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CHAPTER THREE:

EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE ARAB
YOUTH IN THE
LOCALISATION
OF KNOWLEDGE:
BUILDING THE
HUMAN CAPITAL

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Introduction

In the previous chapters, we emphasised the definition of youth as a transitional phase, between childhood and adulthood, through which the person experiences a set of changes that allow a gradual move from limited dependence on others to full independence. However, the economic, social and cultural conditions in the Arab region, as previously mentioned, play an influential role in the delay of this transitional phase affecting young people. Several studies have discussed the phenomenon of this delay as young people move from one stage to another, to the labour market and to social independence. This report focused on young people in the age group 19-29 years, to form a deep understanding and a clear identification of the extent of their effectiveness in terms of transfer, localisation and employment of knowledge processes; or rather in the formation of a human capital capable of building the knowledge society and achieving the renaissance of the Arab region, where a favourable opportunity for knowledge-based development exists.

Accordingly, this chapter focuses on finding answers to important questions revolving around the effectiveness of the youth in the localisation of knowledge, i.e., the success of Arab countries in transforming the youth bulge into a human wealth and cognitive asset that integrates with real developmental operations to move the region towards the knowledge society. These questions are the following:

- To what extent have Arab countries succeeded in providing opportunities for young people in terms of education and qualification for their integration into the transfer, employment and production of knowledge processes?
- To what extent have they succeeded in bringing about a cultural development that enables young people to adopt new mental approaches that unleash their creative innovative potentials?
- To what extent have Arab countries succeeded in providing job opportunities and social participation for youth

integration into the development process?

- To what extent have these countries succeeded in providing an atmosphere of citizenship and participation for young people?

The discussion of this chapter is divided into six key axes:

- Cognitive effectiveness, including skills and qualifications
- Cultural effectiveness, including culture and values
- Economic effectiveness, including employment and unemployment conditions
- Social effectiveness, including citizenship, belonging and voluntary work
- Women, between marginalisation and empowerment
- Openness and communication, locally and globally

Cognitive Effectiveness of the Arab Youth: Skills and Qualifications

This section aims at analysing the cognitive effectiveness of young people in the Arab countries with regards to development, transfer and the production of knowledge. As previously demonstrated, the youth constitute one of the most important groups concerned with the issues of knowledge acquisition and production, as well as those of empowerment and integration in the economic and social development processes. They also represent the social group with the highest ability for learning, training, work and production, and constitute the driving force for development within the society. Youth empowerment requires equipping young people with skills and qualifications, which enables them to assimilate the technology and transfer it from the developed world centres to their home countries so as to employ and localise it.

Based on the previously mentioned concepts of human capacity and social justice, and in an attempt to determine the status of young people and their effectiveness in the dissemination and localisation of knowledge, along with the ability of the Arab countries

This chapter focuses on finding answers to important questions revolving around the effectiveness of the youth in the localisation of knowledge, i.e., the success of Arab countries in transforming the youth bulge into a human wealth and cognitive asset that integrates with real developmental operations to move the region towards the knowledge society

Despite progressing in illiteracy eradication, the number of people who are illiterate in the Arab region remains high. In 2012, it was estimated that there were around 51.8 million illiterate people (age 15 years and above), out of which 66% were females

to form an effective human capital in the field of knowledge transfer and localisation, we will discuss in this section four axes that represent four basic levels. The first axis is the acquisition of knowledge and training; the formation of the essential cognitive capital needed for the transfer and dissemination of knowledge; the extent to which the fair distribution of knowledge opportunities among young people has been achieved; and the ability of education and training systems to achieve this task. The second axis is the extent of “the achievement of advanced quality levels of acquired knowledge”, for the purpose of quantifying the success of education and training systems in providing a chance for the efficient distribution of knowledge and fairly, as well as in identifying the quality of skills acquired from education and training and their responsiveness to the conditions of achieving cognitive efficiency for youth. The third axis focuses on “the development of the personal skills in the information and communication field,” in order to determine the level that the Arab youth have reached in their possession of skills to use information technology, since it is the pillar of progress in the transfer and localisation of knowledge. The fourth and last axis is “the active participation of young people in the activities of scientific research and innovation,” with the purpose of shedding light on the limitations and obstacles hindering the effectiveness of the youth in the dissemination and localisation of knowledge, as well as the shortcomings that limit the expansion of the capacities of young people and the available opportunities that help them achieve and maximise their own potential.

Knowledge Acquisition, Training and Formation of the Knowledge Capital

Knowledge acquisition through the systems of education and teaching is the cornerstone in preparing citizens for the transfer and production of knowledge. The educated and competent young labour force is the key driver for knowledge participation, in addition to its effective dissemination, development and use. This entails the opportunities and educational levels attained

by the young labour force. It also includes the quality of skills they possess and the opportunities to apply them. Consequently, efficient participation in the processes of knowledge acquisition and regular attendance at schools and universities that constitute the fostering environments for the cognitive capital, from which emanate active forces in the cognitive production and innovation processes, represent the basic foundations to enable young people to transfer and produce knowledge.¹

Access to Basic Knowledge and Continuous Training

The enrolment of young people aged between 19-29 years in various stages of education is determined by indicators and practices that are traced back to the years preceding this age bracket. Before reviewing the knowledge situation of university students, the status of the pre-youth category will be presented briefly through an overview of efforts to eradicate illiteracy and improve youth education.

Literacy Efforts

Despite progressing in illiteracy eradication, the number of people who are illiterate in the Arab region remains high. In 2012, it was estimated that there were around 51.8 million illiterate people (age 15 years and above), out of which 66% were females.² According to the latest UNESCO estimates, the literacy rate among adults in the Arab region (aged 15 years and above) is around 77.5%, compared to 95% in East Asia and the Pacific and 98.7% in Central and Eastern Europe, and to a global average of 84.3%. These percentages put the Arab region ahead of Southeast Asia (62.6%) and sub-Saharan Africa (58.7%). In 2012, the number of illiterates among young Arabs (age group 15-24) reached 6.9 million, 64% of whom are females.^{3,4} These statistics also indicate that the literacy rate among the youth (age group 15-24) reached 89.7% in 2012, and this percentage increases among males (92.8%) and decreases among females (86.4%). Regardless of this seemingly increasing percentage among young people,

it remains a cause for concern when compared to the rates in similar countries undertaking a “transition period,” where the literacy rate among young people exceeds 99.7%. The same is true when comparing the rates of the region of Central and Eastern Europe (99.5%), while the rate is at 98.9% for Eastern Asia and the Pacific.⁵

Opportunities to Acquire Knowledge in the Pre-University Stage

Despite the progress achieved in primary education enrolment and registration rates, and the narrowing of the gap in most of the Arab countries, the region is still very far from meeting the educational needs of younger generations. This means that there are large numbers of children at primary-school age who are not enrolled in school. As shown in UNESCO’s most recent data, the number of children not enrolled in school in the Arab countries was around 4.5 million children (4.467) at the end of the school year 2012, noting that females constitute around 57.8% of this number.⁶ Regarding the rate of enrolment in secondary education in the Arab region, the UNESCO statistics indicated it was 74.2% in 2012, which is less than the rates of East Asia and the Pacific (84.5%), Central and Eastern Europe (93%), Central Asia (98.6%) despite being close to the global average (72.9%).⁷


The latest UNESCO data estimated the average number of schooling years for the population in the Arab countries to be at 11.8 years for 2011 and 2012. This rate varies among Arab countries; where it constitutes 13.5 years in Egypt and Jordan (2012); 15.6 years in KSA (2012); 14.6 years in Tunisia (2011); and 9.2 years in Yemen (2011).⁸ Upon comparison, we find that the world average for the years of schooling is 12 years; 13 years in East Asia and the Pacific; 14.7 years in Central and Eastern Europe; 12.5 years in Central Asia and 16.4 years in the United States.⁹

If the prevalence levels of primary education have risen in recent decades because of their interconnectedness to the demographic status, the prevalence levels of intermediate, secondary and university education did not record similar growth levels. Educational opportunities in these stages remained limited compared to the demographic status, particularly for the age group 15-24 years. This has led to diminished opportunities for further education for a large number of young people and to the emergence of the first weak spot in the educational systems in the Arab countries, i.e. their inability to provide educational and training opportunities for the young population.

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Figure 3.1

Gross Enrolment Rates in Primary, Secondary and Higher Education for the Year 2010



Source: UNESCO 2014a.

Opportunities for the Youth to Acquire Knowledge

Arab countries witnessed an expansion in education as a result of the pursuit of modernisation after political independence and an increase in the number of young people within the population pyramid, as well as the expansion of secondary education and the increased participation of women in higher education. Despite this, university education attracted around 7 million students in 2008, equivalent to 9% of total students. Although the number rose to around 9 million students in 2012,¹⁰ these rates still confirm the restricted educational opportunities available to young people in the region.¹¹ The average enrolment rate in higher education in 2012 in the Arab countries was 26.1%; compared to the global average of 32%; 30.6% in East Asia and the Pacific region; 70.9% in Central and Eastern Europe; and 24.5% in Central Asia. The percentage of enrolment in higher education (as a general average) for developed countries was 76%, with 94.3% in the United States. In South Korea, the percentage of the total enrolment was 98.4%.¹²

As for the enrolment growth, statistics indicate that during the ten years between the two academic years 1998/1999 and 2007/2008, the number of students enrolled in higher education in the region increased by 256%. This is a major leap

that can be explained by the population growth rate, which increased by 139%. By comparing it to the growth at the university stage, we find it increased by 156% due to the demographic nature of the population composition in the region. When calculating the growth rate for gross enrolment in higher education for the age group 18-24 years, we find that it increased in that time period from 18% to 22%.¹³ Arab countries achieved during the same decade great jumps in the gross enrolment rate of students in higher education: Algeria (from 14% to 24%), Kuwait (from 22% to 49%), Lebanon (from 33% to 51%), the state of Palestine (from 25% to 46%), Saudi Arabia (from 20% to 34%) and Tunisia (from 17% to 31%).¹⁴

Statistics indicate a disparity of the gross enrolment rates, at the higher education level, between the Arab countries. There are countries with rates exceeding the global average of 32%. These are Saudi Arabia (50.9%), Lebanon (46.3%), the state of Palestine (49.1%), and Jordan (46.6%). There are also other countries that are making great efforts towards increasing enrolment rates, such as Algeria (31.5%) and Egypt (30.1%). (See Figure 3.2).¹⁵

Many Arab countries have attempted to increase enrolment and registration rates in higher education to meet the requirements of the economic shift to knowledge economies. Nevertheless, these efforts were not complemented by similar growth in the number of graduates. For instance, the percentage of students who hold higher education degrees is still less than that in the developed countries.


