Information Integrity for Electoral Institutions and Processes:

Reference Manual for UNDP Practitioners

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Foreword

2024 is a hugely significant elections year. Some 2 billion people in 72 countries, about half the adult population of the globe, will have the chance to vote, far more in one year than ever before. Yet our information ecosystems seem more fragile than ever. As the UN system's foremost provider of electoral assistance, UNDP is naturally concerned about the impacts of information pollution on the electoral institutions and processes we support. We are not alone – the alarm is being sounded globally about the dissemination of false and misleading content online and offline to undermine or delegitimize electoral institutions and processes.

UNDP's long and diverse electoral support experience, together with the mandate to address information integrity as part of an open and inclusive public sphere under the Governance for People and Plan Programme, puts us in a unique position to contribute to programmatic best practice and learning in this emerging field.

"Information Integrity for Electoral Institutions and Processes: Reference Manual for UNDP Practitioners", enhances our collective ability to respond in a coherent and consistent way to impacts of information pollution on electoral institutions and processes. It provides a mapping of recent programmatic approaches implemented by UNDP and guidance on their effective implementation. It collates useful resources, both internal and external, for those seeking to broaden their understanding of the challenges and responses.

This manual serves as an important resource for UNDP and our partners by equipping programme teams with the knowledge and tools to navigate this complex landscape and to mobilize and convene other stakeholders to protect electoral institutions and processes from the harmful impacts of information pollution.

On behalf of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS), I extend my thanks to UNDP's Global Policy Centre for Governance in Oslo for leading this important work, and to the Democratic Institutions and Processes team for supporting its production. I encourage you, dear colleagues, to take the time to familiarize yourselves with the programmatic approaches, resources, and case studies and use these to bring new ideas and thinking to this challenging issue.

Marcos Neto
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UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau
for Policy and Programme Support

Acronyms

AI	Artificial Intelligence
API	Application Programming Interface
CO	Country Office
CSO	Civil society organization
EMB	Electoral Management Body
EU	European Union
G4PP	Governance for People and Plan
IT	Information Technology
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIL	Media and Information Literacy
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NLP	Natural Language Processing
OEA	Office of Electoral Assistance
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SELECT	Sustaining Peace During Electoral Processes
TFGBV	Technology-facilitated gender-based violence

Glossary of terms

Information integrity: The accuracy, consistency and reliability of information content, processes and systems to maintain a healthy information ecosystem.[1]

Information pollution: Verifiably false, misleading and manipulated content online and offline, which is created, produced and disseminated intentionally or unintentionally and which has the potential to cause harm.[2]

Disinformation: Information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country.[3]

Misinformation: Information that is false but not created with the intention of causing harm.[4]

Hate speech: "any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor".[5]

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1   UNDP (2022). Strategic Guidance: Information Integrity: Forging a pathway to Truth, Resilience and Trust.

2   Adapted from C. Wardle and H. Derakshan (2017). Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking. Council of Europe.

3   Ibid.

4   Ibid.

5   United Nations (UN) (2019). United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, p. 2.

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1.
Introduction

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Purpose and use of this reference manual

The Information Integrity for Electoral Institutions and Processes: Reference Manual for UNDP Practitioners **provides a compendium of existing practice that spotlights the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) approach towards strengthening information integrity in support of electoral institutions and processes.** It leverages insights from a diversity of programming initiatives at the global, regional and local levels and provides a consolidated overview of programmatic approaches and initiatives. In doing so, it serves as a key reference tool for UNDP and its partners to identify appropriate and effective interventions, and to define their scope and timing to prevent, manage or mitigate the impact of information pollution on electoral institutions and processes.

The information presented in this reference manual focuses on UNDP projects implemented from 2020 to 2023. This timeframe was defined because of the rapidly evolving threats to information integrity and the need for currency in programming for this reference manual. The data were sourced online from UNDP and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) conducting electoral information integrity projects. Further data and guidance were collected through consultations with UNDP Regional Hubs, Country Offices and thematic experts for their insights and contributions.

Information integrity in electoral institutions and processes

Inclusive, resilient and adaptive electoral institutions and processes are a critical pillar of democratic governance, contributing to the upholding of democratic principles and values, and providing an enabling environment for development to occur and be sustained. In a thriving democracy, citizens rely on accurate, timely and reliable information to make informed decisions about their leaders and policies.

Promoting information integrity is particularly essential for preserving the transparency and credibility of elections, allowing citizens to participate fully in those processes and make choices based on facts rather than falsehoods. Information pollution can be weaponized to influence public opinion, sway voters and create distrust, both in electoral processes and in the institutions and the values that support them. It is a direct threat to the democratic electoral system. In the digital age, where information spreads rapidly through various channels, the potential for information pollution to disrupt electoral processes is amplified. Without measures to counteract this pollution, the information ecosystem—including media coverage, public discourse and information dissemination—becomes vulnerable to manipulation and interference, undermining the very foundation of democratic governance.

Impacts of information pollution

The Internet, and particularly social media, has democratized communications and created more inclusion opportunities for underrepresented groups in political processes. Social media has been shown to empower marginalized groups to advance counter-narratives, pre-empt political spin and build diverse networks of dissent.[6] However, it is also evident that a largely unregulated online flow of information pollution is undermining public trust, political inclusiveness and democratic institutions.

Certain facets of this challenge are particularly worrying for electoral contexts. New technologies that can rapidly produce and disseminate information pollution are increasingly available at a low cost to any actor who wishes to use them. The increasing sophistication of content generated by artificial intelligence (AI) means that disinformation is more believable, more emotionally resonant, easier to produce and increasingly difficult to detect and counter. More and more, disinformation narratives spread freely through encrypted messaging applications (apps), making it very challenging to track their reach and counter them with accurate information. The micro-targeting of political advertising allows for very specific demographic groups to be reached with potentially disruptive or misleading political messages. Women holding or running for political office have emerged as a group particularly targeted for disinformation campaigns. Gendered disinformation is increasingly being deployed to discredit and silence women political leaders and candidates.[7]

All of these vulnerabilities are felt more acutely in more fragile political contexts which lack the institutions and capabilities to provide effective countermeasures. Social media companies have arguably invested insufficient resources to adequately address information pollution on their platforms, particularly in Global Majority countries and in minority languages. At the same time, legacy media (TV, radio, print) are facing stark financial pressures, partly due to advertising revenue lost to online platforms. Information vacuums created by local and community media closure in particular are being filled by sometimes dubious information sources.[8]

6   S.J. Jackson, M. Bailey and B.F. Welles (2020). *# HashtagActivism: Networks of race and gender justice*. MIT Press.

7   UNDP and Tech for Democracy (2023). Promoting Information Integrity in Elections: Global Reflections from Election Stakeholders.

8   D. Ardia, E. Ringel, V.S. Ekstrand and A. Fox (2020). Addressing the decline of local news, rise of platforms, and spread of mis-and disinformation online. UNC Center for Media Law and Policy.

Furthermore, the rise in online threats and harassment of electoral stakeholders, such as election officials, candidates, voters and journalists, as well as election observers and fact-checkers, is creating intimidating environments in which they must work. This heightens political tensions and creates the risks of disputed elections, social unrest and electoral violence. Combined, these conditions create a fractured information ecosystem resulting in political polarization, distortion of public debate, voter manipulation and the dampened political participation of women, young people and minority communities.[9]

The UN Secretary-General's 2023 report, *Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization* specifically points to "the spread of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech online, in particular taking into account the evolving nature and influence of artificial intelligence. Moreover, there are differing views as to how best to address such phenomena, including concerns that restrictions on content could unduly restrict freedom of expression. The issue is more clear-cut, however, when disinformation is specific to the administration of the electoral process, including legal and operational features such as eligibility and voting rights; registration requirements; the date, location and manner of polling; and the announcement of election results. Deliberately circulating falsehoods about such aspects of elections, for example, in an attempt to suppress or change voting behaviour, should be considered unacceptable under any circumstance." [10]

As these threats are emerging and evolving, institutions responsible for administering or otherwise supporting elections, such as Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and media regulatory bodies, often do not have the skills, technology and capacities to develop strategies for countering disinformation.[11] Recognizing this gap, this document provides a catalogue of programmatic options previously implemented by UNDP and aimed at strengthening the capacity of partner institutions and other electoral stakeholders to effectively address these challenges.

Information integrity in UNDP

Since the information integrity workstream was first created in 2020, it has developed into a significant policy, research and programming portfolio with global, regional, and country-level initiatives ongoing. It has been successfully integrated into the strategic direction of UNDP, through the UNDP Strategic Plan 2022–2025 which refers to the importance of access to information on issues of public interest, and the Governance for People and Plan Programme (G4PP), which emphasizes the role of information integrity as integral to an open and inclusive public sphere and democratic governance. UNDP's Strategic Guidance on Information Integrity[12] offers guidance and direction on how to address the issue of information pollution, provides an analytical framework for understanding information ecosystems, and proposes programmatic responses and outcomes.[13]

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9   Ibid.
10 UN Secretary-General (2023). Strengthening the role of the United Nations in the promotion of democratization and enhancing periodic and genuine elections.
11 Ibid.
12 UNDP (2022). Strategic Guidance: Information Integrity: Forging a pathway to Truth, Resilience and Trust.
13 Additional resources on UNDP's information integrity work can be found at UNDP. "Information integrity".

2.
Programme planning considerations

Information integrity in electoral assistance
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Monitoring and evaluation

Programme teams must assess the information environment and determine what interventions are feasible given the problems identified, implementation timelines and available resources. These factors will determine where a programme should focus its attention to achieve the best results. There are various other considerations when planning and designing programming to promote information integrity in the context of elections. This section outlines several of these such as specificities of electoral programming, identifying entry points, deploying digital tools, issues of gender and youth, and monitoring and evaluation.

