Navigating Change: Perspectives of Youth in Ukraine from 2021 to 2023
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The views, conclusions, and recommendations presented in this document do not necessarily reflect the position of USAID, UNDP, the EU or their partners.
About reSCORE Ukraine

reSCORE Ukraine, which is a joint initiative funded by the USAID and UNDP, and implemented by SeeD, continues to serve as an annual assessment tool of societal resilience and recovery that informs the policies and programming of national, regional, and international partners. Like its predecessor, the Ukraine SCORE 2018 to 2021, it aims to identify pathways and respond to complex needs, geared at strengthening individual and collective coping mechanisms, and fostering a democratic, just, inclusive, and cohesive Ukraine.
About Partners

The Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) works with international development organisations, governments, and civil society leaders to design and implement evidence-based, people-centered strategies for the development of peaceful, inclusive, and sustainable societies. Working globally, SeeD provides policy advice for social transformation that is based on citizen engagement strategies and empirical understanding of the behaviour of individuals, groups, and communities.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports strategic capacity development initiatives to promote inclusive growth and sustainable human development. Through partnerships with national, regional, and local governments, civil society, and the private sector, UNDP strives to support Ukraine in its efforts to eliminate poverty, develop the population’s capacity, achieve equitable results, sustain the environment, and advance democratic governance.

Democratic Governance East Activity (DG East) is an 8-year programme of The United States Agency for International Development (USAID). DG East works with civil society, local government entities, and independent media outlets in and from eastern and southern Ukraine to strengthen the connection and trust between citizens and their government. The overall objectives of DG East are to 1) support greater acceptance of a shared civic culture based on common values and understanding; and 2) promote participation to improve Ukraine’s governance, reform processes, and help resolve community problems. The programme addresses immediate war-response needs, promotes good governance, and strengthens an inclusive civic identity.

USAID’s Transformation Communications Activity (TCA) is a six-year activity of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which aims to strengthen Ukrainian democracy through comprehensive research, innovative communication initiatives, and the creation of socially meaningful content.

The report was jointly developed by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine with financial support from the European Union, provided within the “EU4Recovery – Empowering Communities in Ukraine” (EU4Recovery) project.
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Navigating Change:
Perspectives of Youth in Ukraine from 2021 to 2023

The 24th of February 2022 was a defining moment for Ukrainian society and for youth in particular. Russia’s full-scale invasion has profoundly impacted life in Ukraine, affecting young people in numerous ways. At least 82% of them have suffered various losses, ranging from income and mental health deterioration to strained relationships with friends and family. Additionally, one fifth of these young individuals have become internally displaced persons (IDPs). Only half a decade before the full-scale war, the main concern of youth in Ukraine was earning money and securing a decent quality of life, with already 36% afraid of war in the region or in the world, and 70% believing that fighting crime and corruption should have been government priorities. However, from 2021 to 2022 youth’s access to food, basic needs, and mental health worsened, with this becoming their main issues of concern. The outbreak of the full-scale war impacted not only the wellbeing of thousands of young people, but also marked a before and after in individual attitudes, behaviours, and social dynamics, including those related to civic engagement, national identity, political ideology, and their visions of an individual and collective future.

Before the outbreak of the full-scale war there was a widespread perception of young people as being apathetic towards political engagement, especially at the local level. They were often seen as unable to define their ideological stance and exhibited a high level of mistrust towards political leaders, with as many as 74% expressing scepticism. 60% supported the idea of Ukraine joining the European Union, believing this would improve the economic development of the country; however, one third distrusted the EU under the belief that Ukraine was not welcome by the European Union. Socially, most of them reported having felt discriminated against but tended to not tolerate drug users, ex-prisoners, Roma people, and people who identified as LGBTQ. Despite the socioeconomic challenges, most young people were satisfied with their lives and optimistic about their future. Although youth reported feeling satisfied, by 2021 40% were open to emigrating from their localities if needed, and 39% were considering living permanently abroad, mainly because of the lack of educational and economic opportunities, not seeing a future in their current localities, and poor access to public resources.

The election of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in 2019 was momentous for youth in Ukraine, as he achieved electoral support from 80% of people aged 18 to 29, symbolising the idea of a “new beginning”. However, the start of the full-scale war altered young people’s reality.
With the full-scale war, there was also an increase in young people volunteering, with 22% of them reporting that they were driven to volunteer by the beginning of the full-scale invasion itself. While only 1% of young people have been able to participate in the recovery efforts, 72% have reported to be willing to take part on them.

It has been found that youth’s sense of national identity has strengthened following the full-scale invasion, particularly by strengthening their linguistic identity and rejecting Russian influence, with an increase of almost 20% of young people choosing to remain in Ukraine despite the ongoing war. Furthermore, more than half of young people who have been displaced internally and three-quarters of those who had to leave the country see returning to their hometown as part of their plan.

