




PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA'S BORDERLANDS



Africa Amani Journal
Volume 9, Issue 2
June 2023

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IPSTC
P.O Box 24232-00502
Karen, Kenya

Tel: +254 791 57 43 36
Fax: +254 20 288 3159
Email: info@ipstc.org
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EDITORIAL TEAM:

Chairman: Lt Col J M Mwasaru
Editors: Michael Sitawa (PhD)
Maj (Dr) Cliff Obwogi

Members: Watson Karuma
Safari Mwia
Ogaye Martin
Lisa Sigee

DIRECT ARTICLES TO:

The Editor, Africa Amani Journal
P.O. Box 24232-00502
Karen, Nairobi, Kenya
Email: aajeditor@ipstc.org

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ABBREVIATIONS

APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Land
AUC	African Union Commission
CAR	Central African Republic
CBAG	Community Based Armed Groups
CCRT	Climate Change Risk Index
CESA 16-25	Continental Education Strategy for Africa 2016-2025 (AU)
CGL	County Government of Lamu
CNRA	National Agricultural Research Commission
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPA	County Policing Authority
CRC	Collaborative Research Centre
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community Southern African States
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAC	International Armed Conflict
IDC	Internally Displaced Children
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGA	Income-Generating Activity
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre
KES	Kenya Shillings
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Service
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
MoE	Ministry of Education
NGN	Nigerian Naira
NGO	Non-governmental Organization

NPS	National Police Service
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OTI	USAID's Transitional Initiative
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PoC	Protection of Civilians
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PVE	Prevention of Violent Extremism
RDEPPNF	Regional Directorate for Non-Formal Education and Pre-School Education
REC	Regional Economic Community
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALWs	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SS	Safe Space
SSD	Safe Schools Declaration
ToC	Theory of Change
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
WACA	Plan International West and Central Africa
WHO	World Health Organisation

FOREWORD




The Africa Amani Journal - A Journal of the International Peace Support Training Centre remains dedicated to advancing knowledge on matters of peace and security. Appreciative of the complexities that come with the conceptualization of security, the Journal prescribes to the holistic and all-encompassing definition of the 1994 United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report which speaks to the seven elements (economic, environmental, food, health, political, personal and community) on the wider human security debate. Cognizant of the fact that investment in these critical elements should take place equitably across the geographical space of nations states, borderlands tend to lag behind despite playing a critical role in contributing to national development. In Africa's context, the 110 African borders have often been argued to demarcate geographical territories only as communities-some present across borders continue to interact.

The International Peace Support Training Centre and the United Nations Development Programme - Africa Borderlands Centre, through collaborative efforts present to you this special issue dubbed '**Peace and Security in Africa's Borderlands**'. It delves into the critical issues that affect the borderlands of Africa. The compilation of well researched articles that have been subjected to peer review speak to the challenges and opportunities present on the continent's borderlands. The recommendations presented touch on key policy issues that can be adopted at policy level and offer practical solutions for state and non-state actors as well as vital information for the academic and research fraternity. We invite you to engage, interact and familiarize yourself with this special issue as we invite like-minded stakeholders to collaborate with the Centre and our Journal for more agency in the development of Africa's borderlands.

The Centre acknowledges the partnership with UNDP on this vital thematic area which is important to advancing knowledge on the region's borderlands and encompassing complexities. We look forward to further collaboration in research, education and training to advance strategic, operational and tactical responses to issues affecting Africa's borderlands.

The recommendations presented can be adopted at policy level and offer practical solutions for state and non-state actors as well as vital information for the academic and research fraternity.



Africa's borderlands are sites of enormous innovation, creativity, and economic potential, containing human and natural resources to support thriving communities and fast-growing local economies. Nevertheless, these areas tend to be underserved by national institutions and too often suffer from conflict, instability, and endemic poverty. Due to frequent and protracted conflicts, some African countries' borders have been closed while others have been over-secritized. This has caused many difficulties for local communities by limiting cross-border trade, infrastructure investment, and socio-economic development. Indeed, this is of concern because the border economy supports the livelihood of more than 270 million inhabitants. This also has an international impact, as borderland livelihood

systems are directly connected to global trade and development. Grassroots or community-led solutions to conflict in borderlands are paramount for the inhabitants to realize their socio-economic potential. Communities understand their environment better and thus are more likely to identify the root causes of the conflict and effective interventions.

The Africa Borderlands Centre's (ABC) evidence-driven research is anchored on the understanding that the context in which borderlands communities operate requires an in-depth and multidimensional research approach. If done effectively, research can then contribute to unlocking sustainable solutions. ABC Curation of knowledge in partnership with research and knowledge organizations such as IPSTC and independent research scholars, and more specifically through this special issue themed '**Peace and Security in Africa's Borderlands**' provides evidence relevant to programming and policy interventions. The Special Issue through desk and peer-reviewed papers covered re-engineering vocation training as an economic pathway for combating transnational crime by youth, addressing border insecurity, human trafficking, and transboundary water conflict. Moreso the Issue provides opportunities and recommendations on key policy issues and practical solutions for state and non-state actors in the borderlands.

The special issue complements the findings from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Africa Borderlands Centre 2022 flagship

Due to frequent and protracted conflicts, some African countries' borders have been closed while others have been over-secritized. This has caused many difficulties for local communities by limiting cross-border trade, infrastructure investment, and socio-economic development.

research promise-peril-and-resilience-voices-agropastoralists-africas-borderland-regions, From the research borderland inhabitants insecurity, conflict, and climate change as

Crucial drivers of ensuring the safety of borderlands communities include enhancing the rule of law and facilitating dialogue and social cohesion among state and non-state actors from the local to the regional level in borderlands.

the biggest long-term threat to their survival and development. Water-related challenges also impact economic development in the borderlands. Apart from these economic challenges, women are vulnerable to trafficking and gender-based violence. As stated in the Special Issue, addressing sexual and gender-based violence, which is prevalent in the borderland, is essential to improving women's social and economic lives.

Without sustainable income, youth in the borderlands are drawn into violent conflict. Literacy among the young borderland population doubles those of the adults which provides an opportunity for providing incentives for alternative livelihood options such as modern climate-resilient agriculture and livestock practices. Technical and vocational skills acquisition tied to value and supply chains in the borderlands provides an opportunity to enhance sustainable livelihoods, peace, and security across borders. Conflict and security threats significantly impact borderland communities. This is exacerbated by the borders being porous, weak control, minimal or lack of access to justice, and the rule of law, making borderlands prone to crime and attraction to

trafficking and illicit businesses. Crucial drivers of ensuring the safety of borderlands communities include enhancing the rule of law and facilitating dialogue and social cohesion among state and non-state actors from the local to the regional level in borderlands. Applying citizen science such as community conflict management and security mechanisms will add value to government-led conflict mitigation mechanisms.

The UNDP ABC partnership, co-creation, and curation of knowledge through research provide evidence to inform policy and programming including peace, security, and development nexus in the borderlands. The UNDP IPSTC partnership through the Amani Journal Special Edition on Promoting Peace and Security in the Africa Borderlands is a step in the right direction to curating knowledge to inform curriculum design, training policy, and programmatic interventions in the borderlands. This collaboration provides an opportunity to accelerate the achievement of Sustainable Developments goals and Agenda 2063 while reaching those who have been left behind for

Without sustainable income, youth in the borderlands are drawn into violent conflict. Literacy among the young borderland population doubles those of the adults which provides an opportunity for providing incentives for alternative livelihood options such as modern climate-resilient agriculture and livestock practices.

the longest time. I call upon all of us to utilize the knowledge here to influence development in the borderlands.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank IPSTC for its partnership with UNDP in the production of this special issue of the Africa Amani Journal.



CONFLICTS AND PROTECTION ISSUES AFFECTING WOMEN AND GIRLS IN TRANSIT ACROSS BORDERLANDS AND POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS: THE CASE OF SOMALIA IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

BY:

C.A. MUMMA-MARTINON (PhD)

ABSTRACT

For women and girls in the borderlands, violence and abuse is particularly prevalent, with minimal protection from state institutions and courts and only limited monitoring by human rights organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Men and women are affected differently by violent conflict. As a result, the aim of this paper is to investigate the conflict, peace, and security concerns that women and girls face in the Horn of Africa with specific reference to women and girl's immigrants on the Somalia borderlands. The paper focuses on the stage of transit to safe shelters or havens. There are many protection regimes for women transiting across borderlands, but as a theoretical framework, this study has adopted Galtung's Framework on Conflict and Violence. The study mainly uses secondary data. Information about the borderlands of Somalia has been gathered from books, journal papers, and policy documents, among others. The paper concludes that there are serious conflicts and protection issues that affect both women and girls in the borderlands of Somalia and that the mechanisms put in place to address them are not adequate. The paper recommends regional, multi-sectoral and the use of local institutions, among others as some of the strategies to deal with these conflicts and protection issues.

Keywords: Conflicts, protection issues, borderlands, transit, rape and Sexual and Gender Based Violence.

INTRODUCTION

Challenges related to economic, social development, peace and security, and climate change tie most countries of the Horn of Africa (Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea). Extreme poverty as well as environmental stress and scarcity of resources cause conflict and violence that pervade the borderlands. Communities along borderlands are usually vibrant with a lot of trade activities taking place, diverse cultures of people from the bordering states and immense power relations. Such spaces provide great opportunities for the flow of different commodities and differences in currency exchange rates, different market patterns and trade regulations. In addition, such borderlands are characterized by political, social and economic marginalization, persistent conflict, intense poverty, environmental degradation, and forced displacement (World Bank, 2021). Nonetheless, different borderlands in the Horn of Africa also support over 100 million people with different opportunities like pastoralism and trade. These are the places where regional and global trade connect hosting well-knit social, economic and cultural networks based

A borderland may be defined in different ways: from sociological, geographical, cultural and spatial perspectives. Generally defined, it refers to a space where two societies, nations or states border each other.

on cross- cultural, cross - country clan and ethnic connections (World Bank, 2021).

A borderland may be defined in different ways: from sociological, geographical, cultural and spatial perspectives. Generally defined, it refers to a space where two societies, nations or states border each other. It could be defined as a territory distant from the centre, where new people meet and form different cultures. It can also be delimited based on mountains, rivers or administrative attributes. It can be determined by colonisations, migrations and the intense cultural diversity (E-Scholarly Community Encyclopaedia).

But borderlands can also be places full of violence, conflict, suffering and fierce contestations. There are often clashes between neighbouring states and

nations in periphery regions. These usually have devastating effects on societies and communities living in the borderlands. Decisions on these people are also usually made by the governments who live thousands of miles away at the state centre and which do not necessarily understand the dynamics or different activities that take place in the borderlands. The communities more, often face cross border crime, threat of violent incursions and abrupt closures of borders which usually cause havoc on their livelihoods and lives. Such decisions can have negative impacts on the different communities. In cases where borders are contested, such communities also experience neglect from the governments of the bordering states.

