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*Empowered lives,
Resilient nations.*



THE SYRIAN CRISIS:

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING - **LEBANON**





*Empowered lives,
Resilient nations.*

A decorative graphic on the left side of the page consisting of several overlapping triangles pointing to the right. The colors from left to right are green, dark blue, red, purple, and pink. A thick dark red horizontal line runs across the page below the triangles.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS:

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING - **LEBANON**

October 2012

This study was commissioned to the Consultation and Research Institute (CRI) by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with the support of the UNDP regional offices in Bekaa, South, North and BSS



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
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BSS	Beirut and Southern suburbs
CAS	Central Administration of Statistics
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction
CERD	Center for Educational Research And Development
CRI	Consultation and Research Institute
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
ESFD	Economic and Social Fund for Development
ESIA	Economic and Social Impact Assessment
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GOL	Government of Lebanon
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MOPH	Ministry of Public Health
MOSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
SDC	Social Development Centers
STI	Sexually Transmitted Infections
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WB	The World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization




INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES, RATIONAL AND LIMITATIONS

1. The Context

With the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in March 2011, Syrian nationals were displaced and the number of Syrian refugees swelled in neighbouring countries including Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon. While the Syrian crisis is on-going for more than two years, the number of refugees' arrival to Lebanon is continuously on the rise. According to estimates of the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is 756,630 in September 2013 of whom 654,115 are registered¹. As of October 9 2013, the total number of refugees reached 689 thousand.

Clearly, the Syrian crisis has major political and socio-economic repercussions on Lebanon in general and host communities in particular. The national and international response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon attempts to manage the impact of the crisis with relief and emergency action plans pertaining to the rising needs of refugees and host communities. However, Lebanon is characterized by a fragile political stability, a deficient economic situation and structural regional imbalances prior to the Syrian conflict and the arrival of Syrian refugees. As a result, the impact of the Syrian crisis exacerbates the deficiencies of the country in general and the already difficult living conditions of host communities.

Figure 1: Number of Registered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon from January 2012 to September 2013 (in '000)



Source: UNHCR, *Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal*, Date of access: September 24, 2013

¹ UNHCR, *Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal* <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>. Date of access: September 24, 2013

In this context, the report argues that there is a need to move away from a strictly relief response perspective based on the assessment of basic needs of both Syrian refugees and nationals. On the contrary, the overall objective of this assignment is to make a case for **a comprehensive perspective that focuses on a longer term development strategy** that not only focuses on the short term repercussions of the crisis and the immediate needs but also highlights a developmental perspective for the recipient country in general and the largest and most vulnerable host communities

2. The Objectives

On July 23 2013, the Consultation and Research Institute (CRI) received the terms of reference for a UNDP study entitled: "**The Syrian Crisis: Implications for Development Indicators and Development Planning in Jordan and Lebanon**".

Since July 24 (date of the first meeting), several meetings were held between the United Nations Development Program(UNDP)-Lebanon, the Poverty Practice of UNDP Regional Center in Cairo, UNDP Regional Bureau and the CRI during which several topics were discussed, mainly: the study's objectives, background and context; the suggested methodologies and approaches; and the limitations and obstacles.

In parallel, the Government of Lebanon² asked the World Bank to lead an Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon (with a special focus of the hosting communities) with a view to generating rigorous figures of the impact and needs to underpin its policy response. This assessment was to be implemented in collaboration with the UN agencies (including UNDP), the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Because the two reports may overlap to some extent, the complementarity issue was discussed between the UNDP and the

CRI, in order to optimize efforts and avoid duplication. As a result, while the present report has benefited from the outcomes of ESIA report, its focus is less macro and quantitative and more local and qualitative in nature. More precisely, and given the limitations regarding the status of the data in Lebanon³ - especially in terms of social indicators- a pure quantitative approach seems to be difficult to implement, without being complemented by a qualitative dimension. Indeed, the impact of the Syrian crisis seems to vary geographically (North and Bekaa vs. Beirut or South), demographically, per sector of activity, per hosting community's profile...etc. Hence, there is a clear need to fine-tune the "overall national" picture, and supplement it with a localized analytical framework. In other terms, the UNDP report aim is to provide a "close-up" picture with "higher resolution".

More precisely the report aims at adopting a comprehensive approach that addresses the priority challenges of host communities mainly those with the highest concentration of refugees. This approach focuses on the impact on development since inequalities have been additionally strained by the high influx of refugees. The development outcomes therefore are long term objectives that go beyond the immediate relief and emergency response.

2 In a letter from the Prime Minister to the World Bank dated July 25, 2013,

3 Refer to section "Limitations"

The specific objectives of the study were defined as follows:

Objective 1: Develop a set of baseline indicators

Description:

- the indicators should be linked to the MDG and HD frameworks
- the indicators may be measured using qualitative and/or quantitative methods
- the indicators should reflect the impact of Syrian refugees on hosting communities

Objective 2: Analyze the indicators from a dynamic point of view

Description:

Introduce- whenever possible, available and relevant- a dynamic dimension (pre-crisis, current situation, trends, impacts)

Provide- to the extent possible- a set of priorities (in terms of fields of intervention) based on a set of criteria (such as: impact, trend, scale, or spread)

- Show- whenever justifiable- regional disparities or variability according to different segments of population. Analysis should focus on fine-tuning the “global” or “national” or “macro” results through meaningful disaggregation (geographically, demographically, or any other relevant grouping)

Objective 3: Develop a preliminary set of recommendations regarding “national and international development partners’ response to the refugee crisis”.

Description:

- Based on the literature review, the current and previous experiences, and the outcomes of the interviews conducted in this study, CRI will propose a set of recommendations: this would include a rapid assessment of the existing/current response and identify gaps.

Objective 4: Assess the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on major macroeconomic/ budgetary indicators

Description:

- To the extent possible, the Consultant will make use of the chapter that covers macro-economy, fiscal and budgetary dimensions included in the EISA report. It will be briefly reviewed and assessed by the CRI and presented within this report.

In addition to the above objectives, CRI participated actively in the preparation of the ESIA report as well. This participation included the following tasks:

- To participate in the meetings with the UNDP, the World Bank or other UN agencies and/or Ministries
- Provide support to UNDP team in terms of methodology, report outline/structure and commenting the different chapters of the final report.
- Represent the UNDP (whenever necessary) in the committees in charge of the needs assessment report (e.g. Human Development, Livelihoods, Social Cohesion)
- Participate in the preparation, implementation and analysis of the outcomes of the regional working groups

3. The Rational

The figure below illustrates the rationale of the study. Three parallel pillars feed into the final report, namely i) the Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), ii) the Literature Review and iii) the Regional Working Groups.

The different partners involved in the preparation of the first pillar, the ESIA built a consolidated list of documents, reports, statistics and studies more or less related to the issue. This bibliography constitutes the main input/source of the second pillar, the literature review, in addition to the CRI database. The latter included: i) several



relevant studies (e.g. Strategic Plan for Local Development for several unions of municipalities) as well as ii) an archive of newspaper articles that cover the Syrian crisis and its impact on Lebanon. The outcome of the literature review constitutes an input for the UNDP report and the ESIA report.

The third pillar is composed of the regional working groups. CRI, in collaboration with the UNDP country office, conducted seven working groups with municipalities and local authorities/stakeholders. The two outcomes of the working groups are i) the detailed minutes of meeting and ii) the quantitative questionnaires filled by most of the participants. Here again, these outcomes constituted an input for the UNDP report and the ESIA report.


The three pillars of the study are articulated around two major axes: 1) The impacts on development – at the national and local levels – with special focus on host communities with the highest concentration

of refugees, and 2) the analysis of the implemented national and international response to the crisis. These two axes shape the research in a direction of comprehensive and long-term development response.

Finally, this report is prepared based on the combined analysis of the following inputs: 1) The literature review (consolidated bibliography and CRI database); 2) The regional working groups (minutes of meeting and quantitative questionnaires); and 3) The assessment of the macroeconomic chapter included in the ESIA.

4 The CRI commented the ESIA and provided inputs to the final ESIA report using the outcomes of the literature review and the regional working groups.

Figure 2: Rational of the Study



4. The Limitations

Several limitations and potential obstacles have to be taken into account:

1) Time constraints: the time assigned to the impact assessment was relatively tight (less than 1.5 calendar months) which constraints the scope of the study, without however hindering the quality of the results.

2) Status of data in Lebanon: the study team gauged several difficulties and challenges in literature review in terms of availability, accessibility, consistency and reliability of data.

- **Availability:** indicators related to the impact of the crisis as well as some of the baseline indicators are limited, despite the extensive bibliography. For example, indicators related to income, poverty, household living conditions or price monitoring are not up dated regularly. Even though some of the indicators are available at the national level, their disaggregation (at the geographical level, per different profiles of the population, etc.) can rarely be found.
- **Accessibility:** while secondary data seem to be accessible, primary data which allows deeper and disaggregated statistical analysis is largely inaccessible. For example, the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) national surveys, or raw data within the Ministry of Finance on real estate transactions, etc.
- **Consistency:** the comparison between different sources reveals discrepancies of indicators, which hampers the possibility of their usage. For instance, data pertaining to education (gross and net enrolment rates)⁵ are different according to Millennium Development Goal (MDG) report, Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE), United

⁵ Secondary enrollment rates differ from one source to another depending on the inclusion or exclusion of VTE students in the total number of registered students.

- Nations Educational and Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), etc. The main reason behind these differences resides in the definition of these indicators, which are often not clarified to the reader.
- **Reliability:** in general, the quality of the data in the reviewed document cannot be assessed by CRI, except through the cross-checking and convergence of indicators from different sources (from the desk or field work).
- **Lack of recent data:** several key indicators, such as macro-economic indicators or social indicators are old. For example, the last household living condition national survey was conducted in 2004. Similarly, National Accounts covers till the year 2010 only.

3) Qualitative approach vs. Quantitative approach: the present study is concentrated around a rather qualitative approach for the following reasons:

1. The prevailing status of data is one of the major obstacles facing the development of a pure quantitative approach (i.e. using econometric models)

a. The existing data on the situation before crisis is usually old and very few indicators have significant time series.

b. The existing data on the situation before crisis is usually at the national level or in some cases at Mohafazat/Caza level. While the geographic disaggregation is rare, the impact of the crisis is characterized by significant geographic disparities.

c. The existing data prior to the crisis is debatable, knowing that different sources provide different figures or indicators (UNESCO, WB, UNICEF, MEHE on education, for example)



d. Few quantitative data covers the impact assessment of the current situation. In fact, the existing literature relies on qualitative methods of assessments such as focus groups, in-depth interviews, participatory approaches, in specific areas.

2. The impact assessment based on a comparative approach (before vs. after the crisis) is very difficult to quantify and implement since it is merely impossible to dissociate between economic impacts of Syrian crisis and the other exogenous factors (e.g. political and economic context in the region, Lebanese economic system).

4) Regional working groups: As known, participative approach –although widely used in similar contexts- faces several challenges and limitations. CRI took the necessary measures in order to thoroughly guarantee the quality of the outcome of the regional working groups, in terms of the profile of participants (which should reflect the perceptions of the community), the skills of moderators, the structure of the checklist, the regional distribution of the working groups, etc. However, CRI observed one key challenge: the time constraint knowing that it is extremely difficult to keep participants concentrated for more than 4 hours. The working groups aimed at discussing topics that are wide-spread covering a large range of sectors and issues, which ideally required much more time and a sector by sector working session.

5) Fluidity of the situation: the impact assessment faces a serious challenge which consists of the high movement of refugees within the Lebanese territory and between Lebanon, Syria, or other countries. This population movement, which complicates the analysis of the crisis and its impact, must be taken into account whilst reading the findings of this report and especially when building on it future projects and interventions.

5. Outline of the Report

The report is composed of four chapters. **Chapter 1** of the report explains the research methods adopted in preparation of the study; **Chapter 2** consists of the key findings of the desk review of relevant documents pertaining to the Syrian crisis and its impact on Lebanon. The findings are distributed among the key livelihood sectors;

Chapter 3 encompasses the analysis of the current response to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon. Finally, **Chapter 4** draws a brief assessment of the macro-economic and fiscal impacts of the crisis in the ESIA report which is based on an econometric model developed by The World Bank.

Chapter 1: THE METHODOLOGY



The following chapter explains the methods adopted for the preparation of the study. The first section describes the research tools of the desk review; this is followed by the second section that examines the technical tools for the organization of the Regional Working Groups. The third section is an explanatory note pertaining to the matrix that consolidates the findings of the literature review. The fourth section illustrates the research tools used for the assessment of the response to the crisis in Lebanon.

1. The Literature review⁶

The ESIA provided a database of around 90 documents including relevant studies pertaining to different sectors. The documents are mainly published by the Lebanese Government, international organizations and national and international Civil Society Organizations (CSO).

The CRI team systematically reviewed all documents made available in addition to some relevant studies available within CRI database (mainly Local Economic development Plans prepared for Unions of municipalities). Moreover, an archive of newspaper articles pertaining to the Syrian crisis since March 2011 was consulted to supplement the above published documents. The newspaper articles (around 20 articles) were used for illustrative purposes pertaining to the conditions of the host communities at the local level.

Every document was reviewed in order to extract relevant qualitative or quantitative information strictly pertaining to the impact of the Syrian crisis on host communities. Later on, the extracted information was classified according to the matrix structure. As a result, the table below illustrates the relevance of the documents:

⁶ Refer to the Bibliography



Table 1: Types of documents used

Type of documents	Number of documents	Comments
Directly related document	41	Incorporated in the matrix
Indirectly related document	28	Mainly used for baseline indicators
Tangential documents	20	Background/context information
Total number of documents	89	
Total number of articles	20	Provide up-to-date close-up information

Source: CRI's calculations

- Directly related documents are the ones that include information related to the impact of the Syrian crisis on host communities in Lebanon.
- Indirectly related documents are the ones that include information related to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon, without a focus on the impact of the crisis on host communities.
- Tangential documents include background information about Lebanon mainly before the crisis.

A brief analysis of the reviewed bibliography shows a sharp increase of published studies in 2013, which represents more than 60% of the total documents. This can be explained by the sharp increase of arrivals at the beginning of 2013. The limited number of studies prior to 2013 seems to reflect a delay in the prediction of the extent and magnitude of the impact of the Syrian crisis.

Table 2: Distribution of bibliography per year of publication

	Year of publication	Number of documents	%
Syrian crisis	2013	55	62%
Syrian crisis	2012	9	10%
Syrian crisis	2011	4	4%
Pre-crisis	2010 and before	21	24%
Total		89	100%

Source: CRI's calculations

The results also show a prevailing research related to the social aspect of the crisis and its impact on Lebanon. The quarter of the studies covers a multi-sectoral needs assessments. Surprisingly, studies pertaining to the economic repercussions and impact on infrastructure of the crisis are scanty (respectively only 15% and 8% of the bibliography).

Table 3: Distribution of bibliography per sector

	Number of documents	%
Demography	8	9%
Housing	1	1%
Infrastructure	7	8%
o/w Water	6	
Economy	13	15%
Social	37	42%
o/w Education	13	
o/w Health	5	
o/w Social protection	6	
Multi-sectors	21	24%
Institutional	2	2%
Total	89	100%

Source: CRI's calculations

The distribution of documents by the source shows the omnipresence of UNHCR, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and international non-governmental organizations (NGO) (48%). These agencies have mainly relief and emergency mandates, which explains the mainstream of relief literature.

Table 4: Distribution of bibliography per source

	Number of documents	%
UNHCR	16	18%
International NGOs	15	17%
UNICEF	12	13%
UNDP	11	12%
Government of Lebanon (GOL)	11	12%
Economic Social Fund for Development (ESFD)	6	7%
Other UN agencies (WHO, FAO, WFP, ESCWA)	6	7%
The World Bank (WB)	5	6%
Local NGOs	5	6%
EU	2	2%
Total	89	100%

Source: CRI's calculations

Finally, it is noteworthy that most of the bibliography tackles the impact of the Syrian crisis at the national, while only around 26% focus on regional/local levels, i.e. specific host communities.

Table 5: Distribution of bibliography per source

	#	%
Local	23	26%
National	66	74%
Total	89	100%


Source: CRI's calculations

In conclusion, the literature review shows a gap in terms of:

- Developmental and medium to long-terms approach
- Infrastructure and economic assessments
- Localized dimension of the crisis
- Focusing on host communities (instead of focusing on refugees only)
- Quantitative assessments

These gaps will mainly be addressed in the regional working groups.

In addition to these documents, the ESIA report was reviewed as a stand-alone document in order to carry out a macro-economic and fiscal impact assessment.



2. The Regional Working Groups⁷

During the month of August 2013, the UNDP and the CRI organized seven regional working groups, as described in the table below:

Table 6: Distribution of Regional Working Groups (RWG)

	Region	Governorate	Date	Number of participants ¹	Number of questionnaires
RWG #1	Beirut Southern Suburbs	Beirut	August 21 2013	19	10
RWG #2	Dennieh	North Lebanon	August 22 2013	20	11
RWG #3	Baalbeck	Bekaa	August 27 2013	19	15
RWG #4	West Bekaa	Bekaa	August 28 2013	21	11
In depth interview	Burj Hammoud	Mount Lebanon	August 28 2013	2	0
RWG #5	Tyr	South Lebanon	August 30 2013	14	11
RWG #6	Halba	North Lebanon	September 3 2013	14	8
RWG #7	Iklm Kharoub	North Lebanon	September 19, 2013	12	10
Total 7 regions and 1 in-depth interview 121 76					

Selection Criteria: Several criteria were taken into account for the selection of the regions:

- **Significant presence of Syrian refugees:** UNHCR statistics show a high concentration of Syrian refugees in North Lebanon and in the Bekaa region. Hence, four out of seven regional working groups were organized in these two governorates (North Lebanon: Dennieh and Halba; Bekaa: Baalbeck and West Bekaa). The UNHCR statistics also show the presence of Syrian refugees in other regions, but to a lesser extent: Great Beirut has been represented by Beirut and Southern suburbs (BSS), Tyr – representing South Lebanon, and Iklm Kharoub representing Mount-Lebanon.

