.cikd.org
55.	China Development Bank Research Institute	国家开发银行研究院	http://www.cdb.com.cn/
56.	Export-Import Bank of China Strategic Planning Department	中国进出口银行战略规划部	http://www.eximbank.gov.cn
57.	Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development	中国科学技术发展战略研究院	http://casted.org.cn

	ENGLISH NAME	CHINESE NAME	WEBSITE
58.	Energy Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission	国家发展改革委能源研究所	https://fagaiwei.solarbe.com
59.	China Association for International Economic Cooperation (MOFCOM)	商务部中国国际经济合作学会	http://cafiec.mofcom.gov.cn
60.	China National Engineering Research Center of JUNCAO Technology	国家菌草工程技术研究中心	http://www.juncao.org
61.	China Institute of International Studies	中国国际问题研究所	http://www.ciis.org.cn
62.	China Center for International Economic Exchanges	中国国际经济交流中心	http://www.cciee.org.cn
63.	Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	中国社会科学院欧洲研究所	http://ies.cass.cn
64.	Institute of West-Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	中国社会科学院西亚非洲研究所	http://iwaas.cass.cn
65.	Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所	http://iwep.org.cn
66.	Shanghai Academy of Social Science	上海社会科学院	https://www.sass.org.cn
67.	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations	中国现代国际关系研究院	http://www.cicir.ac.cn
68.	Agriculture Information Institute, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences	中国农业科学院信息所	http://www.caas.cn/en/administration/research_institutes/research_institutes_beijing/77772.html
69.	Institute for World Economy Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies	上海国际问题研究院	http://www.siis.org.cn
70.	Guangdong Institute for International Strategies	广东国际战略研究院	http://giis.gdufs.edu.cn

	ENGLISH NAME	CHINESE NAME	WEBSITE
71.	College of Humanities and Development Studies, China Agricultural University	中国农业大学人文与发展学院	http://cohd.cau.edu.cn
72.	China Belt and Road Institute for Agricultural Cooperation / China Institute for South-South Cooperation in Agriculture	中国农业大学一带一路农业合作学院/中国南南农业合作学院	http://cissca.cau.edu.cn
73.	Center for African Studies, Peking University	北京大学国际关系学院非洲研究中心	http://caspu.pku.edu.cn
74.	Institute for Global Health, Peking University	北京大学全球卫生研究中心	http://www.igh.pku.edu.cn
75.	School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University	清华大学公共管理学院	http://www.sppm.tsinghua.edu.cn
76.	Centre for Finance and Development, National Institute of Financial Research, Tsinghua	清华大学金融发展研究中心	http://www.pbcfs.tsinghua.edu.cn/portal/list/index/id/123.html
77.	China Carbon Market Research Center, Tsinghua University	清华大学中国碳市场研究中心	N/A
78.	Centre for Global Economy and Sustainable Development, School of Government, China University of Finance and Economics	中央财经大学全球经济和可持续发展研究中心	http://gesd.cufe.edu.cn
79.	Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development, Peking University	北京大学南南合作学院	www.isscad.pku.edu.cn
80.	School of International Development and Cooperation, University of International Business and Economics	对外经济贸易大学国际发展合作学院	http://sidc.uibe.edu.cn
81.	School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Beijing Foreign Studies University	北京外国语大学国际关系学院	http://sird.bfsu.edu.cn

	ENGLISH NAME	CHINESE NAME	WEBSITE
82.	Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University	浙江师范大学非洲研究院	http://ias.zjnu.cn
83.	School of Advanced International and Area Studies, East China Normal University	华东师范大学国际关系与地区发展研究院	https://saias-en.ecnu.edu.cn
84.	China Institute for International Development, The School of Economics, Xiamen University	厦门大学经济学院中国国际发展研究所	http://www.soe.xmu.edu.cn/departments/institute-of-economics/
85.	International Development Cooperation Institute, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics	上海对外经贸大学国际发展合作研究院	http://www.suibe.edu.cn
86.	Institute of International Economics, Nankai University	天津南开大学国际经济研究所	https://nkiie.nankai.edu.cn
87.	Africa Research Center, China Foreign Affairs University	外交学院非洲研究中心	http://wyx.cfau.edu.cn/col/col3822/index.html
88.	Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development, Peking University	北京大学南南合作与发展学院	www.isscad.pku.edu.cn
89.	Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China	中国人民大学重阳金融研究院	http://rdcy.org/index.php?s=/Index/news_cont/id/973.html
90.	Center for China in the World Economy	清华大学中国与世界经济研究中心	http://www.ccwe.tsinghua.edu.cn
91.	BRICS Cooperation Center, Beijing Normal University	北京师范大学金砖国家合作中心	https://www.bnu.edu.cn
92.	Institute of International Studies, Fudan University	复旦大学国际问题研究院	http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/main.htm
93.	School of Political Science and International Relations, Tongji University	同济大学政治与国际关系学院	http://spsir.tongji.edu.cn
94.	BRICS National Research Center, Fudan Development Institute	复旦大学发展研究院金砖国家研究中心	https://fddi.fudan.edu.cn

