

LIPTAKO-GOURMA STABILIZATION FACILITY

REGIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 2022



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ACRONYMS

CFA	West African CFA franc	NGO	Non-governmental organization
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation	NSAG	Non-state armed group
CR-FDS	Regional Coordination of Defence and Security Forces	OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
CROCSAD	Regional Consultation Board on Development Actions	TBD	To Be Determined
CSO	Civil society organization	TLA / ALT	Transitional Legislative Assembly / l'Assemblée législative de Transition
ECOWAS / CEDEAO	Economic Community of West African States / Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
EU	European Union	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
SDF / FDS	Defence and Security Forces / Forces de défense et de sécurité	UNDSS	United Nations Department for Safety and Security
GMS	General Management Support	UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
IDP	Internally displaced person	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
IOM	International Organization for Migration	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
ISF / FSI	Internal Security Forces / Forces de Sécurité Intérieure	UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
ISGS	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
ISSP	Islamic State Sahel Province	USD	United States Dollar
JAP	Joint Action Plan	VDP	Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland / Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie
JNIM	Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
LGA	Liptako-Gourma Authority		
LGSF	Liptako-Gourma Stabilization Facility		

SUMMARY

This annual report details key developments, progress against outputs, challenges, lessons learned and financial delivery on the Liptako-Gourma Stabilization Facility (LGSF)¹ from January to December 2022.

LGSF activities, implemented in collaboration with the Liptako-Gourma Authority (LGA), span Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger of the Liptako-Gourma region and through a regional window. Country-level implementation is conducted at the village and commune levels, which are governed by Joint Action Plans (JAPs). JAPs are created in consultation and collaboration with stakeholders at all levels. LGSF contributions to JAPs are delivered with the objective of strengthening physical security and access to justice, rehabilitation of critical infrastructure and access to basic services, and revitalization of the local economy. A total of 15 JAP locations are currently active.

Context

Throughout 2022, the security situation in the Liptako-Gourma region continued to be complex and challenging for stabilization programming and delivery. In addition to numerous security incidents and the resulting internally displaced persons (IDPs), the region has faced changes in governments and key political alliances. This has resulted in serious challenges, undermining the capacity of the programme to deliver in a speedy manner especially in Burkina Faso and Mali.

Burkina Faso experienced two military coups over an eight-month period, resulting in significant political changes and security challenges. Despite transitional authorities' focus on fighting terrorism, providing humanitarian aid, improving governance, and promoting national reconciliation, the country's security situation remains serious, with a rise in security incidents, particularly in LGSF implementing areas. LGSF had to re-establish relationships with local and national authorities following the dissolution and replacement of local authorities in implementing areas after the first coup in January and then again after the second coup in September 2022.

The tri-border area and central Mali continue to experience instability, with major attacks causing extensive casualties. Attacks by violent extremist groups against civilians constituted the majority of documented abuse cases in Mali this year. The Centre and Northern regions were affected by the increased presence and activities of armed groups, which caused significant displacement, including in LGSF intervention areas. The political context in Mali has also been marked by a deteriorating relationship with France and other international partners. However, the Malian transitional government has committed to a shorter timeline to return to democratic rule.

1. The stabilization approach is based on the experience of UNDP over the past decade and a half in Africa and the Middle East. Stabilization is defined as a time-bound, localized, integrated civilian programme of activities with the primary purpose of extending state presence through establishing minimum security conditions, basic services, building/rehabilitating essential infrastructure and creating livelihood opportunities. These components are necessary to re-establish the social contract, lay the foundations for peace and allow longer-term social cohesion and development processes to achieve momentum and impact. Stabilization efforts may include rehabilitation of critical infrastructure of basic services, physical security and access to justice; revitalization of the local economy; and the promotion of inclusive governance and meaningful participation of women and youth in decision-making.

Similar to Burkina Faso and Mali, Niger has not been spared from insecurity throughout 2022, affecting the far west, south-east, and south-central parts of the country. The escalation of insecurity was mainly observed in the far western part of the country, particularly in the Tillabéri region where LGSF operates. The security situation in the Tahoua region also remains challenging, with continued incursions by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in small groups.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger continue to face significant humanitarian and human rights challenges.

In 2022, across the three countries, there are approximately

2,800,000²

refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs, and other persons of concern.



In Burkina Faso, growing militarization, deadly attacks by armed groups and political instability have led to civilian and military casualties and the loss of territory to NSAGs. Closures and reductions on social services and the absence of state services have directly affected nearly 40 percent of the population.³

In Mali, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali documented violations of international humanitarian and human rights law allegedly committed by jihadist groups, as well as during military operations conducted by the Malian Armed Forces, accompanied by foreign security personnel and members of the Dozo (self-defence armed groups).⁴ The Government of Mali announced the opening of investigations into violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that have been documented since the beginning of 2022, but the findings have yet to be released. In addition, the transitional President promulgated a law establishing compensation modalities for damages resulting from serious human rights violations.

In Niger, property rights violations and abductions by NSAGs have violated the civilian population's rights to physical integrity and freedom of movement.

2. Data aggregated from IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix.

3. Action Education (2023) The challenges of access to school in Burkina Faso (Available at: <https://action-education.org/en/les-defis-de-lacces-a-lecole-au-burkina-faso/>).

4. Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali, on 6 January 2023: <https://bit.ly/403cLfO>.

The adverse impacts of climate change continued to be magnified in the Liptako-Gourma region, where millions of IDPs are already in need of humanitarian assistance and have limited abilities to meet basic needs and services.

The region is seeing temperatures rise 1.5 times faster than the global average.⁵ Rainfall is becoming increasingly unpredictable and erratic, adding to demographic pressures and overgrazing, which increase drought impacts. Communities in the region are highly agriculture and livestock dependent, compounding what is already a dire food security situation. Climate change continued to disrupt the balances between agricultural and pastoral systems through increasing drought frequency, changing human mobility, chronic food and resource scarcity and the reduction of arable land. In June 2022, the number of food insecure and malnourished people in the Central Sahel was estimated at 12.7 million people, three times the figure for 2019.⁶ Communal conflicts persist due to competition over access to land, pasture and water, paving the way for armed groups to exploit divisions. Climate change risks also continue to exacerbate poverty, erode social cohesion and proliferate conflict.

Young people under the age of 15 represent approximately 50 percent of the cross-border population, while approximately one-third are between the ages of 10 to 24.⁷ In the absence of viable livelihood opportunities, a growing number of youths are exposed to a heightened risk of radicalization and engagement in criminal activities.

5. United Nations University (2023) Climate-Security and Peacebuilding: Thematic Review, p. 28 (Available at: <https://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:9099>).

6. World Food Programme (2022) Food Crisis in the Central Sahel – CRIALCES project factsheet, p. 1 (Available at: <https://www.wfp.org/publications/food-crisis-central-sahel-crialces-project-factsheet>).

7. United Nations Population Fund (2022) World Population Dashboard, (Available at: <https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard>).



Residents of Ingui Igoubeytane
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KEY RESULTS

Despite challenges, significant results were achieved in 2022, including:

Community members benefited from **livelihood support** to revive the local economy. More than

3,600

people (67% women) received livelihood grants or participated in cash-for-work schemes in Burkina Faso and Mali.

More than 18 percent of households across JAP locations have benefited from project resources. In Mali, 98 percent of those participating in livelihood interventions reported an improvement in livelihood conditions; 61 percent say they are economically active.

Target communities have improved **basic social service infrastructure**.

Women, men and children now have access to 17 constructed or improved public infrastructure (e.g. roads, schools, latrines, showers), five constructed and rehabilitated boreholes and water stations, and 69 public infrastructure facilities newly equipped with renewable technologies.

Foundations were laid for a more sustainable **presence of justice and security authorities**.

578

were installed, and nearly 3,500 pieces of equipment were provided to security forces (e.g. tents, ballistic barriers, vehicles, phones, radios and first aid kits).⁸

Improvement in the social contract. Although 86 percent of the surveyed local population in programme areas felt there was an improvement in social cohesion, only 47 percent reported confidence in restoring the social contract. Overall, 70 percent were satisfied with essential social services, but this varies in JAP sites from around 20 percent to 75 percent reporting satisfaction with social services. However, perceptions of safety are low (31 percent), with the main threats coming from NSAG attacks, explosive devices, kidnappings and looting.

Humanitarian-stabilization coordination was strengthened through a series of engagements with humanitarian, peace, and development actors, including the development of a targeted guidance note; as well as operationalization in key countries. For example, in Mali, the facility constructed shelters in collaboration with UN agencies to facilitate the return of IDPS, especially women and youth, from Bandiagara.

In Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, all programme locations have **mediation and conflict monitoring mechanisms** in place. However, these require support to operationalize and begin organizing activities and issuing alerts.

While a **strategy for the Liptako-Gourma region** has yet to be finalized, progress towards its completion has been made. A series of consultations were convened across the three countries to contribute to the strategy. Notably, conflict analysis was finalized and is now an integral part of the strategy.

⁸ Following donor briefings in May 2022, no contributions from donors have directly supported security forces in Mali. Following the National Steering Committee meeting in August 2022, no contributions from Denmark and the Netherlands have directly supported security forces in Burkina Faso.

Challenges and Lessons Learned

The changing political dynamics in the three countries, especially Burkina Faso and Mali, presented unique challenges, not least because of the change in government in Burkina Faso and the involvement of foreign mercenaries in Mali.

In both countries, violence has increased, including in areas where LGSF is now operating. Although LGSF has prepared for and implemented a range of mitigation measures to compensate for changing security situations, JAP locations have been inaccessible for long periods of time. For example, in Burkina Faso, attacks against security forces, explosives planted on bridges and roads, and attacks in numerous localities, including Falagountou and Seytenga, prohibit certain types of access, particularly for the transportation of infrastructure materials. In Niger, although multiple JAP locations have been identified, LGSF has only been able to proceed with activities in two locations. Even these locations remain at risk, as evidenced by the attack in Kangoria Ting in July.⁹ Across all LGSF current and planned implementation areas, quick coordination with all stakeholders to adapt and implement flexible plans will continue to be prioritized in order to reach the maximum number of people.

Inclusive, participatory selection processes that involve women, youth, religious leaders, local leaders and other community members based on community-identified criteria broaden community support and reduce tensions. After local stakeholders raised their initial concerns about preliminary cash-for-work selection processes, community consultations led to the creation of widely acceptable processes. For example, village validation committees in Burkina Faso and Mali have been largely successful. While cash-for-work activities have overall been very successful, especially in Mali, key challenges have been faced in Burkina Faso. Authorities in Burkina Faso suspended cash transfers for all actors, noting that it affects the quality of governance and social processes and could be linked to security threats.

Women continue to have disproportionately lower decision-making influence than men in local stabilization structures. In Niger, despite women's strong representation, their priorities related to natural resource management were not fully incorporated into local planning. In Burkina Faso, only 13 of 106 members in local structures are female. Increasing female membership will require LGSF management advocacy with local leaders and stakeholders on incorporating higher rates of female participation in local structures.

9. On 26 July 2022, unidentified armed individuals attacked a Tillabéri engineering services vehicle on its way to the worksite in Kangoria Ting. Two days later, unidentified armed individuals threatened workers at the Kangoria Ting site and ordered them to leave the premises. Work was then suspended from 28 July to 25 August 2022. The local authorities (traditional leaders, prefect and National Guard) addressed the security situation through dialogue and patrol reinforcement.

Priorities for 2023

Key priorities for 2023 include continuing to follow a proactive conflict analysis and risk management approach, especially in countries like Burkina Faso and Mali.

With foundational security investments made in 2022, key investments in restoring essential social service infrastructure and revitalizing local economies will be scaled up across early JAP locations in all three countries. Women and youth will continue to be a priority group especially for economic livelihoods. In Burkina Faso and Niger, new stabilization locations, developed in close coordination with LGSF partners, will be opened with accompanying JAPs. It should be noted that JAPs for new locations will be regularly reviewed and updated to allow for flexibility and strengthened responsiveness to community needs. Key areas of focus will include: constructing basic social service infrastructure and local economic infrastructure (including cash for work and economic productivity capacity building) and operationalizing all local inclusive mediation mechanisms for organizing peace promotion and conflict prevention activities.

Community Perception Surveys for identifying baseline information will be completed in Burkina Faso and Niger. Notably, a midterm review for Liptako-Gourma Facility will be conducted. The midterm review will provide evidence of progress and challenges and will identify ways forward.

Another key area of focus for 2023 includes finalizing the regional stabilization strategy. A series of consultations will be undertaken to validate and finalize the strategy. The new Liptako-Gourma Authority Executive Secretary in place presents key opportunities for strengthened ownership and institutionalization of the key gains with strategy development and overall stabilization.

INTRODUCTION

This annual report details the recent developments, progress against outputs, challenges, lessons learned, and financial delivery on the Liptako-Gourma Stabilization Facility (LGSF) from January to December 2022. LGSF implements across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger of the Liptako-Gourma region, and through a regional window, in collaboration with the Liptako-Gourma Authority (LGA). Country-level implementation is conducted at the village and commune levels, which are governed by Joint Action Plans (JAPs). JAPs are created in consultation and collaboration with stakeholders at all levels. LGSF contributions to JAPs are delivered under the outputs of strengthening physical security and access to justice, rehabilitation of critical infrastructure and access to basic services, and revitalization of the local economy.

Progress was made in 2022 despite LGSF operating under challenging conditions. Major challenges include two changes in the national government in Burkina Faso, a complex, multi-stakeholder security situation in Mali, and intervention site security risks in Niger. Partly due to adaptive responses, progress at the output level has been made, particularly in improving access to essential social services.

The organization of LGSF Outputs and Outcomes is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: LGSF Outcomes and Outputs

Outcome 1 The risk of violence that is detrimental to the implementation of peacebuilding and long-term development programmes is reduced					
Output 1	Output 2	Output 3	Output 4	Output 5	Output 6
Regional / border cooperation in areas related to stabilization is strengthened	The foundations for a sustainable presence of state authorities are established (justice and security)	Target communities have basic social service infrastructure built and/or rehabilitated, functional and accessible	Target communities benefit from livelihoods to revive the local economy	Target communities have an enabling environment for the co-construction of peace	The Stabilization Mechanism is put in place for effective management of the facility


Active JAP Locations and Target Population

LGSF implements across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger of the Liptako-Gourma area. A total of 15 JAP locations are currently active. A population of approximately 173,000 people (51 percent female) are targeted across active JAP locations.

Table 2: Active JAP Locations and Populations in 2022

Burkina Faso	Mali	Niger
Belgou (771)	Bandiagara (24,946)	Ingui Igoubeytane (1,640)
Falagountou (13,072)	Dandoli (3,381)	Kangoria Ting (2,339)
Foufou (1,643)	Doucombo (8,694)	
Gomo (859)	Dourou (5,236)	
Goulgountou (3,124)	Pignari-Bana (10,015)	
Gourara (617)		
Orou-daka (1,485)		
Seytenga (6,576)		

Figure 1: Active and Non-active JAP Locations in the Liptako-Gourma Region




RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Conflict and Security

Overall, the tri-border area continues to face political and security instability. The border areas of the C10 Sourou Cross-Border Cooperation Area of Mali-Burkina Faso and those of Gulmu-Tilabéri and Sahel-Tillabéri of Burkina Faso-Niger were marked by insecurity issues from January to December 2022. This situation has restricted LGSF implementation of field activities.


In 2022, there were 1,674 security incidents in LGSF operating regions, resulting in 4,304 deaths.¹⁰ This includes 547 incidents and 1,715 deaths in Sahel,¹¹ Burkina Faso; 661 incidents and 1,936 deaths in Mopti, Mali; and 466 incidents and 653 deaths in Tahoua and Tillabéri, Niger. The primary non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in the tri-border area are Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP).¹²

Figure 2: Security Incidents and Deaths in Mopti, Sahel, Tahoua, Tillabéri, 2022



While violence is not new to the tri-border area, there is a worrying trend of an increasing number of security incidents and associated deaths. In 2018, there were only 503 incidents and 1,199 deaths. However, the number of incidents has increased every year since, as have the number of deaths (except for 2021). Compared to 2018, the number of incidents in 2022 increased by 333 percent, and the number of deaths increased by 359 percent. Looking at year-over-year change from 2021 to 2022 only, the number of incidents increased by 25 percent in 2022, and the number of deaths increased by 26 percent. The majority of incidents are violence against civilians and battles between state and NSAG groups.

