




# Social Cohesion in Ukraine:

Part I

TRENDS BASED ON RESCORE 2023  
AND SCORE 2021 INDICES







# Social Cohesion in Ukraine:



TRENDS BASED ON RESCORE 2023  
AND SCORE 2021 INDICES

# Acknowledgements

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*Author* Ruslan Minich

*Data analysis* Pavlo Sereda and Marian Machlouzarides

*Peer-reviewed by* Alexander Guest, Kateryna Ivashchenko,  
Tornike Zurabashvili, Dr. Ilke Dagli-Hustings,  
Orestis Panayiotou, Darina Solodova, Federica  
Dispenza

The views, conclusions, and recommendations presented in this document do not necessarily reflect the position of USAID, UNDP, or their partners.

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# Executive Summary

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Escalation of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine to the full-scale invasion in 2022 has had an effect on social cohesion in Ukraine. The findings of the reSCORE 2023 analysis compared to 2021 highlight that elements of social cohesion have grown stronger across the following indicators: improved perceptions of government authorities as measured by the **Ukrainian Authorities Care (+2.0)<sup>1</sup>** and the **Accountability of Authorities (+1.4)** indicators (both focused on the vertical dimension of social cohesion), as well as stronger **Sense of Belonging to the Country (+1.1)**, and **Sense of Civic Duty (+1.2)** (See table 1 below on page 12-13 on glossary definition of each reSCORE indicator used in the measurement of social cohesion in Ukraine).

Despite the recorded increase, it is worth noting that the Ukrainian Authorities Care and the Accountability of Authorities indicators hold the lowest scores in 2023 among nine indicators that make up the elements of the social cohesion meta concept, while the indicators Sense of Belonging to the Country, Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity, Lack of Social Threat, and Sense of Civic Duty are the highest in ranking. This may suggest that the societal unity measured by these top indicators transcends the short-term wartime effect on the support for authorities, a phenomenon commonly referred to as the 'rallying-round-the-flag' effect. The strengthening in Sense of Civic Duty and Sense of Belonging to the Country (compared to 2021 scores) could imply a lasting transformation in nation- and state-building, especially considering its sustained presence in spring 2023 compared to other SCORE-related measurements in autumn 2022.

It is noteworthy that Sense of Belonging to the Country, Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity, and Lack of Social Threat were already high in 2021, taking top positions among other indicators. This shows that these processes were not sudden, but rather already prominent and deeply embedded in the social and cultural fabric.

The **vertical cohesion**, which is the quality of relations between a citizen and the state, experienced a strong increase in 2023

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1 The (re)SCORE measures social phenomena in scores which ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 corresponds to the total absence of a phenomenon in an individual, location or in society, and 10 corresponds to its strong presence.

compared to 2021. At the same time, compared to the corresponding score reported in autumn 2022, the Ukrainian Authorities Care indicator has decreased in summer 2023 (though it remains higher than before Russia's full-scale invasion). This underscores the importance of identifying entry points and opportunities to fortify vertical cohesion, especially given the relative stability of other facets of social cohesion, such as Sense of Civic Duty, Social Tolerance, Sense of Belonging to the Country, Community Cooperation, and Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity during Russia's full-scale invasion. Changes in vertical cohesion are tied to the protection and security of people (personal security), as well as state performance such as service provision, inclusiveness, accountability, and the absence of corruption (refer to [Unpacking Trends](#) section).

**Identification:** Alongside strong increase in the Sense of Belonging to the Country, which emerges as the highest social cohesion indicator, Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity (refer to [Table 1 for definition](#)) is also quite high, although its increase from previous measurements is negligible.

**Common good:** Sense of Civic Duty indicator, which is made up of items that measure sense of agency and civic responsibility, got stronger in 2023 compared to 2021. However, there is still room for improvement when it comes to internal political efficacy (i.e., understanding and ability to contribute to politics) and local external political efficacy (the capacity to affect change within one's community).

**Horizontal relations:** While the strength and perception of horizontal relations have remained largely stable, there are nuanced considerations. Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity (7.3 in 2023) and Lack of Social Threat (7.2) have seen minimal changes since 2021, remaining high. However, when it comes to Social Tolerance, 51% of respondents express reluctance to have LGBTQI+ people in their communities, and 70% express similar sentiment towards drug addicts.

Despite massive displacement caused by the war, reSCORE respondents report largely positive perceptions of IDPs, a further indication that horizontal relations have not undergone rupture. At the same time, attitudes towards people living in the non-government-

controlled areas (NGCA) of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as defined before February 2022, are less positive than towards residents of areas occupied after 2022. Further, attitudes towards people living in occupied Crimea have worsened. Acceptance of these groups as close friends (Social Proximity) is linked to the belief that people from these groups are open to dialogue and discussion, indicating readiness to engage in mutually beneficial interactions (Readiness for Dialogue indicator).

Although overall horizontal relations have seen little change, certain oblasts stand out. Ivano-Frankivsk oblast scores much lower on Social Tolerance, Lack of Social Threat, and Social Proximity in 2023 compared to other oblasts, and even in comparison to its own values in 2021. Conversely, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv oblasts, located near the frontline, exhibit higher values for these indicators and, additionally, experience significant boost in Sense of Civic Duty.

**Policy recommendations:** Strengthening social cohesion is an essential contribution to building a resilient, united front in the face of Russia's full-scale invasion, as well as a key building block for the recovery of Ukraine. reSCORE survey findings suggests the following policy recommendations to enhance social cohesion in Ukraine:

- 1 *Strengthen vertical cohesion:* Given the decline in the indicator measuring the perception that Ukrainian Authorities Care, there is a need to implement targeted measures to reinforce vertical cohesion. This may include initiatives to support personal security, provide quality services, strengthen the sense of accountability, and reduce corruption.
- 2 *Enhance civic duty:* Capitalize on the observed stronger Sense of Civic Duty by implementing programs that promote political efficacy on the local level to influence change and decision making.<sup>2</sup> Focus on enhancing citizens' understanding of and ability to contribute to politics at both national and local levels, and monitoring recovery efforts.
- 3 *Address social intolerance towards the LGBTQI+ community (as the least accepted group after drug addicts):* Recognize the need for targeted interventions to address some social attitudes. Specifically, initiatives should be designed to

<sup>2</sup> Sense of Civic Duty indicator measures internal political efficacy, i.e., the ability to comprehend and contribute to politics; external political efficacy at the national level, i.e., the ability to influence decision-making in the country (reSCORE considers election as a conventional mean for this); and external political efficacy at community level, i.e., belief in the capacity to effect change at the local level within one's community.



promote tolerance towards LGBTQI+ individuals. Public awareness campaigns could be employed to challenge stereotypes and prejudices, fostering a more inclusive and accepting community.

