

# Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)

## Annual Project Progress Report 2014



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## PROJECT INFORMATION

<b>Project ID</b>	00061104
<b>Duration</b>	January 2011 – December 2014
<b>Strategic Plan Component</b>	NPPA Afghan Peace and Reintegration, and NPPS Law and Justice for All
<b>CPAP Component</b>	Stabilization and Peace Building
<b>ANDS Component</b>	Security
<b>Total Project Budget</b>	US\$ 1,870,528,277
<b>Annual Budget 2014</b>	\$505,000,000
<b>Un-funded Amount</b>	Fully funded
<b>Implementing Partner</b>	Ministry of Interior Affairs
<b>Responsible Agencies</b>	Ministry of Interior Affairs and Ministry of Finance
<b>Project Manager</b>	Mr. Basil Massey (as of November 2013)
<b>Responsible Programme Unit Head</b>	Ms. Dawn del Rio

## ACRONYMS

ABP	Afghan Border Police
AFMIS	Afghan Financial Management Information System
AHRIMS	Afghanistan Human Resource Information Management System
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Force
AUP/AUCP	Afghan Uniform Police/Afghan Uniform Civilian Police
BOQ	Bill of Quantity
CCPM	Civilian Policing Model
CEDAW	Convention to Eliminate All Forms Discrimination Against Women
COC	Code of Conduct
COP	Community Oriented Policing
COPS	Community Oriented Policing Services
CPD	Central Prisons Department
CPM	Community Policing Model
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DCAF	Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DM	Deputy Minister
DPWG	Discipline Procedure Working Group
EFT	Electronic Fund Transfer
ECC	Emergency Call Center
EPS	Electronic Payroll System
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
EUD	Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan
EUPOL	European Police Mission in Afghanistan
FRU	Family Response Unit
GBV	Gender-based violence
GEP	Gender Equity Project
GiZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GHRCGD	Gender, Human Rights, and Children General Department
GMU	Gender Mainstreaming Unit
GIROA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPPT	German Police Project Team
GRB	Gender Responsive Budget
HDIP	Hazard Duty Incentive Pay
HR	Human Resources
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (US Department of State)
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force

JHRA	Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KIGEPE	Korean Institute for Gender Equality Promotion and Education
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOIA	Ministry of Interior Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPRD	Media and Public Relations Directorate
MRT	Management Review Team Mission
NAP	National Action Plan
NAPWA	National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIM	National Implementation Modality
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
OD	Operational Directives
PeMD	Police e-Mardumi Directorate
PFO	Provincial Financial Officer
PMS	Performance Management System
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PFO	Provincial Finance Officer
PPHQ	Provincial Police Headquarters
QA/QC	Quality Assurance/Quality Control
ROL	Rule of Law
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPTC-A	Sivas Police Training Center of Afghanistan
TWG	Technical Working Group
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-Habitat	United National Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
VIPP	Very Important Person Protection
WEPS	Web-based Electronic Payroll System

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A year of transitions would best describe Afghanistan and LOTFA in 2014. While significant security challenges remain, the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) successfully assumed full responsibility for the country's security from the coalition forces. This transition has led to a change in the international aid environment, with security partners drawing down or shifting emphasis and with an increased focus on development. Political transition ushered in a Government of National Unity as a result of democratic elections that aimed to achieve equal opportunities for both men and women, and security and safety to enable full citizen participation.

Against this background, LOTFA continued to build on the internal changes resulting from the 2012 investigation and recommendations, transforming itself into an operation delivering more effectively and with greater transparency and accountability, especially in the critical area of payroll facilitation for the country's growing police force. While not a glitch free year, LOTFA strengthened its transparency and accountability mechanisms and laid the basis for a LOTFA phase VI successor project (hereafter LOTFA Akheri) with a stronger project design and governance framework. LOTFA continued to support the achievement of timely salary payments to Afghanistan's approximately 163,056 national police and corrections officers. With regard to timeliness of payments, 2014 achieved positive results processing salary payments within the prescribed 10-15 days from the start of the month. Given the complex sequence of procedures and administrative steps, the process' interdependence with partner ministries and banks, and the different payment modalities required to actually deliver the monthly salary, this was both a positive result and an improvement over previous years.

These results were due in large part to the expansion of and improvements to both the Electronic Payroll System (EPS) and the Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT). The EPS provides a single system for use by all Afghan National Police and now covers 96 – 100 percent of the *Tashkeel* including the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) (95 percent), as well as the police of the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers (GDPDC) often referred to as the Central Prisons Directorate (CPD). Approximately 84 percent receive salaries through the EFT system. The percentage jumps to 87 percent among just the ANP, ANCOP and CPD, as the ABP often serve in physically remote locations where the EFT is currently unable to reach. These results exceeded the 2014 annual target, but fell short of the request by donors at the July Steering Committee meeting, to reach 100% EFT coverage by the end of 2014, due to slower than expected commercial bank expansion progress.

In partnership with the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA), LOTFA collected feedback from the LOTFA Help Desk, which increased this year from one to two full-time national staff dedicated to answering user trouble calls. Their feedback helped shape training, address speed and connectivity issues, address individual police problems, as well as laid the groundwork for improvement to the EPS infrastructure.

While timely payment of uniformed police and corrections officers accounts for the lion's share of LOTFA's budget and is crucial to sustaining a professional ANP and CPD, these core functions of government must eventually be performed independently without operational help from the international community. The sustainability of the payroll management will be affected, in particular in the longer term, by weaknesses in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and MOIA public administration. In addition, ultimately the police and corrections officers are paid to provide security and safety to the population of Afghanistan so as to bring back legitimacy and trust in the Government.

The intrinsic linkages between the various LOTFA Pillars have been strengthened in 2014 with LOTFA gradually transitioning into a comprehensive project with a stronger design moving forward under LOTFA Akheri. The approach has been strongly based on the Ministry of Interior 10 year vision (2013-2023), the National Police Strategy (2014-2018\_ and National Police Plan (2014-2015). These national documents emphasize civilianization, referring to two distinct processes in the Afghan context: 1) Transforming MOIA from a ministry mostly focusing on control and command over ANP into a ministry with 'traditional' civilian ministerial and public administration skills and responsibilities to ensure more accountability and efficiency of its support and oversight of ANP. 2) Transforming the operational policing functions of ANP from a militarized "force" to a civilian 'service' in order to gain public confidence and increase security by addressing crime and violence. Both processes have been supported by LOTFA in 2014 under LOTFA Pillars 2 and 3 and will be supported more comprehensively under LOTFA Akheri starting in 2015.

For instance, in 2014 jointly with the European Union Delegation several micro-capacity assessments have been carried out in MOIA departments supporting key public administration functions, such as procurement, finance, programming and budgeting. These assessments have informed the more comprehensive approach taken to institutional development under LOTFA Akheri. However, to ensure quick wins and in line with initial findings from these capacity assessments, the MOF procurement unit and the MOIA Education and Training Command have been supported in providing procurement trainings for MOIA. Similarly, English literacy and IT trainings have been provided in 2014 to increase the skills of the MOIA public servants.

In addition, to promote accountability and transparency in the MOIA systems and procedures, LOTFA embarked on a capacity development approach with the MOIA Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Given the numerous international partners working with the OIG, LOTFA made a strong point of ensuring a coordinated approach and started its efforts with the development of a Joint International Community Action Plan jointly with the Combined Security Transition Command-Ministerial Advisor Group (CSTC-A/MAG), the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), LOTFA and the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) Rule of Law Transparency, Accountability and Oversight Unit. Flowing from this plan, LOTFA and the MOIA finalized a thorough capacity development assessment and capacity development strategy which will be implemented under LOTFA Akheri.

Police development towards community oriented policing was supported through consultations around an Afghan contextualized model for community policing. To this end, the Police e Mardumi Directorate and a team of police officers were trained to lead on consultations with



civil society and communities on the model. LOTFA provided financial and logistical support to the Police e Mardumi Directorate in both consultations. In addition, LOTFA supported consultations with international partners and national police experts. Elements of the Community Policing Model have been piloted in 2014. For instance, two District Safety and Security Committees have been established in Herat and Gozara districts and the methodology for a district security survey has been tested in PD16 in Kabul. The District Security Survey will be implemented under LOTFA Akheri in all districts where LOTFA supports the community oriented policing approach. As such the Survey will provide a baseline for measuring progress against security trends.

In addition, LOTFA conducted a technical assessment and developed a capacity development plan for the 119 Emergency Call Centers which are crucial for the provision of a first response to communities and Afghans in need. The capacity development plan will be further implemented under LOTFA Akheri. However, to ensure some quick wins in 2014, LOTFA purchased 6 generators, and developed with MOIA an awareness raising campaign on 119. Building on LOTFA's previous support to the development of the police Code of Conduct, LOTFA places a special emphasis in its police development work on police accountability and transparency. To that end, LOTFA supported the printing and distribution of 120,000 booklets and 2,000 posters on the Code of Conduct as per the MOIA communication strategy. In 2014, 4,811 police received training on the Code of Conduct resulting in a total number of police trained in the Code of Conduct by LOTFA at 15,204 from the beginning of the initiative in 2012.

In 2014, LOTFA also provided support to crucial elements of the MOIA gender strategy, while laying the groundwork for a more comprehensive gender approach for LOTFA Akheri. For instance LOTFA supported a number of crucial workshops to further develop and discuss the Terms of Reference of a women's police council network which is a priority in the gender strategy to ensure voice and participation of female staff in the MOI/ANP. A key goal of the MOIA gender strategy is to increase the number of female police officers. To that end, LOTFA finalized crucial assessments and construction work to increase a safe working environment for women which should be a prerequisite for placing female staff in the MOI/ANP. In addition, LOTFA has been continuing its partnership with police training centers in Turkey and South Korea to empower female staff currently on Tashkeel and ensure newly recruited female police are sufficiently empowered to start their work. Preparatory work has been concluded on ensuring a future LOTFA contribution to a more integrated approach towards addressing and preventing GBV. Finally LOTFA supported MOIA in its function of ensuring safety and security for female voters and thereby increasing their participation in the election process. As such, LOTFA supported the deployment and training of 13,000 female searchers to carry out body searches of women as they arrived to vote.

## SELECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF 2014

- ✓ Timely payment of salaries to all ANP and CPD personnel in all 34 provinces through payment of monthly advance to MOF
- ✓ Successful support of EPS at all police payroll stations (PHQ, ANCOP, ABP and CPD)
- ✓ Migration of police from a cash-based payment modality to Electronic Fund Transfer payment modality
- ✓ Ongoing upgrades to the W-EPS platform using state-of-the-art technologies
- ✓ Reached 30 Police headquarters from standalone EPS to W-EPS
- ✓ Trained up to 2,500 finance officers and system end-users in EPS and W-EPS usage
- ✓ Continued help desk support to provide timely guidance to system end-users
- ✓ Produced and distributed GIS-based maps to support MOIA and MOF efforts to convert locations from cash-based to EFT modality
- ✓ Conducted 13 joint missions with MOIA and MOF to provinces to monitor the system functionality, IT infrastructure and address the challenges in salary payment
- ✓ Installed and configured regional servers (Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Paktiya) to enhance the availability and accessibility of the W-EPS Application
- ✓ Procured IT equipment and power generators to support the expansion and maintenance of MOIA IT infrastructure
- ✓ Use of Trusted Agent payments, which are necessary in some remote areas but are recognized as the least secure payment modality, decreased from 26,438 to 23,693 over 2014, a 10 percent decrease in one year
- ✓ 25 dressing rooms and bathrooms for women in Kabul, completed in 2013, were further upgraded in 2014, benefiting more than 150 ANP women. An additional 40 facilities – Herat (14), Nangarhar (13) and Mazar (13) – were identified and are in the procurement stage with completion targeted for 2015.
- ✓ 4,811 police received training on the Code of Conduct, of which 696 were officers, 1,487 were sergeants, and 2,628 were patrolmen/women bringing to total number of police trained to 15,204. In addition 120,000 copies of the Code of Conduct booklet and 2,000

copies of posters were printed and distributed and the Code was published in 20,000 copies of the police magazine.

- ✓ Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment trainings were held to help build the skills and competency of Office of the Inspector General staff to enable them to develop and introduce corruption risk mitigation measures in high risk departments and programmes within the MOIA
- ✓ Commissioned and completed a study of the Office of the Inspector General to suggest institutional reform measures
- ✓ Engaged a consultant to address the corruption complaints mechanism and to enhance the complaints mechanism within the Ministry of Interior Affairs.
- ✓ LOTFA-supported Gender Strategy Implementation Plan approved in August 2014.
- ✓ LOTFA, in close collaboration with UNAMA and in consultation with EUPOL, and the ISAF Gender Advisory Team support MOIA's 2-day event to formalize and establish Police Women Councils across the country.
- ✓ Training for 200 new female recruits deployed to the Sivas Police Training Center in Turkey for four-month training programme
- ✓ Approximately 12,000 women searchers enable 6.8 million female voters to exercise their right to vote in the 2014 Presidential Elections
- ✓ Senior police officers receive training to improve understanding of the community policing approach
- ✓ LOTFA supported consultations with the Ministry of Interior, the International Community and key civil society organizations to gather inputs for the development of a community policing initiative.
- ✓ Six 119 Emergency Call Centers, one each in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, Herat, Helmand and Jalalabad, now provide policing services to communities across the country. Women operators fielded approximately 200 GBV cases.

# RESULTS

## OUTPUT 1: POLICE FORCE AND UNIFORMED PERSONEL OF CENTRAL PRISONS PAID EFFICIENTLY AND TIMELY

### 1.1 Timely and transparent ANP and CPD payments among 34 provinces by MOIA and MOF funded through LOTFA

LOTFA Pillar I continued to support the achievement of timely salary payments to Afghanistan's approximately 163,056<sup>1</sup> national police and corrections officers. With regard to timeliness of payments, 2014 achieved positive results processing salary payments within the prescribed 10-15 days from the start of the month. Given the complex sequence of procedures and administrative steps, the process' interdependence with partner ministries and banks, and the different payment modalities required to actually deliver the monthly salary, this was both a positive result and an improvement over previous years.

There were, however, several instances of delays all of which were quickly identified and rectified. At the beginning of 2014, LOTFA noted that about 75 percent of police did not receive their January salary on time due to the late preparation and submission of the paperwork needed to process the funding disbursement request<sup>2</sup> from the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA) to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in December 2013. This was the most significant instance in 2014 where payments to police were not processed within the 10-15 working days and it was the only instance of an administrative delay between MOIA and MOF in 2014.

The other significant instance of police not being paid within the prescribed 10-15 working day period was at the end of 2014. As a result of a deficit in the police pay accounts, about 5,875 police in Oruzgan and 3,125 in Helmand<sup>3</sup> did not receive their November pay until December 2014. The deficit in the police pay accounts was corrected by MOIA before the end of December 2014, by realigning US\$ 23M funding from Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) sourced non-pay accounts to pay accounts. Due to this timely action by MOIA and MOF, 15,000 police in danger of not being paid on time in 11 other provinces, including Kabul and as well as those working in the central ministries, fortunately, were not affected. This was a positive result, considering the timing of this deficit at the very end of the fiscal year and the potential it had to affect police pay.

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<sup>1</sup> Each month, the number of police on the payroll varies, as forces are both gained through recruitment and lost to attrition.

<sup>2</sup> Police were paid in January 2014 in Kabul, at the Central Ministries, the provincial capitals of Laghman, Baghlan, Paktika, Balkh, Farah and Faryab, as well as in scattered locations in Farah and Faryab.

<sup>3</sup> Source: MOIA and LOTFA

On a smaller scale, LOTFA discovered in November that 46 ANP in Nahr-e-Saraj, Helmand, had not been paid for August 2014 due to delays in their not being registered for M-PAISA. Although the administration of M-PAISA enrollments was outside LOTFA's control, Pillar I staff coordinated with MOIA, Roshan (the MOIA-contracted mobile phone access provider), and commercial banks successfully throughout 2014 to address this and similar issues related to mobile money.

LOTFA received and resolved help desk calls for individuals and units with pay issues during the year, but none were noteworthy or indicative of systemic problems. LOTFA also researched and responded to numerous media stories concerning non-payment of police, but determined that these were categories of police not funded by LOTFA, such as Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), or that the media information was inaccurate or not possible to confirm.

In terms of transparency, LOTFA conducted an in depth review of the payroll system and the functioning of Pillar 1. Risks and issues have been actively disclosed and discussed by LOTFA with Government partners, donors and watchdogs including through the Pillar 1 Technical Working Group which was established in 2014 and became fully operational.

#### Electronic Payroll System:

The Electronic Payroll System (EPS) provides a digital platform to integrate the payroll data from the MOIA at the district and provincial levels. It allows Provincial Finance Officers (PFO) to record the personal information of individual police, including name, father's name, rank, bank account number, and identification number. It also records time worked, incentives, deductions, net salary, and so forth.

EPS provides MOIA with a mechanism to collect from individual districts and record days worked, entitlements, and deductions. These are captured in payroll forms (M41) and individual pay slips (M40).

EPS allows MOIA to report this data to MOF as the basis for requesting payment to its police. The form EPS produces for this purpose is the summary request for payment (M16). The requests for payment (M16) of all MOIA provinces and central units are passed to the *Mustofiat* (at the provincial level) or the Treasury Department (in Kabul) for manual entry into AFMIS.

MOF uses the data entered into Afghan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) to prepare bulk payment checks and a list of payees for further action (payment distribution) by banks and Trusted Agents, depending on payment method. After the payroll closes, EPS allows LOTFA and MOIA personnel in Kabul to quickly compile and review the payroll information submitted by all payroll officers throughout the country. It is important to note that some data is passed physically (via disc) or by email where connectivity is problematic. In extreme circumstances, it may be reported by phone.

It is important to note that:

- Data compilation takes place after-the-fact, independently of the actual payment process accomplished by MOF, working with banks and Trusted Agents. *Therefore, EPS does not trigger payments.*
- EPS reports data entered by MOIA payroll officers, not actual payments made. Expenses are reported in AFMIS.
- EPS and AFMIS data do not match. Currently, it is not possible to reconcile differences at the central level due to the independent nature of the systems involved and the lack of linkage with the Afghanistan Human Resource Management Information System.

