LISTENING TO PEACE:
BETWEEN CONTRASTS AND LONGINGS FOR PEACE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
LISTENING TO PEACE: BETWEEN CONTRASTS AND LONGINGS FOR PEACE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

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We the Peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind (...), have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims. So begins the Charter of the United Nations, the historic founding document of the UN that, after two disastrous world wars, rose as a categorical call to prevent such events from ever recurring. With this same determination and desire, we wish to initiate this new report, Listening to Peace: the third UNDP survey investigating Colombians’ perceptions of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement’s implementation in the municipalities most affected by the armed conflict. The report is one whose spirit closely mirrors that of the 1945 Charter in that it listens to the voices of the victims and invites collective action to build peace.

This new report shares the trends and sentiments of more than twenty thousand people polled since the first round of the survey in 2019. The initial three survey rounds took place in the PDET zones: the most war-torn areas of Colombia where people overwhelmingly voted “yes” in the 2016 peace agreement referendum. This third edition also measures, for the first time, the perceptions of over 1,100 people in five major cities of the country where the majority referendum vote was “no.”

Three important trends emerged. One, perhaps the most relevant, is the sustained increase in those who have some level of satisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Agreement: between 2019 and 2023, the percentage of satisfied individuals has risen from 35.9% to 58.2%. Although there’s room for improvement, the positive trend in the perceptions of the peace accord’s benefits—and the fact that those who were already satisfied show greater optimism towards negotiating a peace agreement with the ELN—demonstrates two learnings. Firstly, it offers confirmation that Colombia has taken the right path, and secondly, it affirms the need to fulfill the commitments made during the peace process, bearing in mind that the timelines set out by the Peace Agreement and state institutions may not align with the expectations held by communities.

Secondly, despite increased satisfaction with the overall implementation of the Peace Agreement, challenges persist in (a) Colombians’ perceptions of progress as it relates to Comprehensive Rural Reform (RRI), (b) State responsibility to impart justice against armed groups, (c) the desire for the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to take an approach of punitive justice, and (d) the distrust towards the signatories of the Peace Agreement: only one in four people would feel comfortable having an ex-combatant as a neighbor.
Thirdly, the dividends of peace are experienced unevenly across territories. For example, in Sur de Urabá, Bolívar, Urabá Antioqueño, Sierra Nevada-Perijá, and Montes de María, there is both greater overall satisfaction and a greater provision of community goods than in municipalities such as Catatumbo, Pacífico y Frontera Nariñense, and Pacífico Medio. Additionally, the heightened belief that the armed conflict is ongoing or will return (as detected in Catatumbo, Pacífico Medio, and Sur de Bolívar) contrasts with the perceptions of conflict in Alto Patía-Norte del Cauca. It seems clear that, in terms of enjoying the benefits of peace, there is not one uniform Colombian experience.

Recognizing these dynamics and their impact reveals that peace has multiple meanings. For some, it is a hope for the minimum, for survival: it is simply the silence of guns. For others, it implies the provision of state-provided goods and services. Finally, for those in a more advanced stage of security, it is closely linked to human development, or rather, the ability for all people to imagine, seek, and develop a dignified and fulfilling life in accordance with their own culture and aspirations.

The 2016 Peace Agreement, like the 1945 United Nations Charter, expresses both a desire for and commitment to peace: not because it was thought that their signing would automatically change reality, but because of the knowledge that the first step to secure peace was to recognize the atrocities of war and assume a shared responsibility to avoid their repetition. The results of Listening to Peace demonstrate that the first fruits of peace, like a virtuous domino effect, tend to bring additional desires for reconciliation. The Colombian people continue to bet on peace as if it were their destiny. Hence, the importance of measuring the perceptions of those in the most neglected territories, wherein bullets prevented such voices from being heard— for their perception of the current reality will largely determine the possibility of attaining a peaceful future.

Preserving future generations from the scourge of armed conflict will be possible as long as the dividends of peace are experienced with the same intensity throughout all of Colombia’s territories.

Sara Ferrer Olivella
Residente Representative
UNPD Colombia
All Colombians want peace. All of them! It is easy to lose sight of this reality given the duration and magnitude of the armed conflict, as well as the political polarization surrounding the issue. The truth is that no one wants to live in a state of war. If this desire has not been achieved, it is because the country has not yet fully agreed on what it means to live in peace—or on the best way to secure it. Among other questions, much debate remains over whether to pursue peace through negotiated agreement or military victory; whether to focus on ending armed confrontations or correcting the conditions that caused them; and whether to address perpetrators with transitional or punitive justice mechanisms. It has not even been possible to agree on what adjective should describe this longed-for peace scenario: whether it should be “stable and lasting,” “with legality,” or “total.”

The 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP is not immune to this dissent. While for some it was a historic milestone that established the structural guidelines for national reconciliation, for others it was a baseless imposition that favored illegal actors; what for some is a successful text that merely lacked the political will and governmental flexibility to implement, for others was a flawed and failed document from the start. None of these debates are innocuous. The problem is that they reflect a climate of polarization and discontent resulting from a dialogue in which the most resonant voices have been those of political leaders, media, academics, influencers, and urban civil society, but which do not necessarily reflect the reality of the country as a whole. In fact, if the country paused for a moment to look towards the territories most affected by the armed conflict, it would find a diametrically different—and potentially surprising—narrative.

Over the past five years, nearly twenty thousand people from the 16 subregions of the Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (PDET, in Spanish) surveyed by the Listening to Peace project have told very different stories that highlight growing optimism not only towards the accomplishments of the Peace Agreement but also towards potential new negotiation processes. These stories are ones of contrasts, challenges, and fears, far from the assumed view that overall, the country is sharply divided on peace. They are the perceptions of citizens who suffered the ravages of the conflict and who experience both the progress and setbacks of the Agreement: reason enough for the country to respect their lived experience, recognize their expertise on the subject, and begin to listen to them in order to decide on the present and future of peace in Colombia.
This survey, *Listening to Peace: Between Contrasts and Longings for Peace and Human Development*, aims to do exactly this, with UNDP providing the foundation for public debate while also including, in this third edition, comparable data from a sample of five major Colombian cities. ²

The report does not intend to replace formal mechanisms for verifying compliance with the Final Peace Agreement, but rather seeks to complement and enrich them with citizen perception indicators that can help to design and implement programs and public policies that take into account satisfaction with the peace process in the PDET territories. Peace implies not only the absence of direct violence (negative peace), but also overcoming the underlying structural conditions to provide for justice, well-being, coexistence, human rights, and human development (positive peace). Living in peace means being able to develop one’s life to the full, without fear, and with access to essential freedoms (UNDP, 2023).