- 4 *Design tailored approaches to prepare for the reintegration of occupied areas:* Recognize the nuanced attitudes towards people living in areas (NGCA) of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts occupied by Russia before 2022, those in occupied Crimea, as well as those living in areas occupied since 2022. Tailor reintegration strategies to account for differences in perceptions and anxieties towards these groups regarding their civic and political orientations.
- 5 *Focus on horizontal relations in specific oblasts:* Understand the root causes of and address the challenges highlighted in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, where lower scores on Social Tolerance, Lack of Social Threat, and Social Proximity were observed. Engage in dialogue and communication efforts to bridge divides and promote understanding towards various groups (displaced persons, people from the east and the west of Ukraine, pro-EU oriented people, people living in the occupied areas, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, perceived military draft evaders).
- 6 *Understand and replicate best practice cases:* Build on the examples of strong and improved horizontal relations and civic duty in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv oblasts, as best-case practices for studying and replicating in other regions, where appropriate and contextually sensitive.

# Introduction

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This report is Part I of a two-part analytical series on social cohesion in Ukraine. It focuses on the evolution of the state of social cohesion in Ukraine, particularly in the aftermath of the escalation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 (also referred to as ‘Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine’). While Part I focuses on trends, Part II unpacks horizontal cohesion and intergroup relations, and zooms into the drivers of those social cohesion elements.

The impact of war on social cohesion is an essential consideration that has profound implications for the present and the future of Ukraine. Simultaneously, robustness and degree of unity play a crucial role in shaping how societies and states respond to invasion, serving as a significant source of resilience (Minich and Sereda 2023, 17, 26-34). The importance of consolidated society for national resilience is also recognized by the government of Ukraine in the Concept of National Resilience System of Ukraine (Office of the President of Ukraine 2021). In addition, social cohesion is among the top priorities of international actors, including but not limited to USAID’s DG East Programme (USAID DGE 2023, 8) and to UNDP efforts in Ukraine (UNDP 2023, 77).

In 2023, through the use of reSCORE, our objective is to investigate the **trends and dynamics of social cohesion** in comparison to pre-full-scale-escalation levels. The most relevant SCORE dataset for such a comparison is the one from 2021. We commence with an overview of how reSCORE 2023 measures social cohesion, adhering to the established conceptual framework from 2021 (Guest and Panayiotou 2021, 7; Panayiotou, Guest, Dryga, and Pissarides 2021, 4), while incorporating relevant updates for contextual sensitivity and adaptation to the challenges facing Ukraine since the full-scale Russian invasion. Subsequently, we analyze trends both at national and oblast levels by drawing from nationally representative random samples. This analysis is also enhanced by interpretations based on correlations using the panel of respondents who participated in the SCORE surveys both in 2021 and in 2023. Longitudinal panel sample analysis increases explanatory power of our framework by considering the relationship between variable changes for the same individuals in 2021 and 2023.

The findings are complemented with observations from other reSCORE publications and reports that investigate drivers and effects of social cohesion indicators through robust statistical modeling.

# How reSCORE Index Measures Social Cohesion in Ukraine?

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This section provides a brief overview of the concept of social cohesion. We take a quick snapshot of its main dimensions as proposed in the literature and examine how reSCORE indicators align with these dimensions.

Intuitively, social cohesion should refer to the state of affairs concerning how well people in society cohere or stick to each other (Chan et al. 2006, 289-291). It encompasses the interactions among diverse social entities—individuals, social groups, and state institutions—across various levels (such as national or local), within distinct domains (political, social, economic), and manifesting in diverse manners (embracing attitudes and perceptions, alongside actions and behaviors).

Scholars often trace its roots back to Emile Durkheim's concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity (Janmaat, 2011, 62). Building upon this framework, some researchers categorize social cohesion into **ideational and relational dimensions** (Janmaat, 2011, 63-64; Schiefer and van der Noll, 2017, 585; Dragolov et al., 2016, 6-8). The ideational dimension refers to shared norms, values, and identities, representing cognitive and affective aspects of social cohesion. Meanwhile, the relational dimension pertains to the observable relationships and social ties among society members and different groups (ibid).

When scholars embark on the task of measuring and evaluating social cohesion, they undertake assessments across various other dimensions. One prevalent perspective involves assessing social cohesion along **horizontal and vertical dimensions**. The horizontal dimension pertains to relationships among diverse individuals and groups within society, while the vertical dimension relates to the connections between the state and its citizens or civil society (Chan et al., 2006, 290; Dragolov et al., 2016, 6-8; Fiedler and Rohles, 2021, 3; Leininger et al., 2021, 3). Arnim Langer et al. (2017, 324) underscore three significant types of relationships relevant to social cohesion: relationships among individuals within the same group; relationships among individuals across different groups; and relationships between individuals and groups and the state.

The classification based on realms, particularly in the **political and socio-cultural spheres**, appears as an alternative representation

of the horizontal and vertical divisions. The political realm aligns with vertical cohesion, while the socio-cultural realm aligns with horizontal cohesion. The economic domain is less prominently featured as an inherent aspect of social cohesion. The European approach, focusing on social exclusions, inequalities, and marginalization, places greater emphasis on the economic dimension compared to the North American approach, which emphasizes solidarity and the bonds that bring people together (Langer et al., 2017, 323-324). However, the economic situation and (in)equality are often viewed more as preconditions or antecedents of social cohesion rather than its integral components (Dickes and Valentova, 2013, 829-830; Schiefer and van der Noll, 2017, 593-594). When individuals have equitable access to resources and are socioeconomically included, it can bolster their trust in others and institutions, facilitate participation and networking, and foster a positive sense of belonging (ibid).

This does not suggest overlooking the economic dimension; quite the opposite, as it can be a significant factor influencing social cohesion. The manner of its incorporation depends on the specific goal of one's exercise. For instance, if the objective is to monitor a key aspect of social cohesion or to construct an index, rather than establishing cause-and-effect relationships, we may consider other indicators related to social cohesion that do not necessarily constitute its essence (ECLAC 2007; SeeD 2022).

In line with this, the horizontal and vertical dimensions can further be augmented by **the focus on the common good dimension**, a cross-cutting element that defies easy attribution to either the horizontal or vertical aspects. This dimension connects and complements both aspects. It manifests in societal actions and attitudes that showcase solidarity, responsibility for others, respect for social rules, and engagement for the community as a whole (Dragolov et al., 2016, 6-8).