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About this report

Drawing on 2023 data, this report will explore the present conditions, attitudes, and behaviours of young people in Ukraine, delving into the aspects of human security, civic participation, community dynamics, trust, sense of belonging and ultimately future visions, which will play a key role during Ukraine’s recovery process. This report tackles these topics by pinpointing the defining traits of youth in 2023 and the evolution of these characteristics from 2021 to 2023. It examines the diverse experiences of young people based on age, gender, and educational background, among other factors, to discern their primary concerns. The report was guided by the following research questions:

1. What are the key characteristics of youth in 2023? Determined from the means and frequencies of several indicators in the 2023 sample.

2. What changes have youth experienced from 2021 to 2023? Investigated by comparing the statistical significance of an analysis of variance (ANOVA) between mean scores for youth in 2021 and 2023, comparing these to the differences in older respondents.

3. Are there certain subgroups of youth that are fragile or stronger in certain indicators? Determined by detecting the statistical significance (ANOVA) of differences in mean scores across subgroups of youth (young adults from 18 to 24), including gender, education, urbanity, income, and experience of displacement.

4. What are the key needs and priorities of youth? By determining a prioritisation of the needs of young people, by outlining the oblasts with low performance in selected indicators.

The present report aims to answer these questions across nine thematic categories: 1) Human security, 2) Civic participation, 3) Community cohesion, 4) Individual beliefs and values, 5) Employability and skills, 6) Life satisfaction, 7) Satisfaction with the country, 8) Trust in institutions, and 9) Future visions.
The reSCORE quantifies the levels of societal phenomena using indicators based on questions from the reSCORE survey. Using several questions to create one indicator allows us to reliably measure that phenomenon from different perspectives. Scores for each indicator are given a value from 0 to 10, where 0 corresponds to the total absence of a phenomenon in an individual, location or in society, and 10 corresponds to its strong presence. Heatmaps, such as the one shown here, give the score achieved by each oblast in our sample in that indicator.

For example, the indicator Scepticism about reforms shown here (see Figure 1), is measured using three questions, on a scale from 0 (“Strongly disagree”) to 3 (“Strongly agree”).

Q1. To what extent do you agree that reforms in Ukraine are mere publicity stunts, and they will not be effective?
Q2. To what extent do you agree that reforms in Ukraine will not benefit the ordinary people?
Q3. To what extent do you agree that reforms are gradually improving our country’s situation?

This scale is then summed and rescaled from 0 to 10 to give the scores shown on the map below, based on the equation:

\[
\left( Q1 + Q2 + (3 - Q3) \right) \times \frac{10}{9}
\]
Figure 1: Scepticism about reforms, 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10. Youth sample, aged 18-35, N = 2,185.
Methodology

For this report we defined youth as people from 18 to 35 years old, comparing them to adults, from 36 to 59, and people aged 60 and above.

Data for the reSCORE was collected between 26th March and 15th August 2023. Data from citizens aged 18-35 in 2023 contains those surveyed through random sampling at national level (representative\textsuperscript{12}, total $N = 5,914$ for all ages over 18), strengthened by quota-representative booster sampling of this age group in seven target oblasts\textsuperscript{13} (total $N = 502$).

The combined sample of youth is weighted and representative at national and oblast level, and has a total sample size of 2,185. The total sample size of respondents aged 36 to 59 is 2,567, and for those above 60 1,664. The 2023 data is representative of all government-controlled areas at the time of surveying, and therefore excludes Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

The findings detailed in the present report were validated in a qualitative consultation with experts from three organisations, UNDP, SeeD, and SpivDii.

Comparative SCORE data from 2021 refers to that collected between January and May 2021. This data is representative at national and oblast level, with a total sample size of 3,572 for respondents aged 18 to 35. It contains comparative samples of 5,370 aged 36 to 59, and 3,540 aged over 60. The 2021 data is representative of all government-controlled areas at the time of surveying, and therefore includes Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, but excludes the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Gender differences and differences between other demographic groups were investigated throughout the report and are mentioned where significant.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine the statistical significance of differences between various groups of respondents in this analysis. The significance level was $p < 0.05$. Differences are considered marked in cases where the F statistic is larger than 20, and in cases where the Cohen’s d effect size is “large” (greater than 0.8) or “medium” (greater than 0.4). Pearson correlation coefficients were used to determine significant associations between key variables in the analysis. The significance level was $p < 0.05$, and Pearson correlation coefficients larger than are 0.2 considered noteworthy.

The numbers in the graphs, tables, and heatmaps of SCORE indicators in this report represent the mean scores in these indicators.

\textsuperscript{12} Representative of all government-controlled areas excluding Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

\textsuperscript{13} Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolai, Poltava, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
Table 1: Demographic outline of SCORE samples in the present report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2021</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2023</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>60+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced persons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results
# Summary of key findings

## Human Security

Provision of Public Services and Human Security indicators among young people remain at relatively high levels in 2023 compared to 2021 (Mean scores (out of 10): Provision of Public Services: 6.6, Economic Security: 4.9, Health Security: 6.0, Personal Security: 5.6, and Political Security: 6.8). 80% of young people consider that basic utilities are provided efficiently to a different extent. Around one in two young people feel that they have a stable source of income. From 2021 to 2023, there was a significant increase in Health Security for all age groups, although this increase was lower in young people living in poverty (4.2) and in rural areas (5) compared to youth elsewhere (6.0 out of 10).