By comparing the proportion of those who received higher education to that of the population, we find that, while this percentage reaches around 18% in Jordan, it does not exceed the 9% in Egypt or Tunisia. However, it reaches 25% in Spain and Sweden, and approaches 20% in Germany (Figure 3.3).¹⁶

Based on the above, we note that the achievements of the Arab countries are

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Figure 3.2


Gross Enrolment Rates in Higher Education: Comparison of the Arab Region to Other Regions and International Groups (%)



Source: UNESCO 2014a.

Figure 3.3

Proportion of Those Who Received Higher Education to That of the Population in Selected Arab and Comparison Countries



Source: Mouboud 2012.

restricted to quantitative ones, particularly reflected in the increasing enrolment and registration levels in the various stages of education, although to varying degrees, compared to the accomplishments of countries with medium development. According to the indicators of the Millennium Development Goals, the Arab countries are still below the desired level, with the exception of a few of them. In fact, they remain far from achieving the requirements of the cognitive capital for young people to begin building the knowledge economy. The Arab countries' inability to provide secondary education for at least more than a third of the school-aged youth is dangerous in two aspects. The first is represented by a phenomenon called reversion to illiteracy with the passage of chronological age. Field studies, on which the UNESCO's 2012 "Education for All Global Monitoring Report" was based, have shown that with time, adults lose the skill of calculation. In developed countries, where the illiteracy rate dropped dramatically with the expansion of education, one out of five adults obtained bad results in basic literacy competencies.¹⁷ The skill of calculation decreases faster among those who reached an education level less than secondary.

The second aspect is reflected in the lack of basic skills necessary for the labour market.

According to the UNESCO studies and the data of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the basic skills (such as literacy and problem-solving skills) required for the labour market in knowledge economies can only be acquired in secondary and higher education. It appeared that more than 30% of those who had not completed the advanced stage of secondary education suffer from a weakness in calculation skills; compared with 13% of those who had completed that stage.¹⁸

This means that there are large numbers of Arab youth deprived of opportunities to acquire knowledge. They are cut off from the education and learning system, which constitutes the cornerstone in the preparation of citizens and their mastering of the tools to transfer and produce knowledge. Also, the low rates of continuous training in Arab countries clearly demonstrate that these countries lack the systems called "the second chance" that enable young people who lost the opportunity to learn when growing up, join the education ladder again.

The Achievement of Quality Levels of Advanced Knowledge and Skills

Reports and studies show that education and training systems in the Arab countries have been characterised by weak productivity,

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which is a well-known phenomenon to the Arab region. The growth of education does not explain any of the aspects of the increase of the development outputs.¹⁹ Also, the education curricula in the Arab region do not give great importance to the development of the human personality as much as they focus on memorisation and teaching. They focus on the knowledge that can be measured in traditional examinations and not on social skills, despite employers' growing demand for such skills. Education systems at different levels have ignored creative and life skills and arts. They have weakened the creative potential of successive generations in the Arab region. These generations did not gain the experience of skills and knowledge in the broad sense; thinking, language and communication skills and general cognitive skills which support cognitive effectiveness, creativity and productivity.²⁰

In Syria for example, as part of a study of the International Labour Organisation, and when discussing the scope of their transition from school to work, more than 90% of the young people succeeded, but they did not receive any training related to their jobs. When asked about the difficulties they faced while looking for a job, it was clear that the two main obstacles were the lack of educational qualifications and the mismatch between education and the labour market. Together, these two obstacles accounted for 66.3% of the total answers.²¹ In a more recent study, only 15% of young people in their first job declared that their formal education had been beneficial in their work.²² In Egypt, the number of those who graduated from school was estimated at around 600,000 young people, fighting for around 200,000 available jobs each year.²³ A study conducted in 2007 in Egypt stated that 60 to 70% of employers of those who participated in the study, found that young people who were employed for the first time did not invest the knowledge required at work and did not possess the required communication and writing skills.²⁴ The results of a regional study concluded in 2011 came to similar results; less than 30% of human resources managers in Egypt expressed their satisfaction regarding the

level of skills required for work of university graduates. This proportion dropped to half among graduates of vocational programmes.²⁵

This goes in line with the weakness of the systems of training and technical education, which is considered one of the components of the development of the cognitive capital, whether in the stages of university education or beyond. The value of the Knowledge Index "Spread of Continuous training" sub-index did not exceed 3.97, compared to a global average of around 4.02 and to a 4.63 in high-income countries.²⁶ In addition, this sector suffers from bureaucracy and rigidity. The 2012 UNESCO Report confirms that technical education in many of these countries, including Arab ones, will continue to be second-level education if it does not match the effective labour market that pushes the country forward and if it continues to lack the skills required in the era of the knowledge society.²⁷

It should be noted here that the acquisition of the skills we have referred to that achieve cognitive effectiveness for young people are not found solely through formal education, but also through work in public life and the involvement of the youth and their participation in social and training activities in factories and companies. They are also acquired through volunteer activities in the service of the environment and through institutions specialising in youth development, support and integration into the labour market. Since not all of these activities are taken into consideration in the recruitment process, young people lack the entrepreneurial spirit, the values of volunteering and the incentive to participate in them. They also lack the most important education source that forms their personalities and refines their knowledge and general skills, enabling them to acquire language skills and the cognitive, intellectual and social capital. This is one of the most important challenges facing the building of cognitive efficiency among the Arab youth.

As for the quality of scientific skills, mathematics skills specifically (considered

the key to accessing knowledge) – and their link to international levels – international examinations available for the Arab region cannot comprehensively show us the status of the Arab youth, since they are concerned with those under 19 years of age. However, these examinations give important indicators, by and through which we can deduce the quality of the qualifications of young people in higher education. International examinations such as TIMSS (measuring international trends in mathematics and sciences in grades 4, 8 and 12); and PISA (measuring whether students at the age of 15 have basic reading, culture, mathematics and science skills), give important indicators of weakness in the cognitive effectiveness of the Arab Youth. The results of these examinations have showed, in consecutive years, the low levels of cognitive achievement, skills and general knowledge of most of the Arab students compared to the international averages in sciences, mathematics and reading.

During the TIMSS 2011 session, the results of the Arab countries, without any exception, remained below the international average, i.e. 500, in sciences and mathematics and in both the fourth and eighth grades. In mathematics for the fourth grade, for example, and based on the averages obtained, the participating Arab countries can be classified into three categories: those with an average that exceeds 400, which are UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar; those with an average between 300 and 400, i.e. Tunisia, Morocco, Oman and Kuwait; and finally countries with an average below 300, such as Yemen. For the eighth grade (mathematics), some countries have made little progress, such as Bahrain (409), Tunisia (425), Saudi Arabia (394), the state of Palestine (404), and Qatar (410). However, Jordan (406), Syria (380), Oman (366) and Morocco (371) witnessed a decline between 2007 and 2011. Lebanon maintained the same level (449).²⁸

Likewise, the PISA results of 2012 were not very different, as the percentage of Arab students (in Jordan, Tunisia and Qatar) who reached the top three levels of performance did not exceed 3%.²⁹ This is not compatible

with the reality of the growing demand for competitive high-level skills in the world today, and is a warning for Arab countries which will face difficulties in the provision of scientific skills in the future. This topic is further analysed in Chapter 5, which includes the results of skills and effectiveness evaluation for a sample of Arab youth. These analyses were based on field surveys that were conducted – perhaps for the first time in the Arab region – in the context of preparation for this report.

Youth and Scientific Specialisations

Data show an imbalance in the distribution of young people enrolling at universities in scientific majors which are needed in the labour market. If we consider higher education graduates by specialisation in the Arab countries, for which data is available, we notice an imbalance between the disciplines chosen by the graduates and the needs of the society for high competences that can transform the economy in its various spheres to reliance on modern trusted knowledge.³⁰ In the Comoros Islands, the percentage of graduates in non-scientific majors is around 84%. In the state of Palestine it is 75%, while it approaches 62% in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Sudan, and the UAE (Table 3.1).³¹ We are therefore witnessing a paradox represented in a surplus of graduates from different theoretical faculties and sections with no real prospects for work, while internal labour markets lack graduates from majors that young people avoid. As a consequence, a structural imbalance emerges in the relationship between graduates and the labour market, leading to an aggravated unemployment rate among graduates. The reluctance of young people to join these scientific majors is related to the absence of social and economic supporting factors due to the nature of development and the current economic structure.

We notice in Table 3.1 that graduation rates in the fields of social sciences, law, business administration and education are the highest among higher education graduates. However, these sciences, although

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Table 3.1

Distribution of Specialisations of Higher Education Graduates for 2011 or the Closest Year (%)

Country	Education	Humanities and Arts	Sciences	Social Sciences, Law and Business Administration	Agriculture	Engineering	Medicine	Services	Other/ Unspecified
Algeria (2011)	1.83	23.86	11.7	41.01	1.63	13.25	3.47	1.54	1.7
Comoros (2012)	9.26	11.87	9.78	54.22	..	2.17	3.21	9.48	..
Djibouti (2009)	..	30.77	27.79	17.27	..	18.68	..	5.49	..
Jordan (2011)	19.43	17.6	9.72	28.06	5.44	6.4	2.98	0.49	9.88
Lebanon (2011)	5.01	12.62	10.99	46.49	0.49	12.35	11.19	0.81	0.02
Morocco (2010)	6.49	13.14	22.5	33.18	1.43	12.40	5.64	4.6	0.62
Oman (2010)	8.8	15.89	21.52	24.59	0.84	17.42	10.22	0.73	..
State of Palestine (2012)	34.13	9.39	8.65	31.17	0.37	7.27	8.46	0.53	0.03
Qatar (2012)	5.23	18.64	6.35	34.59	...	27.22	5.49	2.49	..
Saudi Arabia (2012)	9.05	27.34	20.65	23.73	0.39	8.31	8.5	1.97	0.06
Sudan (2012)	22.74	11.97	7.4	28.19	4.31	8.63	10.45	0.89	5.43
Tunisia (2012)	0.5	18.74	25.92	23.72	1.55	16.46	9.19	3.92	..
UAE (2012)	8.24	8.93	12.1	49.94	0.10	13.92	5.45	0.83	0.48

Source: UNESCO 2014a.