Borderland studies question the things that take place when different societies with different traditions and cultures live side by side with each other (<https://journals.openedition.org/belgeo/10532>). More often than not, people living in borderlands – find themselves far away from their own capital cities and closer to foreign countries. However, they have connections with people back at home through ethnicity, culture and family.

The World Health Organization (WHO, 2021) describes violence against women as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such

acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life” (WHO, 2021). Hence, gender may be construed to mean characteristics adopted within society, which can change over time and even be discarded. Galtung (1969:168) states that violence occurs when the bodily and mental needs of people are not met.

As men are usually the combatants in conflict, they experience direct violence at higher rates from combat, resulting in injury or death. Women and girls, on the other hand, experience high rates of sexual and gender-based violence. They face systemic rape, higher levels of displacement and are more populated in refugee camps where their mortality rates are higher than those of men (WHO, 2021). Those involved in agriculture and giving basic services lose their livelihoods, causing economic vulnerability

(WHO, 2021). In rural areas, especially during elections, women and girls are targeted for violence in places near water sources. Gender differences may lead to imbalanced dynamics and roles between men and women. When this is a motivator for violence, it called Gender Based Violence (GBV). This includes violence such as human trafficking, sexual assault and rape, both inside homes and outside. Violence is pervasive in many countries, as a result of patriarchal

traditions and cultures that subjugate women, girls and marginalized groups. It is a major threat to the safety of people.

Based on this background, this paper seeks to determine the conflicts and protections issues affecting women along the borderlands of Somalia with other states and borderlands across the different regions within Somalia.

Figure 1: Borderlands of Somalia



Source: Varalakshmi Vemuru Aditya Sarkar (May 19, 2020).

METHODOLOGY

The paper used purely desktop research to evaluate and examine the extent to which individual, collective, environmental, food, economic, and political conflicts, as well as protection issues affect women along the borderlands of Somalia. Desktop research was conducted rigorously. Furthermore, a case study method was used, citing the case of Somalia borderlands in the Horn of Africa. In this paper, the borderlands of Somalia refer to both spaces between Somalia and bordering countries and spaces between different regions within Somalia. In evaluating secondary data, exploratory method was employed. Primarily, secondary data was applied, which involved reports from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and governmental institutions, books, magazines, published studies, newspapers were also used.

PROTECTION REGIMES FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS IN TRANSIT

Globally

There are several regimes that protect women and girls in transit across borderlands. The United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights both state that there will be no limitation as to rights and freedoms because of a person's gender. It also states that all humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights (AU Gender Policy, Rev2/Feb 10, 2009).

Since then, many resolutions have followed, as well as international instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). It calls upon parties to empower women, eliminate stereotypes and foster gender equality, and further establishes an international bill of rights for women, and an agenda for action by countries to ensure the enjoyment of those rights (New York, 18 December, 1079).

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015. At the centre are the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). All these urgently call upon different states to take urgent actions towards a global partnership

The Vienna Declaration on Human Rights (14-25 June 1993), whose main outcome was a common plan of different ways human rights work could be strengthened around the world.

The International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) placed at the very centre of development, human rights, individual dignity and the right to plan one's family.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/25, 15, (November, 2000) Article 2 of Palermo Protocol urges states to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, pay special attention to women and children;

- Assist and protect victims of such trafficking, taking into consideration human rights.
- Promote cooperation among States Parties in order to meet those objectives.
- The Human Development Report (1994) shifted the focus of human security from security of territories to the security of individuals.

It recommends that governments should invest in human development and create policies to promote peace; thus, promoting peace and sustainable development. It also expands the concept of development to include all facets and not just aid, and establishes an Economic Security Council (UNDP, 1994). Thus, the United Nations Millennium Declaration, (September 2000), calls upon states to combat hunger, poverty, literacy, disease, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015. At the centre are the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). All these urgently call upon different states to take urgent actions towards a global partnership. To eradicate poverty and other hardships, the goals emphasize strategies that enhance health, education, reduce disparities, tackle climate change and bring economic growth must all go hand in hand. Agenda 5 of the Sustainable Development Goals 2030 focusses on the achievement of gender


parity and empowerment of all girls and women.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000) was specifically meant to address specific issues affecting women in terms of peace and security. It is preceded by resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 2106 and others, noting that the use of rape and other sexual offences in conflict can amount to war crimes and coming up with recommendations such as installing, naming and shaming systems to emphasize the consequences of sexual violence (UNSCR, 1960) and recommending

the creation of awareness for sexual violence and education on the same, calling for leadership by a special representative to address sexual violence in conflict situations (UNSCR, 1888) and for deployment of a team of experts to respond.

In summary, the policy framework on Women, Peace and Security recognizes women as critical actors in any efforts towards achieving sustainable international peace and security. It pushes for equal participation for women and a gendered perspective in all security, peace building and peace processes.

Figure 2: Women, Peace and Security Agenda



Source: Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI) – (2002).

Continently


African Charter on Human and People's Rights (2016), also referred to as the Banjul Charter, demonstrates the dedication of the African Union towards women empowerment. It aims to protect human rights and basic freedoms in the African continent and states that all peoples shall have the right to their social, cultural and economic development. Their identity and freedom must be respected and all people must enjoy equal and common heritage of mankind. States are called upon collectively and individually, to ensure and exercise of the right to development (AU Gender Policy, 2009).

The Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SGDEA, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia , 2004), reinforces this and urges member states' to continually take action towards the achievement of gender parity and

to reinforce their commitment to international and regional women's rights instruments; AU Strategy for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (2019), Goal 17 of AU Agenda 2063(2013), The Maputo Protocol (2003) and the Kampala Declaration on Sexual and Gender Based Violence (2011) condemn gender discrimination and sexual violence and promote gender mainstreaming in member states, in line with other international instruments. The Silence the Guns Initiative (2016) also has among its agendas the goal to eradicate sexual abuse and gender based violence among women and children, implementing this goal through member states and international organisations (Lusaka Roadmap, 2016).

Theoretical Framework: Galtung's Framework of Understanding Conflict and Violence

Figure 3: Galtung's Framework of Understanding Violent Conflict



Source: Institute for Human Rights (AIHR, Accessed November 2022)

In addition, conflict translates to the killing and loss of human lives thus including the death of adults hence children are compelled to ascend to the traditional role of caregivers in their own families. As they are now required to care for their siblings and even find alternative sources of labour some hazardous to earn a living to sustain themselves. In summary, these harrowing experiences and extreme levels of hardships are bound to have a heavy impact on children. Hence, they play a significant role in maintaining community structures in conflict zones, and, ultimately become determinants of societal stability (Stoffel, 2020).

Galtung(1969) explains conflict and violence using three dimensions; cultural, structural and direct violence. He uses a triangle to depict these three.

Cultural Violence: Cultural violence refers to the existing beliefs and attitudes which different people use to legitimise any kind of violence, be it structural or violence. These include: different stereotypes, prejudices within different societies and which individuals have internalised and taken to be the

truth. As people interact with each other, they develop different stereotypes about them.

Structural Violence: These are conflicts embedded within the structures of the society which is made up of different systems, including different institutions, regulations and laws. These are meant to enforce economic systems such as social inter-relationships, religious institutions, the market, the army and their workings. As these systems interact with each other, complex relationships of power are created. Power can be measured in terms of decision making, different opportunities and access to resources. Such power relations, more often than not result in the discrimination and marginalisation and infringement of rights of certain groups. Such conflicts are not intended and, in most cases, invisible. They are as a result of the existing structures. Galtung uses the term, 'social injustice' in explaining structural violence.

Direct Violence: Direct conflict or violence is overt and experience and see it. It could be physical assault through killing, etc. It could also be intense

psychological behaviour and violence that causes anxiety, stress and trauma.

According to Galtung (1969), these three dimensions of violence reinforce and complement one another. Direct violence is overt and can be seen since it causes physical harm. Cultural and structural conflicts are invisible and difficult to identify thus to resolve. This description of different types of conflict is usually linked to the iceberg model. The iceberg model is a tool that helps us understand the relationship between those problems which are noticeable and those events that are hidden and underlying factors. In the real world, only 10% of an iceberg's mass is seen above water. Galtung thus suggests that addressing conflict, especially structural and cultural conflicts would require that we go below the iceberg since it's there that more factors can be identified as opposed to what we see. What this means is that the tip of the iceberg could represent direct violence. Cultural and structural violence is the part of the iceberg that remains below the waterline as they are not visible. Women in transit across the borderlands suffer all these kinds of violence. And as stated here, some are visible (overt) and some invisible (structural in nature). This study will adopt Galtung Framework of understanding violent conflict.

LITERATURE REVIEW: GLOBAL, CONTINENTAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Conflict Affecting Women in Transit across the borderlands

Global Perspectives

People on transit encounter a number of challenges right from their destinations throughout their journey but at the borderland, the way in which this manifests itself is different to women due to the gendered ways in which this is done universally, but interestingly, it is significant to note that women experience this differently, that is, other structured factors come into play such as race, social class, geopolitics and nationality. This is clear when it comes to the case of migrants trying to get into Portugal, while women migrants from Brazil, a former colony of Portugal

might find it easy to enter Portugal, due to nationality and the agreements that Portugal had with Brazil, women migrants from Nigeria, and Sri Lanka find it difficult to enter Portugal, revealing the geopolitical nature of this.

Moreover, women with a high social class or from a different race other than blacks, find it relatively easier to enter Portugal, even though this still will be done in a gendered manner. Generally, the way in which such conflicts are experienced by both men and women, reveal the way in which violence is done in a directed and structured manner and in some cases, this is done in an opportunistic and systematic way, as the case among women migrants trying to flee from Somalia. Globally, this has been done both by state and non-state actors in a manner that reveals that borders go beyond the territorial boundary.

Some of the conflicts and protection issues that women and girls in particular include: sexual violence as has been the case in the US-Mexico border that has been given much attention (*UNU-GCM Policy Report, 2016*).

For women trying to flee from Somalia while entering Yemen, they have reported rape and sexual harassment, so is the case when they used the land route while entering Kenya (Moret, et al 2006). Cases have also been reported of extortions and detention while crossing the border or after crossing the borders of Somalia (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

For women fleeing Burma, there are threats of detention, sexual violence and shame-this is due to the patriarchal and hierarchical structure of the Burmese society that places women below men-from the police, especially among women who have been involved in politics with the Burmese police, and actual sexual assault with the Thailand police (Human Rights Council, 2019).

Women on transit from Ethiopia have reported cases of being raped, seriously beaten, mistreatment and sometimes being locked up for days under very poor conditions that can lead to sickness and death (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008).

Reports have been given on women from West Africa who are being raped and sexually exploited in different circumstances (Ouedraogo, 2022).

