



REGIONAL STABILIZATION FACILITY FOR LAKE CHAD

REGIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 2022



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ACRONYMS

AWP	Annual Work Plan	MNJTF / FMM	Multinational Joint Task Force / Force Multinationale Mixte
CHRC	Cameroon Human Rights Commission	MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without Borders
CIMIC	Civil-military cooperation	NGO	Non-governmental organization
CSC	Community Stabilization Committee	NIS	Nigeria Immigration Service
CSO	Civil society organization	NNG / GNN	Nigerien National Guard / Garde Nationale du Niger
DIMS	Directory and Information Management System	NSAG	Non-state armed group
EUR	Euro	OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
FACT	Front for Change and Concord in Chad / Front pour l'alternance et la concorde au Tchad	RSF	Regional Stabilization Facility
GMS	General Management Support	RS-SRR	Regional Strategy for Stabilization, Recovery & Resilience
HQ	Headquarters	RSS	Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery & Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin
IDP	Internally displaced person	TAP	Territorial Action Plan
IOM	International Organization for Migration	TBD	To be determined
ISWAP	Islamic State's in West Africa Province / Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyah	TRAC	Target for Resource Assignment from the Core
JAP	Joint Action Plan	UK	United Kingdom
JAS	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
LCB	Lake Chad Basin	WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission		

SUMMARY

Context

In 2022, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) were responsible for over 700 security incidents in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) area, resulting in approximately 1,500 deaths.

Violence in the region has been ongoing for 14 years, leaving over

11 million

people in need of protection and humanitarian assistance.



Tracking all security incidents and related deaths in Joint Action Plan (JAP)¹ locations over the past year reveals an increase in the number of security incidents (from 199 in 2021 to 310 in 2022) and a decrease in the number of deaths (from 707 in 2021 to 377 in 2022). In addition to conflicts related to NSAGs, extreme poverty, underdevelopment, and climate change impacts yield a context of complex crisis in the LCB region.

Security risks and flooding across RSF operating areas have limited access to some JAP locations. In Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, different JAP locations have experienced delays in progress due to conflict and security threats from NSAGs. For example, due to regular security threats in Nigeria, security officials limited access to only a few hours a day. In Niger, local community conflict between farmers and different cultural groups also hindered access. Major flooding in 2022 also severely limited access in the second half of the year, impacting the entire LCB area.

Another challenge in 2022 was higher than normal rates of inflation, partly caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and associated effects on supply chains. As a result, the RSF operating budget across implementing countries was impacted through an increase in prices for construction materials and other supplies.

Despite these difficult challenges, significant progress has been made throughout JAP locations in strengthening security, restoring essential social services, and improving local economies.

Outcome changes: a growing sense of normalcy

Stabilization creates conditions that are vital for bringing a sense of normalcy to internally displaced persons (IDPs) who return home.

Since 2020, over

400,000



IDPs, 54 percent of them women, have now returned to their homes in the Lake Chad area. There are now clear indications that in 2022, subjective perceptions of stability and security in JAP sites have significantly improved over those held in 2020 and 2021.

An estimated

1.36M

women and men in the 31 active programme sites now feel increasingly safe, contributing toward the restoration of the social contract. Further, communities in JAP locations now show a higher level of satisfaction with state security services than they did in previous years.



Amina Modu, Paralegal
Ngarannam, Nigeria
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¹ Country-level implementation is conducted at the village and commune levels, which are governed by Joint Action Plans (JAPs). JAPs are created in consultation and collaboration with stakeholders at all levels.

What we delivered: improving security, justice, and social contract

Since Regional Stabilization Facility (RSF) support began, communities have access to 115 newly constructed, rehabilitated or equipped security and justice infrastructure facilities.



1,373

permanent housing units have been constructed and over 100 water points have been constructed or rehabilitated in JAP locations. On average, RSF has mostly met its planned milestones for 2022.

Across JAP locations, Community Stabilization Committees (CSCs) now plan and monitor the implementation of community development projects; 20 can rely on operational early warning systems. Over 130 social service infrastructures (e.g., health centres and housing, surgical facilities, schools and teacher housing) have been rehabilitated, built or equipped through RSF, and more than 90 have been equipped with renewable technologies.

Women, men and youth have, so far, received over



84,000

instances of livelihood support through quick-fix training, business grants and assets and cash-for-work income. Since 2021, this amounts to around 55,000 individual acts of livelihood support. Over the past two years, around 36,000 people have benefited from productive or business grants or assets; 30,000 people have received short-term and quick-fix training; and approximately 17,000 people have generated income through cash-for-work.

Over



2,000

powered streetlights have been installed in JAP locations, reducing the risk and incidence of crime and accidents.

Since RSF support started, the capacity of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to coordinate the implementation of the Regional Strategy for Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR), including governance and coordinator structures, has been somewhat developed.

How much we invested

In total, RSF has invested an average of around US\$100 per person living across active JAP locations from 2019 to 2022. Of the overall total, 86 percent was delivered directly at the beneficiary level.

For 2022, overall delivery from all windows is on track. A total of

\$48,089,762

(104 percent) was delivered in 2022 (including expenses and commitments).



At the output level, the largest investments were made in immediate stabilization: 42 percent on improving access to essential social services; 16 percent on strengthening safety and security; and 8 percent on boosting local economies.² Additional investments have been in extended stabilization as more JAP locations achieved initial stability.

Next Step



In 2023, additional JAP locations will be activated in Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Existing locations will focus on finishing the rehabilitation and construction of security and justice, essential social service, and economic infrastructure; new locations will finalize Joint Action Plans (JAPs) and initiate infrastructure projects. RSF will prioritize strengthening existing JAP location CSCs through social cohesion and gender equity training and enhancing local conflict monitoring functions. Mid-term evaluations across country windows will be completed in 2023 and used to inform strategic decision-making on stabilization operations.

2. Between 2019 – 2022.

INTRODUCTION

This annual report details the recent developments, progress against outcomes and outputs, challenges, lessons learned and financial delivery of the Regional Stabilization Facility for Lake Chad (RSF)³ from January to December 2022. RSF implements activities across Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria in the Lake Chad Basin region, and through a Regional Window, in collaboration with Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). Country-level implementation is conducted at the village and commune levels, which are governed by Joint Action Plans (JAPs). JAPs are created in consultation and collaboration with stakeholders at all levels. RSF's contributions to JAPs are delivered in the areas of a) strengthening physical security, access to justice and social cohesion; b) constructing or rehabilitating critical infrastructure and access to basic services; and c) revitalizing the local economy.

Stabilization is a timebound, localized, integrated civilian programme of activities with the primary purpose of extending state presence through:



These components are necessary to re-establish the social contract, lay the foundations for peace, and allow longer-term social cohesion and development processes to achieve momentum and impact. Stabilization efforts may include rehabilitating critical infrastructure for basic services, physical security, and access to justice; revitalizing the local economy; and promoting inclusive governance and women's and youth's meaningful participation in decision-making.

Ultimately, stabilization is a political process that works with and through legitimate actors through "swift actions" that create enabling conditions and highlight the centrality of national ownership, legitimacy, and accountability. Stabilization requires support from both state and non-state actors in order to effectively navigate regional and local issues in support of peace. For RSF, this includes the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), tasked with strategic priority-setting and governance for the region; national, local, and territorial governments; country windows; civil society organizations (CSOs); and a national steering committee comprised of representatives from these institutions.

3. Based on the amended and extended Project Document.

Table 1: Organization of RSF Outputs and Outcomes

Result Area 1	Result Area 2
Outcome 1 – Immediate stabilization Community stability and State presence increased in Joint Action Plan (JAP) locations	Outcome 2 – Extended stabilization Local, national, and regional stabilization structures oversee, coordinate and implement stabilization and recovery efforts
Output 1.1 Community security and justice systems established and operational in JAP locations	Output 2.1 Stabilization actors have knowledge to consolidate the stabilization achievements and promote social cohesion
Output 1.2 Essential social services infrastructure constructed and/or rehabilitated, functional and accessible	Output 2.2 Improved cross-border coordination and cooperation
Output 1.3 Targeted households provided with livelihood opportunities	Output 2.3 LCBC capacity developed to steer and support RSS implementation and governance structures
	Output 2.4 Improved LCBC coordination and oversight of Territorial Action Plan implementation

Active Joint Action Plan Locations and Target Population

The RSF is implemented across four countries throughout the Lake Chad Basin area: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. A total of 31 Joint Action Plan (JAP) sites were active in 2022: twelve in Cameroon, seven in Chad, four in Niger and eight in Nigeria (10 of the 31 are cross-border). Across all 31 JAP sites, RSF reached 1,360,000 people (720,000 female): 480,000 in Cameroon (240,000 female), 77,000 in Chad (34,000 female); 21,000 in Niger (6,200 female) and 779,000 in Nigeria (440,000 female).


Table 2: Active JAP Locations

Phase	Cameroon	Chad	Niger	Nigeria
Phase I	Amchidé Blangoua Limani Moskota Waza	Baltram Guité Koulikimé Mitériné Ngalamia Tchoukouboul	Bosso N'Gagam Baroua Garin Dogo	Banki Buni Yadi Damboa Goulak Monguno Ngarannam
Phase II	Fotokol Hile-alifa Kolofata Logone-Birni Makary Mokolo Mozogo	Daboua		Gwoza Ngala



Gendarmarie officers at the office of the Gendarmarie in Guité built by RSF Chad for community protection and safety
© UNDP Chad / Faremi Olanrewaju

Figure 1: RSF Joint Action Plan Locations



RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Conflict and Security


In 2022, Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) alone were responsible for over 700 security incidents in the Lake Chad Basin area, resulting in approximately 1,500 deaths.⁴ As of the start of 2023, the violence in the region has been ongoing for 14 years, leaving over 11 million people in need of protection and humanitarian assistance. LCB communities have also been affected by the impacts of climate change, with unprecedented mass flooding and damage to crops and properties occurring during the rainy season.

The primary NSAGs operating in the Lake Chad Basin are Boko Haram (a.k.a. Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad [JAS]) and its splinter group Islamic State's in West Africa Province (ISWAP) (a.k.a. Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyah). Additionally, the Ansaru (a.k.a. Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan) operate in Nigeria.

JAS remains somewhat weakened since its leader, Abubakar Shekau, was killed in 2021. The splintering of Boko Haram saw insurgents move from Nigeria into neighbouring countries to carry out new stealth attacks facilitated by Lake Chad's flooded shoreline. Such attacks required security forces to deploy additional security camps, particularly around communities that neighbour JAP sites. RSF has facilitated the deployment of these additional camps and, through civilian-military engagement, continues to strengthen the relationship with security forces and to establish effective linkages with local communities.


4. Using Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project data, NSAGs were responsible for 718 incidents across all regions where JAP locations operate, and 1,539 deaths (filtered by region): <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

Figure 2: NSAG-Instigated Incidents and Deaths in Lake Chad Basin in 2022



In 2022, the total number of security incidents in the Lake Chad Basin area, including those involving NSAGs, state security and civilians (both intra- and inter-group), exceeded 1,200. Tragically, these incidents resulted in approximately 3,700⁵ deaths. The most prevalent types of incidents were armed clashes, violence against civilians and the use of explosive devices. The use of explosive devices is a worrying trend. Overall, this level of violence is not new to the region. Over the past five years, the number of incidents fluctuated between a low of 611 in 2017 and a high of 1,557 in 2020. Despite these variations, the overall number of incidents and resulting deaths remains alarmingly high.


Figure 3: All Security Incidents and Deaths in Lake Chad Basin, 2018 – 2022



Incidents at JAP Sites

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project recorded a marked increase in incidents in 2022 compared to 2021 across all JAP sites in the LCB. There was a particularly significant increase in incidents in Cameroon and Niger. Some areas, such as Amchidé in Cameroon, experienced a tripling of incidents; Bosso, in Niger, experienced a doubling of incidents. These incidents were primarily criminal in nature and did not have a negative impact on recorded community perceptions of security. The early warning mechanisms in place (supported by the active role of Stabilization Security Force Liaison Officers) ensured continuous dialogue at sites between security forces and communities.

Figure 4: Map of Incidents Across JAP Sites in LCB in 2022



At the JAP level, there was an overall increase in the number of incidents (from 199 in 2021 to 310 in 2022) and an overall decrease in the number of deaths (from 707 in 2021 to 377 in 2022). In Cameroon, the number of incidents rose from 112 in 2021 to 210 in 2022; the number of deaths rose from 101 in 2021 to 115 in 2022. In Chad, there were 0 incidents in 2021, rising to 5 in 2022; the number of deaths in 2021 was similarly 0, rising to 1 in 2022. In Niger, there were 12 incidents in 2021, rising to 20 incidents in 2022, and 90 deaths in 2021, declining to 38 deaths in 2022. In Nigeria, there were 75 incidents in 2021 and, similarly, 75 incidents in 2022, but 516 deaths in 2021, declining to only 223 deaths in 2022.

Collectively, the increased number of incidents represents a 56 percent increase in 2022 over 2021, while the number of deaths represents a decrease of 47 percent. It is possible that the increased number of incidents at the JAP level is related to increasing prosperity and targeted incidents, while strengthened security infrastructure and personnel capacity are limiting the negative impacts of such incidents.

5. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data: 1,232 incidents and 3,740 deaths: <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>




Gendarmerie officers with motorbikes provided to them by RSF Chad
© UNDP Chad / Faremi Olanrewaju

The overall security situation remained relatively unchanged from month to month throughout 2022. In Nigeria, however, regular NSAG attacks, such as against the Federal Capital Territory in July, exposed the northeast to more security risks.

Table 3: CrisisWatch Monthly Conflict Risk Assessments for 2022⁶

Month	Country			
	Cameroon	Chad	Niger	Nigeria
January	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Red
February	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Yellow
March	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Red
April	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow
May	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
June	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
July	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Red
August	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
September	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
October	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Yellow
November	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
December	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Yellow
Key	Deteriorated Situation	Unchanged Situation	Improved Situation	

Figure 5: JAP Level Incidents and Deaths, 2021 and 2022



6. CrisisWatch is a global conflict tracker, a tool designed to help decision-makers prevent deadly violence by keeping them up to date with developments in over 70 conflicts and crises, identifying trends and alerting them to risks of escalation and opportunities to advance peace. www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch

CAMEROON

In 2022, Jihadist armed groups JAS and ISWAP continued to carry out attacks and raids in the Far North region of Cameroon, killing civilians and causing internal displacement. Both these groups, as well as government forces, allegedly committed human rights abuses, including unlawful killings in the Far North region. The majority of security incidents and deaths occurred in the Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Sava, and Mayo-Tsanaga departments, all RSF implementing regions.

The government has been criticized for failing to fairly prosecute suspected NSAG members who committed serious crimes and for falling short on promises to assist former members of JAS and ISWAP who voluntarily disarmed. Additionally, the authorities have failed to assist and protect women and children associated with these groups.

On 25 February 2022, five Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) workers were kidnapped by unidentified armed men from their residence in Fotokol; they were released a month later. On 2 July 2022, suspected JAS fighters attacked the Mada hospital in the Logone-et-Chari division, killing a civilian and temporarily closing the health facility. This incident left thousands without essential health care. Cameroon responded to these attacks by deploying hundreds of additional troops to the Far North region.

CHAD

April 2022 marked one year since Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno seized power and declared himself head of the Transitional Military Council. These steps followed the sudden death of his father, Idriss, who had been president since 1990. Security forces used excessive force, including live ammunition and tear gas, to disperse opposition-led demonstrations across the country, and arbitrarily arrested demonstrators. Many of these detainees later reported torture and other ill-treatment while in custody. Despite Mahamat Déby's promise of free, fair and credible elections by October 2022, they were indefinitely postponed.

On 8 August, the Transitional Military Council and more than 40 rebel groups signed a peace accord in Doha, Qatar, ending a decades-long conflict and initiating a broader national dialogue. The accord was welcomed by the United Nations and the African Union Commission chief Moussa Faki Mahamat. However, nine armed factions, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (Front pour l'alternance et la concorde au Tchad [FACT]), rejected the deal, saying it did not consider their demands.

On 20 October, security forces fired on protesters in several cities across the country, killing at least 50 people and injuring dozens of others. The protests, which had been banned the previous day, marked the date the military administration had initially promised to hand over power to a civilian government.

In addition to the ongoing political crisis, JAS and ISWAP continued to carry out attacks against civilians and security forces in the Lake Chad area, with most incidents occurring in Lac province. In the Sahel, Chad provided substantial military contributions to regional counterterrorism operations, including Operation Barkhane, the French-led counter-insurgency operation against armed Jihadist groups. The country currently contributes the third-highest number of troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Chad, along with Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and until recently, Mali, is a member of the G5 Sahel, a joint force for fighting terror in the region.

NIGER

In 2022, Niger experienced both positive and negative security developments. On the positive side, public and private donors pledged over EUR 30 billion in support of Niger's 2022-2026 Socio-Economic Development Plan,⁷ double the amount requested. Since February 2015, the government continues to extend the state of emergency in the Diffa region and announced a plan to increase its military personnel from 33,000 to 100,000 by 2030. This more aggressive counter-terrorism strategy includes increased security force operations and an increased operational presence of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF operations are expected to continue in 2023 to capitalize on these military achievements.

In early 2022, major military operations in Diffa caused the suspension of implementation for four months in Garin Dogo and N'Gagam. To enhance stability, several security forces units were created or reinforced in the Baroua, Bosso, Garin Dogo, Kindjandi, N'Gagam, and Bolongou Yaskou areas. The combined effect of socio-economic support and visible security presence may contribute toward improved stability in 2023.

On the negative side, security threats from ISWAP and JAS persisted in Diffa, with frequent reported kidnappings, affecting women and girls. Infighting between ISWAP and JAS in 2022 resulted in over 60 deaths in the Bosso commune, with more deaths reported in subsequent fighting. The Nigerien military and regional allies scaled up security operations in Diffa, killing ten members of NSAGs in an airstrike in N'Guigmi department on 7 May 2022. Despite these efforts, NSAGs maintained a strong presence in Diffa, demonstrated by the attack on a National Guard post in Gueskérou on 3 July 2022, and JAS killing three civilians in Bosso on 3 September 2022, with additional attacks and killings in nearby localities and throughout the rest of the year. President Bazoum is maintaining attempts to engage local jihadist leaders in peace talks, although faces criticism for doing so.

NIGERIA

Nigeria faced high levels of political tension and insecurity as it headed toward its 2023 general elections to elect a new president.⁸ Multiple armed groups posed (and continue to pose) significant threats, as evidenced by recent attacks, including the brutal killing of 40 worshippers in a church in Ondo State by gunmen. These attacks have been carried out by groups such as JAS and ISWAP, which have continued to expand their activities beyond the northeast region. ISWAP has been linked to a high-profile attack on a prison in Kuje and other incidents, including the church killings and an attack on a train from Abuja to Kaduna.

The Borno State government has shut down IDP camps in an effort to resettle displaced persons and support them with sustainable livelihoods. However, this action has been criticized as thousands of IDPs have been left without viable alternatives.⁹ Despite these challenges, there have been positive developments. For example, over 91,000 persons formerly associated with Boko Haram voluntarily surrendered in 2022 and received support for rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.


The government faces allegations of human rights violations during counter-insurgency operations. Despite efforts to increase security, the implementation of the stabilization activities remains challenging, with areas such as Bama, Banki, Buni Yadi, Damboa, Gujba, Gwoza, Monguno, and Ngala recording security incidents in 2022.