A survey conducted in several Arab countries on various companies' satisfaction with adequately-skilled labour provided by the labour market reported that they complained mostly about the lack of appropriate skills

important, cannot hide the obvious deficit in technological science graduates. This makes us question the suitability of the numbers of graduates to push the building of the knowledge society forward with their participation in the employment of knowledge and competence in the labour markets and cognitive production. In fact, the ambition of actively integrating the Arab youth in the process of the transfer and production of knowledge and moving the community towards a knowledge-based economy requires specialists in the sciences, technology, engineering and medicine. It equally requires specialists in the fields of social sciences, education and others. However, this is not currently provided by higher education systems in the Arab countries.³² We notice that Asian countries have increased their investment in engineering, natural sciences and computer sciences, and the number of graduates in these majors has exceeded that of Europe and North America combined. In Asia, graduating engineers are more than double the number of those graduating in North America and Europe combined. In the United States, foreign students represent approximately half of all doctoral students in engineering, mathematics and computer sciences.³³

The Skills of a Large Number of Graduates Are below the Required Level

The 2007 World Bank study entitled "youth – an undervalued asset", noted that the adequacy of education and training systems in the region for the requirements of the labour market, was weak. Education produced low-quality labour and was not consistent with the global wave of change and transition to knowledge economies that required cognitive skills, ability to deal with advanced technologies, English language skills, and post-cognitive thinking skills".³⁴

A survey conducted in several Arab countries on various companies' satisfaction with adequately-skilled labour provided by the labour market reported that they complained mostly about the lack of appropriate skills (Figure 3.4).³⁵ This has prompted some researchers to link between the high rates of youth unemployment and what they called the skills gap; or in other words, the low outputs of education and training systems and their inability to respond to the needs of the labour market.³⁶ However, we affirm in this report the social responsibility of capitalist systems in providing continuous training programmes adapted for the labour market as well as carrying out continuous

reform of the education systems. Education and continuous training must become a permanent philosophy organised by the policies in the country seeking the knowledge society.

Personal Capacities of the Youth in Information and Communications Technology


Information and communications technology (ICT) plays a pivotal role in the dissemination of knowledge by intensifying its sources, increasing the number of recipients and reinforcing the expansion of its bases in every sector of contemporary life. The process of mastering knowledge skills has a fast and tangible impact on the different sectors of economic development for individuals and groups. Therefore, the youth's possession of ICT skills is considered one of the prerequisites for their participation in achieving the goals of economic and social development and building an economy based on knowledge and on its transfer, production and employment.

Despite the disparities between countries of the Arab region, the youth in all Arab countries have generally succeeded in catching up with the wave of information technology and using it; although its usage remains at levels lower than the global level. The most recent 2014 data show the rate of internet access in some Arab countries is less than 10 per one hundred people (Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Iraq, Mauritania, and Somalia), while other countries (Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE) marked 85% usage; the latter being an appropriate usage rate close to those recorded in developed countries.³⁷

The delay in some Arab countries in terms of the levels of internet usage, compared to developed countries and the global average, is due to the high cost of internet service in Arab countries and the lack of mechanisms that allow the use of ICT applications in the fields of education, commerce and government business. It is also due to the weakness of the core structures of this

Figure 3.4

The Percentage of Companies That Consider the Skills Level as a Major Obstacle



Source: O'Sullivan et al 2012.

technology in the Arab countries and the absence of a plan facilitating its usage by the youth.³⁸

With regards to the growing importance of new advanced technology in building the cognitive efficiency of young people, an OECD study conducted in 2011 that included 45 countries noted that about a fifth of the participating students obtained results that were below the basic level in the efficient use of computers.³⁹ Chapter IV of this report will provide more detailed analyses on ICT with regards to enabling environments, the transfer and localisation of knowledge and the youth integration in its operations.

Effective Youth Participation in the Activities of Scientific Research and Innovation

There is no doubt that the youth's possession of capabilities and skills in research and innovation would seriously contribute to activities that lead to the expansion of knowledge and its dissemination, renewal, development and use. The effectiveness of these activities is measured by various indicators, the most important of which are: the number of published research and scientific publications; the number of development and innovation activities and the number of patents registered with the competent offices. It should be noted here

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that the available data do not allow limiting the “net” contribution of the youth in the field of research and innovation, and thus, the importance of the indicators related to this area lies in giving an idea of the Arab research and innovation movement, since it is a platform for the integration of young people in the transfer and localisation of knowledge. All available data note a clear deficiency in this field and in various Arab countries. This implicitly refers to the low effectiveness of the youth in this regard.⁴⁰

Cultural Effectiveness of the Arab Youth

Understanding the cultural effectiveness of the Arab youth and the concepts of culture, values and citizenship on which it is based and whose concepts were previously addressed in Chapter II, opens the doors to determining the challenges facing the countries today with the various obstacles and opportunities to transfer and localise knowledge and technology. The youth constitute an important dimension in the process of interaction in Arab countries between local social, political and cognitive factors and international factors with their different variables, and in the transition to knowledge economies and political, social, economic and cultural globalisation. These are transitions that should alert policymakers in the region to the need to focus on the more than 100 million young people in a demographic structure that needs to be culturally rehabilitated to play a strong role in bringing about a quantum leap in the economic, social and political structure of their countries and be effective in building the data of the knowledge era.

General Frameworks of the Youth Culture in the Arab Region

The values and culture of the Arab youth come from various sources. They have different identities – often contradictory – due to ethnicity, type, gender, family ties, political ideologies and social traditions.^{41 42} Researchers say that the complex structures of culture and identity and the problems of the concept of citizenship are due to a range

of factors, such as the political history of the region,⁴³ cultural history,⁴⁴ development, political economy,⁴⁵ globalisation, global variables and the emergence of the knowledge and communication revolution,⁴⁶ as well as the nature of the political systems and enabling environments.⁴⁷

All these factors overlap and at the same time influence the formation of the identity of the Arab youth and their cultures, values and inner knowledge patterns. They also have an impact on the formation of their political and social rights as citizens who have the right to social protection and human development. From there, we see that our doorway to the analysis and understanding of the youth culture, identity and citizenship status lies in our understanding of the historical, political and economic dimensions of the Arab region and its interaction with the contemporary cultural effects coming from globalisation.

The Arab region is a sprawling open ground. Geographically, it is in the middle of the world from the Arabian Gulf in the east to the Atlantic Ocean west of Africa and from the Mediterranean Sea in the north, and the south shore of Europe to the Arabian Sea and the Pacific Ocean in the south. The red sea, which connects the north to the south through the Suez Canal, splits it in the middle, between Asia and Africa. In this unique geographical location, the Arab region was the cradle of the three major monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). It also witnessed different civilisations over a long history, from the Pharaonic; the Assyrian; the Roman; the Christian; and the Islamic. Apart from the Arabs as a focal demographic power, Berbers, Kurds and other ethnicities lived on this land. This open geographical location, characterised by its historical civilisations, brought to the region long waves of colonialism. The era of the Ottoman invasion, from the late 16th until the early 20th Century, was a long and eventful era that contributed to the spread of cultural and social backwardness; the Ottoman Empire was, in its last decades, the Sick Man – as Europeans called it – i.e. a backward, disjointed state.

The values and culture of the Arab youth come from various sources. They have different identities – often contradictory – due to ethnicity, type, gender, family ties, political ideologies and social traditions

Modernisation cannot be adopted partially, and the Ottomans failed to take the path of modernity as an integrated whole.⁴⁸ Thus, they diverged from the Japanese in their relationship with European modernisation. The Japanese did not fear European modernism, but interacted with it openly and mixed it with their heritage. In one generation, Japan transitioned from historical traditions to modernity and replicated many systems from the West, from industrialisation, education and medicine to social and state welfare systems for the people.⁴⁹ Therefore, the Ottomans failed and the Japanese succeeded,⁵⁰ and the project of Muhammad Ali at the beginning of the 19th Century to build the modern Egypt was disrupted.

That is how the Arab countries inherited cultural and social backwardness, and this is how European countries inherited the Ottoman "Sick Man of Europe". Starting from the second half of the 20th Century, the Arab countries rose toward independence and the search for development and modernity. Various social and political movements and trends emerged, searching for the renaissance: the Nasserist, nationalist, Islamist, political and liberal movements. During the 1970s, the emergence of radical political Islam in the region increased after the defeat of Nasserism and the "Naksa" in June 1967. This movement increasingly progressed with the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and the events in west Asia – in India, Kashmir, Pakistan, and Indonesia – and the interactions of this region with the new global powers.

One other factor of no less importance is to be added to these historical events. It is the second wave of globalisation and the associated scientific and technological revolutions (the internet and its social networks, the mobile phone with its enormous potential and the electronic and satellite media). It turned the world into one village, open to various cultures and values and cultural materials from which Arabs only produced a little. However, this global village kept witnessing many manifestations of division, injustice and inequality. The gap

between the rich, who owned the economy, science, knowledge and technology; and the poor kept widening. Rich people got stronger and richer and the weak and poor became weaker and poorer.⁵¹ Globalisation, with its political, cultural and economic variations, had severe effects on the Arab youth, and these effects triggered questions about the Arab identity and culture; questions that are still unanswered.

Today, the crisis is even more critical and the mixture of cultures has increased and become varied and multi-sourced; making the questions even more difficult. All of this increases the importance of the question on the possibility of achieving access to the knowledge society and transferring and localising knowledge without questioning the meaning of culture, identity, values and citizenship.

To what extent do the youth possess values, identity and citizenship rights that provide them with the ability to interact within the era of knowledge, surmounting the obstacles faced, in order to interact with the world of power based on knowledge and technological progress and enter the knowledge society?