Furthermore, social cohesion can manifest in **subjective perceptions and attitudes**, reflecting people's state of mind, and it can also exhibit **objective behavioral manifestations** (Chan et al., 2006, 293-298; Dickes and Valentova, 2013, 828-829). Langer et al. contend that perceptions are outcomes of actual interactions, making behavior more of a driver and determinant of social cohesion than an integral part of it (2017, 324). However, social cohesion encompasses not only emotional and psychological states, but also tangible acts of belonging, trust, cooperation, and assistance. For instance, a high willingness to cooperate and help holds meaning when accompanied by observable social and political participation (Chan et al., 2006, 290). Similarly, behavior lacks significance without considering perceptions. For example,

individuals unfamiliar with each other may collaborate and aid one another after a terrorist attack, yet it does not constitute the manifestation of social cohesion without a shared sense of identity (Chan et al., 2006, 290).

The final conceptual lenses are distinctive and examine social cohesion of a **country or a sub-national community**. These lenses can either complement each other in some instances or potentially undermine one another in different contexts. For instance, when addressing social trust, it can take the form of particularized, identity-based, or generalized trust. Particularized trust, also termed ‘thick’ trust, is rooted in close relations with familiar individuals or family members, coupled with suspicion of strangers. This form tends to prevail in societies in the early stages of modernization (Fiedler and Rohles, 2021, 8; Janmaat, 2011, 72). Identity-based trust is granted based on group membership, such as ethnicity, nationality, religion, or language (Fiedler and Rohles, 2021, 8). These two forms of social trust are often referred to as in-group or ‘bonding’ trust. The third type is generalized, out-group, bridging, or ‘thin’ trust, which encompasses attitudes towards people in general, including strangers (ibid). This type is typically high in advanced post-industrial societies, where citizens’ connections are diverse and grounded in mutual dependencies (Janmaat, 2011, 72). Consequently, if national cohesion is the focus, assessments of communities should ensure that robust communal cohesion does not undermine national cohesion but rather reinforces it.

These conceptualizations and diverse dimensions often complement each other or show overlap. For instance, we can discuss the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of horizontal cohesion, with social trust representing the attitudinal form and social participation constituting the behavioral form—a demonstration of their complementarity. At the same time, while the common good is a distinct dimension, it can include indicators reflecting both horizontal elements (like willingness to help others) and vertical aspects (such as political participation) on national and local levels. In this way, different dimensions often intertwine while preserving their unique elements. For instance, respect for social rules is categorized as part of the common good dimension, as it does not neatly fit into either horizontal or vertical cohesion.

***Hence, for the purposes of this report, social cohesion is understood as the interconnectedness and unity among diverse social entities at national and local levels – individuals, social groups, and institutions – and the positive, collaborative, and harmonious interactions and relationships among those entities, in a society, encompassing shared norms, values, and identities.***

The reSCORE indicators gauging social cohesion can be evaluated and analyzed within any of the aforementioned dimensions and concepts, contingent on practical requirements and the outcomes of statistical tests. SeeD has suggested measuring social cohesion in Ukraine using the following indicators, which can serve as proxies for the measurement of the aforementioned dimensions (Guest and Panayiotou 2021, 7; Panayiotou, Guest, Dryga, and Pissarides 2021, 4):

TABLE 1. INDICATORS OF SOCIAL COHESION AND ITS DIMENSIONS

Indicator <sup>3</sup>	Glossary	Dimensions				
		Ideational (I) – Relational (R)	Horizontal (H) – Vertical (V)	Focus on common good (CG)	Attitudes (A) – Behaviours (B)	National (N) – Community (C) level
Accountability of Authorities	Authorities are absolutely accountable. They can be held accountable.	R	V		A	N
Community Cooperation	People feel that they can rely on members in their community for help and people from their community actively resolve common problems together.	R	H	CG	A & B	C
Lack of Social Threat <sup>4</sup>	Not feeling threatened by people from different regions or with different political ideologies and visions.	R*	H		A	C

See continuation of the Table 1 on the next page ►►

3 In contrast to SeeD's 2021 report on social cohesion based on SCORE (Guest and Panayiotou 2021, 7), we have incorporated Civic Responsibility. Together with Sense of Agency, they form the Sense of Civic Duty indicator, enriching the common good focus dimension. This addition is particularly relevant for a country at war, where a significant part of unity is derived from a shared purpose. Additionally, Political Security has been omitted, as it primarily revolves around the value of freedom of expression and is considered more of a determinant of social cohesion than an integral component.

4 The intergroup indicators (Lack of Social Threat and Social Proximity) include certain groups in their assessment that may differ between 2021 and 2023 due to the full-scale invasion by Russia, leading to the emergence of new groups relevant to social cohesion. Groups that overlap in both years include: people living in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblast (NGCA) as defined before February 2022, internally displaced persons (IDPs) in one's locality, people from the west of Ukraine, people from the east of Ukraine, Pro-EU oriented people, and people living in Crimea.

In the 2021 indicators, the following additional groups were included: pro-Russia oriented people, active military personnel from the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) or Joint Forces Operation (JFO), people who support the separation of NGCA, and Ukrainian nationalists. New groups added in 2023 include people living under occupation since 2022, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Ukrainian men avoiding military service, and Ukrainians who left the country after the war started. These are either newly emerged groups post-full-scale invasion or groups that have become more prominent in public discourse (Russian-speaking Ukrainians).

In 2023, attitudes towards pro-Russia oriented people and individuals working with occupying forces were also measured. However, positive attitudes toward these groups are not considered factors that improve cohesion; on the contrary, they may have the opposite effect. Moreover, such attitudes do not significantly correlate with other groups and are not added as parts of the indicators.

## ►► Continuation of the Table 1. INDICATORS OF SOCIAL COHESION AND ITS DIMENSIONS

Indicator	Glossary	Dimensions				
		Ideational (I) – Relational (R)	Horizontal (H) – Vertical (V)	Focus on common good (CG)	Attitudes (A) – Behaviours (B)	National (N) – Community (C) level
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	Belief that everyone living in Ukraine, irrespective of ethnic or cultural background, can be considered Ukrainian and an integral part of society despite historic divisions.	I			A	N
Sense of Belonging to Country	Feeling attachment to and belonging to the country.	I			A	N
Sense of Civic Duty	Feeling responsible for the future of Ukraine, that ordinary people can change things in their community, their vote matters and can make a difference, and are able to understand and contribute to politics.	I		CG	A	
Social Proximity <sup>5</sup>	Accepting people from different regions or with different political ideologies and visions as close friends.	R*	H		A	N
Social Tolerance	Tolerance towards marginalized groups (e.g., Muslims, Jews, Roma), openness to interact personally, and acceptance in the community.	R*	H	CG	A	C
Ukrainian Authorities Care	Perception that authorities represent citizens' concerns, care equally about all parts of Ukraine, are open to hearing different points of view and are attentive to the needs of ordinary people.	R	V	CG	A	N

\*Social Tolerance, Lack of Social Threat, and Social Proximity can be considered as relational as they are relevant for the regulation of intergroup relations or as ideational as they represent attitudes of shared belonging and respect for diversity.