One of the report’s most important findings reveals that Colombians remain hopeful about the implementation of the Peace Agreement. Between 2019 and 2023, the percentage of people in the PDET territories who feel some degree of satisfaction with its results has substantially increased—even respondents who felt pessimistic six years ago have improved their views and recognize the progress made. This can be attributed to the country’s advances in recent years to close social gaps in rural areas and in the PDET subregions, where multidimensional poverty has decreased, and access to education and health has improved (as found in the latest National Human Development Report in Colombia) (UNDP, 2024). Multiple concerning territorial disparities still persist, and the level of satisfaction with the Agreement is significantly lower in the major cities, but the overall trend remains positive.

A second notable finding is that the comprehensive implementation of the Peace Agreement is crucial not only for its own sustainability but also for the eventual implementation of future peace agreements. The majority of those who feel most satisfied with the implementation of the Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP are inclined to think that negotiations with the ELN will succeed. This correlation seems to indicate that peace dividends not only help to close gaps but can also lay the groundwork for achieving a broader peace through negotiations with other armed groups.

Analysis of the collected data reveals a clear trend among the Colombian population regarding the management of the armed conflict in the country: a marked preference for a negotiated solution as the main strategy to address the presence and threat of armed groups such as the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), the FARC dissidents, and the ELN. This preference is especially pronounced in municipalities affected by violence, where the majority of inhabitants seem to consider that the use of force entails significant risks to their lives, safety, and well-being.

Perceptions of peace are not homogeneous throughout the country, as the territories’ different contexts largely determine their level of optimism. Thus, for example, where people perceive greater insecurity, the rewards of the 2016 Peace Agreement feel more distant. Four out of five people in the PDET subregions believe that the conflict either is ongoing or will return to their territories. Such trends

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² The April 2024 survey round had a sample of 1,172 people across five major Colombian cities (Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla, and Bucaramanga).
in the perception of conflict have remained constant over the six years of the survey’s application, with a notable increase in 2023. Additionally, in correspondence with new waves of urban violence, the majority of people in the five major cities surveyed perceive that the security situation has worsened. Without a safe environment, it is difficult not only to implement the Peace Agreement and safeguard lives, but also to establish trust in institutions, promote citizen participation in decision-making, and carry out reconciliation and sustainable development processes.

The presence and social control of armed groups in several PDET subregions continues to undermine confidence in state institutions and the justice system. While the conflict has been fueled by weak access to justice, so too has violence itself perpetuated further obstacles to justice. Moreover, the unequal access to justice among populations and territories exacerbates pre-existing inequalities and widens gaps in access to and trust in local justice authorities.

Over the past year, the perception of the state as the entity most accountable for providing justice has decreased, while it has increased for criminal organizations, the ELN, and FARC dissidents. State institutions nonetheless continue to be the authorities most frequently approached by citizens for justice and dispute resolution in most subregions. However, the number of people in the PDET areas who have sought justice in the past year is minimal, potentially due to individuals’ moderate to low confidence in these institutions, as well as their perceived ineffectiveness. Pursuing a positive peace, and promoting the rule of law, will therefore require expanding access to justice on a local level.

With this in mind, it is clear that state presence is an important variable for sustaining peace, since people perceive that they are protected by institutions when they successfully access basic services. In this way, people long for greater institutional presence of the state as a crucial step towards rebuilding trust, peace, and development. In recent years, there has been a trend of heightened perception of state presence in the PDET subregions, although most people still believe that the Peace Agreement has not increased it.

Given that state presence is related to the provision of basic goods and services and the improvement of quality of life, this trend also corresponds to an increase in the perception of community goods provision in the PDET territories. Providing the basic conditions for human development—health, income, and access to education—enables individuals to pursue fulfilling lives that depart from lawlessness and violence (UNDP, 2024). However, these advances are still uneven between regions, with limited state presence in certain territories detracting from human development and peace. Thus, reducing such inequalities between territories will remain an ongoing challenge for the peace process.

Unequal state presence and the lack of minimum protection guarantees for certain populations, such as farming and ethnic communities, have given rise to a heartbreaking number of victims in the rural periphery. These population groups, whose rights are threatened by armed conflict and structural violence, require transformative attention and reparations. This is particularly important since the number of people in the PDET areas who report having suffered a victimizing event has increased. Of these people, the majority are registered in the Single Registry of Victims (RUV), but less than a quarter have received...
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reparations, a figure that corresponds to national trends in the provision of reparations. Peacebuilding in the territories will therefore require a comprehensive approach centered on reducing inequalities among conflict victims. Capacidades básicas que requieren las personas para iniciar trayectorias de vida plena, que las aleje de la ilegalidad y la violencia (PNUD, 2024). Sin embargo, estos avances son aún desiguales entre regiones. La presencia limitada del Estado en ciertos territorios va en detrimento del desarrollo humano y de la paz, y acelerar la convergencia entre los territorios que perciben presencia del Estado y los que no representa una agenda pendiente para la paz.

Transformative reparations must address the structural roots of violence and vulnerability, as peace is created through the inclusion of all voices, and especially those that have been marginalized. The Peace Agreement centers victims through its Comprehensive System for Peace (SIP), which establishes commitments to truth, justice, reparations, and non-repetition. The high value placed on former combatants engaging in truth-telling mechanisms, asking for forgiveness, and compensating victims is not reflected in PDET citizens’ preferences around restorative justice.

Both in the PDET subregions and in the major cities, there is still a high expectation for punitive justice. Indeed, the majority of citizens favor prison sentences without sentence reductions, with the second most common preference being for prison sentences with reduced sentences if offenders engage in truth-telling and provide reparations. The third, far less popular, preference is for a non-custodial sentence provided that offenders engage in truth-telling and provide reparations. These preferences may reflect the deep divisions left by the conflict and the distrust or lack of knowledge about the transitional justice mechanisms working to restore victims’ dignity.

These findings demonstrate that peace is a process of many contrasts: one that is lived differently throughout the various PDET territories. To highlight the differences in subregional dynamics and their evolution over time, this report defines a few indicators that are broadly representative of the various aspects of the Peace Agreement and peace more broadly defined: satisfaction with the implementation of the Agreement, security, access to local justice, presence of and confidence in the state, reintegration, restorative justice, victim reparations, and reconciliation.

