





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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PALESTINIAN JUSTICE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS



March 2012



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March 2012



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RESEARCH

Creative Business Solutions
Al-Wedad Society for Community Rehabilitation

METHODOLOGY

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ACRONYMS

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AGO	Attorney-General's Office
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CBS	Creative Business Solutions
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
HJC	High Judicial Council
JIC	Justice Information Centre
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIS	New Israeli Shekel
oPt	Occupied oPt
PBA	Palestinian Bar Association
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PCP	Palestinian Civil Police
PAPP	Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP)
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VAW	Violence Against Women

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

UNDP recognises that the success of its support to access to justice and the rule of law begins and ends in Palestinian households. To assess public perceptions of justice and security service delivery, UNDP commissioned a survey to establish the extent to which Palestinians engage with and trust justice and security institutions. This baseline survey will contribute to tracking the impact of UNDP's Rule of Law & Access to Justice Programme in the occupied oPt.)

The questionnaire (annexed) was designed in consultation with national and international partners, and University College London, after which it was pilot tested and refined. In the summer of 2011, the survey was conducted by two national implementing partners working in close coordination with UNDP. Both the survey size and sampling methodology - 6,710 households, in every governorate in each area of the oPt - were selected to enable a broad sampling of Palestinian opinions to be recorded. This report provides an overall picture of how the Palestinian people perceive their justice and security institutions.

Survey limitations. The survey was commissioned in order to understand how the Palestinian people perceive the justice and security institutions mandated to serve them. Such perceptions matter: at the micro level, they structure access to justice. If ordinary households do not trust that justice and security institutions can or will protect their rights, they may forego their entitlements, allow disputes to simmer, or take the law into their own hands, with violence ensuing. At the macro level, such perceptions therefore underpin the rule of law, and indicate the health of the social contract. This was not designed to be a 'user survey', soliciting perceptions of justice and security institutions' capacity and performance only. The majority of respondents had not been in contact with Palestinian justice and security institutions in the 12 months preceding the survey. Their perceptions may therefore be based on experiences dating from earlier periods during which the capacities of institutions formed as recently as 1994 were nascent. Their perceptions may also still be shaped by the *intifada* years, during which challenges to effective delivery of justice and security services were considerable. Secondly, the general picture emerging from the data is obscured by the sheer complexity of the legal landscape in the oPt. Households in East Jerusalem are not served by the same justice and security institutions as their counterparts in the West Bank or Gaza. The interviewers asked households in East Jerusalem to give their opinions on Palestinian justice and security institutions only. However, there is a possibility that a very small number of respondents may have misunderstood or been confused, and provided opinions on the Israeli legal system.

Overall public perceptions of Palestinian justice and security institutions. The findings of this survey suggest that investments in justice and security institutions are paying dividends. Data shared in this report show clearly that Palestinians throughout the oPt consider that rule of law institutions and the lawyers and civil society organisations (CSOs) which support their work play a pivotal role in promoting and protecting the rule of law. The overwhelming majority of Palestinian households believe that such institutions are legitimate and choose to use them to resolve all manner of disputes. 91.7% choose to call the police when in danger; 71% consider that courts are the *only* legitimate institutions through which to resolve disputes; 63.3% are confident that they would receive prompt police assistance; 51.2% are confident that they could solve a civil dispute fairly through the courts; and 47.7% are satisfied that the public prosecution maintains dignity and human freedom. Such responses indicate that PNA justice and security institutions have already established their value.

Several factors underpin a significant gender justice gap. Survey data reveal a troubling gap between women's and men's access to justice. Even though Palestinian women's rights are more often violated in civil cases, 24% fewer women than men are party to civil cases. When women cannot defend their civil rights, including to poverty-reducing entitlements such as inheritance and property ownership, they become poorer and more vulnerable to abuse. When women cannot hold perpetrators accountable for abuse, there is little deterrence and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) escalates. The data indicates how this challenge can be addressed. The access to justice challenges faced by women include: lack of 'legal literacy'; lack of legal assistance; discriminatory legislation; and justice and security institutions insensitive to their needs. Women do not know how to assert their rights: 41% fewer women than men know how to bring a case to court. Furthermore, they lack access to the legal assistance they need to effectively press charges: whereas 3.9% of men in contact with the law had the support of a lawyer, only 1.2% of women enjoyed the same help. Women's lower social status is a function of discriminatory norms and attitudes which exist throughout society, including in justice and security institutions: as a result, women are on average 11% less satisfied with the performance of institutions and personnel. Prejudiced institutional norms and attitudes are further aggravated by



discriminatory laws: 71.4% of women do not agree that 'the law is clear and takes all sides into account', and fewer women than men are confident that they would be 'treated equally by the courts'. The data therefore caution that while efforts to strengthen legal literacy, availability of legal assistance, and gender-sensitive case management are needed, they may still not achieve their purpose if women are enabled to access institutions which continue to discriminate against them. Efforts to reform discriminatory legislation and service provision are therefore essential components of efforts to extend justice equally to all Palestinians.

Formal justice is perceived to be too slow. The perception that justice is too slow is a key reason for avoiding the formal justice system, especially in cities and refugee camps. 50.2% of households cited 'court cases take too long' as a reason for not resolving cases in court. The distribution of households who perceive that the formal justice system is too slow is mirrored in the distribution of households who perceive that 'informal justice mechanisms are faster' and who, when in danger, would ask 'community leaders' to assist. Community leaders - '*islah* men' and 'tribal judges' - often use dialogue-based dispute resolution approaches combining forms of mediation and arbitration to resolve disputes. 23.3% of Palestinians perceive that these 'informal' justice mechanisms are faster than formal courts. In the absence of a clear oversight and regulation framework, however, the potential for informal justice mechanisms to deny the rights of vulnerable or marginalised groups is obvious. The data suggests that there is a need for quicker, dialogue-based, human-rights focused alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. There may therefore be value in expanding the Ministry of Justice's current ADR programme beyond Commercial Arbitration towards court-annexed mediation for civil and minor criminal cases, or a national community-based ADR network focused on cities and refugee camps. Besides providing a cheaper, quicker, more accessible means of resolving the civil cases which constitute 36.8% of all cases in the oPt, ADR would 'free up' court capacity to more speedily resolve the smaller number of serious criminal cases.

Palestinians are more satisfied with justice and security institutions' technical performance than their integrity. The survey solicited perceptions on justice and security institutions' technical performance (e.g. adequacy of number of judges; court signposting; lawyers' qualifications) and integrity ('independence'; 'honesty'; fairness of verdicts'). Consistent data sets from throughout the survey show that Palestinians are consistently more satisfied with rule of law institutions' technical performance than their integrity.

Access to legal assistance is inadequate, adversely affecting perceptions of justice and the integrity of security institutions. Religious - church and (predominantly) *Sharia* - courts are the justice forum of choice for Palestinian households. Palestinians are 18.6% more satisfied with the integrity of religious than civil courts' processes. This may be because religious courts often feature 'judicial activism', in which judges take a more inquisitorial role where one party is better represented in order to promote equality before the law. Judicial activism therefore enables unrepresented persons to better understand court procedures and perceive that their interests are considered. It is likely to give religious courts significant appeal in a context in which the majority of those in contact with the law are unlikely to have access to a lawyer: up to 90.8% of Palestinians do not have access to a lawyer; 57.2% cannot easily afford to pay for a lawyer; and 56.0% doubt that they would be able to obtain free legal assistance if they needed it. Encouraging judicial activism may therefore present a low-cost means of compensating for inadequate provision of legal assistance, at least in the short-term. However, if it is in fact judicial activism which results in greater satisfaction with religious courts' integrity, the significance of this survey finding would appear to be to affirm international law's assertion that legal representation is necessary for justice to be done and be seen to be done. It also suggests that programmes such as UNDP's new Civil Society Initiative are likely to be highly effective means of strengthening perceptions of courts' integrity.

NGOs are most trusted to provide legal aid services. Survey data indicate that legal aid services provided by NGOs are well received: out of a maximum of 5, NGOs achieved a trust score of 3.12: 3.03 amongst males, and 3.20 amongst females. Along with police, NGOs therefore top the 'trust table' by which justice and security institutions are ranked. Satisfaction with NGOs' legal assistance services is highest in the Gaza Strip; validating UNDP's decision to strengthen the rule of law in this area by supporting quality NGOs. By contrast, traditional legal assistance providers the Palestinian Bar Association appear at the bottom of the 'trust table', with a score of 2.88. While 74.8% of households are satisfied that lawyers are 'accessible', just 25.3% are satisfied with their cost. These figures suggest that respondents may have understood the question to refer to lawyers' *availability* rather than their accessibility. With its highly educated population and numerous excellent university law faculties, the oPt does not lack lawyers: it is quite easy to physically find one. Contrasting the availability of lawyers with the accessibility of legal services suggests that a pro bono culture is missing, even though, under international law, lawyers are officers of the court with a duty to promote equality before the law by providing services to indigent clients free of charge.

Legal literacy is low, and inversely related to satisfaction with institutional performance. Legal literacy is the gateway to accessing rule of law institutions and achieving justice. 'Legally illiterate' persons are less likely to access justice, demand their entitlements when caught up in the legal system, or hold rule of law institutions accountable for due process violations. Yet 46.7% of Palestinians do not know how to file cases and 71.9% are not aware of the role of justice and security institutions. The data suggests that satisfaction with justice and security institutions is inversely related to legal literacy: legal literacy is highest in the Gaza Strip, followed by the West Bank, then East Jerusalem; and satisfaction with justice and security institutions is lowest in the Gaza Strip, followed by the West Bank, then East Jerusalem. Though factors such as the destructive impact of Israeli attacks on Gazan institutions clearly structure this pattern, a series of data sets suggest that legal literacy is a contributory factor. It is reasonable to conclude that when a person becomes more aware of what rights rule of law institutions are expected to protect, the services they ought to deliver, and the standards they ought to observe, they also become more aware of, and dispirited by, instances in which institutional performance falls short of these expectations. Accordingly, there is likely to be merit in designing legal literacy programmes which incorporate 'expectations management' components aiming to explain the capacity challenges which sometimes constrain service delivery and clarify on-going efforts to address them.

Public 'watchdog' accountability mechanisms are needed to strengthen institutional performance. It is suggested that organisations with a mandate to strengthen the rule of law in the 'opt view lower satisfaction with justice and security institutions' integrity not as a sign of programme failure, or a 'problem', but an opportunity to support improved performance. By investing in accountability, legal literacy can be used as a resource through which dissatisfaction can support reform to advance the performance of justice and security institutions. Partners have every reason to expect that supporting accountability initiatives will be a fruitful endeavour. The Palestinian people manifestly have the courage to speak truth to power, the magnanimity to take action to promote human freedom, and a strong desire to use formal justice and security institutions. This combination is essential for addressing the most critical need revealed by the data: for greater accountability to improve service delivery.



RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations proposed here derive from particularly striking survey findings *only*. They are suggestions, not prescriptions, for organisations with a mandate to strengthen the rule of law in the oPt. Whether, and how, to incorporate them in existing programming is a decision best made on the basis of thorough consultations and dialogue to achieve coherent, coordinated approaches.

1. Promote multi-stakeholder dialogue, including civil society

Civil society's capacities to promote access to justice and the rule of law can be harnessed through the joint thinking, coordinated action, and shared objectives which emerge from dialogue. UNDP could use its convening role to support such dialogues. The effect will be to multiply the impact of resources devoted to strengthening the rule of law in the oPt. In addition to supporting identification of the most effective means of addressing access to justice, other benefits critical to the overarching statehood objective of rule of law investments in the oPt could include:

- *Enhancing the administration of justice*: Dialogue fosters communication, cooperation and coordination between and among the numerous 'links' in the justice 'chain', so that they can work as a system to deliver justice. No matter how effective individual institutions or processes may be, in the absence of such institutional linkages, justice is delayed and hence denied.
- *Supporting a resilient Palestinian state*: A future Palestinian state will be underpinned by a 'social contract' negotiated by ordinary Palestinians when they have the opportunity to voice and reconcile their expectations; inform the development of responsive laws; and hold institutions accountable for their implementation. The processes through which laws are developed, enforced, applied and changed are the substance of the rule of law, and they take place within the context of dialogue.

2. Enhance legal awareness, particularly for women

It is recommended that legal awareness-raising programmes be scaled up, and that these be concentrated in areas in which legal literacy is particularly limited: East Jerusalem and the West Bank, women and people under the age of 30 years, lower income groups, and rural areas. Though numerous women's empowerment initiatives have been implemented in the oPt, including some that promote legal literacy, the data suggest that these have been inadequate. Women's legal literacy is significantly lower than that of men, and this is not surprising: equality between the sexes in the oPt is a transformational change that will take many years to manifest. It is recommended that resources be consistently invested towards this end.

3. Manage expectations

Satisfaction with rule of law institutions' performance is inversely related to legal literacy. The strength of the correlation between these data sets urges the importance of two programmatic issues:

- *Prioritise expectations management*. Expectations management components would balance encouraging people to assert their rights with fostering patience with the kinds of difficulties that can arise in government institutions established as recently as 1994, in a context of protracted occupation. For example, agendas of awareness raising workshops might allocate time for informing participants of the kinds of challenges that can frustrate access to justice, and how they can respond to them.
- *Revise expectations concerning how rule of law investments will affect levels of satisfaction with institutional performance*. A monitoring and evaluation log-frame which sets 'satisfaction with MOJ performance increased by 10%' as a programme benchmark is likely to produce damning results.

4. Enhance access to legal aid and assistance

Limited access to legal aid and assistance highlights the importance of the UNDP Civil Society Initiative, which was launched last year. In addition, it is recommended that partners consider the following means of enhancing availability of legal assistance:

- *Support a 'pro bono' culture among legal professionals.* Suggestions that lawyers are available but not accessible; that their services are too expensive; very low levels of confidence in and satisfaction with lawyer's performance; and limited trust in the Palestinian Bar Association (PBA), suggests that UNDP's support to the PBA, civil society organisations (CSOs) and academic institutions to provide free legal information, advice and representation is highly relevant. Useful additional initiatives could aim to improve lawyers' 'public image', such as radio phone-in shows in which lawyers answer questions on legal concerns.
- *Encourage NGOs based in the Gaza Strip to engage with the formal justice system.* Many Gaza-based legal services CSOs boycotted the formal justice system after Hamas came to power. Significantly higher levels of dissatisfaction with NGOs' performance amongst Gazan households suggests that the boycott is not supporting access to justice and the rule of law in the area. Although some have more recently ended this boycott, a number of large legal aid service provider NGOs have not yet done so. Development partners can use their leverage to advocate for re-engagement with the formal justice system.
- *Invest in NGO capacity development, monitoring and evaluation arrangements.* Significantly higher levels of dissatisfaction with legal services NGOs' performance in an area in which they have been most widely available - the Gaza Strip - highlights the importance of carefully selecting, training, monitoring, and evaluating NGOs. UNDP's policy of rigorously evaluating NGOs towards the development of a roster of 'approved' organisations is commendable.

5. Promote judicial activism and judicial 'vocalism'

The majority of Palestinians who come into contact with rule of law institutions do not know the laws applicable to their case, do not understand legal processes and terminology, are ill at ease in justice institutions, and do not have access to legal aid and assistance. Current and planned efforts to enhance access to legal aid are laudable, but there are mostly new, and there is an inevitable time lag before results manifest: in the short to medium term, demand for legal aid services will continue to outstrip supply. Consequently, there is likely to be strategic value in:

- *Judicial activism:* encouraging judges to intervene on behalf of unrepresented parties; and
- *Judicial 'vocalism':* encouraging judges to use simple language, explain proceedings, and simply to 'vocalise' his/her deliberations, and talk about the factors which have informed his/her decision. Unrepresented parties which do not have the satisfaction of witnessing a lawyer advocate on their behalf are likely to be encouraged by hearing judges demonstrate that facts relevant to the case are understood. Hearing how and why a decision was reached may support greater transparency, conviction that verdicts are fair, and the process by which they are reached is independent.

6. Support a more 'user-friendly' court environment, especially by strengthening the performance of court clerks

Women's levels of satisfaction with civil courts drops significantly on measures pertaining to the courts' 'front of house': their capacity to orient visitors; informing them of where they should go, what they are expected to do, and some rudimentary explanation of how they can expect their day(s) in court to proceed. If women are to be encouraged to play a role in ending impunity and supporting the rule of law, it is imperative that the courts system becomes more 'user-friendly'. Women surveyed have informed partners of where the challenges lie. They are very much less satisfied with:

- Court clerks: their number, efficiency and interpersonal skills.
- Court signposting.
- Court cleanliness.



UNDP is supporting the High Judicial Council to set up court information points in courthouses across the West Bank. It is suggested that other partners coordinate their support with UNDP and national partners in order to coordinate their efforts, and solicit lessons learned which would inform the design of relevant, responsive, initiatives.

7. Support development of gender-sensitive case management protocols

Consistently lower levels of satisfaction amongst women indicate that the PoP's rule of law institutions lack gender-sensitive case management processes. It is suggested that partners support the development of relevant protocols, standard operating procedures, and training modules. Given women's particularly dim view of their performance, it is recommended that court clerks be included as beneficiaries of such efforts. Partners could also consider supporting workshops with judges and lawyers aiming to establish 'practice guidelines' on how to apply the law in a way that supports the emergence of legal precedent aligned with the requirements of national and international law. These may also help to address a key access to justice challenge - lack of confidence that 'the law is clear and takes all sides into account' - in the absence of a fully functioning Palestinian Legislative Council.

8. Enhance protection and confidentiality measures

Households reported lower levels of confidence in the police's ability to protect them from disputing parties, and to protect their privacy. Addressing protection is likely to reduce the number of respondents who do not contact police when in danger, and choose not to resolve disputes through the courts. Confidentiality measures are essential both to protect clients' privacy, and give them confidence that their need for physical safety will not be threatened if they decide to pursue justice. Women survivors of SGBV are especially at risk of reprisals and stigma. Legal literacy and other efforts to encourage them to pursue justice could have grave unintended consequences unless protection and confidentiality arrangements are robust. Given that women face significant access to justice challenges, additional measures to encourage them to assert their rights could include:

- Witness protection schemes.
- Women's refugees and shelters.
- Information collection and storage arrangements to prevent information being stolen or lost.
- National SGBV victims' reparations mechanism. Since women often tolerate abuse because they are financially dependent on their abusers, there may be strategic value in supporting a compensation fund for SGBV survivors. The fact that victims normally do not receive reparations - even after a judgment in their favour - can mean that survivors perceive that they have no incentive to pursue justice. Victims also lack the support they need to end financial dependency which keeps them in abusive relationships.