## National Level Trends

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The reSCORE data suggests that social cohesion has evolved since 2021. The indicators of Ukrainian Authorities Care, Accountability of Authorities, Sense of Civic Duty, and Sense of Belonging to the Country show the most significant improvement (*refer to Table 2*). The full-scale invasion by Russia has notably strengthened vertical cohesion, as people have come together with the state, country, and nation in response to the shared existential threat posed by Russia. This unity is further enhanced by a collective perception of common purpose in response to Russia's full-scale war of aggression. This phenomenon elucidates the heightened emphasis on the common good aspect of social cohesion. Consequently, there is a pronounced enhancement **in the vertical cohesion, sense of civic duty, and belonging to the country**. At the same time, in 2023, Ukrainian Authorities Care and Accountability of Authorities still have the lowest rankings among all social cohesion indicators, leaving room for improvement.

The fact that these changes surpass mere vertical cohesion, which is still not the highest, and extend to the sense of common good and the sense of belonging—both of which also rank at the top—may suggest that this shift is more systemic than just a short-term show of support for the authorities, also known as the 'rally 'round the flag' effect (Chatagnier 2012).

Examining the 2023 values for the Sense of Civic Duty, which has risen by 1.2 since 2021, it is noteworthy that the most pronounced aspects are the sense of responsibility for Ukraine's future and the effectiveness of elections as a conventional means to impact decision-making in the country (external political efficacy). Meanwhile, there is a lower level of belief in the capacity to effect change at the local level within one's community (local external political efficacy) and the ability to comprehend and contribute to politics (internal political efficacy) (*refer to Figure 1*).


Lack of Social Threat and Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity have stayed largely unchanged, yet they remain as high-scoring indicators of social cohesion. The resilience of pluralism and the absence of perceived threats from diverse social groups remains steadfast, enduring through significant displacement, population movements, stress, and other challenges. In addition, other indicators of horizontal relations, such as Social Tolerance, Social Proximity, and Community Cooperation, experienced minimal shifts and consistently maintained average scores, ranging from 5.1 to 5.7 out of 10.



TABLE 2. NATIONAL LEVEL TRENDS IN SOCIAL COHESION INDICATORS: 2021 & 2023, RESCORE

Indicator	2021 (Jan-May)	2023 (Mar-Jun)	Difference	Ideational (I) – Relational (R)	Horizontal (H) – Vertical (V)	Focus on common good (CG)	Attitudes (A) – Behaviours (B)	National (N) – Community (C) level
Ukrainian Authorities Care	2.6	4.6	2.0	R	V	CG	A	N
Accountability of Authorities	2.7	4.1	+1.4	R	V		A	N
Sense of Civic Duty	5.4	6.6	+1.2	I		CG	A	
Sense of Belonging to the Country	7.9	9.0	+1.1	I			A	N
Community Cooperation	5.1	5.5	+0.4	R	H	CG	A & B	C
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	7.3	7.6	+0.3	I			A	N
Social Proximity Towards: Different Groups for SC	5.2	5.4	+0.2	R	H		A	N
Social Tolerance	5.6	5.7	+0.1	R	H	CG	A	C
Lack of Social Threat Towards: Different Groups for SC	7.2	6.9	-0.3	R	H		A	C


FIGURE 1. SENSE OF CIVIC DUTY, RESCORE 2023



Examining the 2023 figures of the Social Tolerance indicator, the most accepted groups for personal interaction are immigrants, Jews, individuals with different skin colors, and Muslims (*refer to Figure 2*). While Romas are generally accepted within communities, this acceptance does not always translate into personal interaction. Moreover, less tolerance is expressed towards the LGBTQI+ community and drug addicts: most respondents prefer them to not be present in their communities.

FIGURE 2. SOCIAL TOLERANCE, RESCORE 2023


How do you feel about the various groups of people listed below?



Regarding intergroup relations, individuals who are pro-Russia oriented and those collaborating with the occupying forces are perceived as threats to public order within the community and are not considered acceptable as friends by most respondents (*refer to Figure 3*). In light of the Russian full-scale war against Ukraine, which poses a threat to the physical existence of people, these perceptions should be considered reasonable. Positive attitudes towards these groups would not contribute to social cohesion but could instead compromise national security and defense priorities. As a result, these groups are intentionally excluded from this paper to maintain a focus on indicators related to Social Proximity and Lack of Social Threat.

FIGURE 3. INTERGROUP RELATIONS, RESCORE 2023

1 Social Proximity: Would you accept members of the following groups as your close friends?



2 Social Threat: Do you believe that increasing numbers of the following groups will threaten public order of your community?



Among the remaining groups, Ukrainian men avoiding military service and individuals residing in the non-government-controlled areas (NGCA) of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, as defined before February 24, 2022 (prior to the Russian full-scale invasion), are considered the least acceptable as close friends. Simultaneously, individuals from NGCA of Donetsk and Luhansk oblast, as defined before February 24, and people from occupied Crimea are more frequently perceived as threats to their communities. Although the percentage of those unequivocally considering people in Crimea (10%) as a threat is lower than those living in the NGCA of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (19%), there has been a notable, 20% increase in those expressing uncertainty, with 'Maybe' answers growing from 35% in 2021 to 55% in 2023.

The more negative perception of people living under Russian occupation since 2014-15, compared to those occupied after 2022, may be attributed to the former having lived longer under Russian occupation and, hence, leading to their perception that they are more embedded, willingly or unwillingly, into the workings of the occupying forces, or that they normalize, tolerate, or accept the occupation to an extent. A survey commissioned by Opora reported that these groups may be perceived as potentially supporting Russia or being opportunistic, rather than being hostages to the situation or the occupiers (Opora 2023).

Moreover, substantial displacement has not led to any disruption in social cohesion in Ukraine. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are widely accepted, and there is only a small difference in the perception of Lack of Social Threat between IDPs and those who remained in their original locations (7.6 vs. 6.9, respectively). At the same time, displaced individuals are more inclined to accept other displaced persons as close friends compared to those who stayed (7.0 vs. 5.7 for Social Proximity).