No subregion showed trends of improvement for all eight indicators between 2021 and 2023, which implies that there are disparities in the progress of each territory. Overall, satisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Agreement and state presence improved in 13 of the 16 territories. Justice processes implemented by the state improved in only one region (Sierra Nevada-Perijá), whereas other indicators worsened. In regions such as Alto Patía-Norte del Cauca and Putumayo, seven of the eight indicators improved with the sole exception of state-imparted justice, which declined. In Chocó and Urabá Antioqueño, in addition to justice, the variable for reintegration also decreased. Macarena-Guaviare and Catatumbo showed

3 For each indicator, the following percentages were calculated for rounds 2 and 3 of the MAPS Survey: 1) Satisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Agreement: percentage of those who felt very satisfied, satisfied, or somewhat satisfied with the implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement signed between the Government and the FARC-EP. 2) Security: percentage who believe that security has improved, or has remained good or very good in the last 12 months. 3) Justice: percentage who affirm that state and local authorities are the ones who impart justice in the last 12 months. 4) Restorative justice: percentage who have a lot of trust or some trust in the JEP. 5) Attention to victims: percentage of victims who claim to have received reparations from the State. 6) Presence of and trust in the State: percentage who perceive an increase in state presence and community goods provision in the last 12 months. 7) Reconciliation: percentage who believe that the country is progressing towards reconciliation. 8) Reintegration-Reincorporation: percentage who would feel comfortable having former members of armed groups (FARC-EP, ELN, and paramilitaries) as neighbors.
few improvements—notably, satisfaction with the Peace Agreement and perception of security—but marked reductions in justice and restorative justice. Given this disparate landscape, it is imperative to understand such territorial differences in order to effectively lay the foundation for human development and peace.

Inequalities in peacebuilding in the PDET zones has been the focus of the MAPS survey across its three rounds, but the future of peace in Colombia lies not only in the PDET territories but also in its urban areas. The five major cities surveyed show less optimism about progress on various issues regarding the Peace Agreement and the future of peace, but they also express interest in participating in the process. The lower level of optimism regarding the peace accord’s implementation may be explained by city populations’ greater distance from the conflict, the lower number of direct beneficiaries of the peace process, or the persistence of beliefs that fueled many cities to vote “no” in the 2016 referendum.

Nevertheless, more than 50% of people in the cities surveyed favor a negotiated settlement with other armed groups, express a desire to participate in negotiations with the ELN, support victims’ rights guarantees, and recognize the work of actors such as the Community Actions Boards (JAC) in providing goods and services on the local level. These findings are relevant because national reconciliation requires including cities in both the decision-making process and resulting peace dividends: not only because of their role in receiving victim populations and reintegrated individuals, but also as territories directly impacted by the armed conflict and new forms of violence.

All of the above reflects the intrinsic connections between peace and reconciliation. Reconciliation is a crucial process for achieving lasting peace, as it addresses the emotional and social wounds caused by conflict, thereby promoting forgiveness, justice, and truth. Without reconciliation, peace becomes fragile and superficial, as unresolved tensions and the underlying causes of the conflict may resurface. The results of the MAPS survey indicate that reconciliation is a complex and gradual social process that involves a diversity of active efforts at multiple levels.

Figure 1. Radar Chart of Strategic Indicators (2021 and 2023)

Note. These indicators show the percentage of those in each subregion who are in agreement with or perceive the different strategic indicators mentioned and elaborated on in this report. The above graph shows the evolution of such indicators for the regions of Montes de María and Catatumbo since, for the majority of the survey rounds, they exhibited the highest and lowest scores, respectively. Source: 2023 MAPS Survey (UNDP)
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For one, numerous institutional programs aim to rebuild the social fabric, promote justice, and advocate for acknowledging and commemorating the conflict. State presence and the provision of basic goods and services also pave the way for human development and the restoration of relationships. Lastly, processes of cultural change offer an avenue to modify societal beliefs, values, and attitudes towards violence, peace, and trust. Such processes also encourage coexistence among civil society members, ex-combatants, and state institutions, among other actors.

Due to the complexity of such mechanisms—and the gaps remaining therein—there exists a low perception of progress in reconciliation, both in the PDET territories and in the major cities. Overall, people continue to express high levels of distrust towards the ex-combatant population and low levels of trust in institutions. Furthermore, the majority emphasize the need to be cautious as it pertains to interpersonal trust. Trust is the variable that most influences satisfaction with the peace accord’s implementation, beliefs about reconciliation, and progress in transitional justice, making it a crucial aspect for achieving the highest levels of peace. There have been advances as well as territorial and demographic nuances in all of these aspects, making population-sensitive efforts crucial. After all, reconciliation can be understood as the ultimate horizon of peacebuilding lasting beyond the Peace Agreement.

The subregions with the highest index, including Montes de María, Arauca, and Sur de Córdoba, have a high level of perceived satisfaction with the implementation of the Agreement and progress towards reconciliation. A detailed analysis of events in those regions can provide clues about actions that could further advance these levels of satisfaction. On the other hand, Catatumbo, Cuenca del Caguán, Piedemonte Caqueteno, Sur del Tolima, Sierra Nevada Perijá, Alto Patía-Norte del Cauca, Bajo Cauca, Nordeste Antioqueño, and Pacífico Medio are the subregions with the lowest index rating, thus exposing difficulties in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the path towards reconciliation (see figure 2). Understanding these trends, various territory-specific actions can be taken to promote both satisfaction with the Peace Agreement and the possibility of reconciliation.

The following nine chapters delve into these trends and provide detailed analysis regarding the relative achievements of the peace accord, other peace-building efforts, and progress towards reconciliation.

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4 Based on an aggregated analysis of ten strategic questions from the MAPS survey, UNDP constructed an index that considers the average ranking of the PDET subregions, according to positive satisfaction or agreement with each of the prioritized questions. The 10 questions are: 1) How satisfied are you with the way the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Government and the FARC-EP is being implemented?; 2) Percentage of people somewhat satisfied, satisfied, or very satisfied who believe that the Colombian government will secure a peace agreement; 3) Percentage of people who consider that negotiated settlement is the best option; 4) Percentage of people who consider that security has improved, or remains good or very good; 5) Percentage of people who consider that in the last 12 months in their community, state authorities have primarily been the ones imparting justice; 6) Percentage of people who trust somewhat or greatly in the JEP; 7) Percentage of victims who have received reparations from the State; 8) Percentage of people who have seen an increased presence of the State and an increase in the delivery of community goods; 9) Do you believe the country is advancing towards reconciliation?; 10) Would you be comfortable having a former member of an armed group as a neighbor?
Chapter 1, “Satisfaction with Peace in the Territories”, describes the increase in overall satisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Agreement in the PDET zones, from 35.9% in 2019 to 58.1% in 2023, while in the major cities, this percentage lies at 40% (Figure 3).

The degree of satisfaction with the peace accord’s implementation is influenced by territorial, demographic, and temporal factors. When comparing between PDET subregions, 13 of the 16 experienced an increase in satisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Agreement in 2023 (Figure 4), making Catatumbo the subregion least satisfied with the implementation (29.8%), followed by Pacífico y Frontera Nariñense and Cuenca del Caguán y Piedemonte Caqueteño. Montes de María is the most satisfied (74.7%), followed by Arauca and Macarena-Guaviare.

