



POLICY BRIEF

ENHANCING THE PROVISION OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: READY FOR MORE REALISM?

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this policy brief is to better understand what type of reinvigorated multilateralism would be fit for purpose, that is, fostering more adequate global public good (GPG) provision under the present policymaking realities, and to explore whether there already exists a momentum for such change on which to build further progress. The analysis suggests that such a reinvigorated multilateralism would have four distinguishing features. It would operate on the principle of fostering mutual compatibility between international cooperation and sovereignty; recognize GPGs as a new, additional type of public policy challenge, ending their current confounding with development assistance; adopt a mission-oriented approach to resolving GPG-related challenges; and integrate the rising number of autochthonous regional organizations as meso-level intermediaries between the 'global' and the 'individual,' including the 'individual national' into global governance. The reason for this fourth feature would be that these regional organizations and the regionalization they drive already play a critical though often still underappreciated role in GPG provision. The policy brief also recommends ways for translating these four reform ideas into innovations at the practical political level. Most just call for a massive rethinking, or put differently, more realism.

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INTRODUCTION

Global challenges figure ever more prominently and in ever greater numbers on national and international policy agendas. They range from communicable disease control to climate change mitigation and from financial stability to the universalization of norms such as basic human rights. Old and new security challenges have also come up for consideration, including cybersecurity; the safe use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence; nuclear non-proliferation; terrorism control; and the prevention or cessation of war. As the recent coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic taught us once again—and perhaps more directly than ever before—many global challenges may, for better or for worse, affect all countries and all people, irrespective of whether we are rich or poor, living in the Global North or in the Global South. Challenges of this type are referred to as **global public goods (GPGs)**.¹ GPGs not only affect all of us directly or indirectly but also require all of us to contribute to their adequate provision. In other words, they call for international cooperation, often even **universal multilateralism**.

While state and nonstate actors worldwide are active contributors to GPG provision, experience shows that the sum of these contributions in many cases falls short of requirements. As a result, **GPG-related problems often remain unresolved, even though their scientific and technical dimensions are well-understood**, and the resources needed to resolve them are also within the bounds of what is feasible.

The question thus arises: Is the present system of multilateral cooperation not well equipped to tackle GPG-type challenges? This question has attracted the attention of world leaders. For example, in their Declaration on the Commemoration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, the heads of state and government of United Nations (UN) member states emphasize that the global challenges confronting us “can only be addressed through reinvigorated multilateralism” (United Nations, 2020; para.5). However, the Declaration does not specify how this reinvigorated multilateralism would need to differ from today’s multilateral governance practices and, importantly, how it could come about. These issues will become the subject of future consultations and debates.

Accordingly, this policy brief explores these two unaddressed points of the Declaration. More specifically, it aims, first, to **better understand what type of reinvigorated multilateralism would be fit for purpose**, that is, fostering more adequate GPG provision given the present

“No clear vision exists of how to realize mutual compatibility between effective international-community and national policymaking sovereignty.”

policymaking realities, and second, to **explore whether there already exists a momentum for such change** on which further progress can potentially be based.

The discussion of these points is structured as follows. The first section analyses the key characteristics of GPGs from the special viewpoint of their governance requirements. Against this background, the second section examines the factors and forces that explain why these requirements are not adequately met today. The third and fourth sections explain how to do better in the future, assuming that the ultimate goal is to foster global sustainable growth and development, as stipulated in the United Nations 2030 Agenda (United Nations, 2015). The fifth section offers suggestions on the next steps that select actor groups could consider in order to help promote the needed governance reforms. The concluding section argues that fostering reinvigorated multilateralism and achieving enhanced GPG provision require a massive rethinking at the theoretical and practical policy level; and that now seems to be the right time for it, considering the broad-based and strong ambition among policymakers and the global public alike to do better in a post-COVID-19 era.

¹ Drawing on Paul A. Samuelson (1954), standard economic theory distinguishes between two main categories of goods: private goods and public goods. This classification depends on two characteristics of goods: (1) their rivalry, that is, whether one’s consumption of the good reduces another person’s ability to consume the good, and (2) their excludability, or the ability of the owner of the good to prevent its use by another person. A good that is both rival, meaning one person’s consumption prevents another person from consuming it, and excludable, meaning the owner can prevent someone from using the good, is a private good. Conversely, a good that is non rival, meaning one person’s consumption does not diminish another person’s ability to consume it, and non excludable, meaning the owner cannot easily prevent others from using the good, is a public good. The public effects of a good can be local, national, regional, worldwide and cross-generational. Global public goods are goods of which benefits or costs are of nearly universal reach or potentially affect anyone anywhere (Kaul, 2015).

GPGs: KEY PROPERTIES AND GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS

This section identifies the distinguishing properties of a GPG and then presents a brief overview of the myriad inputs that, in many cases, must come together in order for the good to emerge. The discussion summary shows that GPGs constitute a new, additional type of public-policy challenge that does not fit easily into any of the conventional governance moulds.²

KEY PROPERTIES

The generic definition of a pure public good (PG) is that it is **non-rival** and **non-excludable** and, because of the latter property, **public in consumption**. Depending on the geographic reach of a good's public effects, it is said to be a local, national, regional or global PG. This may sound rather straightforward. In reality, however, matters are more complicated.

For example, some goods may be non-rival only up to certain points, after which their availability declines due to over-exploitation. An example of a GPG that is subject to over-exploitation is the atmosphere, which, if overloaded with greenhouse gas emissions, causes global warming. Consequently, if global warming is to be limited, the human impact on the atmosphere also needs to be limited by making the good in question less global and public in consumption through deliberate policy choice. Or consider knowledge – a non-rival good par excellence. However, it can, for example, be patented and thereby taken out of the public domain, in many cases, even the global public domain; it thus becomes privatized as the property of the patent holder.

Therefore, thinking in terms of a **public-private continuum** can help us conceptualise PGs. The outer poles of the continuum comprise, at one end, purely private (rival and excludable) goods and, at the other end, purely public (non-rival and non-excludable) goods. Many other goods might fall somewhere between the two ends, based on various sociocultural, moral, ethical, environmental or economic/financial considerations.