Figure 3: Security Incidents and Deaths in Mopti, Sahel, Tahoua, Tillabéri, 2018 – 2022



Throughout 2022, the overall month-to-month security situation across the three countries somewhat worsened, partly due to changes in political leadership and military developments, particularly in Burkina Faso and Mali.

10. Using ACLED data, filtered by region: <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>. Incidents include: Battles, Violence against civilians, Explosions/Remote violence, Riots, Protests, and Strategic Developments.

11. Sahel in this context refers specifically to a region in Burkina Faso, rather than the broader, multi-country region in sub-Saharan Africa.

12. In March 2022, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) broke off from its main affiliate and has renamed Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP).

Table 3: CrisisWatch Monthly Conflict Risk Assessments for 2022¹³

Month	Country		
	Burkina Faso	Mali	Niger
January	Red	Red	Yellow
February	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
March	Red	Red	Red
April	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
May	Red	Yellow	Yellow
June	Yellow	Red	Yellow
July	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
August	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
September	Red	Yellow	Yellow
October	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
November	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
December	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
Key	Deteriorated Situation	Unchanged Situation	Improved Situation

Violent Extremism in the Sahel

Terrorism-related deaths in the broader Sahel¹⁴ continue to increase. According to the 2023 Global Terrorism Index, the Sahel accounted for more terrorism deaths in 2022 than South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa combined. In 2022, deaths in the Sahel comprised 43 percent of global deaths, compared to only 1 percent in 2007.¹⁵ A super-majority of deaths in 2022 were from Burkina Faso and Mali, which account for 52 percent of all deaths in sub-Saharan Africa and 73 percent of all deaths in the Sahel.¹⁶


13. CrisisWatch is a global conflict tracker, a tool designed to help decision-makers prevent deadly violence by keeping them up-to-date with developments in over 70 conflicts and crises, identifying trends and alerting them to risks of escalation and opportunities to advance peace. www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch

14. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal.

15. Institute for Economics & Peace (2023) Global Terrorism Index 2023, p. 61. Available at: <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/resources/?type=research>.

16. Ibid. p. 60.

Figure 4: Percentage of Terrorism-related Deaths in the Sahel in 2022 by Country



Updated research published in early 2023 on the pathways into and out of violent extremist groups challenges traditional assumptions about what drives people to violent extremism. The research underscores the relevance of economic factors as drivers of recruitment: 25 percent of voluntary recruits cited job opportunities as their primary reason for joining, while 31 percent said they were in urgent need of livelihoods at the time of recruitment.¹⁷ In years past, only 13 percent joined for employment reasons, despite 34 percent being in urgent need of employment.¹⁸ Despite the need for employment at both times, actually joining because of the need for employment has increased by 92 percent. This reflects a shift from the original research, where 40 percent of voluntary recruits joined for religious ideologies¹⁹ compared to only 17 percent in the latest findings,²⁰ a 57 percent decrease.


17. United Nations Development Programme (2023) Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement, pp. 66 – 67. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement>.

18. United Nations Development Programme (2017) Journey to Extremism in Africa; Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment, pp. 46, 58. Available at: <https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/v1/en/reports>.

19. United Nations Development Programme (2017) Journey to Extremism in Africa; Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment, p. 46. Available at: <https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/v1/en/reports>.

20. United Nations Development Programme (2023) Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement, pp. 67, 126. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement>.

Figure 5: Changes Over Time in Voluntary Reasons for Joining Extremist Groups²¹



The latest research highlights that over the last ten years, only 2 percent of Official Development Assistance has been invested in peacebuilding and prevention. However, securitized reactive responses, often stand-alone, heavy-handed and militarized, have inherent limitations in curbing violent extremism, are costly and can also result in counter-productive outcomes. Eradicating violent extremism in Africa requires a paradigm shift to include more preventive approaches that invest in addressing the underlying causes of violent extremism and building societal resilience. Investments should be targeted towards more productive and complementary peacebuilding efforts, which have a proven rate of return of nearly 16:1.²⁵ For example, investments into schools will lead to higher school participation rates; an extra year in school decreases the chances of voluntary participation in extremist groups by 13 percent. Individuals who have never reported a trigger event are up to 50 percent less likely to voluntarily join extremist groups.²⁶ Community-wide productive investments strengthen the social contract, thereby decreasing the likelihood of such trigger events.

The latest findings identified a widespread lack of trust in government and its institutions, revealing a much more fractured social contract between the state and its citizens. Approximately 58 percent of voluntary recruits had little or no trust in their national government, while 62 percent felt the same about the police.²² Nearly half of respondents cited a specific trigger event pushing them to join violent extremist groups, with a striking 71 percent pointing to human rights abuse, often conducted by state security forces, as the “tipping point.”²³

Extremist groups exploit these failures in the social contract, combined with development failures, to recruit new members or find sympathizers. Whether due to a lack of employment or livelihood opportunities, inequality or social exclusion, societal ills provide an opening for extremists to introduce their corrosive narratives.²⁴ Despite this evidence, a securitized approach continues to take precedence over efforts to prevent and address long-term root causes of violent extremism, while development-based approaches remain heavily underfunded.

21. Other includes: ethnic principles, political ideas, religious teacher, adventure, security, political marginalization, service provision and social isolation.

22. United Nations Development Programme (2023) Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement, pp. 77 – 78, 81. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement>.

23. Ibid., pp. 90, 104, 128.

24. Ibid., pp. 18, 71 – 72.

25. United Nations Development Programme (2023) Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement, p. 24, 54, 135. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement>.

26. United Nations Development Programme (2023) Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement, p. 65 – 66, 91. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement>.

BURKINA FASO

Political life in Burkina Faso has undergone significant change since the first military coup d'état that took place in January 2022. The transitional authorities established new governance arrangements, including a Transitional Charter, a transitional government, and a Transitional Legislative Assembly to carry out reforms. The Transition Action Plan, the new political programme, focuses on fighting terrorism, responding to the humanitarian crisis, improving governance, and promoting national reconciliation and social cohesion.

In February 2022, local authorities were dissolved and replaced, including 350 municipalities. As a result, during this period, LGSF had to engage with new local and national authorities for implementation plans. Further, the new government requested the remaining French forces in the country to leave; the last contingent of French soldiers departed from Burkina Faso in February 2023.

In July 2022, a compromise was reached at the summit in Accra, Ghana, reducing the duration of the transition from 36 to 24 months. Burkina Faso and Niger signed a military cooperation agreement in August 2022 and requested Mali to re-join the G5 military alliance against jihadism after Mali's initial departure following the non-recognition of its right to head the organization.

On 30 September 2022, soldiers and military vehicles took to the streets of Ouagadougou in the early hours of the morning, cutting off access to administrative buildings, leading to the second coup in eight months. On 5 October 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traoré was appointed as president of the country.

Traoré has committed to supporting a transition and elections as previously scheduled for July 2024. A new two-year transitional charter was adopted, a new 23-member government was appointed and headed by a new prime minister, and a new Transitional Legislative Assembly (TLA) was formed. The new state leaders set, as priorities, fighting against terrorism, improving the population's quality of life and improving the system of governance. However, the situation remains dynamic, and LGSF has had to again re-establish relationships with new national and regional authorities in order to continue to advance stabilization interventions. Additionally, there are concerns that the government of Captain Traoré may begin negotiations with Wagner, the international mercenary group. The programme continues to monitor this and will report to donors if and when there are any changes in this regard. Due to the political context, the Netherlands and Denmark have decided to restrict funding of direct support to security forces since August and September 2022, respectively. Since then, Dutch and Danish resources have not been used for any direct support to security forces in Burkina Faso.

Security threats along country borders and JAP areas remain regular and high-risk. Security incidents in Burkina Faso have continued to rise. There were 624 incidents in 2020, 1,315 in 2021 and nearly 2,900 in 2022.²⁷ The majority of these incidents occurred in the Sahel, North and Eastern regions of Burkina Faso, which are LGSF implementing areas. This includes the devastating attack in Seytenga in June 2022, which resulted in the death of at least 100 people and the displacement of over 34,000 people. The security situation remains serious, with terrorist groups increasingly planting explosive devices and engaging in ambushes against the Defence and Security Forces.

27. <https://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/burkina-faso-humanitarian-snapshot-31-december-2021> and see: <https://www.unocha.org/story/todays-top-news-burkina-faso>

The main armed groups in the region include JNIM and ISSP, which are implementing a strategy to gain control over major road axes in the region. This is done through violent confrontation with security forces and civilians, followed by social control through resource management, mobility monitoring and strategic messaging with the local population. Despite JNIM taking over most of the former areas of influence of ISSP, ISSP remains a significant threat. Conflicts between JNIM and ISSP have been on the rise, leaving ISSP with a smaller yet consolidated presence in the Sahel region.

There is a likelihood of further spillover from the group's Malian and Nigerien strongholds into Burkina Faso.

MALI

The security situation in Mali remains complex, particularly in the centre and the border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Ongoing activities of extremist elements affiliated with JNIM and ISSP continue to drive insecurity.²⁸ The number of conflicts and incidents of violence targeting civilians in Mali significantly increased in 2022 compared to the previous two years. According to the ACLED database, the first half of 2022 alone saw more civilian casualties than the entirety of 2021. In 2022, 1,896 civilians were killed, which is notably higher than the figures from 2020 and 2021. Additionally, ISSP launched an offensive in the Gao and Menaka regions in March 2022, which contributed to the spike in civilian casualties. The underlying inter-communal conflicts further fuelled ISSP actions, which showed less concern for civilian lives in the process.

The region of Bandiagara, where LGSF operates, was affected by terrorist attacks, characterized by the infiltration of jihadists in small groups, followed by attacks on security forces, theft, and the placement of explosive devices. These attacks had a significant impact on the local populations, causing many to become internally displaced. Despite some overall decrease in the total number of IDPs in Mali, women remained the most affected group. The Bandiagara region was the hardest hit, with 72 percent of the displacements due to armed conflict and the remaining 26 percent due to communal tensions.

The political situation in Mali was also tense, marked by the transitional government's deteriorating relationship with France and other international partners. In February, the European Union imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on members of Mali's transitional government. The postponement of the democratic transition, originally scheduled for February 2022, added to the instability. The French ambassador to Mali was expelled from the country in response to comments from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Additionally, the France-led task force, Takuba, and the Barkhane force ceased operations in Mali in late June and August, respectively. In June 2022, Mali withdrew from its official participation in the G5 Sahel, citing its refusal of the rotating presidency and the imposition of economic and political sanctions by the ECOWAS. In November, France suspended development assistance to the country.

28. United Nations (2023) Situation in Mali: Report of the Secretary-General. Available at: <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en>.

NIGER

The security situation in Niger remains complex, with widespread insecurity affecting the far west, south-east, and south-central parts of the country.²⁹ The escalation of insecurity was mainly observed in the far western part of the country, particularly in the Tillabéri region, which accounted for 368 incidents and 602 deaths in 2022 (Tahoua accounted for 98 incidents and 51 deaths).³⁰ Notably, this represents a doubling in the number of incidents but a halving in the number of deaths compared to 2021 (Tillabéri: 203 incidents and 905 deaths; Tahoua 32 incidents and 298 deaths).


In Niger, the number of civilian fatalities caused by NSAGs decreased in 2022 after reaching an all-time high in 2021. This decline was not due to a change in ISSP tactics, the primary NSAG operating in the northern regions of Tahoua and Tillabéri, but rather because of ISSP concentration on the Malian side of the border. Violence in Mali has led to an increase in refugees and tensions between communities on the Nigerien side of the border. The ISSP still faces challenges from militias and criminal groups competing for control of trafficking routes. JNIM, the main NSAG in the southern region of Tillabéri, uses population-centric strategies to gain support. The Torodi area has seen the highest number of security incidents, mostly caused by JNIM. Banibangou has recorded the highest number of civilian fatalities, largely due to self-defence initiatives resulting in ISSP retaliation.

Despite the persistent insecurity in intervention areas, LGSF implementation has made progress. However, on 26 July 2022, unidentified armed individuals attacked a Tillabéri engineering services vehicle on its way to the worksite in Kangoria Ting. Two days later, unidentified armed individuals threatened workers at the Kangoria Ting site and ordered them to leave the premises. Work was then suspended from 28 July to 25 August 2022. The local authorities (traditional leaders, prefect and National Guard) addressed the security situation through dialogue and patrol reinforcement.

The security situation in the Tahoua region remains complex. Continued incursions by NSAGs operating in small groups affect the population's mobility and force them to abandon markets and grazing areas along the Mali border. The main NSAGs operating in the area are the ISGS on the Niger-Mali border and JNIM on the border with Burkina Faso, along with other bandits and traffickers carrying out illegal activities (e.g. illegal migration, human trafficking and narcotics distribution via the Libyan desert).

The government has continued its recruitment efforts to increase the number of security and defence force personnel in the regions of Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillabéri. A new governor was appointed in Tillabéri in early August 2022.

Figure 6: Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) in Africa in 2022



Africa Center for Strategic Studies: <https://bit.ly/3ZI4eF0>

29. Global Protection Cluster (GPC) (2022) Analyse de Protection. Available at: <https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/old/2022/08/08/niger-protection-analysis-update/>.

30. Using ACLED data: <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVILIAN PROTECTION

Burkina Faso

There are growing concerns about the human rights situation in Burkina Faso after two military coups and a growing militarization of society. The human rights situation seriously deteriorated in 2022. As deadly attacks by Islamist armed groups against civilians surged, military forces and pro-government militias committed human rights violations during counterterrorism operations. Further, political instability deepened as a result of the coups.³¹ Confrontations with NSAGs, who now control approximately 40 percent of the land, have led to increased civilian and military casualties.

The government's response to the insecurity has been increasingly aggressive, with the use of air assets and the emphasis placed on the recruitment, training and deployment of VDP groups. However, this approach increases the risk of civilians targeting other ethnic groups and undermines civilian stabilization initiatives. Reports of human rights violations by both the state and NSAGs have been frequent, exposing the civilian population to significant risk.

According to the 'Humanitarian Response Plan 2022 for Burkina Faso', presented by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the closure or reduction of social services and the absence of state services directly affected nearly 40 percent of the population. Approximately 7 percent of the population fled their homes in search of safety. Approximately 1,800,000³² people have become IDPs (1,000,000 in LGSF implementation areas), of which 53 percent are female, and 52 percent are youth under the age of 15.

Humanitarian needs remain significant, particularly in the Eastern, Centre-North, North and Sahel regions, particularly the provision of shelter and essential household items and the provision of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). Access to water has been significantly hindered due to targeted sabotage of water points by NSAGs in several regions.

further, nearly

2,400,000
people suffer from food insecurity.

Regarding education,
more than

4,200
schools have been closed,
affecting more than
700,000 students.

31. Human Rights Watch: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/burkina-faso>

32. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/97767>

Mali

In 2022, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali recorded approximately 2,000 cases of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.³³ This includes civilian killings, injuries, kidnappings, and disappearances. Violations are attributable both to NSAGs, such as JNIM and ISGS, but also to Malian security forces. The majority of victims of these groups were reported in Bandiagara, Bankass, Djenné, Mopti, and Niono Cercles.

Overall, human rights significantly deteriorated in 2022 in Mali due to a variety of actors. The context is characterized by renewed attacks against civilians by terrorist groups, both in the centre and the north, particularly in the Gao and Ménaka regions, and by the actions of self-defence groups. Also of concern are violations and abuses committed during military operations conducted by the Malian Armed Forces, including those involving foreign security personnel, particularly the Wagner group, which is suspected of being involved in the killing of civilians.³⁴ Even though the government has expressed its commitment to uphold human rights and international humanitarian law, impunity and the lack of accountability remain serious challenges.

Furthermore, restrictions on freedom of movement have also adversely affected the ability of human rights observers to conduct investigations. Regarding engagement with Malian security and defence forces and their relationship with the Wagner Group, the Mali window, in agreement with donors, continues to maintain its directive to not provide any security forces with financial or technical support. However, the Mali window remains formally engaged with the defence and security ministries at the national level, as members of the Technical Committee and the National Steering Committee, in order to approve sites and JAPs. Engagement between UNDP and the defence and security forces is specifically aimed at sharing an understanding of the security context and sharing information on UNDP programming in the region.