9. Research Sharia courts

Households are consistently more satisfied with the performance of religious (*Sharia*) courts. As part of reform processes to support the emergence of a more responsive justice and security system, there may be value in researching perspectives on religious courts. Having established through this study *that* households prefer *Sharia* courts, this research would aim to establish *why*:

- Which aspects of procedural and substantive justice in *Sharia* courts are considered to be legitimate?
- Is it possible to identify specific legal principles or practices which could be incorporated in the civil courts system? If so, how?

10. Support justice sector monitoring and oversight mechanisms, including over informal justice mechanisms

Lower levels of confidence in and satisfaction with justice and security institutions' integrity may be improved by establishing or strengthening accountability mechanisms, such as:

- Internal oversight and accountability mechanisms.
- Proper complaints handling mechanisms.
- Civil society scrutiny: monitoring and reporting, and media liaison.
- Media outreach: capacity development initiatives and incentives (e.g. media reporting award or scholarships for communications students) to encourage and enable accurate, high quality media reports on cases in court and rule of law issues.
- Strategic litigation.
- Community-based monitoring committees.
- On-line petition and social dialogue platforms.

The data suggest that households resolve cases through informal justice mechanisms when they perceive that formal justice will take too long. As the formal justice and security apparatus develop its capacity to administer justice in a timely manner, it is imperative that those who use informal justice mechanisms are not thereby deprived of their rights. To ensure that disputes are not resolved quickly simply by pressuring vulnerable parties to accept an unfair settlement, it is recommended that the linkages between formal and informal justice be clarified, and that an effective oversight mechanism be established, including a complaints handling mechanism. The aim of such a mechanism would be to support the emergence of a unitary justice system which protects the rights of all Palestinians, under the democratic control of the Palestinian people.

11. Review methodology for next survey

UNDP intends to conduct the perception survey annually. A full discussion of how to incorporate 'lessons learned' from this inaugural survey is presented in the concluding 'next steps' section. Key recommendations include:

- *Survey results do not necessarily reflect the current performance of justice and security institutions.* Consider performing 'if: then' analysis to isolate the responses of those who have actually used justice and security services over the survey period. Comparing these statistics with the rest of the sample would enable partners to identify how the actual performance and current capacities of the justice system differs from hearsay, speculation, and earlier periods - including the difficult *intifada* years. An alternative would be to conduct a 'user survey' interviewing those who enter, leave, or are caught up in the justice system - to generate comparative statistics to complement this wider public perception survey.
- *Household-based survey excludes Bedouin population.* Consider designing a separate survey component targeting Bedouins. Designing the methodology in partnership with the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) would also enable the perception survey to generate additional development results: a strengthened standard national classification approach. This would support improved national research, more targeted policies, and more equitable development.
- *Focus on formal institutions excludes informal justice system.* Consider including survey questions aiming to ascertain *why* households use informal justice mechanisms. Such questions could foster an understanding of the principles and processes according to which Palestinians wish to resolve their disputes. Such information would enable organisations with a mandate to support the rule of law in the oPt to make an essential contribution to the state building process. Empowered with information concerning Palestinians' legal needs and preferences, partners could support them to forge a single, unitary justice system which manifests their unique identity and values. This information would also support ongoing law reform processes; helping to 'root' international laws in national values. The effect would be to support the emergence of a truly legitimate Palestinian state which embodies indigenous values and responds to popular expectations.



METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

The survey was conducted on the basis of a questionnaire designed by UNDP in consultation with national and international partners including University College London. In close coordination and cooperation with UNDP, two national implementing partners administered the survey process in the summer of 2011. Their tasks included: training and monitoring interviewers; pilot testing the questionnaire; data collection, data entry and coding. Since Palestinian households were found to be receptive to female interviewers, majority-female survey teams were recruited and trained on sampling and data collection methods as well as interview techniques.

The survey engaged 6,710 households randomly selected using the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics' classification method. The sample covered urban, rural and camp settings in every oPt governorate, as well as a broad cross-section of society by sex, age, and socio-economic group (including marital status, educational attainment, income group, employment status, employment type and employment sector).

The results of a 40-household pilot survey were tested to measure the stability of the questionnaire. A highly satisfactory score on the statistical indexing tool used for this purpose affirmed the questionnaire's viability, and some questions were strengthened to increase the reliability of survey data. The final error margin of the survey's household sample is estimated at just 1.18%. Accordingly, the survey team is highly confident that the findings presented herein make an invaluable contribution to evidence-based rule of law programming in the oPt.

1. INTRODUCTION

To ascertain the impact of investments in the rule of law and access to justice in the oPt to date, *UNDP Rule of Law and Access to Justice Programme in the oPt* commissioned a public perception survey of Palestinian justice and security institutions to explore the following issues:

- *Contact* with justice and security institutions.
- *Challenges* to accessing justice and security institutions.
- *Satisfaction* with justice and security institutions.
- *Confidence* with justice and security institutions.

The perception survey will be conducted annually in order to track the effectiveness of existing investments in justice and security sector institutions, identify areas where additional efforts are needed, and prioritise interventions accordingly. Survey responses discussed here reveal where specific access to justice challenges lie, and hence indicate how rule of law institutions may become more accessible to the Palestinian people. The surprising consistency of the data on specific issues permits a clear understanding of specific challenges. The survey size - 6,710 households, in every governorate in each area of the oPt - the sampling and methodology, enabled the Palestinian people as a whole to speak. This report consolidates their voices; enabling partners concerned with rule of law in the oPt to understand how Palestinians perceive the rule of law landscape, and how they choose to resolve disputes.

2. CONTEXT

The Israeli occupation, incursions and internal political struggles have significantly weakened the institutional capacities that are essential for the effective administration of justice, particularly in the Gaza Strip. UNDP has responded by working with its national and international partners to strengthen the capacity of rule of law institutions. Investments in the rule of law in the oPt have largely focused on institutional reforms of statutory justice institutions. Such developments are necessary to strengthen the rule of law because capacity deficits in courts, prisons, and police stations are significant impediments to the smooth administration of justice; but they are not, in themselves, sufficient.

Recognising that access to justice challenges at the local and grassroots level cannot be sufficiently addressed through institutional reforms alone, UNDP has developed a broad programme of work that incorporates legal awareness raising, representation, and monitoring, as well as targeted interventions to strengthen gender and juvenile justice. UNDP's Rule of Law & Access to Justice Programme in the oPt balances the 'demand' and 'supply' sides of the rule of law equation. This comprehensive approach aims to support transformative changes in the rule of law and access to justice in the oPt, towards a legitimate governance apparatus rooted in society, having a monopoly on the use of force, the capacity to effectively administrate justice, and protect, promote and fulfil the human rights of all its citizens.



3. RATIONALE

UNDP is mindful of the fact that justice is the output of a highly complex system involving numerous actors, processes and interfaces, from the community-based organisation and local police post to the highest court. It therefore aims to build the capacity of numerous links within the justice chain, using an evidence-based approach incorporating rigorous monitoring and evaluation throughout the programme cycle.

Mandated to serve the Palestinian people, UNDP in the oPt recognises that the success of its support throughout the justice chain begins and ends in Palestinian households. Whether or not justice and security sector institutions meet the needs of those households is a function of their ability to access those institutions, the degree to which they have confidence in their capacities, and trust them to deliver timely, effective, services. The capacity of justice institutions to deliver such services will ultimately manifest itself in public perceptions, because the people who use justice and security services are the best judges of their accessibility, effectiveness, and efficiency. Households which do not believe that justice and security institutions will meet their need for timely, impartial and effective justice services may allow disputes to simmer; or they may take the law into their own hands, with violence ensuing. This is why perceptions of the justice and security apparatus matter. At the micro level, they measure the dimensions of the access to justice challenge for ordinary Palestinians. At the macro level, they indicate the strength of the rule of law in the oPt.


4. OBJECTIVES

The perception survey will enable partners concerned with the rule of law in the oPt to understand the factors which structure justice choices in the oPt. Designed to obtain information on all aspects and objectives of rule of law programming, the perception survey is intended as an annual process in order to: track the effectiveness of existing investments in justice and security institutions; identify areas where additional efforts are needed, and prioritise interventions accordingly. The survey is therefore intended as part of a feedback loop to inform UNDP and its partners of progress to date, and to stimulate discussion on how to fine-tune approaches to enhance their impact.

5. CONTACT WITH JUSTICE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONNEL

Contact with justice and security institutions varies according to degree of Israeli control. Differences in the pattern of contact between Israeli and Palestinian justice and security institutions in the different parts of the oPt areas define the rule of law landscape in the oPt. Up to 31% of households came in contact with a Palestinian rule of law institution over this period:¹ 34.4% of in the Gaza Strip, 30.9% in the West Bank, and only 13.3% in East Jerusalem. Up to 9.5% of Palestinian households had been in contact with an Israeli justice and security institution over the survey period.²

Figure 1: Contact with Palestinian and Israeli justice and security institutions.



The pattern of contact with the Palestinian and Israeli authorities in the different parts of the oPt indicates the configuration of security and administrative control. When the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was established as a result of the Oslo Accords in 1994, the oPt was organised into areas A, B, and C. Most Palestinian cities were classified as 'A' areas under PNA security and administrative control. 'B' areas were kept under the administrative control of the PNA, while Israel retained control of security. 'C' areas, comprising 58% of the total area, were kept under full (administrative and security) Israeli control.

¹ Readers are asked to note well the qualifying term 'up to'. The figures quoted (9.5% and 31%) are the sum of the number of respondents who had been in contact with each institution in the justice chain: police, public prosecution, civil courts, religious courts, judges, Ministry of Justice, lawyers, and NGOs. Since these institutions form part of a justice chain, it is likely that some respondents are double counted, and the figures inflated as a result. For example, a person convicted of theft may feature in the statistics for those who were in contact with police, courts, prisons, judges, and lawyers: as s/he progressed through the justice chain, s/he came into contact with each of these institutions and personnel. He or she would then be counted in the data five times, underscoring the need to read these two figures carefully. The finding presented here, showing that contact with justice and security institutions varies according to the degree of Israeli control, remains valid because the subsequent analysis is supplemented by several other data sets.

² Households were asked whether they had been in contact with justice and security institutions or personnel 'in the last 12 months': i.e. the 12 months preceding the survey conducted in July 2011. Throughout this report, the 'survey period' refers to July 2010-July 2011.



Men have more direct contact with justice and security institutions. Up to 47.7% of males had been in contact with justice and security institutions over the survey period, compared with up to 13.8% of women. Men are more than three times as likely to encounter justice and security institutions,³ more than 6.5 times as likely to come into contact with either Palestinian civil police or Israeli courts, and more than 17 times more likely to be imprisoned. These figures reflect global trends: Palestinian women - like their sisters across the world - are accused of fewer crimes than men. In the oPt, men are 26% more likely than women to appear as defendants than claimants,⁴ and 54% more likely than women to be party to criminal cases.⁵

Given that women in conflict with the law can find the experience traumatic, this data is somewhat comforting. However, since the justice system is the mechanism through which women can assert their rights and impunity for SGBV, the data also reveals a concerning access to justice gap. When women cannot assert, defend and enforce their civil rights, they become poorer and more vulnerable to abuse. When perpetrators of violence against women⁶ are not held accountable for their actions, would-be perpetrators are not deterred. There is a direct correlation to increased violence against women in a context of impunity. Even though more Palestinian women than men experience civil rights violations,⁷ 24% fewer women than men are party to civil cases. When Palestinian women do not access justice institutions for such cases, they may not enjoy their equal rights to education, inheritance, and ownership, or be able to obtain poverty-reducing entitlements such as credit. Neither can they play a role in eroding the discriminatory social norms which entrench their disempowerment and normalize violence against women.

Women's lack of access to justice is correlated with lack of legal literacy, limited access to legal assistance, and discriminatory legislation. Survey data also highlight the limitations in women's access to justice. Women are often unaware of their rights and how to assert them: they are 41% less likely to know how to bring a case to court.⁸ Legal assistance - typically provided by lawyers - is necessary to effectively claim entitlements, yet whereas up to 3.9% of men in contact with the law had the support of a lawyer, only up to 1.2% of women enjoyed the same.⁹ Ideas concerning 'appropriate' feminine conduct place Palestinian women in the home, where they are wives, mothers, cooks and cleaners. These roles are rarely financially remunerated, and women cannot therefore afford the legal representation they need to successfully assert their rights. Not surprisingly then, women are 16.3% less satisfied than men with the cost of contracting lawyers' services.¹⁰ Weaker financial and educational assets are perpetuated by discriminatory laws and attitudes, which themselves constitute an access to justice challenge: 71.4% of women disagree that 'the law is clear and takes all sides into account';¹¹ and 1.4% fewer women than men are confident that they would be 'treated equally by the courts'. Increasing access to institutions which apply discriminatory laws is a qualified victory: these data highlight the importance of twinning legal literacy and legal aid efforts with legal reform initiatives in order to advance gender justice.

High rates of (male) imprisonment affect men, women and children. 8.4% of male respondents had been imprisoned in either Palestinian and Israeli prisons in the last 12 months. This high number has serious implications for the stability of Palestinian society. Imprisonment often results in loss of livelihoods, homes, and health. Men who have been imprisoned struggle to obtain employment and provide for their families. Women who had been dependent on detained husbands, fathers, brothers, and friends often struggle in their absence, and children's material and emotional needs can also go unmet. The survey therefore suggests that organisations with a mandate to promote the rule of law in the oPt consider supporting the establishment of alternative (non-custodial) sentencing mechanisms.

3 Up to 47.7% of males surveyed had been in contact with Palestinian justice and security institutions, compared to a maximum of 13.8% of women. These figures may permit a determination that men are 3.5 times more likely than women to come into contact with Palestinian justice and security institutions. See caveat in footnote 2.

4 'Defendant' status of those in contact with justice and security institutions: 91.1% of males; 67.7% of females.

5 Of those who had been in contact with justice and security institutions in the last 12 months, 53.6% of men, compared with 24.6% of women, had been party to criminal cases (contraventions, misdemeanours, and felonies).

6 Physical and sexual violence are not the only forms of SGBV. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women's definition of violence against women includes psychosocial or emotional violence - i.e. non-physical methods of controlling another person such as humiliation or threats of violence - and economic violence, such as depriving resources or controlling career choices.

7 A Review of Palestinian Legislation from a Women's Rights Perspective (Jerusalem: UNDP, September 2011)

8 66.8% of men but only 39.3% of women know how to file a charge.

9 See footnote 2. Also note that since women are 21% more likely than men to be claimants, more of them would be represented by the public prosecution.

10 27.6% of males are satisfied with the cost of contracting lawyers' services, compared to 23.1% of females.

11 Compared with 70.2% of men.


Civil cases are the most common category of legal need. 64.6% of cases for which surveyed households have been in contact with the law are civil: insurance and financial claims, land disputes, labour disputes, traffic incidents and work injuries. Family issues (e.g. marriage, inheritance, custody) constitute the largest single category of cases at 36.8% of civil claims.

Religious courts are the formal justice forum of choice for Palestinian households. Palestinian households pursue claims in religious, rather than civil, courts. Because religious courts process family cases,¹² which constitute the largest category of legal cases, they can meet the majority of Palestinians’ legal needs. What is more, they can do so quickly, because administration of justice in religious courts is less likely to be hindered by occupation-related restrictions. The family cases processed by religious courts rarely require further investigations, apprehension of suspects or other interventions which are slowed by occupation-related restrictions on freedom of movement. The data suggest that while Palestinians may be willing to file civil claims in religious courts in anticipation of relatively speedy resolution, they may be reluctant to seek redress for criminal cases heard by civil courts, in anticipation of extensive delays, costs and frustration.¹³ Delays also increase the cost of pursuing formal justice: attending hearings results in lost income from days taken off work and expenditure on transport. The occupation-related challenges associated with administering criminal cases (which are tried in civil courts) are therefore associated with another key access to justice challenge identified in the survey: cost. A significant proportion of households perceive that pursuing justice is not economically viable: 29.9% reported that ‘it is too expensive to go to court’. Accordingly, religious courts may be seen to be the quickest, cheapest dispute resolution forum available.

Table 1: Use of religious and civil courts

	West Bank	East Jerusalem	Gaza Strip
Sharia courts	7.1%	3.9%	7.1%
Church courts	0.3%	0.5%	0.2%
Religious courts total	7.4%	4.4%	7.3%
Civil courts total	7.1%	1.3%	4.1%

Figure 2: Use of religious and civil courts



12 The institution of ‘civil’ marriage does not exist in the oPt: marriage is a religious institution, and marriage-related cases (divorce, custody) are processed in religious courts. 36.8% of cases are family law-related issues.

13 37.2% are satisfied with waiting times in religious courts, compared to 30.9% satisfied with waiting times in civil courts: a 20.4% increase.



6. CHALLENGES TO ACCESSING JUSTICE

The survey identified the following challenges to accessing justice:

- The Israeli occupation.
- Lack of legal literacy.
- Inadequate provision of legal assistance.
- Time: perception that formal justice is too slow.
- Cost: perception that formal justice is too expensive.

The Israeli occupation hinders the administration of justice in complex ways. 2.8% of respondents faced difficulties in accessing Palestinian rule of law institutions over the survey period. This challenge is greatest for households in East Jerusalem (7.7%), followed by the West Bank (2.7%) and Gaza Strip (2.3%).¹⁴ Checkpoints are responsible for most of these delays, followed by the Separation Wall. Such physical hindrances are not the only access to justice challenges posed by the occupation: restrictions on movement also severely hamper the administration of justice because those who call the police do not always receive a timely response, investigations take longer to complete, and the whole justice process is slowed.

Lack of legal literacy. Legal literacy, or understanding your rights and how to assert them, is the gateway to accessing rule of law institutions and achieving justice. It is one closed to most Palestinians:

- 46.7% do not know how to file cases.¹⁵
- 71.9% are not aware of the role of the Palestinian Civil Police, the Attorney-General's Office, the High Judicial Council, the Ministry of Justice, and the Palestinian Bar Association.¹⁶

'Legally illiterate' persons are less likely to access justice, less likely to demand their entitlements when caught up in the legal system, and less likely to hold rule of law institutions accountable for any deviation from due process. Limited legal literacy may help to explain why 8.3% of Palestinians who were in danger decided not to contact the police. When asked why not, 31.8% cited fear of police mistreatment. This may be because those who lack experience with the law can only rely on word-of-mouth accounts of police violations which they then interpret as an inevitable consequence of contact with law enforcement institutions, rather than a deviation from due process for which they can hold such institutions accountable.

¹⁴ Delays vary little between localities across the oPt: 2.8% of those in villages and cities, and 2.6% of those in refugee camps.