7. Le Monde: <https://bit.ly/3m04avM>

8. President-elect Bola Tinubu won the election on 25 February 2023: <https://bit.ly/3Kov3Tz>. However, the results are being contested by multiple candidates: <https://bit.ly/3nFRjiY>, <https://bit.ly/3JWJ9du>

9. Human Rights Watch: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/nigeria>

Figure 6: Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) in Africa in 2022




Africa Center for Strategic Studies: <https://bit.ly/3Zl4eFO>

Security Outlook for 2023

In 2023, the outlook for security in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria remains challenging. All four countries are classified as High Risk, indicating regular conflict, criminal activity or civil unrest, and weak institutions incapable of effectively managing crises.¹⁰ In addition to internal challenges, the region also faces geopolitical risks due to varying conflicts between states and NSAGs and intra-NSAG conflicts. Therefore, RSF and other development partners operating in these areas need to proactively monitor political developments, as the environment is subject to constant and bidirectional change. Forecasting and contingency planning for untoward scenarios will be essential for maintaining operational safety and consolidating previous achievements. It will be essential to carry out regular conflict analyses.


10. Global Guardian 2023 Risk Assessment Map: World (<https://www.globalguardian.com/risk-map>)

Figure 7: Global Guardian 2023 Risk Assessment Map: World



Global Guardian 2023 Risk Assessment Map: World (<https://www.globalguardian.com/risk-map>)

Figure 8: Global Guardian 2023 Risk Assessment Map: Lake Chad



**Table 4: Risk Factor Key, Global Guardian
2023 Risk Assessment Map**

Extreme	Countries classified as Extreme Risk are actively engaged in conflict while also experiencing severe criminal activity and civil unrest. These countries are insecure; state institutions are too weak to manage militant groups or large-scale disasters.
High	Countries classified as High Risk experience regular conflict, criminal activity or civil unrest. These countries have weak institutions and are incapable of effectively managing crises.
Medium	Countries classified as Medium Risk are not fully secure. Political instability and inadequate law enforcement make these countries vulnerable to criminality and sporadic unrest. State institutions are often ill-equipped to manage crises.
Moderate	Countries classified as Moderate Risk are considered resilient. These countries are capable of quickly and effectively managing most crises and threats to personal security. But criminal activity, terrorism and natural disasters can impact travel or in-country operations.
Low	Countries classified as Low Risk are considered highly stable. These countries maintain a strong rule of law and are capable of containing threats to safety and security.
Geopolitical Risk	These areas contain geopolitical risk that include cold, warm, and hot conflicts. Businesses and travelers operating in these areas should actively monitor political developments, as these environments are subject to constant and bidirectional change. Forecasting and contingency planning for untoward scenarios are vital in these regions for maintaining personnel safety and business continuity.

Human Rights and Civilian Protection

Climate change and extreme weather events are making households in the region more vulnerable. Heavy rains and floods in 2022 affected approximately 2.6 million people, causing over 900 deaths and displacing more than 600,000 across Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.¹¹ Thousands of houses and hundreds of thousands of hectares of farmland were damaged or destroyed.

11. OCHA: <https://bit.ly/3Ft60fp>



Beneficiary from Mitériné, Abubakar Haroun, fishing on Lake Chad
© UNDP Chad / Faremi Olanrewaju


Figure 9: Impact of Major Flooding in the Lake Chad Basin in 2022¹²

2.6M

PEOPLE AFFECTED⁴

Cameroon	463,941
Chad	522,925
Niger	9,217
Nigeria	1,450,170

937
DEATHS



Combined with conflicts with NSAGs, extreme poverty, underdevelopment, and a changing climate, the LCB region remains in a complex crisis. Human rights violations by both NSAGs and state security personnel continue to be reported across all countries. These factors have resulted in the significant displacement of populations. According to estimates, as of the end of December 2022, the affected population in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria has reached approximately 5,752,539 individuals, including IDPs, refugees and returnees (former IDPs and returnees from abroad). The majority of the affected population, accounting for 76 percent (4,438,320 people) were located in Nigeria, 11 percent (651,310) resided in Cameroon, 5 percent (289,954) in Chad, and 8 percent (372,955) in Niger.¹³



Women in Guité attend a meeting at the Women's platform, a space for knowledge sharing and innovative solutions in the community © UNDP Chad / Faremi Olanrewaju

Table 5: Displacement Tracking in the Lake Chad Basin for 2022

	Cameroon	Chad	Niger	Nigeria
IDPs	385,372	200,031	164,892	2,455,190
Returnees (former IDPs)	114,346	16,946	42,783	1,822,932
Returnees (from abroad)	23,806	22,599	35,445	160,198
Refugees	127,786	50,378	203,567	-
Total	651,310	289,954	446,687	4,438,320


Violence against citizens, mostly by NSAGs, continued across LCB regions. Nearly 400 violent incidents and more than 550 death were recorded.¹⁴ The majority of incidents took place in Cameroon (176), while the least took place in Chad (24).

12. OCHA: <https://bit.ly/3JtdPEk>

13. International Organization for Migration (IOM): <https://bit.ly/3F6528l>

14. Using a subset of all incidents and deaths from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, there were 377 violent incidents recorded against civilians and 567 deaths: <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

Figure 10: Violence Against Civilians in Lake Chad Basin in 2022



CAMEROON

In Cameroon, the severity and scope of humanitarian needs are increasing due to conflict, insecurity, epidemics and climate-related effects such as floods and droughts. The Far North region is currently facing a multitude of challenges. There are over 385,000 internally displaced people, and over 786,000 people are experiencing severe food insecurity. These challenges are compounded by structural development weaknesses and chronic vulnerabilities, making it difficult to achieve long-term recovery. Unfortunately, insufficient humanitarian assistance and the prolonged nature of these crises have caused the affected populations' resilience to erode, leading to an increase in negative coping mechanisms, such as child labour, child marriage and survival sex.¹⁵

Insecurity is also a significant problem in the region, and heavy flooding from August to December 2022 has worsened the situation. Over 460,000 people were affected, and more than 300,000 people were displaced. Thousands of houses, hectares of farmland and livestock were destroyed, depriving the affected populations of access to education and health care facilities. The cholera outbreak was also exacerbated due to the lack of resources and challenging access to affected areas, compromising the provision of humanitarian assistance.

CHAD

The human rights and civil protection situation in Chad has deteriorated since April 2022, following the self-proclamation of the current transitional president as the Transitional Military Council, despite the 8 August 2022 peace agreement signed between the armed groups and the transitional government. Unfortunately, the 1 October 2022 dialogue exacerbated the security situation and increased human rights violations, leading to the extension of the transition despite warnings from international partners that the transitional authorities should not monopolize power.

The security situation and the impact of human rights violations and protection issues have not been very noticeable in the two RSF provinces or various JAP sites. This is largely due to RSF-supported measures put in place by the defence and security forces. However, NSAG insurgencies and the fragile security situation in neighbouring countries have affected the whole country, with impacts on livelihoods, community resilience and over 1 million people being forcibly displaced due to the ongoing conflict.

Moreover, Chad has also been hit by natural disasters, including rain and river flooding that have affected more than 500,000 people in 19 of Chad's 23 provinces. The floods resulted in significant losses in agricultural production and livestock, damage to health centres and schools and displacement of livestock farmers.¹⁶ In RSF areas, the exceptionally high waters of Lake Chad have destroyed crops, with negative impacts in the JAPs of Baltram, Guite and Ngalamia, villages that depend on agricultural and traditional fishing activities. A lack of resources and challenging access to affected areas are still compromising the provision of humanitarian assistance, exacerbating the already dire situation. In June, the Government of Chad declared a national food emergency due to the increase in international grain prices following the Russia-Ukraine war.

Despite the scale of these challenges, there have been some efforts to address them. For example, authorities have established a judicial commission to investigate human rights abuses, and the justice minister has ordered several courts to open cases on the protests and security forces' responses.

15. OCHA: <https://bit.ly/3Ft60fp>

16. OCHA: <https://bit.ly/3Ft60fp>

NIGER

The humanitarian situation in Niger is complex, with escalating conflict, violence and socio-economic challenges. The security situation, combined with major flooding in 2022, has led to internal displacement and an influx of refugees, increasing protection risks and affecting access to essential services. The Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillabéri regions experienced further deterioration of their security situations. The country is currently hosting over 350,000 refugees (200,000 in the LCB area) and 250,000 internally displaced persons (165,000 in the LCB area). Nearly 900 schools have been closed due to insecurity, leaving 78,000 children without access to education.¹⁷ In addition to these challenges, over 300,000 people were affected by floods in the last quarter of 2022, with 9,200 in the Diffa region alone.

NIGERIA

The human rights and civil protection situation in northeastern Nigeria remains concerning due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Over 2 million people are internally displaced; many rely on humanitarian aid and struggle with disrupted coping mechanisms. Camp closures and involuntary relocations have worsened the situation, posing a significant risk to security and access to basic needs and services. Women and girls face endemic protection needs and are at risk of violence, abduction, rape, trafficking and forced marriage. Children are also vulnerable to forced recruitment by NSAGs.

Conflict and insecurity have severed people from their primary livelihood sources, with more than 1.4 million people affected by flooding during the 2022 rainy season. Access constraints persist due to the high frequency of illegal vehicular checkpoints, the use of improvised explosive devices and NSAG attacks. The volatile operating environment affects most of Borno and parts of Adamawa and Yobe states.¹⁸

17. ReliefWeb: <https://bit.ly/3KuleCF>

18. OCHA: <https://bit.ly/3Ft60fp>

REGIONAL STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

Stabilization and Humanitarian Coordination

Dialogue with humanitarian partners has been strengthened through several meetings organized on various themes. The 'Humanitarian-Stabilization Outcome Document' was developed, which summarizes the outcomes of numerous dialogues and outlines definitions, differences and common ground. The guidance note was shared with the inter-agency standing committee and UN country teams. Among the outcomes of the regional humanitarian-stabilization dialogue, UNDP initiated the establishment of a UN-wide Conflict Analysis Network. The Conflict Analysis Network is a platform for engagement and collaboration among UN teams working on conflict and security-related issues across the Sahel. It will facilitate the exchange of information, joint analysis of context and risks, and the identification of mitigation measures and solutions that can be collaboratively implemented. A thorough contextual understanding will be critical to stabilization efforts, particularly to maintaining an awareness of current trends and developments and to adapting to them in a timely, sensitive and proactive manner.

Conflict sensitivity

The conflict sensitivity of stabilization activities has been strengthened. A methodology and tool for conducting quick conflict scans to monitor trends in JAP locations has been developed; teams in Chad and Niger have been trained on its use. Conflict Sensitivity Advisers to Chad have organized capacity-building missions to improve their conflict-sensitive approach.

An example of this work in practice was documented late in 2022 when tensions arose in Baltram over relief for flood victims. The tensions were identified, assessed and quickly addressed by the team holding dialogue sessions with the village chiefs and security forces. The use of the conflict tracker tool and the existing early warning system facilitated the team's quick assessment and response.

For RSF, a conflict-sensitive approach extends beyond merely assessing whether an activity has or is likely to cause harm; the approach ensures that activities' decision-making processes are also conflict sensitive. This ensures that decisions are made in consideration of activities' interactions with peace and conflict dynamics and that activities respond appropriately when interactions occur. The approach is, therefore, adaptive and supported by adequate risk mitigation measures.

Communication and Analysis

RSF has produced the 'Regional Stabilization Communication Strategy.' The communication focal points of all windows came together in Niamey in February 2022 to discuss the importance of communication for stabilization and what makes it unique from other programmatic communication on development or peace programmes. The different audiences and target messages were refined and guidelines were developed, including on putting the government at the forefront of success and impact stories.

From June to December 2022, a dedicated stabilization social media campaign was implemented. The campaign showcased the ongoing work of stabilization across the 6 Sahelian countries where stabilization is being implemented,¹⁹ promoted a shared and unified understanding of stabilization among internal and external audiences, and included multilevel stakeholder participation from the

19. Regional Stabilization Facility (RSF): Cameroon, Chad, Niger (Diffa), and Nigeria; and Liptako-Gourma Stabilization Facility (LGSF): Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Tillabéri and Tahoua).



A busy day in the market: traders at the Guité Market constructed by RSF Chad
© UNDP Chad / Faremi Olanrewaju

countries, UN and UNDP offices, and partners. The campaign leveraged various platforms and formats to reach its audience,²⁰ including popular hashtags and multimedia content. Two primary hashtags, #RebuildingTogether and #ThrivingSahel, collectively achieved over 21 million impressions and reached nearly 12 million people through more than 850 content pieces.²¹ Additional multimedia content included a 10-part podcast mini-series²² and 4 short videos²³ outlining the stabilization approach in the Lake Chad Basin, discussing opportunities and challenges, and demonstrating the resilience of the local populations. Overall, user engagement with the campaign was 65% positive, 29% neutral, and only 4% negative, indicating broad public support for stabilization.

During 2022, the Security Forces Liaison Officers (SFLO) network was created with the stabilization advisors from the Lake Chad Basin and Liptako-Gourma Region. This network aims to bring together colleagues from SFLO and stabilization teams to engage with experts and colleagues from other contexts, building networks and strengthening their own capacity to work in conflict-affected environments. The monthly meetings focus on building good relationships, sharing information, and improving collective analysis and support. Meetings have a thematic focus on sharing experiences, lessons and challenges, such as how to work with non-state actors in the security sector, gender sensitivity or cross-border challenges.

Gender guidance and Capacities

RSF has produced a 'Gender Guidance Note,' which made important recommendations to improve gender disaggregation and gender targeting. As an outcome of the process of developing the 'Gender Guidance Note' as the identification of the need to better understand the effectiveness and coverage of gender sensitivity stabilization activities. Despite facing immense challenges, women are playing critical roles in bringing about stability to their communities in JAP locations. Women are leading and participating in Community Stabilization Committees, working as engineers or supplying their communities with goods and services. In addition, they are actively engaged in decision-making processes related to restoring structures destroyed by conflicts, such as houses, schools, police stations, health clinics, water points and market stalls — rebuilding communities and areas shattered by violence and conflict. Different infrastructure and interventions, such as security infrastructure and streetlights, have created a sense of security for women. The women's platform in Gitte has contributed to providing a safe space for women to engage in community decision-making and participate in various other community and economic activities.

Sex-disaggregated data and gender statistics are being collected through all programme sites. Gender targeted trainings have been undertaken for local authorities and security forces, including on gender-based violence. For example, law enforcement personnel in Nigeria have undergone training on human rights and sexual and gender-based violence, which in turn have resulted into increased reporting and addressing of 3,194 cases of human rights violations and 1,119 cases of sexual and gender-based violence.

In 2023, a gender assessment of stabilization activities and gender-sensitive conflict analyses (which provide a deeper understanding of underlying gender power relations and how they influence and are affected by conflict and the intervention) will be rolled out. These will guide recommendations to enhance the inclusiveness and effectiveness of conflict-sensitive stabilization activities and inform the prioritization and programming of stabilization interventions.

20. Platforms include Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Pinterest.

21. Analysis is from the 90-period June to August 2022 only. Total campaign impact is higher.

22. Podcasts available on Spotify (<https://spoti.fi/3GEfpRM>), Amazon Music (<https://amzn.to/3zRJ7im>), and Apple (<https://apple.co/41lwLe7>).

23. Videos available on YouTube (<https://bit.ly/3KWtuwz>; <https://bit.ly/3KXR6kt>; <https://bit.ly/3MFNfft>; <https://bit.ly/3UyQdlf>).



Falta Yerima, 1 of the 6 Female Leaders on the Stabilization Steering Committee, her role is to represent the trader's interests in the community, Ngarannam, Nigeria
© UNDP Nigeria / JB Multimedia

OUTCOME CHANGES: A GROWING SENSE OF NORMALCY


SUMMARY

Stabilization creates conditions that are vital for bringing a sense of normalcy to IDPs who return home. Over 400,000 IDPs, 54 percent of them women, have now returned to their homes in the Lake Chad area. There are now clear indications that in 2022, subjective perceptions of stability and security in JAP sites have significantly improved over those held in 2020 and 2021. An estimated 1.36m women and men in the 31 JAP sites now feel increasingly safe, contributing to the restoration of the social contract. Further, communities in JAP locations now show a higher level of satisfaction with state security services than they did in previous years.

IDPs returning home²⁴

An estimated 36 percent of IDPs in the 31 JAP sites in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria have returned home (54 percent women). Around 400,000 once-displaced people (215,000 women) have returned to where they fled from.

Figure 11: Proportion of IDPs in 31 JAP Sites Who have Returned²⁵



24. Refugee and returnee data for Chad is collected on an empirical basis by the RSF-Chad project team together with Community Stabilization Committees; data for Cameroon comes from population data based on interviews with sous-préfets; data for Niger is based on the Civil Registry and UNHCR (2020-2021); data for Nigeria comes from the International Organization for Migration .

25. Chad does not have 2021 data. A middle-point between 2020 and 2022 has been used as a placeholder.

The proportion of IDPs that have returned differs across JAP locations in the four target countries:





Figure 12: Percentage of IDPs in 31 JAP sites that have returned by country



Data on IDPs and returnees also varies significantly across JAP sites. In a number of JAP sites in Cameroon, the proportion of returnees is higher than 50 percent. This is the case in Kolofata (89 percent), Limani (82 percent), Waza (65 percent), Fotokol (60 percent), Logone-Birni (54 percent) and Makary (53 percent). Eight JAP sites in Niger and Nigeria have seen less than 30 percent of IDPs returning home. For Cameroon and Chad, no data on the total number of IDPs in JAP sites are currently available.

Figure 13: IDPs that have Returned by JAP Sites

JAP location	Total number of current and former IDPs	Number of IDPs that have returned	% of total IDPs that have returned
Bosso, Niger	254	254	100%
Baroua, Niger	6,274	6,274	100%
N'Gagam, Niger	1,797	1,797	100%
Garin Dogo, Niger	4,448	4,448	100%
Ngalamia, Chad	7,799	6,923	89%
Guitté, Chad	1,932	1,582	82%
Buni Yadi, Nigeria	58,471	38,087	65%
Gulak, Nigeria	12,044	7,228	60%
Mozogo, Cameroon	28,076	15,177	54%
Ngala, Nigeria	205,821	108,456	53%
Hile-alifa, Cameroon	6,838	3,243	47%
Gwoza, Nigeria	155,105	66,715	43%
Fotokol, Cameroon	29,024	12,185	42%
Mokolo, Cameroon	30,406	11,003	36%
Kolofata, Cameroon	60,751	19,406	32%
Amchidé, Cameroon	10,900	2,900	27%
Logone Birni, Cameroon	19,000	5,000	26%
Monguno, Nigeria	199,208	46,723	23%
Makary, Cameroon	64,309	12,630	20%
Damboa, Nigeria	81,522	15,900	20%
Banki, Nigeria	59,202	8,926	15%
Moskota, Cameroon	31,094	4,200	14%
Baltram, Chad	5,714	714	12%
Koulikimé, Chad	n/a	-	0%
Mitériné, Chad	n/a	500	n/a
Tchoukouboul, Chad	n/a	200	n/a
Daboua, Chad	n/a	320	n/a
Limani, Cameroon	n/a	n/a	n/a
Waza, Cameroon	n/a	n/a	n/a
Blangoua, Cameroon	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ngarannam, Nigeria	n/a	n/a	n/a



Dana Adam, Widow and a female-led household member of the community Ngarannam, Nigeria
© UNDP Nigeria / JB Multimedia

Significant Increase in Perceived Security and Safety

Recent perception security surveys partially explain returnee data in JAP sites. Surveys results suggest that all stabilization locations are now more secure, attract voluntary and safe returns, and exhibit more awareness of human rights and sexual and gender-based violence issues.