The 'globalness'³ of GPGs is often not an innate property but reflects a policy choice, most notably, the choice to promote economic openness and, in support thereof, cross-border market integration and interoperable transportation and communication systems. Therefore, it is also useful to distinguish between, on the one hand, natural GPGs, such as the already mentioned atmosphere, or the moonlight and the high seas, the existence of which predates the existence of humans, and, on the other hand, human-made GPGs.

The latter, for the most part, have arisen from deliberate human choices, such as the global institutional and physical communications and transport systems, or else global norms, such as national sovereignty or basic human rights that aim for global public acceptance: in other words, globally public consumption. In several cases, these deliberate policy choices have led to the (often unintended) globalization of essentially national (including local) PGs, such as financial contagion effects, crime and violence, and information and news.

In this connection, one might also point to the difference between making a non-rival good, such as knowledge, excludable and making a rival good, such as a vaccine, available for all. The latter proposal has emerged as a possible way to end the COVID-19 pandemic, with its advocates frequently calling for making the vaccine a global public good. However, due to its innate property of being rival in consumption, technically speaking, a vaccine cannot be turned into a GPG. All one can do is produce it in quantities sufficient to make it available to all who want it, at an affordable price or even free of charge, thus rendering the rival property moot. However, someone would still have to pay – perhaps several billion times or so – the price that producers charge per single dose of the vaccine, not counting other transaction costs involved in its safe transportation and administration.

On the other hand, if one were to ask inventors of, for example, a critical vaccine or green technology to allow the global and public use of the technology for which they hold the patents, one would perhaps have to reimburse them for the research costs they incurred. However, the invention would not need repeating millions or billions of times. This difference between a vaccine and a knowledge or technology product shows the importance of clarifying the consumption properties of a PG.⁴

A proper understanding of GPGs also requires us to

² For a comprehensive overview of the evolution and the current state of the debate in the social-science, political-science and international relations literature on GPGs, see Kaul (2016) and Kaul et al. (2016).

³ The term 'globalness' originated in the field of marketing, where it describes how a brand is widely available and accepted across the world; see Liu et al. (2021).


⁴ For a more detailed discussion on making vaccines available for all, see Kaul (2020d) and Reddy and Acharya (2020).

clarify the meaning of the terms ‘global’ and ‘good’ as used in this context. **Global means that the goods have worldwide effects**, spanning countries in different parts of the world, areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJs) and, perhaps, multiple generations. Importantly, they tend to penetrate countries and ABNJs without asking for permission or a visa. Thus, considering that we live in a world of manifold differences, disparities and varying preferences among countries and

population groups, the border-crossing penetration effects of a GPG may create conflict or contestation. This occurs because of their perceived negative impact on the welfare of the affected countries and because they run counter to the core principles of the present world order – non-violability of national borders and national policymaking sovereignty.

In other words, the goods’ global ‘publicness’⁵ in

Figure 1: The provision path of a global public good



Source: Kaul et al. (2016, p. xxxix)

⁵ On the concept of ‘publicness’ and global governance, see Koenig-Archibugi and Zürn (2006).

consumption **entails policy interdependence among countries**, which may or may not be welcomed by certain countries and population groups; and, therefore, when used in reference to a PG, the term ‘good’ is **value neutral**. It denotes a thing, product, service or condition, just as it does when used in reference to a private good, such as a cigarette or car.

GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS

Just like most private goods, most PGs, including GPGs, are composed of various building blocks that need to be assembled in order for the desired final good to emerge. Similarly, once they exist, they need maintenance and care lest they stop generating their expected benefits.

The public goods literature has distinguished three main types of assembly processes: **summation**, **summation with a weak link**, and **best shot** (Cornes and Sandler, 1996). Figure 1 illustrates, in a highly stylized and simplified form, the provision path of a good following a summation-type provision process, as do many GPGs. Clearly, GPGs are not provided in a lump sum at the international level, by one or another global actor, such as the United Nations or the World Bank. This holds even for goods that follow a best shot provision path, such as the invention of a new vaccine.⁶ GPG provision is a highly complex process. In order for the final product to emerge, many hands have to come on deck, including multiple state and nonstate actors, who can generate the required inputs at different levels of policymaking and, most likely, also in a wide range of economic sectors.

Thus, when considering how best to provide a GPG most efficiently and effectively, policymakers need to consider several aspects and make a number of choices. Crucially important is to **determine whether the good in question has specific “systemic integrity requirements”** that must be met for it to emerge and generate the expected benefits, or whether it can be improved incrementally (Costanza, 2015). If it is the former, then it is important to accept that in determining adequate provision, not only human interests count but also the interests, the systemic integrity requirements of the good itself, a requirement of special importance now in the Anthropocene.

Other provision aspects to consider would include, for example, the **balances to strike between horizontal and vertical decentralization; the willingness to cooperate among essential input providers** and the incentives they would eventually need; the **views and expectations of concerned stakeholders; the necessary types of financing** and how to mobilize them; and last but not

least, **how to share the costs and expected benefits**. Ideally, each of the goods to be provided, such as maritime security, would have one or more provision platforms, along with platform facilitators or focal points to keep an eye on the overall process and to report back periodically to the policymaking bodies concerned. The creation of such networking arrangements would make it possible for the governance processes of GPG provision to match the goods’ global character.

Thus, GPG provision, too, involves interdependence, adding to the interdependence among countries and people stemming from the goods’ globally public consumption; this consequently **strengthens the sense of curtailed sovereignty that policymakers and the public often associate with GPGs**.

A NEW TYPE OF POLICY CHALLENGE

The foregoing discussion suggests that GPGs constitute a new, additional type of public-policy challenge. This rests mainly on the three following characteristics:

1. **GPGs do not fall squarely into any of the conventional policy moulds**, such as domestic policy or foreign affairs. They also go beyond development assistance because they concern all of us, rich and poor, North and South, and, of course, they do not allow for resolution through military force or geoeconomics. Adequate GPG provision calls for institutional innovation.
2. **GPGs entail policy interdependence due to their globally public consumption and provision**. They therefore clash with the conventional 19th Century (but still dominant) notion of sovereignty, with the related principles of non-violable national borders and non-interference in national policymaking by external forces. Thus, they require viable ways of reaching both effective GPG provision and policymaking sovereignty.
3. **Determining the need, urgency and magnitude of planned GPG interventions requires attention to the goods’ provisioning requirements, not only to human interests**, whether those of state or non-state actors. Hence, investment-thinking rather than donor-thinking needs to underpin GPG financing.