Continental Perspectives

Many women on transit in Africa are from the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia, fleeing conflicts, persecution or natural disasters such as famine, to either Kenya, Yemen, or Italy via Sudan and Libya and they have reported sexual violence, detention, extortions and being forced into the sex industry while on transit, especially at the borderlands (CARE International, 2011). This is the same case with women from Ethiopia and Eritrea, with the former reporting especially sexual violence and being beaten severely when they refuse to give in to sexual demands; for West African women, it is sexual violence and being forced into the sex industry to compensate for the smuggling fee and later being released with the help of so called boyfriends or saviours (CARE International, 2011).

Moreover, in Africa, women have complained of detention, in cases where the borderlands seem to go beyond the defined state borders both by state and non-state actors as has been the case with Sudan and Libya, with the former, the locals raping women while threatening or severely beating men that transport the women should they try to intervene or their husbands are threatened by death (Leifer Manger, et al, 2019). In Libya, the authorities collide with the people transporting the women especially at the borderlands to get more money from them by arresting and detaining them and later releasing them, even in some of the detaining centres, women are reportedly being raped and kept under poor housing conditions. There are also instances of forced labour with either low payments or no payment at all in borderland (ibid).

National Perspectives – Somalia Borderlands

i) Sexual Violence, Abuse and Rape

Sexual violence “any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, or other act directed against a person's sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless

of their relationship to the victim, in any setting. It includes rape, defined as the physically forced or otherwise coerced penetration of the vulva or anus with a penis, other body part or object, attempted rape, unwanted sexual touching and other non-contact forms” (World Health Organization, 2021). For Somali women and girls, rape is the main issue right from their points of departure to their destinations. The routes used out of Somalia are; the Gulf of Aden to Yemen, North-East of the Kenyan border, especially in the course of the outbreak of war in 1991, and the route via Sudan to Libya before entering Italy. For the Yemen route, since it is controlled by smugglers, there are cases of being forced off the boats to avoid being arrested, but while crossing, women and girls have reported being raped on Yemeni beaches while trying to land to a safe place, with sexual harassment and rape being part

of the journey (UNCHR (2009)).

In the boats while trying to cross, they have reported sexual violence.

For the Kenyan route, both by land and while trying to reach the Kenyan shores, they have confronted sexual violence especially rape from smugglers, militia, the military and the police. (Human Rights Watch, 2008). These violations further extend to the camps near the borders when they arrive and try to register as refugees. Rape cases have also been reported in the camps with the perpetrators being the Kenyan police, fellow

refugees and attack from outsiders. Some of the attacks result from clan feuds, where rape is used as a weapon against one clan and also against women from that clan. The Sudan-Libya route is the dangerous one as it is a long journey through the desert (ibid).

Women have also reported cases of sexual violence, forced labour, extortions, detention and sexual exploitation along the borderlands by people transporting them and the police. This has been sometimes done in collusion with the border authorities as is the case in Libya when it comes to detention. Once they enter Italy and Malta,

the biggest challenge is detention under deprived conditions where they report being beaten, raped or put in inhumane conditions (UNHR, 2018).

Within conflict zones in Somalia, women and girls are prone to capture by militia groups and extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab. They are put in detention camps where they experience sexual violence, this include being raped and strip-searched, as a political tool for intimidation (UN, 2020).

ii) Gender Based Violence

Within the borders in Somalia, women usually face gender-based when collecting water, food and firewood; increased insecurity, as well as forms of structural conflicts coupled with issues of patriarchy, where productive assets are limited and, in most cases managed by men.

When it comes to forced displacement, women and men face different challenges in the borderlands. In such cases, there is immense suffering due to , climate change, environmental degradation and climate, natural hazards and food insecurity (Varalakshmi Vemuru Aditya Sarkar, 2020).

A report of Somalia on December 2017 by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) showed that sexual violence in Somalia was pervasive against both men and women, boys and girls, with the women and girls being severely affected. This was protracted by limited legislative protection and implementation of national and international instruments, which further increased gender inequality and displacement, aggravated by the existing drought (OHCHR, 2017).

Sexual abuse, rape and intimate partner violence among other manifestations of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) are still pervasive despite the legal protection. This is as a result to increased insecurity, weak or complete lack of rule of law, internal displacements, gender inequality and limited reliable data on the frequency of

these abuses in the borderlands. This is because it is in these areas that the potential, vulnerable refugees go through as they travel to refugee camps. Being a conflict zone, warring parties including militia, government forces, forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Al-Shabaab are present leading to increased sexual abuse, impunity and violence. Displaced women, women from marginalised ethnic and religious groups and those living in locations under the authority and influence of Al-Shabaab are more susceptible to SGBV owing to inadequate protection from their clans and from the government.

According to UNICEF (2021) 44% of women and girls 15–49 years old affirmed that being hit by husbands is normal. These could be for simple reasons like arguments with the husband, burning food or not giving it to the husband on time, going out without asking the husband for permission or neglecting the children or even refusing any intimate relations with them.

Women and girls in Somalia have continued to experience prevalent rates of sexual abuses related to conflict and violence. In such cases rape is more often than not used as a weapon of war. Members of Militia are usually the main perpetrators of such sexual violence against women with rape being commonly practiced during conflicts between different clans.

Displaced women and girls are very vulnerable since they find themselves in internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps where, abduction and forced marriages are the order of the day. Troops also take advantage of women and girls sexually and use sex as a commodity, trading it for food and money (Social Institute on Gender, 2017).

According to the Human Rights Watch report (18 January 2018), gender based violence and sexual abuses are mainly propagated by militia, Somali government soldiers as well as other armed men. In 2017, reports of sexual violence increased around settlement camps. (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

A country report from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), dated 13 June 2017, stated that 'Violence against women, including, domestic violence, rape, trafficking, sexual abuse exploitation and trafficking is rampant throughout Somalia.

It was reported by the UN Women that the Government army, national police are the main perpetrators since they operate within a patronage system. Here, loyalties are rewarded, thus creating inequalities in the access to services which cripples efforts at access to justice for women. The pluralistic Somali judicial system required is hampered by limited access to independent financial assets by women (DFAT, 2017).

The European Asylum Support Office (EASO), in December 2017 reported that ethnic minorities,

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people living in areas under Al-Shabaab control were particularly under a higher threat of sexual and gender based violence as well as sexual exploitation. It was also reported that the perpetrators involved in these violations included camp administrators in the IDP camps, who were reported to have forced girls and women to get food, clothing and shelter through performing sex acts. (European Asylum Support Office (EASO), 2017).

iii) Lack of Freedom of Movement

The USSD 'Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016' reported on the restriction of movement in some areas, contrary to provisions of the federal constitution which provides for freedom of movement and residence (Somalia, 2011). This restriction was enforced through checkpoints installed by both government agents and armed militia groups, allied groups and Al Shabaab, which exposed citizens to extortion, robbery and harassment (USSD, 'Country Report, 2016').

Armed actors man roadblocks and usually attack unsuspecting humanitarian personnel. Thus, movement is severely restricted across boundaries or to different regions within the country. The freedom of women is further restricted by the rampant threats of sexual abuse and violence (Social Institutions and Gender Index, Somalia, 2017).

iv) Migrations across borderlands within Somalia

The DFAT 'Country Information Report – Somalia' detailed the state of migration in Somalia. It reported on the commonplace internal displacement as a result of conflict and humanitarian disasters, detailing that there exists around 1.1 million IDPs. Even though no barriers exist legally for relocation, the relocation options for the displaced persons are however limited by financial resources available and lack of clan links since Somali people exist mainly in clan settings, their main source of social and physical protection (DFAT, 2017). This clan support is central, enabling sufficient access to food and accommodation (UNHCR, 2016) 'Position on Returns to South and Central Somalia'. Large numbers of IDPs in Mogadishu and urban centres creates a barrier for opportunities to better their livelihood, discouraging relocation to these areas.

v) Internal Relocations - Women Without Families and Networks

Relocation to south and central Somalia and Mogadishu requires resources and protection, which are mainly availed by family, friends or the clan in the Somali societies. Women and girls that lack these systems experience sexual abuse and gender based violence more frequently than those who do. If they are from marginalised ethnic or religious groups, they are more likely to face treatment that amounts to serious harm or persecution.

Without networks and protection by men, single women, girls and single female heads of households are unable to relocate, especially if they are from marginalised communities, and are at an even higher risk of sexual and gender based violence. Determination for relocation is decided on a case by case basis by the decision makers in each household according to the circumstances with determination including the humanitarian situation in the proposed

relocation areas (United Nations Humans Rights, 2014).

Protection Issues specific to Girls

The specific conflicts and protection issues that girls experience are mainly rape and other forms of sexual abuse. They are targeted while going out to do chores, where perpetrators harass and take advantage of them due to their vulnerable position. The Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict 2022 and the Report of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict 2021 found that in 2020, 400 civilians, primarily girls, were victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence, which was an 80% rise from the cases reported in 2019 (United Nations, 2021). According to the reports, these violations were attributed to the extremist Al-Shabaab group, who use sexual violence to assert control over the areas they dominate as well as members of clan militia and police forces. Clan militia were found to have tripled violations, while sexual abuse attributed to security officers were found to be 15% of those reported. These have intensified due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which exacerbated the cases of sexual abuse.

Another major source of concern is the rate of Female Genital Mutilation in Somalia. Over 90% of girls in Somalia have undergone FGM, with the discussion of the practice still being taboo. The Somali Demographic and Health Survey (2020) showed that FGM had a prevalence rate of 99% (UN News, 2022).

Covid-19 exacerbated the rate of FGM in 2020. Data from the Information Management System 2020 that the rate of FGM increased by over 61%. This increase was attributed to closing of schools during the pandemic, a period which families took advantage of, to subject the girls to FGM. Girls in borderlands have even less protection due to the conflicts the breakdown of societal structures due to the conflict in Somalia. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the drought that has faced Somalia as well as ethnic conflicts and Al-Shabaab attacks, the rates of poverty increased, causing families to marry off their children to obtain dowries. In Puntland, for example, 59% of cases reported to service providers were of child marriage, many of which also included cases of FGM (UNICEF, 2022). This is also exacerbated

by the numerous dropouts that occurred during the crisis, putting girls at a higher risk of child marriage and FGM.

PREVENTION MECHANISMS AND CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT, 2017) found that sexual and gender based violence against women, exploitation, domestic violence and trafficking in Somalia is rampant. It also found that a high risk of societal and general discrimination plagued women all over Somalia. The few remedies available to Somali women are inhibited by barriers to implementation.

The Constitution of Somalia

The Constitution of Somalia provides for mandatory inclusion of women in legislation and other institutions, equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sex, the right to life and liberty and personal security (Somalia, 2011). This is in line with international law and its internal policies. However,

The Constitution of Somalia provides for mandatory inclusion of women in legislation and other institutions, equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sex, the right to life and liberty and personal security (Somalia, 2011).

Somalia is not a party to the UN Convention on the Elimination of Violence against Women. Women who do not have any clan connections and families find themselves exposed and more vulnerable to many of these abuses. They neither have access to justice or protection.