## Civic participation

From 2021 to 2023, there was a significant increase in Sense of Civic Duty (5.6 to 6.8 out of 10), particularly in Sense of Civic Responsibility (5.5 to 6.9) in young people, of which 59% believe that what happens to Ukraine in the future is also their problem – an increase of 24 percentage points (p.p). from 2021. Civic Optimism has also increased, with 55% of young people believing that the next generation will be better off, compared to 41% in 2021. Levels of Civic Engagement remain low among youth (2.3), but are higher in young people with higher levels of education (2.8).

## Community cohesion

Young people are generally tolerant towards immigrants (8.3), Muslims (7.5), Jews (7.7), and people with a different colour of skin (7.8), but tolerance is lower towards the Roma community (5.0, with 32% of youth preferring they left their community), the LGBTQ community (4.3, 40% preferring they left their community), and drug users (2.0). However, young people (particularly those aged 18 to 24) are significantly more tolerant of LGBTQ people than older respondents (4.7).

## Individual beliefs and values

Young people tend to be progressive when it comes to Human Rights (6.5) and Gender Equality (6.7). More than 60% of young people believe that freedom of expression and peaceful protest are absolutely necessary, and 34% believe that expressing one's sexual orientation or gender identity is absolutely necessary. Gender Equality Mindset has increased since 2021, and is a key characteristic of youth, with women (7.2) and people aged 18 to 24 (7.1) scoring significantly higher in this indicator. 83% of young people strongly disagree that women should tolerate violence.

## Employability and skills

Despite young people reporting high levels of Entrepreneurship Mentality (7.0), with 78% of them willing to take a certain amount of risk to achieve success, and high levels of Growth Mindset (6.7), with 86% of them interested in expanding their horizons, they struggle to believe that they will find a job easily (4.6), especially those living in poverty (3.3).
**Life satisfaction**

Locality Satisfaction among young people is high (6.7), with 83% agree that their locality is a good place to raise a family, but displaced youth (5.9) and young people living in rural areas (6.0) express significantly lower levels of Locality Satisfaction.

Migration Tendency is significantly higher in young people (4.4), particularly in those aged 18 to 24 (4.8), than adults (3.6 in people aged 36 – 59, and 2.6 and people aged 60+). 36% of young people agree that at some point in the future they want to leave their locality.

Mental Wellbeing has significantly decreased from 2021 to 2023 in young people, from 6.9 to 6.0 out of 10. Almost one in four young people (23%) say that they feel depressed or very sad either often or very often, up from 13% in 2021.

**Satisfaction with the country**

From 2021 to 2023, young people report significant increases in their Sense of Belonging to the Country (7.3 to 8.6). On the other hand, the levels of Sense of Belonging to the Settlement and to the Region are significantly lower than any other age group in young people aged 18 to 35, scoring 7.5 and 7.4 respectively.

**Trust in institutions**

There was significant increase in Trust in Central Institutions among young people, going from 2.9 in 2021 to 4.6 in 2023. This increase did not occur as it pertains to the Trust in Local Institutions. Young people reported a significant increase in the dimension Ukrainian Authorities Care from 2021 (3.0) to 2023 (4.7). Nonetheless, young people living in poverty reported significantly lower levels in this indicator (3.4) than the rest of the sample.

**Future visions**

From 2021 to 2023, young people have become more supportive of Ukraine joining the EU (7.9) and NATO (8.1). There remains consensus across age groups and time that the non-government controlled areas (NGCA) of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts should be part of Ukraine.
**Human security**

In both 2021 and 2023, the levels of Service Provision\(^\text{14}\) and Human Security remain similar between young people (18-35 years of age) and those aged 36 and above, with these levels being relatively high in 2023, with a score of 6.8 and 6.6 respectively. Political Security and Provision of Services remained higher than indicators on Economic, Health, and Personal Security in youth (Table 2).

Around one in two (51%) young people feel that they have a stable source of income (Figure 3) and 63% that they can meet their nutritional needs. Regarding Personal Security, 52% of young people feel that the police can protect them, and 60% feel safe alone in the street at night, compared to 46% of older respondents (see Figure 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Comparison of Human Security and Provision of Public Services, between 2021 and 2023. How efficient do you consider the provision of the following services, as experienced in your locality? Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10, per age group.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021: 18 – 35 years, N = 3572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How efficient do you consider the provision of these services?</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Security</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Security</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Security</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Security</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Public Services</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mean score from 0 to 10, per age group*

There were no significant differences in these indicators from 2021 to 2023 (see Table 2), except for Health Security, which increased from 5.2 to 6.0 out of 10 in respondents aged under 35\(^\text{15}\), and from 4.6 to 5.8 in those aged 36 and above\(^\text{16}\).

Health Security scores are particularly low in young people living in poverty\(^\text{17}\) (4.2) and in rural areas\(^\text{18}\) (5) compared to the rest of the youth sample. Just 18% of those aged 18 to 24 in rural areas have full access to basic and emergency medical services, compared to 38% of the same age group in urban areas. This corresponds to 19% and 32% for those aged 25 to 35, respectively among people aged 18 to 24, 29% in rural areas and 49% in urban areas have difficulty buying necessary medicine. For those aged 25 to 35, the corresponding figures are 21% in rural areas and 42% in urban areas.

