




Assessing Public Awareness of Climate Change in China

United Nations Development Programme
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
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Executive Summary

This report summarises the key findings from a survey aiming to offer insights into Chinese peoples' perceptions of the climate emergency, actions and solutions. Specifically, interviewees were asked about their belief in the climate emergency, urgency of actions, as well as their willingness to pay for actions and solutions towards climate mitigation and adaptation.

The survey was conducted in 2022 using random digital dialling method. It covered 2,431 people from 29 provincial-level administrative regions in China, grouped into four areas - Eastern, Western, Central and North-Eastern China, according to the economic regional classification method of the National Bureau of Statistics.¹

Key Takeaways

i. Views on the Climate Emergency

- In the sample, 87% of respondents believe that climate change is a global emergency, suggesting climate change is a pressing concern that most people in China share.
- This is irrespective of gender, age groups, or education levels. Women are slightly more likely to believe in the climate emergency than men, while no significant difference in levels of belief according to education level is reported.

¹ National Bureau of Statistics of China. (June 13, 2011). [How to classify China's East, West, Central, and Northeast regions]. Retrieved from: http://www.stats.gov.cn/zt_18555/zthd/sjtjr/dejtjkfr/tjkg/202302/t20230216_1909741.htm.

- Older age groups (60 years old and above) are more likely to believe in the climate emergency: this stood at 91% compared to the youngest cohort of adults surveyed – those in the age group of 18-35-year-olds – at 83%.
- Respondents in Central (90%) and North-East (89%) regions of China show a slightly higher belief in the climate emergency compared to those in Western regions (83%).
- In the sample, 84% of respondents who said climate change is a global emergency support the corresponding government action on climate, but levels of urgency varied. Of those accepting climate change as a global emergency, 48% said we should act slowly while we learn more about what to do, meanwhile 35% said we should urgently do everything necessary.

ii. Willingness to Pay for Actions to Address Climate Change

- While willingness to pay is a complex question, the results show that many respondents – around 33% – are willing to incur higher personal costs to address climate change. On the other hand, around a third (34%) of respondents say they “don’t know” whether they are willing to pay more to address climate change.

iii. Support for Climate Solutions

- The majority of respondents support the range of climate solutions proposed in the questionnaire across the areas of nature, energy, protecting people (adaptation), transportation, farming and food, along with the economy. Each solution has a support rate of at least 75%.
- There are some notable differences in support for climate solutions between women and men. Women showed greater support for thirteen of the eighteen proposed climate solutions compared to men, with the greatest difference of a thirteen-percentage point variation of support for promoting plant-based diets.

- The most popular solutions to the climate emergency are to conserve forests and land (95% support), build infrastructure and conserve nature to protect lives and livelihoods (95%), keep the ocean and waterways healthy (92%), use solar, wind and renewable power (92%), reduce food waste (91%), and use more clean electric cars and buses or bicycles (90%).
- The least popular solutions to the climate emergency are to promote plant-based diets (77%), transport goods on planes, ships, trains, and trucks that run on clean energy (77%), provide good and affordable insurance (77%), as well as improve the design and planning of cities and rural communities (75%).
- Comparing the different regions surveyed, respondents in the Western region of China showed lower support for climate solutions compared to those in Eastern, Central, and North-East China. Divergence is widest for solutions concerning an end to burning polluting fuels.

In conclusion, the results show that respondents in China are very concerned about climate change and are in favour of climate action across the board. While some differences exist around the urgency of climate action and how much they personally are willing to pay, overall, people across China spoke consistently in support of tackling the climate crisis.

What's more, different demographic factors, such as age, education level and gender, as well as geographical location, generated some differences in results, but only occasionally were these statistically significant. Currently, there is limited literature around the impact of different factors on people's perceptions around climate action in China and elsewhere. As such, this report also highlights the vast potential for further research and evidence-based analysis for more targeted awareness raising and eventually decision-making by all stakeholders.

Introduction

Climate change is one of the major challenges facing humanity, shaping a global consensus to actively address this growing threat. With a population exceeding 1.4 billion, China is a vast country encompassing diverse ecological environments and exhibiting varying socio-economic conditions across its regions. Thus, the impacts and risks of climate change differ significantly across different areas.

In the meantime, China plays a critical role in global efforts to combat the climate emergency. At the UN General Assembly in 2020, China announced its climate ambitions to reach carbon dioxide emission peaking before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060.² To achieve these “dual carbon” goals, the government has introduced a series of policies at the central and local levels, covering many important sectors such as energy, transportation, construction and finance, establishing the “1+N” policy framework.³

In addition to devising a path for green transformation at home, China has also pledged to enhance its support for the green development of other developing countries on various occasions. Through promoting international development cooperation around SDG 13: Climate Action, China is actively contributing to the global fight against climate change. Moreover, with its robust green finance sector and advancements in renewable energy technology, China has the potential to drive

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (September 22, 2020). “Statement by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People's Republic of China At the General Debate of the 75th Session of The United Nations General Assembly.” Retrieved from: http://www.qstheory.cn/yaowen/2020-09/22/c_1126527766.htm.

³ The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (December 2021). “China's climate policy documents: 1+N and updated NDC.” Retrieved from: <https://www.undp.org/china/publications/issue-brief-chinas-climate-policy-documents-1n-and-updated-ndc>.

innovation and provide valuable support to countries transitioning to sustainable and low-carbon economies.

Considering the whole-of-society transformation that this challenge entails, a vast public buy-in would likely benefit and support accelerated action. Understanding the views on climate change held by people in China and what types of policies they would like to see governments take are important steps to encourage public participation on climate action. This report therefore aims to provide policy makers with evidence around the public willingness to address climate change in China through a telephone survey.

The survey examines respondents' awareness of the climate crisis, their sense of urgency for action, and their willingness to pay. It also explores their preferences climate solutions across six areas – energy, the economy, transportation, farming and food, protecting people and nature. The questionnaire draws on the 2021 UNDP Global Survey, *The Peoples' Climate Vote*,⁴ with additional questions on the willingness to pay for climate action and adjustments made to suit the telephone survey format.