To monitor changes in the levels of social cohesion indicators during the ongoing full-scale war, we can draw on the SHARP dataset.<sup>6</sup> It is important to note that direct comparisons between reSCORE and SHARP datasets are not feasible due to variations in data collection methods and sampling approaches. Instead, we can observe trends and dynamics for specific social cohesion indicators measured by SHARP (acknowledging that our study incorporates indicators beyond the scope of SHARP measurement).

A prominent observation from SHARP surveys is the decline in the perception of Ukrainian Authorities Care in 2023, as compared

<sup>6</sup> SHARP is the SCORE-inspired Holistic Assessment of Resilience of Population. Please refer to the [Methodology](#) section for details.

to 2022 (refer to Table 3). This signifies a reduction in vertical cohesion compared to the previous year. Despite this decrease, as demonstrated by reSCORE, perceptions on the Ukrainian Authorities Care indicator remain higher than the pre-invasion levels, indicating that vertical cohesion persists but undergoes a diminishing trend. This points to a pressing challenge in sustaining the vertical cohesion. Notably, other dimensions measured by SHARP point at relatively stable societal trends.

TABLE 3. SOME ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL COHESION: 2022 V 2023, SHARP

Indicator	2022 (autumn)	2023 (spring)	Difference
Ukrainian Authorities Care	5.8	4.5	-1.3
Sense of Civic Duty	7.6	7.3	-0.3
Sense of Belonging to the Country	9.5	9.3	-0.2
Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	8.2	8.2	0.0
Community Cooperation	5.5	5.6	0.1
Social Tolerance	6.9	7.2	0.3

This suggests that the observed changes and shifts, marked by a significant increase in Sense of Civic Duty and the Sense of Belonging to the Country compared to 2021 (which is still sustained in 2023), may be more enduring and transformative, indicating profound systemic societal changes. However, confirming this hypothesis would require a long-term, longitudinal observation to understand the character and sustainability of these shifts. This transformation is not abrupt; the elevated Sense of Belonging to the Country in 2021 and the moderate level of Civic Duty at that time suggest that these processes were not sudden and have deep-seated systemic roots in the societal attitudes.

In conclusion, the analysis underscores the resilience of horizontal relations in Ukraine, as well as the boost in the sense of unity, belonging, and the shared purpose in response to the escalation of war by Russia to its full-scale scope (also referred to as 'Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine'). Nevertheless, the decreasing perception of Ukrainian Authorities Care in 2023 raises concerns about the sustainability of vertical cohesion. Besides, there is room for improvement for Civic Duty when it comes to internal and local external political efficacy. Recognizing these dynamics is essential for informed strategies aimed at maintaining social cohesion amidst ongoing challenges.

## Regional Level Trends

### Ukrainian Authorities Care and Accountability of Authorities:

According to the reSCORE survey, values for vertical cohesion in 2023 show an increase compared to 2021 in almost all surveyed oblasts. Ternopil and Rivne oblasts are the only two exceptions, where the changes are not significant for both Ukrainian Authorities Care and Accountability of Authorities. It is worth noting that the scores for these oblasts were already notably higher than the rest of the sample in 2021, and in 2023, they remained at the same level. Meanwhile, Kherson and Sumy oblasts score the lowest on the Ukrainian Authorities Care indicator, despite an increase in respective values in 2023 compared to 2021.

TABLE 4. REGIONAL TRENDS: 2021 & 2023, RESCORE

		Ukrainian Authorities Care	Accountability of Authorities	Sense of Civic Duty	Social Tolerance	Lack of Social Threat Towards: Different Groups for SC	Social Proximity Towards: Different Groups for SC	Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity	Sense of Belonging to the Country	Community Cooperation
Total	2021	2.6	2.7	5.4	5.6	7.2	5.2	7.3	7.9	5.1
	2023	4.6	4.1	6.6	5.7	6.9	5.4	7.6	9.0	5.5
	difference	2.0	1.4	1.2	0.1	-0.3	0.2	0.3	1.1	0.4
Zakarpattia oblast	2021	1.9	3.7	4.5	3.5	7.6	4.3	7.2	6.8	4.9
	2023	4.8	4.4	5.6	4.6	7.3	5.3	6.6	8.7	5.5
	difference	2.9	0.7	1.1	1.1	-0.3	1.0	-0.6	1.9	0.6
Lviv oblast	2021	2.4	2.3	6.4	4.5	8.0	5.2	7.6	9.5	5.1
	2023	4.7	4.5	7.1	5.6	6.6	5.2	7.9	9.3	6.2
	difference	2.3	2.2	0.7	1.1	-1.4	0.0	0.3	-0.2	1.1