¹⁵ 33.2% of men and 60.7% of women do not know or are unsure of how to press charges.

¹⁶ This is the average of the number of households which are not aware of the mandate of each institution.

There are statistically significant geographic, age- and sex- related variations in legal literacy:

- Legal literacy is highest in the Gaza Strip, followed by the West Bank and East Jerusalem.¹⁷
- Legal literacy is highest in cities, followed by camps and rural areas.¹⁸
- Legal literacy is lower among Palestinians under 30 years of age, who are up to 6% less likely to demonstrate knowledge concerning the legal system.¹⁹ The data suggest that older Palestinians have progressively obtained legal information in an *ad hoc* fashion - e.g. through media, direct experience, self-study, or rumour - over time. This gap is likely to be because legal issues are not taught in school and university curricula in the oPt, suggesting that investment in legal education at multiple levels will support access to justice and the rule of law.
- Legal literacy is lower amongst women: aggregate data conceal a 43.2% gender legal literacy gap.²⁰ Palestinian women often marry and become wives and mothers with responsibilities in the home at a young age. Fewer women therefore have the characteristics positively correlated with legal literacy: post-graduate education; a high income; or full-time (paid) employment.²¹ Furthermore, in a conservative society in which women are discouraged from taking legal action, they are unlikely to seek information on legal issues.

Figure 3: Legal literacy amongst women and men.



17 Knowledge of the role and functions of the police: 59.4% (Gaza Strip); 45.2% (West Bank); 14.7% (East Jerusalem).

18 Knowledge of how to file a case: 54.5% (cities); 52.9% (camps); 52% (villages).

19 Under 30s scored significantly lower on all seven measures of legal literacy. The following range is typical: knowledge of how to file a case: 51.2% (< 30yrs); 54.2% (30-40yrs); 55.3% (> 40yrs).

20 The percentage by which male legal literacy exceeds that of women may be called the 'legal literacy gap'. For example; knowledge of how to file a case: literacy gap = 41.1% (66.8% of men but only 39.3% of women know how to file a charge); knowledge of police mandate: literacy gap = 30.9% (56.9% of men, but only 39.3% of women surveyed understand the mandate of the police); knowledge of public prosecution: literacy gap = 59.9% (31.6% of men, but only 13.6% of women understand the mandate of the public prosecution). The 43.2% 'gender literacy gap' is calculated by averaging the legal literacy gap for each of the seven measures of legal awareness.

21 Legal literacy is concentrated among higher-income brackets, employers, those in full-time employment, and with high levels of education. Knowledge of how to file cases: 56.7% of those earning more than NIS 5,000 per month, compared with 50.1% of those earning less than NIS 2,300 per month; 70.9% of employers and 66.5% of full-time employees compared with 42.2% of those not in the labour force and 54.3% of those unemployed; 61.1% of post-graduates compared with 50.8% of school-leavers.



Inadequate provision of legal assistance. Legal assistance is normally conceived as a service provided by lawyers to those in conflict with the law.²² Lawyers' services are either privately contracted by individuals; provided to indigent parties under government-administered 'legal aid' or Bar Association 'pro bono' schemes, or delivered by charitable civil society, non-governmental organisations. In the adversarial civil court environment, justice is predicated on lawyers' participation.²³ By representing clients, lawyers support the 'equality of arms' which makes a fair trial possible. They also undertake related tasks which enable clients to understand the law, navigate legal processes, and participate in the decisions affecting their lives. Such services include: informing clients of their rights; explaining the legal process; attending police interviews and visiting clients in prison to ensure that due process is followed and clients' rights are respected; and supporting processes such as bail applications or plea bargains. Quality legal assistance accompanying clients through the legal process therefore supports the administration of justice aligned with human rights standards. This, in turn, promotes greater levels of trust and confidence in the justice and security apparatus.²⁴ When households cannot obtain useful advice, assistance, and representation, they are unlikely to be able to assert their rights effectively. Unrepresented persons - especially criminal accused appearing in civil courts - are therefore at risk of an unfair trial and a traumatic experience in a bewildering institution. Meritorious cases can fail, and people lose confidence in the justice system. Consequently, when the supply of legal assistance - especially 'legal aid services' or 'assistance provided free of charge to those who cannot afford it' - fails to meet the demand, the effect is to limit access to justice, diminish the quality of justice and security services, reduce public confidence in justice and security services, encourage vigilantism, and threaten the rule of law.

Survey data shows that access to legal assistance is challenging for most households:

- Up to 90.8% of those in contact with the law do not have access to a lawyer.²⁵
- 57.2% of households cannot easily afford to pay for a lawyer.²⁶
- 56.0% of households doubt that they would be able to obtain free legal assistance if they needed it.²⁷

Surprisingly, 74.8% of households are satisfied that lawyers are accessible, while just 25.3% are satisfied with their cost. This suggests that respondents may have understood the question to refer to the *availability* of lawyers, rather than their accessibility.²⁸ With its highly educated population and numerous excellent university law faculties, the oPt does not lack lawyers: it is quite easy to physically find one. Yet, the vast majority of people do not use their services and cannot afford to pay for them. Contrasting the availability of lawyers with the accessibility of legal services suggests that oPt's legal profession lacks a *pro bono* (free of charge) culture. Under international law, lawyers are officers of the court with a duty to promote equality before the law by providing services *pro bono* to indigent clients.²⁹ These statistics affirm the value of UNDP's efforts to support the Palestinian Bar Association to provide legal aid services.

22 A new approach to legal aid, which is not correlated with lawyers, representation in court, or statutory, adversarial law enforcement institutions, is gaining traction in international law and development practice. UNDP/PAPP's new Civil Society Initiative is an example of an inclusive approach to legal assistance which enables CSOs employing lawyers, lawyer-trainees and supervised law students and 'paralegals', to meet the vast majority of legal needs. Relevant services are diverse: from legal awareness, concrete legal assistance (e.g. transport to court) and representation to supporting legal reform.

23 The right to a fair trial, equality before the law, and to the legal representation which makes this possible appears in international legal documents from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights onwards.

24 In addition to accompanying individual clients, some legal aid service providers also monitor justice and security institutions, conduct advocacy, and provide technical inputs to inform legislative and institutional reform efforts. The latter strengthen the quality of justice and security services, underscoring the significance of legal aid service providers not as 'civil society' organisations which stand in opposition to government, but as partners with a shared objective in strengthening access to justice and the rule of law.

25 Up to 3.9% of men and up to 1.2% of women in contact with the law had the support of a lawyer. Footnote 2 provides an important caveat on this statistic: the possibility that it may be inflated by double counting. However, even if we allow for significant double counting, and the fact that women - who appear most often as claimants represented by public prosecutors - do not need lawyers' services, we can still conclude that a significant proportion of those who come in contact with the law do not have legal assistance.

26 On average, 57.2% of households are dissatisfied with the cost of contracting lawyers' services. Such dissatisfaction is relatively uniform across areas and income groups: 58.4% of the poorest households and 49.6% of the wealthiest households are dissatisfied with their cost.

27 Only 31.3% are confident that they would be able to obtain free legal aid.

28 A distinction between availability and accessibility provides the fundament of many access to justice programmes. The latter often aim to make the justice and security institutions which are available in a country truly accessible to vulnerable populations which have been financially, geographically, educationally, and culturally cut off from them. The distinction in the meaning of these two terms may be clarified by analogy: food is available to a poor, hungry person in a market - he is positively surrounded by it - but it is not accessible to him, as he has no money with which to purchase any.

29 A number of international legal instruments provide that lawyers have a special role in the provision of legal aid. Article 25 of the United Nations Basic Principles On The Role Of Lawyers (1990) provides that 'professional associations of lawyers have the duty to cooperate with Governments to ensure effective and equal access to legal services for everyone.' Article 8 of the Lilongwe Declaration (2004) provides that: 'lawyers have a duty to promote access to justice'; 'should provide legal aid on a pro bono basis'; 'the organised Bar should cooperate with governments and CSOs to ensure effective and equal access to legal services.' The Declaration has been adopted by the UN Economic and Security Council and hence constitutes an international standard on legal aid.

Although legal assistance is clearly inadequate, there is some good news: the legal aid services which are available appear to be well targeted. Women in contact with the law are particularly vulnerable to discrimination, and legal aid services should be targeted to meet their needs. The data reveal what there is no legal aid 'gender gap', and women are 8.9% more confident than men that they could obtain free legal assistance.³⁰ However, additional efforts are needed to make legal aid services accessible to those in rural areas: just 44% of villagers are satisfied with the extent to which NGOs provide legal services, compared with 50.4% of those in refugee camps and 47.6% of those in cities.

Time: perception that formal justice takes too long. 8.3% of households in the oPt choose not to call the police when in danger.³¹ A perception that formal justice is slow and bureaucratic is the major challenge to accessing justice. Of those who felt unsafe but did not call the police, the majority (40.4%) explained that they "wanted to avoid bureaucratic police procedures". Of those who said they would not go to formal courts to resolve a dispute, the majority (50.2%) gave the reason: "court cases take too long".³² Dissatisfaction with the length of the formal justice process suggests that there would be value in scaling up the Ministry of Justice's programme of work on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to include community-based and court-annexed ADR mechanisms. These would provide a quicker, cheaper, more accessible, means of resolving the civil and minor criminal cases which constitute the majority of disputes in the oPt.

Cost: perception that formal justice is too expensive. Up to 57% of households report that the cost of pursuing justice is prohibitive.³³ Again, this data highlights the relevance of enhancing access to legal aid services.

30 Confidence 'that you would be able to receive free legal aid if you needed it': 30.1% (men): 32.8% (women).

31 Asked "have you felt that you were in danger in the last 12 months, but decided not to call the police?" 8.3% of respondents answered "yes": 5.7% in East Jerusalem, 6.3% in West Bank, and 12% in Gaza Strip.

32 This figure rises to 64% in the Gaza Strip - compared to 58.4% in East Jerusalem and 41.5% in West Bank - affirming the need to prioritise rule of law investments in this area.

33 On average, 29.9% of households reported that the expense of pursuing court cases is a key access to justice problem. The figure jumps to 57.3% in East Jerusalem.



7. SATISFACTION WITH JUSTICE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

The survey solicited perceptions of the performance of the following justice and security institutions and personnel: police, public prosecution, civil courts, religious courts, judges, Ministry of Justice, lawyers, and NGOs. In addition to specific findings, the following general trends are observed:

- Women are less satisfied with justice and security institutions than men.
- Satisfaction is highest in East Jerusalem, followed by West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Women are less satisfied than men with justice and security institutions. As the table overleaf demonstrates, women are, on average, 11% less satisfied than men with the performance of justice and security institutions.

Table 2: Percentage by which women are less satisfied with rule of law institutions

Justice and security institution	Gender satisfaction gap % by which women less satisfied than men
Police	-3.4%
Public prosecution	-11.7%
Civil courts	-14.7%
Religious courts	-15.9%
Judges	-11.8%
Ministry of Justice	-10.3%
Lawyers	-9.3%
NGOs	-7.0%
Average	-11.0%

Levels of satisfaction and confidence are highest in East Jerusalem, followed by West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Levels of satisfaction and confidence in the Gaza Strip are significantly lower than in the West Bank and East Jerusalem - especially on measures of institutional integrity (see table below). This difference may be explained by several political factors. First, following the 2006 elections and the Hamas takeover in Gaza Strip, many judges and prosecutors have been dismissed and replaced by Hamas members. Second, during the military attack on Gaza in December 2008/ January 2009, law enforcement and corrections capacities and facilities were severely damaged and destroyed. Third, justice and security services in the Gaza Strip are administered by a new, separate, Ministry of Justice, Attorney General's Office, and High Judicial Council. Recently established by Hamas, it is fair to assume that the capacity of these nascent institutions to provide quality services is still evolving.

Table 3: Levels of confidence in justice and security institutions' integrity

Confidence in institutions' integrity	Questions: "How confident are you that..."	West Bank	Gaza Strip	% decrease*
Equality before the law	You are treated equally before the law.	49.7%	32.1%	-35.4%
Fair trial (criminal cases)	If you were charged with committing a criminal offense, you would get a fair trial. ³⁴	47%	34.5%	-26.5%
Fair trial (civil cases)	If you had a civil dispute, you would be able to resolve it fairly through recourse to the courts.	52.7%	45.2%	-14.2%
Independence	Palestinian police enforce the law against all individuals equally, without any consideration for family or personal connections.	42%	38.2%	-9.0%
Average				-21.2%

* Percentage by which Gazan households are less confident than their counterparts in the West Bank.

Satisfaction with performance of the police

Police are at the 'front line' of justice in the oPt, and their services are largely regarded as satisfactory. Across the oPt, households have greatest contact with the police service: 33% of respondents who have contact with the justice and security apparatus have had contact with police. Respondents showed a strong awareness of the role of the police, readiness to advance opinions of its performance,³⁵ and a high opinion of its role in supporting the rule of law.³⁶ Satisfaction with the role of the police in enforcing court judgements is very high, at 80% weighted average across the oPt. Police are considered to offer timely, responsive services: 68.1% of households in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are satisfied that police take their requests for assistance seriously,³⁷ and 67.3% are satisfied that police respond to those requests in a timely manner.³⁸ Timely, effective law enforcement in the West Bank requires Palestinian police to coordinate with Israeli authorities. Minimal differences in satisfaction between the West Bank, where police must contend with Israeli security and administrative arrangements, and the Gaza Strip, which does not face this problem, suggest that coordination arrangements between police and Israeli authorities are functioning relatively well.

Satisfaction with police performance is stronger in cities than in rural areas. Across all measures, satisfaction is higher among city dwellers than rural and refugee camp households.³⁹ Satisfaction with availability of police stations is higher in such areas too: 24.8% of households in cities are dissatisfied with the availability of police stations, compared with 40.3% of households in rural areas.⁴⁰ This indicates that satisfaction with police services is correlated with concentration of infrastructure and may suggest that investments are needed to enhance police presence in rural areas.

Satisfaction with police protection of privacy is lowest of all measures. Satisfaction with 'the extent to which police respect privacy' was 50.4% across the territory.⁴¹ This is the lowest score of the eleven measures and also registers the highest level of dissatisfaction amongst all the measures: 38.8% on average, rising to 46.9% in the Gaza Strip. The data suggest that there is scope for re-thinking internal guidelines to protect privacy.

34 Furthermore, 51.9% of households in Gaza are unconfident that they would receive a fair trial - more than double the 22.2% who lack such confidence in East Jerusalem

35 Just 5-10% of respondents answered 'don't know' to the 11 questions on satisfaction with police. By contrast, 20-30% of respondents offered no opinion on the performance of the public prosecution, 35-60% offered no opinion on judges; 10-20% offered no opinion on lawyers; 30-40% offered no opinion on the MOJ; and 20-30% offered no opinion on NGOs.

36 The police ranked second of seven justice and security institutions in terms of their importance with regards to strengthening the rule of law.

37 67.8% West Bank; 68.9% Gaza Strip.

38 66.8% West Bank; 67.7% Gaza Strip.

39 This can be traced to the security and administrative arrangements existing in the territory. Most cities are classified as 'A' areas under PNA security and administrative control. In them, Israeli administrative and/or security control places less of a burden on service delivery.

40 65.3% of households in the West Bank and 61.9% of households in the Gaza Strip, are satisfied with the number of police stations, compared with 50.9% in East Jerusalem. Satisfaction with the effectiveness of investigations and police arrest powers is also lower, and more variable across areas - suggesting the challenges associated with apprehending suspects in Israeli controlled and/or administered parts of the territory. For example, 64.1% of households in Gaza are satisfied or extremely satisfied with police arrest powers, the figure drops to 53% in the West Bank, and 49.1% in East Jerusalem.

41 54.0% West Bank; 42.7% Gaza Strip.



Satisfaction with performance of civil and religious courts

Questions concerning civil and religious' courts performance relate to the following 'technical' and 'normative' performance measures:

- *Technical performance measures:* e.g. queuing system, sign posting, court clerks.⁴²
- *Normative performance measures:* Measures of courts' integrity, e.g. 'fairness' of court verdicts; 'independence' from factional and personal influences; 'equal treatment' of all individuals before the courts.

Palestinians are more satisfied with the integrity of religious than civil courts. The table below demonstrates that Palestinians are much more satisfied with courts' technical competence than their integrity.⁴³ It also shows that Palestinians are more satisfied with religious than civil courts - especially with respect to their 'normative' performance (integrity). This may be because religious courts often feature judicial activism, wherein judges take a more inquisitorial role where one party is better represented, to promote equality before the law and a fair trial. Such judges may simply be more 'vocal', by explaining court procedures, and appearing to deliberate aloud by explaining the factors influencing their verdicts. This 'judicial activism' is likely to give religious courts significant appeal in a context in which a significant proportion of those in contact with the law do not have legal assistance. A defendant in a religious court is more likely to have been asked questions, fostering reassurance that mitigating factors have been understood. S/he is more likely to have heard how the judge interprets this information, and how this has influenced the way the law has been applied to his or her case. S/he is therefore more likely to perceive that relevant facts have been taken into account, and that both process and outcome are based on awareness of his or her situation. By contrast, judicial activism is rarely a feature of civil court justice, even though such activism is arguably more needed because the stakes are higher: civil courts process criminal cases which can attract prison sentences. Without a lawyer to advocate on their behalf, represent their interests, and explain what is happening, unrepresented accused in civil courts may be unconvinced that their situation is understood and that facts relevant to the case have been given due consideration in the interpretation and application of the law. Judicial activism in religious courts may therefore 'compensate' for inadequate provision of legal assistance, enabling unrepresented persons to perceive that their interests are duly considered within a fair process.

Even though women's testimony does not equal that of a man in Sharia courts, women are more satisfied with the fairness of verdicts in religious than civil courts. Given that women are discriminated against in Palestinian society, and that women are particularly ill-served by *Sharia* courts because their testimony does not equal that of a man, it is remarkable that women are more satisfied with issues such as the 'fairness of court verdicts' in *Sharia* than religious courts. The data presented in the following table substantiates recent UNDP research which finds that *Sharia* courts in the oPt are socially and legally dynamic: judges consider women's interests when interpreting the law, and utilise legal loopholes and textual ambiguities to enable women to achieve justice.⁴⁴

42 Other things being equal, the efficiency of these aspects of the court 'machinery' is correlated with effective, timely administration of justice manifested by shorter times spent processing cases and waiting court. Speed at which judgements are reached and time spent waiting in court are therefore 'procedural' performance measures.

43 Households are 10.8% more satisfied with civil courts' technical capability than their integrity. Average level of satisfaction for measures of technical performance is 40.0%, compared with 36.1% for measures of normative performance.