It is important to note that the findings of this survey sit within specific relevant contexts, including the state of domestic and international affairs in 2022, when the survey was conducted, along with other issues determined by the specific questions and methodology used for this survey. Therefore, results may also reflect contexts particular to the parameters and historical conditions of this survey.

⁴United Nations Development Programme. (2024, June 20). *Peoples' Climate Vote 2024*. <https://www.undp.org/publications/peoples-climate-vote-2024>

Research Methodology

The questionnaire includes nine climate-related questions, starting with two big-picture questions, gauging the general population's stance on the climate emergency. They are followed by questions asking about support for 18 different policy focuses, framed around six solution areas: energy, the economy, transportation, farming and food, protecting people (adaptation) and nature. The solutions were simplified into accessible language to enable mass participation and were reviewed by some of the world's leading experts on climate policy. The final climate question asked about the extent to which participants were willing to pay to tackle climate change.

For socio-demographic information, respondents were asked to identify their gender, age, education level, and their geographic region.

2.1 Sampling and Data Collection

The survey sampling and fieldwork were conducted by the Nanjing Institute of Environmental Sciences and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment between August 17th and October 6th 2022. Respondents were sampled by random digit dialling of mobile phone numbers of the form registered in mainland China. Since people need to be 16 or over to independently register a mobile phone number in China, the survey is limited to this population.

A total of 184,790 attempted calls were made, of which 43,504 were connected, giving a connection rate of 23.54%. Of the 43,504 calls, 41,403 were ended midway by the respondent. Some 2,100 answered all questions. The response rate, based on complete interviews as a percentage of successful connections, is 4.83%.

To ensure representativeness, population estimates and analy-

sis in this report are based on the 2,431 respondents who answered the gender, age and education questions. Some estimates, especially for questions later in the survey, are based on responses from fewer individuals, as some respondents ended the interview part-way through. Headline numbers for the national aggregates are based on at least 2,100 respondents.

2.2 Data Processing and Weighting

The data were weighted to be representative of the mainland Chinese population in terms of gender, age, education and region, with the weighting targets derived from population figures in the most recent Chinese census (2020).⁵ Post-stratification weights were based on gender (male or female),⁶ age group (under 18, 18 to 35, 36 to 59, and over 60), educational attainment (never attended / primary, secondary and post-secondary),⁷ and region (North East, Eastern, Central and Western), see Table 1 for details.

⁵ National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2021). "The Seventh National Population Census of the People's Republic of China." Retrieved from: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/pcsj/rkpc/7rp/indexch.htm>.

⁶ Although respondents can also choose the gender as "other", no respondent chose this option.

⁷ When weighting the data to the overall data nationally, we used a more detailed educational level classification, dividing secondary education into junior high school and high school.

Table 1: Regional distribution of sample size

Region	Province	Sample size
Eastern region (10 provinces and municipalities)	Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan	>250
Central region (6 provinces)	Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan	>250
Western region (12 provinces and autonomous regions)	Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang	>250
North-East region (3 provinces)	Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang	181

Specifically, data were weighted to the three-way joint distribution of gender, age and education, and to the two-way joint distributions of gender and region, age and region, as well as education and region. This means, to take the example of education and region, that as well as matching the census data on education level and region overall, the proportions within each region attaining each level of education also fit the census data after weighting. The weighting scheme does not extend to three-way joint distributions involving region because of a lack of publicly available census data.

Since some climate-change questions were answered by more respondents than others, population estimates and analysis for each question are based on question-specific weights. However, the nature of those weights differed very little from question to question. Since the raw sample was relatively close to the profile expected from the census data, the weights are relatively light: 90% of them were between 0.4 and 2.1.

Estimates of climate-change opinions are only presented for a sub-section of the population if there were enough respondents in that sub-section and if the profile of those respondents with respect to other demographic variables is sufficiently balanced so that the estimates are

robust after weighting.⁸ All demographic sub-groups used in the weighting scheme satisfy these criteria, with the exception of the under-18 age group, from whom there were too few respondents. Also, regional estimates are for adults only, because there were too few interviews with under-18s in the North-East region.

Estimates from any survey come with some uncertainty, due to random sampling. Margins of error for survey estimates depend on the size of the underlying sample, the estimated proportion, and the extent of re-balancing required by the post-stratification weights. Since the raw sample is relatively well-balanced, the weights make little difference to the effective sample size. For a given sample size, the margin of error is largest for an estimated proportion of 50% and smallest for proportions approaching 0% or 100%. Given the overall sample size of at least 2100, a 95% confidence interval for an estimate of 50% is + or - 2 percentage points. Other intervals will be smaller. All differences between demographic sub-groups highlighted in the report have been checked for statistical significance to ensure that no claims about population differences have been made when they could have been due to random sampling variation.

⁸ When deciding whether it was possible to present population or sub-population estimates, the raw sample of respondents was assessed relative to the expected number of respondents from a perfectly random sample of 2000 people: the "target" distribution. For each gender x age x education combination cell (e.g. "males who are over 60 and have primary school education"), it was calculated whether that cell was "sufficient" . To be 'sufficient' a cell must either (1) be within 30% of the target number of respondents for that cell or (2) be within 20 respondents of the target number for that cell, or (3) have at least 35 respondents. If the target is between 5 and 10, then the cell must also contain at least one respondent, and if the target is between 11 and 20, then the cell must contain at least two respondents. To present a grouped statistic (e.g. support for a given policy among under-18s) all cells within that group must be "sufficient" and the group as a whole must contain at least 250 individuals. To present a country-level statistic all gender x age x education cells in the sample must be sufficient. In the case of under-18s, the issue lies in there not being 250 under-18s in the sample. Thus, whilst the targets are met there are simply too few individuals in that category to offer a justifiable estimate of the support for climate change policies in that age bracket.

2.3 Other Study and Surveys

Notable surveys comparable in scope and size to this survey include GlobeScan Radar Report 2020,⁹ BBC Poll on Climate Change,¹⁰ Pew Global Attitudes Survey,¹¹ Ipsos Global Views on Sustainability,¹² Earth Day 2020,¹³¹⁴ Gallup Lloyd's World Risk Polls from 2020¹⁵ and 2021¹⁶ and EIB Climate Survey 2021.¹⁷ These polls provide additional evidence regarding public perceptions on climate action in China, which, together with this study, enable a more nuanced understanding of this critical challenge. (Table 2)



⁹ GlobeScan. (September 2020). "Climate Change Insights 2020." Retrieved from: <https://globescan.com/2-020/09/20/-climate-change-insight-2020/>.