Security encapsulates mental security: it includes perceptions of security, providing communities with confidence, and encouraging voluntary return. Different infrastructure and interventions, such as security infrastructure (e.g. police and customs stations) and streetlights, have created a sense of security for communities, especially among women.


Improved security has brought life back to communities that were once devastated by insurgent attacks. Without people returning to their homes and beginning to rebuild their lives, development and peacebuilding are not possible. Getting families home to familiar environments where they feel safe, can send their children to school, go to the local market and rebuild their homes is at the core of stabilization. Families need to believe in the possibility of a future based on security and peace; stabilization lays the foundation for this.

BOX 1: YAGANA IBRAHIM

Yagana Ibrahim is a mother of four from Banki in Bama Local Government Area Borno State, Nigeria. She is an active member of the CSC in Banki, acting as a voice for women and girls. For the first time in her life, she can raise — in a public space — specific issues faced by females in the community and suggest solutions for improving them. CSCs bring together traditional rulers, religious leaders, young people, community security actors (e.g. military and police) and female representatives to talk things through and explore ways to settle disputes fairly and safely.

Since 2020, there has been a noticeable improvement in the perceptions of safety and security among individuals residing in JAP locations across Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria.²⁶ More than 1.1 million people (600,000 women) in JAP locations now feel safe and secure, an increase of 614,000 from 2020.²⁷ Over a span of two years, the proportion of households in JAP communities that reported feeling safe and secure²⁸ has drastically risen from 38 percent in 2020 to 84 percent²⁹ in 2022, a significant total increase of 36 percentage points (indicator 1.1).

Figure 14: Percentage of JAP Populations Reporting Safety and Security³⁰



The most dramatic turnaround in safety and security perceptions can be seen in JAP locations in Chad, where only 16 percent of the population felt safe and secure in 2020 compared to 83 percent of the population who felt safe in 2022. In JAP locations in Cameroon, the percentage of people who feel safe and secure rose from 46 percent in 2020 to 81 percent in 2022. In Nigeria, the percentage rose from 53 percent in 2020 to 87 percent in 2022.

This data supports the expectation that the combination of rehabilitated and constructed security infrastructure, the installation of thousands of solar-powered streetlights across communities, the revitalization of local security personnel through equipment and capacity building, and the active role CSCs have contributed to greater safety and security in JAP locations.

26. Niger Community Perception Surveying will take place in 2023.

27. In 2022, there are an estimated 1,340,000 people living in Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria JAP locations (710,000 or 53 percent of them are women). 38 percent of these people are approximately 508,000; 84 percent are 1,122,000 people.

28. Community Perception Survey question: “Vous sentez-vous en sécurité dans la zone où vous vivez ?”

29. Unweighted average for the three countries Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria.


30. Chad does not have 2021 data. A middle-point between 2020 and 2022 has been used as a placeholder.

Increased Satisfaction of Communities with State Security Services

Stabilization has a targeted focus on reinforcing the social contract. The social contract strengthens police, community security and the capacities of local governments to address the community concerns that led to the outbreak of violence in the first place.

Overall, communities in JAP locations are satisfied with state security levels: 85 percent in Nigeria and 81 percent in Cameroon and Chad in 2022 (indicator 2.4).

Figure 15: Percentage JAP Population Satisfied with State Security Services



In Nigeria, where trendlines are available, the proportion of households satisfied with state security services has increased over time, from 57 percent in 2020 to 83 percent in 2021 to 85 percent in 2022.³¹ For Cameroon and Chad, no trends over time are yet available. However, in both Cameroon and Chad, a 2022 baseline of 81 percent already shows a high level of satisfaction.

Evidence from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report points to the construction and rehabilitation of security infrastructure, combined with the provision of security equipment, to have been enabling factors of improved security perceptions.³² Proper security equipment has increased security personnel capacity, while infrastructure has supported larger deployments to local areas. For example, increased operational capacities have allowed for the creation of the River Brigade in Guite, increasing security.

Another state service, access to justice, shows similar trends, although on a lower level. In Nigeria, the percentage of households reporting access to justice increased from 26 percent in 2021 to 47 percent in 2022 (indicator 1.2). In Cameroon and Chad, 71 percent and 65 percent of households, respectively, reported access to justice, serving as a baseline.³³

31. Community Perception Survey question: “Are you satisfied with the security services provided in your community by the State?”

32. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report (PowerPoint, slide 9 – 11)

33. Community Perception Survey question: “Quel est votre niveau de confiance aux membres des autres communautés ?”


Perceptions of Access to Essential Social Services Clearly Show Improvements

There has been a clear improvement in perceptions of access to essential social services (health, education, WASH) in Chad and Nigeria. In 2022, an estimated 308,000 people (171,000 female) reported that they were satisfied with their access to essential social services who did not report this in 2020.³⁴

The proportion of households in JAP communities that reported satisfaction with access to social services also drastically rose,³⁵ from 36 percent in 2020 to 72 percent³⁶ in 2022 (indicator 1.3).³⁷ In Cameroon, 69 percent of households reported satisfaction with the provision of and access to social services in 2022, serving as a baseline.

Steady progress on rehabilitating, constructing and equipping more than 150 essential social service infrastructure (including schools, health facilities, water points and administrative centres), combined with the addition of hundreds of permanent housing units in 2022, contributed towards these positive trends in community access to social services.

Figure 16: Percentage JAP Population Satisfied with Access to Essential Social Services



These RSF findings are confirmed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report, conducted in September 2022 in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.³⁸ Across the three countries and four JAP locations surveyed, 80 percent of respondents, on average, reported that access to essential social services has increased since RSF programming began.³⁹

34. In 2022, there are an estimated 856,000 people living in Chad and Nigeria JAP locations (474,000 or 55 percent of them women). A 36 percentage-point increase is approximately 308,000 people (an estimated 171,000 female).

35. Based on Community Perception Survey data from Chad and Nigeria.


36. Unweighted average for Chad and Nigeria.

37. Community Perception Survey question: "Quel est votre niveau de satisfaction vis-à-vis de la fourniture et de l'accès aux services sociaux essentiels (santé, éducation et WASH) ?"

38. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report (PowerPoint, slide 14).

39. Unweighted average for the three countries Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

Figure 17: Percentage JAP Population Reporting Increased Access to Essential Social Services⁴⁰



Limited But Rising Confidence in the State to Repair Social Fabrics

In Nigeria and Chad, the two countries where data were available in 2022, households in JAP locations indicated some confidence in the state process of repairing the economic fabric (indicator 1.5). In Nigeria, 75 percent of households were confident in 2022, an increase from 60 percent in 2020 and 72 percent in 2021. In Chad, 51 percent of households feel the same in 2022, serving as a baseline.

40. Evidence is from 4 JAP locations: Limani and Mozogo in Cameroon, Guité in Chad, and Bosso in Niger.

EXAMPLE OF NIGERIA

Community perceptions of safety and security in the area have steadily improved over the past few years. In 2019, only 51 percent of people felt safe, but that number rose to 53 percent in 2020, 87 percent in 2021 and 87 percent by November 2022. This improvement was possible due to various measures taken to enhance security, including the establishment of CSCs to facilitate civil-military coordination, address human rights and sexual and gender-based violence issues and promote community safety in eight communities. Moreover, the presence of security and law enforcement forces has been increased in six communities by setting up police stations and outposts, police residences and dormitories. Additionally, 46.3 km of security trench was dug in five communities to prevent insurgents from entering villages. The government has also dug 30 km of trenching, which helped extend the security perimeter and prevent NSAGs from attacking Banki, which was previously attacked seven times. Notably, 1,637 solar-powered streetlights were installed in five communities, contributing to increased safety and security in those areas.

Significant progress has been made in improving the capacity and understanding of the armed and security forces on human rights and sexual and gender-based violence issues, leading to significant progress. Law enforcement personnel serving/dispatched in eight communities have undergone training on human rights and sexual and gender-based violence, with 144 human rights actors and defenders, 120 paralegals, and 360 informal justice actors in six communities receiving training. The reporting and addressing of 3,194 cases of human rights violations (including 441 committed by security actors) and 1,119 cases of sexual and gender-based violence (including 140 committed by security actors) in all six communities demonstrate a commitment to promoting a culture of respect for human rights in the area. These efforts have contributed to improving the capacity of the armed and security forces to address human rights and sexual and gender-based violence issues, ultimately enhancing the safety and security of communities in the area.

A significant achievement is the improvement in access to justice and human rights. A total of 61 courts, law enforcement institutions and facilities have been constructed or rehabilitated. 729 law enforcement officials have been trained, contributing to the improved capacity and understanding of the justice system. Additionally, 3,310 crimes have been recorded, and four judges and judicial officials have been deployed, leading to the adjudication of 411 cases. Further, 80 human rights monitors and 90 human rights defenders were trained and deployed, 4,171 human rights incidences were documented and 1,723 incidences were resolved. These efforts have resulted in improved access to justice and human rights protection in the area, ultimately promoting a culture of respect for the rule of law.

Stabilization for the Humanitarian, Peace and Development Nexus

Stabilization has been the glue to the humanitarian, peace and development nexus. Without people returning to their homes and beginning to rebuild their lives, it is not possible to discuss development and peacebuilding. These families have, in many cases, experienced conflict and often witnessed the death of loved ones. They need to believe in the possibilities of a future based on security and peace; stabilization lays the foundation for this.



Farmers across several communities in northeast Nigeria received agricultural input to boost local food production and enhance food security
© UNDP Nigeria / Amalachukwu Ibeneme


In Chad, for example, several UN agencies, including IOM, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOCHA and WFP, have formed a development and humanitarian actors task force to operationalize the nexus in Lac and Hadjer-Lamis provinces. As part of this effort, a nexus-focused Joint Action Plan has been developed for the Tchoukouboul stabilization site, aimed at encouraging the return of IDPs from Baga Sola. UNDP will focus on justice, local administration, security offices, social service infrastructure and livelihoods, while OCHA will coordinate humanitarian assistance in Tchoukouboul. Monthly meetings to monitor progress and ensure effective coordination, held at the governor's office, involve local authorities, CSOs, national and international NGOs and security forces to monitor progress and ensure effective coordination.

In Nigeria, the UNDP-constructed Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) compound at the Banki border supports NIS border monitoring activities and voluntary repatriation activities from Cameroon led by UNHCR. UNDP's rehabilitation and furnishing of area courts enable UNHCR's access to justice programmes, while the organization's rehabilitation of schools supports UNHCR's child protection programming.

Positive Trends on Rehabilitation and Reintegration in Nigeria

In Nigeria, progress has been made towards rehabilitating and reintegrating former members of Boko Haram, with positive trends across all metrics. In Borno State, prior to the reintegration of former members, 30 percent of the population reported feeling safe and secure. After reintegration, in the first half of 2022, only 19 percent reported feeling safe and secure. However, following RSF scale-up activities, 40 percent of the population reported the same, a significant achievement.⁴¹


Figure 18: Before and After Safety and Security in Communities Impacted by Reintegration



In the first half of 2022, only 31 percent of respondents approved of the government's handling and treatment of the reintegration process. However, by the second half of 2022, 51 percent reported the same.


Similarly, in the first half of 2022, only 15 percent of the population of communities affected by reintegration were satisfied with access to essential social services, but 55 percent were satisfied by the end of 2022.

Figure 19: Communities Impacted by Reintegration Satisfaction with Essential Social Services




Only 31 percent were satisfied with government efforts in promoting peace and stability after the reintegration process in the first half of 2022, compared to 41 percent in the second half. Further, only 25 percent were satisfied with government efforts in changing knowledge, attitudes and practices on civic, peace and religious education after reintegration, compared to 29 percent in the second half.

Figure 20: Satisfaction with Peace Promotion and Social Reintegration



With regards to the overall reintegration process, only 24 percent were satisfied in the first half of 2022, compared to 40 percent in the second half.

Figure 21: Overall Community Satisfaction with Reintegration Process



41. Community Perception Survey on the reintegration of Boko Haram members in the first-half and second-half of 2022.

Community respondents noted that the reintegration of persons formerly associated with Boko Haram is a major pathway to peace and stability. However, they perceived that the duration of rehabilitation of surrendered persons was too short and felt that the reintegration process was not inclusive of critical community stakeholders. Respondents were concerned that preparatory initiatives of community awareness, sensitization, dialogue and training were inadequate in Borno State.




Food supplied to the rehabilitation camp for the former associates of Boko Haram
© UNDP Nigeria / Amalachukwu Ibeneme

WHAT WE DELIVERED: IMPROVING SECURITY, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

At the output level, which is directly linked to RSF implementation, significant progress has been achieved since activities began. Under outcome 1, immediate stabilization, three outputs are measured against 20 indicators. There has been major progress on all fronts, from strengthening local security and justice to improving access to essential social services to boosting local economies. Under outcome 2, extended stabilization, four outputs are measured against 27 indicators. While consolidation efforts, such as enhancing local community and governance capacities, have progressed well, similar efforts at the regional level and with the LCBC have moved slower.

In total, RSF has invested an average of around \$100 per person living across active JAP locations from 2019 to 2022. Of the overall total, 86 percent was delivered directly at the beneficiary level. At the output level, the largest investments were made in immediate stabilization: 42 percent on improving access to essential social services, 16 percent on strengthening security and justice, and 8 percent on boosting local economies.⁴²

Figure 22: RSF Resource Distribution by Cost Area, 2019-2022



42. This calculation compares the total amount of funds spent so far from 2019-2022 of USD 134.2M with the estimated population of the 31 currently active JAP locations of approximately 1,360,000. The total amount includes all programme costs, programme management costs, and General Management Support. This results in USD 98.68 spent on average on persons in JAP locations.

OUTPUT 1.1: SECURITY AND JUSTICE

Community Security and Justice Systems Established and Operational in JAP Locations

Table 6: Aggregated Output 1.1 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline	Chad	Niger	Nigeria
1.1.1 Number of Stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at established and functional at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels	22	40	40 (+16)	79
1.1.2a Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) constructed/rehabilitated	42	69	73 (+24)	149
1.1.2b Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) equipped	3	28	42 (+28)	145
1.1.3 Number of JAP sites with Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures established	21	39	32 (+11)	40
1.1.4. Percentage of female representatives (including female presidents) within Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures	16%	30%	24%	33%
1.1.5 Number of JAP locations with operational early warning systems	15	27	20 (+5)	42
1.1.6 Number of security providers trained on human rights and prevention of gender-based violence	1,338	2,938	3,164 (+1,521)	4,600
1.1.7 Number of JAP locations in which local human rights defenders are reporting on human rights violations and issues surrounding civilian protection	13	28	21 (+8)	42
1.1.8 Number of training /sensibilization activities on risk of mine carried out in JAP sites	0	0	0	35
1.1.9 Number of streetlights installed in JAP Location	360	1,819	1,996 (+892)	2,750

Table 7: Output 1.1 Financial Data

Financial Data (USD)		
2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$5,590,440	\$7,562,217	135%

Since RSF support began, communities have access to 115 newly constructed, rehabilitated or equipped security and justice infrastructure facilities. Nearly 2,000 solar-powered streetlights have been installed in JAP locations, reducing the risk and incidence of crime and accidents. Further, 40 locations now have established partnerships between local and national security forces and community groups. Across JAP locations, CSCs now plan and monitor the implementation of community development projects; 20 can rely on operational early warning systems. Overall, RSF has fully or largely achieved its planned milestones for 2022.

In 2022 alone, 24 security and justice infrastructure were newly constructed and rehabilitated (indicator 1.1.2a). In Cameroon, five on-call dormitories were constructed, including one each for the Commissariat Amchidé and Commissariat Mozogo, and one each for the Gendarmerie of Amchidé, Blangoua and Mozogo. These accommodations, which are equipped with amenities (electricity, water, fence), reinforce the presence of security personnel in their duty stations, contributing to local community safety.

In Chad, two buildings were constructed: an office building for the CSC and a building for the women's platform in Guité. The women's platform has contributed to improved community-level gender equality by serving as a safe location for women to engage in community decision-making and participate in various other community and economic activities.

In Niger, a fixed security position was constructed in Bosso to support the operational deployment of security personnel and to strengthen community safety. The fixed position serves as a centre for operations supporting security in the wider area, including the ability to operate three flexible outpost locations. In Nigeria, 16 security infrastructure was constructed, including trenches, police stations, outposts and immigration facilities across Banki, Buni Yadi, Damboa, Gulak, Monguno, Ngala and Ngarannam.



Constructed Customs Post in Banki
@UNDP Nigeria/ Amalachukwu Ibeneme



The Women's Platform in has contributed to empowering women in Guité, Chad



Police station in Amchidé

Further, 28 security and justice infrastructure have been equipped (indicator 11.2b) in 2022: five in Cameroon, three in Chad and 20 in Nigeria. In Cameroon, five solar electrification kits were installed, one each for the Gendarmerie Company in Waza, Gendarmerie Brigade in Mozogo, Special Police Station in Mozogo, Customary Court in Mozogo and Customary Court in Moskota.

Additionally, RSF provided the Nigerien National Guard (NNG) in Niger with approximately 1,150 pieces of security support and operational equipment. As a result, NNG is now better able to carry out localized operations with the provision of 945 operational equipment, which are critical for the sustainable presence of justice and security authorities.

Table 8: Operational Equipment Provided to the Nigerien National Guard

Equipment	Quantity
First aid kits	300
Portable Radios	218
Personal protection equipment	360
Vehicles (equipped with High Frequency radios)	30
Mobile lighting towers	12
Satellite Phones	20
Solar batteries	3
Very High Frequency Radio base stations	2

Further, 208 flexible security support equipment were provided to support the operations of the three outposts in Niger.

Table 9: Security Support Equipment Provided to Support Flexible Outposts

Equipment	Quantity
Ballistic barriers	132
Soft tents	60
Rigid tents	16

Overall, RSF support to restoring security and justice infrastructure has improved community safety and security, as evidenced at the outcome level. In Niger, RSF played a critical role in supporting security forces' deployment strategies, which now have established, fixed security positions in Baroua, Bosso and Garin Dogo, which, due to vehicular and equipment transfers, now enable Niger to maintain minimum security conditions in the region. In Nigeria, the deployment of security personnel increased by 89 percent following the completion of the construction and rehabilitation of offices and residences for law enforcement agencies, leading to reduced dependence on the Nigerian military for security and civil disputes. Based on survey data from the end of 2022, the police retained the position of the second-most trusted institution reporting security incidents in RSF sites in Nigeria by 62.6 percent (following the military at 72 percent). The police also retained the position of the second-most trusted institution in resolving disputes, at 64 percent (following community leaders at 79 percent). Following the rehabilitation of customs and immigration facilities in the border community of Banki, cross-border movement, trade and security have been enhanced between Cameroon and Nigeria.



In Nigeria, 892 additional solar-powered streetlights were installed (indicator 11.9) in 2022. Installation locations varied across schools, marketplaces, medical centres, places of worship and public roads. Serving as a quick-response, basic security foundation for higher-level activities,⁴³ these streetlights brought improved lighting to public areas, providing numerous benefits to communities. These benefits include reducing the risk and incidence of crime and accidents, thereby increasing public safety, stimulating local economies by providing marketplaces and other areas with sustained lighting, and improving educational and health care access to schools and medical centres.

In addition to providing infrastructure and equipment for community security and justice, 11 new CSCs were created in 2022 (indicator 1.1.3): six in Cameroon (Fotokol, Hile-Alifa, Kolofata, Logone-Birni, Makary and Mozogo), three in Chad (Daboua, Mitterine and Tchoukouboul), and two in Nigeria (Gwoza and Ngala). In Cameroon, there are 22 female members across the six new CSCs. The CSCs have been mandated with identifying community development priorities, selecting beneficiaries, facilitating project missions and monitoring project activities.