Young people aged 18 to 35 also reported lower levels of Health Security than older people in Kherson, Rivne, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts (see Figure 2).

\(^{14}\) The Provision of Services indicator measures the perceived efficiency of services in the respondent’s locality, including those related to education, health care, justice, administrative services, transportation, and basic and emergency services.

\(^{15}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 166.51.

\(^{16}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 735.70.

\(^{17}\) People in poverty are defined as those who cannot afford food. ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 31.58.

\(^{18}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 247.24.
**Figure 2:** Health Security, 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10. Youth sample, aged 18-35, N = 2,185.

**Figure 3:** Personal and Economic Security, 2023. Please tell me to what extent do you...?
Share of those (%) who responded ‘yes, to some extent’ + ‘yes, very much’, per age group. 2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185 | 36 – 59 years, N = 2567 | 60+, N = 1664
Civic participation

Sense of Civic Duty has increased from 2021 to 2023\(^{19}\), with 59% of young people believing that what happens to Ukraine in the future is also their problem, 24 percentage points (p.p.) higher than in 2021 (see Figure 4).

\[\text{Figure 4: Sense of Civic Duty, 2023. To what extent do these statements describe you? Share of those (%) who responded “Not at all like you”, per age group.}
\]

2021: 18 – 35 years, N = 3572 | 36 – 59 years, N = 5370 | 60+, N = 3540.
2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185 | 36 – 59 years, N = 2567 | 60+, N = 1664

Young people also report relatively high levels of Civic Optimism (6.5), with 55% believing that the next generation will be better off, compared to 41% in 2021. These trends are also observed in older respondents.

\[\text{Table 3: Civic Engagement, 2023. How often do you...? Share of those (%) who responded “Sometimes” + “often” + “very often”, per age group.}
\]

2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185 | 36 – 59 years, N = 2567 | 60+, N = 1664

\[\text{ANOVA, } p < 0.01, F = 367.81, \text{ 5.6 out of 10 in 2021, 6.8 in 2023.}\]
In 2023, the mean score for Civic Engagement among young people was 2.3, with higher scores reported among those with higher levels of education\textsuperscript{20} (2.8 in people with higher education degree, compared to 1.6 in those with just primary education). While there are no significant differences between different age groups in Civic Engagement overall, those aged 18 to 24 are much less likely to report that they vote with only 51% reporting it, compared to 87% of those aged 25 to 35, though this may emerge due to them only just having become eligible to vote.

Data shows that youth in Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts report the lowest levels of Civic Engagement (see Figure 5).

Consultations with experts during the validation process identified the need for youth centres which enable co-creation and communication, for better education across demographic groups on the importance of civic participation, as well as better information about civic engagement opportunities as important aspects that influence the levels of engagement. Experts also highlighted the importance of education mentioning that “education lays the groundwork for an information bubble, and well-educated people are inclined to participate more”. Moreover, they mentioned that “the role of parents is also important, as they should teach children to be active from an early age”.

\textbf{Figure 5:} Civic Engagement, 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10. Youth sample, aged 18-35, N =2,185.
Nevertheless, data indicates that since the full-scale invasion began, 53% of young people under 24 have donated money, and 28% have volunteered to help people in need, alongside 26% who have volunteered to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine (see Table 4). This trend shows that young people tend to engage more through passive means of participation. Another report found that the number of young people volunteering for the first time has increased after the war, from 6% in 2021 to 30% in 2023. 

Table 4: Civic Action & Resistance, 2023. Which of the following actions did you take or are you already taking since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022? Share of those (%) who responded “yes”, per age group.
2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185 | 36 – 59 years, N = 2567 | 60+, N = 1664

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-29</th>
<th>30-35</th>
<th>36-59</th>
<th>60+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donate money</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host IDPs in my house free-of-charge</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join territorial defence force or another armed group(s)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in cyber-attack and information resistance</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report war crimes</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer to help people in need</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU)</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community cohesion

There are no large differences in the levels of Community Cooperation between those aged 18 to 35 and older respondents within the 2023 sample, although there has been a notable increase in these levels across age groups, and in particular among older respondents. In 2023, 21% of respondents aged 18 to 35 feel that they can rely on members in their community very much, compared to 26% for 36 to 59-year-olds and 29% of those aged over 60. In 2023, 73% of respondents of all ages agree to some extent\(^{22}\) that their community is transforming for the better.

Overall, Marginalisation\(^{23}\) is low, although slightly higher in respondents under the age of 35\(^{24}\). These respondents report higher marginalisation because of gender\(^{25}\), education\(^{26}\) and income\(^{27}\) compared to older respondents (see also Table 5).