¹⁰ GlobeScan. (October 2021). "2021 BBC GlobeScan Climate Polling." Retrieved from: https://globescan.wp-enginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2021BBC_GlobeScan_Climate_Polling_Oct21_Press-release.pdf.

¹¹ Pew Research Center. (September 2021). "In Response to Climate Change, Citizens in Advanced Economies Are Willing to Alter How They Live and Work." Retrieved from: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/09/14/in-response-to-climate-change-citizens-in-advanced-economies-are-willing-to-alter-how-they-live-and-work/>.

¹² Ipsos. (2022). "Ipsos Survey: Global Views on Sustainability." Retrieved from: <https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/ipsos-survey-global-views-on-sustainability-2022>.

¹³ Ipsos. (April 2020). "Earth Day 2020 Ipsos." Retrieved from: <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2020-04/earth-day-2020-ipsos.pdf>.

¹⁴ Ipsos. (April 2021). "Earth Day 2021." Retrieved from: <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2021-04/Earth%20Day%202021.pdf>.

¹⁵ Gallup. (September 2021). "Environment Efforts in 19 Countries Falling Short." Retrieved from: <https://news.gallup.com/poll/357149/environment-efforts-countries-falling-short.aspx>.

¹⁶ Lloyd's Register Foundation. (2021). "A Resilient World: Understanding Vulnerability in a Changing Climate." Retrieved from: <https://wrf.lrfoundation.org.uk/2021-report-a-resilient-world-understanding-vulnerability-in-a-changing-climate/>.

¹⁷ European Investment Bank. (2022). "The EIB Climate Survey 2021-2022." Retrieved from: https://www.eib.org/attachments/publications/the_eib_climate_survey_2021_2022_en.pdf.

Table 2: List of well-known surveys that are comparable in scope and size to this one

1	GlobeScan Radar Report 2020
2	BBC Poll on Climate Change
3	Pew Global Attitudes Survey
4	Ipsos Global Views on Sustainability
5	Earth Day 2020, Gallup Lloyd's World Risk Polls from 2020 and 2021
6	EIB Climate Survey 2021




Key Results

3.1 Views on the Climate Emergency

In the survey on Chinese public recognition of climate change, an overwhelming majority (87%) of those surveyed said they do believe that climate change is a global emergency (see Figure 1).


Figure 1: Belief in the climate emergency (All respondents)



3.1.1 Gender

From a gender perspective, this survey finds that a slightly higher percentage of women (89%) believe that climate change is a global emergency compared to men (85%) (see Figure 2).


Figure 2: Belief in the climate emergency, by gender



3.1.2 Education

Splitting the data by education level, the belief in the climate emergency is unanimously high with no statistically significant differences. Similar responses were gathered among those educated to a primary or lower level (87%), junior high (85%), high school (88%), and post-secondary school level (89%) (see Figure 3).


Figure 3: Belief in the climate emergency, by education



3.1.3 Age

Age was a demographic indicator influencing responses to a degree: 91% of those surveyed aged 60 or older stated that they believe in the climate emergency. This surpassed the youngest demographic of 18-35-year-olds, 83% of whom responded “yes” (see Figure 4). One recent study shows that while many people believe that younger individuals are more concerned about climate emergency than the elderly, an examination of literature suggests that there is no definitive conclusion regarding intergenerational disparities in climate change awareness.¹⁸ The result is usually influenced by the framing of survey questions and the specific national context. Our finding of higher climate awareness among elderly people may be due to other unmeasured factors among the surveyed elderly respondents.

Figure 4: Belief in the climate emergency, by age group




¹⁸ Milfont, T.L., Zubielevitch, E., Milojev, P., et al. (2021). "Ten-year panel data confirm generation gap but climate beliefs increase at similar rates across ages." *Nature Communications*, 12, 4038. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-24245-y>.

3.1.4 Regions

The survey samples covered 29 provincial-level administrative regions in China, and we divided them into the Eastern, Western, Central and Northeastern regions according to the economic regional division method of the National Bureau of Statistics. By geographical breakdown, belief in the climate emergency is consistently high at well above 80% across all regions (Figure 5). That said, the data shows some differences by region.¹⁹

Figure 5: Belief in the climate emergency, by region




¹⁹ Regional data was only representative of the larger population for adults over the age of 18, hence no data for under-18s is included in the regional breakdowns throughout this report. A geographical breakdown of the regions can be found in the appendix.

3.2 Desire for Government Response to the Climate Emergency

In addition to gauging their climate change perspectives, respondents who said they believe climate change is a global emergency were also asked how urgently they want to see action taken. This revealed that 84% of respondents who believe in the climate emergency support some form of government action on climate change. More specifically, 48% of respondents said we should “act slowly while we learn more about what to do” ; 36% said we should “do everything necessary, urgently” ; 12% believe “the world is doing enough” ; and only 4% responded with “we should do nothing” (Figure 6).


Figure 6: Desired response to the climate emergency of those who had said “yes” to believing in the climate emergency



3.2.1 Age

Among respondents who believe climate change is a global emergency, views on how to address it differed by age group (Figure 7). 90% of young people aged 18-35 said that more should be done to address the climate emergency, a higher percentage than among middle-aged (aged 36-49) and older people (aged 60+). This result is an interesting contrast to previous analysis, which found that the old people are more likely to believe in the climate emergency. Current data analysis shows that while the oldest demographic is more likely to acknowledge the existence of the climate emergency, they seem to exhibit less urgency in demanding immediate actions compared to other age groups. That said, the older cohort shows the highest urgency in terms of demand for action, with 42% of them choosing “do everything necessary, urgently” , while the majority of young people (61%) choose a more cautious approach (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Desired response to the climate emergency of those who had said “yes” to believing in the climate emergency, by age group




3.2.2 Education

When factoring in education levels, the results show that, among those who believe climate change is a global emergency, the more educated the group, the more supportive they are towards enacting greater action on climate change. 93% of respondents with post-secondary school education versus 74% of respondents with primary school education, or lower, said that actions should be taken.