Essential Features of Contemporary Values and Culture of the Arab Youth

Traditional Upbringing Methods Are still Prevalent

The interactions between the historical and political factors we have previously mentioned, as well as the interactions between the cultural legacies in the national and regional cultures and the cultural trends that accompany globalisation, brought about key attributes that were tackled by numerous research and studies.⁵² The aforementioned studies were able to touch on a set of general features that characterised the culture, identity and system of values among young people in the Arab region. The first of these features is the presence of a cultural gap between generations (parents and children). The second is young people's socialisation of different identities

Globalisation, with its political, cultural and economic variations, had severe effects on the Arab youth, and these effects triggered questions about the Arab identity and culture; questions that are still unanswered

The tribal system exists while reform movements are absent. It functions as a system that regulates the social cognitive system, where the tribal chief or any parental figure, such as the cleric, is the natural source of knowledge stemming from family, religion or tribe, or he is the gateway to knowledge

Studies and research have found that there are traditional elements that characterise the identity of the Arab youth and affect their visions and priorities. The most important of these elements are religion, family and society, or rather, the ethnic and sectarian elements

and the existence of the so-called “cultural hybridity” that is varied among generations, due to the historical, cultural and political reality. The third feature is that regardless of the multiple variations of the Arab youth due to geographical differences, economic levels and cultural affiliations, a strong cultural line runs through them all. It stems from the region’s cultural heritage; a line that we call the Arab Patriarchal Phenomenon and that is based on religion, family, race or sect. It is a trend that maintains traditional Arab values and is the strongest trend, particularly in the absence of development cultural policies that renovate culture and values and form a mind-set linked to science and modernity among young people. The fourth feature is the emergence of new cultural ideas stemming from global movements, especially with regards to women’s rights, human rights, the environment, sexual freedom, citizenship and the globalisation of trade. These are ideas that are being emphasised with the growing influence of satellite television, mobile phones and online social networking sites, and with that of international organised forces and efficient institutions. The increase in these elements affects the formation of new cultural values that settle in the minds of the youth and can sometimes clash with the inherited elements. However, this increase eventually adds to the phenomenon of “the cultural and value hybridity of youth in the Arab region.”

Traditional Knowledge Values Are still Prevalent

An important study confirms that the tribal system characterising most Arab countries, as is the case in most developing countries, does not only form the major societal practices in these countries, but also connects the social groups by affiliation. Thus, tribal knowledge remains a permanent one passed on from generation to generation through available traditional mediums, such as stories and legends. And to some extent, this knowledge also spreads by personal inertia, as this culture and the knowledge and values it includes are rarely exposed to the forces of change, especially

in the absence of reform movements aimed at achieving cultural development and restitution.⁵³ The tribal system exists while reform movements are absent. It functions as a system that regulates the social cognitive system, where the tribal chief or any parental figure, such as the cleric, is the natural source of knowledge stemming from family, religion or tribe, or he is the gateway to knowledge. The embodiment of relations among generations in this system takes place through the living memory of the tribe, and not through a codified modern system or an information storage network that is found in developed Western societies.

The format of tribal knowledge transferred through nurturing and under the influence of parents or guardians represents implicit knowledge. If we introduce a modern information network to this tribal pattern without changing its current values structure and without a true cultural movement of change and development, then the information and knowledge network in these information systems will continue to represent an explicit knowledge in society. Moreover, this information network would remain incapable of having any impact on the formation movement of the youth’s cognitive effectiveness. In fact, the influential knowledge and values that societies need for the purposes of development and the creation of a quality transition stage in Arab societies are included in the implicit knowledge.⁵⁴ Explicit knowledge, regardless of the variety of databases and knowledge networks, has no effect on shaping the behaviour and the cultural cognitive recognition systems that make up the people’s perception of their world, their values and the pattern of their knowledge. Despite this, Mirghani Mohamed⁵⁵ gives an optimistic opinion in terms of the ability of Arab societies to make a change, for the problem facing these countries does not reside in the roots of the Arab culture. They once brought about philosophers and an Arab civilisation. This was when this region had philosophers and intellectuals who were able to conserve the Greek civilisation and transfer it to the West, especially during the 4th and 5th Centuries of the Hijra, within

the scope of what was widespread at that time. It is not the case today, where the voices of intellectuals and scientists have abated and the culture of religious extremism and tribalism has spread.

Cultural Gap between Generations and Cultural Hybridity among the Youth

The cultural gap between generations and its pattern varies from one Arab country to another. However, the emergence of the youth culture evolves mostly around the revolution of media and communication satellite and electronic systems (internet and TV). As one analyst explains, the media has created virtual communities that gather around the means of advanced technology to see new worlds. Common features have arisen among these groups as an expressive language which is increasingly reproduced; consumer rituals and slogans and the use of advanced technologies i.e. hybrid cultures that manifest themselves in the types of music, clothes brands, language and encodings that confirm that the globalised youth culture is a mixture of various cultural influences interacting with the local and regional cultural dimensions.⁵⁶

In this regard, the “Asda'a Centre” notes in its survey studies for 2008 and 2014⁵⁷ that the Arab youth enjoy consumer rituals and lifestyle habits similar to those of their Western counterparts. They also use technologies that are similar to those of their peers in the West. Perhaps these common features (Western language, clothing, technology and lifestyle habits) are what unite the groups of Arab youth and connect them, widening the gap between them and their parents. It is only natural that the culture of the parents who have not lived this life differs from that of the children who pursue higher education and live openly with the available world possibilities.

Such acceleration in the spread of the “hybrid” globalised culture among the youth may lead to a weakening of the influence of parents as well as a weakening of the family’s influence on them in the short or long term, along with an increasing influence of

Arab and Western peers. Thus, the cultural gap between parents and children widens, and the patriarchal hierarchal symbols, traditionally associated with the authority of the father in Arab culture, will fade with time. This may lead to a weakness of the traditional model of socialisation. Perhaps the signs of weakening control or the erosion of a cultural authority are already looming in the Arab urban areas. This door has been relatively open to the Arab youth so they can contribute in developing their culture, even if a hybrid one.

Studies and research have found that there are traditional elements that characterise the identity of the Arab youth and affect their visions and priorities. The most important of these elements are religion, family and society, or rather, the ethnic and sectarian elements. Surveys conducted on the Arab youth in the region, between the ages of 18 to 24 years, have shown that parents have the most influence, with a rate of 67%, followed by the influence of the family with 58%, and that of religion with 56%.⁵⁸

With regards to identity and traditional values, and unlike the Western youth, the Arab youth have displayed an ambiguity in their opinions, expressing their insistence and pride in their traditional Arab identity on the one hand and the adoption of new values and beliefs on the other. Four out of ten young Arabs expressed their consent to the fact that traditional beliefs are old-fashioned and outdated and that they prefer having “modern” beliefs and values. The proportion of young people who are adopting “modern” beliefs and values is increasing, reaching 17% in 2011, 35% in 2012, 40% in 2013, and 46% in 2014.⁵⁹

In a study on Egyptian young people, about 96% of the sample studied confirmed the importance of religion, and 82% stressed the importance of preserving the values and traditions derived from religion and family. The same study also revealed the influence of religion on life and faith rooted in fatalism. For example, 69% of the Egyptian youth said that everything was pre-destined and inevitable, and the percentage

The cultural gap between generations and its pattern varies from one Arab country to another. However, the emergence of the youth culture evolves mostly around the revolution of media and communication satellite and electronic systems

There is no doubt that religion and family are two important factors in the lives of humans. But it is necessary to differentiate between two prominent trends in this area: there are religious extremist trends that limit life, isolate it from the outside world and trends that represent the tolerant Islamic religion, which offers work values, optimism and interaction with life and other people with love and human values that exalt science and seek scientific knowledge as a basis for development and progress

of those who said that they determined their own fate did not exceed 7%, whereas 25% took a neutral stance on fatalism and freedom of choice. This percentage rose among women and less educated people to 79% of the sample.⁶⁰ In Egypt too and according to surveys conducted by Silatech Guide and Gallup Centre, 63% of Egyptian youth considers forming a family one of the most important goals for women and men.⁶¹ In Bahrain, nine out of ten young people confirmed their devotion to traditions for the sake of future generations.⁶² In Lebanon, the youth expressed interest in the family and national identity and acknowledged their close association with their sect. In the same study, it was found that the two main sources of values governing the Arab youth were religion as the face of morality and family and its relation with the sect.⁶³

In Jordan, a survey conducted by the Issam Fares Institute (IFI) at the AUB revealed that two thirds of the respondents (67%) felt that being successful in life depended on the status of their families in society, and not on their efforts. The study also showed that religion played a strong role in determining the identity and values of the Jordanian youth; the percentage of those who identified themselves as belonging to the Islamic Ummah first exceeded 34%, while the percentage of those who identified themselves as Jordanians first was 31%. Most Jordanians (58%) took pride in their homeland and expressed their great confidence in the state institutions such as the army, the judicial system and the police, but noted lower confidence in the parliament, the media and the private sector.⁶⁴

Traditional youth trends have reflected on the issue of gender. A study in Egypt has shown that young people believe that men are better than women at work. This percentage increases among young males and decreases (with only a 3-degree difference) among young females. 87% of the sample reported that in the case of scarce job opportunities, priority should be given to men because they are primarily responsible for the livelihood of the family. In line with this finding, results showed that

high proportions of the sample, mostly females, confirmed that the role of a housewife can give women the same feeling achieved by working outside the house.⁶⁵ Other surveys have shown that 58% of men and 73% of women between 18 and 24 years of age believe in gender equality and the necessity of equal opportunities at work.⁶⁶ While 69% of young Western males confirmed women's right to freedom and the application of gender equality in the workplace, this was 58% among young Arab males and at 73% among young females.⁶⁷

These results confirm a male patriarchal spirit prevailing in the Arab region. It is remarkable that it is predominant among many of the region's women, young and old alike. This patriarchal view that is biased against women is prevalent among young people and penetrates the system of social values in general, even among educated people, raising the question of the role of education in changing the social perception based on gender inequality. It also raises the question of why the power and impact of such values continue despite the existence of important factors such as modern education, media and modernisation efforts in the Arab region.

There is no doubt that religion and family are two important factors in the lives of humans. But it is necessary to differentiate between two prominent trends in this area: there are religious extremist trends that limit life, isolate it from the outside world and only deal with the knowledge society by using its advanced technologies and social networking sites to broadcast fatwas and ideologies that inhibit progress and encourage obsolete practices in a society that seeks development through knowledge. However, there are trends that represent the tolerant Islamic religion, which offers work values, optimism and interaction with life and other people with love and human values that exalt science and seek scientific knowledge as a basis for development and progress. The same goes for the family. There is a difference between the male patriarchal family that is authoritarian and associated with tribal

values that dominate the individual and eliminate personal identity, and the family that fosters its children and exalts them, providing them with an education that embraces the world and knowledge data. This is a family that upholds the value of the individual, considering him or her to be the first unit in the community, and develops rationality, thinking and creativity. These issues necessitate further research and are more important today than ever in the Arab history and in this era of hyper-political activity in more than one Arab country.