## 1.2 Percentage of ANP and CPD covered under EPS and Web-based EPS<sup>4</sup>

As LOTFA prepares to transition the Electronic Payroll System to full ownership by the Government, it is useful to look back at the growth of the Afghan National Police force over the past several years, to gain some context for the achievements of the Electronic Payroll System in responding to the needs of the Government.

The Afghan National Police has more than doubled in strength, from 67,377 in 2008 to 150,789 in 2014.<sup>5</sup> Naturally, this growth has been accompanied by the need for increased capacity to pay police and report their salaries to the Government. Where some other ministries organizations have had to rely on manually compiled spreadsheets and other mechanisms for reporting pay data, EPS has provided a single system for use by all Afghan National Police on *Tashkeel*, including the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), as well as the police of the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers (GDPDC), often referred to as the Central Prisons Directorate (CPD).




Chart 1. *Tashkeel* Authorizations vs. Actual Force Strength, 2008 – 2014. Source: LOTFA

EPS enables the electronic recording of the payroll each month, but does not electronically trigger the release of the funding to pay police. EPS, as the payroll recording and reporting system, offers several important capabilities:

<sup>4</sup> There are two versions of EPS: the stand-alone EPS (commonly referred to as EPS), and the web-based EPS (WEPS). Although EPS is used to indicate the entire EPS system in the bar graphs (i.e. stand alone and web-based EPS), in the narrative, EPS refers to stand-alone EPS unless described otherwise.

<sup>5</sup> 150,789 reported by MOIA-HR for December 2014.

- At present, MOIA does not have a single, comprehensive electronic database containing personnel data on each police serving in the force. EPS serves as the single source of monthly, electronically reported human resources data on each police, thus serving as an important tool to validate monthly MOIA-HR summary-level force strength data.<sup>6</sup>
- With each year, more and more fields and tables have been automated, such as hazardous duty incentive pay, which has reduced the possibility of errors by users.
- LOTFA has complemented MOIA-Director General Finance and Budget staff as a direct line of support to MOIA staff in the field. With data reported and reviewed monthly, LOTFA has a view into transactions reported by officials throughout the country involved in payroll. This has enabled third-party assistance outside both MOIA and MOF to enhance payroll officers' pay management skills.




Chart 2. Police Covered by EPS and Police Paid Through EFT, 2005 – 2014. Source: LOTFA

### Afghan National Police

- The *Tashkeel* for the Afghan National Police remained set 157,000 throughout the year. By the end of the year, EPS and WEPS coverage of the ANP had reached 149,219, as compared to 150,789 police reported by MOIA-HR as actively serving. Of the ANP covered by LOTFA payroll systems, 59.56 percent were covered under the web-based version and 40.44 percent were covered under the stand-alone EPS version.
- As of December 2014, the last month available for this report for ANP data, 83.92 percent of Afghan National Police reported receiving their salaries via EFT, and about 16 percent reported receiving their salary through the cash-paid Trusted Agent mechanism. Although 300 ANP still reported receiving their salary via MPAISA as of November, this program ended in December.

<sup>6</sup> 149,219 police were recorded in EPS for December 2014, illustrating the utility of EPS to support MOIA-HR data.

## Afghan National Police Force




Chart 3. ANP coverage rates and payment modalities. Source: LOTFA.

### Afghan Border Police

- The Afghan Border Police are a component force of the Afghan National Police. In 2014, their *Tashkeel* remained fixed at 22,955 police, with MOIA-HR reporting 21,879 of these positions as filled. Their overall EPS and WEPS coverage was 21,640, or 98.96 percent; 90.84 percent were served by the EPS system, and 9.16 percent by the WEPS system.
- Due in part to the physically remote location of many ABP units and stations, this component of police continued to feature a high percentage of the force paid by Trusted Agent, with 6,730, or about 31 percent paid via this modality; 14,910 or 69 percent, received their pay through Electronic Funds Transfer.




Chart 4. Payroll Coverage of ABP. Source: LOTFA.



## Afghan National Civil Order Police

- The Afghan National Civil Order Police (AFNCOP) is also a component force of the Afghan National Police. In 2014, their *Tashkeel* was 15,223 police, with MOIA-HR reporting 14,793 of these positions as filled. Their overall EPS and WEPS coverage was 14,263, or 96 percent.
- In contrast to the ABP, this component of police continued to feature a high percentage of the force reporting payment by EFT due to their stations being located in bank-served areas with 14,263, or 100 percent of police reported in EPS as paid via Electronic Funds Transfer by the end of 2014.








Chart 5. Payroll Coverage of ANCOP Source: LOTFA

## Geographic Coverage

- Throughout 2014, LOTFA Pillar 1 continued to expand WEPS coverage. By the end of 2014, Pillar I WEPS coverage reached 30 police headquarters including those in the provinces of Helmand, Zabul, Oruzgan and Daikundi, as well as expanding coverage to those offices in MOIA's headquarters working with payroll. Future expansion to Sar-i-Pul, Khost, and Paktika, where police headquarters are still on EPS instead of WEPS, is planned for 2015. Reporting of data in WEPS versus EPS will be contingent upon the continued connectivity and infrastructural support of MOIA's internet by the MOIA-ICT department of the MOIA Network Operations Center (NOC) system. One example of a required input for WEPS capability (outside of LOTFA control) is the provision of fuel for generators by the MOIA.



### General Directorate of Prisons and Department of Corrections (GDPDC)


- The GDPDC, also known as the Central Prison Directorate, is a separate police branch with a *Tashkeel* of 6,056. By December 2014, 5,913 positions were reported by MOIA-HR as filled, representing 98 percent of the *Tashkeel*. LOTFA received several requests from GDPDC in 2014 to increase the *Tashkeel* in order to enable more effective management of a reportedly growing prison population. LOTFA explained that this proposal needed to be brought before the Oversight and Coordination Body (OCB). The GDPDC does not yet have any stations under WEPS due to lack of connectivity to the MOIA network. EPS coverage was 5,819, or 98.4 percent of serving police as reported by MOIA-HR.
- This force is almost completely on EFT, with 5,743 or 97 percent reporting payment via EFT. Only 76, or 1.2 percent, of GDPDC reported receiving their pay via Trusted Agent.

### 1.3 Number of ANP and CPD paid through EFT, M-Paisa and Trusted Agent

By the close of 2014, 125,226 ANP and 5,743 GDPDC police personnel receive their salaries in bank accounts through the EFT modality. This exceeded the 2014 annual target, but fell short of the request by donors at the July Steering Committee meeting, to reach 100% EFT coverage by the end of 2014, due to slower than expected commercial bank expansion progress. LOTFA also noted instances where commercial banks offered services by mobile teams, but police were still not enrolled in EFT or paid by EFT, due to coordination gaps between the banks and MOIA. As in

the past, LOTFA will continue to support coordination between MOIA and commercial banks to ensure that police take full advantage of EFT services offered by banks.

As noted previously, the Trusted Agent modality, which is recognized to be the least secure payment modality, continues to be necessary in order to make payments to ANP personnel serving in remote and insecure areas that are not served by commercial banks. In January 2014, 26,438 police in 22 provinces received their pay via Trusted Agent. MOIA released Cypher #055, directing the migration of all police to payments by Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT), which is a much more secure and accountable transfer method. LOTFA coordinated meetings with MOIA, MOF, and the commercial banks to support their efforts to expand EFT payments. LOTFA also provided data to the ministries and banks concerning the number of police, districts, and payment modalities, according to the EPS records maintained by Pillar I. Expansion plan actions identified by LOTFA included: MOIA providing geo-mapping of police districts to the banks; banks determining the distribution of police districts and mobile teams (based on district and bank mapping); banks seeking operating licenses from Afghanistan's Central Bank (where needed), and banks opening accounts for individual police. By year's end, the total number of police paid via Trusted Agent was reduced 23,693 in 21 provinces, a decrease of 10 percent. This represents a significant accomplishment for MOIA and its partners in the commercial banks.



**Chart 6. ANP payment distribution by modality, December 2014 Source: LOTFA**

### **Transition to EFT**

As the transition to the goal of 100 percent EFT continues, LOTFA strives to provide clarity for its donors concerning changes in bank fees related to EFT expansion. Bank fees have historically been charged only to Kabul-based police at the nominal rate of 80 AFS (US\$1.38) per month for police earning above 15,000 AFS (US\$259) per month. In October 2014, LOTFA received and reviewed a circular issued by the MOF, changing and expanding the fee schedule as a result of contracts signed with commercial banks to offer service throughout the country. Bank fees likely have an appropriate role in offsetting the cost of expansion to underserved areas, but LOTFA noted several instances where the MOF fee schedule could be open to varied application or interpretation. The project has sought additional clarification before applying these changes to

the EPS system. At the time of this report, information concerning the fees was still pending from MOF. As a result, LOTFA has still not gained donor approval for the fees or included them in EPS, but anticipates resolution of this issue in early 2015.

### **Discontinuation of M-PAISA**

In 2014, LOTFA ended the limited pilot of the M-PAISA mobile money payment mechanism in full, transparent consultation with donors and MOIA. A significant factor in the decision to terminate the program was the limited customer base served by M-PAISA. As a result of regulatory changes made in 2013, MOF required that all salary payments be made through commercial banks registered with MOF. This effectively limited M-PAISA to operating in areas where commercial bank services were also available, but at the high fixed price of the monthly service contract, in addition to per-transaction costs. Given the limited demonstrated potential of M-PAISA to expand into un-banked regions and replace the Trusted Agent modality, the final month of M-PAISA service was December 2014, with 79 in Ghor and in 221 in Badakhshan paid via M-PAISA.

### **Capacity Development and Implementation**

In partnership with its principle ally, the Ministry of Interior Affairs, LOTFA collected feedback from the LOTFA helpdesk, which increased this year from one to two full-time national staff dedicated to answering user trouble calls. Their feedback helped shape training, address speed and connectivity issues, address individual police problems, as well as laid the groundwork for improvement to the EPS infrastructure.

- Training: As in past years, MOIA partnered to offer training to MOIA-identified audiences, focusing on EPS users and others involved in payroll. Five classes were conducted by Pillar I staff, using the LOTFA Computer Lab for smaller groups and the local venues for larger groups. In total, 223 male students were involved in the police pay system received training. Trainees were drawn from all provinces and many districts, with the goal of imparting knowledge in such a manner as to foster follow-on training at home units by the students (“train the trainer”). LOTFA staff used feedback gleaned from 504 troubleshooting calls to the helpdesk in 2014 to shape training events (see Helpdesk information below). Different provinces and units reporting their issues, such as network connectivity, username and password problems, and allowance and deduction calculation issues, helped inform and improve training.
- *MOIA ICT and MOIA Network Operations Center:* As a system run on the MOIA network, LOTFA staff worked closely with MOIA Network Operations Center (NOC) staff to relay user feedback concerning the speed and health of the network and troubleshoot connectivity problems. Pillar I staff communicated frequently with MOIA ICT and NOC staff in support of WEPS expansion. In addition, the security of data stored in EPS is dependent in many ways on the security of the network itself. EPS security was improved indirectly in 2014 as a result of MOIA NOC overall improvements. For example, the MOIA Network Operations Center improved its physical security practices, including incorporating biometric data into the process for data center entry. EPS also benefitted from improvements in the stability of the power supply to provincial headquarters, with the exception of Helmand Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).

MOIA ICT also collaborated with LOTFA concerning plans for the expansion of fiber optic connectivity in the MOIA compound. Once completed, this project will enhance the MOIA's ability to access, process, and manipulate data in AHRIMS and EPS, and data downloaded from AFMIS.

- *Troubleshooting Calls to the Pillar I Helpdesk:* In 2014, the help desk logged 504 calls from users for troubleshooting and other assistance. WEPS users from all provinces made use of the service to resolve problems ranging from network connectivity, to username and password issues. Calls were also received for complaints of police not receiving pay. In most cases, calls were resolved in less than one business day within Pillar I, but LOTFA also observed good cooperation with the MOIA payroll staff in resolving calls requiring MOIA assistance.

## ANNUAL EXPENSES

During 2014, a total of US\$ 475,272,073 was spent for this Output. For more details, please see Annex II.

Below is a snapshot of where LOTFA is in relation to its annual targets of Pillar 1, Output 1 by the end of Q4.

2014 Baseline <sup>7</sup>	2014 Annual Targets	Q4 Planned	2014 I	Comments
<b>1.1</b> Payments are made in time in 34 provinces.	<b>1.1</b> Maintain timely payment in 34 provinces.	<b>1.1</b> Payments made in time in 34 provinces.	<b>1.1</b> Timely payments made Feb– Dec 2014, with limited exceptions as described	<b>1.1</b> EPS recorded payroll in time. Cases of late payments were due to circumstances outside LOTFA control.
<b>1.2</b> 44 percent EPS and 56 percent WEPS (ANP); and 93 percent EPS (CPD).	<b>1.2</b> % EPS decreases from baseline; 65 percent WEPS (ANP); and 93-95 percent EPS (CPD).	<b>1.2</b> 40 percent EPS and 60 percent WEPS (ANP); and 95 percent EPS (CPD).	<b>1.2</b> 40.44 percent EPS and 59.56 WEPS (ANP); and 98.4 percent EPS (CPD).	<b>1.2</b> 2014 WEPS coverage target for ANP was not met due to MOIA network connectivity issues. The annual EPS coverage target for CPD was exceeded.
<b>1.3</b> 114,616 ANP (EFT) and 4,811 CPD (EFT);  <b>1.3.1</b> 27,228 ANP (Trusted Agent);  <b>1.3.2</b> 1,216 ANP (M-PAISA).	<b>1.3</b> Maintain 114,616 ANP (EFT) and 4,811 CPD (EFT).  <b>1.3.1</b> Decrease Trusted Agent with 2,000 ANP.  <b>1.3.2</b> Increase M-PAISA with 2,000 ANP.	<b>1.3</b> Maintain coverage within the annual target values.  <b>1.3.1</b> Decrease to 25,000 ANP.  <b>1.3.2</b> 1,000 ANP (M-PAISA).	<b>1.3</b> 125,226 ANP (EFT) and 5,743 CPD (EFT). <b>1.3.1</b> 23,693 <b>1.3.2</b> 0 ANP (M-PAISA)	<b>1.3.2:</b> As a result of decisions taken in Pillar 1 Technical Working Group meetings between May and June 2014, LOTFA phased out M-PAISA instead of expanding it.
<b>1.4</b> 2014 Payroll Action Plan developed and implementation started.	<b>1.4</b> 100 percent progress made against 2014 Payroll Action Plan.	<b>1.4</b> 75% of actions initiated 40% of actions complete.	<b>1.4</b> 73.07% of actions initiated, 42.3% complete.	<b>1.4</b> Percentage of progress is based on the number of actions initiated (17) and completed (11) against the total number of actions included in the plan (26).

<sup>7</sup> Baseline and annual targets based on the LOTFA Annual Work Plan for 2014 approved and released in May 2014. Payroll baseline is linked to Pillar 1 coverage data from December 2013.

## OUTPUT 2: REQUIRED EQUIPMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROVIDED TO MOIA

### 2.1 Percentage of construction works completed within the DM-Support Building project

The DM-support Building Project, funded by the Government of Japan, remains ongoing with about 55 percent of the project completed. A number of factors contributed to the slower progress in 2014 compared to 2013. The MOIA developed a Bill of Quantity (BOQ) which did not include, or did not adequately estimate, the quantities of certain materials needed for the construction. MOIA subsequently did not approve related changes to the BOQ, and did not approve payment to the contractor for work done on the raft foundation concrete. This placed a financial burden on the contractor causing a work slowdown.



As part of its oversight function, LOTFA ensured the transparent and competitive selection of a third party company which was entrusted to lead the Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC) of the construction work. The QA/QC firm provided oversight of the construction project and guaranteed compliance with the highest standards for infrastructural development projects.

Though work was originally intended to commence in parallel with the launch of the project, delays in the selection process, as well as conflicts with MOIA, pushed the start date to July 2014. A team leader with the qualifications and experience needed to lead the QA/QC process was approved by LOTFA during Q4.

LOTFA halted construction work in October 2014 for quality assurance reasons and an independent assessment of the QA testing was arranged through a Copenhagen-based company. The company completed a comprehensive report on 10 November, which outlines the issues and risks thus far in the project's cycle including initial procurement, requests for amendments and justifications for same. The Government of Japan has visited the site and is aware of the issues and risks facing the project.

### 2.2 Percentage of construction and renovations initiated by MOIA, supported by LOTFA to improve living conditions of prisoners in Kabul, Kunduz, Takhar and Jawzjan, Nangarhar

The Central Prisons Department (CPD) is a fully integrated function of MOIA's structure and mandate since the handover by MOJ of its administration and management, along with its assets and workforce, in 2009. Following the July 2013 report by the United Nations Assistance Missions of Afghanistan (UNAMA)'s Rule of Law unit on the status of Afghanistan's prisons, LOTFA facilitated a joint initiative between MOIA-CPD and UNAMA to identify construction and rehabilitation projects that would respond to CPD's needs. Also during the summer of 2013, CPD released a 10-Year Vision, linked to MOIA's 10-Year Vision, which lays out the strategic direction



of policy development and operational needs faced by the CPD/MOIA, including construction of priority prisons. Together, MOIA-CPD, UNAMA and LOTFA identified sites in Kabul, Kunduz, Takhar and Jawzjan, Nangarhar as priority sites given the poor living standards among male and female prisoners, and based on security assessments conducted by MOIA.

Central Prison Department construction under LOTFA was divided into two distinct phases. The first dealt with renovating existing facilities which were considered a priority for MOIA. The second phase involved designing and building new correctional facilities in regions which were considered to be in areas which lacked prison coverage.

#### *CPD project Phase 1*

An Invitation to Bid for the Central Prison Department renovation projects located in Takhar, Kunduz, Juzjan, Nangarhar and Kabul provinces was announced in Q3. Pre-bid meetings were held, proposals were received and evaluations of the bids carried out through November 2014. The bid evaluation process was split into three separate panels with LOTFA engineers, Pillar 2 staff and representatives from MOIA's Facilities and Procurement sections serving as panel members. LOTFA Procurement staff facilitated the evaluation process.

