




Social Cohesion in Ukraine:

Part II

UNDERSTANDING HORIZONTAL RELATIONS
BASED ON RESCORE 2023 INDEX





Social Cohesion in Ukraine:

Part II

UNDERSTANDING HORIZONTAL RELATIONS
BASED ON RESCORE 2023 INDEX

Acknowledgements

<i>Author</i>	Ruslan Minich, Dr. Ilke Dagli-Hustings, Tornike Zurabashvili
<i>Data analysis</i>	Marian Machlouzarides, Solomia Myronovych, and Pavlo Sereda
<i>Peer-reviewed by</i>	Dr. Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik, Darina Solodova

The views, conclusions, and recommendations presented in this document do not necessarily reflect the position of USAID, UNDP, or their partners.

Table of contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
INTRODUCTION	7
COMMUNITY COOPERATION	9
SOCIAL TOLERANCE	16
INTERGROUP HARMONY	24
METHODOLOGY	34
HOW TO READ RESCORE	35
ABOUT RESCORE UKRAINE	36
ABOUT PARTNERS	37
REFERENCES	38

Executive Summary

This report draws on the reSCORE 2023 survey in Ukraine; it focuses on elements of social cohesion that relate to horizontal relations between people and groups and investigates their drivers. It is Part II of a two-part analytical series on social cohesion in Ukraine. reSCORE 2023 measures horizontal relations using four indicators, namely, Community Cooperation (5.5 out of 10), Social Tolerance (5.7/10), Social Proximity (5.4/10), and Lack of Social Threat (6.9/10)¹, and concludes that the figures for these indicators stand at a moderate level, leaving room for improvement. Beyond outlining these findings, this report also focuses on identifying entry points and pathways to fostering horizontal cohesion in Ukraine. Key findings of the analysis are summarized below.

Community Cooperation:

- The overall score for Community Cooperation stands at 5.5 out of 10, which is an average result. There are no pronounced regional and demographic differences, except for Zaporizhzhia oblast, which scores 4.4 – noticeably lower than the national average of 5.5. There was also a sizable increase in Community Cooperation in large cities compared to the previous survey (5.5 in 2023 and 4.4 in 2021).
- Community Cooperation has five drivers, three of which have moderate influence, and the remaining two – weaker influence. These are: Community Cohesion, Civic Engagement, and Pride in Local Community Bonds, followed by Faith in Society’s Morals and Ukrainian Authorities Care.
- Local institutions and civil society organizations can lead efforts aimed at boosting Community Cooperation, including through the drivers with relatively stronger influence (Community Cohesion,

¹ Community Cooperation: People feel that they can rely on members in their community for help and people from their community actively resolve common problems together.

Social Tolerance: Tolerance towards marginalized groups (e.g., Muslims, Jews, Roma), openness to interact personally, and acceptance in the community.

Social Proximity: Accepting people from different regions or with different political ideologies and visions as close friends.

Lack of Social Threat: Not feeling threatened by people from different regions or with different political ideologies and visions.

Civic Engagement, and Pride in Local Community Bonds). Emphasis should be drawn to fostering engagement in local decision making and supporting grassroots organizations. This can lead to a more vibrant civil society landscape at the local level and create a more robust participation environment.

Social Tolerance:

- Social Tolerance in Ukraine stands at a relatively moderate level (5.7 out of 10). While tolerance towards immigrants, Jews, individuals with different skin colors, and Muslims are higher, it is lower towards the Roma, LGBTQI+ individuals, and drug addicts. More specifically, 86% of people on the national level state that they would either personally avoid drug addicts or not want them in their communities at all. This is 71% for the LGBTQI+ individuals and 63% for the Roma community.
- The research shows variations along demographic lines, with older and lower-income groups showing lower tolerance towards the LGBTQI+ community, while residents of urban areas exhibit higher acceptance of this group. In other words, younger metropolitan environments are more open and inclusive of different identities and groups.
- There are also regional variations. Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts demonstrate higher Social Tolerance in general, while Ivano-Frankivsk oblast lags behind.
- Drivers of Social Tolerance can be grouped into five categories. The first one is about democratic values and includes indicators such as Belief in Human Rights, Gender Equality Mindset, and Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity. The second one is Social Proximity towards different socio-political groups in Ukraine, followed by Sense of Civic Duty, an indicator that refers to sense of agency and responsibility, as well as the traumatic experiences related to the full-scale Russian invasion, such as witnessing shelling or damage to property. Finally, Traditional Media Consumption has a negative influence on Social Tolerance, meaning that consumption of mainstream TV, radio, newspaper, and the like can erode social

tolerance. One contributing factor could be that mainstream media content often fails to promote tolerance towards certain groups, such as LGBTQI+ individuals and the Roma community.

- Given the variety of drivers, policy recommendations that can foster social tolerance can operate at multiple levels and by different actors. Efforts focusing on Social Proximity (e.g. building close social relationships across different regions of Ukraine) and Gender Equality Mindset would help increase the Social Tolerance scores.
- Policy efforts could target older and lower-income demographics, and rural areas, as well as focus on oblasts where scores are relatively lower (specifically, in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast).

Intergroup Harmony:

- Intergroup harmony focuses on two indicators, namely Social Proximity (5.4) and Lack of Social Threat (6.9). While Social Proximity is lower, meaning that people are not as ready to accept different socio-political and geographic groups as close friends, this reluctance does not necessarily translate into perceived threats. Social Threat, which looks at whether these groups are believed to threaten public order in the community, is lower, or, phrased positively, the figure for Lack of Social Threat is higher than those for Social Proximity.
- Looking across different groups measured by the intergroup indicators, individuals who live(d) under the Russian occupation, especially since 2014-15, face lower acceptance and are perceived as more threatening.
- Regional differences are also evident, with Kherson, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts demonstrating more harmonious intergroup relations, while Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts score lower.
- Policy recommendations to foster intergroup harmony could include efforts that aim to build dialogue, understanding, and social relations with people living in or coming from the non-government-controlled areas (NGCA) both before and after 2022, including Crimea. These efforts could include platforms for interaction (i.e., family hubs, children's play groups, or other community support groups) aimed at demystifying potential misperceptions.

Introduction

Social cohesion literature often categorizes different elements as horizontal (between groups and citizens) and vertical (between citizens and state institutions). Horizontal relations refer to the interconnectedness, interactions, and social ties among individuals and groups within a community or a society. It encompasses the way people relate to one another, collaborate, and form networks across various groups. Horizontal relations reflect the organic connections and interactions within a society, highlighting the importance of interpersonal bonds, cooperation, and solidarity among individuals and groups.

This report is Part II of a two-part analytical series on social cohesion in Ukraine. Thus, we suggest that the two parts are read in sequential order for better digestion and anchoring, as they present complementary analytical findings. Part II zooms into the issue of **horizontal cohesion** and builds on Part I, titled '[Social Cohesion in Ukraine: Trends](#)' report. The **vertical cohesion** is not part of this deep dive analysis for several reasons. Firstly, horizontal cohesion dimension is larger, with four indicators (see below) compared to the vertical cohesion dimension, which is built on two indicators – Accountability of Authorities and Ukrainian Authorities Care. This means that horizontal dimension has more relationships, pathways, and entry points to investigate. Secondly, reSCORE, being a sociological population survey, cannot account for many more objective or niche variables (e.g., cases of corruption or governance decision making processes) that are also needed to investigate the drivers of vertical cohesion indicators. This means that the horizontal dimension offers more avenues for investigation within reSCORE.