See continuation of the Table 4 on the next page ►►

►► Continuation of the Table 4. REGIONAL TRENDS: 2021 & 2023, RESCORE

Ivano-Frankivsk oblast	2021	2.1	2.4	5.7	5.4	7.7	5.9	6.4	8.6	5.5
	2023	4.8	4.1	6.8	3.8	5.0	4.1	7.6	9.3	5.6
	difference	2.7	1.7	1.1	-1.6	-2.7	-1.8	1.2	0.7	0.1
Chernivtsi oblast	2021	2.9	2.6	6.2	6.0	7.7	6.0	7.3	8.2	5.4
	2023	4.6	4.2	6.7	5.6	6.3	5.4	8.0	9.4	5.7
	difference	1.7	1.6	0.5	-0.4	-1.4	-0.6	0.7	1.2	0.3
Ternopil oblast	2021	4.8	4.0	5.3	6.8	8.4	6.6	8.0	8.3	5.0
	2023	4.3	3.7	6.6	5.6	6.1	5.4	8.1	8.6	5.4
	difference	-0.5	-0.3	1.3	-1.2	-2.3	-1.2	0.1	0.3	0.4
Khmelnyskiy oblast	2021	3.5	3.2	5.4	5.0	6.6	4.9	7.0	8.0	5.6
	2023	4.1	4.2	6.4	4.9	6.8	5.2	7.1	8.5	5.0
	difference	0.6	1.0	1.0	-0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.5	-0.6
Volyn oblast	2021	2.8	3.0	6.2	5.0	6.7	4.8	7.4	7.3	6.1
	2023	4.8	3.9	6.5	4.5	6.4	4.4	6.7	8.7	5.2
	difference	2.0	0.9	0.3	-0.5	-0.3	-0.4	-0.7	1.4	-0.9
Rivne oblast	2021	3.8	3.8	6.4	6.1	7.2	5.8	7.5	8.7	6.5
	2023	3.8	4.0	6.8	5.5	6.5	5.0	6.6	9.2	4.9
	difference	0.0	0.2	0.4	-0.6	-0.7	-0.8	-0.9	0.5	-1.6
Zhytomyr oblast	2021	2.9	3.0	5.9	6.2	6.6	5.8	8.0	8.0	5.4
	2023	4.2	3.5	6.4	5.7	6.6	5.8	7.4	8.7	5.0
	difference	1.3	0.5	0.5	-0.5	0.0	0.0	-0.6	0.7	-0.4
Vinnytsia oblast	2021	2.6	2.7	5.9	6.0	7.4	5.2	8.2	7.5	5.5
	2023	4.5	3.7	7.0	6.0	7.5	5.7	7.8	9.3	5.8
	difference	1.9	1.0	1.1	0.0	0.1	0.5	-0.4	1.8	0.3
Cherkasy oblast	2021	2.5	2.5	5.6	6.1	7.7	4.5	8.1	8.6	5.3
	2023	4.7	3.8	7.0	6.4	7.1	5.7	8.0	9.1	5.5
	difference	2.2	1.3	1.4	0.3	-0.6	1.2	-0.1	0.5	0.2
Poltava oblast	2021	2.2	2.3	5.1	5.7	5.8	4.9	7.7	8.3	4.7
	2023	5.2	4.0	6.4	5.5	6.8	5.1	7.4	8.8	5.6
	difference	3.0	1.7	1.3	-0.2	1.0	0.2	-0.3	0.5	0.9
Kirovohrad oblast	2021	2.0	2.8	4.5	6.6	7.1	4.6	7.4	6.4	5.2
	2023	5.1	3.5	5.8	7.0	7.0	6.2	7.3	8.5	6.0
	difference	3.1	0.7	1.3	0.4	-0.1	1.6	-0.1	2.1	0.8

See continuation of the Table 4 on the next page ►►

►► Continuation of the Table 4. REGIONAL TRENDS: 2021 &amp; 2023, RESCORE

Kyiv city	2021	3.0	2.9	6.0	6.5	7.5	5.5	7.3	7.9	4.4
	2023	5.1	4.1	6.9	6.1	7.4	5.3	7.9	9.3	5.1
	difference	2.1	1.2	0.9	-0.4	-0.1	-0.2	0.6	1.4	0.7
Kyiv oblast	2021	3.0	2.7	6.0	5.4	7.1	5.1	6.9	7.5	4.9
	2023	5.2	4.7	6.6	5.1	7.2	4.8	7.6	8.5	5.4
	difference	2.2	2.0	0.6	-0.3	0.1	-0.3	0.7	1.0	0.5
Chernihiv oblast	2021	2.2	1.6	5.1	4.6	6.5	4.1	7.5	7.9	5.1
	2023	4.3	3.8	6.8	6.1	7.7	5.8	7.0	8.6	5.7
	difference	2.1	2.2	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.7	-0.5	0.7	0.6
Sumy oblast	2021	2.2	3.0	4.7	4.7	7.4	3.5	7.7	7.1	4.8
	2023	3.5	3.7	6.7	5.5	7.1	5.0	7.5	9.1	5.0
	difference	1.3	0.7	2.0	0.8	-0.3	1.5	-0.2	2.0	0.2
Kharkiv oblast	2021	1.6	2.1	4.8	5.4	6.8	5.1	6.5	7.7	4.4
	2023	4.7	3.8	6.5	6.5	7.6	7.1	7.9	9.1	5.9
	difference	3.1	1.7	1.7	1.1	0.8	2.0	1.4	1.4	1.5
Dnipropetrovsk oblast	2021	3.2	3.3	5.3	5.5	7.1	5.4	7.3	7.5	5.3
	2023	4.8	4.3	6.4	6.3	6.7	5.8	8.0	9.1	6.0
	difference	1.6	1.0	1.1	0.8	-0.4	0.4	0.7	1.6	0.7
Zaporizhzhia oblast	2021	3.3	2.7	5.0	4.8	6.7	5.1	6.9	7.5	4.8
	2023	4.0	3.9	6.4	5.7	6.1	6.3	7.3	9.1	4.4
	difference	0.7	1.2	1.4	0.9	-0.6	1.2	0.4	1.6	-0.4
Mykolaiv oblast	2021	2.2	2.6	5.2	6.2	8.3	4.6	7.9	8.1	5.0
	2023	5.3	3.4	6.8	8.1	8.3	5.9	7.3	9.9	5.1
	difference	3.1	0.8	1.6	1.9	0.0	1.3	-0.6	1.8	0.1
Kherson oblast	2021	2.7	3.0	5.2	5.9	7.6	5.5	7.7	7.7	5.6
	2023	3.5	4.2	7.3	7.4	7.4	7.1	7.5	8.7	5.2
	difference	0.8	1.2	2.1	1.5	-0.2	1.6	-0.2	1.0	-0.4
Odesa oblast	2021	1.6	2.1	4.9	5.6	7.1	5.5	7.5	8.1	4.8
	2023	4.4	4.5	6.6	6.6	7.3	6.0	8.4	9.1	5.4
	difference	2.8	2.4	1.7	1.0	0.2	0.5	0.9	1.0	0.6

**Shaded Cells Note:**

Blue shading indicates higher values for the respective oblasts in 2021 and 2023 compared to the rest of the sample, or higher values in 2023 compared to 2021. Violet shading denotes lower values. Lighter shaded cells have Cohen's  $d > 0.4$ , and darker shades have Cohen's  $d > 0.65$ . Higher Cohen's  $d$  values signify stronger differences. All shaded differences are statistically significant based on the ANOVA test with a  $p$ -value  $< 0.05$ .



**Sense of Civic Duty:** In 2023, all oblasts, except Volyn oblast, show a statistically significant increase in the Sense of Civic Duty compared to 2021 (i.e., p-value is lower than 0.05). The most notable increases are observed in liberated or frontline oblasts, with Kherson (+2.1), Sumy (+2.0), Chernihiv (+1.7), Kharkiv (+1.7), Odesa (+1.7), and Mykolaiv (+1.6) oblasts experiencing the strongest growth.

**Social Tolerance:** While Social Tolerance at the national level has seen little change compared to 2021, there are notable regional variations. In some oblasts, tolerance is either higher or not statistically different from 2021, but in **Ivano-Frankivsk**<sup>7</sup> (-1.6) and Ternopil (-1.2) oblasts it is considerably lower than in 2021. Despite higher values compared to 2021, **Ivano-Frankivsk** (3.8 vs. 5.7), Volyn (4.5 vs. 5.7), and Zakarpattia (4.6 vs. 5.7) have the lowest scores compared to other oblasts in 2023.