Both technical and financial bid evaluations were completed in November 2014. Though bid documents should have been handled and kept within the LOTFA premises, due to the lack of physical space the bid documents were transferred to MOIA and kept there. It was later learned that the bid documents were tampered with while at MOIA. Unfortunately no copies were made. As a result, the procurement was cancelled.

#### *CPD project Phase-2*

The preparation of TORs to outsource the design of the construction of prisons in Phase-2 progressed in the Q4 period. Prison design specifications were made in concert with (INL) and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) both of whom have developed global design standards for prisons and detention centers in keeping with both international security standards and human rights principles. LOTFA is actively participating in CPD working group meetings to ensure alignment with the INL and ICRC standards.

A management decision from LOTFA on the future of CPD construction was made in consultation with donors in December 2014 which resulted in all CPD renovation and new construction work being stopped. This decision has been communicated in writing to those who participated in the bidding process for CPD renovations, and has also been communicated to UNDP partners such as UNAMA.

### **2.3 Progress in construction of separate toilets and dressing rooms for female police in Kabul, Balkh, Herat and Nangahar**

MOIA's 10-Year-Vision identifies providing a safe working environment as a key component for increasing recruitment and advancement of women police within the ANP. Work on 25 separate toilet and dressing room facilities in Kabul commenced in 2013 and was both continued and expanded into Balkh, Herat and Nangarhar provinces in 2014. In addition to the completion of the 2013 construction, assessments for further construction were conducted in 2014. An additional 40 facilities in Herat (14), Nangarhar (13) and Mazar (13) were identified and are in the



procurement stage, with completion targeted for 2015. More than 150 women police are expected to benefit from these safer, gender-friendly facilities.

#### *Construction of toilets and dressing rooms – Female staff phase-1*

The keys for the first 18 facilities were handed over to Gender Directorate of MOIA in a ceremony attended by representatives of the Korean Embassy in August of 2014. The handover received extensive and positive, media attention.

#### *Construction of toilets/ dressing rooms – Female staff phase-2*



Construction itself is now complete in the targeted locations and final inspection of the second phase of construction was carried out. Only the counter narcotics building remains incomplete. The contractor was unable to access the building services (sewage, electricity, water) due to parallel construction being carried out in the area which was being supervised by INL. INL was contacted to request access but responded negatively. Services need to be connected to the building so that LOTFA can close this phase of construction. Resolving access to the site is

actually a function of MOIA, who will be called upon to intervene; as of this report the issue had not been resolved.

#### *Construction of toilets /dressing rooms – Female staff phase-3*

LOTFA engineers' recently identified 15 locations in Jalalabad (the capital of Nangarhar province), and 14 locations in Herat suitable for construction of dressing rooms and toilets for female police officers. The design of construction of toilets/dressing rooms in the two provinces were revised in coordination with MOIA's Facilities and Gender Departments and, the technical documents for construction of the facilities were prepared.

Upon further verification with the UNDP/LOTFA Regional Coordinator for Nangarhar province, locations for construction of toilets and dressing rooms were reduced from 15 to 13. In two locations there was a strong request from the District Commander to have toilets and changing rooms upgraded; however as there are no female staff currently working in those District commands, upgrading the facilities is not justified. The procurement process is on-going to the end of the reporting period.

#### *Construction of toilets /dressing rooms – Female staff phase-4*

Separate missions to Mazar-e-Sharif (the capital of Balkh province) were conducted to assess locations for the construction of toilets and dressing rooms. Each mission's technical report was prepared and suitable sites were finalized for the province. LOTFA was ready to initiate the 4th phase of construction for the facilities by the end of 2014. MOIA's final confirmation letter is pending.

#### *Assessment for phase 4 of women-friendly facilities in police stations*

Having reviewed MOIA's vision for women-friendly police stations, an initial assessment was completed following field missions (Kabul, Mazar, Herat and Nangarhar) to focus provinces. LOTFA engineers and gender staff refined the TORs for the facilities, taking into consideration the requirements of MOIA.

#### **Final inspection of the Martyrs Building**

Though completed in 2013, deficiencies in the construction of the Martyrs Building were noted in the final inspection report released in August 2014. By the close of 2014, all deficiencies were rectified in 2014 and the building was ready for inhabitants. In addition to completing the construction, fair and transparent assignation of the apartments is a critical component for the success and impact of the project. Currently there are two families living in the building which was designed to provide housing for 60 martyrs and disabled families in Kabul. There has been a strong push by the Italian Government to have the facility handed over to MOIA.

A meeting was held with senior MOIA command from various directorates in November 2014 to discuss how and who would be chosen to occupy the building. The meeting was chaired by DM Strategy Policy. A split for martyr beneficiaries will be made equally across 34 provinces, with the remaining apartments divided among those with physical disabilities related to injuries incurred when in the service of ANP. One problem raised was that MOIA intends to include Afghan Local Police (ALP) in the list of martyrs eligible to use the facility, which LOTFA's donors are not likely to agree to.

## ANNUAL EXPENSES

During 2014, a total of US\$ 1,757,490 was spent for this Output. For more details, please see Annex II.

Below is a snapshot of where LOTFA is in relation to its annual targets of Pillar 1, Output 2 by the end of Q4.

2014 Baseline <sup>8</sup>	2014 Annual Targets	Q4 Planned	2014 Actual	Comments
<b>2.1</b> 35 percent total construction works completed.	<b>2.1</b> 100 percent DM Support building completed as per contract between DM and contractor.	<b>2.1</b> 60 percent of total construction works completed.	<b>2.1</b> 55 percent.	<b>2.1</b> Structural issues emerged during the construction.
<b>2.2</b> No construction and no renovation works initiated by MOIA and supported by LOTFA for prisons in Kabul, Kunduz, Takhar, and Jawzjan, Nangarhar.	<b>2.2</b> Assessment, design, advertisement, invitation to bid and contracting completed.	<b>2.2</b> Invitation to bid announced.	<b>2.2</b> Invitation to bid announced; evaluation bids started. LOTFA management decided to halt CPD and new construction, in consultation with donors.	<b>2.2</b> None. All procurement activity concerning CPD renovation and new construction has been suspended. Written notification is required to be sent to all stakeholders.
<b>2.3</b> Work on 20 separate toilets and 20 dressing rooms initiated in Kabul; work on 20 separate toilets and 20 dressing rooms not started in Balkh, Herat and Nangarhar.	<b>2.3</b> 20 separate toilets and dressing rooms completed in Kabul; 20 separate toilets and dressing rooms initiated in Balkh, Herat and Nangarhar.	<b>2.3</b> Complete and handover of 25 toilets and dressing rooms in Kabul.  Start planning construction in Herat and Nangarhar.	<b>2.3</b> 25 toilets and dressing completed and provided to MOIA. Design revised in Herat and Nangarhar. Assessment mission to Mazar-e Sharif.	<b>2.3</b> On track.

<sup>8</sup> Baseline and annual targets based on the LOTFA Annual Work Plan for 2014 approved and released in May 2014. Construction baseline is linked to progress information from December 2013.

## OUTPUT 3: CAPACITY OF MOIA AT POLICY, ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL LEVEL IMPROVED IN IDENTIFIED AREAS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS STRENGTHENED

The 10-Year Vision of the Ministry of Interior Affairs sets key objectives related to strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of MOIA's core functions, including financial management, logistics and procurement management. Pillar 2 focuses on institutional reform and capacity support of the MOIA in alignment with the Vision as well as with the National Police Strategy and the National Police Plan. With 2014's continued move to civilianization, particular focus is now on addressing the sustainability of both the ANP and MOIA and the link between policing and good governance.

### 3.1 Progress in finalizing road map for MOIA reform

The Afghan Police Strategy and Plan that were adopted in 2013 placed a strong emphasis on civilianization; or strengthening civilian and independent oversight as a key element for an effective and accountable Ministry. Currently, within the Ministry, there is no distinction between MOIA and ANP<sup>9</sup>. Roles and responsibilities overlap as the Minister serves as both head of the Ministry and the Operational Commander of the ANP. In addition, over the years many units and departments have been created within the Ministry with overlapping mandates and reporting lines. Together these presented a challenge to ensuring accountability, sustainability and institutional effectiveness.

During the second quarter of 2014, LOTFA supported MOIA to lead a process designed to develop a roadmap to re-structure and reform the Ministry. During Q3, comprehensive discussions on the roadmap were put on hold pending the outcome of the Presidential election and the assumed change in leadership that would follow. However, LOTFA and the Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan (EUD) used this time to undertake a series of micro-technical needs assessments of core directorates of the MOIA crucial for a strengthened public administration such as HR, procurement, facilities, ICT, finance, strategy, policy and budget.

The EUD, in consultation with LOTFA, engaged consultants to conduct micro-capacity assessments of the MOIA HR, finance, procurement and logistics departments, which would inform the Roadmap. The consultants also recorded lessons learned from LOTFA Phase VI and developed recommendations for the design of the next phase<sup>10</sup>. LOTFA itself engaged in a micro assessment of the MOIA ICT departments and the MOIA strategy and policy departments of which results will be finalized in 2015. Findings and recommendations of the EU supported consultancy and the first findings of the LOTFA work were subsequently being integrated in the design for the LOTFA Akheri.

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<sup>9</sup> All MOIA staff on *Tashkeel* (official staffing structure) are consequently also ANP and vice versa. However, to date there are approximately 5,000 to 6,000 "non-ANP" staff contracted outside *Tashkeel* for specialized civilian functions. The new President H.E. Ashraf Ghani is committed to replacing all senior MOIA officials by "non-ANP" civilian staff.

<sup>10</sup> Organizational capacity assessment MOIA, Recommendations Design LOTFA phase VII (September 2014).

### 3.2 Number and capacity development initiatives implemented for increased accountability and internal oversight

Building capacity and increasing transparency across MOIA and the ANP was fundamental to the activities of LOTFA Phase VI. Going forward, LOTFA *Akheri* will consolidate these efforts into a more comprehensive approach towards institutional development and the overall strengthening of the MOIA public administration on the one hand and police professionalization and development for service delivery on the other hand. Both are crucial for handing over key functions from the international community to MOIA, which will be the key focus of LOTFA *Akheri*.

#### Implementation of Code of Conduct Communication Strategy and training

Issued in 2012 with LOTFA support, the MOIA Code of Conduct (COC) initiative offers a large scale opportunity to reach and sensitize ANP forces about the roles and responsibilities of civilian and community-oriented policing and to provide security services with both institutional integrity and fair behavior among fellow officers. As the Afghan police force moves from counter-insurgency to civilian and community policing, the COC provides key behavioral guidance for male and female police.



In 2014, 120,000 copies of the COC booklet and 2,000 copies of posters were printed as part a communication strategy developed in 2013. In addition, more than 20,000 copies of a special edition of the monthly police magazine, *Khiedmat* (Service), featuring the COC in both Dari and Pashto were published by MOIA in September, 2014 with support from UNESCO. This special edition is available in Literacy Centers across the country, as well as from the Literacy Unit of MOIA in Kabul, again with UNESCO's support as well as the support of the Government of Germany and MOIA.

Training in the COC restarted in Q4 across MOIA following a hiatus due to the national elections. LOTFA experienced difficulties with the master trainers, who insisted DSA payments be made before they left for the training missions. LOTFA consistently stated this would not be possible through UNDP's payment system. In the end the trainers did continue their work.

According to the basic COC training report, 4,811 police received training on the COC, of which 696 were officers, 1,487 were sergeants, and 2,628 were patrolmen/women. Further, all personnel from Kabul's 16 Police Districts and 14 additional districts were trained on the COC from March to August 2014. The total number of police trained in the COC stood at 15,204 at year's end. MOIA did not keep records of the proportion of men to women.

## Procurement Training

As noted previously, LOTFA and the Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan (EUD) used the hiatus caused by the Presidential election to undertake a series of micro-technical needs assessments of core directorates (HR, procurement, facilities, ICT, finance and budget, etc.)

In June 2014, LOTFA supported the MOF's Procurement Unit to conduct a 12-day training session for 18 MOIA investigators (all men) working in the Department of Analysis and Evaluation which supports the Deputy Minister (DM) Support. The Department is responsible for monitoring MOIA contracts as well as salaries. Using a combination of theory and case studies, the training enabled department members to properly monitor contracts based on the procurement laws of Afghanistan. High pre-training scores for the majority of the participants suggested that participants started with a basic of understanding of procurement and policies. Post-training results showed an average 20 percent increase in comprehension.

From 23-27 August 2014, 36 participants (all men) from nine provinces received training in the MOIA Central Command. Pre- and post- assessments were conducted on 27 attendees and showed an average increase in understanding of 29 percent.

The training was then conducted from 20-25 September 2014 in Bamyan and combined with Daikundi Province. There were 24 (23 men and 1 woman) procurement officers registered plus four trainers. Choosing Bamyan as the location for the programme was a direct result of MOIA's concern that too many sessions were held in Kabul, resulting in the training not reaching those who need it the most.

Training for procurement, finance and logistic officers lead by MOIA's Education and Training Command and available to Afghan Border Police (ABP) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) took place in Ghor, Badghis, Farah and Herat provinces. Of the 26 ANP attending the course, four were female. Coordination and facilitation of the training was undertaken over five days in the Herat's province from 17-22 October 2014.



A fourth batch of procurement trainings were held in Kandahar, in which 34 men from Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul and Nimroz participated. Trainees participate in pre- and post- tests prepared by LOTFA in consultation with MOIA's Procurement Department of MOIA and endorsed by MOIA.

Additionally there was training in procurement law for senior MOIA commanders coordinated by LOTFA and arranged by the LOTFA M&E unit.

### **English Literacy for Deputy Minister Strategy and Policy**

During the third quarter of 2014, at the request of DM Strategy Policy, 74 male staff from the DM Strategy Policy unit participated in a combined English language Training Needs Assessment and month-long course. Participants included the Deputy Minister, and were divided in Elementary and Intermediate language capabilities. M&E testing, conducted by LOTFA, showed dramatic improvement in both levels. MOIA is considering fast tracking the programme immediately into language training and extending the programme to nine months.

### **ICT Training**

LOTFA supported four Information and Communication Technology (ICT) training sessions in 28 districts during 2014 led by MOIA trainers. Communications Officers and Radio Operators, all men, participated in the 12-day programme. The training curriculum was shared with the LOTFA M&E unit and both pre- and post-training assessments were conducted for all sessions.

An overall improvement in knowledge and skills among participants was recorded based on the pre- and post-assessment scores. The majority of personnel rated the training good to excellent noting the practicality of the content applied to their work and aligned with their TORs. Some of the training participants also requested the duration of the sessions be extended in the future.

### **Support to Traffic Department of MOIA**

An international consultant was introduced to the DM-Strategy and Policy and the General Director of Policy to write a concept note for scoping the possible support of MOIA Traffic Department. This was a special request by both the DM-Strategy and Policy and the General Director of Policy and agreed to by LOTFA management.

The Pillar 2 National Training Coordinator assisted the consultant in the development of the scoping exercise to provide continuity after the consultant departed. The draft report was submitted on 15 September 2014. The Traffic Reform Draft Report was developed and shared with LOTFA management, and was used to inform LOTFA Akheri.

### ***Office of the Inspector General***

#### ***Establishing a coordinated approach and capacity building***

In the development of the 2014 AWP, project partners, LOTFA and the MOIA identified the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) as a key component to institutional effectiveness and increased accountability.

LOTFA recognized early on that a strongly coordinated and harmonized approach that engaged MOIA's international partners would be integral to the effort's success. One of LOTFA's first priorities was to reinforce and deepen the coordination, as well as clarify the roles and responsibilities of the key international partners supporting the OIG and align international efforts with Goal 8 of MOIA's National Police Plan (NPP): "Combating corruption and institutionalization of sustainment mechanisms for MOIA stability, transparency and accountability".



On 5 June, LOTFA hosted the first comprehensive multi-partner coordination meeting. Attending were representatives from the Combined Security Transition Command-Ministerial Advisor Group (CSTC-A/MAG), the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), LOTFA and the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) Rule of Law Transparency, Accountability and Oversight Unit. Participants agreed that the first priority would be to develop a Joint International Community Action Plan (JICAP). JICAP was presented to MOIA's DM Support on 24 July. The DM was asked on several occasions to sign the Plan, however by the end of 2014 without success.

In the following months, numerous meetings with the OIG and heads of key OIG departments were held to identify the capacity needs of the OIG. Participants included the Anti-Corruption and Anti-Bribery Department, the Professional Standards Department, and the Internal Audit and Document Inspection Department. From these meetings LOTFA developed a thorough capacity development strategy that links capacity needs to specific OIG functions. These included:

- Simplify and automate select administrative processes of departments and programs in MOIA to ensure a more transparent and effective provision of service
- Ensure that MOIA operations are in compliance with established operational policies and procedures
- Reduce real and potential theft, corruption and fraud in the MOIA to provide a more transparent, accountable and effective provision of service

To launch the effort, the Inspector General expressed particular interest in staff participating in Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment training (VCA). The goal of trainings was to help build the skills and competency of OIG staff to enable them to develop and introduce corruption risk mitigation measures in high risk departments and programmes within the MOIA.

Workshops were conducted at the Kabul Star Hotel from 22-29 November 2014. The exercises covered stakeholder analysis; mapping and case studies; mapping specific processes; risks, vulnerabilities and mitigation for corruption; and identifying potential entry points. This was followed by a debriefing on the outcomes of the workshop including recommendations, M&E and implementation exercises. Two groups of 25 MOIA male staff members attended the workshops. The LOTFA M&E unit conducted pre- and post- testing with unusual results. The pre-test scores indicated the majority of trainees, 95 percent, possessed a basic knowledge of the subject. While the majority of trainees scored well on the post-test assessment, four of the 24 participants showed zero progress while six scored higher on the pre- than the post-test. Among the participants recommendations were that the training materials be provided in Dari, the inclusion of practical work in the curriculum, and expanding the programme to more than two days. LOTFA is looking into these results and recommendations to make improvement for further trainings or on the testing methodology if necessary.