Figure 2. Cross-Tab Analysis (2023)

Average rating of the PDET subregions across the MAPS survey strategic indicators on satisfaction with the Peace Agreement’s implementation and belief that the country is moving towards reconciliation.

Source: 2023 MAPS Survey
The degree of satisfaction with the peace accord’s implementation is influenced by territorial, demographic, and temporal factors. When comparing between PDET subregions, 13 of the 16 experienced an increase in satisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Agreement in 2023 (Figure 4), making Catatumbo the subregion least satisfied with the implementation (29.8%), followed by Pacífico y Frontera Nariñense and Cuenca del Caguán y Piedemonte Caqueteño. Montes de María is the most satisfied (74.7%), followed by

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**Figure 3. General Satisfaction with the Peace Agreement’s Implementation**

Note. Q36: Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with the way in which the 2016 Peace Agreement between the government and the FARC-EP is being implemented?

Source: 2019 and 2021 MAPS Survey, (UNDP/PRIO); 2023 and 2024 (UNDP)
Arauca and Macarena-Guaviare.

At the demographic level, women are less optimistic than men regarding the implementation, highlighting the need to advance gender-focused provisions (which have shown delays). Trends also show that individuals demonstrate higher levels of satisfaction over time, even when they expressed dissatisfaction with the contents of the peace accord in the 2019 survey. This indicates that implementation efforts are at least somewhat positively impacting communities and their territories.

Recognizing that contextual variables and prevailing structural conditions can influence people’s perceptions, it was identified that the perception of security, the perception that the conflict persists or may return, and trust in state institutions have a significant and directly proportional relationship with overall satisfaction with the implementation. Addressing and improving these indicators could propel greater optimism about the Peace Agreement and potential new agreements, as well as the general prospect of peace.

For example, satisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Agreement shows a significant and positive relationship with the belief that an agreement will be reached with the ELN. Those who are satisfied or very satisfied with the implementation of the Agreement are mostly inclined to believe that a peace agreement will also be reached with the ELN (53.3%). The majority of the PDET subregions where the ELN is actively present, such as Arauca, Sur de Córdoba, Chocó, Sur de Bolívar, Alto Patía, Norte del Cauca, Pacífico Medio, and Sierra Nevada-Perijá, show a high level of satisfaction and greater optimism regarding a potential agreement with the ELN (see Figure 5).

Optimism about the possibility of an agreement is lower in the five major cities.
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Figure 5. Belief that the Colombian government and the ELN Will Reach a Peace Agreement, According to Satisfaction with the Implementation of the Agreement in PDET Subregions (2023)

Note: Q105: Do you believe that the Colombian government and the ELN will reach a peace agreement?
Source: 2023 MAPS Survey, UNDP

Chapter 2, “The Challenges of Territorialization and Development in the PDET Territories”, addresses the main challenges, opportunities, and gaps related to the PDET subregions that could help inform updated Action Plans for Regional Transformation (PATRs). Among them are perceptions of the present, visions of the future, presence and trust in the State, the provision of community goods, and local participation in civil society.

Five years after the first MAPS survey in 2019 (see Figure 6), the main problems perceived by people in the PDET subregions continue to be ordinary crime (25.4%), unemployment (22.7%), corruption (12.4%), the armed conflict (8.6%), and road infrastructure (4.6%), indicating that the populations’ principal concerns have gone unchanged.

Despite the fact that prioritized investment—prompted by the Peace Agreement’s implementation—has helped to reduce the poverty gap and equalize perceptions of the overall improved economic situation, marked disparities at the subregional level persist.

Figure 6. Main Problems in the PDET Subregions (2019, 2021, and 2023)

Note. Q115: In your opinion, what is the most serious problem affecting your subregion?
Source: 2019 and 2021 MAPS Survey, UNDP/PRIO; 2023 (UNDP)

5 Decree 893 of 2017 ruled that PATRs must be updated every five years.
The majority of the population still believes that the PDET agenda will transform their territory; however, this perception has decreased by almost 8 percentage points, from 59% in 2021 to 52.9% in 2023 (Figure 7). These results show marked regional differences: the subregions with the highest hopes of transformation are Sur de Bolívar (72.7%) and Sur de Córdoba (67%), while the most pessimistic subregions are Macarena-Guaviare (30.8%), Catatumbo (26.4%), Chocó (21.4%), and Sur del Tolima (19.6%).

**Figure 7. The PDET agenda will transform the PDET territories (2021 and 2023)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregion</th>
<th>Round 2 (2021)</th>
<th>Round 3 (2023)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sur de Bolívar</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sur de Córdoba</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sur de Tolima</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chocó</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Nevada - Perijá</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alto Patía - Norte del Cauca</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urabá Antioqueño</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arauca</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putumayo</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macarena - Guaviare</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>47.8%</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
</tr>
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<td>47.6%</td>
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<td>Pacífico y Frontera Nariñense</td>
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<td>40.6%</td>
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<td>Catatumbo</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacífico Medio</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Q56: Do you believe that implementation of the PDET agenda will transform the reality of your territory? Source: 2019 and 2021 MAPS Survey, (UNDP/PRIO); 2023 and 2024 (UNDP)
In recent years, the perception in the PDET zones of greater state presence has increased from 15.5% in 2021 to 25.7% in 2023. Nevertheless, the majority of people in these territories (71.2%) still consider the State to be absent. The most pessimistic subregions in this regard are Catatumbo (88.5%), Pacífico Medio (79.2%), Alto Patía and Norte del Cauca (77.8%), and Pacífico y Frontera Nariñense (87.5%), while the most optimistic are Sur de Córdoba (48.3%), Bajo Cauca y Nordeste Antioqueño (44%), and Montes de María (41%).

Additionally, citizens from both the PDET subregions and the five major cities continue to prioritize investment in health, education, and productive projects (see Figure 8). Investment preferences in the PDET zones are consistent with those identified in 2021, in which universal and quality healthcare was the top priority (40.8%), followed by quality education (19.9%) and the promotion of productive projects (16.3%).

The development of the PDET agenda implies a greater presence of state institutions, which provide goods and services in rural areas (the irregular presence of the State is considered one of the structural causes of the conflict in Colombia).
Figure 9. Perception of State Presence in Each PDET Subregion (2021 and 2023)

Note. Q40: Excluding the Military Forces, have you seen a greater state presence in your territory since the signing of the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP (for example: roads and infrastructure, health, education, justice, etc.)?

Source: 2019 and 2021 MAPS Survey, (UNDP/PRIO); 2023 and 2024 (UNDP)
Additionally, the perception of increased state presence is materially related to an uptick in investment in community assets, trust in state institutions, and an improved economic situation both at the territorial and individual levels. Because of the relationship between trust in institutions and the perception of state presence, the slight increase in trust in 2023 could be an opportunity, alongside encouraged participation, to boost optimism in the PATR update process.