Conversely, there is notably higher Social Tolerance in **Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts** – which are frontline oblasts – compared to their 2021 values and compared to other oblasts in 2023.

**Lack of Social Threat:** The Lack of Social Threat shows little difference between 2021 and 2023 nationally, but there are some regional differences. There is a significant decrease in the Lack of Social Threat in the west, particularly in Lviv, Chernivtsi, Ternopil, and **Ivano-Frankivsk** oblasts. Here, attitudes have soured towards various groups, including those from the western and eastern regions of Ukraine, pro-EU-oriented individuals, and people from Crimea. **Ivano-Frankivsk** oblast also scores among the lowest in 2023 (5.0 for the Lack of Social Threat) for 9 out of the 11 groups reSCORE uses to measure this indicator.

Conversely, Chernihiv and Poltava oblasts have higher values in 2023 compared to 2021. Mykolaiv oblast stands out with the highest value compared to other oblasts in 2023.

**Social Proximity:** In 2023, **Ivano-Frankivsk oblast** records the lowest score for Social Proximity compared to other oblasts, and this value has notably decreased from 2021. The decline is particularly pronounced for the attitudes towards people from the east of Ukraine, those who are pro-EU oriented, and individuals from Crimea. The lowest value in 2023 is observed for Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Conversely, **Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts** demonstrate

7 Oblast names in bold are those oblasts which show higher values for the indicator in focus when compared to its values in 2021 as well as when compared to the values of other oblasts in 2023. The Cohen's d is higher than 0.40.

higher scores in 2023 compared to their respective figures in 2021 and in comparison to other oblasts in 2023.

**Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity:** In 2023, Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity has significantly increased compared to 2021 in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts. However, it is lower in **Zakarpattia and Rivne oblasts** compared to other regions, and these oblasts also demonstrate a decrease from 2021.

**Sense of Belonging to the Country:** Zakarpattia, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Sumy, and Mykolaiv oblasts have experienced the strongest boost in Sense of Belonging to the Country.

**Community Cooperation:** Community Cooperation has strengthened compared to 2021 in Lviv and Kharkiv oblasts, while it has weakened in Rivne oblast.

**General patterns and observations:** In terms of social cohesion, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast displays weaker intergroup relations, scoring significantly lower than other regions in 2023 and also to their values in 2021. This is evident across various indicators, including Social Tolerance, Lack of Social Threat, and Social Proximity. Conversely, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv oblasts, located near the frontline, demonstrate higher levels of Social Tolerance, Lack of Social Threat, and Social Proximity in 2023 compared to 2021 and other regions in 2023. Additionally, they experience the most significant boost in Sense of Civic Duty. Meanwhile, regional differences in other indicators are either less pronounced or do not show divergent trends and patterns.

In the subsequent section of this paper, we will delve into the relationship between these social cohesion indicators and their potential drivers or effects.

## Unpacking Trends

In this chapter, we employ panel correlations to elucidate the shifts in indicators measuring social cohesion.<sup>8</sup> The panel sample enables us to measure the changes in indicators by focusing on the same individuals and their responses to identical questions in both 2021 and 2023, thereby tracking them over time. Consequently, our analysis goes beyond mere examination of the relationship between indicators in a single year, offering a nuanced understanding of the dynamics by exploring changes in these indicators between 2021 and 2023.<sup>9</sup> The table below presents brief interpretations to help us better understand the trends.

TABLE 5. UNPACKING CHANGES IN SOCIAL COHESION INDICATORS, PANEL SAMPLE

Change indicator of social cohesion based on the panel sample (167 respondents) <sup>9</sup>	National change (random samples, 2023 minus 2021)	Correlations with other indicators from two time points and respective values of Pearson's correlation coefficient $r$ that can help explain the change
<b>Increase in Ukrainian Authorities Care</b>	+2.0	...is linked to a rise in <b>Personal Security</b> ( $r=.44$ ), supporting the protection hypothesis, and indicating that security is an important social expectation from the state (Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret 2021, 6). There is also an increase in <b>Trust in Central Institutions</b> (president, government, parliament, courts) with an $r=.34$ . Furthermore, there is a boost in the <b>Provision of Services</b> ( $r=.32$ ), aligning with the performance hypothesis, suggesting that citizens anticipate quality public services as an important state responsibility (Cloutier et al. 2021, 28; Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret 2021, 6). Additionally, there is a decrease in the <b>Perceived Level of Corruption</b> ( $r=-.33$ ) and an increase in <b>Accountability of Authorities</b> . This supports the Inclusiveness or Political Performance hypothesis, which advocates that the social contract should benefit the broader population rather than a select few (Cloutier et al. 2021, 28; Mishler and Rose 2001, 310).

See continuation of the Table 5 on the next page ►►

8 For the demographic composition of the panel sample please refer to [Methodology](#) section.

9 However, it is crucial to acknowledge that these correlations do not provide insight into causality of relations or the direction of causation. They do not clarify whether social cohesion indicators act as drivers or effects of other explanatory indicators in the right column. This limitation highlights the need for caution in interpreting causality from correlation alone. Part 2 of this report investigates various relationships with more sophisticated analyses, to disentangle certain dynamics and test certain hypotheses about the drivers and outcome of social cohesion.

10 In this analysis, our focus is on correlations surpassing 0.30 or falling below -0.30. Consequently, not all indicators are included in the table where the correlations are lower.