RSF contributed to strengthening the CSCs, for example, in Cameroon, by training 29 CSC members on their mandate and responsibilities. As a response to heavy flooding in the LCB in late 2022, the CSCs mobilized their communities to build dikes to mitigate flood damage. The CSCs also effectively monitored community project activities and acted as trusted liaisons between their respective communities and RSF project implementation units. In Nigeria, the capacities of 200 CSC members across eight RSF locations were strengthened on public safety and security, community dialogue and mutual trust with government and security agents. CSCs are contributing towards building community trust, for example, in Limani, Cameroon, where the reduction in the number of terrorist attacks has been partially attributed to the local CSC.⁴⁴ This finding is also backed up in Chad, where CSCs were noted to play important roles in liaising with local authorities and directly resolving local conflicts. For example, in Baltram, the CSC heard and successfully resolved six community conflicts between farmers and herders.⁴⁵

43. Early investments in security support later investments into restoring essential social services and revitalizing local economies.

44. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report (PowerPoint, slide 11).

45. RSF Chad Independent Evaluation, December 2022, p. 27.



Fotokol Community Stabilization Committee members

Sixteen additional stakeholder relationships and collaborations with security forces were established (indicator 1.1.1): 10 in Chad, four in Niger and two in Nigeria. These include partnerships with local and national security forces and other community groups.

In Chad, security forces were trained on human rights and engaged in community dialogues in Daboua, Mitériné and Tchoukoulboul; sensitized on counter-terrorism and the judicial system in Baltram, Guité, Koulikimé and Ngalamia; engaged in community security matters in Baltram; and partnered with to develop security assessments for the Hadjer-Lamis and Lac regions. Additionally, RSF provided 12 fuel support transfers to security forces in Chad.

In Cameroon, community dialogue sessions were held in Fotokol, Hile-Alifa and Kolofata, involving the Defence and Security Forces, vigilance committees, CSCs, communal social assistance committees, traditional chiefs and youth and women community leaders. These dialogue sessions, based on previously established relationships, helped to identify local security challenges and needs and to develop local security plans.

Five new JAP locations (three in Chad and two in Nigeria) now have operationalized early warning systems in place (indicator 1.1.5). CSCs have contributed to improving security through various engagements with state security personnel. For example, in Chad, in collaboration with local security personnel, systematic checkpoints (including metal detectors) have been operationalized in hotspot areas such as marketplaces and public gathering locations. The CSCs of Guité and Ngalamia in Chad were trained in civil-military dialogue, human rights and conflict prevention and management in order to further coordinate community safety measures. Despite a significant increase in early warning systems in 2022 (to 20 overall), operationalizing systems in Cameroon have been rescheduled to 2023 due to the delayed start of stabilization activities in JAP locations in 2022.

More security providers now have improved knowledge, skills and awareness on gender-based violence and human rights across all RSF programme

countries. In 2022, RSF trained 1,521 security providers on human rights and gender-based violence (indicator 1.1.6): 950 in Cameroon, 147 in Chad and 424 in Nigeria.

In Cameroon, this included training on human rights, international humanitarian law, and gender-based violence for 659 Defence and Security Forces and other state security personnel, 605 (five female) military personnel, 10 (0 female) MNJTF military officers, and 44 (five female) administrative, judicial, and community leaders. RSF also provided training on national criminal procedures and professional ethics in the context of violent extremism to 194 (30 female) police officers in Blangoua, Moskota, and Waza and 97 (5 female) police officers in Mayo-Sava.

In Chad, 147 civil-military stakeholders across Baltram, Guité, Koulikimé and Ngalamia increased their capacities to protect the civilian population's human rights.

In Nigeria, 424 (39 female) police, customs, immigration, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps and military officers were trained and deployed to Banki, Buni Yadi, Damboa, Gulak, Gwoza, Monguno, Ngala and Ngarannam. Training evaluations conducted both before and after training demonstrated that 98 percent of these officers increased their knowledge and capacities to apply and promote human rights principles in conflict areas.

The increased knowledge and capacities of the trained security providers will contribute to better protection of civilians in conflict-affected areas. This, in turn, could lead to a reduction in human rights abuses and incidents of gender-based violence, which are prevalent in the Lake Chad Basin region.

Eight new JAP locations now have local human rights defenders reporting on human rights violations and issues surrounding civilian protection (indicator 1.1.7): six in Chad and two in Nigeria. Additionally, in Cameroon, the Cameroon Human Rights Commission (CHRC) launched a confidential, toll-free hotline (1523) in July that is open to anyone who wants to report a human rights violation, express concerns or obtain information. A total of 29 calls reporting human rights violations in the Far North region were recorded in 2022. This hotline helps CHRC to better fulfil its missions to promote and protect human rights and prevent torture. In addition, as part of the implementation of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, Cameroon produced a human rights violation risk assessment report and began to raise awareness of defence and security personnel's awareness of and respect for human rights, particularly when using RSF assets.

In Chad (in Baltram, Guité, Koulikimé, and Mitériné) CSCs held community information events on human rights issues to explain what human rights are and how to report abuses. In Nigeria, RSF collaborated with the National Human Rights Commission to engage the Nigerian Army on monitoring military court-martial processes and accountability for human rights issues in conflict-affected communities in northeastern Nigeria, including recording and reporting cases of human rights abuses and sexual and gender-based violence by military personnel in the field. Five court-martial cases were initiated; judgements were secured against two military personnel.

In Nigeria, multiple rounds of discussions between UNDP, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, and the United Nations Mine Action Service were held to support the formulation of explosive ordnance risk education awareness campaigns for JAP location populations (indicator 1.1.8). Chad and Niger are also developing mine-risk work plans.

TESTIMONY

“Stabilization Committees have taught us a lot about the importance of rehabilitating and reintegrating repentant insurgents. Sympathizing with open arms and giving them a chance to be useful to society again.”

Hassan Alhaji Bakar
CSO Youth Network
Banki, Nigeria

“We pleaded for support to build a perimeter, which helped put a stop to the insurgent’s reprisal attacks and enabled us to sleep in peace with our children.”

Adda Abdullahi
RSF Beneficiary
Banki, Nigeria

OUTPUT 1.2: ESSENTIAL SOCIAL SERVICES

Essential Social Services Infrastructure Constructed and/or Rehabilitated, Functional and Accessible

Table 10: Aggregated Output 1.2 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.2.1a Number of new or rehabilitated essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH and education) handed over to local authorities or communities	82	158	133 (+48)	339
1.2.1b Number of equipped essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH and education) handed over to local authorities or communities	5	43	46 (+38)	221
1.2.2a Number of bridges constructed / rehabilitated	0	1	1 (+1)	26
1.2.2b Number of km of roads constructed / rehabilitated	0	0	0	TBD
1.2.3 Number of permanent housing units constructed	505	1,117	1,373 (+863)	2,148
1.2.4 Number of public facilities and infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	32	173	92 (+30)	262
1.2.5 Number of water points (including boreholes) constructed/rehabilitated in JAP location	15	103	109 (+47)	209

Table 11: Output 1.2 Financial Data

Financial Data (USD)		
2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$12,757,637	\$16,583,602	130%

Overall, over 130 social service infrastructures (e.g., health centres and housing, surgical facilities, schools and housing for teachers, etc.) have so far been rehabilitated, built or equipped through RSF, and more than 90 have been equipped with renewable technologies. Further, 1,373 permanent housing units have been constructed and over 100 water points have been constructed or rehabilitated in JAP locations. On average, RSF has mostly met the planned milestones for this year.

In 2022, 48 additional social service infrastructure were constructed or rehabilitated, 38 more were outfitted to become operational (indicator 1.2.1), and 30 more were equipped with renewable technologies (indicator 1.2.4). Three infrastructure facilities have been constructed or rehabilitated in Cameroon, 37 in Chad, eight in Niger and five in Nigeria. In Cameroon, one on-call health centre housing complex was rehabilitated, one medical operating facility was constructed and one multi-sport centre was rehabilitated in Blangoua. In Chad, one primary school and one health centre were rehabilitated in Baltram; one college for general education, one teachers' residence, one drainage canal and several other social service infrastructure were constructed in Guité; and one multifunctional centre, one CSC building and one teacher's residence were constructed in Koulikimé. The operationalized school in Guité has been a success for over 330 students, while maintaining an unusually high retention rate for female students due to its quality and correspondingly high level of trust put in it by parents.⁴⁶ In Niger, a primary school and health centre were rehabilitated in Baroua, and a health centre was rehabilitated in Garin Dogo. In Nigeria, classrooms were rehabilitated in three schools across Buni Yadi, Gulak and Monguno; one health centre was rehabilitated in Damboa; and one local administrative building, the Madagali Local Government Council, was constructed in Gulak. Additionally, in Cameroon, a playground area was constructed in Blangoua.



School in Buni Yadi



Students in school in Guité, Chad

Thirty-eight essential social service infrastructure have been equipped and handed over to local stakeholders (indicator 1.2.1b): 27 in Chad, six in Niger and five in Nigeria. In Niger, six ambulances have been placed in public operation, one each in Bosso, Baroua, N'Gagam, Garin Dogo, Tam, and Toumour; in Nigeria, two ambulances were placed in operation in Buni Yadi and Gulak.

46. RSF Chad Independent Evaluation, December 2022, p. 27 – 28.



Equipped and operational ambulance in Niger



Teachers Residences in Banki
@UNDP Nigeria/ Niyi Fagbemi



Two-bedroom housing units
constructed in Ngarannam, Nigeria
@UNDP Nigeria/Niyi Fagbemi

Thirty public facilities and infrastructure have been equipped with renewable technologies (indicator 1.2.4). In Cameroon, 15 public infrastructures, including health centres, schools, and administrative offices, had solar panels, battery chargers and inverters installed across Amchidé, Kolofata, Limani, Mora and Waza. In Chad, 11 public infrastructures were equipped with renewable technology equipment in Koulikimé and Ngalamia. In Nigeria, four security and social service facilities across Banki, Damboa, Gulak and Ngarannam had solar-powered technologies installed. By running fans, lights, computers, telephones, etc., these renewable technologies make it possible to continue to provide administrative and essential social services when conventional power is absent and to secure the buildings throughout the night.

Approximately 4,000 women and men,⁴⁷ mostly in Nigeria, now have permanent housing in 2022 through the construction of 863 additional housing units (indicator 1.2.3). 835 housing units in Nigeria were built across Banki and Ngarannam, providing 1,670 bedrooms of permanent shelter. Additionally, in Nigeria, 15 blocks of four (60 total) teachers' bedrooms were constructed across Banki, Monguno and Ngarannam; and 10 blocks of two (20 total) local administrators' bedrooms were constructed in Buni Yadi. In Chad, three housing units were constructed.

In 2022, two-bedroom housing units were constructed in Banki and Ngarannam, Nigeria.

In earlier years, a large portion of the Banki population was forced to evacuate due to attacks and ongoing security risks. Since then, RSF-supported security gains have been allowing for populations to return in 2022.

However, due to conflicts in other communities, IDPs and Banki returnees have been heavily concentrating in Banki. This has put a strain on both populations due to limited access to services and housing. The allocation of housing units to households has significantly contributed to reducing tensions between the IDP community and the returnee population. Additionally, a newly deployed police contingent has supported a return to law and order, resulting in reductions in domestic abuse, gender-based violence and other conflicts.

47. Using an average household size of 4.5.



Returnees enjoying their new homes in Nigeria

Through RSF construction or rehabilitation initiatives, people in JAP locations now have improved access to 47 water points (indicator 1.2.5): In Chad, three water towers were constructed in Guité. In Nigeria, 10 solar-powered boreholes were constructed across Banki, Gulak and Ngarannam; one water distribution pipeline (10km) was constructed in Damboa; and numerous other boreholes and human-powered pumps were constructed and rehabilitated across JAP locations. Combined, the water towers and boreholes have significantly improved access to clean water.⁴⁸

In Nigeria, one bridge was constructed at the community level, which enabled access to farmlands and movement to 25 neighbouring villages (indicator 1.2.2a).



Solar panels installed on a portion of roofing of a medical facility in Amchidé, Cameroon



Access Bridge constructed to link up farmlands in Damboa, Nigeria



Solar power system management room in a medical facility in Amchidé, Cameroon



Patients in the consultation block of the health centre, Amchidé, Cameroon

48. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report (PowerPoint, slide 14).

OUTPUT 1.3: LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES

Targeted Households Provided with Livelihood Opportunities

Table 12: Aggregated Output 1.3 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.3.1 Number of rehabilitated or constructed productive infrastructure projects (such as small business offices and market structures)	35	56	42 (+4)	123
1.3.2 Number of people benefitting from cash for work as income generating opportunities in the JAP locations (disaggregated by gender and age)	4,048	16,831	16,679 (+4,121)	27,524
1.3.3 Number of people benefitting from short-term and quick-fix training in JAP locations (gender and age disaggregated)	4,767	17,828	29,800 (+15,193)	38,538
1.3.4 Number of people benefitting from provided productive or business grants or assets (disaggregated by gender and age)	17,640	22,720	38,074 (+13,814)	50,584

Table 13: Output 1.3 Financial Data

Financial Data (USD)		
2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$3,870,908	\$3,905,456	101%

Since RSF activities started, women, men and youth have, so far, received over 84,000 instances of livelihood support through quick-fix training, business grants and assets and cash-for-work income. Since 2021, this amounts to around 55,000 individual acts of livelihood support. Over the past two years, around 36,000 people have benefited from productive or business grants or assets; 30,000 people have received short-term and quick-fix training, and approximately 17,000 have generated income through cash for work.

In 2022, a significant number of community members benefited from livelihood support to revive the local economy. More than 15,000 people received training to improve their economic productivity, nearly 14,000 people received business grants and productive assets and more than 4,000 people participated in cash-for-work programmes. Further, four markets, stalls and shops were constructed and rehabilitated during this year. During 2022, the planned milestones were mostly achieved.

In 2022, a total of 15,193 people benefited from short-term and quick-fix training (indicator 1.3.3). In Cameroon, 1,233 (513 female; 475 youth) were trained in tailoring, conservation production techniques, fattening techniques and processing of agricultural, fishery and livestock products. In Chad, 1,780 (1,023 female) benefited from informal training on management and financial management, such as managing small grants and managing community infrastructure (including the provision of tools, such as simplified templates for leasing). In Niger, 30 youths were trained on solar photovoltaic system mounting practices. In Nigeria, 12,150 (5,393 female) were trained and sensitized on modern farming techniques for dry and wet seasons, starting businesses, managing business finances, cooperative saving schemes and home gardening techniques.

In 2022, 13,814 people benefited from productive business grants and assets (indicator 1.3.4). There were a total of 569 beneficiaries in Cameroon, including 509 producers of Waza provided with productive assets and 60 women in Mozogo who received equipment for processing agricultural products. This support has enabled the farmers of Waza to continue their farming activities and expand their farmed areas. Initial follow-up reports of beekeepers who benefited from Kenya-type hives indicate positive signs of larger harvests.

As for the women of Mozogo, they have started to produce cereal flour and peanut, cowpea and soybean paste for local consumption. In Chad, 1,095 people received agricultural inputs and fishing tools. This has resulted in relaunching the fish business between Guite to Mitterine and Ngalamia to N'Djaména, supporting an increase in household incomes. About 70 percent of beneficiaries in Chad initiated income-generating activities, with 50 percent still active as of the end of 2022.⁴⁹ In Nigeria, 12,150 (5,393 female) benefited from business start-up grants, fishing supplies, agricultural inputs and food distribution to former members of Boko Haram who voluntarily disassociated from the group. Cash grants were provided to assist small business owners who benefited from the allocation of rehabilitated lock-up shops and market stalls in Banki and Buni Yadi, which enabled new businesses to start and which galvanized community economic recovery in Gulak. Grant and asset transfers were exceeded in order to support the mass exit of persons formerly associated with Boko Haram in Nigeria and the scaling up of assistance on dry and wet seasons farming.⁵⁰

49. RSF Chad Independent Evaluation, December 2022, p. 2.

50. 4,085 persons formerly associated with Boko Haram were supported in 2022.

TESTIMONY

“Before the project came to our rescue with the solar power plant, we used to receive an average of one hundred patients, including two childbirths a week. Today, with the availability of constant electricity from the plant, we now receive over three hundred patients and thirteen births a week. It has enabled us to provide quality care both during the day and at night, with our laboratory running smoothly and our freezer perfectly keeping vaccines at the required temperature. Permit me to highlight the increasing needs of the hospital. We need beds and other materials, especially for the laboratory, to deal with the increasing number of patients”

Dr. Diga Mahamat
Chief of the Amchidé Health Centre
Cameroon

“I am delighted to be returning to fishing. I have a dozen fish that I was able to catch this morning, and one sells for CFA 2,500. I can’t wait to get back on the water to fish more. Thanks to fishing, now we can eat, I can trade and my children will be able to go to school again.”

Zara Abdullahi
RSF Beneficiary
Chad



Zara Abdullahi,
Chad

“The canoe and hooks that were given to us in Mitériné are useful. I fish every day, and it helped me to provide for my needs.”

Abubakar Haroun
RSF Beneficiary
Mitériné, Chad

“I will use the inputs sensibly, and I believe that I will get a good harvest this year as the weather conditions for farming this year is promising. After the harvest, I will still store some seeds for the next planting season; that way, I don’t need to rely on humanitarian people giving us seedings.”

Aisha Ali
RSF Beneficiary
Nigeria



Aisha Ali, Photo credit - Niyi Fagbemi



Motorized tricycles transferred to agricultural cooperative groups in Amchidé

Across JAP locations, 4,121 people generated additional income through cash-for-work (indicator 1.3.2) during the year. In Chad, 1,331 (665 female) participated in community cash-for-work activities contributing to local economic development and the creation of new businesses.⁵¹ In Nigeria, 2,790 (726 female; 2,064 youth) participated in cash-for-work, 500 during the construction of a waste management facility in Banki and the remaining during construction of other projects throughout Banki, Buni Yadi, Damboa, Gulak, Monguno and Ngala.

In 2022, an additional four markets, stalls, and shops were constructed or rehabilitated (indicator 1.3.1). In Nigeria, three market areas, one each in Banki, Buni Yadi and Ngarannam, were constructed, consisting of a total of 1,122 lock-up shops and market stalls for the same number of individual business owners. In Chad, a market with a hangar was constructed in Guité. Combined, these investments are contributing to new, local business opportunities and improved economic growth in JAP locations.

Overall, livelihood interventions enable local populations to shift from dependency (on humanitarian assistance) to independency. By supporting women such as Zara and men such as Abubakar in Chad with fishing equipment, stabilization activities help them to earn a living with pride and dignity — while boosting local economies and redirecting youth from potential recruitment into extremist groups.



A beneficiary in Nigeria taking possession of farming inputs @UNDP Nigeria/Amalachukwu Ibeneme



Abubakar Haroun fishing in Mitériné




Watermelon sellers prepare for the day at the market in Guité

51. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report (PowerPoint, slide 22).

When recipients of livelihood support were asked if their livelihood had actually been improved due to RSF business grants and assets, training or cash-for-work (indicator 1.4⁵²), the responses were generally positive. In Cameroon, 91 percent of project participants reported improved livelihoods in 2022, while 75 percent did so in Nigeria (up from 73 percent in 2021). However, in Chad, only 63 percent reported the same. The causes for relatively lower levels of self-reported improved livelihoods in Chad may be attributed to the significant impact of flooding in JAP locations, which devastated agricultural production and hindered fishing activities, and some initial quality issues of canoes and outboard motors.⁵³

Figure 23: JAP Population Livelihood Beneficiaries Reporting Improved Livelihoods in 2022⁵⁴



52. Outcome indicator 1.4 has been reported under output 1.3 due to relevance.

53. Interviews with beneficiaries noted the impact of flooding on livelihoods and some quality issues with earlier sets of fishing assets: RSF Phase I Chad Window Evaluation, Draft (December 2022), p. 33. Additionally, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report (PowerPoint, slide 20) identified that initial distributions to cooperative fishing groups rather than individuals hindered asset usage.