Information integrity in electoral assistance

UNDP is the largest implementer of electoral assistance in the UN system. Increasingly, this assistance includes components focusing on protecting information integrity during the electoral process. Any such initiative that is specifically designed within an electoral assistance programme should be guided by the UN framework for electoral assistance, which stipulates that any electoral assistance can only be provided based on a formal request by a Member State or, in rare occasions, a Security Council/General Assembly mandate.

The decision and type of electoral assistance is based upon an electoral needs assessment, led by the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs' (DPPA) Electoral Assistance Division, and the approval of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The electoral needs assessment outlines the appropriateness and parameters of UN assistance and analyses the risk, benefits and advisability of the UN providing electoral assistance.

In addition to the electoral needs assessment mission, UNDP Country Offices can ensure that a separate assessment of the information ecosystem beyond traditional media and its potential impact on the electoral process and election stakeholders is conducted. Non-traditional stakeholders include online influencers, bloggers and other online actors, as well as disinformation researchers, data scientists and those countering disinformation and other harmful content.

Furthermore, when designing timebound election-specific interventions, it is important to consider how they can be sustained beyond the election event, adapted to respond to a post-electoral context, and contribute effectively to longer-term democratic governance objectives.

Identifying entry points

Understanding the information environment and the wider political, legal and social factors that may influence it is an important first step in developing effective responses. A UNDP Country Office's ability to conduct this kind of initial mapping may be limited by budgetary and time constraints. However, it can still be feasible to identify key enablers and drivers of information pollution, existing initiatives, local partner capacities and potential entry points for UNDP and its partners through literature review, engaging with partners and analysis of quantitative data sets from other sources. If the budget allows, it may include the use of digital tools for online monitoring and analysis purposes. These data, while extremely valuable, should be validated through qualitative research or literature review, before being used to make significant programme design decisions.

UNDP's *Strategic Guidance: Information Integrity: Forging a pathway to Truth, Resilience, and Trust* provides a framework to help determine which enablers and drivers of information pollution are the most significant in a given context. It can guide the problem analysis and to help identify the most prominent causes of information pollution on a given issue and their potential impacts.

The framework proposes four contextual factors for analysis: 1) political, 2) media and Internet, 3) social and 4) legislative. Each of these contains possible enablers, drivers and impacts of information pollution.[14] By identifying which drivers and enablers are relevant and prioritizing the most influential, it is possible to identify points of entry which address the root causes of information pollution and therefore have more programmatic impact.

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14 For an application of this framework, please refer to A. Breuer (2024). Information integrity and information pollution: vulnerabilities and impact on social cohesion and democracy in Mexico (IDOS Discussion Paper 2/2024). Bonn: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Analysis Framework: Prioritise environmental factors contributing to information pollution	Analysis Framework: Identify main enablers and drivers of information pollution	Programme Framework: Select relevant outcome(s)	Programme Framework: Develop a set of outputs to achieve outcome(s)

Source: UNDP (2022). *Information Integrity: Forging a pathway to Truth, Resilience and Trust.*

Timeframe

The implementation timeframe is an important consideration in the development of achievable information integrity objectives. The integration of information integrity into longer term electoral cycle or broader governance programming may allow for more complex objectives, such as improved institutional communications or increased public resilience to information pollution. In contrast, initiatives implemented in an electoral period may have more immediate concerns, such as ensuring that accurate information on an electoral process is available to voters. These can successfully address challenges specific to the election event but may not produce sustainable results in the long term. Hence, it is important to focus on an integrated approach, aligning electoral projects with broader democratic governance efforts and emphasizing longer-term programming. This not only allows for more sustainable impact, but also creates favourable conditions and strong networks and partnerships to respond to threats to electoral processes and other potential information pollution flashpoints.

Use of digital tools

Digital solutions can provide powerful data collection and analysis capabilities, including of online trends and narratives, all of which can be used to inform programming and policymaking. In considering digital solutions to counter information pollution, it is important to first examine the rationale for the deployment of such solutions and how these will contribute to supporting the goals of the project. Cost, language capabilities and sustainability are also important factors. Exploring the suite of digital tools available within UNDP can provide a cost-effective option compared to external providers. Further details on UNDP's tools are available below in section 4. of this document. When deploying digital solutions, it is important to adhere to digital principles, such as those outlined in the UNDP Digital Standards, ensuring that projects are aligned with the organization's goals, values and ethical considerations.

Gender

Due to the different and specific ways in which information pollution impacts women, it is important to obtain gender-disaggregated data and conduct in-depth analysis on the intersection of disinformation and gender dynamics. Gender-disaggregated data provide insights into why and how certain groups and individuals become the targets of disinformation campaigns and online harassment. This includes examining how cultural, social and political factors influence the impact of disinformation on women and men.

Additionally, it is crucial to recognize the complexity of gender dynamics and how they intersect with other social identities such as race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and disability. Adopting gender-inclusive strategies ensures that the distinct information challenges faced by women are recognized and appropriately addressed, including gendered disinformation, hate speech, tech-facilitated gender-based violence and gender inequality.

Further, it is essential in gender-inclusive strategies to empower institutions, organizations, women and gender minorities to play an active role in the fight against disinformation. To do this effectively requires developing organizational capacity, advocating for the needs and rights of those targeted, and equipping them with skills to protect themselves, and to identify and combat false and manipulative information.

Championing young people

Young people are often at the forefront of adopting new technologies and exploring emerging online spaces, which makes them highly receptive to new ways to engage online, but also potentially more exposed to information pollution. To harness the potential and mitigate these risks, it is essential to involve young people in designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating interventions to counter harmful content around elections as well as to share positive and constructive narratives. Young people can be included from early stages of the design process, with the aim of empowering them as active participants. Youth-driven initiatives can encourage young people and youth-led organizations to actively participate in designing digital and non-digital solutions. By equipping them with the necessary skills and tools, especially in discerning false content, these efforts empower young people to effectively counter information pollution and design innovative solutions, both digital and non-digital, to protect the integrity of the information ecosystem.

Monitoring and evaluation

The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of information integrity initiatives faces challenges which distinguish it from other development programming. These include constantly changing information ecosystems; a diverse range of stakeholders (transnational, governmental, non-governmental and commercial); political sensitivities; the difficulties in identifying and measuring intended impacts such as public resilience; among others. While this field of M&E remains relatively underdeveloped, UNDP has already undertaken efforts to improve our understanding of how digital tools contribute to improved information integrity in electoral contexts. This M&E framework can provide some initial guidance and considerations on how to measure the impact of similar approaches.

3.

Programmatic approaches for promoting information integrity for electoral institutions and processes

This section categorizes and describes information integrity programming related to electoral institutions and processes, implemented from 2020 to 2023. The five broad programme categories covered in this document are:

A.	**Media and online content monitoring and analysis**
B.	**Public resilience**
C.	**Strategic communications**
D.	**Multi-stakeholder engagement and political agreement**
E.	**Strengthening public interest media and independent journalism**

While the primary focus of this reference manual is enhancing information integrity within electoral institutions and processes, many of the programming options outlined here are not limited to electoral contexts alone. They have far-reaching applicability across a broader spectrum of governance programming that can be effectively adapted to improve transparency, accountability and public trust in non-electoral governance processes. By applying these approaches to a wider governance framework, they contribute to a more informed and engaged citizenry, enhance the resilience of democratic institutions against information pollution and, ultimately, contribute to the strengthening of democratic governance as a whole.

A.
Media and online content monitoring and analysis

Social media listening

Media monitoring

Monitoring technology-facilitated gender-based violence

Case study: eMonitor+ to dynamize the information integrity ecosystem in Peru

Media and online content monitoring and analysis encompass the tracking, gathering and evaluating of information disseminated through traditional and digital media related to electoral processes. The purpose is to understand media coverage, detect biases, identify disinformation, evaluate public sentiment and assess the impact of media on voter behaviour and attitudes.

The ultimate goal is to analyse if citizens are receiving sufficient information to make informed decisions. Media monitoring and analysis employ both quantitative and qualitative methods to assess media behaviour and compliance with international standards and local regulations and analyse information manipulation, derogatory speech and hateful content.

Online monitoring can be done over a limited period, allowing the collection of data from a predetermined set of online sources or by continuously tracking online public conversations over a long period to identify broad trends and patterns in online public discourse. Each of these methods serves different functions for a programme team or Country Office. With these data, a Country Office or its partners can gain insights into the concerns and needs of the public and use that information to develop effective responses, inform policy decisions and understand public perceptions of those decisions.

The monitoring process can vary, ranging from manual tracking of specific offline and online spaces to the use of programming languages, neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) and artificial intelligence to scan and analyse large volumes of data. It also involves gathering sex-disaggregated data to uncover patterns, biases and discrimination against women.

These initiatives involve a wide array of stakeholders, including EMBs, government agencies, media organizations, social media platforms, CSOs, gender and women's organizations, academic institutions and others.

Social media listening

Social media listening initiatives aim to monitor online spaces, identify emerging trends and measure public sentiment surrounding electoral processes and other issues of public concern. Monitoring can be conducted manually by a team of qualified monitors or automatically using Natural Language Processing (NLP) and AI models, ideally both. This includes monitoring online political campaigns, online public discourse on electoral issues, and key information and news sources.

OBJECTIVES

To gather and analyse online content, trends and practices to inform decision-making, improve public outreach and increase transparency in electoral processes.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

EMBs, government institutions, political parties, CSOs, election monitors and observers, journalists, researchers and the general public.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Contribute valuable data and evidence to inform policymaking and institutional decision-making processes.