Table 5: Marginalisation, 2023. How often are you, members of your family, and close friends are treated unfairly because of...? Share of those (%) who responded “sometimes” + “often” + “very often”, per age group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>18-35</th>
<th>36-59</th>
<th>60+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health status or disability</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of income</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality or ethnicity</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native language</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political opinions</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious beliefs and opinions</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual orientation</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the levels of Social Tolerance that young people report towards Immigrants, Muslims, Jews, and people with a different colour of skin are high (ranging from 8.3 to 7.8 out of 10); the levels of tolerance towards LGBTQ+ (4.3), Roma people (5.0), and drug users (2.0) are low.

\(^{22}\) This includes people who responded “somewhat agree” and “strongly agree”.
\(^{23}\) The Marginalisation indicator reports if the respondent, their family or close friends have been treated unfairly due to different aspects of their identity.
\(^{24}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 23.88 Mean score 0.7 in 18-35 year-olds, 0.5 in 36-59 year-olds, 0.5 in those aged over 60.
\(^{25}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 23.08.
\(^{26}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 31.01.
\(^{27}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 29.73.
While tolerance among youth increased from 2021 to 2023 towards immigrants, Muslims and people with a different colour of skin (Table 6), tolerance towards drug users decreased, and that towards members of the LGBTQ+ and Roma communities remained consistently low, with 40% and 32% of young people reportedly preferring that these two groups left their community completely, respectively. Nevertheless, younger people aged 18 to 24 reported significantly higher levels of tolerance towards LGBTQ+ people than older age groups, with a score of 4.7 in 2023. A different report suggested that the war had affected economically Roma people, and reinforced negative attitudes towards LGBTQ people, which also increases their vulnerability.

Social Tolerance towards LGBTQ+ people was reportedly lower among youth in Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts; while lower levels of tolerance towards the Roma community were observed in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, and Poltava oblasts.

Table 6: Comparison of Social Tolerance, between 2021 and 2023. How do you feel about the various groups of people listed below? Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10, per age group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social tolerance towards...</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug users</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTQ+ community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People with a different colour of skin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean score from 0 to 10, per age group

28 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 51.84.
29 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 29.41.
30 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 43.19.
31 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 21.65.
32 ANOVA, p <0.01, F = 102.31. Mean score 18-24 4.7, 25-35 4.1, 36-59 3.3, over 60 2.2 out of 10.
Individual beliefs and values

Most young people were found to align with progressive values, particularly regarding support for Human Rights and gender equality. Young people report high levels of Belief in Human Rights\(^\text{34}\) (6.5), which encompasses freedom of religion, expression, protest, sexual orientation, abortion, and same-sex marriage. More than six in ten people of all ages believe that freedom of expression and peaceful protest are absolutely necessary (see Figure 7). Of respondents aged 18 to 35, 34% believe that expressing one's sexual orientation or gender identity is absolutely necessary (44% of them responded they would accept to interact with LGBT people personally in the Social Tolerance indicator), and 36% believe that the freedom to choose to have an abortion is absolutely necessary. These correspond to 23% and 28% of respondents aged over 60, respectively.

**Figure 6**: Gender Equality Mindset, 2023. To what extent do you agree with these statements? Share of those (%) who responded "strongly" + "somewhat" agree, per age group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>18-35</th>
<th>36-49</th>
<th>60+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women should have more delicate jobs</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men in the family should have the final word when important decisions are made</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are too emotional and this affects their rationality and judgement</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a man is capable of providing for the family the woman should take care of the kids instead of working</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men should not cry even when something really bad happens</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men are not capable of taking care of children on their own</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A husband, as the head of the family, may discipline his wife to correct her behaviour</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should tolerate violence to keep the family together</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{34}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 24.89. Mean scores 6.5 for those aged 18-35, 6.2 for 36-59. 6.8 for over 60 years old.
From 2021 to 2023, there was a significant improvement in the Gender Equality Mindset in young people, which grew from 6.0 to 6.736; this indicator is significantly higher in women (7.2), and younger people aged 18 to 24 (7.1). The improvement in Gender Equality Mindset is particularly a result of lower reported levels of Gender Stereotypes in young people, which has decreased from a mean score of 5.0 in 2021 to 4.1 in 2023, and again significantly lower in women (3.5), and younger people aged 18 to 24 (3.7). Gender Equality Mindset was lower in young people in Zakarpattia, Poltava, and Rivne oblasts.

Figure 7: Respect for Human Rights, 2023. Which rights do you think are absolutely necessary and which are optional or unnecessary? Share of those (%) who responded “absolutely necessary”, per age group.
2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185 | 36 – 59 years, N = 2567 | 60+, N = 1664

- ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 177.08 between 2021 and 2023 in 18-35-year-olds.
- ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 141.14 between men and women aged 18 to 35.
- ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 18.76.
- ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 269.88.
- ANOVA, p < 0.01.
- ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 16.9.
Employability and skills

Young people struggle to believe that they will find a job easily. The mean score for the Employment Opportunities indicator is 4.6 out of 10, and youth living in poverty report an even lower mean score (3.3 out of 10). Despite this, young people aged 18 to 35 report relatively high levels of Entrepreneurship Mentality (7.0), with 78% willing to undertake business risks. Moreover, young people report high levels in the Growth Mindset indicator (6.7), with 86% of them interested in expanding their horizons (see Table 7).