44 'Review of Palestinian Legislation from a Women's Rights Perspective' (Jerusalem: UNDP, September 2011).

Table 4: Satisfaction with performance of Palestinian religious and civil courts: gender disaggregated data


	Civil courts			Religious courts		
	Men	Women	Percentage decrease	Men	Women	Percentage decrease
TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE						
Courts' queuing system	39.8%	34.6%	-13.0%	43%	36.8%	-14.4%
Courts' sign posting	47.3%	40%	-15.4%	48.6%	40.6%	-16.4%
Courts' cleanliness	48.7%	42.3%	-13.1%	51.5%	43.9%	-14.7%
Interpersonal skills of clerks	41.2%	31.8%	-22.8%	42.6%	32.6%	-23.4%
Number of available court clerks	41.7%	30.1%	-28.0%	43.6%	31.7%	-27.2%
Efficiency of court clerks	45.2%	35.3%	-21.9%	47.4%	37.0%	-21.9%
Average*			-14.3%			-19.6%
PROCEDURAL PERFORMANCE						
Speed at which judgements are reached	32.2%	28.3%	-12.1%	44.3%	38.9%	-12.1%
Time spent waiting in courts	27.5%	24.8%	-9.8%	35.5%	30.2%	-14.9%
Average			-10.9%			-13.5%
NORMATIVE PERFORMANCE						
Equal treatment of all individuals before the court	36.9%	35.5%	-3.7%	46.9%	42.3%	-9.8%
Independence of courts from factional (political, business) influences	34.2%	29.8%	-12.8%	42.7%	37.9%	-11.2%
Independence of courts from personal/clan/family influences	36.2%	31.6%	-12.7%	44.1%	38.1%	-13.6%
Fairness of court verdicts	45.0%	39.5%	-12.2%	53.7%	47.3%	-11.9%
Average			-10.3%			-11.6%

* Average percentage decrease: x by which women are less satisfied than men.

Women are least satisfied with court operations; especially court clerks' performance and courts' sign posting. The greatest variation in satisfaction levels between men and women appears with respect to technical performance. Women are up to 28.0% less satisfied than men with court clerks' performance, courts' signposting, cleanliness, and queuing system. As justice institutions are especially unfamiliar environments for Palestinian women, one may assume that they rely on effective performance of the orientation function frequently provided by court clerks. We may therefore consider that women's level of satisfaction with services provided by court clerks are a critical measure of the user-friendliness of courts, especially for the anyone who needs help to navigate complex legal processes in unfamiliar institutions.



Figure 4: Satisfaction with processing of cases concerning violence against women



Women are less satisfied than men with the way in which courts process cases involving children, SGBV and murder. Overall, households are more satisfied with religious' courts processing of cases involving violence against women such as domestic violence. Women are 14.7% less satisfied than men with the way that (civil and religious) courts process cases involving children. Women are 19.3% less satisfied than men with the way in which courts process murder cases.

Corruption emerged as a priority issue for the ongoing legal reform process. When asked to express their degree of satisfaction with the way that courts deal with 12 specific issues,⁴⁵ there is a clear, uniform opinion on only one issue: corruption appeared simultaneously at the top of the dissatisfied and bottom of the least satisfied scales.⁴⁶

More judges may be needed. The data indicate a shortage of judges: 35.1% are satisfied with the number of judges working in Palestinian courts.⁴⁷ There is a possibility that households attribute a key justice frustration - lengthy court waiting times and decision making - to a shortage of judges. Their responses could represent a call to recruit more judges, in order to address their frustration that 'formal justice is too slow.'

Satisfaction with performance of the Ministry of Justice and public prosecution

Lack of legal literacy complicates determination of Ministry of Justice performance. Lack of legal literacy prevents a significant number of respondents from stating their level of satisfaction with the performance of the Ministry of Justice. Knowledge concerning the Ministry of Justice is most limited: just 20.7% of Palestinian households know what the MOJ is and does. Lack of clarity is a function of generally limited knowledge concerning rule of law institutions. The establishment by Hamas of a second Ministry of Justice, based in Gaza City, may also complicate public understanding of how formal judicial institutions should function. Very limited awareness of the mandate of the MOJ(s) effectively shrunk the survey sample: up to 46% of respondents answered 'don't know' to questions concerning MOJ performance. Fewer people giving an opinion manifests in lower levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Accordingly, (dis)satisfaction data must be read alongside information about the number of people who are silent on each issue.

Levels of satisfaction with MOJ's integrity is generally strong, except with respect to defence against human rights abuses perpetrated by Israeli actors. Satisfaction with the Ministry's ability to defend the independence of the judiciary is reasonably strong, at 37.6% of all respondents.⁴⁸ Satisfaction with the Ministry's ability to lead justice sector reform

45 Theft, violence against women (in both civil and religious courts), murder, fraud, financial disputes, work-related disputes, children, property damage, insurance, drugs, land disputes, and cases involving children. Note that violence against women was the only case in which respondents were asked to consider civil and religious courts' performance separately.

46 48.3% dissatisfied; 38.2% satisfied.

47 48.3% are silent on this issue.

48 With 39.4% offering no opinion ('don't know').

is also solid, at 37.3% (with 39.0% silent on this issue).⁴⁹ Opinions concerning the Ministry's ability to ensure the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups are less positive: just 33.4% of households are satisfied.⁵⁰ Satisfaction with the MOJ's ability to defend citizens against human rights abuses perpetrated by Israeli actors is especially low: 27.5% of households are satisfied that the Ministry performs this role well.⁵¹ These figures suggest that the Ministry's new Justice Information Centre and website could usefully invest in publicising information concerning the Ministry's diplomatic and other efforts to protect and promote the rights of Palestinian households. Such efforts may also address the generally poor knowledge concerning the Ministry's work.

Satisfaction with the MOJ's performance with respect to delivering concrete services is lower. Levels of satisfaction with MOJ performance are lowest with respect to the MOJ's provision of certificates of non-conviction and notary services for foreign documents: 44.4% of households expressed dissatisfaction with such services, while only 24.4% expressed satisfaction.⁵² The high level of dissatisfaction and relatively low level of satisfaction commonly indicate the need for institutional capacity development efforts towards a 'customer service' orientation, as there is a strong demand for such services. Certificates of non-conviction, for example, are often required for obtaining employment, or for marriage.

Public confidence in the public prosecution is reasonably high. Notwithstanding the fact that on average 28.1% of respondents gave no opinion⁵³ on the public prosecution's performance - effectively reducing the sample size by the same proportion - 47.7% of all households surveyed are satisfied with the role of the public prosecution in maintaining dignity and human freedom. 45.2% are satisfied with the role of the public prosecution in mobilising criminal lawsuits; 38.6% are satisfied with the integrity and independence of the public prosecution; and 39.9% are satisfied with the efficiency of the public prosecution.

Satisfaction with performance of NGOs

Satisfaction with NGO performance is strong, especially in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the extent to which NGOs provide free legal assistance - information, advice and representation - is strong: 46.8%. 48.9% of males and 44.7% of females are satisfied with provision of such assistance. 45.6% of households are satisfied with the role of NGOs in monitoring violations of human rights. Satisfaction is highest in the Gaza Strip (53.1%), compared with 41.6% in the West Bank including East Jerusalem. 49.7% of households are satisfied with NGOs' human rights awareness raising programmes. Again, satisfaction is highest in the Gaza Strip (54.8%), followed by the West Bank (47.7%) and East Jerusalem (40.6%). This suggests that, following the takeover by Hamas, NGOs are meeting justice needs which the beleaguered formal justice and security apparatus is not trusted, or lacks the capacity, to meet. This substantiates UNDP's decision to strengthen the rule of law in the Gaza Strip by empowering NGOs to provide relevant services.

However, higher levels of dissatisfaction with the quality of NGO's provision of legal aid services complicate the picture: 31% of Gazan households are dissatisfied with NGOs' legal aid services, compared to 21% in East Jerusalem, and 27.3% in the rest of the West Bank. This may be because most Gaza-based legal aid NGOs responded to Hamas' post-election appointment of judges by boycotting the formal justice system. Consequently, many have not supported access to justice in formal courts. High levels of dissatisfaction with legal aid providers may therefore represent a desire to use formal courts, and frustration that NGOs fail to respond to households' justice needs. Although many have more recently ended this boycott, a number of large legal aid service provider NGOs have not. This suggests the relevance of UNDP's efforts to encourage them to 're-engage' with the formal justice system.

There is a perception that NGOs could do more to press for legislative reform. Satisfaction with NGOs' role in promoting legal reform is comparatively low, at 39.6%. Furthermore, 31.5% expressed dissatisfaction with what they currently do. This finding suggests that UNDP and its partners could further develop NGOs' advocacy skills and provide greater opportunities to use these, such as PNA/civil society consultations.

49 42% of Gazan households are silent on this issue.

50 With 33.1% silent on this issue.

51 32.8% are silent on this issue.

52 With 31.2% silent on this issue.

53 Answered "don't know".



8. CONFIDENCE IN THE JUSTICE SECTOR

Confidence in rule of law institutions is generally high across all sex, age and socio-economic categories and both technical and 'normative' measures. 71% of Palestinian households agreed that courts are the *only* legitimate institutions through which to resolve disputes.⁵⁴ 63.3% of households are confident that they would receive prompt police assistance; 47.6% are confident that crimes against them would be effectively investigated; 47.5% are confident that a need for effective police protection from a disputant would be met; and 51.2% are confident that they could solve a civil dispute fairly through the courts. These figures are surprisingly high when considered in the light of the fact that the majority of respondents had not used justice and security services over the last 12 months. Hence their perceptions are more likely to reflect:

- Stories and rumours of others' experiences. Retail research famously finds that people are twice as likely to relate accounts of negative rather than positive service delivery. Accordingly, perceptions based largely on 'second-hand' reports are likely to be lower than those based on personal contact.⁵⁵ The effect would be to depress overall levels of satisfaction and confidence in these institutions, and to paint a picture of the legal landscape in oPt which does not reflect the current capacities and actual performance of these institutions.⁵⁶
- Weaker performance of justice and security institutions of earlier years, as nascent institutions (established in 1994) continued to develop their capacities. Note that this would include poorer service delivery during challenging *intifada* years.⁵⁷

Households are reasonably confident that they would get a fair trial, even though they doubt judicial independence. 52.7% of Palestinians are confident that trials are fair, yet only 21.9% are confident that they are independent.⁵⁸ Furthermore, 44.0% of households are satisfied that civil courts deliver fair verdicts, while just 33.3% are confident that the courts are independent of factional influences.⁵⁹ A fair trial would appear to result only from an independent process, so one would expect roughly equal levels of confidence (and lack thereof) on both 'fairness' and 'independence' measures. That the statistics do not meet expectations that independence would be equated with fairness reminds us of the need to interpret perception survey statistics - and all aspects of the Palestinian legal landscape - in the socio-legal context which produced them. Informal - so-called 'tribal' or customary - dispute resolution mechanisms with roots deep in Palestinian history conceive of justice as a deeply political, social process. Considering 'extra-legal' facts (e.g. the relative size of disputants' families, the strength of their political affiliations, the extent to which they are armed, and hence their ability to credibly threaten violence) is regarded as being an integral part of the justice process. A judge with a sincere intention to support reconciliation and peace, and having no personal advantage to gain from the process, could consider such factors in order to support a settlement which endures because it is based on a realistic assessment of the balance of power between disputing parties. If strict independence (application of the law without reference to broader family, community or political matters) is not always considered to be conducive to peace in oPt, then a trial which is not 'independent' may still result in a 'fair' verdict.

Fear of police mistreatment deter access to justice. 8.3% of households do not call the police when in danger.⁶⁰ Of these - i.e. 2.6% of all households surveyed - gave the following explanation: 'I was afraid that the police would mistreat me'. This number is inflated by significantly higher levels of fear of police amongst women: while 35.4% of

54 72.4% West Bank; 69.6% Gaza Strip; 60.8% East Jerusalem.

55 The fact that satisfaction with the police - the institution with which most respondents had direct experience over the survey period - is not significantly higher than other justice and security institutions, lends credence to this claim. It is also worth noting that levels of dissatisfaction with the police are generally lower among East Jerusalem households, who have the least exposure to them because Palestinian police are prohibited from operating in this area. This affirms the importance of using 'if then' analysis in the next survey, to isolate and compare perceptions of those who have direct experience of justice and security institutions. It is suggested that these data would provide a more accurate picture of current capacities and actual performance of justice and security institutions. See the concluding section for more information on survey limitations, and recommendations for subsequent surveys.

56 The fact that satisfaction with the police - the institution with which most respondents had direct experience over the survey period - is not significantly higher than other justice and security institutions, lends credence to this claim. It is also worth noting that levels of dissatisfaction with the police are generally lower among East Jerusalem households, who have the least exposure to them because Palestinian police are prohibited from operating in this area.

57 *Informal Justice: Rule of Law and Dispute Resolution in Palestine* (Ramallah: Birzeit University Institute of Law, 2004) finds that during the *intifadas*, PNA institutions faced more extreme challenges to providing quality justice and security services. Palestinian households perceived that the cost and time required to resolve disputes through them became prohibitive. However, after each *intifada*, service provision improved, and use of PNA justice and security institutions increased.

58 The combination of low confidence in independence and greater confidence in fairness appears in many data sets.

59 36.0% are confident that they are independent of personal, clan, and family influences.

60 Asked "have you felt that you were in danger in the last 12 months, but decided not to call the police?", 8.3% of respondents answered "yes": 5.7% in East Jerusalem, 6.3% in West Bank, and 12% in Gaza Strip.

men are confident that police will respect their rights, only 23.6% of females share their confidence. This suggests that there is a need to strengthen *internal* police oversight arrangements, including complaints handling mechanisms, and internal disciplinary protocols. Fear of police mistreatment may be a function of inadequate *external (public)* oversight. Just 23.0% of households know how to complain against the police. This low figure indicates that public accountability is weak and suggests that there is scope for police to abuse their power. Knowledge of how to hold police accountable for abuse of power follows the legal literacy trend: it is highest in Gaza Strip (29.3%), followed by the West Bank (20.3%), then East Jerusalem (13.1%). Again, the data affirm the importance of enhancing legal literacy, both as stand-alone access to justice initiative, as well as foundational components of external accountability, i.e. public watchdog initiatives.

Levels of confidence amongst those who come into contact with the law are up to 50% higher than those who come into conflict with it. The confidence levels of a person in conflict with the law requiring legal services, such as a defendant or detainee, are up to 50% lower than those who solicit legal services (e.g. as claimants, victims, or witnesses).⁶¹ This indicates a need to strengthen internal processes to ensure that those in conflict with the law are not deprived of their rights by the very system charged with protecting them. Increased legal literacy, which empowers people with the knowledge and confidence to defend their own rights when in contact with the law, legal assistance, as well as prison and court monitoring initiatives, are likely to be useful ways to meet this need.

NGOs are most trusted to meet popular justice needs. Popular confidence in NGOs is strikingly high: out of a maximum of 5, NGOs scored 3.12: 3.03 amongst males, and 3.20 amongst females. Along with police, NGOs therefore top the table of popular trust and confidence. The good degree of trust enjoyed by NGOs indicates their potential as partners in efforts to promote the rule of law. It also indicates that UNDP's Civil Society Initiative promises to be an effective means of meeting legal aid needs. In addition, lower levels of trust in lawyers - with a score of 2.88, and at the bottom of the 'trust table' - affirms the value of the Bar Association's new UNDP-supported legal aid clinics in the Gaza Strip.

⁶¹ *Those in conflict with the law (e.g. defendant; detainee):* 43.8% are confident that they would get a fair trial if charged with committing a criminal offence; 31.3% believe that their trial would be independent of external influences; and the same number are confident that they would be able to obtain free legal assistance if they needed it. *Those in contact with the law (e.g. as claimants or victims):* 63.3% of households are confident that they would receive prompt police assistance; 47.6% are confident that crimes against them would be effectively investigated; 47.5% are confident that a need for effective police protection from a disputant would be met; and 51.2% are confident that they could solve a civil dispute fairly through the courts.



10. TRUST IN JUSTICE AND SECURITY SECTOR INSTITUTIONS: A COMPOSITE MEASURE

This inaugural public perception survey established a ‘trust table’ to facilitate easy year-on-year performance comparison of each rule of law institution, track progress with regard to strengthening the rule of law and improving access to justice, and support evaluation of the effectiveness of justice sector development programmes. Households were asked to enumerate their trust in the Palestinian justice system as a whole, as well as individual rule of law institutions and personnel on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating complete lack of trust, and 5 indicating complete trust. The overall level of trust in the justice system as a whole was strong, with a 3.09 territory-wide average. On most measures, trust was highest in the West Bank, followed by the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.⁶²

Table 5: Levels of trust in justice and security institutions (scale of 1-5)

	Institution	oPt average	West Bank	East Jerusalem	Gaza Strip
1	Palestinian Civil Police	3.12	3.22	2.85	2.99
1	NGOs	3.12	3.08	2.75	3.24
2	High Judicial Council	3.09	3.19	3.00	2.94
3	Palestinian Authority	3.07	3.18	2.79	2.93
4	Ministry of Justice	3.01	3.14	2.81	2.82
5	Attorney-General’s Office	2.97	3.08	2.82	2.81
6	Palestinian Legislative Council	2.94	2.99	2.85	2.86
7	Palestinian Bar Association	2.88	2.90	2.91	2.84

11. CONCLUDING REMARKS: NEXT STEPS

UNDP/PAPP intends to repeat this inaugural perception survey annually. This section notes lessons learned from the limitations of the present survey, followed by recommendations for how to address them next year.

Lack of clarity as to whether all East Jerusalem households gave their opinions on Palestinian institutions. Respondents must give their perceptions of PNA institutions for the survey data to provide a baseline against which the impact of investments in these institutions may be measured. To this end, the questionnaire should be re-worded, and interviewers trained to ask these questions precisely as they appear in the questionnaire.

Survey results do not necessarily reflect the current performance of justice and security institutions. The vast majority of respondents had not been in contact with Palestinian justice and security institutions in the 12 months preceding the survey. Accordingly, their perceptions may be based on experiences dating from earlier periods during which the capacities of institutions formed as recently as 1994 were nascent. Their perceptions may also still be shaped by the *intifada* years, during which challenges to effective delivery of justice and security services were considerable. Perceptions shared by those who have never had direct contact with justice and security institutions are also likely to be based on others’ experiences, or hearsay. The survey may therefore achieve its objective - to provide an overall picture of how the Palestinian people perceive their justice and security institutions - but without properly being able to capture the impacts of recent investments in these institutions.