54. Unweighted average for Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria.

TESTIMONY

Marguerite is 19 years old, the third child of seven. She lives with her mother; her father passed away. Conflict disrupted their farming income.

“I was forced to drop out of school, the one thing that gave me hope. I stayed at home, taking care of my siblings, and could barely have a square meal. My optimism for a bright future was lost. I could no longer go to the farm for fear of being killed. I can’t explain how we survived that period.”

With the revitalization of the Government Vocational Training Centre, supported by RSF, Marguerite has graduated from professional tailor training and was provided with equipment.

“I now make enough profit to take care of my needs and assist my family. I am now sure of becoming a big designer and am training other vulnerable girls.”

Marguerite
Tailor
Cameroon



“The tailoring and carpentry equipment and security stabilization efforts in our community were greatly revived the centre. The centre doubled its enrolment and scaled up the quality of training.”

Mr. Blata
Director, Government Vocational Training Centre
Mozogo, Cameroon

53-year-old Baba Sultan Ibrahim is the chairperson of the Women’s Association of the Limani Sub prefecture in Guité, Chad. She noted that the RSF intervention provided the community with safety, resulting in a cessation of insurgent attacks and a way to revive economic life.

“Since the inception of this project in 2018, we have taken many initiatives, most of them are trainings on the stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin, conflict management and skills on how to relate with others and mentorship.

And for children, we had awareness programmes on child enrolment into armed groups, violence, extremism and gender-based violence. And there were so many beneficiaries that were empowered with farming and fishing tools, and they were trained on how to use the tools properly.

Farmers received agricultural materials like water pumps and other materials and fishermen received fishing materials like nets, canoes, hooks, and other equipment. Under this project, our market was renovated and other new buildings and sheds were constructed. Additionally, new houses were built, a youth sports centre was built. All these are achievements of this project. As you can see, the work is still in progress. We are really happy and grateful, especially for the aspect of training and awareness programme on gender-based violence, radicalization and violent extremism.”

Baba Sultan Ibrahim
Chairperson,
Women’s Association
Guité
Chad



OUTPUT 2.1: CONSOLIDATE THE STABILIZATION ACHIEVEMENTS

Stabilization Actors Have Knowledge to Consolidate the Stabilization Achievements and Promote Social Cohesion

Table 14: Aggregated Output 2.1 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.1.1 Number of officers of local government and municipality, NGO, CSO, as well as Community Stabilisation Committees trained on promoting social cohesion	75	426	433 (+279)	490
2.1.2 Number of Members/staff of local structures involved in stabilisation trained on promoting gender equity	75	288	207 (+53)	540
2.1.3 Number of officers of local government and municipality, NGO, CSO, as well as Community Stabilisation Committees trained on community-based participatory planning approaches	75	288	267 (+113)	504
2.1.4 Number of coordination meetings, joint advocacy, and fundraising with UNDP, UN, and other development partners	16	33	32 (+14)	80

Table 15: Output 2.1 Financial Data

Financial Data (USD)		
2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$2,172,734	\$2,197,675	101%

Since RSF support started, approximately 300 government officers and members of local structures have been trained on social cohesion, gender equity and/or participatory planning.⁵⁵ Further, 32 coordination and joint advocacy activities have been carried out so far with UNDP, UN and other development partners. Overall, 2022 milestones have been met.

In 2022, 279 local officers and community leaders were trained on the promotion of social cohesion (indicator 2.1.1): 226 in Chad and 53 in Nigeria. For example, in Chad, 226 (26 female) CSC members, community and religious leaders, administrative authorities, traditional leaders, CSO representatives and the Defence and Security Forces representatives were trained on conflict management and dispute resolution techniques, peaceful cohabitation and promoting intra- and inter-community dialogue across Baltram, Guité, Koulikimé and Ngalamia. In Nigeria, 53 members of local structures were trained on promoting social cohesion.

Local structures have enhanced knowledge and skills on community-based participatory planning. In 2022, 113 members of local structures were trained on community-based participatory planning (indicator 2.1.3). In Cameroon, 60 (11 female) CSC members in Fotokol and Hile-Alifa participated in capacity-building sessions on developing community action plans, understanding and integrating their respective JAPs, and engaging the community in decision-making. In Nigeria, the same 53 members trained on social cohesion were also trained on community-based participatory planning and on gender equity (indicator 2.1.2). The establishment of state-supported CSCs, combined with RSF-supported training, has contributed to a greater perception of state presence, strengthening the social contract and laying the foundations for stabilization gains to be maintained over time.⁵⁶

Notably, 14 coordination meetings, joint advocacy, and fund-raising with development partners were held (indicator 2.1.4): two in Cameroon, four in Chad, seven in Niger and one in Nigeria.

OUTPUT 2.2: CROSS-BORDER COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

Improved Cross-Border Coordination and Cooperation

Table 16: Aggregated Output 2.2 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.2.1 Number of surge capacity to national windows	6	11	16 (+5)	TBD
2.2.2 Number of RSF knowledge products developed by all RSF	3	9	13 (+7)	24
2.2.3 Number of RSF strategic communications products and programs developed	22	117	171 (+148)	193
2.2.4 Number of active cross-border JAP sites where cross-border trade is conducted	0	6	6 (+2)	10

Table 17: Output 2.2 Financial Data

Financial Data (USD)		
2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$2,156,733	\$265,588	12%

55. Some of the officers and members of local structures participated in multiple trainings.

56. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report (PowerPoint, slide 8).

Overall, six JAP locations are now engaged in active cross-border trade since RSF support began. Further, more than 150 strategic communications and knowledge products have been published, and 16 surge deployments to support country windows were made. Overall, 2022 milestones were fully met.

Since RSF activities began, six JAP areas have become engaged in cross-border trade (indicator 2.2.4), which has contributed to boosting local economies. This includes Daboua, Chad with N'Guigmi, Niger; Amchidé, Cameroon with Banki, Nigeria (since 2021); and Fotokol, Cameroon with N'gala, Nigeria in 2022.⁵⁷

To improve cross-border coordination and cooperation, seven knowledge products were developed (indicator 2.2.2) in 2022: two in Niger, four in Nigeria and one regional. For example, in Niger, a knowledge product was developed based on the deliberations at the Niamey Conference on the Stabilization of Conflict Zones and Insurgency Terrorism in the Central Sahel and the LCB. The knowledge product highlights the links between the stabilization programme and military operations to combat terrorism, elaborating on the links between poverty, radicalization and violent extremism. Another knowledge product summarizes past RSF achievements, describes the challenges of stabilization and discusses how different stakeholders such as the Defence and Security Forces, local and state administrators and citizens can work towards establishing peace and stability in the region. A report on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the LCB, analysing arms trafficking, its impacts on NSAGs, and providing policymakers with critical insights, was also produced.

In 2022, 148 new strategic communication products were developed (indicator 2.2.3). The Regional Window published 36 strategic podcasts, Instagram posts, and Twitter messages. The communication products were designed to regularly engage with a wider audience of stakeholders and enhance RSF visibility. Communication products developed in Chad include 58 banners, testimonials, infographics, and videos. Nigeria also developed and published 54 strategic communication products, including Instagram posts, Tweets, and human-interest stories.

The Regional Window provided surge deployments to country windows in 2022 (indicator 2.2.1). This includes one to each country window to harmonize monitoring and evaluation tools, procurement and financial management.

57. Each JAP location counts as one.

TESTIMONY

“We were able to re-open the Banki-Amchidé-Mora-Ndjamena corridor, which is very important economically and which enabled the population that were left to themselves to resume their activities. Youth who had joined the camp of Boko Haram came back and were supported through the RSF cash-for-work initiative.”

H.E Midjinyawa Bakari
Governor, Far North
Cameroon



OUTPUT 2.3: LCBC CAPACITY

LCBC Capacity Developed to Steer and Support RSS Implementation and Governance Structures

Table 18: Output 2.3 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.3.1 Number of knowledge products developed by RSS secretariat	5	20	24 (+11)	43
2.3.2 Extent to which RSS research, monitoring, reporting, analysis, and advocacy, at the territorial and regional levels, are gender and youth-sensitive	High Level	High Level	No data	High Level
2.3.3 Existence of RSS Knowledge management Platform (yes/no)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
2.3.4 Number of people accessing the knowledge management platform (disaggregated by location and gender)	0	200	No data	600
2.3.5 Existence of LCBC Institutional Capacity Building plan (yes/no)	No	Yes	No	Yes
2.3.6 Number of non-kinetic CIMIC related joint initiatives between RSS Secretariat and MNJTF	4	16	15 (+7)	42

Table 19: Output 2.3 Financial Data

Financial Data (USD)		
2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$2,734,326	\$2,504,850	92%

Overall, since RSF support started, the capacity of LCBC to coordinate RS-SRR implementation, including the governance and coordinator structures, has been somewhat developed. In 2022, an operational knowledge management platform is now open to the public and development stakeholders, non-kinetic CIMIC-related joint initiatives for MNJTF have proved beneficial, and 11 knowledge products have been developed by the RS-SRR secretariat, allowing for greater understanding of LCB conflict dynamics and policy options. However, an LCBC institutional capacity-building plan has been delayed due to political considerations and clearances. All technical requirements have been met.

In 2022, the Secretariat developed and published 11 publications (indicator 2.3.1), including regional and territorial-level conflict analyses, a major study on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of former Boko Haram associates and a study on the crime-terror nexus in the LCB. The publications offer a unique regional lens and insights on the challenges of the Lake Chad Basin countries to inform regional programming and policy development. The studies have been widely distributed among partners and through the Regional Task Force. While data has yet to be collected on the exact number of partners that have utilized the publications in their programming, there has been a high interest and positive response to using the data collected. Plan International and Norwegian Capacity have reported that they used the information for the development of new projects.

In 2022, the RS-SRR knowledge management platform, the LCBC Community Connect, was finalized and went live (indicator 2.3.3).⁵⁸ Platform usage and management trainings for the Secretariat and LCBC staff have been completed.

The platform serves four key purposes:

1

High-quality web-based resource for policymakers, practitioners, think tanks, academic institutions, civil society and knowledge actors on all aspects of the stabilization, recovery and development efforts around Lake Chad;

2

Space for networking and interaction among all stakeholders;

3

Observatory, resource and coordination tools for all initiatives and actions around the RS-SRR;

4


Repository for regional and global policy documents, strategies and action plans, assessment reports, lessons learned and good practices.

58. See <https://communityconnect.cblt.org>

The knowledge platform constitutes a cornerstone in efforts to strengthen regional information sharing and cooperation and enables the LCBC to have an overview of ongoing regional initiatives and discourses. In 2023, work will be undertaken to further populate and engage stakeholders and partners on the platform. Combined, the knowledge platform and the knowledge products that have been developed will provide RSF, LCBC, national authorities, development partners and other stakeholders with tools to understand regional conflicts and to develop appropriate responses.

In 2022, there were significant advances regarding the Secretariat's support to MNJTF on CIMIC (indicator 2.3.6). Monthly meetings with the CIMIC cell, operationalized in 2020 and led by the RS-SRR were conducted. The meetings facilitated a shared understanding among partners and MNJTF on the key aspects of incorporating and strengthening CIMIC in MNJTF planning and operations. More concretely, the work with the CIMIC cell has resulted in a joint CIMIC action plan, a review and update of MNJTF standard operating procedures on CIMIC and the execution of two key exercises that were conducted to further MNJTF personnel's understanding of CIMIC.

The CIMIC cell finalized an agreed-upon action plan based on seven strategic priorities:



The action plan has aided the efficiency of the CIMIC cell and has accelerated the mobilization of resources (e.g. African Union, European Union, UK) through quick-impact projects, such as drinking water projects, health outreach projects and infrastructure construction/reconstruction projects. It also has improved service delivery, improved trust between civilians and MNJTF and strengthened communication and coordination with civilian authorities.

Furthermore, the Secretariat, jointly with the MNJTF and other members of the CIMIC cell, conducted a Joint Planning Exercise in November, analysing how CIMIC could be mainstreamed into MNJTF operations planning. The exercise was attended by 30 senior MNJTF command staff.

A strategic workshop that focused on enhancing MNJTF knowledge of humanitarian principles was held from 29 November to 1 December 2022. As a result, the CIMIC work and processes both at HQ and sectors level were thoroughly assessed, progress was discussed and solutions to address challenges were identified. Additional results include:

- MNJTF Officers from HQ and Sectors had their knowledge and practical skills on CIMIC enhanced, including on key aspects related to humanitarian interventions and prevention of violent extremism;
- Participants gained a better understanding of RSS, its structure, its achievements, its challenges and the role of CIMIC in overall LCB stabilization;
- MNJTF CIMIC guidelines to reinforce the existing standard operating procedures were discussed and validated by participants; and
- Coordination between MNJTF, LCBC, the African Union, the Center for Coordination and Liaison and other partners on CIMIC was strengthened.

As an outcome of this work, MNJTF has initiated a review and update of their CIMIC standard operating procedures. The Secretariat has already provided technical support to the process and will, in 2023, focus on the development of a comprehensive and targeted training package to accompany the roll-out of the new standard operating procedures.

The process of assessing LCBC capacity needs and addressing those through a capacity building plan (indicator 2.3.5) faced some challenges in 2022, which has delayed the process. The institutional assessment of LCBC capacities, which the Executive Secretary was mandated to commission in 2021, was not commissioned until early 2022. In 2022, two advertisements for assessment services were unsuccessful.⁵⁹ In September 2022, the Secretariat received support from a key donor, the UK, to support the assessment. The capacity assessment and plan were completed in the first half of 2023 (indicator 2.3.5).

The N'Djamena-based RSS Secretariat was reinforced with additional capacities. A Programme Specialist joined the Secretariat in May, one year after the position opened. A secondment agreement between the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Secretariat allowed for a senior CIMIC Adviser to be deployed. A secondment agreement with Norwegian Capacity⁶⁰ allowed for the deployment of two personnel, including a new CSO Platform Coordinator. The CSO Platform Coordinator has revived CSO platform engagement, and the CIMIC Adviser has broadened the engagement with MNJTF as well-strengthened relations and information exchange with UK's programme "Lake Chad Basin support facility" implemented by ASI.

59. There were no technically qualified bids on the first advertisement; there were no bids at all on the second advertisement.

60. Norwegian Capacity is operated by the Norwegian Refugee Council, which is funded by the Norwegian government.

OUTPUT 2.4: LCBC COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT OF TERRITORIAL ACTION PLAN

Improved LCBC Coordination and Oversight of Territorial Action Plan (TAP) Implementation

Table 20: Output 2.4 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.4.1 Existence of report of Governors' Offices Capacity Assessment for TAPs implementation (yes/no)	No	No	No	Yes
2.4.2 Number of trainings on coordination, information management, monitoring and reporting to Governors' Offices	0	2	0	5
2.4.3 Existence of monitoring and reporting tools and guidelines for TAPs implementation (yes/no; disaggregated by tool)				
RSS Results Framework	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RSS Reporting Guidelines	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RSS Reporting Templates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2.4.4 Number of territories with TAPs M&E frameworks	8	8	8	8
2.4.5 Number of coordination and experience sharing meetings between Governors' Offices on TAPs implementation	0	4	2 (+2)	10
2.4.6 Number of technical coordination meetings between RSS implementing partners and RSS Secretariat for TAPs implementation (disaggregated per territory)	0	5	6 (+1)	11
2.4.7 Number of joint-led initiatives between RSS implementing partners	5	11	7 (+4)	18
2.4.8 Cross-border initiatives identified by the RSS Secretariat and shared with RSS implementing partners	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.4.9 Existence of document of next phase of the RSS August 2023 – August 2028 (yes/no)	No	No	No	Yes
2.4.10 Yearly cross-border cooperation meetings organised (yes/no per year) (Governors' Forum/Steering Committee/ Interparliamentary Committee/ Private Sector Forum/ CSO Platform meetings etc.)				
Governors' Forum	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Interparliamentary Committee	No	Yes	No	Yes
Private Sector Forum	No	Yes	No	Yes
CSO Platform meetings	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
2.4.11 Number of RSS Regional Task Force and the three RSS Thematic Clusters meetings (disaggregated per type)				
RSS Regional Task Force	2	3	2	6
RSS Thematic Clusters	2	3	2	6
2.4.12 Number of RSS Civil Society Platforms established and operational (that organise regular meetings)	12	13	13 (+1)	13
2.4.13 Number of RSS CSO Platforms meetings (disaggregated per level)				
Regional	1	2	4 (+4)	4
National	8	10	12 (+12)	13
Territorial	2	6	2 (+2)	12

Table 21: Output 2.4 Financial Data

Financial Data (USD)		
2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$1,877,871	\$1,273,579	68%

In 2022, 18 RSS CSO Platform meetings were held, 2023 CSO workplans were developed, Directory and Information Management System Phase 1 was completed, two experience-sharing meetings between governor’s offices were held, a TAP Guidance Note for stakeholders was published, multiple joint initiatives between the Secretariat and implementing partners were commenced, a regional 2022-2024 action plan was developed, and the Secretariat supported the 2022 LCB Youth Network annual meeting.

In 2022, some progress was made in supporting governors’ offices execute their mandate to oversee and guide the implementation of the territorial action plans (TAPs). Most significantly, was the completion of territorial profiles, baselines for the M&E framework (developed in 2021), conflict analyses and the development of a TAP guidance note (indicator 2.4.3). These tools will enable governor’s offices to more easily communicate the needs and processes to TAP implementation actors and, as such, strengthen coordination, information management, monitoring and reporting.

Governors’ office representatives met twice, in March and June 2022. Though neither of those occasions exclusively focused on TAPs, the representatives were offered the opportunity to share their experiences on their work with the TAPs and the challenges they faced. Major concerns raised by the governors’ offices were the lack of capacities and lack of understanding among on-the-ground TAP implementing actors. Consequently, the Secretariat and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (as co-leads of the humanitarian and development cluster) completed a scoping mission to Lac in 2022 to observe TAP coordination and develop actionable recommendations for strengthening TAP implementation (indicator 2.4.6). The mission team met with the Lac Governor’s Office, community stakeholders and MNJTF representatives. A key finding was that communication between implementing actors and governors’ offices must improve and that the understanding of roles and responsibilities should be enhanced. In 2023, the work to address these challenges will continue by assessing and piloting recommendations in a limited number of territories.

Several joint initiatives between the Secretariat and implementing partners were initiated in 2022 (indicator 2.4.7). From 28 to 30 March 2022, in association with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, a high-level conference took place at Wilton Park, UK. Participants discussed the next steps towards regional solutions in the LCB area, including transitional justice, screening, prosecution and community-based reconciliation and reintegration. Based on the discussions, partners also agreed to establish a basket fund to support programming on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration and to commission a comprehensive assessment of existing transitional justice practices in the LCB region. These two joint initiatives are ongoing and will be completed in 2023.

Furthermore, the Secretariat and Plan International worked together to strengthen youth engagement in the RS-SRR, including initiating the process of developing a regional project focusing on youth. GIZ and the Secretariat collaborated to expand mental health and psychosocial support trainings for CSOs within the eight territories.