►► Continuation of the Table 5. UNPACKING CHANGES IN SOCIAL COHESION INDICATORS, PANEL SAMPLE

Change indicator of social cohesion based on the panel sample (167 respondents) <sup>9</sup>	National change (random samples, 2023 minus 2021)	Correlations with other indicators from two time points and respective values of Pearson's correlation coefficient <i>r</i> that can help explain the change
<p><b>Increase in Accountability of Authorities</b></p>	<p>+1.4</p>	<p>...is associated with a rise in <b>Personal Security</b> (<math>r=.30</math>), <b>Trust in Central Institutions</b> (<math>r=.38</math>), and a decrease in the <b>Perceived Level of Corruption</b> (<math>r=-.28</math>).</p> <p>This mirrors the substantial correlation between Accountability and the Ukrainian Authorities Care.</p>
<p><b>Decrease in Social Proximity Towards Groups</b> measured in 2021 and 2023 (People Living in NGCA, IDPs, People from the West of Ukraine, People from the East of Ukraine, pro-EU Oriented People, People from Crimea)</p>	<p>NA</p>	<p>...is associated with a decrease in <b>Readiness for Dialogue</b> with the following groups: People Living in NGCA (<math>r=.48</math>), IDPs (<math>r=.47</math>), People from West of Ukraine (<math>r=.39</math>), People from East of Ukraine (<math>r=.48</math>), pro-EU Oriented People (<math>r=.47</math>), and People from Crimea (<math>r=.51</math>). Consequently, acceptance of individuals from these groups as close friends is linked to the belief that these groups are open to hearing arguments, willing to discuss them, and that engaging in dialogue with them would result in mutual benefits.</p> <p>Although the change in Social Proximity at the national level is negligible, these observations can be pertinent for regions experiencing a significant decrease in Social Proximity.</p>

# Methodology

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Data from the Ukraine reSCORE in 2023 relies on face-to-face, structured and quantitative interviews with citizens in Ukraine, collected between March 26th and June 12th, 2023. The data, covering 5,914 respondents, is representative of all territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine at the time of surveying, excluding the temporarily occupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Additionally, the reSCORE 2023 also includes a distinct sample of 167 panel respondents who were surveyed as part of SCORE 2021.

The Ukraine SCORE in 2021 relied on data from face-to-face, structured and quantitative interviews with citizens in Ukraine, collected between January and May 2021. The data, covering 12,482 respondents, was representative of all territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine at the time of surveying, including Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.

The SCORE-inspired Holistic Assessment of Resilience of Population (SHARP) is a surveying tool, funded by the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU), and implemented in partnership with SeeD, the USAID funded Democratic Governance East (DG East), USAID's Transformation Communications Activity (TCA) and the UNDP. The SHARP study and the data presented herein are based on a quantitative nationwide random sampling survey deployed at two time points – Wave 1 between 23rd September and 5th of October 2022 (N = 4,327), and Wave 2 between 27th June and 20th August 2023 (N = 4,995). For both studies, data was collected through structured and quantitative computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI).

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to detect the statistical significance of differences in the indicators of social cohesion over time as well as between each oblast and the rest of the sample. Differences are reported if they are significant to  $p < 0.05$ , and if  $F > 20$  or the Cohen's  $d$  effect size between two groups is greater than 0.4. Significant differences are considered small if the Cohen's  $d$  effect size is between 0.2 and 0.4, "medium" if it is between 0.4 and 0.8, and "large" if it is greater than 0.8

TABLE 6: DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE

		Panel Sample reSCORE, 2021-2023	Main Sample reSCORE 2023
	Sample size	167	5,914
Sex	Men	37%	47%
	Women	63%	53%
Age	18-35	17%	29%
	36-59	49%	43%
	60+	34%	28%
Displacement	Internally displaced persons	10%	5%
	Returnees	10%	8%
	Stayers	80%	87%
Urbanity	Rural	27%	35%
	Urban	73%	65%
Income	No money for food	8%	7%
	Money for food but not clothes	43%	32%
	Money for clothes but not expensive goods	38%	45%
	Enough money for expensive goods	11%	16%
Education	Primary	2%	1%
	Secondary academic	16%	18%
	Secondary vocational	43%	44%
	Higher	39%	37%
Employment	Employed	50%	51%
	Running a household or maternity leave	12%	8%
	Pensioner	31%	26%
	Student	0%	5%
	Unemployed	8%	11%
Macroregion	North	29%	23%
	West	16%	37%
	Centre	22%	17%
	South-East	33%	22%

# How to Read reSCORE


reSCORE quantifies the levels of societal phenomena using indicators based on questions from the reSCORE survey. Using several questions to create one indicator allows us to reliably measure particular phenomenon from different perspectives. Scores for each indicator are given a value from 0 to 10, where 0 corresponds to the total absence of a phenomenon in an individual, location or in society, and 10 corresponds to its strong presence. Heatmaps, such as the one shown here, give the score achieved by each oblast in our sample in that indicator.

For example, the indicator Pluralistic Ukrainian Identity shown here, is measured using two questions, on a scale from 0 (“Strongly disagree”) to 3 (“Strongly agree”).

- 1 I think all people living in Ukraine can be Ukrainians no matter their ethnic or religious backgrounds.
- 2 I think in Ukraine, we have always been one people, despite all wars, conflicts and historic divisions.

The responses to these questions are then summed and rescaled from 0 to 10 to give the scores shown on the map below, based on the equation:  $(Q1+Q2)*(10/6)$ .

MAP. PLURALISTIC UKRAINIAN IDENTITY



## About reSCORE Ukraine

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reSCORE Ukraine, which is a joint initiative funded by the USAID and UNDP, and implemented by SeeD, serves as an annual assessment tool of societal resilience and recovery aimed at informing the policies and programming of national, regional, and international partners. Like its predecessor, the Ukraine SCORE 2018 to 2021, it aims to identify pathways to meaningful change and respond to complex needs, geared at strengthening individual and collective coping mechanisms, and fostering a democratic, just, inclusive, and cohesive Ukraine.



## About Partners

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### **Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD)**

works with international development organizations, governments, and civil society leaders to design and implement evidence-based, people-centered strategies for the development of peaceful, inclusive, and sustainable societies. Working in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, SeeD provides policy advice for social transformation that is based on citizen engagement strategies and empirical understanding of the behavior of individuals, groups, and communities. SeeD's approach focuses on understanding the root causes of social problems by developing and empirically testing a science-based theory of change.

### **Democratic Governance East Activity (DG East)**

is an 8-year programme of The United States Agency for International Development (USAID). DG East works with civil society, local government entities, and independent media outlets in and from eastern and southern Ukraine to strengthen the connection and trust between citizens and their government. The overall objectives of DG East are to 1) support greater acceptance of a shared civic culture based on common values and understanding; and 2) promote participation to improve Ukraine's governance, reform processes, and help resolve community problems. The programme addresses immediate war-response needs, promotes good governance, and strengthens an inclusive civic identity.

### **USAID's Transformation Communications Activity (TCA)**

is a six-year activity of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which aims to strengthen Ukrainian democracy through comprehensive research, innovative communication initiatives, and the creation of socially meaningful content.

### **The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

supports strategic capacity development initiatives to promote inclusive growth and sustainable human development. Through partnerships with national, regional, and local governments, civil society, and the private sector, UNDP strives to support Ukraine in its efforts to eliminate poverty, develop the population's capacity, achieve equitable results, sustain the environment, and advance democratic governance.

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