



*The Development and Use of  
Governance Indicators in Africa*  
**A COMPARATIVE REPORT**

*Produced by Idasa*



# **The Development and Use of Governance Indicators in Africa**

## **A Comparative Study**

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# Acronyms

APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AR	Assembleia da República (Parliament)
BdPES	PES Progress Reports
CAJDHL	Parliamentary Committee of Constitutional Affairs, Human Rights and Legality
CSAR	Country Self-Assessment Report
CSM	Country Support Mission
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSPG	Cross-Sectoral Planning Groups
DCD	District Coordinating Director
DFO	District Finance Officer
DHMC	District Citizen Monitoring Committee
DIC	District Implementation Committees
DOC	District Oversight Committee
DOs	Development Observatories
DPCU	District Planning Coordinating Units
DPPF	Provincial Directorates of Planning and Finance
ECLSP	Eastern Corridor Livelihoods Security Promotion Program
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EOU	Evaluation and Oversight Unit
FBO	Farmer Based Organization
FN	APRM National Forum
FNGO	Focal Non-governmental Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GES	Ghana Education Service
GHS	Ghana Health Service
GII	Ghana Integrity Initiative
GoG	Government of Ghana
GPRS	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
GRASP	Global and Regional Advocacy for Small Producers
GRPE	Gender Rights and Peace Education
GSFP	Ghana's School Feeding Programme
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
GTLC	Ghana Trade and Livelihoods Coalition
GTZ	German Development Cooperation
HDI	Human Development Index

HGSF	Home Grown School Feeding
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
IDDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDEG	Institute of Democratic Governance
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
ILGS	Institute of Local Government Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IREX	International Research and Exchange Board
ISODEC	Integrated Social Development Center
ISSER	Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research
JTI	Judicial Training Institute
JS	Judicial Service
M/DA	Municipal/District Assemblies
M/DCE	Municipal/District Chief executive
MARP	Mecanismo Africano de Revisão de Pares (African Peer Review Mechanism)
MDBS	Multi-Donor Budget Support
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MF	Ministry of Finance
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs
MINECOFIN	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MIGEPROF	Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion
MLGRDE	Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Environment
MOFA	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
MoH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPD	Ministry of Planning and Development
MTDP	Medium Term Development Plan
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NAPRM-GC	National African Peer Review Mechanism - Governing Council
NCA	National Communication Authority
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDP	National Development Plan
NDPC	National Development Planning Commission
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NETRIGHT	Network for Women's Rights in Ghana
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NMC	National Media Commission

NPoA	National Programme of Action
NPP	New Patriotic Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OBI	Open Budget Index
PAF	Performance Appraisal Framework
PARPA	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
PEF	Private Enterprise Foundation
PES	Economic and Social Plan
PM&E	Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation
PNC	Peoples National Convention
PNDCL	Provincial National Defence Council
POA	Program of Action
PQG	Plano Quinquenal do Governo (Government Five-Year Plan)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Papers
PTA	Parent-Teacher Association
PTR	Pupil Teacher Ratio
PUFMARP	Public Financial Management Reform Program
RCC	Regional Coordinating Councils
RISDP	Regional Integrated Strategic Development Plan
ROPAL	Representation of the Peoples Amendment Law
RPCU	Regional Planning Coordinating Units
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SEND	Social Enterprise Development Foundation
SF-CSA	School Feeding Complementary Service Assessment
SFP	School Feeding Program
SHEP	School Health Education Coordinator
SIC	School Implementation Committee
TI	Transparency International
TWN	Third World Network
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP OGC	United Nations Development Programme Oslo Governance Centre
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNICEF	United Nations Children Education Fund
WACAM	Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining
WB	World Bank



# Executive Summary

Good governance is one of the bedrocks of successful development. The ability to assess governance is therefore important both in terms of how that evidence can be used to influence policy and how policy can, in turn, influence governance outcomes. Assessments are also useful to establish benchmarks, objectives and targets. That said, generic assessment tools can lack national ownership and engagement in the process as well as investment in ensuring a change in outcomes. These tools also rarely include the necessary disaggregation that would capture the impact, experiences and perceptions of marginalised groups in society, especially the poor and women. Finally, such tools usually do not address capacity deficits within developing countries, deficits that impact on the measurement and monitoring of governance.

This research, through country studies conducted by reputable non-state actors, looks at three African countries through the lens of questions of governance and the use of governance indicators. The three countries – Ghana, Mozambique and Rwanda – were selected because of linguistic and administrative peculiarities in their colonial legacies, as well as their divergent paths to independence and in post-independence administration and experience. The study asked each country partner to find some specific cases which reflected two concerns. First, whether or not evidence-based decision-making forms part of the political process, and if not, why not? Second, whether governance can be improved by focusing on the development of national plans driven by a number of agreed upon indicators.

The idea of “evidence-based decision-making” has gained currency on the African continent. The research reveals however that, although the discourse around indicators is present, the implementation of assessments as a tool for decision-making, or as a means of generating relevant information, remains weak. As a result, performance assessments and other forms of evaluation involving governance indicators, remain the preserve of a few institutions and organisations. There are instances in which indicators were developed in collaboration with other stakeholders but in the majority of cases, the process happens unilaterally. In fact, where governance assessments are concerned, government collaboration with donors is more frequent than a similarly participatory process with civil society. As such, the citizens of the countries studied played little part in the assessment and monitoring of the extent to which the state delivered on developmental issues.

The outputs of the study are threefold. The first is a research overview that provides a succinct picture of the study as a whole. The overview uses the study conclusions and lessons learnt to establish a way forward from a policy perspective. The second output is this synthesis report which considers the case studies through close analysis of the indicators identified, the producers and users of the indicators in the different contexts and, where relevant, the established impact of indicators on decision making. The cases were selected for the access they provided to insights from different stakeholders and sectors. Where possible, they also spoke to different levels of government and to interactions between civil society and government. The report considers these case studies; analyses them within the country context and then where possible across countries. Finally, the three in-depth country studies can be accessed and read independently.<sup>1</sup>

When considering the lessons learned and conclusions drawn, it is important to bear in mind that the study sought to gain a greater understanding of the issue within specific contexts and, where possible, to examine common experiences from a comparative perspective. As a result, although some generalisations can be made based on these findings, the arguments in support of such generalisations are subject to interpretation.

# Introduction

The United Nations Development Programme Oslo Governance Centre (UNDP OGC) contracted Idasa to execute a Comparative Study on the Development and Use of Governance Indicators in Africa. The aim of the “study is to better understand the building and functioning of national governance monitoring systems and in particular the development and use of indicators in the field of democratic governance within these systems, with a view to produce clear policy recommendations to donors to inform donor strategies, as well as national counterparts, including government and civil society.” The study seeks to understand if governance indicators are used to inform decision-making and, if so, can they or are they being used as a basis upon which to measure performance, by internal and external actors.

The UNDP OGC notes that there is a growing recognition of the importance of democratic governance for sustainable development and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Consequently, there is an increasing interest in monitoring of improvements and progress in governance at the national and sub-national level and thus a growing demand from both governments of developing countries and international development partners for national monitoring systems.

A prolific range of tools to assess governance has been developed, often relying on global datasets<sup>2</sup>, some enabling comparisons over time and across countries and regions. However, while this data is a rich source of information for a range of analysis, it seldom points to particular institutions or institutional arrangements as the cause of governance challenges, nor does it help identify appropriate operational solutions and performance improvement processes. These often-generic tools can thus only be of limited help in policy-making processes.

The uniqueness of each governance situation must not be forgotten and thus one size fits all solutions and approaches to governance monitoring and assessments are not enough. Generic tools often lack national ownership and engagement in the assessment process. They also rarely include the necessary disaggregation to capture the impact, experiences and perceptions of marginalized groups in society, especially the poor and women. Moreover, such tools usually do not address eventual capacity deficits that often exist in national administrations in developing countries to ensure an effective monitoring system.

The precise definition of the concept of governance varies from source to source. In exploring this idea, the choice of definition affects the range and nature of indicators that one is able to associate with it. What one would hope to avoid is the simplistic approach of making a list of basic structural requirements and then ticking them off. A constitutionally mandated parliament or, more importantly perhaps, an electoral management body, does not automatically ensure good governance. Similarly, if one takes the indicator of “public participation”, existing and comprehensive legislation that should facilitate effective participation cannot serve as a definitive assessment of the “lived” quality of participation. Hence, in addressing good governance, global indicators need to be complemented by the development of indicators that can address the specific, contextual issues that may undermine or contribute to governance.

This report is a synthesis of three Country Reports produced by partners in Ghana, Mozambique and Rwanda. The countries were principally selected because of their participation in and completion of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which runs as a crosscutting theme between the Country Reports. As the APRM process involves the development of measurable indicators, it was assumed that governments and civil society familiar with the APRM as an assessment tool would have had a basic introduction in the formulation and implementation of governance indicators. The aim, then, was to draw lessons from the efficacy of the different national approaches to the implementation of the APRM recommendations and the way in which its conclusions have been incorporated into national planning.

In addition to crosscutting studies such as the APRM, case studies unique to the selected countries explore instances in which governance indicators can or are being used/developed in relation to a specific issue. As with the crosscutting case studies, these contextualised case studies attempt to demonstrate how indicators are developed and applied, and whether or not decision-making is or can be enhanced through such tools. Internally generated indicators and assessments tools are anticipated to be more effective in that they promote local ownership, and thus the participatory nature of formulation and implementation have been highlighted and explored.

The unique case studies, along with those that cut across the three countries, provide examples in which the development and use of indicators varies greatly. In some cases, particularly those relating to the APRM, it is clear that some thought has gone into the development of indicators, although the extent to which they are used to measure progress on governance matters is often questionable. However, with the range provided in

the case studies one is able to identify the gaps where the development of appropriate indicators would improve the process of assessment.

An additional intended outcome of the study is the promotion of “evidenced-based decision-making”. The various case studies attempt to assess the extent to which indicator-based information shapes or influences the direction and content of political discourse and decision-making. Caution must again be applied in this regard, as the forces that impact on decision-making within the political arena are diverse and representative of various interests, often emanating from the dictates of the ruling party and its leadership, if not explicitly then implicitly. In this context, the pulse of “political will” plays a critical role in understanding the way in which priorities are set and decisions made. This study will attempt to draw out those instances in which one could postulate that some form of evidence shaped either stakeholder interests or political will, and whether the composition, substance and presentation of that evidence could enhance the impact it has on decision-making.

## Structure of Report

To facilitate the analysis of the country-specific and crosscutting case studies, the report is divided into four principle sections:

1. Defining Governance and Governance Indicators;
2. Presentation of the Country-Specific Case Studies and Analysis;
3. Presentation of the Crosscutting Case Studies and Analysis;
4. Lessons Learned and Recommendations.

Information was drawn directly from the country reports, with the provision of additional components and analysis. Each unique case study highlights the information relevant to the use of indicators, whether that be instruments, actual indicators, institutions or processes. Much of the background and context have been omitted to allow for a focus on the main area of interest.

The second half of the report contains the crosscutting case studies. Particular attention is paid to the process, or instruments, involved in these studies, as both the APRM and National Development Plans (NDPs) are based on overarching frameworks.

The analysis sections that follow the two different sets of case studies provide generalized information about the incidence of variables as they appear in the case studies. Based on a system of coding, the analysis template provides an overview of the extent to which different stakeholders engage with other stakeholders as the developers and users of indicators, what indicator themes are most prominent, and the methodological approaches used in the application of indicators as assessment tools. The analysis sections attempt to address the following questions:

- Who are the developers of indicators?
- What are the dominant governance themes for which indicators are developed?
- Who uses indicators?
- What type of information is used to facilitate the use of indicators as an assessment tool?

The case studies provide snapshots into specific areas in which governance indicators can or are being used. It is important to note that these case studies provide only a limited picture of the extent to which indicators are formulated and/or applied. For instance, the information used as the basis for the analysis sections does not reflect the use or non-use of indicators for the entire country, but is only specific to the issues or topics that are examined. Furthermore, during the scoping mission that led to the selection of the case studies, it was apparent that indicators did exist and were, to various extents, used. These studies and the information provided give some insight into the effectiveness of indicators when applied to a particular topic, and, more importantly, whether or not it has any impact on the process of decision-making. The emphasis of the analysis section specifically is on what kind of indicators were used and/or developed in order to ascertain whether or not there are examples of best practice that could be applied elsewhere.

The analysis provided below is based on coding of the information provided in the case studies. The material was assessed in terms of the occurrence of pre-selected indicators, such as “Who Developed the Indicators”, “Who Used Them”, “What Category of Governance Indicator is it”, etc. The overarching template for this process was the Governance Indicators developed by the UNDP under the broad rubrics of Efficiency, Transparency and Participation. These, like many other indicators, represent “families” of proxies or are aggregated indicators. In some cases, it should be noted, the case study does not provide a comprehensive look at a particular topic,

such as the National Development Plan, and it is often the case that other indicators, apart from those mentioned, also exist.

In conclusion, the report will look at some of the lessons learned in the implementation of this project and offer a set of recommendations on how the results can be used, developed further and applied by stakeholders and interested parties.

## Scope of Work and Methodology

The research analyzes the political economy of the production and use of governance evidence at the country level, with a view to developing policy recommendations. The research keeps end users in mind, and was designed to support current governance assessment processes within the selected countries, with a view to assisting national stakeholders.

The research analyses country-specific drivers of supply of, and demand for, governance evidence. This includes looking at official as well as unofficial data and communication and dissemination of this data to understand the dynamics of the supply side. It also includes looking at the demand-side of governance evidence and asks questions such as: Who uses the data and for what purposes? Who are the actors and groups that have a strategic interest in using data to better voice their interest but do not have access or for other reasons do not use data? The starting point for such analysis includes an examination of country-specific policy processes, and how data is used at the various stages in policy-making and in political debate.

## Methodology

Three countries were selected to participate in this study: Ghana, Rwanda and Mozambique. In each country, a research institution/organization was engaged to produce reports based on an agreed upon set of objectives.

- Ghana: The Institute for Democracy and Governance (IDEG).
- Mozambique: The Centre for Democracy and Development Studies (CEDE).
- Rwanda: The Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP).

An initial visit to the three countries was conducted to identify the stakeholders and processes relevant for the selection of the country-specific case studies. The basic guideline for the selection of these was indicator use or instances in which the development of governance indicators could play a useful role in enhancing the quality of decision-making or advocacy.

Each country partner produced a set of pre-determined case studies as well as individually selected and contextually relevant topics:

1. The APRM process;
2. Civil society engagement with indicators;
3. Parliamentary use of indicators;
4. The NDP; and
5. Contextual case studies. (See Appendix for a summary of the motivation behind the choice of case studies in each country.)
  - a. Three in Ghana
  - b. One in Mozambique
  - c. Three in Rwanda

The country-specific and crosscutting case studies were to use the following framework upon which to base the research and results:

- A mapping of national producers of governance evidence;
- A mapping of the use of governance indicators by various key stakeholders and decision-makers;
- An assessment of the impact that governance evidence has in policy making, using:
  - Media analysis;
  - Mapping of how evidence is or is not used in advocacy campaigns by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or political parties;
  - Mapping of how evidence is or is not used in government plans, including monitoring and evaluation.
- An assessment of the state of civil society and political parties and their demand, opportunities and capacities for using governance indicators in their work.

In all countries, researchers used a combination of desktop and structured interviews. In one instance (Rwanda and Decentralisation), questionnaires were used as the basis for analysis.



# Country-Specific Case Studies

## Ghana Case Study One: SEND-Ghana and the School Feeding Program

Since 2005, Ghana has been piloting the comprehensive School Feeding Program (SFP) under the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). By March 2007, the program had expanded to cover 975 schools and benefited about 408,989 schoolchildren<sup>3</sup>. Based on the relatively modest gains of the pilot phase, the government of Ghana, with financial assistance from the Dutch government, developed a scale-up strategy to extend the program to 2010 and a desired reach of more than 1.2 million<sup>4</sup> schoolchildren across the country. The SFP is in line with the 2005 UN World Summit Home-Grown School Feeding (HGSF) program and is a "quick impact initiative" to achieve the MDGs on universal primary education, under-five mortality, poverty and hunger, particularly in communities facing chronic malnutrition and low agricultural productivity<sup>5</sup>.

SEND-Ghana (The Social Enterprise Development Foundation) was elected to monitor the program<sup>6</sup> as part of its broader advocacy campaign around monitoring of governance programs. Through SEND-Ghana's activities, the SFP National Secretariat hoped to facilitate an independent civil society-led Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) of the program<sup>7</sup>. The objectives of the monitoring were to:

1. Increase local stakeholders' active participation and make them the drivers of the SFP;
2. Enhance financial and administrative accountability and transparency of the key implementers and monitor the performance of service providers, regional offices, district and school implementation committees structures of the SFP;
3. Strengthen local food crop producers' access to the SFP.

## The Development and Use of Indicators

SEND-Ghana monitored the SFP in 42 of the poorest districts in Ghana. Each district was divided into six regions, each headed by a SEND-Ghana Field Officer whose main responsibility was to provide technical support to the Focal Non-Governmental Organizations (FNGO)<sup>8</sup>. The field officers also facilitated the planning and execution of district and regional level advocacy initiatives and developed networking capacity within the area that included the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs)<sup>9</sup>.

SEND-Ghana used the following criteria to monitor the school feeding program.

- a) Good governance;
- b) Accountability;
- c) Equity;
- d) Institutional collaboration;
- e) The use of the School Feeding Complementary Service Assessment (SF-CSA) Index (this was adapted from the CIVICUS Civil Society Index to assess the levels and efficacy of the participation of the various institutions);
- f) Assessment of quality of work (quality assurance).

The activities carried out by SEND-Ghana to achieve these monitoring objectives included:

- *Education and training* aimed at mobilizing stakeholders to actively engage in the program. These stakeholders included key ministries, departments and agencies of the program and grassroots actors such as parent-teacher associations, school monitoring committees, women's organizations, NGOs, faith-based organizations, student and youth groups, Assembly members, and District HIPC Monitoring Committees (DHMCs).
- *Participatory monitoring and evaluation* of the activities of the District and School Implementation Committees by the DHMCs, to strengthen accountability and transparency in the use of financial, human and material resources allocated to the program.
- Using information gathered during the monitoring to carry out *lobbying and advocacy* activities to bring about positive changes in the administration of the SFP.

- *Linking the SFP program to farmers*, especially to SEND eastern corridor farmer's co-operatives producing soybean, yam and other food crops to achieve food security.
- *Holding interface meetings* with the District Implementation Committees (DICs), School Implementation Committees (SICs) and the National Secretariat to share key findings and recommendations on how to improve the performance of the program.
- *Financial monitoring*, in which SEND-Ghana monitored the extent to which funds intended for the program were disbursed using the government treasury system.

SEND-Ghana's evaluation reports provided feedback and suggestions regarding the implementation of the SFP. The report used participatory monitoring and evaluation tools to assess good governance and citizen's participation in demanding public accountability and transparency in the use of public resources, grassroots structures of implementation, fundamental principles for effective decision-making, planning and coordination.

The National Secretariat of the SFP recorded 21% coverage of the three-fold program objectives and their corresponding activities in the beneficiary schools by mid 2009.<sup>10</sup> One of the principle objectives of the SFP was to increase enrolment in rural schools where pupils who were previously not in schools came to school. According to the Ghana Education Service Annual School Census Report, the enrolment of some beneficiary schools doubled and the program increased attendance, retention rate and Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR). Another objective of the SFP, to reduce hunger and malnutrition, also recorded some success. According to the Ghana Education Service Annual School Census Report, the SFP reduced malnourishment among schoolchildren in the beneficiary schools. The SFP objective to boost domestic food production and security was however not attained and consequently did not achieve the intended impact on agricultural productivity of farmers. However, reports from Kwamekrom in the Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai District for example, indicated that the program offered ready markets for produce from school gardens that was purchased by the caterers<sup>11</sup> indicating the potential for the program to have a positive impact on domestic food production.

SEND-Ghana's key findings did inform the national policy dialogue. The monitoring and evaluation process provided empirical evidence on the challenges and constraints faced in the implementation of the SFP. SEND-

Ghana then used these indicators to demand accountability and improved performance from the implementing institutions and to engage stakeholders in a National Dialogue. The majority of the indicators were generated by SEND-Ghana itself—thus domestically. However, in its monitoring activity, SEND-Ghana also adapted the CIVICUS Civil Society Index to assess the level of participation in the various implementing institutions. The application of this index suggests the use of international indicators (albeit only to a limited extent) in the monitoring and evaluation of the SFP.

Despite the above noted, it is not clear that SEND Ghana's monitoring had a specific direct impact on the overall project outcomes nor that the results of the monitoring were incorporated into government planning around the project. In contrast to the government approach to monitoring (using numerical indicators), SEND Ghana placed an emphasis on participation and transparency that did enable them to increase interaction between local stakeholders and ensure better monitoring by local stakeholders. However, their attempts at advocacy using the evidence they gathered cannot be said to have been an unqualified success. As a result, detail on, for example, the lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities or the lack of provision of infrastructure to meet increased enrolment needs were issues that the state did not address adequately. While this could have been due to a lack of clarity in SEND-Ghana's advocacy strategy, it could also illustrate a lack of understanding within the government as to the appropriate application of certain types of governance-related evidence.

## Ghana Case Study Two: The Judiciary and Judicial Reform

Over the years, perceptions have arisen amongst the public and some members of the judiciary that the Ghanaian judiciary has not lived up to the expectations set out in 1992. Allegations of inaccessibility to justice, corruption of judges, interference from the executive organ of government, excessive delays in resolving disputes etc., have undermined the credibility and integrity of the judiciary. Taking cognizance of these criticisms, the judiciary embarked upon a reform program to improve its capacity, service delivery, integrity and public image. The main driving force behind judicial re-engineering was an internal recognition of the

need for reform. Although the demand for reform emanated mainly from domestic pressure and debates, the reforms were modeled on successful examples from other countries<sup>12</sup>. In particular, they were tailored along international standards such as the “Latimer House Principles”, the objective of which is to provide an effective framework of relationship between the three branches of government with the aim of establishing the rule of law, the promotion and protection of fundamental human rights and the entrenchment of good governance based on the highest standards of honesty, probity and accountability<sup>13</sup>.

The Judiciary in 2005 set up the “Judicial Reform, Project Development and Implementation Unit” headed by a full time Director, with the mandate to carry out reforms linked to specified areas<sup>14</sup>. The home-grown reforms included the revision of outdated court rules; among others<sup>15</sup>, the establishment of:

- the career magistrate program;
- the establishment of the Fast Track Courts,
- the initiation of a new Commercial Court Complex in Accra housing 34 commercial courtrooms;
- the establishment of Annual Reports for the Judicial Service (JS);
- the establishment of Code of Ethics; and
- the initiation of the Chief Justice Outreach Program.

In Ghana there are two main judicial bodies: the JS and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). A third institution worth noting, though not directly involved in the judicial reform process, is the Ministry of Justice. These three institutions produce the following relevant documents and data:

#### 1. JS

- Annual reports which contain quantified data on their performances and document the number of cases handled within each year.
- Total number of courts in the country during the year.

#### 2. CHRAJ

- Annual report which contains quantified performance data.
- Statistics of cases dealt within the year by type and region/districts.

#### 3. Ministry of Justice

- Sets criteria for performance rating and evaluation of judges.
- Use of international indicators to assess Ghana on money laundering, drugs and human trafficking, anti-corruption, etc.
- Has recently put in place a Monitoring & Evaluation Unit.

Each of the two principle institutions, i.e. the JS and CHRAJ, provide two different sets of data, but as of yet there is no systematic data collection that encompasses the whole judicial system. The establishment of the Monitoring & Evaluation Unit is evidence that the judiciary is interested in monitoring these indicators and judging its own performance. Beginning in 2010, CHRAJ developed a strategic plan which contains indicators for measuring performance. The process of reform is ongoing and there is a need for more technical support for reform to reach citizens.

The reform process so far has been based on qualitative and quantitative indicators. The major qualitative indicators are capacity building and enhancement, procedural revisions and improvement of adjudication processes, promotion of accountability, continuous judicial education, the development of an ethical code, greater access to judicial services, infra-structural development, information and communication technology, and automation of the courts. These indicators are, however, more process- than outcome-oriented. They indicate the various actions the judiciary is taking to fulfill its responsibility and commitment and thus make itself more relevant to society's socio-economic and democratic development. They do not, however, indicate how the judiciary measured the impact of these procedural shifts on the accessibility of justice, the efficiency of the judicial system or a decrease in incidences of corruption.

The statistics on the number of cases disposed of in a year, on cases pending at the beginning of the year, cases filed in the year, etc. at the various courts suggest that the judiciary does seek to produce and use quantitative governance indicators. There is evidence that the judiciary is monitoring these indicators and using them to judge its own performance. These latter indicators could suggest that the number of people enjoying their rights and access to the judiciary in Ghana has improved. The Chief Justice herself noted that "the situation has improved considerably in relation to all the superior courts and some circuit courts—the highest courts in the lower strata of courts—and a few district courts, but sadly that laborious practices still exist in most districts courts; the courts which the majority of Ghanaians access on daily basis"<sup>16</sup>. To what extent this view is based on the simple numerical proxies for access and efficiency is unclear. What is

valuable though is the judiciary's willingness to collect information and evidence on its own functioning and to use that in assessing progress. The further steps necessary include the opening up of monitoring to independent bodies (in the service of objective evidence) and the use of appropriate evidence derived from operational indicators to drive policy change in respect of access and efficiency – an approach that would enable reform in the service of transparency and participation.

## Ghana Case Study Three: The Media and Press Freedom

As of 2009, according to the National Media Commission (NMC), established in 1993 by an Act of parliament, there are in Ghana:

- 700 newspapers;
- 130 radio stations;
- 78% of the media is in the urban areas;
- 14% in the rural areas;
- 7% unclassified media;
- 52% in Greater Accra (the capital);
- 6.1% in the Ashanti region (the dominant ethnic group); and
- 3.4% in the eastern region.

The same research identified the fact that the three major issues that dominated the news in 2008 were politics, sports and drugs, at 26%, 24%, 10% respectively. Conversely, important issues such as health, women and children and development were at the bottom of the list with only 2% media coverage on each topic. Media content is considered too political, about 60-70% of media content is on political issues with the rest on sensational stories, economic issues and sports<sup>17</sup>. Apart from over-representation of political issues, a largely unregulated media has also resulted in abuses such as publication of unconfirmed facts, political colorization of events and a general lack of professionalism.

*The media, to a large extent, takes sides, thereby championing the cause of one political party or the other. The effect has been the publication of unbalanced stories, unsubstantiated facts and defamation, among others<sup>18</sup>.*

One of the underlying weaknesses within this sector is that there is no broadcasting law to regulate the activities of the electronic media, their content and growth, and an inability to sanction “irresponsible” media houses. By not having a broadcasting law, Ghana’s Constitution has given absolute freedom to the media<sup>19</sup>, which has led to a culture within the media that “anything goes.” Part of this problem emanates from the weakness of and political interference in the work of the National Communication Authority (NCA). The NCA was set up as an instrument within the executive branch of government. The chair and board members of the NCA are also appointed by the president. One of the main concerns with this institution is that it is controlled by the state, and thereby able to influence the allocation of broadcasting frequencies<sup>20</sup>. Its work as an independent institution is therefore suspect, and it is further criticised as being incapable of effectively regulating the media.