⁶² Note that these rankings do not simply correspond with levels of knowledge concerning the roles of various institutions and personnel. For example, awareness concerning the role of lawyers is higher than awareness of the role of judges, public prosecution and Ministry of Justice.

Logistical challenges result in smaller sample in East Jerusalem. Due to logistical challenges posed by the separation wall and Jerusalem ID-related issues, the implementing partner contracted to administer the survey in East Jerusalem⁶³ was not able to survey as many households as anticipated. The smaller sample in East Jerusalem may carry implications for the reliability of data from this area. The fact that East Jerusalem is not served by the same judicial and police services as the rest of the West Bank also affects the accuracy of responses from this part of the oPt.

The household-based survey excludes the Bedouin population. The survey was designed to target households using the numeration area classification approach elaborated by PCBS. The benefits of so doing were considerable: the process was easy to administer, completed within a short time-frame, and produced results which can be used alongside other national statistics. An unintended consequence was the exclusion of Bedouins, a migrant community which does not live in 'households'. Accordingly, the survey does not represent the views of a particularly vulnerable portion of the Palestinian population.

The interview process may have influenced responses. Poor legal literacy demanded that field workers explain questions in order to elicit informed responses. Consequently, the survey process itself generated capacity development results for UNDP and its partners: strengthening legal literacy, stimulating critical thinking on rule of law issues, and supporting the emergence of a more receptive audience for planned awareness raising, accountability, and participatory law reform efforts. However, there is a risk that the enabling explanations also influenced responses and distorted results. It can be easy for interviewers to introduce biases simply by the way they ask questions - the tone they use, the stress they add to certain words - let alone the explanations they offer. That field workers who conducted the present study were trained significantly reduced this risk. That the several, differently phrased questions pertaining to the same issue generated very similar results also suggests that such training was adequate, and that the interview process was generally sound.

Focus on formal institutions excludes informal justice system. The oPt is a legally pluralistic context in which disputes are resolved by both national, formal justice institutions and community-based, 'informal' justice mechanisms. This survey did not aim to explore the status of households' engagement with and perceptions of these 'informal justice' institutions, and elicited only limited information on such issues. Since the topography of the informal justice system is largely absent from the analysis, it risks presenting an incomplete picture of the legal landscape. However, the informal justice system appears 'between the lines' of this report, and other (referenced) research is used to clarify unusual data in such cases. For example, 37.1% of households in the Gaza Strip 'would not resolve disputes in formal courts, because informal justice is faster', compared with just 15.2% in the West Bank. There would be value in researching these issues in the next survey.

63 Ramallah-based consulting company 'Creative Business Solutions'.



RECOMMENDATIONS

Logistical challenges result in a smaller sample in East Jerusalem. Consider contracting a Jerusalem-based organisation to administer the survey process in East Jerusalem. Three organisations (one in each of West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem) would need to work in close cooperation and be closely monitored to ensure that the survey methodology was uniformly applied in each area.

Household-based survey excludes Bedouin population. Consider designing a separate survey component targeting Bedouins. Designing the methodology in partnership with PCBS may also enable the perception survey to generate additional development results: strengthened national research informing more targeted policies, and more equitable development.

Survey results do not necessarily reflect the current performance of justice and security institutions. Consider performing 'if: then' analysis to isolate the responses of those who have actually used justice and security services over the survey period. Comparing these statistics with the rest of the sample would enable partners to identify how the actual performance and current capacities of the justice system differs from earlier periods - including the difficult *intifada* years - hearsay and speculation.

Focus on formal institutions excludes informal justice system. Consider including survey questions aiming to ascertain *why* households use informal justice mechanisms. Such questions could foster an understanding of the principles and processes according to which Palestinians wish to resolve their disputes. Such information would enable organisations with a mandate to support the rule of law in oPt to make an essential contribution to the state building process. Empowered with information concerning Palestinians' legal needs and preferences, partners could support the Palestinian people to forge a single, unitary justice system which manifests their unique identity and values. This information would also support ongoing law reform processes; helping to 'root' international laws in national values. The effect would be to support the emergence of a truly legitimate Palestinian state which embodies indigenous values and responds to popular expectations.

ANNEX 1: METHODOLOGY

The survey was implemented as follows:

1. Select implementing partners.
2. Design questionnaire.
3. Conduct pilot survey.
4. Select and train field workers (interviewers).
5. Conduct sampling and interviews.
6. Calculate data error margin.

1. Selecting implementing partners: Ramallah-based consulting company 'Creative Business Solutions' (CBS) and Gazan NGO 'El-Wedad Society for Community Rehabilitation' were selected following a competitive procurement process.⁶⁴

Working in close cooperation, El-Wedad administered the survey in the Gaza Strip, while CBS administered the survey in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem). In close cooperation with UNDP, both organisations executed the following tasks: informing survey design; sampling in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip; training the interviewers; pilot testing the questionnaire; conducting and monitoring data collection; data entry; data coding; and drafting the survey report.

2. Design questionnaire: The questionnaire was designed in consultation with national and international partners. A draft was reviewed by world-class research institution University College London to ensure its suitability for obtaining accurate, relevant information on the following issues:

- *Contact* with justice and security institutions.
- *Challenges* to accessing justice and security institutions.
- *Satisfaction* with justice and security institutions.
- *Confidence* with justice and security institutions.

3. Pilot survey: A pilot survey was conducted on a sample of 40 households from West Bank and Gaza Strip May 2011. The aim of the pilot was to examine the accuracy of the questionnaire, determine the appropriateness of its questions, and calculate its reliability and 'stability'. Where several questions measuring perceptions of the same issue generate identical results, a survey is considered to be 'stable', and able to produce reliable results. The Cronbach's Alpha Index used to test the stability of the questionnaire revealed that internal consistency of the questionnaire was more than 85% for each section of the questionnaire: a score confirming its stability and reliability. Based on results of the pilot, some questions were modified and re-worded to further enhance the survey's stability, the reliability of results, and viability of its findings.

4. Select and train field workers (interviewers): Palestinian families were the survey's unit of analysis. Having previously discovered that they are more receptive to women interviewers, CBS and El-Wedad engaged majority-female survey teams in order to elicit more considered responses. Survey team composition was as follows:

- West Bank: 50 trained field workers; 48 of whom were females.
- Gaza Strip: 23 trained field workers; 8 of whom were females.

The field workers were trained on sampling and data collection methods, as well as interview techniques.

⁶⁴ A 'Request for proposals' was widely advertised, and submissions evaluated on the basis of standard UNDP technical and financial criteria. Proposals were considered technically compliant if they scored at least 49 of a maximum possible 70 points against the following technical criteria: detailed work plan and time frame; monitoring plan; previous experience in conducting field surveys; CVs of all survey staff. Proposals could score a maximum possible 30 points against the following financial calculation: the lowest price quoted ('x') is scored at 100 points. Other proposals ('y') are measured against this using the following formula: (x/y) x 100.



5. Conduct sampling and interviews: Questionnaires were conducted in a total of 6,710 households. In order to obtain data that would permit territory-wide determinations of the rule of law landscape in the oPt, the survey covered:

- Every governorate in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.
- Every locality in every area of the oPt: cities, villages, and refugee camps.
- A broad cross-section of society: each sex, age, and socio-economic group, including marital status, educational attainment, income group, employment status, employment type and employment sector.

The distribution of the sample across these areas and categories is presented in the following tables:

Area	Sub-area	Sample size	Proportion of sample (%)
oPt	East Jerusalem	389	5.8%
	West Bank	4,021	59.9%
	Gaza Strip	2,300	34.3%
Governorate	North Gaza	476	7.1%
	Gaza	758	11.3%
	Deir Al-Balah	329	4.9%
	Khan Younis	439	6.5%
	Rafah	298	4.4%
	Jenin	406	6.1%
	Tubas	375	5.6%
	Tulkarem	389	5.8%
	Nablus	420	6.3%
	Qalqiliya	390	5.8%
	Salfit	375	5.6%
	Jericho	392	5.8%
	Ramallah	404	6.0%
	Jerusalem	389	5.8%
	Bethlehem	391	5.8%
	Hebron	479	7.1%
	Locality	City	3,154
Village		2,442	36.4%
Refugee camp		1,114	16.6%

Category	Sub-category	Proportion of sample (%)
Sex	Male	51.1%
	Female	48.9%
Age	< 30 years	39.1%
	30-40 years	26.6%
	> 40 years	34.3%
Marital status	Single	27.1%
	Married	67.4%
	Divorced	1.5%
	Widowed	3.8%
	Separated	0.3%
Educational attainment	High school	67.6%
	Bachelor's degree	21.0%
	Graduate diploma	10.1%
	Masters degree and above	1.4%
Income group	< NIS 2,300	60.1%
	NIS 2,300 - 3,500	27.5%
	> NIS 3,501	12.4%
Employment status	Full-time	24.3%
	Part-time	12.2%
	Unemployed	21.6%
	Not in labour force	41.9%
Employment type	Public sector	35.6%
	Private sector	32.7%
	Self-employed	26.7%
	NGO	2.9%
	International organisation	2.1%
Employment sector	Industry	16.4%
	Services	60.3%
	Construction	14.1%
	Agriculture	9.2%



6. Conduct sampling and interviews: The sampling and interview process was approached as follows:⁶⁵

1. Random selection of numeration areas from each community. According to the PCBS' classification method, a numeration area consists of 80-100 households. Selection of numeration areas ('block') therefore varied along with the size of communities: one block in smaller communities; two in larger communities.
2. Random selection of households within each numeration area.
3. Selection of a person of at least 18 years from each household.
4. Assurance of an equal number of male and female respondents within each numeration area. To ensure that both male and female perceptions of justice are well represented in survey findings, field workers (interviewers) determined the sex of the person to be interviewed before entering the household.
5. Expression of preference regarding sex of respondent. For example, if the previous respondent had been a male, the field worker would ask to interview a female in the next household visited. Note that female respondents may or may not have been accompanied by other males. The 'Kish table' was used: if the respondent was a female, the interviewer neither requested a male to be present, nor requested any male already present to leave. Consequently, it is not possible to determine whether women were interviewed alone, or in the presence of others. In the considered opinion of the national implementing partners, the presence or absence of a male would not influence responses rendered.
6. **Calculate data error margin:** The error margin of the sample is estimated at 1.18% at household level. At governorate level, the sample error is less than or equal to 6%.

65 The following formula was used to determine the sample size: $n = \frac{t^2(p(1-p))}{E^2}$ where n = sample size; t = 1.96 for a 95% confidence level; E = 0.05 (5%) confidence interval (also called 'margin of error'); and p = estimated prevalence of 50%. The 'prevalence' factor is used to reflect neutrality: for example as the sample distribution and households were selected randomly, factors such as respondents' political affiliations are unknown, and assumed to be mixed (e.g. 50% secular; 50% religious).

ANNEX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE



UNDP Rule of Law & Access to Justice Programme in the oPt Public Perceptions of Palestinian Justice and Security Institutions

I. Contact with justice and security sector institutions

R1 Have you been in contact with any of the following Palestinian justice/security sector institutions in the last 12 months?

R1_1 Civil police:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R1_2 Military courts:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R1_3 Civil courts:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
R1_4 Sharia courts:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R1_5 Church courts:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R1_6 Security forces:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
R1_7 Prisons:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R1_8 Ministry of Justice:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R1_9 Lawyers:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

R.2 Have you been in contact any of the following Israeli justice/security sector institutions in the last 12 months?

R.2.1 Civil police:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R.2.2. Military courts:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R.2.3 Civilian courts:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
R.2.4 Military prisons:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R.2.5 Civilian prisons:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		
R.2.6 Israeli army	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R.2.7 Border police:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		

R.3 If you have been in contact with a Palestinian justice/security sector institution in the last 12 months, please explain the type of issue for which you have been in contact: (Please tick all that apply).

R.3.1 Contraventions	R.3.2 Misdemeanours	R.3.3 Felonies	R.3.4 Land disputes
R.3.5 Traffic accidents/incidents	R.3.6 Labour disputes	R.3.7 Insurance issues	R.3.8 Work injuries
R.3.9 Financial claim		R.3.10 Personal issues	
R.3.11 Other, please specify:			

R 4 If you have been in contact with Palestinian courts in the last 12 months, please indicate your status:

1. Claimant	2. Defendant	3. Witness	4. Expert
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R.5 Please rank the following entities in terms of their importance with regards to strengthening the rule of law: (1 = not important at all / 8 = very important)

R.5.1 <input type="checkbox"/> The courts	1 2 3 4 5 7 8	R.5.2 <input type="checkbox"/> Lawyers Bar	1 2 3 4 5 7 8
R.5.3 <input type="checkbox"/> The public prosecution	1 2 3 4 5 7 8	R.5.4 <input type="checkbox"/> The Palestinian Legislative Council	1 2 3 4 5 7 8
R.5.5 <input type="checkbox"/> Non-governmental organisations	1 2 3 4 5 7 8	R.5.6 <input type="checkbox"/> The Ministry of Justice	1 2 3 4 5 7 8
R.5.7 <input type="checkbox"/> The police	1 2 3 4 5 7 8		

R.6 Do you know:

R.6.1 How to sue an individual or organization: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Unsure <input type="checkbox"/> No	R.6.2 What judges do: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Unsure <input type="checkbox"/> No
R.6.3 What lawyers do: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Unsure <input type="checkbox"/> No	R.6.4 What the police do: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Unsure <input type="checkbox"/> No
R.6.5 What the public prosecution does: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Unsure <input type="checkbox"/> No	R.6.6 What the ministry of justice does: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Unsure <input type="checkbox"/> No
R.6.7 What the Bar Association does: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Unsure <input type="checkbox"/> No	

R.7 In the last 12 months, have you been delayed from accessing Palestinian Authority justice institutions as a result of:

R.8 Reason

R.8 .1 Israeli checkpoints: Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	R.8 .2 The Separation Wall: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	R.8 .3 Others
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S: Satisfaction with Palestinian justice/security sector institutions:
 (1☐ = Palestinian civil courts 2☐ = Palestinian religious (Sharia or Church) courts)

Code		Item	Extremely unsatisfied	Un Satisfied	Satisfied	Extremely satisfied	Don't know
The courts							
To what extent are you satisfied with:							
S1.1	S1.2	The speed at which judgments are reached	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S2.1	S2.2	Wait duration inside the court room	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S3.1	S3.2	Equal treatment of all individuals before the courts	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S4.1	S4.2	The independence of courts from factional influences	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S5.1	S5.2	The independence of courts from personal/ clan/family influences	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S6.1	S6.2	The fairness of court verdicts	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S7.1	S7.2	The efficiency of court clerks	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S8.1	S8.2	The numbers of available court clerks	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S9.1	S9.2	The interpersonal skills of court clerks	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S10.1	S10.2	The cleanliness of the courts	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S11.1	S11.2	Sign posting within the courts	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S12.1	S12.2	The queuing system within the courts	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
Specific types of cases							
To what extent are you satisfied with the way in which the Palestinian courts deal with:							
S.13		Fraud					
S.14		Murder					
S.15		Theft					
S.16		Damage to property					
S.17		Drugs offenses					
S18.1	S18.2	Violence against women	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐	1☐ 2☐
S.19		Corruption cases					
S.20		Land disputes					
S.21		Financial claims					
S.22		Insurance issues					
S.23		Work injuries					
S.24		Juvenile issues					

Code	Item	Extremely unsatisfied	Un Satisfied	Satisfied	Extremely satisfied	Don't know
The public prosecution						
To what level are you satisfied with:						
S.25	The role of public prosecution in maintaining the dignity and human freedom.					
S.26	The role of public prosecution in mobilizing the criminal lawsuit.					
S.27	The integrity and independence of the public prosecution.					
S.28	The efficiency of the members of the public prosecution.					
The police						
To what extent are you satisfied with:						
S29.1	S29.2	The effectiveness of the police with regards to enforcing court judgments	1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/>
S.30		The ease with which the police are contactable by telephone				
S.31		The number of police stations in your area				
S.32		The seriousness with which the police respond to requests for assistance				
S.33		The speed at which the police respond to requests for assistance				
S.34		The arrest powers of the police				
S.35		The effectiveness of police investigations				
S.36		The extent to which the police adhere to the law				
S.37		The extent to which the police respect privacy				
S.38		Police performance with Juvenile cases				
Judges						
To what extent are you satisfied with:						
S.39		The adequacy of the numbers of judges working in Palestinian courts				
S.40		The efficiency of judges				
S.41		The experience of judges				
S.42		The qualifications of judges				
S.43		The independence of judges				
S.44		The fairness of judges				



Code	Item	Extremely unsatisfied	Un Satisfied	Satisfied	Extremely satisfied	Don't know
Lawyers						
To what extent are you satisfied with:						
S.45	The qualifications of lawyers					
S.46	The efficiency of lawyers					
S.47	The accessibility of lawyers					
S.48	The cost of contracting the services of lawyers					
S.49	The adequacy of the numbers of lawyers in the oPt.					
S. 50	The honesty of lawyers					
The Ministry of Justice						
To what extent are you satisfied with the Ministry of Justice's:						
S. 51	Ability to defend the independence of the judiciary					
S. 52	Ability to lead justice sector reform					
S. 53	Provision of information on legal rights					
S. 54	Ability to ensure the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups					
S. 55	Provision of legal assistance					
S. 56	Provision of public services such as certificates of non-conviction and notary services for foreign documents					
S. 57	Ability to defend citizens from human rights abuses perpetrated by Israeli actors					
Non-governmental organizations						
To what extent are you satisfied with:						
S. 58	The extent to which non-governmental organizations provide free legal assistance (information, advice and representation)					
S. 59	Human rights or legal rights awareness raising programmes conducted by non-governmental organizations					
S. 60	The role of non-governmental organizations in pressing for legislative reform					
S. 61	The role of non-government organisations in monitoring violations of human rights					

T Confidence in the justice sector

T1 How confident are you:

Code	Item	Extremely unconfident	Not confident	Confident	Extremely confident	Don't know
T1.1	That if you were charged with committing a criminal offense, you would get a fair trial.					
T1.2	That if a crime were committed against you, it would be effectively investigated.					
T1.3	That if you had a civil dispute, you would be able to resolve it fairly through recourse to the courts.					
T1.4	That you would receive prompt police assistance if you requested it.					
T1.5	That you would be able to obtain free legal assistance if you needed it.					
T1.6	That Palestinian judges are appropriately qualified.					
T1.7	That the justice system is independent from external influences.					
T1.8	That you are treated equally before the law.					
T1.9	That you would be able to find an appropriately qualified lawyer if you needed one.					
T1.10	That the Palestinian police enforce the law against all individuals equally, without any consideration for family or personal connections					
T1.11	That you if you needed it, you would receive effective police protection from individuals or families with whom you had a legal dispute.					