### *Recommended Institutional Reforms*

Simultaneously, LOTFA commissioned a study to suggest institutional reform measures that would strengthen the Office of the Inspector General of the MOIA, by safeguarding its independence, clarifying its institutional functions, and by proposing a revised organizational structure that corresponds to the revamped mandate.



The objectives and departments suggested by the study are very much in line with the existing institutional framework. The difference lies in the strengthened independence proposed for the Inspector General, and the simplified, and, hopefully, clarified functional scope for the Departments.

The report also attempted to caution the conflict of interest risk that OIG's dual role in conducting complaints investigations, as well as inspections of complaints management procedures create. It is important to examine and evaluate options to eliminate or minimize this risk. A suggestion put forward in this report would be to evaluate the possibility of reestablishing an Internal Affairs Department with the authority to lead investigations of complaints of abuse of authority, misconduct and corruption. The OIG, on the other hand, would then have a clear authority to inspect complaints procedures to ensure that good practice and due process is met.

The report was not intended to be exhaustive. The initial suggested reform measures, to be consulted with MOIA in 2015, however, were intended to provide a point of departure for a subsequently MOIA-led formulation of an Inspector General Law that would provide the governing anchor of a well-functioning Office of the Inspector General.

In addition, key recommendations proposed below also need to be translated into practical OIG guided institutional policies, carefully aligned with the Afghan contextual realities.

- Recommendation 1: Develop a proper regulatory framework that provides the Office of the Inspector General a legally sanctioned mandate that is shielded from recurrent policy changes and undue interference by executive authorities.
- Recommendation 2: All existing decrees, orders, regulations and instructions create confusion regarding the true mandate and mission of the Office of the Inspector General. They need to be reviewed, scrutinized and considered in the preparation of the Inspector General Law. Once the law is passed, they need to be revoked, not only by law but also in their practical application.
- Recommendation 3: Evaluate the prospect of relinquishing the OIG from its authority to undertake complaints investigations and instead re-establish and empower the Internal Affairs Department (IAD) to lead investigations of complaints connected with abuse of authority, misconduct and corruption. This would remove the conflict of interest risk by separating the investigative authority (with IAD) from the regulatory oversight responsibility (with OIG).
- Recommendation 4: Establish an organizational structure that aims to fulfill and reflects the functional objectives of the Office of the Inspector General that is not influenced by motives beyond the mere consideration of the OIG most effectively fulfilling its institutional mandate.
- Recommendation 5: The independence of the Inspector General needs to be firmly anchored in the Inspector General Law.
- Recommendation 6: Provide the Anti-Corruption and Anti-Bribery Department of the OIG the authority to issue disciplinary recommendations pertaining to minor misconduct, wrongdoing and corruption offenses. The recommendations would subsequently be enforced by the relevant management authority of the offender. This procedure would apply to minor internal MOIA staff corruption cases as well as minor external 119 call

center corruption cases. Cases of a criminal nature would be referred on to Attorney General's Office (AGO) for prosecution or discharge.

- Recommendation 7: Develop and formalize responsibilities for AGO to report status of criminal cases under investigation pertaining to MOIA staff when proper formal requests to do so have been submitted. Retribution for failure to do so need to be stipulated and enforced.
- Recommendation 8: Improve inter-institutional case coordination and information sharing by establishing a formalized Joint Working Group between the Office of the Inspector General of the MOIA and the Military Division of the Attorney General's Office.

### *Strengthening anti-corruption mechanisms*

In response to Recommendations 3 and 4, during the fourth quarter LOTFA engaged a consultant to address the corruption complaints mechanism and to enhance the complaints mechanism within the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA). Senior-level MOIA staff were consulted in the process as well as local national officials outside the MOIA. Working with local national and international stakeholders, the consultant investigated the legal and administrative framework for the corruption complaints mechanism and found the process to be nearly devoid of legal or administrative authority or guidance. Consequently, the Consultant set about mapping the corruption complaints process at MOIA. Statistics gleaned from the mapping processed clearly indicated that corruption was, by far, the single largest reported incident to the call centers, averaging about 20% of all calls. Incidents involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was the second most prevalent cause of calls, followed by reports of hooliganism.

The mapping process also revealed weaknesses in several areas of internal control. In the 119 call centers, complaints were processed without keeping a permanent log of calls or assigning case tracking numbers to the complaints. Consequently, as the mapping continued, numerous cases were found to have been "lost" in the system. Additionally, several gender related issues arose. Women were completely excluded from representation on the *Tashkeel* for call center personnel at the sub-national level. If a caller wanted to speak to a woman, the only women available in the 119 call centers were in Kabul and worked only from 7am to 3pm. Consequently, in a society where women have great reluctance to speak with males, they were left without any alternatives between the hours of 3pm and 7am when a significant amount of domestic violence occurs.

Finally, and most importantly, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was discovered to be suffering from severe deficiencies. These included everything from leadership lapses to system and organizational deficiencies. Of equal concern, there was no identified oversight mechanism for the OIG. These extensive internal control weaknesses have resulted in an almost complete functional breakdown of the corruption complaints mechanism at the MOIA. To address these internal control weaknesses, the consultant liaised with international stakeholders and senior leaders at the MOIA to develop clearly identifiable recommendations for rectifying the existing problems. These recommendations were political and technical in nature. LOTFA will support with the implementation of technical recommendations under LOTFA Akheri in 2015.

## ANNUAL EXPENSES

During 2014, a total of US\$ 5,837,462 was spent for this Output. For more details, please see Annex II.

2014 Baseline <sup>11</sup>	2014 Annual Targets	Q4 Planned	2014 Actual	Comments
<b>3.1</b> Macro assessments are conducted by UNDP and International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) on core areas for MOIAA reform but no agreement exists on a detailed comprehensive roadmap.	<b>3.1</b> One micro assessment is conducted and a detailed comprehensive roadmap for MOIA reform is agreed upon by MOIA and the international community.	<b>3.1</b> Initiate micro assessment following approval of ANP.	<b>3.1</b> Limited progress.	<b>3.1</b> Roadmap requires political backing within MOIA and ANP, thus further action is pending appointment of new officials. However, the unexpected dispute and subsequent audit of the election caused further delay of appointments within MOIA.
<b>3.2</b> Not available, zero.	<b>3.2</b> One SOP drafted and 1 capacity development initiative implemented.	<b>3.2</b> Same as above.	<b>3.2</b> Same as above.	<b>3.2</b> Same as above.

Snapshot of where LOTFA is in relation to its annual targets of Pillar 2, Output 3 by the end of Q4.

<sup>11</sup> Baseline and annual targets based on the LOTFA Annual Work Plan for 2014 approved and released in May 2014.

## OUTPUT 4: GENDER CAPACITY AND EQUALITY IN THE POLICE FORCE IMPROVED

The most effective tool to help Afghanistan reach internationally defined objectives in relation to women's rights, gender equity and equality is the National Action Plan (NAP). The NAP aims to increase women's participation and involvement in the peace process and security sector; protect women; prevent conflict; and provide relief and recovery services for women. Based on UNSCR 1325, the NAP recognizes the importance of the equitable development of men's and women's capacities for creating a strong and developed nation where access to opportunities and resources is shared equally by men and women ensuring their joint efforts result in the progress of the whole society. While the consequences of three decades of war has negatively impacted all areas of social, cultural and economic life of women, the issue of gender equity, which the GIROA has prioritized under gender mainstreaming, includes the strengthening of women's rights and women's increased participation in areas of decision-making. Afghanistan's accession to international human rights instruments such as the Convention to Eliminate All Forms Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Millennium Development Goals, as well as the development and adoption of legislation such as the 2013 Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law, Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA) in addition to the NAP are all efforts towards achieving the abovementioned objectives.

Being cognizant that Afghan women were not only victims of the recent conflict, but that that they have struggled with the impact of more than three decades of war, the government acknowledges the important and active role women must play in the peace-building process, within security institutions and in decision-making positions with the Afghan administration. The Government's initiatives with regards to women's inclusive participation in the decision-making process in specific areas, particularly elections, and their significant participation in the National Assembly, have been successful. Yet women's presence has been poor in the areas of security, the judiciary, detention facilities management and the like. The participation of women is still also poor in traditional decision-making forums. The limitations and constraints that women face in the decision-making process prevents them from fully participating in the peace-building process. However, Afghan women play a tangible role in the maintenance of national consensus and social harmony. They are able to be advocates for peace and supporters of social justice from within the official ranks. The National Action Plan will therefore be a principal tool to address key concerns in regards to women's meaningful participation in the peace process and security sector reform, including the protection of women and prevention of violence.

In line with these higher level strategies the MOIA places a strong emphasis on gender equity and equality in the MOIA 10-Year Vision as well as the National Police Strategy and Plan. The MOIA also developed a gender strategy.

During 2014, LOTFA pursued the LOTFA phase VI gender related activities guided by the MOIA gender strategy. Moving forward LOTFA will provide more comprehensive support and technical assistance to MOIA to further the country's NAP and NAPWA and MOIA's 10-Year Vision. LOTFA Akheri will have gender mainstreamed throughout the project activities into a comprehensive approach in order to better yield results.

## 4.1 Progress in implementing the MOIA Gender Strategy

### LOTFA's role in operationalizing gender strategy

LOTFA is part of the Commission which created the MOIA Gender Strategy Implementation Plan, approved in August 2014. Led by MOIA, the commission also includes UNAMA, EUPOL, other international agencies and civil society organizations. The Implementation Plan provides stakeholders with a concrete roadmap to achieve the goals set forth in the Strategy. A key goal of the strategy is to increase the number of female police officers. The Plan includes three key elements for achieving the recruitment goal: 1) inclusion of a complaints mechanism for sexual harassment; b) establishment of Police Women Councils/Networks c) adoption of a practical implementing methodology for the MOIA Gender Strategy. A logical framework to chart out actionable steps, who would be the responsible implementing partners, a feasible timeline for each step, and a means to mobilize resources are supporting the Plan.

Since the implementation of the Strategy, there has been a steady increase in the number of female police and civilian officers as evidenced in the chart below. However MOIA's goal of 5,000 women police by the end of 2014 was not achieved.

### Establishing a Police Women's Council



To support the human resources needs of female personnel and ensuring their voice and participation in the organization, the MOIA gender strategy implementation plan stresses the need for Police Women Councils. The Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA) held a 2-day workshop on 20 and 21 October 2014 to establish Police Women Councils, national and government associations designed to build the capacity, improve the welfare, and build solidarity among female police officers. UNDP/ LOTFA, in close collaboration with UNAMA and in consultation with EUPOL and the ISAF Gender Advisory Team

supported the event. The opening ceremony took place at the Intercontinental Hotel, Kabul and was attended by approximately 350 people from MOIA, international agencies, Afghan male and female police officers from across the country and civil society.

In light of President Ghani's and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah's vision to enhance the position and role of women in public life, and eliminate all forms of discrimination and violence against women, the MOIA's General Directorate of Human Rights, Children and Women Affairs, led by Brigadier General Hekmat Shahi, guided Workshop participants to exchange views on how to take practical measures to finalize the Terms of Reference for a specifically Afghan Women's Council with the assistance of the international gender policing advisory group, comprised of UNAMA, EUPOL, ISAF and UNDP/LOTFA.



Police Women Council representatives from all provinces, as well as Deputy Chiefs of Police for Administration, Heads of Recruitment, Heads of Education, Heads of Gender and Human Rights, concurred on the values and roles of Police Women's Councils. Civil society members, represented by the Afghan Women's Network, welcomed the Ministry's participatory efforts to engage with a wide spectrum of society in introducing this new policy initiative, including drafting the Terms of Reference. The Afghan President's wife has taken a special interest in this initiative. The 20-21 October 2014 workshop contributed to bringing MOIA, women police officers and existing women police council members together in an open dialogue with various stakeholder groups. Furthermore the Workshop provided participants with an opportunity to review and discuss the draft TORs for a women's police council network, and build a common understanding of its scope and purpose.

### **Safe working environments**

In addition to the three priorities set out in the gender strategy implementation plan to increase the number of female staff, LOTFA finds it important to provide immediate safety improvements for women that are currently employed by the MOIA. This in particular since LOTFA supports the salaries of these women. MOIA fortunately also recognizes the need to provide women friendly, safe facilities for both cadets and ANP females to operate within. LOTFA's gender team attended the joint monitoring of class rooms and dormitories in the police academy, supported by the German Police Project Team (GPPT). The conditions of these classrooms and dormitories for females were considered by LOTFA to be generally good.

Furthermore, the 25 dressing rooms and bathrooms for women in Kabul, completed by LOTFA in 2013, were further upgraded in 2014, benefiting more than 150 ANP women. LOTFA conducted a comprehensive Female Police Conditions Assessment using gender indicators across the provinces of Nangarhar, Herat and Mazar. Given their high number of gender-based violence cases, these provinces were identified as potentially benefiting most from women friendly police facilities, and that supporting these particular provinces would maximize the impact of recruitment, training and subsequent deployment. An additional 40 facilities – Herat (14), Nangarhar (13) and Mazar (13) – were identified and are in the procurement stage with completion targeted for 2015.

### **Training in support of female recruitment**

Similarly and as per the Gender Strategy, an important element of the MOIA female recruitment efforts are to ensure continuous training of female police currently on Tashkeel, and ensure the recruitment of female police with reasonably high level of education. To that end, LOTFA supported the recruitment unit to train 200 females under the MOIA *Tashkeel*. The training programme is 16-weeks in total and started in November 2014 running through February 2015. Of these women, 20 will serve as female trainers in the police academy. All 20 women hold Bachelor's degrees. The training was conducted by the Sivas Police Training Center in Turkey through a south-south collaboration initiative with Turkey funded by the Government of Japan in partnership with NTM-A.

In addition, basic police training to new recruits is provided by the Sivas Police Training Center supported by LOTFA and under the condition that the new recruits have at least a Bachelor's degree. 200 new female recruits started the training in November 2014. One month later, 30 female ANP from the MOIA Recruitment Unit were deployed to the training center for courses on recruitment policies and practices to support the 200 new recruits. The Sivas training center is also used by the MOIA communications department for recruitment campaigns. Some sources within the MOIA and women's' groups say that this indeed attracts the interest of female candidates and could have been the direct cause to the increased numbers of new recruits since the MOIA started using Sivas for this purpose (see also "Data on women police" on page 63).

Through a similar collaboration but this time with the Korean Institute for Gender Equality Promotion and Education (KIGEPE) a residential training was conducted on gender responsive policing and gender mainstreaming. The training was provided in 2013 for senior women officers. However, based on the positive results and recommendations<sup>12</sup> from the 2013 KIGEPE training, MOIA's Gender and Human Rights Department decided to scale-up this residential training initiative and open it up not to new senior women officers, but also to male staff working for the FRU offices across the country. As such LOTFA in 2014 supported the deployment and training through KIGEPE of twenty males and twenty females. THE KIGEPE training complements the Sivas programme in its scope and trainee profile. Where SIVA aims to increase the number of professional police officers directly serving communities, KIGEPE training is meant to build leadership and management skills and capacity among women police serving at the MOIA. Further, where Sivas training introduces women police to policing skills, KIGEPE focuses on gender as a component of policing skills.

### **Literacy training in support of female police empowerment**

Most of the female police officers currently on the Tashkeel are illiterate. To empower them and ensure they can provide better police services to women, LOTFA collaborated with UNESCO in advancing ANP literacy training for female police officers in Kabul, Jalalabad, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. The initial course was implemented by UNESCO in December 2014, and LOTFA will monitor this progress. Discussions on further collaboration with UNESCO to roll out an ambitious training package for the MOIA took place but could not be pursued under LOTFA Akheri.

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<sup>12</sup> At the conclusion of the first edition, all participants developed individual plans of action according to which each woman police, with the support of the KIGEPE instructors, defines feasible actions for professional education and skills strengthening on the job site.



### **IT training in support of female police empowerment**

In 2013, in collaboration with the Kabul Engineering Technical NGO of Management Communication & Information Technologies (KETN-MCIYT), LOTFA supplied computers and other IT equipment coupled with IT skills training for staff of the Family Response Units (FRU), Gender Mainstreaming Units (GMU) and other MOIA units specifically dedicated to gender responsive policing. As part of the post-training assessment, during the third quarter of 2014, 60 of the 224 trainees were selected to provide feedback about acquisition of skills and overall satisfaction. The M&E follow-up revealed that trainees were able to correctly respond to 50-60 percent of the total questions and 89 percent of trainees and 80 percent of supervisors were satisfied with the course.

### **4.2 Existence of a comprehensive MOIA approach for preventing and addressing GBV**

Addressing and preventing Gender Based Violence (GBV) requires an integrated multi-sectoral approach and cannot be dealt with by MOIA alone. To that end, 2014 was a transition year during which LOTFA implemented its obligations under LOTFA VI while simultaneously holding consultations with MOIA and other partners on the development of such a comprehensive approach. Discussions were held amongst other with MOIA, the GBV protection cluster co-chaired by UNFPA and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and donors (e.g. the round table held by the Canadian Embassy in November 2014). Moving forward LOTFA under LOTFA Akheri will support the most crucial GBV needs as they relate to the MOIA/ANP. Discussions will need to continue with the MOIA and LOTFA donors as to how to better link this to GBV responses in other institutions in the justice and rule of law and health and social sectors.

### **UNiTE Campaign 2014**

Changing negative attitudes towards female personnel within the Afghan National Police (ANP), coupled with reducing the cases of violence against policewomen by their male colleagues, will set an example for the general community about the importance of eliminating violence against women in the country. That was the message from Jamal Nasir Sediqi, Deputy Minister for Public Protection of the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA), to launch LOTFA's celebration of the annual UNiTE to End Violence Campaign.



The launch event was attended by approximately 150 key officials from MOIA and its national and international partners and included the screening of a film on violence against women, including forced marriage, the cutting of women's faces and harassment. Participants wore orange scarves, which were contributed by UN Women, as a mark of solidarity

for the victims of gender violence. Participants also shared their experiences as a way of strengthening ties among themselves and their solidarity to the cause.