Another problematic area that can lead to biased reporting and conflicts of interest is that politicians from the major political parties in Ghana, in particular the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), own or are closely associated with some media houses<sup>21</sup> and use this control to promote various political agendas<sup>22</sup>. For example, during the 2008 elections, Radio Gold and Oman FM, publically perceived to be linked to the NDC and NPP respectively, “incited” people to get out and cause mayhem<sup>23</sup>. Such reports from these media outlets during the election heightened the perennial tension between the NPP and NDC, which also had the dangerous effect of heightening tension between the Ashanti and Ewe ethnic groups, generally aligned to these two parties<sup>24</sup>. “Political ownership” thus compromised objectivity because, as noted by a participant in the study, “you cannot bite the fingers that feed you...the media is suffering from objectivity crisis”<sup>25</sup>. One consequence of this is the “publication of already packaged news copies before conducting interviews, one-sided stories, not prompting guests before interviewing them on air, unbalanced stories and politically motivated stories”<sup>26</sup>. Furthermore, many media houses often lack technical expertise and an institutional capacity for proper analysis and enquiries that would enhance objectivity<sup>27</sup>. There is abundant evidence of a glaring lack of professionalism and ill-equipped, poorly motivated personnel in the various media houses. In addition, poorly conducted opinion polls are the principle means by which the media usually undertakes any evidence based “analysis”.

The International Press Freedom Index rates Ghana extremely highly. It is the second African country (after Namibia). However, according to local sources and internal debate, this index obscures certain key features of the



media landscape, including the roles of key institutions. However, there is a broad agreement among major stakeholders that media houses are not always responsible, accountable and objective. Part of this problem emanates from the politicization of the media landscape and media houses, the absence of a broadcasting law to regulate the industry and the weakness of existing regulatory institutions. There is what experts call “media anarchy” in Ghana particularly during elections. This lack of professionalism in reporting induces fear and insecurity in society—a situation that could threaten democratic governance. “Media anarchy” is potentially inimical to national unity, peace and development or the deepening of democratic culture and values.

The study found that no organizations produce indicators as a basis for measuring performance or informing national policy on issues relating to the media. The NMC did produce indicators for assessing the content of news stories in Ghana. The findings appeared in the Media Review of September 2006, but this exercise was not sustained. There is broad agreement in Ghana that there is a need for an effective regulatory framework, a Broadcasting Law and the promulgation of the Right to Information Bill in order to enhance the role of the media in the service of democratic consolidation. There is a need to accelerate the review process of the Right to Information Bill but without sustained evidence gathering it is difficult to establish effective advocacy strategies. The NMC is a strong advocate of the use of indicators to facilitate regulation of the media, in particular, broadcasting organizations, and to have indicators formally incorporated in the law, but has been unable to apply appropriate pressure for the promulgation of the law. If these laws were promulgated they would help in demanding accountability and professionalism from the media. Media experts are querying the performance of the media and demanding governance indicators but the supply side of these indicators has been slow to develop and sporadic.

The case study illustrates how international indicators, such as the international Press Freedom Index, can inappropriately capture the details of certain in-country contexts. That is, in choosing certain proxy statistics, international indicators can obscure qualitative differences in actual operating environments. The challenge for Ghana is that, in the absence of internal (or local) indicator development and use, efforts to improve the governance of the media sector and to strengthen the rights of ordinary Ghanaians are both difficult to sustain and have met with little success. There is therefore an urgent need for stakeholders within Ghana to develop and apply indicators in the service of improved evidence-based policy making in relation to the sector.

## Mozambique Case Study One: The Process of Decentralisation

During the past ten years, the government of Mozambique has made various efforts to improve the living conditions of citizens and promote good governance principles. Several forums have been set up at district, provincial and national level. Development Observatories have also been created as formal forums, headed by civil society organizations, to measure the extent to which the government has implemented activities, and achieved the results and objectives set out by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP). The Development Observatories have been led by the G-20, a network of twenty national civil society organizations, and produce an annual report detailing the efficiency, efficacy and impact, or lack thereof, of the PRSP.

In addition to the Development Observatories, a network of four civil society organizations (Associação Moçambicana para Desenvolvimento da Democracia-AMODE, Centro de Integridade Pública-CIP, Grupo Mocambicano da Dívida-GMD and Liga dos Direitos Humanos-LDH) set up a platform to monitor the performance plan of districts and municipalities. Their first Local Governance Monitoring Report was launched in 2009, with the second report due in 2010. In partnership with District Consultative Councils and Municipal Assemblies, the network defined a social audit as a methodological focus.

A Memorandum of Understanding between donors, civil society and government established a common framework for dialogue and accountability using Mozambican instruments of planning, budgeting and reporting corresponding to the planning and budget cycle. A critical component contained within this MOU is the Budget and Balance of Payment Support section, which involves a mid-year review to measure the targets agreed to during the last year and to set up the indicative targets for following years, both for the predefined Performance Assessment Framework matrix and the Programmatic Aid Partners. Various stakeholders prepare and feed into the mid-year review, using, where possible, existing government instruments, procedures and review mechanisms. The participants in the process are government officials, donor representatives (drawn from various areas of expertise), local representatives and members of civil society. As a result, a Performance Assessment Framework and a Programmatic Aid Partner matrix have been agreed on and include specific yearly targets.

The PARPA II (the second poverty reduction strategy plan), approved in 2006, defined the main indicators to be used to measure progress in decentralisation. The PARPA II was based on the following four pillars, with the addition of the crosscutting themes of gender, HIV/AIDS and decentralisation:

- *Governance* – public sector reform, justice and rule of law;
- *Poverty and Macro Economic Management* – growth and macro economic stability poverty analysis and monitoring systems and public financial management;
- *Human Capital* – health, water and sanitation, housing, social action;
- *Economic Development* – financial sector, private sector, agricultural, roads and infrastructure, energy and infrastructure.

The governance - public sector reform, justice and rule of law pillar has a sub-component focusing on decentralisation and strengthening the institutional capacity of local governance. During the last four years, stakeholders have identified several indicators to measure performance against this objective. As the first and preliminary requirement, however, it was agreed that the central government should transfer 3% of the general budget to all district administrations and 0,8% to municipal administrations. It was also agreed that in 2005, 45% of the 128 districts should have a Strategic Plan for District Development (PEDD), Social and Economic Plan (PES) and a district budget. The PARPA II also sets out the percentage of districts that should realise the formulation of Strategic Plans annually, starting from 50% in 2006, to 70% in 2007; 85% in 2008 and 100% in 2009.

Thus, the agreement reached between the donors and government led to the definition of two main indicators:

- The % of budget implementation at district and municipal level; and
- The percentage of human resources with a higher education qualification at district and municipal level.

Specifically relating to the budget and the decentralization process, the government and donors agreed to measure the increase in revenue generated by the municipalities<sup>28</sup> (in relation to annual budget) per category in 33 municipalities.

In 2007, in addition to those indicators agreed upon within the PARPA II, the government and donors agreed that there was a need to select the 10 new municipalities that would undergo budget re-allocation in the

year. When the new municipalities were approved, it became necessary to identify and develop new indicators to be measured in 2009. This was done in conjunction with Decree 33/2006, approved by the Ministry of State Administration, which authorised the transfer of some competencies and resources from the central level to the municipalities. Based on these improvements in the legal framework, the government and donors decided to put pressure on municipal authorities to increase collection of local revenues.

In this context, both government and donors agreed to set up as an indicator the percentage of own revenue in relation to the annual budget per each category of municipalities (village, cities and capital), referred to as Indicator 13. Indicator 13 is based on the proportional growth of the “municipality’s own revenues” divided by “total expenditure of municipalities”. Because the total includes revenue coming from external sources, including aid, which is not a stable source of financing (differing considerably from year to year), it is difficult to compare this figure for the same municipality in different years or for different municipalities. In order to solve this problem, donors proposed to exclude the external financing component from the total revenue and expenditures, when calculating Indicator 13. This indicator seeks to measure the sustainability and financial autonomy of the municipalities as local governance institutions. Importantly, there was also consensus that one cannot conclude that municipalities are functioning properly by the simple fact that they are able to increase local revenue. In other words, the municipalities needed to improve their ability to generate revenue AND provide better goods and services to their constituencies.

According to the data presented in the table on the following page, the conclusion is that in general, the municipalities increased their own revenue.

However, the implementation of the municipal budget decreased considerably. The data presented by the government revealed that 42.4% (14 of 33) municipalities decreased their level of budget implementation. Apart from Maputo City, all the municipalities had an implementation below 50%.

<b>MUNICIPAL RECEIPTS 2007 - 2008 (in million meticaís)</b>		
Municipalities of Vila	2007 Receipts	2008 Receipts
Metangula	4'468.30	5'963.84
Vilankulo	17'571.30	33'848.67
Cuamba	12'997.90	21'313.80
Montepuez	14'481.60	25'402.28
Nacala	34'742.00	50'438.54
Gurúe	8'690.40	9'038.02
Mocuba	13'548.30	18'034.50
Manica	12'921.60	22'737.31
Dondo	39'795.80	52'382.00
Chókwe	11'389.70	22'009.26
Lichinga	15'287.60	33'098.20
Pemba	47'721.50	58'340.00
Chimoio	29'215.40	48'285.01
Beira	132'846.30	187'785.51
Maputo Cidade	267'295.50	1'053'352.00

By agreement, the government was required to present information and data to be analysed by donors during the joint review process. Two separate tables were presented by government. One of the tables contained the revenue collected by each municipality in 2007 and 2008. Another table contained all revenue collected in each municipality in 2008. The tables presented were analysed by donors and the outcome was discussed with government. Some challenges were revealed, most relevant to this analysis being that there were questions about the quality of the information presented by the government, which often appeared to be contradictory.

Other contradictory information was found when comparing the data presented by the government with that presented by Xai-Xai City during the National Meeting of Municipalities held in 2008. The table below indicates the contradictory information provided. This inconsistency of information raised some suspicion and gave the impression of a lack of coherence in the data presented by the government as a way to measure the targets achieved in each performance evaluation framework indicator.

Source of information	2007	2008
Government data presented during JR	26.702,10	39.230,67
Data on Xai-Xai Municipality Report	28.904,508,00	41.885,444,00

Apart from the delay in information, a lack of government transparency and systematic changes of the indicators, it is important to mention that the definition and monitoring process of the indicators remained the exclusive preserve of the donors and government.

Two conclusions can be made based on the information above: although the municipalities boosted the percentage of own revenue generated, implementation remains a critical problem. However, there is a question about the accuracy of the data presented by government. Another conclusion is that the proportion of own revenue generated needs to be better clarified. As an indicator, the government and the donors agreed that the same measurement criteria must be maintained in 2010 and 2011. It was, however, also agreed that the indicators must be redefined to add a measure for financial implementation at municipal level. In recent years, there has been inadequate engagement between the state, academics and civil society in assessing performance, and preparation of narrative evaluations of the indicators and targets. This would suggest that not all sectors are adequately prepared or motivated to participate actively in this exercise.

In 2007, donors had a negative position related to the previously defined indicators. For example, during the mid-year review, donors identified that the transfer of resources from provincial level to the district level remains low and noted that there is a bottleneck rather than a steady flow of important resources. Although the government of Mozambique has made an effort with regard to the availability of resources for investment (about 4% of the budget goes to the district), this process is not accompanied by empowerment of district administrations since only 2% of budget operation is allocated. In general, the functioning expenditure transferred to the district from provincial level has been quite unbalanced (30.4% of the budget in Nampula Province, against 3.5% in Manica Province). Additionally, there is an unstable distribution of resources between provinces unexplained by information on the components of poverty and population. (There are cases where the most populated provinces receive a smaller budget than others, and the level of poverty does not explain the inconsistency.)

Evidence suggests that parliament has considerable capacity limitations when it comes to monitoring and evaluation (oversight). For example, even though more of the support staff now have higher education degrees, they still only play a secretarial function. In addition, due to budget limitations, the critical research unit continues to suffer from a lack of skilled staff that could support parliamentary Standing Committees in policy for-

mulation and oversight. Although some Standing Committees do attempt to fulfil their function, due to the inadequate budget they are unable to monitor and evaluate government policy implementation in all provinces. For instance, committees are only able to visit one to two provinces per year. As a result, they lack the information-gathering capacity that would be necessary in order for them to effectively participate in and contribute to the mid-term review of the implementation of the executive's annual plan and corresponding budget. This lack of capacity in parliament is a constraint on their ability to engage in the process of monitoring using governance indicators.

The indicators discussed above are seen as the relevant instruments to measure how the objectives, activities and results could or should be achieved during the implementation of government activities. However, the identification of indicators requires consensus amongst the different partners involved in the formulation of the programme (government, donors, civil society and others). Also, the identification of indicators requires mutual compromise amongst the partners to achieve their goal. In Mozambique, the definition of indicators and the way to measure them remains a contentious issue between the main national and international partners. Government, donors and civil society organizations have had difficulty reaching consensus on what are the most relevant indicators, and the goals to be measured and achieved.

## Rwanda Case Study One: Decentralisation and Citizen Participation in the *Imihigo* Planning and Evaluation

**D**ecentralization is the process through which government has been brought closer to the citizens in order to improve the local voice, accountability and to make service delivery more responsive to local needs. The 2000 decentralization policy in Rwanda has three phases, each with a particular target:

- Phase 1 ( 2000- 2005): establish legal, institutional and policy reforms to redesign administrative entities, reinforce the role of the district as the core local government authority and to provide elections;

- Phase 2 (2006-2010): extend the decentralization process by enhancing service delivery, building local administrative capacity, strengthening planning processes and promoting community participation in the planning and management of local affairs;
- Phase 3 (2011-2015): reduce the number of administrative layers and strengthen the partnership between state and non-state actors.

Much of the decentralization process emanates from on traditional practices. The concept of decentralization, or rather decision-making at the local level, is not in and of itself a novel idea. Although not all of the following examples are specifically related to administrative or fiscal decentralization, they provide a clear indication that the idea of decentralized action and decision-making is a viable and necessary concept adhered to by many Rwandans. Some of those tools are:

- 1) *Ubudehe*: at the village level, where citizens organize themselves, formulate and realise an action intended to benefit one of their own, especially the more needy;
- 2) *Gacaca*: a form of restorative social justice in which citizens in a village sit together and engage one another on genocide crimes that were committed in the area;
- 3) *Abunzi* (mediators): a mediation framework similar to *Gacaca* but focusing primarily on crimes and conflicts;
- 4) *Umuganda*: development work done by community members at the lowest local administrative entity once a month. Once the work is done and before the session ends, there is a “General Assembly Meeting” where all members of the umudugudu discuss issues of common interest.

## *Imihigo* concept: an instrument for performance assessment

Good local or national governance is effective principally when governments are accountable to citizens. In this study, the concept of *Imihigo* is the point of departure for addressing the question of decentralization. *Imihigo* is a revived cultural practice that implies a “self commitment to realize a higher performance”. “Traditionally this was a public pledge made in front of local leaders to perform a brave act or other collective interest achievement”<sup>29</sup>. It is important, however, that clear indicators



can facilitate the assessment of the achievements that accompany such commitments. This concept was re-introduced at a National Dialogue and Consultation Summit (an annual event provided for by the new Constitution), that includes central and local government leaders, members of the Diaspora, and is chaired by the Head of State. During one of these summits, participants expressed their concern that, although each meeting concluded with very good suggestions, these were not necessarily translated into action, especially at the local level.

The *Imihigo* concept is a means by which to ensure that key decisions taken by the annual Constitutional National Dialogue and Consultation Meeting are followed up and implemented. Each District Mayor prepares his/her pledges (*Imihigo*) that he/she signs in front of the Head of State in the aforementioned annual summit meeting. Monitoring frameworks are clearly defined in the “contract” and periodic reviews are conducted. The *Imihigo* also confers a sense of competition between leaders, thereby urging them to reach their targets and objectives in relation to their peers.

The *Imihigo* process is an opportunity for local leaders to be accountable vis-à-vis their citizens; it is also an opportunity for citizens to be part of the planning, implementation and monitoring processes of development projects. A number of tools and sub-processes have been created and institutionalized in order to ensure the participation of ordinary citizens in decision-making throughout the process.

The government of Rwanda has also developed and reinforced a number of mechanisms to coordinate and harmonize decentralization interventions. These include the use of the “cluster” mechanism at the national level (gathering stakeholders operating in the same field) and the Joint Action and Development Forums (JADF) on the local level. Relationships between the JADF and the Community Development Committee (an official administrative organ at decentralized level) also contribute to reinforcing capacities in terms of evaluation and implementation and follow up of the vision as well as the development plans.

National, regional and international partners who were engaged in governance assessments of Rwanda issued, together with recommendations, a number of indicators related to decentralization. These are as follows:

No	Indicator	Origin	Disaggregation	Frequency	Source	Baseline
1	District government expenditures published and available	JGA	By sector, programme	Annual	MINALOC	with civil society verification
2	% central transfers un-earmarked	JGA	By district	Annual	MINALOC MINECOFIN	n/a
3	% of district revenues locally generated	JGA	By district	Annual	MINALOC	n/a
4	% of citizens in target districts who feel they participate actively in local decision-making and that local government is listening to and addressing priority concerns	JGA	By gender, district, by sector	Every three years in selected districts/ sectors	Commission survey from independent organization based on Citizen Report Cards, Community Scorecards	n/a
5	Proportion of citizens participating, at least a month, in the management of social, cultural and political affairs if their district	ICGLR	By gender, district, by sector	Annual	Commission survey from independent organisation based on Citizen Report Cards, Community Scorecards	n/a
6	Increased number of district employees with relevant skills in project management	APRM	By district	Annual	MINALOC	n/a

Source : *Integrated Governance Action Plan, February 2009*

## A Brief Assessment of *Imihigo*

For the purpose of this study, and to fully capture the spirit of *Imihigo* and highlight the role of participation and inclusiveness at the grassroots level, a questionnaire was designed and distributed to 80 citizens in 10 districts, randomly selected in 4 of the 5 provinces of Rwanda<sup>30</sup>. In each district a cell was randomly selected and the questionnaire administered to 4 male and 4 female residents. The principle indicators addressed by the questionnaire are the central concepts of the *Imihigo* process, i.e. its participatory nature; the role of citizens in the development process; the role of stake-

holders in *Imihigo* implementation; the inclusion of the population in the evaluation process. The challenges the population meets in the *Imihigo* implementation were also explored. Some of the results are highlighted below:

## Stakeholders' involvement in *Imihigo* development

Stakeholders	Frequency	Percentage
Local leaders	80	100
NGOs	0	0
Population	42	52.5
Others	0	0
Don't know	0	0

All respondents (100%) declared that at the grassroots level, local leaders are the first actors in the planning of *Imihigo*. 52.5% of the respondents declared that they play a role in *Imihigo* planning, which shows important participation at the local level in *Imihigo* development.

## Role of citizens in *Imihigo* planning

Role	Frequency	Percentage
Preparing household commitment	42	100
Just attending meetings	15	35.7
Giving ideas	28	67
Other	6	14

All respondents (100%) who declared that the population is a stakeholder in *Imihigo* planning revealed that their role pertains to deciding what their households will have to achieve over a specific period (generally 3 months). Another 67% also declared that they participate by providing ideas on what should be addressed by the *Imihigo* process, while 35.7% revealed that they just attend meetings wherein *Imihigo* are planned. This, again, confirmed their participation in the prioritization of targets and issues. Conversely, however, many respondents commented that *Imihigo* uses a top-down approach. They argued that apart from what the residents commit to achieve in their households, *Imihigo* at the grassroots level is

formulated by local leaders who, through community meetings, ensure residents are made aware of and contribute to the implementation of the planned actions.

## Stakeholders in *Imihigo* implementation

Stakeholders	Frequency	Percentage
Local leaders	80	100
NGOs	0	0
Population	80	100
Others	0	0
Don't know	0	0

All respondents declared that citizens implement *Imihigo* for their households and that, in collaboration with local leaders, they implement *Imihigo* in decentralized entities, referring to those *Imihigo* pledged by local leaders. The table below shows the nature of citizens' participation in implementing *Imihigo*.

## Nature of citizens' contribution in *Imihigo* implementation

Nature of contribution	Frequency	Percentage
Manpower	80	100
Money	80	100
Implementing household <i>Imihigo</i> or family pledges	80	100

All respondents declared that they use both money and their own force (labor) to implement *Imihigo*, both at the household and the community level. At the higher level, some respondents noted that local leaders decide on what each household or each citizen shall contribute with regard to a specific objective. However, other respondents contended that the nature and the quantity of the contribution, as a supplement to the available budget, are discussed in community meetings prior to embarking on implementation.

## Level of citizens' participation in *Imihigo* evaluation

Stakeholders	Frequency	Percentage
Local leaders	80	100
NGOs	0	0
Population	21	26
Others	0	0
Don't know	0	0

All respondents declared that the evaluation of the *Imihigo* process is carried out by local leaders, while 26% of them added that the population also takes part in the assessment process. At the household level, most respondents stated that the assessment is done by village leaders, while at the administrative level the assessment is carried out by leaders at the immediate higher level. Importantly, these results show that the involvement of the population in the *Imihigo* evaluation process is minor.

## Challenges to citizens' participation in *Imihigo* process

Challenge	Frequency	Percentage
Poverty	62	77.5
Ignorance	47	58.7
Mindset	18	22.5
Climate hazards	7	8.57
Other	4	5

The above table presents different factors limiting the full participation of citizens in the *Imihigo* process. Poverty and ignorance were cited by 77.5% and 58.7% respectively of respondents as major challenges. It was also found that some citizens do not have sufficient financial resources to contribute fully to the *Imihigo* in both the participation and implementation phases. A percentage of respondents, 8.75%, identified climatic hazards as a challenge impeding their participation. Unpredictable drought in highlands, unexpected heavy rains causing erosion, floods in lowlands, poor harvests, famine and poverty may cause a more "self-centred" versus "community oriented" approach. Many respondents seemed unaware that it is both their right and duty to participate in the planning and evalu-

ation of *Imihigo*. Instead, they believe that it is the responsibility of the government. This clearly indicates that, although *Imihigo* is a traditional concept, the link between this practice and the logic of decentralization and participatory governance is not obvious.

Though described as a good instrument for results-based governance, the practice does face a number of significant challenges. If it is true that *Imihigo* is a practice borrowed from Rwandan culture, it is also true that:

- Linkage to the global “district action plan” needs to be considered. Starting from when this practice of *Imihigo* was introduced in the local government monitoring framework, it appears that the practice has precedence and overshadows other planning tools in the districts;
- Participation, seen from an official angle, refers to different spaces such as *Umuganda* (meaning ‘contribution’, a national day of community service), *Ubudehe* (a locally embedded poverty reduction and community empowerment initiative), *Gacaca* (traditional courts used to try genocide suspects). It should also be understood and measured taking into consideration the extent to which citizens have a direct say in public decisions to address issues pertaining to their direct interests;
- Most of the time, citizens are referred to when it is time to implement policies and other public decisions. But they should also be contacted and involved in the planning as well as evaluation stages;
- Because of the competition aspect of *Imihigo*, some leaders may tend to commit to undertakings beyond their means and capacities. In such cases, leaders may act in ways that ignore citizens’ fundamental rights in order to meet their pledges by any means.

There is no doubt that these spaces are useful and can serve more than one purpose. However, the key question is whether they are appropriate for an ordinary Rwandan, and whether they are the best way to influence political and socio-economic decision-making. Leaders at the local as well as national level of government find that the most threatening challenge to the process of decentralization is a “resistance to change”. This can be observed at various levels, national and local. This resistance allows for the creation of distortions concerning process and objectives, which has resulted in a loss of momentum in the implementation of decentralization.

The *Imihigo* performance contract is one of Rwanda’s particular home-grown solutions to the challenges of monitoring both delivery and performance. It is used as a planning and implementation tool and serves to boost

commitment, performance and competition. Further, it reflects the country's commitment to accountability through self-engagement. This case study interrogated how the *imihigo* system impacts on decentralization, as a governance indicator, and how the measurement of indicators of decentralization through *imihigo* enhances participation and accountability.

*Imihigo*, as a monitoring framework, produces indicators in three major areas of the country's life. Though these indicators seem to be user friendly and objectively verifiable, their development was not participatory enough as citizens and civil society organizations were not actively involved in the process. In Rwanda, the decentralization process was conceptualized and implemented by high-level leaders and was only later introduced to local leaders and ordinary citizens. As an observer has put it, "Rwanda is the best example of a top-down decentralization model that came from high level of the government"<sup>31</sup>. However, recent trends seem to indicate that there is an increasing level of ownership of the process by grassroots populations as they are no longer perceived as just beneficiaries, but also as "full partners", which is in line with the new approach advocated by MINALOC.

As regards citizens' participation in *Imihigo* planning and evaluation, it was established that participation is highest in the monitoring of implementation, but very low when it comes to the development of the contracts and the evaluation of the work or activities undertaken within the contract. It could be more rewarding if these first-hand actors could share in the development of the indicators from the outset in order to increase their ownership of the process and their own accountability within the process. That is, the beneficiaries of decentralization should first be informed about and mobilized in support of the decentralization process.

The central government's decision to embark on a decentralization process in Rwanda should be commended; the question is to what extent local leaders and Rwandan citizens have internalized the process and whether their level of ownership in the process enables them to participate effectively. This area needs further research in order to test the depth of the decentralization governance principle in action.

## Rwanda Case Study Two: Anti-Corruption Initiatives and the Role of Parliamentary Oversight

There are numerous reports on the status of corruption in Rwanda, most of which claim that corruption in Rwanda is decreasing. Relative to its neighbouring countries, for instance, the anti-corruption rhetoric within Rwanda is supported by a measure of political will and action. Available evidence as well as the general climate regarding corrupt officials and their accomplices shows that there is a clear will to fight corruption. Efforts to fight corruption have included institutional as well as societal reforms. To this end, tremendous efforts have been made to introduce and maintain such change. For instance, a number of institutions have been created or reformed to reduce or limit government authority.

The Joint Governance Assessment (JGA) set two main indicators for fighting corruption: the number of successful prosecutions as a percentage of the cases reported to the police and/or the ombudsman; and a comprehensive national survey of the incidence of corruption. These indicators serve as critical markers in the fight against corruption and the results are influential in the process of policy development. It is important that the JGA made a distinction between simply the number of reported cases and the percentage of those cases brought to trial. An increase in the number of cases reported to the police and/or to the National Public Prosecution authority is not synonymous with an increase in levels of corruption. An increase in reported corruption cases could simply be due to the increased number of institutions in place to fight corruption or an increased awareness among Rwandans of the costs of corruption, resulting in more systematic reporting of suspected cases by victims and those who may witness corrupt practices. It is also argued that fluctuations in the reporting of corruption can be explained by a lack of trust or confidence in the institutions where people report abuses when cases are not solved. The most important determining factors are often the rate at which reported cases are handled and whether they are resolved effectively.

One of the principle sources for this type of data is the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman submits a report to the president of the republic and parliament on an annual basis. According to recent figures presented by the Ombudsman, the number of cases reported has increased



slightly since 2007. However, as the table below clearly indicates, there was a dramatic reduction in reported cases between 2004 and 2007.

Year	Cases reported	Handled	Sent to other institutions	Pending
2004	3924	71%	0%	29%
2005	3056	73,8%	2,3%	23,9%
2006	961	71,4%	0%	28,6%
2007	1099	65,6%	17,4%	17%

*Source: Ombudsman's Office, Regional form of strengthening public accountability and governance in East Africa, Kigali, 2008.*

In monitoring the activities and expenditure of the state, the most important institution is that of the Auditor General's Office which submits a yearly report on the implementation of the state budget to parliament.