Throughout 2022, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has recorded 1,427 grave human rights violations against children.³⁵ The violations included recruitment, murder or bodily harm, sexual violence, abduction, attacks on schools and hospitals and denial of humanitarian access. The cases were reported in the regions of Bamako, Bandiagara, Gao, Kayes, Kidal, Koulikoro, Mopti, Ménaka, Segou, Sikasso, and Timbuktu and were mainly committed by the Coordination of Azawad Movements,³⁶ the Malian Defence and Security Forces and various other identified and unidentified armed groups. Armed groups also recruited and used over 300 children as child soldiers. As of October 2022, insecurity forced the closure of 1,950 schools, leaving more than 519,300 children out of school.

By the end of 2022, there were nearly 1,300,000 IDPs, refugees and other persons of concern in Mali.³⁷ Overall, the humanitarian situation has worsened due to global food shortages and regional economic sanctions.

33. <https://bit.ly/3ZJjr2E>. Data from 1 January to 30 September 2022 is 1,654.

34. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-10/mali-20.php>.

35. 4 reports of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali

36. Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) is a rebel alliance in Mali.

37. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sahelcrisis>.

Niger

In 2022, there were nearly 700,000 displaced persons in Niger, including 375,000 IDPs and 250,000 refugees.³⁸ The majority of the IDPs are located in the regions of Diffa, Maradi, Tahoua, and Tillabéri. In Tillabéri, an LGSF implementing area, some households have returned to their villages of origin, but difficulties remain in accommodating the return of IDPs as basic social services have not been rehabilitated in most of these areas. The department of Tera remains a focal point for attracting IDPs from Burkina Faso and Mali.

Press freedom and freedom of expression remain a challenge in Niger, with journalists and human rights defenders being targeted and prosecuted under defamation provisions in the cybercrime law. In January 2022, for example, following the conviction of two investigative journalists for reporting the findings of an international NGO, Amnesty International expressed concern over the recent harsh repression of critical media by authorities in Niger. The journalists, Samira Sabou and Moussa Aksar, were handed suspended prison sentences in January 2022 for reporting on a report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime, which alleged that a large quantity of drugs seized by Nigerien authorities had been repurchased by traffickers using illicit means. These restrictions on freedom of expression and human rights defenders' ability to operate freely pose significant challenges for human rights monitoring by civil society actors in Niger.³⁹

Property rights violations perpetrated by NSAGs have been prevalent in the regions of Maradi, Tahoua and Tillabéri. In Diffa, frequent abductions have violated the civilian population's right to freedom of movement. Violations of the right to physical integrity in the form of assaults, injuries and the right to life were committed in all four regions.

The outlook for security in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in 2023 remains challenging. Both Mali and Niger are classified as High Risk, indicating expectations of regular conflict, criminal activity and potential civil unrest. Burkina Faso is classified as Extreme Risk. State institutions across all three countries are weak, and the stability of political leadership is uncertain. In addition to each country's internal challenges, the region also faces geopolitical risk due to varying conflicts between states and NSAGs and conflicts between competing NSAGs. Therefore, LGSF and other development partners operating in these areas need to proactively monitor political developments, as the political environment is subject to constant change. Forecasting and contingency planning for untoward scenarios are essential for maintaining operational safety.

38. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/97767>

39. <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2022/01/niger-conviction-of-investigative-journalists-marks-deepening-repression-of-media-freedom/>

Figure 7: Global Guardian 2023 Risk Assessment Map: World⁴⁰





Figure 8: Global Guardian 2023 Risk Assessment Map: Liptako-Gourma



Global Guardian 2023 Risk Assessment Map: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger (Liptako-Gourma areas)

40. Global Guardian 2023 Risk Assessment Map: World (<https://www.globalguardian.com/risk-map>)

Table 4: Risk Factor Key, Global Guardian 2023
Risk Assessment Map

Extreme	Countries classified as Extreme Risk are actively engaged in conflict, while also experiencing severe criminal activity and civil unrest. These countries are insecure; state institutions are too weak to manage militant groups or large-scale disasters.
Extreme	Countries classified as Extreme Risk are actively engaged in conflict, while also experiencing severe criminal activity and civil unrest. These countries are insecure; state institutions are too weak to manage militant groups or large-scale disasters.
Medium	Countries classified as Medium Risk are not fully secure. Political instability and inadequate law enforcement make these countries vulnerable to criminality and sporadic unrest. State institutions are often ill-equipped to manage crises.
Moderate	Countries classified as Moderate Risk are considered resilient. These countries are capable of quickly and effectively managing most crises and threats to personal security. But criminal activity, terrorism, and natural disasters can impact travel or in-country operations.
Low	Countries classified as Low Risk are considered highly stable. These countries maintain a strong rule of law and are capable of containing threats to safety and security.
Geopolitical Risk	These areas contain geopolitical risk that include cold, warm, and hot conflicts. Businesses and travelers operating in these areas should actively monitor political developments, as these environments are subject to constant and bi-directional change. Forecasting and contingency planning for untoward scenarios are vital in these regions for maintaining personnel safety and business continuity.

REGIONAL STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

Stabilization and Humanitarian Coordination

At the regional level, dialogue with humanitarian partners has been strengthened through several meetings organized on various themes. The ‘Humanitarian-Stabilization Outcome Document’ has been developed, which summarizes the outcomes of numerous dialogues and outlines definitions, differences and common ground. Among the outcomes of the regional humanitarian-stabilization dialogue, UNDP initiated the establishment of the cross-agency Conflict Analysis Network (see below), which will include UN and non-UN agencies and organizations. The Network will facilitate the exchange of information, joint analysis of context and risks and the identification of mitigation measures and solutions that can be collaboratively implemented. A thorough contextual understanding will be critical to stabilization efforts, particularly to maintaining an awareness of current trends and developments and to adapting to them in a timely, sensitive and proactive manner.

Conflict analysis and sensitivity

A series of multiple deep dives were conducted with on-site UNDP teams. These deep dives provided a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the conflict dynamics and the context in which the on-site UNDP teams are working. This understanding helps the on-site teams design and implement more effective conflict-sensitive programming, which is crucial for building sustainable peace and reducing the risk of exacerbating existing conflicts. The deep dives also helped identify potential risks and opportunities for conflict-sensitive programming that the on-site teams may not have been aware of. This information can help the on-site teams to adjust their programming and strategies accordingly, ensuring that their efforts are targeted and effective.

In one such session, held in November 2022 with the UNDP Mali team, the focus was on their cash-for-work programme in the Bandiagara region, which has been heavily affected by conflict. By applying a conflict-sensitive lens to the planning and delivery of the programme, the team was able to gain valuable insights and lessons learned and highlight best practices to inform future delivery of cash-for-work interventions within stabilization programming.

After the deep dive session, a paper was created to document the discussions and key takeaways, including the importance of developing an exit strategy for the programme. The paper serves as a record of the lessons learned during the session and provides insights for future programming. Such deep dives can help ensure that UNDP interventions are sensitive to the context in which they are being implemented and can ultimately lead to more effective programming.

Quarterly, short briefs for teams across West Africa provide concise, insightful analysis of the conflict and stability context of six countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger and Nigeria). The briefs are intended to help local teams identify and think through tricky issues and dilemmas in their stabilization programming and to share lessons across neighbouring areas. Each section of the briefs discusses the current situation in each country and draws out implications for UNDP programming, ending with a set of questions for consideration. Some of the topics covered have included the humanitarian-stabilization nexus, mitigating conflict risks in Mali as international partners withdraw, the impacts of anti-Western sentiment on stabilization efforts, and reducing tensions around aid through conflict-sensitive engagement.

UNDP and UN colleagues established the Conflict Analysis Network to facilitate information sharing and analysis between different teams and colleagues working in the conflict, stability and security sphere in the Sahel region. The network will connect various UN and non-UN agencies within the sphere of conflict sensitivity in order to facilitate information sharing and undertaking cross-sector conflict analysis.

The rationale for the Conflict Analysis Network includes identifying opportunities for synergy with other analysts, ensuring greater and more effective collaboration between UN agencies, building and contributing to a community of practice, increasing awareness of inclusive security and creating a platform for collegial support.

Conflict sensitivity of stabilization activities has been strengthened. A methodology and set of tools for quick conflict scans to monitor conflict trends in JAP locations have been developed. This guidance package introduced conflict analysis to Regional Stabilization Facility (RSF) and LGSF staff.

The Regional Stabilization Facility conducted a three-part Training Workshop on Conflict Analysis and Conflict Sensitivity. The workshop objective was to build a shared understanding among key stakeholders on the importance of conflict analysis, how to use conflict analysis tools to build conflict sensitivity, and how to integrate conflict analysis into programme design and management.

A study was conducted on conflicts in the Liptako-Gourma region, with a focus on identifying risk factors, divisions and positive dynamics. The study analysed specific conflicts in the LGSF's intervention zones, evaluated socio-economic dynamics, assessed the extent and importance of each conflict dynamic, identified factors that connect or divide communities and their impacts on social cohesion, identified positive dynamics and existing conflict resolution mechanisms, evaluated the security environment and accessibility, and identified ongoing interventions and partners. The study took a multi-scale approach that required considering social, economic and security connections between different zones of interest across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.⁴¹

Engagement with Security Forces

UNDP conducted an analytical study to examine recent work with security forces, including risk mitigation and early warning measures. The study drew on the experience of countries that have successfully provided support to security forces. The direct support to security forces, including the provision of specific items of non-lethal equipment and rehabilitation or construction of law enforcement buildings, is a key element of the stabilization intervention. UNDP generally provided support to the police and gendarmerie.

The Mali Defence and Security Forces/civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) network was created with stabilization advisers from the Lake Chad Basin and Liptako-Gourma Region. This network aims to bring together colleagues from Defence and Security Forces, CIMIC, and stabilization teams to engage with experts and colleagues from other contexts, building networks and strengthening their own capacity to work in conflict-affected environments. The monthly meetings focused on building good relationships, sharing information and improving collective analysis and support. Meetings had a thematic focus on sharing experiences, lessons and challenges, such as how to work with non-state actors in the security sector, gender sensitivity and cross-border challenges.

41. The zones or areas of conflict studied include: In Mali, zone #1 includes Anderamboukane and Ménaka; zone #2 includes Ansongo and Gao; in zone #3, the conflict is present in Niafounké and Tombouctou; in zone #4, the areas affected are Bandiagara and Mopti. Burkina Faso has four conflict zones: zone #5 covers Ouahigouya and Titao, zone #6 includes Dori and Sebba and zone #7 involves Djibo and Gorom Gorom. Zone #8 covers Fada and Pama. In Niger, the conflict is present in zone #9, covering Gueladjo and Torodi, and in zone #10, which includes Ayorou and Tillabéri. zone #11 covers Bankilaré and Téra, zone #12 includes Abala and Tillia. These zones have seen varying degrees of violence and conflict, with different armed groups and actors involved.

Targeted risk analysis has been adopted for Mali. A discussion note developed for Mali has presented the current political situation in Mali, which has been in turmoil following military coups and political uncertainty. Concerns have been raised about the risks associated with activities supporting the government authorities in transition. The Stabilization Facility in Mali is engaged with national and local actors and has established a Local Monitoring Committee that is responsible for evaluating the context, reviewing the implementation of activities, and providing recommendations.

The Mali Stabilization Facility does not provide any financial or technical support to security forces but remains engaged with the Defence and Security ministries at the national level. The security of the stabilization programme is ultimately the responsibility of the government; the Facility is making efforts to monitor and detect security risks.

Gender equality

Targeted gender guidance was produced that includes important recommendations to improve gender disaggregation and gender targeting. Despite immense challenges, women were engaged across various Facility interventions. For example, in Burkina Faso, the provision of agricultural and fishing inputs and tools enabled farmers and fishers (60 percent women) to earn a living and support their families. Women contributed to restoring degraded land and cleaning up public spaces, including markets, schools and medical centres. In Mali, women engaged in expanded income-generating opportunities, including fish farming, plastic waste processing, weaving and dyeing. Notably, the installation of solar-powered systems, as part of the programming, is having a tangible effect on the opportunities available for women.

“We used to experience frequent power outages, and it was especially difficult for women in labour. With 24-hour electricity, we can now provide continuous care,” stated Salimata Talata, a midwife at the Seytenga maternity ward, emphasizing the importance of solar kits for medical facilities.

Activities in 2023 include a gender assessment of stabilization activities and gender-sensitive conflict analyses, which will provide a deeper understanding of the underlying gender power relations and how they, in turn, influence and are affected by conflict and the intervention. These will guide recommendations that enhance the inclusiveness and effectiveness of conflict-sensitive stabilization activities and inform the prioritization and programming of stabilization interventions.

Climate Security

In partnership with the LGA, important research was undertaken on climate security in the Liptako-Gourma region. The survey targeted 379 respondents, including 121 Malians from the Cercle from Bandiagara, 126 Burkinabés from the province of Séno, and 132 Nigerians from the commune of Bankilare. Twenty-five percent of the respondents felt that environmental changes had a negative effect on security and caused communal conflicts. Nearly 87 percent noted increased competition over natural resources due to environmental changes. Over 80 percent indicated not having enough water and pastures for their livestock, putting pressure on their ability to maintain traditional livestock livelihoods. The lack of access to water and pastures was cited as one of the key risks for increasing conflicts between herders and farmers. Only 20 percent of the participants indicated that local authorities are helping with mitigation and adaptation to the environmental changes that they are experiencing. Improving social cohesion was identified as a core challenge.

The facility is focusing on tackling such challenges by strengthening the interface between communities and local governments and through direct initiatives that focus on strengthening the livelihoods of cross-border communities through a climate-smart approach. This includes targeted support to communities with equipment and infrastructure for agriculture, livestock, and fishery.

Communication and data

A new stabilization communication strategy was developed. The communication focal points of all windows came together in Niamey in February 2022 to discuss the importance of communication for stabilization and what makes it unique from other programmatic communication on development or peace programmes. Audiences and target messages were refined and guidelines were developed, including on putting the government at the forefront of success and impact stories. Due to the political context in Mali, the decision was taken to use donor logos to make sure communities were aware of where the support was coming from, i.e., to ensure it was not mistaken as support from any mercenary group or their governments.

A dedicated stabilization social media campaign was implemented from June to December 2022. The campaign showcased ongoing stabilization work across the six Sahelian countries where stabilization is being implemented,⁴² promoted a shared and unified understanding of stabilization among internal and external audiences, and included multilevel stakeholder participation from the countries, UN, and UNDP offices and partners.

The campaign leveraged various platforms and formats to reach its audience,⁴³ including popular hashtags and multimedia content. Two primary hashtags, #RebuildingTogether and #ThrivingSahel, collectively achieved over 21 million impressions and reached nearly 12 million people through more than 850 content pieces.⁴⁴ Additional multimedia content included a 10-part podcast⁴⁵ and four short videos⁴⁶ outlining the stabilization approach in the Lake Chad Basin, discussing opportunities and challenges and demonstrating the resilience of local populations. Overall, user engagement with the campaign was 66 percent positive, 30 percent neutral and only 4 percent negative, indicating broad public support for stabilization.

The GIS platform is a multidimensional platform that collects, analyses and visualizes data in various areas, such as the movement of population, infrastructure (destruction, construction and rehabilitation), cross-border activities, reporting (including conflict analysis), and communication. The purposes of the platform are to assist in data collection and analysis related to UNDP stabilization efforts across Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin and to support data management and analysis for stabilization efforts. During the last part of 2022, training sessions for all focal points were organized to familiarize them with the platform so that they will be able to make full use of it.

42. RSF: Cameroon, Chad, Niger (Diffa) and Nigeria; LGSF: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Tillabéri and Tahoua).

43. Platforms include Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and Pinterest.

44. Analysis is from the 90-day period June to August 2022 only. Total campaign impact is higher.

45. Podcasts are available on Spotify (<https://spoti.fi/3GEfpRM>), Amazon Music (<https://amzn.to/3zRj7im>), and Apple (<https://apple.co/41lwLe7>).