LOTFA's UNiTE campaign involved a mix of outreach events at MOIA headquarters and provincial police headquarters and the dissemination of information to police as well as to political, religious



and community leaders. LOTFA and MOIA delegations travelled together throughout the provinces of Kabul, Herat, Nangarhar and Balkh, where they addressed issues of gender based violence with the police officers and provincial authorities. The materials were provided by key LOTFA partners including, UN Women, UNFPA, UNAMA, UNDP's Gender Equality Project (GEP) and International Development of Law Organization (IDLO).

### **SOPs and trainings on police and prosecutor collaboration on GBV in Herat, Mazar and Kabul**

A major gap in the police response to GBV is the absence of clearly understood guidance among police officers as to how to collaborate adequately with the prosecutor's office in GBV cases. Currently SOPs do exist for the police on how to work on GBV cases. However there is not sufficient guidance on specific police-prosecutor collaboration as well as collaboration on GBV within the different ANP departments. To that end, in October and November 2014 LOTFA and UNDPs Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan (JHRA) supported joint workshops in Herat, Mazar and Kabul, to develop guidelines for the establishment of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for police and prosecutor collaboration across the regions. LOTFA supported participation of police officers in the workshop, while JHRA supported the participation of the prosecutors' offices. The initial draft of the SOPs was shared with the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Attorney General's Office who further elaborated the draft. One of the major recommendations evolving out of the workshop was that current guidance on GBV was set at a too high level for the average police officer to understand. Accordingly, as a follow up action, under LOTFA Akheri, LOTFA will seek to support the MOIA in translating current SOPs in simplified and standardized checklists so that low literate officers can understand and follow the process.

The SOP review was coupled with an initial pilot training implemented in collaboration with EUPOL, and JHRA with JHRA bringing in the prosecutor's office. Major topics of the training were EVAW laws, practices in crime scene analysis, and strengthening coordination among key stakeholders. The pre- and post- assessments were undertaken by the LOTFA's M&E team. Participants suggested future trainings be longer.

GBV training is also mainstreamed in the LOTFA supported Sivas trainings for new female recruits. A workshop on the issue was added as a new element to the 2014 trainings in close collaboration with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The Turkish police commander and Brig. General Hekmashi from MOIA's General Directorate of Human Rights, Children and Women's Affairs participated in the workshop and made presentations which were very well received by the participants.

### **Supporting MOIA in ensuring safety and security for female voters through Female Searchers**

The use of Female Searchers during the April elections was designed to demonstrate the government's commitment to an inclusive electoral process by acknowledging the specific needs of women and enabling their participation. Moreover, improving the security of Afghan women would facilitate the ability of both men and women to exercise their Constitutional right to participate in national decision-making and elect their leadership.

The Ministry of Interior Affairs was responsible for coordinating operational assistance for the April elections, including security at polling stations. According to the Minister of Interior Affairs,

more than 400,000 police, army and National Directorate of Security staff members were deployed throughout the country to improve the security of elections on 5 April.

Deploying two trained Female Searchers per polling station was part of the government's Joint Plan for Election Security. Because women comprise less than two per cent of Afghan National Police personnel and there were not enough policewomen to meet the security needs on Election Day, MOIA needed to identify and train temporary female security staff.

Approximately 600 trainers selected from the Afghan National Police, and their *Mahrams* (guardians), were trained by police master trainers from the Education and Training Command. The Female Searchers' training materials were developed and printed with UNDP support. The training of trainers and *Mahrams* attended sessions in five regional centers, including Kabul, and were then deployed to their respective provinces to conduct training courses in provincial and district centers during February and March 2014.

On 5 April, the Government of Afghanistan deployed a corps of approximately 13,000 temporary female security staff to carry out body searches of women as they arrived to vote at the dedicated women's areas at polling stations across Afghanistan. Stationed at dedicated women's areas at polling stations, the Female Searchers were required to search female voters – by hand or using a metal detection wand – for firearms, knives, explosives and other items prohibited within polling stations by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), as well as identifying men posing as women wearing burkas.

The attendance of Female Searchers at polling stations on Election Day was monitored by IEC officials and verified by UNDP Elect II. Their payments were issued along with other IEC staff. MOIA's Deputy Chief of Staff was working with the DM Security's Director of Police Affairs to define what needed to be assessed as part of the project's evaluation process. LOTFA planned to support this by running a lessons learned workshop based on the priorities defined by MOIA. The workshop was scheduled for the last quarter of 2014, but the lessons learned exercise was deferred pending a request from MOIA.

The Republic of Korea covered the training costs while a contribution from the USA covered the Female Searchers' remuneration. The UN Secretary-General commended the Afghan national security forces for their professionalism and dedication that enabled citizens to vote on 5 April in the face of serious security threats.

## ANNUAL EXPENSES

During 2014, a total of US\$ 1,255,537 was spent for the Output. For more details, please see Annex II.

Below is a snapshot of where LOTFA is in relation to its annual targets of Pillar 2, Output 4 by the end of Q4.

2014 Baseline <sup>13</sup>	2014 Annual Targets	Q4 Planned	2014 Actual	Comments
<b>4.1</b> MOIA Gender Strategy approved, but implementation plan not available.	<b>4.1</b> One training needs assessment and one training developed for female MOIA and ANP staff as per MOIA strategy.	<b>4.1</b> Support approval of Gender Strategy Implementation Plan.	<b>4.1</b> Gender Strategy Implementation Plan approved in August.	<b>4.1</b> Interventions leading to the achievement of the annual target will take place in Q4/2014.
<b>4.2</b> No unified system of GBV reporting available at the MOIA.	<b>4.2</b> MOIA Model for GBV victim support is developed.	<b>4.2</b> Continue developing police-prosecutor SOP for GBV cases.	<b>4.2</b> Continued development of SOP; preparations made for workshop in Q4.	<b>4.2</b> None.

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<sup>13</sup> Baseline and annual targets based on the LOTFA Annual Work Plan for 2014 approved and released in May 2014.

## OUTPUT 5: POLICE-COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS INSTITUTIONALIZED FOR IMPROVED LOCAL SECURITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND SERVICE DELIVERY

LOTFA's support for developing the Afghan National Police's (ANP) community policing efforts derive from discussions with the Police e-Mardumi Directorate (PeMD) at the MOIA which have been articulated in a concept note, *Support to the Ministry of Interior Affairs for Developing a Civilian Policing Model for the Afghan Uniform Civilian Police in Afghanistan*. The Director of the PeMD requested LOTFA to explore options designed to strengthen Community Oriented Policing (COP) principles across the ANP. These options were later narrowed down to the development of a Community Policing Model (CPM) specifically for the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). Development of the CPM drew on the 10-Year Vision developed by the MOIA, which states, "Policing comes from the people and should serve the people" and was guided by the following principles:

- The CPM is guided by gender responsive and child-friendly, community-oriented policing principles;
- The CPM is an Afghan initiative that builds on inputs and recommendations by the Afghan community.
- 

The concept note was instrumental in rallying key international partners, UN agencies and civil society organizations under a single framework.

### 5.1 Existence of Afghan Civilian Policing Model guided by Community-Oriented Policing and Rule of Law Principles

To ensure a truly Afghan-led model, LOTFA supported the PeMD to establish a team of senior police officers that would be able to jointly with the PeMD lead the CPM development process. To that end, 51 senior police officers from eight districts (Kabul, Herat, Mazar, Kunduz, Bamyan, Helmand, Ghor and Baghlan) gathered at the Afghan National Police Staff College for a training workshop. The 5-day programme was organized in partnership with UNICEF and EUPOL who both led sessions on community policing. Guest lecturers included representatives of UNDP JHRA and UNICEF.

A second workshop, organized in Herat, focused on reviewing the consultative process for the CPM and further strengthening officers' skills such as change management, negotiations and problem solving. PeMD partnered with MOIA's Training and Education Command to lead the 5-day training for 45 AUP officers. Officers from Kabul, Kunduz, Balkh, Ghor, Herat, Helmand and Bamyan attended the event.

The subjects that were discussed during these five days are presented in the below:




Figure 1: General Ainii at the PeMD training.

S/N	Subjects
01	Community Policing Principles
02	Communication Skills
03	Police Ethics
04	Dealing with Conflicts
05	Decision Making
06	Time management

07	Change Management
08	Negotiation Skills
09	Domestic Violence Awareness
10	Problem Solving
11	Counseling Psychology
12	Presentation Skills

The two 5-day training workshops results in the improved understanding and broadening of the community policy approach by participating officers. As a result of these trainings, the PeMD and the newly trained team of police officers successfully implemented a consultation process for the development of the CPM:



#### *Step 1: Engage Civil Society Organizations*

PeMD organized a three-day consultation to gather inputs from key civil society organizations for the development of the CPM for the AUP. One hundred and twenty representatives from participated of which 98 were from 70 CSOs – men and women (58), youth representatives and emerging leaders (31), and religious leaders (9) – were selected to attend the event based on inputs from GiZ, UNAMA, and UNICEF. The event was held in Kabul from 16-18 August.



The consultation achieved its key objectives and created an environment in which state and non-state actors openly discussed the future of the police in Afghanistan. The main outputs included:

- strengthened partnership between CSOs and the MOIA;
- identification of good practices by the CSO to support police professionalism;
- Formulated key recommendations for the development of the CCPM for the AUP.

Participants agreed to continue the dialogue on a regular basis to further strengthen the partnership and maintain an open channel of communication. It is anticipated that the level of

inputs and discussion will continue to improve over time while simultaneously strengthen Afghan ownership of the police.

### *Step 2: Engaging Community Members.*

As direct beneficiaries of policing services community members are the most important part of the development of a Community Policing Model and therefore must play a key role in the development of the AUP CPM in Afghanistan.

To ensure community involvement, the PeMD provincial teams held four workshops in Kabul, Herat, Balkh and Bamyan provinces to discuss key issues including:

- Responsiveness to women, children and other underrepresented groups
- Strengthening the partnership and coordination with both civil society and the prosecutor's office;
- What police services communities have a right to expect;
- The roles of the community in the new policing model?
- Measuring police performance?

Kabul's community consultation took place on 14-15 September. A total of 120 community members representing youth, women, elders, and religious leaders, as well as local police members and local authorities, attended the meeting.

In Bamyan, 80 community members representing youth, women, elders, and religious leaders attended the meeting, along with local police members and local authorities, on 24-25 September

Heart's Community Consultation took place on 29-30 October in Tejarat International Hotel in Herat. At this workshop, 93 representatives from various groups of women, youth, religious leaders, community elders and civil society organization at central and provincial level attended. And in Balkh more than 60 representatives from various groups of women, youth, religious leaders, community elders and civil society organization at the central and provincial level attended.

Province	Total Participants Invited	Total Attendance	Male participants	Female participants
Kabul	60	104	98	6
Herat	93	85	65	20
Bamyan	80	80	44	36
Balkh	60	60	53	7

### *Step 3 and 4: Engaging Civil Authorities and National Police Experts*

Through bilateral meetings with international actors and organizations working directly with the policing sector, and interviews with experts at the HQ, provincial and district levels, LOTFA presented details on the CPM as a tool for police civilianization and professionalization, the steps involved in the development process, and the gathering of specialized inputs and recommendations. Government officials at the province and district level were interviewed.

During these meetings participants generally accepted the philosophy of the CPM and also agreed with the need for a specialized Policy Manual for the AUP. However, two opposing visions emerged from the bi-lateral interviews. On the one hand, the international community and key MOIA staff and Deputy Ministers are convinced that the only way forward to improve AUP professionalization and security is engagement with the Afghan community through community-oriented policing principles. On the other, there are key figures in the MOIA as well as influential members of the international community who are of the opinion that Afghanistan is at war and that all resources should be focused on winning this war through an armed military approach. It is important to reconcile these views moving forward.

#### *Step 5: Engaging International Partners*

At a meeting on 20 August, 30 representatives from 11 international partners met to identify lessons learned and build a consensus around key recommendations (see below) for consideration by MOIA on the development of the CPM for the AUP. In parallel, the intent was to identify organizations ready to actively engage in supporting the PeMD to develop the Community Policing Model and contribute to its roll-out beginning in 2015.

During the forum, participants expressed the need to articulate how and by whom the change process would be implemented. The government supports the creation of a team of national experts which should be empowered to lead the process within MOIA.

Further discussions will be needed on key issues and it was recommended to hold thematic session in collaboration with MOIA stakeholders.

#### *Key Recommendations*

A substantial number of recommendations were discussed at the 20 August meeting of which the following represent those that the majority of participants agreed on.

1. Balance policing activities between policing as it relates to military security functions of the Afghan National Police and policing as it relates to rule of law and development. Both are needed in the Afghan context but need to be balanced as per the needs of the particular geographical area. Military security functions include checkpoints management, combating riots and civil unrest and countering insurgents through war-fighting techniques. Policing as it relates to rule of law and development is captured in the CPM and includes supporting civilian governance and oversight of the ministry of interior, criminal investigations, police patrolling and trafficking, neighbourhoods watch and countering insurgents through getting the trust and support of the population.
2. Separate general policing services from specialised policing
3. Establish and capacitate national actors to lead the community policing processes at the provincial and district level
4. Strengthen and formalise policing governance including tools, processes and mechanisms to build up community trust and ownership
5. Empower and extend the role of policewomen
6. Expand diversion of youth in conflict with the law away from the adult criminal justice system towards specialised justice mechanism
7. Develop intelligence-led policing (crime and violence analysis) by establishing monitoring and analysis tools
8. Review Operational Directives (SOPs) and reorient the training curriculum based on community policing

9. Operationalize measures advocated in the Code of Conduct
10. Support the referral of victims of crime and violence to social and health services
11. Streamline and operationalize the management structures and reporting lines of the different policing services

### *The Community Policing Model*

The overall findings and recommendations gathered through the development process serve as the basis for the Community Policing Model (CPM), which is designed to strengthening police services in selected provinces and lay the foundation for scaling up the model to other provinces as conditions permit.

This new Afghan-contextualized model responds to the political sensitivities of a country served by multiple security agencies and aims at reinvigorating the partnership, trust and confidence between police and community. It is not meant to compete or replace the ANP's military style counterinsurgency activities, nor ignore the delicate security situation prevailing in certain regions and sectors. Rather it is a step forward toward providing more comprehensive solutions from both a security and development perspective, particularly in the light of possible reductions in donor commitments. It is time to address security matters in a way that links itself more coherently with the criminal justice system in general and with community demands in particular. Moving forward, PeMD, in collaboration with LOTFA proposed the discussion of this consensus-generated model and to prepare its rollout in selected provinces where relative peace and security exists and can be further consolidated.

LOTFA sought to operationalize this approach by adapting it to the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). Although this was not envisaged to be completed in 2014 the MOIA, in collaboration with LOTFA, felt that without an operational manual, the CPM would be just another policy paper. Therefore, given that the AUP is envisaged to be the 'front-line-responder' for addressing safety and security needs within communities, an AUP Policy Manual was drafted in line with the community oriented policing approach and is currently being further reefing and discussed by the MOIA.



Figure 3: LOTFA Pillar-III Manager presenting the framework for the development of the CCPM to



### *Enabling Environment for COP:*

The implementation of the CPM based on gender sensitive and child friendly community-oriented policing principles will require a change of mindset on the part of both the Afghan community and the police. To this end, LOTFA supported the development of an illustration that conveys the CPM philosophy. These were the criteria:



- Contextualized to Afghanistan;
- Presents the benefits of police-community partnership;
- Provides an entry point to introduce and strengthen the presence of women in the police;
- Linkages with the improvement of safety and security for the community.

This illustration presents the outcome of this process. The first row expresses the disappointment, dangers and hopelessness that results from the police working alone, and when the community hosts criminals, wittingly or unwittingly. The second row demonstrates how working together with the policeman and the policewomen, offenders are identified and brought to the justice.

## **Strengthening AUP's response Capacity through 119 Call Centres**

The 119 Emergency Call Centres (ECC) are an extension of the police to the community. MOIA currently has six 119 Emergency Call Centers, one each in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, Herat, Helmand and Jalalabad, and provides policing services to the community across the country. The 119 ECC of Kabul was been established in 2008 by CSTC-A, and the project was then expanded to the other five provinces in close collaboration with EUPOL and LOTFA.

Currently, three centres, Mazar, Kandahar and Nangarhar, are temporarily closed due to technical problems such as connectivity and power fluctuation. In order to correct the problem, LOTFA undertook the following steps:

- Support to the implementation of the 119 Emergency Call Centers (ECC) policy framework-through technical assessment;
- A technical assessment of each existing 119 ECC was undertaken to identify the scope of the problem, support the development of corrective actions, and ensure that MOIA has the capacity to operate the 119 ECC;
- Purchase of six generators for the 119 ECC;
- Support for an awareness raising campaign once the 119 ECCs are repaired. This will include TV spots and radio, development of visual identity and slogans; and printing of relevant promotional materials.

### **119 Call Centers & CPM**

The 119 Emergency Call Centers were developed to provide Afghanistan citizens with a mechanism to contact and interact with the police. This includes urgent requests for assistance such as crime, road incidents and emergency. In addition, citizens are encouraged to report cases of corruption, misuse and abuse of authority by public officials, and police misconduct. The importance of these centers has grown over the years with the increase of telephone access. It is an important tool in the CCPM.

LOTFA support for the 119 ECC public awareness campaign is comprised of the following components:

- TV public service announcements spots development and its broadcast
- Radio public service announcement spot and its broadcast
- Promotional materials and billboard installation across fourteen provinces.

All three components of the 119 campaign have been through UNDP's procurement process though as of the close of 2014, only the TV spots were produced. Broadcast will be scheduled when the 119 centers are fully functional.

## **5.2 Number of provinces and districts which pilot Community-Oriented Policing governance components of the Community Policing Model**

The governance component provides the mechanisms through which community and the police can work together and implement priority needs as jointly defined in the CPM. LOTFA's work in this area provides the processes, tools and activities required to successfully implement the CPM.