SHORT TERM

Enable timely responses to emerging issues during election campaigns.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

Language capabilities can be a significant limitation, with analysis of many minority languages not always possible. Certain online platforms are becoming increasingly restrictive with their application programming interfaces (APIs), by limiting data access or charging fees. Caution must be exercised to prevent the misuse of the data collected, to protect data privacy, and to avoid misinterpretation of data. Governments may misuse sensitive data for political or other purposes. UNDP Country Offices should seek to establish clear protocols and agreements that outline the terms of data collection, storage and usage.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

The impact can be evaluated by measuring the way in which the data are used and applied, such as to inform new policies, fact-check information and advocate for responses from online platforms.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX A)

Bangladesh, Libya, Mozambique, Pakistan and Peru.

Media monitoring

Media monitoring evaluates media behaviour and adherence to international standards and local regulations, whether in general or specifically during electoral periods. It can hold media entities accountable and ensuring media fairness. Monitoring can extend beyond traditional media to include new media and online journalism.

OBJECTIVES

To inform the public about the conduct of the media during the elections, to promote media compliance with international standards and best practices regarding freedom of expression and independence; and to monitor the spread of disinformation in the media and determine to what extent the media is combating false content.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

CSOs, media organizations, media, EMBs, journalists, researchers, media regulators and election observers.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Continuous monitoring of media to provide information about political sentiment, trust in electoral processes, or efforts to undermine electoral institutions.

SHORT TERM

Media monitoring during an election provides the public with important information about the performance of different media, particularly the accuracy and balance of reporting on the electoral process, political issues, and candidates.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

This activity can be labour intensive, even when supported by digital technologies. The large amounts of data require expert analysis skills and/or powerful data analytics capabilities.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

Instances of media entities making corrections or editorial changes in response to monitoring findings or uptake of recommendations for policy changes in election and media regulation.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX A)

Georgia.

Monitoring technology-facilitated gender-based violence

Technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) exploits information and communication technologies to target individuals based on gender, posing significant threats to their safety and well-being. It encompasses various forms of abuse, including sextortion, image-based abuse, doxxing, cyberbullying, online harassment, stalking, grooming, hacking, hate speech, and impersonation. As technology becomes more ingrained in daily life, the avenues for perpetrating such violence increase, disproportionately affecting women and girls. Monitoring TFGBV during electoral processes tracks and analyses instances of disinformation, harassment, threats and discriminatory behaviour directed towards women in politics.

OBJECTIVES

To contribute to safeguarding women's participation in political processes and fostering an environment where all individuals can engage in politics without fear of being targeted, harassed or intimidated due to their gender.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

CSOs, EMBs, women in political roles, political parties, advocacy groups, law enforcement agencies, researchers and journalists.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Contribute to developing and advocating for evidence-based policies; enhancing capacities of women to navigate and counter online threats; increasing public awareness; and building lasting partnerships with tech companies to create safer online environments.

SHORT TERM

Rapidly identify and mitigate instances of online harassment in an electoral period.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

Lack of data access from social media platforms.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

Reduction in frequency and severity of incidents, improvements in response times to these incidents, increased public awareness, behavioural changes in online communities, greater participation of women in politics, and effective policy implementation.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX A):

Colombia, Libya, the Philippines, Tunisia and Uganda.

CASE STUDY
eMonitor+ to dynamize the information integrity ecosystem in Peru

UNDP Peru deployed eMonitor+ at the core of an ambitious multi-stakeholder strategy to monitor and analyse the information ecosystem and encourage collective action against information pollution. This network has analysed more than 200,000 publications and identified more than 5,000 cases of hate speech and 700 cases of gender-based violence as used by key political actors, media channels and thought leaders. More than 20 partner organizations are now able to better map the rapidly evolving landscape of information pollution, transforming their action from reactive to preventive and from individual responses to system movement.

UNDP Peru started the implementation of eMonitor+ with a whole-of-society approach from the very start, with two initial core partners: Ama Llulla, a fact-checking collective that comprises some 15 media outlets and Asociacíon Civil Transparencia, an official electoral observer.

EXPANDING THIS NETWORK REQUIRED:

- **Technology tailored to fit the context:** eMonitor+ benefited from a series of consultations with key actors working in information integrity, including Electoral Management Bodies, journalists and private businesses to ensure the technology was adapted to existing capacities and priorities.

- **A focus on medium and long-term solutions:** UNDP Peru is establishing new partnerships with specialized organizations, including UNESCO, to focus on how to link this tool with media literacy and hate speech prevention initiatives.

- **Knowledge products designed to inspire action:** UNDP Peru designed three levels of knowledge products to cater to the diverse needs in the ecosystem: 1) Early warnings to promote quick action from targeted stakeholders, 2) Bi-weekly trend reports for joint communication efforts that could halt toxic narratives spread, 3) Thematic reports that could look at highly vulnerable groups, like women, journalists and electoral management bodies, to support policymaking.

- **No gatekeeping data as a source of legitimacy:** From the start, eMonitor+ Peru provided full transparency of data collection and insights. This, in turn, has inspired independent academic and journalistic work on new topics.

A year into the implementation of eMonitor+ in Peru, new partners continue to approach the multi-stakeholder platform. This underscores both the need for spaces like this and the effectiveness of the tool. Looking forward, UNDP Peru will explore the potential of eMonitor+ to transcend electoral periods and become a core offering to both information integrity and wider development efforts.

B.
Public resilience

Fact-checking and debunking

Media and information literacy

Digital inclusion and literacy

Countering gendered information pollution

Case study: Fostering peaceful, credible and inclusive elections in Sierra Leone

Public resilience interventions are designed to empower individuals and organizations to resist online and offline efforts to manipulate or deceive. These initiatives promote media and Internet literacy and critical thinking skills, fact-checking and digital inclusion.

They aim to equip individuals with the ability to effectively identify, respond to and even debunk disinformation encountered online and offline. Public resilience interventions aim for long-term behavioural and societal change, fostering an environment where individuals critically analyse and adaptively respond to evolving information landscapes, particularly in the context of generative AI.

Public resilience projects adopt a whole-of-society approach, involving a diverse range of stakeholders such as EMBs, government ministries responsible for information, fact-checking organizations, civil society organizations, established media companies, political parties, educational institutions and various citizens' groups.

Fact-checking and debunking

Fact-checking interventions aim to verify the accuracy of information online or on traditional media such as TV, radio or print. This verified information can then be disseminated to the public, used to monitor narratives and public perceptions on election-related issues or employed to improve journalistic reporting.

OBJECTIVES

To increase public access to accurate and trustworthy information; to discourage political actors from knowingly making false claims; and to address content that aims to mislead or misinform voters around the electoral processes.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

Internet users, news consumers, CSOs, voters, government and policymakers, and media outlets and journalists.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Allow ongoing verification of information such as debunking of false narratives on issues of public concern, ensuring accuracy of government communications and building public awareness and resilience to disinformation and misinformation.

SHORT TERM

Election-specific fact-checking allows for rapid identification of false information about the electoral process and can provide guidance for messaging of strategic communication efforts.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

Public-facing fact-checking requires wide dissemination and can be less effective if the reach of the verified content is limited. Some actors may undermine the credibility of fact-checkers or establish fake fact-checking initiatives to confuse the public and disseminate disinformation. Fact-checkers must operate in a highly evolving information context and cannot verify everything that comes their way with the speed required. They need to make critical decisions rapidly about what information to fact-check. Requesting and receiving information to allow for verification may prove challenging and also impede the speed of the process.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

The number of corrections and clarifications issued, their reach among the target audiences, the reduction in the dissemination of false information and changes in public perceptions of media credibility.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX B)

Honduras, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zambia.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCE

SELECT, The Knowledge Hub, "Fact-Checking by Media or Civil Society".

Media and information literacy

Media and information literacy (MIL) supports individuals to access, create, analyse and act on diverse types and formats of information, including from traditional media and online sources. It empowers individuals to confidently navigate today's information ecosystems and critically assess the quality of information and its sources. It helps individuals to detect deceptive tactics and untrustworthy information and transform quality information into knowledge and decisions. MIL initiatives in election settings contribute to the integrity and credibility of electoral processes, ensuring that voters are well-informed, capable of making informed choices and engaged in the democratic process.

OBJECTIVES

To empower the general public to critically assess media and information content and enhance the capacity of individuals to detect disinformation.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

Youth, educators, journalists and media professionals, political candidates, policy-makers, civil society organizations and election observers, voters and the general public.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Integrating MIL into educational curricula, establishing community engagement programmes, and advocating for policies that support responsible media use and information literacy, promoting sustainable, long-term shifts in public resilience to information pollution.

SHORT TERM

Skills development through workshops, targeted public awareness campaigns and briefings with election stakeholders; and the development of resources to reveal identified disinformation trends and tactics.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

Increasingly sophisticated information pollution methods, including deepfake videos and AI-generated disinformation, can make detection challenging for the general public. Staying ahead of evolving disinformation tactics is critical.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

Reduced susceptibility to election-related disinformation, enhanced media literacy skills among the general public and stakeholders, and reduced dissemination of disinformation.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX B)

Europe and Central Asia region, Kosovo, North Macedonia, South Africa, Sudan and Tunisia.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCE

SELECT, The Knowledge Hub, "Fostering Media Information Literacy and Digital Literacy".

Digital inclusion and literacy

Digital inclusion and literacy focuses on enhancing public knowledge and the skills to access and utilize digital technologies easily, effectively and safely. The aim is to ensure equal access to digital tools, resources and services, as well as sufficient capacities to use those technologies effectively in everyday life, regardless of gender, age, religion, ethnicity or location.