The four reSCORE indicators that are used to measure horizontal relations, namely – Community Cooperation, Social Tolerance, Social Proximity, and Lack of Social Threat, are presented in the table below. This paper focuses on these indicators to help unpack societal unity and connectedness, as crucial elements for wartime resilience. It also looks at this selection since at least three out of four indicators have national scores that float around 5 out of 10, which points to the need for further improvement, including through designing preventative initiatives that can help address potential war fatigue leading to societal chasms. As such, this report aims to shed light on the horizontal dimension of social cohesion and inform local, national, and international actors' efforts in strengthening social cohesion and resilience in Ukraine.

TABLE 1. NATIONAL LEVEL TRENDS IN SOCIAL COHESION INDICATORS: 2021 & 2023, RESCORE

Indicator	2021	2023	Difference
Community Cooperation	5.1	5.5	+0.4
Social Proximity Towards: Different Groups for Social Cohesion	5.2	5.4	+0.2
Social Tolerance	5.6	5.7	+0.1
Lack of Social Threat from: Different Groups for Social Cohesion	7.2	6.9	-0.3

The first chapter unpacks Community Cooperation, while the second chapter focuses on Social Tolerance. The paper then examines intergroup relations using Social Proximity and Lack of Social Threat indicators. These two indicators are combined and taxonomized as Intergroup Harmony as they are highly complementary and conceptually similar. Each chapter begins with a national overview of indicators under scrutiny, followed by an overview of demographic and regional differences. Finally, the first two chapters conclude with a more in-depth analysis, drawing on advanced statistical tools to investigate pathways and entry points to create positive trends with respect to the indicators. The chapter on Intergroup Harmony also looks at linguistic, geopolitical, and geographical differences, as well as at differences observed across groups of various specialized experiences, including the displaced, and those who have lived under Russian occupation.


Community Cooperation

The Community Cooperation indicator measures the extent to which reSCORE respondents feel that they can rely on members of their community for help and that people in their community actively resolve common problems together. This indicator is one of the four key indicators that make up the horizontal dimension of social cohesion, along with Social Tolerance, Social Proximity and Lack of Social Threat.

The Community Cooperation indicator is connected to the concept of social capital, defined as an asset or a resource embedded in social relationships and networks that individuals can invest in (Häuberer 2011, 147-148). Access to social capital contributes to community resilience by boosting collective efficacy during wartime (Leykin et al. 2013, 317). Additionally, it enhances individual resilience by offering social support and resources to cope with challenges (Bogdanov et al. 2021, 326; MacLeod et al. 2016, 268). As such, Community Cooperation is not only central to the horizontal dimension of social cohesion but also, in the Ukrainian context, an essential resilience factor in the face of Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion.

FIGURE 1. COMMUNITY COOPERATION, reSCORE 2023


The extent to which...



On the national level, Community Cooperation in 2023 stands at 5.5 out of 10, where 0 signifies that no one relies on their community or addresses common problems collectively, and 10 means that everyone everywhere does so. The value of 5.5 is moderate, indicating ample opportunity for improvement. Differences in Community Cooperation across various demographic groups (age, income, type of settlement, education, displacement, employment) are either minimal or statistically insignificant. Although Community


Cooperation did not show any notable increases between the two time points, there was a clear rural-urban divide in 2021. Back then, SCORE identified notable differences in settlement types, with larger and more urban areas showing lower Community Cooperation than smaller and more rural areas. In other words, residents in larger cities used to display more individualistic tendencies and less dependence on neighborly relations before the full-scale Russian invasion (Panayiotou et al. 2021, 15). However, reSCORE 2023 shows that these differences diminished across time, with Community Cooperation in large cities increasing from 4.4 in 2021 to 5.5 in 2023. This indicates that feelings of solidarity, common purpose, and willingness to cooperate with fellow community members experienced a notable increase in larger settlements in the face of the invasion.

FIGURE 2. COMMUNITY COOPERATION BY SETTLEMENT TYPE, reSCORE 2023 & SCORE 2021



Regional differences in Community Cooperation in 2023 are generally minimal or statistically insignificant, except for one outlier – Zaporizhzhia oblast, which scores 4.4, noticeably lower than the national average of 5.5 (refer to Map 1). Although there are no meaningful differences across oblasts in 2023, there are notable differences on the oblast level when respective figures are compared to 2021. For example, while Rivne oblast experienced significant decreases in Community Cooperation between 2021 and 2023, Lviv and Kharkiv oblasts experienced significant increases (see [Social Cohesion in Ukraine: Part I](#)).

MAP 1. COMMUNITY COOPERATION, RESCORE 2023



In addition to exploring demographic and regional dynamics, linear regressions were applied to identify factors influencing Community Cooperation. Given that this indicator evaluates cooperation on the local level, and hence, focuses on the community itself rather than the national or individual level relations, it is not surprising that most identified drivers are about the characteristics, assets, or the environment pertaining to communities.

TABLE 2. DRIVERS OF COMMUNITY COOPERATION, reSCORE 2023

	Score	Standardized beta	p-value
Community Cohesion	7.0	0.17	0.000
Civic Engagement	2.5	0.13	0.000
Pride in Local Community Bonds	6.9	0.13	0.000
Faith in Society's Morals	5.6	0.07	0.000
Ukrainian Authorities Care	4.6	0.07	0.000
Urbanity	N/A	-0.09	0.000

Existing literature suggests that cultural and societal aspects, such as norms of reciprocity and generalized trust, play pivotal role in driving Community Cooperation, as they ease the creation and maintenance of relationships (Häuberer 2011, 147-148). This hypothesis is supported by our research, as Community Cohesion, Faith in Society's Morals, and Pride in Local Community Bonds emerge as key drivers of the studied indicator. Among the three drivers, the strongest one is Community Cohesion, which evaluates the extent to which respondents agree that people in their community share similar aspirations for the future, possess similar values, are trustworthy, and that the community is evolving positively despite the ongoing war.


Community Cohesion encompasses the concept of social trust, which can be further categorized into particularized (bonding) and generalized (bridging) forms. Particularized trust is centered around close-knit, in-group relationships like family, neighbors, and close friends, while generalized trust extends to a more abstract trust in individuals who may not share similar demographic characteristics (Fiedler and Rohles 2021, 8-14; Grootaert et al. 2004, 4). The former is exclusive and focused on in-groups, while the latter is inclusive and open to out-groups.

From this perspective, we might infer that social cohesion in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast is characterized by a strong emphasis on bonding and in-group relations. This inference arises from the observation that while Ivano-Frankivsk oblast demonstrates the highest levels of Community Cohesion (8.0), it also records the lowest values for Social Tolerance (3.8), Readiness for Dialogue with Different Groups (3.7), and Social Proximity towards Different Groups (3.8). This inference can also be supported by the negative correlations observed in this oblast, specifically: Community Cohesion is negatively associated with Social Tolerance (Pearson's correlation=-0.31), Social Proximity (-0.22), and Readiness for Dialogue with Different Groups (-0.27). This suggests that efforts to enhance Community Cohesion in this oblast should be underpinned by social tolerance and constructive intergroup relations, otherwise, they may inadvertently reinforce closed and exclusive in-group feelings that are cohesive within themselves but not inclusive.