T2 Have you felt that you were in danger in the last 12 months, but decided not to contact the police? Yes No

T3 If yes, please explain why (please tick the main reason why)

T3.1 <input type="checkbox"/> I did not know how to call the police	T3.2 <input type="checkbox"/> I tried to call the police on a previous occasion but I did not receive an adequate response.
T3.3 <input type="checkbox"/> The police would not have been able to protect me	T3.4 <input type="checkbox"/> I don't trust the police
T3.5 <input type="checkbox"/> I wanted to avoid bureaucratic police procedures	T3.6 <input type="checkbox"/> I was afraid that the police would mistreat me
T3.7 <input type="checkbox"/> Other. Please specify:	

T4 If in the future you felt that you were in danger, who would you call? Please tick all that apply.

T4.1 <input type="checkbox"/> The police	T4.2 <input type="checkbox"/> Contacts within the Palestinian Authority
T4.3 <input type="checkbox"/> Friends or relatives	T4.4 <input type="checkbox"/> Community leaders (<i>mukhtars</i>)
T4.5 <input type="checkbox"/> No one.	T4.6 <input type="checkbox"/> Other. Please specify:



T5 Do you know how to make a complaint against the police?

T5.1 <input type="checkbox"/> Yes, I definitely know how to do that	T5.2 <input type="checkbox"/> I think I know how to do that.
T5.3 <input type="checkbox"/> I don't think I know how to do that.	T5.4 <input type="checkbox"/> No, I definitely don't know how to do that.

T6 Would you go to the courts in order to resolve a dispute? If no, please go to question No. T8.

T7 If I had a dispute, I would go to the court because: (Please tick all that apply)

T7.1 <input type="checkbox"/> The courts are the only legitimate institutions through which to resolve disputes	T7.2 <input type="checkbox"/> Recourse to the courts can prevent violence
T7.3 <input type="checkbox"/> Recourse to the courts result in obtaining justice	T7.4 <input type="checkbox"/> Informal justice mechanisms are unfair
T7.5 <input type="checkbox"/> Informal justice mechanism are inefficient	T7.6 <input type="checkbox"/> The law is clear and takes all sides into account

T8 If I had a dispute, I would not go to court because: (Please tick all that apply)

T8.1 <input type="checkbox"/> I don't trust the courts	T8.2 <input type="checkbox"/> I cannot obtain my rights through the courts
T8.3 <input type="checkbox"/> Court cases take too long	T8.4 <input type="checkbox"/> It is too expensive to go to court
T8.5 <input type="checkbox"/> The formal justice sector is corrupt	T8.6 <input type="checkbox"/> Informal justice mechanisms are faster

T9 Please choose your level of trust in the following: 1 = Don't trust at all 5 = Trust completely

Code	Item	Level of trust
T9.1	To what extent do you trust the Palestinian police?	1 --- 2 ---3 ---4 ---5
T9.2	To what extent do you trust the public prosecution?	1 --- 2 ---3 ---4 ---5
T9.3	To what extent do you trust the Bar Association?	1 --- 2 ---3 ---4 ---5
T9.4	To what extent do you trust judges?	1 --- 2 ---3 ---4 ---5
T9.5	To what extent do you trust the Ministry of Justice to support the rule of law?	1 --- 2 ---3 ---4 ---5
T9.6	To what level you trust the PA to support the rule of law?	1 --- 2 ---3 ---4 ---5
T9.7	To what level you trust the PLC to support the rule of law?	1 --- 2 ---3 ---4 ---5
T9.8	To what level you trust the human rights and Women NGOs to support the rule of law?	1 --- 2 ---3 ---4 ---5
T9.9	To what level you trust politicians to support the rule of law?	1 --- 2 ---3 ---4 ---5
T9.10	To what level you trust the justice system as a whole?	1 --- 2 ---3 ---4 ---5

Personal Information:

Sex: 1 <input type="checkbox"/> M 2 <input type="checkbox"/> F	Age: _____
<p>Marital status:</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Single</p> <p>2 <input type="checkbox"/> Married</p> <p>3 <input type="checkbox"/> Divorced</p> <p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> Widowed</p> <p>5 <input type="checkbox"/> Separated</p>	<p>District of current resident:</p> <p>15 <input type="checkbox"/> Bethlehem</p> <p>03 <input type="checkbox"/> Deir Al-Balah</p> <p>02 <input type="checkbox"/> Gaza</p> <p>16 <input type="checkbox"/> Hebron</p> <p>06 <input type="checkbox"/> Jenin</p> <p>12 <input type="checkbox"/> Jericho</p> <p>14 <input type="checkbox"/> Jerusalem</p> <p>04 <input type="checkbox"/> Khan Younis</p> <p>09 <input type="checkbox"/> Nablus</p> <p>01 <input type="checkbox"/> North Gaza</p> <p>10 <input type="checkbox"/> Qalqiliya</p> <p>05 <input type="checkbox"/> Rafah</p> <p>13 <input type="checkbox"/> Ramallah</p> <p>11 <input type="checkbox"/> Salfit</p> <p>07 <input type="checkbox"/> Tubas</p> <p>08 <input type="checkbox"/> Tulkarem</p>
<p>ID card held:</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Palestinian (West Bank)</p> <p>2 <input type="checkbox"/> Palestinian (Gaza)</p> <p>3 <input type="checkbox"/> Israeli</p> <p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> Jerusalem</p> <p>5 <input type="checkbox"/> No ID card</p> <p>6 <input type="checkbox"/> Other</p>	
No. of dependants: _____	<p>Type of locality of main residence:</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> City</p> <p>2 <input type="checkbox"/> Village</p> <p>3 <input type="checkbox"/> Refugee camp</p>
<p>Highest level of education attained:</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Tawjihi (high school) or under</p> <p>2 <input type="checkbox"/> Post-graduate diploma</p> <p>3 <input type="checkbox"/> Bachelor degree</p> <p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> Master and above</p>	<p>Employment status:</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Employed full-time</p> <p>2 <input type="checkbox"/> Employed part-time</p> <p>3 <input type="checkbox"/> Unemployed</p> <p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> Not in the labour force</p>
<p>If employed-Sector of employment:</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Industry</p> <p>2 <input type="checkbox"/> Service</p> <p>3 <input type="checkbox"/> Construction</p> <p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture</p>	<p>If employed-Type of employer</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Public sector body</p> <p>2 <input type="checkbox"/> Self-employed</p> <p>3 <input type="checkbox"/> Private sector institution</p> <p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> Non-governmental organization</p> <p>5 <input type="checkbox"/> International organization</p>
<p>Position within the household:</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Head of household</p> <p>2 <input type="checkbox"/> Housewife</p> <p>3 <input type="checkbox"/> Son</p> <p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> Daughter</p> <p>5 <input type="checkbox"/> Grandfather</p> <p>6 <input type="checkbox"/> Grandmother</p>	<p>Average household monthly net income in NIS (Israeli shekels):</p> <p>1 <input type="checkbox"/> Less than 2,300</p> <p>2 <input type="checkbox"/> 2,301-3,500</p> <p>3 <input type="checkbox"/> 3,501- 5,000</p> <p>4 <input type="checkbox"/> More than 5,000</p>



ANNEX 3: STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 1: Contact with the Palestinian justice and security sector institutions in the last 12 months

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Civil police	yes	8.3%	12.0%	4.4%	9.3%
	no	91.7%	88.0%	95.6%	90.7%
Military courts	yes	1.1%	0.8%	0.3%	0.9%
	no	98.9%	99.2%	99.7%	99.1%
Civil courts	yes	7.1%	4.1%	1.3%	5.7%
	no	92.9%	95.9%	98.7%	94.3%
Sharia courts	yes	7.1%	7.1%	3.9%	6.9%
	no	92.9%	92.9%	96.1%	93.1%
Church courts	yes	0.3%	0.2%	0.5%	0.3%
	no	99.7%	99.8%	99.5%	99.7%
Security force	yes	1.8%	1.6%	1.3%	1.7%
	no	98.2%	98.4%	98.7%	98.3%
Prisons	yes	1.9%	4.8%	0.5%	2.8%
	no	98.1%	95.2%	99.5%	97.2%
Ministry of Justice	yes	0.7%	0.9%	0.3%	0.8%
	no	99.3%	99.1%	99.7%	99.2%
Lawyers	yes	2.6%	2.8%	0.8%	2.6%
	no	97.4%	97.2%	99.2%	97.4%

Table 2: Contact with the Israeli justice/security sector institutions in the last 12 months

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Civil police	yes	1.60%	0.10%	8.50%	1.50%
	no	98.40%	99.90%	91.50%	98.50%
Military courts	yes	1.30%	0.10%	2.10%	1.00%
	no	98.70%	99.90%	97.90%	99.00%
Civil courts	yes	0.80%	0.00%	4.90%	0.80%
	no	99.20%	100.00%	95.10%	99.20%
Military prisons	yes	1.80%	0.20%	2.10%	1.30%
	no	98.20%	99.80%	97.90%	98.70%
Civilian prisons	yes	0.70%		2.60%	0.50%
	no	99.30%	100.00%	97.40%	99.50%
Israeli army	yes	4.30%	0.00%	2.10%	2.70%
	no	95.70%	100.00%	97.90%	97.30%
Border police	yes	2.30%	0.00%	4.90%	1.70%
	no	97.70%	100.00%	95.10%	98.30%

Table 3: Type of issue for which you have been in contact with a Palestinian justice/security sector institution in the last 12 months

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Contraventions	yes	21.60%	23.70%	40.00%	23.00%
	no	78.40%	76.30%	60.00%	77.00%
Misdemeanours	yes	7.10%	12.50%	10.00%	8.80%
	no	92.90%	87.50%	90.00%	91.20%
Felonies	yes	3.50%	3.90%	2.50%	3.60%
	no	96.50%	96.10%	97.50%	96.40%
Land disputes	yes	9.80%	5.60%	5.00%	8.40%
	no	90.20%	94.40%	95.00%	91.60%
Traffic accidents/ incidents	yes	10.70%	10.70%	35.00%	11.60%
	no	89.30%	89.30%	65.00%	88.40%
Labour disputes	yes	7.40%	5.90%	5.00%	6.80%
	no	92.60%	94.10%	95.00%	93.20%
Insurance issues	yes	2.50%	2.10%	10.00%	2.60%
	no	97.50%	97.90%	90.00%	97.40%
Work injuries	yes	0.40%	0.90%	7.50%	0.80%
	no	99.60%	99.10%	92.50%	99.20%
Financial claim	yes	15.50%	14.80%	10.00%	15.10%
	no	84.50%	85.20%	90.00%	84.90%
Personal issues	yes	37.30%	35.60%	37.50%	36.80%
	no	62.70%	64.40%	62.50%	63.20%

Table 4: The status of those who were in contact with Palestinian Justice and security institutions 12 months

Status		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Claimant	yes	35.20%	33.80%	55.60%	35.50%
	no	64.80%	66.20%	44.40%	64.50%
Defendant	yes	50.50%	39.30%	36.10%	46.60%
	no	49.50%	60.70%	63.90%	53.40%
Witness	yes	21.20%	26.00%	8.30%	22.20%
	no	78.80%	74.00%	91.70%	77.80%
Expert	yes	0.60%	4.20%	0.00%	1.70%
	no	99.40%	95.80%	100.00%	98.30%



Table 5: Ranking of the following entities in terms of their importance with regards to strengthening the rule of law (averages)

Institution	West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The courts	4.89	4.29	4.62	4.67
Lawyers Bar	2.9	2.97	3.33	2.95
The public prosecution	4.15	3.92	4.43	4.09
The Palestinian Legislative Council	3.79	4.02	3.64	3.86
Non-governmental organizations	3.44	4.1	3.62	3.68
The Ministry of Justice	4.24	4.08	4.01	4.17
The police	4.59	4.65	4.34	4.6

Table 6: Knowledge and awareness of the role of justice/security sector institution

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
How to sue an individual or organization	yes	51.6%	55.9%	55.8%	53.3%
	Unsure	13.8%	12.8%	20.3%	13.9%
	no	34.5%	31.3%	23.9%	32.8%
:What judges do	yes	26.8%	30.6%	13.1%	27.3%
	Unsure	20.4%	21.1%	32.1%	21.3%
	no	52.8%	48.3%	54.8%	51.4%
What lawyers do	yes	28.3%	32.4%	20.3%	29.3%
	Unsure	22.9%	24.1%	35.2%	24.0%
	no	48.8%	43.5%	44.5%	46.7%
What the police do	yes	45.2%	59.4%	14.7%	48.3%
	Unsure	17.0%	14.8%	31.6%	17.1%
	no	37.7%	25.8%	53.7%	34.6%
:What the public prosecution does	yes	21.9%	26.6%	9.8%	22.8%
	Unsure	21.9%	21.2%	38.6%	22.6%
	no	56.2%	52.2%	51.7%	54.6%
What the ministry of justice does	yes	19.5%	25.1%	7.7%	20.7%
	Unsure	20.9%	21.8%	33.7%	22.0%
	no	59.6%	53.2%	58.6%	57.3%
Whatz the Bar Association does	yes	20.6%	23.0%	11.1%	20.8%
	Unsure	20.7%	23.8%	33.7%	22.5%
	no	58.8%	53.2%	55.3%	56.6%

Table 7: Obstacles in accessing Palestinian justice institutions

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
In the last 12 months, have you been delayed from accessing Palestinian Authority justice institutions	yes	2.70%	2.30%	6.70%	2.80%
	no	97.30%	97.70%	93.30%	97.20%
Due to the Israeli checkpoints:	yes	91.90%		69.20%	85.10%
	no	8.10%	100.00%	30.80%	14.90%
Due to the Separation Wall	yes	40.60%		44.00%	40.70%
	no	59.40%	100.00%	56.00%	59.30%

Table 8: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts - speed at which judgments are reached

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The speed at which judgments are reached	Extremely unsatisfied	21.00%	13.70%	7.50%	17.70%
	Unsatisfied	34.20%	39.50%	11.60%	34.70%
	Satisfied	27.40%	25.90%	48.10%	28.10%
	Extremely satisfied	2.50%	1.40%	2.80%	2.10%
	Don't know	14.90%	19.50%	30.10%	17.40%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 9: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts - How long you have to wait inside the court room

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
How long you have to wait inside the court room	Extremely unsatisfied	18.50%	9.30%	8.00%	14.70%
	Unsatisfied	30.80%	29.60%	12.10%	29.30%
	Satisfied	23.50%	22.00%	41.40%	24.00%
	Extremely satisfied	2.50%	1.10%	2.30%	2.00%
	Don't know	24.70%	38.00%	36.20%	29.90%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 10: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts- The extent to which all individuals are treated equally before the courts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The extent to which all individuals are treated equality before the courts	Extremely unsatisfied	15.90%	12.10%	8.70%	14.20%
	Unsatisfied	29.20%	34.40%	17.00%	30.30%
	Satisfied	34.20%	29.40%	39.80%	32.90%
	Extremely satisfied	3.70%	2.90%	1.80%	3.30%
	Don't know	17.00%	21.20%	32.60%	19.40%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%



Table 11: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts - The independence of courts from factional influences

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
	Extremely unsatisfied	15.80%	17.50%	9.30%	16.00%
	Unsatisfied	29.90%	37.00%	14.70%	31.40%
	Satisfied	29.90%	22.10%	35.70%	27.60%
	Extremely satisfied	3.90%	5.60%	2.80%	4.40%
	Don't know	20.40%	17.80%	37.50%	20.50%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 12: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts- The independence of courts from personal/clan/family influences

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The independence of courts from personal/clan/family influences	Extremely unsatisfied	17.10%	15.30%	7.70%	16.00%
	Unsatisfied	30.10%	36.90%	15.20%	31.50%
	Satisfied	30.00%	26.10%	39.60%	29.20%
	Extremely satisfied	4.20%	6.10%	2.10%	4.70%
	Don't know	18.60%	15.50%	35.50%	18.50%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 13: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts- The fairness of court verdicts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The fairness of court verdicts	Extremely unsatisfied	11.50%	9.50%	6.70%	10.60%
	Unsatisfied	25.90%	33.40%	8.70%	27.50%
	Satisfied	39.40%	36.10%	46.50%	38.70%
	Extremely satisfied	4.30%	2.40%	3.30%	3.60%
	Don't know	18.90%	18.60%	34.70%	19.70%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 14: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts- The efficiency of court clerks

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The efficiency of court clerks	Extremely unsatisfied	4.90%	4.30%	5.70%	4.70%
	Unsatisfied	13.60%	14.80%	6.20%	13.50%
	Satisfied	39.80%	31.90%	39.10%	37.10%
	Extremely satisfied	4.10%	2.00%	3.30%	3.30%
	Don't know	37.60%	47.10%	45.80%	41.30%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 15: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts - The numbers of available court clerks

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The numbers of available court clerks	Extremely unsatisfied	4.60%	3.50%	3.90%	4.20%
	Unsatisfied	13.80%	14.40%	6.20%	13.60%
	Satisfied	35.10%	25.40%	36.50%	31.90%
	Extremely satisfied	5.30%	2.20%	3.60%	4.10%
	Don't know	41.10%	54.50%	49.90%	46.20%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 16: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts- The interpersonal skills of court clerks

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The interpersonal skills of court clerks	Extremely unsatisfied	4.20%	2.90%	3.90%	3.70%
	Unsatisfied	12.90%	14.80%	5.70%	13.10%
	Satisfied	35.70%	28.20%	38.00%	33.30%
	Extremely satisfied	4.20%	1.80%	2.80%	3.30%
	Don't know	43.00%	52.40%	49.60%	46.60%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 17: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts- The cleanliness of the courts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The cleanliness of the courts	Extremely unsatisfied	7.20%	4.20%	3.10%	5.90%
	Unsatisfied	15.20%	17.10%	7.20%	15.40%
	Satisfied	38.90%	39.80%	42.90%	39.40%
	Extremely satisfied	6.90%	5.80%	2.60%	6.30%
	Don't know	31.80%	33.00%	44.20%	32.90%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 18: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts- Sign posting within the courts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Sign posting within the courts	Extremely unsatisfied	7.40%	3.60%	3.90%	5.90%
	Unsatisfied	15.40%	14.90%	9.00%	14.90%
	Satisfied	37.70%	39.20%	39.60%	38.30%
	Extremely satisfied	5.80%	5.50%	2.30%	5.50%
	Don't know	33.80%	36.70%	45.20%	35.50%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%