OBJECTIVES

To foster equal access and build capacity to engage productively in digital spaces for electoral information and services and to ensure that digital divides and exclusions do not hinder individual participation in elections and governance processes.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

Anyone who may face barriers to accessing and using digital services including youth, women, rural populations, minorities and other stakeholders in electoral processes.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

These include establishing ongoing educational programmes and continuous programmes to enhance digital literacy skills across the whole society, ensuring consistent and equitable access to digital resources and digital literacy.

SHORT TERM

Organizing targeted digital literacy workshops and awareness campaigns, providing access to digital resources, particularly in marginalized communities, to reduce the digital divide in the lead-up to elections.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

Risks include limited Internet access as well as restricted online access through certain platforms leading to limited ability to seek alternative information sources. Additionally, expanding digital access without investing in digital literacy can exacerbate exclusion through lack of skills. Lack of trust in digital systems and concerns about data misuse, including by government, pose significant barriers to the adoption of digital solutions.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

Measurable improvements in digital literacy skills, greater access to digital tools by marginalized communities, skills acquired in navigating digital technologies and platforms.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX B)

Asia and Pacific Regional Project, Argentina, Armenia, Ecuador, Kosovo, Mongolia and Serbia.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCE

SELECT, The Knowledge Hub, "Fostering Media Information Literacy and Digital Literacy".

Countering gendered information pollution

Initiatives to counter gendered information pollution aim to mitigate the impact of disinformation, harassment and hate speech targeting women in elections while empowering them to actively and safely participate in public life and assume leadership roles. This covers a wide set of activities to assess the impacts of gendered information pollution, amplify women's voices in online spaces, counter false narratives and stereotypes, provide digital skills and leadership training, shape legislation and policy and the collective creation of solutions. The broader impact is anticipated to create a more inclusive and equitable political landscape, empowering women to contribute effectively to democratic processes.

OBJECTIVES

To improve capacities to detect and counter gendered information pollution and online violence against women; to build capacities of women public officials, candidates and relevant stakeholders with essential digital skills to empower them to identify and effectively counter online threats and disinformation; to raise public awareness and improve public attitudes towards women in politics; and to influence policymaking efforts.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

Women public officials, candidates, election officials, observers and journalists.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Continuously working towards empowering women's political participation and countering digital harms builds a foundation for sustained women's participation in politics, including changing cultural norms about women's role in society through policy changes and public education.

SHORT TERM

Capacity building to enhance digital resilience against online threats and disinformation and rapid coordinated responses to emerging instances of gendered information pollution during election cycles.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

Understanding the trends, patterns and origins of online gendered information pollution can be challenging, time-consuming and costly. Efforts should be made to ensure that women are not further endangered through their engagement in such initiatives. Overcoming deeply ingrained biases and stereotypes related to both gender and minority status can pose complex obstacles to inclusive political engagement.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

Increase in the number of women public officials, candidates, observers and journalists actively involved in electoral processes and those reporting a decrease of instances of gendered information pollution targeting them.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX B)

Mongolia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Sri Lanka.

CASE STUDY
Fostering peaceful, credible and inclusive elections in Sierra Leone

UNDP partnered with the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ), the Independent Radio Network (IRN) and BBC Media Action to launch iVerify in advance of the 2023 General Election. Using a three-tier verification process, the iVerify team (two coordinators and eight fact-checkers) processed requests submitted by the public through the website, Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp or identified through monitoring various news outlets and social media platforms. To ensure proper verification and to mitigate any bias, each piece of content was thoroughly analysed by two fact-checkers and then reviewed and validated by the coordinators.

With the project's support, BBC Media Action in-country trainers and international consultants trained 267 people (including youth, persons with disabilities, journalists and social media influencers) on digital media literacy skills, mis/disinformation and hate speech.

To allow for wide distribution of verified news, IRN aired a weekly radio show with election-related content focusing on media literacy and civic and voter education. UNDP partnered with popular music group LXG to produce the popular iVerify song and video (Dem Say and Empress Pee Dem Say) to raise public awareness. The song was repeatedly aired on radio and received 65,000 views on YouTube.

iVerify played a widely recognized role during a highly polarized electoral campaign in Sierra Leone, with over 265 fact-checking requests processed, including 40 during election week. By some accounts, awareness of the platform led to a reduction in unsubstantiated claims by politicians. The EU electoral observation mission press release highlighted the positive role played by iVerify, stating "national fact-checking initiative iVerify vigorously countered disinformation and media debates in all districts helped voters to make informed choices." The iVerify Sierra Leone website registered 514,000 hits from 5 April to 31 July 2023 (245,000 from Sierra Leone). Traffic to the site peaked in the month of the election and accounted for 46 percent of the total hits.

UNDP's Elections Project is funded by the Governments of Ireland, Iceland and Canada, the European Union, UNDP and the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund.

C.
Strategic communications

Institutional communications

Online platform engagement

Case study: Iraq – Supporting elections in the age of misinformation and disinformation (2021 and 2023)

Strategic communications involve the planning and implementation of proactive, coordinated and targeted communication activities aiming to build credibility and trust in the EMB and the electoral process, provide important voter information and counter disinformation narratives targeting the electoral process.

These programmes have always been instrumental in achieving specific communication goals, fostering public trust and engaging diverse stakeholders. However, as EMBs and electoral processes become increasingly vulnerable to false, misleading or inciteful narratives online and offline, there is a need to rethink the approach to be even more pre-emptive, proactive and dialogue-oriented. There is also a need for good data about the trends, patterns and narratives emerging from various information sources and the skills to respond rapidly to them.

Depending on the context, these efforts can sit within the EMB itself, as collaborative initiatives, or with other stakeholders and institutions. They require a strong understanding of the communication and information-seeking patterns of various groups, social media usage, trusted information sources and appealing formats. It should as much as possible also include engagement with digital platforms to ensure adequate and timely measures are taken to promote accurate civic information and address any violations of platform policies. Strategic communication programming involves various stakeholders, including government agencies, EMBs, civil society organizations, media outlets, observers, media influencers and digital platforms.

Institutional communications

The institutional communications approach should aim to transform the way these institutions engage with their constituencies and interact with voters both offline and in the online spaces they frequent. In the short term, it involves creating comprehensive communication strategies to pre-empt and counter disinformation and maintain electoral integrity, and in the longer term encourages more transparent, constructive, solutions-oriented dialogue between state institutions and members of the public.

OBJECTIVES

To enhance the capacity of EMBs and government agencies to establish versatile and multifaceted communication plans, including identifying and responding to disinformation; to raise public awareness about disinformation; to issue timely alerts to inform and engage the public; and to disseminate tailored messaging to both the general public and specific target groups.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

EMBs and other institutions responsible for communication and public engagement on relevant issues.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Provide continuous support to EMBs and relevant institutions to develop comprehensive communication plans for consistent messaging during and beyond electoral cycles, while continually enhancing their communication capabilities. This entails ongoing implementation of training programmes to improve staff skills in managing disinformation and crisis communication, ensuring they are adept at navigating the challenges of the digital information age.

SHORT TERM

Building the institutional capacities of EMBs to disseminate timely alerts and maintain public trust during election periods, developing time-bound communication strategies to cover electoral periods, coalition-building for effective and coordinated responses, and engagement with online platforms.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

The reluctance of EMBs and other institutions to engage in timely and proactive communication can hinder the effectiveness of strategic communications projects.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

Number and reach of communications issued; number of instances where disinformation is identified and countered; level of public awareness about disinformation and electoral integrity; the speed at which alerts and updates are disseminated to the public; and levels of ongoing public engagement and trust over multiple electoral cycles.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX C)

Iraq and Ukraine.

Online platform engagement

Online platform engagement involves building meaningful and effective relationships between EMBs, other electoral stakeholders and digital platforms, to ensure the implementation of adequate protection measures during the electoral period. This can serve a number of important functions, including elevating accurate information and official information sources on digital platforms, as well as countering disinformation and other content that violates platform policy and threatens the electoral process or the reputation of the EMB and its officials. Engaging with the most prominent or influential online platforms in a country can be an effective strategy to ensure that problematic online content, particularly in an electoral context, can be rapidly addressed.

OBJECTIVES

To ensure enforcement of online platforms' own policies in relation to certain content during elections, ensure effective communication between online platforms and election stakeholders, and help prioritize accurate, reliable information on the electoral process.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

EMBs, CSOs, media and national civic coalitions.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Sustained partnerships with online platforms can improve the enforcement of online community standards and policies and can significantly amplify the visibility of national and local actors working to promote accurate information. They can also greatly increase the reach of fact-checked content and can bring nuance and contextual understanding into content moderation.

SHORT TERM

Rapid responses to emerging disinformation threats or immediate communication needs during the electoral cycle.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

The lack of willingness of digital platforms to engage with EMBs in smaller countries and territories, and government pressure on online platforms to act in ways that violate citizens' rights to privacy and freedom of information are risks. With recent cutbacks of large online platforms in their public safety and trust teams, building long-term relationships and focal points may be challenging.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

Improved access to data for local researchers and academics, increased effectiveness and timeliness of responses from online platforms.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX C)

Kenya and Kyrgyz Republic.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCE

SELECT, The Knowledge Hub, "Platform Engagement".

CASE STUDY
Iraq – Supporting elections in the age of misinformation and disinformation (2021 and 2023)

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq's (UNAMI) Office of Electoral Assistance (OEA) provided support to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) in Iraq to combat electoral misinformation and disinformation in the 2021 Council of Representatives election and the 2023 Governorate Council elections. The demographics of Iraq's population was a factor to consider in formulating the programming because nearly 60 percent is under 25 years old and youth are particularly active on social media. Online activism has become a feature of Iraq's political life, exemplified by the use of platforms such as Twitter (currently X) and Facebook to mobilize protesters in 2019. Moreover, it is estimated that more than 30 million Iraqis are active social media users, predominantly youth.