46. Videos are available on YouTube (<https://bit.ly/3KWtuwz>; <https://bit.ly/3KXR6kt>; <https://bit.ly/3MFNftt>; <https://bit.ly/3UyQdlf>).

RESULTS

Outcome: Risks of Violence Reduced

Risks of violence detrimental to the implementation of peacebuilding and long-term development programmes are reduced

For 2022, no evidence is yet available on whether risks of violence detrimental to the implementation of peacebuilding and long-term development programmes have been reduced. However, for Mali, there is now baseline data from 2022 (collected between November and December 2022), which will allow an evidence-based judgement in subsequent years on the reduction of the risk of violence detrimental to peacebuilding. This data was collected through a sample survey. For Burkina Faso and Niger, no baseline data at the outcome level is yet available. Burkina Faso perception surveying is scheduled for early 2023.

Table 5: Baseline Outcome Indicator Data for Mali


Indicator	Baseline (2022)	Target (2024)
Security and Justice		
Number of community conflicts recorded in the intervention sites	5	0
Percentage of households in JAP sites who report that there is safety in their place of residence (disaggregated by age, sex and location)	Total: 31% Female: 29% Youth: 35%	75%
Percentage of households in JAP sites who report being satisfied with security services provided by the state	57%	80%
Percentage of households in JAP sites that report access to justice (disaggregated by age, gender and location)	Total: 59% Female: 53% Youth: 71% Bandiagara: 68% Dandoli: 45% Doucoumbo: 22% Dourou: 45% Pignari-Bana: 52%	85%

Indicator	Baseline (2022)	Target (2024)
Essential Social Services		
Percentage of households in JAP sites satisfied with the provision of and access to essential social services (health, education and WASH) (disaggregated by age, gender and location)	Total: 70% Female: 71% Youth: 71% Bandiagara: 76% Dandoli: 69% Doucombo: 19% Dourou: 55% Pignari-Bana: 73%	95%
Number of children accessing school through the Stabilization Facility (disaggregated by gender)	0	1,000
Economic		
Percentage of individuals participating in livelihood interventions in JAP sites who feel that there has been an improvement in their livelihoods (disaggregated by age, gender and location)	Total: 98% Female: 100%	100%
Level of confidence by households in the process of restoring the economic fabric in the target areas (EU)	28%	60%
Percentage of youth at JAPs sites who are economically active (employer or employee)	61%	85%
Social Cohesion		
Percentage of households who feel confident in the process of restoring the social contract in the target areas	47%	80%

LOW LEVELS OF FEELING OF SAFETY IN MALI


Overall, only 31 percent of household respondents in Mali in the target areas feel safe in their local areas (29 percent female; 35 percent youth). Slightly lower reports of safety by women are likely related to their additional exposure to working in the fields and time spent in market areas.

Figure 9: Respondents Reporting Safety and Security in Mali JAP sites



The highest **threats** to safety and security in the target areas were attacks by NSAGs (70 percent), explosive devices (69 percent), kidnappings and looting (60 percent), arbitrary arrests (20 percent), and gender-based violence (10 percent). To further strengthen safety and security moving forward, the Mali window will establish citizen monitoring committees in JAP locations, which will work with local authorities to communicate security incidents and security needs. Further, public awareness activities around explosive devices will be completed.

Figure 10: Reported Threats to Safety and Security in Mali JAP sites⁴⁷




Related to perceptions of safety, **59** percent of households in the target areas reported having **access to justice**,⁴⁸ with female households reporting a slightly lower access rate of 53 percent, while youth reported a higher access rate of 71 percent. The data was also disaggregated by location, with Bandiagara having the highest access rate of 68 percent and Doucombo having the lowest access rate of 22 percent. In Mali, Bandiagara is the largest commune of JAP intervention areas and is also in the centre of the other four locations. Bandiagara serves as the centre point for security forces and, as a consequence, has received more LGSF support in 2022 in order to facilitate greater outreach to the surrounding communes in 2023. The planned citizen monitoring committees will also be leveraged to communicate and strengthen access to justice.

47. Total across threats does not add to 100% because respondents were able to report multiple threats.

48. Access to justice is defined as being able to take action to initiate legal proceedings (reporting, filing, etc.).

Figure 11: Respondents Reporting Access to Justice in Mali JAP sites



Of the five community conflicts recorded, none were resolved peacefully. This is despite Mali having established conflict resolution mechanism structures. As these structures are new, awareness of them and capacity building of their membership is a critical objective moving forward in 2023.

ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES VARIES IN MALI

70% of households in the target areas in Mali are satisfied with the provision of and access to essential social services, including health, education, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services.

However, perceptions of access vary significantly among JAP locations in Mali: The location with the highest satisfaction rate was Bandiagara at 76 percent, while Doucombo had the lowest rate at 19 percent.



Built water tower in IDP Camp, Bandiagara, Mali
© UNDP Mal/Ousmane Arama

LIVELIHOOD IMPROVEMENTS IN MALI

The short-term livelihood interventions in Mali JAP sites seem to work: **98 percent** of those participating in interventions reported an **improvement in livelihood conditions**. Further, 61 percent of surveyed youth in Mali said they are economically active as either an employee or employer in target areas. This is likely the result of the provision of productive assets and the implementation of cash-for-work programmes. These interventions provided individuals with the resources and opportunities necessary to improve their economic status, leading to a high percentage of individuals who reported an improvement in their livelihoods.

However, the broader sentiment in Mali JAP locations is different: Only **28 percent** of households in the target area reported feeling **confident** in the process of **restoring the economic fabric**.

This may be due to two factors:

1

The presence of an IDP camp in Bandiagara has put pressure on local resources and created instability, affecting the overall economic climate in the area; and

2

The security risks and conflict in the surrounding communities could be contributing to a general sense of uncertainty and unpredictability, leading to low confidence in the long-term economic prospects of the area. To address this disparity, it may be necessary to implement additional interventions that address the underlying security and resource constraints and promote a more positive and stable economic outlook for the area.

ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES VARIES IN MALI

86% of the targeted population in Mali felt that there was an improvement in social cohesion, only 47 percent reported confidence in restoring the social contract.

Further, 41 percent of the population in target areas felt that they trusted other communities. This figure is likely related to local and surrounding conflict and instability and its subsequent connection to IDPs. Support in host communities, such as the IDPs site in Bandiagara that was recently completed may help shift these sentiments upward over the short- to medium-term.

OUTPUT 1: STRENGTHENING CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION

Regional / border cooperation in areas related to stabilization is strengthened

Table 6: Output 1 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
1.1 Existence of a validated regional stabilization strategy	No	Yes	No	Yes
1.2 Rate of physical implementation of the strategy	0%	20%	0%	100%
1.3 Extent to which there is cross-border technical exchange between the three countries (Likert scale 1 to 5)	1	2	1	4

Table 7: Output 1 Financial Data

2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$1,047,547	\$892,302	85.2%

In 2022, some progress was made towards a validated regional stabilization strategy, including broad consultations. However, such a strategy is currently not yet validated or in place.

One component of regional and cross-border cooperation is developing a validated, **regional stabilization strategy** for Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. While a strategy for the Liptako-Gourma region was not finalized in 2022, progress towards its completion has been made (indicator 1.1). A series of consultations have taken place in Burkina Faso with technical focal points from several ministries and with civil society actors. Further meetings with remaining ministries and technical partners took place in October. The LGA has also reached out formally to Mali and Niger to start the consultation process. Following meetings with ministries and CSOs in Burkina Faso, meetings with partners and UNCT are planned. Additionally, a conflict analysis is currently underway, which will feed into the development of the strategy. An assessment of LGA institutional capacities is ongoing, although based on LGA feedback, it requires validation.⁴⁹

49. As a side note, Hawa Aw, who previously oversaw UNDP's LGSF implementation across the Liptako-Gourma countries, has been appointed as the Executive Secretary of the LGA on 1 October 2022, enabling the potential for a stronger collaboration between LGSF implementation stakeholders.

A cross-border technical exchange between the three countries is still low. According to local cross-border cooperation groups members, the level of technical cooperation is 1 out of 5 on the Likert scale. To improve the cooperation, Stabilization actors have engaged in **cross-border technical exchanges** (indicator 1.3). 54 new administrative authorities have been sensitized on cross-border cooperation. As a prelude to setting up a local cross-border cooperation framework in the Kenedougou (borders between Burkina Faso and Mali), a workshop was organized in Koudougou, Burkina Faso, from 13 to 16 September 2022. The workshop aimed to inform and sensitize the new administrative authorities following the dissolution of the community councils/local authorities who were replaced. Although the Kenedougou is not in the "traditional" geographical scope of the Liptako-Gourma, this activity was accepted to support the LGA, whose mandate now covers the entire territories of the three countries.

OUTPUT 2: JUSTICE AND SECURITY

The foundations for a sustainable presence of state authorities are established (justice and security)

Table 8: Aggregated Output 2 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
2.1 Number of public infrastructures (Justice, Police stations, Gendarmerie, etc.) constructed, rehabilitated or extended in the intervention area	0	5	3	32
2.2 Number of public infrastructures (Justice, Police Stations, Gendarmerie, etc.) equipped in the intervention areas	0	0	0	31
2.3 Percentage of JAP sites with a security plan aligned with the national security strategy	0%	32%	29%	100%
2.4 Number of security officers trained on human rights and gender-based violence prevention (disaggregated by age, sex and location)	242	306	264 (+22)	1,764
2.5 Number of streetlights installed in target areas	0	430	578	3,760

2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$21,116,484	\$20,847,834	98.7% ⁵⁰

50. The majority of expenses are under Niger Window as per their approved Workplan from the National Steering Committee on April 6, 2022. Sequencing of activities aligns with the stabilization approach which requires minimum security to be ensured prior to initiation of other interventions.

In 2022, some foundations were laid for a more sustainable presence of justice and security authorities: 578 solar-powered streetlights were installed, and nearly 3,500 pieces of equipment were provided to security forces (e.g. tents, ballistic barriers, vehicles, phones, radios, first aid kits), one gendarmerie building was rehabilitated, two fixed security positions were constructed, and 322 security officers, community leaders, and community members (173 women) were engaged in gender-based violence prevention capacity building. Further, nine out of 31 JAP locations have a security plan aligned with national strategies.⁵¹

A total of 578 **solar-powered** streetlights have been installed (indicator 2.5): 260 in Burkina Faso and 318 in Mali. Installation locations varied across schools, marketplaces, medical centres, places of worship and public roads. Serving as a quick-response, basic security foundation for higher-level activities, these streetlights have brought improved lighting to public areas, providing numerous benefits to the communities. These benefits include reducing the risk and incidence of crime and accidents, thereby increasing public safety, stimulating local economies by providing the marketplace and other areas with sustained lighting, and improving educational and healthcare access at schools and medical centres.

Only 16 percent of residents in Mali JAP locations reported that it was safe to send children out in the evening before LGSF interventions,⁵² but 61 percent reported feeling safe afterwards.⁵³ In addition, the use of solar-powered technology is environmentally friendly, reduces dependence on fossil fuels and reduces greenhouse gas emissions. This not only helps to protect the environment but also reduces the cost of providing lighting, as solar-powered streetlights can be installed and maintained more cheaply than traditional streetlights powered by electricity from the grid. Niger has procured an additional 1,500 streetlights, which will be installed in 2023.

51. Indicator 2.4 is not applicable to Mali.

52. Evening is after 8:00 PM.

53. Mali Perception Survey, November-December 2022.

RESIDENT TESTIMONY ON BENEFITS OF STREETLIGHTS

“My name is Brahim Saye. I am a 48-year-old mason. Married and father of 2 children including a girl and a boy, all schooled. Before streetlights, the first difficulty was fear. Nightfall gave way to fear.

As soon as it got dark, especially during the heat, the little snakes hung around and this quickly scared the women and children. We also went to bed early because walks were not possible during the night. At dusk, you couldn't commission someone unless you fumbled to go into town. Very often, some unidentifiable people bullied our young girls on this road in the dark.

We were defecating on the space that is currently used as shelters for IDPs. But now the toilets in the camp help us a lot.

So we stayed that way for over a decade before the light came. Now we can go out, walk as we please without encountering anything like a creature. The light works 24 hours a day, we can no longer tell the difference in night and day.

There are even some residents who plan to shop all along the streetlights. Something we could not imagine.

After the light, water. What is pressing now is the acquisition of water. Currently, all neighbours and IDPs are turned to my only well. A well that will cease to exist after February [2023]. I would like to see my well improved to be able to serve all seasons. Also, my family does not have a toilet.”



Brahima Saye,
Habitant à Bandiagara, Mali

© UNDP Mali_Mohamed Diawara

A total of three public security infrastructures were constructed and rehabilitated (indicator 2.1). In Burkina Faso, the gendarmerie building damaged during the devastating attack in Seytenga in June 2022 has been rehabilitated. In Niger, two fixed security positions were constructed to support the operational deployment of security personnel and to strengthen community safety. The fixed positions serve as a centre for operations, supporting security in the wider area, including the ability to operate six flexible outpost locations. The Niger National Guard is now better able to carry out localized operations with the provision of security support and operational equipment, which are critical for a sustainable presence of justice and security authorities.

Table 10: Operational Equipment Provided to the Niger National Guard

Equipment	Quantity
First aid kits	1,200
Portable Radios	800
Personal protection equipment	600
Thuraya Phones	100
Mobile lighting towers	71
Vehicles	58
VHF Radio Set	21
Solar batteries	15

Further, flexible security support equipment was provided to support the operations of the six outposts in Niger.

Table 11: Security Support Equipment Provided to Support Flexible Outposts

Equipment	Quantity
Ballistic barriers	300
Soft tents	180
Rigid tents	44

In Burkina Faso, the Regional Coordination of Defence and Security Forces (CR-FDS), located in Dori, was provided with operational equipment (laptop, VHF Radio Set, Sound equipment, etc.). This equipment will strengthen the coordination of cooperation actions between all security providers in the Sahel region. The gendarmerie and police are an integral part of the CR-FDS, which coordinates all security operations in the Sahel region. This will have direct security impacts on intervention areas.

Table 12: Operational Equipment provided to the CR-FDS

Equipment	Quantity
Equipment	Quantity
Visitor chairs	15
Tables	10
Tablets	9
VHF Radio Set	9
Professional chairs	7
Air conditioners	4
Solar devices	4
Sound equipment	2
Metal cupboards	2
Laptop	1
Desktop	1
Multifunction Inverter	1
Video Conference equipment	1
Internet Connection device	1

Further, nine active JAP locations across the three countries now have a security plan aligned with their national security strategies (indicator 2.3).

Twenty-two security officers (0 female) of the police and gendarmerie in Burkina Faso now know how to apply human rights and gender-based violence prevention techniques (indicator 2.4) due to their participation in a training that strengthened their professional capacities.⁵⁴ Further, 200 community leaders (78 female) in Burkina Faso participated in a training that focused on the rights to health and education, women's and girls' rights, children's rights, and the right to identity and nationality. This training should empower them to promote and protect the fundamental human rights of their communities, particularly those of women and children, who are often marginalized and face significant barriers to accessing health, education and other essential services. By building the capacities of community leaders, stabilization efforts ensure more inclusive and equitable communities where everyone has equal access to their rights and opportunities to thrive.

In addition, 100 community members (45 female) in Burkina Faso, including IDPs, participated in five dialogue events on gender-based violence and mechanisms to be adopted to prevent and report cases. These community representatives will, as focal points, be able to sensitize their communities on gender-based violence and report cases of gender-based violence.



Handover of operational equipment to the Niger National Guard
© UNDP Niger_Zoukaleyni Dourfay




Handover of vehicles to the Niger National Guard
© UNDP Niger_Zoukaleyni Dourfay



Training of community leaders on human rights and gender, Dori, November 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Delivery of equipment to the CR-FDS in the presence of the Resident Representative in Dori, Burkina Faso
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Solar streetlights in the streets of Falagountou, Burkina Faso October 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso

54. A post-training evaluation revealed that 20 participants (90 percent) significantly strengthened their professional capacities on these issues.