In a bid to successfully carry out its role as a corruption oversight body, the parliament put in place a legal framework to serve as its basis for action. The principle sources of information for parliament are the reports from the Office of the Ombudsman and the Auditor General. Based on these reports, parliament summons and questions members of the executive in relation to corruption. With no prosecutorial power itself, the parliament can only request that the relevant authorities take punitive measures against officials implicated in mismanagement or corruption. However, a number of ministers have been impeached by parliament and others, fearing impeachment, have resigned. The Rwandan parliament also joined the African parliamentary Network Against Corruption (APNAC) in January 2005.

According to Kalisa Evariste<sup>32</sup>, the parliament often asks members of the Cabinet to provide explanations for a number of cases, including incidences where corrupt practices have been identified. He added that, "given that there are some corruption- and embezzlement-related allegations in many ministries, the parliament has recommended asking the Premier to provide explanations on those cases. He might do it very soon". The MP's view was echoed by the US Department of State (2009:8) in its 2009 Investment Climate Statement, highlighting that the Rwandan government maintains a consistent policy of combating corruption, and that "when corruption involves high-ranking officials, they are dismissed or prosecuted. Senior government officials take pride in Rwanda's reputation as being tough on corruption, and the parliament takes an active role in investigating public officials accused of corruption".

Although not directly involved<sup>32</sup> in the fight against corruption, other

institutions worth noting that can act as key organs in the prevention of corruption include:

- The National Privatization Secretariat serves to remove the government from economic activities that could provide opportunities for recurrent and corrupt practices in areas such as sales, employment, procurement and financing contracts. For instance, it controls all matters relating to the sale of state or public assets, or state “businesses”, which is an area where corruption often flourishes.
- The Public Service Commission is intended to act as an oversight mechanism with regard to employment within the public sector.
- The Rwanda Revenue Authority was created in 1997 to increase public revenues and increase citizen’s compliance with tax laws. By smoothing taxation procedures and non-tariff obstacles, it increases transparency and reduces corruption;
- The National Examination Council seeks to enhance efficiency and transparency in the education sector, combating the practice of confining education to an elite group.

An increase in reported corruption cases could simply be due to the increased number of institutions in place to fight corruption or an increased awareness among Rwandans of the costs of corruption, resulting in more systematic reporting of suspected cases by victims and those who may witness corrupt practices. It is also argued that fluctuations in the reporting of corruption can be explained by a lack of trust or confidence in the institutions where people report abuses when cases are not solved. The most important determining factors are often the rate at which reported cases are handled and whether they are resolved effectively.

It is important to note Rwanda is taking the fight against corruption seriously, and that it is not a case of empty rhetoric. The parliament’s efforts to fight corruption are two-fold: establishing a legal framework for monitoring and dealing with corruption and exercising their oversight function in corruption-related matters. Parliament’s efforts and use of evidence have resulted in the reformulation of policies by the executive. Rwanda still has a long way to go in eradicating corruption. In the words of MP Kalisa, “corruption in Rwanda has a cultural base and is endemic in some social circles”. However, the elaboration of indicators on this issue in the JGA and parliament’s use of the evidence provided by the democratic institutions established to monitor corruption provide the basis for ongoing work in the fight against corruption.

## Rwanda Case Study Three: Representation of Women in Parliament and its Impact on Women's Livelihood

Rwandan society, like many other African societies, is characterized by patriarchal social structures and unequal power relations between men and women. Colonial rule and the changes in socio-economic conditions brought on by this period only exacerbated historically based gender discrimination and inequalities. The abrupt shift from subsistence to a monetary economy based on paid employment and a formal education system, weakened the position of women vis-à-vis that of men. In particular, it weakened their bargaining position on matters concerning their access to and control over resources, and their level of participation in the development process<sup>33</sup>. In response, the basic tenets of gender equality were enshrined in the Constitution of 2003, which provides, in Article 9, paragraph 4, “for a state governed by the rule of law, a pluralistic democratic government, equality of all Rwandans and between men and women reflected by ensuring that women are granted at least thirty percent (30%) of posts in decision-making organs.”

This case study focused on the following questions:

- Which, if any, indicators are used to monitor gender progress in Rwanda?
- Who contributed to their production?
- Who is using them?
- How does the percentage of women in parliament impact on the lives of other women?

Three local institutions or organizations have developed and used a number of indicators to measure or assess gender integration progress in different countries.

The first attempt to create local gender-related indicators was made by the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEPROF) in its gender profile for Rwanda. The gender profiling study was conducted over a period of 3 years (2005 – 2007) and the results appeared in a report in March 2009. The overall objective was to supply MIGEPROF with a document detailing the equity situation between men and women at the national

level, and to ensure gender integration in the implementation of Vision 2020, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) objectives and MDGs. The study focused on eight areas, each of which includes a number of indicators disaggregated by sex. The areas covered were as follows:

1. Gender, population and housing;
2. Gender, economic activity, poverty and capacity building;
3. Gender, decision-making and political participation;
4. Gender, justice, human rights, reconciliation, security and information;
5. Gender, education, science and technology;
6. Gender, health, water and sanitation;
7. Gender-based violence;
8. Gender, sports and culture.

In all of the above sectors, the emphasis was on percentages and examining the extent to which gender is mainstreamed in major national development policies and instruments. Many global gender indicators are based on the quotas of men and women in specific institutions, such as parliaments for example. It is acknowledged that in most countries gender imbalances were or are still based on structural and/or legal biases. Thus, by focusing on such institutions, indicators examine the extent to which women and men are being given equal opportunities to fight gender imbalances.

It is important to note that since the results of the gender profile for Rwanda were disseminated in March 2009, no gender integration assessment has, to our knowledge, been conducted in Rwanda, either by a national or international evaluator. In addition, it is worth noting that the development of the gender profiling indicators was done by consultants hired by the ministry, and was therefore not a participatory process. The absence of such a process of consultation in the gender profiling study highlights one of the recurring and problematic aspects of indicator development. The majority of people interviewed for this study, who had heard of the gender profile, stated that they did not play any role in the development of the indicators. They only became aware of the study when the results were presented to stakeholders during a validation workshop, which included the gender based civil society organizations.

The Rwandan state became the first in the world to achieve a proportion of 48.8% of women in the former parliament legislature (August 2003 to August 2008), and 56.20% in the current legislature (August 2008 to August 2013). The role of women parliamentarians was acknowledged by most respondents, including all representatives of women organizations. In the words of one representative of a women's organization: "In Rwanda, laws used to be made by men in general, and no attention was paid to gender balance. They were men-centered laws. Since the high representation of women in the parliament, most of laws are gender mainstreamed. This shift in the composition of lawmakers affects directly or indirectly, mostly positively, women's lives".

In the formulation and development of laws aimed at promoting gender equality, many of the participants interviewed, including representatives of gender-based civil society organizations, stated that they are used to being consulted by specific commissions of the parliament. This was confirmed by Kalisa Evariste, Member of Parliament, who asserted: "the civil society organizations, and sometimes the population are consulted prior to passing the laws". That said, in the words of one source, "we [civil society] are consulted only when the bill is not politically motivated. In case that it is, the law-making becomes so fast that no opportunity is given to us for comment on the bill", adding that "... or in that case, we were consulted but our comments not taken into account".

Claire Devlin & Robert Elgie state that, "Given the activism of Rwandan women's groups and the high level of women's representation in the Chamber of Deputies, Rwanda provides an excellent case for examining the effect of women's parliamentary representation"<sup>34</sup>. The impact can primarily be seen in the development of new laws that promote the interests of women. Three laws, in particular, were highlighted by study participants:

- the law on prevention, protection and punishment of any gender-based violence (GBV);
- the law on nationality; and
- the law on the identity card.

The law against any GBV, promulgated on 10/09/2008, was initiated by the Rwandan Women parliamentarians Forum. In the words of one women's rights activist, Ingabire Marie Immaculee, "They [women parliamentarians] not only initiated it [law on GBV] but they also advocated and lobbied for it to be passed. I have no doubt that this law is a paramount

instrument to curb GBV in Rwanda". The impact can also be seen in the growing sensitization of the communities on the issues confronted by women. These issues include genocide ideology, gender-based violence, poverty alleviation, education of girls, etc. The Forum of Women parliamentarians of Rwanda supported study tours of women from different districts of Rwanda and cooperated with the Association of Women Survivors of the genocide in visiting and assisting the genocide orphans and widows.

Other activities that should be highlighted include:

- Women parliamentarians through their forum gathered ideas and provided amendments to the bill determining the Responsibilities and functioning of the Gender Monitoring Office. The bill became law n° 51/2007 of 20/09/2007 determining the responsibilities and functioning of the Gender Monitoring Office in Rwanda.
- The same forum conducted research on existing gender blind legislation and established a list of laws to be reviewed (for example, see the above amended laws).
- \* Members of the forum played a significant role in integrating the principle of gender equality in all legislation adopted and passed by the parliament.
- In collaboration with male parliamentarians, the forum of women parliamentarians conducted various field visits around the country in order to understand the nature and magnitude of gender-based violence and to consider viable strategies to curb it.
- Contributing to the drafting, adoption and passing of the law on gender-based violence.

One notable exception, where the high number of women MPs did not seem to play a role, was during the formulation and adoption of a new labour law. This is one of the most controversial laws passed by the parliament since the 2003 elections. As one respondent commented, "since the law promulgation, in most offices, be it at the morning staff welcome or during the break time, the hottest discussions inevitably focus on the maternity leave issue provided for by the new law."

Art. 64 of the new Labour Law stipulates that, "The mother with no maternity insurance coverage shall, during the first six weeks of her maternity leave, have the right to her entire salary. During the last six weeks of her maternity leave, she may resume her work and receive her full salary

or else, have the right to twenty per cent of her salary.” This provision replaced the former one that allowed for three months fully paid maternity leave. It therefore challenged the value of the role played by women parliamentarians. Most respondents blamed women parliamentarians for their failure to oppose the adoption and passing of a law that includes such a provision. “This article brings shame on women parliamentarians. Either they are not independent or they are not fully knowledgeable of their mission. How come that such a discriminatory law was passed in parliament the majority of which is made by women? They failed and they really failed!”

The failure of parliament and female MPs in particular, according to respondents, is that there was no consultation with relevant stakeholders, including women’s organizations, prior to the adoption of the Bill. One representative of a women’s group stated that, “We were only called upon to attend a meeting which aimed at discussing the ways to be used to popularize this law which was already promulgated. We were surprised and despised”. Another respondent commented that, “this law was politically motivated. It was made for investors at the expense of women in particular, and the entire family or household in one way or another. They [parliamentarians] were deliberately so speedy that they did not allow any critical debate on the Bill. Even some of us who participated in some sessions did not all understand what was happening. However, some women in parliament tried to demonstrate the discriminatory nature of art, all but fruitlessly. It looked as if it was an order from the Executive”. This statement was backed up by another respondent who contended that, “I attended a session for the bill drafting. The Deputy Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies came to tell us that the Head of the State had ordered that the bill was to be adopted for the sake of boosting investment”.

The effects of the lack of consultation may have been evident in the fact that women parliamentarians, instead of using their majority in the parliament to promote three months of paid maternity leave, supported the idea of setting up a maternity insurance fund to cover the salary of women on maternity leave. The provision on such a fund was seen by some respondents, including the coordinator of the Forum of Women parliamentarians, as an important contribution from women parliamentarians. According to one respondent, “We [Rwanda] have to conciliate the necessity to boost investment and the right for mothers to enjoy maternity leave. So this is the happy medium”.

Respondents repeatedly mentioned two further criticisms of women

parliamentarians. First, that women parliamentarians did not collect views from women's organizations, specifically on the provision relating to maternity leave. Second, that women parliamentarians did not use their majority to oppose this provision that some respondents termed "anti-Constitutional". Furthermore, the new legislation did not uphold Section 3.17 of the National Gender Policy according to which: "Measures will be introduced to review and revise current legislation to integrate health-enhancing laws, for example better maternity leave allowances."

Gender equality is integral to both the realisation of women's rights and economic development. It is also globally recognized an indicator of democratic governance. Some international bodies have developed indicators and have used them to monitor gender equality in different countries. In Rwanda, with the exception of the Gender Profile for Rwanda developed by MIGEPROFE, no other framework for gender monitoring and evaluation exists. In addition to this, the development of indicators used in the Rwanda Gender Profile was not participatory, given that neither civil society organizations nor women structures were associated with the process. However, the Gender Monitoring Office is expected to develop a monitoring framework.

Despite the lack of indicators in this area, Rwanda has made tremendous efforts to promote women's participation in decision-making, with a world record representation of women in parliament. This high representation has affected the gendered nature of lawmaking in the country, from initiation through drafting to promulgation. The female MPS also participate in other activities that impact positively on the lives of women such as sensitization, advocacy and institutional strengthening. However, women parliamentarians have been criticized for, at times, defending their seats at the expense of the people they are supposed to represent. The reason for such behavior is believed to be related to the fact that voters choose political parties rather than individual parliamentarians. The shortcoming of such an electoral system is that parliamentarians consider themselves more accountable to their parties than to their constituencies. The development and production of indicators on gender equality should therefore take into account the impact of the electoral system on the independence of and power in relation to decision making of women MPs.




# Summary and Analysis of Indicator Use in Country Case Studies

The case studies set out above provide snapshots of specific areas in which governance indicators can or are being used. It is important to note that these case studies provide only a limited picture of the extent to which indicators are formulated and/or applied. For instance, the information used as the basis for this section does not reflect the use or non-use of indicators for the entire country, but is only specific to the issues or topics that are examined. These studies and the information provided give some insight into the effectiveness of indicators when applied to a particular topic, and, more importantly, whether or not it has any impact on the process of decision-making. The emphasis of this section, specifically, is on what kind of indicators were used and/or developed in order to ascertain whether or not there are examples of best practice that could be applied elsewhere.

## Prevalent indicator themes

When taking a broad perspective, it is possible to draw out trends across the countries with regard to the kinds of indicators used, by whom, the governance themes that recur, and upon what data they were/are based. For instance, the majority of indicators used in the case studies measured Participation, Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law. The remaining three themes are not highly represented, with Transparency, perhaps one of the most critical elements in assessing governments, not featuring prominently in any of the country case studies.

In Rwanda, the emphasis was mainly on Government Effectiveness and Participation, whereas Ghana placed equal emphasis on these two and looked at Regulatory Quality. Ghana was the only country where Transparency indicators appeared within the studies. The programmes and processes detailed in the other case studies may have Transparency as an objective, formulated in different terminology, but the absence of elaboration would seem to show that this is not one of the priority areas. In Mozambique, the Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness indicators were discussed, but the case study did not extend to other domains.




The high incidence of Participation as a theme signifies an acknowledgment, across the studies, that this is a principle concern that needs to be addressed. However, one cannot infer from it whether actual participation in decision-making is high or low. Rather, one can assume that the concept of participatory governance is familiar to the stakeholders and seen as an important part of the governance process. On the other hand, the low frequency of Transparency as a theme is not encouraging. For example, participation without transparency can render participatory mechanisms and processes of nominal value. As a theme to be included in governance assessments, transparency was more important for civil society than for the executives, parliaments and the other stakeholders

Government Effectiveness was the main theme throughout the case studies, and little attention was paid to Efficiency as an indicator theme. In part, this may be due to the problematic nature of both defining and measuring efficiency as a governance indicator. This may be associated with a lack of understanding on the part of all or most of the stakeholders, or it could be that efficiency is often conflated with the idea of effectiveness.

## The developers and content of indicators

The executive branch of government stands out as the biggest producer of indicators, with the other stakeholders (civil society organisations [CSOs], donors and parliaments) sharing an almost equal percentage in making up the total. This is apparent when looking across the case studies, but

varies greatly in some instances. In the SEND-Ghana SFP study, it was apparent that this CSO was the primary agent in both the production and use of indicators. From the government's perspective, more attention was paid to numerical data, such as the increase in school attendance and reduction in cases of malnutrition. Although this formed part of the SEND-Ghana evaluation tool, a strong emphasis was placed on measuring the effectiveness of participation in the program's decision-making process. It is not evident that the information generated by the "external" evaluation provided by SEND-Ghana was incorporated or considered in the governmental decision-making process on the setting of targets or implementation of the program. Without such a link, the evidence-based advocacy undertaken by SEND-Ghana could only have limited, if any, success. Interestingly, within this study, both Participation and Transparency indicators were developed by the NGO.




In many instances, indicator development relies on internationally formulated assessment frameworks or objectives. For instance, the reform of the judiciary in Ghana was conducted with reference to the "Latimer House Rules". It is not clear, however, whether those rules then also serve as indicators for measuring the success (or failure) of the reform process. In fact, generally speaking, there seems to be some confusion as to the relationship between objectives and indicators throughout the case studies.

This confusion between objectives and indicators is apparent in Rwanda, where there is an emphasis on the number of women MPs. Of course, the impact of a high number of women MPs is slightly more difficult to ascertain, and it is for this reason that governance indicators need to be developed. To some extent, the emphasis on numbers is the product of international objectives. For many, therefore, reaching targets (or objectives) is associated with improved governance. Again, in the case of the *Imihigo*, the principle form of measurement was the setting of targets or objectives. That the *Imihigo* is a tool geared towards increasing participation of communities in the decision-making process, including the setting of targets and objectives, is to some extent assumed and not necessarily measured

systematically. Leaders are bound to commitments made to their seniors, distorting the democratic notion of accountability. Thus, for government, this form of performance evaluation did not extend beyond whether or not leaders at the various levels had implemented what they had committed themselves to achieving. Evidence presented in the Mozambique decentralisation study showed clearly that local governments were assessed by numerical (financial) targets, revenue versus expenditure, and in so doing measured some success. However, although this does speak to government effectiveness, it is a superficial evaluation lacking operational or process oriented assessments.

### Themes Developed by Organisation/Institution




Throughout the case studies, although two of the seven focused specifically on parliaments, the main interest was on government Effectiveness and Rule of Law (which is also the only category in which all of the stakeholders developed indicators). Efficiency, again, was not addressed.

Participation is a recurring theme in all of the case studies, and the measure (or indicator, where such exists) tends to rely on the number of workshops held, the variety of stakeholders in attendance, or the number of “consultative” meetings, without providing any detail as to how the level or quality of participation is to be assessed. For Participation indicators, the executive, donors and CSOs played the largest roles in the development. However, it would be premature to assume that the development of indicators on Participation by the executive shows a willingness on the part of government branches and institutions to encourage participation in the decision-making process. The development of an indicator on participation only reveals what is perceived to be an important theme to

measure. The causal relationship between the existence of the indicators generally, and the priorities in terms of what areas need to be improved, is not clearly delineated.

Of the principle stakeholders mentioned in the reports, local governments did not seem to play a significant role in the development of thematic indicators, and institutions played a minimal role. Only in the case of Rwanda, with regard to the impact of women parliamentarians on the livelihood of women, was there some evidence that governmental institutions, such as the Gender Monitoring Office, had or will be developing indicators. That this office has yet to produce a set of governance indicators to monitor and evaluate the status of women in Rwanda, despite being operational since 2007, would support the assertion that indicator development remains problematic.

### Themes of Indicators Used by Stakeholders




From the narrative reports, it is possible to argue that some of these indicators were developed in collaboration with other stakeholders. However, the vast majority were done unilaterally with very few instances where the process was collaborative. Government collaboration with donors is more frequent than a participatory process with civil society. Only in Rwanda were indicators developed between local institutions and civil society, and even here this happened more frequently on the national level and not the local level, which is the main focal point of the *Imihigo*. In the SEND-Ghana case study, the CSO concerned seemed to work independently of the government, but did incorporate indicators developed by external actors (CIVICUS). The case studies underline a general lack of communication between government branches and civil society in the development of indicators, which extends to the application and monitoring process.

## Type of indicators used

The case studies make mention of many governance-oriented themes and indicators, but they generally tend to appear as part of a set of objectives or targets. How they are measured is often ambiguous and does not form part of the policies, laws or programmes that are intended to address the specific issue or topic. Thus, a large portion of the indicators in the case studies are undefined. The high number of undefined indicators also reflects the extent to which indicators move beyond the conceptual stage to actual implementation. Much of this is due to a lack of capacity, mainly in understanding how indicators can be used in systematic performance assessments.

**Types of Indicators Used by All Stakeholders**



The case studies reveal that the principle form of data used to inform indicator-based evaluations is quantitative. For instance, in the judicial reform process in Ghana, most of the stated objectives rely solely on objective and quantitative data, such as how many cases are processed or courts established. Similarly, in Rwanda, the impact on the livelihood of women tends to rely on numerical data more often associated with the Human Development Index, for instance. This would suggest that either governance indicators are not used or they are not understood.

Although some international governance assessment tools also rely on *de jure*, or rules-based data, such as the number of monitoring institutions created, international human rights treaties ratified or laws passed for example, these do not provide any qualitative (*de facto*) assessment of how or whether such instruments impact on the socio-political landscape. Few assessments, and a very small portion of the indicators discussed in

the case studies, utilise outcome-based data, given that the impact of laws, policies, etc. is often difficult to quantify or measure. The production of outcome-based data, often qualitative or subjective, is a painstaking process that necessitates significant human and financial resources, not to mention capacity to formulate and conceptualise proxies. This capacity is often scarce. Certainly, to implement governance assessments of this nature systematically and comprehensively is a logistical exercise of considerable scope.

Only in measuring government effectiveness do the case studies reveal the prevalence of outcome-based, objective and quantitative data as the principle or main source of data. It is interesting to note in the vast majority of instances in which the executive was the principle developer of indicators, the technical aspects of the indicators remain largely undefined. While this holds true for civil society as well, this group also relies on rules-based indicators whereas the executive seems to rely solely on outcome-based assessments. The only stakeholder that appears to rely on an equal variety of information is parliament, which, along with the judiciary, generates (or is interested in generating) qualitative data. The incidence of qualitative data being used by the other principle developers of indicators, excluding donors, is rarely mentioned, if at all.

## Impact on decision-making

Observations based on the information gathered from the country reports reveal that, although the discourse around indicators appears to be present, the implementation of this as a tool for decision-making, or as a means of generating relevant information, remains weak. Performance assessments and other forms of evaluations involving governance indicators, remain the preserve of a few institutions and organizations.

The idea of “evidenced-based decision-making” has gained currency on the African continent. It is difficult to know, however, whether this is mere rhetoric or the reflection of a trend within political decision-making processes. The country case studies make it clear that, in the majority of instances, there is no explicit link between indicator-based governance assessments and decision-making by government. There is an assumption that there is some form of impact, yet the extent or nature of that impact remains ambiguous and undefined. Direct causal relationships between the presentation of information or evidence and the impact this may have on the policy or legislative process, is extremely difficult to measure precisely.

In many instances described in the case studies, the involvement of civil society in all stages of the process, from the formulation and application of indicators to the presentation of assessment-based information, is limited. Although provision is often made for the inclusion of civil society in consultative processes, their interests or expertise is overtaken by the agenda of governments (the decision-makers). Even within government, as was noted in the case study on women representation in parliament, it was evident that the potential impact of women on legislation is rendered ineffective when other priorities emerge, regardless of the impact this may have on the livelihoods of women within Rwanda.

It is possible to discern some impact of evidence on those occasions where the information is presented in a quantitative format, such as statistics, numbers, percentages, etc. This is clearest in the case relating to the judicial reform process in Ghana, where many of the objectives were defined in terms of “number of...” but in the area of reducing corruption within the judiciary little information on the process was made available. Ghana also presents two different perspectives on the role of international standards. Whereas the judiciary informed, to some extent, the reform process on the basis of an internationally recognised standard, the new mining legislation in Ghana, despite efforts on the part of other stakeholders to influence the process, seemed to have little if any impact. The relationship between the actors on various levels, such as the international, regional, national and local is therefore difficult to define specifically. International gender-related governance initiatives, of which many women MPs in Rwanda seemed to be aware, had some impact on the generation of legislation, but also failed to impact on the process of labour law formulation.

In most instances, frameworks for assessments or governance-related action are formulated at the national level, and the extent to which this informs action at the local level appears to be inconsistent. For instance, in Mozambique the decentralisation process was undertaken by the national government and applied by local government. However, the capacity to undertake the process of evaluation and assessment imposed upon them by the national government proved to be beyond the skill-set present in local government. Perhaps no locally generated information was made available to the national government during the planning process. In other words, the process was “top-down”.

Even when information or evidence is gathered using informed and objective methods, such as with SEND-Ghana, the extent to which this is



assimilated into the decision-making process is not clear. Some claim can be made that this did have an impact on the delivery of the SFP, but it is also clear that no concerted effort was made by the government to formally incorporate the conclusions generated by SEND-Ghana. Their monitoring and evaluation process ran parallel to the government's program, and therefore relied on invitations by government for opportunities to influence decision-making. In short, in the case studies, the use of indicators, and evidence based on the application of assessments and evaluations in decision-making processes, is inconsistent at best. Many factors contribute to this, primary amongst which are a lack of knowledge regarding governance indicators and a lack of capacity to formulate and implement indicator-based evaluations and assessments.

# Crosscutting Case Studies

## Crosscutting Case Study One: The African Peer Review Mechanism

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a mutually agreed instrument voluntarily acceded to by the Member States of the African Union (AU) as an African self-monitoring mechanism. Its mandate is to encourage participating Member States to ensure that their policies and practices conform to certain political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards, and that mutually agreed objectives in socio-economic development contained in the Nepad process are agreed. Although the criteria for assessing the APRM process in participating African countries are set by the continental APR Forum, through the APR Panel of Eminent Persons, for practical purposes the main interaction is with the Secretariat, which is based in Midrand, South Africa. The criteria are outlined in the APRM Self-Assessment Questionnaire, in which participating countries are given the opportunity to localize them to suit their domestic requirements. The Mechanism is meant to promote peer learning and capacity building by engendering constructive peer dialogue and persuasion. It is an African-owned and African-managed process that is supposed to be transparent and free of political manipulation. It is voluntary and open to all Member States of the AU. By July 2010, 30 states had acceded to the APRM and 13 had been peer-reviewed at APR Forum level.

Performance and progress is measured in four thematic areas:

1. Democracy and Political Governance;
2. Economic Governance and Management;
3. Corporate Governance; and
4. Socio-Economic Development.

Each thematic area has a number of objectives, questions and indicators that each participating country is meant to address.

## The APRM in Ghana

The principles guiding Ghana's APRM are that all reviews should be technically competent, transparent, credible and free from political manipulation with the active participation of civil society organizations. To this end, the governing council appointed think tanks to be the lead institutions in the country's self-assessment<sup>35</sup>. Four separate institutions are responsible for the four thematic areas of the APRM. The Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD) focuses on democracy and good political governance, the Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA) on economic governance and management, corporate governance is assigned to the Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF) and finally, the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) examines the socio-economic development in the country.

The APRM took place in 2005 illustrating the government of Ghana's concern with performance ratings determined by external standards. However, it is worth noting that prior to this in order to enhance its receptiveness to performance ratings and assessment by citizens, the government instituted the Annual Governance Forum and the People's Assembly (in 1998 and 2001 respectively). In the Annual Governance Forum, stakeholders discussed selected issues on democracy and good governance. The People's Assembly is an annual unstructured interaction between the president and the people. The president travels to parts of the country, addresses citizens and answers their questions. The Annual Governance Forum and the People's Assembly have brought government closer to the people and given political leaders the chance to ascertain the concerns of ordinary citizens as well as how citizens rate government performance. These forums indicate that the government is equally concerned with internal performance ratings.