In 2023, 40% of surveyed individuals perceived an increase in the construction of community assets, which represents an improvement compared to 2021 (27.8%). Even so, subregional disparities remain: while in Catatumbo, only a small percentage of the population has noticed the provision of these goods (13.9%), in Sur de Bolívar, this percentage is considerably higher (56.8%). These disparities are relevant since, in closing historical inequalities in the PDET areas disproportionately impacted by the armed conflict, community goods play a fundamental role in covering basic needs and ensuring the connectivity of such territories with the rest of the country.

Finally, the perception of the decrease in spaces for participation—as well as distrust in the actors responsible for carrying out, implementing, or financing the PDET—could be shaping the territories’ perceptions of their transformative potential. In 2023, 21.7% perceived an increase in the availability of spaces for participation, 30.6% reported that it stayed constant or decreased, and 46.9% answered that they did not know either way. In the majority of subregions, the don’t know/no response answer represents more than 40% of responses.

Figure 10. Perception of the Provision of Community Assets in Each PDET Subregion (2023)
Executive summary

Note. Q54: In your community, have you seen an increase in the construction of community assets (bridges, schools, roads, community centers, etc.) in the last 12 months?
Source: 2023 MAPS Survey (UNDP)

Note. Q57: Do you believe that in 2023, spaces for citizen participation in the PDET implementation have increased?
Source: 2019 and 2021 MAPS Survey, UNDP/PRIO, UNDP (2023)

Figure 11. Perceptions of PDET Participation Spaces (2023)

Note. Q54: In your community, have you seen an increase in the construction of community assets (bridges, schools, roads, community centers, etc.) in the last 12 months?
Source: 2023 MAPS Survey (UNDP)
Chapter 3, “Reintegration and Reincorporation as a Social Process”, explores the possibilities of transitioning ex-combatants to civilian life by analyzing citizens’ perceptions of reintegration and reincorporation programs, as well as their opinions on coexisting with ex-combatants. Citizens’ desire for ex-combatants to go through reintegration and reincorporation programs in order to gain their trust increased from 52% in 2019 to 64% in 2023, and in the five major cities, that figure was 51.3%. At the same time, the perception that ex-combatants should ask for forgiveness and provide reparations to victims increased from 88.9% in 2019 to 95.1% in 2023. In the case of the five major cities, the percentage was 89.7% (see Figure 12).

**Figure 12. Perceptions of Reintegration Programs (2019, 2021, 2023, and 2024)**

Ex-combatants should participate in reintegration programs before returning to society

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>88.1%</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
<td>92.8%</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
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Ex-combatants should engage in truth-telling, ask for forgiveness, and make reparations to victims

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89.7%</td>
<td>95.1%</td>
<td>91.2%</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
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Ex-combatants should receive state benefits through DDR programs

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
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% agree or strongly agree

Note. Q45: Now I want you to tell me what you think about the reintegration programs. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.
Source: 2019 and 2021 MAPS Survey, (UNDP/PRIO); 2023 and 2024 (UNDP)
Although there is growing support for ex-combatants to participate in reincorporation programs, ask for forgiveness, and make reparations to victims, only 1 in 4 people would be comfortable having ex-members of armed groups as neighbors. This willingness to coexist varies among PDET subregions, with Catatumbo being the subregion with the lowest proportion of people who would feel comfortable having an ex-combatant as a neighbor (7.4%) and Putumayo presenting the highest percentage of people who would be willing to do so (48.3%). In the major cities, although most would buy products from ex-combatants (72.5%), opinions on whether they would employ or work with ex-combatants are divided, with 44.6% saying they would be willing and 48.6% saying they would not. These perceptions, both in cities and PDET areas, highlight the difficulties for community reintegration and coexistence with ex-combatants.

**Figure 13. Percentage of People in PDET Subregions (2019, 2021, and 2023) Who Would Feel Comfortable Having Former Members of Armed Groups as Neighbors**

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FARC - EP</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC Dissidents</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitaries</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal orgs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note. Q48: Would you be comfortable having a former FARC-EP member as a neighbor? Q49: Would you be comfortable having a former paramilitary member as a neighbor? Q50: Would you be comfortable having a former ELN member as a neighbor? Q52: Would you be comfortable having a former member of a criminal organization as a neighbor?

Source: 2019 and 2021 MAPS Survey; UNDP/PRIO; UNDP (2023)
When investigating the perceived impacts of the AETCR (formerly ETCR) social projects in the municipalities where they have been implemented, few believe that they benefit communities. 35.6% perceive that social projects increased in ex-combatant reintegration areas, but only for the benefit of ex-combatants; 16.7% believe that social projects increased for the benefit of both ex-combatants and surrounding communities, and 20.6% indicate that they had no impact at all (see figure 14).

The percentage of those who believed social goods increased only for ex-combatants is higher in Sierra Nevada y Perijá (increased: 50.4% / no impact: 42.3%); Urabá Antioqueño (49.0% / 28.7%); Arauca (49.7% / 17.6%); and Sur del Tolima (49.5% - 17.4%). These findings demonstrate that the advances and investments made by government entities in the AETCR projects (and territories where they are located) do not necessarily translate into citizens’ perceptions of improvement.

**Figure 14. Perception of Social Projects in Ex-Combatant Areas, According to Whether the Municipalities Have ETCR Spaces (2023)**

![Perception of Social Projects in Ex-Combatant Areas](image)

Note. Q46: In the 2016 Peace Agreement signed between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP, ETCR zones were created where ex-combatants settled. From your point of view, in these zones:

Source: 2023 MAPS Survey, UNDP
Chapter 4, titled “The Centrality of Victims: Transitional Justice and Reparations for Reconciliation”, presents the perceptions of citizens from the PDET subregions and major cities on the progress of the Peace Agreement’s implementation of truth, justice, and reparation processes aimed at reconciliation. The vast majority of people in the PDET territories agree with providing truth, justice, and reparation to the victims, as well as supporting truth-telling activities, finding the disappeared, and calling attention to the crimes of the armed conflict. However, despite a trend of increasing awareness of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, and Reparation (SIP), a high percentage of people still have not witnessed its contributions.

The increase in awareness between 2021 and 2023 of the Commission for the Clarification of Truth (CEV) (4%), the Search Unit for Missing Persons (UBPD) (9%), and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) (7.7%). Regarding the perceived contributions of each of these entities, for the year 2023, 41.6% considered they do not contribute, compared to 27.7% who believe they do contribute to victims’ rights. Opinions in the major cities are more negative than in the PDET territories. From a demographic perspective, women are more pessimistic than men, and victims are more optimistic than non-victims.