Table 19: Satisfaction with Palestinian civil courts- The queuing system within the courts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The queuing system within the courts	Extremely unsatisfied	10.80%	7.10%	4.10%	9.20%
	Unsatisfied	20.40%	18.70%	7.50%	19.00%
	Satisfied	31.90%	34.50%	38.80%	33.20%
	Extremely satisfied	4.60%	3.60%	2.30%	4.10%
	Don't know	32.30%	36.10%	47.30%	34.50%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 20: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts - The speed at which judgments are reached

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The speed at which judgments are reached	Extremely unsatisfied	13.20%	7.50%	3.30%	10.70%
	Unsatisfied	29.80%	29.80%	7.70%	28.50%
	Satisfied	35.60%	37.50%	54.80%	37.40%
	Extremely satisfied	4.50%	4.10%	2.30%	4.20%
	Don't know	16.80%	21.20%	31.90%	19.20%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 21: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts - How long you have to wait inside the court room

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
How long you have to wait inside the court room	Extremely unsatisfied	12.70%	4.90%	3.30%	9.50%
	Unsatisfied	27.90%	26.50%	11.60%	26.50%
	Satisfied	28.70%	27.30%	45.20%	29.20%
	Extremely satisfied	4.00%	3.00%	3.30%	3.60%
	Don't know	26.60%	38.30%	36.50%	31.20%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 22: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts- The extent to which all individuals are treated equality before the courts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The extent to which all individuals are treated equality before the courts	Extremely unsatisfied	10.00%	7.70%	4.60%	8.90%
	Unsatisfied	25.10%	28.10%	12.90%	25.40%
	Satisfied	40.10%	36.70%	46.80%	39.30%
	Extremely satisfied	6.00%	4.80%	2.60%	5.40%
	Don't know	18.90%	22.70%	33.20%	21.00%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 23: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts- The independence of courts from factional influences

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The independence of courts from factional influences	Extremely unsatisfied	9.80%	11.50%	3.60%	10.00%
	Unsatisfied	26.70%	31.30%	12.90%	27.50%
	Satisfied	34.90%	30.00%	41.60%	33.70%
	Extremely satisfied	6.50%	7.60%	3.30%	6.70%
	Don't know	22.00%	19.60%	38.60%	22.10%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 24: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts- The independence of courts from personal/clan/family influences

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The independence of courts from personal/clan/family influences	Extremely unsatisfied	10.60%	10.70%	3.60%	10.20%
	Unsatisfied	26.70%	31.80%	12.10%	27.60%
	Satisfied	35.10%	31.80%	45.00%	34.50%
	Extremely satisfied	6.50%	7.60%	2.80%	6.70%
	Don't know	21.10%	18.10%	36.50%	21.00%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 25: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts- The fairness of court verdicts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The fairness of court verdicts	Extremely unsatisfied	6.90%	5.70%	3.60%	6.30%
	Unsatisfied	21.30%	25.30%	5.90%	21.70%
	Satisfied	44.40%	44.10%	51.70%	44.70%
	Extremely satisfied	6.90%	4.40%	3.30%	5.80%
	Don't know	20.60%	20.50%	35.50%	21.40%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 26: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts - The efficiency of court clerks

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The efficiency of court clerks	Extremely unsatisfied	4.00%	3.00%	4.10%	3.70%
	Unsatisfied	11.70%	13.10%	5.70%	11.80%
	Satisfied	40.30%	33.30%	40.60%	38.00%
	Extremely satisfied	5.30%	2.70%	3.90%	4.30%
	Don't know	38.70%	47.90%	45.80%	42.30%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%



Table 27: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts- The numbers of available court clerks

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The numbers of available court clerks	Extremely unsatisfied	3.80%	2.20%	3.60%	3.20%
	Unsatisfied	12.20%	13.50%	5.90%	12.30%
	Satisfied	35.90%	26.80%	37.80%	32.90%
	Extremely satisfied	6.20%	2.80%	3.30%	4.90%
	Don't know	41.90%	54.60%	49.40%	46.70%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 28: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts- The interpersonal skills of court clerks

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The interpersonal skills of court clerks	Extremely unsatisfied	3.70%	2.00%	3.30%	3.10%
	Unsatisfied	11.60%	14.20%	5.10%	12.10%
	Satisfied	35.50%	28.90%	39.10%	33.50%
	Extremely satisfied	5.30%	2.30%	2.80%	4.20%
	Don't know	43.80%	52.60%	49.60%	47.20%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 29: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts - The cleanliness of the courts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The cleanliness of the courts	Extremely unsatisfied	5.20%	3.50%	2.80%	4.50%
	Unsatisfied	13.90%	14.80%	5.70%	13.70%
	Satisfied	40.40%	41.40%	43.70%	41.00%
	Extremely satisfied	7.70%	6.10%	3.90%	6.90%
	Don't know	32.70%	34.20%	44.00%	33.90%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 30: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts - Sign posting within the courts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Sign posting within the courts	Extremely unsatisfied	5.60%	3.00%	3.10%	4.50%
	Unsatisfied	14.60%	13.90%	9.00%	14.00%
	Satisfied	38.00%	39.60%	39.60%	38.70%
	Extremely satisfied	6.40%	6.00%	3.60%	6.10%
	Don't know	35.40%	37.50%	44.70%	36.70%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 31: Satisfaction with Palestinian religious courts- The queuing system within the courts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The queuing system within the courts	Extremely unsatisfied	7.50%	4.80%	3.60%	6.40%
	Unsatisfied	18.30%	16.60%	7.50%	17.10%
	Satisfied	34.00%	36.40%	40.10%	35.10%
	Extremely satisfied	5.40%	4.30%	2.60%	4.90%
	Don't know	34.90%	37.90%	46.30%	36.60%
Total		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 32: Satisfaction with the way in which the Palestinian courts deal with certain issues

Issue		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Fraud	Extremely unsatisfied	10.70%	11.60%	20.30%	11.60%
	Unsatisfied	30.50%	27.80%	18.30%	28.90%
	Satisfied	43.40%	42.60%	44.70%	43.20%
	Extremely satisfied	2.90%	4.40%	3.10%	3.40%
	Don't know	12.50%	13.50%	13.60%	12.90%
Murder	Extremely unsatisfied	11.60%	12.90%	18.80%	12.50%
	Unsatisfied	31.30%	28.70%	18.30%	29.70%
	Satisfied	40.30%	42.30%	48.60%	41.50%
	Extremely satisfied	4.20%	4.80%	2.60%	4.30%
	Don't know	12.60%	11.20%	11.80%	12.10%
Theft	Extremely unsatisfied	10.10%	9.30%	18.80%	10.30%
	Unsatisfied	29.70%	27.60%	22.40%	28.50%
	Satisfied	44.10%	47.60%	45.00%	45.40%
	Extremely satisfied	4.80%	4.40%	2.80%	4.60%
	Don't know	11.30%	11.10%	11.10%	11.20%
Damage to property	Extremely unsatisfied	10.30%	9.00%	14.70%	10.10%
	Unsatisfied	31.20%	31.40%	25.40%	30.90%
	Satisfied	39.90%	41.20%	44.20%	40.60%
	Extremely satisfied	4.00%	3.80%	2.80%	3.90%
	Don't know	14.60%	14.50%	12.90%	14.50%
Drugs offenses	Extremely unsatisfied	12.20%	15.10%	18.50%	13.60%
	Unsatisfied	27.70%	27.30%	25.40%	27.40%
	Satisfied	37.30%	39.50%	40.90%	38.30%
	Extremely satisfied	4.70%	8.00%	2.30%	5.70%
	Don't know	18.10%	10.00%	12.90%	15.00%
Violence against women - civil courts	Extremely unsatisfied	12.00%	9.90%	24.40%	12.00%
	Unsatisfied	25.20%	30.90%	21.30%	26.90%
	Satisfied	40.30%	37.80%	39.80%	39.40%
	Extremely satisfied	5.30%	5.10%	3.30%	5.10%
	Don't know	17.10%	16.30%	11.10%	16.50%



Issue		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Violence against women - religious courts	Extremely unsatisfied	9.50%	7.70%	21.90%	9.60%
	Unsatisfied	24.60%	28.00%	21.10%	25.50%
	Satisfied	41.50%	39.00%	41.40%	40.70%
	Extremely satisfied	7.40%	7.60%	3.60%	7.20%
	Don't know	17.00%	17.60%	12.10%	16.90%
Corruption cases	Extremely unsatisfied	13.90%	15.30%	25.70%	15.10%
	Unsatisfied	34.70%	32.00%	23.70%	33.20%
	Satisfied	33.20%	38.50%	37.50%	35.20%
	Extremely satisfied	3.40%	2.60%	2.10%	3.00%
	Don't know	14.90%	11.50%	11.10%	13.50%
Land disputes	Extremely unsatisfied	11.10%	10.30%	9.30%	10.70%
	Unsatisfied	32.50%	32.40%	20.80%	31.80%
	Satisfied	38.60%	39.70%	48.10%	39.50%
	Extremely satisfied	4.60%	2.60%	1.80%	3.80%
	Don't know	13.20%	15.10%	20.10%	14.20%
Financial claims	Extremely unsatisfied	9.10%	9.20%	9.30%	9.20%
	Unsatisfied	29.00%	28.30%	20.30%	28.30%
	Satisfied	39.20%	42.30%	46.80%	40.70%
	Extremely satisfied	5.00%	3.10%	2.10%	4.20%
	Don't know	17.60%	17.10%	21.60%	17.70%
Insurance issues	Extremely unsatisfied	8.30%	6.90%	7.50%	7.80%
	Unsatisfied	26.00%	21.90%	20.10%	24.20%
	Satisfied	39.90%	40.70%	48.80%	40.70%
	Extremely satisfied	4.10%	3.20%	1.50%	3.60%
	Don't know	21.70%	27.30%	22.10%	23.60%
Work injuries	Extremely unsatisfied	9.90%	9.50%	8.00%	9.70%
	Unsatisfied	28.60%	26.20%	21.60%	27.40%
	Satisfied	36.40%	36.40%	44.20%	36.90%
	Extremely satisfied	3.60%	2.70%	2.10%	3.20%
	Don't know	21.50%	25.20%	24.20%	22.90%
Kids issues	Extremely unsatisfied	8.40%	5.70%	7.20%	7.40%
	Unsatisfied	26.90%	21.90%	19.30%	24.80%
	Satisfied	35.70%	40.10%	44.20%	37.70%
	Extremely satisfied	3.50%	2.60%	2.30%	3.10%
	Don't know	25.50%	29.70%	27.00%	27.00%

Table 33: Satisfaction with the public prosecution

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The role of public prosecution in maintaining the dignity and human freedom.	Extremely unsatisfied	6.70%	7.00%	8.00%	6.90%
	Unsatisfied	21.10%	26.70%	17.50%	22.80%
	Satisfied	45.20%	42.40%	53.50%	44.70%
	Extremely satisfied	3.00%	3.40%	3.10%	3.20%
	Don't know	23.90%	20.40%	18.00%	22.40%
The role of public prosecution in mobilizing the criminal lawsuit.	Extremely unsatisfied	5.00%	5.50%	4.60%	5.20%
	Unsatisfied	20.80%	23.30%	15.40%	21.30%
	Satisfied	42.20%	38.70%	54.80%	41.70%
	Extremely satisfied	3.80%	3.30%	1.50%	3.50%
	Don't know	28.20%	29.30%	23.70%	28.30%
The integrity and independence of the public prosecution.	Extremely unsatisfied	7.50%	8.50%	4.60%	7.70%
	Unsatisfied	23.10%	30.00%	22.60%	25.40%
	Satisfied	37.00%	30.60%	46.30%	35.30%
	Extremely satisfied	3.70%	2.40%	3.90%	3.30%
	Don't know	28.70%	28.60%	22.60%	28.30%
The efficiency of the members of the public prosecution.	Extremely unsatisfied	6.20%	6.60%	5.10%	6.30%
	Unsatisfied	19.10%	23.50%	16.50%	20.50%
	Satisfied	39.00%	29.80%	52.70%	36.70%
	Extremely satisfied	3.50%	2.70%	2.80%	3.20%
	Don't know	32.10%	37.40%	22.90%	33.40%



Table 34: Satisfaction with the police

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The effectiveness of the police with regards to enforcing civil court judgments	Extremely unsatisfied	7.50%	4.70%	6.90%	6.50%
	Unsatisfied	18.20%	20.80%	13.10%	18.80%
	Satisfied	57.40%	56.70%	62.70%	57.50%
	Extremely satisfied	7.90%	9.50%	1.80%	8.10%
	Don't know	9.10%	8.20%	15.40%	9.10%
The effectiveness of the police with regards to enforcing religious court judgments	Extremely unsatisfied	5.80%	3.60%	4.90%	5.00%
	Unsatisfied	16.80%	18.00%	11.60%	16.90%
	Satisfied	57.90%	57.50%	65.00%	58.10%
	Extremely satisfied	9.50%	10.90%	2.30%	9.60%
	Don't know	10.10%	10.10%	16.20%	10.40%
The effectiveness of the police with regards to enforcing court judgments	Extremely unsatisfied	3.90%	2.20%	11.60%	3.70%
	Unsatisfied	10.70%	10.50%	13.90%	10.80%
	Satisfied	62.40%	60.60%	59.10%	61.60%
	Extremely satisfied	18.60%	20.80%	2.60%	18.40%
	Don't know	4.50%	5.90%	12.90%	5.50%
The number of police stations in your area	Extremely unsatisfied	8.30%	4.90%	20.30%	7.90%
	Unsatisfied	22.70%	27.30%	13.90%	23.80%
	Satisfied	51.10%	54.00%	48.30%	51.90%
	Extremely satisfied	14.20%	7.90%	2.60%	11.30%
	Don't know	3.80%	5.80%	14.90%	5.10%
The seriousness with which the police respond to requests for assistance	Extremely unsatisfied	5.00%	3.00%	12.60%	4.70%
	Unsatisfied	21.10%	21.30%	19.50%	21.10%
	Satisfied	57.70%	59.70%	55.00%	58.30%
	Extremely satisfied	9.90%	8.90%	2.60%	9.10%
	Don't know	6.20%	7.10%	10.30%	6.80%
The speed at which the police respond to requests for assistance	Extremely unsatisfied	5.30%	3.40%	9.80%	4.90%
	Unsatisfied	22.10%	20.40%	19.80%	21.40%
	Satisfied	56.70%	56.90%	55.80%	56.70%
	Extremely satisfied	10.10%	12.80%	2.60%	10.60%
	Don't know	5.70%	6.50%	12.10%	6.30%

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The arrest powers of the police	Extremely unsatisfied	9.70%	7.10%	14.10%	9.00%
	Unsatisfied	29.60%	23.40%	24.70%	27.20%
	Satisfied	45.40%	50.60%	46.00%	47.20%
	Extremely satisfied	7.60%	13.50%	3.10%	9.40%
	Don't know	7.80%	5.40%	12.10%	7.20%
The effectiveness of police investigations	Extremely unsatisfied	6.80%	7.10%	5.90%	6.90%
	Unsatisfied	24.60%	29.00%	16.70%	25.70%
	Satisfied	49.30%	45.20%	61.20%	48.60%
	Extremely satisfied	5.60%	4.30%	5.90%	5.20%
	Don't know	13.60%	14.30%	10.30%	13.70%
The extent to which the police adhere to the law	Extremely unsatisfied	7.20%	7.20%	7.20%	7.20%
	Unsatisfied	23.90%	29.30%	20.80%	25.50%
	Satisfied	50.00%	44.70%	58.60%	48.70%
	Extremely satisfied	5.80%	4.80%	2.60%	5.30%
	Don't know	13.00%	14.00%	10.80%	13.20%
The extent to which the police respect privacy	Extremely unsatisfied	9.40%	13.20%	9.80%	10.80%
	Unsatisfied	25.40%	33.70%	21.90%	28.00%
	Satisfied	47.90%	38.50%	55.30%	45.10%
	Extremely satisfied	6.10%	4.20%	3.10%	5.30%
	Don't know	11.10%	10.30%	10.00%	10.80%
Police performance with Juvenile cases	Extremely unsatisfied	7.10%	5.60%	4.60%	6.50%
	Unsatisfied	22.10%	26.00%	17.50%	23.10%
	Satisfied	47.70%	47.90%	59.90%	48.50%
	Extremely satisfied	5.20%	6.00%	3.30%	5.40%
	Don't know	17.80%	14.50%	14.70%	16.50%



Table 35: Satisfaction with judges

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The adequacy of the numbers of judges working in Palestinian courts	Extremely unsatisfied	5.80%	2.30%	4.90%	4.50%
	Unsatisfied	11.80%	13.70%	6.20%	12.10%
	Satisfied	37.70%	19.60%	38.80%	31.60%
	Extremely satisfied	5.00%	1.00%	2.60%	3.50%
	Don't know	39.60%	63.50%	47.60%	48.30%
The efficiency of judges	Extremely unsatisfied	3.70%	3.30%	3.30%	3.50%
	Unsatisfied	13.70%	16.10%	4.60%	14.00%
	Satisfied	45.20%	28.70%	50.10%	39.80%
	Extremely satisfied	5.80%	1.60%	8.00%	4.50%
	Don't know	31.60%	50.50%	33.90%	38.20%
The experience of judges	Extremely unsatisfied	4.00%	3.60%	3.30%	3.80%
	Unsatisfied	13.60%	16.90%	6.90%	14.30%
	Satisfied	44.60%	27.60%	47.00%	38.90%
	Extremely satisfied	6.00%	1.90%	7.70%	4.70%
	Don't know	31.90%	49.90%	35.00%	38.20%
The qualifications of judges	Extremely unsatisfied	3.90%	2.80%	3.30%	3.50%
	Unsatisfied	11.80%	13.80%	5.90%	12.10%
	Satisfied	45.80%	29.70%	46.30%	40.30%
	Extremely satisfied	6.40%	2.60%	8.70%	5.20%
	Don't know	32.20%	51.10%	35.70%	38.80%
The independence of judges	Extremely unsatisfied	6.40%	6.30%	2.60%	6.10%
	Unsatisfied	18.90%	21.00%	7.50%	18.90%
	Satisfied	39.20%	24.40%	45.80%	34.50%
	Extremely satisfied	5.00%	1.90%	6.90%	4.00%
	Don't know	30.60%	46.40%	37.30%	36.40%
The fairness of judges	Extremely unsatisfied	7.30%	5.60%	4.10%	6.50%
	Unsatisfied	18.50%	19.70%	4.10%	18.10%
	Satisfied	39.80%	29.40%	48.30%	36.70%
	Extremely satisfied	4.70%	2.30%	6.40%	4.00%
	Don't know	29.80%	42.90%	37.00%	34.70%