- **Rural vs. urban factors:** Tyr, BSS and Halba were selected in order to highlight the disparities among rural and urban areas.

- Variability in terms of **economic sectors** (agriculture, construction, etc.) was also taken into consideration. For example, agriculture activities are predominant in the Bekaa governorate while construction is more concentrated in BSS region.

- **Logistic facilities:** the UNDP Country Office was in charge of the logistic

preparation of the working groups, through their regional representatives. Priority was given to the most accessible regions.

The participants' profile: elected members of municipalities, union of municipalities, local authorities, NGOs, opinion leaders, major stakeholders at the local/regional levels (such as: director of Social Development Center, Doctor, etc). It is important to note that around 10% of the total number of participants was females. Although this percentage seems to be very low, it reflects the effective situation in terms of women participation in political and electoral process or local authorities.

⁷ Refer to Annex 1: Technical Tools (the detailed discussion guide and questionnaire templates)

⁸ Refer to Annex 2: Regional Working Groups Report (detailed minutes and list of participants)

The working sessions were coordinated by the ART-Gold regional facilitator, in presence of three experts from CRI (moderator, assistant, questionnaire facilitator). The average duration of the discussion reached around 4 hours. At the end of each session, all participants (those who remained till the end) filled a quantitative questionnaire.

The discussion guide addressed the following topic “impact of Syrian crisis and Syrian refugees on the hosting communities”. It was composed of seven chapters covering all livelihoods dimensions:

1. Brief description of the situation before crisis
2. Demographic profile
3. Housing
4. Infrastructure
5. Economic activities
6. Social dimensions
7. Social Cohesion

The quantitative questionnaire measured the following:

1. Presence or absence of an impact
2. Positive or negative impact
3. Amplitude of the impact: high, medium, low (on those who are impacted)
4. Trend of the impact: ascending, stable or descending

The regional working groups' discussions were taped and a detailed transcription was conducted. The findings of these working groups were classified and included in the matrix.

Moreover, the questionnaires filled by participants were subject to data coding, data entry and data cleaning. The results were used to consolidate the qualitative findings.

The regional working groups aim at addressing the information gaps identified in the Literature review. The discussions were directed towards the identification

of the priorities, in terms of developmental perspective (i.e. local level, host communities, medium and long term).

3. The Matrix

At the onset of the study, the CRI considered the following questions in order to design the adequate framework and methodology:

- Q1: Impact of what?
- Q2: Impact on whom?
- Q3: Impact on what?

Based on this exercise, CRI developed a comprehensive matrix for the analysis of the collected data necessary for the impact assessment.

Findings of the literature review, the regional working groups and the remaining analysis (macro-economic, budgetary and fiscal assessment, in addition to the aid response assessment) feed in the impact assessment matrix.

The matrix pertains to:

- *A1: Impact of the Syrian crisis, an Syrian influx of refugees to Lebanon*
- *A2: Impact on host communities*

At a first glance, the answer to the question Q3 (impact on what?) may produce a “huge” list of sectors, or dimensions such as employment, education, income, housing, etc. This listing has to be, on one hand, comprehensive and on the other structured.

In this context, the matrix aims at organizing the impact sector in a structured grouping and a comprehensive approach. In order to do so, the CRI resorted to sector groupings adopted by several key international and national organizations, mainly the below three references²:

- a) Human Development Indicators
- b) Millennium Development Goals
- c) Livelihoods methodology

⁹ For a detailed explanation of the design of the matrix structure refer to Annex 3: Matrix design



Based on the above review of the different structures, CRI adopted the following final grouping of the impact sectors:

Sector 1: Population and demography

- Size of the phenomenon (current situation)
 - Estimations vs. Official figures (why are there discrepancies?)
- Recent Trends (ascending, descending, depending on what? i.e. explanatory factors)
- Expectations for the end year 2013? 2014?
- Dynamic analysis: movements of refugees, origins, average stay
- Demographic characteristics: households or individuals, average age, gender distribution, joining existing families in the area (family grouping)

Sector 2: Housing

- Main characteristics of place of residence: type of residence, rent, employer, informal dwellings, hotel occupancy, furnished apartment occupancy, what about the furniture: do they buy or bring it with them
- Impact on real estate market: prices/rent, occupancy rates, crowdedness, hotel and furnished apartments, impact on construction activity (from a demand point of view because supply point of view will be studied in the topic "economic activity")
- Indirect impact on dwelling related services: dish/satellite, maintenance (paintings...etc.), furniture relocation, impact on furniture demand and appliances demand, house cleaning

Sector 3: Infrastructure

- Water and sanitation:
 - Used water
 - Drinking water
 - Sanitation
- Solid waste
- Electricity-Energy
 - Public electricity
 - Private electricity
 - Impact on energy: in the coming winter what are the means of heating? What are the indirect impacts?
- Transportation:
 - Direct impact on roads
 - Indirect impact on transportation means: vehicles, motorcycles, taxi-service-bus, fuel consumption
- Telecommunication
 - Telephones-land lines
 - Telephones-mobiles
 - Internet
- Global impact on environment and natural resources?

Sector 4: Economic activity

- Labour market
 - Supply side: labour participation, unemployment, formality/informality
- Economic activity
 - Sector by sector analysis: agriculture, industry, real-estate/construction, retail/trade, services, tourism,
- Income, poverty, food security

Sector 5: Social dimension

- Education (Access and Quality)
- Health (Access and Quality)

Sector 6: Social Cohesion

- Security problems
- Social cohesion between different groups/segment or entities (refugees, host community, international aid, official authorities, etc)

The structure of the matrix will dictate the presentation of the findings of the literature review in chapter 2.

Moreover, the below explanatory factors should be taken into account when trying to assess the impact of the Syrian crisis on the hosting communities, topic by topic in order to highlight, whenever relevant, discrepancies or specificities:

1. Geographic dimension: National vs. local
2. Qualitative vs. quantitative
3. Rural vs. urban

Moreover, the following factors will provide interesting insights when addressing the types of responses:

1. Timeframes: emergency, relief, short medium and long-term (stabilization, development)
2. Universal vs. Targeted (beneficiaries)

Moreover, baseline indicators³ pertaining to each of the abovementioned sectors (pre-crisis situation) were extracted from two unpublished documents the ESIA report and the new MDG-Lebanon report which took into account the impact of the Syrian crisis. The indicators were assessed, classified as per the structure of the matrix and whenever possible up-dated based on recent sources made available to CRI.

4. Assessment of the Aid Response


In parallel to the previous tasks (literature review and regional working groups), the CRI conducted a series of meetings and in-depth interviews with major stakeholders involved in the response management, e.g. UNHCR, Ministry of Social Affairs.

The objective of this assessment is to examine the response of international organizations and local CSOs towards the influx of Syrian

refugees to Lebanon in order to determine the different aspects as well as to provide recommendations for response operations in the upcoming years.


Up till now, it seems that the response strategy is focused around emergency and relief operations. However, with the ongoing Syrian conflict for more than two years, this strategy needs to be reexamined in view of the current conditions of refugees and the impact of this crisis on host communities.

The assessment of the aid response takes into account the lessons learned and recommendations of previous response strategies such as those following July-2006 Israeli aggression and Nahr El bared conflict in North of Lebanon in 2007.




10 For a detailed list of indicators and related statistics, refer to "Baseline Indicators and Statistics Annex" at the end of the report.





Chapter 2: THE FINDINGS



The presence of Syrian nationals in Lebanon precedes the recent crisis. The majority moved to Lebanon in search of work opportunities, with low-skills and low educational attainments working mainly in the construction and agricultural sectors. Syrian workers therefore arrived to Lebanon alone without their families and lived in crowded dwellings in groups of workers. Only seasonal agricultural workers in rural areas and concierges settled in Lebanon with their families who share their job responsibilities¹¹.

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in April 2011, Syrians citizens were displaced and the presence of Syrian nationals in Lebanon swelled up. Lebanon now hosts the highest share of Syrian refugees whom are living with relatives or friends, in rented accommodation, empty shops or tents pitched on rented private lands¹². Host communities are sharing their livelihood resources mainly health, education, shelter and employment.

While Lebanon is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the government facilitates the entry of Syrian refugees to Lebanon, their registration as well as their access to public services. With the rising number of Syrian displaced, local communities are put under strain in terms of available resources, job opportunities, school capacity for new students, availability of health services, water and sanitation, shelter, etc¹³. Host communities who were first welcoming at the beginning of the Syrian crisis have now reached the absorption capacity leading to rising tension between hosts and refugees. The

11 Regional Working Groups

12 Syria and Lebanon share roughly 365 km of border, much of which is porous and un-demarcated

13 UNHCR (2013) A real-time evaluation of UNHCR Response to the Syrian Refugee Emergency, July 2013, p. 3.

14 World Vision (2013) The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Host Communities in Lebanon-July 2013, p.5



pressure on host communities in terms of crowdedness and the lack of sufficient basic resources and services are on the verge of destabilizing an already unsteady and frail situation of the country in general and host communities in particular¹⁴.

This report aims at assessing the impact of the Syrian crisis on host communities in Lebanon. As opposed to a relief/emergency perspective that aims for a stabilizing response, this assessment adopts a developmental approach that focuses on development priorities of host communities, mainly at the local level, in a medium and long term time frame. The developmental approach stresses on the strong participation of local authorities, in addition to the central government, through integrated and comprehensive interventions.

The risks associated to this crisis are


multifaceted and may have significant impact on many sectors. The impact assessment follows the matrix structure, as described in the methodology, and is based on the outcomes of the literature review and the regional working groups.

2. Perceived Impacts in Host Communities: Results from Regional Working Groups Questionnaire Survey at a Glance

At first glance, the following section sets-up the scene by presenting the perceptions of different host communities in seven regions of Lebanon. This will allow getting a brief picture of the current situation, before delving - in the subsequent sections - into a more detailed assessment of the impact per sector.

During the Regional Working Groups a quantitative questionnaire has been filled

Figure 3: Impact Rating of Sectors



by most of the participant. The quantitative questionnaire measured the following:

1. Presence or absence of an impact
2. Positive or negative impact
3. Amplitude of the impact: high, medium, low (on those who are impacted)
4. Trend of the impact: ascending, stable or descending

The analysis of the questionnaire showed the following results (rating 1= no impact; rating 2=has an impact):

Source: CRI's calculations based on questionnaire filled by participants

The table below presents the rating of sector impacts (i.e. priorities), at the national level and within each selected region.

Table 7: Impact rating of sectors per region

Sectors	Total average	BSS	Don-nieh	Baal-beck	West Bekaa	Tyr	Halba	Eklim kharoub	Standard deviation/ mean (in %)
6- Solid Waste	1.97	1.89	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.88	2.00	2.00	3%
8- Labour market competition	1.95	2.00	1.82	2.00	2.00	1.75	2.00	2.00	6%
18- Health	1.93	2.00	1.82	2.00	2.00	1.75	1.90	2.00	5%
4- Electricity	1.91	1.25	2.00	1.93	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	15%
2- Water	1.89	1.22	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.88	2.00	2.00	16%
7- Natural Resources	1.88	1.63	1.73	2.00	1.91	1.86	2.00	1.90	7%
3- Sanitation	1.87	1.11	2.00	1.93	2.00	1.88	2.00	2.00	18%
17- Education	1.87	1.80	1.73	1.93	1.91	1.88	1.80	2.00	5%
12- Size of local market	1.85	1.56	1.82	1.86	2.00	1.83	1.82	2.00	8%
16- Income level	1.80	1.13	2.00	1.93	1.90	1.86	1.80	1.80	17%
19- Social cohesion	1.78	1.00	1.91	2.00	1.82	1.63	1.90	2.00	20%
14- Cost of products and services	1.76	1.22	1.64	1.86	1.82	2.00	1.90	1.90	15%
Total Average	1.75	1.35	1.77	1.83	1.85	1.67	1.85	1.84	11%
11- Competition on market SMEs	1.67	1.22	1.45	1.79	1.91	1.43	1.82	1.89	17%
1- Transportation	1.66	1.33	1.73	1.87	1.60	1.13	1.91	1.80	18%
15- Quality of products and services	1.62	1.11	1.55	1.79	1.50	1.67	1.89	1.80	16%
5- Telecommunication	1.58	1.00	1.91	1.60	1.67	1.38	1.55	1.80	19%
9- Cost of production	1.54	1.00	1.64	1.43	1.82	1.57	1.91	1.25	21%
10-Investments	1.44	1.11	1.45	1.54	1.70	1.00	1.55	1.50	18%
13- Foreign trade	1.36	1.00	1.45	1.36	1.67	1.33	1.40	1.30	15%

Source: CRI's calculations;



Red highlight shows, within each region, the sectors that were rated above the region's average that is in grey highlight

Figures in bold shows, within each sector, the regions that were rated above the sector's total average

Regional Working Groups Results:

- a. The total average reaches a rate of 1.75, meaning that there has been a **significant impact**, since the "theoretical" average is 1.5 (minimum=1.0 and maximum=2.0).
- b. **Regional disparities are identified in all sectors.** Peripheral areas, mainly North and Bekka, were significantly more impacted than BSS or Tyr. Eklim Kharoub, in Chouf/Mount-Lebanon reached similar rating than North and Bekaa.
- c. **Solid waste is the highest challenge.** It reached an impact rate of 1.97 over 2. This dimension, in addition to other infrastructural dimensions (Water, electricity-mainly private generators, sanitation, etc.).
- d. The impact on infrastructure places **significant strain on municipalities.**
- e. **The employment sector ranked second.** The competition of Syrian refugees in the Lebanese labour market appeared to be significant.
- f. At the social level, **health and education were significantly affected.** However, health seems to be more affected than education.
- g. **The indicator (standard deviation/mean)** shows the dispersion/variation of the impact per sector between regions. In fact, the lower the percentage is for a sector, the less variation is found among the different regions. Most of the regions in this case, are facing the same impact in a specific sector. On the contrary, the higher the percentage is, the more dispersed is the impact among the

different regions. Based on the analysis of this indicator, the results are as follows:

- o Among the most impacted sectors, solid waste, labour competition and health have low variability per region.
- o Among the most impacted sectors, electricity, water and sanitation have high variability among regions. In fact, BSS is noticed low impacts on these sectors, while peripheral regions are, in the contrary, facing significant impact on these infrastructural sectors.
- o The highest variability per region is found in:
 - Cost of production: Halba –and to a lesser extent West Bekaa- is facing a significant problem since it became a central urban zone for Syrian refugees in north Lebanon, in Akkar. Syrian refugees are significantly reducing the labour cost in these regions.
 - Social cohesion: high impacts are noted in areas where high density of refugees is found.
 - Significant disparities are found in the telecommunication sector. However, this is a structural problem due to pre-crisis coverage policy

3. Profile of the Refugee Crisis

The registration of Syrian refugees entering Lebanon seems to be neither accurate nor systematic which is mainly due to the fact that a number of refugees tend to abstain from registration for political reasons or tend to return to Syria while being registered in Lebanon. In addition, it is not clear whether the number of Syrian nationals present in Lebanon prior to the crisis is included in the estimates of refugee number knowing that it is difficult to discern whether some currently registered Syrian refugees were actually present in Lebanon prior to the crisis as no verification procedures can be applied. From another perspective, the estimation

of the size of Syrian influx can be under or over-estimated for political reasons.

As opposed to Syrian workers whom settled without their families in Lebanon prior to the crisis, Syrian refugees arrive to Lebanon with their families, an indicator for a relatively long stay, which explains the manifestation of high numbers of women and children. Refugees of poor socio-economic conditions tend to settle in peripheral areas, which are already vulnerable regions in Lebanon, whereas middle to high income categories prefer to reside in central areas that are equipped with better public services and relatively wealthier regions, such as Beirut and Mount Lebanon. The distribution of refugees within one region according to their socio-economic background seems also to follow the disparities among host communities. For instance, in BSS), Syrian refugees who live in the Palestinian camps tend to be of poorer socio-economic conditions than those who settle outside the camps. Similar distribution can be identified among refugees who settle in Burj Hammoud, who are somehow in better socio-economic conditions than those who live in BSS¹⁵.

the Lebanese government estimates that an additional half million Syrians, of whom Syrian workers nationals present in Lebanon before the crisis, reside in Lebanon without registration and therefore any support from the international community⁴. Estimates for end of 2014, varies between 1.2 million¹⁷, 1.7 million¹⁸ and 2.3 million¹⁹, which means that on average Syrian refugees will represent around 40% of total resident at the end of 2014.

Statistics so far point to the fact that there are 1400 locations (or Circonscriptions Foncières) where Syrian refugees are present, knowing that Lebanon is composed of approximately 1500 CF. In more than 30% of these locations, the number of refugees exceeds those of the local Lebanese. In addition, the refugees are concentrated in many cases in conjunction with the poorest Lebanese, the map below - produced by UNICEF - illustrates the intersections between the geographic distribution of refugee and poverty mapping in Lebanon.

Table 8: Registered Syrian Refugees by Gender and Age

Age	Males	Females
0-4	10%	10%
5 – 11	10%	10%
12-17	7%	6%
18-59	21%	24%
60 & above	1%	1%
Total	49%	51%


Source: UNHCR (2013) Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, Date of Access: October 3, 2013

The number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is estimated to reach one million by the end of 2013 which is equivalent to almost 25% of the total resident population whereby one in five people could be a refugee. In addition,

15 Regional Working Groups
 16 UNHCR (2013) «Broadening Support to Lebanese Communities affected by displacement from Syria», June 2013, p. 1; UNHCR (2013) «Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees», July 2013, p. 27.
 17 UNHCR low influx scenario
 18 UNHCR high influx scenario
 19 ESCWA scenario




Figure 4: Intersection between refugee concentrations and Lebanon poverty lines



The intersections are obvious everywhere and especially in the worst hit regions in terms of both refugee concentrations and poverty lines such as the case in North Lebanon which is experiencing highest rates in terms of poverty and worst case in terms of refugee concentrations, as another UNICEF PMO produced map illustrates below.