OUTPUT 3: SOCIAL SERVICE

Target communities have basic social service infrastructure built and/or rehabilitated, functional and accessible

Table 13: Aggregated Output 3 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
3.1 Number of public infrastructures (health centres, schools, etc.) constructed, rehabilitated or extended in the intervention area	0	60	17	125
3.2 Number of boreholes constructed/rehabilitated in target areas	0	30	5	56
3.3 Number of public infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	2	39	71 (+69)	124
3.4 Percentage of JAPs sites with public infrastructure (health, school) up to standard ⁵⁵	40%	70%	40%	100%

Table 14: Output 3 Financial Data

2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$3,541,616	\$3,226,330	91.1%

In 2022, target communities improved basic social service infrastructure. Although not all planned targets for 2022 were met, people now have access to 17 constructed or improved public infrastructure (roads, schools, latrines, showers, etc.), five constructed and rehabilitated boreholes and water stations, and 62 public infrastructures that were newly equipped with renewable technologies.

Overall, the proportion of JAP sites, d, **with up-to-standard public health facilities and schools** remains low. In Mali, the percentage of JAP sites with basic social services infrastructure up to standard is 40 percent (indicator 3.4), as a recent survey has shown.⁵⁶ Planned activities for multiple schools in Mali in 2023 will contribute to improving standards. In Burkina Faso, preliminary surveying identified six schools and four medical centres as not up to standard, including straw hut infrastructure and ill-equipped classrooms at the schools, and conditions of disrepair at the medical centres. In Niger, surveying is scheduled for 2023. However, completed work on schools will contribute to an improved overall standard.

Out of 17 **public social service infrastructures** that were constructed and rehabilitated in 2022 (indicator 3.1), 11 were constructed in Burkina Faso. This includes two medical centre housing units, two four-stall latrines at a public school, and seven three-stall/one-shower latrines in places of worship, women's platforms and marketplaces. In Mali, four public infrastructures were constructed and rehabilitated. This includes a reinforced concrete crossing slab for 7.52 m³ of gutters and formed concrete along key road areas in Bandiagara, a site of 60 converted shelters, and the rehabilitation of one public road with a length of 7 km at the IDP development in Bandiagara.⁵⁷ In Niger, two primary schools were constructed. Additionally, two ambulances have been placed into public operation. Further, the IDP development in Bandiagara now has a children's playground.

Further, **five boreholes and water stations** have been constructed and rehabilitated (indicator 3.2). In Burkina Faso, four community human-powered pumps have been rehabilitated. These pumps have contributed to reducing water accessibility pressure caused by population displacement from neighbouring areas to Seytenga. Additionally, one water station for the gendarmerie brigade in Seytenga was rehabilitated. As part of the humanitarian nexus, in Mali, one borehole with a water tower of 5m³ and four tap-heads was constructed at the IDP development in Bandiagara by UNICEF, serving as a critical point for improving water accessibility for the marginalized populations in that area.

In 2022, 69 public infrastructures were equipped with **renewable technologies** (indicator 3.3). 42 in Burkina Faso, 20 in Mali, and seven in Niger. In Burkina Faso, 40 schools, medical centres, women's platforms, marketplaces, youth centres, places of worship and primary public roads have been surrounded by solar-powered streetlighting. Further, two medical centres in Burkina Faso have been equipped with solar power systems (solar panels and power system and supporting equipment, including wall sockets, fans and pharmaceutical cold-storage refrigerators). In Mali, 20 public infrastructures have been equipped with renewable technologies. A total of 19 public infrastructures have been surrounded by solar-powered streetlighting, including an area of 60 shelters at the IDP development, multifunctional platforms and primary public areas across Bandiagara, Dandoli, Doucombo, Dourou, and Pignari-Bana. Further, the borehole and water tower at the IDP development in Bandiagara was equipped with a solar pump. Additionally, the IDP development was provided with 200 portable lamps.

55. Infrastructure is assessed against national standards. Data available only for Mali.

56. Mali Survey Report, January 2023.

57. The IDP site is inside the town of Bandiagara and plays a critical role in the area.

RESIDENT TESTIMONY ON THE BENEFITS OF THE INSTALLATION OF SOLAR KITS AT THE MEDICAL CENTRES

“This achievement represents great progress for us in that it allows us to put an end to the serious problems of load shedding. In our area, power cuts are very frequent. We regularly receive pregnant women at term, and working conditions are made difficult by the incessant power cuts. We find ourselves obliged to use telephone torches to carry out deliveries. With this solar system installed in the maternity ward, we can work in peace at any time.”



Tapsoba Arnold
Attending Doctor, Seytenga Medical Center
Burkina Faso
© UNDP Burkina Faso

“We were regularly confronted with problems related to load shedding. At night more particularly, the working conditions were difficult. This was particularly the case when women in labour for childbirth suffocated from heat. With the installation of this solar system, we use the fans and the light. We gain in efficiency. With the availability of electricity 24 hours a day, we ensure the continuity of care, which was not the case before.”

Salimata Talata



Salimata Talata
Midwife, Seytenga Maternity
Burkina Faso
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Solar lamp posts at the Maternity Hospital in Seytenga
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Construction of latrines in Seytenga, December 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Construction of latrines in Seytenga, December 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso

Construction of shelters for IDPs in Bandiagara, Mali
© UNDP Mali_Mohamed Diawara



Installation of solar kits at the maternity hospital of Seytenga and Falagountou, October 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Solar streetlights surrounding a school in Falagountou, November 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Borehole repaired at the Gendarmerie Brigade of Seytenga
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Drilling repaired in the city of Seytenga, April 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso




Installation of solar kits at the maternity hospital of Seytenga and Falagountou, October 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Photovoltaic solar system at the maternity ward in Falagountou, November 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso



IDP camp in Bandiagara, Mali
© UNDP Mali_Ousmane Arama




Primary school in Ingui Igoubeytane before rehabilitation
© UNDP Niger_Zoulkaleyni Dourfay



Primary school in Ingui Igoubeytane before reconstruction (outside)
© UNDP Niger_Zoulkaleyni Dourfay



Primary school in Ingui Igoubeytane after reconstruction (eight classrooms)
© UNDP Niger_Zoulkaleyni Dourfay



Primary school in Ingui Igoubeytane after reconstruction
© UNDP Niger_Zoulkaleyni Dourfay

OUTPUT 4: LOCAL ECONOMY

Target communities benefit from livelihoods to revive the local economy

Table 15: Aggregated Output 4 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
4.1 Percentage of households in target areas with at least one member benefiting from project resources (technical, material, financial) (disaggregated by age, sex of head and location)	0%	28%	18% ⁵⁸	87%
4.2 Number of persons trained to enable them to seize economic opportunities (training in the creation and management of micro-enterprises, IGAs, trade, etc.)	0	400	117	1,800
4.3 Number of beneficiaries of cash or equipment grants	0	1,671	3,636	3,700
4.4 Number of productive infrastructure projects rehabilitated or constructed (such as small enterprise shops and market structures)	2	30	8 (+6)	63

Table 16: Output 4 Financial Data

2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$2,594,650	\$2,393,961	92.3%

In 2022, a significant number of community members benefited from livelihood support to revive the local economy: More than 3,600 people (67% women) received livelihood grants or participated in cash-for-work schemes in Mali and Burkina Faso. Approximately 13 percent of households across Burkina Faso and Mali have benefited from project resources. Further, six shops and market structures were built, and close to 120 people were trained in the creation of small enterprises.

Overall, the economic support provided is well targeted: Nearly all (98 percent) of individuals participating in livelihood interventions to revive the local economy in the target areas reported that there had been an improvement in their livelihoods (100 percent for women).⁵⁹

58. 2,662 households benefitting divided by 14,439 total households in JAP locations.

59. Mali Perception Survey, November-December 2022.

RESIDENT TESTIMONY ON THE IMPACTS OF PARTICIPATING IN CASH-FOR-WORK ACTIVITIES

Ms. Ramata Boubacar Dicko is a 50-year-old head of household who benefited from the cash-for-work programme in Seytenga between 10 January 2022 and 1 April 2022. Although her name was not initially on the list of 500 beneficiaries, Ms. Dicko volunteered during the first week for cleaning and sanitation activities.

“I will miss staying at home knowing that all the women are working in the village for a common cause. There is a Fulani adage that says: it is better to work to have something than to sit doing nothing and be ashamed: bii aadama golla heba buri joodo semta. This work is useful for the whole community”.

On the second week of the programme, her name was added to the list, and she ended up being paid for 23 days of work (CFA 46,000, US\$75).

“I was able to buy food and a small goat for CFA 12,500 that I will fatten and sell as the Tabaski festival approaches.”



Ms. Ramata Boubacar Dicko
Seytenga
Burkina Faso

© UNDP Burkina Faso


Overall, more than 18 percent of households in target areas have a least one member **benefiting from project resources** (indicator 4.1). In Mali, over 20 percent of households are benefiting. This is based on the five JAP locations of Bandiagara, Dandoli, Doucombo, Dourou and Pignari-Bana, with an approximate population of 173,000, based on monitoring surveys carried out during the first phase of cash-for-work activities.⁶⁰ In Burkina Faso, just over 17 percent of households are benefiting (based on a population of 28,000).

In 2022, 3,636 people (67% female) in Burkina Faso and Mali benefited from **cash or equipment grants** and **cash-for-work** schemes (indicator 4.3). There is currently only strong anecdotal evidence through beneficiary testimonies that this has improved local economic activities in intervention locations and surrounding localities. In Burkina Faso, 800 people (506 female) participated in cash-for-work activities. This includes 500 (320 female) people mobilized to recover more than 5ha of degraded land and clean up public service and community locations (e.g., markets, schools, gendarmerie and medical centres).

Participants received West African CFA franc (CFA) 20 million between 10 February to 1 March 2022. Another 250 people (154 female) completed cash-for-work jobs in the construction of 50 family latrines. Further, 50 (32 female) cash-for-work jobs were created as part of the construction of a runoff water collection basin with a volume of 5,250 m³. In Mali, 2,836 persons benefited. This includes 1,508 people (1,266 female; 729 youth) who were provided with productive assets to increase income-generating opportunities. This includes fish farming, plastic waste processing, weaving and dyeing, and events/rental equipment. Additionally, 1,328 persons (669 female; 1,135 youth; 341 IDPs) participated in a cash-for-work initiative in Bandiagara, which hosts the IDP development site.

General workers received CFA 112,000, supervisors CFA 280,000, and tricycle owners CFA 840,000. Beyond the influx of capital, the livelihood activities were essential in containing local frustrations due to insecurity and lack of economic opportunities, especially for the youth. For example, in Mali, local authorities have directly communicated to project staff a reduction of youth demonstrations since the beginning of these initiatives.

Figure 12: Persons Benefiting from Cash or Equipment Grants and Cash-for-Work



60. Additional surveying is scheduled for March 2023, which will capture the second phase of cash-for-work activities completed in December 2022.

Further, economically active community members now have access to six new **productive infrastructure projects** (indicator 4.4) in 2022. In Mali, five multifunctional centres have been constructed. The centres have specifically contributed to improving the conditions for women by reducing the production time of women engaging in various activities, such as peanut sellers with improved production facilities. In Niger, one agropastoral transformation centre has been constructed in Ingui Igoubeytane. A market area with 28 individual shop stalls is under construction. Security risks in Kangoria Ting slowed down construction activities. In Burkina Faso, eight productive infrastructure projects were planned for construction in 2022. However, ongoing security incidents resulting in the destruction of roads and bridges have prevented accessibility.



In 2022, 117 persons were better equipped to take advantage of economic opportunities (indicator 4.2). In Mali, 102 persons (78 female; 24 male) participated in capacity-building training on entrepreneurship, women's leadership, production techniques, cooperative financial management and networking. In Burkina Faso, 15 youth (seven female; eight male) received training in masonry and construction.⁶¹ Follow-up interviews with participants demonstrated that they feel confident in entering and contributing to community construction and rehabilitation projects based on the training.

61. Included 8 days of training.

RESIDENT TESTIMONY ON THE IMPACTS THAT LGSF ACTIVITIES HAVE HAD ON HER COMMUNITY

“I am Aminata Guindo, member of the Coordination of Women’s Associations and NGOs in Bandiagara. The arrival of the stabilization project has changed our city. Before there was insecurity, poverty, and the city was not stable. Now young people are recruited to clean up the city. Young men and women are all busy. We really liked the lighting with the solar lamps. My neighbourhood itself is a beneficiary. Currently, a group of young women and men are clearing out the garbage. It was found that during recruitment, there was no racial discrimination. We are all involved in the work.

Here in Bandiagara, women had nothing to do. They only stayed at home to cook and take care of the children, and this was also difficult for lack of means. With the arrival of UNDP, women are not only at home preparing; they had other occupations. So we women got involved in this work. We also sensitize our young girls who have not had the chance to go to school, and who are at home doing nothing to go to this UNDP project to at least work in order to have their daily bread.

The city was unstable and there was little activity. Women leave one village to another for income-generating activities. In those times, we were scared! We did not know where to go to carry out these activities. As the UNDP project is there, now even if we do not move villages for income-generating activities, we even have an income without making a move. And it helps the family to cover the needs of children, husbands, etc.

We are women from Bandiagara, even when you do not benefit directly and one of your relatives benefits, it means that you have benefited. We have our children, our sisters, our brothers who are in this work.

We, the women of Bandiagara and the surrounding municipalities, benefited from a nine-day training with UNDP. We were 90 women. They trained us to manage our businesses, associations and cooperative societies well. It was up to par and delivered in the language we understand. We have been given the tools and we are going to make the most of it. So now we are waiting for the equipment.”



Aminata Guindo,
Membre de la CAFO, Bandiagara
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RESIDENT TESTIMONY ON LGSF-SUPPORTED PRODUCTIVITY TRAINING

“I am Habi Poudiougou, married and mother of four children (two girls and two boys), president of the cooperative society Goudjoukadiou Nena composed of 30 people (including 26 women and 4 men). Before the training, we did not know the difference between an association and a cooperative. But for three days we learned how to manage these two groups.

Among the trades, it is the most difficult agri-food processing because it is food. Thanks to the training, we have greatly improved hygiene in our working environment so as not to harm our products. Today, our premises are clean and this is one of the achievements of the training that we put into practice daily.

We process cassava, peanut leg, fonio, millet, beans, rice.

Our wish today is really to have a cassava plantation, which is considered the food of the poor. 100 F of attiéké allows you to spend the day. The same is true for “gari, tô, tapioka and porridge,” all cassava-based foods. The profitability is huge in terms of food security because you can have up to 50 kg of cassava with a single plant.

For me, the state must do everything to support us in the fight against food insecurity in Mali.”



Habi Poudiougou showing cassava leaves,
Bandiagara, Mali
© UNDP Mali_Mohamed Diawara

RESIDENT TESTIMONY ON LGSF-SUPPORTED PRODUCTIVITY TRAINING

“I am Moctar Kassogué, promoter of the soap factory Aichata Kassogué. I have been doing saponification for two years. It was as a follow-up to a training that I started the work. Currently we have 13 people in the company, including seven men and six women. I took the leadership training and business management and the relations between the leader and his employees.

Before the training, I had small difficulties with the employees here. I took everything to heart. During the training we were explained how to be with employees, how to talk with them, how to care about their well-being and ask for their opinion in relation to production. Frankly, I was doing everything by myself. So after the training, I knew to involve all employees in production. By involving them, we had a lot of advantages, thanks to that I had other formulas that I did not know. We were able to create our own formula and it works well on the market.

Among the employees are two internally displaced women from Kassa and another woman with disabilities. These women came to help us from time to time and I understood that they intended to work with us. I hired them and we work together.

On five barrels we produce 500 cartons of soaps per day, and each carton contains 30 pieces of soap. The production cost of a barrel amounts to CFA franc 225,000, after-sales we can save CFA franc 100,000 as profit. At each production, I give CFA franc 1,000 to the workers and it has nothing to do with the salary. I pay some CFA franc 35,000 and others CFA franc 50,000 per month depending on the tasks.

We still need capacity building and economic support, especially in the Bandiagara region, where the crisis has greatly affected. There are many young people who have young people but do not know how to implement them. I ask the state and its partners to help these young people.”