Table 36: Satisfaction with lawyers

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The qualifications of lawyers	Extremely unsatisfied	5.50%	1.70%	3.30%	4.00%
	Unsatisfied	14.70%	14.80%	4.90%	14.20%
	Satisfied	54.50%	56.60%	54.20%	55.20%
	Extremely satisfied	5.00%	4.90%	9.00%	5.20%
	Don't know	20.40%	22.00%	28.50%	21.40%
The efficiency of lawyers	Extremely unsatisfied	5.10%	1.80%	2.60%	3.80%
	Unsatisfied	18.90%	20.20%	5.10%	18.50%
	Satisfied	50.30%	50.10%	54.00%	50.40%
	Extremely satisfied	5.00%	3.40%	8.70%	4.70%
	Don't know	20.80%	24.50%	29.60%	22.60%
The accessibility of lawyers	Extremely unsatisfied	4.30%	0.60%	4.10%	3.00%
	Unsatisfied	10.50%	10.40%	5.90%	10.20%
	Satisfied	57.10%	63.30%	52.20%	59.00%
	Extremely satisfied	15.30%	17.70%	9.30%	15.80%
	Don't know	12.70%	8.00%	28.50%	12.00%
The cost of contracting the services of lawyers	Extremely unsatisfied	30.00%	22.90%	15.40%	26.70%
	Unsatisfied	28.70%	36.50%	14.10%	30.50%
	Satisfied	22.90%	22.80%	33.90%	23.50%
	Extremely satisfied	2.10%	0.90%	4.10%	1.80%
	Don't know	16.20%	17.00%	32.40%	17.40%
The adequacy of the numbers of lawyers in the oPt.	Extremely unsatisfied	5.00%	2.60%	4.40%	4.10%
	Unsatisfied	11.50%	12.50%	5.90%	11.50%
	Satisfied	50.90%	46.30%	50.10%	49.30%
	Extremely satisfied	17.90%	17.50%	3.90%	16.90%
	Don't know	14.70%	21.10%	35.70%	18.10%
The honesty of lawyers	Extremely unsatisfied	12.20%	7.90%	10.30%	10.60%
	Unsatisfied	26.40%	32.10%	14.90%	27.70%
	Satisfied	38.90%	35.90%	43.40%	38.10%
	Extremely satisfied	3.00%	2.00%	5.10%	2.80%
	Don't know	19.50%	22.20%	26.20%	20.80%



Table 37: Satisfaction with Ministry of Justice

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Ability to defend the independence of the judiciary	Extremely unsatisfied	5.30%	3.30%	4.90%	4.60%
	Unsatisfied	16.90%	22.30%	12.30%	18.50%
	Satisfied	37.20%	30.00%	44.50%	35.20%
	Extremely satisfied	2.90%	1.20%	3.30%	2.40%
	Don't know	37.70%	43.20%	35.00%	39.40%
Ability to lead justice sector reform	Extremely unsatisfied	4.40%	3.20%	4.60%	4.00%
	Unsatisfied	18.70%	23.00%	11.10%	19.70%
	Satisfied	36.00%	30.50%	45.50%	34.70%
	Extremely satisfied	3.20%	1.30%	3.60%	2.60%
	Don't know	37.70%	42.00%	35.20%	39.00%
Provision of information on legal rights	Extremely unsatisfied	5.20%	3.10%	8.20%	4.70%
	Unsatisfied	18.50%	19.30%	12.30%	18.40%
	Satisfied	34.70%	29.90%	41.60%	33.50%
	Extremely satisfied	3.00%	1.70%	2.80%	2.50%
	Don't know	38.60%	46.10%	35.00%	40.90%
Ability to ensure the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups	Extremely unsatisfied	7.30%	8.40%	11.30%	7.90%
	Unsatisfied	24.30%	29.20%	16.20%	25.50%
	Satisfied	31.40%	27.60%	36.50%	30.40%
	Extremely satisfied	3.00%	3.10%	2.80%	3.00%
	Don't know	34.00%	31.70%	33.20%	33.10%
Provision of legal assistance	Extremely unsatisfied	6.20%	5.30%	8.50%	6.00%
	Unsatisfied	22.40%	25.30%	12.60%	22.80%
	Satisfied	30.30%	25.50%	39.10%	29.20%
	Extremely satisfied	2.80%	0.90%	3.30%	2.20%
	Don't know	38.40%	42.90%	36.50%	39.90%
Provision of public services such as certificates of non-conviction and notary services for foreign documents	Extremely unsatisfied	17.00%	13.50%	25.20%	16.30%
	Unsatisfied	26.50%	33.00%	16.20%	28.10%
	Satisfied	21.90%	21.60%	26.50%	22.10%
	Extremely satisfied	2.50%	2.20%	1.30%	2.30%
	Don't know	32.00%	29.70%	30.80%	31.20%

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Ability to defend citizens from human rights abuses perpetrated by Israeli actors	Extremely unsatisfied	12.90%	15.20%	17.00%	13.90%
	Unsatisfied	24.90%	29.30%	14.40%	25.80%
	Satisfied	25.70%	21.90%	32.90%	24.80%
	Extremely satisfied	2.90%	2.70%	1.50%	2.70%
	Don't know	33.70%	31.00%	34.20%	32.80%

Table 38: Satisfaction with non-governmental organisations

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The extent to which non-governmental organisations provide free legal assistance (information, advice and representation)	Extremely unsatisfied	6.50%	5.30%	10.80%	6.30%
	Unsatisfied	20.70%	25.70%	10.30%	21.80%
	Satisfied	38.90%	44.50%	38.80%	40.80%
	Extremely satisfied	6.60%	5.70%	2.60%	6.00%
	Don't know	27.30%	18.90%	37.50%	25.00%
Human rights or legal rights awareness raising programs conducted by non-governmental organisations	Extremely unsatisfied	5.50%	4.50%	9.50%	5.40%
	Unsatisfied	20.10%	25.00%	12.60%	21.30%
	Satisfied	40.50%	46.30%	38.30%	42.30%
	Extremely satisfied	7.20%	8.50%	2.30%	7.40%
	Don't know	26.70%	15.70%	37.30%	23.50%
The role of non-governmental organisations in pressing for legislative reform	Extremely unsatisfied	6.50%	5.80%	8.20%	6.40%
	Unsatisfied	24.20%	31.80%	12.30%	26.10%
	Satisfied	33.70%	34.80%	37.50%	34.30%
	Extremely satisfied	5.50%	5.70%	1.50%	5.30%
	Don't know	30.10%	22.00%	40.40%	27.90%
The role of non-government organisations in monitoring violations of human rights	Extremely unsatisfied	7.70%	4.70%	8.70%	6.70%
	Unsatisfied	22.40%	22.80%	10.50%	21.90%
	Satisfied	35.80%	44.50%	39.80%	39.10%
	Extremely satisfied	5.80%	8.60%	1.80%	6.50%
	Don't know	28.20%	19.30%	39.10%	25.80%



Table 39: Confidence in the justice sector

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
That if you were charged with committing a criminal offense, you would get a fair trial.	Extremely unconfident	8.70%	10.40%	3.30%	9.00%
	Not confident	34.40%	41.50%	18.80%	35.90%
	Confident	43.10%	31.80%	62.50%	40.40%
	Extremely confident	3.90%	2.70%	3.30%	3.40%
	Don't know	9.90%	13.60%	12.10%	11.30%
That if a crime were committed against you, it would be effectively investigated.	Extremely unconfident	7.60%	7.20%	5.10%	7.30%
	Not confident	33.10%	39.80%	20.10%	34.60%
	Confident	44.60%	38.80%	60.70%	43.50%
	Extremely confident	4.90%	2.90%	3.60%	4.10%
	Don't know	9.80%	11.40%	10.50%	10.40%
That if you had a civil dispute, you would be able to resolve it fairly through recourse to the courts.	Extremely unconfident	6.80%	5.70%	3.90%	6.20%
	Not confident	32.40%	38.40%	17.70%	33.60%
	Confident	47.80%	42.80%	67.10%	47.20%
	Extremely confident	4.90%	2.40%	3.90%	4.00%
	Don't know	8.10%	10.80%	7.50%	9.00%
That you would receive prompt police assistance if you requested it.	Extremely unconfident	5.70%	3.10%	4.10%	4.70%
	Not confident	26.90%	26.00%	23.70%	26.40%
	Confident	52.50%	55.80%	60.40%	54.10%
	Extremely confident	9.40%	9.70%	3.90%	9.20%
	Don't know	5.60%	5.30%	8.00%	5.60%
That you would be able to obtain free legal assistance if you needed it.	Extremely unconfident	13.10%	11.40%	4.60%	12.00%
	Not confident	43.70%	47.40%	27.80%	44.00%
	Confident	29.60%	23.10%	50.60%	28.60%
	Extremely confident	3.40%	1.60%	2.60%	2.70%
	Don't know	10.20%	16.40%	14.40%	12.60%
That Palestinian judges are appropriately qualified.	Extremely unconfident	7.10%	5.80%	5.10%	6.60%
	Not confident	31.10%	42.10%	20.10%	34.20%
	Confident	45.70%	33.20%	57.80%	42.10%
	Extremely confident	4.70%	2.40%	8.20%	4.10%
	Don't know	11.40%	16.40%	8.70%	13.00%

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
That the justice system is independent from external influences.	Extremely unconfident	12.40%	12.20%	5.10%	11.90%
	Not confident	40.50%	45.60%	30.10%	41.60%
	Confident	30.10%	22.50%	46.00%	28.40%
	Extremely confident	3.30%	2.20%	2.30%	2.90%
	Don't know	13.70%	17.50%	16.50%	15.10%
That you are treated equally before the law.	Extremely unconfident	11.00%	8.50%	5.10%	9.80%
	Not confident	34.40%	41.20%	27.00%	36.30%
	Confident	40.70%	32.90%	56.00%	38.90%
	Extremely confident	4.20%	2.20%	4.40%	3.50%
	Don't know	9.80%	15.30%	7.50%	11.50%
That you would be able to find an appropriately qualified lawyer if you needed one.	Extremely unconfident	6.30%	2.40%	3.30%	4.80%
	Not confident	22.80%	18.10%	18.00%	20.90%
	Confident	53.20%	61.60%	66.30%	56.80%
	Extremely confident	10.00%	9.70%	5.10%	9.60%
	Don't know	7.80%	8.20%	7.20%	7.90%
That the Palestinian police enforce the law against all individuals equally, without any consideration for family or personal connections	Extremely unconfident	14.00%	13.60%	6.90%	13.40%
	Not confident	35.40%	40.40%	33.90%	37.00%
	Confident	37.50%	34.00%	47.00%	36.90%
	Extremely confident	4.50%	4.20%	3.90%	4.30%
	Don't know	8.70%	7.80%	8.20%	8.40%
That you if you needed it, you would receive effective police protection from individuals or families with whom you had a legal dispute.	Extremely unconfident	12.00%	7.10%	4.60%	9.90%
	Not confident	31.70%	35.80%	27.50%	32.80%
	Confident	42.10%	42.50%	55.30%	43.00%
	Extremely confident	4.30%	5.00%	3.90%	4.50%
	Don't know	9.90%	9.60%	8.70%	9.80%



Table 40: Seriousness and trustworthy of the police

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Have you felt that you were in danger in the last 12 months, but decided not to contact the police?	yes	6.30%	12.00%	5.70%	8.30%
	no	93.70%	88.00%	94.30%	91.70%
Yes- I did not know how to call the police	yes	11.00%	5.80%	13.60%	8.50%
	no	89.00%	94.20%	86.40%	91.50%
Yes- I tried to call the police on a previous occasion but I did not receive an adequate response	yes	14.90%	7.90%	4.50%	11.00%
	no	85.10%	92.10%	95.50%	89.00%
Yes- The police would not have been able to protect me	yes	28.60%	19.50%	36.40%	24.40%
	no	71.40%	80.50%	63.60%	75.60%
Yes- I don't trust the police	yes	25.10%	29.20%	50.00%	28.20%
	no	74.90%	70.80%	50.00%	71.80%
Yes - I wanted to avoid bureaucratic police procedures	yes	41.60%	39.00%	45.50%	40.40%
	no	58.40%	61.00%	54.50%	59.60%
Yes - I was afraid that the police would mistreat me	yes	27.10%	36.80%	22.70%	31.80%
	no	72.90%	63.20%	77.30%	68.20%

Table 41: Individual's knowledge of how to complain against the police

	West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
Yes, I definitely know how to do that	20.30%	29.30%	13.10%	23.00%
I think I know how to do that	23.50%	17.10%	41.60%	22.40%
I don't think I know how to do that	14.20%	14.40%	19.80%	14.60%
No, I definitely don't know how to do that	41.90%	39.20%	25.40%	40.00%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 42: Reason to recourse to courts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
The courts are the only legitimate institutions through which to resolve disputes	yes	72.40%	69.60%	60.80%	71.00%
	no	27.60%	30.40%	39.20%	29.00%
Recourse to the courts can prevent violence	yes	27.10%	28.30%	34.50%	27.80%
	no	72.90%	71.70%	65.50%	72.20%
Recourse to the courts result in obtaining justice	yes	31.70%	34.20%	54.70%	33.40%
	no	68.30%	65.80%	45.30%	66.60%
Informal justice mechanisms are unfair	yes	11.50%	10.30%	25.70%	11.50%
	no	88.50%	89.70%	74.30%	88.50%
Informal justice mechanism are inefficient	yes	12.20%	5.50%	20.90%	10.20%
	no	87.80%	94.50%	79.10%	89.80%
The law is clear and takes all sides into account	yes	27.50%	30.10%	52.00%	29.30%
	no	72.50%	69.90%	48.00%	70.70%

Table 43: Reason for not recouring to courts

		West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	Opt
I don't trust the courts	yes	10.20%	14.10%	32.40%	12.80%
	no	89.80%	85.90%	67.60%	87.20%
I cannot obtain my rights through the courts	yes	8.80%	14.30%	24.40%	11.60%
	no	91.20%	85.70%	75.60%	88.40%
Court cases take too long	yes	41.50%	64.00%	58.40%	50.20%
	no	58.50%	36.00%	41.60%	49.80%
It is too expensive to go to court	yes	23.60%	36.30%	57.30%	29.90%
	no	76.40%	63.70%	42.70%	70.10%
The formal justice sector is corrupt	yes	5.10%	7.30%	31.60%	7.40%
	no	94.90%	92.70%	68.40%	92.60%
Informal justice mechanisms are faster	yes	15.20%	37.10%	32.60%	23.80%
	no	84.80%	62.90%	67.40%	76.20%

Table 44: Trust in the Palestinian justice/security sector institutions (scale 1-5)

	West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
To what extent do you trust the Palestinian police?	3.22	2.99	2.85	3.12
To what extent do you trust the public prosecution?	3.08	2.81	2.82	2.97
To what extent do you trust lawyers / Bar?	2.9	2.84	2.92	2.88
To what extent do you trust judges?	3.19	2.94	3	3.09
To what extent do you trust the Ministry of Justice to support the rule of law?	3.14	2.82	2.81	3.01
To what level you trust the Palestinian Authority to support the rule of law?	3.18	2.93	2.79	3.07
To what level you trust the legislative council to support the rule of law?	2.99	2.86	2.85	2.94
To what level you trust the human rights and Women NGOs to support the rule of law?	3.08	3.24	2.75	3.12
To what level you trust politicians to support the rule of law?	2.5	2.16	2.74	2.4
To what level you trust the justice system as a whole?	3.18	2.94	2.97	3.09

Calculating the 'trust table'. Individuals' satisfaction and confidence indices were estimated as follows:

1. Average response of individuals on the importance of entities in terms of their importance with regards to strengthening the rule of law (as reported in table 5).
2. A weight of each entity is estimated based on the total response given in step 1.
3. The weight is then multiplied by the individuals average response to the questions that rate their confidence and satisfaction in the various entities (as reported in table 44).
4. The results of step 3 are added up to get the index.
5. The following tables (45-48) present the estimated indices according to location, age group and gender.



Table 45: Confidence in the Palestinian justice/security sector institutions by location

Entity	West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Palestinian Civil Police	3.22	2.99	2.85	3.12
Attorney General Office	3.08	2.81	2.82	2.97
Palestinian Bar Association	2.9	2.84	2.92	2.88
Courts	3.19	2.94	3	3.09
Ministry of Justice	3.14	2.82	2.81	3.01
Palestinian Legislative Council	2.99	2.86	2.85	2.94
Human rights and Women organizations	3.08	3.24	2.75	3.12
Confidence index	3.1	2.94	2.86	3.03
maximum value of the index	5	5	5	5

Table 46: Confidence in the Palestinian justice/security sector institutions by gender and age group

Entity	Gender		age group	
	Male	Female	18-35	more than 35 years
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Palestinian Civil Police	3.1	3.14	3.08	3.18
Attorney General Office	2.94	3	2.95	3
Palestinian Bar Association	2.83	2.94	2.88	2.89
Courts	3.05	3.14	3.1	3.1
Ministry of Justice	2.95	3.07	3	3.02
Palestinian Legislative Council	2.89	2.98	2.95	2.92
Human rights and Women organizations	3.03	3.2	3.17	3.05
Confidence index	2.98	3.08	3	3.03
maximum value of the index	5	5	5	5

Table 47: Satisfaction with the Palestinian justice/security sector institutions by location

Entity	West Bank	Gaza Strip	East Jerusalem	oPt
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Palestinian Civil Police	2.71	2.71	2.61	2.70
Attorney General Office	2.58	2.48	2.66	2.55
Palestinian Bar Association	2.62	2.68	2.78	2.65
Courts	2.50	2.50	2.62	2.50
Ministry of Justice	2.45	2.39	2.49	2.43
Human rights and Women organizations	2.60	2.64	2.54	2.61
Confidence index	2.57	2.56	2.62	2.57
maximum value of the index	4	4	4	4

Table 48: Satisfaction with the Palestinian justice/security sector institutions by gender and age group

Entity	Gender		age group	
	Male	Female	18-35	more than 35 years
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
Palestinian Civil Police	2.71	2.71	2.6	2.70
Attorney General Office	2.58	2.48	2.7	2.55
Palestinian Bar Association	2.62	2.68	2.8	2.65
Courts	2.50	2.5	2.6	2.5
Ministry of Justice	2.45	2.39	2.5	2.43
Human rights and Women organizations	2.60	2.64	2.5	2.61
Confidence index	2.57	2.56	2.6	2.57
maximum value of the index	4	4	4	4