The fourth Governors’ Forum, as well as a CSO Forum, were planned to take place in Chad in 2022 (indicator 2.4.10). However, notwithstanding significant time investment in preparations for the forums, they couldn’t take place due to the political situation in Chad. However, in June, during the preparatory workshop in N’djamena, together with the governors’ offices, the concept and agenda for the next forum was agreed upon. Additionally, the Secretariat worked with GIZ, Plan International, and the African Development Bank to develop a concept for the CSO forum. The Forum has been confirmed to take place in July 2023.

There was significant progress in strengthening CSOs in 2022 through the completion of phase one of the Directory and Information Management System (DIMS) and the CSO Platform.

Of the 18 RSS CSO Platform meetings held in 2022, four were organized at the regional level, 12 at the national level and two at the territorial level. This is exceeding milestones set for 2022 at all levels (indicator 2.4.13). A key meeting was held on 13 – 14 December 2022, bringing together the eight platform leads on a territorial level and the four national coordinators. The meeting focused on understanding the key dimensions of localization; reviewing key achievements and challenges from various countries in 2022; introducing RSS/LCBC strategic priorities for 2023 and the role of CSOs, including TAPs implementation, DIMS, and Peacebuilding Fund updates; presentations and discussions on proposed activities for 2023 from the various countries; and Communication: Introduction to the Knowledge Management Platform.

Key workshop results include:

1. Review of RSS implementing progress;
2. Knowledge Management Platform and DIMS capacity strengthened;
3. Calls to action on resource mobilization for CSOs; and
4. 2023 CSO workplans.

DIMs Phase 1 was concluded, with a mapping and assessment of over 900 CSOs in the LCB region. The results are currently available as paper-based directories; data will be migrated to an online platform and database during Phase 2.

From 7 – 9 March 2022, the Secretariat facilitated the Regional Action Plan workshop for 2022-2024 for the RSS Regional Task Force. The workshop aimed to assess 2020-2021 RAP implementation and identify a set of concrete actions, solutions and common approaches for implementing the 2022 – 2024 Regional Action Plan. In line with the RSS “New Way of Working” that emphasizes the imperatives for the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in implementing the Strategy, the Regional Action Plan will bring together UN and non-UN humanitarian, development and peace actors at the regional level to articulate collective plans and actions for 2022-2024. The focus was on regional actions to complement territorial efforts articulated in the TAPs. The ‘Regional Action Plan: Narrative Report and Action Matrix for 2022/2024’ was produced as an output.

In 2022, the Secretariat continued its work to further youth engagement in the LCB and in the RS-SRR. In addition to the work done in collaboration with Plan International, the Secretariat supported eight (four female) youth representatives to participate in #YouthConnekt2022, themed “Accelerating Investment in Youth-Resilient Youth, Resilient Africa,” held in October 2022 in Kigali, Rwanda.

The Secretariat used the opportunity to showcase Youth engagement in the LCB through publications of interviews with the youth participants and a blogpost on the event posted to social media.

Further, the Secretariat supported Crisis Management Initiative – Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation, to convene the annual meeting of the LCB Youth Network in December 2022 in N’djamena, Chad. Past and current operations of the Youth Network were reviewed and a draft workplan for 2023, including activities connected to TAPs, was completed.

FINANCIAL REPORTING

Table 22: Financial Data⁶¹

Output	2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Output Ratio	Delivery Ratio
Output 1.1: Security and Justice	5,590,440	7,562,217	15.7%	135.3%
Output 1.2: Essential Social Services	12,757,637	16,583,602	34.5%	130.0%
Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities	3,870,908	3,905,456	8.1%	100.9%
Output 2.1: Consolidate Stab. Achievements	2,172,734	2,197,675	4.6%	101.1%
Output 5: Reintegration (Nigeria only) ⁶²	2,803,738	4,153,311	8.6%	148.1%
Output 2.2: Cross-Border Coord. and Coop. ⁶³	2,156,733	265,588	0.6%	12.3%
Output 2.3: LCBC Capacity	2,734,326	2,504,850	5.2%	91.6%
Output 2.4: LCBC Coord. and Oversight of TAP	1,877,871	1,273,579	2.6%	67.8%
Subtotal	33,964,388	38,446,278	79.9%	113.2%
Programme Management	9,199,432	6,764,531	14.1%	73.5%
GMS	3,021,467	2,878,954	6.0%	95.3%
Total	46,185,287	48,089,762	100.0%	104.1%


Overall delivery is on track. Based on available resources, the total planned expenditure for 2022 was **\$46,185,287**. A total of **\$48,089,762** (104 percent) was delivered in 2022 (including expenses and commitments). For outputs alone (excluding Programme Management and GMS), the total planned expenditure for 2022 was **\$33,964,388** and **\$38,446,278**; 113 percent was delivered.

61. Financial information is presented in United States Dollars (USD).

62. Detailed reporting on RSF output 5, “Social, political, and economic reintegration strengthened,” focusing on mass exit, will be reported in a separate report by the Nigeria office.

63. The budget for output 2.2 includes resources that were decided to be invested in 2023. The AWP was revised in the third quarter.

Figure 24: Annual Work Plan vs Expenditure, Total, 2022



- For output 1.1, the 2022 Annual Work Plan (AWP) was \$5,590,440; \$7,562,217 (135 percent) was delivered.
- For output 1.2, the 2022 AWP was \$12,757,637; \$16,583,602 (130 percent) was delivered.
- For output 1.3, the 2022 AWP was \$3,870,908; \$3,905,456 (101 percent) was delivered.
- For output 2.1, the 2022 AWP was \$2,172,734; \$2,197,675 (101 percent) was delivered.
- For output 2.2, the 2022 AWP was \$2,156,733; \$265,588 (12 percent) was delivered.
- For output 2.3, the 2022 AWP was \$2,734,326; \$2,504,850 (92 percent) was delivered.
- For output 2.4, the 2022 AWP was \$1,877,871; \$1,273,579 (68 percent) was delivered.
- For output 5, related to reintegration in Nigeria only, the 2022 AWP was \$2,803,738; \$4,153,311 (148 percent) was delivered.

Figure 25: Annual Work Plan vs Expenditure, Outputs, 2022





Figure 26: Percentage of Total Spending



For outputs 1.1 and 1.2, delivery exceeded planned expenditure. For output 1.1, the majority of this is attributable to Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, where significant progress toward strengthening JAP location security and justice has been made. For output 1.2, the majority is attributable to Chad and Nigeria.⁶⁴ This is the result of rapid progress on rehabilitating and constructing essential social service infrastructure, including many non-WASH projects in Chad and nearly 1,000 permanent housing units in Nigeria. Additionally, Nigeria accounted for 46 percent of the total 2022 budget and 53 percent of total actual delivery in 2022, meaning that any significant expenditure shifts in Nigeria noticeably affect delivery.


Figure 27: AWP vs Expenditure, Windows, 2022



64. Chad's AWP was adopted in December 2021. In 2022, the UK allocated additional funds to stabilization, including \$1,267,647 for Chad. However, due to a short deadline for delivery, there was no time to organize a Project Board meeting to revise the AWP 2022. In February 2023, the Project Board provided post-facto endorsement.

As a share of all delivery in 2022, Cameroon has delivered 17 percent, Chad 9 percent, Niger 11 percent, Nigeria 53 percent and Regional 10 percent (compared to AWP of 16 percent, 8 percent, 11 percent, 46 percent, and 19 percent, respectively).

Figure 28: RSF Window Delivery as Percentage of Total Delivery



CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

CHALLENGES

- 1 Security risks, combined with extensive flooding around the Lake Chad Basin, have made accessing some JAP locations extremely difficult. In Cameroon, risks from armed groups in Mayo-Tsanaga and flooding in Logone-et-Chari prevented access. In Nigeria, due to regular security threats, security officials limited access to only a few hours a day, and flooding destroyed roads and bridges, rendering some locations inaccessible.
- 2 Some JAP locations in Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria have had implementation delays due to continued conflicts and security threats. In Niger, for example, local community conflicts between livestock farmers and different cultural groups were also present. These risks can prevent RSF planning, regular monitoring of ongoing activities and reduce the incentives for vendors to bid on opportunities. Where applicable, establishing regular communication channels with military agencies for escorts and general protection, including scheduling working hours with vendors, is required
- 3 Higher than normal rates of inflation, partly caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, increased prices for construction materials and other supplies, thereby impacting budgets. Additionally, this has limited the availability of materials in local markets, particularly in Nigeria, where more than 90 percent of supplies need to be procured in cities.
- 4 While cash-for-work selection procedures have been developed with local stakeholders, and women have been adequately enrolled, women remain underrepresented in skilled and managerial positions. This was particularly the case in Chad. Further, there were some instances of cash-for-work beneficiary selection and payment processing issues, for example, in Limani, Cameroon, which have been addressed through community consensus, including periodic review of beneficiary lists.⁶⁵
- 5 While RSF activities continue to strengthen IDPs' abilities to return to their communities, the lifespan of essential social service infrastructure may be overestimated. Infrastructure expansion and maintenance plans to accommodate high volumes of IDP returnees are necessary.
- 6 Although the Secretariat spent considerable time and resources preparing the 4th Governor's Forum, it could not be implemented in 2022 due to domestic politics in Chad. The forum is expected to take place in July 2023.

65. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report (PowerPoint, slide 21, 23, 25).

7

The rotation of staff negatively affected CIMIC Cell coordination with the MNJTF. Developing institutional memory and representative handover policies is necessary.

8

The ambitions of the amended and extended phase of RSF have been to scale up stabilization efforts across a broader area. However, resource mobilization has fallen short, with the total RSF 2022 AWP approximately half of the originally planned project document amount. Moving forward, coordinated visibility activities between the regional and country windows will be required to mobilize sufficient resources to meet planned objectives, including through high-quality, strategic communications.

LESSONS LEARNED

1

When working in a volatile environment where non-state extremist actors are engaged in violence that aims to create fear and disrupt or destroy legitimate government structures, open and transparent relationships between UNDP and partners are especially crucial. **Strong engagement of Ambassadors and senior management is essential. Stabilization is essentially political.** Engagement at the highest level with the governors, ambassadors and the LCBC ambassador, including through the Steering Committee, is essential to navigating political sensitivities. In UNDP, such engagement at the Resident Representative level has been essential.

2

Trust-based partnerships with governments and maintaining visibility of government are essential ingredients of success. RSF focuses on restoring trust between communities and the state. To this end, RSF has established various partnerships with provincial departments and local authorities in order to ensure that achievements are embodied by the state. RSF aims to strengthen social cohesion by building the capacities of state actors to ensure service delivery, accountability and participation. Strong partnership with state governments supports sustainability. For example, in Nigeria, Ngarannam RSF built 360 houses; Borno state government built 200. In Nigeria, the national government has contributed \$1,000,000 to RSF with potential future annual contributions.

3

Ensuring continuity from shorter-term stabilization support to longer-term recovery efforts across UN agencies from the start is critical. Partnerships with other UN agencies and other stakeholders are vital. For example, in Chad, UNDP partnered with UNICEF to ensure that rehabilitated schools are equipped with teachers and with the Ministry of Health in anticipation of health centres that need to be operationalized.

4

Collaboration with regional and cross-border structures is vital for regional stability: From boosting local economies through cross-border openings to sharing intelligence and coordination with regional security forces, such as the MNJTF, the UNDP stabilization approach is centred on the premise that the challenges in the region are too big for any single country to tackle alone.

Challenges related to violent extremism, competition over natural resources and displacement require regional coordination. This is why UNDP builds on regional structures, such as the LCBC. Further, different cross-border interventions (e.g. construction of customs offices and police stations) have helped create an enabling environment for cross-border trade and have enhanced state presence and security.⁶⁶ For example, in 2021, customs revenues between Amchidé (Cameroon) and Banki (Nigeria) was valued at FCFA 825 million compared to 2014 to 2020 — when revenue was zero.

Notably, engagement with the governments in this regard has been essential in fostering collaboration. For example, in his capacity as chairman of the Governor's forum, the Governor of Far North Cameroon went to see the Governor of Borno from 22 to 24 August 2022, and the Governor of Yobe between 25 – 26 August 2022. Various topics were discussed in plenary sessions, such as the security context, cross-border cooperation, transitional justice for ex-Boko Haram associates, women's empowerment, Nigerian refugees in Cameroon, military cooperation and cross-border trade revitalization, including across the new JAPs of Gamboru and Fotokol.

5

Speed and scale are essential for stabilization programming. To achieve speed, we must not “reinvent the wheel” with each new stabilization programme. The model is there; although it needs to be adapted to the reality of each country context, the fundamental principles of speed and working to scale apply across the board. Recognizing the importance of assessments, based on lessons learned, we discourage long draw-out assessments because communities in these areas need health clinics, schools, water points and all other essential services to function immediately with speed. Fostering normality requires local economic vitalization that quickly puts money in people's pockets.

6

Achieving impacts requires stabilization interventions at scale. Large-scale interventions, such as cash-for-work, market rehabilitation and trade revitalization, are essential, for example, in facilitating the return of IDPs. Intervening at scale also helps mitigate conflict dynamics and avoids intercommunity conflict (for example, if a school is being rehabilitated, a neighbouring school must receive some degree of refurbishment to ensure that communities do not feel forgotten or marginalized).

7

The involvement of decentralized state authorities as implementation partners has facilitated stronger ownership and the consolidation of RSF achievements. Across all implementing countries, the close involvement of local stakeholders in RSF implementation decisions has broadened local support. Local stakeholders include local state authorities and local non-state leaders, including traditional, religious and CSO representatives.

66. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Third-Party Monitoring Report (PowerPoint, slide 8 – 9).

8

Closer involvement with local stakeholders in collecting data and monitoring project progress has mitigated concerns related to JAP location accessibility. CSCs have been tasked with supporting monitoring activities. In Cameroon, the usage of local, youth community member volunteers supported the collection of perception survey data.

9

Utilizing appropriate contractors, small vs big and local vs non-local, can improve delivery speed and quality. Using local contractors and labour for relatively smaller and easier projects serves as a mitigation measure against JAP inaccessibility due to security risks and flooding. However, smaller contractors may have more difficulty completing larger projects, in which case more experienced, larger vendors are required. In Cameroon, multiple awarded contracts were abandoned due to insecurity, inflationary pressure and the inability to source materials locally.

10

Supporting dedicated community spaces for women has multiplier effects on encouraging women's participation in stabilization activities and improving gender equality. Without such spaces, women's participation rates in cash-for-work and business asset grants stabilization activities may remain lower as institutional barriers, such as domestic chores and cultural norms, tends to hinder women's access. In Chad, the dedicated Women's Platform building in Guité has supported women's inclusion by providing a safe space for community exchange and discussion, product storage and the processing and marketing of agricultural and fishery products.

11

Updated findings on the pathways into and out of violent extremist groups challenges traditional assumptions about what drives people to violent extremism. Voluntary recruits of extremist groups cited job opportunities as their primary reason for joining, an increase of 92 percent, while joining for religious ideologies has decreased by 57 percent.⁶⁷ When prioritizing cash-for-work and other livelihood interventions, it is critical to provide opportunities to young men who need employment. This improves their economic status and self-esteem, and serves as a clear alternative to joining violent groups.

12

Community perceptions may be non-linear due to variable factors. In Nigeria, community perceptions of security increased after initial interventions. However, some communities have reported small declines, possibly linked to the return of former Boko Haram members. Declines in community perceptions of access to essential social services may be possible when thousands of IDPs return home.

13

Delays in the official occupation of completed infrastructure projects raised the incidence of theft and vandalism. For example, there were instances of theft of batteries meant for solar-powered lighting at a completed but not operationalized health centre in Chad.⁶⁸ Timing project completions with quick handovers to state authorities is essential.

67. United Nations Development Programme (2017) Journey to Extremism in Africa; Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment, pp. 46, 58. Available at: <https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/v1/en/reports> and United Nations Development Programme (2023) Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement, pp. 66 – 67. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement>.

68. RSF Chad Independent Evaluation, December 2022, p. 29.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Next Steps

CAMEROON

Output 1.1: Security and Justice

1. Rehabilitate, construct and equip approximately 25 infrastructure facilities
2. Train 700 security personnel on human rights and preventing gender-based violence
3. Establish one new Community Stabilization Committee
4. Install 300 solar-powered streetlights
5. Monitoring the human rights and civil protection situation (analyse and strengthen human rights monitoring platforms)
6. Strengthen community security mechanisms (traditional jurisdictions, agro-pastoral conflicts, rural land tenure)
7. Operationalize and strengthen seven community early warning systems
8. Build local-level human resource administrative capacities on responsibilities, ethics and professional conduct

Output 1.2: Essential Social Service

1. Rehabilitate, construct and equip approximately 40 infrastructure facilities
2. Equip 30 critical infrastructure facilities with renewable technologies
3. Rehabilitate and construct 17 water points
4. Construct 200 permanent housing units

Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities

1. Construct approximately 20 infrastructure facilities
2. Enrol 1,000 people in cash-for-work programmes
3. Train 1,300 people in livelihood opportunities
4. Support 1,800 people with product assets and business grants

Output 2.1: Consolidation of Stabilization Achievements

1. Train 120 members of local structures on social cohesion
2. Train 140 members of local structures on gender equity
3. Train 80 members of local structures on participatory planning
4. Build the capacities of CSC members on the maintenance of streetlights and water points
5. Organize community activities on social cohesion and peace promotion
6. Train regional and municipal leaders on the Decentralization Code, local governance and the sustainability of stabilization achievements
7. Establish national- and local-level mechanisms for the sustainability of achievements in community security

Strategic

1. Mid-term project evaluation
2. Bi-annual Report 2023
3. Annual Report 2023
4. Special report for activities funded by Japan
5. Four special field missions
6. Community Perception Survey, May 2023
7. Community Perception Survey, November 2023

CHAD

Output 1.1: Security and Justice

1. Rehabilitate, construct and equip approximately 30 infrastructure facilities
2. Train 150 security personnel on human rights and the prevention of gender-based violence
3. Conduct two community awareness exercises on the risk of mines

Output 1.2: Essential Social Service

1. Equip 30 infrastructure facilities
2. Equip approximately 100 critical infrastructure facilities with renewable technologies
3. Construct 14 permanent housing units

Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities

1. Construct 15 infrastructure facilities
2. Enrol 2,500 people in cash-for-work programmes
3. Train 500 people in livelihood opportunities
4. Support approximately 2,700 people with product assets and business grants

Output 2.1: Consolidation of Stabilization Achievements

1. Train 200 members of local structures on social cohesion
2. Train 100 members of local structures on gender equity
3. Train 100 members of local structures on participatory planning

Strategic

1. Activate three additional JAP locations
2. Increase female-led businesses and skills
3. Bi-Annual Report 2023
4. Annual Report 2023
5. Community Perception Survey, November 2023

NIGER

Output 1.1: Security and Justice

1. Continue to strengthen the logistical capabilities of the Internal Security Forces
2. Support traditional authorities in their role of mediation and conciliation of local conflicts
3. In collaboration with NNG, determine feasibility and construction planning for Bosso squadron camp and three supporting outposts
4. Installation of 600+ streetlights

Output 1.2: Essential Social Service

1. Construction and rehabilitation of the final infrastructures in Baroua, Bosso, N'Gagam, and Garin Dogo
2. Initiate activities in Toumour and Tam

Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities

1. Livelihoods support activities in Toumour (1,928 households) and Tam (334 households)
2. Targeted livelihood support activities to young people (1,000) in various economic fields

Output 2.1: Consolidation of Stabilization Achievements

1. Provide institutional support and capacity building for local authorities, particularly municipalities, to sustain stabilization gains