Civic Engagement stands out as one of the strongest drivers of Community Cooperation. This indicator captures the extent to which individuals engage in formal and informal civic, social, and political activities, such as voting in elections, attending events organized by local authorities, volunteering, donating, participating in events organized by NGOs, and engaging in activities aimed at improving their neighborhoods. reSCORE research results highlight

that individuals who are more civically active have increased opportunities to invest in social relationships and networks and have more exposure to formal or informal mechanisms aimed at solving common community problems (see Figure 3).

FIGURE 3. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, reSCORE 2023



reSCORE 2023 shows that the most popular form of civic activity is voting in elections, followed by volunteering and donating, particularly in the context of supporting the army and aiding those affected by Russia’s full-scale invasion. On the other end of the spectrum, participation in local governance and decision-making stands as the least frequently reported activity, with 83% of respondents saying they have never attended events organized by local authorities. This highlights the need to invest in mechanisms and efforts that can foster participation of citizens in the decision-making process as a form of civic engagement (where it is possible under martial law). Enhancing Civic Engagement could yield dual advantages, potentially strengthening one’s own social networks, while simultaneously fostering the spirit of cooperation and solidarity within the communities as a public good benefiting larger number of its inhabitants.

reSCORE 2023 also shows that 58% of people never participated in events organized by NGOs. This suggests there is an untapped potential for increased civic engagement locally. NGOs represent an effective avenue for cooperation and networks, offering both formal membership structures and informal volunteer opportunities. They can contribute to horizontal social cohesion through cultivating more active and participatory civic culture among citizens.

The third driver is Pride in Community Bonds, with a respectable score of 6.9 nationwide. This driver measures the degree to which one feels proud of community bonds in their locality.

Faith in Society's Morals, the fourth driver of Community Cohesion, has a relatively lower score (5.6) than Community Cohesion and Pride in Community Bonds. It measures elements such as the degree to which respondents agree that Ukrainian citizens do not claim benefits they are not entitled to, do not engage in tax evasion, and are not deceptive in business and trade. Policies and programmes that address systemic corruption and institutional accountability, consumer or business watchdog initiatives, and those that raise awareness about the potential socio-economic damage of tolerating and condoning corruption can help foster citizens' Faith in Society's Morals.²

The fifth driver – the Ukrainian Authorities Care indicator – measures the degree to which one feels that Ukrainian authorities represent their concerns and views, are ready to listen and equally care about all parts of the country. The fact that this indicator is a driver (albeit a weak one), underscores how intertwined the relationships between horizontal and vertical dimensions of social cohesion are and how different dimensions of social cohesion can mutually reinforce one another, creating a multiplier effect. It also suggests that the sense of care, sense of representation, and improved citizen-institutional linkages trickle down to horizontal relationships and amplify Community Cooperation on the local level. Consequently, local institutions can invest in participatory mechanisms as a public good, which may lead to positive spillover effects.³ However, this endeavor's success rests on the trustworthiness of these institutions and their genuine commitment to engagement of and the welfare of their citizens.

2 A significant illustration of this connection is evident in the relationship between higher Perception of Systemic Corruption and a reduced likelihood of having Faith in Society's Morals (Pearson's $r = -0.33$, $p = 0.000$). In essence, individuals who perceive a higher level of systemic corruption are less inclined to believe in the integrity of societal morals.

3 Participation in events organized by local authorities is an item of Civic Engagement which is one of the drivers of Community Cooperation. At the same time, this local political participation is associated with the perception that public authorities are attentive to the needs of ordinary people ($\gamma = 0.24$, $p = 0.000$), a component of the Ukrainian Authorities Care indicator, another driver of Community Cooperation. Thus, local political participation can have both direct effect on Community Cooperation and indirect one via Ukrainian Authorities Care.

Recommendations and entry points:

The analysis above identifies indicators with the greatest likelihood of positive impact on Community Cooperation. Community Cohesion emerges as the driver with the strongest potential influence, but since it records a relatively high score with little differences across oblasts, there is less room for improvement here. Civic Engagement as the second strongest driver of Community Cooperation emerges as the most practical and concrete entry point in terms of programmatic and policy design. Although Civic Engagement scores the lowest, standing at 2.5, it is important to note that a perfect score of 10 is not realistic, nor is it desirable. A very high score in Civic Engagement would imply that everyone everywhere is frequently (i.e. 'very often') engaged across all eight civic activities measured by the indicator, ranging from petitions, demonstrations, and donations to local authority events, NGO activities, and voting in elections (refer to Figure 3).

Considering that civic engagement in local decision-making and political participation is low when compared to other civic engagement actions and given the relationship between Authorities Care and Community Cooperation, **programmes and policies should prioritize improved civic participation in local politics and decision-making as the main pathway with 'strongest kinetic energy' for fostering Community Cooperation, and by extension, social cohesion in Ukraine.**


Given the drivers of Community Cooperation in Table 2, programmes and policies could invest in initiatives such as neighborhood and consumer watchdogs, community shared vision and roadmap deliberative sessions, and family/neighborhood support hubs, as well as participatory budgeting and decision-making on the local level aimed towards recovery, reconstruction, and social integration efforts.

Social Tolerance

The Social Tolerance indicator measures acceptance of certain [minority] groups in a given society, as well as willingness to engage with them personally, and their acceptance within the community. This indicator has two aspects: it is ideational in the sense that it reflects personal attitudes, and it is also relational as it helps regulate intergroup relations in contemporary societies (Janmaat 2011, 64). In a society with diverse groups, fostering mutual tolerance and embracing diversity is crucial for social cohesion (Dragolov et al., 2016, 11; Schiefer and van der Noll, 2017, 588). It is important to include and accept all segments of a society (Schiefer and van der Noll, 2017, 588), particularly those that tend to be marginalized, have less opportunities, or are potentially more vulnerable.

The national Social Tolerance score in Ukraine stands at 5.7 out of 10, where 0 means that everyone wishes that these 'outgroups' listed in the question leave the community all together, and 10 means that everyone would accept them in the community and interact with them personally. The break-down of the indicator illustrated in the figure below (see *Figure 4*) shows that most respondents accept and are tolerant towards immigrants, Jews, individuals with different skin colors, and Muslims. However, most Ukrainians are reluctant to accept LGBTQI+ individuals and drug addicts as members of their community. When it comes to Roma people, the survey shows a mixed picture: while 30% are willing to interact with them personally, 28% would accept them in the community but prefer to avoid personal communication, and a further 35% would not want to have them in their community at all. This highlights the need for policies targeted at promoting the integration of Roma people, as well as LGBTQI+ individuals, and drug addicts.

FIGURE 4. SOCIAL TOLERANCE, RESCORE 2023



Variations in the levels of Social Tolerance towards LGBTQI+ are most prominent across age and income groups, with older and lower-income individuals showing less acceptance (see Table 3). The survey also shows clear rural-urban divide, with respondents from large cities exhibiting higher tolerance towards Jews, people with different skin colors, and LGBTQI+ individuals compared to those living in rural areas (refer to Table 4). In light of these findings, policies aimed at enhancing Social Tolerance towards the LGBTQI+ community should strategically target older and lower-income demographics, along with prioritizing efforts in rural areas. This would help members of the LGBTQI+ community feel safer and less isolated outside of circles that are young, metropolitan, and middle/upper income.