Figure 15. Perception of Contributions to Truth, Justice, and Reparation by the SIP in PDET Subregions (2021 and 2023) and Major Cities (2024)

Note. Q59: Do you believe that in the last 12 months the following institutions contributed to truth, justice, and reparation for the victims of the armed conflict?
Source: 2021 MAPS Survey, UNDP/PRIO; UNDP (2023, 2024)
In this context, the Unit for Comprehensive Attention and Reparation of Victims (UARIV) remains the most recognized transitional justice entity. The JEP and the UBPD have only a small presence in the PDET territories, which can be explained by their recent territorialization processes and their relative newness: UARIV has been operating for nearly twice as long. Such entities enjoy a higher level of trust than most state entities (30-33%), although this trust is still moderate and could be diminished if their programs are poorly received or if violence continues in the territories. Indeed, trust in transitional institutions is fundamental because it is fundamentally connected to perceptions of reconciliation and satisfaction with the Peace Agreement’s implementation.

Victims’ access to truth, justice, and reparations is a crucial step in this equation. While most victims in the PDET territories are registered in the Victims Registry (74.2%), a large majority (79.9%) of them have not received any type of reparation. At the subregional level, registered victims from Montes de María have the highest percentage of individuals compensated, both individual (16.4%) and collective (21%), which could be due to the robustness of local organizations. On the other hand, Macarena - Guaviare is the subregion that has received the fewest reparations, which can be explained by its difficulties in registering victims.

Finally, the transitional justice mechanisms of the Peace Agreement, particularly the JEP, face widespread preference among citizens for punitive justice over restorative

**Figure 16. Preferences on Judicial Measures Towards Military Personnel Who Committed Human Rights Violations and Ex-Combatants of the FARC-EP and ELN, PDET Subregions (2023 and 2024)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Round 3 (2023)</th>
<th>Major cities (2024)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ex-FARC combatants, lower ranks</strong></td>
<td>44.7% 45% 1%</td>
<td>46.7% 42.8% 1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ex-FARC combatants, middle ranks</strong></td>
<td>50.3% 41.3% 0.7%</td>
<td>52.1% 41.7% 0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ex-FARC combatants, commanders</strong></td>
<td>56.5% 36.1% 0.8%</td>
<td>68.2% 27.9% 0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ELN</strong></td>
<td>49.1% 43.4% 1%</td>
<td>56.8% 36% 0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army members</strong></td>
<td>51.7% 39.2% 0.6%</td>
<td>59.8% 34.4% 0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
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Note. Q64: Without considering what the 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP states, what do you think should happen to former FARC members (in their different command ranks) who committed human rights violations?

Q65: What do you think should happen to members of the Colombian Army (in their different command ranks) who committed human rights violations?

Q108: Without considering what might eventually be agreed upon in a peace agreement with the ELN, what do you think should happen to ELN members (in their different command ranks) who committed human rights violations?
This applies to the FARC-EP, ELN, and military personnel involved in human rights violations. Both in the PDET subregions and the major cities, the majority of citizens (on average more than 90%) favor prison sentences (imprisonment without sentence reduction and imprisonment with sentence reduction if offenders engage in truth-telling and undertake reparative actions), with a considerable proportion preferring sentences without any reduction. This trend is even more pronounced when city populations are polled about the case of top FARC-EP commanders.

Trust in the JEP, knowing former members of armed groups, and an improved security situation contribute to the preferences of those who advocate for sentence reductions or non-custodial sentences. Given these dynamics, the JEP’s resolutions going forward will represent a crucial opportunity to increase the credibility and legitimacy of these processes.

Chapter 5, “Bridges of Development: Territorial Tools to Address the Problem of Illicit Drugs while Benefitting Local Populations”, addresses how in most PDET subregions (15 out of 16), the substitution of illicit crops is considered the best option to solve this problem (59.8%), despite 53.7% of people expressing that the implementation of substitution programs in 2023 is going poorly or very poorly (compared to 44.2% in 2019). As shown in Figure 17, the subregions who register the highest perception of discontent with the implementation of substitution programs are Catatumbo (82.6%), Pacífico y Frontera Nariñense (62.7%), and Macarena-Guaviare (58.0%): all territories that have seen an increase in illicit crops.

Figure 17. Opinions on the Best Option to Solve the Problem of Illicit Crops in PDET Subregions (2023)
Listening to peace

Support for the production of legal products derived from coca, poppy, and marijuana receives significant approval from people in PDET zones and cities, particularly from women, making it an opportunity for a potential solution. Overall, both in PDET territories (56.5%) and in the five major cities (55.9%), most people would be willing to buy these types of products. Support for the sale of legal products derived from coca, poppy, and marijuana is positively associated with the following variables: the belief that progress is being made towards reconciliation, an improved or unchanged perception of security, an increase in public goods, familiarity with the Peace Agreement, and self-identification as indigenous or female.

The second most popular option to solve the problem of illicit drugs is forced eradication (18.4%). Catatumbo is the only subregion that shows majority support for this option at 54.2%, possibly due to its high concentration of coca crops. A third option is the production of legal products derived from coca, marijuana, and poppy (15.1%). There is considerable support for this option in regions such as Pacífico Medio (35.7%), Arauca (24.6%), Putumayo (24.2%), Urabá Antioqueño (21.3%), and Montes de María (23.5%).

Finally, a small minority of citizens prefer the legalization of illicit crops (6.7%), making it the least favored option in the PDET zones. Nonetheless a few regions such as Putumayo (16.6%), Macarena-Guaviare (11.9%), Pacífico y Frontera Nariñense (11.9%), and Pacífico Medio (11.7%) show some degree of preference for this alternative.

Note. Q90: Which of the following do you believe is the best option to solve the problem of illicit coca, poppy, and marijuana crops? Source: 2023 MAPS Survey, UNDP
Figure 18. Opinions on the implementation of illicit crop substitution programs in PDET subregions (2019, 2021, and 2023) and in major cities (2024).

Note. Q37: How do you think the Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP is being carried out today in your community, in each of the following components? c. Offer money/economic alternatives and technical support for families to substitute coca crops.

Source: 2019 and 2021 MAPS Survey, (UNDP/PRIO); 2023 and 2024 (UNDP)
Chapter 6, “The Fundamental Nature of Security and Justice for the Sustainability of the Peace Agreement”, highlights how PDET territories continue to be areas of violence, with low rates of dispute resolution carried out by judicial institutions. The perception of security in the PDET subregions has slightly improved over time, but in most of the territories, it is still poorly perceived. Meanwhile, in the major cities, most consider that the security situation has worsened (63%). High levels of violence and insecurity are reported in some of the PDET subregions (Catatumbo, Alto Patía - Norte del Cauca, and Pacífico Medio), while in others, residents note either stability or improvement (Sur Córdoba, Pacífico y Frontera Nariñense, and Cuenca del Caguán y Piedemonte Caqueteño).