The APRM National Programme of Action (NPOA) was incorporated into the three pillars of the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) which are:

1. Private Sector Development;
2. Human Resource Development;
3. Good Governance and Civic Responsibility.

This is to ensure that the implementation of the GPRS II is linked to the NPOA and the national development agenda. (For detail on the insti-

tutions that monitor the NDP and the indicators that they use, see the analysis of the same later in this report.)

In its assessment of Ghana, the APRM report noted a number of achievements Ghana has attained in the area of good governance, but also revealed deficiencies in the practical workings of the constitution, democracy, institutional capacity, the delivery of public services, the electoral process and the performance of government institutions at various levels<sup>36</sup>. Based on these, the Mission made a number of recommendations to the government of Ghana. Of the ten recommendations, there are clear links of evidence-based policy-making in the implementation of direct elections for district assembly representatives and the establishment of computerized births and deaths registration mechanisms to enhance the state's ability to update the voters roll on an ongoing basis. In some cases, follow through on the recommendations derived from internal pressure rather than the evidence put forward in the APRM report. With respect to other recommendations, the necessity for constitutional review in order to achieve the policy changes has hindered progress. The government has established a Constitutional Review Committee, illustrating some response to the evidence generated by the APRM, but work on the specific amendments has yet to begin. (It is worth noting that one specific APRM recommendation was that the Nepad School Feeding Program, discussed above, should be pursued.)

## The APRM in Mozambique

The APRM was introduced in Mozambique in 2005 and implemented in 2006. The first Country Review Report of Mozambique was concluded in 2008, and the country was peer reviewed at the Forum. The official approach adopted to the process was:

*“based on the principles of complementarity and inclusion to ensure that the operationalization of APRM does not duplicate the already existing review mechanisms and processes in Mozambique. It is critical to clearly define how the APRM relates to these mechanism processes and carefully analyze how they complement one another. This means nothing to the APRM, given to a greater inclusiveness and emphasis on governance indicators; it is a direct contribution to the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF). The inclusion of civil society and marginalized groups, such as disabled, diseased, women*

*and children, is at the very heart of the APRM and therefore, it is an opportunity to increase involvement in the ongoing process of policy review and decision-making. At the same time, the APRM will fill the gap in the PAF, which has often been criticized for paying too little attention to qualitative indicators, particularly in the areas of political, corporate and economic governance<sup>37</sup>.*

The National Forum incorporated the conclusions of the four thematic areas, including what the country considers its best practice in terms of management and policies already implemented. Following this, the report was disseminated to the stakeholders for validation. This report was then submitted to the government and to the continental APRM Secretariat. Based on the material submitted to the APRM Secretariat, which included the Programme of Action, a country review mission was undertaken to ascertain if the country self-assessment reflected the situation on the ground. As in other countries, some issues were identified that had not been adequately addressed. In Mozambique, this included the issue of land privatization. The government did not agree with some of the conclusions and its comments were attached to the Country Review Report and then submitted to the APRM Forum for discussion, comment and adoption. The completion of the first phase of the APRM process in Mozambique, and the production of the report, took almost two years. The APRM Forum peer reviewed the Mozambican report and the Action Plan in June 2009, making Mozambique the 12th country to have reached this stage. The APRM report was approved during an election year, as the government was concerned that its new programme took into consideration the APRM Report and the Plan of Action.

There is, however, an ongoing debate on the use of several instruments and indicators to assess governance in Mozambique. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) with its Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) has its own set of indicators. In addition, the Economic and Social Plan (PES) and the State Budget (OE), also provide indicators. The PES and OE tend to present aggregated indicators, while the APRM Plan of Action presents indicators in detail and in a disaggregated manner. The management and use of this multitude of indicators is therefore somewhat of a challenge. One of the concerns was to ensure harmony between the indicators of the Action Plan of the APRM<sup>38</sup> and the indicators that form part of PES, as well as the indicators of the PAF that are used to assess the country's PRSP. As a result, the APRM Plan of Action did not just complement the existing mechanisms, but attempted to encompass all of them. The APRM process in Mozambique made clear reference to the PAF that the government

and donors will use to assess the country's PRSP. It is, however, too early to judge the outcome as Mozambique has not produced its first annual implementation report.

The APRM claims to be an independent assessment mechanism and thus stresses civil society participation and societal representation. In Mozambique, participation by societal stakeholders was facilitated by the fact that forums already exist for civil society to participate in the discussion and evaluation of governance. In addition, in an effort to include people's perceptions of governance, and given that many citizens are unable to understand indicators such as the GDP, the APRM questions were rewritten in simple language to facilitate information gathering. The APRM, therefore, does appear to be a useful tool to promote the systematic use of governance indicators internally. The participation of parliament, however, was not satisfactory due to the challenge of synchronising the National Forum and parliamentary sessions. There is an ongoing discussion related to the submission of the APRM Report to parliament for approval. In many instances, where parliament participates in political processes, the question of its legitimacy and credibility has often been raised and weighed in relation to the government and other stakeholders. How to ensure the effective participation of civil society and the parliament relative to the executive, political parties, experts and other actors in order to ensure that the process remains independent is a challenge that is yet to be resolved.

Further challenges will come with the implementation of the Action Plan and sustaining the process in a manner that preserves its independence. It can be argued that the Programme of Action commits the executive, parliament and other actors to its implementation in terms of the indicators and the timetable it outlines. That is, Mozambique has to produce an annual report on the progress of implementation. However, the technical units must ensure that the Forum will be able to act independently of the government. The government, through the Ministry of Planning and Development, should identify a focal point to interact with the National Forum. Each thematic group within the APRM must have clear objectives to ease the implementation of related activities. The APRM assessment mechanism is supposed to function as a continuous process. To ensure the understanding and use of government indicators relating to the APRM and effective monitoring of the implementation of the Plan of Action, an information dissemination system must form part of the process. However, it must also be recognised that effective communication strategies are likely to be costly.

The objectives and goals of the APRM are ambitious and it may be unrealistic to think that the APRM “will naturally feed” into the government and donor dialogue. This is principally because the APRM is yet another mechanism added to a number of already existing instruments and processes. The data collection process for the APRM is expensive, particularly for a country where funds for research activities and surveys are not a priority. Most of these activities therefore need donor funding. According to the APRM in Mozambique, by the end of the project period, the government should be able to assume all responsibilities regarding the process of the APRM assessment. Will an African government pay the costs of sustaining the APRM without the support of donors? Some African governments already show reservations about the APRM process, despite it being an “African” tool. Few African countries acceded to the process and those who have done so have experienced difficulties in implementation. In the case of Mozambique, the way the report was produced shows some positive trends, but the challenge will come in sustaining the implementation process.

## The APRM in Rwanda

Rwanda signed the MOU on the APRM on 9 March 2003, committing itself to providing all the necessary resources to facilitate the processes involved at the national level, as well as access to all the required information and stakeholders. The APRM Country Support Mission took place from 21 to 24 June 2004. Rwanda was the second country after Ghana to receive the Support Mission for National Self Assessment.

Stakeholders’ workshops were held with members of civil society and the private sector in March and May of 2004. One of their recommendations was to conduct further sensitization on the APRM with other stakeholders. Additionally, they also created thematic groups to work on the questionnaire. For each section, the report begins with an introduction that provides an overview of the trends and developments in the sector, including a discussion of the standards and codes, assessing the extent of compliance to the standards and codes ratified or adopted by Rwanda. This is followed by a summary of findings from Rwanda’s Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR) and a discussion of the findings of the CRM. Finally, there are recommendations to improve shortfalls in each thematic area by the Panel of Eminent Persons.

The APRM Panel raised governance issues that were to be addressed by the government of Rwanda. These were seen as steps required to bring Rwanda closer to achieving the ideals, principles and spirit of democracy, good governance and socio-economic development as enshrined in the APRM. Among the identified issues were:

- Land and population;
- Political pluralism and competition of ideas;
- *Gacaca* courts;
- Capacity constraints;
- Aid effectiveness; and
- Managing diversity.

For each issue, government authorities were given the opportunity to make observations and clarifications that were then added to the report submitted to the APRM Forum. With many of its conclusions and recommendations well documented and appreciated, there are, however, some that were definitely not supportive of the government of Rwanda. It should also be noted that many commentators believe the APRM momentum and enthusiasm for implementation slowed down after the report was released. This was at least partly due to a lack of mechanisms to translate recommendations into actions, which brought the process to a standstill. Indeed, observation shows that some partners, especially foreign donors, were enthusiastic at the time of the review but are dragging their feet on follow-through.

The APRM proved to be a useful instrument to measure and assess government practices. It can also serve as a baseline in the field of governance. It included internal and external views, had good country coverage, and people participated in its development process. It identified many issues and the government has made efforts to address these. For instance, in the area of reducing government expenditure, the government adopted the “zero fleet” policy, whereby government staff had to stop using government vehicles for personal use, while civil servants were given facilities to hire/purchase their own vehicles. This suggests a positive impact on government effectiveness in financial management.

The APRM is an instrument that used standard international governance indicators but it seems not all were agreed upon by all stakeholders, which led to a lack of ownership on the part of the government of Rwanda (GoR). Its recommendations were partly accepted while an avenue was identified



for further review. For foreign stakeholders, keeping internationally recognized indicators would work for credibility and recognition, while for the GoR, contextualization of standards would bring forward the local realities that are different from one country to another.

#### The Integrated Governance Action Plan (IGAP) and the Joint Governance Assessment (JGA)

With the introduction of the JGA, the APRM process was incorporated (or transformed) into an alternative instrument. The APRM, like other national, regional and international commitments to which Rwanda has subscribed, is being implemented under the framework of the IGAP and within the EDPRS and timeframe (2008-2012). Compared to the APRM, the JGA has the advantage of joint support from the government and development partners because it was a mechanism agreed upon and accepted between them. It is an assessment that was jointly undertaken by the two parties, intended to establish a common understanding of governance processes, problems and priorities, and a framework for assessing progress over the coming years based on agreed indicators and benchmarks.

The JGA is to measure the achievements of the last ten years, up to 2007. It also highlights indicators that are needed to show whether the state is moving in the right direction as far as good governance is concerned. The four thematic areas of the APRM were re-grouped under the JGA and put into three broad categories:

- Ruling Justly (establishing and maintaining security, national reconciliation and transitional justice, rule of law, human right and civil liberties, political rights, and voice and accountability);
- Government Effectiveness (public financial management, corruption, decentralization, public service delivery, and public service reform); and
- Investment Climate and Corporate Governance (ease of doing business, corporate law and governance, private sector advocacy, and state-business relations).

The narrative report contains an assessment and a set of recommendations for each of the three areas and their respective sub-areas. A framework was designed showing indicators to be used for the next assessment in the areas of peace and security, inclusive governance, the rule of law and accountability. The table below is an excerpt of the global monitoring framework that is found in the annexes of the JGA. According to Professor

Shyaka of the Rwanda Governance Advisory Council, it was agreed that there will be an annual review where government and partners can agree on amendments to the said framework.

<b>RULING JUSTLY: Establishing and maintaining security</b>					
Indicator	Disaggregation	Frequency	Source	Availability	Baseline
Percentage of respondents expressing confidence in the performance and conduct of security organs (a score of 3 or 4 on a scale of 4)	Ask separate questions for (1) Rwanda Defence Forces, (2) Rwanda National Police and (3) Local Defence. Disaggregate by gender, district if feasible	Every three years	Perceptions survey to be commissioned from Independent source.	NA	2007 estimate for Police – 85.6% (World Values Survey, forthcoming)
Percentage of respondents expressing a high level of satisfaction in their personal security (a score of 3 or 4 on a scale of 4)	Ask separate question for (1) personal and (2) property security. Disaggregate by gender, district if feasible	Every three years	Perceptions survey Survey to be commissioned from independent source.		2007 estimate for Kigali – 87% personal security, 84% property security (EDPRS security baseline)
Number of homicides per 100,000	Disaggregate by gender, district, categories of crime.				Annual Rwanda National Police Available RNP figures (homicides per 100,000 includes: 'ubwicanyi', 'ubuhoto -zi' and 'kwihekura'): 2002: 7.2 2003: 8.0 2004: 6.6 2005: 5.9 2006: 7.2 2007: 6.1

The production of the JGA means that all government institutions use its indicators and incorporate them in their action plans in order to respond to challenges identified by the JGA. This brought about the creation of an integrated action plan to match the EDPRS implementation period. This has the advantage of integrating all the commitments made by the government, avoiding duplication that may cause a waste of time or money. The JGA indicators are also adapted and incorporated into ministerial sectoral plans and District Development Plans that will be submitted for funding through the Medium Term Economic Framework (MTEF), the driving

mechanism for translating strategies into action. The latter will itself seek to respect governance principles and indicators of transparency, fairness and accountability to support monitoring and evaluation. The JGA process will review the situation downstream and restart the process at strategic level. In addition to fact-based measures, perception-based indicators produced through a survey regularly conducted by an independent body, will supplement the assessment. The framework includes the frequency for gauging the indicator, indicates the sources and compares indicators with existing local baselines.

As many governance assessments in Rwanda have drawn heavily on international comparative standards, they have not been very useful in assessing specific problems facing Rwanda and in helping identify priorities for action. Needless to say there has been controversy surrounding some international indicators that appeared inaccurate or contradictory for different stakeholders. There was a need to improve the understanding by crafting an assessment mechanism that was grounded in the country context. In response to the plethora of indicators included in a range of governance assessments, the JGA was highly commended. It should enable the establishment of benchmarks and standard indicators upon which governance progress can be monitored by both internal and external stakeholders.

## Crosscutting Case Study Two: The National Development Plan

### Ghana and the National Development Plan (NDP)

The legislative framework of the NDP is provided for by the National Development Planning Commission of 1994 (Act 479) mandated to co-ordinate and harmonize sector plans from MDAs and district plans from DAs into a broad, comprehensive and integrated national plan<sup>39</sup>, and to ensure that strategies, policies and programmes are effectively carried out. It is also mandated to make proposals for the development of multi-year rolling plans and, to monitor, evaluate and co-ordinate development policies, programmes and projects.<sup>40</sup> Legal instruments regulate the planning system in Ghana, defining the planning activities and the functional

relationships between the various planning authorities in both vertical and horizontal planning processes. The development planning system has four planning authorities:

- Two at the national level — National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) and sector Ministries/Departments/Agencies (MDAs);
- the Metropolitan/Municipal/Districts Assemblies (MMDAs), referred to as District Assemblies (DAs); and
- At the local level — the Regional Co-ordinating Councils (RCCs).

The first activity undertaken by the NDPC was to prepare a long-term perspective for the National Development Policy Framework, intended to show the strategic direction of national development over a 25-year period, from 1996-2020. The main purpose of this framework (which became popularly known as Ghana-Vision 2020) was to provide a consistent framework for comprehensive development planning over the long term. Its main development goal is to transform Ghana from a poor, under-developed, low-income country into a vibrant, prosperous middle-income country with a per capita income of US\$ 4000 or above<sup>41</sup>. Ghana-Vision 2020 is to be implemented by all sectors of society (central and local governments, national security agencies, print and electronic media and information dissemination agencies, private and public sector operators, including non-governmental organizations [NGOs], rural and urban communities, individuals and groups) in order to achieve the long-term development goal.

The process of developing national development plans in Ghana, to a great extent, can be described as being based on broad consensus. For example, the Ghana-Vision 2020 policy framework was prepared after extensive consultation with citizens, professionals and experts<sup>42</sup>. The consultative process was implemented in phases:

- The First Phase: Professionals were asked to do a situational analysis of the nation, to set the baseline for policy formulation, and to offer advice on the specific thematic areas.
- The Second Phase: The NDPC met the public and professional associations to feed their inputs into the thematic areas.
- The Third Phase: Consultation with cross-sector planning groups. During this phase, draft policies were shown to experts in government institutions, such as the ministries, departments and agencies, judicial service, security services and financial institutions, to allow them to comment on the process and content of the NDP.

Additional consultations were conducted with:

- The public: these were at various regional levels with economic and social groups such as traditional authorities (chiefs and queens), farmers, businessmen, academic and research personnel, teachers, market women, NGOs/CSOs, etc. to collate their views;
- Political parties;
- The parliamentary Committee on Development Planning;
- Development partners such as NGOs, CBOs, bilateral and multilateral stakeholders and co-sponsors of the NDP<sup>43</sup>.

Finally, the NDPC sent a draft policy to parliament for approval and for subsequent development into a NDP. After parliamentary approval, the NDPC prepared a guideline on planning to assist sectors and districts to establish localised development plans, which were then included in the NDP. At the local level, guidelines for the development of the district plans were provided by the NDPC and included a broad framework for consultation with sector ministries at the local level, CSOs and citizens in the communities and districts.

A major problem with development planning in Ghana is that the plans are often abandoned when new governments come to power. This would seem to indicate that it is political parties and/or governments, and not the nation that own development plans.<sup>44</sup> Currently, Ghana is in the process of developing a Medium-Term Development Framework 2010-2013 – Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) – since the coming to power of the NDC.

Because the national development plans are meant to achieve long-term objectives, medium term plans are needed as incremental steps towards realizing long-term goals. Thus, in accordance with its mandate, the NDPC also prepared Medium-Term Development Plans based on the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The MTEF is a three-year budgeting tool that Ghana began using in 1999 when the previous budget system had a problem of line-item budgeting<sup>45</sup> and difficulty in associating recurrent expenditures with capital expenditure. The MTEF was introduced in response to an identified need for performance-based budgeting. The MTEF is based on the principles of a strategic plan, which requires each ministry to prepare a strategic plan. It also ensures the prioritization of programmes and activities for the effective and efficient use of resources. Thus, the NDP is linked to the MTEF<sup>46</sup>. However, the linkage of the NDP to the MTEF is quite weak due to the late submission of the district devel-

opment plans to the annual budget<sup>65</sup>. The NDP needs the approval of the cabinet before it can be approved by parliament. The budget is a rolling budget because unaccomplished policies and programs in the previous year are rolled over into the next year's budget<sup>47</sup>.

The NDPC facilitates the preparation of the development policies in the country but is not an implementation agency. The implementing agencies are usually government ministries/departments/agencies (MDAs) at the national level and metropolitan/municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs) at the local level. However, the NDPC specifies indicators according to thematic areas as a basis for assessing the performance of the implementing agencies. Implementing agencies at the local level can also provide additional indicators derived from their particular environment. The NDPC then collates data based on the thematic areas. Independent consultants are also engaged to collate data from all sectors, districts and sometimes from the public to determine the qualitative aspects of performance. Reports from the NDPC and independent consultants are put together. However, wherever there are disparities in such reports the Citizens Assessment reins supreme<sup>48</sup>. These monitoring and evaluative processes were applied in preparation of the Annual Progress of Reports on the GPRS I & II. These reports are disseminated to the public in all regions and in ministries and districts<sup>49</sup>. Through its monitoring of the implementation of policies and programs by the MDAs and the MMDAs, the NDPC writes up an annual progress report which informs cabinet on the policy decisions relative to the NDP<sup>50</sup>. Successes of the NDP are highlighted and weaknesses are addressed. Cabinet then reviews progress in the overall implementation of the NDP.

The institutional arrangements for monitoring and evaluation are made up of several institutions, units, organizations and mechanisms. These are:


*The Evidence-Based Policy-Making Technical Committee*, which is comprised of representatives from the NDPC, the Office of the President, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) and the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). Its role and responsibilities are to:

- Promote greater coordination and harmonization of M&E activities across all levels of government;
- Ensure better information flows to improve the GPRS monitoring and evaluation system;
- Strengthen the capacity of key central management agencies (NDPC, Office of the President, MOFEP, Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Environment [MLGRD], GSS and MDAs) to generate,

analyze and disseminate M&E information; and

- Improve communication across all levels of government and the wider stakeholder community about M&E processes by addressing the systematic deficiencies in M&E data collection and information flow.

## Institutional Arrangement for Monitoring and Evaluation



Source: GPRS II, National Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (2006-2009)

*The Office of the President* plays a key role in ensuring that M&E is adequately resourced and taken seriously by ministries, departments and agencies. It is also one of the central management agencies and a member of the EBPM Technical Committee.

*The parliamentary Select-Committees on Finance and Poverty Reduction* has oversight responsibility and provides recommendations to the plenary of parliament for approval. It influences government policies on poverty reduction through the annual budget and regular interaction with CSOs. Members of parliament also use the outcome of M&E to influence government policies.

*The Committee on Government Assurance in Parliament* is mandated to follow up on promises given by ministers on the floor of parliament, particularly the extent of implementation and the realisation of development plans<sup>51</sup>.

Parliament, as an institution, engages with development plans indirectly through the annual budget and the annual reports of the MDAs. Accordingly, parliament reviews how the development plan is set out by assessing the development plan of the NDPC for a particular period and how such goals have been achieved or otherwise. Parliament is in the process of developing its own set of indicators to help it assess its own functions<sup>52</sup>.

*MOFEP* plays a significant role in:

- Ensuring that MDAs are held accountable for resource use;
- Strengthening the capacity of key MDAs to generate, analyze and disseminate financial data and
- Ensuring that feedback from the M&E system is fed into policy formulation and implementation through the annual budget.

The *GSS* is the main constitutional body mandated to oversee data collection, analysis, compilation and dissemination activities across government institutions, including all surveys and systematic compilation of statistics and indicators from all major sources of data (i.e. census, sample surveys and administrative records). The *GSS* produces the data from which most indicators for M&E of the GPRS II was derived. It also supports the M&E system by helping in the design of methodologies, approaches and the instruments employed in collecting data at the national, regional and district levels.

*CSOs* serve on the Cross Sectoral Planning Groups (*CSPG*), which are part of the framework for preparing the Annual Progress Report. *CSOs* also collaborate with Regional Planning Coordinating Units and the District Planning Coordinating Units to undertake policy, program and project assessment of services that affect the poor. Furthermore, *CSOs* undertake social audits of budget releases, District Common Funds, funds from development partners and internally generated funds targeted for the delivery of services to the poor. *CSOs* also assist the NDPC sectors and districts to disseminate the National Annual Progress Report on the implementation of the GPRS II to stakeholders.

*Cross Sectoral Planning Groups (CSPGs)* are made up of stakeholders from



MDAs, development partners, the private sector and CSOs at the national level. CSPGs act as monitoring groups at the national level. CSPGs review the performance of the GPRS II in its thematic areas, with particular attention to the indicators selected. They also make suggestions on how evaluations should be conducted, including impact assessment and participatory M&E as well as provide relevant input into the policy formulation processes.

*The Public Expenditure and Monitoring Unit (PEMU)* of the budget division of Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning monitors expenditure programmes of development plans. The Economic Planning Division monitors the growth of the economy and the Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) monitors the disbursement of funds by donors<sup>53</sup>.

*The Policy Evaluation and Oversight Unit (PEOU)* is mandated to develop a data bank of the policies and the programmes emanating from the various government ministries, departments and agencies. It also monitors the aforementioned policies, the cost of the implementation of these programmes, and the time duration of the programmes giving a monthly account of the work in progress<sup>54</sup>. The evaluation is based on an Evidence Based Performance Monitoring System. In addition to the evaluation based on the extent to which the programme has been completed, the assessment also evaluates the actual developmental impact on the target population. Whereas the NDPC monitors medium- to long-term development plans, the PEOU monitors activities on a daily basis.

*District Assemblies* have the overall responsibility of implementing the development goals at the local level and the Municipal Planning and Coordinating Units are responsible for monitoring and evaluation of these<sup>55</sup>.

#### Impact and Analysis of Indicator Use

Even though the NDPC guidelines make provision for adequate and broad consultation, there are discrepancies between theory and practice. Firstly, the consultations were not widely spread. Some key stakeholders, such as parliament and CSOs, were only involved in a limited capacity and given little time to make the necessary contributions<sup>56</sup>. These two stakeholders were primarily involved only in the last stage of the work of the NDPC. In addition, most inputs by CSOs came from urban-based groups, neglecting CSOs at the local level. Similarly, consultation with parliament concerning the GPRS I & II was also limited. Their involvement was at the point when

the NDPC had finished the NDP and wanted to unveil it to the public<sup>57</sup>. At the district level, lack of adequate funds hampered the consultation process<sup>58</sup>.

In addition, key stakeholders interviewed had concerns about the capacity of the NDPC to carry out its monitoring and evaluation mandate and to do so within a reasonable timeframe. In the main, these concerns centred on resource issues. There were financial resource concerns, logistical issues and concerns about the capacity of the NDPC personnel to undertake the monitoring and to achieve nationwide coverage. As a result, there is a concern that there will always be inadequate consultation by the NDPC. Finally, the current NDC government has created an Evaluation and Oversight Unit that could compete with the NDPC in the production and use of governance indicators unless their respective functions are clearly differentiated and stipulated.

The use of indicators to provide evidence for policy makers appears to be further jeopardised by capacity and participation concerns in relation to officials in other parts of the government. For example, not only is there a limited time period for districts to submit their plans to the NDPC but there are concerns that there is a knowledge gap in the districts that prevents officials from making informed decisions in relation to the development plan. This lack of capacity is exacerbated by a lack of professionalism in state institutions due to both the appointment of political party cronies into official positions and the inability of institutions to hire and retain skilled labour. Even parliamentary oversight of the monitoring process is questionable given that MPs do not appear to receive publications from the Committee of Government Assurance, prejudicing their ability to ask relevant questions in relation to the process.

The use of indicators in the monitoring of government performance in the achievement of the NDP suffers from three further complications. First, issues of access to information and the quality of information. There is no incentive for or commitment from state actors to the sharing of information. This makes measurement of indicators problematic as, despite indicators existing, there is no data or analysis to use in determining progress towards or a lack of progress in the achievement of the indicator. In addition, there is a lack of standardization in the measurement of indicators across MDAs which compromises the quality of reports and, timely production of reports is a problem across MDAs which prevents the preparation of accurate national monitoring and evaluation.

## Mozambique and the National Development Plan

The Mozambican planning cycle overlaps with the political cycle and is broadly based on the election manifestos of the contesting parties. The winning party in the general elections has a five-year mandate and this gives it the prerogative of presenting the Five-Year Government Programme. The preparation of this programme follows a methodology that must include the so-called “Agenda 2025”. It must also take into account the country’s international commitments, which includes policies and programmes associated with the MDGs, the Regional Integrated Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and NEPAD. A particular emphasis must also be placed on the APRM.

After its approval by parliament, the Five-Year Government Programme (whose Portuguese acronym is PQG) becomes the foundation for other plans and programmes, including mid-term strategies, Provincial and District sector strategic plans, and short-term (operational) planning instruments, such as the Economic and Social Plan (PES) and State Budget. The Mid-Term Fiscal Framework, which covers a three-year period, is updated annually and is a tool to forecast expected revenues, expenditures and informs the preparation of the Annual State Budget. Recently the government introduced programme budgeting, which only covers investment expenditures. This has been a step forward for monitoring, since this approach allows for a multi-annual costing of interlinked activities, and consequently to a more integrated vision of government programmes.

The PQG is also a politically oriented document, and is operationalized through specific policies, programmes and the PES. Among the strategies stemming from the PQG is the second poverty reduction plan (PARPA II). Despite PARPA’s relatively short life-span (currently only 4 years, from 2006 to 2009/10), it can be considered the de facto national development strategy because it embodies the main set of policy priorities. It also informs the negotiation between donors and government, since the monitoring of its activities is the main input for decisions on general budget support. PARPA II (2006-2009) focuses on poverty reduction and informs the elaboration of the PES and the state budget. It is also one of the mid-term strategies stemming from the PQG.