*District Safety and Security Committees:* Many districts, often supported by international partners, already have certain systems in place through which the community and the police

interact and collaborate. LOTFA through the CPM supports the Police e Mardumi Secretariat to streamline existing structures or establish new structures under a common name, the District Safety and Security Committee. LOTFA provided this support as a pilot for two districts: Herat PD1 and Gozara district. These pilot interventions provided a unique opportunity to present and refine the mandate of such committees. Their goals included:

- Build a relationship, trust, and partnership between police and communities with the aim of improving safety and security;
- Enhance the capacity building and skills of the Police-Community Committee to prevent crime and violence in the concern district;
- Develop and implement the District Police and Security Plan in a partnership comprised of police and community;
- Improve communication and the rate of reporting incidents and offences to the police, thus contributing to decreasing crime rates.



*District Police and Security Plan:* In line with the recommendations made in the various consultative workshop and meetings, lessons learned suggested to operationalize the CPM at the district level through the development of district level plans focused on police reform and the improvement of safety and security of the community. The plan provides locally based solutions, and shall be jointly developed by the police and community. Micro-capital grants combined with local resources shall be provided to support the solutions as proposed in the plan. This can potentially include:

- Strengthening the capacity of the police-community committee through trainings on security analysis and basics of change management;
- Supporting community-based self-help initiatives aimed to improve safety and security;
- Promoting advocacy activities and networking between civil society organizations (CSOs) and state security apparatus.

The grant mechanism has been effective in other countries to operationalize the partnership between the police and the community, to promote an approach in which the community and the police have delineated responsibilities towards the improvement of safety and security, and that it could support the implementation of the change management strategy.

The provincial and district level framework is guided by an assessment. LOTFA shall finalize the detail of the provincial assessment in 2015.

*District Security Surveys* normally support the development of the district security plans. It measures the trends in four sectors;

- Trend of crime and violent incidents segregated by type, gender in target district compared with other districts in target province
- Perception on police performance in target provinces in alignment with the GIROA national ROL indicators study

- Percentage of victimized individuals who reported their victimization to the police within the last 12 months (disaggregated by sex)
- Government mechanisms (district safety and security committees, development and implementation of CSPs)

The District Security Survey aligns with indicators developed in the UNDP Rule of Law Indicators Baseline Assessment for Afghanistan and Afghanistan National Development Strategy: 1387-1391 (2008-2013): “Index on the progress of building statistical capacity in the country and establishing statistical baselines”.

This approach was tested in PD16 Kabul and reviewed based on lessons learned. The training phase which took place on 9-11 October and 15 November to accommodate an amendment made to the questionnaires to align it with LOTFA *Akheri*. During the training days, the Baseline’s questionnaires, survey methodology, mapping and some key recommendations were explained in detail to the attendees. During the implementation phase the entire area of PD 16 in Kabul was divided into six clusters and each cluster into 2 to 3 sub-clusters and surveyed from 16-18 October by the trainees. The collected data was consecutively inserted into a database.

For the purpose of the survey, 20 surveyors, 4 supervisors and 2 data entry clerks were recruited and trained to interview the targeted number of people with technical and financial support from LOTFA. It is recommended that the District Security Survey be applied on an annual basis to measure trends and quantify progress, or the lack of. The results of the District Security Survey are presented in two reports available at LOTFA.

### 5.3 Extent to which General Training Command is capable to deliver trainings needed for Community Police Model roll out

In 2014 the Government of Japan allocated funding to support LOTFA’s core programmatic functions for the sustainment of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Central Prison Department (CPD) guards’ payroll, as well as for capacity and system building of the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA). LOTFA has been working with the MOIA to assess and develop the capacity of the General Training Command to take the lead in the management and delivery of trainings. A report is expected in the beginning of 2015. In the meantime, the



Photo 4: Training session on traffic control at the Sivas center. Source: IPTA.

Training Command has been supported by the International Police Training for Afghanistan (IPTA) programme. Its implementation is on track, according to the training calendar agreed to by all partners, and 499 Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) started the 4<sup>th</sup> training edition of basic and advanced police training in mid-April 2014. Initial findings from the training sessions show that Afghan NCOs are actively and successfully performing in both theoretical and practical exercises. The budget expenditures related to the IPTA initiative are reported to be on-track.





As part of the LOTFA Phase VI extension, in 2014 ANP and MOIA staff professionalization became a programmatic component of the Pillar 3 portfolio. In light of the internal re-organization of the LOTFA Project, Pillar 3 assumed the coordination for the organizational arrangements related to the Sivas training for police professionalization in 2014.

The Government of Japan has positioned itself as strategic partner of MOIA and LOTFA for police professionalization by funding the Sivas Police

Training Center for Afghanistan initiative, which was officially launched in 2011. Since July, 2011 2,048 Afghan police cadets have been trained in different ranks and capacities. (Based on SIVAS 4th term report)

This year, sessions commenced in early April following the Afghan election and were completed in September. As in the past, all participants attended first two months of basic police trainings and enter more to advanced training modules in the remaining four months of the programme. Afghan Non-Commissioned Officer (NCOs) cadets for fourth male training session arrived at the Sivas Police Training Center for Afghanistan (SPTC-A) in April 2014.

The Fourth Term police training program is comprised of basic, advanced, criminal investigation and logistics modules. The cadets are assigned to 14 separate classes; each class is comprised of 35 cadets on average. There are seven course hours a day, 39 hours a week. There are no courses scheduled on Friday afternoons and on Sundays. During this term, 496 cadets out of 499 cadets successfully completed the six months course. According to the final assessment 486 scored (< 85%) and 10 scored (<75%) and it was satisfactory result of assessment done by SIVAS training center. In addition, 10 of these students were honor graduates and awarded by the administration of the SIVAS center.



## ANNUAL EXPENSES

During 2014, a total of US\$ 5,757,347 was spent for the Output. For more details, please see Annex II.

Below is a snapshot of where LOTFA is in relation to its annual targets of Pillar 3, Output 5 by the end of Q4.

2014 Baseline <sup>14</sup>	2014 Annual Targets	Q4 Planned	2014 Actual	Comments
<b>5.1</b> Currently there is no comprehensive Afghan CPM that is based on COP and ROL principles.	<b>5.1</b> CPM is developed and partially implemented.	<b>5.1</b> CPM to be approved; related consultations with different segments of society to take place.	<b>5.1</b> CPM still being further developed.	
<b>5.2</b> No COP governance components of the CPM piloted by police at provincial and district level.	<b>5.2</b> COP governance components of the CPM piloted among 5 districts, 3 provinces.	<b>5.2</b> Undertake questionnaire to conduct district crime and trust survey (SSG assessment). <b>5.2</b> Further develop joint trainings between police and communities on crime reporting and solving.	<b>5.2</b> PD 16 of Kabul undertaken and the remaining 8 provinces and 15 districts to be accomplished by a CSO during 2015. <b>5.2</b> Concept further developed; training to occur together with piloting.	Additional activities in support of strengthening 119 call centers and communicating the COP concept to communities undertaken.
<b>5.3</b> General Training Command is able to deliver some training needed for CPM roll out, but no comprehensive CPM capacity and training development plan exist (Phase 1).	<b>5.3</b> Comprehensive capacity and training development plan is in place (Phase 2).	<b>5.3</b> This activity was planned to be implemented through in house UN resources (UNITAR) but was cancelled due to the unavailability of UNITAR	<b>5.3</b> TOR developed for consultant.	<b>5.3</b> Decision taken not to use UNITAR, but independent consultant.

<sup>14</sup> Baseline and annual targets based on the LOTFA Annual Work Plan for 2014 approved and released in May 2014.

## GENDER SPECIFIC RESULTS

An assessment of working conditions for female police conducted by MOIA and LOTFA during the year indicated clear challenges for women's participation in the ANP. These include weak policies and laws related to gender, weak mechanisms and unaccountable authorities responsible for investigating abuses, impunity of harassment within MOIA, the lack of enabling working conditions for females and, in general the lack of a robust implementation plan for existing directives. There are no clear statistics on the numbers of female police at police station level, nor information on personal profiles of female police officers. There are gaps between the assigned duty position and actual function. Often women are tasked with menial duties beyond what they are assigned to perform such as cleaning or body searching. There are many cases of female police officers having no chance for promotion even after long service.


In spite of these challenges, MOIA and LOTFA continued efforts to improve recruitment, training and opportunities for female police as well as the strengthening of the police capacity overall in dealing with police services targeting the female population such as preventing and addressing Gender Based Violence in the Afghan society. See for the specific activities implemented and achieved by LOTFA page 39 of this report on output 4: Gender Capacity and Equality in the Police Force Improved.

### LOTFA budget devoted to gender results

LOTFA continued to register progress related to Gender Responsive Budgeting (GRB) results of LOTFA project implementation. GRB expenses track and assess the total amount of funds allocated to support gender-related projects. In 2014, four of six Outputs (Outputs 1, 3, 5 and 6) featured GRB expenses (direct and indirect) above the UNDP global target of 20 percent.


### Data on women police

Due to the efforts of the recruitment unit of MOIA, the number of female police officers serving in Afghanistan increased to 1939, as indicated below.




**Chart 8. Trends of Female Employees. Source: LOTFA**

In spite of the increase in female police, their numbers represented in lower ranks increased steadily, while the number of high ranking female police officers was more or less same from September 2013 until December 2014.




**Chart 9. Female Police Rank. Source: LOTFA**

Currently only 12 percent of female police have officer positions, while 88 percent of female police have positions in lower ranks such as soldiers. Though the number of female employees increased, the number of low ranking female police also increased. The proportion of lower ranks increased from 87 percent (September 2014) to 88 percent (November 2014) out of the total number of female employees.




**Chart 10. Rank of Female Police 09/2014.**




**Chart 11. Rank of Female Police 11/2014.**

Police constitute 81 percent of female employees of MOIA/ANP, while 8 percent are civilians. The ratio of 10 percent CPD and 1 percent of Special Forces remained the same. Comparing the proportion of female employees in September 2014, the proportion of female police in November 2014 increased when compared with the total female employees of MOI.





**Chart 12 Proportion of Female Police 1. Source: LOTFA**



**Chart 12 Proportion of Female Police 2. Source: LOTFA**

The figures point to the challenges MOIA faces in recruiting women police. The goal of the 10-year Vision of 5,000 recruits by 2014 has not been achieved.

### ANNUAL EXPENSES

During 2014, a total of US\$957,874 was spent for the Output. For more details, please see Annex II.

## PARTNERSHIPS

The year witnessed considerable advancement in the building and improved coordination of partnerships across all Pillars. These improvements are evident not only in the project's results, but perhaps more importantly in LOTFA's ability to address problems and challenges rapidly and effectively when needed.

LOTFA's Pillar 1 and MOIA benefitted from expanded partnerships with donors via regularly conducted Technical Working Group (TWG) meetings. (Similar efforts by Pillars 2 and 3 were launched but require further work under LOTFA Akheri.) Through the TWG, Pillar I and the MOIA were able to communicate to donors and clarify misconceptions concerning system functionality, capability, and limitations. In addition, LOTFA enhanced donor and MOIA understanding of UNDP/LOTFA, MOIA, and Ministry of Finance roles and responsibilities about various points in the payment process, from collecting and reporting time and attendance data from police working in the field, to ensuring the EFT transfer is deposited into the account of the intended recipient. Technical Working Group meetings in 2014 covered IT, financial, and human resources areas of ANP/GDPDC payroll management, and included:

- The MOIA cooperative and compulsory deductions from police to support the cooperative (colloquially, the "cooperative tax")
- Other deductions recorded in the EPS
- Pension calculations
- Duplicate and invalid bank records
- Invalid, missing, and non-uniform identification card numbers
- EFT expansion
- WEPS expansion
- LOTFA M&E review and findings concerning the Trusted Agent modality
- Presentations from other partners on topics such as the Afghan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS), Afghanistan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS), and biometric identification cards

During the course of the year, findings from Monitoring Agent reports and LOTFA monitoring missions were shared in Technical Working Group meetings to improve transparency. And at the July 2014 Steering Committee meeting, the protocol was established allowing MOIA 60 days to provide documentation concerning the Monitoring Agent findings of ineligible expenses. The MOIA responded by successfully collecting, compiling, and submitting for LOTFA review the documentation needed to support questionable expenses. By December 2014, LOTFA recovered (via deductions from monthly advances) approximately \$8.3M in 2013 and Q1/Q2 2014 ineligible expenses, the full amount not supported by MOIA documentation.<sup>15</sup>

CSTC-A and LOTFA continued cooperation aimed at improving the Electronic Payroll System (EPS). LOTFA provided to CSTC-A auditors data from the EPS system on a monthly basis, as well as user accounts (user names and passwords) to enable access from the ISAF compound to facilitate analysis. This visibility enabled CSTC-A audit team members to suggest to Pillar I staff,

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<sup>15</sup> It should be noted that at the time of drafting this report, ineligible expenses for the period January – September 2014 were only US\$ \$2.1 million, on track to be less than in 2013.

via Electronic Payroll System Working Group meetings, specific changes to EPS. The changes included automation of incentive lists, object codes, bank account field formats, and removal of the field capturing other deductions. The forum also served to update LOTFA on progress made by MOIA to achieving a “slotted *Tashkeel*”, ultimately for linkage with the EPS and validation of its data.

LOTFA’s staff actively supported a number of external and internal partners conducting reviews and studies of LOTFA and payroll management and processes, such as the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the UNDP’s Office of Audit and Investigation (OAI), and separate due diligence reviews by the UK and EU. Through open sharing with these bodies, LOTFA gained objective, third-party analyses and recommendations, many of which have been incorporated in LOTFA project documentation for the final, January – June 2015 work plan. These external partners also served the useful purpose in 2014 of ensuring LOTFA implementation of past recommendations, such as improved internal management of the Monitoring Agent contract.

In Pillar 2, LOTFA strengthened partnerships with INL, UNAMA and the International Federation of the Red Cross concerning Central Prison Department (CPD) renovation. INL have also hosted coordination meetings throughout 2014 with all CPD related stakeholders including UNAMA, EUPOL, and UNDP LOTFA.

LOTFA initiated a partnership approach with ISAF, CSTC-A MAG and EUPOL through the development of a Joint Action Plan to strengthen the Office of the Inspector General.

LOTFA also partnered with EUPOL and the MOIA’s Deputy Chief of Staff to establish a Police Disciplinary Board. Other partners included UNAMA Rule of Law, IPCB and DM Strategy Policy.

LOTFA facilitated the Gender Directorate become the focal point for gender and policing dialogue and supported MOIA in hosting interagency gender coordination meetings chaired by the Gender Directorate. Partners involved in these meetings are too numerous to mention here, however as an example UN Agencies such as UN WOMEN, IDLO, UNFPA, UNAMA Human Rights and UNAMA Rule of Law, and UNDP Projects like Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan were represented. In addition to international partners, GPPT, EUPOL and GIZ, international NGOs such as OXFAM were represented. International donors especially EU, Korea, Canada and DFID and local NGOs like RIWPS Afghanistan were usually present at these meetings.

Most of the agencies noted above were partners in the development of the TORs for the Police Women’s Council. The acceptance and establishment of Police Women’s Councils in Afghanistan was a major achievement for LOTFA and UNAMA. In addition, hosting International Women’s Day and the UNiTE campaign required LOTFA to leverage the support of these above-mentioned partners.

Pillar 3 required the support of partners on different levels all aiming to achieve LOTFA’s Annual Work Plan for 2014 in terms of institutionalizing the police-community partnership for improved local security, accountability and service delivery.

LOTFA's principle partner in Pillar 3 is the Police-e-Mardumi Directorate (PeMD) of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan and all activities related to police-community initiatives have been accomplished in close partnership with the PeMD and in close coordination with the MOIA. LOTFA also has had several discussions with CSOs on the national level and with community representatives on local level. Specific inputs from representatives of youth, elders, religious leaders and women's organizations were collected from communities. Key COSs and representatives from the district and provincial level government supported the development of CCPM as the partners. UN Agencies and International Organizations are also key partners in LOTFA's support for MOIA's community policing efforts.

## ISSUES

In 2014, and in cooperation with LOTFA Monitoring and Evaluation and MOIA staff, the LOTFA Pillar I team undertook joint missions throughout the country, sharing mission findings with the Pillar's Technical Working Group. Missions were conducted in Balkh, Bamyan, Daikundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, Nangarhar, Oruzgan, and Paktia and Takhar provinces. These missions served several purposes, including determining the causes for pay anomalies observed from Kabul, providing training and support to EPS users, and expanding WEPS.

LOTFA missions confirmed many of the issues identified by the Monitoring Agent. LOTFA reviewed and reported on numerous payment issues outside its control indicating weak controls by MOIA and MOF and improper actions by agents involved in the payment process. Significant issues included:

- *Incentives paid in cash without generating the payroll (M41) from EPS.* In these cases, police being paid certain incentives were not eligible to receive them. The payments were not recorded in EPS, so there was no way for LOTFA staff to detect the payments made to police who were not entitled to them.
- *Expenses booked under the incorrect fund code.* The LOTFA fund code, 10020, was charged for improper expenses such as pension incomes, very important person protection, important site protection, cadets, families of deceased, civilians and others. It was used to pay salaries for Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) police, even though the APPF mission generates revenue and should be self-supporting. LOTFA has discussed in multiple meetings the ineligibility of such categories of expenses and MOIA officials have acknowledged the guidance on the use of LOTFA funds, but incorrect charges have persisted.
- *Many incorrect payments were made in cash, further obfuscating wrong transactions.* In other cases, the Monitoring Agent noted (and LOTFA monitoring missions confirmed) instances of police being paid in cash even though they had bank accounts.

In 2014, payments were also acknowledged using stamps instead of thumb prints or signatures, payments were made to police marked absent in the human resources attendance reports, and some police received duplicate payments by being on the payroll at different stations.

These issues continued to be reported month after month, with LOTFA sharing the Monitoring Agent findings with the Ministry of Interior Affairs regularly.

LOTFA's staff relies on the data reported in EPS to determine the numbers of police being paid by each modality but does not have an independent means of verifying the numbers. In cases where provincial finance officers and *Mustofiats*, (Ministry of Finance officials) do not make payments duly reported in EPS, LOTFA staff have had limited means of detecting these missing payments.