Box 3.1

Religion as a Source of Ethics, Science and Knowledge

“We must distinguish between two different paths in religion. The first path is the course of religion as the source of morality in life. It enables young people to acquire development values that support the pursuit of science and scientific knowledge regarding the universe, the human being and life. The second path is the course of religious extremism (with oneself or with the society, members or systems). It defies science, rejects tolerance and relativity and excludes others. This second path is completely different. While the first leads to the formation of ethics towards science that help in developing and highlighting it, the second path leads to the cancellation of the scientific approach and the undermining of science, which limits the freedom of thought, creativity and the priority of dialogue and experience as knowledge generators. This path can appear in a radical form that opposes society and regards it as blasphemous, or in the form of withdrawal from the world surrounding it. However, the culture of the Arab society carries a set of values, customs, traditions, standards and behavioural models that glorify the values of masculinity, especially among nomadic tribal, family and sectarian values. It then reproduces them via the faulty employment of religious upbringing, in many cases, in a process of guidance and rationalisation of young people. Despite the socio-economic transformations in society, the system of essential social relations that define the dominant value pattern with regards to women is still prevalent. And despite the manifestations of change in the roles of women in terms of their education and work, they are still ruled by a system of traditional values that prevail in the social, religious and perhaps political upbringing that the individual undergoes.”

Source: UNDP and Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation 2012. (Reference in Arabic)

Youth and the Values of the Knowledge Society

Research surveys have demonstrated that the youth in Arab countries highly appreciate the values of democracy (93% in Jordan; 84% in Egypt; 85% in Morocco; 91% in Iraq and 75% in the UAE) and that most young Arabs between 18 and 24 years of age show an interest in voting. Studies also point out that young people in the state of Palestine are more politicised than others and that young males dominate the youth movement. The study also shows that the use of new electronic means has created a new space as well as distinct forms of communication, expression and participation in civic life and that digital activities have now become a way to mobilise the youth.⁶⁸

A survey on the trends of the Arab youth in the age group of 15 to 25 years in six of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and Oman) exhibited a high level of optimism about the future. While some young people expressed grievances and complaints in some respects, more than 90% confirmed that they were very optimistic about their future and expressed their gratitude and satisfaction. The survey indicated the tendency of Lebanon's youth towards achievement, self-orientation and the independence of thought and action, and they were extremely influenced by the global youth culture that has increased with communication networks and mass media. But at the same time, they felt frustrated because of sectarian practices that imprisoned them in specific environments.⁶⁹

International comparisons of nineteen countries showed that young people in Jordan, Egypt and Morocco ranked 13th, 14th and 17th, respectively, in their perception of “mastery at work” as a first priority when searching for a job. 12% of the young people pointed this out in Jordan, 11% in Egypt, and 10% in Morocco, while the global ratio was 20% for 19 countries selected in the global survey and also for 56 countries included in the largest survey on youth and social values. The difficulty in

A survey on the trends of the Arab youth in the age group of 15 to 25 years in six of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries exhibited a high level of optimism about the future

The Joint Arab Economic Report 2012 estimated the size of the workforce in 2010 at about 122 million people, which was approximately 34.5% of the total population in the Arab countries in the same year

finding a job strongly affected the priorities of young people in the three countries; a secure job and income were more important than the value of achievement.⁷⁰ Furthermore, the fact that most young people in the Arab region preferred government jobs may explain the weak motivation to search for the value of mastery and achievement at work.

The interest of young people in the private sector varied in light of its relative growth in the Arab region, thereby increasing the proportion of young people who preferred private-sector jobs in the GCC from 24% in 2013 to 31% in 2014.⁷¹ This rate also increased outside the GCC, where it moved from 28% in 2013 to 31% in 2014. While the government sector is still preferred by young people in the Arab region, the level of demand for jobs in this sector declined from 55% in 2012 to 46% in 2013, and down to 43% in 2014,⁷² noting that the preference of the private sector was considered one of the values of the free economy, upon which depend knowledge economies and globalisation. There is a positive trend among young people which can be built upon to change the reality of the Arab youth's continued reliance on government jobs that only focus on degrees without taking knowledge and skills into account. Such factors lead to low human development and adversely affect the transfer and localisation of knowledge.

The previous display of the values of the youth shows the various manifestations of hybridity that characterise the values of young people and their culture. These manifestations keep increasing in the absence of a modern enlightened policy for the development of the Arab culture and identity, carried out by the government and the enlightened forces of change, and in light of the weakness of Arab knowledge production and the need to expand the role of enlightened religious trends.

Economic Effectiveness of the Youth

In the previous sections of this chapter, the report discussed two main themes, namely

the cognitive effectiveness and the cultural effectiveness of the youth. In this part, we continue to search for the status of young people in the Arab region and the extent of their effectiveness in labour and economic activity to contribute to the transition from a traditional economic system to a new knowledge-based economic system, i.e. knowledge economies, which are considered the major factor in building the knowledge society.

In order to analyse the economic efficiency of the youth, the report is based on the indicators of employment, unemployment, poverty and inequality among the youth, since they are some of the most important indicators to help understand and clarify the situation of young people and their economic effectiveness. Employment, the quality of life and positive participation based on justice lead to the effectiveness of the youth and their contribution to building what their country seeks in order to establish the knowledge society. The increasing rate of these indicators shows the weak participation of the youth in public life and the inability of these communities to integrate young people into the process of the transfer and localisation of knowledge. Based on the above, we move now to discuss the situation of the Arab youth in four vital areas: unemployment, poverty, inequality among the youth, as well as the marginalisation of women.

Youth Unemployment

The Joint Arab Economic Report 2012 estimated the size of the workforce in 2010 at about 122 million people, which was approximately 34.5% of the total population in the Arab countries in the same year. According to the report, the reason behind the low percentage was the growing number of people under 15 years of age, in addition to the limited contribution of women in the labour market.⁷³ The annual growth rate of the workforce in Arab countries reached 3.1% in the period between 1995 and 2010. This is considered a high rate and it varies among the Arab countries. The

rate of employment growth is expected to increase, as is the rate of the economically active population, for several decades to come and as a result of rapid population growth over the past three decades. This poses a challenge in the face of development in the Arab region. The Arab Economic Report also shows the concentration of around 57% of the total workforce in the Arab region in five countries. The workforce in Egypt is at about 26 million workers, with 14 million in Sudan, about 12 million in Morocco, 10 million in Algeria, and 8 million in Iraq. The share of women in the workforce is still low, as it was around 29% in 2010. This percentage is considered the lowest compared to global geographic regions.⁷⁴

The average unemployment rate in the region, according to the latest data available, is estimated at about 16%, and it remains the highest among the other regions of the world. The number of people unemployed in Arab countries in 2011 was estimated at about 17 million, compared to 197 million unemployed around the world. According to the estimates of ILO (2011) and the European Centre for Census (2012), the proportion of youth unemployment is 27% in the Arab region, and 12.6% worldwide.⁷⁵ As a result of the events witnessed in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen, the unemployment rate in these countries increased significantly, as we will discuss in the next section.⁷⁶

Unemployment Rate is Highest among the Youth

Despite the decline in the youth unemployment rate from 30% in the 1990s to 24% as an average for the years 2005 to 2011, it still represents more than twice the global average of 11.9%. The proportion of young people among the unemployed population is more than 50% in most Arab countries.⁷⁷ Political events in the region have contributed to the rise in unemployment. In 2011, the unemployment rate increased compared to 2010, and the increase was estimated at about 6% in Tunisia and Syria, 4% in Yemen and 2% in Egypt (Table 3.2).⁷⁸

It should be noted that education in the Arab region does not provide a guarantee against unemployment. Unemployment is almost 15% among those with university qualifications when compared to others (Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia).⁷⁹ The proportions of unemployed graduates of higher education is 43% in Saudi Arabia, about 32% in Bahrain, 24% in the state of Palestine, 22% in Morocco and the UAE, 14% in Tunisia,⁷⁹ and more than 11% in Algeria.⁸⁰ According to one report,⁸¹ the proportion of young university graduates with high qualifications who are unemployed in the year 2010 reached 21.9% in Tunisia, 24.8% in Egypt, 17.8% in Morocco, and 15.5% in Jordan, compared to an average of 3.5% in the European Union and 3.3% in the OECD countries.

Education in the Arab region does not provide a guarantee against unemployment. Unemployment is almost 15% among those with university qualifications when compared to others

Table 3.2


Evolution of Unemployment Rates in Selected Arab Countries (%)

Country	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Jordan	13.1	12.7	12.9	12.5	12.9
Bahrain	4	4	4	3.8	3.7
Tunisia	12.4	12.4	13.3	13	18.9
Algeria	13.8	11.3	10.2	10	9.8
Syria	9.2	10.9	8.5	8.6	14.9
State of Palestine	21.5	21.6	21.5	26.6	26.6
Egypt	8.9	8.7	9.4	8.9	11.9
Morocco	9.8	9.6	9.1	9.1	8.9

Source: Arab Monetary Fund 2012. (Reference in Arabic)

Figure 3.5

Unemployment of Graduates in Various Regions of the World (%)



Source: Jaramillo & Melonio 2012.

Arab youth unemployment has several features, the most important of which is that it specifically emerges among secondary school graduates (intermediate qualifications)

Figure 3.5 shows that Arab countries in North Africa have the highest global rates of unemployment among higher education graduates, with a rate of 25%. They are followed by the rest of the countries of the Middle East with a rate of 21%. These rates decrease in other regions.⁸²


The Arab Monetary Fund data of 2012 note that the average proportion of unemployed who are seeking jobs for the first time, account to about two thirds of the total number of unemployed people in the Arab countries. The average youth unemployment rate represents about 3.6 times the gross average unemployment rate in 2012. This indicator records a high value in the GCC

countries, for example, 17% in Qatar, 7.8% in Kuwait and 5.2% in Saudi Arabia, while it varies between 3% and 5% in Algeria, Bahrain, Libya, Jordan and the UAE and the value of the index less than 3% in the other Arab states as shown in Figure 3.6.⁸³ It is obvious that Arab women in particular are more subject to unemployment and unstable work.⁸⁴

Arab youth unemployment has several features, the most important of which is that it specifically emerges among secondary school graduates (intermediate qualifications). It also affects young women more than young men, especially uneducated women, because they are 4 times more likely

Figure 3.6

Youth Unemployment to General Unemployment (%)



Source: Arab Monetary Fund 2012. (Reference in Arabic)

to be unemployed than men due to cultural norms, the structure of the labour market and economic policies.