However, when choosing between urgent and slower climate action, among those who believe climate change is a global emergency, there was stronger support for slower action among those with a higher level of education: over half (57%) of those with high school education and the majority (61%) of those with post-secondary school education said that we should “act slowly while we learn more about what to do” . By contrast, respondents with lower levels of education were relatively more supportive to “do everything necessary, urgently” (see Figure 8). There is virtually no evidence-based analysis offering explanations around this pattern. One possible option raised by the authors is that higher-educated individuals might be more inclined to seek comprehensive and evidence-based solutions, which could lead them to support a slower, more measured approach to climate action.


Figure 8: Desired response to the climate emergency of those who had said “yes” to believing in the climate emergency, by education



3.2.3 Region

Splitting the data by region, some differences exist among those who believe climate change is a global emergency in terms of how urgently they believe climate action is needed. “Act slowly while we learn more about what to do” received the highest support among the four options. However, people in the Northeast (51%) supported this option significantly more compared to both Central (44%) and Western (46%) regions. Urgent action was supported by more people in Central China (38%) compared to those in Western China (33%). No statistically significant differences in support could be ascertained for “the world is already doing enough” and “do nothing” among the four regions (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Desired response to the climate emergency of those who had said “yes” to believing in the climate emergency, by region



Regardless of the differing preferred pace of climate action taken, the results show that there is strong support for climate action – whether urgently, or slowly – amongst those surveyed in China, across age groups, gender, education levels and regions.


3.3 How Much Individuals are Willing to Pay for Climate Action?

The survey sought to understand how respondents perceive their personal finances in relation to climate change. They were asked about their willingness to personally pay to address climate change, compared to what they are already paying. While this is a complex question for many reasons, it yields some important findings.

3.3.1 Overall response

Overall, 33% of the respondents indicated that they are willing to allocate more funds for actions to deal with climate change. Among them, 11% of the respondents are willing to pay “much more” and 22% of the respondents are willing to pay “somewhat more” than what they are currently paying for actions to address climate change (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Willingness to pay to address climate change relative to the respondent’s current payment level




Sociodemographic factors including gender, age and education levels did not appear to heavily influence levels of support for each response, except for slight differences in the “don't know” response category.

3.3.2 Region

Respondents in Eastern, Western, Central and North-Eastern regions differ in their rate of saying they “don't know” about their personal willingness to pay for climate actions, and “don't know” was still the most popular option in all four regions (Figure 11). There are some differences in the willingness of respondents in the four regions

to pay “much more” and “slightly more” . 27% of respondents in the Western region chose these two options, significantly lower than those in the Central region (39%). This result is consistent with the conclusion of previous analyses that the Western region has lower levels of climate change awareness and climate action urgency than other regions. This relates to a general pattern whereby the willingness of individuals to pay for climate actions has a strong positive correlation with their level of belief in the climate emergency.

Figure 11: Willingness to pay to address climate change, by region



3.4 Survey of Climate Solution Preference Across Demographics and Regions

Participants in the survey were presented with 18 solutions for addressing the climate emergency to gauge levels of support for different policies. They span six different areas: energy, nature, farming and food, transportation, the economy and protecting people (climate adaptation).

3.4.1 Five most popular and five least popular climate solutions in terms of support rate

The five most popular climate solutions were:


1. Conserve forests and land (95%)
2. Build infrastructure and conserve nature to protect lives and livelihoods (95%)
3. Keep the ocean and waterways healthy (92%)
4. Use solar, wind and renewable power (92%)
5. Reduce food waste (91%)

The five least popular climate solutions were:

1. Stop burning fuels that pollute (80%)
2. Transport goods on planes, ships, trains, and trucks that run on clean energy (77%)
3. Provide good and affordable insurance (77%)
4. Promote plant-based diets (77%)
5. Improve the design and planning of cities and rural communities (75%)

The results suggest strong support from respondents on all solutions to address climate change (Figure 12). Even support for the lowest two – to “improve the design and planning of cities and rural communities” and “promote plant-based diets” , – reached 75%.


Figure 12: Support for climate solutions by climate governance area



3.4.2 Survey of Solutions to Address the Climate Emergency in different fields

The results of support for solutions to address the climate emergency across six areas – energy, transport, farming and food, nature, protecting people (adaptation), and the economy – are shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13: The support rates of each climate solution by the field of climate governance



● Energy

Energy makes up most of China's greenhouse gas emissions.²⁰ The survey shows that among the three energy solutions proposed, promoting the use of renewable energy sources ranks first (92%). Increasing efficiency in homes, buildings, and factories (85%), as well as stopping the use of polluting fuels (80%) follow.

The above survey results indicate that the respondents have a stronger willingness to support responding to the climate crisis by

²⁰ World Bank. (October, 2022). *China Country Climate and Development Report*. World Bank. Retrieved from: <https://open-knowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/38136/FullReport.pdf>.

using renewable energy represented by solar energy and wind energy. Part of the explanation behind such results could be China's emphasis on the "dual carbon" targets announced in 2020 and on renewable energy development in attaining such goals. In 2022, the installed capacity of both solar and wind power increased by 87.4GW and 37.6GW respectively, reaching record highs.²¹

Additionally, China's investment in solar and wind energy in 2022 reached \$164 billion and \$109 billion, respectively, accounting for 55% of the global total investment in renewable energies.²²

● Transport

At present, China's transport sector accounts for about 10% of its total carbon emissions.²³ Decarbonization transportation is thus also crucial for mitigating climate change and achieving China's "dual carbon" goals. According to the survey, the most popular option for transport solutions for climate action is to "use more clean electric cars and buses, or bicycles", with 90% of respondents supporting this solution.

Box 1 – Policy evolution supporting new energy vehicles and the low carbon transition of the transportation sector in China

By the end of 2024, the number of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China had reached 31.4 million, accounting for 8.90% of the total vehicle fleet. The newly registered NEVs have grown rapidly, rising from 1.2 million in 2019 to 11.25 million in 2024.²⁴ This follows China's history of policy support for NEVs,

²¹ Ministry of Ecology and Environment. (October, 2023). 2023 Annual Report on China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change. Retrieved from: <https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/ydqhbh/wsqtzk/202310/W020231027674250657087.pdf>.