Judging from recent reports on global crisis and gaps in GPG provision, it appears that the needed innovations have, to date, only happened in part if at all (WEF, 2021; WMO, 2021). The next section offers some explanations for this current state of GPG provision.

⁶ On the process of vaccine research and development, see Felner (2021) and WHO (2021).

EXPLAINING TODAY'S UNDER-PROVISION OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS

Psychological and behavioural factors receive the most frequent mention in the social-sciences literature as contributors to GPG under-provision. The most frequently assumed **impediment is free riding on the part of individual actors in the presence of public goods**. By now, however, evidence has mounted that this type of behaviour does not occur as generally as analysts assume. Many individual actors, whether organizational entities, such as state, business and civil-society groups, or human individuals, act out of mixed motives, or perhaps even out of pure altruism. Often, hesitation to cooperate arises from aversion to change or uncertainty stemming from lack of information or inability fully to grasp complex events.

No doubt such psychological and behavioural factors also contribute to GPG under-provision today. However, many seem to have deeper roots and serve as symptoms of more **basic systemic and structural problems**. Therefore, the following analysis focuses on systemic factors, notably lagging adjustment to today's policymaking realities within the operational system of multilateral cooperation and structural factors, especially as-yet-unsettled and intensifying global power shifts. The summary notes that concern about their national policymaking sovereignty makes countries reluctant to cooperate today.

SYSTEMIC FACTORS

Global governance, or the system of international cooperation, consists of two main interrelated processes: **policy-setting or negotiations and operations or implementation**. With the rising number of GPG-type challenges confronting us, the policy-setting part has become more and more global issue-focused. Special issue-focused multilateral, even universal multilateral negotiation processes now exist for older and newer GPGs, ranging from climate change to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), cybersecurity and the combined global public spill-over effects of GPG under-provision, such as swelling movements of forced international refugee and migration streams. In these forums, countries forge agreements on global goals, principles, norms and standards.

However, on the operational side, governance arrangements have largely remained unchanged. For the most part, the operational multilateral system still functions as a development assistance or aid system: much the same holds for the bilateral aid system.

Most of its increasingly numerous agencies, funds and programs, including the multilateral development banks (MDBs), have a country-focused business model and corresponding instruments, and, in the case of the MDBs, for example, sovereign loans. Of course, developing countries – like many industrialized countries – have a genuine interest in undertaking projects (even loan-financed ones) in GPG-related policy fields, projects that can generate national benefits and global co-benefits. This becomes evident from their voluntary nationally determined commitments (NDCs) to reduce greenhouse gases.

“A continuation of business as usual seems to be highly undesirable, leading us not toward but away from the agreed goal of global sustainability”

However, the experience in the Global South and Global North has also made it evident that the non-recognition of GPGs as policy concerns sui generis also creates many challenges. While countries, state and non-state actors contribute in myriad ways to numerous GPGs, **the sum of all these individual efforts often does not meet requirements for adequate provision levels**. Individual and global interests overlap only partially, and the present system has no effective pull mechanisms in place. As a result, especially in the case of binary goods, such as climate change mitigation, under-provision problems remain unresolved, and may even worsen and assume ever more serious, costly and potentially catastrophic proportions. The next section suggests that the ongoing global power shifts play a major role in this institutional lock-in and path dependency.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS

As more developing states have moved up the development ladder, some have become global powerhouses and have begun to play a more proactive role in multilateral forums, regionally and globally (Kaul, 2020;

Lopes and Kararach, 2019). The world has begun a gradual move away from the conventional constellation of a small group of powerful states acting as global policy-setters, often under the leadership of one of the superpowers, with the rest of the countries largely relegated to policy-taker status.

In the wake of these shifts, **top-down power politics have increasingly lost effectiveness** as multilateralism's main operating principle. The industrialized countries have confronted ever more frequently what their developing counterparts have long known: namely, that **international cooperation and sovereignty do not necessarily fit together** quasi-automatically. Especially under the present conditions of increasing multipolarity, any such fit calls for compromises, acknowledging and respecting varying preferences and priorities, and striking win-win bargains to bring all on board.

However, rather than accepting that conditions have changed, industrialized countries began partially to retreat from universal multilateralism, negotiating select issues in mini-lateral forums and promoting club-based governance, for example by institutionalizing regular meetings of the Group of Seven (G7). The developing countries followed suit and set up their own mini-lateral initiatives, such as the BRICS Forum and other new mechanisms, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the New Development Bank. Moreover, official development assistance (ODA) flows became more targeted to issues of special concern for donor countries. In fact, the principal change has come in greater reliance on private finance for development.

Unsurprisingly, under these circumstances very few if any countries have had a strong appetite for change. Universal multilateralism and perhaps even multilateralism in general became shallow. More omnibus agreements were adopted, such as the 2030 Agenda, which covers so wide a range of goals and sub-goals (many already approved in earlier UN resolutions) that adopting it did not require any too-difficult compromise. Similarly, the Paris Agreement on climate change could pass because, among other things, it emphasized voluntary nationally determined commitments to carbon-dioxide emissions reductions. To complicate matters further, rather than seeking new cooperation strategies, rivalry emerged between the major powers, notably between China and the United States. This left the world adrift without any clear vision of how to cooperate on GPG-type issues that, as both sides would perhaps readily admit, no one country, however powerful, can resolve unilaterally and alone.⁷

A LACK OF REALISM AND VISION HOLDS BACK NEEDED CHANGE

Thus, it appears that the under-provision of GPGs today stems from two main factors: **institutional lock-in**, notably the lagging adjustment of the operational system of international cooperation (IC) to both the growing importance of GPGs and increasing multipolarity; and **the ongoing global power shifts**, which make both developed and developing countries follow a 'logic of hedging' (Matthews, 2021, p.12). This is a course of shallow, non-committal IC because, for quite different reasons, **both groups of countries are concerned about lacking compatibility between international cooperation and national policymaking sovereignty**. Therefore, how could the world escape from this policy trap? The next section offers an initial set of reform ideas, while the fourth section explores whether there already exist change processes that appear to head in the direction of the changes suggested.