Moctar Kassogué,
Promoter of a soap factory in Bandiagara, Mali
© UNDP Mali_Mohamed Diawara

RESIDENT TESTIMONY ON LGSF-SUPPORTED PRODUCTIVITY TRAINING


“I am Djeneba Sissouma. I do the processing of agri-food products. I was a worker in the cash-for-work activities of the stabilization project. Initially, people said that women could not work as cash-for-work agents. I am not afraid of challenges and it is in the context of cleaning up our city. Even though it was voluntary, I was up for it. That’s how I got involved in those activities. We were paid every two weeks and I set aside in the amount we were given and it is in this context that I was able to save until the end of the activity. We were paid CFA franc 38,000 every two weeks.

Before cash-for-work, I put a pause on production for lack of means. My ambition was to do food and medicinal production, buy machinery and hire some women to help me in my activities. But with cash-for-work, I was able to save money and I started the realization of my project by relaying my activity.

The amount of production was very minimal. For example, with ginger powders I could produce between CFA franc 5,000 to 10,000 and when I sold, I could benefit from CFA franc 10,500. The sale took a lot of time because I had no visibility. Today, I manage to make my image more public.

Security issues have played a major role in our activities. Generally, when we start buying the raw materials with the farmers in the villages, the means of transport is very difficult with the insecurity. So we rarely find our products of better quality and often our deliveries are very late. Insecurity continues to cause a real problem and it also increases the price of food.

We are often lowering our selling prices to sell our products easily. When I produce for CFA franc 25,000, I manage to save at least CFA franc 10,000 or 12,500 in profits. In the future, I will not be able to do everything manually; these savings will be used to buy machines to produce faster.”



Djeneba Sissouma,
Bandiagara, Mali
© UNDP Mali_Mohamed Diawara



Young masons-in-training getting hands-on experience at the Regional Centre for Professional Training in Dori, Burkina Faso
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Masons-in-training getting hands-on experience at the Regional Centre for Professional Training in Dori, Burkina Faso
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Restoration of degraded land in Seytenga, February and March 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso




Cash-for-work participants working on underground channels in Mali
© UNDP Mali_Mohamed Diawara



Channels cleaning team working
© UNDP Mali_Mohamed Diawara



Cash-for-work participants in Burkina Faso
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Channels cleaning team
© UNDP Mali_Mohamed Diawara



Productive assets for beneficiaries in Mali
© UNDP Mali_Mohamed Diawara.jpg



Participants in the cleaning and sanitation work of services and public places of Seytenga, February and March 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Truck transporting agricultural produce near Seytenga, Burkina Faso, towards Niger
© UNDP Sub-Regional Hub for West and Central Africa_Joe Feeney



Truck transporting agricultural produce near Seytenga, Burkina Faso, towards Niger
© UNDP Sub-Regional Hub for West and Central Africa_Joe Feeney

OUTPUT 5: ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR THE CO-CONSTRUCTION OF PEACE

Target communities have an enabling environment for the co-construction of peace

Table 17: Aggregated Output 5 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
5.1 Percentage of JAPs sites with an inclusive mediation mechanism that have organized at least 1 peace promotion activities/initiatives (mediation, conflict prevention, awareness-raising, training, etc.)	0%	0%	0%	100%
5.2 Percentage of target municipalities with a continuous conflict monitoring mechanism or early warning system that have issued at least 1 alert or have organised at least 1 conflict prevention or peace-building activities/initiatives	0%	0%	0%	100%
5.3 Number of activities/initiatives carried out by inclusive mediation or ongoing conflict monitoring mechanisms	0	0	0	45

Table 18: Output 5 Financial Data

2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$896,826	\$804,090	89.7%

During the reporting period, because of the deteriorating security situation, none of the JAP sites in Burkina Faso, Mali, or Niger organized a peace promotion activity or issued an alert. However, all sites have mediation and conflict monitoring mechanisms in place.

In Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, while all JAP sites have an inclusive mediation mechanism through recognized platforms, none of the platforms have organized peace promotion activities as of the end of 2022 (indicator 5.1). Additionally, in four out of five JAP locations in Mali, Land Commissions exist that are meant to serve as a mediation point for regular land disputes, although they have not been operationalized. Stabilization efforts in 2023 will focus on working with local mechanisms to strengthen personnel conflict prevention and management capabilities. Similarly, all target municipalities in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have a **conflict monitoring mechanism or an early warning system**. As of the end of 2022, however, there have been no alerts issued or conflict prevention activities organized (indicator 5.2). As a result, there have been no activities carried out by inclusive mediation or ongoing conflict monitoring mechanisms (indicator 5.3).⁶²

62. Indicators for output 5 have been amended. The original indicators were about establishing a mediation mechanism (5.1), and a continuous conflict monitoring mechanism or early warning system at each JAP location (5.2). In 2022, all JAP locations across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have established these structures. Therefore, the focus in 2023 will be on strengthening their functionality. The amended indicators now reflect this objective.

Additionally, 60 community leaders have increased **knowledge and capacities** how to prevent and management conflicts related to natural resources.⁶³ This was the result of a training organized in Dori, Burkina Faso, which brought together 75 community leaders (27 female) to learn about conflict prevention, regulatory frameworks, and tools related to natural resource exploitation.



Training on the prevention and management of conflicts related to the exploitation of natural resources, Dori, November 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso



Training on the prevention and management of conflicts related to the exploitation of natural resources, Dori, November 2022
© UNDP Burkina Faso

Further, 225 youth (105 female) in Mali participated in International Youth Day (12 August 2022) and National Reconciliation Week (15-21 September 2022) across Bandiagara, Dandoli, Doucombo, Dourou, and Pignari-Bana focusing on the prevention of violent extremism and peacebuilding. Activities focused on ways for youth to reduce their exposure to and participation in violence, including non-violent conflict resolution techniques.

63. Post-evaluation testing demonstrated that 80 percent of the 75 participants increased their knowledge and capacities.

OUTPUT 6: EFFECTIVE STABILIZATION MANAGEMENT

The Stabilization Mechanism is put in place for effective management of the facility

Table 19: Aggregated Output 6 Indicators

Aggregated				
Indicator	Baseline 2021	Milestone 2022	Actual (2022)	Target (2024)
6.1 Rate of financial implementation (delivery) of the regional annual work plan	0%	100%	84%	100%
6.2 Rate of achievement of annual performance indicator targets	0%	100%	72% ⁶⁴	100%
6.3 Percentage of female representation in Local Partnership Platforms (communal and village level) / Stabilization committees	0%	23%	11% ⁶⁵	50%

Table 20: Output 6 Financial Data

2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Delivery Percentage
\$9,619,729	\$5,581,716	58.0%

The combined total rate of all stabilization financial implementation is 84 percent (indicator 6.1). The rate of financial implementation is 90 percent in Burkina Faso, 87 percent in Mali, 92 percent in Niger and 41 percent at the Regional level.

The combined total rate of achievement against annual performance indicator targets is 72 percent (indicator 6.2). The rate of achievement against annual performance indicator targets is 71 percent in Burkina Faso, 83 percent in Mali, 77 percent in Niger and 10 percent at the Regional level.⁶⁶

64. Calculated by adding 57 performance indicators, actual 2022 data, as percentages, against milestone 2022, dividing by 57.

65. Unweighted average between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

66. Regional only has four indicators. Two of the four indicators are related to the regional stabilization strategy. While the strategy does yet exist, progress has been made and will be completed and validated in 2023.

MONITORING & EVALUATION

The monitoring & evaluation system of the facility has been strengthened at both regional and national levels to improve monitoring.

At the regional level, the facility has improved its operational planning through the development of a consolidated work plan for all windows. This work plan provided an overview of the priority activities for 2022 with their indicative budgets.

As part of accountability measures, partners received regularly updated information on the political and security context in each country. This information allowed the monitoring of political and security risks and guided implementation decisions at the national window level. Additionally, the regional window facilitated strategic, monthly meetings among country window monitoring & evaluation officers to share challenges and lessons learned regarding data collection and monitoring activities.

The results framework of the facility has been reviewed and revised in partnership with country window monitoring & evaluation officers to ensure indicators are specific and results are measurable. Monitoring tools have been harmonized to facilitate data aggregation and consolidation. This revision of the results framework facilitated the completion of the output indicators at national and regional window levels.

At the country level, the three country windows have recruited staff dedicated to monitoring & evaluation and reporting. These human resources facilitated the preparation of national progress reports and the consolidated progress reports (biannual and annual) of the regional facility.

Mali and Burkina Faso were able to undertake perception surveys.⁶⁷ Mali was able to carry out its first perception survey during the 4th quarter of 2022; the data was available in December 2022. Burkina Faso was able to launch its first perception survey in December 2022; results should be available in May 2023.

Mali conducted a vulnerability profiling study that guided the targeting of cash-for-work interventions.

67. In Niger, the first perception survey is scheduled for 2023.

FINANCIAL REPORTING

Table 21: Financial Data⁶⁸

Output	2022 Annual Work Plan Budget	Expenses + Committed	Output Ratio	Delivery Percentage
Output 1: Regional / border cooperation in areas related to stabilization is strengthened	1,047,547	892,302	2.6%	85.2%
Output 2: The foundations for a sustainable presence of state authorities are established (justice and security) ⁶⁹	21,116,484	20,847,834	59.7%	98.7%
Output 3: Target communities have basic social service infrastructure built and/or rehabilitated, functional and accessible	3,541,616	3,226,330	9.2%	91.1%
Output 4: Target communities benefit from livelihoods to revive the local economy	2,594,650	2,393,961	6.8%	92.3%
Output 5: Target communities have an enabling environment for the co-construction of peace	896,826	804,090	2.3%	89.7%
Output 6: The Stabilization Mechanism is put in place for effective management of the facility ⁷⁰	9,619,729	5,581,716	16.0%	58.0%
Subtotal	38,816,852	33,746,232	96.6%	86.9%
GMS	2,969,245	1,203,851	3.4%	40.5%
Total	41,786,097	34,950,083	100%	83.6%

Overall delivery is on track. Based on available resources, the total planned expenditure for 2022 was **\$41,786,097**. A total of **\$34,950,083** (83.6 percent) was delivered in 2022 (including expenses and commitments). For the six outputs (excluding GMS), the total planned expenditure for 2022 was **\$38,816,852** and **\$33,746,232**; (86.9 percent) was delivered.

Outputs 1 through 5 are all on track: Output 1 at 85 percent, Output 2 at 99 percent, Output 3 at 91 percent, Output 4 at 92 percent and Output 5 at 90 percent. Output 6 had a delivery rate of 58 percent.

68. Financial information is presented in United States Dollars (USD).

69. Following donor briefings in May 2022, no contributions from donors have directly supported security forces in Mali. Following the National Steering Committee meeting in August 2022, no contributions from Denmark and the Netherlands have directly supported security forces in Burkina Faso.

70. This includes resources put on hold due to the political and security situations in Mali and Burkina Faso, in alignment with donor requests.

Figure 13: Percentage of Total Spending by Output





Figure 14: Budget vs Delivery by Output



Out of the total budget of **\$41,786,097**, Burkina Faso had a budget of **\$7,868,900** and delivered **\$7,056,452** (90 percent), Mali had a budget of **\$6,739,464** and delivered **\$5,837,774** (87 percent), Niger had a budget of **\$21,618,980** and delivered **\$19,787,932** (92 percent), and Regional had a budget of **\$5,558,753** and delivered **\$2,267,924** (41 percent).

Figure 15: Budget vs Delivery by Window





Figure 16: Window Delivery as a Percentage of Total Delivery



With a delivery of **\$20,847,834**, Output 2 represents 60 percent of total delivery. Of that amount, Niger delivered **\$16,539,877**. This is the result of the extensive acquisition of over 3,500 security support and operational equipment items and 58 vehicles. The equipment was handed over to the Niger National Guard. With plans to activate additional JAPs in Niger, the Niger National Guard will serve as a key partner with LGSF, serving to provide security across intervention areas. The provision of the equipment was a necessary initial step towards strengthening the logistical capacities of security forces and the governorates of Tahoua and Tillaberi. Additionally, falling under Output 2, 1,500 solar-powered streetlights were procured. These will be installed across JAP locations to serve as a critical step towards initiating essential infrastructure and local economy activities.

CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

Concerns about the involvement of the Wagner group and human rights violations have compelled the programme teams and partners to operate in a risk management approach and suspend/delay key interventions with security forces in Mali and Burkina Faso. A focused risk analysis was conducted in the Liptako-Gourma region, assessing risk factors, divisions and dynamics across intervention zones in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The analysis evaluated socio-economic factors, community connections, and the security environment, while also identifying ongoing interventions and partners. Key activities, such as the development of the human rights due diligence assessment for Burkina Faso, are vital to monitoring human rights and risks in intervention countries. The programme continues to closely monitor the situation.

Security and other operational risks across the Liptako-Gourma countries have presented growing concerns and key challenges for stabilization. Many areas remained inaccessible. Identifying, prioritizing and maximizing local labour recruitment, including through local partners and businesses in Burkina Faso, for example, has facilitated access to JAP locations.

An influx of IDPs in the host communities of Seytenga, Burkina Faso and Bandiagara, Mali, increased the risk of inter-community conflict due to increased pressure on natural resources and basic services, particularly access to water. Targeted interventions of rehabilitating primary water points in Seytenga and the construction of an IDP camp in Bandiagara, including a water tower, contributed to an increase in water access, relieving some conflict pressures.

Authorities in Burkina Faso suspended cash transfers modality from all partners (beyond UNDP), with the reasons that it affected the quality of governance and social processes and potential security threats. They also cited irregularities along the cash transfer chain, e.g. the absence of transparent targeting criteria, robust delivery and monitoring mechanisms or an oversight system. Notably, they noted that cash transfers come with humanitarian responses/programmes that are by nature temporary and present funding sustainability challenges. Consequently, the facility engaged beneficiaries of cash-for-work schemes for labour based on a pre-agreed set of criteria. LGSF will continue policy advocacy to ensure cash for work, in particular for young people who can be attracted to join the insurgents due to their limited access to livelihood opportunities and/or employment. In 2023, LGSF will conduct dedicated research on cash-for-work, including lessons learned and best practices.

Community consultations led to the creation of widely acceptable processes. Inclusive, participatory selection processes involving women, youth, religious leaders, local leaders and other community members based on community-identified criteria broaden community support and reduce tensions. For example, village validation committees in Burkina Faso and Mali have been largely successful.

Targeted, strategic partnerships with specialized local actors can improve data collection and knowledge management initiatives. In Burkina Faso, an agreement between LGSF and local CSOs has allowed for cooperation in data, conflict analysis, and perception surveying. Similarly, for Mali, the partnership with a national NGO, Peacekeeping School, made it possible to carry out a perception study and to remove any ambiguity on the question of access in accordance with the rules and UN procedures.

Security incidents in the region displaced thousands of people near the Bandiagara Cercle. As a result, the urban commune of Bandiagara ended up as a destination for many IDPs. Ensuring that the programme is flexible and agile enough to respond to changing circumstances on the ground, like deteriorating security situations and increased numbers of IDPs, has been core to success. Notably, partnerships have been essential. For example, in the face of limited resources, LGSF coordination within the framework of the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus allowed for the pooling and effective targeting of resources between UNDP, UNHCR, OCHA and IOM. As the JAP locations in Mali are concentrated in the Bandiagara Cercle area, containing numerous village sites, this action is an example of the interconnectedness of immediate humanitarian needs and stabilization priorities to longer-term development initiatives.

Women continue to have disproportionately lower decision-making influence than men in local stabilization structures. In Niger, despite women's strong representation, women's priorities related to natural resource management were not fully incorporated into local planning. In Burkina Faso, only 13 of 106 members in local structures are female. Advocacy from LGSF management with local leaders and stakeholders on incorporating higher rates of female participation in local structures will be required to increase female membership.