The United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of Violence against Women

Somalia has not ratified the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (20 December 1993). This has exposed women to limited protection by municipal laws, especially if they have no clan, family backing or protection by men. They are disadvantaged by the loyalty system operated by the Somali Army and national police which results

in unequal access to services as found by the UN Women Report (2022).

The Somalia National Development Plans 2021-2025

Incorporates the joint communiqué of Somalia and the United Nations on the prevention of sexual violence, of 7 May 2013,³⁸ which is strengthened by Security Council resolution 2628 (2022), 39. This is for the implementation of the Somali Women's Charter as well as the Security Council Resolution 1325.

Lack of Enforcement of Laws and Regulations prohibiting Rape

Somalia's laws have prohibitions for rape. These laws include 5 to 15 year sentences for rape, a death sentence in military court. They are however, barely enforced by the government. Legal provisions punishing spousal rape, sexual harassment or domestic violence are unavailable. (USSD 'Country Report on Human Rights Practices', 2016). On May 27 2016, a national gender policy was approved by the Council of Ministers allowing the government to sue anyone who raped or killed a woman. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Somalia reported cases of rape, committed with impunity, especially on women from minority clans and IDPs.

Traditional Justice Systems and Weak Legal Frameworks

Sharia law and customary law are often used to address sexual and gender based violence against women owing to the weak Somali legal framework (Amnesty International, 2015). This is also compounded by weak state judicial institutions (The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, 2014). Both traditional and formal justice systems are ineffective in addressing this problem since they are male dominated and tend to disregard survivors' rights. Sexual exploitation and violence against women are majorly overlooked under Somali traditional and customary laws, since it is a taboo topic in many cases. These systems are male dominated as well (in Somali Odayaasha Dhaqanka) and women are excluded from the process, usually represented by a male relative. A woman's death is typically compensated by 50 camels, while the

figure is usually double for a man and rape victims are sometimes forced to marry their rapists. (Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2018).

Puntland Rape Act, 2015

The 'Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of human rights in Somalia', submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council on 6, September, 2017 articulates the steps the government took towards protecting women against gender based violence and sexual abuses. The Minister of Women and Human Rights Development in Puntland explained the provisions of the Puntland Rape Act, which was established in 2015 with the aim to facilitate formal processes towards prosecutions of rape offenders in formal courts. Chapter 19 of the Act delegates certain responsibilities to the government officials charged with prosecution. It also states that the Attorney General has the mandate to decide on any prosecution of sexual offenders. This simply means that the complainant has no say on what judgement she gets.

Somalia's Attorney General has the mandate to decide on any prosecution of sexual offenders. This simply means that the complainant has no say on what judgement.

Rape issues are however, not addressed in the Somali Penal Code. It gives the prosecution officials the mandate to create specific departments which comprises prosecutors specialized in for sexual offence cases. This penal code in its different legal stages, has a requirement that the prosecution authorities must forbid any authorities or elders from the traditional courts from taking any steps to adjudicate crimes provided in the act whatsoever that would be informal dispute resolution mechanism or any traditional mechanisms.

Traditional elders and families have been relinquished the authority to settle rape cases through traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. 'The Rape Act is not yet effectively implemented because of the lack of empowerment and training of magistrates and judges in the formal courts. They still apply sharia law in the cases of inadequate formal legislation.' (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2017).

National Gender Policy

A national gender policy was passed by the Council of Ministers on May 27th 2016. This policy plan was created to empower women by increasing their political participation, economic empowerment and education, including creating those programs and initiatives that can promote awareness and sensitivity to gender issues and tools to measure gender inequities in policies and programs. It was denounced by the Somali Islamic Scholars Union as un-Islamic demanding that its authors be punished. This was followed by death threats to the Minister of women, human rights, and social development, the only woman remaining in the cabinet, from extremist Islamic groups who opposed the policy since it increased representation of women. The Somali Religious Council on October 2nd of the same year released a press statement claiming that the provisions providing women with a 30% quota would lead to disintegration of the family and warned the government against its approval and implementation.

Inadequate Information on Prosecution

Rape and other forms of sexual and gender based violence are rarely prosecuted; shame and fear are a barrier to reporting of such cases by survivors, since it is highly stigmatised. Somali police neglect their duties to investigate and sometimes ask victims to investigate themselves, leaving these cases unaddressed. UN numbers captured from January to November 2012, show that 100 cases of violation were reported from January to November 2012 in Mogadishu. Among them, 13 rape cases were specifically reported against Somali soldiers in the military court. One was found guilty and three were acquitted. Data showing the number of convictions and acquittals are not easy to come by as Somali authorities do not release data on the conviction and prosecution of criminals. Insecurity has been



100 cases
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January to November 2012 in Mogadishu.

a major impediment to access to justice, with rare convictions of rape in Mogadishu courts (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

The USSD 'Country Report on Human Rights Practices (2016)' showed that reluctance of police to investigate, traditional approaches to dealing with rape including compensation systems and reprisals from communities prevented women from reporting rape cases' (USSD, 2016).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite the fact that they are so many conflicts and protection issues that women face in the borders of Somalia, it should be noted that there is still resilience along the borders especially among those women who are determined to cross the borders for any reasons or the other. There is robust trade along the borderlands and especial livestock exports. This is with the aim of tapping markets from Middle East and Egypt. And this is despite the external market shocks, climate crises and heightened conflicts. Cross-border informal trade is usually dominated by women and this plays a crucial role across the region. Informal and traditional community institutions are still important. They are often based on ethnicity or clan. Though weakened at the borderlands, they still play a significant role in regulating livestock trade, management of trade relations, and disputes resolution especially in areas where there is limited state presence.

When it comes to protection of women and girls, this paper concludes that the main challenge is lack of harmonization between Islamic Sharia laws on women rights and the universal laws, which makes the domestic implementation difficult.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Regional Approaches

Regional approaches are required since challenges and conflicts in the borderland become regionalized. Governments should therefore, collaborate regionally, at institutional and policy levels. Common border policies among the governments can ease the flow of labour, capital, goods, labour and services across borders. Second, there is need for social services and basic infrastructure along the borderlands, such as energy, electricity, roads, health, education, water, information and communications, and access to financial exchange. The formal and informal institutions for conflict

prevention, management and resolution should be strengthened. This is particularly because women and men are impacted differently by the conflicts along the borderlands.

Multi-Sectoral Approaches

Evidently, the prevention and response to violent conflict targeted at women requires a cross-cutting attitude. In Somalia, the health sector also has a central role to play. They should be strengthened to take action and advocate for women making violence against them unacceptable by addressing and declaring violence a public health problem; sensitizing and training health care providers to be able to provide comprehensive health services, that can adequately respond to the needs of survivors in a holistic and empathetic way.

Identification of Forms of Violence Early

Identification of violence experienced by women and girls early will lead to prevention of further violence. The provision of appropriate support and referral facilities; promoting gender norms, which are egalitarian in nature and as part of comprehensive sexuality education and life skill techniques towards preventing related conflicts. Population-based surveys should be conducted and evidence based data generated surveillance and health information systems on violence against women.

The Use of Local Institutions

Durable solutions should be sort including financial and resource in peace activities and initiatives. Borderlands should be turned into opportunities, rather than risky spaces they are currently. It's in this line that UNDP recommends the focus on local institutions that are sustainable and empowerment of communities to have those resources and relevant technical expertise that would lead to proper planning, managing and delivering different services, as well as the 'soft' skills that can promote dialogue, consensus-building and trust among the different cultures. All efforts should be aimed towards preventing, managing and resolving conflict and promoting sustainable peace among the communities living along the borders (UNDP's Deputy Representative for programme in Ethiopia).

Applying the Concept of Respect to Women in Somalia

'RESPECT' for women was published in 2019 by WHO and UN Women, a move endorsed by 12 other UN and bilateral agencies. This is a structure which aims to prevent violence in conflict against women and also at policy makers. The letters in 'RESPECT' represents seven strategies: The skills of relations making and social networking should be strengthened; women should be empowered and sensitized about available Services and in different ways of reducing poverty. They should be taught how to access enabling environments like work places, schools, and different public spaces especially for their children). The abuse of children and adolescent should be abuse prevented through attitudes transformation, norms and, beliefs (WHO, 2021). Based on well- designed evaluations, currently, one can easily tell what works in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts relating to gender based violence against women.

Paying Attention to the context, history and spatial dynamics of border regions

Attention should be paid to the context, history the different borderland dynamics. Such attention could offer an analytical lens to help development actors craft better policies, strategies and investments.

Supporting women led initiatives

Women led initiatives such as Generation Equality have sprung up over the years, with advocates representing Somalia working to support policies that protect women from sexual and gender based violence. These initiatives are supported by organisations such as UN Women, helping to bring change to Somalia's borderlands. For FGM, UN initiatives such as "Dear Daughter Campaign", in collaboration with the IFRAH Foundation which aims to involve parents in the effort to end FGM should be enhanced to reach as many women as possible. It involves signing a pledge to protect their daughters from the practice and support their autonomy.

Harmonization of Islamic Sharia Laws and International Laws

The Government of Somalia should make a conscious effort to harmonize the Islamic Sharia Laws and International Laws, to make the implementation of international laws domestically easier.



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DR C.A MUMMA-MARTINON is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Nairobi. She is also a council member of the National Defence University - Kenya



RE-ENGINEERING TVET PROGRAMME IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE YOUTHS FOR TRANSNATIONAL CRIME REDUCTION IN THE SOUTH-EAST STATES OF NIGERIA

BY:

PROF. (MRS) A. N. ALIO,
MBAH, CHIDOZIE .O. (PhD),
IDEH, NONSO .F.

*Department of Technology and
Vocational Education, Enugu State
University of Science and Technology,
(Esut) Enugu, Nigeria*

ABSTRACT

The study intends to determine the measures for re-engineering technical and vocational education and training (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youths for transnational crime reduction in the South-East States of Nigeria. It was guided by three research questions and three null hypotheses. A descriptive survey research design was used. The population was 218 TVET educators in the 12 tertiary institutions offering TVET programme in South-East States of Nigeria. There was no sampling due to the manageable size of the population. The instrument for data collection was 44 items structured questionnaire based on the three research questions that guided the study. The instrument was validated, and the reliability of the instrument was determined using Cronbach Alpha which yielded 0.85. Mean, standard deviation and ANOVA were used to analyze the data. Specifically, the study identified the current status of TVET programme, government and institutional measures for re-engineering TVET programme in achieving sustainable economic development for transnational crime reduction. Based on the study, the youth unemployment and their involvement in the transnational crime have contributed to low economic development and difficulty in achieving sustainable human security in the south-east states of Nigeria. This crime involves illegal businesses, cybercrime, arm and weapon trafficking, organ harvesting, trafficking of drugs and human trafficking. These could be linked to unavailability of a functional TVET programme, whose objectives could have been to equip the youth with a sustainable skills for self-employment and self-reliant. The findings of the study revealed among others include; that TVET is perceived as a career path for the less academically endowed, low esteemed in social relations as a result of devalued esteem, TVET lack the training facilities for effective teaching and learning, TVET staff lack the technical capacity among the other in developing competency based

curriculum and TVET staff lack knowledge among the others in developing the training packages. Based on the findings, the following recommendations were made among others which include; that the government should provide resources to equip the TVET institutions with teaching facilities on the need to improve the training of students for sustainable economic development of the youth, Government should provide implementation framework on TVET programmes to enable the institutions and TVET educators to implement the programme in achieving the desired result and that the institution administrators should provide the TVET educators with the needed environment that would promote effective teaching of TVET programme.