“Clearly, enhancing the provision of GPGs, notably resolving the most pressing problems resulting from their under-provision, requires a major rethinking of current concepts, institutional arrangements and international-community strategies. Isolated *ad hoc* changes and a bit more money here or there will not suffice”

⁷ On this point, also see the 2021 Earth Day Summit on Climate convened by the US President and attended by 40 heads of state or government (Neuberger, 2021).


DOING BETTER IN THE FUTURE I: MAKING MULTILATERALISM FIT FOR PURPOSE

When taking the previous findings together, it seems that making multilateralism fit for purpose will at least need the following three reforms: first and foremost, to **forge consensus on a new principle of mutual compatibility** between IC and sovereignty as a new operating principle of multilateralism and, in support thereof, to **recognize GPGs as a new, additional type of public policy issue**; and to **adopt a platform or ‘mission-oriented approach’** to GPG provision that is focused on actually achieving the resolution of existing under-provision problems (Mazzucato, 2017; Mazzucato, 2021). We will discuss each of these three reforms in turn. As the search for doing better continues in the next section, we integrate and sum up the analysis in the final sections.

MAKING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION AND SOVEREIGNTY MUTUALLY COMPATIBLE

The conventional and, until now, dominant operating principle of international cooperation has been power politics. However, considering that this principle is fast losing out in political acceptance and consequently, effectiveness, the question arises of what could take its place in the future. Given countries’ concerns about how to ensure that international cooperation does not undermine their sovereignty, Kaul (2020) argues for replacing power politics as the chief operating principle of international cooperation by a principle of ‘**dual**

Figure 2: A tripod architecture of international cooperation finance



Source: Kaul (2020d, p.154)

compatibility, referring to the mutual compatibility between international cooperation and sovereignty. To foster such compatibility, the principle would require states to aim for two objectives:

1. Constructing international cooperation bargains

that all the concerned parties view as sovereignty-compatible, that is, enhancing their national welfare and well-being.

2. Making every effort possible to exercise their national policymaking sovereignty in a way that is compatible with the global.

To elaborate on the second objective, the respectful exercise of national policymaking sovereignty might imply, among other things, respect for other nations' sovereignty and to this end, **willingness to internalize negative cross-border spillovers wherever possible and in line with established global goals and norms of fairness and justice.** It would also include **respect for the adequate-provision requirements of GPGs** and hence, willingness to contribute a fair share of the inputs required, individually and collectively.

Clearly, reaching consensus on any one side of this notion of dual compatibility will depend on consensus on the other side. It may also depend on related processes of consultation and decision-making being fully participatory and transparent. Discussing and agreeing on a notion of dual compatibility could have the positive effect of changing the language and perception of IC, such that in the minds of many policymakers and the public, it loses its equation with giving up or losing national policymaking sovereignty. However, applying the new operating principle and enabling all concerned parties to judge for themselves whether a particular IC initiative meets the criterion of dual compatibility would critically depend on states' concurrent agreement to the reforms discussed next.

RECOGNIZING GPGs

Given the intention stated in several recent global agreements to promote sustainable global growth and development, the resolution of the most pressing cases of GPG under-provision ought to be a top priority, not only at the level of rhetoric but also at the practical political level. It is difficult to imagine how an effective and efficient resolution of related problems could be achieved without granting GPGs their long overdue recognition as a policy type sui generis. To do so would imply accepting both that these goods differ in significant ways from other types of IC challenges, such as development assistance and financing for a global crisis response and stabilization facility and that there also exist nu-

“On the operational side, GPGs call for extensive, often world-wide, multi-level, multi-sector and, therefore, also quasi-universal multilateral networking arrangements with decision makers, input providers and stakeholders. Therefore, they would best be tackled by setting up GPG-specific global platforms and mission-oriented approach”

merous interlinkages and synergies between these different IC strands, as shown in Figure 2, which illustrates the resultant tripod-shaped architecture of international cooperation finance.

ADOPTING A MISSION-ORIENTED APPROACH TO GPG PROVISION

As discussed above, GPGs tend to be highly complex issues. On the political or negotiations side of IC, they tend to call for universal multilateralism for the simple fact that they often affect and concern all or at least many of us across the world. On the operational side, they call for extensive, often world-wide, multi-level, multi-sector and, therefore, also quasi-universal multilateral networking arrangements with decision makers, input providers and stakeholders. Therefore, they would best be tackled by setting up GPG-specific global platforms, along with platform facilitators and focal points, mandated to facilitate a comprehensive, integrated and result-oriented approach to the management of their provision. Such a platform approach would be akin to what Mazzucato (2017; 2021) describes as a **“mission-oriented approach.”**

The main characteristic of such an approach is its ambition of not only to aim at but actually reach the goals, targets and timeframes decided by the concerned legislative bodies. To this end, it would also be a part of the mission not only to **reach out to, exchange information with and provide a sense of direction to the myriad actors who voluntarily provide**

inputs. In addition, the platform or mission facilitators' mandate would involve **identifying complementary inputs that need to be provided collectively at the international level and to mobilize the requisite financing for those.** In this way, it could become possible to actually close the gaps that nowadays remain between the sum of the inputs voluntarily provided by individual actors and those needed to reach the level of adequate provision.

To illustrate, in the case of COVID-19, the collectively to-be-provided inputs include, among others, financing for the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access Facility (COVAX) and the financing needed to support developing countries in coping with the economic effects of the pandemic. However, as the IC approach to COVID-19 is still of a conventional, fractured type, many of the additionally required inputs are seriously underfunded.⁸ There exists no integrated mission-oriented approach to fighting the COVID-19 pandemic.

Clearly, key features of mission-oriented projects that deserve this name would systematically assess what it would cost to achieve their mission, undertake at least rough-and-ready but solid analyses of the financial and non-financial costs and benefits and mobilize the required funds. In cases that require urgent resolution, it could even be desirable to establish a scale of assessed contributions until a project's mission is accomplished, covering all countries and taking into account such established burden-sharing principles as the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities (UNFCCC, n.d.).

“Regional organizations play an important role in both enhanced GPG provision and in making multilateralism function. In fact, some of the global challenges confronting the world could prove to be much more serious but for the activities undertaken by regional organizations in Asia and elsewhere”

⁸ On the COVAX funding gap, see Farge (2021) and, on financial support for developing countries, see Mazarei (2021).