Figure 8: Employment Opportunities, 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10. Youth sample, aged 18-35, N=2,185.
### Table 7: Comparison of Employment Opportunities, Entrepreneurship Mentality, and Growth Mindset, between 2021 and 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10, per age group.

2021: 18 – 35 years, N = 3572 | 36 – 59 years, N = 5370 | 60+, N = 3540
2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185 | 36 – 59 years, N = 2567 | 60+, N = 1664

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>36-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Opportunities</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship Mentality</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Mindset</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mean score from 0 to 10, per age group*
Life satisfaction

Levels of Locality Satisfaction across young people have remained steadily high since 2021 (6.3 in 2021 and 6.7 in 2023). 83% of young people agree that their locality is a good place to raise a family. Data from 2023 shows that the type of settlement and individual experience of displacement influence the individual’s satisfaction with their locality, with levels reportedly higher in young returnees (7.6) and young people in urban areas (7.1), and lower in displaced youth (5.9), and young people living in rural areas (6.0). Lower levels of satisfaction were reported in Kherson, Chernihiv, and Rivne oblasts (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: Locality Satisfaction, 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10. Youth sample, aged 18-35, N = 2,185.

There were no significant changes in Migration Tendency over time, which is higher in young people (4.4), particularly in those aged 18 to 24 (4.8), in comparison to older people (3.6 in people aged 36 – 59, and 2.6 and people aged 60+). 36% of young people agree that at some point in the future they want to leave their locality.

45 Locality is defined as the current place of living of the respondent.
46 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 22.40 compared to other people aged 18 to 35.
47 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 123.38 compared to rural young people.
48 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 22.40 compared to other people aged 18 to 35.
49 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 123.38 compared to urban young people.
50 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 202.3 compared to older people.
51 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 14.41 compared to other young people.
A potential explanation for the lack of increase in this indicator is that many young people have already left the country, and many of the ones who stayed did not were planning to relocate\(^\text{52}\). Young people score higher in Migration tendency in Ivano-Frankivs'k, Khmelnytskyi, and Sumy oblasts (see Figure 10). Experts pointed to the main driver for migration being economic opportunities, noting that if good opportunities are present for people in Ukraine, they are less likely to leave the country.

**Figure 10:** Migration Tendency, 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10.
Youth sample, aged 18-35, N = 2,185.

Young people who emigrate are tied to their parents. Of course, they can express their opinions, but they are minors and their parents, who say that it is better abroad, decide for them more. Many young people want to study abroad, but the question is whether they will return to Ukraine and work here.

*Expert on her opinion on young people’s migration tendencies*

---

\(^{52}\) *Impact of War on Youth in Ukraine. Findings and Recommendations*, UNDP, 2023.
Figure 11: Locality Satisfaction and Migration Tendency, 2023. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about your current locality? Share of those (%) who responded “strongly” + “somewhat” agree.

2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185 | 36 – 59 years, N = 2567 | 60+, N = 1664

- **There are different leisure activities I can do in my locality:**
  - 18-35: 63%
  - 36-49: 64%
  - 60+: 61%

- **My locality is a good place to raise a family:**
  - 18-35: 83%
  - 36-49: 88%
  - 60+: 89%

- **My locality is a good place to live and work:**
  - 18-35: 75%
  - 36-49: 81%
  - 60+: 83%

- **At some point in the future, I hope to leave this locality:**
  - 18-35: 25%
  - 36-49: 19%
  - 60+: 36%

- **My friends often talk about making a better life somewhere else:**
  - 18-35: 55%
  - 36-49: 45%
  - 60+: 30%

- **I often find myself comparing the benefits of emigrating somewhere else versus staying in this country:**
  - 18-35: 35%
  - 36-49: 27%
  - 60+: 18%

Mental Wellbeing significantly decreased among youth, from 6.9 in 2021 to 6.0 in 2023\(^53\), equivalent to increases from 3.6 to 4.5 out of 10 for Anxious Tendencies\(^54\), and 2.8 to 3.6 for Depressive Tendencies\(^55\) (see Figure 12). Anxious tendencies are higher in young women than in the rest of the sample. The mental wellbeing of youth is slightly, but significantly, higher than for older people\(^56\). Almost one in four young people (23%) say they feel depressed or very sad often or very often, up by 10 percentage points (p.p.) from 2021. Further, 40% say that they worry a lot about bad things (up 10 p.p.), and 33% that they have trouble getting themselves to stop worrying (10 p.p. higher), while 24% report that they do not feel like doing anything (up from 16%), and 16% that they feel bad about things that they have done (14% in 2021). Finally, compared to respondents over the age of 60, those aged 18 to 35 report higher levels of Aggression\(^57\), with these ones being particularly higher in men, though there are no significant increases in this indicator over time.