TABLE 3. SOCIAL TOLERANCE TO LGBTQI+ BY AGE AND INCOME


Grouping		I would accept to interact with them personally	I would accept them in the community, but personally avoid communication	I would not want to have them in my community at all	DK
Age groups	18-35	28%	23%	40%	9%
	36-59	19%	20%	50%	11%
	60+	10%	16%	63%	11%
Income groups	No money for food	13%	16%	61%	10%
	Money for food	17%	17%	57%	9%
	Money for clothes	19%	22%	48%	10%
	Money for expensive goods	28%	21%	42%	9%

TABLE 4. SOCIAL TOLERANCE TO JEWS, PEOPLE WITH DIFFERENT COLOUR OF SKIN, AND LGBTQI+ BY SETTLEMENT TYPE

		Large city (500K+)	Large town or city (50K-500K)	Small town (Less than 50K)	Village
Jews	I would accept to interact with them personally	73%	63%	58%	52%
	I would accept them in the community, but personally avoid communication	18%	22%	22%	24%
	I would not want to have them in my community at all	4%	8%	12%	14%
	DK	5%	7%	8%	10%
People with a different color of skin	I would accept to interact with them personally	69%	63%	60%	51%
	I would accept them in the community, but personally avoid communication	20%	22%	21%	25%
	I would not want to have them in my community at all	5%	8%	14%	15%
	DK	6%	6%	5%	9%
LGBTQI+	I would accept to interact with them personally	27%	22%	18%	14%
	I would accept them in the community, but personally avoid communication	21%	22%	19%	19%
	I would not want to have them in my community at all	41%	47%	54%	57%
	DK	12%	9%	10%	10%

There are pronounced regional variations on the Social Tolerance indicator, with significantly lower scores observed in Ivano-Frankivsk (3.8), Zakarpattia (4.6), and Volyn (4.5) oblasts compared to the national average. Conversely, Mykolaiv (8.1), Kherson (7.4), and Kirovohrad (7.0) oblasts demonstrate much higher levels of tolerance. These three oblasts can serve as best practice examples to be studied and replicated in other areas.

MAP 2. SOCIAL TOLERANCE, RESCORE 2023



Close examination of regional disparities in attitudes towards Romas, LGBTQI+ individuals, and drug addicts - groups perceived as less acceptable nationwide – reveals interesting patterns. In Mykolaiv oblast, the majority (51%) would accept drug addicts in the community but would prefer to avoid personal interaction. In Kherson oblast, 21% of respondents indicated that they would personally interact with drug addicts, while an additional 21% would accept them in the community, even if they would prefer to avoid personal interaction with them. Similarly, in Kirovohrad oblast, a significant share (28% and 23%, respectively) indicated that they would either personally engage with drug addicts or, if not, accept them in the community. This reflects a more open stance compared to other regions.

Respondents from Mykolaiv (37% and 36%, respectively) and Kirovohrad (32% and 27%, respectively) oblasts show greater willingness, compared to the national average, to personally interact with the LGBTQI+ individuals and, when not, at least accept them in the community. Notably, there are more respondents in Kherson oblast (40%) willing to interact with LGBTQI+ people than in other regions. In contrast, 63% of respondents from Ivano-Frankivsk oblast would not accept LGBTQI+ people in their communities let alone personal interaction. Most respondents from Mykolaiv (83%),

Kherson (55%), and Kirovohrad (50%) oblasts express willingness to personally interact with Roma people. In contrast, most respondents from Ivano-Frankivsk oblast (52%) would not accept Roma people in their communities.

Stemming from this, for enhancing social tolerance towards Roma, LGBTQI+, and drug addicts, it is advisable to study and replicate best practices from Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts elsewhere. Additionally, it could be beneficial to focus on Ivano-Frankivsk oblast when implementing policies to increase tolerance towards these groups.

For the purposes of this research, and to go beyond diagnostics, predictive modeling was used to identify potential entry points that could increase Social Tolerance (see Table 5). Our findings show that different indicators of social cohesion complement each other, meaning that improvements in one indicator can positively impact others. More specifically, analysis shows that Social Proximity, which is a component of the horizontal dimension of social cohesion, is at the same time the strongest driver of Social Tolerance. In other words, efforts focusing on intergroup relations among Ukrainians (including IDPs, those from the eastern or western oblasts, those who lived/are living under occupation, those who are Russian speaking, etc.) would also help improve Social Tolerance towards marginalized groups such as Roma and LGBTQI+ community. Importantly, analysis of drivers presented in the table below also validates the central role of Social Tolerance in promoting social cohesion by revealing its intricate positive relationship with respect for human rights (as measured by Gender Equality Mindset and Belief in Human Rights), participatory political culture (Sense of Civic Duty), and harmonious intergroup relations.

TABLE 5. DRIVERS OF SOCIAL TOLERANCE, RESCORE 2023

	Score	Standardized beta	p-value
Social Proximity Towards: Different Groups	4.5	0.17	0.000
Gender Equality Mindset	6.5	0.13	0.000
Belief in Human Rights	6.9	0.12	0.000
Sense of Civic Duty	6.6	0.11	0.000
South-East Macroregion*	N/A	0.09	0.000
Heard or Saw Fighting: Personal experiences	1.9	0.09	0.000
Traditional Media Consumption (TV, radio, newspaper, political talk shows online or on TV)	4.5	-0.11	0.000

*South-East macroregion includes Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts.


Social Tolerance is deeply rooted in key foundations of democracy, such as the respect for individual freedoms and pluralism (Doorn and Weerd 2006, 25; Kirchner, Freitag, and Rapp 2011, 205). In our case, these values include the rights of peaceful protest, freedom of speech, freedom of religion (the items of Belief in Human Rights with relatively higher correlation coefficient for Social Tolerance), and equality (Gender Equality Mindset). Prior studies also suggest that stronger inclination towards greater societal involvement is expected to foster more liberal attitudes in individuals, driven by increased exposure to the outside world and the ideas distinct from one's own (Kirchner, Freitag, and Rapp 2011, 214). As such, beyond the Belief in Human Rights, this literature also validates why Social Proximity, Gender Equality Mindset, and Sense of Civic Duty are influential drivers of Social Tolerance in Ukraine. Further, the finding that Social Proximity, which looks at one's willingness to accept different political and regional groups such as those from western/eastern oblasts of Ukraine, or Russian speaking Ukrainians or draft evaders as close friends, is a key driver of Social Tolerance, demonstrates the other role of Social Tolerance beyond its value-driven role proving it to be an important tool for intergroup relations (Doorn and Weerd 2006, 29). This shows that acceptance of individuals from diverse groups as close friends generates openness, tolerance, and acceptance of minority groups, such as Roma, LGBTQI+, and Muslims.

Interestingly, experiencing personal traumas due to Russia's full-scale invasion, such as hearing or witnessing fighting, is associated with an increase in the levels of Social Tolerance, even after controlling for regional differences in the south-west. In addition, this direct personal experience of war is more prevalent among residents in oblasts located near the frontline, and thus more prevalent among IDPs. This finding is important because although societies often turn to their smallest in-group in the face of crises (e.g., economic downturn) because of competition over resources (Navarro-Carrillo G et al. 2018; Hesse, J.O. 2021), in Ukraine, the society is opening up and becoming more inclusive in the face of an external aggressor and huddling together to find strength and solidarity.