In the past, misinformation and disinformation have been employed to diminish public confidence in elections and the validity of election outcomes. In response, IHEC, with the support of UNAMI OEA, collaborated with fact-checking organizations, conducted civic education about credible sources of election information, and worked with social media companies to identify and remove false or misleading content.

Furthermore, IHEC, supported by UNAMI OEA, engaged in social media monitoring, and published numerous fact-checking content to debunk electoral misinformation.

Examples of misinformation and disinformation disseminated during the 2021 elections included false information about candidates, misleading advertising, false news articles and conspiracy theories, voter suppression tactics and attacks on IHEC and UNAMI OEA.

IHEC conducted a live question-and-answer session for voters on Facebook and monitored content on sites. IHEC had regular exchanges with Facebook and collaborated with media and civil society on mitigation measures. IHEC developed a fact-checking capacity for voters to reference.

UNAMI OEA developed a social media guideline and policy for IHEC, marking one of the first social media policies for any governmental institution in Iraq. UNAMI OEA provided both on-the-job and online training to IHEC employees on these guidelines to enhance IHEC's capacity to counter electoral misinformation during the 2023 governorate council elections, which were the first to be held since 2015 and the first in Kirkuk governorate since 2005.

These programmes were developed through a UNAMI OEA training session for IHEC staff which included the basics of cybersecurity, the global and social media landscape, social media in an electoral context, disinformation in an electoral context, social listening and media monitoring, and social media content analysis. In addition to UNAMI and UNDP, this project was financed by the governments of Australia, Japan, Norway and the United States, and the European Union. See UNAMI (2022). Supporting Elections in the Age of Misinformation and Disinformation.

D.
Multi-stakeholder engagement and political agreements

Coalition building to promote information integrity

Political codes of conduct

Case study: Enhancing early warning and prevention to counter hate speech and incitement ahead of the Kenya election (2022)

Multi-stakeholder engagement brings together diverse stakeholders to pool resources and expertise, creating a unified and effective approach to collectively analyse, prioritize and respond to threats in the information ecosystem.

Strategies developed may involve establishing standardized frameworks for identifying information pollution, developing joint public campaigns and shaping policies for responsible information dissemination. Key to these efforts is the establishment of efficient channels for information exchange among stakeholders, allowing for the sharing of disinformation trends, effective countermeasures and public sentiment insights. This improved coordination is essential for a timely and cohesive response to disinformation campaigns, thereby increasing their overall effectiveness.

Political agreements can either be voluntary, non-binding agreements and consensus-driven among the political actors or they can be part of the legislative and regulatory framework that is binding and enforced. These agreements establish a negotiated set of rules and ethical standards that political parties pledge to adhere to throughout an electoral cycle and beyond.

Key partners for these initiatives are UN Member States, intergovernmental organizations, electoral practitioners, international NGOs, social media platforms, traditional media, academic institutions and civil society organizations.

Coalition building to promote information integrity

OBJECTIVES

To convene a diverse group of stakeholders to collaboratively address disinformation through collective information sharing and the formulation of joint responses; to enhance information sharing and coordination among participants by pooling resources and expertise; and to develop effective strategies and tools for identifying and countering disinformation.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

State institutions, EMBs, legacy media, academic institutions, parliaments, National Human Rights Institutions and CSOs.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Establish sustainable coordination mechanisms and networks of stakeholders dedicated to developing long-term strategies to combat disinformation related to democratic institutions and processes, thus reducing the prevalence and impact of disinformation over time.

SHORT TERM

Formation of timebound coalitions to promptly address current and emerging instances of disinformation, aiming to mitigate their immediate impacts effectively.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

Challenges in coalition-building may arise from coordinating among diverse groups with varying objectives, incentives and experiences. Additionally, political pressures and the dynamic nature of digital platforms present ongoing challenges. Ensuring the coalition's actions adhere to principles of freedom of expression and privacy is also critical.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

The level of collaboration among coalition members, reflected in the joint actions undertaken and the sharing of resources; the coalition's responsiveness in identifying and addressing instances of disinformation swiftly; the impact of the coalition's efforts on influencing policy changes or developments; and the strengthened capacity of its members to collaboratively address information integrity challenges.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX D)

Kenya.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCE

SELECT Knowledge Hub includes a programmatic option called "Coordination and Partnership Approaches".

Political codes of conduct

Codes of conduct primarily seek to establish a set of ethical standards and responsible practices for political parties, candidates, media or the electorate against disinformation. A key objective can be the ethical use of social media and other online platforms for dissemination of political campaign content.

OBJECTIVES

To establish and enforce an agreed set of principles to promote integrity in public information, which can set clear standards and expectations for the behaviour of political parties, candidates and even media outlets, in the creation, dissemination and management of information.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

Political parties, candidates, elected officials, online and legacy media, EMBs and regulatory bodies.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Creation of a standing ethical framework for electoral communication and information sharing, and the promotion of integrity and responsibility in information dissemination among all election stakeholders which contributes to ensuring fair and transparent elections.

SHORT TERM

Minimizing the dissemination and impact of politically motivated disinformation and other potentially harmful content during an electoral cycle.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

Wavering levels of commitment and adherence among political actors, the influence of external pressures on political behaviour, and difficulty in monitoring and enforcing compliance with the code of conduct are all risks and limitations.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

The degree of commitment by political actors, their engagement and the reduction in unethical practices including the spread of disinformation during political campaigns, and the overall improvement in the quality of political discourse.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX D)

Uruguay.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCE

SELECT Knowledge Hub includes a programmatic option called "Codes of Conduct".

CASE STUDY
Enhancing early warning and prevention to counter hate speech and incitement ahead of the Kenya election (2022)

As part of an Early Warning and Response Project in advance of the Kenya 2022 Elections, under the guidance of the UN and in close collaboration with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), a Social Media Consortium (MAPEMA) was established, comprised of Code for Africa (CfA), Shujaaz Inc, and an AI-powered influencer-marketing firm, Alfluence. The Consortium proactively identified toxic disinformation and hate speech in Kenya before and after the country's elections, using a combination of in-country investigative researchers and data-driven forensic analysis, which served as an early warning and response for immediate intervention by stakeholders, shaping peace messaging and public engagement strategies. Social media listening, collaborative case investigations, capacity-building and online and offline peace campaigns were all utilized, contributing to reducing hate speech and incitement in the online and offline spaces.

To conduct comprehensive monitoring of online hate speech, incitement and mis/disinformation in Kenya, the Consortium developed a lexicon in English, Swahili and Sheng, and some 15 other local languages, including definitions, taxonomies and benchmarking to monitor developments in relation to hate speech and incitement. Moreover, an actor watchlist that mapped influential officeholders relevant to Kenya's political discourse was developed, identifying an estimated 17,000 candidates with about 38.79 percent of them having presence on social media. Online fact-checking was also activated in a bid to research and debunk claims related to the elections with fact-checks being shared with Meta, TikTok and Twitter for mitigation on their platforms. Response and counter messages were developed through a peace message hub that brought together state and non-state peace actors to reflect on the issues that were being identified on the social media platforms.

The Peace Messaging Hub harmonized counter-messages and campaigns on mainstream media, social media and public platforms in collaboration with micro and nano influencers spread across various social media platforms. The MAPEMA Consortium in collaboration with the peace hub members developed a communication strategy for the social media influencers that ensured that they spoke and advocated for the trends and issues that were being observed on social media. Partners from state institutions, CSOs, the UN, the Consortium and the media held weekly meetings and produced content for offline and online audiences.

Based on social media listening and peace messaging activities, the MAPEMA Consortium produced comprehensive regular situation reports, summarizing insights on key trends and narratives as well as debunking of mis/disinformation, hate speech and incitement cases, with a focus on ethnic stereotyping, gender-based attacks and the role of youth in prevention of hate speech and incitement. Reports were initially produced monthly, then weekly and finally daily during the week of the election. Virtual roundtable discussions were convened to facilitate collaboration, information sharing and coordination of activities between key global tech platforms (Twitter, Meta, TikTok, Google), national governmental institutions and civil society actors. Virtual mediation spaces brought together leaders and young people in conversations on peacebuilding and the voting process. The virtual sessions were recorded and aired on Shujaaz's Facebook platform where guests discussed critical issues.

The project led to over 550,000 posts related to Kenyan elections labelled as toxic on just Facebook alone. CfA's pioneering partnership with Wikipedia proactively identified misleading election-related information in indigenous languages, resulting in 1,128 corrections, 169 news articles and 2,475 new data sets (on WikiData). Counter-messaging and narratives reached over 8.5 million Instagram users and 27.9 million other Kenyans both online and through printed media. Through peer-mentor support for NCIC, robust early warning systems and forensic techniques were developed for detecting and investigating hate speech and other toxic content online, including flagging over 200 cases per month, up from an average of just 20 cases. The regular situation reports helped shape proactive intervention strategies within the UN as well as international development agencies, and were used extensively by CSOs and other civic watchdogs to understand digital trends and protagonists for informed response strategies.

The Project was funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the German Embassy.

E.
Strengthening public interest media and independent journalism

Media and journalism support

Media coalition-building

Case study: Journalism and election training: promoting transparency and inclusiveness in the parliamentary election in Timor-Leste (2023)

Independent and public interest media and journalism are an essential pillar of healthy information ecosystems and of inclusive and effective governance.

The goal of these initiatives is to sustain and enhance the quality of public interest media, ensuring they can continue to provide critical information to the public, thereby supporting informed citizen participation in electoral processes.