Keywords: *Transnational Crime, TVET Programme, Economic Development and Human Security*

INTRODUCTION

The challenges of youth unemployment and its implication on economic, social and political and security of the nation have directly impacted the overall development. This has contributed to get-rich syndrome, human trafficking, human parts merchandizing, kidnapping, snatching of properties, agitations, corrupt practices, stealing, among others. Some of these illegal activities are carried out through the collaboration of external bodies and therefore known as transnational crime. *Transnational crime* according to Falana and Omotayo (2020) involves offences that cross the international borders which affect the interest of more than one state. Thus, transnational crime involves illegal business or job activity which jeopardizes the socio-economic, values and environmental sustainability of a given society. In the South-East States of Nigeria, these crimes have contributed to high level of criminality, giving opportunity to non-state actors to control the human security architecture. However, the Transnational crime within the study area includes but not limited to arm and weapon trafficking, illegal mining, human trafficking, organ trafficking, drug trafficking, cybercrime among others.

Consequently, this transnational crime undermines the local, state and national economy; thereby destroying the environment and jeopardizing the health and wellbeing of the public. However, this crime will continue to grow until the government and educational system takes responsibility, rising up to their feet, thereby addressing the foundational causes of this crime, based on the values and structure of competency-based education programme like Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET). Thus, this study focused

on the re-engineering of the TVET in addressing the human capacity needs and thereby engaging the youth meaningfully to legal productive activities.

This crime can be said to be theoretically linked with international migration by the international community of practitioners and scholars. Thus, transnational crime like human trafficking, organ trafficking and arm and weapon trafficking ranks amongst the most prevailing transnational crime issues in South East States of Nigeria and therefore demand for measures to drastically reduce it to minimum, using education of the youth on various vocational skill areas.

In line with the above, it is imperative to note that achieving sustainable economic development is dependent on the level of human capital development and availability of a functional education programmes. Hence, human capital development and a functional education programmes is to help in equipping people with knowledge, skills and attitude in facing the challenges of human security in the society. Human security according to UNDP (1994) is a form of security approach which is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their choices, how much access they must market and other social opportunities; and whether they live in conflict or in peace. However, UNDP stated that the elements of human security include; economic security assured basic income, food security (physical and economic access to food, health security (relative freedom from disease and infection, environmental security (access to water, clean air), personal security (security from physical violence and threats, community security (cultural identity) and political security (protection of basic

human rights and freedoms. Hence, these elements of human security have a great impact to the survival of human beings. For instance trafficking in persons (TIP) otherwise known as human trafficking, is said to pose as a human security challenge and there are about 20.9 million victims of TIP (Polaris, 2015).

Thus, many factors have resulted to this transnational human trafficking, organ trafficking and arms and weapon trafficking which include; poverty, unemployment and lack of qualitative educational programme that would educate the human cognitive, affective and psychomotor. Naik (2018) asserted that poverty is the main driving force behind human

Many factors have resulted to this transnational human trafficking, organ trafficking and arms and weapon trafficking which include; poverty, unemployment and lack of qualitative educational programme that would educate the human cognitive, affective and psychomotor.

trafficking and other criminal activities. People living in abject poverty are usually very eager to leave their immediate environment to secure a better standard of living and this gives the human traffickers and others the opportunity to lure them into criminality. In some cases, parents consider this practice (of human trafficking, drug trafficking, organ harvesting and prostitution) as an avenue to send their children away for a while in order to make money (Massarath, 2019). However, one can say that the reason that made someone leave in abject poverty is as a result of not being employed. Thus, several people who are jobless are unable to provide for their family and meet other financial needs. In view of this, these people become a prey to human traffickers as they needed a sustainable job to survive.

Thus, another fundamental problem that contributes to transnational crime is the type and quality of education that the youth in 21st century is receiving. Most school an average man can afford lack facilities for effective teaching, the students are taught in abstract and the school environment is not conducive enough for teaching and learning thereby jeopardizing the process. However, Mbah and Elobuiké (2016) stated that the education system needs to be restructured in other to provide the recipient (youth) the needed competency to

become self-employed and relevant in the labour market. Hence, the type of education that can achieve this result and equally reduce transnational crime to minimum in the south East is Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET).

TVET can be said to be a skill oriented programme whose objectives is to achieve the needs of society based on the opportunity that it provides to the recipients to acquire skills, making them to think independently. Technical and Vocational Education and Training TVET according to Ojimba (2012) in Okolocha and Baba (2016) is a form of education whose primary aim is to prepare an

individual for employment in a recognized occupation in an encompassed field of study (agricultural education, fine and applied art education, business education and vocational trades in soap making, hairdressing, computer training among

others). However, Sofoluwe (2013), viewed TVET as a programme that will help a recipients in the acquisition of certain relevant skills, attitudes and aptitudes under a tutor, for a gainful employment and proper integration into the society. However, it is said to be a programme that train and develop the individual in the fields of vocation and technology to become experts, so that the nation can enjoy the good fruit of technology through her contribution to the overall technological development of the world. Thus, UNESCO (2013) sees TVET as a deliberate intervention which brings about learning that would make people more productive or simply adequately productive in designated areas of economic activities (e.g. economic sectors, occupations, specific work task). TVET programme according to UNESCO-UNEVOC (2010), is classified into three categories; Informal, Non-formal and Formal TVET programme. Informal TVET programme is kind of programme that is based on learning and training which is carried out in form of apprenticeship system where the master craftsman decides out of experience what apprentice learn (Alio & Ideh, 2022). This kind of programme normally takes place at roadside mechanics workshop, electrical workshop and furniture workshop among others. Following this kind of programme, one might decide to get certificate to have more opportunities through subscribing to an organized non-formal

TVET programme (Alio and Ideh, 2022). Non-formal TVET programme is the kind of programme which normally takes place in the skill acquisition centers in form of short courses, workshops or seminars in all the trades (Alio & Ideh, 2022). According to them, any trainee that passed through this programme can decide to acquire additional higher training in higher institutions which is known as formal TVET programmes.

Formal TVET programme can be referred as an organized vocational education, with her programmes being carried out in an approved public or private educational or training institution, with a structured curriculum, with her objectives and time of learning fixed, which constitutes a continuous ladder, where one level leads to the next and finally leads to certification (Alio & Ideh, 2022). However, Okoye and Okwelle (2013) opined that TVET has been recognized as the wide diversified education system instrumental in making the remarkable contribution to economic growth of a nation by

TVET programmes are offered in post primary and tertiary institutions to enable students to develop saleable skills for service and production occupations. Re-engineering TVET programmes in these institutions would contribute tremendously in addressing the human security and reduction in transnational crime.

production of suitable manpower relevant to the needs of industry, society and changing technological work environment. Thus, TVET programmes are offered in post primary and tertiary institutions to enable students to develop saleable skills for service and production occupations. Re-engineering TVET programmes in these institutions would contribute tremendously in addressing the human security and reduction in transnational crime; since education remains the viable tool for human capital development. However, many literatures indicate that the status of TVET programmes in Nigeria and especially in these institutions in South-East is ineffective and of very low quality (Akhueomonkhan & Raimi, 2013; Maigida, 2014).

Consequently, TVET programmes in Nigeria are facing challenges which Tihamiyu and Babalola (2013) classified into four groups namely; student

factors, institution management factors, government factors, and quality factors. Tihamiyu and Babalola (2013) noted that most of the students admitted into TVET programmes are not mentally prepared and intellectually fit to successfully pursue the programme of studies. Among the students factors in TVET programme according to Ayomike, Okwelle and Okeke (2013) are; lack of interest to learn, poor entry qualification for TVET programmes, poor public perception, poor reading culture, lack of relevant instructional material such as textbooks, practical materials (consumable), peer group influence, and lack of self-confidence.

Thus, it can be deduced that these students' factors can be a result of inappropriate institutional management. Inappropriate institutional management according to Tihamiyu and Babalola (2013), include over population of the students, the management ineffectiveness to discipline the erring students and staff due to ethnicity and cronyism. Other institution-related factors as identified by Ayomike, Okwelle and Okeke (2013) include poor teaching methods employed by teachers, lack of teacher practical competency, lack of pedagogical skill by the teacher, poor students-teacher relationship, poor evaluation of students' academic performance, poor facilities and lack of basic amenities among others.

Thus, the institution problem can be attributed to the adamant attitudes of the government towards TVET programme. The government factors are emanated from the government contributions towards TVET challenges. According to Mbah, Obi, Ehimen and Onyebuanyi (2018) the following government related factors hinder the attainment of quality TVET programme in these institutions; poor supervision of vocational technical education programmes, poor provision of instructional materials to the relevant institutions, obsolete or no facilities in the relevant institutions, poor funding of the programme, inadequate curriculum content for TVET programme, poor welfare packages for vocational technical education educators, lack of training and retraining of the technical education teachers and instructors, lack of incentives/motivation to the teachers, and

politicization of employment of staff especially the head of technological institution.

In this study, the quality of education provided to TVET students would determine their capacity building and thought of sustainable self-employment. Thus, for effective TVET practices and reduction

The quality of education provided to TVET students would determine their capacity building and thought of sustainable self-employment.

of transnational crime among the youth especially (including women) in South-East States of Nigeria to be realistic, the current status of the TVET is to be re-engineered. Re-engineering is the process of repositioning, restructuring and/or improving the system or the operation of a system (Mbah and Elobuiké, 2016). The measures for re-engineering the TVET programme for economic development of the youth include institution and government related measures.

Institution related measures are the strategies adopted by the institution in ensuring an effective running and efficient practices of TVET programme. Some of the institution related measures in re-engineering the TVET programme for economic development of the youth include; revising the TVET programme curriculum to reflect multiple intelligent from the industrial sector, placement of students in real and relevant working environment for quality practical skill development, involving industrial experts in the curriculum development and establishment of short term refresher courses for TVET instructors. However, the institution related strategies may not yield the desired result if the government related measures are not considered.

Government related measures are the strategies adopted by government in ensuring an effective running and efficient

Some of the government related measures in re-engineering the TVET programme for economic development of the youth include: public enlightenment/sensitization of the effectiveness of TVET programme in training skill workers for sustainable livelihood, establishment of TVET board at the state level, training and re-training of TVET instructor and involving industrial specialist in the programme supervision.

practices of TVET programme. Government is an institution or a system made up of a group of people that takes care or manages a country. Some of the government related measures in re-engineering the TVET programme for economic development of the youth include: public enlightenment/sensitization of the effectiveness of TVET programme in training skill workers for sustainable livelihood, establishment of TVET board at the state level, training and re-training of TVET instructor and involving industrial specialist in the programme supervision.