Interestingly, Traditional Media Consumption exhibits a direct negative effect on Social Tolerance. This indicator measures the extent to which individuals rely on traditional media sources like radio, TV, and newspapers to stay informed about current affairs. Despite popularity of online media as the primary source of information over mainstream media especially since Russia's full-scale war, TV still remains the most widely used form of traditional media. Notably, there are correlations between TV consumption and negative attitudes towards LGBTQI+, as well as newspaper consumption and

negative attitudes towards people with different skin colors.⁴ This may be due to the content on traditional media and the profile of the audience that depends on it as a source of information. Even if the content is not explicitly intolerant or ‘othering’, it is likely to be less diverse and heterogeneous than online media. As such, producing traditional media content that promotes diversity and heterogeneity would help nurture Social Tolerance among the audience. This, in turn, could enhance overall social cohesion in Ukraine, as Social Tolerance is linked with values like societal connectedness, democratization, and rights.

FIGURE 5. TRADITIONAL AND ONLINE MEDIA CONSUMPTION, RESCORE 2023



⁴ Gamma=-0.22, p=0.000, between TV consumption and negative attitudes towards LGBTQ+; gamma=-0.23, p=0.000, between newspaper consumption and negative attitudes towards people with a different skin color.

Recommendations and entry points:

As discussed in the previous chapter, when material and immaterial resources are scarce, and when time is limited, effective and evidence-based prioritization becomes crucial to ensure that efforts are targeted and precise. Focusing on indicators with lower scores and those with higher influence (i.e., standardized beta coefficients) could help foster Social Tolerance (*refer to Table 5*). The strongest driver of Social Tolerance, which is Social Proximity, has the lowest reported score. Hence, building cross regional social and working groups, civil society networks, entrepreneur collaboration platforms, and family support groups that include residents of different oblasts, including those with different experiences of displacement and Russian occupation, should be among the programmatic priorities.

Further, considering the influence of Gender Equality Mindset on Social Tolerance, targeted policy and programmes on multiple levels involving multi-actor and multi-stakeholder coordination could help cultivate it. This could range from democratic parenting and family healing spaces on the household level to awareness raising on reproductive rights on the policy level. Gender Equality efforts should not only focus on women but all genders, and hence be inclusive of promoting the rights and freedoms of the LGBTQI+ community given the comparatively lower levels of acceptance of this group. To create multiplier effects, these efforts could also be supported by traditional media programming, from debates and talk shows to entertainment programmes such as soap operas that promote Gender Equality Mindset.⁵ For example, some studies show that television viewers have similar or higher levels of social tolerance compared to non-viewers when recurring portrayals of minority groups is frequent and when minority characters are likeable, attractive and they have friendly interactions with the rest of society (Garretson 2015; Żerebecki et al. 2021).

5 For more detailed analysis on the state of affairs on gender equality, please refer to SeeD's Gender study by Machlouzarides, Novosolova, and Uretici 2023. Accessible via: https://api.scoreforpeace.org/storage/pdfs/Gender-report_01-36_3_web.pdf.

Intergroup Harmony

SeeD's intergroup harmony concept consists of two indicators: Social Proximity and Lack of Social Threat. Both indicators ask respondents about their attitudes towards various groups. In 2023, respondents were asked about their views on IDPs, individuals living in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts as of before February 2022, individuals living in areas occupied by Russia since 2022, people from the west and the east of Ukraine, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, those with pro-EU orientations, residents of Crimea, men avoiding military service, and Ukrainians who left the country after Russia's full-scale invasion.⁶

The Social Proximity indicator gauges the extent to which individuals would accept members from various socio-demographic groups as close friends, while the Social Threat indicator evaluates the degree to which one feels that different socio-demographic groups may threaten public order in their community. The Lack of Social Threat indicator is the reverse of the Social Threat, representing the absence of it as a phenomenon. Lack of Social Threat fosters social cohesion as higher values on it indicate more cohesive aspects of society.

The Social Proximity indicator is modeled after the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, one of the items of which measures perceived distance in a society (Bogardus E. S. 1926; Mather, Jones, and Moats 2017). This indicator focuses on the acceptance of groups as close friends, indicating low social distance and the potential for close relations with these groups. In contrast, the Social Threat indicator represents the opposite extreme. As such, it does not measure social distance, but rather, it assesses the perceived threat to public order that different groups pose, addressing the existential feeling of safety. There is a significant distance between these two indicators. With Social Threat (or Lack of it), we can identify groups perceived as dangerous, which may contribute to social tensions and threaten community security. Social Proximity,

⁶ It's essential to note that the list of groups we asked about to calculate scores for these two indicators excluded pro-Russia oriented people and individuals working with occupying forces. Positive attitudes toward these groups were not considered factors contributing to cohesion. Additionally, attitudes to these groups did not correlate well with other groups and were not included in the indicators for this paper.

on the other hand, is more concerned with social acceptance of groups into one’s intimate personal circle.

The overall score for Social Proximity in our survey is 5.4, which is an average standing, while Lack of Social Threat has a higher score of 6.9. While these numbers provide insight, a deeper understanding of these scores necessitates examining specific groups within each indicator.

FIGURE 6. SOCIAL PROXIMITY, reSCORE 2023
Would you accept members of the following groups as your close friends?




FIGURE 7. SOCIAL THREAT FROM DIFFERENT GROUPS, reSCORE 2023
Do you believe that increasing numbers of the following groups will threaten public order of your community?




In terms of Social Proximity, reSCORE respondents are less inclined to accept individuals living in areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that were occupied by Russia in 2014-15, as well as draft evaders. Approximately one-third of the respondents would not accept them as friends. Nevertheless, draft evaders are perceived as less threatening than people living under Russian occupation. At the same time, those who have lived under occupation since 2022 are perceived as less threatening than those who have lived under occupation since 2014-15. This heightened negative perception of people living under Russian occupation since 2014-15 may be attributed to their longer exposure to such conditions and potentially a perception that they normalize, tolerate, or accept the occupation to an extent. According to a survey commissioned by Opora, this group may be potentially viewed as supporting Russia or exhibiting opportunistic behaviors, rather than being viewed as hostages of the situation and the occupiers (Opora 2023). Hence, the reintegration of the occupied territories necessitates a tailored approach for non-government-controlled areas (NGCA) both before and after 2022, as well as for Crimea, to ensure that intergroup harmony can be nurtured.

No significant differences among various demographic groups (in terms of age, income, type of settlement, education, displacement, employment) are observed for Social Proximity and Lack of Social Threat,⁷ except for Social Proximity towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians. For this group, Social Proximity is higher among displaced respondents, scoring 7.0, and lower among those who were not displaced from their original residence, with their figure standing at 5.5. This difference could be partly explained by the geographical origin of displaced respondents, who come from regions with a better knowledge of Russian language.


When it comes to regional variations, Social Proximity is higher than the national average in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts, while it is lower in Ivano-Frankivsk and Volyn oblasts (*refer to Map 3*). On the other hand, Lack of Social Threat is higher in Mykolaiv oblast and lower in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, when compared to the full sample (*refer to Map 4*). The oblasts with higher values for both indicators can serve as sources of best practices to be emulated elsewhere, while those with lower values can be targeted with relevant policies to build and strengthen intergroup harmony.