An innovation of PARPA II was its costing, although it is not used as a tool for operational budgeting, which is set out by the Mid-Term Fiscal

Framework. However, although the Mid-Term Fiscal Framework is increasingly used as the main mid-term tool for budget planning, its use is not binding, since formally it has a lower status than ordinary annual budgets, which are approved through a law enacted by the parliament. The Mid-Term Fiscal Framework is also frequently by-passed in the normal decision-making process, because the government's plans and budgets are included in the proposals that are submitted directly to parliament, without necessarily being compared with what had been planned in the Mid-Term Fiscal Framework. This means that the flow of information from decision-making bodies, such as the Council of Ministers, to the technical units responsible for preparing and disseminating the Mid-Term Fiscal Framework is deficient. Consequently, there is a lack of harmonisation between the annual budget and the Mid-Term Fiscal Framework.

In the area of governance this dilemma is more critical. A study carried out by the Center for Public Integrity in 2008 reveals that there are mismatches between the PES, the annual budget and the Mid-Term Fiscal Framework. Budget allocation to key governance areas also tends to be concentrated at the central level, despite the political rhetoric about decentralisation and the steps taken forward in de-concentration and in promoting local participation in planning and budgeting.

Ensuring ownership of governance policies embodied in the NDP hinges on the existence of genuine political will, combined with appropriate technical capacity within the country. Shifting the principle relationship from one of donor-government accountability to a process driven more by a citizen-government focus increases ownership as well as long-term accountability. The specialization of non-state actors in policy areas and promoting constituency-based activism among civil society organizations can help broaden and strengthen ownership. This can also create citizen driven demand for better performance in government. Political will has been largely absent in the implementation of the NDP, which would account for the modest performance of government thus far, and active citizenship may be the only means of influencing and rectifying this problem.

In comparison to PARPA I (2001-220), the process of formulating PARPA II has been an improvement in terms of country ownership and the participation of local actors. PARPA I faced many criticisms, particularly as it was seen as a stand-alone programme running in parallel with the PQG. There was also a perceived lack of participation from non-governmental actors in its design and monitoring. The criticism of PARPA I led

to the establishment of poverty observatories, later called Development Observatories, which are forums where government engages with CSOs to discuss the implementation of PARPA. Development Observatories are also present in the provinces and are chaired by the provincial governor. Further, PARPA II includes a Governance Pillar, which has four main themes: Decentralisation; Public Sector Reform; Justice Sector and Public Security/Order; and Anti-corruption.

There is no consolidated monitoring and evaluation system in Mozambique<sup>59</sup>, but a set of three basic mechanisms can be identified as follows:

- *Monitoring of processes and results.* This consists of quarterly, bi-annual and annual PES progress reports, prepared by sector planning/economy directorates and provincial units responsible for planning. In this process, output/execution indicators are used with three approaches: qualitative, quantitative and participative.
- *Budget monitoring.* This process has two key components, programming and execution, and comprises the analysis of budget proposals and the analysis of expenditures.
- *Impact evaluation.* This is carried out through econometric (quantitative) and socio-anthropologic (qualitative) analyses, which are combined in the production of the Impact Evaluation Report (RAI). This process includes a participation component involving the Development Observatories, Local Councils and Annual Joint Reviews.

The rationale is that these mechanisms are complementary and feed into the overall planning process. However, government currently relies primarily on the PES Progress Reports (Balanço do PES - BdPES) and the Budget Execution Report (REO) as monitoring tools.

Government and donors also monitor the fight against poverty using the Annual Review process, which informs development partners' General Budget Support. A set of indicators drawn from the PARPA comprise the Performance Appraisal Framework (PAF) that is the monitoring matrix used to assess government performance in key policy areas. Civil society is invited to participate in the Annual Reviews, although its contribution has thus far been modest. Information for monitoring is provided by different sectors and is summarised by the Ministry of Planning and Development. In Development Observatories, civil society organizations present their qualitative assessments of progress in poverty reduction, often critically, but not much is discussed on indicators. However, proposals for the revi-

sion of PARPA are presented. Parliament does not participate formally in either process.


#### Information and Data Used for Monitoring

The flow of information varies according to the mechanism and level of coordination used in the monitoring. The budget and process/output monitoring tends to be carried out through progress reports and reports on budget implementation. Impact assessments use qualitative studies on specific policies and quantitative data gathered through specific surveys, such as QUIBB (Basic Well-Being Indicators Survey), IOF (Households' Budget Survey) and the population census. Each department responsible for the implementation of plans and budgets related to the NDP, should provide information on activities and budget expenditure. At the provincial level each directorate, through specific internal units, analyses and consolidates information and then sends it to the local Directorate of Planning and Finance, which produces the provincial PES progress report as well as the budget implementation report within the timeframe defined in the planning cycle. In the same process, at the level of periodic coordination, INE carries out surveys that are delivered to the main government bodies (MPD/MF/CE) for decision-making purposes and for general public consumption.

In summary, the principle tools for information gathering and impact assessment, are:

- QUIBB (Basic Well-Being Indicators Survey);
- IOF (Households' Budget Survey);
- The population census;
- National departmental reports on activities and budget expenditure;
- Provincial reports analysing and consolidating information;
- INE carries out surveys provided to government to inform decision-making and for general public consumption.

The chart on the following page shows the organizational framework and the main monitoring processes.



Source: Government of Mozambique (MPD) PP Presentation on the M&E Institutional Model

An additional monitoring sub-system, which is part of the PARPA, is the PAF discussed above. These broad systems are supported by sector and provincial M&E systems, although these do not have a normative and methodological framework to set minimum standards. Consequently, the existing systems tend to privilege monitoring (and pay less attention to evaluation), because of its importance in feeding into the annual planning process and definition of annual objectives and targets. Provincial M&E systems that revolve around the PES differ among the provinces and use different methodological approaches and indicators. This hinders the building of an integrated and coherent monitoring national system<sup>60</sup>.

All these processes feed into a final assessment of the government by all the relevant stakeholders participating in the review. The review presents recommendations of areas needing more government attention, which can include defining new policies or changing the course of the already existing policies. Moreover, the review also influences the level of funding of government programmes, because donors involved in the general budget support define their commitments to support the state budget according

to the government performance, as measured through the PAF. It is within the PAF that monitoring of governance is more effective and integrated. The governance pillar is monitored through a system composed of the following actors:

- The key sectors (mentioned above) – responsible for reporting on the planned activities;
- The working groups, such as decentralisation, public sector reform and justice, which comprise donors, government representatives, and occasionally civil society organizations – responsible for monitoring progress in their specific areas, taking into account the respective indicators;
- Governance group – chaired by a representative of the government (currently the General Administrative Inspector) and composed of key sectors, donors and civil society representatives. This group produces the final performance assessment report of the overall governance area, based on the analysis of specific sectors carried out by the working groups.

The decisions stemming from the annual reviews are a good example of where indicator-based monitoring can have an impact on decision-making. Moreover, annual reviews also influence the political dialogue between donors and government, which is a regular process included in the General Budget Support Memorandum of Understanding.

#### Quality of indicators

There is a tendency to design monitoring processes with narrow sector-based indicators and no indicators at the intermediate level. Some indicators are based on events and less on content. For example, in the PARPA II matrix, under the Poverty Analysis and Monitoring systems component, the indicator reads: “carry out at least one Provincial Poverty Observatory in each province”. The target indicated in this indicator is often achieved, but it does not prevent criticism of the participatory monitoring component of PARPA II for lacking effectiveness. The same is applicable to the area of public sector reform, more precisely the implementation of the decentralized planning and finance strategies, the indicator for which is the “percentage of operational District Consultative Councils (at least 3 meetings per year) with accountability to the government”. In this case, meetings are not the core question, but rather the quality of participation of local stakeholders, its impact on accountability and sustainability of the process (e.g. working conditions), which remain critical weaknesses. Static



indicators do not capture the dynamics underlying these participatory mechanisms, hence they end up undermining their effectiveness as sound accountability mechanisms and enablers of good governance.

Two examples illustrate this. There have been divergent positions on the effectiveness of these two participatory forums, with some (mainly the government) viewing them as effective mechanisms for promotion of citizens' participation, whilst others consider them ineffective, prone to manipulation by the government and with limited impact on decision-making. This argument, to some extent, led to the revision of these mechanisms, which resulted in the introduction of guidelines for the Development Observatories and local councils, as well as an increasing concern in the improvement of the working conditions of the latter.

Also, some governance indicators can only address specific sectors but not the general governance policy. For example, a set of indicators selected for the PAF to assess progress in the fight against corruption were too vague (number of corruption cases reported, under investigation, accused and tried) and their contribution to an objective assessment of the progress in this area is difficult to foresee. The Anti-Corruption National Action Plan has a set of indicators measuring sector activities, but it does not include indicators that can allow for the measurement of the anti-corruption strategy objectives, which makes a strategic assessment of the implementation more difficult. In other words, it does not allow for the establishment of a linkage between separate activities and overall objectives<sup>61</sup>.

Apart from these examples, regular planning tools such as the PES consist of a listing of activities to be implemented, and do not provide a set of indicators that are objectively or qualitatively measurable. This pattern is repeated in progress reports (BdPES), which make a qualitative assessment of progress in the achievement of strategic goals very difficult. The mid-term report on the implementation of the Five-Year Programme does not solve this problem either, since it is a very broad document without an objective and evidence-based appraisal of progress<sup>62</sup>.

Sources of data for governance monitoring are normally the line ministries and the provincial sectors, as mentioned earlier. Lately, some civil society organizations<sup>63</sup> have been involved in governance monitoring, although generally the capacity of these actors is still weak<sup>64</sup>. That said, the limited involvement of CSOs has already yielded interesting results. For instance, a report monitoring the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy revealed that some activities were not included in government reports. This supports the claim by sectors about deficiencies regarding

the inclusion of their achievements in government reports. Conversely, some activities that were said to be implemented were actually not. The existing system does not have the necessary conditions to confirm or audit the physical progress of most government activities. Therefore, reporting is based on “good faith”, and in line with PES and BdPES, it is only activity/output-based. Issues of quality and effectiveness remain almost untapped. Only civil society organizations try to use their networks to produce qualitative analysis of government policies, but this information is not used to discuss the quality of the indicators; rather, the focus has been on analysing the quality of the output.

Some governance indicators involve more than one sector. For example, justice sector indicators may involve different branches of government (the executive and the judiciary), and institutional barriers and arguments about the independence of these institutions can render monitoring difficult. However, recently the sector has approved an Integrated Strategic Plan and is setting up an integrated monitoring system, which is a step forward. A coordination mechanism was also created involving the Ministry, the Attorney General, the Supreme Court and the Administrative Tribunal, but it was considered unconstitutional and was dissolved. Currently the Ministry of Justice coordinates the monitoring process.

Selection of governance indicators included in the Poverty Reduction Strategy was formally a participative process, since it was part of the design of the PARPA II. This does not necessarily mean that the process was credible or inclusive in a democratic sense. For example, lack of participation of parliament in this process, which informs the PES priorities that are then submitted to parliament for approval, demonstrates a critical lack of accountability. Civil society participation in the process does not solve legitimacy problems either, because there are also questions regarding the representation of the organizations participating in the Development Observatories<sup>65</sup>.

At the local level, participation of communities in the local councils is growing, but there are also allegations of excessive party influence in the selection of council members<sup>66</sup>. Moreover, at this stage it is not realistic to expect local council members to have the sophistication to design sound indicators by which to measure the work that they undertake. There are events that include participatory monitoring, but the results are not sufficiently structured to allow them to be integrated into the national monitoring systems. An illustrative example of this is the recent approval of the Operational Guidelines for the Development Observatories, which seek to solve the problem hindering these forums from being arenas of effective

citizen participation in policy design, implementation and monitoring.

This underlines a general trend in governance processes in Mozambique, where true and effective participation by stakeholders is more often than not a symbolic gesture by the ruling party. Currently, the only actors with the political leverage and technical capacity to create and monitor governance indicators are the government and donors. This is documented in many studies and was almost a unanimous position of most participants interviewed for this study. One of the problems raised is the balance of power between donors and government. Their diverging positions on governance issues can confuse the main objectives in the selection of indicators. That is, should indicators form the basis for reform or should they be designed to assess the performance of government in particular sectors, or simply to provide information for donors to impose budget support conditions. This poses clear legitimacy problems, since other relevant actors, such as civil society and even parliament, have a very limited role.

Another factor in planning and monitoring has been the “Open Presidency”<sup>67</sup>. Presidential visits and meetings with the citizens at the local level have been opportunities for the president to hear grievances, gather demands and take policy and political decisions in a relatively ad-hoc way. After the introduction of the local investment initiatives budget in 2006, also known as the 7-million fund, many district administrators were dismissed on the basis of citizen complaints about transparency and fairness in the utilization of this fund to benefit the local population. The rules for the utilisation of the fund have also been changed after presidential visits. For some interviewees, despite the political and institutional/legal legitimacy of the president to take policy and political decisions, this is an example of how the political leadership can sometimes subvert the implementation and regular monitoring of government plans, sometimes overlooking the need for a clear vision of the objectives.

## Conclusion

Government ownership is a major problem in the definition of governance indicators, mainly regarding monitoring carried out in the Annual Joint Review, which is seen as more in line with the interests of donors than those of the government or civil society. However, this argument is slightly simplistic as the principle governance indicators included in the PAF are negotiated between donors and government on a continuous basis. One of the main problems is the level of prioritisation of governance interventions by the government and donors, which can be due to different levels

of political will, lack of capacity to define realistic targets, or inadequate indicators that are not properly monitored. This can be inferred from the continuous modest performance in governance in successive Annual Review Aide Memoires<sup>68</sup>. These Memoires would seem to indicate that the government and donors have different perspectives on some of these issues. Both actors may agree on the need to address governance issues, but not necessarily on the urgency or the approach necessary to do so.

Most interviewees acknowledge that PARPA II was designed and is being monitored in a relatively participatory manner, even though the definition (and revision) of indicators has been monopolized by government and donors. However, despite reluctance on the part of the principle actors to acknowledge that governance indicators are monitored as part of a set of conditionalities related to development aid, this factor can lead to the setting of unrealistic targets, poor monitoring or even non-prioritisation of some areas by the government. Evidence of this can be found in the recurrent poor performance in governance indicators as documented in the Annual Joint Review processes. The absence of civil society in the monitoring process is seen as the result of its weak capacity to engage in a dialogue that is often very technical, stemming from lack of specialization in specific policy areas, or even from their voluntary abdication from participating in the invited spaces created by the government. Moreover, most of the work carried out by civil society organizations is not used for advocacy purposes and does not necessarily influence decision-making. This can be a consequence of a weak or absent linkage of these organizations with concrete social demands or constituencies<sup>69</sup>. The way civil society representatives are chosen to participate in the Development Observatories and in the annual review is also contested<sup>70</sup>.

Broadening ownership would highlight the causes underlying the persistent poor performance of the government in governance areas, as well as the ambiguous participation of civil society in the process. Untying the revision of indicators from the conditionalities of budget support does not seem possible in the current context of government-donor relations in Mozambique, where the most profound disagreement about the implementation of PARPA has been in the governance area. Weak management seems to be the most plausible cause for poor performance, stemming from a lack of political will and different perspectives on priorities. The government is no doubt hesitant to ensure proper monitoring and evaluation based on the developed indicators as this would entail disclosing unflattering information. In terms of civil society, since the existing mechanisms (Development Observatories and annual reviews) are in principle

participative, broadening ownership has mainly to do with strengthening the capacities of non-state actors to be more proactive in the process, as well as linking their work to clear social demands and constituencies, or at least making their work an effective input for informed advocacy that can influence decision-making.

There are many complaints about the current system. Sectors claim that their performance is not accurately captured in the existing instruments and that budget allocations do not reflect the costs of the policies they are supposed to implement. Provinces complain about lack of resources and working conditions that prevent them from doing their job properly. Sectors at the central level and provinces claim that deadlines are very tight and there is insufficient follow-up by the Ministry of Planning and Development. This is exacerbated by a lack of resources to build M&E structures and the need for clarification on methodologies, among others. Participatory monitoring at the local level is relatively new and unfamiliar. Sectors at the local level tend to prepare plans based on the priorities defined in the local councils at the district, administrative posts and lower levels. However, despite the slow start for participatory monitoring, there is a growing interest and involvement of local actors in monitoring Strategic Development Plans, annual plans and budgets<sup>71</sup>.

The absence of a coordinated process of monitoring and evaluation at the national level, that is not linked to donors or external actors, undermines the ability of these mechanisms to feed into decision-making. Integration of the existing systems at all levels, through the setting up of harmonized methodologies, standardized type and content of information and establishment of a normative framework, are very important steps in this regard. Recently the government created the National Directorate of Monitoring in the Ministry of Planning and Development, whose capacity is still being developed. This seems to be a step in the right direction, but the effectiveness of this measure will depend on how the system is converted into strong sector and territorial units.

## Rwanda and the National Development Plan (EDPRS)

Rwanda's Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) is a mechanism that provides a medium term framework for achieving the country's longer term development aspirations as embodied in the MDGs, Rwanda Vision 2020, and the seven year Government of Rwanda (GoR) program. In order to implement the EDPRS strategy, a sectoral allocation

of resources has been established to maintain momentum in all sectors of public life.

It should be underscored that in the EDPRS a particular emphasis was put on corporate governance, including the use of soft infrastructure for the private sector through the implementation of commercial justice, business and land registration programs, improving economic freedom, regulatory and licensing environment for doing business, among other corporate governance principles. A certain number of public sector reforms are also envisaged to enhance government effectiveness through public sector capacity building, strengthening public finance management, performance-based budgeting and transparency and predictability in policy-making.

The EDPRS strategy emerged as a result of the review of Rwanda's progress in achieving MDG and Vision 2020 targets and the need to establish targets for achievement in relation to the two sets of targets by 2012 (a five-year duration 2008-2012). This is why the EDPRS reflects global targets from the MDGs, disaggregated targets from Vision 2020 of which it stands as an implementing mechanism, and its own complementary targets. Further, periods for the implementation of these targets and further review were set at different intervals in order to allow review recommendations to be incorporated into the ongoing programs before the next assessment.

Among other poverty reduction related objectives, the EDPRS has objectives in relation to governance that include:

- maintaining peace and security; preserving and strengthening good relationship with all countries, continuing to promote unity and reconciliation among Rwandans;
- strengthening the rule of law and human rights;
- promoting vibrant and professional media (public and private) to enhance citizens' voice and dissemination of public information;
- promoting decentralization, transparency and accountability; enhancing citizens' participation, empowerment and ownership of their social, political and economic development in the respect of their rights and civil liberties including freedom of expression.

EDPRS monitoring: indicator development and use

The EDPRS mainstreams a system of monitoring and evaluation at national, sub-national and sectoral levels to improve public sector performance.

A framework has been set up including three classical monitoring steps:

- observing how a set of indicators changes over time;
- analyzing and drawing conclusions from those observations;
- feeding conclusions back into the policy process.

Rwanda has developed several monitoring systems, each of them a product of different initiatives launched at different times. The result has been that the policy-maker is faced with an excessively large number of indicators tracking the country's development<sup>72</sup>. Before the increase in indicator systems, the EDPRS set out a four-stage indicator framework based on the progression from the input, to the output, to the outcome and the impact of any objective. A matrix of twenty strategic outcomes and impact indicators was adopted to provide a succinct overview of progress in development and poverty reduction. In a three-step analysis, a baseline survey provided basic data out of which timely progression could be calculated, and dependent and independent outcome variables were to be used to evaluate the strategy performance at the end of the roadmap period.

Evaluating the impact of public action is more complex than monitoring a set of given indicators, as it involves determining with precision the causal impact of a given outcome from all other determinants, including emerging strategies under the implementation course. Mostly, the involvement of all stakeholders in the indicators construction may result in their owning the evaluation results. Many stakeholders took part in developing EDPRS monitoring indicators. As the former EDPRS coordinator within MINECOFIN and currently Coordinator of Development Policy Analysis and Research, Habimana Andre, put it, EDPRS indicators were developed in a participatory way and comprise three levels:

1. National Steering Committee comprised of ministers and donors;
2. Technical Steering Committee comprised of ministries permanent secretaries, donors, civil society organizations, private sector representatives;
3. Sector working groups.

According to the same coordinator, further discussions and consultations were made at district level and in higher learning institutions such as the National University of Rwanda, Kigali Institute of Science and Technology, Kigali Institute of Education, Institut des Sciences Agronomiques et d'Élevage, etc. This declaration was backed in interviews with representatives of civil society organizations. They confirmed having participated in

sessions of consultations on the EDPRS in which their views were sought and given.

However, the above exercise seems not to have been the case in “laboratory designed” EDPRS indicators, which were discussed by technical and elite stakeholders without including perceptions from the citizenry. Prior to EDPRS adoption, consultations did not seek direct involvement and perceptions of the citizenry, while it is a development strategy covering most areas of citizens’ lives. Rather, most ordinary citizens were sensitized by both national and local leaders on its implementation after it was already adopted.

In practice, an indicator will be designed (e.g. percentage of women using modern contraceptive techniques) to meet the objective (e.g. family planning); a baseline indicator is identified (known or estimated, e.g. 10% of women using modern methods to date) and an EDPRS target fixed (e.g. 70% of women using contraceptives in 2012) and data source indicated (e.g. Ministry of Health). The frequency of the indicator production is also fixed (e.g. progression per annum). Further, yardstick activities resulting in temporary indicators are set per period, which renders the system more complex. For example, in terms of decentralization indicators include the production of and agreement on a comprehensive five year local government capacity building needs assessment (2008); capacity building plans implemented (2009); decentralization strategy, action plans and responsive interventions developed using monitoring and evaluation data (2010); MIS at central and local level effective (2011-2012).

Like many other performance indicators, the EDPRS system proves rather cumbersome and its complexity can lead to inaccurate estimates. Moreover, some of the subjective indicators will always be dependent on the inclination to accommodate a given situation, which can lead to speculation and endangers the validity and reliability of the indicator. Further, any EDPRS evaluation report relies mostly on a compilation of reports from various ministries with the risk of information not being available on a regular basis and the bias of self-evaluation easily introduced.

As may be expected, evaluating the EDPRS has not involved direct field observations and impact identification. Rather, the evaluation is done through sampling of some programme-exposed groups in comparison with those in a control group. It would be more accurate to measure impact using a longitudinal exercise involving the largest representation of priority programs (VUP). Given its nature and context, EDPRS evaluation would require an appropriate self-tailored mechanism.




## Connecting the EDPRS, JGA and other governance instruments

As many governance assessments in Rwanda have drawn heavily on international comparative standards, they have been less useful to assess specific problems facing Rwanda and to help identifying priorities for action. There has been controversy surrounding some international indicators which appeared inaccurate or contradictory for different stakeholders. There was a need to improve the understanding by crafting an assessment mechanism that is grounded in the country context. The JGA was conceived as a novel process based on a set of agreed principles jointly owned by the GoR and development partners, conducted in an open and consultative manner, forward looking and providing for a baseline to identify priorities. Its credibility would depend on its thoroughness and rigorous analysis, taking into account the specific governance and historical context of Rwanda. It's monitoring is to be based on sound evidence and a framework established for continuous assessment.

The JGA has a management structure comprising high-level representatives of the GoR and its development partners, a technical committee involving the Rwanda Advisory Council and a joint team of experts and a team of four international and four local consultants. The JGA was conducted with the involvement of respondents from the GoR, civil society and the private sector. Sampled local government districts were equally consulted and ongoing drafts were discussed in different forums with the GoR and development partners for cross-checking and improvement. In its essence, the JGA is a result of broad consultations that confer on it the legitimacy of a participative initiative.

The MTEF in Rwanda is one of the many measures undertaken to improve the level of fiscal transparency and create a more efficient and effective public sector. It is aimed at creating a consistent, predictable National Policy & Budget Framework and improving financial management and accountability, by linking policies to planning and budgeting. The JGA indicators were therefore adapted for incorporation into ministerial sectoral plans and District Development Plans submitted for funding through the MTEF, the driving mechanism for translating strategies into action. The mechanism respects governance principles and indicators of transparency, fairness and accountability to support activities that are constantly monitored and will be evaluated.

LIAISING JGA, EPRS AND MTEF



Source: Adapted from National Planning, Budgeting and MTEF Guidelines, MINECOFIN (2008).

The above chart illustrates that Rwanda’s national development plan is not holistically costed, but rather its components are (sectoral, local government and public institutions). The same plan remains linked to the MTEF and is subject to Cabinet approval. A special unit hosted in the Ministry of Finance is in charge of managing its preparation and implementation. Cabinet regularly reviews its progress and sets new orientation following emerging strategies.

The JGA process will be reviewed downstream and at the end, the process will restart at the strategic level through new and adapted plans responding to the assigned orientation that will be a result of the evaluation recommendations. This cyclic exercise will allow further improvement and

refining of the process, thus leading to further chances of a positive assessment of governance indicators at the next evaluation milestone.

#### Monitoring and evaluation framework

Objective measures have been established for each of the assessed indicators and can be compared with international standards. In addition to fact-based measures, perception-based indicators generated through a survey regularly conducted by an independent body will supplement the assessment. The framework includes the frequency for gauging the indicator, indicates the sources and compares results with an existing local baseline. A possible stumbling block is the validity of the baseline data, more often than not nonexistent. This is a result of statistics not keeping pace with other national development trends.

#### Recommendation implementation

Once the specificity of the governance indicators has been gauged (as related to accountability, responsiveness, capacity, legitimacy and inclusiveness) and appropriate recommendations drawn up, they are submitted to the operational level both at central and local government for translation into action. The main advantage of this mechanism is the appropriateness to the local context and specificity. In local settings, domestically generated indicators are privileged, rather than those developed for international comparison. It should be underscored that balanced evidence from various sources including national and international actors, state and non-state bodies and citizens' organizations render these indicators and subsequent recommendations better owned by the stakeholders, thus not subject to resistance from implementation.

#### Conclusion

The production and use of governance indicators within national development planning involves the synchronisation of a range of existing instruments. The main finding is that process and result indicators are both complementary and allow the development of a thorough and comprehensive picture of governance issues in Rwanda. The three selected fields covered by the lead JGA mechanism, namely ruling justly, government effectiveness and corporate governance, were key for this exercise as they covered the topmost governance priorities of the country.

One of the toughest challenges is to capture processes and results that are not quantifiable, yet indispensable for good governance evaluation, e.g. trust, reconciliation and unity. The only way to assess them is through large-scale perception surveys, including advice from knowledgeable people, thus introducing a noticeable bias in the sampling processes. Still, a well-reasoned sample selection method would mitigate the bias effect. This exercise is indeed necessary and could be useful when combined with more objective and measurable tools.

## Crosscutting Case Study Three: Civil Society and the Parliamentary Process

### Ghana - Mining Legislation

**G**hana has the Minerals and Mining Act 2006 (Act 703) to regulate the mining industry. In order to understand the interaction between parliament and civil society organizations in relation to the legislation, it is important to note that the adoption of International Monetary Fund/World Bank structural adjustment policies in 1983 led to a fast, harsh liberalization of the mining sector. Over the next few years, many foreign gold-mining companies entered the country and began operating in the Wassa West District in the Western Region. The operations and activities of these companies in the District generated intense conflict with the communities immediately adjacent to their concessions. The conflict centred on the issues of access to land. When the mining companies began developing surface mining operations they needed access to large tracts of land, much of which was already being used by nearby communities. Mining companies accessing large tracts of land resulted in:

- Numerous cases of forced eviction;
- Inadequate compensation;
- Land degradation;
- Destruction of culturally sacred sites;
- Community displacement; and
- The pollution of essential water bodies.