Figure 5: Poverty and refugee situation in North Lebanon



In terms of host communities, the UNHCR estimates that around 1.2 million Lebanese residents are severely affected by the high influx of Syrian refugees²⁰. The percentage of affected residents varies widely from one Governorate or region to another. The resources and capacities of host communities are put under strain by the increasing number of refugees and the extension of the Syrian conflict for now more than two years.

Table 9: Distribution of Syrian refugees per Governorate - Individuals

Individuals	Registered	Awaiting	Total	%
Beirut and Mount-Lebanon	133047	41895	174942	23%
North	210261	14012	224273	30%
Bekaa	216422	42465	258887	35%
South	85651	4855	90506	12%
Lebanon	645381	103227	748608	100%

Most of refugees are concentrated in peripheral areas namely North of Lebanon and the Bekaa valley (30% and 35% respectively). Some towns in the North of Lebanon and Bekaa reported a doubling of the population size in the past two years²¹. Significant number of refugees is also registered in Beirut while South of Lebanon - which received little Syrian influx of refugees at the beginning - is recently witnessing a higher influx compared to earlier periods in the past two years²². It should be noted that that some of the refugees are also subject to inter and intra- regional displacements for different purposes.

Sources: UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", Sept 17 2013

20 UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 26.

21 World Vision (2013), Advocacy Report –Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 2013, p. 9.

22 World Vision (2013), Advocacy Report –Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 2013, p. 9.



Table 10: Distribution of Syrian refugees per Governorate - Households

Households	Registered	Awaiting	Total	%
Beirut and Mount-Lebanon	31711	10719	42430	25%
North	51932	4049	55981	33%
Bekaa	44838	8982	53820	31%
South	18702	1206	19908	12%
Lebanon	147183	24956	172139	100%

Sources: UNHCR (2013) “Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees”, Sept 17 2013

Overcrowding is considered to be an urgent problem facing host communities which puts under increasing pressure the issue of shelter, transportation and rent prices as well as the well-being of residents in terms of an inadequate physical environment that can affect the educational achievements and social development of children²³.

Table 11: Average household size of Syrian refugees

Households average size	Registered	Awaiting	Total
Beirut and Mount-Lebanon	4.2	3.9	4.1
North	4.0	3.5	4.0
Bekaa	4.8	4.7	4.8
South	4.6	4.0	4.5
Lebanon	4.4	4.1	4.3

Sources: UNHCR (2013) “Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees”, Sept 17 2013

4. Housing

Syrian refugees are disseminated across the quasi entire Lebanese territories rather than in specific areas or settlement such as camps or gatherings. With the beginning of the Syrian influx to Lebanon – and due to the deep rooted memory that Lebanese had concerning the case of the massive 1948 Palestinian influx towards this country - the government adopted a policy

against the establishment of camps or gathering for Syrian refugees and forbids any structural intervention in informal tent settlements. As a result, around 1,400 localities are now hosting Syrian refugees who are living with families or friends, in rented accommodation, or tents pitched on rented private lands on the periphery of towns²⁴.

Refugees in urban areas tend to settle in rented accommodation while those in rural areas live in informal tents within private lands. Most of refugees in urban areas such as BSS and Mount Lebanon live in rented accommodation with poor or limited facilities. In rural areas, most refugees are settled in tents within agricultural lands or in under-construction buildings. Over crowdedness is putting a significant strain on water and energy resources of host communities²⁵, and especially those of municipalities.

The high influx of Syrian refugees is causing significant increase in rents which imply higher housing cost for host communities. At the beginning of the crisis, refugees found shelter with family and friends or in affordable rented accommodation. However, the high influx of refugees is causing increase in rents whereby the demand for shelter outstrips the supply in most host communities²⁶. Approximately more than 60% of Syrian refugees live in rented accommodation which increases competition for housing and therefore

²³ Ibid, p. 14

²⁴ ACAPS (2013) Regional Analysis Syria, July 2013, p. 8.

²⁵ Regional Working Groups

increasing the cost of housing for Lebanese residents²⁷. In Beirut, some districts registered an increase of monthly rent up to 400\$, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis. While the poorest categories can no longer afford to pay higher rents, there is a manifestation of eviction of tenants and their replacement with refugees who are able to pay higher rents knowing that several families tend to live in one dwelling²⁸. In BSS, rent has increased from USD 300 to USD 500 for a “lower-middle” dwelling since the beginning of the crisis²⁹.

Overcrowding is a significant challenge affecting the living conditions of host communities. The population of some towns in the North of Lebanon and the Bekaa seem to have doubled³⁰. In the Qaa region, more than 1500 refugees are accommodated in around 120 housing units whereby more than 10 residents live per dwelling³¹. In Hermel, on average more than 12 persons live per dwelling knowing that more than 830 households are sheltered in around 500 housing units³². In Zahle, in addition to rented accommodation and shops, informal tent settlements are spread around agricultural lands³³. Overcrowding puts pressure on resources and services of host communities and affects the social environment and psychosocial conditions of residents.

5. Economic activities

Growth, trade and tourism

In the post-war period (1993-2008), the average annual growth rates was limited to around 4%³⁴, which lies behind pre-war average growth rates of 6% in the sixties and seventies. Reconstruction Programs launched in the nineties expected annual

growth rates of around 8% (constant prices)³⁵. As a consequence of the war, growth was affected by significant losses in capital and revenues in addition to economic changes in the Arab and Gulf countries and a decreasing external demand on Lebanese economy. In the last few years, GDP growth picked up to more than 8% between 2007 and 2010³⁶, however this slowed down to 1.4% in 2011 and 2013 and is expected to be 0% in 2013³⁷. This is partially due to the outbreak of the Syrian crisis as well as the instability in the region in the past few years.

The significant challenges of Lebanon's economy makes it difficult and complicated to cope with the high influx of Syrian refugees which in a way or another place additional pressure on the economic situation of the country. Lebanon struggles since the end of the civil war with a very high debt to GDP of 140% on average³⁸. The economy endures from structural deficiencies including “sectoral and regional imbalances, jobless growth, predominance of non-tradable (non-exportable) goods and services, weak labour productivity and relatively high cost of production.”³⁹ The Lebanese economy relies heavily on the services sector which represents 73% of GDP, while industry and agriculture represent just 20% and 6% respectively⁴⁰. The Syrian crisis and the high influx of refugees have economic repercussions on Lebanon's economy which is already in a critical situation, particularly as a result of reduced trade, competition for job opportunities and increased poverty. Government consumption has slightly increased as a result of the crisis due to some service being provided to refugees such as education and electricity⁴¹.

26 UNHCR (2013) “Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees”, July 2013, p. 77.

27 IRC (2013) Briefing Note on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, June 2013, p.4.

28 World Vision (2013) The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Host Communities in Lebanon-July 2013, p.14

29 Regional Working Groups

30 UNHCR (2013) “Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees”, July 2013, p. 79.

31 ESFD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Qaa, May 2013, p.4.

32 ESFD (2013) Hermel Rapid Assessment, May 2013, p.4.

33 ESFD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Zahle – Al Maalaka, May 2013, p.4.



Trade with Syria and neighboring countries is impacted by the ongoing Syrian crisis.

In 2013 the exports through Syria decreased by 20.2%. The turmoil in border areas hinders trade with Syria and limits the availability of Syrian products in the Lebanese market and increases at the same time the prices of available goods⁴². Nevertheless, Syrian demand for Lebanese products is on the rise and tames the negative impact of the crisis which hampers the transit of goods through Syria⁴³. In Dennieh for example the export of agricultural products decreased significantly due to the insecure transit via Syria and the increasing prices of sea transport/shipping. However, the decrease in export has been absorbed by the increase in the local demand (due to the Syrian influx)⁴⁴. In the Bekaa, traders reported increased business whereas in WadiKhaled profit decreased between 50%-70%⁴⁵. On the other hand, the revenues of the Beirut Port have increase in 2013 by 26% taking into account that regional demand for Syrian goods was replaced by Lebanese exports, e.g. industrial exports increase by 13.5% between June 2012 and June 2013⁴⁶. These results show that clear disparities exist at the local level, in terms of impact. Indeed, impacts may be, in some cases, at the benefit of host communities.

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the tourism sector witnessed a decline by 24% in 2011 and 18% in 2012⁴⁷.

34 For the period 1993-1996: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2009; and for the period 1997-2008 and forecast 2009: Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Economic Accounts.

35 Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR).

36 For the period 1993-1996: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2009; and for the period 1997-2008 and forecasts

37 For the period 1993-1996: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2009; and for the period 1997-2008 and forecasts; Al Akhbar 2013/07/14, Ahram 2013/06/29

38 IMF (2012) World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012

39 Ministry of Social Affairs (2010) National Social Development Strategy

40 World Bank, World Economic Indicators (WDI) Online access 28 June 2013; it is worth mentioning that these figures are different from those in the ESIA report.

41 World Bank (2013) "Lebanese Economic Monitor", September 2013; p. 24

According to Ministry of Tourism, the number of arrivals into Lebanon was of 365,845 visitors in 2012 which is more than 17% less than 2011 and almost 50% less than 2011. Most of hotels and restaurants in north and Bekaa, which are the largest host communities, stated a decrease in revenue in their businesses. The occupancy rate of four and five star hotels in these areas was 54 percent in 2012, compared to 58 percent in 2011 and 68 percent in 2010⁴⁸.

Poverty and vulnerability

The Syrian refugees are concentrated – as stated above - in exactly the poorest governorates in Lebanon i.e. North, South and Bekaa.

Lebanon is considered as a high middle-income country with a per capita income estimated around USD 9,862 in 2011,⁴⁹ however high poverty rates and income inequality are omnipresent. According to UNDP, the poverty rate in 2004-2005 is 28%, while the extreme poverty rate is estimated 8%. The country is characterized by severe regional imbalances, whereby North of Lebanon holds the highest poverty rates (53%) and extreme poverty rates (18%). In North Lebanon- the poorest cazas of Akkar and Minnieh-Dinnieh exhibit the highest overall headcount poverty rate (over 60%) in the country, followed by Tripoli city (over 50%). The other governorates with high poverty rates are South of Lebanon (12% and 42%) and the Bekaa (11% and 30%). Beirut registers the lowest rates with 6 % overall poverty and less than 2% in extreme poverty⁵⁰. Unfortunately, the Syrian crisis places these poverty gaps under stark hardship.

42 International Rescue Committee (2013) Syria: A regional Crisis, January 2013, p. 13-14.

43 World Bank (2013) Lebanese Economic Monitor", September 2013; p. 25

44 Regional Working Groups

45 IRC & Save the Children, Livelihoods Assessment Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, October 2012, p.1 in "WFP (2013) Syrian Refugees and Food Insecurity in Lebanon, March 2013, p. 7

46 ACAPS (2013) Regional Analysis Syria, July 2013, p. 12; .Daily Star 2013/06/20, Al-Akhbar 2013/06/17

47 ESCWA (2013) "Impact of the Syrian Crisis on the Lebanese Economy", Presentation, June 2013,

Table 12: Poverty headcounts per Governorate

governorate	poor	extremely poor
Beirut	5.85%	0.67%
Mount Lebanon	19.56%	3.79%
South	42.21%	11.64%
Nabatieh	19.19%	2.18%
Bekaa	29.36%	10.81%
North	52.57%	17.75%
Lebanon	28.55%	7.97%

Source:

The capacities of host communities to receive an increasingly large number of refugees are now limited whereby strain is placed on expenditures of Lebanese households. Many surveys converge around the significant increase in food prices over the past year. This can be explained by the increase of demand without additional supply especially Syrian goods which used to be less costly. Indeed, inflation reached more than 3% in the beginning of 2012 reaching 5.3% by end 2012⁵¹ and 4.4%⁵² in 2013. According to a 2012 survey, in North Lebanon, around 80% of households reported increasing expenditures attributed to the high influx of refugees. In addition, inhabitants used to benefit from less costly goods and services provided through the Syrian border which are no longer available. Household expenditures are said to have increased on average 15% in the Bekaa and 6% in North Lebanon. Host communities members are also dealing

Beirut: ESCWA, p. 9); Regional Working Groups
 48 Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA) of the Service Sector in North and Bekaa, Lebanon, p. 14
 49 IMF (2012) World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012
 50 UNDP/MOSA (2008) Poverty, Growth, and Income distribution in Lebanon. Beirut: UNDP. Poverty rate refers to individuals falling below the upper poverty line of USD 4 per person per day. Extreme poverty rate refers to people falling below the lower poverty line of USD 2.4 per person.
 51 World Bank (2013) "Lebanese Economic Monitor", September 2013; p. 30
 52 Consultation and Research Institute (CRI) figure.

with decreasing income whereby 90% in the North and Bekaa stated a decrease of income without finding alternative sources of income⁵³. According to a recent survey, household living expenses in the north were around USD 790 before the crisis compared to USD 842 after the crisis, with a general inflation rate of 6% and 12% for food prices, 34% for medicines, 6% for water and utility bills⁵⁴.

The increasing number of refugees in peripheral areas and within vulnerable hosting communities increased the demand on services provided by Social Development Centers (SDC) of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA). The SDCs are supposed to undertake relief work in such a refugee crisis; however their interventions are hampered by limited resources and financial capacities. MOSA launched recently a set of reform interventions in order to strengthen the SDC capacities and activities⁵⁵.

In the context of a deficient labour market, the Syrian crisis places additional pressure on employment and job opportunities. Half of the Lebanese workers (50.7%) work in services followed by trade with more than 20% of total workers⁵⁶. At the same time, employment in Lebanon is characterized by a gradual and significant loss of jobs in agriculture and industry. It is recognized that the economic growth experienced in Lebanon since 2007 was not accompanied with an increase of job opportunities despite the fact that the labour force was growing between 2004-2010, at an average annual rate of 2.2%⁵⁷. The jobs created in the Lebanese economy are mostly for unskilled

53 UNDP "Inputs regarding the Social Protection Chapter in the Lebanon Economic and Social Impact & Stabilization Assessment of the Syrian Conflict" p.4, from UNDP (2012) Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Crisis on socio-economic Situation in North and Bekaa, prepared by DMI, Beirut: UNDP
 DMI, Rapid Assessment, Op.cit, p. 22,
 55 World Bank (2013) Social Promotion and Protection Project (SPPP) Lebanon, Project Appraisal Document, p.13
 56 ILO (2010) Review for the Labor Market Information System, Beirut: International Labor Organisation.
 57 World Bank (2013) Good Jobs Needed: The Role of Macro, Investment, Labor, Education and Social Protection Policies



workers and are concentrated in low productivity sectors, the fact that reflects on the other side the structural obstacles and bottlenecks that characterize the demand on labour from operating establishments (more than 98% of the total number of establishments in Lebanon has less than 10 employees⁵⁸). Jobs were lost in high productivity sectors⁵⁹, whereby highly skilled workers tend to migrate outside Lebanon. In fact, the largest share of unemployed in 2004 belong to skilled workers (24%) followed by the service sector workers (18%) and unskilled workers (15%)⁶⁰ Around 23,000, jobs need to be created each year over the next ten years in order to be able to absorb the new entrants in the labour market. This is six times more the number of jobs currently being created⁶¹.

The high influx of refugees created drastic competition over jobs and businesses, which is considered as one of the key challenges facing Lebanese host communities. While the competition of Syrian workers existed prior to the Syrian crisis with respect to certain skills and a limited set of sectors such as agriculture and construction, Syrian workers of all skill levels are now competing with Lebanese residents in all economic sectors mostly including not only agriculture and construction but also services. Unskilled workers seem to be the most affected by the competition over jobs among Syrians refugees and Lebanese nationals. Most Syrian refugees are perceived to have low educational attainment and to accept lower wages. This competition threatens Lebanese unskilled workers and self-employed which are most likely to belong to poor vulnerable categories⁶². Lebanese workers are being replaced by Syrians in retail shops, restaurants, private schools, medical clinics, transportation, etc. Many Syrians are self-employed especially in the construction sector where competition

with Lebanese workers is fierce⁶³. Syrians are opening their own small enterprises/businesses such as restaurants, butcheries, hairdresser saloons, sewing workshops, etc. In some cases, Syrian refugees arrived with their livestock which constitute a competition vis-a-vis Lebanese farmers. For example, some 12,000 goats have crossed into northern Lebanon and settled placing some farmers out of business⁶⁴. These results are confirming the outcomes of the regional working groups questionnaires, where "Labour competition" was ranked second in terms of impact.

The increase in labor supply due to the high number of refugees leads to decreasing wages. Syrian refugees tend to work with lower wages with on average half and sometimes one fifth of the Lebanese wage, and longer working hours (while Lebanese workers tend to have a fixed schedule of 8 hours). Lebanese workers cannot compete with Syrian workers in terms of wages and informal economy. In fact, informality is significantly increasing and working conditions are significantly deteriorating⁶⁵. According to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the increasing number of Syrian workers caused a reduction of 60% in daily wages.⁶⁶ Lebanese locals perceive that Syrian refugees work informally, without health coverage, evade payment of taxes while they also receive food and shelter support from international organizations which enables them to work for lower wages especially in agriculture while the living costs are increasing. As mentioned above, competition for jobs threatens Lebanese-Syrian relations within communities. However, few options are available for newly arrived refugees other than to accept informal low paid jobs as

58 ERF (2004) Micro and Small Enterprises Research Project, prepared by the Consultation and Research Institute, Cario: ERF

59 World Bank (2013) Good Jobs Needed: The Role of Macro, Investment, Labor. Education and Social Protection Policies

60 ILO (2010) Review for the Labor Market Information System, Beirut: International Labor Organisation.

61 Ibid

62 World Vision 2013/07, FAFO 2013/06

63 Regional Working Groups

64 FAO (2013) Agricultural Livelihoods and Food Security Impact Assessment and Response Plan for the Syria Crisis in the Neighboring Countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, March 2013, p. 48

65 Regional Working Groups

66 FAO (2013) Agricultural Livelihoods and Food Security Impact Assessment and Response Plan for the Syria Crisis in the Neighboring Countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, March 2013, p. 36; International Rescue Committee (2013) "Syria: A regional Crisis, January 2013", p. 13-14.

they do not immediately benefit from international support due to registration delays⁶⁷. In parallel, Lebanese employers benefit in specific activities from the availability of labour with lower wages. Syrian workers compete in agro-food industries and generate a decrease in the costs of production⁶⁸. In this context, it is the poorest and most vulnerable categories among host communities that seem to be the most affected by the Syrian crisis⁶⁹.