The perception of improved security is related to trust in civilian state institutions, trust in State and civil society institutions, an improved economic situation, increased public goods, and state institutions being those who administer justice. Conversely, the perception of deteriorating security is associated with variables such as perceived territorial control by illegal groups, the perception that illegal groups are more often responsible for administering justice, and the belief that the conflict has continued or will return.

Figure 19. Perceptions of whether the conflict may return to your territory, PDET subregions (2019, 2021, and 2023).
The combined percentage of these two last beliefs is similar across survey rounds: 2019 (72.4%), 2021 (74.8%), and 2023 (79.2%), with a considerable increase in the last year (see figure 19). Overall, common crime is perceived as the most prominent cause of violence (41.7%), followed by Bacrim (38.3%). In 5 of the 16 subregions, FARC dissidents and the ELN are considered to be the main causes of violence.

The perception of social and territorial control by illegal and criminal groups remains considerable in PDET municipalities. People also report a sustained increase since 2019 in these actors’ involvement in dispute resolution and justice administration in communities. The perception that the State is responsible for administering justice dropped from 73.6% in 2021 to 52.9% in 2023, and the perception that criminal organizations (13.5%), FARC dissidents (5.5%), and ELN (3.4%) administer justice has increased (see figure 20).

Note: Q68: In the last 12 months in your community, who has been mainly responsible for administering justice? Example: common crime, theft, robbery, drug addiction.

Q69: In the last 12 months, who has mainly collaborated in resolving disputes between community members? Disputes refer to: fights, conflicts between neighbors, conflicts between family members, boundary disputes, etc.

Source: 2019 and 2021 MAPS Survey, (UNDP/PRIO); 2023 and 2024 (UNDP)
The State is still considered the most important actor for imparting justice and is the institution most commonly approached when there is a need for justice. That said, only 4.2% of people in PDET territories, and 8.3% in the main cities, reported having approached a justice institution in the last year (see figure 21). This could be explained by distrust towards and perceived inefficiency in state justice institutions, since a plurality of respondents in the PDET territories and major cities indicated that in their case, the justice process moved forward but did not solve the problem or help at all.
Chapter 7, titled “New Negotiations and Opportunities for Peace”, explains citizens’ opinions and expectations regarding new negotiated peace opportunities in the country. A majority of people in the PDET zones (82.1%) support a negotiated solution with armed groups such as the AGC and FARC dissidents, a perspective likely related to the perceived consequences of violence and conflict on the lives, well-being, and development of communities in such territories. In the major cities, a weaker majority considers the negotiated solution with armed groups to be the best option (52.5%). At the subregional level, the territories that most support a negotiated solution are Arauca (90.5%), Catatumbo (89.9%), Chocó (89.8%), and Sur de Córdoba (89.3%), where there is still an active presence of various armed groups. In none of the PDET territories did less than 70% of the population voice their preference for a negotiated end to conflict.

Figure 22. Opinions on how to solve the conflict with armed groups like the AGC and FARC dissidents in PDET subregions (2019, 2021, 2023) and major cities (2024)

Regarding a negotiated solution with the ELN, opinions are very similar: In PDET zones, 82.3% believe a negotiated solution is the best option, compared to 54.4% of people in the major cities. Analyzing the data by PDET subregion, the preference for negotiation remains at levels above 80% in all territories and is even higher in areas with high ELN presence, such as Arauca, Chocó, and Catatumbo.

The greatest support for the use of military force with the ELN is found in areas where the group has little or no presence, such as Sierra Nevada - Perijá, Sur del Tolima, Pacífico Medio, and Montes de María. The desire for negotiation contrasts with the extremely low levels of trust in the ELN shared by citizens in PDET territories and cities (1.6% and 0.7%, respectively).

Predictions of whether a peace agreement will be reached with the ELN differ between PDET territories and the main cities. In PDET territories, 49% of citizens do not believe a negotiated peace will be achieved, while in the five major cities, this pessimism rises to 60.4% (see figure 23). Catatumbo is the PDET subregion with continued ELN presence that shows the most negative view regarding the possibility of an agreement with the group (26.2%). Lowered optimism about a potential agreement may be explained by factors such as distrust, ELN-perpetrated violence, and the limited dissemination of progress in ongoing talks with the group.

Note. Q103: Which of the following do you think would be the best option to solve the conflict with armed organizations such as the Clan del Golfo, Galtanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), and FARC dissidents?

Source: 2023 and 2024 MAPS Survey, UNDP
Listening to peace

Figure 23. Opinions on the achievements of dialogues between the Colombian government and ELN in PDET subregions (2023) and major cities (2024)

Negotiations with the ELN face a challenge regarding citizen participation: according to survey results, the majority of PDET territory inhabitants (64.5%) would not be interested in participating in the process, mainly for security reasons. That said, the major cities show greater interest in participating (64.3% would like to participate).

The data reveals certain variables associated with a higher probability of interest in participating in dialogues: trust in State institutions, belief that an agreement with the ELN will be achieved, knowledge of the current Peace Agreement, and knowing an ex-combatant. Those open to participating in this process are mainly interested in verifying compliance with the agreement (23%) and proposing topics for negotiation (9.6%). This trend prevails in major cities especially among male respondents and respondents who identify as victims (figure 24).

Respondents in the PDET zones highlight the following as priority topics in negotiations with the ELN: overcoming poverty (58.9%), fighting corruption (53.1%), and issues of land and rural property (35.1%).

Figure 24. Interest in participating in dialogues with the ELN in PDET subregions (2023) and major cities (2024)

Note. Q105: Do you think the Colombian government and the ELN will reach a peace agreement?
Source: 2023 and 2024 MAPS Survey, UNDP

Note. Q107: If spaces for citizen participation were opened in the current negotiations between the Colombian government and the ELN, in what capacity would you like to participate?
Source: 2023 and 2024 MAPS Survey, UNDP
Chapter 8, “Reconciliation”, analyzes how the belief in reconciliation has not been automatic and how citizen perception of progress remains low—-not exceeding 33%—despite a slight increase in 2023 and with certain PDET subregions expressing more optimism (up to 49%). At the subregional level, Catatumbo is the territory with the most pessimistic assessment of reconciliation, while Montes de María has the most optimistic assessment.

The perception of progress towards reconciliation is significantly related to variables such as reintegration programs, community coexistence with ex-combatants, the belief that transitional institutions contribute to the dignity of victims, and trust. Among other findings, 70% of respondents would not be willing to have an ex-combatant as a neighbor (chapter 3); 95.8% say that when it comes to interpersonal trust, it is necessary to be cautious (figure 27); no institutional actor reaches more than 43% trustworthiness from citizens, and over 90% prefer punitive justice over restorative justice.