However, this study would provide empirical justification of the measures which the institution and government would use to re-engineer the TVET programme for economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction. The TVET educators in tertiary institution were used to determine these measures. TVET educators are lecturers trained in TVET programmes to impact skills and knowledge of TVET programme to recipients for them to become economical independents. The TVET educators work with different tertiary institutions (colleges of education and university) in South-East. The TVET educators' experiences on the measure to re-engineer TVET would be considered following their years of TVET teaching experiences in South-East. South-East is one of the geo-political zones in Nigeria dominated by the Igbo people. The zone has huge economic activities which require TVET programme to train youths in different skill areas to become economically independents. Hence, the sustainability of the TVET programme remains paramount in empowering the youths economically, thereby reducing their involvement in transnational crime. It is against this background that the need arose to determine the measures for re-engineering the TVET programmes in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the southeast of Nigeria.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Youth unemployment and involvement in crime have contributed to low economic development and difficulty in achieving sustainable human security. The youth involvement in illegal businesses, cybercrime and trafficking of drugs and human has continued to increase especially across the borders. In the case of human trafficking, it is said to be a lucrative criminal

Researchers are worried about the increasing rate of this transnational crime and its effect on the South East States in particular and Nigeria at large. The condition can be transformed if the students are provided with a functional TVET programme.

activity, touted as the third most profitable business for organized crime, after drugs and the arms trade. However, it is regarded as one of the fastest growing criminal trade in Nigeria. Human trafficking is divided into three categories: sex trafficking, labour trafficking and the removal of organs (Wooditch and Steverson, 2019). Organ trafficking is referred as an illegal organ trade, which portrays the phenomenon of trafficking in person for the purpose of organ removal. Thus, in the recent time, there have been great demands for human organs such as kidneys, livers and hearts in different places all over the world, as a result of unavailability of finding a legitimate organ donor who are willing to donate for people who need to replace their organs for health reasons. These criminal activities have continued to cross the borders of the state.

However, the researchers are worried about the increasing rate of this transnational crime and its effect on the South East States in particular and Nigeria at large. The condition can be transformed if the students are provided with a functional TVET programme. This could be achieved through the restructuring of TVET programme for the training of the youth for economic sustainability and self-employment. Youth self-employment and quality education would therefore reduce transnational crime among others in the South-East States of Nigeria. The problem of the study is posed as a

question what are the measures for re-engineering the TVET programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in South-East States of Nigeria.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The main purpose of the study was to determine the measures for re-engineering the TVET programmes in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. Specifically, the study sought to determine the;

1. current status of TVET programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.
2. Institution measures for re-engineering the TVET programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.
3. Government measures for re-engineering the TVET programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions guided the study;

1. What is the current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria?
2. What are the institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria?
3. What are the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria?

HYPOTHESES

The following null hypotheses were formulated and tested at .05 level of significance.

- HO1:** There is no significant difference between mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET

Educators on the current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

- HO2:** A significant difference does not exist between the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.
- HO3:** There is no significant difference between the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

RESEARCH METHOD

Research Design

This study adopted a descriptive survey research design. According to Nworgu (2015) descriptive survey research design is one in which a group of people or items are studied by collecting and analyzing data from only a few of them to represent the entire group. This design was adopted due to the responses from TVET Educators used for the study, which could be generalized to the rest of other programmes in tertiary institutions in South-East. Area of the Study

The study was conducted in the South-East States of Nigeria. South-East is one of the six geopolitical Zones of Nigeria. The five states that made up of South-Eastern States in Nigeria include; Anambra, Eboyi, Enugu, Imo and Abia State.

Population

The population comprised 218 TVET lecturers of in the 12 tertiary institutions offering TVET programme in South-East States Nigeria. The population was determined from field survey conducted by the researchers. The number was manageable and as such, there was no sampling.

Validation of the Instrument

The instrument was validated by three experts, two from Technology Education Department and one from Measurement and Evaluation unit of Mathematics and Computer Education Department, all from from faculty of Education in Enugu State University of Science and Technology, Enugu. Their corrections and suggestions of the experts after the validation were used to produce the final instrument used for the study.

Reliability of the Instrument

To determine the reliability of the instrument, the instrument was trial tested using 20 TVET educators in Delta State who were not part of the population under study. The reliability coefficient yielded .85 using Crombach Alpha method. This .85 coefficient is in-line with Uzoagulu (2011) that reliability index of 0.60 to 1 shows that the instrument is highly reliable.

Instrument for Data Collection

The data collection was carried out using 44 item structured questionnaire developed by the researcher based on the related literature. The instrument was structured in four point response options of Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D) and Strongly Disagree (SD) with numerical values of 4, 3, 2 and 1. The researcher administered the 218 copies of the questionnaire with the help of seven guided assistants. The researcher guided the research assistants on how to successfully administer the questionnaire to the respondents, helping them to properly fill the questionnaire and collect them back. The researcher and the research assistant went to the selected schools for briefing and discussion, after which the questionnaire was administered. out of 218 copies that was distributed 193 copies were returned giving 88.53% return rate.

DATA ANALYSIS

Data collected for the study were analyzed using relevant statistics. Weighted mean and standard deviation were used to answer the research questions. Decisions on the research questions were made using the lower and upper limits of the mean based on a four point rating scale. The standard deviation was used to determine the homogeneity or otherwise the

opinions of the respondents. The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to test the null hypotheses. The analysis was carried out using Statistical Packages Social Science (SPSS).The significant value (at 2-tail) was compared with .05 level of significant at the appropriate degree of freedom. The null hypothesis was not rejected when the significant value was less than the .05 level of significance and at appropriate degree of freedom; otherwise the null hypothesis was rejected.

RESULTS

The results of the study are presented according to the research questions and hypotheses that guided the study.

Table 1: Respondents' mean ratings and standard deviation on the current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria

S/N	current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction includes:	Overall	Decision	Decision
		XG	SDG	
1	Perceived as a career path for the less academically endowed	3.54	0.75	Strongly Agree
2	Low esteemed in social relations of TVET as a result of devalued esteem	3.05	0.73	Agree
3	Unsatisfactory policy framework	2.97	0.75	Agree
4	Lack of technical and practical skills among TVET instructors	2.99	0.77	Agree
5	TVET instructors not abreast with the new technology	2.97	0.76	Agree
6	Mismanagement of TVET fund by a general education administrator	3.03	0.77	Agree
7	Lack of training facilities	3.06	0.76	Agree
8	Lack of technical capacity among the TVET staff in developing competency based curriculum	3.02	0.74	Agree
9	Lack of knowledge among the TVET staff in developing the training packages	3.01	0.79	Agree
10	Lack of skills among the TVET staff in conducting quality assurance and accreditation	2.92	0.79	Agree
11	TVET students not mentally prepared and intellectually fit to successfully pursue the programme	2.99	0.81	Agree
12	Poor teaching method employed by the teacher	3.01	0.76	Agree
13	Poor supervision of TVET programme	3.08	0.75	Agree
14	Inadequate curriculum content for TVET programme	3.02	0.76	Agree
15	Poor welfare packages for TVET educators	3.07	0.73	Agree
16	Lack of training/re-training of TVET instructor	3.03	0.71	Agree
17	Mismatch of skill between demand and supply of technical manpower	3.08	0.71	Agree
Cluster Mean/SD		3.05	0.76	Agree

Note: X = Mean; SD =Standard Deviation

Research Question 1

What is the current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria?

The analysis of data presented in Table 1 shows that the overall mean ratings for item one is 3.75 indicating strongly agree. The remaining 16 items mean rating range from 2.92 to and 3.08 showing agree. This means that the items are the current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. The overall cluster mean of 3.05 further showed agree. The cluster low standard deviation of .76 indicates that the respondents have relatively similar opinion itemized measures.

Hypothesis 1

There is no significant difference in the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

The result of analysis of variance (ANOVA) in Table 2 shows that the f values is 1.864 at .05 level of significant and degree of freedom between group is 2 and within group is 190 with significant value of .178. Since the significant values of .178 obtained is more

Table 2: Summary of One-way ANOVA on the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the current status of(TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F	Sig	Decision
Between Groups	129.235	2	64.618	1.864	.178	NS
Within Groups	797.111	190	34.657			
Total	926.346	192				

S= Significant; NS= Not Significant

Research Question 2

What are the institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria?

The analysis of data presented in Table 3 above shows that overall mean rating ranging from 3.07 to 3.43 showing agree. This means that the respondents agree to the items as the institution measures for

than the .05 level of significant the null hypothesis for the items is not significant. This means that there is no significant difference regarding the mean ratings of the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction. The overall cluster mean of 3.23 further indicates that the items are the institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. The low standard deviation of 0.53 indicates that the respondents have similar opinion to the items.

Table 3: Mean ratings and standard deviation on the institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria

S/N	Institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction includes:	Overall XG	Decision SDG	Decision
18	Revising the TVET programme curriculum to reflect multiple intelligent from the industrial sector	3.27	0.74	Agree
19	Provision of appropriate tools, equipment, materials and machine for constituent practices	3.07	0.47	Agree
20	Modernization of instructional and infrastructural resources	3.07	0.47	Agree
21	Better synergy between TVET institution and industry	3.22	0.42	Agree
22	Placement of students in real and relevant working environment for quality practical skill development	3.22	0.42	Agree
23	Engaging the students in mentorship programme to complement their studies while in school	3.39	0.49	Agree
24	Admitting students based on merit	3.24	0.58	Agree
25	Invitation of an industry experts to address students during orientation	3.41	0.67	Agree
26	Involving industrial experts in the curriculum development/review	3.29	0.73	Agree
27	Taking of students to relevant industrial cities	3.07	0.47	Agree
28	Hiring industrial specialist in coaching the TVET instructors on the new trends	3.07	0.47	Agree
29	Establishment of regular interactive sessions by TVET instructors and industrial specialist	3.21	0.43	Agree
30	Establishment of short term refresher courses for TVET instructors	3.21	0.43	Agree
31	Motivating experienced TVET instructors to mentor the fresh ones for effective practices	3.43	0.65	Agree
Cluster Mean/SD		3.23	0.53	Agree

Note: X = Mean; SD =Standard Deviation

Hypothesis 2

There is no significant difference in the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

The result of analysis of variance (ANOVA) in Table 4 shows that the f values is 1.633 at .05 level of significant and degree of freedom between group is 2 and within group is 190 with significant value of .217.

Since the significant values of .217 obtained is more than the .05 level of significant the null hypothesis for the items is not significant. This means that there is no significant difference regarding mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

Table 4: Summary of One-way ANOVA on the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria

highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F	Sig	Decision
Between Groups	195.440	2	97.720	1.633	.217	NS
Within Groups	1376.444	190	59.845			
Total	1571.885	192				

NS= Not Significant

Research Question 3

What are the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria?