6. Infrastructure

With the beginning of the Syrian conflict in early 2011, the Syrian influx put additional pressure on a weak and deteriorating infrastructure which exacerbated previously existing problems. Infrastructure in Lebanon is in a poor condition especially in peripheral areas of the country. The fact that Syrian refugees are concentrated in peripheral governorates such as North Lebanon and Bekaa magnified the impact on this sector⁷⁰.

The pressure on infrastructure places significant strain on municipalities of host communities. While most municipalities initially have limited equipment and financial and human resources, they are strained by supplementary expenditure on operations, higher fuel consumption, maintenance works pertaining to water, sanitation, solid waste, etc.. At the same time, municipalities witness a decline in receipts in terms of collected municipal tax due to the decreasing numbers of tourists and visitors⁷¹. Reportedly, the central government did not provide any kind of support to municipalities of host communities in order to enable local authorities to cope with the high influx of Syrian refugees⁷².

The high influx of Syrian refugees increases the demand on public electricity as well as the private generators beyond available capacities. Power cuts and rations are common in Lebanon in general and peripheral host communities in particular, prior to the Syrian crisis⁷³. Palestinian refugee

camps in Lebanon are also facing pressure in terms of power supply due to overcrowding with Syrian refugees⁷⁴.

While water shortage is common in Lebanon prior to the Syrian crisis due to a dilapidated infrastructure, water resources are under severe pressure caused by high Syrian influx. A significant number of dwellings in some host communities are not initially linked to water network. In Hermel for example, only 60% of house units are linked to a deteriorating running water network⁷⁵. Tension in host communities is rising as Syrian refugees tend to use water resources through illegal connections or evade the payment of water bills. Water scarcity is reported in Bekaa regions such as Qaa and Hermel where more than 650 and 600 artisans wells respectively are used at a growing depth (between 200 and 400 meters) which indicates the exacerbation of water scarcity⁷⁶.

Sewage discharge is a challenge in many host communities especially those in peripheral areas. The increasing number of residents exceeds the capacities of already deficient sanitation facilities. In the Qaa and Hermel for instance, there are no treatment plants in the area and waste disposal is done through sewage tanks. A significant number of Syrian refugees in Qaa and Zahle live in informal tents settlements on agricultural lands where treatment networks are absent causing the pollution of potable and irrigation water⁷⁷. Municipalities are facing difficulties in discharging the increasing amount of produced waste water⁷⁸. As mentioned above, the operation and maintenance works put increasing pressure on the already limited financial and human resources of municipalities⁷⁹.

The capacities to address increasing water needs seem to be limited by available funding. Based on assessments and projection conducted in May 2012, the end of 2013 almost 2 million individuals will need hygiene support, 665 thousands will need water support and 698 thousands will need sanitation support. The share of people that need water and sanitation support is the same among refugees and



host communities⁸⁰. Several interventions are needed: The construction of treatment plants, the rehabilitation or construction of pumping stations, improvement of drainage and disposal of waste water, and better linkage of housing units to potable and running waters⁸¹.

Solid waste is one of the most critical and urgent problems facing all municipalities.

The current capacities of municipalities, especially in peripheral areas, are limited and cannot meet the increasing needs. In areas Qaa, Hermel and Zahle solid waste is collected and disposed at dump sites at the outskirts. The concentration of Syrian refugees in some host communities increased the needs of waste removal and therefore increase waste removal cost for municipalities. Local authorities reportedly, did not receive any additional support from the central government. In Akkar for example, waste collection fees increased by 100% without any additional municipal budget⁸². Solid waste systems in Palestinian camps are also under rising pressure due to the arrival of a high number of Syrian refugees⁸³.

Additional bins and trucks are required in parallel with additional workers in order to secure sufficient daily garbage collection.

In addition, solid waste treatment plants are needed as most of the garbage is being burned or thrown in valleys and rivers. These interventions are urgently needed in order to avoid a significant environmental pollution crisis⁸⁴.

Environmental pollution is reported in several host communities creating a huge risk for diseases.

The increase of environmental pollution is reported as result of deficient solid and sewage waste disposal in springs, rivers or roads. Drinking and irrigation water is being polluted creating a risk for diseases and plants contamination. Bardawni and Al Assi rivers in Zahle are now subject to pollution as well as other natural springs⁸⁵.

With the upcoming winter season, it is expected that Syrian refugees as well as host communities will face additional pressure related to heating. On one hand,

the price of heating energy exacerbates the already strained household expenditures. At this point, it is not sure whether the government will decide to increase the rate fuel subsidization in order to help Syrian refugees and host communities alike. It is also believed that the most vulnerable groups consider tree-cutting for heating purposes, which is environmentally harmful. It is important to note that informal tent settlements do not have the right to put in place heating installations as per government policy.

The high Syrian influx affects transportation in some peripheral regions such as the Bekaa where aid distribution is causing significant traffic in the area. Motorcycles are increasing as Syrian refugees tend

67 World Vision (2013), Advocacy Report –Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 2013, p. 13.

68 Regional Working Groups

69 World Vision (2013), Advocacy Report –Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 2013, p. 13; ACAPS (2013) Regional Analysis Syria, July 2013, p. 12.

70 Regional Working Groups

71 Regional Working Groups

72 World Vision (2013), Advocacy Report –Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 2013, p. 14.

73 Regional Working Groups

74 UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 86.

75 ESFD (2013) Hermel Rapid Assessment, May 2013, p. 6.

76 ESFD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Qaa, May 2013, p.6.

77 ESFD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Zahle – Al Maalaka, May 2013, p.7.

78 ESFD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Qaa, May 2013, p.4-6

79 Regional Working Groups and

80 UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 86-87.

81 ESFD (2013) Hermel Rapid Assessment, May 2013, p. 7.

82 World Vision (2013), Advocacy Report –Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 2013, p. 14.

83 UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 86.

84 Regional Working Groups and UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 86.

85 ESFD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Zahle – Al Maalaka, May 2013, p.8.

to commute using motorcycles as an affordable mean of transportation. Public transportation in Lebanon is originally scanty and lacks organization⁸⁶.

Lebanon suffers from a lack of organized public transportation networks and Lebanese rely mostly on individual private means of transportation, which explains the difficulty of movement within the country as well as major daily traffic congestions, especially at the main entry point of economic poles, such as Greater Beirut. It is believed (although not measured) that the high influx of Syrian refugees exacerbates the issue of traffic congestion. As a result, it becomes even more urgent to finally establish a performing public transportation plan. Moreover, it was stated that numerous Syrian taxi drivers are operating without an official license and therefore compete with Lebanese drivers.

7. Social dimensions

A) EDUCATION

Access and quality in education in Lebanon are subject to prevalent challenges and obstacles, which are aggravated by the Syrian crisis. In the 2011-2012 academic year, the total number of students enrolled in public, private and UNRWA schools at all levels was 943,763⁸⁷. Law No 686 of 1998 restricts free and compulsory primary education to students of Lebanese nationality. According to the revised internal regulations for elementary schools, only Lebanese students are eligible to register in public schools. However, Lebanese schools do admit foreign students. At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the MEHE issued a memorandum informing all schools to admit Syrian students regardless of their legal status and exempted them from school fees.⁸⁸ The MEHE faces a problem in issuing official degrees at the secondary level for Syrian students. At the intermediate level, Syrian refugees are being granted official degrees⁸⁹.

According to UNHCR around 55% of registered refugees are below the age of

18 and need education. The enrolment rate of Syrian children is estimated at only 31%. For academic year 2012-2013, around 31,000 Syrian students are enrolled in primary and intermediate public schools and 1,000 in public secondary schools with the majority in Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon and the Bekaa. Around 1,235 Syrian students are registered in public schools in north Lebanon (excluding Akkar) for the academic year 2012-2013. It is said that around 5,000 students are registered in private schools in the North which provide the Syrian curriculum rather than the Lebanese one⁹⁰. In Hermel, only around 550 out of Syrian students are registered in the schools or 11% of the Syrian refugees in the region⁹¹. Information on Syrian children enrolled in private schools is scanty⁹². The number of Syrian school-aged children is expected to reach 555,000 by the end of 2013 and schools will need support from the central government to be able to absorb increasing numbers of students⁹³.

Despite the fact that influx of Syrian refugees is swelling the number of students in the country, schools in general are not so far overcrowded. Classrooms in Lebanon are initially not overcrowded especially in the public sector. Only 20% of classrooms in the public and private sectors are overcrowded with 26 to 35 students per class. Also, there is an oversupply of teachers in the Lebanese education system, which implies a rather low ratio of students to teachers⁹⁴.

86 Regional Working Groups

87 UNICEF (2013) Education for Children and Adolescents in Lebanon: A human Rights-based, Equity-Focused Analysis of the Situation. Draft Report for Review, p.36

88 UNICEF (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children: In Schools, Community and Safe, p.4

89 Regional Working Groups

90 UNICEF (2013) Education for Children and Adolescents in Lebanon: A human Rights-based, Equity-Focused Analysis of the Situation. Draft Report for Review

91 ESFD (2013) Hermel Rapid Assessment, May 2013, p.5.

92 UNICEF (2013) Education for Children and Adolescents in Lebanon: A human Rights-based, Equity-Focused Analysis of the Situation. Draft Report for Review, p. 39

93 UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 111.



According to the Center for Educational Research And Development (CERD) statistics in 2009-2010, the ratio of students to teachers for all levels of education is the lowest in the public sector (7.4:1), followed by the private sector (11.6:1) and is highest in the free private schools (18.7:1). More recent findings from D-RASATI confirm that the student to teacher ratio in public schools ranges from a low of 1-5 students per teacher to a high of 20 or more students per teacher. It is important to note that Beirut Suburbs, North Lebanon and Bekaa have the highest student/teacher ratio which might explain that schools in these host communities might experience under additional pressure in education⁹⁵.

The ratio of students to classroom and students to teacher is however expected to rise in host communities with high influx of Syrian refugees such as Akkar in North of Lebanon⁹⁶. It was also reported that some schools – in specific regions - that used to be under-populated and at risk of shut down are now over-crowded due to the influx of refugees. For example, in 2013, only 7 out of the 30 surveyed schools in the North (excluding Akkar) reported that their classes are overfilled. The increasing number of Syrian students is not reported at present as a major problem by these host communities. Furthermore, in regions such as Zgharta where 63% of students in the town public schools are Syrians. Syrian students' influx prevented the shutdown of previously under-populated small schools⁹⁷. The overcrowding of some schools is exacerbated by the fact that Syrian students cannot afford transport costs to enroll in schools in neighboring areas which might have additional space⁹⁸.

The quality of education in Lebanese schools is mainly affected by the difficulties facing Syrian children in following the Lebanese curriculum as well as shortage of resources of public schools. Syrians students find it hard to cope with the differences between the Syrian and Lebanese curriculum as well as the challenges pertaining to language barriers. Most of Syrian children do not speak English or French which makes it difficult for them to follow and understand core materials taught in foreign languages.

These obstacles hinder the integration of Syrian children, discourage students and increase drop outs as students struggle to follow a new curriculum in a foreign language⁹⁹. As a result, student-peer educational support was developed in host communities bringing together many Syrian and Lebanese students¹⁰⁰. Some schools (e.g. in the Bekaa) introduced double shifts whereby Syrian students are being taught separately. In the Bekaa and BSS, some schools, consecrate afternoon shifts for education support for Syrian students whom are facing difficulties¹⁰¹. In Zahle, afternoon classes are opened for the Syrian children instructed by Syrian teachers.¹⁰²The difficulties facing Syrian students and the efforts placed to cope with the differences between Syrian and Lebanese curriculum affect the quality of education of all students.

The access to education of Lebanese students is affected by increasingly difficult living conditions of households.

Poor Lebanese families who are facing increasingly difficult financial situation due to higher unemployment and higher living costs are in need of financial support for school fees which might lead the drop out of children. In this context, it is reported in some

94 UNICEF (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children: In Schools, Community and Safe, Beirut: UNICEF, p.5

95 UNICEF (2013) Education for Children and Adolescents in Lebanon: A human Rights-based, Equity-Focused Analysis of the Situation. Draft Report for Review, p. 62

96 UNICEF (2013) Education for Children and Adolescents in Lebanon, Op. cit.p. 12

97 UNHCR and NRC (2013) Rapid Assessment of the Education Situation of Syrian Refugee Students Attending Lebanese Public Schools in North Lebanon (Excluding Akkar), p.8

98 UNICEF (2013) Education for Children and Adolescents in Lebanon, Op.Cit. , p.40; World Vision (2013) The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Host Communities in Lebanon-July 2013, p.15

99 Ibid, p.15

100 UNICEF (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children: In Schools, Community and Safe, Beirut: UNICEF, p.8

101 Regional Working Groups and UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 28.

102 ESFD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Zahle – Al Maalaka, May 2013, p.6.

communities that Lebanese households perceive that Syrian households receive education support in terms of exemption of fees more than equally poor families. Some parents are also concerned about medical conditions in overcrowded schools¹⁰³.

Lebanese Public schools which are initially under-resourced are not prepared to deal with the Syrian crisis. Most public schools lack equipment, adequate buildings, and safe playgrounds. Water and sanitation facilities are deficient and schools mostly lack adequate sanitary conditions¹⁰⁴. The increase in the number of students enrolled in already deteriorating schools does not provide a proper environment for children¹⁰⁵. In Qaa for example, MEHE took the initiative to rehabilitate and equip two public schools in the agricultural fields in order to admit most of the Syrian students in the region, knowing that they are operated by Syrian teachers¹⁰⁶. Lebanese teachers and principals are not trained nor qualified to deal with children from diverse backgrounds in general and the particular needs of Syrian refugees¹⁰⁷. Only few schools seem to adopt inclusion policies and train their staff to cope with the Syrian refugee crisis¹⁰⁸. For example, survey data¹⁰⁹ show only few school principals in North Lebanon (excluding Akkar) attended orientation sessions regarding inclusion policies of Syrian students in Lebanese public schools¹¹⁰.

Discrimination against Syrian students creates a hostile environment in Lebanese schools. Discrimination by both students and teachers against Syrian students is reported in certain schools especially in host communities with high concentration of refugees. The tension between Syrian and Lebanese children constitutes an obstacle for the adequate access and inclusion of Syrian students and creates a hostile school environment that affects the quality and respect in education for all. However clashes among student do not seem to be common and discrimination tends to tame at the end of the academic year with time as well as efforts exercised by members of the community.¹¹¹

The Government and international organizations identified the need to support public schools to cope with the high influx of Syrian students. While public schools have capacity for 300,000 students, projections exceed 550,000 refugee children by the end of 2013. Therefore, additional classrooms, rehabilitation of premises and training of teachers is required¹¹². A national strategy is needed to address the high dropouts among the most disadvantaged students in public schools including Syrian students. Strong coordination networks between municipalities, MEHE and CSOs are required in order to facilitate and manage the admission of Syrian students into Lebanese schools. Teachers in host communities should be exposed to inclusion strategies and approaches in order to better integrate vulnerable Syrian children and address their needs and difficulties¹¹³.

103 World Vision (2013) The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Host Communities in Lebanon-July 2013, p.15

104 UNICEF (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children: In Schools, Community and Safe, Beirut: UNICEF, p.8

105 UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 110.

106 ESD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Qaa, May 2013, p.5.

107 UNICEF (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children: In Schools, Community and Safe, Beirut: UNICEF, p.6

108 UNICEF (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children: In Schools, Community and Safe, Beirut: UNICEF, p.32

109 The survey took place in 30 schools in North Lebanon (Dennieh, Koura, Mennieh, Tripoli and Zgharta) with a total of 11768 students. The number of Syrian students is 951 that constitute 8% of the total student population.

110 UNHCR and NRC (2013) Rapid Assessment of the Education Situation of Syrian Refugee Students Attending Lebanese Public Schools in North Lebanon (Excluding Akkar), p.8

111 UNICEF (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children: In Schools, Community and Safe, Beirut: UNICEF, p.5-7

112 UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 111.

113 UNICEF (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children: In Schools, Community and Safe, Beirut: UNICEF, p.8-9



B) HEALTH

The increase in the number of Syrian refugees places significant strain on access and quality of healthcare services in most host communities especially in peripheral areas of the country.

Healthcare centers in most host communities are facing increasing demands and most of the time registering double the number of cases since the beginning of the crisis as well as an increase of cases in specific diseases such as Leishmaniasis and measles. Hospitals report an increasing number of patients of which dangerous cases to a level difficult to manage due to the influx of Syrian refugees especially wounded fighters. The difficult living conditions of refugees as well as the limited access to basic services in most host communities are factors that constitute threats of epidemics. Despite the financial and medical support provided to healthcare centers and hospitals, the weight of the crisis remains omnipresent. The World Health Organization (WHO) projects that Syrians demands for health care services will increase by 30% minimum by the end of 2013¹¹⁴. Host communities in Bekaa, BSS, Dinnieh, Baalbeck suffer from the over-crowdedness of healthcare centers, which limits the servicing of hosts communities¹¹⁵. In Qaa and Hermel, high number of refugees contributed to the double of registered cases whereby only primary health care services are provided for free by International organizations and NGOs and by public dispensaries¹¹⁶. Some residents now tend to go to private clinics instead¹¹⁷.