Collectively, these issues caused pay budget shortfalls, damaged confidence in the system, and increased the likelihood of fraud, waste, and abuse, and need to be addressed in 2015. In addition, payroll issues often overshadowed the work of the other pillars. The Annual Work Plan (AWP) approval process was slow, resulting in delays in actual implementation of LOTFA interventions under Pillar 2 according to agreed timelines.

The delayed approval of the AWP had an impact on the delivery rate of the specific projects. In addition, elections further delayed programme implementation. The priorities of MOIA counterparts were given to election-related activities, putting programme delivery further at risk. MOIA shared the two-year Policing Strategy with LOTFA, and requested that Pillars 1, 2 and 3 incorporate the activities into the Annual Work Plans. LOTFA proceeded to match where possible, MOIA's Policing Strategy activities with the 2014 AWP activities in each Pillar. It was clear that some activities described in the Police Strategy were highly ambitious and well beyond the scope of LOTFA or any international partner's ability to implement within the year 2014. LOTFA has sought to managing the expectations of the MOIA and provided advice on realistic planning parameters in the context of Afghanistan. Nevertheless expectations of MOIA and partners continue to be high.

The implementation of the information campaign to support the 119 Emergency Call Center was delayed due to the number of inoperative EECs. With the absence of functioning centers able to receive calls for assistance from the community, LOTFA could not start the national campaign. One of the outputs of the PeMD training workshop was the development of five provincial work plans and associated budgets. They were top priority to provide the framework for channeling resources to the PeMD for undertaking the consultation process at the provincial and district level for the CCPM, build up the operational capacity of the PeMD provincial offices, and undertake key activities to strengthen partnership between police and the community. However, the roll-out of the plan was put on hold by MOIA in September until the negotiations over the election result were concluded. Only Kabul and Bamyan were able to proceed.

The main organizations supporting the police in Afghanistan including EUPOL, GPPT, NTMA and ISAF are currently in transition. Departments are closed or merged, mandates are changing, and personnel are no longer replaced or rotated. This makes partnering a time consuming and difficult process. Moving forward more formalized partnership agreements will need to be concluded to ensure agreements made are clear and do not need to be renegotiated.

## RISKS

Operating in a complex environment, such as Afghanistan, presents risks on many levels. It is impossible to entirely eliminate risk. Sources of risk are manifold – from external security threats, to internal corruption, or simply lack of appropriate information or systems to function effectively. These can negatively affect project results, and in the worst case scenario cause unintended harm to individuals, groups, institutions or the environment.

Risk sources include contextual risks (security, political, socioeconomic, financial, environmental) and stakeholder risks (implementing partner, donors, beneficiary, other support providers) and organizational risks (planning, management, project design etc.). Contextual and stakeholder-related risks are external. The likelihood of contextual risks cannot be reduced by UNDP, but their effect on the project can be managed and mitigated. Likelihood and impact of stakeholder risks are not in UNDPs direct control but can be influenced by the project partners. An important stakeholder risk is the risk that partners conduct human rights violations or engage in corruption. Organizational risks are internal and their likelihood can be directly reduced by UNDP.

LOTFA under phase VI has focused mostly on risks related to payroll and construction. At the same time a more comprehensive approach to risk sharing and mitigation, tackling the different risk sources described above has been developed and has been integrated under LOTFA Akheri. As for payroll, while good progress was made with the MOIA and other partners as described earlier, 2014 saw little progress toward some of the systemic changes outside LOTFA's control that would significantly improve the payments system.

- *Persistence of the Trusted Agent payment modality.* In 2014, LOTFA M&E presented to the Technical Working Group its findings concerning the risks of abuse associated with the Trusted Agent payment modality. Some progress was made migrating police to EFT in 2014, but much more needs to be done, including receiving from MOIA a report requested as part of the Payroll Action Plan. This report was requested to include details concerning the approved procedures for Trusted Agent, MOIA oversight and the mechanisms by which they receive reimbursement for expenses associated with fulfilling their duties. LOTFA and the international community understand the current limitations of commercial banking services, which directly impact the ability of the MOIA to move police off Trusted Agent cash payments. Still, the lack of transparency and documentation associated with this method of payment will continue to present risks that are difficult to mitigate.
- *System integration or linkage.* LOTFA observed limited progress toward achieving the collective vision of linkage or integration of the payroll system with the human resources and voucher payment systems. The lack of a central human resources database for the validation of data reported in the Electronic Payroll System impacted the reliability of EPS reports. The Afghanistan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS) version 1.2 was expected to be available in September 2014, complete with MOIA's slotted *Tashkeel*, but this capability was delayed. It will not be available until summer 2015, by some estimates, to include vetting the data in the system. The importance of authoritative human resources data for the payroll cannot be overemphasized. Currently,

provincial finance officers report payroll information via the EPS, and it is compiled in Kabul by Pillar I staff for use by MOIA. Without a central human resources database for reconciliation, LOTFA cannot verify the accuracy of the data reported in EPS. Once data is entered into EPS, it is still not linked electronically to the actual payment request. Discussions with the Technical Working Group indicated challenges preventing this linkage, such as the proprietary nature of the AFMIS software.

- *Identification cards.* LOTFA also observed limited progress in the issuance of biometric identification cards. In order to ensure each police is associated with only one human resources record and is paid only once, each police record must be associated with a unique identifier. The MOIA solution to achieve unique identifiers is the biometric identification card, previously furnished under a DynCorp contract. LOTFA facilitated several presentations to the Technical Working Group to discuss MOIA progress toward issuing biometric identification cards to each police, and undertook a multi-month exercise to compare records in the EPS with MOIA records. As of May 2014, LOTFA determined that approximately 60,000 records reported in EPS still lacked a biometric identification number. Provincial Finance Officers (PFOs) continue to report bank account, *Tazkira* (national identification cards) and other numbers as identification numbers, so that records continue to lack unique identifiers. The MOIA's identification cards unit has reported that it lacks the manpower and funding resources to send mobile teams to the provinces at the levels necessary to change this in the near future.
- *Bank reports.* LOTFA has recognized the need to reconcile the data reported in the Electronic Payroll System with the actual payments made in a large-scale, meaningful way that provides assurance in the data being reported, can be used to correct errors, and prevents purposeful abuse. To verify the EPS reflects actual payments made to police, LOTFA requires read-only access to bank reports, and conducted several meetings this year with various government offices to further this request for data, but with little success. This effort illustrates the importance of having a government champion take ownership of measures aimed at increasing transparency, and the limitations of progress absent such a champion.

As for construction, LOTFA's construction work has raised a number of risks which must be addressed in the near future. Having contracted an independent Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) company to monitor LOTFA construction, especially for the DM Support building, questions began to emerge as to the quality testing standards employed by the MOIA Facilities Department, which LOTFA and engineers had relied on from the project's inception. On further analysis and based on expert advice from the QA/QC company, the quality of the construction materials for the building was questioned, and after exhaustive compressive testing and other techniques, LOTFA decided to suspend the construction until the quality of materials could be assured by independent experts.

## LESSONS LEARNED

One of the critical lessons learned is that LOTFA's capacity development approach has been too weak, which has prevented a successful payroll transition. LOTFA does not merely disburse funds for the payment of police forces, but has established, maintained, and managed the entire EPS system form more than 12 years on behalf of MOIA. This has unintentionally led to "capacity substitution" in detriment of effective capacity development. As demonstrated by the section above, apart from LOTFA, a similar pattern has been seen as well with other international organizations working closely with MOIA in other programmatic areas. However, it is not to be forgiven that this could happen in a UNDP project, given the organization's core mandate in capacity development.

Some of the shortcomings can be explained by the fact that LOTFA has historically been perceived, and operated, as a funding channel for the international community to support the establishment of ANP, particularly through the transfer of funding for salaries and equipment to the Government of Afghanistan. However, over time, partners working in the area of rule of law, justice and security envisioned LOTFA to not only serve as a funding channel, but as a development project that would develop the capacity of MOIA to manage payroll and further develop the police. At the same time, it has been acknowledged that MOIA/ANP development cannot take place in a vacuum and that reform to deliver improvements in the performance of MOIA/ANP won't be successful without the commitment of a broader range of actors. Therefore, LOTFA has also been promoted as a vehicle to finance and support an integrated rule of law, justice and security approach.

This shift remains nascent and is challenged by different stakeholder's perspectives of the role of LOTFA. Moving forward, LOTFA Akheri will have as its primary goal the strengthening of the performance and accountability of MOIA in executing payroll tasks, so that all payroll operation and management functions can be transferred to MOIA. In collaboration with CSTC-A and other partners working in payroll areas, the project will support the design, development and implementation within MOIA of an accurate, transparent and accountable payroll system linked with MOF payment systems and AHIRMS, so that MOIA and MOF can pay uniformed police and corrections officers correctly, on time and in accordance with the approved tashkil and applicable law and regulation. Additionally, LOTFA Akheri will support broader MOIA/ANP development to ensure continuing peacebuilding efforts and sustainability of the payroll transition. Such capacity development measures clearly fall within the realm of a "development" project.

The shift from a funding channel to a capacity development project started under LOTFA VI. However, the capacity development approach, project management and governance arrangements were too weak to effectively support national ownership and the handover of implementation responsibilities. This is the main lesson learned from LOTFA phase 6, which benefits from a number of internal and external reviews, evaluations and audits recommending improvements. These include the UNDP-HQ Management Review Team (MRT) in November 2012 and the United Kingdom (UK) Due Diligence Assessment in 2014 among others.<sup>16</sup> Their

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<sup>16</sup> OAI conclusions/actions of June 2012, OAI Briefing 18 October 2012, OAI Final Report of February 2013, MEC letter 26 May 2012, Management Review Team (MRT) report of 15 December 2012 (hereafter 2012 MRT report), 2012



recommendations have, to a large extent, been operationalized and/or integrated into the LOTFA Akheri design and AWP.

As for payroll specific lessons learned, in 2014, LOTFA observed several characteristics of the MOIA payroll and accounting system which will affect the Ministry next year as well.

- *The cash basis accounting system will continue to cause difficulties related to prior year liabilities.* At the end of 2013, MOIA experienced a significant shortfall in funding to pay December salaries. There were several major lessons learned as a result. First, MOIA did not have any mechanism to account for or to pay prior year liabilities. When LOTFA recovered ineligible 2013 expenses, MOIA should have accomplished accounting entries to charge 2013 MOIA funds, but could not do so, since it does not have a reserve of prior year funding for such purposes. MOIA explained that part of the surge in expenses in December resulted from making back payments to police who had not been paid in 2012 for various reasons; for example official transfer paperwork was not received and processed by the gaining unit in time. Again, lacking a mechanism to pay prior year funding liabilities, such as back pay, the MOIA paid these claims using 2014 funding.
- *MOIA would benefit from support in financial management, including budgeting and accounting.* MOIA had very limited mechanisms to explain the cause of the surge in December pay expenses. The documentation provided was insufficient. Possible causes for the surge in expenses, such as annual incentives that had come due in December, did not seem to match the magnitude of the shortfall, of about \$23 million. The MOIA covered this shortfall by realigning funding from non-pay accounts with CSTC-A authorization, but was never able to properly identify or quantify the causes of the shortfall. Earlier in 2014, when LOTFA recovered funding in response to the Monitoring Agent's findings, the MOIA's accounting and finance functions did not seem to adjust to deductions taken by LOTFA. Following the deductions, there were no accounting adjustments to government accounts, reductions in allotments, or collections from individuals to offset LOTFA deductions.
- *MOIA needs to reduce its force structure or seek approval for additional Tashkeel.* MOIA budget and finance officials recognize that persistent force management issues affect the payroll and will cause another pay shortfall in 2015 if left unchecked. Namely, the MOIA continues to fund APPF, reserves, cadets, and "over-Tashkeel" forces using LOTFA funding. MOIA requires support to strengthen its capability to budget for such forces using government funding, seek Oversight and Coordination Board (OCB) approval for additional forces, or cut forces for which no funding is identified.
- At the outset of the fiscal year, MOIA should set aside Government funding to absorb prior year liabilities and ineligible expenses. The current system of advance payments to the Ministry of Finance followed by actual expenditures, then reconciliation after-the-fact of Monitoring Agent findings, means that deductions will inevitably affect the current year budget. MOF and MOIA should plan jointly now for these issues to occur.

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NIM Audit Report of 15 May 2013, EU letter/inquiry of 9 December 2013, UK/Joint Donor Letter of 2 December 2013, UK/Joint Donor Letter of 23 January 2014, 2010 Mid-Term Evaluation ATOS Consulting, UNDP BCPR monitoring mission reports.

## FUTURE PLAN

LOTFA Phase VII, or LOTFA Akheri, marks the beginning of a transition phase during which LOTFA activities are transitioned to the GIROA. The central goal is to support the GIROA in “achieving a paid, professional Afghan National Police staff that delivers essential services to the Afghan people for improved public trust, safety and security” and to support “improved rule of law” enforcement. This may be achieved through the provision of technical and policy support service by UNDP to MOIA and MOF, as MOIA financial management is an intrinsic part of the MOF road map for public financial management.

An “inception phase” has been approved for a six month period, 1 January through 30 June, 2015. During this period, UNDP and GIROA will work closely in priority areas to implement the following key activities including the reorganization of activities which were organized around four pillars to align with the MOIA functional structure.

### **Pillar 1: Support to Payroll Transition**

- Payment of remuneration of the uniformed Afghanistan National Police and Central Prisons Department through specially earmarked contributions;
- Strengthening national regulatory framework and business process;
- Automated/centralize payroll payment system;
- Improved capacity to pay ANP/CPD more correctly and on time;
- Better integration of human resources and finance functions;
- Support the GIROA in reaching agreement with mobile companies to pilot a new programme with sufficient scale for payment of police salaries through mobile phones. The contract to be established will be between the MOF/MORA and the individual companies. LOTFA will continue to fund monthly fees based on donor agreement and provide technical assistance.

### **Pillar 2: Institutional Development**

- Strengthened MOIA policymaking, planning, budgeting, and monitoring/evaluation;
- Accountability measures (systems and enforcement mechanisms) are identified and implemented by MOIA;
- Linked to the capacity development component above, gender orientation (recruitment, training and gender mainstreaming in the police.

### **Pillar 3: ANP/CPD Professionalization**

- Building of service delivery oriented police-community partnerships based on best democratic policing principles;
- Capacity assessments in key areas undertaken to support capacity development planning;
- MOIA sets direction and coordinates approach to Professionalization;
- MOIA training and education strategy developed;
- Operational directives, training systems and skills strengthened and put in place to deliver ANP/CD functional requirements in community oriented policing, criminal investigation, gender based violence and safety and security of correctional facilities, etc.

#### **Pillar 4: Improved Polices Service Delivery**

- Expansion of community-oriented safety planning and partnerships;
- Crime and safety data collection;
- 911 Call Centers improvements;
- Strengthened skills and tools to respond to and referral of incidents of GBV and crime cases;
- Strengthened police-prosecutor cooperation;
- Limited facility improvements.

During the inception phase, the entire LOTFA team will be at the disposal of the GIROA to provide technical support, guidance and coordination to ensure a smooth transition. It shall provide, as requested, technical support to the development of the Payroll Transition Plan to be designed by the GIROA in collaboration with partners. During this period, GIROA will identify activities and functions over which it will begin to assume control at various points within the transition period based on benchmarks development GIROA and donors. UNDP will fully support the transition of such identified activities.

Under LOTFA Akheri, UNDP will carry out the following key activities:

##### **Salary Payments and Payroll Systems Improvements**

Under Pillar 1 payroll transition, LOTFA will for the time being continue to execute the following ongoing payroll management functions, while seeking to improve these functions in line with the revised GIROA Payroll Action Plan, as well as cooperating with CSTC-A in the development of a “joint data verification plan”

- Administering donor funding and issue monthly NIM advances to the government. The final advance shall be provided on in June 2015 for the June payroll (assuming sufficient donor funding);
- Conducting activities to support the maintenance of existing LOTFA governance arrangements including Technical Working Group and Project Board meetings. The structure may be modified based on joint agreement.
- Overseeing the Monitoring Agent contract through the issuance of the monitoring report for the payroll expenses from January to June 2015. In accordance with established procedures, the MOIA will have 60 days to reply to the Monitoring Agent finding, so that their response on the June report will be in October-November 2015. Based on the Monitoring Agent review of the MOIA response, UND will issue a recommendation concerning any amount of ineligible expenses that were identified and should be recovered from the GIROA in October-November 2015.
- Continuing activities such as routine payroll user training, and expanding the WEPS where MOIA network connectivity permits and making planned improvements to the payroll system and training activities. Activities deemed important beyond this current phase would need to be approved by the relevant governance structure in advance time.
- Continuing daily and monthly activities related to the EPS, such as compiling data, generating reports, answering calls to the Help Desk, and troubleshooting technical issues.
- Continuing other management activities. These include correspondence and meetings with MOIA and MOF, weekly working group meetings with CSTC-A Comptroller audit

team, response to internal and external audits and studies, and responses to donor inquiries.

### **Ongoing Capacity Development Activities**

Capacity development activities that are current will continue to be supported. Where the anticipated implementation date is beyond the life of this phase of LOTFA, decision on the appropriate modality will need to be approved by the relevant governance body at the appropriate time.

- Additional capacity development activities outlined for implementation during the inception phase include:
- The development of Standard Operating Procedures to ensure transparent and efficient operations and maintenance of the MOIA disaster recovery equipment.
- Training that has been ongoing will continue, including M-16 updates and ANP payroll management regional, provincial and central levels; ICT; procurement; and SIVAS training.
- Ongoing institutional capacity assessments will be completed and the results and recommendations will be conveyed to the GIROA.
- The draft internal control measures that have already been developed will be submitted for approval and implementation by MOIA/OIG at the appropriate time.
- Similar to capacity assessment activities, a number of ongoing needs and assessment and quality assurance activities will be conducted during that period.
- The National Technical Advisors with existing agreements will be extended until 30 June 2015.
- Pending payments for activities completed in 2014/15 have been included in the budget and shall be paid by 30 June 2015.