Output 2.2: Cross-Border Coordination and Cooperation

1. Finalize the cross-border action plan with the locality of Daboua, in Chad.

Strategic

1. Activate four additional JAP locations
2. Study on social dynamics and local conflicts
3. Conflict analysis report
4. Human rights update
5. Analysis, evaluate, develop and implement mine-risk awareness
6. Household census
7. Bi-Annual Report 2023
8. Annual Report 2023
9. Community Perception Survey

NIGERIA

Output 1.1: Security and Justice

1. Rehabilitate, construct and equip approximately six infrastructure facilities
2. Establish nine new Community Stabilization Committees
3. Operationalize and strengthen two community early warning systems
4. Conduct three community awareness exercises on the risk of mines
5. Strengthening local structures' capacity to report on human rights violations

Output 1.2: Essential Social Service

1. Rehabilitate, construct, and equip two infrastructure facilities
2. Equip three critical infrastructure facilities with renewable technologies
3. Rehabilitate and construct 25 water points
4. Construct 440 permanent housing units

Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities

1. Construct one infrastructure facility
2. Enrol 200 people in cash-for-work programmes
3. Train 1,000 people in livelihood opportunities
4. Support 1,000 people with product assets and business grants

Output 2.1: Consolidation of Stabilization Achievements

1. Train 200 members of local structures on social cohesion
2. Train 200 members of local structures on gender equality
3. Train 200 members of local structures on participatory planning

Strategic

1. Activate two additional JAP locations
2. Bi-annual Report 2023
3. Annual Report 2023
4. Community Perception Survey, June 2023
5. Community Perception Survey, November 2023

REGIONAL

Output 2.2: Cross-Border Coordination and Cooperation

1. Facilitate approximately 20 information exchanges, coordination meetings, and joint advocacy events with UNDP and development partners
2. Develop approximately 40 knowledge products
3. Publish approximately 90 strategic communication products

Output 2.3: : LCBC Capacity

1. Disseminate and promote user access and engagement of the knowledge management platform Sada Resources
2. Complete LCBC institutional capacity assessment
3. Develop LCBC institutional capacity-building plan
4. Facilitate five non-kinetic CIMIC-related joint initiatives between RSS Secretariat and MNJTF

Output 2.4: LCBC Coordination and Oversight of Territorial Action Plan

1. Develop governor's offices capacity assessment for TAPs implementation
2. Facilitate four training, information management and monitoring and reporting exercises for governor's offices
3. Facilitate six coordination and experience-sharing meetings between governors' offices on TAPs implementation
4. Facilitate 12 joint-led initiatives between RSS implementing partners
5. Develop RSS August 2023 – August 2028 next phase document
6. Facilitate cross-border cooperation:
 - One Governor's Forum
 - One Interparliamentary Committee meeting
 - One Private-sector Forum
 - One CSO Platform meeting
7. Facilitate regional and thematic meetings:
 - Three RSS Regional Task Force meetings
 - Three RSS Thematic Clusters meetings

Strategic

1. Action Plan 2023
2. Bi-annual Report 2023
3. Annual Report 2023
4. Risk updates
5. Infographics by JAP location
6. Oversight of mid-term evaluations
7. Implementation of Information Sharing Platform
8. Lessons learned capital document
9. Thematic studies (conflict analysis, human rights)
10. Operationalization of the DIMs phase one and AfDB partnership / funding for phase two

Annex 2: Indicator Table by Country Window⁶⁹

CAMEROON				
Indicator	Baseline Year	Baseline	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.1 Percentage of households in JAP locations who say there is safety and security (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)	2020	45.7%	81.0%	90%
Youth			80.2%	90%
Adults			81.5%	90%
Women			81.1%	90%
Men			80.6%	90%
1.2 Percentage of households in JAP locations who say they have access to justice (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)	2022	71.4%	71.4%	85%
Youth	2022	72.7%	72.7%	85%
Adults	2022	70.3%	70.3%	85%
Women	2022	73.3%	73.3%	85%
Men	2022	69.8%	69.8%	85%
1.3 Proportion of households expressing satisfaction with provision and access to essential social services in JAP locations, e.g., health, education, and WASH (disaggregated by area) (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)			69.1%	85%
Education			71.1%	85%
Youth			73.2%	85%
Adults			68.7%	85%
Women			73.7%	85%
Men			68.3%	85%

69. Some baseline information is from late 2020 and early 2021. Therefore, there is updated data for 2021, however, this column is not displayed. For output tables, Actual 2022 = Baseline + Update 2021 + Update 2022.

CAMEROON				
Indicator	Baseline Year	Baseline	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
Health			76.6%	85%
Youth			73.1%	85%
Adults			70.6%	85%
Women			74.6%	85%
Men			69.2%	85%
WASH			71.8%	85%
Youth			73.1%	85%
Adults			70.6%	85%
Women			74.6%	85%
Men			69.2%	85%
1.4 Proportion of individuals participating in livelihoods strengthening interventions in the JAP locations who report improved livelihoods (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)			91.1%	85%
Youth			94.0%	85%
Adults			87.7%	85%
Women			92.9%	85%
Men			89.4%	85%
1.5 Perception of government performance in providing livelihood opportunities in JAP locations				85%

CHAD				
Indicator	Baseline Year	Baseline	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.1 Percentage of households in JAP locations who say there is safety and security (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)	2020	16%	83.0%	90%
Youth				90%
Adults				90%
Women				90%
Men				90%
1.2 Percentage of households in JAP locations who say they have access to justice (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)			65.2%	85%
Youth				85%
Adults				85%
Women				85%
Men				85%
1.3 Proportion of households expressing satisfaction with provision and access to essential social services in JAP locations, e.g., health, education, and WASH (disaggregated by area) (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)	2020	16%	56.3%	85%
Education				85%
Youth				85%
Adults				85%
Women				85%
Men				85%

CHAD				
Indicator	Baseline Year	Baseline	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
Health				85%
Youth				85%
Adults				85%
Women				85%
Men				85%
WASH				85%
Youth				85%
Adults				85%
Women				85%
Men				85%
1.4 Proportion of individuals participating in livelihoods strengthening interventions in the JAP locations who report improved livelihoods (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)			62.9%	85%
Youth				85%
Adults				85%
Women				85%
Men				85%
1.5 Perception of government performance in providing livelihood opportunities in JAP locations			50.9%	85%

NIGERIA				
Indicator	Baseline Year	Baseline	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.1 Percentage of households in JAP locations who say there is safety and security (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)	2020	53.0%	87.3%	77%
Youth				
Adults				
Women				
Men				
1.2 Percentage of households in JAP locations who say they have access to justice (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)			47.4%	40%
Youth				
Adults				
Women				
Men				
1.3 Proportion of households expressing satisfaction with provision and access to essential social services in JAP locations, e.g., health, education, and WASH (disaggregated by area) (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)	2020	56.7%	91.1%	95%
Education				
Youth				
Adults				
Women				
Men				

NIGERIA				
Indicator	Baseline Year	Baseline	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
Health				
Youth				
Adults				
Women				
Men				
WASH				
Youth				
Adults				
Women				
Men				
1.4 Proportion of individuals participating in livelihoods strengthening interventions in the JAP locations who report improved livelihoods (disaggregated by age, gender, and location)			75.0%	85%
Youth				
Adults				
Women				
Men				
1.5 Perception of government performance in providing livelihood opportunities in JAP locations	2020	60%	74.6%	85%

CAMEROON				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.1.1 Number of Stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at established and functional at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels	6	12	8	19
1.1.2a Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) constructed/ rehabilitated	30	35	35 (+5)	70
1.1.2b Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) equipped	0	0	5 (+5)	70
1.1.3 Number of JAP sites with Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures established	5	12	11 (+6)	12
1.1.4. Percentage of female representatives (including female presidents) within Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures	18%	40%	37%	40%
1.1.5 Number of JAP locations with operational early warning systems	5	12	5	12
1.1.6 Number of security providers trained on human rights and prevention of gender-based violence	1,338	2,288	2,288 (+950)	3,500
1.1.7 Number of JAP locations in which local human rights defenders are reporting on human rights violations and issues surrounding civilian protection	0	0	0	12
1.1.8 Number of training /sensibilization activities on risk of mine carried out in JAP sites	0	0	0	20
1.1.9 Number of streetlights installed in JAP Location	190	190	190	790

CHAD				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.1.1 Number of Stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at established and functional at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels	4	10	14 (+10)	20
1.1.2a Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) constructed/ rehabilitated	4	13	8 (+2)	40
1.1.2b Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) equipped	0	13	8 (+3)	40
1.1.3 Number of JAP sites with Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures established	4	10	7 (+3)	10
1.1.4. Percentage of female representatives (including female presidents) within Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures	0%	20%	12%	30%
1.1.5 Number of JAP locations with operational early warning systems	4	7	7 (+3)	10
1.1.6 Number of security providers trained on human rights and prevention of gender-based violence	0	200	147 (+147)	300
1.1.7 Number of JAP locations in which local human rights defenders are reporting on human rights violations and issues surrounding civilian protection	1	7	7 (+6)	10
1.1.8 Number of training /sensibilization activities on risk of mine carried out in JAP sites	0	0	0	10
1.1.9 Number of streetlights installed in JAP Location	0	0	0	10

NIGER				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.1.1 Number of Stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at established and functional at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels	6	10	10 (+4)	30
1.1.2a Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) constructed/ rehabilitated	0	1	1 (+1)	2
1.1.2b Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) equipped	0	0	0	2
1.1.3 Number of JAP sites with Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures established	6	6	6	10
1.1.4. Percentage of female representatives (including female presidents) within Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures	24%	40%	24%	40%
1.1.5 Number of JAP locations with operational early warning systems	0	0	0	10
1.1.6 Number of security providers trained on human rights and prevention of gender-based violence	0	0	0	TBD
1.1.7 Number of JAP locations in which local human rights defenders are reporting on human rights violations and issues surrounding civilian protection	6	10	6	10
1.1.8 Number of training /sensibilization activities on risk of mine carried out in JAP sites	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1.1.9 Number of streetlights installed in JAP Location	0	629	169	250

NIGERIA

Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.1.1 Number of Stakeholder relationships and collaboration with security forces (military, law enforcement agencies, government recognized community security groups) at established and functional at community, district, governorate, state, and national levels	6	8	8 (+2)	10
1.1.2a Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) constructed/ rehabilitated	8	20	29 (+16)	37
1.1.2b Number of security and justice infrastructures (Law enforcement agencies, Gendarmerie, Courts, etc.) equipped	3	15	29 (+20)	33
1.1.3 Number of JAP sites with Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures established	6	11	8 (+2)	8
1.1.4. Percentage of female representatives (including female presidents) within Community Stabilisation Committees or similar structures	20%	20%	21%	20%
1.1.5 Number of JAP locations with operational early warning systems	6	8	8 (+2)	10
1.1.6 Number of security providers trained on human rights and prevention of gender-based violence	0	450	729 (+424)	800
1.1.7 Number of JAP locations in which local human rights defenders are reporting on human rights violations and issues surrounding civilian protection	6	11	8 (+2)	10
1.1.8 Number of training /sensibilization activities on risk of mine carried out in JAP sites	0	0	0	5
1.1.9 Number of streetlights installed in JAP Location	170	1,000	1,637 (+892)	1,700

CAMEROON

Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.2.1a Number of new or rehabilitated essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH, and education) handed over to local authorities or communities	36	45	39 (+3)	100
1.2.1b Number of equipped essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH, and education) handed over to local authorities or communities	0	0	0	100
1.2.2a Number of bridges constructed /rehabilitated	0	0	0	TBD
1.2.2b Number of km of roads constructed /rehabilitated	0	0	0	TBD
1.2.3 Number of permanent housing units constructed	0	100	0	300
1.2.4 Number of public facilities and infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	0	50	40 (+15)	100
1.2.5 Number of water points (including boreholes) constructed/ rehabilitated in JAP location	0	50	31	60

CHAD				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.2.1a Number of new or rehabilitated essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH, and education) handed over to local authorities or communities	14	73	51 (+37)	179
1.2.1b Number of equipped essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH, and education) handed over to local authorities or communities	0	27	27 (+27)	101
1.2.2a Number of bridges constructed /rehabilitated	0	0	0	25
1.2.2b Number of km of roads constructed /rehabilitated	0	0	0	30
1.2.3 Number of permanent housing units constructed	5	17	13 (+3)	48
1.2.4 Number of public facilities and infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	16	100	27 (+11)	125
1.2.5 Number of water points (including boreholes) constructed/ rehabilitated in JAP location	0	3	3 (+3)	14

NIGER				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.2.1a Number of new or rehabilitated essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH, and education) handed over to local authorities or communities	27	30	30 (+3)	45
1.2.1b Number of equipped essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH, and education) handed over to local authorities or communities	0	6	6 (+6)	6
1.2.2a Number of bridges constructed /rehabilitated	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1.2.2b Number of km of roads constructed /rehabilitated	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1.2.3 Number of permanent housing units constructed	0	0	0	30
1.2.4 Number of public facilities and infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	13	13	13	20
1.2.5 Number of water points (including boreholes) constructed/ rehabilitated in JAP location	0	0	0	15

NIGERIA				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.2.1a Number of new or rehabilitated essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH, and education) handed over to local authorities or communities	5	10	13 (+5)	15
1.2.1b Number of equipped essential social service infrastructure projects (administrative, health, WASH, and education) handed over to local authorities or communities	5	10	13 (+5)	14
1.2.2a Number of bridges constructed /rehabilitated	0	1	1 (+1)	TBD
1.2.2b Number of km of roads constructed /rehabilitated	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1.2.3 Number of permanent housing units constructed	500	1,000	1,360 (+860)	1,800
1.2.4 Number of public facilities and infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	3	10	12 (+4)	17
1.2.5 Number of water points (including boreholes) constructed/ rehabilitated in JAP location	15	50	75 (+44)	120

CAMEROON				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.3.1 Number of rehabilitated or constructed productive infrastructure projects (such as small business offices and market structures)	29	35	29	70
1.3.2 Number of people benefitting from cash for work as income generating opportunities in the JAP locations (disaggregated by gender and age)	1,500	2,500	1,500	3,500
1.3.3 Number of people benefitting from short-term and quick-fix training in JAP locations (gender and age disaggregated)	2,406	3,406	3,639 (+1,233)	4,914
1.3.4 Number of people benefitting from provided productive or business grants or assets (disaggregated by gender and age)	1,837	3,337	2,406 (+569)	5,186

CHAD				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.3.1 Number of rehabilitated or constructed productive infrastructure projects (such as small business offices and market structures)	1	13	4 (+1)	37
1.3.2 Number of people benefitting from cash for work as income generating opportunities in the JAP locations (disaggregated by gender and age)	1,331	2,831	2,662 (+ 1,331)	10,324
1.3.3 Number of people benefitting from short-term and quick-fix training in JAP locations (gender and age disaggregated)	331	2,162	2,111 (+1,780)	6,824
1.3.4 Number of people benefitting from provided productive or business grants or assets (disaggregated by gender and age)	8,763	11,543	11,638 (+1,095)	19,298

NIGER				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.3.1 Number of rehabilitated or constructed productive infrastructure projects (such as small business offices and market structures)	4	4	4	10
1.3.2 Number of people benefitting from cash for work as income generating opportunities in the JAP locations (disaggregated by gender and age)	717	1,000	717	1,500
1.3.3 Number of people benefitting from short-term and quick-fix training in JAP locations (gender and age disaggregated)	30	60	60 (+30)	1,000
1.3.4 Number of people benefitting from provided productive or business grants or assets (disaggregated by gender and age)	40	40	40	300

NIGERIA				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.3.1 Number of rehabilitated or constructed productive infrastructure projects (such as small business offices and market structures)	1	4	5 (+3)	6
1.3.2 Number of people benefitting from cash for work as income generating opportunities in the JAP locations (disaggregated by gender and age)	500	10,500	11,800 (+2,790)	12,200
1.3.3 Number of people benefitting from short-term and quick-fix training in JAP locations (gender and age disaggregated)	2,000	12,200	23,990 (+12,150)	25,800
1.3.4 Number of people benefitting from provided productive or business grants or assets (disaggregated by gender and age)	7,000	7,800	23,990 (+12,150)	25,800

CAMEROON				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.1.1 Number of officers of local government and municipality, NGO, CSO, as well as Community Stabilisation Committees trained on promoting social cohesion	0	0	0	240
2.1.2 Number of Members/staff of local structures involved in stabilisation trained on promoting gender equity	0	50	0	200
2.1.3 Number of officers of local government and municipality, NGO, CSO, as well as Community Stabilisation Committees trained on community-based participatory planning approaches	0	50	60 (+60)	164
2.1.4 Number of coordination meetings, joint advocacy, and fundraising with UNDP, UN, and other development partners	9	11	11 (+2)	TBD

CHAD				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.1.1 Number of officers of local government and municipality, NGO, CSO, as well as Community Stabilisation Committees trained on promoting social cohesion	0	226	226 (+226)	250
2.1.2 Number of Members/staff of local structures involved in stabilisation trained on promoting gender equity	0	0	0	150
2.1.3 Number of officers of local government and municipality, NGO, CSO, as well as Community Stabilisation Committees trained on community-based participatory planning approaches	0	0	0	150
2.1.4 Number of coordination meetings, joint advocacy, and fundraising with UNDP, UN, and other development partners	0	3	4 (+4)	5

NIGER				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.1.1 Number of officers of local government and municipality, NGO, CSO, as well as Community Stabilisation Committees trained on promoting social cohesion	0	0	0	TBD
2.1.2 Number of Members/staff of local structures involved in stabilisation trained on promoting gender equity	0	38	0	190
2.1.3 Number of officers of local government and municipality, NGO, CSO, as well as Community Stabilisation Committees trained on community-based participatory planning approaches	0	38	0	190
2.1.4 Number of coordination meetings, joint advocacy, and fundraising with UNDP, UN, and other development partners	5	12	12 (+7)	60

NIGERIA				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.1.1 Number of officers of local government and municipality, NGO, CSO, as well as Community Stabilisation Committees trained on promoting social cohesion	75	200	207 (+53)	TBD
2.1.2 Number of Members/staff of local structures involved in stabilisation trained on promoting gender equity	75	200	207 (+53)	TBD
2.1.3 Number of officers of local government and municipality, NGO, CSO, as well as Community Stabilisation Committees trained on community-based participatory planning approaches	75	200	207 (+53)	TBD
2.1.4 Number of coordination meetings, joint advocacy, and fundraising with UNDP, UN, and other development partners	2	7	5 (+1)	15

CAMEROON				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.2.2 Number of RSF knowledge products developed by all RSF	1	2	2	4
2.2.3 Number of RSF strategic communications products and programs developed	4	6	4	10
2.2.4 Number of active cross-border JAP sites where cross-border trade is conducted ⁷⁰	0	2	2 (+1)	2

CHAD				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.2.2 Number of RSF knowledge products developed by all RSF	0	0	0	5
2.2.3 Number of RSF strategic communications products and programs developed	0	58	58 (+58)	58
2.2.4 Number of active cross-border JAP sites where cross-border trade is conducted	0	1	1	5

NIGER				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.2.2 Number of RSF knowledge products developed by all RSF	1	3	3 (+2)	5
2.2.3 Number of RSF strategic communications products and programs developed	2	0	2	4
2.2.4 Number of active cross-border JAP sites where cross-border trade is conducted	0	1	1	1

70. Counts only the location in the country. In the aggregated table in the narrative, data is combined.

Annex 3: Risk Log

NIGERIA				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.2.2 Number of RSF knowledge products developed by all RSF	1	3	7 (+4)	10
2.2.3 Number of RSF strategic communications products and programs developed	1	2	56 (+54)	70
2.2.4 Number of active cross-border JAP sites where cross-border trade is conducted	0	2	2 (+1)	2

REGIONAL				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (2022)	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.2.1 Number of surge capacity to national windows	6	11	16 (+5)	TBD
2.2.2 Number of RSF knowledge products developed by all RSF	0	1	1 (+1)	TBD
2.2.3 Number of RSF strategic communications products and programs developed	15	51	51 (+36)	51

CAMEROON				
Risks / Externalities	Risk Category	Impact and Probability	Mitigation measures	Update of Relevant Developments
Balance of funds on activities budgeted in local currency caused by the fluctuation of the exchange rate between the dollar and the CFA franc.	Financial and Operational	High	Submit budget revisions to financial partners with an explanation of the discrepancies identified.	A review of Japanese-funded activities is being prepared.
Lack of submissions from vendors and service providers caused by the change in online platform from Atlas to Quantum.	Operational	Medium	UNDP Cameroon focal points have undergone training on how to use the Quantum platform. This training will be replicated to colleagues and then broadly to service providers.	The UNDP Cameroon focal point carried out a first series of training for service providers of the RSF project on the submission of offers for the use of the platform.
Delay in the implementation of activities due to the deterioration of the security situation in certain localities	Security and Operational	Medium	Prioritize interventions in JAPs where the security situation is favourable.	Fotokol, Hile-Alifa and Kolofata JAPS were selected as priorities for the first year of Phase 2.
UNDP support to the law enforcement can contribute to or facilitate the commission of serious human rights violations	Operational	Medium	Capacity building of law enforcement on human rights and good practices of criminal procedure	Four capacity-building sessions for judicial police officers and agents were carried out during the first half of 2022 The process of recruiting a human rights consultant for the implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy is underway.
The resurgence of social unrest and famine due to the general increase in the cost of basic necessities	Socio-economic and Operational	Medium and High	Strengthening coordination between stabilization interventions and the humanitarian-development-peace triple nexus. Updating producer training modules to deal with rising input prices.	A module on the manufacture and use of biopesticides and compost was provided during training for JAP producers in Hile-Alifa during the month of June 2022 to increase agricultural outputs.