Access to healthcare services in Lebanon is more costly and limited for both refugees and nationals.

Despite the fact that healthcare costs of registered refugees are partially covered by UNHCR, many refugees are still unable to cover remaining costs, which exacerbates their capacities. In some host communities, many refugees reported very limited access to healthcare facilities. Other refugees are unaware of international organizations support while unregistered Syrian displaced do not benefit from similar support. In addition, some members of host communities

perceive that Syrian refugees benefit from preferential healthcare services whereby resources which initially used to serve host communities are diverted towards refugees. These perceptions seem to fuel tension among hosts and refugees.¹¹⁸

There are a high number of births among Syrian refugees and Reproductive health services are needed in all regions.

The increasing demand for reproductive health services is a main challenge facing both nationals and refugees, and is reflected in limited awareness of family planning methods and reproductive health issues including Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) prevention. In Dinnieh for instance, the shortage in reproductive health services is reported which constitute a significant issue for host communities¹¹⁹;

An increase in specific diseases is reported without these constituting epidemics threats.

The fact that many refugees live with limited or deficient water and sanitation facilities exacerbate the spread of diseases necessarily affects health and safety conditions of host communities¹²⁰. Some diseases are spreading among Syrian refugees such as water and skin related diseases without this turning into an epidemic threat¹²¹. Lebanon is experiencing an increase in the number of confirmed measles cases, and cases of Hepatitis have been reported in refugee communities. In Qaa and Hermel, the most spread diseases are diarrhea and scabies.¹²² Also, there is an increasing demand for chronic drugs¹²³.

Vaccination campaigns organized by the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) and UNICEF targeted both nationals and refugees in host communities.

By July 2013, more than 300,000 children have been vaccinated against measles of whom around 46,000 were Syrian children and more than 100,000 were vaccinated against polio of whom more than 23,000 were Syrians. UNICEF undertakes the vaccination of newly arriving refugees¹²⁴.

The lack of food control at the Lebanese borders as well as illegal cross-border

trade threatens the food health and safety of host communities and Syrian refugees. Vulnerable groups of poor socio-economic conditions tend to buy cheap and unsafe food which increases the risk for the transmission of animal and plant diseases and pest threatening the livelihoods of host communities and refugees¹²⁵.

The support of hospitals as well as prevention and control of diseases is required across the country with a focus on host communities with high concentration of Syrian refugees.

The central government and international donors should support health facilities receiving additional patients in order to increase their absorption capacity. The increasing needs in reproductive health services must be addressed as it appears to be one of the most pressing needs in the health sector¹²⁶. In terms of prevention and control, the training of healthcare staff, vaccination campaigns and ambulatory care medication should be provided¹²⁷.

8. Social Cohesion

The ongoing Syrian crisis since April 2011 impinged on an already deficient political situation in Lebanon. In fact, the country, especially since 2005, is subject to increasing political and security tensions.

114 World Vision (2013) Under Pressure: The impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 2013, p.15

115 Regional Working Groups outcomes

116 ESFD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Qaa, May 2013, p.5.

117 Regional Working Groups

118 ACAPS (2013) Regional Analysis Syria, July 2013, p. 12.

119 Regional Working Groups

120 World Vision (2013) The Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Host Communities in Lebanon-July 2013, p.15

121 Regional Working Groups

122 ESFD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Qaa, May 2013, p.5.

123 Regional Working Groups

124 UNICEF (2013) Syria Crisis Bi-weekly Humanitarian Situation Report, July 12-25th, p.9

125 UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 63-64.

126 International Rescue Committee (2013) Syria: A regional Crisis, January 2013, p. 19.

127 WHO (2013) "Health: Regional Response to the Crisis in Syria", Poster, June 2013, p.1

These were attributed to huge internal divisions among the different formations of the ruling political class, with respect to numerous issues, of which: the process of power sharing between the leadership of the different sectarian groups (mainly after the assassination of the former president Rafic Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005), the contested mode of implementation of Taef Agreement (1989), the deficiency of the successive parliamentary election laws, the weak governance and the predominance of a "clientelist" approach in dealing with major economic policy orientations and attempts to reform public administration and entities. These internal political divisions were however exponentially aggravated, by the antagonistic direct implication of the different Lebanese politico-sectarian groups, in the stark regional and international confrontation that was and is still deeply taking over and dividing the Arab World (and the Middle East) into two major blocks: Syria, Iran, Iraq and the Lebanese "8 of March" coalition (supported by Russia) on one hand, and the GCC countries, Turkey and the Lebanese "14 of March" coalition on the other (supported by EU and USA). Within such a dualistic regional and international framework, the gradual implicit or even explicit involvement of both Lebanese coalitions in the current Syrian conflict, becomes rather a matter of fact.

The fact that some Lebanese nationals consider that their living conditions are increasingly difficult because of the high influx of Syrian refugees, hampers Lebanese-Syrian interactions. As economic and social pressure on host communities increases, tension among nationals and refugees are in the rise especially in areas of high concentration of refugees such as Akkar and West Bekaa where tension is extremely high¹²⁸. Competition for jobs, increasing expenditures, and decreasing wages/revenues, in addition to growing pressures on limited public services and utilities, are major cause of tension between Lebanese nationals and refugees. The competition for livelihoods resources amidst already difficult living conditions fuels the sense of discontent within some host communities¹²⁹.

Tension is also fueled by the widespread



perception among community members that Syrian refugees benefit from significant support from international organizations whereas Lebanese nationals who can be equally poor are left without any assistance.

There is a perception that Syrians receive more support than Lebanese living under the poverty line. Some Lebanese residents perceive that Syrians who are benefitting from assistance have in fact been in Lebanon prior to the crisis as seasonal workers. According to members of host communities, those Syrians are not real refugees while vulnerable nationals are not being assisted to better cope with the crisis. These perceptions –whether real or not- create further instability. Clashes between refugees and host-communities are reported in parts of the Bekaa and the South¹³⁰. In Zahle, animosity towards Syrian refugees was expressed by the community which did not undertake any integration measures.¹³¹In Aarsal and Qasr, some forms of support and assistance provided by the central government and CSOs to Syrians angered many Lebanese nationals. Some members of the community expressed the need for international community support to local communities. These peripheral areas have always been marginalized and deprived of basic services. The Syrian crisis exacerbated already vulnerable living conditions of such host communities¹³².

Host communities sense a lack of safety and security since the beginning of the Syrian crisis¹³³. Members of host communities state that their towns and villages have become dangerously overpopulated and increasingly insecure with increased levels of crime such as mobile and handbag theft. Street fighting and clashes between Syrian refugees and Lebanese citizens occur in certain areas in the North such as Aarsal and Tripoli or even in Beirut violent attacks and night-time curfews on refugees are reported in certain localities. Women and children report to be less confident during evening hours.¹³⁴.

Inter-marriages between Lebanese nationals and Syrian refugees are reported in some communities. Such marriages are often perceived to secure better living conditions for vulnerable Syrian refugees.

These marriages might ease social cohesion in host communities¹³⁵ such as Hermel where parental ties among locals and refugees are valorised. In Qaa and Hermel, locals express a good sense of social solidarity which is highlighted during marriages and funerals.¹³⁶

Vulnerable categories of host communities should be included in national and international support interventions, knowing that Syrian refugees are concentrated in the poorest areas of the country. The support of host communities mainly via the assistance of municipalities is necessary in order to ensure a stable environment and protection for both nationals and refugees. Such inclusion policies can decrease tension and enhance social cohesion among hosts and refugees. Conflict prevention approaches, targeted dialogue and mediation can also increase the capacities of host communities in preventing and managing conflicts. UNHCR is planning on directly targeting around 277,000 individuals in social cohesion and livelihoods response including 177,000 Lebanese nationals of whom 30% in extremely vulnerable localities and around 100,000 refugees.¹³⁷

128 UNICEF (2013) Education for Children and Adolescents in Lebanon: A human Rights-based, Equity-Focused Analysis of the Situation. Draft Report for Review, p.10; UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 37.

129 World Vision (2013), Advocacy Report –Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 2013, p. 17; ACAPS (2013) Regional Analysis Syria, July 2013, p. 5
130 Ibid, p. 10-20

131 ESD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Zahle – Al Maalaka, May 2013, p.8.

132 UNICEF (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessment for Displaced Syrian Children: In Schools, Community and Safe, Beirut: UNICEF, p.36-37

133 World Vision (2013), Advocacy Report –Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 2013, p. 16.

134 World Vision (2013), Advocacy Report –Under pressure: the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities in Lebanon, July 2013, p. 5.

135 UNHCR (2013) "Broadening Support to Lebanese Communities affected by displacement from Syria", June 2013, p. 2.; IRC (2013) Briefing Note on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, June 2013, p.1.

136 ESD (2013) Rapid Needs Assessment in the Community of Qaa, May 2013, p.6.

137 UNHCR (2013) "Lebanon Inter-Agency Response: Syrian Refugees", July 2013, p. 125.

9. Impact Assessment Matrix

IMPACT	
NATIONAL	LOCAL
<p>POPULATION</p> <p>The registration of Syrian refugees entering Lebanon seems to be neither accurate nor systematic which is mainly due to the fact that a number of refugees tend to abstain from registration for political reasons or tend to return to Syria while being registered in Lebanon</p> <p>Syrian refugees arrive to Lebanon with their families, an indicator for a relatively long stay, which explains the manifestation of high numbers of women and children.</p>	<p>Refugees of poor socio-economic conditions tend to settle in peripheral areas, which are already vulnerable regions on Lebanon whereas middle to high income categories prefer to reside in wealthier regions such as Beirut. In Beirut Southern Suburbs (BSS), Syrian refugees who live in the Palestinian camps tend to be of poorer socio-economic conditions than those who settle outside the camps; those in Burj Hammoud are somehow in better socio-economic conditions than those who live in BSS</p> <p>Most refugees are concentrated in peripheral areas namely North of Lebanon and the Bekaa valley. Some towns in the North of Lebanon and Bekaa reported a doubling of the population size in the past two years. Significant number of refugees is also registered in Beirut while South of Lebanon is witnessing a higher influx of refugees compared to earlier periods in the past two years</p>
<p>The number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is estimated to reach one million by the end of 2013 which is equivalent to almost 25% of the total resident population. In terms of host communities, the UNHCR estimates that around 1.2 million Lebanese residents are severely affected by the influx of Syrian refugee</p>	



HOUSING	<p>Syrian refugees are present across the entire Lebanese territories rather than in specific areas or settlement such as camps or gatherings. With the beginning of the Syrian influx to Lebanon, the government adopted a policy against the establishment of camps or gatherings for Syrian refugees and forbids any structural intervention in informal tent settlements. As a result, around 1,400 localities are now hosting Syrian refugees who are living with families or friends, in rented accommodation, or tents pitched on rented private lands on the periphery of towns . The high influx of Syrian refugees is putting significant strain on the resources of host communities.</p>	<p>Refugees in urban areas tend to settle in rented accommodation while those in rural areas live in informal tents within private lands. Most of refugees in urban areas such as BSS live in rented accommodation with poor or limited facilities. In rural areas, most refugees are settled in tents within agricultural lands or in under-construction buildings. Over crowdedness is putting a significant strain on water and energy resources of host communities</p>
	<p>The high influx of Syrian refugees is causing significant increase in rents which imply higher housing cost for host communities. Approximately more than 60% of Syrian refugees live in rented accommodation which increases competition for housing and therefore increasing the cost of housing for Lebanese residents.</p>	<p>Some districts in Beirut registered an increase of rent up to 400\$. In Beirut Southern suburbs (BSS), rent has increased from USD 300 to USD 500 for a “lower-middle” dwelling since the beginning of the crisis.</p>
	<p>Overcrowding is a significant challenge affecting the living conditions of host communities. Overcrowding puts pressure on resources and services of host communities and affects the social environment and psychosocial conditions of residents.</p>	<p>The population of some towns in the North of Lebanon and the Bekaa seem to have doubled. In the Qaa region, more than 1 500 refugees are accommodated in around 120 housing units whereby more than 10 residents live per dwelling. In Hermel, on average more than 12 persons live per dwelling knowing that more than 830 households are sheltered in around 500 housing units. In Zahle, in addition to rented accommodation and shops, informal tent settlements are spread around agricultural lands.</p>
IMPACT		
	NATIONAL	LOCAL
INFRASTRUCTURE	<p>Syrian influx put additional pressure on a weak and deteriorating infrastructure which exacerbated previously existing problems. While most municipalities initially have limited financial and human resources, they are strained by supplementary expenditure on operations and maintenance works pertaining to water, sanitation, solid waste, etc.</p>	<p>Infrastructure in Lebanon is in a poor condition especially in the peripheral areas of the country. The fact that Syrian refugees are concentrated in peripheral governorates such as North Lebanon and Bekaa magnified the impact on this sector .</p>

Energy	<p>The high influx of Syrian refugees increases the demand on public electricity as well as the private generators beyond available capacities</p> <p>With the upcoming winter season, it is expected that Syrian refugees as well as host communities will face additional pressure related to heating.</p>	
Water and Sanitation	<p>While water shortage is common in Lebanon prior to the Syrian crisis due to a dilapidated infrastructure, water resources are under severe pressure caused by high Syrian influx. A significant number of dwellings in some host communities are not initially linked to water network. Tension in host communities is rising as Syrian refugees tend to use water resources through illegal connections or evade the payment of water bills</p> <p>Sewage discharge is a challenge in many host communities especially those in peripheral areas. The increasing number of residents exceeds the capacities of already deficient sanitation facilities. Municipalities are facing difficulties in discharging the increasing amount of produced waste water</p>	<p>In Hermel only 60% of house units are linked to a deteriorating running water network. Water scarcity is reported in Bekaa regions such as Qaa and Hermel where more than 650 and 600 artisans wells respectively are used at a growing depth (between 200 and 400 meters) which indicates the exacerbation of water scarcity .</p> <p>In the Qaa and Hermel, there are no treatment plants in the area and waste disposal is done through sewage tanks. A significant number of Syrian refugees in Qaa and Zahle live in informal tent's settlements on agricultural lands where treatment networks are absent causing the pollution of potable and irrigation water</p>
Solid waste	<p>Solid waste is one of the most critical and urgent problems facing all municipalities. The current capacities of municipalities, especially in peripheral areas, are limited and cannot meet the increasing needs. Local authorities did not receive any additional support from the central government.</p>	<p>In areas Qaa, Hermel and Zahle solid waste is collected and disposed at dump sites at the outskirts. In Akkar for example, waste collection fees increased by 100% without any additional municipal budget. Solid waste systems in Palestinian camps are also under rising pressure due to the arrival of a high number of Syrian refugees.</p>
Environment	<p>The increase of environmental pollution is reported as a result of deficient solid and sewage waste disposal in springs, rivers or roads. Drinking and irrigation water is being polluted creating a risk for diseases and plants contamination.</p>	<p>Bardawni and Al Assi rivers in Zahle are now subject to pollution as well as other natural springs.</p>



Transportation	It is believed (although not measured) that the high influx of Syrian refugees exacerbates the issue of traffic congestion. As a result, it becomes even more urgent to finally establish a performing public transportation plan. Moreover, it was stated that a certain number of Syrian taxi drivers are operating without an official license and therefore compete with Lebanese drivers.	The high Syrian influx affects transportation in some peripheral regions such as the Bekaa where aid distribution is causing significant traffic in the area. Motorcycles are increasing as Syrian refugees tend to commute using motorcycles as an affordable mean of transportation.
IMPACT		
	NATIONAL The significant challenges of Lebanon's economy makes it difficult and complicated to cope with the high influx of Syrian refugees which in one way or another place additional pressure on the economic situation of the country	LOCAL The Syrian refugees are concentrated in exactly the poorest governorates in Lebanon i.e. North, South and Bekaa. The country is characterized by severe regional imbalances, whereby North of Lebanon holds the highest poverty rates (53%) and extreme poverty rates (18%). In North Lebanon- the poorest cazas of Akkar and Minnieh-Dinnieh exhibit the highest overall headcount poverty rate (over 60%) in the country, followed by Tripoli city (over 50%). The other governorates with high poverty rates are South of Lebanon (12% and 42%) and the Bekaa (11% and 30%). Beirut registers the lowest rates with 6 % overall poverty and less than 2% in extreme poverty. Unfortunately, the Syrian crisis places these poverty gaps under stark hardship.