The establishment of Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM) in 1998 was a direct response to these problems, and aimed to assist communities adversely affected by mining activities in the region. WACAM sought to ensure that the rights of individuals and communities affected by mining activities are respected and to assist persons and communities whose land was usurped by mining firms to obtain adequate compensation.

Another major civil society organization whose activities influenced parliament in passing the law is Third World Network-Africa (TWN). TWN is an international network of organizations and individuals involved with issues relating to the environment and development in the Third World and North-South issues. The Ghana Chapter was established in 1994, and conducts research and advocacy activities on issues relating to social and economic policy that can advance the needs and interests of Ghanaians, Africans and other Third World Countries<sup>73</sup>.

TWN and WACAM interacted with parliament and other ministries, departments and agencies such as the Ghana Chamber of Mines, academics, the Minerals Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency. Their aim was to influence the legislation to address issues generating conflict in the mining communities and to make the mining law conform to international standards<sup>74</sup>. The main strategy adopted by these organizations was to join forces for the purposes of advocacy. This led to the formation of a National Coalition on Mining (NCM). The NCM organized a number of workshops, seminars and demonstrations on the mining situation in the country and sent memorandums to members of parliament and the Committee on Mines and Energy<sup>75</sup>.

In order to adequately influence the mining law, the NCM developed its knowledge base on mining issues and set up task groups to study the Bill on mining. For example, the TWN set up a study group that held a number of meetings to review the draft Bill and met the Minerals Commission, Interior Ministry, Defence Ministry and Environmental Protection Agency to raise issues relating to the Bill. The coalition also held numerous discussions in the media as part of its strategy to push for specific amendments to the Bill<sup>76</sup>. Finally, the TWN and WACAM submitted a memorandum to parliament (through the parliamentary Committee on Mines and Energy) requesting that the mining law should address the following issues:

- “Unrealistic” royalties;
- Compensation for local communities and individuals whose lands are compulsorily claimed;

- Securing “no go zones” for sacred sites;
- Pollution of water bodies;
- Cyanide spillage;
- Waste disposal;
- Blasting standards; and
- Adequate re-settlement programmes<sup>77</sup>

The final product, the Minerals and Mining Act 2006, has received mixed reviews. The law stipulates for example that compensation should be paid by mining firms to affected individuals, institutions and communities. The law also improved land acquisition procedures and maintained that cultural/sacred lands be respected<sup>78</sup>. Whereas parliament sees its interaction with civil society as “fruitful,”<sup>79</sup> the TWN and WACAM argue that throughout the engagement parliament and government agencies, including the Chamber of Mines, perceived them as adversaries rather than partners providing support to the process. For example, parliament only notified stakeholders of its intention to debate the Bill a day or two in advance, making it difficult for CSOs to be adequately prepared. Thus, the impact of civil society activities was partial<sup>80</sup>, and did not have the desired effect. Although civil society took great interest in the drafting of the mining law, parliament simply “ignored their voices and went ahead to do its wishes”<sup>81</sup>. It is also argued that the law does not conform to international standards and therefore needs to be amended<sup>82</sup>.

In their criticisms, civil society groups noted that parliamentarians “had passed a law that impoverished already poor and feeble mining communities but enriched already prosperous and powerful multinational mining companies...” They also described the mining law as “a perfect example of a neo-colonial law” in that it is a piece of legislation that takes resources out of Ghana<sup>83</sup>. The Act is viewed as perpetuating weaknesses in Ghana’s mining regulatory framework because it does not define “areas like forest reserves as ‘No Go Zones’ for mining and [has] no provision for ‘Free Prior and Informed Consent’ (FPIC) that can empower community people to say no to mining operations which have grave consequences on (their) communities”<sup>84</sup>. In addition, the TWN and WACAM demanded that there be adequate compensation for those dispossessed of their land, but this was not respected or incorporated in the final Act.

The inclusion of CSOs in the dialogue around the Bill appears to have been driven by the demands of external powers, rather than a sincere

desire by government to be inclusive and informed by alternative views. “It was triggered in part by international donors’ insistence that parliament actively engage civil society in its activities”<sup>85</sup> This indicates that, in this instance, the donor communities were more concerned about good governance practice than the government of Ghana. Governance indicators for the mining sector formed part of the demands by civil society organizations, but government was unable (or unwilling) to provide them at a standard acceptable to civil society. Perhaps more importantly, mining companies and the government of Ghana have been reluctant to develop a set of indicators to which they can be held accountable.

It is important to note that, as Ghana has now become an oil-producing state, civil society continues to demand the development of adequate governance indicators for the resource sector. There is already evidence that the discovery and drilling of oil is resulting in oil spillage and threats to marine life and the livelihoods of anglers<sup>86</sup>. TWN, WACAM, Friends of the Nation, and other NGOs are sensitizing the population on their rights. In short, despite the government’s unwillingness to engage sincerely with civil society and incorporate evidence in their decision-making, or even to put in place a system of governance indicators whereby government and industries can be held accountable, civil society will continue to be proactive in the promotion of standards within the extractive industries.

## Mozambique – Parliamentary Oversight and Governance Performance

The principle instruments used by the Assembly to exercise oversight of the executive are:

- The annual social economic plan;
- The state budget;
- The Constitution; and
- The Auditing Report carried out by the Account Tribunal.

The majority of parliamentary oversight activities occur within the Committees. The Assembly can also use the following instruments and programmes, each of which includes sets of indicators, to monitor and assess governance issues:

- Agenda 2025;
- Quinquennial government Plan, Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PRSP);
- Social Economic Plan;
- Auditing Report from the Administrative Court;
- Sectoral Strategic Plans;
- APRM; and
- The Provincial Government Strategic Plan and District Government Strategic Plan.

Collection of information, or data, to be used to assess progress is undertaken by:

- Parliamentary research staff (excluding budget office);
- Parliament budget office;
- Independent researchers and civil society organizations, including media; and
- Standing Committees meeting with executive branches at the national and local levels.

At the local level, Committees tend to rely on the use of two monitoring and evaluation instruments: the annual social economic plan and the state budget. Both of these form part of the broader Quinquennial government plan (Five Year Plan). With these instruments, the committees track the performance of the executive at provincial and district levels. Using these tools, they are able to assess whether or not the executive is implementing policies according to what was approved by the Assembly.

### Capacity Constraints

Due to the limited capacity of the Committees, however, this oversight function is not performed systematically and coverage is not national. Standing Committees have limited support staff, most of whom do not have the necessary expertise. In addition, Standing Committees only have between 15 to 17 members, most of whom have little or no experience or expertise in policy analysis and oversight. Thus, even in an area where the Committees do attempt to exercise oversight, it is nearly impossible to gain a comprehensive picture of the extent to which the annual social and economic plan and state budget have been implemented by the executive.



Significant efforts have been undertaken to train staff and to fill civil service vacancies within the Assembly. The number of staff assigned to Standing Committees holding university degrees (Bachelor and honours, and occasionally higher degrees) has increased. Nevertheless, most do not have the qualifications required to offer the necessary expertise to the MPs in their committee work. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the “administrative and legislative technical support [divisions] of parliament are characterised by weak and unskilled structures, which means they are ineffective in terms of providing appropriate technical support to parliament and its members” (Pereira and Shenga, 2005:33-34).” In addition, Pereira and Shenga emphasized that even though the legislative support division has a technical research unit (e.g. Gabinete Técnico) to carry out research and provide technical support on policy-making and budgeting to the Assembly, this unit does not have the capacity to provide and respond to the demands of the Assembly. The unit relies on expert consultants to fulfil its duties. As Shenga (2002) illustrated, from 1999 to 2001 the Assembly made 38 requests for technical assistance, all of which were sent to external experts, due to the lack of expertise and capacity of the parliamentary technical research unit. Although not recent, the evidence of these reports continues to hold true, as there seems to have been no notable improvements from 2002 to the present circumstances.

#### Political interference

Some interviewees stated that the majority party in parliament has been particularly attentive to the allocation of seats in Standing Committees according to professional experience. The appointment of Committee Chairs seems to confirm this observation. The Plan and Budget Committee is chaired by Eneas Comiche, former Finance Minister and Mayor of Maputo and member of the Frelimo Political Commission. The Public Administration Commission is chaired by Alfredo Gamito, former Minister of State Administration. The Legal Commission is chaired by Teodoro Waty, a university lecturer in law and a member of the Frelimo Political Commission. Although this is noteworthy, the trend over the past 15 years has been that the substance of day-to-day businesses of the Standing Committees relies too much on the experience and expertise, if any, of the chairs, vice-chairs or individual MPs, without the necessary support from the technical staff of the Assembly, as should be the case.

It is important to note that the oversight exercised by the Committees is based solely on presentations done to them within the Assembly. With

regard to the annual plan and budget, at national and local levels, the Committees rely primarily on information provided by the various ministries. The Committees do not physically visit executive branch departments and hence cannot see the goods and services procured by the executive as shown in the plan and budget.

The other critical point is that views from civil society and the political opposition inside parliament are not taken into account by the ruling parliamentary party, Frelimo. The socio-economic plan and budget are approved by the Assembly in the form in which they are presented. Amendments are only permitted to these documents in order to make them clearer, and no substantive changes can be made to the contents as submitted by the executive. This is what is commonly referred to as “rubber-stamping”. One MP stated that, “the global aspects that are the great aggregates of the budget do not change”. However, clarity amendments are not insignificant. They improve the documents by limiting opportunities for interpretation. On the other hand, legislation other than social economic plan and state budget (like laws relating to land or labour) does undergo significant amendment by Standing Committees.

Apart from the government’s overall plan and budget, the Committee on Planning and the Budget uses the Auditing Report from the Administrative Court as an instrument to monitor and evaluate the performance of the executive. The Audit Report is submitted to the plenary of the Assembly prior to presentations made by the executive branch. The Committee on Planning and the Budget analyses and debates the reports, which may include calling the Administrative Court to its sittings to answer questions<sup>87</sup> and present its findings to the Plenary for approval. However, the details of each audit carried out by the Administrative Court on public institutions are not made accessible to the media, civil society or all members of the Assembly. The details of each audit carried out by the Account Tribunal are only sent to the Speaker, who does not supply a copy to the Committee on Planning and the Budget. The details become confidential and classified information shared only with the President of the Republic, the Speaker and the Attorney General. The Assembly, therefore, is only able to review a summary of audits done by the Administrative Court.

#### Access to Information and Indicators

The Assembly does not use internationally developed indicators such as the World Bank Institute indicators on governance, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Freedom House on civil lib-

erties and political rights, Afrobarometer, or the Mo Ibrahim Governance index. Although these instruments could enter into parliamentary debate at committee level through research units, the lack of competence and skills of Assembly staff seems to preclude this. These international instruments are even less likely to be used by the Assembly to help monitor and evaluate the executive.

Within the context of the 2009 APRM, the Assembly did engage with civil society organizations to evaluate development and governance carried out by the executive. Parliamentary committee chairs attended thematic groups dealing with the development and governance pillars, two of which were chaired by them. While many of them did not fully participate, the two who chaired the groups had to commit themselves to the APRM process. However, the 2009 APRM did not use information produced by civil society or the Assembly in their final (English) report. There are in fact two different reports: the Portuguese version that incorporates the views of domestic assessments done by both the Assembly and civil society; and the English version, which mostly incorporates the assessments of APRM experts.

Whether the Assembly uses the APRM as an instrument to assess governance issues is not clear, considering that the APRM was not discussed by the Assembly at committee or plenary levels. Only the committee chairs participated in the APRM process, but did so outside of the parliament process. Some of the interviewees noted parliamentarians have limited awareness of the APRM report and the Action Plan. One observed that the discussions on the issue of entrenched Frelimo structures in state institutions during question time were an important revelation in this regard. Parliamentarians of all groups discussed it as if it was a new issue, even though it is contained in the APRM report as one of the main governance problems according to public perceptions.

Other national instruments, such as the Agenda 2025, PARPA, Sectoral Strategic Plans, Provincial Government Strategic Plans and District Government Strategic Plans, are not used by the Assembly as a source of indicators to monitor and evaluate the governance performance of the executive. The reason given is that the Assembly considers them to be executive instruments instead of parliamentary ones. One MP went so far as to say that, “[PARPA and even Agenda 2025] are government instruments of governance that were just presented and delivered to us. We have nothing to do with them”.

Even though the information produced by non-state actors is relevant,

consistent and valid, it is not used to assess the performance of the executive. In most cases the dominant political party, Frelimo, tends to ignore this information. Participants in interviews stated that information is regularly provided to the Assembly by civil society, but this does seem to be taken into account for decision-making or monitoring and evaluation. MPs interviewed were not able to provide any examples in this regard. While it is not clear whether the parliament uses information from civil society to oversee government governance performance, secondary sources within civil society confirmed that such information has been supplied to the Assembly.<sup>88</sup>

Effective public policy analysis and evaluation is a process that requires taking into account all executive policy documents. Basing governance oversight only on the documents (e.g. annual social and economic plan and budget) approved by the oversight institution (e.g. the Assembly) does not lead to effective oversight and does not guarantee that policy objectives will be realised. The Assembly needs to develop more awareness of the APRM process and Plan of Action, PARPA, Sectoral Strategic Plans, Provincial Government Strategic Plans and District Government Strategic Plans to be able to monitor and evaluate governance effectively. More training on these instruments is required for both MPs and parliamentary staff. Otherwise, as is the case currently, it will be unable to perform its basic functions.

## Rwanda – Legislation Development and Interactions between Stakeholders

In Rwanda, like in most countries, laws are generally made by legislators elected as representatives of the citizens. The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, though it does not specify the direct role of the citizens in the lawmaking process, identifies a number of duties and rights of citizens as far as participation is concerned. As far as legislation development is concerned, article 114 of the Organic Law n°06/2006 of 15/02/2006 establishing internal rules of procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, stipulates that “through the Bureau of the Chamber of Deputies, a Committee may call upon a Minister, a Minister of State, any other person, body or any relevant institution to give their views on the draft bill under examination by the Committee”. It should be noted that, according to the Organic Law, citizens can participate in the work of the committees only when called

upon to do so. In other words, the choice to participate rests with the committee, and not the citizen. Indeed, the adoption of the submissions made by citizens depends largely on the whim of the committee in question.

Formally, there is no specific law defining the role that citizens should play in the development of legislation, apart from the constitutional right to vote in their representatives (including lawmakers). Despite this, some participation does take place, but there is a lack of indicators to assess the level and quality of citizens' participation in the lawmaking process.

The example analysed here relates to the law on the punishment of the crime of genocide ideology initiated by the Chamber of Deputies in the Rwandan parliament. Parliament tried to ensure the active participation of representatives of major socio-professional categories of the Rwandan community. A number of stakeholders participated in the debate on the Bill. These included, amongst others, representatives from:

- Religious denominations;
- National Commission against Genocide Ideology;
- Genocide survivors' associations;
- Human Rights Organizations;
- National Commission for Unity and Reconciliation;
- National Commission for Human Rights;
- Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace; and
- Media practitioners.

The parliament and the National Commission for the Fight against the Genocide organized meetings in order to allow members of civil society organizations to contribute to the Bill on the prevention and punishment of genocide ideology. The officer for legal affairs and information within a genocide survivors' association commented that, "We [women survivors' associations] contributed actively to the development of that law as we met with the parliamentarians. We gave them our ideas on the bill, especially as regards the definition of genocide ideology and its characteristics. We are satisfied because our contribution was taken into account in the law".

Other stakeholders participated in the development of the law through memos formally sent to the Commission for Human Rights and the fight against the genocide. In the words of the second Deputy Director of the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP): "IRDP participated in

the development of the law on the genocide ideology. IRDP organized a consultative meeting on the Bill on the punishment on the genocide ideology, following which a memo was sent to the parliament. Although not all our propositions were considered by the Commission, we are happy that many of them appeared in the current law”.

Citizens’ participation in decision-making in general and in lawmaking in particular is considered globally as an indicator of democratic governance. However, there seems to be no clear framework or indicators, neither internationally or in Rwanda, which help to assess or measure public participation in lawmaking. Though some stakeholders are not happy with a number of provisions of the law, the development of the law relating to the prevention and punishment of the genocide ideology was highly participatory, in that many stakeholders were given a say and their opinion considered in the final product.

## Analysis of Crosscutting Case Studies

The crosscutting case studies were selected to allow for some cross-country comparison. All three countries have implemented the APRM and, in one form or another, an NDP. The third component looks at the role of parliament in the three countries, and the extent to which they engage with civil society in their work. Although the three country reports, upon which this synthesis is based, differ in the focus or angle which they have used to portray these issues, there are nevertheless some trends that can be identified. Furthermore, the information provided by these studies provides an overview of engagement by all stakeholders, generally, with regard to indicator use and development.


## Who Develops Indicators?

Unlike the country-specific case studies, in this section, the international community, the donors in particular, have played a significantly larger role. The formulation and implementation of the APRM and NDPs are often closely monitored by the donor community. NDPs tend, for better or worse, to have an impact on donor aid, and hence the donors play a role in the design and implementation of instruments related to govern-

ance assessments. Evidence provided by the case studies suggests that the nature of the relationship is “participatory”, but there are instances where the influence of the donor community is somewhat disproportional in relation to other national stakeholders. One obvious reason for this is that the donor community has easier and more frequent access to government, and is capable of exerting a significant amount of influence.

The three case studies make reference to multiple instances in which indicator development is participatory. The table below illustrates the different stakeholders who participated in the processes. In the APRM process specifically, the case studies indicate that CSOs, executives and parliaments played a significant role in the indicator development process, with the donors/international partners influencing or being directly responsible in almost all instances.

**Indicator Development Relationships**




In the NDP indicator development process, the principle players are the executive and donors, with the former being primarily responsible for the development of indicators. CSOs only seem to have played a minor role, and local government was evident as a stakeholder in certain instances within Ghana. The Ghana study on mining legislation is the only instance in which CSOs were the sole stakeholder responsible for the development of indicators, using international indicators as reference points. However, it should be noted again, that the case studies vary greatly in the scope and depth of their studies, and thus these assessments do not necessarily reflect the complete picture of the NDP or APRM indicator development processes.

The indicator themes cited in the crosscutting case studies are presented in the tables below. As was the case in the country-specific case studies, Participation and Government Effectiveness appear frequently, with


Regulatory Quality also the only theme that spans all three cases. However, Transparency plays a larger role in these processes and Efficiency makes its first appearance in the studies discussing the APRM process. The APRM process also appears to be the most comprehensive source of thematic indicators, being the only instance in which all six themes are raised. This may be related to the participatory nature of the indicator development process, as the APRM in each of the countries appears to be the most inclusive in terms of the number of stakeholders implicated.

This stands in contrast to the NDP case studies, where fewer themes are raised and the process of formulation was less inclusive, with CSOs playing only a minor role in indicator development. Indeed, Participation as a theme is only raised on one occasion, and it is a within a context in which CSOs did have some influence on the process. The Development Observatories that were created as informal monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of the PARPA II in Mozambique were spearheaded by civil society, and both Transparency and Participation are shown to be important components of this process.


**Number of Indicator Themes Cited in Parliament and Civil Society Case Studies**




**Indicator Indicator Themes Cited in the National Development Plan in Case Studies**






**Number of Indicator Themes Cited in the APRM Case Studies**

Contrasting the Rwanda case (EDPRS) with the NDP processes in Ghana and Mozambique, reveals a marked contrast in the level of participation by civil society. Of the 19 instances cited as points where indicator themes were developed, CSOs only played a role in Rwanda. It is noted that there were different processes of development in Rwanda, some more participatory than others. In all three countries however donors and the executive were the dominant stakeholders involved. It is worth noting that the NDPs across the three countries all include the elaboration of indicators for all six thematic areas. Rwanda, in particular, given the incorporation of the APRM in the JGA and the rationalisation of the EDPRS within the JGA, developed indicators across the six thematic areas, as shown in the chart below.

**Indicator Themes Developed in Rwanda APRM/JGA Process**

## Type of Indicators Used

The table below shows the total number of instances in which different stakeholders were cited as the users of indicators. Parliament emerges as the dominant user of indicators across the three countries. This is somewhat misleading, in that even though parliaments may in some way be involved, the extent of their participation in the development and use of indicators is generally not substantive. There are also questions that need to be asked about the effectiveness of parliament's engagement with the executive and others in their use of indicators. One must be cautious in making the association between a user of indicators and an effective user of indicators as the one does not automatically imply the other. For instance, much of the work that parliament is to undertake using indicators is that of executive oversight. As the case studies clearly illustrate, the capacity within parliaments to implement monitoring and evaluation is extremely limited. Similarly, this lack of capacity could equally be applied to the executive, but other factors (such as political will) can also play a role.




That CSOs do not appear to be dominant users of indicators is somewhat surprising. Perhaps their minimal role in the development of indicators, or lack of capacity to both develop and use indicators, goes some way in explaining why CSOs do not figure prominently in the monitoring and evaluation of both the APRM and the NDP. Of the examples provided in the studies, only in the case where CSOs tried to influence the new mining legislation in Ghana is the relationship between the developers and users of indicators clearly seen. Indeed, CSOs were the only stakeholders to have attempted to use indicators as a means by which to inform the

legislative process. Interviews and research conducted in Ghana, however, made it clear that even with indicator-based information, the CSOs' ability to influence the outcome was limited. Indeed, the final product of the parliamentary process was, arguably, mining legislation that appeared to ignore relevant information.

As was clearly set out in the Mozambique NDP study (PAPRA II), CSOs were often relegated to informal engagement, with the donor community and the executive dominating the process. Although efforts were clearly made to include other stakeholders, and some inter-institutional and sectoral structures were developed, there are questions as to the effectiveness of these to actually influence or impact on the various programmes, whether through formulation, implementation or monitoring. To some extent, the low participation of CSOs can also be related to the geographical distribution of users of indicators. As the table below illustrates, most indicator use took place at the national level.

**Geographical Level of User**




The national level of indicator use also suggests that the process was highly centralised. Levels falling below the national level were therefore limited to playing minor roles in all of the crosscutting case studies, except Rwanda's EDPRS process which involved a multitude of stakeholders in the development of indicators, though it is less clear how participatory the processes were for the use of indicators and monitoring. In some instances, the involvement of CSOs, and community and district level stakeholders was defined as simply participating in workshops, particularly in Ghana, where the extent of implementing the recommendations of the APRM was weak. In Mozambique, some effort was placed on having the lower levels "feed into" the national fora, but this was achieved only with limited suc-

cess. Community involvement only took place within the context of the Ghanaian case study on mining legislation, and did not figure in either the APRM or NDP processes in that country.

Centralisation of indicator use appears in both the country-specific and crosscutting case studies. Top-down monitoring and evaluation of the APRM and NDP, specifically, is shown to be the modus operandi of indicator use. By implication, and with little to no use of indicators at the sub-national level, it is fair to assume that information flow is largely unidirectional, with information generated by the use of indicators coming from national institutions or organizations. Centralised decision-making is common in the three countries under review, but a lack of capacity at the local and community level can also explain why these sectors have a limited ability to feed into and participate in matters relating to the NDP and the APRM.

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the studies is the nature of the data or information used by which to measure and evaluate. In looking at this it is possible to make tentative conclusions with regards to the impact of the use of indicators. In other words, while it may be clear who develops and uses indicators, and at what level of national assessment they are used, to what extent these are actually applied is revealed by the nature of the information gathered.


The tables below show that in the majority of instances the data source is undefined.



The large proportion of undefined data sources is due to an absence of information within the narratives of the case studies. In turn, this is due to an absence of clarity and/or information from the targets of the research. The difficulty of attaining information pertaining to the collection and nature of the data, to be used in applying developed indicators, reveals

that this element of the process remains highly problematic. As we see in the charts, in the crosscutting case studies, where data can be classified, the three principle sources are Objective, Quantitative and Rules-Based data. In the instances in which indicator use was identified, only one fifth of these had a Qualitative component. All of the indicators raised in the case studies involving CSOs and parliament do not present any clues as to the nature of the data used.

Mozambique's NDP process shows the greatest variety of data sources.




## Impact on Decision-Making

Although the development of indicators appears to be extensive in both the APRM and NDP processes, the extent to which their use impacted on decision-making is difficult to gauge. The table below shows the type and number of cases in which the case study reports argue that some impact can be assumed.

Unfortunately, confirming the impact is difficult and would necessitate extensive, in-depth interviews with all of the stakeholders involved in decision-making. The majority of the cases fall under the “Implied” or “little to none” categories and there is only one instance in which the impact can be accredited. Again, the vagueness and ambiguity of indicator use and impact on decision-making may simply be related to the extent to which these are understood, by both those attempting to influence and those making the decisions.

### Incidence of Impact on Decision-Making




The nature of the governance indicators would also provide some clues as to why the impact appears to be negligible. If the overwhelming majority of the information gathered is Objective, Quantitative and Rules-Based, then it is difficult to provide evidence that would necessitate a re-assessment of perceptual starting points. In short, such information does not necessarily provide evidence that could convince decision-makers of the need for a drastic or significant change of course. The power of the evidence is therefore diluted, and the potential impact limited. Indicators derived from perception-based data go deeper and offer more substantive information, can attempt to answer questions related to “why”, even if these can be perceived as having inherent biases.

The initial phases, the design and development of indicators, appear to be successful, but the application of the agreed indicators remains problematic. In the absence of this component, it is unlikely that indicator-based evidence has a significant impact on decision-making. Simply put, there just isn’t enough information to warrant the consideration of other options.

Taken in sum, the case studies presented in this report do not depict a picture where indicators play a prevalent role in decision-making processes. Some of the evidence suggests that there is a willingness on the part of national stakeholders to use indicators as a means by which to assess and measure the performance of government. However, civil society or other advocacy based on the information generated in these processes does not appear to have a significant impact on the political process as it relates to policy-making. Although a plethora of instruments exists to measure

progress, there are gaps in the information that is provided and therefore the outcome of the assessment is less reliable. Participatory mechanisms, though stronger in some instances, do not necessarily yield the desired results. In part, this is due to the prevalence of top-down approaches to the implementation of governance assessments. Thus, instruments such as the APRM and NDP, despite efforts to ensure local ownership at different socio-political levels, remain primarily within the ambit of government.


The role of external actors, whether the donor community or international civil society organizations, in the design and, in some cases, implementation of governance assessments is significant. It is important to note that the role of external actors may be overstated given the number of instances in which local stakeholders use international standards to guide reform or adapt international instruments to local contexts. In terms of the emphasis placed on national assessments, the APRM and indicators for measuring NDPs, it seems that governments place an emphasis on monitoring as a result of external insistence or perceived external demand for such systems to be in place in countries. The causal links between external pressure and internal development of indicators are not, however, clearly demonstrated or obvious outside of assumptions. That said, in almost all of the case studies examined herein, the international community played an influential role. The table below shows the total instances, relative to the other categories, in which external actors were highlighted as developers of indicators.



The studies also show that, when taken together, the executive and external actors account for the formulation of over 50% of all governance indicators used in the three countries. Indeed, non-state actors only represent a small percentage of the total. This is demonstrated in the case studies, in which CSOs are often relegated to a peripheral role. Certainly, in assessment initiatives that work at the national level, the lead is very

much taken by governments, principally the executive but with parliament playing a role in some instances. Civil society engagement in the development – and implementation – of governance indicators seems to be most frequent when it is a narrow or specific issue/topic, or where the topic is localised below the national field.