Furthermore, the Arab youth, in general, tend to prefer government jobs.⁸⁵ Although these jobs offer lower wages and are based on bureaucracy and inflexible official standards, and not on the standards of supply and demand, they remain more attractive, because the youth perceive them as safer, in addition to the privileges they offer. For the majority of young people, government jobs are more respectful and stable than those in the private sector.⁸⁶

Box 3.2

The Delayed Start of Independent Life for Young People

The consequences of youth exclusion is that young people simply wait for their independent lives to begin. They experience long periods of unemployment during which they live with their parents and are financially unable to get married or purchase a house. According to the survey on young people in the labour market, the percentage of the youth aged 15–29 years has grown significantly from 1988 to 2006, putting huge pressure on the labour market in terms of creating sufficient jobs for new entrants. The psychological impact of the waiting phase is also evident, with unemployment leading to apathy, as evidenced in the extremely low youth participation rates. There is also considerable concern that some isolated youth are being targeted by extremist groups who prey upon their sense of hopelessness. While delayed marriage is a trend observed in many societies, an increasing number of the youth in Egypt for example, are resorting to customary or informal marriage, known as Urfi marriages, which offer little security to spouses and any subsequent offspring.

Source: UNDP and Institute of National Planning Egypt 2010.

In Syria, for example, 80% of graduates prefer working in the public sector. In the Gulf countries, the volume of employment in the public sector ranges between 30 and 40%, while it exceeds 50% in Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE. This phenomenon is dangerous because it increases the possibility of driving the human capital away from the jobs that stimulate economic growth.⁸⁷ We have demonstrated in the

previous section that there are positive approaches among young people towards working in the private sector in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the structure of the labour market in the Arab region remains far from the process of integration of young people in the localisation and employment of knowledge. This is due to the lack of employment opportunities in the sectors related to scientific research and to knowledge and its production. This will be further clarified in the following sections when addressing the production of knowledge and scientific research.

Based on the aforementioned, we note that the structure of employment in the Arab countries is not conducive to the knowledge society. It greatly contributes to the marginalisation and exclusion of young people and women, who are victims of the lack of development policies that are effective in this regard. Regardless of the various estimates about youth unemployment, they all refer to the growing challenge facing Arab policymakers and planners to provide opportunities for decent and productive work for the growing number of young Arabs hoping to enter the labour and production market. There are many issues that must be dealt with in this area and that extend to the systems of youth rehabilitation and preparation in line with the requirements of the labour market, the stimulation of entrepreneurship and the establishment of a favourable investment climate.

Box 3.3

Street Youths in the Arab Region

Street youths are often school drop-outs, and the majority of them cannot read or write. In Yemen, the illiteracy rate is close to 70% among street youths. This high illiteracy rate has dangerous repercussions on work opportunities (this means that street youths often remain trapped in the low levels of the labour market, such as street vending). Among the main reasons for dropping out of school is that families cannot keep up with the educational expenses (37%) and they depend on the children's work (27%), or are unwilling to send their daughters to schools (12.5%).

Source: World Bank 2007.

In the Gulf countries, the volume of employment in the public sector ranges between 30 and 40%, while it exceeds 50% in Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE

The structure of employment in the Arab countries is not conducive to the knowledge society

Social Effectiveness: Participation, Voluntary Work and Belonging

Citizenship among the Arab Youth

According to a UN report on women in the Arab region,⁸⁸ and despite the fact that the constitutions of many Arab countries lay emphasis on citizenship and civil rights, some countries overlap or mix the traditional concepts of “parish” and “clan”.

In Western culture, constitutions identify the individual as the elementary unit in the structure of society, with all that “individualism” includes such as the privacy of the individual and the right to express oneself and bear the responsibility of rights.⁸⁹ The culture in East Asia (China or Japan, for example) is based on “collectivism”⁹⁰ with the values of social inclusion, teamwork and the sense of happiness in the community that it contains.⁹¹ In the Arab culture, family represents the unity of society;⁹² the limits of the individual’s rights and privacy in the community dissolve. Men in Arab societies are “citizens” that are heads of patriarchal families, and women’s rights as “citizens” are understood through the structure of the parental context and through expressions such as: the woman is a mother, a wife, a sister or a daughter. The woman is a citizen associated with children, and in many countries of the Arab region, women have to obtain permits to travel, work and get married.

The gaps in the cultural structure that affect the identity and the concept of citizenship in the Arab region as previously presented, have a negative impact on stimulating progress towards the knowledge society and the economic, social and political requirements associated with it. The confounding notion of citizenship, state, family, clan and privacy and their similarity with the political currents – sometimes authoritarian – and religious fatwas that deviate from true religion, weaken the potential of young people to protect themselves with knowledge and the localisation of scientific and rational thought and to build new cognitive cultural models that open doors to the knowledge and

technology-based progress of civilisation in the world today.

Participation in Public Life and Voluntary Work

Participation in public life and voluntary work are not only associated to citizenship but are indicators of the experience of active citizenship among young people. The concept of participation extends to political, social and economic participation and is connected with volunteer work that achieves the individual’s sense of belonging and establishes a culture of tolerance and mutual respect, creating the basic condition for youth effectiveness in the transfer and localisation of knowledge. Volunteer activities are based on selflessness and altruism to achieve a quality of life for the local and national community. They are not aimed at realising financial returns as much as they intend to achieve a sense of value and self-respect for those who carry them out. They strengthen the sense of citizenship and belonging and enrich identity.⁹³ Volunteer activities also represent a way to acquire knowledge, skills, broad life experiences and thinking skills.

The value of volunteer activities is apparent in a multitude of areas; from work to health and education, in addition to all activities that improve the quality of life. Volunteering is a means for the group or individual to gain a rich cognitive and social capital. It is noted in many countries of the developed world that a large part of education and public life skills is carried out outside the formal education system. This takes place either through volunteer work for young people through summer work, part-time work in companies and institutions, or work with the local community. This often takes place during school terms and it becomes a source to build the individual’s profile. The work benefits the person and the group and benefits society through the organised efforts of volunteers. Thus, volunteer work comprises a clear system with identifiable rules.⁹⁴

In the Arab region and the Middle East in general, young people are more likely

Participation in public life and voluntary work are not only associated to citizenship but are indicators of the experience of active citizenship among young people

to be unemployed, and despite the time available to them, little volunteer work is undertaken. One survey showed that only 11% of the region's youth had been enrolled in volunteer work or activity, while 20.9% of the American youth volunteered once or more in the same year in the United States.⁹⁵ This can be attributed to the absence of citizenship education in the Arab systems.⁹⁶

An important study prepared as a background paper for the Marseille Conference⁹⁷ found that 15% of young people in Morocco in 2000 had participated in one activity with organisations, associations or sports clubs. A 2009 study by the National Population Council in Egypt found that 3.3% of young men had never participated in any volunteer work. And despite the fact that the data was not recent, the implications are still applicable. Important studies confirm that the lack of participation has left a void for radical religious and political movements to attract young people to activities of a political and religious nature.⁹⁸

The low levels of volunteering among young people can be explained by the frustration, personal problems and inequality they experience, in addition to the high unemployment rates and the dominance of the patriarchal culture that values the authority of adult males, excluding young people, and dominating the social space. Some researchers offered a structural explanation associated with the systems of social work, life and culture in the community and the absence of incentive systems in which this behaviour is missing.⁹⁹ University admission only demands a high-school diploma based on grades gained through memorisation and private lessons. However, finding jobs, especially in the government sector, requires nothing more than a university degree, without any reliance, in most cases, on tests, experiences or life skills and without taking into consideration the extent of the individual's involvement in professional or social activities. This has pushed participation in public life and volunteer work out of the values system in Arab culture, as well as the education system and the economic system,

in contrast to their counterparts in the rest of the developed world, where participation and volunteering are encouraged, invested in and institutionalised.

Box 3.4

The Importance of Youth Participation

Participation is a process through which an individual can play a role in the decision-making process and its implementation in the various economic and social aspects of life and all that affects them. There is a difference between verbal participation, in which youth are talked and listened to - and which actually does not have any effect- and real participation that achieves full citizenship for young people and through which social integration is built. This becomes a source for teaching, transferring and localising knowledge and skills while exchanging benefits. Thus, the sense of belonging grows and the youth incentive for volunteer work increases.


Source: Afifi 2011.

Participation and volunteer work are the foundations for the formation of a sense of belonging and citizenship. This integrated system is referred to as active citizenship. It is based on three factors. First, providing opportunities that support building the capacity of young people to participate, and is represented in cultural contexts and supporting legislation. It provides the opportunities for justice and equality and for the absence of the domination of the patriarchal system, along with the recognition and respect of the capabilities of young people. Second, providing systems of motivation, which is not only evident in the appreciation and respect of youth activity, but also in the institutionalisation of participation and volunteering activities, so that they become an integral part of the individual or group's life profile and also become appreciated in education, employment, leadership and public life opportunities. Moreover, institutions and policies that establish plans and directions must exist. Third, developing the skills of young people, who have acquired or constantly acquire them in the contexts of education and daily interaction. The most important of these skills are: public work, problem-solving, professional and

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Figure 3.7

The Basic Pillars of Active Citizenship and Effective Participation



In education, Arab women remain marginalised. The literacy rate among adults (above 15 years) in the Arab region, according to data from 2012, was 77.5%. This was approximately 69.2% among women.¹⁰⁰ The proportion of women in the total illiteracy rate in the Arab region was about 66%

social skills, the positive sense of social responsibility, knowledge and general culture, the acceptance of pluralism, tolerance, refusal to exclude others, teamwork, written and oral expression and understanding skills, leadership skills, life skills, public work and social awareness. This idea is illustrated in Figure 3.7, which shows that efficient citizenship is the product of interaction between three factors: the existence of equal opportunities and individuals that have the capacity to exploit these opportunities and an incentive and supportive environment for these individuals. Without these three factors, active citizenship cannot be realised in society.

Women between Marginalisation and Empowerment

The issue surrounding women is related to development, from the integration of freedoms to the provision of human rights, such as the right to freedom and a decent life and impartiality towards marginalised groups in Arab societies. Have educational systems in these societies helped women by providing them with education, training, employment, freedom and social justice and lifting them out of the cycle of poverty and marginalisation?

Various data about education, training and employment opportunities note that the

most embodied form of inequality in the Arab region is that of gender. It manifests itself in discrimination that grants men opportunities at the expense of women in all domains of life. This is illustrated mostly in education and employment.