DOING BETTER IN THE FUTURE II: RECOGNIZING THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GPG PROVISION

A central thesis developed in economist Albert O. Hirschman's writings states that at any point in time, societal conditions are likely to contain both destructive and constructive forces (Adelman, 2013). So, can we discern these sorts of constructive forces at the present moment, ones that could help advance the change agenda discussed above. As the following discussion shows, the answer is 'Yes.'

Among the many ongoing global transformation processes, one that seems to qualify as constructive is the rising trend towards regionalism in the Global South. According to Acharya, "Regionalism – especially [...] 'open regionalism' that engages positively with outside actors – is key to the decentring and pluralisation of world politics. It allows different actors, regions and institutions to play a role in building global order" (Acharya, 2016, p.3). **Autochthonous regional organizations** (ROs) have emerged as an important driving force behind the rise of regionalism in the developing world. These entities, for the most part created and governed by states of a particular geographic region, aim to enhance their member-states' welfare through various forms of cooperation and integration, including economic, sociocultural, environmental and political. These ROs differ from other regional entities, such as the UN's regional commissions, in that they are not arms of a conventional multilateral organization but rather associations rooted and headquartered in regions and subregions.

This section analyses the present role and functioning of ROs in the Global South in terms of their potential for enhancing GPG provision. It takes stock of current RO action in respect to GPGs and examines their models of multilateral cooperation.⁹ It then assesses the role of ROs to date, suggesting that ROs already serve as pivotal meso-level intermediaries between the global and the individual in GPG provision. To date, this role of ROs has, however, received only limited attention, including from the international development assistance community.

ROS' PRESENT ROLE IN GPG PROVISION

Most ROs were created with the overarching goal of improving the welfare and wellbeing of their member states through cooperative efforts aimed at fostering integration among them. The expectation, which, in large measure, has been realized, was that integration

would give small- or middle-sized countries added economic and political visibility and strength and thus enhanced opportunities to pursue more self-determined development goals and to exercise more agency in international negotiations on global matters.

“The GPG-related activities undertaken by regional organizations fall into a number of different functional categories, including providing new and additional contributions to GPGs, offering development assistance to weaker members, preventing conflicts from erupting and preventing negative spillovers”

While some ROs, such as the South American trade bloc, MERCOSUR, have a main purpose, often economic cooperation and integration, most are **multi-purpose organizations that deal with economic, environmental and security challenges and sociocultural concerns**, increasingly including human rights and gender equality issues. Importantly, considering the present context, ROs address a large number of GPG-type challenges. In fact, almost all GPGs, human-made or natural, long-standing or of recent origin, figure on some RO agenda, although with varying emphases depending on the RO's geographic location or its level of integration and institutional strength.

When one categorizes the GPG-related RO interventions according to their purpose, the typology shown in Box 1 emerges. It seems that in many cases, their activities are geared toward protecting their member

⁹ The methodological note in the Appendix A explains the data collection for this section.

Box 1: A typology of GPG-related functions performed by regional organizations

The GPG-related activities undertaken by ROs, often facilitated by their secretariat or other regional entities, fall into a number of different functional categories, including the following:

Protecting the region and individual countries in the region against negative ‘spill-ins’ from underprovided GPGs, such as climate change-related extreme weather events, health threats, excessive financial volatility, and international crime and violence.

Preventing simmering conflicts within the region from erupting, such as preventing the military skirmishes in the South China Sea or in the Indian Ocean from turning into war, or halting over-fishing before it reaches levels that threaten global food security.

Adapting to changed global conditions, such as melting ice caps, rising sea levels, and change in global production patterns and trade flows, through resilience-building and strengthening risk management at national and regional levels.

Facilitating member states’ and the region’s collective access to select GPGs, such as international markets, the Internet, outer space and new technologies and knowledge through national and regional-level capacity-building, thereby making the GPGs in question more de facto globally public in consumption.

Fostering the rollout of global norms, such as those concerning human rights, gender equality, democracy and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in ways that fit the regional context and the preferences of individual member states, thereby contributing to the strengthening of the global normative framework.

Reinforcing rules-based global governance by making sure that regional initiatives are in line with existing international law, such as the UN Charter, UNCLOS, World Trade Organisation agreements and international health regulations, and staying in touch with the concerned multilateral intergovernmental agencies.

Encouraging member states to avoid and, where they exist, internalize negative cross-border externalities through the establishment of regional research, education and training facilities as well as joint monitoring and review activities in such fields as climate-change mitigation, biodiversity preservation, communicable disease control and commitment to the safe use of nuclear materials.

Providing new and additional contributions to GPGs by enhancing member states’ willingness to contribute to cooperative endeavours by creating problem and solution awareness, promoting a sense of community among member states and adopting an integrated public-policy approach to compensation for losses in one area of cooperation through benefits in another area, where and whenever possible.

Offering development assistance to weaker member states to foster regional fairness and create a basis for cooperation within the region and beyond.

Establishing upward linkages to relevant intergovernmental organizations with a worldwide mandate for GPGs of concern to the region.

Reaching out to various external partners to consult with them and seek their political, technical and financial support for planned or ongoing regional and global projects.

states and the whole region against ill effects resulting from the under-provision of a wide range of GPGs, preventing problems in their neighbourhood from worsening, or supporting member states in individual and collective adaptation to climate change impacts, such as rising sea levels that result from melting polar ice.

Another important function of ROs is to enable member states to access GPGs, such as international markets by, for example, fostering regional market integration and assisting members to strengthen their international competitiveness as buyers, sellers, inves-

tors and investment destinations. Many ROs wish to be seen not as stumbling blocks but rather as facilitators of globalization and enhanced GPG provision. To this end, they aim to operate within existing international laws. By doing so, they promote the rollout and upholding of global norms and standards as well as policy principles that range from free and fair trade to human rights, safe use of nuclear material and free passage for all through the high seas.