The case studies further illustrate that, in the main, parliament is the principle user of indicators, with the executive the next most dominant user. However, it should be noted that parliaments were a particular focus of several case studies, so the incidence of indicator usage for this category in the study is out of proportion to the other stakeholders. The narratives suggest that, in fact, donors and the executive are the main drivers behind most instruments intended to assess government performance. Furthermore, although parliaments may be involved in the use of indicators, their capacity to effectively utilise evidence in the service of oversight is limited in all three countries by their access to resources and the capacity of MPs to interpret the information or data put before them. In Mozambique and Rwanda there is also the impact of politics on the independence and actions of MPs. In fact, the study suggests that the developers of indicators are, in the main, the principle users of those indicators. The exceptions to this are primarily with the APRM or NDP instruments, where external actors occasionally carry out assessments.




While indicators were developed across the key governance themes, participation and government effectiveness were more dominant than others were. Rule of law and regulatory quality also figured in assessment processes, but little work seems to be taking place in terms of monitoring government effectiveness and transparency. As corruption and other critical components of service delivery – and democratic decision-making itself – require transparency, the minimal emphasis on these themes is a




concern. This is particularly important given that a lack of transparency in decision-making would negate the effectiveness of any participatory mechanisms present in the countries. Instruments such as the NDP and APRM do address issues of corruption, and thus it is somewhat surprising that these were not raised within the case studies. Greater in-depth study may reveal that these issues are addressed, or, even more likely, that they do not figure prominently as they are relatively difficult to measure. A further complication may be that government effectiveness and transparency tend to involve issues that are often sensitive to governments. Reluctance on the part of certain governments to focus on these areas could explain why these themes do not form the core of the assessment processes. The one exception being Rwanda's emphasis on fighting corruption.

The case study narratives also offer some example of how the participatory mechanisms that are in place do not necessarily translate into participatory or transparent decision-making. This touches upon one of the critical issues central to the notion of measuring and assessing governance, in that it can bring to light the extent to which governments are committed to participatory processes and to what extent these mechanisms are able to influence or guide their actions. Official and unofficial forums to allow stakeholder participation are in most cases present. Often, it would seem that these mechanisms are largely of a symbolic nature, gestures on the part of governments that are limited to consultation and not central to processes that define outcomes.



A more critical point is that the study reveals a broad lack of understanding of what governance assessments are and what constitutes the indicators that can be used to undertake such assessments. Capacity concerns within parliament, local governments, institutions and civil society

were all mentioned as prohibitive factors in the successful use of assessment processes as a means through which evidence could be generated. Human development indicators, for example, appear to be more accessible measures of government effectiveness, as they are more closely linked to visible outputs. However, development indicators such as the Human Development Index do not address the “why?” that explains instances in which governments fail to meet their objectives. Certainly, in NDPs the tendency will be to rely on these types of indicators as a means by which to measure progress. In a similar way, the case studies illustrate an emphasis on analysing budget allocations as a quantifiable measure. The more nuanced use of indicators that could reveal, for example, inefficiencies behind procurement processes, central to service delivery questions, was not evident in any of the case studies.



The data collected through these studies must be viewed within the limitations imposed by the project as a whole. The case studies cannot in any instance claim to have addressed the issue of governance indicators comprehensively. Indeed, in selecting specific case studies, areas in which indicators are developed and applied may have escaped attention. That said, in the scoping missions carried out at the start of the project, the selection of case studies was, in part, dependent on finding areas in which the development and use of governance indicators was or should have been evident. The apparently poor use of indicators, in particular, in the case studies also highlights the widespread lack of understanding and general knowledge of such processes. The principle participants, across the case studies, were more often than not the executive and the donor community. One of the concerns this raises is the extent to which governance monitoring is an issue of broad national concern below the level of the state. A further concern is the extent to which governance monitoring is privileged by the state because it enables longer-term decision-making based on accurate evidence or because it is perceived to be a means to access external funding assistance.

# Conclusions

There are eight main lessons learned and conclusions drawn from the study. When considering these, it is important to bear in mind that the study sought only to gain a greater understanding of the issue within specific contexts. Although some generalisations can be made based on these findings, the arguments in support of these are subject to interpretation. However, the study draws upon the knowledge and experience of a broad range of actors and stakeholders.

1. High levels of commitment to development indicators and the MDGs require similar commitments to governance indicators

Stakeholders and practitioners have, progressively, become familiar with the quantitative statistics and global parlance around development indicators. It is relatively easy to grasp the concepts and implications behind figures such as the percentage of a population living below the poverty line or the number of households connected to an electricity source. Both local and international groups have collected and analysed such data. In addition, the developing world has rallied behind the call to ensure their countries try to meet the MDGs in which development is quantified and measurable.

This clarity and understanding is less prevalent in the realm of governance indicators, both because governance indicators seek to understand the “why” behind any set of numbers and because good governance, while clearly necessary for development, is not so easily quantifiable. When asking why a phenomenon occurs within a social or political system, there is also often a need to rely on a quantifiable or group of quantifiable proxies, the production of which requires the use of complex statistical models. Development indicators are mainly numbers; governance indicators, by contrast, are concepts represented by an amalgamation of numbers and, as such, are less commonly understood and referenced than their development counterparts.

A complicating factor is that international commitment to a developmental agenda comes with clear backing and more easily accessible funding streams than the international rhetoric around governance.

Nevertheless, failures to achieve the necessary development results require one to look more closely at the governance processes which can

either enhance or inhibit development. Those working with MDGs and other development indicators require support from those focusing on governance, while those focusing on governance require political and resource backing from those whose primary interest is development.

The Ghanaian case study, in which SEND-Ghana (Social Enterprise Development Foundation) monitored the implementation of school feeding programmes in several provinces, provides an illustrative example of the ease with which an initiative designed to monitor governance questions can quickly become focused on more developmental issues. Due to the difficulties encountered in assessing governance, SEND-Ghana was forced to focus on the logistical and practical issues, such as the need to consider infrastructure development and increasing enrolment figures before and after, and less attention was paid to governance issues of transparency or accountability.

Development objectives appear to have obvious practical solutions. Governance issues require a complex set of interventions at different levels, involving a multitude of actors and, most difficult of all, systemic and institutional evolution.

## A single domestically agreed set of governance indicators needs to be established

The countries in the study, and we suspect from general knowledge that the same can be said of other countries, are struggling to make sense of the variety of tools and indicator lists which are being applied or supplied by states and external actors. In Mozambique, for example, parliamentarians list 11 different programmes and instruments they are able to refer to in tracking government development plans. But these plans are all developed separately, often in collaboration with different or overlapping donor groups, and with different or overlapping civil society constituencies.

Competing spheres of influence, whether they are economic or political, exacerbate a situation that is currently inundated with well-meaning programmes and instruments. International, regional, sub-regional and national commitments and pressures result in an almost schizophrenic political profile, requiring governments to be active and re-active with little space in between. Until and unless it is possible to encourage countries to develop their own systematic and coherent development policy process,

and then to make use of it in the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, transaction costs are going to remain high, confusion over means and ends will continue and the policy process will zigzag back and forth rather than move steadily forward.

One result of the competing demands is that a great deal of time is spent in co-ordinating meetings between the various processes. Indicators are generalised or re-interpreted to create coherence, even when this may not be appropriate or possible, and the results from one monitoring exercise may not comfortably be applied to others. Compounding this problem is a lack of expertise within institutions such as parliaments, both in the administration and among Members of Parliament themselves. Few MPs have the necessary knowledge, experience and skills to engage constructively with the various tools at their disposal and those with the capacity to initiate and implement oversight initiatives are placed in numerous committees and structures, limiting the extent and depth to which they can examine any one subject.

Countries attempt to streamline these multiple processes by re-using or recycling data from one process into another, or by seeing each separate exercise as a subset of a greater exercise – so an annual PRSP might form the building block for a “2020” vision. These are ingenious ways of making sense of competing processes, sometimes undertaken more out of obligation than need.

The Joint Governance Assessment in Rwanda, initiated by the government and select members of the donor community, has been somewhat successful in combining different instruments and programmes. As it remains a relatively new exercise, begun only in 2008, lessons may be learned by monitoring the medium- and long-term impact of such a streamlining exercise.

## 2. Institutionalisation of governance assessments and development of local expertise promotes credibility and sustainability

In the past, issues such as capacity and opportunity-cost inhibitors have been understood to be solvable through the injection of external support or technical assistance. While such input can be useful to kick-start governance monitoring, policy reform in the service of governance evaluation or aid in the establishment of governance indicators, there are two issues that were brought to the fore during the current study. The first, already acknowledged by many international donors but nonetheless worth

repeating, is the question of ownership. This is particularly pertinent in the realm of governance assessments given that an evaluation has a direct bearing on the power wielded by national stakeholders. Whether in relation to votes in a future election or access to international funds, a governance review is not perceived to be a neutral process.

In addition, and with other implications, there is a sustainability issue that needs to be considered in the use of external expertise as a solution for local capacity gaps. Africa is a continent in which asymmetry of information, particularly due to poor access to information by the average citizen, is a means to power. Information is both powerful and sensitive. A time-series collection of data on accountability can therefore be a significant tool in the hands of an NGO and government control of statistics on delivery and corruption can be manipulated to suggest favourable governance progress.

There needs to be a strong commitment to the ongoing production of information and it must be regularly, reliably and impartially produced in the service of monitoring. The time-bound introduction of external consultants or academics, while it may be useful in the service of skills transfer, will always run the risk of being unsustainable given a lack of commitment in a nation, statistics board or civil society organization to the time, cost and potential confrontation involved in tracking governance indicators.

In numerous instances throughout the report there is clear evidence that recruitment of external experts is required. The example of media monitoring by the National Media Commission (NMC) in Ghana is illustrative. The NMC developed a set of indicators for assessing the content of news stories but produced only a single analysis. While not an example of the unsustainable injection of external technical support, the case highlights the challenges of sustainability when it comes to research and monitoring, even in the face of NMC commitment to using indicators to support the development of a regulatory framework for the media.

Similarly, in the development of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in Mozambique and Rwanda, both countries relied to some extent on international experts to develop indicators. The absence of local or “in-house” capacity, whether that be in parliaments, institutions, the executive or civil society, is a critical concern as this increases the cost of such exercises and does little to promote institutional knowledge.

## Externally designed and implemented governance assessments less likely to engender local ownership

There are many national governance assessment tools used across Africa. Amongst these are the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Governance study and the APRM. There are other more specific studies – the Harvard African Governance Index, Afrobarometer and Freedom House studies come to mind. All of them use sets of indicators which have been developed in collaboration with expert groups based on the continent. That said, with the involvement, and often leadership, of external institutions it is possible to question whether such studies are adequately contextualised.

All of the above studies also have differing methodological approaches. The most favoured is to use both qualitative and quantitative data from a variety of intergovernmental, governmental and non-governmental sources. In some cases these are themselves aggregated to make them more useful. In addition, more in-depth analysis of data can be done using expert focus groups or interviews, panel reviews or surveys. The results are sometimes, but not always, validated domestically before being published. Some of the studies then provide comparative rankings and scores. Some are done annually or bi-annually and then suggest, with caution, the possibility of tracking progress over time. However, due to the broad nature of these surveys and assessments, it is difficult to pinpoint specific governmental initiatives that may require support in which improvement is necessary.

While all of the studies are applicable in different ways and some have received considerable media attention, it is less clear to what extent they are actually changing governance behaviour. It may be that they are building a consensus for a particular type of behaviour; and it is true, though only to a limited extent, that governance reformers are making use of these results and the indicators in their advocacy. What is certain, however, is that the field of governance indicators, and the use of them in advocacy, analysis or other ways, remains limited to a few well-informed groups benefiting from increased exposure to both theoretical and practical fields of knowledge.

Two of the studies mentioned above attempt to avoid the pitfalls of being discounted by local actors. The UNECA study seeks to gain local ownership of the reports before they are published, with mixed results.

The APRM sought to obtain government support at the design level and then through its voluntary accession mechanism, thereby ensuring that it is a country-based study with external validation rather than the other way around. Both studies suffered from strict time requirements and have not been able to reproduce themselves within a sufficient time period to make an impact. The UNECA study is into a third round in some countries, the APRM is not yet through its first round. Indeed, in Ghana, the APRM process appeared to be getting progressively less attention (and funding) and in Rwanda it has been amalgamated with another new programme, with former APRM secretariat staff now disbanded and redistributed to various governmental departments.

In-depth studies, such as UNECA and the APRM, have themselves faced considerable capacity constraints in the move from diagnosis to practical plans of action for ensuring sustainable governance reform. Initial financial outlay for these studies has not been matched in the process of applying the plans of action or recommendations. In these and a number of other case studies, therefore, the impact should be considered as yet untested. Some institutions, such as the Gender Monitoring Office in Rwanda, have yet to develop a set of indicators by which a diagnosis can be made, and points of reference remain external (such as the Beijing Platform for Action aimed at equality for women). Although “gender profiling” has been carried out, this too suffers from how it can be used as a practical application for change.

Extractive industry governance assessment tools continue to lack governmental buy-in, despite mounting evidence and research by internal actors (usually with the support of international examples). However, there appears to be a uniform tendency to dismiss studies or concepts when these appear to be unfavourable to the government, who are then quick to remonstrate with interlocutors and deride studies as lacking an appreciation of the context or a proper understanding of locally owned initiatives.

Compounding the problems of ownership and credibility are the plethora of studies produced. Each study then competes for public space and the attention of policy-makers, which enables the subjects of study to discount their results except where it is in their interests. Opposing political parties, furthermore, have been known to use the same report to make contradictory conclusions, drawing attention to the often ambiguous and malleable nature of statistics and indicators. Thus rankings are either ignored as irrelevant or advertised as examples of good performance for purposes of obtaining support.



3. The capacity to understand, formulate and apply governance indicators requires further development

Financial questions and issues surrounding time constraints are recurring concerns and are applicable in varying degrees to all governance assessments, addressed further below. Additionally, there remain two principle concerns with regard to capacity. Firstly, the pre-monitoring phase necessitates the conceptualisation and creation of indicators. Secondly, the capacity and ability of stakeholders to implement a system of monitoring requires an understanding of the nature and potential outcome of the process. Understanding governance indicators is the key underlying foundation upon which this system of oversight rests. Without this fundamental knowledge the process is rendered problematic and the results questionable. Although the concept of governance may have a foothold in the work of civil society organizations (CSOs) and government, its relatively broad definition invites a lack of clarity in terms of what, in fact, needs to be measured, and how. The need to focus questions to enable the actors involved to draw out relevant and accurate information is of paramount importance. Sector-specific assessments and oversight initiatives are rare, usually have skeleton budgets, are implemented on an ad hoc basis and rely primarily on national actors and institutions. Although examples of indicators abound, particularly on the international level, contextualising indicators to address country-specific demands depends on local capacity to understand the objectives and process in a way that enables flexibility and nuanced adaptations.

Assessments of democratic practice can choose two different, but equally important, aspects: the process and the outcome. Governance assessments tend to, or should, target the process through which results are or are not achieved. Measuring the quality of governance solely on outputs makes it difficult to identify and address root causes. Ideally, governance indicators can measure and assess both of these dimensions, but in focusing on and promoting the process of good governance practice the emphasis is placed on the sustainability of the overall system.

One example of a moderately successful sector-specific national oversight and assessment process is the SEND-Ghana and the School Feeding Programme (SFP). In this particular instance, the NGO in question was able to develop its own set of indicators while also incorporating the CIVICUS Civil Society Index. SEND-Ghana was attempting to measure the process through which the SFP realised its objectives by identifying the bottlenecks and capacity gaps. This focus on the process, while remaining

aware of the ultimate objective, is an approach that places emphasis on the means and not merely the ends.

Although a coherent and well-adapted approach was adopted by SEND-Ghana, this understanding was not necessarily shared by their government counterparts. For instance, much of the information generated by governmental agencies came in the form of numerical analysis in relation to the objectives, i.e. the number of children beneficiaries, the increase in school attendance, etc. In so doing, the SFP and government relegated the role of governance monitoring to civil society, which then was placed in a position of having to unilaterally advocate for changes to the process. Whether or not the issues raised by SEND-Ghana were incorporated remained the purview and prerogative of the government, which, as was stated above, seemed more concerned with development outcomes. Nevertheless, as an official partner in the process, SEND-Ghana was able to adopt a collaborative rather than confrontational approach, which increases the likelihood of government accepting and incorporating their findings. That said, the extent to which decision-making was influenced by the information provided by SEND-Ghana is difficult to measure and therefore unclear.

The majority of the remaining case studies abound with examples where the formulation, application and general understanding of governance indicators remain a significant challenge. With a reasonable amount of resources available to it, the Gender Monitoring Office in Rwanda, despite being in existence for two years, has yet to develop a set of governance indicators by which to monitor and assess the impact government policies and practice have had on the status of women. A variety of reasons may explain this, but it is nevertheless clear that the development of governance indicators for this particular governmental institution can be supported and improved.

Lastly, there remains an absence of understanding in most cases regarding the aggregation of indicators to form an overall assessment of the governance process. The complexity of formulating a systematic and in-depth approach to measuring the governance process necessitates a detailed understanding of the issues and relationships between process and outcome. In the case of decentralisation in Mozambique, for instance, the inability of the local governments to formulate and implement governance assessments was indeed acknowledged.

For such an exercise to be effective, a multitude of actors needs to have a common understanding of the objectives and monitoring process. This absence in capacity within local government resulted in a reliance upon

figures relating to revenues generated and spent, with little or no qualitative information on the how and why, which could, if generated, have an impact on the sustainability of the success surrounding the fiscal process.

## Governance measurements need to move beyond quantitative analysis

In the synthesis and analysis of the country reports, one of the issues highlighted was the continuing reliance on quantitative data. Indeed, in many instances, achieving what is perceived to be good governance practice is simplified to the realisation of a numerical quantity. Although many aggregate indicators coming from international institutions and organizations sometimes also use numerical data, this is largely incorporated into an indicator based on aggregated information. That said, within the APRM set of indicators, the number of international legal texts is taken as an objective to satisfy a particular indicator, without any consideration of whether or not this has had any measurable impact.

The most obvious example, and chosen for this very reason, is the examination of the potential benefits of a high representation of women in the Rwandan parliament. In this instance, the challenge was to ascertain whether or not this had a measurable impact on governance practice and formulation of priorities. Further study along these lines is critical if those favoring the increased participation of women can answer and rebut arguments that assert the futility of greater involvement of women in politics if they are not capacitated or willing to effectively promote the interests of their unique constituency. In other words, numbers may count for nothing if there is no discernible qualitative impact.

### 4. Information gaps and supply side inefficiencies

The key to undertaking any research study is the availability of the requisite information. A further consideration, which is equally important, is the comprehensive nature of the information made available. An incomplete database or gaps in data availability mean that any study will only be able to form a partial picture. Put another way, it is a puzzle with pieces missing. Of course, realistically, 100% accuracy is an ideal recognised as unattainable, with margins of error commonplace in statistical, quantitative or qualitative studies. Narrowing down the pertinent questions and

identifying that which is measurable is therefore an essential preliminary task in any such undertaking. Governance assessments, due to their often sensitive nature, face several constraints in their ability to provide accurate and relevant products. Subjectivity and inherent bias, emanating from both ends of the information-gathering process, also render governance assessments susceptible to misleading or contextually inaccurate outcomes.

In most cases, as is clearly illustrated in the case studies, it is the availability of information that is the main constraint. Those governments examined within this study do not have a very systematic and reliable method of generating and disseminating information, and we believe this to be true of most governments in the region. In all three countries there seemed to be no one organization focused on measuring governance as an exclusive, stand-alone project. Although this may be due to funding issues, it would also suggest that the development of projects and programmes that could undertake governance assessments relies on the existence of expertise, understanding or even interest.

Further complicating the production of assessments are the difficulties encountered in gathering information. In the absence of clearly defined and functioning institutions, structures, systems and processes, a problem compounded by the general absence of basic numerical data, assessing political contexts and dynamics is rendered highly problematic. To some extent, governance assessments should therefore attempt not only to measure but also define that which they are measuring. Certainly, if any assessment has as its aim to map and influence decision-making, it is necessary to analyse both the *de jure* and the *de facto* operating contexts of institutions. In short, the crux of the dilemma is to be able to find and define the locus of political will, understand upon what evidence or logic it functions, and thereby draw out relevant information.

In some cases data does exist, and it can simply be a case of knowing how to locate it. In Mozambique, the assessment of the decentralisation process was problematic due to the contradictory budget information presented by the government. Whether this was the result of a lack of capacity in terms of information management, or a deliberate attempt to mislead the assessment process, is difficult to gauge. However, even the generation of information that would have enabled stakeholders to verify the data was hampered by a lack of transparency.

Common to all three cases was the inability of parliaments to generate information that would enhance their capacity to engage in evidence-based

decision-making. The inadequately trained and few researchers available are unable to provide committees with comprehensive and timely supporting documentation. Aggravating this scenario is an apparent reluctance on the part of parliaments to use information generated by external experts, particularly if these come from non-state or civil society bodies.

Certainly there is no commonly available and trusted source of comprehensive data. Everyone is doing the best they can, shining their light on that corner of the room in which they believe the black cat to be hiding. It is therefore not surprising that policy is made without reference to evidence that is mistrusted either because of its origin or its quality.

In Ghana, the formulation of the Mining Law within the committee process did include submissions by civil society, but the impact of this information was negligible. Ultimately, the outcome of the legislative process did not address the key concerns expressed by civil society. One can only speculate as to what information the law was finally based upon, and this again shows a lack of transparency within the political process.

## Access to information

In other instances, information may be withheld due to its unflattering nature. Governments are often sensitive to external criticism and can be reluctant to share information that paints a less than positive picture. An example of this is the delay by the government of Mozambique to make public the ARPM report. With looming elections, the government made the decision to withhold the report until after the poll. Although this is an issue concerning the output of the assessment process, rather than the process itself, it is nevertheless indicative of the government approaches to sharing knowledge and information.

In all three countries studied, the relationship between governments and civil society is a defining characteristic that impacts on the level of transparency and information-sharing. Although less so in Ghana, the governments of Mozambique and Rwanda remain reluctant to engage with civil society in collaborative assessments or decision-making processes. Both the APRM and National Development Plan (NDP), combined into the Joint Governance Assessment (JGA) and NDP in Rwanda, are characterised by an absence of real engagement between civil society and government. Without access to information pertaining to the performance

of the government, any attempt by civil society to support the implementation of national poverty reduction strategies, for instance, is necessarily done unilaterally.

In addressing corruption, whether in Rwanda or elsewhere on the African continent, information pertaining to the procurement process is notoriously difficult to come by. In the role of parliament in anti-corruption initiatives in Rwanda, this key area was not raised. Initiatives to explore and regulate this sector of government expenditure are mainly limited to the reports of the Auditor General, which do not normally provide sufficient detail to allow proper and detailed oversight. That said, the case of Rwanda also illustrates government's sensitivity to global perceptions, as considerable efforts to act against corruption came from the executive's awareness of its international ranking. Despite this, however, Rwanda continued to go down in Transparency International's Corruption Index. Hence, even with the creation of numerous bodies that are tasked, in one form or another, to prevent corrupt practices, it has continued to plague the country. Again, civil society participation in Rwanda's efforts to stem corruption remains minimal.

## Dialogue and the sharing of information

In Mozambique the participatory processes around the National Development Plan (or PARPA) is a good example of how participation and engagement between stakeholders can be formalised and institutionalised. What is perhaps most significant is the regularity with which this engagement took place. Such mechanisms can foster trust and positive, non-confrontational dialogue.

Ad hoc engagements such as submissions to or advocacy directed towards parliamentary committees, as is discussed in both the Mining Law in Ghana and the Labour Law in Rwanda, tend to have limited success. In most cases, such engagement between government and civil society is characterised by the absence of transparency and a tendency by governments to dictate the terms of the dialogue and the extent to which their information is shared.

Although donors and other international actors demonstrate a greater willingness to engender an inclusive dialogue process, bi-lateral negotiations, particularly around budget support, are often undertaken behind closed doors. The Paris Declaration attempts to address this issue with

regards to budget reporting, but the onus of disclosing this information also rests with the donor community. Monitoring of budgets, following both the executive's presentation of the budget and the Auditor General's report, is an area that has received significant attention recently. This form of oversight can have a significant impact on a range of issues, such as service delivery and corruption, amongst others. Unfortunately, this area remains a top-down chain of information sharing, and stakeholder engagement in the formulation of budgets and monitoring of its implementation is subject to the extent to which governments allow this to happen.

Dialogue processes that involved civil society in the monitoring of the decentralisation process in Mozambique, particularly with regards to revenue generation and implementation, have been plagued by inaccurate or incomplete information. However, this may also have been due to a lack of capacity in both central and local government branches.

#### 5. Scarce human and financial resources undermine the long-term sustainability of governance assessments

Firstly, it should be clearly stated that the potential and ability to formulate and implement governance assessments in the three countries studied here does exist. However, due to constraints based principally on time and funding, these types of exercises can and will only be done on an ad hoc basis. Currently, there is no institution or other body that is capable of sustaining a continuing assessment and monitoring exercise. Budgetary support from the government of these countries is often limited and, as stated above, once the initial exercise is completed, implementation and follow-up processes tend to receive less attention and financial support. The Ghana study suggests that this can change over time as political actors see the benefit of recovering a report or programme of action arising out of a study such as the APRM. There seems to be a new impetus based on recognition that the study did appropriately identify constitutional weaknesses that require remedy.

Even in these instances, one could make the argument that funding can and is only made available as external aid. Perhaps what is most significant is that as donor interest dwindles so does national interest. This is an enduring legacy of the aid dependency syndrome, where government priorities are by and large dictated by the financial resources, which are generally allocated according to a set of objectives generated externally and unilaterally. Only rarely are these priorities and objectives influenced by external, non-state or international actors if additional financial resources

are not part of the process. With a broad range of interests vying for state time and resources, monitoring and evaluation exercises compete with pressing, often short-term, needs and solutions.

Sustaining the process of governance assessments over time is also a problem identified in these studies. Advocacy, by its very nature, tends to be ad hoc and opportunistic, and evidence is generated as needs arise. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) suffer a chronic inability to sustain any one activity due to their reliance on external funding, a source that is also contingent upon the shifting sets of priorities. The most sustainable and viable relationship in the long term is therefore that between governments and donors. Budget and electoral cycles, for both donors and governments, can also endanger sustained engagement and commitment. A Rwandan stakeholder interviewed during the study referenced a perception that while international partners and the state collaborated closely on the development of governance indicators for joint monitoring, this collaboration did not so easily extend to the financing of an implementation phase involving research and roll-out. Donors, as much as the governments they deal with, are often under pressure to produce results, which can have the affect of limiting the attention span of the principle actors.

In the same vein, a Mozambican stakeholder pointed out that in a developmental state with a range of urgent priorities, finding or justifying the diversion of funds to the costly and time-consuming work of national statistic collection and survey work can be a difficult task. An effective monitoring or evaluation mechanism relies on the establishment of base-line data from which to measure progress. While the human resources and financial capacity to establish base line measures are one set of issues, the time involved in national roll out of a base line study should not be underestimated and is simply the first in what should be an annual or regular series of undertakings. It took the Rwandan Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion three years to conduct its first gender profiling study and a further two years to present the results in a report. Once the time cost is coupled with the financial cost of national survey roll-out or statistic gathering – often a reason African nations have outdated or non-existent census data – any developing nation government or local civil society organization needs to have a strong commitment to such an exercise otherwise it will either not take place or it will be carried out once and never again or too infrequently to have comparative value. The opportunity cost of governance monitoring can mean programmes and systems do not get past the conceptualisation stage.