**Figure 25. Perceptions of reconciliation progress in PDET subregions (2021, 2023) and major cities (2024)**

Note. Q53: Do you believe the country is moving towards reconciliation? (When referencing reconciliation, we do not only refer to members of armed groups but to society in general).

Source: 2021 MAPS Survey, UNDP/PRIO; UNDP 2023
Listening to peace

There have been advances as well as territorial and demographic nuances in all of these aspects, making population-sensitive efforts crucial. Indeed, reconciliation should be understood as the ultimate horizon of peacebuilding even beyond the Peace Agreement. In terms of gender, significant gaps remain in the trust of men and women towards the principal state institutions, which impacts reconciliation (figure 26). In fact, when it comes to all institutions, men hold greater trust than women.

**Figure 26. Level of trust in the State in PDET subregions (2019, 2021, 2023)**

Note. Q111: Please tell me, how much do you trust the following institutional bodies (no trust at all, very little trust, some trust, a lot of trust, don’t know or no response).

Source: 2019 and 2021 MAPS Survey, (UNDP/PRIO); 2023 and 2024 (UNDP)
Reparations to victims and the perception of economic improvement at the community level have also been factors relevant for reconciliation. In this regard, there has been a positive association between these two elements and the belief that progress is being made towards reconciliation. This demonstrates how national reconciliation not only requires carrying out transitional justice processes or reparations but also improving economic conditions for the population. Alongside investment and State presence, it is also crucial to develop programs to rebuild the social fabric, community ties, and trust so that reconciliation can advance beyond mere coexistence and the development agenda.

Chapter 9 outlines principal opportunities and recommendations using the results of the different MAPS survey rounds. The following are highlighted:

**On the implementation of the Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP:**

Now is the ideal time to accelerate the implementation of the Peace Agreement. The improved perceptions of the benefits of the Peace Agreement and the peace dividends it brings to the territories creates a favorable environment for national and local governments to deepen their commitment to the implementation of goals to foster human development in the territories most affected by the conflict.
It is necessary to reposition the “driving groups” and the “community roundtables” of the PDET. Since there is no correlation between the investments made in the PDET territories and inhabitants’ perception of their impact, it is important to develop strategies to highlight these state interventions and allow inhabitants to feel ownership over them.

Reintegration efforts must also be linked with measures to involve local communities and bolster social cohesion. In this sense, reconciliation must go beyond reintegration efforts in order to design locally-focused programs that incorporate both institutional and non-institutional methods of development and create trust at the local level.

It is urgent that the Special Jurisdiction for Peace issues its first sentences so that citizens can understand the scope of transitional justice and develop trust in it. The idea of punitive justice as the only option remains deeply rooted in Colombia, so it is also necessary to design strategies to publicize the JEP’s scope, management, and achievements, mainly in the territories most affected by the conflict, and to ensure that its institutions are effectively deployed in these regions.

The gender-focused measures established in the Peace Agreement must be revitalized as a driver of change. This implies implementing specific measures to address gender inequalities and ensure that women benefit equitably in peacebuilding and the progress of the peace accord.

**On future peace processes:**

It is essential to efficiently communicate the tangible benefits and dividends that negotiated agreements can bring. Indeed, the support for the Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP and the positive predisposition of communities provide a solid foundation to continue promoting dialogue and negotiations with other armed groups. To capitalize on this opportunity, it is crucial to intensify communication and awareness efforts. Similarly, the preference for a negotiated solution provides a solid basis to implement specific programs that promote peacebuilding. One way to take advantage of these opportunities is by utilizing informational campaigns to communicate about the negotiations and reduce knowledge gaps.

Strategies must be implemented to increase trust and credibility in the negotiation processes in order to address skepticism about the possibility of reaching concrete agreements with illegal armed groups. One option is to promote citizen participation mechanisms that involve communities at all stages of the processes (agenda creation, implementation, and verification). The increased willingness of victims to participate could also be leveraged to contribute to these new processes, as territorial initiatives that generate early peace dividends can strengthen trust in new processes.

Ceasefires and negotiations with armed groups must also take into account the ramifications of violence and the changing security situation influenced by the presence of armed actors. A detailed analysis of the

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6 Mechanisms created for the implementation of the Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (PDET).
local context is necessary to understand the dynamics between these groups and their impacts on communities. At the same time, it is essential to strengthen current verification mechanisms alongside participation from local actors to ensure that humanitarian measures are implemented and provide protection for communities.

On peacebuilding with a human development focus: tempranos de paz pueden fortalecer la confianza en nuevos procesos.

On peacebuilding with a human development focus:

The human development benefits of the Peace Agreement must be integrated into local and national public policies. As such, their effective implementation can be ensured through the adequate allocation of resources and the active participation of communities, providing a structured framework to address the root causes of the conflict and thereby promote reconciliation and sustainable development.

It is essential to rethink a rural security model that prioritizes the well-being and protection of the civilian population and the preservation of life in all its forms. To address this challenge comprehensively and inclusively, it is fundamental to adopt a human security-centered approach. This implies ensuring equitable access to basic services such as health and education, as well as creating opportunities for sustainable economic development. It is also crucial to promote job creation and reduce dependence on illicit activities. Additionally, police action needs to be strengthened to improve security and citizen coexistence, while also bolstering early warning and population protection mechanisms.

Strengthening the coordination of justice actors in PDET territories and implementing models tailored to the specific needs of rural areas is crucial. This should include the implementation of agrarian jurisdiction, a greater deployment of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms, local coordination of transitional justice institutions, strengthening of Indigenous and Afro-descendant groups’ own justice processes, and the usage of restorative justice to address cases where alternative sentencing would be more effective for victims, cost-efficient for the State, and work towards true resocialization and reconciliation. Furthermore, it is essential to close gender gaps in access to justice and to strengthen mechanisms for the prevention of and response to gender-based violence.

An integral approach focused on the sustained closure of inequities for conflict victims will be necessary as a precondition for peacebuilding in the territories. Beyond humanitarian assistance and individual reparations, it is essential to rethink the integral reparation model to make it both timely and transformative. Collective reparations play a key role in transforming the conditions of victims and PDET populations. Considering that a high proportion of internally displaced people live in the PDET subregions, it is necessary to couple the implementation of individual and collective reparations with durable solutions.

Reconciliation cannot be understood as a collateral outcome: it is vital to define an agenda that positions victims as agents of change and to address the needs for transformative reparations which combat discrimination and stereotypes about ex-combatant populations who have committed to peace. Simultaneously, it remains crucial to develop programs aimed at strengthening
interpersonal trust and reinforcing institutional mechanisms that restore State trust in the territories most affected by the armed conflict (particularly when it comes to security and justice issues).