²² Bloomberg NEF. (February 2, 2023). A Record \$495 Billion is Invested in Renewable Energy in 2022. Retrieved from: <https://about.bnef.com/blog/a-record-495-billion-invested-in-renewable-energy-in-2022/>.

²³ Ministry of Ecology and Environment. (2023). China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change 2023 Report. Retrieved from: <https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/ydqhbh/wsqtzk/202310/W020231027674250657087.pdf>

²⁴ State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (January, 2025). Over 30 million new energy vehicles running on China's roads. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.cn/lianbo/bumen/202501/content_6999345.htm.

referring to vehicles powered by alternative energy, including electricity.²⁵ In 2009, China started to pilot subsidies for NEVs, first targeting their purchase for public services in selected cities. In 2013, the Ministry of Finance, along with three other relevant ministries, jointly issued a notice specifically outlining subsidies for NEVs purchases.²⁶ Simultaneously, administrative policies were implemented to restrict the registration of fuel vehicles in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, encouraging consumers to opt for new energy vehicles. By the end of June 2024, the total number of charging piles in China has reached 10.24 million, representing a year-on-year growth of 54%.²⁷

China has also implemented policies to promote the low carbon transition of freight transport. The Ministry of Transport has outlined key policy priorities in its 14th Five-Year Plan including:²⁸

1. Adjusting the transport structure, reducing the volume of road transport for bulk goods, and increasing the volume of rail and water transport.
2. Taking the goal of building “model” cities with “green freight and distribution” as an opportunity to accelerate the establishment of an “intensive, efficient, green and intelligent” urban freight and distribution service system.
3. Actively promoting the adoption of new and clean energy vehicles and ships in the sector of transport services, as well as supporting the planning, distribution and construction of infrastructure, such as power charging piles and hydrogen refuelling stations.

● Farming and Food

Among the three options listed in the survey, the most popular climate solutions relating to farms and food are to “reduce food waste” (91%), followed by to “use climate-friendly farming techniques” (86%), and “promote plant-based diets” (77%).

²⁵ New energy vehicle (NEV) is a term commonly used in China's policy, it includes electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs).

²⁶ State Council of the People's Republic of China. (September 17, 2013). Notice on the Continued Development and Application of New Energy Vehicles. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-09/17/content_2490108.htm.

²⁷ State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (July, 2024). The total number of charging piles in China reaches 10.244 million. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/jiedu/tujie/202407/content_6965583.htm.

²⁸ Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of China. (November 2, 2021). Notice by the Ministry of Transport on the Issuance of the “14th Five-Year Development Plan for Integrated Transport Services. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021-11/18/content_5651656.htm.

Box 2 - China's policy actions in farming and food

In response to the issue of food waste, China initiated the “Clean Plate” campaign in 2020, emphasizing the need to address food waste at the institutional level. Subsequently, in 2021, the National People's Congress voted in favour of the Anti-Food Waste Law of the People's Republic of China. In the same year, the General Offices of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued the Food Conservation Action Plan to promote its implementation, focusing on reducing food waste in the industrial supply chain, curbing the waste of food and beverage in consumption, as well as raising public awareness around this issue.²⁹

In line with the “dual carbon” goals, there has also been a recent focus on green agricultural transformation to better address and adapt to climate change. In 2021, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, together with five relevant ministries, jointly issued the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Agricultural Green Development in 2021. This document outlines key goals for the low carbon transition of agriculture industry, including improving the sustainable use of agricultural resources, strengthening capacities for agricultural carbon emissions reduction and carbon sequestration, as well as improving the supply of green agricultural products.³⁰ Following the plan, many actions are being taken including promoting resource-efficient and environmentally friendly agricultural production standards, adopting environmentally friendly agricultural technologies, and accelerating the development of the rural biogas industry. By the end of June 2023, biogas projects in China could process approximately 220 million tons of agricultural and rural organic waste annually, providing 120 million tons of organic fertilisers, while reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the waste.³¹

With rapid economic development and increasing household incomes, China has witnessed a significant shift in dietary patterns, characterized by a substantial rise in meat consumption.³² Although China does not currently have specific policy measures and initiatives to promote plant-based diets, the release of the 2022 Chinese Dietary Guidelines provides an important foundation for public health education and policy formulation. These guidelines emphasize the importance of consuming vegetables and fruits to achieve a more balanced diet.

²⁹ Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (November 3, 2021). The Action Plan for Food Conservation. Retrieved from: https://www.moa.gov.cn/gk/zcfg/xzfg/202111/t20211103_6381159.htm.

³⁰ Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (September 9, 2021). The Joint Issuance of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs with Six Other Departments on the “14th Five-Year” National Agriculture Green Development Plan. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-09/09/content_5636345.htm.

³¹ National Development and Reform Commission. (July, 2023) Accelerating the formation of green and low-carbon production methods. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/gdzt/2023qhjnxcz/bfjncx/202307/t20230707_1358207_ext.html

³² Ye, Y., & Leeming, J. (June 22, 2023). By the numbers: China's changing diet. Nature Spotlight. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-023-02060-3>

● Nature

The results show that, the most popular nature-related climate solution for addressing the climate emergency was to “conserve forests and land” (95%), followed by “keeping the oceans and waterways healthy” (92%), and lastly, “supporting local communities, Indigenous Peoples and women that are environmental stewards” (86%).

The support for all three options related to nature reached or exceeded 86%, indicating that people in China are relatively more in favour of climate solutions relating to nature. This support may be attributed to the government's focus on protecting nature, which is reflected in its national development concepts such as eco-civilisation as well as its visible role at the United Nations’s Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP15). China presided over the two-phase CBD COP15 meetings held in 2021 in Kunming (Yunnan) and 2022 in Montreal (Canada).³³

China was one of the first countries to sign the Convention on Biological Diversity, and has since passed various legislation to better preserve nature.³⁴ In the meantime, China has taken multiple measures to increase the area of forests, grasslands, wetlands, rivers and lakes, while reversing land desertification.