These interventions aim to reinforce the economic resilience of independent media organizations, fostering experimentation and innovation within the media industry, and striving to establish a new model of sustainability for independent public interest journalism.

The main partners for these initiatives include independent media organizations, media development organizations, national broadcasters, technology and innovation partners, youth organizations, online content creators and advocacy groups.

Media and journalism support

Media landscapes vary enormously between contexts. Nonetheless, the media plays a uniquely influential role in influencing public opinion, setting agendas and acting as watchdog to governments and institutions. Independent, professional, unbiased media can help foster electoral institutions and processes that are transparent and credible. Journalists and media professionals, who are empowered to do their jobs without fear of reprisal, can build public trust in the information they provide and can hold public figures to account. For this reason, media remains a critical stakeholder. The nature of media and news has changed enormously in recent years, with the rise of alternative online news sources, citizen journalism and other innovative forms of news and information delivery. These changes may require adaptations to how and with whom to engage, looking beyond traditional media, and fully understanding other influential information sources in particular contexts.

OBJECTIVES

To empower journalists by providing journalists, editors, broadcasters, online media professionals and content creators with necessary skills, resources and support to produce fair, accurate and appealing elections coverage; and to strengthen the principles of responsible reporting and improve the quality of journalism through systematic support.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

Online and offline media organizations and professionals, including editors, broadcasters, online content creators, journalism associations, journalists and citizen journalists.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

A sustained investment in media, through capacity-building, policy support, creation of networks and alliances, research, mentoring and other means, will allow for more durable improvements across the sector as well as create relationships, partnerships and networks which can be readily mobilized for short-term initiatives.

SHORT TERM

Training sessions on relevant issues such as electoral coverage, campaign reporting, journalism safety and conflict-sensitive journalism; improved access to equipment to facilitate information production and dissemination; the creation of platforms for exchange and dialogue with regulatory bodies, EMBs and other stakeholders; media codes of conduct; and media synergy by pooling staff and resources and aligning around certain editorial lines for greater consistency of information to the public.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

Engaging in a media landscape that is highly politically biased, polarized or homogenous can all present challenges. Journalists can be very underpaid and rely on patronage systems which can skew reporting. Sustainability is a key challenge in the media sector, with often limited financial autonomy, leading to an overreliance on state funding, political actors or overseas development aid. Finally, the safety of journalists is of critical importance during election periods and should be taken into consideration in any engagement with the media sector.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

Changes in knowledge following training sessions; more neutral, measured content as detected through media monitoring efforts; adoption of new approaches and best practices by the journalism community; and improvements in the quality and accuracy of reporting.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX E)

Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Timor-Leste and Tunisia.

Media coalition-building

Creating and strengthening collaborative networks among media professionals, organizations and relevant stakeholders can build resilience to political pressures, allow for sharing of resources, and facilitate greater collaboration during times of heightened tensions, crisis or critical national processes. These networks can act as effective advocacy groups with greater capacities than that of individual members to influence policy, protect members and build constructive relationships with media regulatory bodies and EMBs.

OBJECTIVES

To facilitate communication and information sharing, and to coordinate to collectively combat disinformation.

PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

Independent media outlets, digital media platforms, journalists, journalism associations, bloggers, media advocacy groups and relevant civil society organizations.

INTERVENTIONS

LONG TERM

Creation of a sustainable ecosystem of collaborative networks, stable partnerships and a unified approach in tackling disinformation and other challenges to electoral processes.

SHORT TERM

Election-focused initiatives can improve accuracy of election reporting, including reporting of election results, allow sharing of resources, provide protection to journalists, and create efficient communication channels to EMBs for immediate information.

RISKS/LIMITATIONS

Risks and limitations may include resistance from some media entities or stakeholders to collaborate due to competition or conflicting interests. There could also be challenges related to resource constraints and ensuring active participation of all network members. Moreover, potential political or regulatory pressures could hinder the initiative's goals.

IMPACT MEASUREMENT

The number of media professionals, organizations, and stakeholders joining the collaborative network over time, instances where the network's activities have contributed to positive social change, such as increased civic engagement or informed decision-making, and the decline in the spread of disinformation in media reporting.

EXAMPLES OF UNDP IMPLEMENTATION (SEE ANNEX E)

Lebanon, Peru and Sierra Leone.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCE

SELECT, The Knowledge Hub, "Coordination and Partnership Approaches".

Journalism and election training: promoting transparency and inclusiveness in the parliamentary election in Timor-Leste (2023)

UNDP's COVID-Resilient Elections in Timor-Leste (CORE-TL) project supported the Timor-Leste Press Union (TLPU) in conducting a three-day training programme on "Journalism and Election Training: Promoting Transparency and Inclusiveness in the Parliamentary Election 2023."

The training was aimed at journalists to provide fair and accurate information about the 2023 parliamentary elections and for citizens to be positioned to make informed decisions about it. The curriculum was based on the national guidelines for journalism, "The Guidelines for Electoral Reporting for Journalists and Media", co-developed by the National Press Council and UNDP CORE-TL.

This curriculum sought to promote principles of peace journalism, responsible reporting and inclusive politics for elections for Timorese journalists. The guidelines were originally developed to support journalists covering the 2022 presidential election to ensure that citizens had access to truthful information about the election as well as COVID-19 prevention measures and accurate information about the virus. This initiative was followed by the provision of three media buses for journalists during the election to provide wider in-person electoral operations coverage in 12 municipalities. The project was funded by the Government of Japan.

4.
UNDP information integrity tools, resources and partnerships

UNDP's Digital Kit for Democracy

**Sustaining Peace During Electoral Processes (SELECT)**

UNDP has developed a comprehensive set of digital and non-digital tools and resources, tailored specifically to support COs seeking to engage in information integrity programming. These resources are available to any CO and are intended to improve programme quality, promote best practice, and provide viable and concrete support offers to national counterparts and partners.

UNDP's Digital Kit for Democracy

Digital Kit 4 Dem

WHAT IS THE DIGITAL KIT 4 DEM?

The *Digital Kit for Democracy* **is a suite of digital tools designed to support inclusive, credible and peaceful democratic institutions and processes. It includes a suite of tools and methodologies to promote information integrity.** These are designed to support national and regional stakeholders in verifying information accuracy and monitoring online and offline spaces for certain types of content such as hate speech, information pollution and gender-based violence. Deployed in over 15 countries, these tools have supported partners to process millions of pieces of content and detect thousands of cases of disinformation and hate speech. These tools are available for deployment either individually or as a comprehensive package to interested UNDP Country Offices.

DIGITAL KIT 4DEM

4 CREDIBILITY
- **Social media analysis** & listening | **MONITOR**
- **Fact-checking** & debunking | **iVerify**

4 INCLUSION
- **Citizen agenda** crowdsourcing | **iParticipate**

4 PEACE
- **Early warning** system | **iReport**

WHO DESIGNS THE DIGITAL KIT 4 DEM?

The Kit falls under UNDP's governance support and is part of the Global Programme, Governance for People and Planet (G4PP). G4PP adopts a systems approach, which is rooted in human rights, problem-focused, and participatory to accelerate development and ensure no one is left behind.

iVerify

iVerify is a fact-checking system, with a digital platform at its core, that allows national stakeholders to identify and fact-check online and offline content that may be misleading or harmful. The system allows citizens and partner institutions to submit content for verification through a dedicated website and publicly accessible social media tiplines (e.g. META, WhatsApp, Instagram). Following a three-step verification process within the iVerify system, the fact-checked reports are disseminated online (websites and social media) and offline (radio) to provide citizens with accurate and verified content.

UNDP provides capacity-building for fact-checkers from the national partner as part of the rollout of the iVerify system. This support, accompanied by communication campaigns to raise awareness of the system and the dangers of disinformation and hate speech, are part of the comprehensive support package. Lastly, the system facilitates partnership-building and the coordination of responses between various stakeholders involved and mandated to work on the mitigation of disinformation and hate speech.

eMonitor+

eMonitor+ is a social media monitoring and analysis system that includes a set of digital tools with advanced artificial intelligence capabilities. It can be deployed to expand national, regional and global stakeholder capacities to analyse and address a range of challenges, including but not limited to toxic communication, hate speech, disinformation and gender-based violence. This is particularly useful in countries and regions where such critical issues are understudied. eMonitor+ collects and analyses thousands of pieces of online content daily, from platforms including Facebook, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter) and YouTube, as well as website content and offline media.

The system integrates external tools and solutions into UNDP-built software to analyse offline and online content. Yet, human monitors lead its operation, utilizing the suite's automated functions to streamline otherwise time-consuming tasks. This fusion of human oversight and AI-driven analytics results in a more cost-effective, time-efficient and comprehensive monitoring process. Every eMonitor+ deployment is accompanied by comprehensive technical support, enabling national stakeholders to develop and execute information integrity strategies that are evidence-based and tailored to address the unique challenges of their contexts. Outcomes can include advancing long-term digital resilience, particularly in the form of innovative policies, encouraging whole-of-society responses, and enhancing media literacy and public awareness.