	<p>The capacities of host communities to receive an increasingly large number of refugees are now limited whereby strain is placed on expenditures of Lebanese households. Many surveys converge around the significant increase in food prices over the past year. Inflation rate was more than 3% in the beginning of 2012 reaching 5.3% by end 2012 and 4.4% in 2013.</p>	<p>In North Lebanon, around 80% of households reported increasing expenditures attributed to the high influx of refugees in addition to the fact that inhabitants used to benefit from less costly goods and services provided through the Syrian border which are no longer available. Household expenditures are said to have increased on average 15% in the Bekaa and 6% in North Lebanon. Host communities members are also dealing with decreasing income whereby 90% in the North and Bekaa stated a decrease of income without finding alternative sources of income. According to a recent survey, the living expenses in the north were around USD 790 before the crisis compared to USD 842 after the crisis, with a general inflation rate of 6% and 12% for food prices, 34% for medicines, 6% for water and utility bills</p>
	<p>Trade with Syria and neighboring countries is impacted by the ongoing Syrian crisis. In 2013 the exports through Syria decreased by 20.2%. The turmoil in border areas hinders trade with Syria and limits the availability of Syrian products in the Lebanese market and increases at the same time the prices of available goods. Demand for Lebanese products is on the rise due to local Syrian demand which tames the negative impact of the crisis which hampers the transit of goods through Syria. The revenues of the Beirut Port have increase in 2013 by 26% taking into account that regional demand for Syrian goods was replaced by Lebanese exports, e.g. industrial exports increase by 13.5% between June 2012 and June 2013</p>	<p>In Dennaih the export of agricultural products decreased significantly due to the insecure transit via Syria and the increasing prices of sea transport/shipping. However, the decrease in export has been absorbed by the increase in the local demand (due to the Syrian influx) . In the Bekaa, traders reported increased business whereas in Wadikhald profit decreased between 50%-70% .</p>




	<p>The high influx of refugees created robust competition over jobs and businesses, which is considered as one of the key challenges facing Lebanese host communities. Unskilled workers seem to be the most affected by the competition over jobs among Syrians refugees and Lebanese nationals. Many Syrians are self-employed especially in the construction sector where competition with Lebanese workers is fierce . Syrians are opening their own enterprises/businesses such as restaurants, butcheries, hairdresser saloons, sewing workshops, etc. Syrian refugees tend to work with lower wages with on average half and sometimes one fifth of the Lebanese wage, and longer working hours. According to FAO, the increasing number of Syrian workers caused a reduction of 60% in daily wages. Lebanese employer benefit in specific activities from the availability of labour with lower wages.</p>	
	IMPACT	
<p>EDUCATION</p>	<p>NATIONAL</p> <p>The quality of education in Lebanese schools is mainly affected by the difficulties facing Syrian children in following the Lebanese curriculum as well as shortage of resources of public schools. Lebanese Public schools which are initially under-resourced are not prepared to deal with the Syrian crisis. Most public schools lack equipment, adequate buildings and safe playgrounds. Water and sanitation facilities are deficient and schools mostly lack adequate sanitary conditions. The enrolment rate of Syrian children is estimated at only 31%. Around 31,000 Syrian students are enrolled in primary and intermediate public schools and 1,000 in public secondary schools. The number of Syrian school-aged children is expected to reach 555,000 by the end of 2013 and schools will need support from the central government to be able to absorb increasing numbers of students Syrian students find it hard to cope with the differences between the Syrian and Lebanese curriculum as well as the challenges pertaining to language barriers. Most of Syrian children do not speak English or French which makes it difficult for them to follow and understand core materials taught in foreign languages. These obstacles hinder the integration of Syrian children, discourage students and increase drop outs as students struggle to follow a new curriculum in a foreign language .As a result, student-peer educational support was developed in host communities bringing together many Syrian and Lebanese students The difficulties facing Syrian students and the efforts placed to cope with the differences between Syrian and Lebanese curriculum affect the quality of education of all students.</p>	<p>LOCAL</p> <p>The majority of Syrian students are in Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon and the Bekaa. Around 1,235 Syrian students are registered in public schools in north Lebanon (excluding Akkar) for the academic year 2012-2013. It is said that around 5000 students are registered in private schools in the North which provide the Syrian curriculum rather than the Lebanese one . In Hermel, only around 550 out of the Syrian students are registered in the schools or 11% of the Syrian refugees in the region . Information on Syrian children enrolled in private schools is scanty. Some schools (e.g. in the Bekaa) introduced double shifts whereby Syrian students are being taught separately. In the Bekaa and BSS, some schools, consecrate afternoon shifts for education support for Syrian students whom are facing difficulties . In Zahle, afternoon classes are opened for the Syrian children instructed by Syrian teachers.</p>

<p>HEALTH</p>	<p>Access to healthcare services in Lebanon is more costly and limited for both refugees and nationals. Healthcare centers in most host communities are facing increasing demands and most of the times registering double the number of cases. Many refugees still do not have access to healthcare services. Other refugees are unaware of international organizations support while unregistered displaced Syrians do not benefit from similar support.</p>	<p>Host communities in Bekaa, BSS, Dennieh, Baalbeck suffer from the over-crowdedness of healthcare centers, which limits the servicing of hosts communities. In Qaa and Hermel, high number of refugees contributed to the double of registered cases whereby only primary health care services are provided for free by international organizations, NGOs, and by public dispensaries .</p>
<p>SOCIAL COHESION</p>	<p>The fact that some Lebanese nationals consider that their living conditions are increasingly difficult because of the high influx of Syrian refugees, hampers Lebanese-Syrian interactions. As economic and social pressure on host communities increases, tension among nationals and refugees are on the rise especially in areas of high concentration of refugees such as Akkar and Bekaa where tension is extremely high .Competition for jobs, increasing expenditures, and decreasing wages/revenues are major cause of tension between Lebanese nationals and refugees. The competition for livelihood resources amidst already difficult living conditions fuel the sense of discontent within some host communities</p>	<p>Clashes between refugees and host-communities are reported in parts of the Bekaa and the South . In Zahle, animosity towards Syrian refugees was expressed by the community which did not undertake any integration measures. In Aarsal and Qasr, the support and assistance provided by the central government and CSOs to Syrians angered many Lebanese nationals.</p>





Chapter 3: ASSESSING THE CURRENT RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS



The massive influx of Syrian refugees has strained existing response mechanisms. In order to assess the magnitude of the current response, point to existing gaps, and gain from good practices, this part of the report will analyze the response from several perspectives:

1. Responding entities
2. Sectors of response
3. Aid coordination and institutional setup
4. Current development efforts
5. Women and children dimension

6. Responding entities

In short, there are currently two networks that deliver humanitarian assistance: one run by the UN system, mainly UNHCR and UNICEF, along with other UN agencies and

the other consisting of monetary assistance by various governments implemented through NGOs.

The implementation of UN-funded assistance is mainly entrusted to international NGOs and, to a lesser extent, local ones. There are more than 80 NGOs, 13 UN agencies, and 5 government entities engaged in the current relief efforts of the UN affiliated system. The international UN affiliated system is more or less transparent with funding status available online. The latest figures show that out of the USD1.7 billion requested, 457 million have arrived to the country. The vast majority of the funding has gone to 7 out of the 80 listed NGOs and 13 UN agencies as the table below demonstrates.



Table 13: Funding as of August 8 - RRP5 for Lebanon - Source: MOSA and RRP5-Lebanon

	Requested amounts	Disbursed amounts	% of subtotal	Ratio disbursed/ requested
UNHCR	372	192	42%	52%
UNICEF	125	57	12%	45%
DRC	72	51	11%	70%
WFP	240	40	9%	17%
UNRWA	65	29	6%	44%
PU	7	22	5%	315%
NRC	19	10	2%	50%
GoL	450	0	0%	0%
Other	315	57	12%	18%
Total	1666	457	100%	27%

As can be seen in the table above, the majority of the funding is currently being channeled to the UNHCR because this is primarily a refugee crisis. This also means that the funds will necessarily be spent on UNHCR priorities, namely short-term relief and recovery efforts. However, as the crisis extends in time, and shows no sign of abating in the near future, other priorities are arising (as was shown in impact assessment). These new priorities require a restructuring of the responsibilities of the various actors and the involvement of the development arms of the UN system.

The second source of humanitarian funding is represented by foreign government support channeled through local or international NGOs. Because of the lack of a coordination structure, this system remains to a large extent outside of the government's knowledge and is free to operate in any shape or form. The problem with this system is that it mainly consists of ad-hoc interventions that may overlap. There is also a risk of political maneuvering which could exacerbate the security situation in certain regions.

To date, the Lebanese government's involvement remains limited to the provision of public education (MEHE) and limited health services in the various SDC centers (MoSA), and dispensaries (MoPH). However, it has not received any funding to compensate for the resulting strain on its already limited budget or to allow it to play a more active role in setting the priorities

of the current relief efforts. Indeed, it has requested 450 million USD but has yet to receive any of that funding. As a result, the government is an important player as a provider of assistance, but its oversight role over the relief efforts of other players such as local and international NGOs remains limited.

2. Sectors of response

The current response to the crisis is primarily humanitarian. As such, the main point of reference is the humanitarian needs of the refugees and increasingly of the Lebanese host communities. These needs have been increasing in acuity as demonstrated by the ever increasing calls for aid in the Regional Response Plans (RRPs). The current response focuses on eight sectors:

1. WASH concerns mainly water, hygiene, and sanitation issues
2. Non-food items such as winterization kits, basic clothing and baby kits, hygiene kits, etc.
3. Food items including food packages or food vouchers
4. Legal protection of the refugees, such as child protection and sexual and gender based violence issues
5. Health services, including preventive measures
6. Education services, such as accelerated learning and inclusion in Lebanese schools
7. Assistance to host communities
8. Shelter provision in light of the no-camp policy of the government



The sectoral breakdown of RRP 5 in the table below shows that around 55% of the total requested amount is dedicated to the basic relief tenants of health (22%), food (17%), and shelter (16%). This further confirms the relief orientation of aid, a direction that seems to persist into the future, as shown by the planned disbursement of aid in RRP 5. Moreover, the priorities seem to differ between UN agencies and the Lebanese government, with health taking up the largest share of funding requested by the GOL. It is for instance surprising that, in view of the dilapidated state of the power and water infrastructure in Lebanon and the added demands on that infrastructure resulting from the refugee influx, that the government has requested little funding in that regard; this may be explained by the fact that the Syrian crisis was considered as being a temporary crisis. In addition, as was previously mentioned, the economic dimension represented by job creation and sustainable development efforts is sorely lacking. The small amount devoted to social cohesion and livelihoods is also an indicator of the limited attention paid to local development aspects.

Table 14: Breakdown of GoL request within the RRP5 - Source: MOSA and RRP5-Lebanon

	UN	UN %	GoL	GoL %	Total	Total %
Health	94	8%	274	61%	368	22%
Education	134	11%	54	12%	189	11%
Shelter	202	17%	65	14%	267	16%
NFIs	189	16%	11	2%	201	12%
WASH	143	12%	12	3%	155	9%
Food	279	23%	10	2%	288	17%
Protection	144	12%	24	5%	168	10%
Host community assistance (cohesion and livelihoods)	31	3%	0	0%	31	2%
Total	1216	100%	450	100%	1666	100%



The breakdown of requested funding by government agency mirrors the sectoral distribution in that the MoPH will receive the largest share of funding, followed by MoSA, and MEHE.



Table 15: Specific GoL sector requests -

Source: MOSA and RRP5-Lebanon

Agency	Protection	Food	WASH	Shelter	NFIs	Education	Health	TOTAL
MEHE						54		54
MoSA	24			53	4		9	89
MoPH							265	265
Water Authorities			10					10
High Relief Committee (HRC)		10	2	12	8			31
Total	24	10	12	65	11	54	274	450

It is worth noting that the planning process is currently dictated by the availability of resources. Thus, only 27% of the total requested amount has been disbursed (none of which was directed at the Lebanese Government). As such, only a portion of the planned activities will take place and the humanitarian response will have to move towards a targeted approach that tackles only the most urgent needs.

In conclusion, although this sectoral approach does not prevent the interlinkage of specific interventions, it results in a fragmented response mechanism which does not follow a holistic or strategic outlook on the crisis. Indeed, as has been shown in the previous impact assessment, the economic impact of the crisis is significant and extends over the long term. Therefore, relief efforts are no longer sufficient and must be complemented with long-term solutions that will help the economy expand in order to absorb the new labor force and allow the refugees to become economically self-sufficient. Moreover, there is a need for an integrated approach which stems from a holistic/strategic vision and engenders priorities for the various underlying sectors.

3. Aid coordination and institutional set up

Each of the aforementioned sectors of intervention is governed by a working group. Most of these working groups are chaired by either UNHCR or UNICEF and co-chaired by the GoL. Indeed, only two sector subgroups are chaired by UNDP (livelihood) and the WHO (health). These groups coordinate amongst each other through an inter sector working group, which is a meeting for sector chairs and co-chairs to organize joint initiatives and achieve synergy of service delivery. In addition, there is a higher level coordination structure called the interagency coordination unit which brings together most of the agencies working in the field. This structure is mimicked more or less throughout the regions. The government's involvement is currently limited to attendance of the various working groups.

On the government's side, the inter-ministerial committee brings together the line ministries and the relevant security agencies under one structure. This committee, which is chaired by the Prime Minister with MOSA acting as the secretary, also comprises the ministries of Interior, Education, Health, and Defense, as well as the various security agencies.

MoSA is proposing the creation of a coordination unit that is empowered to implement the decisions of the inter-ministerial committee and to coordinate current humanitarian aid efforts. This new structure would also allow the government to link the developmental needs of the host communities into a comprehensive development program. In addition, there is a need to integrate UN plans into the GoL's priorities in order to create synergies and avoid duplication.

4. Towards a developmental approach

As it was previously mentioned, assistance is currently focused on relief and few development projects may be pointed out. One example of such development projects is QUIPS (quick impact projects). These are small projects with budgets that do not exceed 18 thousand USD (as a maximum funding ceiling). This means that most of these projects are necessarily of short duration and immediate impact. There are currently 90 such projects for a total budget of 1.3 billion USD (average project budget is estimated at around 14 thousand USD). Two main agencies, DRC and UNDP are currently implementing the projects. The 54 already implemented projects affect around 568 thousand Lebanese residents and around 188 thousand refugees. Akkar and the Bekaa house 70 out of the 90 projects and take up 76% of the total QUIP budget.

While developmental in spirit, these interventions remain reactive rather than proactive and ad-hoc in nature. However, these interventions can be reviewed and possibly modified in order to be able to contribute at a larger scale with more ownership at the local and national level, in order to meet longer-terms needs of communities. In fact, the existing local development plans, which were elaborated by almost half of the union of the municipalities in Lebanon, may constitute a platform for the review of the actual interventions.

The impact assessment shows a significant strain on the income of hosting communities which tend to be located in the poorest regions of the country. Therefore, there is a need for much more substantial public expenditure projects. However, such large structural development projects require substantial planning, extensive budgets and human resources, as well as government coordination, at the national and the local levels.

Moreover, the current response does not systematically involve municipalities. Rather, it is left up to NGOs to coordinate with municipalities when they see fit, knowing that some municipalities are taking the initiative and implementing their own efforts. Meanwhile, the previous needs assessment clearly shows that

Table 16: An overview of QUIPS as of 31st of July 2013 - Source: MOSA and RRP5-Lebanon

General Overview				
Status	Number	Amount in USD	Local population	Refugee population
Completed	54	647,300	567,627	188,356
On-going	36	665,900	1,104,309	253,661
Grand total	90	1,313,200	1,671,936	443,017
Location Overview				
Location	Amount	Location Population	Refugee Population	Number of Projects
South	98,000	117,500	11,860	5
Mt Lebanon	40,000	240	450	2
Tripoli	174,700	402,119	37,393	13
Bekaa	431,600	901,600	276,500	38
Akkar	568,900	250,477	116,814	32
Totals	1,313,200	1,671,936	443,017	90



municipalities need to take a leading role in terms of: 1) stepping up service provision to refugees and host communities, which requires increased municipal budgets and capacity building and 2) designing and implementing development projects which should - to the extent possible - be inscribed within local development plans whenever they exist.

Finally, whereas originally relief efforts were exclusively targeted at refugees, the current trend is toward increased assistance to the host communities. Moreover, as the impact assessment shows, because Syrian refugees are essentially intermingled with host communities and do not reside in separate camps or locations, development efforts should necessarily target the entire community in all its components.

5. Women and children dimension

Gender-based violence increases substantially in times of conflict and displacement within both the refugee and host communities. Women and children currently make up 78% of the refugee population and children alone make up 68% of that population as of August 22nd. These rates have been steady for most of the crisis and are likely to persist. This has led to significant programming being focused on women and children. Thus, two separate working groups have been created within the protection working group, one dealing with gender-based violence and the other with child protection. The services provided are currently limited to outreach and coping mechanisms. Moreover, most Lebanese institutions are not allowed to provide services to non-Lebanese victims. Therefore, regulatory reform is needed to amend the situation.

6. Conclusion

The humanitarian response has been able to meet with the most basic needs of the refugees and lessen the impact on Lebanese host communities. However, a transition towards a development

approach based on municipal capacity building, infrastructure projects, and long term economic development interventions should be envisaged.

The table below proposes a list of recommendations that may serve as guidelines for future response efforts.

Recommendations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen government capacity to manage response to the Syrian crisis • Adopt a clear government strategy on the issue • Create a governmental entity which plans and coordinates response efforts with the technical assistance of UN agencies and the World Bank. • Complement humanitarian response with a strategic development approach • Adopt a holistic, comprehensive and integrated approach which combines targeted interventions that address the immediate needs of refugees and structural universal interventions that improve the living conditions of both the refugees and host communities. • Enforce transparent reporting standards for all entities involved in the response effort (GoL, UN agencies, WB, international and local NGOs) • Reinforce the role and strengthen the capacities of municipalities • Strengthen the service provision capacity of existing institutions • Review laws and regulations to allow the extension of service provision to non-Lebanese citizens • Propose a phased plan that includes immediate, short term, medium term and long term interventions.



Chapter 4: ASSESSING THE ECONOMETRIC RESULTS OF THE ESIA – Towards a developmental approach



The review of the WB macroeconomic model (as part of ESIA report) leads to a set of preliminary comments and concerns, some of which are general and methodological, and others are rather specific to some concrete components of the model. These comments and concerns are developed, in details, in the annex.

Below is a brief presentation of the major outcomes of the ESIA, regarding the budget and fiscal impact:

- The conflict in Syria is estimated to be costing Lebanon USD 7.5 billion in lost economic activity over the three years of the impact assessment (2012-2014)
- Lebanon GDP growth rate is estimated to 2.85 percentage points lower for each conflict year.
- Trade and Tourism sectors were significantly affected by the Syrian crisis.
- Public finance will notice an increase in the deficit estimated at USD 2.7 billion over the period 2012-2014. This figure resulted from: i) decrease in revenues estimated at USD 1.6 billion and ii) increase in public spending estimated at USD 1.2 billion.
- By end-2014, some 170'000 additional Lebanese (to be added to the current 1 million below poverty line) will be pushed into poverty.