³³ UN Environment Programme. (December 2022). “UN Biodiversity Conference (COP15).” Retrieved from: <https://www.unep.org/events/conference/un-biodiversity-conference-cop-15>.

³⁴ State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (October 8, 2021). Biodiversity Conservation in China. Retrieved from: <https://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/publications/Whitep/202110/P020211008419847485077.pdf>.

● Economy

The results show that, out of the economic solutions for addressing climate change, “investing more money in green businesses and jobs” (90%) was most popular, followed by “making companies pay for their pollution” (86%), and “requiring more information on how products are made” (83%).

Box 3 - China’s policy efforts in boosting green investment and developing the carbon market

In recent years, the Chinese government has made positive progress in the three areas mentioned above. To guide more investment into the green sector, China issued the Guiding Opinions on Building a Green Financial System in 2016, outlining a clear roadmap for establishing a green financial system. In 2021, the People's Bank of China, together with relevant ministries and commissions, updated and issued the Catalogue of Green Bond Supporting Projects (2021 edition). This harmonized definitions of green projects among different ministries and commissions, as well as gradually aligning with the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities.³⁵ China's domestic and foreign labelled green bond issuance reached USD 131 billion in 2023, ranking the first in the world.³⁶ Green loans continued to grow rapidly, reaching a balance of RMB 36.6 trillion by the end of 2024, representing a 21.7% year-on-year increase.³⁷ “Making companies pay for their pollution” emphasizes the role of market mechanisms in reducing emissions. The Chinese government has been aware of the potential of carbon pricing mechanisms for a long time and has been conducting local pilots of carbon emission trading systems since 2011. On July 16, 2021, the national carbon emission trading system was officially launched, incorporating 2,162 key emitters across China's power industry and covering about 4.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide emission. This marks the establishment of the world’s largest carbon market.³⁸

³⁵ State Council of the People's Republic of China. (May 6, 2021). The Release of Green Bond Support Project Catalogue (2021 Edition) – New Highlights in Green Bonds. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-05/06/content_5604789.htm.

³⁶ Climate Bonds Initiative. (2023). China sustainable debt: State of the market report 2023. https://www.climatebonds.net/files/reports/china_sustainable_debt_state_of_the_market_report_2023.pdf

³⁷ State Council of the People's Republic of China. (February 2025). China's green loans maintain rapid growth. https://www.gov.cn/lianbo/bumen/202502/content_7004354.htm.

³⁸ State Council of the People's Republic of China. (August 3, 2021). China Forges Ahead With Carbon Emission Trading. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-08/03/content_5629115.htm.

● Protecting People (Adaptation)

The survey results show that the most popular climate solution for adapting to the climate emergency was to “build infrastructure and conserve nature to protect lives and livelihoods” (95%), followed by “installing more early warning systems for disasters” (89%), along with “providing good and affordable insurance” (77%).

Box 4 - China's progress in climate adaptation

China is vulnerable to and significantly affected by the impacts of climate change. Consequently, adaptation has always been an important part of China's climate strategies. To help coordinate these efforts, the government developed the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy as early as 2013, fixing guiding ideology and main objectives for national adaptation efforts between 2014 and 2020. In 2022, seventeen ministries, including the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, jointly issued the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035, which further clarified key areas, regional patterns and safeguard measures for China's future climate adaptation. The strategy covers communication and coordination between relevant ministries, highlighting the importance of climate change monitoring, early warning and risk management, and stressing the improvement of capacity in key areas and key vulnerable regions to adapt to climate change.³⁹

In terms of disaster management, China has been actively working to strengthen its disaster risk reduction (DRR) and response capabilities. Being part of these efforts, the 14th Five-Year National Comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction Plan aims to establish an efficient and scientific system for preventing and controlling natural disasters. Enhancing China's capabilities in monitoring and early warning systems for natural disasters, by leveraging innovative technologies, are also listed as key priorities in the document.

Affordable insurance is crucial in safeguarding individuals from climate-related disasters and assisting them in recovery. In China, several provinces have

³⁹ Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People's Republic of China. (June 13, 2022). Joint Issuance of the “National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035” by MEE and Seventeen other Departments. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-06/14/content_5695554.htm.

experienced unusually heavy rainfall in recent years. Henan Province, for example, suffered direct economic losses of approximately RMB 120 billion (approx. 16.9 billion USD) due to heavy rainfall in 2021.⁴⁰

However, the insurance industry only covered around RMB 12.4 billion (approx. 1.75 billion USD) of these losses, indicating that 90% of the losses were uninsured.⁴¹ This highlights the need to raise public awareness about catastrophe insurance and the potential for improvements in this area.



⁴⁰State Council of the People' s Republic of China. (January 21, 2022). Report on July 20 Deadly Floods from Rain Deluge in Zhengzhou, Henan. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-01/21/content_5669723.htm.

⁴¹China Central Television (CCTV). (September 7, 2021). China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission: Initial Insurance Claims for Henan Deadly Floods Estimated at 12.4 billion RMB. Retrieved from: <https://news.cctv.com/2021/09/07/ARTILOIEIMsWn0HdRgEG7tEE210907.shtml>.

Conclusion and Discussion

4.1 Conclusion

Effective climate change mitigation and adaptation actions cannot be achieved without public support. By increasing awareness and understanding around the existence, causes and effects of climate change, we can incorporate effective climate action into policy planning and enable all of society to participate in ensuring a sustainable development path for this and coming generations.

4.1.1 Gender and regional difference in climate awareness in China

The survey shows that 87% of the respondents believe that climate change is a global emergency, indicating a high level of awareness among Chinese respondents regarding climate change issues.

From a gender perspective, women demonstrate higher climate awareness, underscoring their unique position in the fight against climate change. Extensive literature also highlights the pivotal role that women play in family and community activities as well as in managing natural resources. Their involvement provides them with valuable knowledge and experience in developing strategies for climate change mitigation and adaptation.⁴² These findings underscore the crucial need to involve women in decision-making on climate action for maximum impact. In addition, women possess strong community mobilization skill, which are crucial for managing climate disaster risks.⁴³

⁴² Liu, L. (2021). Progress and Enlightenment in Incorporating Gender Considerations in the Process of Climate Change Response. *Climate Change Research Progress*, 17(5), 548-558.