In education, Arab women remain marginalised. The literacy rate among adults (above 15 years) in the Arab region, according to data from 2012, was 77.5%. This was approximately 69.2% among women.¹⁰⁰ The proportion of women in the total illiteracy rate in the Arab region was about 66%.¹⁰¹

However, we must not dismiss the historical achievements that have brought about progress for Arab women in terms of education, freedoms, citizenship promotion and an increase in political participation. The rise in Arab women's enrolment rates in universities compared to previous rates is noticeable. The AKR 2010/2011 notes that the percentage of women's enrolment in universities in some Arab countries ranges between 40% and 50%. Also, in recent years, the number of women enrolled in universities in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE has actually exceeded that of men.¹⁰²

Furthermore, UNESCO statistics show a rising proportion of young women pursuing higher education compared to male students in some Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf countries. For example, the value of the Gender Parity index (GPI) in the state of Palestine was 1.41 at the level of Gross Enrolment ratio (GER) in tertiary education, in 2012, compared to a value of around 0.95 recorded in the past decade (2002).¹⁰³ In Saudi Arabia, the percentage of female students among those who are enrolled in scientific disciplines reached 65% in 2010, compared to 40% in the past decade. In many Arab countries, young women show a high level of competence that exceeds in many domains that of their male colleagues. This is an indicator of a reversed quality gap in tertiary education, especially in the scientific disciplines in many Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf countries.¹⁰⁴

Irrespective of the efforts and achievements of the Arab countries in bridging the gap in the education field, particularly in women's participation in scientific disciplines, they have not been significantly reflected in the participation of women in scientific research. In 2011, women only constituted 1% of the total researchers in Saudi Arabia, 19% in the state of Palestine, and 22% in Libya, and these rates remain below the global average (30%).¹⁰⁵ Although the number of females enrolled in scientific, technological, engineering, mathematics and medicine disciplines is steadily increasing, a small number pursue graduate studies or work in these disciplines in which they excel. Some studies also point to a trend that considers the gap in women's participation in scientific disciplines as harmful to the economies of science, knowledge and R&D in a given society, especially in the economies where women do not have the chance to work. If educated women do not get these opportunities, their preparation as trained human capital assets will benefit neither them nor society.

Perhaps what explains the progress of women in education is that this field is practically the only path open to them


in many Arab countries to overcome the restrictions imposed on them. Women's attendance in schools and universities is one way to reach public life and participate in it. Education has even become a goal in itself for women to prove themselves and explore a space where they enjoy freedom, in spite of the crippling contexts surrounding them culturally, economically and politically. Women's participation in the public sphere has relatively expanded, with average participation in Arab parliaments increasing from 3.4% in 2000 to about 15.9% in 2014,¹⁰⁶ noting that this participation is still largely lacking systematic support. The few available statistics indicate that the participation of women in senior and key positions did not exceed 14% in Kuwait or 2% in Yemen, compared with the global average of 25%.¹⁰⁷ The improved status of women in education has not had the desired effect on social, political and economic participation. This is due to the fact that Arab women still face discrimination, inequality and marginalisation.

In the employment field, discrimination against women in the labour market constitutes, for many researchers, a shocking fact that belies the improvement in

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Figure 3.8

Male and Female Participation in the Labour Force in a Number of Arab Countries and the Rates for the MENA Region 15-64 years (%)



Note: * Official Estimates excluding foreigners.

Source: World Bank. (2013a). (Reference in Arabic)

The low rate of women's participation in the labour market is considered one of the important phenomena associated with the marginalisation of Arab women, their weak empowerment, social limitations, and the lack of rights to full citizenship in Arab societies

women's education in many Arab countries. Although the gender gap in education in Arab countries is similar to that recorded globally, women's participation in the labour market remains low compared to men. (See Figure 3.8).¹⁰⁸ The difference is illustrated in the comparison with other countries of the world. Despite the continued gaps between men and women in terms of economic opportunities in all the countries of East Asia, the Pacific, Europe, Central Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa, more than 50% of women aged 15 years and older participate in the labour market.¹⁰⁹


One study confirms that the structure of the labour market and the economic environment deter women's work in the Arab region. They reduce employment opportunities for women, especially if they have not pursued higher education, and therefore women remain more vulnerable to unemployment and receive lower wages than men.¹¹⁰ Early marriage also affects employment opportunities for women and their participation in the economy. It should be noted that the largest proportion of the female labour force in many Arab countries is in the agriculture sector, especially in Egypt, Yemen and Syria, in contrast to Morocco and Tunisia (where we are witnessing a decline in demand for this sector). Higher education

is perhaps the most important factor contributing to women's departure from the agriculture sector towards the business sectors in governmental institutions.

The low rate of women's participation in the labour market is considered one of the important phenomena associated with the marginalisation of Arab women, their weak empowerment, social limitations, and the lack of rights to full citizenship in Arab societies. Thus, Arab countries lose half of society's youth and deprive themselves of key players in the development and localisation of knowledge and the performance of comprehensive development and progress. The gender phenomenon in the labour market in the Arab countries can only be explained through the pattern of the rentier economy prevailing in the region. It can also be attributed to the characteristics of the Arab culture with its patriarchal nature that emphasises the dominance of the man and his responsibility to the family, as well as to some religious interpretations that deviate from true religion and give strong support to these two economic and cultural criteria. All of these factors amount to increased gender inequality, weakened prevalence of women in scientific research and innovation, limited participation in political and economic fields and marginalisation in civic life.

Figure 3.9

Proportion of Women in Legislative Councils (%)



Source: World Bank (2013a). (Reference in Arabic)

The above does not negate that the Arab region is rich with educated women activists who are aware of their civil rights. This has led them to call for freedom and equality in the family and society and asserting themselves academically, socially, politically and economically. Concerning political participation, data suggest an improvement in the percentage of women's representation in legislatures in recent times, with differences from one Arab country to another (Figure 3.9), but this representation rate remains below the desired level.

Openness and Intercommunication

Openness and cognitive intercommunication are approaches adopted by the Arab Knowledge Reports as an organising line and a rooted principle in the establishment of the knowledge society. It is a comprehensive concept that enjoys its own cultural, social and political aspects, in addition to technological and cognitive mechanisms. We have previously examined the cultural situation of the youth and the attributes it involves. This calls for action and policies to enable the youth to genuinely open up to the global culture, benefit from it and contribute to it, so they become a player in it and not just a recipient. In this section of the report, we focus on the openness of the Arab youth and their communication with other Arabs and/or foreigners in various forms, most notably, the virtual communication with others, trips and journeys, and the regional and international movement of young university students.

Virtual Communication with Others

The statistics of the Arab Planning Institute/Arab Competitiveness (2012) and the statistics of the World Bank (2013) noted that the Arab youth had achieved great progress in recent years in their use of communication technologies, although there remains a gap between them and the youth in developed countries. ICT helps young people in planning job trends and supporting new opportunities, especially in small businesses and entrepreneurship, which in turn supports economic growth.

It also offers wide-open spaces for young people to communicate with the outside world and enables them to seize the abundance of knowledge and its transfer and employment. It further helps in preparing them for the implementation of national policies to access the desired knowledge society.

A survey conducted by the ASDA'A Burson-Marsteller over the past few years has shown that the responses of the Arab youth express a great degree of openness.¹¹¹ The 2010 report showed that the percentage of young people who used the internet daily increased from 56% in 2009 to 80% in 2010.¹¹² The 2009 report showed that mobile phones were a basic tool – such as clothing and fashion – for 78% of males and 79% of females. The percentage of young people using a mobile phone with internet access (Blackberry, iPhone) was at 22% for males and 24% for females. The percentage of laptop users was 66% among young males and 59% among females. The same report noted that 80% of the study sample used internet more than once a week, with “Google” considered the most favoured site; it ranks first among young people in Egypt, Qatar and Bahrain.¹¹³

According to an Asda'a 2014 report, the television was still considered a great source of information (75%) in 2014. Also, the percentage of those who read newspapers decreased steadily with only three out of 10 young people choosing them as their primary source to follow the news. Three out of 5 noted that the internet was their favourite platform to follow up on the news. Two out of 5 young people surveyed in 2014 expressed greater trust in social media in terms of news reliability, and this percentage has increased compared to 2013 when it was one out of 5.¹¹⁴


Travelling Abroad

As for tourism and recreation as a channel to express the openness of young people, the study showed that the proportions of young people who travelled abroad in 2009 varied from one Arab country to another.

Openness and cognitive intercommunication are approaches adopted by the Arab Knowledge Reports as an organising line and a rooted principle in the establishment of the knowledge society

Figure 3.10

Number of Arab Students Studying Abroad (2012)



Source: UNESCO 2012a

It was 10% in Egypt, 19% in Lebanon and 21% in Jordan. It also showed that 24% of Egyptian youth were optimistic in terms of getting the chance to travel in the near future, while 23% of the Lebanese youth noted that they were planning a trip in the next two years.¹¹⁵

Students' Regional and International Mobility

The regional and international mobility of Arab students represents a key channel of openness. It contributes to communicating with others in the areas of study, research and training and interacting with other

people's implicit knowledge. Data indicates an increase in the movement of students in the last twenty years around the world. There are almost three million students in higher education around the world studying abroad; about a quarter of a million of whom are Arab students, representing 7.3% of foreign students. According to the UNESCO 2014 data, there were more than 314,000 Arab students studying abroad in 2012. Arab countries host about 253,000 international students. For example, the UAE alone hosted more than 54,000 students from abroad, Egypt 49,000 students, and Saudi Arabia 46,500 students.¹¹⁶

Figure 3.11

Top Ten Countries of Destination for Arab Students (2010)



Source: UNESCO 2012a.

Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia are the countries with the highest number of students studying abroad (Figure 3.10). According to the UNESCO data for the year 2012, France is the main destination, and it hosts around 28.5% of these students, followed by the United States with 18.8%, the UAE with 10.9% and the United Kingdom with 9.4%.¹¹⁷ Also, 27% of Arab students are studying in institutions of higher education in a country other than their own inside the Arab region, which creates an ever-expanding regional market for higher education. This reflects the economic importance of the region and increases its progress towards trading strategies. Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon are considered the countries that receive the highest numbers of Arab students. Those students pursue different specialisations that include business administration, engineering and English as a second language.¹¹⁸

This research, educational and student movement, in addition to the Arab countries' encouragement, reflects the globalisation of labour markets, the economy and their orientation towards competitiveness, based on enabling students to acquire high-level skills and knowledge that turn them into international-level skilled workers with high qualifications. However, the inability of the Arab labour markets to absorb these internationally qualified elements and integrate them into the labour market based on knowledge makes the Arab work environment one that contributes to the increasing brain drain from the Arab region. And that is what we will discuss when analysing enabling environments in Chapter 4.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the situation of youth effectiveness in the Arab region, revealing its limitations which confirm the volume of the knowledge, social, economic and cultural gap separating them from their counterparts in the developed world. Yet, with differences of varying degrees of importance from one Arab country to another and from one area of effectiveness to the other on the path of

progress, we see that a majority of the youth has not yet possessed the requirements of the knowledge society era. Although the available data indicated some progress in some areas – education, youth employment and empowerment of women – the situation remains a cause for concern with regards to the effectiveness of the youth and their readiness for integration into the process of the transfer and localisation of knowledge in the Arab region. If we do not accelerate the drafting of effective policies and strategies to equip young people as a force for advancement in the community, the Arab countries will lose a historic opportunity to turn its “youth bulge” into a real human wealth and a human capital capable of carrying the torch of development in the region and realising its hopes in accessing the knowledge society on an equal basis with other nations. These results have been confirmed by field studies that will be presented in Chapter 5 of this report.

The cost of the exclusion and marginalisation of the youth, through the misuse of human capital, was estimated in 2006 in Egypt, for example, at about USD 53 billion and USD 1.5 billion in Jordan. The cost of unemployment was only estimated in 11 Arab countries covered by the analysis and reached an average of 2.32% of the GDP, with the highest rate scored in Morocco at 6.86%.¹¹⁹ The study confirms that Arab countries are among those that are far from safe in terms of reducing the degree of youth exclusion. There is no doubt that this cost is likely to exacerbate under the influence of youth protest movements in more than one Arab country that call for a decent living, freedom and dignity and the subsequent political, economic and social instability.

The empowerment of young people, with regards to skills and qualifications and through efficient educational institutions, plays a significant role in increasing their social effectiveness. This is realised through capitalising on a combined element of values, trust, tolerance and common understanding among the youth in society, along with the determination of conduct,

Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon are considered the countries that receive the highest numbers of Arab students. Those students pursue different specialisations that include business administration, engineering and English as a second language

The empowerment of young people, with regards to skills and qualifications and through efficient educational institutions, plays a significant role in increasing their social effectiveness

and trends towards active participation and the exercise of real democracy, i.e. “social cohesion”. This is reflected, of course, in the economic efficiency of the youth in production institutions that require common values of cooperation and teamwork skills. The youth’s possession of knowledge efficiency will further provide countries of the region with a competitive advantage in the globalised knowledge economies.¹²⁰

Even with different opinions in this regard, it could be argued that the current status of the Arab community, with its political, social and economic positions contexts, is built in a

way that does not allow for the qualification of the youth and factors of change. The Arab youth looks at power from a weakened point. It needs development policies to support it and enable it to traverse weakness towards strength, to take hold of knowledge and to access the knowledge society. Does the Arab region enjoy the necessary enabling environments for the preparation of the Arab youth to undertake a historic responsibility in the transfer and localisation of knowledge and to achieve the required progress to which all the nations of the Arab region aspire. This is discussed in Chapter 4.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Kamal Naguib, background paper for the report.
- 2 UNESCO 2014a, the proportion of women was calculated by the report team, based on data of UNESCO 2014a. See Annex 4, Table A 4-5.
- 3 UNESCO 2014a.
- 4 The proportion of women was calculated by the report team, based on the UNESCO database (UNESCO 2014a). See Annex 4, Table A 4-5.
- 5 UNESCO 2014a, regional literacy rates.
- 6 Ratios related to primary education. It should be noted that the percentage of females is calculated by the report team are based on UNESCO database (UNESCO 2014a).
- 7 UNESCO 2014a.
- 8 UNESCO 2014a.
- 9 UNESCO 2014a. For more details, please refer to Annex 4, Table A 4-6.
- 10 Abu-Orabi 2013
- 11 Kamal Naguib, background paper for the report.
- 12 UNESCO 2014a.
- 13 UNESCO 2010a.
- 14 UNESCO 2010a.
- 15 UNESCO 2014a.
- 16 Mouhoud 2012.
- 17 UNESCO 2012. (Reference in Arabic)
- 18 UNESCO 2012. (Reference in Arabic)
- 19 Salehi-Isfahani 2010.
- 20 Salehi-Isfahani 2010.
- 21 Alissa 2007.
- 22 European Training Foundation 2012.
- 23 Kendzia 2002.
- 24 Angel-Urdinola et al. 2010.
- 25 IFC & Islamic Development Bank 2011
- 26 Arab Thought Foundation 2012a. (Reference in Arabic)
- 27 UNESCO 2012. (Reference in Arabic)
- 28 Mullis et al. (2012a, b and c).
- 29 OECD 2012.
- 30 World Bank 2007. (Reference in Arabic)
- 31 Report team calculations based on the UNESCO database (UNESCO 2014a).
- 32 Najib, background paper for the report.
- 33 Brown et al. 2008.
- 34 World Bank 2007. (Reference in Arabic)
- 35 O'sullivan et al. 2012.
- 36 See Mohamed et al. 2008; O' Sullivan et al. 2012.
- 37 For more details, please refer to Annex 4, table A 4-11 Source: Internet World Stats 2014.
- 38 Kamal Naguib, background paper for the report.
- 39 UNESCO 2012.
- 40 See Chapter 4 on scientific research and innovation as a system and an enabling environment in the Arab region.
- 41 The UNICEF and the American University of Beirut (AUB) issued in 2010 an important two-year study to analyse the situation of youth in the Arab region (15-24 years). One of the study's priorities were pro-youth knowledge and development policies in the Arab region.
- 42 UNICEF & AUB IFI 2010.
- 43 Attar 2009.
- 44 Barakat 1993.
- 45 Ahmad Al-Kawwaz 2011 (Reference in Arabic); Bush & Ayebe 2012; Chaaban 2008.
- 46 Mohamed et al. 2008; UNDP 2002; Kraidy 2008.
- 47 Arab Knowledge Report 2010/2011.
- 48 Attar 2009.
- 49 Ahmad Al-Kawwaz 2011 (Reference in Arabic); Mahbubani 2009.
- 50 Attar 2009; Roskin & Coyle 2008.
- 51 UNDP 2006.
- 52 UNDP and Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation 2012 (Reference in Arabic); Ahmad Al-Kawwaz 2011 (Reference in Arabic); UNICEF & AUB IFI 2010; UNDP 2002, 2004 and 2005 (References in Arabic); Kraidy 2008; ASDA'A Burson-Marsteller 2008; Haskell et al. 2012; Pratt 2005.
- 53 Mohamed et al. 2008.
- 54 Mohamed et al. 2008.
- 55 Mohamed et al. 2008.
- 56 Kraidy 2008.
- 57 Asda'a Burson-Marsteller 2008 and 2014.
- 58 Asda'a Burson-Marsteller 2014.
- 59 Asda'a Burson-Marsteller 2013 and 2014.
- 60 UNDP & the Institute of National Planning 2010.
- 61 UNICEF & AUB IFI 2010.
- 62 Asda'a Burson-Marsteller 2009.
- 63 UNICEF & AUB IFI 2010.
- 64 UNICEF & AUB IFI 2010.
- 65 UNDP & the Institute of National Planning 2010.
- 66 UNICEF & AUB IFI 2010.
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- 69 UNICEF & AUB IFI 2010.
- 70 UNDP & the Institute of National Planning 2010.
- 71 Asda'a Burson-Marsteller 2014.
- 72 Asda'a Burson-Marsteller 2014.
- 73 Arab Monetary Fund 2012. (Reference in Arabic)
- 74 Arab Monetary Fund 2012. (Reference in Arabic)
- 75 Mirkin 2013.
- 76 Arab Monetary Fund, 2012 (Reference in Arabic). Another ESCWA report published in 2013 estimated the number of unemployed at approximately 20 million.
- 77 UNDP 2011.
- 78 Arab Monetary Fund 2012. (Reference in Arabic)
- 79 Ahmed et al. 2012.
- 80 Ncube & Nyananwn 2012.
- 81 Jaramillo & Melonio 2011.
- 82 Ahmad Hajji, background paper for the report.
- 83 Arab Monetary Fund 2012. (Reference in Arabic)
- 84 As previously mentioned in the report, the share of female workers of jobs did not exceed 29% in 2010, which is the lowest rate among all regions.
- 85 Chaabaan 2010.
- 86 Chaaban 2010; Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon 2008.
- 87 Chaaban 2010.
- 88 UNDP 2005. (Reference in Arabic)
- 89 Basok et al. 2006; Roy 2013.
- 90 Dwairy & Achoui 2006.
- 91 UNDP 2002.
- 92 Anthias 2008.
- 93 Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon 2008.
- 94 Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon 2008.
- 95 Faour & Muasher 2011.
- 96 Marseille Conference 2010.
- 97 Cabras 2010.
- 98 Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon 2008.
- 99 UNESCO database (UNESCO 2014a). For more details, please refer to Annex 4, A 4-5

- ¹⁰⁰ Report team calculations based on the UNESCO database (UNESCO 2014a) on literacy. See Annex 4, table A 4-5.
- ¹⁰¹ UNDP and Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation 2012, Arab Knowledge Report 2010/2011. (Reference in Arabic)
- ¹⁰² UNESCO 2014a.
- ¹⁰³ Economic Intelligence Unit 2012.
- ¹⁰⁴ Economic Intelligence Unit 2012
- ¹⁰⁵ Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014.
- ¹⁰⁶ UNSD 2012.
- ¹⁰⁷ Salehi-Isfahani 2010.
- ¹⁰⁸ World Bank 2013a. (Reference in Arabic)
- ¹⁰⁹ Chaabaan 2009.
- ¹¹⁰ Asda'a Burson-Marsteller 2009, 2010, 2014
- ¹¹¹ Asda'a Burson-Marsteller 2010.
- ¹¹² Asda'a Burson Marsteller 2009
- ¹¹³ Asda'a Burson-Marsteller 2014.
- ¹¹⁴ Asda'a Burson-Marsteller 2009.
- ¹¹⁵ UNESCO 2014b.
- ¹¹⁶ UNESCO 2014a.
- ¹¹⁷ UNESCO 2014a.
- ¹¹⁸ The cost was estimated relatively to a value of unemployment that is equal to zero.
- ¹¹⁹ Chaaban 2008.
- ¹²⁰ Bukatti & Falk 2002.