Given the limitations raised in the introductory chapter, especially regarding data quality and availability, it seems hazardous to build the impact assessment on an econometric model **only**, without cross-cutting analysis using other methodologies, even though, econometric models provide interesting quantifiable impacts assessments results.

The econometric model had to set a series of assumptions that may be subject to discussions. In addition, **practically**, it is difficult to dissociate between the Syrian crisis impact, and other external factors that would have also an impact at the macro level. Hence, the econometric model has to be complemented by another methodology, which is the aim of this report.

Beyond these limitations, the most crucial issue that should be thoroughly underlined, when assessing the ESIA methodology, resides in the intrinsic overall rationale or philosophy of this model. It is basically a stabilization model, aiming essentially to restore the set of major economic and social indicators that had deteriorated due to the Syrian crisis to their pre-crisis level. However, in the Lebanese case, such a stabilization alternative is far from responding adequately to the real needs of the resident population. In fact, most of the above mentioned indicators were not satisfactory in the pre-crisis period, especially in the geographic areas of concentration of the main bulk of Syrian refugees (mostly in the North and the Bekaa that include around 70% of the total number of Syrian refugees, in addition to Beirut suburbs), which are at the same time the major areas of poverty and social exclusion in the country. It is to be recognized that unsatisfied basic needs at that period were not only related to the deficient public services in terms of availability, accessibility, and quality (health, education, pension coverage, housing, public transportation, electricity, water, solid waste, waste water, etc.). More importantly, this dissatisfaction is mainly attributed to deep-rooted issues related mostly to employment: high youth unemployment, precarious employment in low value added jobs, low wages and earnings, limited social benefits, growing informality, a deficient pension system, etc.

In the prevailing political and economic conditions, the great potential risk of adopting a new stabilization – and not developmental - alternative, lies in the simple reproduction of the “spirit” of the previous international support programs

to Lebanon (such as Paris I, Paris II, Paris III....). It should be noted in this regard that within such programs, the major priorities have mostly focused on trying to solve the public finance problems (i.e. to manage the delicate common risk (i.e. Government and banks), at the expenses of revitalizing the foundations of a real economy. Furthermore, another serious risk consists in the pre-disposition of such a model to practically lead into a classical “humanitarian” program, where the distribution and redistribution of aid and subsidies will form the cornerstone of the effort. In this case, stabilization programs present serious challenges in terms of financial sustainability, while the targeted population becomes accustomed to rely indefinitely on the simple reproduction of aid and subsidy, instead of acquiring their rights as citizens, i.e. the right to decent work, health, education, housing and social protection, in addition to the right to effective political representation.

Without being closely integrated into a medium and long term development process, stabilization programs are likely to aggravate the crisis of both the hosting community and the Syrian refugees, instead of positively dealing with the huge economic and social impacts of the crisis. In this perspective, launching a developmental process – accompanied by comprehensive political and economic reforms – means as a first step the mobilization of international and local funds to be invested in an ambitious labor-intensive infrastructure and public works programs. Different infrastructure need assessments and development programs, previously undertaken by public authorities need to be reviewed and revised, in order to set the specific investment priorities that adequately cope with the prevailing economic and social conditions.

Among these assessments and programs, one may note especially the “Horizon Development Program: 10-15 years” (CDR-2005), the various public transportation programs, the irrigation and dams programs, the “Simplified Economic Development Plans” (27 Plans) elaborated by 27 out of

52 municipal unions, in addition to other specific power, solid waste, and water projects. It is to be noted that these different infrastructural programs have at the same time a national (central) dimension as well as a local one, which will generate economic synergies and help in containing geographic and thus social imbalances. In the same perspective, and while launching such an ambitious investment program, Lebanon needs to strengthen its social and economic fabric, through the progressive implementation of the already adopted National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territories (2004), "The National Social Strategy of Lebanon" (2009), pension system reform, and other complementary programs, including MDG and the poverty targeting program. In other words, such a developmental alternative is not supposed to take off from zero, in light of the huge long term cumulative efforts that have been undertaken nationwide by different public entities.

In fact, the model limits the average share of public investment to less than 2% of GDP and less than 7% of total investment during the projection period 2013-2014. This implicitly confirms the on-going predominance of the private sector, which will be responsible – in very difficult political and security circumstances - for the quasi totality of investment. While it is very well known that real estate activities polarize more than two thirds of total investment, and around 98% of the total number of operating establishments (having less than 10 employees) in the private sector have a very limited investment capacity.

International and local funds should be channeled towards such ambitious infrastructure programs, in order not only to respond to a concrete and imminent national and social needs, but also to create job opportunities for tens of thousands of Lebanese and Syrians who are effectively at risk, (instead of subsidizing them for a long duration). Job creation should effectively be the foremost concern in light of the 30% to 50% expected increase in labor supply during the projection period 2013-2014, and the expected increase of unemployment

from 11% of total active population in 2011 to around 20% in 2014. Although the public sector suffers from several severe bottlenecks (institutional, decision-making process, monitoring, human resources, management skills, etc.), the actual crisis must be seen as an opportunity to elaborate and implement a set of specific and ambitious reforms, in addition to encouraging and developing different forms of public-private partnerships, that will contribute in the revitalization of the public sector and in bridging the gap between the latter and the competitive segments of the private sector.



CONCLUSION and recommendations

After thirty months of the eruption of the Syrian crisis, the multidimensional impact of this latter on Lebanon tends to be potentially so high that it may threaten the political, economic and social fabric of the Lebanese entity. Politically, the major pillars of the very delicate and fragile equilibrium between the different politico-communitarian Lebanese groups seem to be at risk. This risk is mainly generated by the excessive intentional and unintentional politicization of the sectarian phenomenon, the rise of sub-national identities (the sects) and supra-national ones (different forms of fundamentalism), and consequently the growing divisions and weaknesses of the central authority. Other major factors are converging towards deepening and enlarging the threats that Lebanon is potentially subject to: the eventual deterioration of the economic and social situation in relation with the direct and indirect outcomes of the Syrian earthquake. The major concluding remarks in this respect are the following:

- The economic and social conditions in Lebanon, and especially in the peripheral areas that attract most of the Syria refugees, were deteriorating prior to the Syrian crisis: deficient public services delivery system, weak economic activity with the predominance of “rentier” activities and low value added production, acceleration of unemployment rates and social imbalances, high concentration of marginalized groups and poverty gaps, etc....
- The Syrian crisis has exacerbated the above mentioned phenomena in many regards, especially with the expected increase of the total resident population – with the Syrian influx – by around one third or one half during the years 2013 and 2014. While this drastic fact will induce a more or less similar increase in total labor supply, labor demand – especially from operating

establishments – seems not to absorb such increase. On the contrary, with the increasing trend in unemployment rates during the pre-crisis period and the expected decreasing trend in economic growth rates in the coming two years, one should rather expect the ongoing reduction of already existing jobs, namely precarious jobs.

- Stakeholders' response – from Lebanese government, international NGO's, local NGO's, foreign donors...– has been significantly less than the estimated requirements. The response widely varied from one actor to another, and was evidently subject to a deficiency or lack in coordination. Besides the interventions of these different stakeholders has quasi exclusively concentrated on emergency and relief, with the absence of significant development components. The Lebanese government that has provided tangible support, from its own resources, especially in terms of education and health services, seems definitely incapable to deal with the growing needs of the increasing number of Syrian refugees.
- The municipalities and unions of municipalities – in Lebanese hosting areas – that have borne the dorsal responsibility of providing public utilities (water, electricity, solid waste, sewage system...), without additional financial support from the central government, are no longer able to assume such kind of responsibility. It is worth mentioning that the total municipal expenditures prior to the crisis did not exceed an average of 0.7 or 0.8% of total GDP which clearly shows the scanty capacities of local authorities.

Based on the overall outcome of the analytical assessment of the socio-economic impact of Syrian crisis on host communities, the scene is set for a series of major general recommendations that aim at enhancing the forthcoming response to the crisis. These recommendations do not replace the current relief response

but rather complement it and, redirect it towards a more comprehensive and sustainable approach:

The availability of data and monitoring tools: The actual status of data in Lebanon is characterized by significant weaknesses which hampers the production and quality of research. In fact, the conducted assessment shows the lack of information pertaining to both macro-economic data and socio-economic indicators, especially on the local level. Such data are necessary for a continuous monitoring of the conditions of refugees and host communities. An “observatory” of the impact of the Syrian crisis is required in order to centralize and continuously update the produced data and coordinate efforts of data producers. Therefore, policy makers will be able to build accurate, robust and prompt strategies.

A development approach: The forthcoming response to the crisis should go beyond the strictly “distributive” and humanitarian approach, and be based on a developmental alternative characterized by the following: i) covering a medium to long term time frame; ii) adopting integrated and multi-sectoral interventions, with high intrinsic synergies and external economies; iii) targeting both the national and local level, and addressing not only the immediate consequences of the Syrian crisis, but also the grass rooted bottlenecks and distortions that existed long before this crisis. In that sense, any stabilization program – as focused on in ISEA report – should not be considered as a final goal by itself, but should be an integral part of a very well determined development approach. The table below illustrates this conceptual framework.

Table 17: Relief, Stabilization and Development perspectives

Perspective	Relief	Stabilization	Development
Time frame	Emergency	Emergency Short Term	Emergency Short Term Medium to Long Term
Beneficiaries	Refugees Indirectly host communities	Refugees Host communities	Host communities Indirectly refugees
Scope	Ad-hoc interventions	Ad-hoc interventions National programs	National comprehensive plan, with local dimension
Sectors	Priority sectors	Sectoral approach	Integrated approach
Counterparts	UN agencies NGOs	GoL Local authorities UN agencies NGOs	GoL Local authorities UN agencies NGOs
Type of interventions	Ad-hoc Punctual	Targeted assistance Temporary	Structural Sustainable
Cost effectiveness	Operating costs (Opex)	Operating costs (Opex)	Investment (Capex)

- **A core public investment program:** The main pillar of the development approach should consist in a major public

investment program, focusing mainly on the priority sectors in view of ensuring sustainable development outcomes.



Based on the already elaborated programs dealing with infrastructure rehabilitation and development (CDR, different Ministries...), the needed approach should review and reprioritize infrastructural capital investments at both the national and the municipal levels, in such a way that adequately copes with the prevailing economic and social deterioration. The launching of such an ambitious public investment program constitutes more than a necessity, and has strong theoretical and empirical determinants, given the fact that the expected decrease in private local and foreign investment, which is implicated by the overall political and economic uncertainty, will negatively affect the global demand.

- **Job creation** should be seen as a top priority concern of the ambitious public investment program: The declining trend in job creation prior to the Syrian crisis, coupled with the unprecedented increase in labor supply due to this crisis (30% to 50% increase in labor supply in just two years), sheds clearly the light on the extreme importance of this prioritized and strategic concern. While expecting the increase of unemployment rates from 11% in 2010 to around 20% in 2014, it is a matter of fact that the remedy to this unbearable increase cannot – and should not - be mostly addressed through subsidizing such a tangible percentage of unemployed among the active population. Lobbying in this regard for the creation of a national consensus among different public and private stakeholders, should be dealt with as a top priority.
- Within this job creation alternative, great efforts should be deployed to prioritize **labor-intensive investment projects** (public transportation projects including eventually north-south railway, water and irrigation, dams and hydro-agricultural projects, solid waste, pre-requisite oil industry infrastructures, etc...), with a focus on job creation for both nationals and Syrian refugees, including low-skilled labor. Similar

efforts should be undertaken in order to provide establishments (SME's) with fiscal (and other than fiscal) stimulus, encouraging them to absorb first time job seekers and especially new flows of graduates from universities and vocational and technical education, and to impose the “labor component” parameter as a major criteria for the selection of Lebanese and international companies, implicated in public work bids and contracts.

A central role of the Government: the Government (and other related public entities) should be the effective owner of the overall development program, in terms of concept, design, follow-up, control, and monitoring and impact assessment. It is known that Lebanese public administration is suffering from severe distortions and bottlenecks at many levels: juridical, institutional, decision-making process, monitoring, human resources, management skills, etc...The actual crisis must be seen however as an opportunity to launch and implement a set of tailored reforms, in an attempt to alleviate the above mentioned distortions and bottlenecks. Developing and encouraging different forms of public-private partnerships – with respect to big scale public investment projects – may be an integral part of the needed orientations. The PPP will contribute in enhancing governance, transparency and cost effectiveness of public investment, in addition to a better allocation of surpluses in bank deposits. It will also potentially contribute in the medium term in bridging the gap progressively between the public sector and the competitive segments of the private sector.

An efficient institutional framework: An institutional set up must be overarching the medium and long term developmental response. The government of Lebanon must obviously take the lead on the process, through a reactivated and revitalized inter-ministerial committee which includes the concerned Ministries (with a specific role of MOSA) in addition to the CDR and other related public entities. The technical component of this committee should

be very well equipped in terms of high skilled human resources, clearly defined and efficient prerogatives, in addition to transparent procedures, and easy access to available data basis in the public sector. this inter-ministerial committee should of course benefit from the technical support of major UN agencies, the World Bank and different Arab funds for development, that may be involved in the process of fund raising.

Greater role of Local authorities: One of the major challenges is to prepare the Municipalities – and especially the Unions of Municipalities - to play a greater and more efficient role in the proposed response. Unfortunately the excessive degree of centralization of the public administration system in Lebanon has historically prevented Municipalities from actively contributing in local development processes, bearing in mind that the total yearly municipal expenditures do not exceed on average 0.6% to 0.7% of total GDP, which is considered to be very low in international comparison. The recent huge influx of Syrian refugees has deeply exacerbated the multi-dimensional and structural problems faced by local authorities, especially with respect to their limited capabilities to provide major infrastructural services and contribute in hosting refugees, and ensuring education and health services. Among the measures and reforms that may be addressed in this regard, one should note the following: the approval and progressive implementation of the decentralization law, the integration of “the simplified economic development plans” – already elaborated in around 27 Unions of Municipalities - within the proposed broader development program, and the notable increase of the financial, technical and human resources of local authorities. Such measures will definitely consolidate the developmental role of Municipalities, and guarantee to these latter greater ownership of local development processes.


A set of recommendations on Syrian refugees influx:

Regulate the Syrian influx of refugees towards Lebanon and their frequent displacements inside the Lebanese territories

Encourage - with the support of the regional and international community - the progressive return migration of the Syrian refugees towards specific areas of Syria where security and living conditions are relatively stable and bearable.

Reorient – as much as possible - the new influx of refugees towards other countries and destinations, in cooperation with the regional and international community.

Enhance and detail the statistical registration tools and processes of the Syrian refugees, and differentiate between those who are considered as refugees per se on one hand, and those who are (and were) on the other hand normally residing and working in Lebanon (in most of the cases informally)




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Brief Assessment of the ESIA report

The review of the WB macroeconomic model (as part of ISEA report) leads to a set of preliminary comments and concerns, some of which are general and methodological, and others are rather specific to some concrete components of the model.

- In the absence of updated national accounts – based on detailed recent data and outcomes of periodic national and sectoral surveys – the ISEA macroeconomic report has had to rely on relatively rare available data, and extensively on assumptions, projections and benchmarking with similar countries and international cases (of military conflict or civil strife). Therefore it is obvious that any change in one of the numerous significant assumptions used in the report is likely to produce more or less drastic changes in the final outcomes of the model, including its financial incidences¹³⁸. This means that these final outcomes should be dealt with carefully.
- One of the major assumptions on the basis of which the model is built, consists in the projected numbers of Syrian refugees during the remaining part of 2013 and the whole of 2014. The figures used in the macroeconomic model in both the low and the high scenarios (in the horizon of 2014), are mainly based on the data gathered by UNHCR. Although the gathering of such data by UNHCR is a considerable and commendable effort, the resulting data remain nevertheless subject to questions and a number of limitations (see CRI regional report). One of the main limitations is that the projected figures of UNHCR are mainly the result of a simple linear projection,

138 Moreover, the report does not mention the results of a sensitivity analysis that would test the robustness of the model's results to various changes in its basic parameters. Nor does the report present the results of any tests of statistical significance or goodness of fit of the econometric model.

which does not sufficiently take into consideration the future evolving path of the Syrian crisis, and especially the huge efforts deployed recently by the Lebanese Government to contain or at least slow down the rate of influx of Syrian refugees. In fact, additional conditions, mainly financial, have been recently imposed by the Lebanese authorities on the entry of Syrian refugees into Lebanon.

- The econometric model focuses essentially on quantifying the effects of the decreasing trend of GDP growth rates due to the Syrian crisis. Thus, it estimates the annual loss in GDP and the resulting cumulative loss during the period 2012-2014. One of the critical issues to be addressed in this regard is how to dissociate between the economic impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon GDP on one hand, and the impact of other exogenous factors on the other. The model does not concretely clarify how each of the major components of global demand (i.e, private and public consumption, private and public GFCF, exports, etc.) will be specifically affected by the Syrian crisis, and consequently what will be the relative contributions of these impacted components on the GDP growth rates in 2013 and 2014, in comparison with their historical trend (as illustrated in the Lebanese National Accounts for the years 1997-2009).
- The incidence of the crisis on the sectoral distribution of the economic added value is not sufficiently justified and clearly explained in the WB report, knowing that this incidence has varying implications on many other important aggregates, related namely to employment and income distribution. Furthermore, it seems that the simulation of this sectoral distribution has been closely related to the immediate pre-crisis situation (the base line being set in 2011, or in some cases in 2009-2010), rather than to the long term trend that governs the growth rates of the different sectors. It should be noted in this respect, that economic growth rate

in 2011 was more or less equal to the long term average yearly growth rate registered all over the period 1993-2010, while the one registered on average in 2009-2010 was more than the double of 2011 growth rate. This means that projecting major economic indicators on the basis of the former base line may differ significantly from projecting these indicators on the basis of the latter one.