---

53 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 246.63.
54 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 190.73.
55 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 205.17.
56 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 30.86.
57 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 55.7.
Figure 12: Comparison of Anxiety, Depression, and Aggression, between 2021 to 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10, per age group.
2021: 18 – 35 years, N = 3572 | 36 – 59 years, N = 5370 | 60+, N = 3540
2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185 | 36 – 59 years, N = 2567 | 60+, N = 1664
Satisfaction with the country

Sense of Belonging to the Country increased significantly from 7.3 in 2021 to 8.6 in 2023\(^{56}\), while Sense of Belonging to the Settlement\(^{59}\) and Region experienced smaller increases\(^{60}\) (see Table 8). In 2023, 74% of young people said they were very attached to the country, up by 24 p.p. from 50% in 2021. Similar increases are seen for older age groups, where 80% of 36-59-year-olds feel very attached to the country in 2023, up from 61%, corresponding to 87% of over-60-year-olds in 2023, from 72% in 2021.

Sense of Belonging Overall is consistently lower in those aged 18 to 35\(^{61}\), as is Sense of Belonging to the Settlement and to the Region\(^{62}\). Sense of Belonging to the Settlement was particularly lower in Kyiv, Ternopil, and Poltava oblasts.

Table 8: Comparison for Sense belonging, between 2021 and 2023. Please tell me how attached you feel to the following...? Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10, per age group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>36-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of belonging (overall)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of belonging to the country</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of belonging to the region</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of belonging to the settlement</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Young people want freedom and can’t stand pressure. And being tied to a place is always pressure. Most of them identify themselves as Ukrainians, but they may be physically in Poland or Germany. In other words, you don’t have to live in Ukraine to be a Ukrainian.

Expert on her opinion on young people’s sense of belonging

\(^{58}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 307.83.
\(^{59}\) Settlement is defined as the village, town, or city of residence of the respondent.
\(^{60}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 46.23 for region, F = 52.69 for settlement.
\(^{61}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 122.75 between age groups.
\(^{62}\) ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 105.59, 109.43.
Trust in institutions

When it comes to Trust in Institutions, there was a significant increase in young people’s Trust in Central Institutions, from 2.9 to 4.6\(^\text{63}\) (see Figure 13); with the central institutions group including the President, Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, and courts. This trend is reflected across age groups. Trust in central institutions was lower in Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, and Sumy oblasts. Nonetheless, this increase did not occur in Trust in Local Institutions, which includes the Oblast state administration, town or village administration, and mayor or town head or the head of the MCA\(^\text{64}\), which remained at moderate levels, with lower levels in Kherson, Rivne, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

![Figure 13: Comparison of Trust in Institutions, between 2021 and 2023. To what extent do you trust these institutions? Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10, per age group.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>2021 Score</th>
<th>2023 Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18–35</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36–49</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, there was a significant increase in the perception that Ukrainian Authorities Aare\(^\text{65}\) (see Figure 14), indicating that young\(^\text{66}\) and older people alike are more likely to feel cared for, heard, and represented by the public authorities; the increase for those aged 18 to 35 ranges from 3.0 in 2021 to 4.7 in 2023. However, this indicator was the lowest in Kherson, Rivne, and Zhytomyr oblasts (see Figure 15). Despite the generalized positive increase, young people living in poverty reported significantly lower levels\(^\text{66}\) in their perception that authorities do care (3.4 out of 10). In 2023, 51% of youth believe that authorities care equally about all parts of Ukraine, and 44% that public authorities are attentive to the needs of ordinary people, equivalent to increases of 23 and 24 p.p., respectively over the 2021 scores.

---

63 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 887.21 from 2021 to 2023 for young people.
64 Military civil administration.
65 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 727.47 for 18-35 year-olds.
66 ANOVA, p < 0.01, F = 21.45 compared to other youth.
Figure 14: Comparison of Ukrainian Authorities Care, from 2021 and 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10, per age group.
2021: 18 – 35 years, N = 3572 | 36 – 59 years, N = 5370 | 60+, N = 3540
2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185 | 36 – 59 years, N = 2567 | 60+, N = 1664

Figure 15: Ukrainian Authorities Cares, 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10. Youth sample, aged 18-35, N = 2,185.
Future visions

A consensus remains on the future of the non-government controlled areas (NGCA) of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, with 84% of respondents of all ages agreeing that the NGCA should remain part of Ukraine with the same legal status as all other oblasts (see Table 9). There are no significant changes in this indicator since 2021.

Table 9: Comparison for Future visions for NGCA, between 2021 and 2023. How would you evaluate the following scenarios of the future of non-government controlled areas of Donetska and Luhanska oblasts? Share of those who responded "strongly" + "somewhat" agree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2021</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2023</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>36-59</td>
<td>60+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remain part of Ukraine, with the same legal status as other oblasts</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remain part of Ukraine, with special autonomy status</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Become part of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Become internationally recognised independent countries</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revert back to the status quo before February 2022 (previously Just maintain current situation)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent "strongly" + "somewhat" agree

There was a significant increase in Support for Membership of the European Union (EU) as well as NATO among both youth and older people: specifically, the support for the EU grew from 6.6 to 7.9 in youth, and for NATO from 5.8 to 8.1 also in the youth sample. On the contrary, there was a significant decrease in Support for Membership of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (from 2.0 to 0.8 within the youth sample) and for non-aligned status (4.8 to 3.3 within the youth sample) (see Figure 16).
**Figure 16**: Comparison of Support to EU, NATO, EEU membership, and for non-aligned status, between 2021 and 2023. Mean scores on a scale from 0 to 10, per age group.