⁴³ Carvajal-Escobar Y, Quintero-Angel M, García-Vargas M. (2008). "Women' s role in adapting to climate change and variability." *Advances in Geosciences* 14: 277-280. Retrieved from: <https://adgeo.copernicus.org/articles/14/277/2008/adgeo-14-277-2008.pdf>.

Geographically, belief in the climate emergency is consistently high, over 80% across the Eastern, Western, Central, and Northeastern regions.⁴⁴ Awareness in the Western region was slightly lower than in the Central and Northeast China, which may relate to differences in economic and social development levels across these regions. According to UNDP's National Human Development Report, although the Western region has made great progress in human development in the past few decades, its human development index still lags behind the other three regions.⁴⁵

4.1.2 Insights on public attitude towards the government's actions in responding to climate emergencies

The survey reveals that 84% of the respondents support the government in taking some form of actions to address climate change. Among them, a higher proportion (48%) supports “act slowly while we learn more about what to do” , compared to 35% who favors “do everything necessary, urgently” . This suggests that Chinese respondents generally prefer a gradual and cautious approach to advancing climate action. From the perspective of educational level, individuals with higher educational attainment are more supportive of taking actions in response to climate change. However, when it comes to the pace of action, those with higher education level favor a measured and cautious approach, whereas individuals with lower educational levels tend to choose the option of “do everything necessary, urgently” . Although there is virtually no evidence-based analysis offering explanations around this pattern, one plausible explanation brought forward by the authors is that higher-educated respondents might be more inclined to seek comprehensive and evidence-based solutions, which may lead them to support taking climate actions in a slower and more measured manner.

⁴⁴ The regional data in this report only represents the adult population aged 18 and above, and the data of the population under 18 is not included in the regional breakdown. For the detailed regional breakdown chart, please refer to section 2.2.

⁴⁵ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (December 19, 2019). *National Human Development Report: Special Edition*. Retrieved from: <https://www.undp.org/china/publications/national-human-development-report-special-edition>.

4.1.3 Insights on individuals' willingness to pay for climate actions

The willingness of individuals to pay for climate action is important to informing the design and implementation of emission reduction politics, including carbon pricing policies. The survey reveals that 33% of the respondents said that they were willing to pay more for actions to address climate change, indicating a public support base for advancing climate action through market mechanisms. However, an equal proportion (33%) of responded with “don’t know” , highlighting the need for enhanced outreach and communication to help the public understand the implications of personal financial contributions to climate action and the potential environmental benefits they entail. Climate change is already generating significant financial burdens across economies worldwide. It is estimated that about \$143 billion per year in extreme weather event costs can be attributed to climate change.⁴⁶ This translates into a significant number of people being financially impacted as they have to bear the costs caused by changing weather patterns. Climate change is already pushing millions of people into poverty.⁴⁷ Mounting evidence shows that paying to mitigate climate change today is more cost-effective than paying to cover its future consequences.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Newman, R., & Noy, I. (2023). The global costs of extreme weather that are attributable to climate change. *Nature Communications*, 14, Article 6103. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-41888-1>.

⁴⁷United Nations. (2020). *The Climate Crisis: A Race We Can Win*. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/un75/climate-crisis-race-we-can-win>.

⁴⁸Curbing global warming could save US\$20 trillion. (May 23, 2018). *Nature* 557, 467-468. Retrieved from:<https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05219-5>

4.1.4 Gender, education and regional perspective on support for climate solutions

The survey reveals that general attitudes and dispositions toward different climate solutions are largely uniform among respondents, regardless of socio-demographic factors like age, gender, education, or geographic location. However, some notable differences do exist. From a gender perspective, for thirteen out of the eighteen solutions, there was a significantly stronger support amongst women than men, with the largest difference between women and men being “promote plant-based diets” (83% compared to 71%, respectively) (Figure 14). Women are more likely to support solutions that offer individuals more options to mitigate their impact on the climate by adjusting lifestyles and habits. In terms of educational attainment, the results show statistically significant differences in support for different climate solutions by education levels for nine of the eighteen solutions, indicating that education level influences peoples’ preferred climate solutions to some degree. However, no educational group consistently favoured solutions more than others across all eighteen proposals. From a regional perspective, “conserve forests and land” , along with “build infrastructure and conserve nature to protect lives and livelihoods” were the two most popular climate solutions across all four regions with over 90% support from all (Figure 15). This suggests that the public places a strong emphasize on climate solutions that protect their own survival and health, as well as nature.

Figure 14: Support for climate solutions, by gender





Figure 15: Support for climate solutions, by region



4.2 Discussion

Based on the findings of the survey, this section offers targeted recommendations to guide national efforts in climate mitigation and adaptation. It further explores the policy implications of the five most supported and least supported climate solutions:

4.2.1 Leverage differences in climate awareness and solution preferences across diverse groups to effectively promote public participation in climate actions

Implement diversified climate awareness campaigns that tailored to different demographic groups, including age and gender. Survey results indicate that women exhibit a higher level of climate awareness and are more supportive of numerous climate solutions compared to men. To capitalize on this difference, initiatives should effectively harness influential role of women in advancing low-carbon lifestyles. These include promoting sustainable transportation options such as public transit, bicycles, and walking; advocating for energy-saving appliances to boost household energy efficiency; and reducing food waste and adopting environmentally friendly dietary habits.

Address regional disparities and enhance outreach in critical areas. Survey findings reveal that awareness of climate change and the willingness to personally pay for climate actions are relatively lower in the western regions. This presents opportunity to strengthen awareness-raising efforts in these regions. Communication campaigns could be tailored to reflect local context, fostering greater community engagement and a stronger sense of identity. Particularly, it is important to leverage key dates such as International Day for Biological Diversity and World Environment Day, to implement diverse awareness-raising and educational programs on climate change.