- More specifically, the model does not lay out sufficiently strong arguments that justify maintaining the projected share of "Industry" out of total GDP at the pre-crisis level (or the slight increase of this share), knowing that Industry seems to include, in this model, the "construction" sector whose share in GDP in the last decade has been on average 70% to 80% higher than that of the strictly industrial sector. It may be argued that a relative increase in the share of Industry per se may be justified to some extent, due to the additional consumption demand by the refugees on food and other local low value added consumer products, and due also to the expected relative decrease in real wage implicated by the acceleration of competition between Lebanese and Syrian workers. But such an increase or even stabilization cannot be easily expected in the case of the construction sector (which the report includes in "Industry"): in fact, the political uncertainty, the decreasing trend of remittances and FDIs, and the eventual increasing trend of Lebanese middle class emigration – that are the most important target group concerned with real estate transactions - will most probably have a negative impact on the construction sector (and thus the related industrial activities). For these reasons, maintaining the share of Industry (including Construction) at the pre-crisis level is not easily defensible. This argument may be further strengthened by the fact that the Government has the intention to increase direct taxes on real estate transactions in the fiscal year 2013-2014, in order to finance the cost of the last official wage adjustments decided for the public sector during 2012 and



2013. In any case, the published current figures on real estate transactions for the first half of 2013 show a significant decrease in this sector, in comparison with the same period of 2012.

- The investment ratios used by the model are also questionable to some extent. In fact, investment was exceptionally high and had reached a peak during the adopted base line (the 2 years 2009 and 2010), amounting to around 34% to 35% of GDP. This share far exceeds the long-term investment historical trend registered during the decade 1998-2008. Thus, maintaining this ratio during the projection period 2012-2014 at a relatively high level (28% to 29% out of GDP) does not seem justifiable in light of the internal and external political instability, the current deterioration of the local investment climate, and the multiple forms of economic pressure currently exercised on Lebanon by the governments and private sectors of GCC countries, which are usually the main partner of Lebanon, in both the trade and investment spheres. These types of concerns are exacerbated by the fact that private investment – which proved to be very sensitive to political and security shocks – has represented an average share of 90% to 95% of total investment since the end of the reconstruction period (1993-1998).
 - Some important data used in the WB model and covering the pre-crisis period differ significantly from official data published by CAS, or reported in the national accounts documents. The WB has been known to sometimes reassess and fine-tune the primary data provided by the Lebanese Government, using its own methodology and benchmarking processes. These discrepancies between figures should however be explained and clarified in order to reach a strong and common understanding between the government and international organizations, including the WB. Among the most striking examples of such discrepancies, are the data pertaining to exports and imports in the pre-crisis
- period (as a percent of GDP), and especially to Lebanon's services export values (Figure 13 of the WB report) which vary widely from similar values presented in the National Accounts of the year 2009 (Chapter 5, table no 25).
- In the same perspective, one should note that the figures of the WB report covering estimates or projections related to Public Finance indicators for the current year 2013, present more or less significant differences with the actual statistics recently published by the Ministry of Finance for the first 6 months of the same year. For example, while the WB model expected an increase in total public expenditures of around 590 billion of L.L for the whole year 2013 (in comparison with 2012), actual figures recently published by the Ministry of Finance show that this increase has already amounted at 830 billion L.L. at the end of June 2013. It is obvious that such differences either in expenditures or in revenues will impact the projected overall fiscal balance arrived at in the WB model, and most probably, the fiscal deficit ratio will increase at the end of 2013 and 2014, at a higher rate than the projected one.

Baseline Indicators and Statistical Annex¹³⁹

1	MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT			
1.1	Real Sector			
1.1.1	average real GDP growth rate	2006	from 2007 to 2011	
		0.6%	7.1%	
1.1.2	annual growth rate in services exports	2008	2009	
		44%	38%	
1.1.3	share of net inflows (of services, income, transfers, and capital) to GDP	2009		
		60%		
1.2	Fiscal			
1.2.1	overall fiscal deficit (percent of GDP)	from 2002 to 2011	2002	2011
		9.7%	14.9%	6.5%
1.2.2	public debt (percent of GDP)	2006	2010	
		180%	140%	
1.3	Trade Sector			
1.3.1	average annual export growth rate	from 2000 to 2010		
		22%		
1.3.2	share of exports to GDP	2010		
		11.4%		
1.3.3	share of total imports transit by land through Syria	2010		
		6%		
1.3.4	share of total exports transit by land through Syria	2010		
		20%		
1.4	Tourism Sector			
1.4.1	Tourist arrivals	Jul-10		
		361,964		
1.4.2	hotel occupancy rates	Jul-09		
		52.2%		
1.5	Banking Sector			
1.5.1	Lebanese banks' assets in Syrian branches (in billion USD)	2010		
		2		



1.5.2	Lebanese banks' market share of total deposits and lending in the Syrian banking sector	2010 22%		
1.5.3	Lebanese banks' market share of total deposits and lending in the Syrian privately-owned banks	2010 60%		

2	HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT			
2.1	Health			
2.1.1	life expectancy for females (years)	pre-crisis 75		
2.1.2	life expectancy for males (years)	pre-crisis 71		
2.1.3	infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	pre-crisis 9		
2.1.4	under five mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	pre-crisis 10		
2.1.5	maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	pre-crisis 25		
2.1.6	immunization coverage	pre-crisis 98%		
2.1.7	Births attended by skilled health personnel	pre-crisis 98%		
2.1.8	Non communicable diseases share of all deaths	pre-crisis 84%		
2.1.9	beneficiaries of MOPH financing who are suffering from three diseases or more	pre-crisis 29%		
2.1.10	beneficiaries of MOPH financing who are treated with more than three drugs	pre-crisis 26%		

2.1.11	Government spending on health (in billion USD)	2011		
		2.6		
2.1.12	Government spending on health per capita (in USD)	2011		
		622		
2.1.13	Government spending on health (percent of GDP)	2011		
		6.3%		
2.1.14	Public spending on health as a percentage of total health spending	2005	2011	
		45.6%	25.5%	
2.1.15	MOPH budget (percent of the total budget)	2005	2011	
		11.9%	5.8%	
2.1.16	insured population	pre-crisis		
		50.1%		
2.1.17	Out-of-pocket (OOP) spending share of total health spending	pre-crisis		
		60%		
2.1.18	share of household out-of-pocket spending	2005	2011	
		39.4%	56.5%	
2.1.19	public health purchasers (MOPH, NSSF, and other funds) payments to the 137 contracted private hospitals (in million USD)	pre-crisis		
		800		
2.1.20	MOPH payments to the 137 contracted private hospitals (in million USD)	pre-crisis		
		80		
2.1.21	average reimbursement by MOPH per hospital admission (in USD)	current		
		988		
2.1.22	number of visits to primary health centers network	2009	2012	
		723,891	1,102,066	
2.1.23	number of pregnant women who use primary health centers services	2009	2012	
		13,122	26,666	
2.1.24	number of prescriptions of chronic medications to beneficiaries by PHC network	2012		
		156,850		



2.1.25	total number of chronic medication drugs dispensed	2012		
		460,480		
2.1.26	ratio of hospital beds per 1000 population	pre-crisis 3.5		
2.1.27	occupancy rate of hospital beds	pre-crisis 56%		
2.1.28	ratio of physicians per 1000 population	pre-crisis 3		
2.1.29	ratio of pharmacists per 1000 population	pre-crisis 1.2		
2.1.30	ratio of dentists per 1000 population	pre-crisis 1.1		
2.1.31	ratio of nurses per 1000 population	pre-crisis 1.8		
2.1.32	number of private sector owned hospital beds	current 10,214		
2.1.33	number of public sector owned hospital beds	current 1,688		
2.1.34	share of public sector owned hospital beds	current 14%		
2.2	Education			
2.2.1	enrollment rates in primary education	2004 92.7%	2007 92.8%	2009 99.2%
2.2.2	enrollment rates in Intermediate education	2004 68.5%	2007 72.0%	
2.2.3	enrollment rates in Secondary education	2004 42.3%	2007 53.5%	2009 85.6%

2.2.4	gender parity index at secondary school attendance	pre-crisis		
		1.1		
2.2.5	Number of Contracted Teachers	2010		
		8924		
2.2.6	share of secondary school age children who are still in primary school	pre-crisis		
		5%		
2.2.7	share of public schools	2009-2010		
		47%		
2.2.8	share of students in public schools	2009-2010		
		30%		
2.2.9	public school share of pre-school service provision	current		
		19%		
2.2.10	non-free private school share of pre-school service provision	current		
		66%		
2.2.11	free private school share of pre-school service provision	current		
		15%		
2.2.12	public sector results for the Brevet (grade 9)	pre-crisis		
		55%		
2.2.13	private sector results for the Brevet (grade 9)	pre-crisis		
		74%		
2.2.14	repetition rate in schools	2010-2011		
		18.2%		
2.2.15	share of public schools that have access to piped water systems	2011		
		78%		
2.2.16	number of students per toilet in public schools	2011		
		25.3		
2.3	Employment and Livelihoods			
2.3.1	average annual labor force growth rate	2004-2010		
		2.2%		



2.3.2	average annual share of working age population growth rate	2004-2910		
		1.7%		
2.3.3	labor force participation rate	2004	2010	
		44%	46%	
2.3.4	average annual number of jobs created	2004-2007		
		3,400		
2.3.5	average annual employment growth rate	1997-2009		
		1.1%		
2.3.6	unemployment share of labor force	pre-crisis		
		11%		
2.3.7	average durations of unemployment spell	pre-crisis		
		close to one year		
2.3.8	unemployment rate among women	pre-crisis		
		18%		
2.3.9	unemployment rate among youth	pre-crisis		
		34%		
2.3.10	unemployment rate among university graduates	pre-crisis		
		14%		
2.3.11	unemployment rate among those with secondary education	pre-crisis		
		15%		
2.3.12	unemployment rate among those with no education	pre-crisis		
		10%		
2.3.13	unemployment rate among those with primary education	pre-crisis		
		7%		
2.3.14	informal wage employees share of workers	pre-crisis		
		19%		
2.3.15	self-employed share of workers	pre-crisis		
		36%		

2.3.16	Syrian workers share of total labor force in the country	pre-crisis		
		17%		
2.3.17	number of Syrian workers in the country	pre-crisis		
		300,000		
2.4	Poverty and Social Safety Nets			
2.4.1	number of poor population - living on less than USD 4 per day - (million people)	2008		
		1		
2.4.2	share of poor population - living on less than USD 4 per day - (%)	2008		
		27%		
2.4.3	number of extremely poor population - living on less than USD 2.4 per day - (people)	2008		
		300,000		
2.4.4	Share of extremely poor population - living on less than USD 2.4 per day - (%)	2008		
		8%		
2.4.5	share of Lebanese citizens who claimed they do not have money left after paying for basic needs and necessities	2012		
		Over half		
2.4.6	share of Lebanese citizens who claimed not being able to afford the basic necessities at some time	2012		
		63%		
2.4.7	Government spending on social safety nets (percent of GDP)	2010		
		1.3%		
2.4.8	annual number of beneficiaries of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) social safety nets	2011		
		350,000		
2.4.9	number of health services provided by Social Development Centers	2011		
		260,000		
2.4.10	number of social services provided by Social Development Centers	2011		
		64,000		
2.4.11	number of training services provided by Social Development Centers	2011		
		8,000		



2.4.12	number of education services provided by Social Development Centers	2011		
		5,000		
3	INFRASTRUCTURE			
3.1	Water and Sanitation Sector			
3.1.1	share of Lebanese population who have access to the potable water network	pre-crisis		
		79%		
3.1.2	continuity of potable water supply in the summer (hours/day)	pre-crisis		
		7.6		
3.1.3	continuity of potable water supply in the winter (hours/day)	pre-crisis		
		13		
3.1.4	costs of inadequate public water supply - alternative, informal and private sector water supply (percent of GDP)	2009		
		1.3%		
3.1.5	cost of health impacts of water and sanitation problems (million USD per year)	2001		
		7.3		
3.1.6	costs of bottled water consumption (million USD per year)	2001		
		7.5		
3.1.7	cost of inadequate potable water, sanitation and hygiene (percent of GDP)	2004		
		1%-1.2%		
3.2	Urbanization			
3.2.1	share of Lebanese population living in urban areas	2011		
		87%		
3.2.2	share of Lebanese population who reside in large agglomerations	2011		
		64%		
3.2.3	annual average MPWT spending on construction/reconstruction (million USD/year)	2008-2012		
		65		
3.3	Solid Waste Management			
3.3.1	share of landfilled solid waste to all municipal solid waste	2011		
		51%		
3.3.2	share of dumped solid waste to all municipal solid waste	2011		
		32%		

3.3.3	share of recovered solid waste through sorting and composting to all municipal solid waste	2011	
		17%	
3.3.4	number of open dumps	2010	
		670	
3.3.5	number of sanitary landfills	current	
		3	
3.3.6	solid waste generation rates (average weight of solid waste produced by one person in one day) in rural areas (kg/capita/day)	2010	
		0.75	
3.3.7	solid waste generation rates (average weight of solid waste produced by one person in one day) in urban areas (kg/capita/day)	2010	
		1.1	
3.3.8	cost of solid waste collection and disposal (USD/ton)	2010	
		40	
3.4	Municipalities		
3.4.1	number of municipalities	current	
		1,008	
3.4.2	number of unions of municipalities	current	
		42	
3.5	Electricity Sector		
3.5.1	installed generating capacity available at peak (MW)	current	
		2,019	
3.5.2	demand of generating capacity at peak (MW)	current	
		3,195	
3.5.3	share of available generating capacity (supply of electricity) to demand	current	
		63%	
3.5.4	the national average daily power supply (hrs/day)	current	
		18.3	
3.5.5	annual cost of government subsidies to EdL (percent of GDP)	2012	
		4%	
3.5.6	annual cost of government subsidies to EdL (billion USD)	2011	2012
		1.7	2.2



3.6	Transportation			
3.6.1	length of total road sector network (Km)	current		
		21,705		
3.6.2	length of International Roads network (Km)	current		
		529		
3.6.3	length of Primary Roads network (Km)	current		
		1,673		
3.6.4	length of Secondary Roads network (Km)	current		
		1,367		
3.6.5	length of Internal Roads network (Km)	current		
		2,811		
3.6.6	length of Municipal and other local roads (paved for most part and unpaved roads) network (Km)	current		
		15,325		
3.6.7	share of main network in good condition	current		
		15%		
3.6.8	share of main network in fair condition	current		
		65%		
3.6.9	share of main network in poor condition	current		
		20%		
3.6.10	spending on road maintenance by MPWT (in million USD)	2008	2011	2012
		39	120	175
3.6.11	share of annual spending for the maintenance of municipal and local roads by MPWT	current		
		25%		
3.6.12	spending on the maintenance of local roads by municipalities (in million USD)	2008	2012	
		4.3	19.6	
3.6.13	annual average MPWT spending on the maintenance of roads network (million USD/year)	2008-2012		
		100		
3.6.14	annual CDR expenditures in the road sector (million USD/year)	2008	2012	
		110	210	

3.6.15	share of loans of CDR's budget for roads	pre-crisis		
		50%		
3.6.16	traffic volumes in the Greater Beirut Areas main arterials (thousands vehicles per day)	current		
		50-80		
3.6.17	peak hour traffic volumes on the northern approach to Beirut - Dbaye&JalEddib - (thousands vehicles per hour)	current		
		7		
3.6.18	number of vehicles (in million)	current		
		1.2		
3.6.19	share of private cars to total number of vehicles circulating in GBA	current		
		80%		
3.6.20	share of vehicles circulating in GBA to total number of vehicles	current		
		50%		
3.6.21	number of formal (registered) taxis	current		
		33,000		
3.6.22	number of informal taxis	current		
		55,000		
3.6.23	number of formal (registered) minibuses	current		
		4,000		
3.6.24	number of informal minibuses	current		
		16,000		
3.6.25	number of formal (registered) buses	current		
		2,200		
3.6.26	number of informal buses	current		
		3,500		
3.6.27	share of taxi fleet that operates in GBA	current		
		50%		
3.6.28	number of trucks of over 3,500 kg capacity	current		
		15,000		
3.6.29	share of owner-operators of the total Lebanese common carrier truck fleet	current		
		one-third		



3.6.30	average age of the current truck fleet (in years)	current		
		25		
3.6.31	number of trucks that crossed the Lebanese borders from Lebanon heading abroad	2010		
		105,000		
3.6.32	share of Lebanese trucks to total number of trucks that crossed the Lebanese borders from Lebanon heading abroad	2010		
		30%		

Employment Status	Share of Labor Force
Employer	5%
Self-employed high skilled	5%
Self-employed low skilled	31%
Formal wage employees	29%
Informal wage employees	19%
Unemployed	11%

Road Sector Expenditures (In millions of LBP):

Category			2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
MPWT	Maintenance	Maintenance of International Roads	3,015	3,015	20,050	25,175	37,235	88,490
		Maintenance of Main Roads	30,150	40,250	30,150	40,250	55,325	196,126
		Maintenance of Secondary Roads	4,975	7,085	10,100	20,050	39,195	81,405
		Maintenance of Internal Roads	452	151	65,275	50,200	64,370	180,448
		Maintenance of Other Roads	20,050	24,874	50,200	45,225	67,385	207,734
		Total maintenance	58,793	75,375	175,925	180,900	263,360	754,353
		Construction	61,355	81,405	117,585	122,108	104,470	486,923
	Total MPWT	120,148	156,780	293,510	303,008	367,830	1,241,276	
	CDR	163,413	196,578	202,458	315,068	313,259	1,191,078	
	Municipalities	6,482	16,281	19,598	24,572	29,547	96,480	
Total	290,044	369,640	515,566	642,649	710,637	2,528,837		



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