2021: 18 – 35 years, N = 3572 | 36 – 59 years, N = 5370 | 60+, N = 3540
2023: 18 – 35 years, N = 2185 | 36 – 59 years, N = 2567 | 60+, N = 1664
Recommendations
Young people living in poverty and in rural areas are identified as the most vulnerable groups with reference to Health Security concerns compared to the general youth sample.

Recommendations:
- Raise awareness about the barriers that youth in poverty and rural areas, and support strategies such as providing mobile clinic services with increased attention to rural areas and low-income neighbourhoods.
- Addressing poverty in youth through the implementation of “first employment” quotas for businesses.

While the findings point to an increase in the Sense of Civic Duty and Civic Responsibility among youth, the levels of Civic Engagement among young people are relatively low, indicating an inclination to civically engage but a hesitancy to act. Civic Engagement levels were found to be closely related to the level of education, with young people coming from higher education backgrounds having higher levels of Civic Engagement.

Recommendations:
- Involvement of youth in the design and implementation of recovery plans for Ukraine, by unpacking recovery process and ensure that young people are being informed about ways on how to contribute and participate on them.
- Implementation of different strategy to raise civic awareness among youth, such as civic literacy workshops in schools providing information and inspiration on different ways to exercise rights on local, national, and state levels, or media campaigns targeting youth utilising encouraging and motivating rhetoric on civic engagement.
- Increase support for civil society actors, for example by the creation of a youth volunteering platform with easy online access to a database of volunteering opportunities for youth.

Young people tend to be more intolerant towards the Roma and the LGBTQ+ communities compared to their tolerance towards other marginalised groups. Yet, the findings indicate that people aged 18 to 24 have the lowest levels of intolerance towards the LGBTQ+ community compared to older people.

Recommendations:
- Role of the media in improving visibility of the Roma and the LGBTQ+ communities with realistic portrayals of these groups as active members of the society.
- Creation of youth ambassadors, intergroup dialogue workshops, and events led by a collaboration of civil society organisations working with LGBTQ and Roma people focusing on youth.
- In the validation process, experts suggested to “engage in educational activities to raise awareness”.

Although Gender Equality Mindset is a positive key characteristic of youth in Ukraine, and particularly among women and people aged 18 to 24, 55% of youth still think that women should have more delicate jobs, and 42% believe that women are too emotional and that they should take care of the children if the man can provide.

Recommendations:
- Workshops and awareness raising campaigns led by civil society organisations targeting women, aiming to encourage involvement in industries they are underrepresented in such as computer science and engineering.
- The media to play a role in transcending gender stereotypes in their portrayal of women, avoiding the dominant narrative of men as defenders amidst the full-scale invasion and promoting more positive masculinity examples.

Despite young people reporting high levels of Entrepreneurship Mentality, with 78% of them willing to take a certain amount of risk to achieve success, and high levels of Growth mindset, with 86% of them interested in expanding their horizons, they struggle to believe that they will find a job easily.

Recommendations:
- Provide career guidance during education by implementing assessments for skill matching between labour demand and supply.
- Implementation of job centres for youth to form a bridge between employers and young job seekers.
- Youth civil society organisations to introduce entrepreneurship workshops providing concrete information on business planning for youth to capitalise on their already existing growth mentality.

Displaced youth and young people living in rural areas have lower Locality Satisfaction than the rest of the youth sample.

Recommendations:
- Involving the needs of youth in the Strategy for Integration of Internally Displaced Persons, introducing local youth groups to organise events to familiarise and include displaced youth in the local life.
- Similarly, for youth living in rural areas, introducing local youth groups to organise events to increase solidarity among youth in rural areas.
Levels of Mental Wellbeing have decreased for youth from 2021 to 2023. Depression should be particularly addressed since data suggests that one in four young people reported feeling depressed or very sad.

**Recommendations:**
- Implement school-based mental health services, to destigmatise the use of them, and to facilitate their accessibility for youth in school.
- Awareness raising campaigns on how to access mental health services, and combating the stigma associated with these.
- Implement initiatives that address the different needs of youth, such as support to hotlines that address the needs of youth and children, implementation of local support groups for youth to discuss mental health issues, and provision of online support groups for youth with no access to transportation.

Young people aged 18 to 35 report lower levels of Sense of Belonging to their Settlement and Region and higher levels of Migration Tendency. The report further found that young people living in poverty have an increasing belief that Ukrainian authorities do not care, as reported in the Trust in Institutions section.

**Recommendations:**
- Address the barriers that youth in different contexts face, ensuring that youth voices are heard in the recovery process of Ukraine by including youth committees in decision-making.
- Advocate and build capacities for local leaders to play a role in meaningfully interacting and addressing the needs and concerns of youth.
- Providing youth with employment opportunities encouraging their active participation in the economic sphere.
- Collaboration of youth civil society organisations with organisations focused on Ukrainian arts and culture to engage youth with local arts.
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