The data presented in Table 5 indicates that the overall item mean ratings range from 2.97 to 3.37 depicting agree. These shows that the respondents

agree to the items as the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction. The overall cluster mean rating of 3.06 indicates agree. The low standard deviation of .76 shows that the respondent's opinions is homogenous to the items as government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

Table 5: Mean ratings and standard deviation on the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria

S/N	Government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction includes;	Overall XG	Decision SDG	Decision
32	Public enlightenment/sensitization of the effectiveness of TVET programme in training skill workers for sustainable livelihood	3.37	0.79	Agree
33	Making good institutional policy framework for proper implementation of TVET programme	2.97	0.81	Agree
34	Establishment of TVET national board at the state level	3.00	0.79	Agree
35	Placement of TVET professionals as managers/policy makers with adequate expertise in controlling TVET affairs	2.97	0.77	Agree
36	Training and re-training of TVET instructor	3.00	0.76	Agree
37	Adequate provision of internal and external supervision	3.20	0.75	Agree
38	Adequate provision of scholarship/grant for TVET instructor	3.02	0.76	Agree
39	Genuine political will and education policy makers	3.08	0.73	Agree
40	Motivation of TVET instructors in training youth on practical skills	3.03	0.71	Agree
41	Involving industrial specialist in the programme implementation	3.08	0.72	Agree
42	Making it mandatory for TVET instructors to acquire professional experience in the industry in addition to academic training	3.02	0.78	Agree
43	Sending the TVET instructors periodically to upgrade and modernize their practical knowledge on workplace technologies	3.05	0.77	Agree
44	Mandating TVET instructors in upgrading their digital competencies	3.02	0.75	Agree
Cluster Mean/SD		3.23	0.53	Agree

Note: X = Mean; SD =Standard Deviation

Hypothesis 3

There is no significant difference in the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

The result of analysis of variance (ANOVA) in Table 6 shows that the f values is 1.096at 0.05 level of significant and degree of freedom between group 2 and within group 190 with significant value of .278. Since the significant values of .278 obtained is more

than the 0.05 level of significant the null hypothesis for the items is not significant. This means that there is no significant difference regarding the items on the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

Table 6: Summary of One-way ANOVA on the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Squares	F	Sig	Decision
Between Groups	129.235	2	63.648	1.096	.278	NS
Within Groups	797.213	190	33.667			
Total	926.448	192				

NS= Not Significant

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The findings of this study were discussed according to the research questions answered and hypotheses that guided the study under the following headings.

Current Status of TVET Programme in Achieving Sustainable Economic Development of the Youth for Transnational Crime Reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

The result of data analysis reviewed the current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. The result showed that the current status of TVET according to the opinion of TVET educators were that; TVET is perceived as a career path for the less academically endowed, Low esteemed in social relations as a result of devalued esteem, there is mismanagement of TVET fund by a general education administrator, there is lack of training facilities, there is lack of technical capacity among the TVET staff in developing competency based curriculum, there is lack of knowledge among the TVET staff in developing the training packages, poor teaching method employed by TVET teacher, poor supervision of TVET programme, inadequate curriculum content for TVET programme and Poor welfare packages for TVET educators among others.

The findings were in agreement with Umunadi, (2014) who asserted that TVET programme implementation have not met the required global standard in Nigeria following the challenges to it implementation. The

result showed that the status of TVET in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction needs to be improved. The inadequacy in the TVET current status need to be addressed in order to achieve the needed improvement in training the youth for sustainable economic development and reduction in crime especially transnational crime. The result of null hypothesis showed that there was no significant difference in the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. This indicated that experience of the TVET Educators had no significant influence on the current status of (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

Institution Measures for Re-Engineering the TVET Programme in Achieving Sustainable Economic Development of the Youth for Transnational Crime Reduction in the South-East of Nigeria

The result of data analysis indicated the institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. The identified institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction includes; revising the TVET programme curriculum

to reflect multiple intelligent from the industrial sector, provision of appropriate tools, equipment, materials and machine for constituent practices, modernization of instructional and infrastructural resources, better synergy between TVET institution and industry, placement of students in real and relevant working environment for quality practical skill development, engaging the students in mentorship programme to complement their studies while in school, admitting students based on merit, invitation of an industry experts to address students during orientation, involving industrial experts in the curriculum development/review, taking of students to relevant industrial cities, hiring industrial specialist in coaching the TVET instructors on the new trends and Motivating experienced TVET instructors to mentor the fresh ones for effective practices.

Thus, the identified institution measures are required to improve and sustain full implementation of TVET programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East. The findings were in line with Mbah, Obi, Ehimen and Onyebuenyi, (2018) who asserted that institutions need to develop strategies for implementing the TVET programme, and thereby partnering with the industry for cooperative instructional delivery to the students. The institution measures according to Alio and Ideh (2022) need to be considered as the training of the youth for quality is dependent on the institution instructional development strategies. Therefore, the identified measures would help the institution in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction. The findings of the study revealed that there was no significant difference in the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the identified institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for

The findings of the study revealed that there was no significant difference in the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the identified institution measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.

Government Measures for Re-Engineering the (TVET) Programme in Achieving Sustainable Economic Development of the Youth for Transnational Crime Reduction in the South-East of Nigeria

The result of data analysis depicted the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. The study identified the following as the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction to include; public enlightenment/sensitization of the effectiveness of TVET programme in training skill workers for sustainable livelihood, making good institutional policy framework for proper implementation of TVET programme, establishment of TVET national board at the state level, placement of TVET professionals as managers/policy makers with adequate expertise in controlling TVET affairs, training and re-training of TVET instructor, adequate provision of internal and external supervision, adequate provision of scholarship/grant for TVET instructor, genuine political will and education policy makers, motivation of TVET instructors in training youth on practical skills and involving industrial specialist in the programme implementation among others.

The findings of the study indicated that these measures could be implemented by the government in achieving in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth through TVET programme for transnational crime reduction. The findings were in consonance with the findings made by Ayomike, Okwelle and Okeke (2013) that government is to make policies and form strong will, implementing them effectively in other to achieve the desired result in the youth development through the TVET programme. This implies that the items are the government measures for

re-engineering the TVET programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. Furthermore, the result of the study showed that there was no significant difference in the mean ratings of highly experience, experienced and less experience TVET Educators on the government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of

the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. Further, the findings have no influence on the identified government measures for improving the status of TVET programmes. Therefore, the identified government measures should be considered in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria.



RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and conclusion, the following recommendations were made;

1. Government should review the TVET programmes in the her institutions following the unacceptable current status as identified in the study.
2. Government should provide resources to equip the TVET institutions with facilities for effective teaching on the need to improve the training of students for sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction.
3. Government should provide implementation framework on TVET programmes to enable the institutions and TVET educators to implement the programme in achieving the desired result in sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction.
4. Institution administrators should provide the TVET educators with the needed environment that would promote effective teaching of TVET programme.



CONCLUSION

The study was designed to determine the measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. The issue of transnational crime is gradually becoming a normal business in South-East as many young people have decided to make money not minding its legitimacy. These young people could be redirected to acquire and develop their skills in creative ventures for more legitimate sources of income. The study therefore identified the institution and government measures for re-engineering the (TVET) programme in achieving sustainable economic development of the youth for transnational crime reduction in the South-East of Nigeria. It therefore concludes that the identified measures should be implemented to achieve the desired result in reducing transnational crimes among the youth in South-East States of Nigeria.



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ABOUT THE AUTHORS



PROF. ABIGAIL NGOZI ALIO hails from Obinagu in Udi Local Government Area of Enugu State. She holds a Doctorate of Philosophy Degree (Ph.D) in Vocational Teacher Education, Masters of Science M.Sc in Electrical/ Electronics Technology and Bachelors of Science B.Sc in Industrial Education from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. She also holds N.C.E (Technical) from the institute of Management and Technology (IMT), Enugu. Prof. (Mrs) Alio is a senior lecturer in the department of Technology and Vocational Education, Enugu State University of Science and Technology (ESUT) Enugu. She has a considerable teaching and research experience. She has a number of published scholarly article in reputable journal as well as contributions in many books to her credit. She resides in Enugu with her family.



CHIDOZIE ONYEKACHUKWU MBAH, hails from Lomu Umunze, Orumba South Local Government Area of Anambra State. He holds the Nigerian Certificate in Education (NCE, Automobile Tech) from Federal College of Education (Technical), Umunze. He also holds Bachelors of Science B.Sc, Masters of Science M.Sc and currently running a Doctorate of Philosophy Degree Programme (Ph.D) in Mechanical Technology Education in Enugu State University of Science and Technology (ESUT) Enugu. He worked ESUT and currently lecturing in the department of Automobile Technology Education, Federal College of Education (Technical), Umunze. Mr Mbah has taught Basic Technology, Technology/ Engineering Drafting and Designing at Post Primary and Tertiary level for many years. He has a number of published scholarly article in reputable journal as well as contributions in many books to his credit. He resides in Anambra with his family.



NONSO FRANKLIN IDEH hails from Enugwu-Ukwu, Njikoka Local Government Area of Anambra State. He holds the Higher National Diploma (HND, Electrical/Electronics Engineering) from the institute of Management and Technology (IMT), Enugu and a post graduate diploma in Education from National Open University of Nigeria. He also holds Masters of Science Degree M.Sc and currently running a Doctorate of Philosophy Degree Programme (Ph.D) in Electrical/ Electronics Technology Education in Enugu State University of Science and Technology (ESUT) Enugu. Mr Ideh has taught Electrical installation and Maintenance Works and Basic Electricity at Post Primary school level for many years. He has a number of published scholarly article in reputable journal.. He resides in Anambra State with his family.



TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN ACROSS THE BORDERLANDS IN KENYA

BY:

RAUDHAT SAYEEDA SADDAM

JANICE NABWIRE SANYA

HORN Institute

ABSTRACT

Modern-day slavery in the East African region is often manifested in human trafficking. Human trafficking in Kenya can be traced back to the 17th Century when the slave trade was carried out by Arab traders. It is one of the most lucrative businesses in Kenya today. Using an extensive literature review, review of government and non-governmental reports, and thematic analysis of videos and documentaries, this paper examines the genesis, proliferation, and drivers of human trafficking. Broadly, the paper focuses on understanding Kenya's position as an origin, transit, and destination state, and how these have created a permissive environment for traffickers to move people through Kenya's borderlands. This analysis contributes towards a nuanced understanding of human trafficking patterns as well as informs policy options for Kenya and regional and supranational bodies such as UNHCR with a special focus on women. Women are vulnerable parties of human trafficking, as they have historically been susceptible to violence and exploitation in society.