Although LGSF has prepared for and implemented a range of mitigation measures to compensate for changing security situations, some JAP locations are inaccessible for long periods of time. For example, in Burkina Faso, attacks against security forces, explosives planted on bridges and roads, and attacks in numerous localities, including Falagountou and Seytenga, prohibit certain types of access, particularly for the transportation of infrastructure materials. In Niger, although multiple JAP locations have been identified, LGSF has only been able to proceed with activities in two locations. However, even those locations remain at risk, as evidenced by the attack in Kangoria Ting. Across all LGSF current and planned implementing areas, quick coordination with all stakeholders to adapt and implement flexible plans will have to be prioritized in order to reach the maximum number of people. Despite challenges, a key lesson learned is the need to achieve scale and increase the number of sites in each country.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Next Steps

BURKINA FASO

Output 2: Justice and Security

1. Rehabilitate critical Internal Security Forces (ISF) infrastructure
2. Equip ISF (vehicles, motorcycles, operational equipment)

Output 3: Social Service Infrastructure

1. Construct 16 classrooms
2. Rehabilitate 14 classrooms
3. Equip schools
4. Construct 10 additional essential social service infrastructure
5. Rehabilitate 20+ boreholes and human-powered pumps

Output 4: Local Economy

1. Rehabilitate six agropastoral sites
2. Recover 1,000 ha of degraded land
3. Scale up cash-for-work activities
4. Scale up economic productivity training

Output 5: Enabling Environment for the Co-construction of Peace

1. Operationalize inclusive mediation mechanisms for organizing peace promotion activities
2. Operationalize early warning mechanisms for alert-issuing and conflict-prevention / peace-building activities

Strategic

1. Complete Community Perception Survey
2. Activate four additional JAP locations
 - Two in the Sahel
 - Two in the Eastern region

MALI

Output 2: Justice and Security

1. Complete installation of remaining solar-powered streetlights

Output 3: Social Service Infrastructure

1. Complete construction of essential social service infrastructure (health centres, schools)
2. Complete rehabilitation of boreholes and human-powered pumps
3. Rehabilitation of critical JAP location roads

Output 4: Local Economy

1. Construct productive infrastructure (markets, multifunctional centres, garden perimeters, museum)
2. Scale up cash-for-work activities
3. Scale up economic productivity training

Output 5: Enabling Environment for the Co-construction of Peace

1. Operationalize inclusive mediation mechanisms for organizing peace promotion activities
2. Operationalize early warning mechanisms for alert issuing and conflict-prevention / peace-building activities

Strategic

- Establishing Stabilization Committees at JAP locations
- Organize Capitalization Workshop
- Develop beneficiary success stories
- Organize joint UNDP and government mission

NIGER

Output 2: Justice and Security

1. Complete installation of remaining 1,500 solar-powered streetlights

Output 3: Social Service Infrastructure

1. Complete construction of health infrastructure in Ingui Igoubeytane and Kangoria Ting
2. Complete construction of WASH infrastructure in Ingui Igoubeytane and Kangoria Ting

Output 4: Local Economy

1. Complete construction of livestock market in Ingui Igoubeytane and Kangoria Ting

Output 5: Enabling Environment for the Co-construction of Peace

1. Operationalize inclusive mediation mechanisms for organizing peace promotion activities
2. Operationalize early warning mechanisms for alert issuing and conflict-prevention / peace-building activities

Strategic

- Complete Community Perception Survey
- Activate additional JAP locations
- Conduct household census
- Finalize exit strategy

REGIONAL

Output 2: Justice and Security

1. Complete installation of remaining solar-powered streetlights

Output 3: Social Service Infrastructure

1. Complete construction of essential social service infrastructure (health centres, schools)
2. Complete rehabilitation of boreholes and human-powered pumps
3. Rehabilitation of critical JAP location roads

Output 4: Local Economy

1. Construct productive infrastructure (markets, multifunctional centres, garden perimeters, museum)
2. Scale up cash-for-work activities
3. Scale up economic productivity training

Output 5: Enabling Environment for the Co-construction of Peace

1. Operationalize inclusive mediation mechanisms for organizing peace promotion activities
2. Operationalize early warning mechanisms for alert issuing and conflict-prevention / peace-building activities

Strategic

- Establishing Stabilization Committees at JAP locations
- Organize Capitalization Workshop
- Develop beneficiary success stories
- Organize joint UNDP and government mission

Annex 2: Indicator Table by Country Window

BURKINA FASO				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
2.1 Number of public infrastructures (Justice, Police stations, Gendarmerie, etc.) constructed, rehabilitated or extended in the intervention area	0	3	1	16
2.2 Number of public infrastructures (Justice, Police Stations, Gendarmerie, etc.) equipped in the intervention areas	0	0	0	16
2.3 Percentage of Jap sites with a security plan aligned with the national security strategy	0%	30%	20%	100%
2.4 Number of security officers trained on human rights and gender-based violence prevention (disaggregated by age, sex and location)	242	306	264 (+22)	TBD
2.5 Number of streetlights installed in target areas	0	260	260	TBD

MALI				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
2.1 Number of public infrastructures (Justice, Police stations, Gendarmerie, etc.) constructed, rehabilitated or extended in the intervention area ⁷¹	0	0	0	3
2.2 Number of public infrastructures (Justice, Police Stations, Gendarmerie, etc.) equipped in the intervention areas ⁷²	0	0	0	3
2.3 Percentage of Jap sites with a security plan aligned with the national security strategy	0	100%	100%	100%
2.4 Number of security officers trained on human rights and gender-based violence prevention (disaggregated by age, sex and location)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2.5 Number of streetlights installed in target areas	0	170	318	500

NIGER				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
2.1 Number of public infrastructures (Justice, Police stations, Gendarmerie, etc.) constructed, rehabilitated or extended in the intervention area	0	2	2	13
2.2 Number of public infrastructures (Justice, Police Stations, Gendarmerie, etc.) equipped in the intervention areas	0	0	0	12
2.3 Percentage of Jap sites with a security plan aligned with the national security strategy	0%	13%	13%	100%
2.4 Number of security officers trained on human rights and gender-based violence prevention (disaggregated by age, sex and location)	0	0	0	1,500
2.5 Number of streetlights installed in target areas	0	0	0	3,000

71. In Mali, only administrative public infrastructure related to security is included.

72. In Mali, only administrative public infrastructure related to security is included.

BURKINA FASO				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
3.1 Number of public infrastructures (health centres, schools, etc.) constructed, rehabilitated or extended in the intervention area	0	43	11	43
3.2 Number of boreholes constructed/rehabilitated in target areas	0	27	5	27
3.3 Number of public infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	0	18	42	42
3.4 Percentage of JAPs sites with public infrastructure (health, school) up to standard	TBD	N/A	No data	TBD

MALI				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
3.1 Number of public infrastructures (health centres, schools, etc.) constructed, rehabilitated or extended in the intervention area	0	12	4	38
3.2 Number of boreholes constructed/rehabilitated in target areas	0	1	0	15
3.3 Number of public infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	2	14	22 (+20)	40
3.4 Percentage of JAPs sites with public infrastructure (health, school) up to standard	40%	70%	40%	100%

NIGER				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
3.1 Number of public infrastructures (health centres, schools, etc.) constructed, rehabilitated or extended in the intervention area	0	5	2	44
3.2 Number of boreholes constructed/rehabilitated in target areas	0	2	0	14
3.3 Number of public infrastructure equipped with renewable technologies	0	7	7	42
3.4 Percentage of JAPs sites with public infrastructure (health, school) up to standard	0%	100%	0%	100%

BURKINA FASO

Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
4.1 Percentage of households in target areas with at least one member benefiting from project resources (technical, material, financial) (disaggregated by age, sex of head and location)	0%	5%	17.14%	100%
4.2 Number of persons trained to enable them to seize economic opportunities (training in the creation and management of micro-enterprises, IGAs, trade, etc.)	0	300	15	1,500
4.3 Number of beneficiaries of cash or equipment grants	0	500	800	1,200
4.4 Number of productive infrastructure projects rehabilitated or constructed (such as small enterprise shops and market structures)	0	8	0	8

MALI

Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
4.1 Percentage of households in target areas with at least one member benefiting from project resources (technical, material, financial) (disaggregated by age, sex of head and location)	0%	80%	20.49%	100%
4.2 Number of persons trained to enable them to seize economic opportunities (training in the creation and management of micro-enterprises, IGAs, trade, etc.)	0	100	102	300
4.3 Number of beneficiaries of cash or equipment grants	0	1,171	2,836	2,500
4.4 Number of productive infrastructure projects rehabilitated or constructed (such as small enterprise shops and market structures)	2	7	7 (+5)	25

NIGER

Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
4.1 Percentage of households in target areas with at least one member benefiting from project resources (technical, material, financial) (disaggregated by age, sex of head and location)	0%	0%	0%	60%
4.2 Number of persons trained to enable them to seize economic opportunities (training in the creation and management of micro-enterprises, IGAs, trade, etc.)	0	0	0	TBD
4.3 Number of beneficiaries of cash or equipment grants	0	0	0	TBD
4.4 Number of productive infrastructure projects rehabilitated or constructed (such as small enterprise shops and market structures)	0	15	1	30

BURKINA FASO

Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
5.1 Percentage of JAPs sites with an inclusive mediation mechanism that have organized at least 1 peace promotion activities/initiatives (mediation, conflict prevention, awareness-raising, training, etc.)	0%	0%	0%	100%
5.2 Percentage of target municipalities with a continuous conflict monitoring mechanism or early warning system that have issued at least 1 alert or have organised at least 1 conflict prevention or peace-building activities/initiatives	0%	0%	0%	100%
5.3 Number of activities/initiatives carried out by inclusive mediation or ongoing conflict monitoring mechanisms	0	0	0	10

MALI

Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
5.1 Percentage of JAPs sites with an inclusive mediation mechanism that have organized at least 1 peace promotion activities/initiatives (mediation, conflict prevention, awareness-raising, training, etc.)	0%	0%	0%	100%
5.2 Percentage of target municipalities with a continuous conflict monitoring mechanism or early warning system that have issued at least 1 alert or have organised at least 1 conflict prevention or peace-building activities/initiatives	0%	0%	0%	100%
5.3 Number of activities/initiatives carried out by inclusive mediation or ongoing conflict monitoring mechanisms	0	0	0	10

NIGER

Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
5.1 Percentage of JAPs sites with an inclusive mediation mechanism that have organized at least 1 peace promotion activities/initiatives (mediation, conflict prevention, awareness-raising, training, etc.)	0%	0%	0%	100%
5.2 Percentage of target municipalities with a continuous conflict monitoring mechanism or early warning system that have issued at least 1 alert or have organised at least 1 conflict prevention or peace-building activities/initiatives	0%	0%	0%	100%
5.3 Number of activities/initiatives carried out by inclusive mediation or ongoing conflict monitoring mechanisms	0	0	0	25

REGIONAL				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
6.1 Rate of financial implementation (delivery) of the regional annual work plan	0%	100%	40.80%	100%
6.2 Rate of achievement of annual performance indicator targets	0%	100%	10.20% ⁷³	100%

BURKINA FASO				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
6.1 Rate of financial implementation (delivery) of the regional annual work plan	0%	100%	89.70%	100%
6.2 Rate of achievement of annual performance indicator targets	0%	100%	71.47% ⁷⁴	100%
6.3 Percentage of female representation in Local Partnership Platforms (communal and village level) / Stabilization committees	0%	20%	12% ⁷⁵	50%

MALI				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
6.1 Rate of financial implementation (delivery) of the regional annual work plan	0%	100%	86.60%	100%
6.2 Rate of achievement of annual performance indicator targets	0%	100%	82.51% ⁷⁶	100%
6.3 Percentage of female representation in Local Partnership Platforms (communal and village level) / Stabilization committees	0%	0%	0%	50%

NIGER				
Indicator	Baseline (2021)	Milestone (Dec 2022)	Actual (Dec 2022)	Target (Aug 2024)
6.1 Rate of financial implementation (delivery) of the regional annual work plan	0%	100%	91.50%	100%
6.2 Rate of achievement of annual performance indicator targets	0%	100%	76.79% ⁷⁷	100%
6.3 Percentage of female representation in Local Partnership Platforms (communal and village level) / Stabilization committees	0%	50%	22%	50%

73. Calculated by adding 4 Regional performance indicators Actual 2022 data, as percentages, against Milestone 2022, dividing by 4.

74. Calculated by adding 18 Burkina Faso performance indicators Actual 2022 data, as percentages, against Milestone 2022, dividing by 18.

75. 13 female members in local structures divided by 106 total members = 12.26 percent.

76. Calculated by adding 17 Mali performance indicators Actual 2022 data, as percentages, against Milestone 2022, dividing by 17.

77. Calculated by adding 18 Niger performance indicators Actual 2022 data, as percentages, against Milestone 2022, dividing by 18.

Annex 3: Risk Log

BURKINA FASO		
Risk	Mitigation Measures	Implementation Status
Security		
Continuous deterioration of the security context in the communes and withdrawal to the capital of the region of the administrative and local authorities and the main actors in the target communes	Advocate with regional authorities and set up regular coordination with the SDF to strengthen security arrangements in the Stabilization intervention communes	Completed
Isolation caused and accessibility of the regions of intervention of the programme made difficult by unidentified armed groups (Ouaga-Kaya-Dori axis, Ouaga-Kongoussi-Djibo axis, Ouaga-Koupéla-Fada axis, Ouaga-Gourcy-Ouahigouya axis)	Strengthen the exchange of information with the authorities and the SDF on the planning of the implementation of activities Focus on mission-critical missions and use the services of UNHAS flights to supply areas inaccessible by land	
Operational		
Weak capacity of contractors and reluctance to apply for UNDP tenders for project implementation in programme intervention regions	Target and prioritize local and regional businesses Organize briefings or training sessions to explain how to access UNDP tendering platforms	Training sessions with local and regional businesses has been completed

MALI		
Risk	Mitigation Measures	Implementation Status
Security		
Risk (of attraction) of targeted attacks against intervention sites, preventing / frustrating / breaking immediate stabilization investments and resulting in a backlash for the return of the state and the reconstruction of the social contract, i.e. the very purpose of stabilization	The project has a Liaison Officer with the Defence and Security Forces who produces a weekly report of security incidents in the intervention area A feasibility study of the interventions also assessed the level of safety and accessibility of the intervention area. To date, 60 percent of sites are accessible	A liaison officer with the security forces has been recruited and conducts a weekly analysis of the security situation, incorporating security instructions. But the risk is still there in the intervention area. The analysis is updated on a regular basis to assess the evolution of the security situation. But overall, it turns out that the situation remains volatile.
Risk of deterioration of the security climate and/or change in National Defence Force security strategies which, in turn, alter the prerequisites for the implementation of a selected immediate stabilization site	Deployment of an expert in social cohesion Establishment of the local project monitoring committee including a monthly conflict and security analysis	An expert in social cohesion has been deployed through the partnership with the Regional Development Agency. The local committee is set up at the regional level. It is expected that the stabilization committees will be set up in the communes

MALI		
Risk	Mitigation Measures	Implementation Status
Political		
Risk of insufficient capacity and/or political commitment to support stabilization efforts and their effects beyond UNDP intervention. This is a risk for the Facility given the many competing priorities and limited capacities of the state and the local authorities concerned.	<p>Project governance mechanism (Technical Committee and Steering Committee) allowing a strategic and political dialogue with the Malian government: from January to August 2022, one steering committee was held and four meetings of the technical committee</p> <p>Support for strengthening interdepartmental coordination on stabilization within government and between government and international partners</p> <p>UNDP supports the coordination of development partners in the project area to support project investments and consider additional support from UN partners and local NGOs (holding of the first meeting of the CROCSAD of Bandiagara: Regional Committee for Orientation, Coordination and Monitoring of Development Actions)</p>	<p>The meeting of the technical committee was organized as well as discussions were initiated with the partners to overcome challenges on points of divergence such as the construction of the Bandiagara museum whose construction was controversial after validated in the Annual Work Plan. This lifted the blockage.</p> <p>Support for inter-ministerial coordination was not effective during the period.</p> <p>UNDP support to the governorate in the organization of periodic meetings is effective and has enabled UNDP and other United Nations agencies (IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, OCHA) to carry out joint actions, including the construction of the IDP site in Bandiagara.</p>
Operational		
Risk of suboptimal coordination and synergies with other actors at intervention sites and therefore limited or duplicated results	<p>Establishment of the local committee to monitor project activities</p> <p>Evaluation of feasibility and accessibility of intervention sites</p> <p>Learning from previous experiences of UNDP and UNS in target areas and by assessing security</p>	<p>The local monitoring committee is set up at regional level. The meetings of the Committee are organized on a regular basis and contribute to the smooth functioning of the coordination.</p> <p>An assessment of the security situation is made on a weekly basis and the necessary safety instructions are made available to project staff</p> <p>The stabilization project due to the challenge of access in the target areas was inspired by the existing experience of a UNDP project PROSMED⁷⁸ to develop a partnership with a national NGO. This partnership made it possible to provide the project with local volunteers for project activities. However, there has been no significant progress in sharing experiences among UN agencies.</p>