Yet another way in which ROs contribute to enhanced GPG provision is by supporting regional research and

training activities, as well as policy dialogue aimed at strengthening members awareness of existing challenges and new global opportunities and, thereby, their motivation to cooperate. This happens in areas such as climate change, biodiversity preservation, digitalization of the economy and the peaceful use of the outer space. In cases where member states require assistance in order to participate in a particular project, ROs offer them support, recognizing that contributing to GPGs often depends on the existence of requisite national capacity and resources.

Through these various activities aimed at enhancing member states' access to GPGs, ROs demonstrate that fairness can be granted, for example, by richer to poorer countries, but that it can – and, perhaps often, must – be self-made. Actors must acquire the capacity to benefit from available opportunities.

Given their emphasis on a comprehensive and integrated perspective on policymaking, **ROs demonstrate an awareness of the multiplex nature of GPGs.** This can be seen from the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which deals with the multi-dimensional GPG of maritime security. IORA not only adopts a multi-issue/sector/actor approach, but has membership comprising African and Asian countries. In this case, the GPG is the region or space that determines the organization's membership. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region where the health and peacefulness of the South China Sea are important rallying points that make countries cooperate around issues of sustainable fisheries, illicit trade and free passage through the sea. The notion of integrated, continent-wide development obviously also underpins the work of the African Union (AU), as evident from its 2063 Agenda (African Union, n.d.a). Regional public goods (RPGs), such as the aforementioned, clearly show the significant global spillover effects that RPGs can have. They are dual-purpose RPGs, because they serve the region and the world, for example, by making it possible also for external actors to access and utilize these RPGs, be it in the form of natural-resource mining or enjoying a free and safe passage of their ships through the high seas.¹⁰

Many of the ROs' functions mentioned in Box 1 have become institutionalized in various forms, including regional crisis management mechanisms; research and training centres; centres for disease control; regimes harmonizing physical and institutional infrastructure; regular consultations, monitoring and review processes; and, in support of these and other functions, the establishment of RO secretariats.¹¹ These entities can be viewed as **intermediate dual-purpose RPGs, serv-**

ing the region and contributing to GPG provision by easing goods under-provision or enhancing their provision levels, thereby making globalization look better than it would without the corrective efforts of the ROs.

The quantity and quality of RO-produced RPGs, in turn, depend on a critically important intangible RPG: the trust that exists among RO member states. Comparative analyses of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), on the one hand, and for example, ASEAN and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), on the other hand, show that differences in the level of trust among RO member states helps explain the differences in these organizations' respective performance, including the internal and external legitimacy enjoyed by their representatives, notably their secretariats.¹²

Several ROs clearly recognize the limits of their regional interventions in dealing with GPGs and, therefore, they proactively seek and establish links with external, state and nonstate partners beyond their region. To do this effectively, **their representatives must enjoy external agency;** to enjoy external agency they need to be seen by their partners as enjoying internal agency and legitimacy, the trust of their member states. The issue of trust, legitimacy and partnering brings us straight to the next point: the ROs' models of multilateralism.

¹⁰ For more information, see Bergin et al. (2020) and Birdwell and Taherian (2020).

¹¹ Examples of these dual-purpose RPGs are organizations such as the African Union's Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (<https://africacdc.org/>); the Chiang Mai Initiative, an emergency liquidity facility launched by ASEAN and China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (i.e., ASEAN+3) (<https://aric.adb.org/initiative/chiang-mai-initiative/>); the Disaster Management Centre of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (<http://saarc-sdmc.org/>); and the Caribbean Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (<https://caricom.org/institutions/caribbean-center-for-renewable-energy-and-energy-efficiency-cceee/>). Besides the aforementioned tangible dual-purpose RPGs, there also exist less-tangible ones, such as the normative frameworks that ROs have created, including, for example, the agreements that they forged on economic cooperation and integration; the norms laid down in various charter documents and subsequent declarations calling for commitment to international cooperation within and beyond the region; the peaceful settlement of disputes; and, increasingly, promotion of environmental sustainability, respect for human rights and the strengthening of women's role in development.

¹² See, for example, the case studies presented in Bhattacharjee (2018), Meyer et al. (2019) and Zaum (2013).

REGIONAL MODELS OF MULTILATERALISM

Of course, different ROs function differently, mainly because they operate under varied regional conditions and external influences. However, assessments of RO effectiveness generally show that these organizations have generated positive results. For example, analysts recognize ASEAN's major achievement in terms of preventing conflicts relating to the South China Sea from exploding. The recently concluded Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which ASEAN facilitated over several years, marks yet another one of its achievements. Despite the tensions existing between SAARC's members, notably between India and Pakistan, it, too, has achieved important positive results. It has kept the communication channels among its members alive. In addition, as noted above, several regional centres were established and continue to function. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have engendered a new, strengthened willingness among SAARC members to engage in more active cooperation (PSRP, 2021a).

In fact, despite various external interferences and efforts to pull RO member states apart, most ROs have survived and are, to varying degrees, able to produce results (Chirathivat and Langhammer, 2020). This appears in large measure to be due to the basic type of multilateralism that more or less all ROs practice, whether located in Asia or other parts of the Global South, which has become known as the 'ASEAN way.' Its hallmarks include **mutual respect among RO member states for each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; decision-making through consultation and by consensus; seeking unity in diversity; promoting a sense of community among member states; and practicing open multilateralism** by reaching out to external partners while maintaining the RO's centrality (ASEAN, 2007). The last point, that of RO centrality, receives special emphasis in ASEAN's Charter (ASEAN, 2007: article 2.1[m]). But it also appears in African pronouncements that stress the importance of increased African agency and equality of partnership, including in global matters that also concern the continent. ROs are open to the views and preferences of others, respect them, but do not want to get instrumentalized by external partners for purposes that are not the RO's.

However, the ASEAN Charter's stipulation on centrality should be read together with its Article 2.1(n) calling on RO members' **respect for and follow-up to the global commitments they have undertaken**. This duality – the emphasis on one's sovereignty, on the

one hand, and commitment to agreed-upon global goals, on the other hand – explains RO concern about implementing global goals in a region-specific manner while also reaching out to external partners and multilateral organizations in order for regional preferences and priorities to be better heard and taken into account in global negotiations and decision-making.