### **Operations**

LOTFA's Project Management Unit (PMU) will continue to operate business as usual during this phase of LOTFA to ensure efficient and effective operations during the transition period. During this period, the PMU will continue to support the following activities in addition to day-to-day business:

- Project management
- Monitoring of activities
- Audit FY 2014
- Annual evaluation
- Reporting and communication
- Office supplies, rent, security, IT services, vehicle maintenance, etc.
- LOTFA staff costs

With clear guidance to transition EPS payroll operations from LOTFA to GIROA management by 30 June 2015, Pillar I is focused on strengthening the existing EPS system, improving and developing documentation to be provided to the government, and continuing support to MOIA in user training, monitoring, and daily system administration.

LOTFA is working on formal, written documents to provide to the government to smooth the payroll transition, such as a technical manual for system coding, legal analysis concerning pay entitlements and deductions, and standard operating procedures for Pillar I operations. Currently, the MOIA has expanded the MOIA intranet to 33 provincial headquarters (all but Nuristan). LOTFA's objective is to expand WEPS to Sar-i-Pul, Khost, and Paktika by 30 June 2015. LOTFA will also expand WEPS coverage in those areas currently under partial WEPS coverage, with a target of 75% WEPS coverage by 30 June 2015.

LOTFA also has underway several system improvements which will be complete by 30 June 2015. In October 2014, Pillar I began a disaster recovery assessment and plan, expected to be implemented prior to transition. The digitalization of the M-16 is also in development, and should be fielded this spring, with enough time to provide training to users concerning the procedures to complete the new form. LOTFA is prepared to implement fiber optic expansion for the MOIA, if some technical differences can be resolved in a timely manner. In addition, Pillar I is conducting a formal assessment of user requirements, and will improve the user interface this spring. LOTFA also recently received the draft results of the scoping mission study, which will be presented to the Technical Working Group and the government for decision concerning implementation. The guiding objective is to improve capability as much as possible in a limited time, without turning over to the government unfinished projects.

LOTFA is also ready to provide technical support to the government during the next six months for initiatives such as mobile payments to police, or address any new requirements that may arise that will require historical expertise from LOTFA. Pillar I is prepared to be flexible to support a seamless transition, and will work within the Technical Working Group, as in the past. The development and testing of the CCPM's strategies, tools and processes at the community level paves the way for scaling up this initiative at the provincial level, where condition permits. This requires the development and empowerment of a strong national change management team that shall lead the process, and ensure that policies and strategies are impacting the community. LOTFA remains available to provide technical and financial support as required by the national team to roll-out of the CCPM.

## GLOSSARY OF EPS PAYROLL TERMS

AFMIS	Afghanistan Financial Management Information System is a customized financial management system used by GIROA to record accounting transactions for primary and secondary budget unit and is the backbone of GIROA accounting information system.
EPS/WEPS	Electronic Payroll System (EPS)/ Web Based Electronic Payroll System (WEPS) are databases designed by UNDP/LOTFA to support MOIA in preparing payments electronically. The database records the details of policemen employed by MOIA and generates payroll sheet (M41) each month.
Expenses Ineligible	Expenses that are not committed, not allowed or that do not meet the eligibility criteria for being settled through LOTFA and are questionable.
Ineligible Expenses - Rectifiable	Expenditures that could have been eligible, but are not supported with adequate documentation, do not have the required approvals or authorizations or were not available for review; these expenditures can be regularized subsequently upon providing of the required documentation, special cases of approvals or authorizations are obtained
Ineligible Expenses –Not Rectifiable	Expenditure is ineligible by nature because they are unreasonable, prohibited and not in accordance with the agreement terms and applicable laws and regulations. These expenses are disallowed at once for being settled against LOTFA advance.
ID Card Database	IDs are the badges issued to MOIA officials confirming their engagement as policeman with MOIA, and the database contains the information of their exact rank and in additional information like name, father name, registration ID card number etc.
M-16	The GIROA standard form for payment order to authorize the payment showing the purpose and distribution of the expenditures to budgetary and operating accounts.
M-41	The GORIA standard form for payroll or we pay sheet. This form provides the information for payroll preparation and contains the record of payments to each employee for the period.
Tashkeel	The GIROA allocation of personnel after being approved by the President of Afghanistan. This provides the maximum number of personnel allocation for each provinces and locations by rank and grade.

# ANNEXES

## Annex I. Financial Table

### The Interim Donor Report for the period January to December 2014 (LOTFA Phase VI)

Donor Name	COMMITMENT/ PREVIOUS YEARS RECORD						CURRENT YEAR-2014				FUTURE EXPENSES		TOTAL RECEIVABLE		
	Commitment (a)	Revenue Collected as at 31/12/2013 (b)	Expenses as at 31/12/2013 (c)	Other Revenue (Revaluation of Foreign exchange gain) (g)	IPSAS Adjustment (d)	Prior Period Adjustment Expenses of (PPE) (h)	Opening Balance E=(b-c+d)	Contribution Revenue (f)	Expenses (i)	Closing Balance J=(e+f+g+h - i)	Commitments (Unliquidated Obligations) (k)	Undepreciated of fixed Assets and Inventory (l)	(Future Due) M=(a-b-f)	(Past Due) (n)	Available Resources O=(j -k - l-n)
Denmark	2,923,348	2,923,348	2,923,348			-	-			-		-	-	-	-
	4,016,496	4,016,496	4,016,496			-	-			-			-	-	-
	4,362,843	4,362,843	4,336,873			-	25,970		25,970	-			-	-	-
	15,556,772	3,642,324				-	3,642,324	6,166,391	4,314,703	5,494,011	29,573		5,748,057		5,464,438
Canada (DFAIT)	12,337,397	12,337,397	12,337,209			-	188			188			-	-	188
European Union	48,887,732	48,887,732	48,887,732			-	-			-			-	-	-
	48,717,641	48,717,641	48,716,415			-	1,226		1,226	-			-	-	-
	97,286,928						-	45,822,011	4,263,669	41,558,342			51,464,917		41,558,342
Finland	5,396,578	5,396,578	5,396,575			-	3			3			-	-	3
	15,436,000	3,192,935	-	48,445			3,241,379	6,204,395	4,942,227	4,503,547	179,153	54,425	6,038,670		4,269,969
Germany	72,626,280	72,626,280	72,626,280			-	-			-			-	-	-
	26,560,425	26,560,425	26,560,425			-	0			0			-	-	0
	28,683,181	28,683,181	28,683,181			-	0			0			-	-	0
	17,663,043	17,663,043	4,979,319			-	12,683,724		12,683,725	(1)			-	-	(1)
	24,535,316							24,535,316		24,535,316					24,535,316
Italy	1,225,014	1,225,014	664,537			-	560,477			560,477			-	-	560,477
Japan	248,659,805	248,659,805	248,659,805			-	(0)			(0)			-	-	(0)
	231,000,000	231,000,000	230,998,613		(1,388)	-	-			-			-	-	-
	101,044	101,044	724,515		5,514,139	-	4,890,668		828,905	4,061,763			-	-	4,061,763
	122,500,000	122,500,000	115,311,885			-	7,188,115		7,188,115	(0)			-	-	(0)
	12,500,000	12,500,000	12,500,000			-	-			-			-	-	-
	130,000,000					-	-	130,000,000	99,927,163	30,072,837	190,900		-	-	29,881,937
	2,000,000							2,000,000		2,000,000			-	-	2,000,000
Japan (DIAG C/F)	695,409						695,409		288,461	406,948					406,948
Netherlands	14,666,767	14,666,767	14,361,543		(35,735)	3,737	265,752		301,488	(35,736)			-	-	(35,736)
	13,586,957	13,586,957	-			-	13,586,957		12,700,280	886,677			-	-	886,677
Norway	15,942,831	15,942,831	15,942,830			-	1			1			-	-	1
	9,578,544					(33,949)	33,949	9,578,544	4,595,130	5,017,363			-	-	5,017,363

SDC (Switzerland)	2,672,833	2,672,833	1,604,177		125	-	1,068,780		370,509	698,271	56,618		-	-	641,653
USA-INL	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000			-	-			-			-	-	-
	5,000,000	5,000,000	3,731,765			-	1,268,235		1,268,235	-			-	-	-
	7,216,000	7,216,000	7,216,000			-	-			-			-	-	-
	218,358,432	218,358,432	218,358,432			-	-			-			-	-	-
	141,876	141,876	141,876			-	-			-			-	-	-
USA-CSTCA-A	163,844,414	163,844,414	160,228,590			(286,059)	3,901,883		3,901,883	-			-	-	-
	139,315,300	139,315,300	139,308,825		(6,475)	-	0			0			-	-	0
	31,500,000	31,500,000	31,500,000			-	-			-			-	-	-
	88,737,843	88,737,843	88,737,843			-	-			-			-	-	-
	307,982,087					-	-	304,089,003	304,118,064	(29,061)	8,354	968,232	3,893,084	-	(1,005,648)
UK	13,320,229	13,320,229	13,320,229			-	-			-			-	-	-
	16,483,516	16,483,516	16,446,361		-	-	37,155		37,156	(0)			-	-	(0)
	4,071,661	4,071,661	4,071,661			-	0			0			-	-	0
Korea	50,000,000	50,000,000	24,623,076			-	25,376,924	(1,872,384)	2,839,523	20,665,017	1,165,058	87,638	1,872,384	-	19,412,321
	50,000,000	50,000,000	-			-	50,000,000		29,425,143	20,574,857			-	-	20,574,857
Czech Republic	51,589	51,589	51,589			-	-			-			-	-	-
	10,064	10,064	10,064			-	-			-			-	-	-
	49,480	-	2,466			-	(2,466)	49,480	47,014	0			(0)	-	0
Poland	158,143	158,143	157,905			-	237		237	0			-	-	0
	44,489					-		44,489	44,490	(1)				-	(1)
Interest (UNDP)	1,451,019	1,451,019	1,362,614			(17,464)	70,941		-	70,941			-	-	70,941
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>2,332,855,327</b>	<b>1,736,525,560</b>	<b>1,614,501,054</b>	<b>48,445</b>	<b>5,453,202</b>	<b>(316,272)</b>	<b>128,537,833</b>	<b>526,617,246</b>	<b>494,113,316</b>	<b>161,041,763</b>	<b>1,629,655</b>	<b>1,110,295</b>	<b>69,017,112</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>158,301,812</b>

Note:

i) Income received in currency other than USD is approximated to USD based on UN- Operational Rate of Exchange applied.



## Annex II. Expenses by Output

### The Interim Donor Report for the period January to December 2014 (LOTFA Phase VI)

Project Output ID and Description	2014 Budget (AWP)	Commulative (Jan-Dec 2014)	Delivery Rate
Output 1 ( 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid effieciently and timely	550,579,002	475,272,073	86%
<b>Sub-total Output 1</b>	<b>550,579,002</b>	<b>475,272,073</b>	<b>86%</b>
Output 2 (00081409): Required Equipment and Infrastructure provided to MOI	12,384,628	1,757,490	14%
<b>Sub-total Output 2</b>	<b>12,384,628</b>	<b>1,757,490</b>	<b>14%</b>
Output 3 (00077274): Ministerial reform (policy and processes) effectively delivered for sustained and sustainable institutional change of the Ministry of Interior	7,825,890	5,837,462	75%
<b>Sub-total Output 3</b>	<b>7,825,890</b>	<b>5,837,462</b>	<b>75%</b>
Output 4 (00081410): MoI gender development capacities enhanced	6,903,920	1,255,537	18%
<b>Sub-total Output 4</b>	<b>6,903,920</b>	<b>1,255,537</b>	<b>18%</b>
Output 5 (00077275): ANP professionalised and capacitated and the Community for improved public safety and security	12,868,579	5,757,347	45%
<b>Sub-total Output 5</b>	<b>12,868,579</b>	<b>5,757,347</b>	<b>45%</b>
Output 6 (00078879): Project Implementation managed effectively and efficiently through Project Management Support Unit (PMU)	7,360,515	4,233,407	58%
<b>Sub-total Output 6</b>	<b>7,360,515</b>	<b>4,233,407</b>	<b>58%</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>597,922,534</b>	<b>494,113,316</b>	<b>83%</b>

### Annex III. Expenses by Donor

#### The Interim Donor Report for the period January to December 2014 (LOTFA Phase VI)

Donor	Project Output ID and Description	2014 Budget (AWP)	Cumulative Expense (Jan-Dec 2014)	Delivery Rate	Remarks
UNDP Interest	Output 3 (ID # 00077274 ): ministerial reform (policy and processes) effectively delivered for sustained and sustainable institutional change of the Ministry of Interior	70,941	-	0%	
Sub total		70,941	-	0%	
Czech Republic	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	47,014	47,014	100%	
Sub total		47,014	47,014	100%	
Demark	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	4,149,453	3,977,620	96%	
	Output 6 (Output ID # 00078879): Project Management Support Unit (PMU)	360,822	363,053	101%	
Sub total		4,510,275	4,340,673	96%	
Finland	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	5,016,008	2,440,276	49%	
	Output 3 (ID # 00077274 ): ministerial reform (policy and processes) effectively delivered for sustained and sustainable institutional change of the Ministry of Interior	1,688,531	808,015	48%	
	Output 4 (Output ID # 00081410 ): Moil gender development capacities enhanced	372,560	119,088	32%	
	Output 5 (Output ID # 00077275) ANP professionalized and capacitated and the Community for improved public safety and security	840,696	653,052	78%	
	Output 6 (Output ID # 00078879): Project Management Support Unit (PMU)	1,136,772	921,796	81%	
Sub total		9,054,568	4,942,227	55%	
Germany	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	12,683,725	12,683,725	100%	
Sub total		12,683,725	12,683,725	100%	

Italy	Output 3 (ID # 00077274 ): ministerial reform (policy and processes) effectively delivered for sustained and sustainable institutional change of the Ministry of Interior	28,792	-	0%	
Sub total		28,792	-	0%	
Japan	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	129,509,427	99,573,494	77%	
	Output 3 (ID # 00077274 ): ministerial reform (policy and processes) effectively delivered for sustained and sustainable institutional change of the Ministry of Interior	3,209,888	3,570,838	111%	The IPCB over spent is agreed to be covered by donor.
	Output 4 (Output ID # 00081410 ): Mol gender development capacities enhanced	1,468,800	351,126	24%	
	Output 5 (Output ID # 00077275) ANP professionalized and capacitated and the Community for improved public safety and security	5,000,000	3,619,820	72%	
Sub total		139,188,114	107,115,278	77%	
Japan (DM Support)	Output 2 (Atlas ID # 00081409): Required Equipment and Infrastructure provided to Mol	4,571,661	764,285	17%	
	Output 3 (ID # 00077274 ): ministerial reform (policy and processes) effectively delivered for sustained and sustainable institutional change of the Ministry of Interior	318,332	64,619	20%	
Sub total		4,889,994	828,905	17%	
Japan (DIAG Carry Over)	Output 3 (ID # 00077274 ): ministerial reform (policy and processes) effectively delivered for sustained and sustainable institutional change of the Ministry of Interior	299,999	288,461	96%	
Sub total		299,999	288,461	96%	
Netherlands	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	12,689,051	12,689,050	100%	
	Output 5 (Output ID # 00077275) ANP professionalized and capacitated and the Community for improved public safety and security	747,657	312,719	42%	
Sub total		13,436,708	13,001,768	97%	

ROK	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	29,664,861	27,665,071	93%	
	Output 2 (Atlas ID # 00081409): Required Equipment and Infrastructure provided to Mol	7,903,072	993,205	13%	
	Output 3 (ID # 00077274 ): ministerial reform (policy and processes) effectively delivered for sustained and sustainable institutional change of the Ministry of Interior	1,237,257	240,806	19%	
	Output 4 (Output ID # 00081410 ): Mol gender development capacities	3,117,311	637,414	20%	
	Output 5 (Output ID # 00077275) ANP professionalized and capacitated and the Community for improved public safety and security	5,480,151	949,155	17%	
	Output 6 (Output ID # 00078879): Project Management Support Unit (PMU)	1,832,000	1,779,015	97%	
Sub total		49,234,652	32,264,666	66%	
SDC	Output 4 (Output ID # 00081410 ): Mol gender development capacities enhanced	155,249	147,908	95%	
	Output 5 (Output ID # 00077275) ANP professionalized and capacitated and the Community for improved public safety and security	800,074	222,601	28%	
Sub total		955,324	370,509	39%	
Norway	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	6,533,607	4,040,212	62%	
	Output 3 (ID # 00077274 ): ministerial reform (policy and processes) effectively delivered for sustained and sustainable institutional change of the Ministry of Interior	547,893	457,115	83%	
	Output 6 (Output ID # 00078879): Project Management Support Unit (PMU)	498,084	97,803	20%	
Sub total		7,579,584	4,595,130	61%	
UK	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	37,156	37,156	100%	
Sub total		37,156	37,156	100%	

USA/CSTC-A	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	307,982,086	308,019,947	100%	
	Output 6 (Output ID # 00078879): Project Management Support Unit (PMU)	-	0	0%	
Sub total		307,982,086	308,019,947	100%	
USA/INL	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	1,297,920	1,268,235	98%	
	Output 4 (Output ID # 00081410 ): Mol gender development capacities enhanced	1,700,000	-	0%	
Sub total		2,997,920	1,268,235	42%	
EU	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	40,924,206	2,785,785	7%	
	Output 3 (ID # 00077274 ): ministerial reform (policy and processes) effectively delivered for sustained and sustainable institutional change of the Ministry of Interior	423,913	407,609	96%	
	Output 6 (Output ID # 00078879): Project Management Support Unit (PMU)	3,532,609	1,071,501	30%	
Sub total		44,880,727	4,264,895	10%	
Poland	Output 1 ( ID# 00077273): Police force and uniformed personnel of Central Prisons Department (CPD) paid efficiently and timely.	44,718	44,489	99%	
	Output 6 (Output ID # 00078879): Project Management Support Unit (PMU)	238	238	100%	
Sub total		44,956	44,727	99%	
Grand Total		597,922,534	494,113,316	83%	