78. Le programme d'appui à la stabilisation du Mali à travers le renforcement de l'État de droit (PROSMED).

MALI		
Risk	Mitigation Measures	Implementation Status
Risk of insufficient M&E and analytical capacity to develop relevant baselines and subsequent monitoring of progress that will be needed to demonstrate results	<p>Monitoring and evaluation team dedicated to the Facility recruited</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation plan developed</p> <p>Partnership initiatives with national structures to overcome the challenge of accessing sites and collecting data remotely have been initiated</p>	<p>A monitoring and evaluation specialist dedicated to the implementation of the mechanism was recruited and assisted by a data scientist</p> <p>Due to the significant delay recorded by the Mali window, an action plan for the activities of the monitoring and evaluation mechanism was developed urgently over four months, from September to December 2022, to meet the needs. The project resolved to design the more comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan in the first quarter of 2023.</p> <p>An agreement with the Peace Keeping school / Ecole de maintien de la paix (EMP) made it possible to carry out the perception study, coupled with the conflict analysis and the collection of baseline data. Also, the vulnerability profiling study was made thanks to the volunteers made available to the project following an agreement with the CNPV.</p>
Financial		
Risk of insufficient funding to create a critical stabilization impact on sites in order to meet local needs and expectations and thus achieve the desired short-term effect of increased public confidence in security and state services	<p>Engage UNS partners in the integration of the Humanitarian Development Nexus in order to carry out complementary actions;</p> <p>Drafting and approval of joint action plans</p>	<p>This action was successfully carried out in the construction of the IDP site</p> <p>Joint Action Plans were drawn up but not approved at local level with meeting minutes. Some of the points contained have been taken in place to be discussed during the steering committee.</p>
Reputational		
Risk of the project being associated with parties to the conflict, including those who commit human rights violations and are responsible for civilian casualties	<p>The Mali Window of the Facility does not support any activity dedicated to the defence and security forces</p>	<p>To date, no support has been given to the security forces. However, as part of the support to administrative authorities, consideration was given to conducting a proper UN human rights policy assessment with administrative authorities</p>
Environmental		
The project could generate waste during infrastructure work	<p>Make use of renewable energies for the infrastructures to be realized</p> <p>Establish a mechanism to plant trees at infrastructure implementation sites to correct tree cuts related to the work</p>	<p>Most of the infrastructures built (multifunctional platforms, public lighting) contain the solar system</p> <p>To date, the construction of the infrastructure to house the trees is not effective and, consequently, the trees are not planted at the sites</p>

NIGER		
Risk	Mitigation Measures	Implementation Status
Security		
Armed conflict and instability	Liaison with local and national authorities for implementation planning and execution Advocate for additional security deployments to the regions of Tillabéri and Tahoua	
Isolation caused and accessibility of the regions of intervention of the programme made difficult by unidentified armed groups (Ouaga-Kaya-Dori axis, Ouaga-Kongoussi-Djibo axis, Ouaga-Koupéla-Fada axis, Ouaga-Gourcy-Ouahigouya axis)	Strengthen the exchange of information with the authorities and the SDF on the planning of the implementation of activities Focus on mission-critical missions and use the services of UNHAS flights to supply areas inaccessible by land	
Operational		
Lack of local vendor capacity for larger projects	Organize training sessions on UNDP procurement processes	
Delays in procurement	Development of procurement plan including options for local sourcing Framework Agreement with national system institutions assessed through Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers	
Political		
Changes in government disrupt coordination planning	Regular meetings between the facility and the locales authorities, including field missions Support the coordination unit of the ministry Support local committees to ensure follow-up of activities	
Risk of insufficient political support at national and regional level for the requisite political cooperation amongst key actors and for creating favourable preconditions for scaling up	Continuous political consultations and engagements of key stakeholders throughout the project length Provide support to the LGA via UNDP's regional team	

REGIONAL		
Risk	Mitigation Measures	Implementation Status
Political		
Political, administrative, logistical hurdles to making the Partnership Platforms work efficiently and hence a lack of coordination, early warning, safety, sustainability	Robust communication and support strategy from UNDP to the Partnership Platforms, which also includes the central and decision making levels of the organizations / partners present on the ground (such as the SDF, internal security, the judiciary, de-concentrated state services and decentralized government structures Promoting a participatory approach and implication of local communities and authorities to ensure ownership and strengthen the functioning of the platforms	
Operational		
Risk of attracting targeted attacks against JAP sites and undermining stabilization	Selecting JAP locations where security commitments are made as precondition to intervention Maintaining regular cooperation with security forces and Partnership Platforms to ensure early warning systems Not openly displaying UNDP and international actor logos and advertising material Regular conflict analysis and decision-making on ongoing intervention activities	
Strategic		
Risk of insufficient capacity and / or political commitment to sustain stabilization efforts and its effects beyond the UNDP intervention	Continuous political engagement and advocacy to ensure the commitment by national and local authorities while also assessing their actual capacity to sustain investments and looking into additional support or bridging solutions in cooperation with other development partners Continuous engagement at the regional level by stabilization management Capacity assessment/gap analysis at the central/regional level for effective coordination and designing of a support plan	

REGIONAL		
Risk	Mitigation Measures	Implementation Status
Risk of suboptimal coordination and synergies with other actors at the intervention sites and hence limited, or duplication of, results	<p>Updating the mapping exercise conducted on the presence of other actors in connection with site identification</p> <p>Convening and actively supporting coordination and sequencing via the local level Partnership Platforms</p> <p>Identify and actively contribute towards existing regional, national and sub-national overall coordination mechanisms linked to existing policy and programmatic frameworks for crisis response</p> <p>Using coordination mechanisms of the authorities to engage with various clusters</p>	
Project association with parties engaged in conflict and human rights abuses	<p>Local level conflict analysis and proper Human Rights Due Diligence of all (internal) security forces receiving support from UNDP, as per UNDP policy</p> <p>Systematic monitoring of companies and civil society organizations</p> <p>Regular assessment of reputational risks at JAP locations</p>	
Insufficient compliance with sexual exploitation and abuse code of conduct by staff and implementing partners	<p>Use Clear Check database during the recruitment stage to screen applicants for sexual exploitation and abuse</p> <p>Include a question on sexual exploitation and abuse in recruitment exercises</p> <p>Engage staff and implementing partners in vigorous onboarding and monitoring for the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (provide ongoing training on sexual exploitation and abuse, co-create a Code of Conduct with implementing partners, provide info on reporting)</p> <p>Ensure all staff and consultants complete mandatory trainings (sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual harassment, Gender Journey)</p>	

REGIONAL		
Risk	Mitigation Measures	Implementation Status
Risk of continued instability and / or unpredictability of the political process in Mali	<p>Regular monitoring of the situation both in Mali and in the region more broadly, drawing on existing conflict and security assessments by UNDP and the UNS as well as other available sources</p> <p>If risks rise higher (staff, contractors, expected results), a discussion will be held with the steering committee to discuss available options</p>	
Detrimental effects on conflict dynamics by not having a sufficient understanding of local conflict dynamics at the sites for immediate stabilization, i.e. risk of incomplete conflict analysis and hence conflict sensitivity	<p>Analysis of conflict dynamics at the sites and the Liptako-Gourma region as a whole in connection with initial selection and assessments which will inform conflict sensitivity in designing action plans for immediate stabilization</p> <p>Regularly assess conflict dynamics and their evolution and be able to adjust project implementation accordingly</p>	
Operational		
Risk of lack of local implementing capacity for immediate stabilization	<p>Learning from prior UNDP and UNDSS experience in the target areas and by assessing security, access and implementation capacity as part of the initial assessment of sites, with the option of not pursuing certain sites / target areas if conditions do not allow for implementation</p> <p>Assessing local government, local private sector and the community's capacity before site approval</p>	
Risk of insufficient M&E capacity to develop relevant baselines and subsequent monitoring of progress which will be required to demonstrate results	<p>Recruit M&E specialist for Country windows</p> <p>Focus on efficient and effective M&E system</p> <p>Ongoing training on data collection and analysis will be provided to national monitoring actors</p>	<p>Recruitment Completed</p> <p>All country windows have an M&E specialist</p>

REGIONAL

Risk	Mitigation Measures	Implementation Status
Financial		
Risk of insufficient funding to create critical stabilization impact at sites to meet local needs and expectations and hence achieve the desired short-term effect of increased confidence of populations in security and state services	<p>Assessing the local situation at the sites and designing action plans for immediate stabilization that optimize the cost – (expected) effect ratio</p> <p>Designing action plans for immediate stabilization in two to three phases with clear communication to populations</p> <p>Seeking complementarity and alignment with other stabilization-interested development partners</p> <p>Systematically increasing resource mobilization efforts</p>	
Human Rights		
Rights-holders might not have the capacity to claim their rights	The Facility will support human rights monitoring and reporting in the target areas, as part of a broader effort to promote accountability and compliance with all international and continental norms and standards, that nurtures relations of trust and confidence between security providers and local communities	
Duty bearers do not have the capacity to fulfil their commitments under the project	The Facility will support trainings on human rights and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence to security forces, as well as basic skills training of local government officials, and advocate for and further develop the capacity of local authorities to improve, maintain and provide access for all to essential public service delivery and lead participatory decision-making processes	

Annex 4: Financial

Total Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Cumulative Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022					Budget Balance	Resources Balance
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses	Output Ratio	Delivery Ratio		
Income	58,905,971								
Output 1: Strengthening Cross-border Cooperation		1,047,547	886,056	6,246	892,302	2.6%	85.2%	155,245	
Output 2: Justice and Security		21,116,484	8,798,841	12,048,993	20,847,834	59.7%	98.7%	268,650	
Output 3: Social Service		3,541,616	1,236,970	1,989,361	3,226,330	9.2%	91.1%	315,285	
Output 4: Local Economy		2,594,650	660,439	1,733,522	2,393,961	6.8%	92.3%	200,689	
Output 5: Enabling Environment for the Co-construction of Peace		896,826	229,789	574,302	804,090	2.3%	89.7%	92,736	
Output 6: Effective Stabilization Management ⁷⁹		9,619,729	4,078,576	1,503,140	5,581,716	16.0%	58.0%	4,038,014	
GMS		2,969,245	1,203,851		1,203,851	3.4%	40.5%	1,765,394	
Total	58,905,971	41,786,097	17,094,520	17,855,563	34,950,083	100.0%	83.6%	6,836,014	23,955,888
Utilization vs Income %					56%				
Management Cost %					14%				

79. This includes resources put on hold due to the political and security situations in Mali and Burkina Faso, in alignment with donor requests.

Burkina Faso Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Burkina Faso - Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022			Budget Balance	Resources Balance
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses		
Income	8,766,968						
Output 1: Strengthening Cross-border Cooperation		8,123	5,464		5,464	2,659	
Output 2: Justice and Security ⁸⁰		3,928,084	358,489	3,516,533	3,875,022	53,062	
Output 3: Social Service		1,712,792	790,600	859,854	1,650,454	62,337	
Output 4: Local Economy		300,000	134,845		134,845	165,155	
Output 5: Enabling Environment for the Co-construction of Peace		50,000	32,735		32,735	17,265	
Output 6: Effective Stabilization Management		1,300,000	1,076,886	100,153	1,177,039	122,961	
GMS		569,901	180,894		180,894	389,007	
Total	8,766,968	7,868,900	2,579,912	4,476,540	7,056,452	812,447	1,710,516
Utilization vs Income %			80%				
Management Cost %			16%				

80. Following the National Steering Committee meeting in August 2022, no contributions from Denmark and the Netherlands have directly supported security forces in Burkina Faso.

Mali Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Mali - Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022			Budget Balance	Resources Balance
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses		
Income	7,506,704						
Output 1: Strengthening Cross-border Cooperation		600,000	586,058		586,058	13,942	
Output 2: Justice and Security ⁸¹		588,400	136,108	296,826	432,935	155,466	
Output 3: Social Service		1,500,000	299,012	957,284	1,256,296	243,704	
Output 4: Local Economy		1,500,000	467,743	1,015,480	1,483,224	16,776	
Output 5: Enabling Environment for the Co-construction of Peace		607,626	181,943	359,874	541,816	65,810	
Output 6: Effective Stabilization Management		1,500,000	673,022	707,401	1,380,422	119,578	
GMS		443,438	157,024		157,024	286,414	
Total	7,506,704	6,739,464	2,500,909	3,336,865	5,837,774	901,690	1,668,930
Utilization vs Income %			78%				
Management Cost %			22%				

81. Following donor briefings in May 2022, no contributions from donors have directly supported security forces in Mali.

Niger Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Niger - Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022			Budget Balance	Resources Balance
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses		
Income	20,760,714						
Output 1: Strengthening Cross-border Cooperation		81,001	69	137	206	80,795	
Output 2: Justice and Security		16,600,000	8,304,244	8,235,633	16,539,877	60,123	
Output 3: Social Service		328,824	147,358	172,222	319,580	9,244	
Output 4: Local Economy		749,750	21,638	718,041	739,679	10,071	
Output 5: Enabling Environment for the Co-construction of Peace		235,000	10,912	214,428	225,340	9,660	
Output 6: Effective Stabilization Management		2,076,651	918,692	317,5812	1,236,273	840,378	
GMS		1,547,754	726,977		726,977	820,777	
Total	20,760,714	21,618,980	10,129,889	9,658,043	19,787,932	1,831,048	972,781
Utilization vs Income %			95%				
Management Cost %			6%				

Regional Project Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations⁸²

Output	Resources carried over from 2021 and contributions received in 2022	2022 Approved Budget	Regional - Expenses from 01 January to 31 December 2022			Budget Balance	Resources Balance
			Expenses	Commitments	Total Expenses		
Income	21,871,584.99						
Output 1: Strengthening Cross-border Cooperation		358,423	294,465	6,109	300,575	57,849	
Output 2: Justice and Security							
Output 3: Social Service							
Output 4: Local Economy		44,900	36,213		36,213	8,688	
Output 5: Enabling Environment for the Co-construction of Peace		4,200	4,200		4,200		
Output 6: Effective Stabilization Management		4,743,078	1,409,976	378,005	1,787,981	2,955,097	
GMS		408,152	138,956		138,956	269,196	
Total	21,871,585	5,558,753	1,883,810	384,114	2,267,924	3,290,829	19,603,661
Utilization vs Income %			10%				
Management Cost %			35%				

82. The P4 Head of Stabilization was allocated to the Regional Hub instead of the BF country Windows. This will be rectified in 2023.

Annex 5: Active JAP Locations and Populations in 2022

Country Windows	Regions	Municipalities	Community Locations	Population	Female		
Burkina Faso	Sahel	Falagountou	Falagountou	13,072	6,791		
			Gomo	859	433		
			Belgou	771	408		
			Gourara	617	298		
			Goulgountou	3,124	1,604		
					Total Municipality of Falagountou	18,443	9,534
		Seytenga	Seytenga	6,576	3,343		
			Foufou	1,643	763		
			Ouro Daka	1,485	721		
						Total Municipality of Seytenga	9,704
Total targeted population in Burkina Faso				28,147	14,361		
Mali	Bandiagara	Dandoli	Dandoli	13,919	6,786		
		Bandiagara	Bandiagara	24,945	12,089		
		Doucombo	Doucombo	30,276	15,881		
		Dourou	Dourou	28,371	14,325		
		Pignari Bana	Pignari Bana	43,709	22,691		
				Total targeted population in Mali	141,220	71,772	
Niger	Tillabéri	Bankilaré	Ingui Igoubeitane	1,640	804		
		Bankilaré	Kangoria Ting 1	2,339	1,153		
				Total targeted population in Niger	3,979	1,957	
Total Liptako–Gourma Region				173,346	88,090		



Construction of shelters for IDPs in Bandiagara, Mali
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