Thus, ROs act as meso-level intermediaries in the system of global governance, engage in linking and fostering compatibility between individual interests, whether local, national, regional or other, and the global interest. This intermediary role is, in many cases, an explicit part of ROs' identity. For example, according to its charter, ASEAN has the task of finding or, where it does not yet exist, promoting 'unity in diversity' (ASEAN, 2007: article 2.1[i]). It is barely imaginable how, in today's world, agreement on global goals and their implementation could be achieved without such a commitment to seeking unity in diversity, both among RO member states and between them and external interlocutors and partners.

ASSESSING CURRENT AND POTENTIAL FUTURE ROLES

As can be seen from the above analysis and the regionalism literature, ROs are already playing an important role in both enhanced GPG provision and in making multilateralism function. In fact, some of the global challenges confronting the world could prove to be much more serious but for the activities undertaken by the ROs in Asia and elsewhere.

Moreover, the existence of ROs has meant that the stark contrast between a few major global policy-setters and many policy-takers, characteristic of earlier global governance eras, has begun to fade, gradually giving way to a more even global distribution of power among today's large countries, such as China, Japan, Russia and the United States, and the RO clusters of middle and smaller countries. In fact, in terms of joint economic strength, a few ROs have already moved up the development ranks closer to some of the top-ranking countries. For example, if the member states of ASEAN counted as one economy, in 2020 it was the fifth largest economy in the world, behind the United States, China, Japan and Germany (ASEANstats, 2021). Certainly, the high-level attention that some ROs already enjoy depends not only on the critically important role they play in respect to GPG provision, but also on their growing importance as markets and natural-resource endowment.

Nevertheless, some ROs by now possess considerable

internal and external ‘actorness’,¹³ including strong convening powers, as shown, for example, by the attendance at ASEAN and AU summit meetings (ASEAN Regional Forum, 1993; African Union, n.d.). This strength equips them to play a role as intermediary between the global and the individual in both directions, downward and upward.

While some major powers seem well aware of them, links between ROs and the conventional entities of the IC system, notably the development assistance community, appear to be less well-developed. For the most part, development assistance agencies still view regions only as geographic spaces made up of individual countries and not as communities. Consequently, for them, integration means mainly furthering, country-by-country, interoperability of physical and institutional infrastructure and less so supporting the development of integrated communities capable of doing together what is best done together.¹⁴ Of interest, however, is that a number of UN General Assembly resolutions recognized the role of ROs,¹⁵ and several ROs have been granted consultative status to the United Nations. Moreover, ROs were sometimes invited to meet with the UN Secretary-General or attend a meeting of the UN Security Council. These and other signs suggest that the new reality of increasing regionalism is beginning to be recognized and appreciated as a force potentially to be relied on to foster more sustainable global growth and development and that it is time for IC agencies, including the UN regional commissions, to **shift gears from doing development for individual countries in their respective region** to enabling individual countries and ROs as regional communities to **promote development that is done by and for themselves and the world**, in line with the principle of mutual compatibility between IC and sovereignty.

Thus, regionalism will prove less a stumbling block and more a building block of a type that has been sorely lacking in global governance until now: **agency at the meso-level**. This is where ROs facilitate context-specific agreements with and among their member states to foster compatibility between international cooperation and national policymaking sovereignty, a feat unlikely to be achieved as well, if at all, in any other international relations setting, including that of universal multilateralism. Certainly, at some future date, there may also arise a need for considering a multilateralization of regional developments, but for now the issue remains one of encouraging regionalism and multiple solutions. Barbieri (2019, p.436) even argues that “Rather than regionalism being guided by globalization, the relationship between the two can be said to flow in both directions.” And, in fact, it ought to flow in both directions, because, as discussed above, multilateralism – especially universal multilateralism at the global

level – also needs a new operating principle, similar to that underpinning the RO model.

THE FOUR DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF A FIT-FOR-PURPOSE MULTILATERALISM

Clearly, the reforms discussed above require one another for each to work, and for all to achieve the goal: the grand mission of making multilateralism more fit for the purpose of enhanced GPG provision. Together, they constitute a four-point reform agenda that, once accomplished, would lead to a fit-for-purpose multilateralism with four distinguishing features. It would:

1. **Operate on the principle of mutual compatibility** between international cooperation and sovereignty.
2. **Recognize GPGs as a new, additional type of policy challenge** and end their confounding with development assistance.
3. **Adopt a mission-oriented approach** to resolving GPG-related challenges.
4. **Involve ROs as meso-level intermediaries** between the global and the individual, including the specific interests of individual states, in matters of global governance.

As several analysts argue, among them Söderbaum (2016), regionalism is here to stay. Considering that several ROs are already actively interlinked with various external partners, including ROs outside their own geographic space, it seems reasonable to assume that over time regionalism and its model of multilateralism will increasingly flow upward into the global realm and help generate more understanding and support for applying the principle of mutual compatibility between IC and sovereignty, also in the context of universal multilateralism.

However, many of today’s global challenges need to be addressed urgently and decisively. The next section offers recommendations on how to kickstart and accelerate the needed change processes.

¹³ On the concept of ‘actorness’ and interregional relations conceptualised in terms of institutions, recognition and identity, and as a relational concept dependent on context and perception, see Mattheis and Wunderlich (2017).

¹⁴ For examples of such so far rather rare activities of regional community-building or, perhaps better, region-building performed by development assistance agencies, see ADB (2016) and AfDB (2019).

¹⁵ See, for example, UN General Assembly Resolution 75/69 adopted 25 March 2021, concerning cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (United Nations, 2021).

MOVING FORWARD: CATCHING UP WITH REALITY

Clearly, enhancing the provision of GPGs, notably resolving the most pressing problems resulting from their under-provision, requires a major rethinking of current concepts, institutional arrangements and IC strategies. Isolated ad hoc changes and a bit more money here or there will not suffice, as the analysis in this policy brief shows. Basic constraints require removal and new opportunities need tapping. However, mounting empirical evidence demonstrates that several of the present policy paths, notably the present way of addressing GPG-type challenges, are not only becoming increasingly costly but also posing global systemic risks. Hence, a continuation of business as usual seems to be highly undesirable, leading us not toward but away from the agreed goal of global sustainability.