National censuses may take place once a decade. The present rate of progress of the APRM suggests a similar cycle – but this is equivalent to two electoral cycles and beyond the life span of many civil society organizations and most donor funding cycles. In order to continue, such detailed and comprehensive assessments will need to be sufficiently institutionalized and embedded within state businesses. Something will have to change – either the scope and periodicity of the studies or financing and capacity models.

#### 6. Objectives and targets shift with national and international political cycles

Democracies and the policies they formulate and implement are in all instances subject to the electoral cycle. This fact can cause negative consequences in countries battling with the need for development. On the other hand, political parties that stay in government over successive elections have the benefit and ability to think and act in the long term. In the cross-cutting case studies in this report, the APRM and the NDP are particularly subject to the changes of and within governments, or, conversely may benefit from a lack of change. Another factor that often plays a role in the internal decision-making process is international circumstances and pressures. Continuity and some measure of systemic stability are critical if governance assessments are to be effective tools to assess change. If priorities, objectives and targets change, due to a variety of circumstantial reasons for both national and international stakeholders, governance assessments can only offer a snapshot of a situation that is largely time-specific.

One of the lessons coming from Ghana is that national priorities can shift with successive governments. Indeed, there often seems to be a deliberate attempt to discard what the previous government undertook as policy and practice. The last two elections in Ghana have seen an alternation between the two dominant political parties. Although this may be indicative of a healthy democratic system, in some regard it has resulted in disruptions and changes in the approach to and conceptualisation of the NDP and APRM. In terms of assessing government practice in relation to these, it means that the goal posts, so to speak, are continually shifting. The comprehensive studies deal with processes with very different time lines – from the more volatile political arrangements to the extremely long-run developmental trajectories. They are therefore particularly sensitive to short cycles and likely to be challenged for their temporal conclusions and recommendations.

Rwanda demonstrates the benefits of having a leadership with a singular vision which is set and dominated by the president. Despite criticisms of the centralised nature of political power in Rwanda, the continuity provided by the leadership has resulted in enhanced coherence of policy and implementation. Indeed, the transition from the APRM structure to the JGA can be acknowledged as a potentially positive approach to rationalising government policy. Rather than facing the challenges of attending to and implementing a host of different instruments with differing – though similar – agendas, the JGA has harmonized these within a single plan of action. This coherence offers the benefits of setting a baseline by which progress can be assessed holistically, rather than in a disjointed manner. Combining the various instruments into one overarching programme can maximise the human and financial resources.

#### 7. The executive branch and international actors are the principle developers and users of indicators

One of the principle conclusions of this study is that the main actors in the process of development and use of indicators are international partners and the executive branch of government. Furthermore, it is apparent that indicators developed by these two stakeholders are more likely to be of a national character, whereas local or sub-national indicator development and use has a higher chance of involving non-state or civil society actors. The causal factors behind this are evident in the contrast between the crosscutting case studies and the country-specific studies. In the APRM and NDP indicator development process, as in other comprehensive governance assessments, the point of contact will by necessity be the executive due to their inherent links to actors and institutions within the international arena. These instruments will therefore depend on the government, and in some part international actors and process, in the modalities of their formulation, contextualization and implementation.

The NDP process in Mozambique is, on the surface, intentionally participatory. Efforts have been made by both the executive and international partners to ensure that parliament, civil society and other stakeholders are part of the consultative as well as monitoring process. Though commendable, there are some obvious power dynamics that are critical in defining the positions of each actor within the decision-making process. Budget support by the donor community is a powerful tool within this process and accords them considerable leverage. Mozambique's substantial reliance on foreign aid places it in a tenuous bargaining position, and has an

impact on the perceptual focus and internal priorities. Within this tripartite alliance of partners (donors, executive and civil society), civil society will only be able to exert limited influence and impact. The case study addressing this issue would seem to indicate that within the Joint Review process, despite attempts to be inclusive, civil society only plays a nominal role. Thus, in both the formulation and application of governance indicators, civil society relies on the ability or willingness of the two principle actors to include them.

The APRM process is inherently an internationally guided process. As the bulk of the indicators are pre-determined, the contextualisation is often a matter of translation or insertion of country-specific institutions, processes and, to a limited extent, priorities. That said, the outcome in the form of recommendations does rely on national stakeholders, but the implementation of these often falls within the domain of the executive. Although the report itself, as was the case in Ghana, was mainly produced by civil society, the task of realising the objectives of the Plan of Action is relegated to the APRM secretariat, which relies on the executive for its budget. Mozambique also provides an interesting perspective on the ownership dimension of the APRM as the government unilaterally determined how and when the report would be released. In all instances, the final report must pass through and be approved by the executive, which places the balance of power on its side.

The prominent status of the donor community in designing and monitoring governance indicators is not, however, inherently negative. As the international community often appears more willing to engage with civil society, and draw from their knowledge and expertise, this provides a critical avenue of influence for this partner with minority status. That the international community plays such a prominent role in developing and implementing these instruments is a contentious issue, and its members are often criticised for being unaware of particulars of the national context. Approaches to ensure local “ownership” of indicator development and associated processes have met with moderate success, and will no doubt continue to do so if the power dynamics of the various relationships are not altered.

## Government performance assessments are an area of positive potential

Performance assessments, as elaborated in Rwanda's *Imihigo* process, are gaining currency within African governments. Although this has as yet to be applied in a comprehensive manner, it is a potentially useful mechanism by which to oversee governments' efforts to realise their mandates. What is particularly remarkable in the case of Rwanda is the adaptation of a traditional concept into democratic practice, specifically around the concept of accountability. However, as is elaborated in the study, the *Imihigo* is principally a system of accountability upwards rather than to citizens, and participation of citizens in the formulation of the goals within the process is limited. This presents a problematic situation where the state is already highly centralised. Efforts to de-centralise and devolve political power are thus undermined, despite what are no doubt good intentions on the part of the government.

While there are some instances of indicators being used as part of a general oversight and accountability mechanism – for example by parliaments and civil society actors – there seems to be an increasing imperative on the part of national governments to use an indicator-based approach to increase accountability within the government and state system. This movement is certainly influenced by both regional bodies, through the APRM, and the international donor community, which often set criteria upon which aid is based. Again, however, these criteria are currently predominantly drawn from developmental indicators, and the need to draw and rely upon governance indicators, while increasing, is an area that needs further attention, clarity and acceptance by national governments.

In Rwanda, for example, very specific measures of performance are being established. In the main the language is that of performance management rather than indicators, but the results statements can be tied to more generally developed and monitored indicators. We discuss elsewhere the questions of whether these indicators measure governance behaviour as opposed to development progress and whether they sufficiently deal with qualitative issues.

One potential problem of this approach is that it creates a single government, reducing decentralisation merely to localised service delivery rather than to an independent autonomous level of government capable of mediating regional or local interests and dispersing power across the state. An

advantage for those promoting governance indicators is that performance management connects with the very real interests of an incumbent government to demonstrate impact while in office and prior to any election contest.

8. Internationally recognised standards and indicators are used to support advocacy for reform

The study specifically identified a case of law reform in Ghana to test the extent to which indicators were involved in the reform process. From this case and others it is clear that the development of indicators has served one useful purpose. For whatever reason, pressures for reform arise – which are unrelated to the indicators, except peripherally – and reformers require external validation to promote their agenda. In interviews with the Department of Justice, reference was made to the efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to reduce corruption. It was clear that, in this case, sub-regional standards and indicators could be an effective tool for advocacy. Indeed, national perceptions, particularly within governments, may be more susceptible to events and structures within their sphere of influence. States establish these sub-regional institutions and formulate their mandates and directives. Thus they are participatory mechanisms, on an international level, that can enhance a sense of ownership and obligation.

For many reasons, governments may find it useful to shift their stance on particular issues of governance. It might be that within the government there are differences of opinion, or that despite the apparent lack of aid conditionality, governments get the message that change is required. Internationally recognised indicators, especially if they have regional support, enable governments to comply with new standards without having to debate these standards domestically or within their own constituencies or work from first principles to establish them. Of course this can lead to pretence, but in some instances it appears that the very existence of an indicator such as a target for women's participation in parliament, can encourage compliance and have outcomes beyond those anticipated. They can be system changers.

The pressures for reform seem to arise from dissatisfaction with the status quo, the opening of public space for whatever reason, professional pride and contact with a larger, international community. With judicial reform in Ghana, it was clear that the institutions concerned were sensitive to popular perceptions regarding levels of inadequacy and corruption.

Media outlets in Ghana, which have considerable freedom in what they can say and report, no doubt have an influence in channeling the opinions and concerns of civil society, experts and normal citizens. This form of public oversight should be nurtured and expanded into other areas of government. In extreme cases, there might be other triggers to action on the part of individuals and organizations within the particular sector. This seems to create an impetus for governance reform.

That said, there remain sectors and issues that are of great public concern where governments seem impervious to outside influence or advocacy. Specifically, the issues surrounding the extractive industry are often shrouded in secrecy. As was illustrated in the Ghanaian study on the evolution of the Mining Law, local considerations and concerns highlighted by activists, who resorted to evidence drawn from national and international sources, seem not to have been taken on board by the decision-makers.

What indicators or norms – such as the Harare principles of the Commonwealth, the APRM indicators and lists of international standards, and in the Ghana case of judicial reform, the Latimer Principles – do is provide an independent, specific and measurable target towards which the reformers can aim. It seems that these are selected from a menu for their legitimacy within the sector, and for the extent to which they match the aspirations of the reformers. Perhaps they shape those aspirations. Relatively innovative efforts were also made by reformers in Ghana to address local needs, such as the training of “lay magistrates” who could expand the judicial system to areas that do not have immediate access or recourse to courts. In this case, internationally inspired objectives were, in part, addressed and accommodated in a manner that suited the local context.

By contrast, while locally based aspirations seem to address immediate needs, international standards, perhaps because they are viewed as reputable and reflective of an internationally accepted norm, enable reformers to establish a sense of purpose and “common sense” which they might otherwise not be able to achieve. The indicators act as framers of the reform process rather than the individual actors themselves, allowing all parts of the system to adjust even if there are conflicts between the various actors which would not otherwise be resolvable. The promotion of women’s participation in governance structures, such as parliament in Rwanda, is also largely based on movements emanating from the international sphere. Traditional cultures are often at odds with these types of initiatives and an externally reputable set of indicators, objectives and standards play a pivotal role in reforming perceptions and practice.

# Recommendations

- The conceptualization of governance indicators should embrace the system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and the private sector.
- There is need for greater sensitization of citizens on APRM findings, recommendations and their implementation processes. Equally, there is need for the development of governance indicators for monitoring the implementation process and for measuring the performance of the implementing institutions.
- Access to information is critical in all areas relating to governance assessments, but especially so in the fight against corruption and office abuse. Laws need to be formulated and enacted that enshrine the citizens' right to access all information necessary to hold governments accountable.
- The demand for governance indicators in the extractive industry to facilitate continued advocacy efforts on the rights of citizens and communities is an area that requires sustained attention. A comprehensive system of oversight and assessment that can incorporate all relevant information needs to be developed. However, of greatest importance is to ensure that stakeholders have access to the documents that could ensure accurate data collection.
- With long-term programmes, such as the APRM and NDP, there is a need to develop an approach that overcomes the parochial interests of specific political parties. This applies especially in situations where new governments come into power and discard the work, goals and strategies of the previous government.
- Ensuring ownership of governance policies and assessment of government necessitates a shift away from what is often a donor-government accountability relationship to a process driven by a citizenry-based accountability demand.
- Specialization of non-state actors in policy areas and promoting a policy and constituency-based activism among civil society organizations can help broaden and strengthen ownership of governance assessments, and create democratically legitimate demand for better performance. Pressure from the citizenry can activate the political will that is often missing and is likely to be responsible for the recurrent modest performance in governance areas. In this context, domestically generated

indicators are privileged, rather than those developed for international comparison, which might hinder their credibility. It should be underscored that a balanced evidence from various sources, including national and international actors, state and non-state bodies and citizens' organizations, render these indicators and subsequent recommendations better owned by the stakeholders, thus not subject to resistance from implementation.

- Political interests are the enabling environment for democratic reform, and assessments should be aligned with interests that are pro democracy (who are the change agents on the ground).
- Whereas national ownership is essential, it needs to be broadened in order to achieve democratic ownership, for indicators this should be achieved both in terms of process, who takes part in planning and conducting the assessment, as well as in terms of methodology, through the use of pro-poor and gender-sensitive indicators, as well as large representative samples/household surveys.
- We need to strengthen the demand side of indicators. So far there is too little understanding and too little done in terms of strengthening the demand side to indicators. Country-led assessments should be a much clearer programming option for engaging with civil society.
- Identifying existing key mechanisms of accountability, where the government is actually being held to account by citizens or citizens' representative (either formally in the form of elected representation or informally through civil society), is a critical entry point for positioning governance assessment work to strengthen these mechanisms.
- Governance assessments should seek to bridge the supply side and demand side of governance and service delivery. For indicators this means that the process should seek to create a dialogue mechanism, adjust mutual expectation, and build consensus on the process involved in how to agree on targets and measure progress towards those targets.
- The starting point for any governance assessment should be to seek political influence. There is no such thing as an apolitical governance assessment.
- Assessments and M&E conducted by the executive in order to report to donors have no traction with any other national counterparts, including parliamentarians. This is viewed as the executive's business, and an integral part of negotiations with donors, and therefore not relevant to the work of parliament or civil society. Trying to popularize these



indicators is likely to be ineffective as they often duplicate national formal accountability systems and risks to undermine these. (It is the role of parliament and the finance/budget committee to discuss the budget, not the executive/donors and representatives randomly selected from civil society.) Instead, country-led assessments should be the starting point. The executive may then draw on this material when reporting to donors. (This is very important so that donors do not strengthen the skewed accountability by making reporting quantitative and scientific; the executive should be held to account by citizens, not by donors.)

- There is no doubt that the credibility of the assessment will depend on broad acceptability of the indicators used as being relevant. Securing a national consensus on a relevant assessment process involving national stakeholders should be done first, and certainly not before engagement with donors.
- Ensuring that it bridges the demand and supply side would be an important element. A major challenge will be to ensure that government neither dominates the process nor believes it is being subjected to unfair and politicized criticism.
- It should also have a clear action orientation. The purpose of the assessment is not merely to determine what the governance situation is like but also to identify priorities for improvements.

## Endnotes

- 1 This research overview and the three country reports can be found on Idasa's website, [www.idasa.org](http://www.idasa.org).
- 2 See for instance the World Bank Institute "Governance Matters" and the UNDP "Governance Indicators: A Users' Guide".
- 3 SEND-Ghana (2008). "Whose Decision Counts", A monitoring report on the Ghana School Feeding Program.
- 4 School Feeding Program manual.
- 5 2005 World Summit Outcome, "Quick-impact initiatives", item 34, p.39
- 6 The Social Enterprise Development Foundation (SEND Foundation) is a West Africa based non-governmental/civil society organization established in 1998 and headquartered in Ghana. SEND Foundation of West Africa, Proposal for monitoring School Feeding Program of the Ghana government 2007-2010, pg. 6.
- 7 SEND-Ghana (2008). "Whose Decision Counts", A monitoring report on the Ghana School Feeding Program.
- 8 SEND-Ghana normally depends on officers of NGOs already operating in the districts/regions. These officers and their NGOs are the FNGOs.
- 9 SEND Foundation of West Africa, Proposal for monitoring School Feeding Program of the Ghana government 2007-2010, pg 8.
- 10 Interview with a Senior Official of the GSFP National Secretariat. August, 2009.
- 11 Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai District Assembly (2009). 1st and 2nd quarter report (January-June 2009) submitted to the Ministry of Local government, Rural Development and Environment.
- 12 West Africa International "Ghana: Who is Afraid of Justice Acquah's Judicial Revolution" Vol.8, No. 48 April, 2006.
- 13 The Commonwealth Principles on the accountability of and the relationship between the three branches of government was agreed by Law Ministers and endorsed by the Commonwealth Heads of government Meeting, Abuja, Nigeria, 2003.
- 14 2005 Judicial Services Report, p.45.
- 15 See Forward to Tracy Smith, Judicial Reform and Its Impact on the Administration of Justice: Case Study Focused on Court Reforms in Accra (n.d).
- 16 See Georgina Wood, "Judiciary has no Choice but to Change" in Daily Graphic, April 10, 2010, p. 13.
- 17 Interview with Mr. David Newton, Rector of Ghana Institute of Journalism.
- 18 Interview with Christopher Asiedu, Controller of Programmes, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation.
- 19 Interview with Mr. David Newton, Rector of Ghana Institute of Journalism.

- 20 Interview with Dr. Audrey Gadzekpo, Director of School of Communication Studies.
- 21 Interview with Prof. Kwame Karikari, executive Director of Media Foundation for West Africa.
- 22 Interviews with Bright Blewu, General Secretary for Ghana Journalist Association.
- 23 Interviews with Ben Ephson, Editor-in Chief of The Daily Dispatch and Dr. Audrey Gadzekpo, Director of School of Communication Studies.
- 24 Interview with Ben Ephson, editor of The Daily Dispatch.
- 25 Interview with George Sarpong, executive Secretary, National Media Commission.
- 26 Interview with Mr David Newton, Rector of Institute of Journalism.
- 27 Interview with Prof. Kwame Karikari, executive Director of Media Foundation for West Africa.
- 28 The urban population in Mozambique is estimated at 30 percent of the total population, and the projected rate of urbanisation implies that 50 percent of the population will live in cities and towns by 2025.
- 29 Interview with the Minister of Local Government.
- 30 Rwanda counts 4 provinces, plus the City of Kigali.
- 31 Kauzya John Mary, Political decentralization in Africa: Experiences of Uganda, Rwanda, and South Africa, December 2007
- 32 Kalisa Evariste is Chairperson of the parliamentary Commission for Human Rights and the fight against genocide; also 2nd Vice Chairperson of African parliamentarian Network Against Corruption (APNAC)/Rwanda Chapter.
- 33 MIGEPROFE, 2003.
- 34 Claire Devlin & Robert Elgie, 2008:7.
- 35 NAPRMGC, Manual for District Oversight Committees, February, 2008.
- 36 NAPRM-GC Republic of Ghana, Fourth Bi-annual Progress Report, January-June 2009.
- 37 Government of Mozambique & UNDP, 2006: 8.
- 38 PES and OE are the documents that are submitted annually and used to implement and monitor the government's Five-Year Programme in Mozambique. Once elected, the government was expected to submit this programme to parliament for approval and implementation.
- 39 Ghana Vision 2020: The First Medium Term Development Plan (1997-2000) p.8.
- 40 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana.
- 41 Ghana Vision 2020: The First Medium Term Development Plan (1997-2000) p. 2-3.
- 42 Interview with Jonathan Azasu, Senior Planning Officer, National Development Planning Commission.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 Ibid.

- 45 Budget in which individual financial statement items are grouped by cost centers or departments. It shows the comparison between the financial data for the past accounting or budgeting periods and estimated figures for the current or a future period.
- 46 Interview with Jonathan Azasu, Senior Planning Officer, National Development Planning Commission.
- 47 Interview with Dr. Alhassan Iddrisu, Acting Director Economic Planning Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.
- 48 Interview with Jonathan Azasu, Senior Planning Officer, National Development Planning Commission.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Interview with Mr. Cephass Amevor, Principal Assistant Clerk, parliament of Ghana.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Interview with Dr. Alhassan Iddrisu, Acting Director Economic Planning Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.
- 54 Interview with Dr. Tony Aidoo, Head, Policy Evaluation and Oversight Unit.
- 55 Interview with Herbert Antor, Deputy Director, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.
- 56 Interview with Victor Brobbey, Research Fellow, Center for Democratic Development (CDD).
- 57 Interview with Mr. Cephass Amevor, Principal Assistant Clerk, parliament of Ghana.
- 58 Interview with David Osei-Owusu, Head, Administration and Human Resources, Institute of Local government Studies.
- 59 USEC, 2008.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 ACS, 2009.
- 62 República de Moçambique, 2009.
- 63 CIP, 2009; AMODE et al, 2008.
- 64 MASC, 2008.
- 65 Francisco & Matter, 2007; Muendane, 2008.
- 66 Massala Consult, 2009.
- 67 Basically it consists of presidential visits to the local level to assess the implementation of the government plan and interact with the population.
- 68 See [www.papg.org.mz](http://www.papg.org.mz).
- 69 See FDC, 2008 and MASC, 2008.

- 70 Francisco and Matter, 2007; Muendane, 2008.
- 71 USEC, 2008.
- 72 Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008-2012), 2007, p. 133.
- 73 <http://www.twnafrica.org>
- 74 Interview with Ms Linda Tanufor and Mr Nyamposa, Programme Officers of the Environmental Unit of TWN.
- 75 In an interview Mr. Mohammed Inusa , First Deputy Speaker and Clerk to Mine and Energy Committee, he noted that civil society sent numerous memorandums.
- 76 Interview with Ms. Lindlyn Tanufor and Mr. Nyamposa, Programmes Officers of the Environmental Unit of the TWN.
- 77 Interview with Mr. Daniel Owusu-Koranteng, executive Director of WACAM
- 78 Interview with Ms. Lindlyn Tanufor and Mr. Nyamposa, Programmes Officers of the Environmental Unit of the TWN.
- 79 Interview Mr. Mohammed Inusa , First Deputy Speaker and Clerk to Mine and Energy Committee.
- 80 Interview with Ms. Lindlyn Tanufor and Mr. Nyamposa, Programmes Officers of the Environmental Unit of the TWN and Mr. Daniel Owusu-Koranteng, executive Director of WACAM.
- 81 Interview with Mr. Bernard Mornah, the General Secretary of the Peoples National Convention
- 82 Interview with Ms. Lindlyn Tanufor and Mr. Nyamposa, Programmes Officers of the Environmental Unit of the TWN
- 83 See article “ CSOs Advocate the Review of Mining Act” in Resource Watch Agenda, Edition 2, October 2009 and also Interview with Mr. Daniel Owusu-Koranteng, executive Director of WACAM
- 84 Resource Watch Agenda, Edition 2 October, 2009 p. 3.
- 85 Interview with Mr. Charles Owiredu, Director for International Affairs of the National Patriotic Party.
- 86 Daily Graphic 19th May, 2010 reported that Cosmos Energy, a United State oil company spilled about 584 barrels of LTOBM in its exploration area and into the sea contrary to its environmental regulations.
- 87 Note that even though the committee hold the account tribunal accountable, the accountability audience is hosted at the administrative court and never the opposite, since the administrative court exhibit some kind of “independence”.
- 88 [www.cip.org.mz](http://www.cip.org.mz)

# Appendix

## Ghana Case Studies and Rationale

The three case studies selected for analysis include projects or issues where governance indicators are used or can be used to enhance the process of decision-making.

### SEND-Ghana

The restoration of multi-party democracy in Ghana encouraged many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to participate in and contribute to democratic development in that country. This study has elected to examine the work of SEND-Ghana, a local NGO, to gain an insight into how civil society can monitor, evaluate and even influence the implementation of the Ghanaian government's School Feeding Programme. The activities of SEND-Ghana offer a unique opportunity to examine the effectiveness of locally developed indicators.

### The Judiciary

An independent, efficient and effective justice system is a key pillar of good governance. Allegations of corruption and long delays in the justice system have contributed to a general public perception that the judicial system is failing. This negative image of the judiciary has prompted a process of judicial reform, which reveals ways in which the judiciary is becoming more responsive to the demand side evaluation, the lessons learnt and how the process of reform is contributing to the enhancement of democratic cultural practices, norms and values.

### The Media

Freedom of the press is also a cardinal feature of healthy democratic culture as it serves the important function of giving voice to divergent views

that reflect economic, political, social, religious and gender differences in society. It can also channel different views into debate on legislation and governmental performance in general. Therefore, freedom of the press is an important condition for a vibrant, articulate and well-informed citizenry. The International Press Freedom Index rates Ghana extremely high, second only to Namibia. Local sources, however, claim that this index obscures certain key features of the media landscape, including the roles of key institutions. A legislative process using indicators to establish criteria for broadcast registration may also be forthcoming. This case study looks at this complex set of institutions and international indicators to establish if issues of quality and support for democratic governance can be enhanced.

## Mozambique Case Studies and Rationale

### The process of decentralisation

The Five-Year Government Program (whose Portuguese acronym is PQG) is the foundation for other mid- and short-term strategic plans, for example the Economic and Social Plan (PES) and the state budget. One of the mid-term strategies stemming from the PQG, the PRSP (PARPA II 2006-2009), focuses on poverty reduction. PARPA II includes the Governance Pillar, which covers decentralization, public sector reform, the justice sector and public security/order and corruption.

The Mid-Term Fiscal Framework, a three-year rolling instrument that is updated annually, indicates expected revenues and expenditures to inform the preparation of the annual state budget. Recently, the government introduced program budgeting, which only covers investment expenditures. This has been a step forward for monitoring, since this approach allows for a multi-annual costing of interlinked activities, and consequently a more integrated vision of government programs.

The assumption behind decentralising and transferring political power to local authorities is that it promotes good governance principles, such as participation, transparency and social accountability and tackles corruption. The government's plan to achieve decentralization is to some extent

managed by the indicators, as they are seen as instruments to measure the objectives, activities and results of the projects. However, the identification of indicators requires some consensus between the partners at different levels of the programmes (government, donors, civil society and others). Also, identifying indicators requires compromises by the partners. In Mozambique, the definition of indicators and the way to measure them still remain contested between the main national and international partners. Government, donors and civil society organizations have struggled to reach consensus on the most relevant and best indicators, and the goal to be measured and achieved.

## Rwanda Case Studies and Rationale

It was agreed that there would be two cross-cutting themes in each case study: the innovation of tradition and the production/issues with evidence in Rwanda. The Institute for Research on Dialogue and Peace (IRDP) was left to determine which case studies would be in-depth and which would be desk-based, using stakeholder interviews.

### Decentralisation through *Imihigo*

This study looks at citizen participation in planning and evaluation, with a focus on the impact of *imihigo* on performance, commitment and competition. The study also considers where planning and indicators are conflated and questions why citizen score cards don't work as effectively as more community-based, discussion forums.

### Anti-corruption initiatives

Given the centrality of anti-corruption initiatives and the political will behind them, this case study focuses on the role of parliamentary oversight in relation to corruption, taking into consideration the role of the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman and, potentially, the work of Transparency Rwanda.



## Gender

Rwanda's parliament comprises 56% women, but the case study interrogates to what extent this high representation actually impacts on the lives of women.

## Legislation

This comparative study looks at the development of legislation and interaction between parliament and other stakeholders (particularly civil society) in this regard, in particular the process by which the Genocide Ideology Law was promulgated. The study looks at process, debate around the law and issues that have arisen in its implementation.

This study is a snapshot of three different countries with the intention of producing clear policy recommendations to inform donor strategies.

Commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme Oslo Governance Centre (UNDP OGC), it is a comparative study on the development and use of governance indicators in Africa. It explores both comprehensive national governance assessments, in their various forms, and the use of more discrete sets of governance indicators in sectoral or thematic assessments.

UNDP OGC contracted African democracy institute Idasa to execute the project to help develop policy recommendations for the European Commission. The country studies were done by the Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP), Rwanda; the Centre for Democracy and Development Studies (CEDE), Mozambique; and the Institute for Democracy and Governance (IDEG), Ghana.