CHAD				
Risks / Externalities	Risk Category	Impact and Probability	Mitigation measures	Update of Relevant Developments
Lack of financial resources	Financial	Medium	<p>Planning of project activities according to available resources, ensuring that all selected action plans are covered.</p> <p>Increase contacts with other donors, submit concept notes and negotiate TRAC with UNDP</p>	The concept notes have been submitted to senior management for approval for submission. Last year the project had a 250,000 TRAC which allowed it to cover some gaps
Delays in delivery	Operational	Medium	<p>Establishment of a service centre and use of accelerated procedures.</p> <p>Recruitment of an International United Nations Volunteer (IUNV) Procurement associate.</p>	The recruitment procedures were slow last year due to the late arrival of the budgetary allocations. This did not allow for the recruitment of the INV Procurement Associate.
Difficulties accessing JAP locations	Operational	Medium	Use of on-site partners at all times.	In progress.
Increased attacks by NSAGs	Security	Medium	<p>Coordinate with religious leaders to promote dialogue and inclusion and to combat the discourse of violent extremists and collaboration with stabilization committees</p> <p>Ensure the establishment of community resilience mechanisms (early warning systems and strengthening of security structures) in harmony with the stabilization committees</p>	<p>The project has had good relationships with local leaders.</p> <p>Early warning systems were put in place in seven JAP sites that were linked to the stabilization switch.</p>
Reduced trust between the State and the population because of human rights violations	Human Rights	Medium	<p>Support to human rights defenders, strengthen investigations and reporting on cases of abuse.</p> <p>Follow-up to the recommendations of the human rights due diligence, in collaboration with the CIMIC.</p>	In progress.

NIGER				
Risks / Externalities	Risk Category	Impact and Probability	Mitigation measures	Update of Relevant Developments
Association perceived from the Niger window with NSAGs and political actors	Political	Low	<p>Sustained political dialogue and communication.</p> <p>Communication and coordination with UN/CSO/NGO agencies for the promotion of human rights and a better understanding of the principles of stabilization.</p>	Collaboration reinforced by joint follow-up missions in the field.
Lack of interest from local actors and communities	Political	Low	<p>Continue to inform and raise awareness of the stabilization approach and the benefits they can derive from it in order to ensure the participation of all in all phases of the project</p> <p>Continue to support and build the capacity of local actors</p>	Community feedback collected and considered throughout implementation.
Insufficient adherence or blockage by the main national and regional authorities of Diffa	Political	Low	<p>Strengthen policy advocacy and consultations with stakeholders to ensure alignment of their perspectives.</p> <p>Ensure a continuous dialogue among Steering Committee members</p> <p>Ensure the participation of the community in decision-making and the monitoring of activities through the operationalization of local stabilization committees</p>	Creation of a Stabilization project coordination unit at the national level which facilitates dialogue and communication at national, regional, and local levels.
Increased attacks by NSAGs	Security	Medium	<p>Security support (reinforcement of security forces around the areas of intervention)</p> <p>Dialogue and liaison with security forces</p> <p>Strengthening early warning systems</p>	Regular meetings with security forces and local authorities held to facilitate the securing of project intervention sites.

NIGER				
Risks / Externalities	Risk Category	Impact and Probability	Mitigation measures	Update of Relevant Developments
Reduced trust between the state and the population because of human rights violations	Human Rights	Low	<p>Systematic consultation of local partners (Governorate, Prefects, Mayors, traditional leaders, religious leaders, High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, Peace Committee, opinion leaders etc.) in the implementation of project activities</p> <p>Support mechanisms for monitoring human rights violations (early warning systems, courts, informal justice, etc.)</p>	Regular coordination with actors (UN, NGOs) on the protection situation in the localities of intervention.
Political instability and the changing security landscape in Mali and Burkina Faso are having negative impacts on political stability and security in the Lake Chad Basin region	Security	Medium	Strengthening cross-border (security) cooperation between Chad, Niger and Nigeria	
Lack of financial resources	Financial	High	<p>Mobilize resources by the Country Office (excluding the Regional Office)</p> <p>Limit the selection of the number of intervention localities according to the resources available.</p> <p>Ensure compliance with the obligations to limit costs (project management) up to 20 percent</p> <p>Broaden the scope of resource mobilization to other financial institutions and partners</p>	Advocacy for state contributions and ownership.

NIGER				
Risks / Externalities	Risk Category	Impact and Probability	Mitigation measures	Update of Relevant Developments
Lack of coordination between authorities at central, regional and local levels	Organization	Medium and High	<p>Hold regular meetings at all levels (central, regional, local)</p> <p>Support the dynamics of communication for the exchange and/or sharing of information.</p>	Regular updates to stakeholders on the progress of activities.
Difficulties accessing JAP locations	Operational	Medium and High	<p>Recruitment of Security and Defence Forces in sufficient numbers</p> <p>Increase logistical support to Security and Defence Forces</p> <p>Strengthening liaison with Security and Defence Forces</p> <p>Work with implementing partners with knowledge and local presence</p>	Improved security allowed easy access to all intervention areas. No “no go” zones currently for the Niger counter.

NIGERIA				
Risks / Externalities	Risk Category	Impact and Probability	Mitigation measures	Update of Relevant Developments
Lack of interest from local and national actors and communities	Political	Low	Advocacy, sensitization and partnership efforts by RSF with state, national and the LCBC regional level since the development of RSF. Persistent work on coordination at senior management and technical levels of RSF with Adamawa, Borno and Yobe state government offices. Engagement with the population through Security Planning and Coordination Groups (SPCG) and CSCs and the visibility of the infrastructure supported by the project.	Meetings were held by the UNDP governance team with officials of the Federal Ministry of Budget and Planning to consolidate support for RSF at the national level (with the Ministry represented at RSF Board meetings). Similar engagements were held at the state level with key stakeholders in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe governments, including their Governors. Such engagements involved the participation in meetings of the Technical Committee, Project Board and at lower levels with SPCG, CSCs and Community Security Groups.
Reduced trust between the state and the population because of human rights violations	Human Rights	Medium	Train security personnel on human rights and prevention of gender-based violence. Perception survey of community feeling of safety and security. Survey of community perception of government performance in providing access to essential basic and social services as a measure of compliance to the social contract between communities and government.	A total of 729 security personnel have been trained, with 424 being trained in JAP locations in 2022. Community perceptions on safety and security in RSF locations in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states rose from 51 percent in 2019 to 53 percent in 2020, to 86.9 percent in 2021 and to 87.3 percent in 2022. The perception of state legitimacy also rose from 0 percent in the same locations in 2019 to 56.7 percent in 2020; to 89.8 percent in 2021 and to 91.1 percent in 2022.

NIGERIA				
Risks / Externalities	Risk Category	Impact and Probability	Mitigation measures	Update of Relevant Developments
Delays in procurement	Operational	Medium	Use the staff in the North East Nigeria Sub-office Service Centre to support RSF implementation. Using the team of RSF engineers to scope, contract, and manage construction works. Conducting regular Spot checks, third-party audits and risk assessments to ensure that RSF local and international partners are complying with UNDP financial management standards.	

Annex 4: Financial

Total Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations (excluding Nigeria Output 5)

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Cumulative Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022 (excluding Nigeria Output 5)					Budget Balance	Resources Balance
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses	Output Ratio	Delivery Ratio		
Income	71,786,542								
Output 1.1: Security and Justice		5,590,440	5,195,654	2,366,563	7,562,217	17.2%	135.3%	(1,971,777)	
Output 1.2: Essential Social Services		12,757,637	13,089,490	3,494,113	16,583,602	37.7%	130.0%	(3,825,965)	
Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities		3,870,908	2,523,982	1,381,474	3,905,456	8.9%	100.9%	(34,547)	
Output 2.1: Consolidate Stabilization Achievements		2,172,734	1,975,180	222,495	2,197,675	5.0%	101.1%	(24,940)	
Output 2.2: Cross-Border Coordination and Cooperation ⁷¹		2,156,733	251,063	14,525	265,588	0.6%	12.3%	1,891,145	
Output 2.3: LCBC Capacity		2,734,326	2,503,959	890	2,504,850	5.7%	91.6%	229,476	
Output 2.4: LCBC Coordination and Oversight of Territorial Action Plan		1,877,871	1,136,531	137,048	1,273,579	2.9%	67.8%	604,291	
Programme Management		9,199,432	6,168,658	595,872	6,764,531	15.4%	73.5%	2,434,901	
GMS		3,021,467	2,878,954		2,878,954	6.6%	95.3%	142,514	
Total	71,786,542	43,381,548	35,723,471	8,212,980	43,936,451	100.0%	101.3%	(554,902)	27,850,091
Utilization vs Income %			61%						
Management Cost %			17%						

Total Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations⁷²

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Cumulative Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022					Budget Balance	Resources Balance
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses	Output Ratio	Delivery Ratio		
Income	71,786,542								
Output 1.1: Security and Justice		5,590,440	5,195,654	2,366,563	7,562,217	15.7%	135.3%	(1,971,777)	
Output 1.2: Essential Social Services		12,757,637	13,089,490	3,494,113	16,583,602	34.5%	130.0%	(3,825,965)	
Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities		3,870,908	2,523,982	1,381,474	3,905,456	8.1%	100.9%	(34,547)	
Output 2.1: Consolidate Stabilization Achievements		2,172,734	1,975,180	222,495	2,197,675	4.6%	101.1%	(24,940)	
Output 5: Social, political, and economic reintegration strengthened (Nigeria only) ⁷³		2,803,738	3,865,040	288,271	4,153,311	8.6%	148.1%	(1,349,573)	
Output 2.2: Cross-Border Coordination and Cooperation ⁷⁴		2,156,733	251,063	14,525	265,588	0.6%	12.3%	1,891,145	
Output 2.3: LCBC Capacity		2,734,326	2,503,959	890	2,504,850	5.2%	91.6%	229,476	
Output 2.4: LCBC Coordination and Oversight of Territorial Action Plan		1,877,871	1,136,531	137,048	1,273,579	2.6%	67.8%	604,291	
Programme Management		9,199,432	6,168,658	595,872	6,764,531	14.1%	73.5%	2,434,901	
GMS		3,021,467	2,878,954		2,878,954	6.0%	95.3%	142,514	
Total	71,786,542	46,185,287	39,588,511	8,501,251	48,089,762	100.0%	104.1%	(1,904,476)	23,696,780
Utilization vs Income %			67%						
Management Cost %			16%						

71. The budget for output 2.2 includes resources that were decided to be invested in 2023. The AWP was revised in the third quarter.

72. Most of the offices have over delivered the planned budgets. Additional resources received in 2022 and budget revisions are being updated for 2023 through UNDP migration to a new financial system.

73. Detailed reporting on RSF output 5, "Social, political, and economic reintegration strengthened," focusing on mass exit, will be reported in a separate report by the Nigeria office.

74. The budget for output 2.2 includes resources that were decided to be invested in 2023. The AWP was revised in the third quarter.

Cameroon Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Cameroon - Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022					Budget Balance	Resources Balance
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses	Output Ratio	Delivery Ratio		
Income	7,422,957								
Output 1.1: Security and Justice		2,451,211	1,889,049	1,254,308	3,143,357	38.2%	128.2%	(692,146)	
Output 1.2: Essential Social Services		928,163	492,230	576,305	1,068,535	13.0%	115.1%	(140,373)	
Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities		1,973,129	1,007,076	1,109,704	2,116,780	25.7%	107.3%	(143,651)	
Output 2.1: Consolidate Stabilization Achievements									
Output 5: Social, political, and economic reintegration strengthened (Nigeria only)									
Output 2.2: Cross-Border Coordination and Cooperation									
Output 2.3: LCBC Capacity									
Output 2.4: LCBC Coordination and Oversight of Territorial Action Plan									
Programme Management		1,480,794	1,472,827	42,406	1,515,233.01	18.4%	102.3%	(34,439)	
GMS		478,331	383,603		383,603.02	4.7%	80.2%	94,728	
Total	7,422,957	7,311,628	5,244,785	2,982,723	8,227,509	100.0%	112.5%	(915,880)	(804,551)
Utilization vs Income %					111%				
Management Cost %					22%				

Chad Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Chad - Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022					Budget Balance	Resources Balance
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses	Output Ratio	Delivery Ratio		
Income	3,868,967								
Output 1.1: Security and Justice		847,545	750,891	75,424	826,315	19.1%	97.5%	21,230	
Output 1.2: Essential Social Services		25,597	676,982	589,478	1,266,460	29.2%	49477% ⁷⁵	(1,240,863)	
Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities		369,705	196,563		196,563	4.5%	53.2%	173,142	
Output 2.1: Consolidate Stabilization Achievements		2,172,734	1,274,177	22,097	1,296,274	29.9%	59.7%	876,460	
Output 5: Social, political, and economic reintegration strengthened (Nigeria only)									
Output 2.2: Cross-Border Coordination and Cooperation									
Output 2.3: LCBC Capacity									
Output 2.4: LCBC Coordination and Oversight of Territorial Action Plan									
Programme Management		119,917	497,264	4,062	501,326	11.6%	418.1%	(381,409)	
GMS		247,485	250,371		250,371	5.8%	101.2%	(2,886)	
Total	3,868,967	3,782,983	3,646,248	691,061	4,337,309	100.0%	114.7%	(554,327)	(468,342)
Utilization vs Income %					112%				
Management Cost %					14%				

75. Chad's AWP was adopted in December 2021. In 2022, the UK allocated additional funds to stabilization, including \$1,267,647 for Chad. However, due to a short deadline for delivery, there was no time to organize a Project Board meeting to revise the AWP 2022. In February 2023, the Project Board provided post-facto endorsement.

Niger Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Niger - Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022					Budget Balance	Resources Balance	
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses	Output Ratio	Delivery Ratio			
Income	5,015,775									
Output 11: Security and Justice		1,809,852	1,305,549	1,035,478	2,341,027	44.5%	129.3%	(531,176)		
Output 1.2: Essential Social Services		1,966,680	732,157	1,277,214	2,009,371	38.2%	102.2%	(42,690)		
Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities		400,102	173,989	112,753	286,742	5.4%	71.7%	113,360		
Output 2.1: Consolidate Stabilization Achievements										
Output 5: Social, political, and economic reintegration strengthened (Nigeria only)										
Output 2.2: Cross-Border Coordination and Cooperation										
Output 2.3: LCBC Capacity										
Output 2.4: LCBC Coordination and Oversight of Territorial Action Plan										
Programme Management		595,496	427,893		427,893	8.1%	71.9%	167,603		
GMS		334,049	205,354		205,354	3.9%	61.5%	128,695		
Total	5,015,775	5,106,179	2,844,942	2,425,445	5,270,387	100.0%	103.2%	(164,208)	(254,612)	
Utilization vs Income %			105%							
Management Cost %			9%							

Nigeria Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Nigeria - Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022					Budget Balance	Resources Balance	
			Expenses	Commitments	Output Ratio	Delivery Ratio	Percentage of 2022 Expenses vs Budget			
Income	31,342,598									
Output 1.1: Security and Justice		481,833	1,250,164	1,353	1,251,518	4.9%	259.7%	(769,685)		
Output 1.2: Essential Social Services		9,837,197	11,188,120	1,051,116	12,239,236	47.8%	124.4%	(2,402,039)		
Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities		1,127,973	1,146,354	159,017	1,305,371	5.1%	115.7%	(177,398)		
Output 2.1: Consolidate Stabilization Achievements			701,004	200,397	901,401	3.5%		(901,401)		
Output 5: Social, political, and economic reintegration strengthened (Nigeria only)		2,803,738	3,865,040	288,271	4,153,311	16.2%	148.1%	(1,349,573)		
Output 2.2: Cross-Border Coordination and Cooperation										
Output 2.3: LCBC Capacity										
Output 2.4: LCBC Coordination and Oversight of Territorial Action Plan										
Programme Management		5,598,720	3,495,135	536,614	4,031,750	15.7%	72.0%	1,566,971		
GMS		1,389,462	1,729,492		1,729,492	6.8%	124.5%	(340,029)		
Total	31,342,598	21,238,923	23,375,309	2,236,768	25,612,078	100.0%	120.6%	(4,373,155)	5,730,520	
Utilization vs Income %			82%							
Management Cost %			20%							

Regional Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Regional - Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022					Budget Balance	Resources Balance
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses	Output Ratio	Delivery Ratio		
Income	24,136,245								
Output 1.1: Security and Justice									
Output 1.2: Essential Social Services									
Output 1.3: Livelihood Opportunities									
Output 2.1: Consolidate Stabilization Achievements									
Output 5: Social, political, and economic reintegration strengthened (Nigeria only)									
Output 2.2: Cross-Border Coordination and Cooperation ⁷⁶		2,156,733	251,063	14,525	265,588	5.7%	12.3%	1,891,145	
Output 2.3: LCBC Capacity		2,734,326	2,503,959	890	2,504,850	54.0%	91.6%	229,476	
Output 2.4: LCBC Coordination and Oversight of Territorial Action Plan		1,877,871	1,136,531	137,048	1,273,579	27.4%	67.8%	604,291	
Programme Management		1,404,504	275,539	12,789	288,329	6.2%	20.5%	1,116,175	
GMS		572,140	310,134		310,134	6.7%	54.2%	262,007	
Total	24,136,245	8,745,574	4,477,227	165,253	4,642,479	100.0%	53.1%	4,103,095	19,493,766
Utilization vs Income %	19%								
Management Cost %	4%								

76. The budget for output 2.2 includes resources that were decided to be invested in 2023. The AWP was revised in the third quarter.

Lake Chad Regional Stabilization Facility Financing Partners



- AfDB
- Denmark
- European Union
- France
- Germany
- Japan
- Netherlands
- Nigeria
- Sweden
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