FIGURE 1: **Programmatic features of eMonitor+ and iVerify**

FIGURE 2: **Technical features of eMonitor+ and iVerify**

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS		eMONITOR+	iVerify
Data collection and visualization Using third-party and UNDP-owned solutions to collect data from online and offline sources	From Twitter / X	☑ Data access through X's research facility	⊗
	From Facebook & Instagram	☑ Automated collection from Meta's Data System	☑ External use of Meta's Data System
	From YouTube	☑ Automated collection from Google's Data System	⊗
	From other & offline sources	☑ Integrated tool for manual content upload	☑ Integrated tool for manual content upload
	Citizen content flagging	⊗	☑ Whatsapp, Facebook and Web tiplines
	Export and visualization	☑ CMS, external CSV + PDF. PowerBI and Kibana	☑ CMS
Content verification Applying industry-standard features for content verification	Prior fact-check search	⊗	☑ Cross-check enabled through Meedan support
	Collaborative workspace	☑ UNDP-built interface for multiple users	☑ Meedan-based interface for multiple users
	Similar content detection	☑ UNDP-built solution for backlog data contrast	☑ Enabled through Meedan support
	Reverse image search	☑ Integrated Google Lens and TinEye tools	☑ Access to a suite of tools with Meedan Check
	Reverse video search	☑ Frame splitting and frame origin check	⊗
	External comms website	☑ Developed ad hoc for national counterparts	☑ Developed ad hoc for national counterparts
Automated data analysis Using AI to detect harmful narratives and content	Toxicity mapping & analysis	☑ UNDP-built AI algorithm + Perspective + Detoxify	☑ Perspective + Detoxify
	Sentiment & topic analysis	☑ UNDP-built solution	⊗
	Thematic analysis	☑ ChatGPT to map key themes (e.g. climate)	⊗
	Emotion, VAW, extremism	☑ UNDP-built solution (currently BETA in Arabic)	⊗
	Human verification and data annotation capacities	☑ Work with human monitors at country level	⊗

Sustaining Peace During Electoral Processes (SELECT)

SELECT is a UNDP project with an established global online knowledge hub aimed at building the capacity of national and international electoral stakeholders to prevent electoral violence. One of the six factors identified as contributing to the prevention of electoral violence is information integrity. The programme has undertaken a comprehensive research initiative, ensuring a multi-regional perspective that incorporates a wide array of stakeholder experiences and sharing of knowledge. In the publicly available research report, SELECT offers an in-depth analysis of how information pollution affects democratic processes, particularly elections. It delves into the role of the Internet, and particularly social media, in shaping political discourse as well as the challenges of managing disinformation and hate speech. Translating this research, the knowledge hub explores strategies and programmatic entry points for promoting information integrity in diverse contexts, highlighting the importance of context-specific approaches:

1. **Prevention**—to address the supply side of information pollution by preventing or deterring the creation of information pollution

2. **Resilience**—building public resilience to information pollution limiting the ability of users to be influenced or coopted by information pollution

3. **Countering**—identifying and attempting to counter information pollution.

For each strategy, SELECT offers a range of programmatic options that can be customized and implemented according to local needs with the support of the SELECT team, with resources and examples of where such activities have been implemented by UNDP and others.

Accelerator Labs

The UNDP Accelerator Labs, embedded within UNDP Country Offices, can serve as a valuable resource to support information integrity initiatives. With a mandate to foster experimentation and local partnerships, the Labs' role is instrumental in developing and prototyping new solutions that are responsive to the nuanced challenges of information pollution in various contexts. Leveraging their unique position, the Labs can engage in testing and refining novel approaches to tackle information pollution, as well as generate valuable insights into its impact on development issues and the Sustainable Development Goals. Through the Labs, Country Offices can pursue innovative research and development, form new partnerships and test alternative pathways to integrate information integrity solutions within diverse national contexts.

Institutional programming partnerships

The implementation of information integrity projects by UNDP may require institutional partnerships within the UN system as well as outside of it to obtain special capacities, regional insights and funding. These partners may be UN departments and agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international and domestic non-governmental organizations, social media companies, host government agencies and UN Member States. Annex G lists the institutions and Member States which have been identified as partnering with UNDP on information integrity in the projects listed in Annexes A to E.

5.
Conclusion

Information pollution intersects with complex issues of public trust, identity, digitalization, social cohesion and institutional readiness, especially in a context such as elections. These forces, and their impact on each other, are highly contextual and any response must place context at its forefront. Nonetheless, some key trends have emerged in the compiling of these programmatic experiences from across UNDP's portfolio that may be applicable across countries and contexts when responding to the growing sophistication, scale and evolving nature of information pollution.

Firstly, the variety and wealth of programming referenced in this document offer many potential entry points to explore and consider when addressing these challenging issues. Long-term, systematic approaches serve to build networks, forge partnerships, test and improve implementation strategies, and build important levels of trust, collaboration and knowledge. Nimble, time-bound initiatives which are run immediately before, during or after an election can provide valuable data on evolving information pollution tactics and narratives. They can allow stakeholders to respond collectively and rapidly to emerging threats and can quickly remedy public information gaps and concerns.

Secondly, capacities and competencies in various institutions and stakeholder groups have not necessarily kept pace with the myriad of changes in the way people now engage, debate, forge alliances, advocate and seek information. By fostering a culture of innovation, collaboration and continuous learning, UNDP can strengthen capacities to pre-empt and mitigate emerging threats to information integrity.

Thirdly, the range and diversity of stakeholders in this document emphasizes the need for a whole-of-society approach. This involves engaging not only key institutions such as EMBs and regulatory bodies, but also civil society organizations, online and offline influencers, community leaders, media, peacebuilders and many other actors. It entails tackling root causes through a coordinated and sustained multi-stakeholder approach.

To conclude, the ability of an information ecosystem to sustain the free flow of information and the robust exchange of ideas, opinions and beliefs is critical for inclusive and credible elections. Respect for these fundamental rights must be embedded in any information integrity initiative. The *Information Integrity for Electoral Institutions and Processes: Reference Manual for UNDP Practitioners* provides UNDP practitioners with a comprehensive set of options to explore and adapt according to their specific context. It is the intention that these initiatives foster an environment in which free speech and freedom of expression are protected, quality information is promoted, and the impact of information pollution on electoral institutions and processes and on voters' ability to make informed decisions is mitigated. And more broadly, it is hoped that these efforts help to advance the priorities of UNDP's Strategic Plan by contributing to inclusive, accountable and effective governance.

Annexes

ANNEX A. **Media and online content monitoring and analysis**

SOCIAL MEDIA LISTENING			
Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2023-2024	Bangladesh	Partnerships for a More Tolerant, Inclusive Bangladesh	UNDP Bangladesh. "Partnerships for a more Tolerant, Inclusive Bangladesh (PTIB) Phase 2".
2023	Mozambique	Democracy and Elections Project	UNDP Mozambique. "Electoral Transparency and Credibility". Club of Mozambique (2023). "Mozambique to introduce artificial intelligence in elections – 'to promote information integrity'." Report. 15 August.
2021	Panama	Generating conditions for inclusive, equal and violence-free participation of women in politics and public life	For more info, contact the UNDP CO focal point: Patricia Perez.
2022	Peru	Hate Speech Detection	UNDP Peru (2022). "Discursos de odio: nueva herramienta de inteligencia artificial permitirá identificar y enfrentar violencia en la conversación política". News. 1 December.

MEDIA MONITORING			
Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2020	Georgia	Election Media Monitoring	UNDP Georgia. "Media Monitoring of the 2020 Parliamentary Elections in Georgia".

MONITORING TECHNOLOGY-FACILITATED GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE			
Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2022	Columbia	Gender Social Media Monitoring	UNDP (2022). Gender Social Media Monitoring.
2022	Libya	Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Women's Participation in Electoral Processes	UNDP Arab States (2022). "Election Commission uses artificial intelligent to enhance women's participation in electoral processes". 9 August.
2022	Philippines	Gender Social Media Monitoring	UNDP (2022). Gender Social Media Monitoring.
2021	Tunisia	Tunisia Electoral Assistance Project II (TEAP II)	UNDP Transparency Portal. Tunisia Electoral Assistance Project II.
2022	Uganda	Gender Social Media Monitoring	UNDP (2022). Gender Social Media Monitoring.

ANNEX B. **Public resilience**

FACT-CHECKING AND DEBUNKING

Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link/Story
2020-2022	Honduras	Proyecto de Apoyo al Ciclo Electoral en Honduras para Elecciones Transparentes y Pacíficas 2020–2022 (PACE-H)	UNDP (2022). "In Honduras, iVerify partners with local university to support national elections". 10 February.
2021-2023	Kenya	Deepening Democracy Project (DDP)	Media Council of Kenya (2022). "New Fact-checking Tool to Counter Fake News". 1 July.
2023	Liberia	Liberia Electoral Support Project	UNDP Liberia. "Liberia Electoral Support Project Plus (LESP +)".
2022	Nigeria	Promoting Transparent, Inclusive and Peaceful Elections in Nigeria Project	For more info, contact the UNDP CO focal point: Mathew Alao.
2022-2023	Sierra Leone	Fostering Peaceful, Credible and Inclusive Elections in Sierra Leone 2022–2023	UNDP (2023). "Debunking disinformation: iVerify platform combines human skill and technology to check the facts ahead of elections in Sierra Leone". 6 June. iVerify Sierra Leone. Separating truth from fiction for breaking news in Sierra Leone.
2020-2022	Zambia	Democracy Strengthening in Zambia Project (2020–2022)	UNDP (2021). "AI-powered fact-checking tool iVerify, piloted during Zambia election, shows global promise". 17 November.

MEDIA AND INFORMATION LITERACY

Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2022-2024	Europe and Central Asia Regional Project	Youth 4 Inclusion, Equality & Trust	UNDP Albania. Youth 4 Inclusion, Equality & Trust.
2023-2024	Kosovo[15]	Strengthening Information Integrity in Kosovo through Youth Empowerment	UNDP Kosovo. "Strengthening Information Integrity in Kosovo through Youth Empowerment".
2023-2024	North Macedonia	Miss the Misinformation (Strengthening the Capacities of Local Communities to Responds to Misinformation and Gendered Disinformation)	UNDP North Macedonia. "Miss the Misinformation: UNDP organized a panel discussion on the negative impact of misinformation on the electoral process and in society in general". 15 September.
2023	Sudan	Together We Talk: Guiding Respectful Digital Dialogue	For more info, contact the UNDP CO focal point: Ali Muntasir.