	ENGLISH NAME	CHINESE NAME	WEBSITE
95.	Center for BRICS Studies, Guangdong University of Technology	广东工业大学金砖国家研究中心	http://brics.gdut.edu.cn/zxgk/zxjj.htm
96.	School of International Relations, Xiamen University	厦门大学国际关系学院	https://guoguan.xmu.edu.cn
97.	National Think-Tank of Development and Strategy	国发智库研究院	http://www.ntds.org.cn/Wlist/?id=287
98.	China Daily China Watch Think Tank	中国日报中国观察智库	http://cn.chinadaily.com.cn
99.	Center for China and Globalization	中国全球化智库	http://www.ccg.org.cn
100.	China Overseas Security Research Institute	中国海外安全研究所	http://cosri.org.cn
101.	China South-South Cooperation Network	中国南南合作网	http://www.ecdc.net.cn

Annex 4. Mapping of partner countries' engagement with China (including trilateral projects)

Note: A more detailed version can be obtained from UNDP and is updated on a regular basis.
For the latest list of UN Agency engagement in SSTRC with China please contact UNDP China directly.

DEVELOPMENT PARTNER	SECTORS	COUNTRIES	NAME OF PROJECTS	PROJECT TIMEFRAME AND BUDGET	MODALITIES	PARTNER INSTITUTIONS	CHINESE CONTRIBUTORS
Australia	Health	Papua New Guinea	Australia China Papua New Guinea Pilot Cooperation on Malaria Control	2016 to 2019 AUD 5.5 million	Technical cooperation	Joint Programme Working Group: Papua New Guinea National Department of Health, Papua New Guinea Department of National Planning and Monitoring, Papua New Guinea Department of Foreign Affairs, MOFCOM (DITEA), Chinese National Health Commission, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Implementing agencies: Papua New Guinea Central Public Health Laboratory, Papua New Guinea Institute of Medical Research, Papua New Guinea School of Medicine and Health Sciences, National Institute of Parasitic Diseases (China), Chinese Provincial Disease Control Agencies, Burnet Institute (Australia), Walter & Eliza Hall Institute (Australia), Australian Defence Joint Force Malaria and Infectious Disease Institute, Australian National University	Technical expertise and in-kind support
	Governance	China	Australia China Human Rights Technical Cooperation Program 2017-21	June 2017 to June 2021 AUD 8 million	Technical cooperation	Australia: Australian Human Rights Commission. China: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (lead agency), All China Women's Federation, Zhicheng Public Interest Lawyers, China Disabled Persons' Federation, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Justice, National Health Commission, Supreme People's Court, United Nations Association of China	
	Gender	Cambodia	Gender-sensitive Corporate Responsibility Project	April 2018 to May 2020 AUD 200,000	Project	The Asia Foundation and the China Textile Information Centre	
	Various	China and misc. partner countries	Enhancing engagement with China in support of the 2030 Agenda	May 2018 to June 2022 AUD 2.9 million	Flexible facility project	UNDP China	
Denmark	Renewable energy	Zambia	China-Zambia South-South Cooperation on Renewable Energy Technology Transfer	2014 to 2018 USD 2.6 million: Zambia USD 1.6 million China USD 1 million	Training workshops, study visits, pilot projects	Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water Development (Zambia), Ministry of Science and Technology (China), Administration Center for China Agenda 21 (China), UNDP in China and Zambia	
	Renewable energy	Ghana	China-Ghana South-South Cooperation on Renewable Energy Technology Transfer	2014 to 2018 USD 2.7 million: Ghana USD 1.8 million China USD 956,000	Training workshops, study visits, pilot projects	Energy Commission in Ghana, China Ministry of Science and Technology, Administration Center for China Agenda 21, UNDP in China and Zambia	