⁷ Differences with Cohen's d of less than 0.4 are considered to be small.

MAP 3. SOCIAL PROXIMITY TOWARDS DIFFERENT GROUPS, reSCORE 2023



MAP 4. LACK OF SOCIAL THREAT FROM DIFFERENT GROUPS, reSCORE 2023



To assess the state of intergroup relations and their role in social cohesion, we examined attitudes towards the listed groups among both members and non-members of each of the groups. In the reSCORE questionnaire, this analysis includes various groups, based on their geographic locations (oblast-level), spoken languages, geopolitical orientations, experiences of living under Russian occupation since 2022, displacement statuses, gender, combat participation, and experiences of volunteering to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces. By considering responses from individuals who presumably belong to a particular group (in-group) and those who do not (out-group), we can gain valuable insights into the dynamics of intergroup relations and better understand the overall intergroup harmony within the surveyed population. For example, lower values on Social Proximity towards people who do not belong to the group in focus could indicate potential challenges for social integration into the close personal networks, while lower values on the Lack of Social Threat could potentially indicate disagreements on safety concerns and have a potential for social tensions.

The attitude towards draft evaders shows little or no difference between various demographic groups, including men and women, individuals who have participated in combat since 2014, and those who have not, as well as between volunteers supporting Ukraine's armed forces and those who do not volunteer. This suggests that these factors, characteristics, or experiences do not significantly influence the attitudes towards draft evaders, indicating relatively consistent perceptions across different segments of the surveyed population.

TABLE 6. INTERGROUP RELATIONS: DRAFT EVADERS, RESCORE 2023

	Combat participation		Gender		Volunteer to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces (ZSU)	
	No	Yes	Male	Female	No	Yes
	5,713 (97%)	201 (3%)	2,792 (47%)	3,122 (53%)	4,493 (76%)	1,421 (24%)
Lack of Social Threat from men avoiding military service	6.8	6.7	6.9	6.6	6.8	6.7
Social Proximity towards men avoiding military service	4.1	3.8	4.2	4	4.1	4.2

Further, to distinguish in-group and out-group members for Ukrainian and Russian language users, we use the reSCORE question which asked respondents to self-report their level of knowledge of these two languages, ranging from native and fluent to basic and no knowledge. The resulting combinations of different language levels were then analyzed, focusing on the most numerous groups. This led to the identification of four primary groups with the rest of the groups constituting less than 4% each. These selected groups are the following:

- Respondents fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian (16%);
- Respondents considering Ukrainian as native or mother tongue and being fluent in Russian (40%);
- Respondents with native Ukrainian and basic Russian knowledge skills (19%);
- Respondents with native Ukrainian skills and no knowledge of Russian (9%).

All four groups have a good command of the Ukrainian language (mother tongue or fluent) but have a different degree of the reported knowledge of the Russian language.

The groups with native Ukrainian and basic or no knowledge of the Russian language tend to score lower on Lack of Social Threat from Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Social Proximity to them. This means that they perceive higher threats and feel more social distance towards this group. At the same time, it should be noted that the absolute score for Lack of Social Threat is still ranging from 6.0 to 6.2 among the respondents who do not speak Russian well. However, when it comes to Social Proximity, native Ukrainian speakers with basic or no Russian language knowledge are rather reluctant to accept people from east of Ukraine and Russian-speaking Ukrainians into their friendship circles. Yet, reported level of Marginalization because of language is low across all language groups, indicating a lack of unfair treatment of any of the groups based on their language (*Table 7*).

TABLE 7. INTERGROUP RELATIONS BY LANGUAGE GROUPS, RESCORE 2023

	Fluent Ukrainian and fluent Russian	Native Ukrainian and fluent Russian	Native Ukrainian and basic Russian	Native Ukrainian and no Russian
	938 (16%)	2,366 (40%)	1,129 (19%)	515 (9%)
Lack of Social Threat from people from eastern Ukraine	7.3	7.4	6.6	6.4
Lack of Social Threat from Russian-speaking Ukrainians	7.5	7.5	6.2	6.0
Social Proximity towards people from eastern Ukraine	6.4	6.3	5.2	5.0
Social Proximity towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians	6.8	6.1	4.3	3.7
Marginalization because of the native language	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.7

Shaded Cells Note:

The shaded cells represent the groups that have distinct scores for the specific measurement in the row, as compared to one or more other groups in columns, with a significant difference (p -value of 0.000) of at least moderate effect size (Cohen's $d > 0.40$). Lighter shaded cells have Cohen's $d > 0.4$, and darker shades have Cohen's $d > 0.65$.

The differences between perceptions of displaced groups in terms of Lack of Social Threat from IDPs and Ukrainians who left Ukraine after Russia's full-scale aggression are minimal. However, Social Proximity to Russian-speaking Ukrainians and IDPs, who are predominantly from regions with better knowledge of the Russian language, is higher among the in-group, the displaced respondents, compared to stayers. Combining these findings with previous results about language groups suggests that the observed variations may be more related to language differences than the fact of displacement itself. Given high scores on the Lack of Social Threat indicator, these nuances in Social Proximity may not pose significant challenges for safety and stability of Ukraine. Yet, these insights imply that the social integration of IDPs could be more complex.

TABLE 8. INTERGROUP RELATIONS BY DISPLACEMENT, RESCORE 2023

	Displaced persons	Returnees	Stayers
	296 (5%) ⁷	484 (8%)	5,135 (87%)
Lack of Social Threat from IDPs	7.6	7.3	6.9
Lack of Social Threat from Russian-speaking Ukrainians	7.6	7.3	7.1
Lack of Social Threat from Ukrainians who left Ukraine after the war started	7.2	7.5	7.4

See continuation of the Table 8 on the next page ►►

⁸ According to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, there are 4.9 million of IDPs in Ukraine, which indicates that reSCORE sub-sample of IDPs is underrepresented in terms of relative numbers. Source: <https://www.msp.gov.ua/timeline/Vnutrishno-peremishcheni-osobi.html>.

►► Continuation of the Table 8. INTERGROUP RELATIONS BY DISPLACEMENT, RESCORE 2023

	Displaced persons	Returnees	Stayers
	296 (5%)	484 (8%)	5,135 (87%)
Social Proximity towards IDPs	7.0	6.2	5.7
Social Proximity towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians	7.0	6.2	5.5
Social Proximity towards Ukrainians who left Ukraine after the war started	6.0	6.2	5.8

Shaded Cells Note:

The shaded cells represent the groups that have distinct scores for the specific measurement in the row, as compared to one or more other groups in columns, with a significant difference (p -value of 0.000) of at least moderate effect size (Cohen's $d > 0.40$).

There are notable geographic variations when it comes to intergroup harmony across different oblasts. Compared to the national average score of 7.1, Lack of Social Threat from people from east of Ukraine is significantly lower in Ivano-Frankivsk (5.5) and Volyn (5.9) oblasts, both in the west. Conversely, it is notably higher in Kharkiv (8.5) and Mykolaiv (9.4) oblasts, in the east and the south, respectively. A similar pattern is observed for the Social Proximity indicator. The same is valid when it comes to attitudes towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians, which aligns with the previous findings regarding the influence of language on social attitudes. In other words, social threat and social distance towards people from the eastern parts of the country who speak Russian well (as well as considering Ukrainian their native tongue) is higher in western oblasts than eastern oblasts. This is not surprising considering the geographical distance and less exposure between these regional groups prior to the full-scale Russian invasion.