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15   References to Kosovo in this document shall be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

MEDIA AND INFORMATION LITERACY

Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2022	Tunisia	Media Literacy and Online Information in Electoral Context Toolkit	UNDP Arab States (2022). "Online media and information literacy toolkit in electoral context". 14 October.

DIGITAL INCLUSIVITY AND LITERACY

Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2021	Argentina	The Con Vos Network	UNDP Argentina. With a little help from my neighbors.
2022	Armenia	Investing in Digital Skills for Youth	UNDP Armenia. "Investing in Digital Skills for Youth". 7 September.
2023	Asia and Pacific Regional Project	Empowering Youth in Asia with AI Fluency and Skills for the Future	UNDP Asia and the Pacific. "UNDP and Microsoft to create joint initiative to empower youth in Asia with AI fluency and skills for the future". 1 June.
2022	Mongolia	Experimenting, learning, and innovating to improve digital inclusivity and literacy	UNDP Mongolia. "Experimenting, learning, and innovating to improve digital inclusivity and literacy in Mongolia". 19 December.
2023	Serbia	Digital Literacy for all Ages	UNDP Serbia. "Digital literacy for all ages". 14 June.

COUNTERING GENDERED INFORMATION POLLUTION

Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2021-2024	Mongolia	Promoting gender equality in public decision-making and women's empowerment in Mongolia	UNDP Mongolia. Promoting gender equality in public decision-making and women's empowerment in Mongolia.
2023	Montenegro	Strengthening Institutional and Media Capacities to Counter Hate Speech	UNDP Montenegro. "Strengthening institutional and media capacities to counter hate speech". 13 May.
2023-2024	North Macedonia	Miss the Misinformation (Strengthening the Capacities of Local Communities to Responds to Misinformation and Gendered Disinformation)	UNDP North Macedonia. "Miss the Misinformation: UNDP organized a panel discussion on the negative impact of misinformation on the electoral process and in society in general". 15 September.
2022-2023	Sri Lanka	Countering Hate Speech Through Education and Advocacy for Improving Social Cohesion in Sri Lanka	UN MPTF Office Partners Gateway. PBF/IRF-427: Countering hate speech through education and advocacy for improving social cohesion in Sri Lanka. Peacebuilding Fund.

ANNEX C. **Strategic communications**

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FOR EMBS AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2021	Iraq	Supporting Elections in the Age of Misinformation and Disinformation	UNAMI (2022). "Supporting Elections in the Age of Misinformation and Disinformation".
2023	Ukraine	Strategic Communications Training for Government Officials	UNDP Ukraine (2023). "UNDP, in collaboration with partners, conducts a training on strategic communications for government official". 29 September.

ONLINE PLATFORM ENGAGEMENT

Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2020	Kenya	Early Warning and Response Project	Project document: United Nations Peacebuilding. Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund: PBF Project Document. UNDP, OHCHR and NCIC (2023). End Term Evaluation Report for the Project on Enhancing Early Warning and Prevention to Counter Hate Speech and Incitement Ahead of the 2022 Elections in Kenya. July.
2020	Kyrgyz Republic	Online Political Advertising Transparency in the Kyrgyz Republic	UNDP Kyrgyzstan (2020). "CEC starts cooperation with Facebook on the issues of political advertising online". 9 September.

ANNEX D. **Multi-stakeholder engagement and political agreements**

COALITION-BUILDING TO PROMOTE INFORMATION INTEGRITY			
Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2020	Kenya	Early Warning and Response Project	United Nations Peacebuilding. Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund: PBF Project Document. UNDP, OHCHR and NCIC (2023). End Term Evaluation Report for the Project on Enhancing Early Warning and Prevention to Counter Hate Speech and Incitement Ahead of the 2022 Elections in Kenya. July.

POLITICAL CODES OF CONDUCT			
Year	Country	Project Title	Project Link
2020	Uruguay	Ethical Pact against Disinformation	UNDP Uruguay (2019). "Partidos políticos uruguayos firmaron pacto ético contra la desinformación". 26 April.

ANNEX E. **Strengthening public interest media and independent journalism**

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM SUPPORT			
Year	Country	Project title	Project Link
2022	Guinea-Bissau	Open Class for Journalists for Media and New Information Technologies	UNDP Guinea-Bissau (2019). "Open class for journalists on media and the new information technologies". 27 May.
2022	Iraq	Citizenship Journalism: Peacebuilding through Media in Iraq	UNDP Iraq (2022). "Citizen Journalism: Peacebuilding through Media in Iraq". 3 February.
2023	Timor Leste	Journalism and Election Training: Promoting Transparency and Inclusiveness in Parliamentary Election in Timor-Leste	UNDP Timor Leste (2019). "Journalism and Election Training; Promoting Transparency and Inclusiveness in Parliamentary Election 2023". 31 May.
2022	Tunisia	Media Education in Information Online in the Electoral Context in Tunisia	UNDP Arab States (2022). "Online media and information literacy toolkit in electoral context". 14 October.

MEDIA COALITION AND NETWORK BUILDING			
Year	Country	Project Title	Project link
2021	Lebanon	Journalist Pact for Civil Peace	UNDP Iraq (2021). "Raising Voices for Diversity: UNDP Iraq launches citizen journalism platform". 18 March.
2021	Peru	The Ama Llulla network	UNDP Peru (2021). "Verificación y Democracia: La respuesta frente a la infodemia". 26 February.
2019	Sierra Leone	Support to Media Development in Sierra Leone	UNDP (2019). "UNDP's Engagement with the Media for Governance, Sustainable Development and Peace".

ANNEX F. **General UN resources**

PROGRAMME APPROACHES	RESOURCES
Media and online content monitoring and analysis	UNDP Arab States (2023). eMonitor+.
	UNDP (2022). Gender Social Media Monitoring.
Public resilience projects	UNDP (2023). Global Programme Project Document, Governance for People and Planet.
	UNDP. IVERIFY.
	UNDP and European Union (2023). Information Integrity to Sustain Peace during Electoral Processes. SELECT Project.
	UNDP Europe and Central Asia: "RISE ABOVE: Countering misinformation and disinformation in the crisis setting".

UNDP Europe and Central Asia: Social norms, gendered disinformation and violence against women in politics. The Equal Future Platform. |
Strategic communications projects	UNDP (2022). Strategic Guidance: Information Integrity: Forging a pathway to Truth, Resilience, and Trust.
	UNDP (2015). Media and Elections: A Guide for Electoral Practitioners.
Political codes of conduct	United Nations (2023). Information Integrity on Digital Platforms. Our Common Agenda. Policy Brief 8. June.
Multi-stakeholder engagement and political agreement	UNDP and Tech for Democracy (2023). Promoting Information Integrity in Elections: Global Reflections from Election Stakeholders.
General resources	UN Secretary-General (2021). Countering disinformation for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms: report of the Secretary-General. A/77/287.
	Principles for Digital Development. "About".
	UNDP. "Digital Standards".
	Association of African Election Authorities (2023). "Principles and Guidelines for the Use of Digital and Social Media in Elections in Africa".

ANNEX G. International partners based on inventoried programming

UN departments and agencies	Online companies
• Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights • UN Electoral Assistance Division/Department of Political Affairs • UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs • UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization • UN High Commission for Refugees • UN International Children's Emergency Fund • UN Peacebuilding Fund • UN Population Fund • UN Missions, Regional Hubs, and Country Offices	• Facebook • Microsoft • X • YouTube
Inter-governmental organizations and regional associations • African Union Commission • Association of African Election Authorities • European Union **International non-governmental organizations** • Digital Cooperation Organization • Drylands Development Centre • Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia • Global Centre for Cooperative Security • Global System for Mobile Communications Association • International Fact-Checking Network • International Foundation for Electoral Systems • International Telecommunication Union • Open Society Foundation • USAID	**Member States** • Australia • Bahrain • Canada • Czech Republic • Denmark • France • Germany • Ireland • Italy • Japan • Korea • Luxembourg • Netherlands • Norway • Qatar • Spain • Sweden • Switzerland • United Kingdom • United States

Note: *Partners are arranged in alphabetical order either by their organizational name or by the country in which they are located.*

ANNEX H. **Information integrity research and toolkits**

Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)
Countering Disinformation Guide.

Democracy Reporting International
Digital Democracy Monitor.

German Marshall Fund (GMF) – Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD)
ASD at the GMF (2023). *The Summit for Democracy Cohort on Information Integrity*.

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
IFES. "Chain of Harm Methodology".
IFES. "Crisis Communications Strategies to Address Disinformation".
IFES. "IFES Global Online Campaigning Transparency Community of Practice".
IFES. "Social Media Tools for Electoral Management Bodies".

International Republican Institute (IRI)
IRI, NDI and Stanford Internet Observatory (2021). *Combating Information Manipulation: A Playbook for Elections and Beyond*.
IRI (2023). *Guatemala 2023 Elections: A Risk Assessment on the Online Information Space*.
IRI (2023). *Zimbabwe 2023 Elections: A Risk Assessment on the Online Information Space*.

National Democratic Institute (NDI)
NDI (2020). *Data Analytics for Social Media Monitoring*.
NDI (2022). *Interventions for Ending Online Violence against Women in Politics*.

Supporting Democracy
NDI, DRI and SOFRECO (2021). *Guide for Civil Society on Monitoring Social Media During Elections*.
Council of Europe (2022). *Monitoring of Media Coverage Elections: Toolkit for Civil Society Organisations*.
International IDEA (2024). *Challenges for electoral officials in the information environment around elections*.