“A reinvigorated multilateralism would have four distinguishing features. It would operate on the principle of fostering mutual compatibility between international cooperation and sovereignty; recognize GPGs as a new, additional type of public policy challenge, ending their current confounding with development assistance; adopt a mission-oriented approach to resolving GPG-related challenges; and integrate the rising number of autochthonous regional organizations as meso-level intermediaries ”

But what would it take, then, to set the necessary rethinking in motion? Here some suggestions on possible next steps.

Recommendation 1: Most important for policymakers and the global public at large is perhaps to bear in mind Mahbubani’s (2013, p.87) words: “The world has changed. Our way of managing it has not.” Therefore, most important would be for scholars and experts working in relevant policy fields to, first of all, take stock of, synthesize and communicate in an accessible form for further public debate what we know already about how concretely we could more fully and systematically adjust to today’s policymaking realities. **Additional policy research and development** ought to be undertaken and well-documented proof that describes the conditions under which to implement reforms. Without such additional information about the how, when and why, many policymakers and their various constituencies would most likely hesitate to innovate unless a major global disaster would finally compel them to do so. Clearly, the better way is to rethink and act out of realism and enlightened self-interest.

Recommendation 2: As regards the suggested strengthening of the role of ROs in the Global South, it could be useful to take a clue from how the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the AU have decided to organize the relationship between them. Whereas other UN economic commissions still **tend to do a lot of development for the region, the UNECA and AU have agreed on a partnership model of development with and by the AU**, in line with the AU’s basic principle that Africa’s development ought to be driven by Africans. If similar agreements were reached in other parts of the world, ROs’ capacities could receive a significant boost as could their contributions to GPG provision and global sustainable growth and development.¹⁶

Recommendation 3: Much could also be gained in terms of strengthening ROs and, beyond that, furthering the emergence of a more fit-for-purpose multilateralism if the conventional development assistance agencies, including the MDBs and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee, would undertake a **review of their current activities to determine to what extent they have or have not yet adjusted their operational modalities to today’s policymaking realities**. More specifically, have they initiated reforms to help create the new tripod architecture of IC finance dis-

¹⁶ On the UNECA/AU relation, see Africa Union (2017).

cussed above (Figure 2), which would be an essential step towards realizing a new multilateralism? What additional reforms are they intending to implement next? And what are the lessons they have learned that could be useful to share with the wider IC community?

Recommendation 4: In several respects, the reforms needed to realize the type of a new multilateralism suggested here go right to the core of today's world order by **calling for a modernized interpretation of the notion of sovereignty**. Therefore, it would only be fitting if the UN Secretary-General would seek member states' agreement on the establishment of a panel of renowned personalities to hold global consultations on this proposed agenda and offer their advice on how to proceed further.

Recommendation 5: Considering the urgency of several of the global challenges we confront, why would the UN member states not dare to be bold and decide to

establish two mission-oriented pilots as soon as possible: **one for climate change mitigation and adaptation and one for global health**, including the fight against COVID-19 and strengthening global preparedness for the next health threats likely to attack the world, such as microbial resistance? Certainly, member states would find it easier to take this decision if there was **strong support for it from civil society, the business community, think tanks and academia**, that is, the global public.

Of course, the message here is not to halt current action to address global challenges. All of that can and should for now continue, even with incremental improvements, but always with the awareness that these measures will not suffice. More fundamental change is needed and hence the call here for a willingness to rethink and innovate so that, come 2030, we may not see ourselves fall too far short of the goal of global sustainable growth and development.

CONCLUSION

The analysis in the first two sections of this policy brief shows that sovereignty is coming under pressure in IC contexts. This demotivates states from engaging in multilateral cooperation, notably the universal multilateralism that many GPGs require. So far, however, no clear vision exists of how to realize mutual compatibility between effective IC and national policymaking sovereignty. The third and fourth sections offer a possible vision of fit-for-purpose multilateralism. As the fifth section argues, translating this vision into policy practice requires a major rethinking and notably more realism: on the one hand, a willingness to accept that

the world has changed and, on the other hand, acceptance of the fact that in GPG-related policy fields that entail interdependence among countries, effective cooperation tends to be the better way forward towards realizing national interests because it solves problems that cannot be resolved unilaterally. Are policymakers and the global public ready for that? The many calls and expressed commitments to doing better in the post-COVID-19 era suggest that now could be the right time to introduce some long-overdue corrective steps and facilitate faster and scaled-up progress towards global sustainable growth and development.

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE SOURCES REVIEWED FOR THE FOURTH SECTION OF THIS BRIEF

The discussion in the fourth section of this policy brief is based on a comprehensive review of the literature on regionalism and the role of regional organizations in the Global South. Included in this review have been contributions from multiple disciplines, including economics, political science, international relations, and peace and security studies, as well as contributions focusing from a regional perspective on particular GPG-related aspects, including, among others, the following: Alisjahbana, 2020; Alston et al., 1996; Acharya, 2008a; Acharya, 2008b; Acharya, 2008c; Acharya, 2015; Barbieri, 2019; Bergin et al., 2019; Berkofsky and Sciorati, 2021; Börzel and Risse, 2016; Börzel et al., 2016; Chirathivat et al., 2020; Chirathivat and Langhammer, 2020; Cohen and Fontaine, 2020; Cornell and Starr, 2018; Dembowski, 2018; Ergenç, 2021; Fawcett, 2019; Foot and Goh, 2019; Islam and Kieu, 2020; Jones et al., 2019; Kaul, 2020; Khor et al., 2020; Libman, 2019; Lissovolik, 2019; Lopes and Kararach, 2019; Mahbubani, 2013; Mahbubani, 2020; Meyer et al., 2019; Mirelli, 2018; Pelkmans, 2020; Pizarro,

1999; PSRP, 2021a; PSRP, 2021b; Rivera, 2017; Söderbaum, 2016; Söderbaum, 2018; Susantono and Park 2020; Wang and Song 2020.

In addition to the aforementioned contributions, the websites of a select sample of ROs were consulted to see how different ROs describe the purpose, functioning and outcomes of their GPG-related interventions. Among the ROs selected for this purpose were the following: African Union (AU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO), Caribbean Community/ Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CARICOM/ CELAC), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Mercado Común del Sur (MERCUSOR), Organization of American States (OAS), Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

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Box 1: A typology of GPG-related functions performed by regional organizations

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Figure 1: The provision path of a global public good

Figure 2: A tripod architecture of international cooperation finance

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