Interestingly, Lack of Social Threat from people from the west of Ukraine is lower than in the full sample (7.7) in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast (6.2) and Zaporizhzhia oblast (6.1), one in the west and the other in the south of the country. At the same time, it is much higher in Mykolaiv oblast (9.2), which is – like the latter – also in the south. Moreover, Kherson oblast (7.8) in the south scores notably higher in Social Proximity for western Ukrainians than the national average (6.8). Considering these findings, efforts to foster intergroup harmony should primarily target Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, where social distance and threat are more pronounced towards different groups, even those who are 'closer' to the presumed in-groups.

In terms of geopolitical orientations, there are noticeable differences in Social Proximity towards the pro-EU oriented people between EU supporters and opponents (refer to Table 9). However, these

differences are relatively small when it comes to Lack of Social Threat from this group. Besides, the sizes of the groups with different geopolitical orientations are different. Notably, 83% of respondents express support for EU membership, while only 5% still support joining the Russia-led EEU. These findings underscore a strong pro-EU sentiment among the majority of respondents, with minimal support for joining the Russia-led EEU.

TABLE 9. INTERGROUP RELATIONS BY GEOPOLITICAL ORIENTATIONS, RESCORE 2023

	Eurasian Economic Union		European Union	
	Disapprove	Approve	Disapprove	Approve
	5,271 (89%)	311 (5%)	650 (11%)	4,914 (83%)
Lack of Social Threat from pro-EU oriented people	7.4	6.5	6.6	7.5
Social Proximity towards pro-EU oriented people	6.0	5.0	4.6	6.1

Shaded Cells Note:

The shaded cells represent the groups that have distinct scores for the specific measurement in the row, as compared to one or more other groups in columns, with a significant difference (p -value of 0.000) of at least moderate effect size (Cohen's $d > 0.40$).

With respect to the groups with experience of living under Russian occupation, the reSCORE sample predominantly includes respondents from areas occupied after 2022. The survey results show that individuals who have had the experience of living under the Russian occupation are more inclined to accept as close friends (Social Proximity) those who are likely to share or better understand this experience. However, these differences are small in the feelings of Social Threat (refer to Table 10). This suggests that while individuals with similar experiences may seek social connections, there is not a significant divergence in the perceived threat or lack thereof from these groups.

TABLE 10. INTERGROUP RELATIONS BY EXPERIENCE OF LIFE UNDER RUSSIAN OCCUPATION, RESCORE 2023

	Lived under occupation	
	No	Yes
	5,642 (95%)	272 (5%)
Lack of Social Threat from people living under occupation since 2022	6.4	7.0
Lack of Social Threat from IDPs	6.9	7.7

See continuation of the Table 10 on the next page ►►

►► Continuation of the Table 10. INTERGROUP RELATIONS BY EXPERIENCE OF LIFE UNDER RUSSIAN OCCUPATION, RESCORE 2023

	Lived under occupation	
	No	Yes
	5,642 (95%)	272 (5%)
Lack of Social Threat from people from eastern Ukraine	7.1	7.7
Lack of Social Threat from Russian-speaking Ukrainians	7.1	7.8
Lack of Social Threat from people from Crimea	6.2	6.5
Social Proximity towards people living under occupation since 2022	5.2	7.1
Social Proximity towards IDPs	5.7	7.4
Social Proximity towards people from eastern Ukraine	5.9	7.4
Social Proximity towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians	5.6	7.4
Social Proximity towards people from Crimea	4.8	6.1

Shaded Cells Note:

The shaded cells represent the groups that have distinct scores for the specific measurement in the row, as compared to one or more other groups in columns, with a significant difference (p -value of 0.000) of at least moderate effect size (Cohen's $d > 0.40$).

In summary, language-related issues and political orientations are contentious topics. However, these challenges do not pose significant threats or create societal divides that threaten the overall stability and safety of Ukraine, considering the scores or the size of these groups. To address intergroup harmony, it is essential to promote Social Tolerance, invest in integrating IDPs both in their new locations and upon their potential return, and focus on specific regions, such as Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, with targeted efforts to maintain and further foster intergroup harmony.

Methodology

Data from the Ukraine reSCORE in 2023 relies on face-to-face, structured and quantitative interviews with citizens in Ukraine, collected between March 26th and June 12th, 2023. The data, covering 5,914 respondents, is representative of all territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine at the time of surveying and thus excluding the temporarily occupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to detect the statistical significance of differences in the indicators of social cohesion over time as well as between each oblast and the rest of the sample. Differences are reported if they are significant at $p < 0.05$, and if $F > 20$ or the Cohen's d effect size between two groups is greater than 0.4. Significant differences are considered small if the Cohen's d effect size is between 0.2 and 0.4, "medium" if it is between 0.4 and 0.8, and "large" if it is greater than 0.8

Linear regressions were used for predictive analyses, to identify the drivers of Community Cooperation and of Social Tolerance. To demonstrate the magnitude and direction (i.e., effect/influence) of each predictor variable on the outcome variable in predictive models, standardized beta coefficients are reported. Significance threshold for interpretation for linear regressions used for this report is $p < 0.05$.

How to Read reSCORE


reSCORE quantifies the levels of societal phenomena using indicators based on questions from the reSCORE survey. Using several questions to create one indicator allows us to reliably measure particular phenomenon from different perspectives. Scores for each indicator are given a value from 0 to 10, where 0 corresponds to the total absence of a phenomenon in an individual, location or in society, and 10 corresponds to its strong presence. Heatmaps, such as the one shown here, give the score achieved by each oblast in our sample in that indicator.

For example, the indicator Community Cooperation shown here, is measured using two questions, on a scale from 0 (“Not at all”) to 2 (“Very much”).

- 1 How much can you rely on members in your community or neighbours for help if you have a serious problem?
- 2 In the last year, to what extent have people from your community actively solved common problems together (such as cleaning territory or planting trees)?

The responses to these questions are then summed and rescaled from 0 to 10 to give the scores shown on the map below, based on the equation: $(Q1+Q2) \cdot (10/4)$.

COMMUNITY COOPERATION, RESCORE 2023



About reSCORE Ukraine

reSCORE Ukraine, which is a joint initiative funded by USAID and UNDP, and implemented by SeeD, serves as an annual assessment tool of societal resilience and recovery aimed at informing the policies and programming of national, regional, and international partners. Like its predecessor, the Ukraine SCORE 2018 to 2021, it aims to identify pathways to meaningful change and respond to complex needs, geared at strengthening individual and collective coping mechanisms, and fostering a democratic, just, inclusive, and cohesive Ukraine.

About Partners

Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD)

works with international development organizations, governments, and civil society leaders to design and implement evidence-based, people-centered strategies for the development of peaceful, inclusive, and sustainable societies. Working in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, SeeD provides policy advice for social transformation that is based on citizen engagement strategies and empirical understanding of the behavior of individuals, groups, and communities. The SeeD approach focusses on understanding the root causes of social problems by developing and empirically testing a science-based theory of change.