4.2.2 Strengthen resilience of vulnerable groups through targeted climate adaptation awareness campaigns

While the elderly show higher climate awareness and youth groups demands greater climate actions, they remain particularly vulnerable to climate-related disasters due to limited capacity for disaster preparedness and recovery. To address this, it is recommended to develop accessible handbooks and educational materials tailored to different regions and demographic groups, particularly for the elderly and youth. Educational initiatives should focus on bridging the knowledge gap in climate adaptation for these groups, covering topics on impacts, risks and coping strategies related to climate change. These initiatives would help individuals understand how extreme weather events—such as heavy rains, floods, and heatwaves—could affect their lives and provide guidance on effective response strategies. Additionally, encouraging vulnerable groups to purchase suitable insurance products can help mitigate the economic loss caused by such disasters.

4.2.3 Increase targeted promotion and research for the five least supported climate solutions

For the five least supported climate solutions, it is recommended to conduct more in-depth research to understand the public's concerns about these solutions and enhance awareness and support through increased promotion and capacity building activities.

- (1) Stopping burning fuels that pollute: the relatively low support for this option may stem from concerns about energy security and potential impacts of energy transition on specific groups' interests and well-being. Therefore, it is recommended that the government strengthen research on social impacts of energy

- transitions and encourage public participation in policy formulation through consultations, hearings and online feedback mechanisms to ensure the energy transition is inclusive and fair.
- (2) Transporting goods on planes, ships, trains, and trucks that run on clean energy: To further promote the use of clean energy for long-distance freight transportation, it is crucial to increase investment in the research and development of related technologies. In the meantime, more efforts are needed to raise public awareness, especially among the youth, about emerging trends in green transportation solutions, including hydrogen. This could attract greater youth participation in the green economy.
 - (3) Providing good and affordable insurance: it is recommended to further enhance awareness of the significance of catastrophe insurance and increase public participation rates. By leveraging experiences from pilot programs in key cities, efforts should focus on strengthening the national policy framework on catastrophe insurance.
 - (4) Promoting plant-based diets: it is important to continuously promote responsible consumption concepts and help the public to draw the link between dietary choices and environmental sustainability. More concretely, community and school-based activities could be carried out to encourage individuals integrate sustainable eating habits into daily life.
 - (5) Improving the design and planning of cities and rural communities: The low support may be attributed to limited public awareness on the link between urban and rural design and climate change mitigation and adaptation. Thus, it is important to increase outreach effort on this front. Moreover, relevant cities could consider conduct climate impact analyses and risk assessments, alongside more educational programs to raise public awareness, increasing urban and rural communities' capacity to adapt to climate change, and enhance resilience.

4.2.4 Advancing the implementation of the top five climate solutions in line with public preferences

The five most supported climate solutions focus on the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, as well as the development of adaptive infrastructures, reflecting the public's preference in addressing climate change. The government could consider responding to these needs by prioritizing relevant policy actions accordingly. Additionally, leveraging strong public support can help mobilize businesses and communities to accelerate the implementation of these actions. Specific recommendations include:

- (1) Conserving forests and land: continue efforts to protect and restore forests, grasslands, and wetlands, while advancing the specialized management of black soil lands. These actions aim to enhance the capacity of natural ecosystems to adapt to climate change;
- (2) Building infrastructure and conserve nature to protect lives and livelihoods: conduct systematic assessments of urban climate adaptation capacities and accelerate the development of climate-resilient infrastructure;
- (3) Keeping the ocean and waterways healthy: strengthen the protection and restoration of marine ecosystems in coastal areas to improve their stability and resilience to disasters;
- (4) Using solar, wind and renewable power: in addition to scaling up the installed capacity of renewable energy, equal emphasis should be placed on demand-side interventions. This includes raising public awareness of the need to transition away from fossil fuels and encouraging businesses and households to adopt clean energy;
- (5) Reducing food waste: beyond individual-level initiatives to reduce food waste, efforts should focus on minimizing losses during agricultural production, transportation, storage, and sales, promoting the transformation of the food industry to more sustainable growth models.

◆ Questionnaire Survey

Q1 What is your gender?

1. Female 2. Male 3. Other
-

Q2 What is your age?

1. Under 18 2. 18 - 35 3. 36 - 59 4. 60 or over
-

Q3 How old were you when you left education?

1. Under 12 2. 12 - 16 3. 17 - 19
4. 20 or over 5. Still in education 6. Never went to school
-

Q4 What is your education level?

1. Never attended School 2. Pre-school 3. Primary School
4. Junior high school 5. High school 6. Tertiary education
-

Q5 What province and city do you live in? _____.

Q6 Do you think climate change is a global emergency? Yes or no?

1. Yes (extend in sequence) 2. No (Jump to Q3)
-

Q7 What should the world do about climate change?

1. Do everything necessary, urgently
2. Act slowly while we learn more about what to do
3. The world is already doing enough
4. Do nothing

Q8 To address the climate crisis, how should China improve transport?

- 1. Use more clean electric cars and buses, or bicycles.
 - 2. Transport goods on planes, ships, trains and trucks that run on clean energy
 - 3. Improve the design of cities and rural communities
 - 4. None of them.
-

Q9 To address the climate crisis, what should China do about energy?

- 1. Use solar, wind and renewable power
 - 2. Waste less energy in homes, buildings, and factories
 - 3. Stop burning fuels that pollute
 - 4. None of them
-

Q10 To address the climate crisis, what should governments do on agriculture and food?

- 1. Use climate-friendly farming techniques
 - 2. Reduce food waste
 - 3. Promote plant-based diets
 - 4. None of them
-

Q11 To address the climate crisis, what do you think China should do about nature?

- 1. Conserve forests and land
 - 2. Keep the ocean and waterways healthy
 - 3. Support local communities, indigenous peoples, and women that are environmental stewards
 - 4. None of them
-

Q12 How can China better protect people from extreme storms, flooding, droughts, forest fires, and other climate impacts?

- 1. Install more early warning systems for disasters
- 2. Provide good and affordable insurance
- 3. Build infrastructure and conserve nature to protect lives and livelihoods level
- 4. None of them

Q13 To address the climate crisis, what should governments do about the economy in each country ?

- 1. Invest more money in green businesses
 - 2. Require more information on how products are made
 - 3. Make companies pay for their pollution
 - 4. None of them
-

Q14 How much are you willing to pay to address climate change compared with what you are currently paying?

- 1. Much more 2. Somewhat more 3. The same as currently
- 4. Somewhat less 5. Much less 6. Don't know