DEVELOPMENT PARTNER	SECTORS	COUNTRIES	NAME OF PROJECTS	PROJECT TIMEFRAME AND BUDGET	MODALITIES	PARTNER INSTITUTIONS	CHINESE CONTRIBUTORS
Germany (Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Federal Republic of Germany, implemented by GIZ)	Technical Vocational Education and Training	Laos	Technical Vocational Education and Training for Rural Jobs in Laos	Pilots 2018	Triangular cooperation project Technical cooperation	Political Partners: Ministry of Education and Sports of the Lao People's Democratic Republic; Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China; Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Federal Republic of Germany Implementation: Vocational Education Development Institute (Lao), Qingdao Education Bureau, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	Parallel funding of equal contributions
	Textiles	Ethiopia	Sustainable Textile Investment and Operation in Ethiopia	2019-2021	Triangular cooperation project Technical cooperation	Political Partners: Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia; Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China; Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Federal Republic of Germany Implementation: Ethiopian Textile Industry Development Institute (ETIDI); United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO); China National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC); Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	Parallel funding of equal contributions
		Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam	Support for sustainable investment in the textile and garment industry in Asia	2020-2021	Regional project Technical cooperation	Chinese Political Partner: MofCom Chinese implementation Partner: China National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC) Political Partners in other partner countries: Ministries in charge of supervision of the textile sector Implementing partners in other partner countries: various	Technical expertise, staff costs, full cost of Chinese participation in activities, share of general costs for activities
	Various	Worldwide with focus on Africa	Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development	Current phase 2019-2021, cooperation history for over 10 years	Trilateral cooperation facility Technical cooperation	Chinese Political Partner: MofCom Chinese Implementing Partners: Trade Development Bureau (TDB), China Center for International Knowledge on Development (CIKD), China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), various	Equal contributions to joint trilateral cooperation projects
	Agriculture	Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Mongolia	Support of regional economic cooperation in Asia, with focus on agricultural products	Current phase 2017-2020	Regional project Technical cooperation	Chinese Political Partner: MofCom Chinese implementing partners: various, local political partners of border provinces, e.g. Guangxi, Jilin Political Partners in other countries: Ministries in charge of trade and agriculture Implementation partners: Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), chambers of commerce and trade associations, e.g. VIETRADE	Chinese contribution to GTI secretariat and GTI projects; Technical expertise, staff costs, full costs for Chinese participation in pilot trilateral activities, share of general cost for activities
	Global Governance	Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa	Emerging Market sustainability Dialogues	Current phase 2019-2022, previous phase 2015-2019, cooperation history for over 10 years	Global Dialogue on sustainability topics with emerging markets (finance, infrastructure, think tanks)	Chinese Implementation Partner: China International Contractors Association (CHINCA), Peoples Bank of China (PoB), various Implementation Partners in other countries: various	Technical expertise, in-kind, Chinese participation costs of activities

DEVELOPMENT PARTNER	SECTORS	COUNTRIES	NAME OF PROJECTS	PROJECT TIMEFRAME AND BUDGET	MODALITIES	PARTNER INSTITUTIONS	CHINESE CONTRIBUTORS
New Zealand	Water and sanitation	Cook Islands	China-New Zealand Cook Islands Te Mato Vai Water Partnership: Upgrade potable water infrastructure in Cook Islands	2014 to 2016, being extended USD 23 million (concessional loan from the EXIM Bank, up to NZD 15 million grant)		EXIM Bank, China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC)	Concessional loan
United Kingdom (DFID)	Agriculture	Pilots: Malawi, Uganda, Research in Cambodia, Ghana, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda	Working in Partnership for Agricultural Technology Transfer	2013 to 2017 GBP 10 million	Pilot projects, collaborative research, knowledge sharing	Ministry of Agriculture, MOFCOM	
	Disaster response	China, Bangladesh, Nepal	Community-Based Disaster Management	2012 to 2018 GBP 6 million (GBP 300,000 for each country)	Policy exchange, community exchanges, testing of approaches, collaborative research, information platform	Ministry of Civil Affairs/National Disaster Risk Reduction Centre for China, MOFCOM	
	Health	Ethiopia, Myanmar, Tanzania	Global Health Support Programme	2012 to 2018 GBP 5.9 million	Pilot projects to test experiences from China and deliver health outcomes	National Health and Family Planning Commission, MOFCOM	
United States (USAID)	Agricultural technology and food security	Timor-Leste	US-China Timor-Leste Trilateral Cooperation Project in Agriculture	2013 to 2015	Technology transfer and training		
	Health	African Union, Addis Ababa	Supporting the African Union Centre for Disease Control and Prevention	Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2016, launched in 2017	Training	US and Chinese centres for disease control	



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