Democratic Governance East Activity (DG East)

is an 8-year programme of The United States Agency for International Development (USAID). DG East works with civil society, local government entities, and independent media outlets in and from eastern and southern Ukraine to strengthen the connection and trust between citizens and their government. The overall objectives of DG East are to 1) support greater acceptance of a shared civic culture based on common values and understanding; and 2) promote participation to improve Ukraine's governance, reform processes, and help resolve community problems. The programme addresses immediate war-response needs, promotes good governance, and strengthens an inclusive civic identity.

USAID's Transformation Communications Activity (TCA)

is a six-year activity of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which aims to strengthen Ukrainian democracy through comprehensive research, innovative communication initiatives, and the creation of socially meaningful content.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

supports strategic capacity development initiatives to promote inclusive growth and sustainable human development. Through partnerships with national, regional, and local governments, civil society, and the private sector, UNDP strives to support Ukraine in its efforts to eliminate poverty, develop the population's capacity, achieve equitable results, sustain the environment, and advance democratic governance.

References

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1989. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. SAGE Publications.

Bogdanov, Sergiy, Andriy Girnyk, Vira Chernobrovkina, Volodymir Chernobrovkin, Olexander Vinogradov, Kateryna Garbar, Yuliya Kovalevskaya, Oksana Basenko, Irina Ivanyuk, Kimberly Hook, Mike Wessells. 2021 'Developing a Culturally Relevant Measure of Resilience for War-Affected Adolescents in Eastern Ukraine.' *Journal on Education in Emergencies* 7, no. 2: 311-334. <https://doi.org/10.33682/wxrd-x8fq>.

British Council and the University of Oxford's Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS). 2021. *Social Cohesion In Europe: Literature Review*. https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/social_cohesion_in_europe_literature_reviewfinal.pdf.

Darin M. Mather, Stephen W. Jones, and Scott Moats. 2017. 'Improving upon Bogardus: Creating a More Sensitive and Dynamic Social Distance Scale.' *Survey Practice* 10, no. 4. <https://doi.org/10.29115/SP-2017-0026>.

Doorn, Marjoka van and Jannie de Weerd. 2006. 'Accepting the Disliked. The Practice and Promotion of Tolerance.' PhD-Thesis - Research and graduation internal, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam]. Vrije Universiteit.

Dragolov, Georgi, Zsófia S. Ignácz, Jan Lorenz, Jan Delhey, Klaus Boehnke, and Kai Unzicker. 2016. 'Social Cohesion in the Western World What Holds Societies Together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar.' Springer Briefs in Well-Being and Quality of Life Research.

Durlauf, Steven N., and Marcel Fafchamps. 2005. 'Social Capital.' In *Handbook of Economic Growth*, edited by Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf. 1639-1699. Elsevier.

Fiedler, Charlotte, and Christopher Rohles. 2021. 'Social Cohesion After Armed Conflict: A Literature Review.' Discussion paper, no. 7/2021, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn. <https://doi.org/10.23661/dp7.2021.v1.1>.

Jeremiah J. Garretson. 2015. 'Does Change in Minority and Women's Representation on Television Matter?: A 30-year Study of Television Portrayals and Social Tolerance.' *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 3, no.4: 615–632. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2015.105040>.

Grootaert, Christiaan, Deepa Narayan, Veronica Nyhan Jones, and Michael Woolcock. 2004. 'Measuring Social Capital: An Integrated Questionnaire.' World Bank working paper no. 18. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ru/515261468740392133/pdf/281100PAPER0Measuring0social0capital.pdf>.

Guest, Alexander, and Orestis Panayiotou. 2021. 'Social Cohesion in Ukraine. Part I: Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion Using the SCORE.' Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD). https://api.scoreforpeace.org/storage/pdfs/PUB_SCOREUkr21_Social_Cohesion_Volume1.pdf.

Häuberer, Julia. 2011. *Social Capital Theory: Towards a Methodological Foundation*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften and Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, Wiesbaden.

Hesse, Jan-Otmar. 2021. Financial crisis and the recurrence of economic nationalism. *Journal of Modern European History*, 19(1), 14-18. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1611894420974254>

Janmaat, Jan Germen. 2011. 'Social Cohesion as a Real-life Phenomenon: Assessing the Explanatory Power of the Universalist and Particularist Perspectives.' *Social Indicators Research* 100: 61–83. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-010-9604-9>.

Kirchner, Antje, Markus Freitag, and Carolin Rapp. 2011. 'Crafting Tolerance: The Role of Political Institutions in a Comparative Perspective.' *European Political Science Review* 3, no.2 (July): 201-227. doi:10.1017/S175577391000041X.

Leykin, Dmitry, Mooli Lahad, Odeya Cohen, Avishay Goldberg, Limor Aharonson-Daniel. 2013. 'Conjoint Community Resiliency Assessment Measure-28/10 Items (CCRAM28 and CCRAM10): A Self-report Tool for Assessing Community Resilience.' *American Journal of Community Psychology* 52, no. 3-4 (December): 313-323. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10464-013-9596-0>.

Machlouzarides, Marian, Nadiia Novosolova, Selin Uretici. 2023. 'Ukraine Gender Snapshot: Findings from the reSCORE 2023.' September. https://api.scoreforpeace.org/storage/pdfs/Gender-report_01-36_3_web.pdf.

MacLeod, Stephanie, Shirley Musich, Kevin Hawkins, Kathleen Alsgaard, Ellen R. Wicker. 2016. 'The Impact of Resilience Among Older Adults.' *Geriatric Nursing* 37, no. 4 (July–August): 266-272. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gerinurse.2016.02.014>.

Mather, Darin M., Stephen W. Jones, and Scott Moats. 2017. 'Improving upon Bogardus: Creating a More Sensitive and Dynamic Social Distance Scale.' *Survey Practice* 10, no. 4. <https://doi.org/10.29115/SP-2017-0026>.

Navarro-Carrillo, Luis, Inmaculada Valor-Segura, Luis Lozano, and Miguel Moya. October 2018. Do Economic Crises Always Undermine Trust in Others? The Case of Generalized, Interpersonal, and In-Group Trust. *Frontiers in Psychology*. <https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01955/full>

Panayiotou, Orestis, Alexander Guest, Andrii Dryga, and Christoforos Pissarides. 2021. 'Social Cohesion in Ukraine. Part II: Towards a Tolerant, Cohesive and Inclusive Society.' Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD). https://api.scoreforpeace.org/storage/pdfs/REP_DGEUkr21_SocCoh_II_v17.pdf.

Rating. 2022. 'The Sixth National Poll: The Language Issue in Ukraine.' March 19. https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/language_issue_in_ukraine_march_19th_2022.html.

Schiefer, David, and Jolanda van der Noll. 2017. 'The Essentials of Social Cohesion: A Literature Review.' *Social Indicators Research* 132(2): 579–603. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1314-5>.

Żerebecki, Bartosz G., Suzanna J. Oprea, Joep Hofhuis, and Susanne Janssen. 2021. 'Can TV Shows Promote Acceptance of Sexual and Ethnic Minorities? A Literature Review of Television Effects on Diversity Attitudes.' *Sociology Compass* 15, no.8 (August). <https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12906>.