Keywords: Human Trafficking, Women, Porous, Security, and Development

INTRODUCTION

Human trafficking is a criminal activity with far-reaching consequences, especially for an individual's dignity. For the purposes of this paper, it is essential that a distinction between smuggling and trafficking is outlined. While smugglers move migrants across borders illegally and with their consent, trafficking on the other hand involves the movement of people without their consent, it is a crime against the person, as well as a human rights violation (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs [FDFA], 2022). The nature of human trafficking means that a victim of trafficking is at high risk of infections due to the denial of basic amenities such as food, sleep, or medical treatment and safety. This can have adverse social, psychological, sexual, and physical effects on the individual (Gezie, Yalew, & Gete, 2019). People who have been trafficked could be exploited sexually, forced to remove and give their organs, forced to work, and forcefully recruited into armed groups (Bigio & Vogelstein, 2019). Human trafficking has implications for peace and security, as this activity can be used for instance, by armed groups to raise income and expand their power and military capabilities; groups such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and Boko Haram in Nigeria have enslaved women and girls and generated revenue from sex trafficking (Malik, 2017). Thus, dealing with human trafficking is in line with regional agendas such as the AU Agenda 2063, which set out to make Africa a conflict-free zone, making peace a reality through the 'Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020' initiative. Human trafficking is detrimental to the advancement of development at the global and national levels. As



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was highlighted in the United Nations Development Report (1994), human security threats are no longer just personal, local, or national concerns. These issues have become global and they are characterized by having global impacts (United Nations Development Programme, 1994).

Human trafficking was practised by slave traders in Kenya's early history. In East Africa, slave trade was mainly carried out when Islam was gaining strength, especially along the coast before Europeans started participating in slavery. Arab Muslims would capture Africans and sell them to the Middle East where they worked as field workers, teachers, or Harem guards, which is the reason behind the castration of male slaves being a common practice. Muslims were however excluded from slavery on the grounds of Islamic legal views. Zanzibar was used as the focal point and slave hub for the East African slaves (Fröhlich, 2019). Slavery in East Africa was abolished in 1909 after Great Britain pressured Sultan Seyyid Barghash of Zanzibar to sign a treaty that made the slave trade illegal in 1873 (Fröhlich, 2019). Despite Kenyans in the earlier centuries had been victims of the slave trade, the history part of this paper will use the Transatlantic slave trade as it was one of the biggest forms of African slavery in demonstrating the slave trade and its similarities to modern slavery which encompasses Human Trafficking.

METHODOLOGY

The research design employed in this paper dealt with data collected from secondary sources. This data has been organized, analysed, interpreted, and presented systematically. The objective of using this process is to ensure that the information gathered is credible and reliable for the purposes of usage by practitioners, academics, and policymakers. Journal articles, books, legal documents and frameworks, News broadcasts, and conference papers were all analyzed and put together to create a broad perspective and understanding.

AFRICAN SLAVERY

In 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush spoke about human trafficking at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, "We must show new energy in fighting back an old evil. Nearly two centuries after the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade and more

than a century after slavery was officially ended in its last strongholds, the trade in human beings for any purpose must not be allowed to thrive in our time" (Bush, 2003). The statement demonstrated an interconnection between human trafficking and slavery. Bravo's (2011) analysis of the transatlantic slave trade and white slavery also gives a better understanding of human trafficking which may in turn be useful in combatting modern trafficking of humans more effectively than current efforts. As per these statements, the slave trade was indeed a precursor of human trafficking.

Christopher Columbus, during his arrival in America in 1492, could be argued to be the foundation of the transatlantic trade. Columbus, in his quest for a direct water route, on behalf of the Spanish Monarchy, from Europe to Asia stumbled upon the Americas which he referred to as the 'New World' (History.com editors, 2009). He first landed in what is now known as the Bahamas, where he came across the Arawak Indians who welcomed him with kindness and generosity (Liberation School, 2014). He however took some of the Arawaks into captivity in search of gold and later enslaved more Indians across Hispaniola Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Columbus later returned to Spain where he reported on the incredible wealth the islands of the 'New World' had to offer. This resulted in the monarchs handing Columbus 17 ships and more than 1,200 men to assist in his new expedition of searching for wealth. He established a system where the American natives were subjected to slavery and brutality leading to the death of many natives. Due to Columbus' expeditions and 'discovery of the New World', a series of exploration and exploitation of the Americas began, and because the indigenous Americans were unable to withstand some of the harsh working conditions, the Europeans shifted to Africans, who came as a result of the Transatlantic slave trade (Liberation School, 2014).

In Africa, enslavement took place before the Transatlantic Slave Trade. However, this later turned out to be a contributor to the Transatlantic Slave Trade. African slaves came to be as a result of tribal and cultural wars where stronger tribes captured and enslaved members of the defeated tribe; criminal activities, where the elite punished subjects for crimes by selling them as slaves; and

excommunication where members were cast out of the communities and into slavery by tribal or ethnic groups as a form of punishment. These brought about some of the forms of trade in Africa such as the Tran-Saharan Slave Trade which provided a source of slaves and trade routes that later fueled the Transatlantic movement (Muhammad, 2003). The age of 'discoveries' that brought about the opening up of sea routes to Africa, Asia and America enabled the Western European countries led by Portugal to make slavery a global venture. European slave traders acquired African slaves through kidnapping and the willingness of some African monarchs to supply some of their natives in order to advance their own interests.

Impact of Slavery on Africans

Since some Africans would resist entering ships during departure, the slave traders would often use the bullwhip to force them into the ships. They would also use scorching hot iron tools on the bodies of the slaves. This also served as a means of branding in order to designate ownership, and most times the mark represented the monarch that captured the slaves. It also helped the slave traders restrict the slaves from running away or engaging in slave insurrection. The branding mechanism did not just stop at the departure stage as Africans would receive more brandings each time they would be sold. In transit, the slaves were subjected to extreme and inhumane conditions including being forced to relieve themselves where they stood or lay, and the resulting urine and excrement would mix with other bodily



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fluids, as well as food and water, creating a breeding ground for disease and infection. This was due to the fact that many slaves were packed tightly into the hold of a ship, with little space to move and no access to fresh air or sunlight. The situation affected them psychologically causing disruption of family and cultural ties which further caused emotional damage (Muhammad, 2003).

The health of Africans was also affected owing to the fact that the ventilations and sanitary conditions in the ships were poor. They were subjected to various forms of diseases such as measles, fever, and scurvy that caused the death of many of them. There were also Africans who suffered from seasickness because they were not used to travelling by sea. As a restriction measure due to fear of escape, the European traders would use heavy iron shackles on African ankles and wrists which would cause additional injury. There were slaves whose chains were linked on the same iron and connected to each other's limbs making it a burden to both parties. African women slaves would occasionally be raped by the Europeans both the captures on the ship and with buyers on land. The pregnant women would be forced by their masters to lie on the ground facing down with their pregnant bellies in a hole and would be continuously beaten using a bullwhip as a way of punishment. The slavers saw this as a way of instilling fear in not only the mothers but also the fetuses. African slaves who were found to be rebellious would be killed and their corpses thrown in the waters as a way of instilling fear in the rest. At times, the flesh of those that were killed would be forcefully fed to the enslaved people. The Europeans would also use amputation of limbs to instil fear in those that attempted to escape (Muhammad, 2003).

African slavery also led to the establishment of The English Slave Triangle, which is a pattern that was established by John Hawkins, a privateer commissioned by the Queen, Elizabeth I, to attack Spanish fleet as a way of maintaining maritime dominance of the trade passages. It is during this career that Hawkins ventured into slave trade where he violently captured Africans from Sierra Leone to the Spanish plantations in the Americas in exchange for pearls, hides and sugar. His business in trading with Africans became so lucrative that the Queen funded his subsequent expeditions and provided ships, supplies and ammunition. Hawkins executed

three major slavery expeditions in the 1560s that created the slave triangle between England, Africa and the 'New World'. This meant that English goods would be traded in Africa (West Africa), slaves were captured from Africa across the Atlantic, and the products made in the 'New World' was transported to England (Royal Museums Greenwich, 2022).

How The Transatlantic Slave Trade Impacted the European States

Through the Transatlantic slave trade, Europeans were able to acquire free labor especially in their domestic plantations and in the development of lands acquired in the 'New World' led by Spain. The 'New World' which was also most western European colonies provided agricultural produce such as sugar, cotton, tobacco, indigo, rice and other crops that would be exported to the European market. This enabled Europe to have enough material wealth that later resulted in the Industrial Revolution.

Because African slaves were treated as a commodity, nation-states imposed a system of import and export taxes for slave traders on every slave purchased and this benefitted the respective nation-states financially. The Portuguese were at an advantage when it came to this as they for the better part of the early stages of the slave trade had a monopoly and the tax effectively raised the revenue of the Portuguese government.

Importance of Women

Just like men, women had value as they had the highest expected output levels as they had the ability to have children who were later enslaved by their mothers' owners by law. This made the average price of women slaves higher than that of their male counterparts up to the puberty stage. Pregnant women increased the slave trader's wealth and that of the slave master.

GLOBAL, REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TACKLING HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Globalization, a phenomenon that has occurred over the 20th and 21st Centuries, is characterized by the increase in the flow of people, goods, and services across international borders. These

borders have functioned as a source of trade, legal or illegal in nature (Gioto, Muteti, & Rono, 2018). There are also many borders across the globe that have become flight and refuge zones for people who are fleeing conflict. Increased border activity, coupled with the conditions outlined before that face border communities have led to challenges that are borderland-related crimes and threats to security (Gioto, Muteti, & Rono, 2018). These threats are complex because they are characterized by movement across national borders. This movement can in some cases lead to the limitation of action that law officials from a singular country can undertake against the perpetrators.

Globally, action has been undertaken to ensure that regional or global conventions are created and implemented to build capacity and institutes that can deal with the perpetrators of crimes of this nature. The main instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime in the international system is The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC).

Globally, action has been undertaken to ensure that regional or global conventions are created and implemented to build capacity and institutes that can deal with the perpetrators of crimes of this nature. The main instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime in the international system is The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). This convention does not offer a precise definition of the term transnational organized crime, nor does it list the specific crimes that constitute a transnational organized crime. However, Article 2(a) of the convention does offer a definition of the term 'organized criminal group' (United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000):

» *Organized criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.*

The definition of the term organized criminal group is crucial as it aids in identifying the perpetrators of transnational organized crimes. As mentioned before, a definitive working definition of the term transnational organized crime has not been provided by the United Nations (UN), and this is a deliberate move intended to allow for broader applicability of the UNTOC to new types of crime that emerge constantly as global, regional, and local conditions change over time. The scope of crimes that are defined as transnational under the UNTOC is: firstly, an offence that is committed in more than one country. Secondly, an offence that is committed in one country but a substantial part of the planning, preparation, direction, or control was done in another

country. Thirdly, an offence is committed in one country however it was perpetrated by an organized criminal group that has engaged in criminal activities in more than one country. Lastly, an offence that is committed in one country but has a substantial impact on another country (United Nations Convention against Transnational

Organized Crime, 2000). This scope is important as it provides an implied definition of transnational organized crime, as a criminal offence, which is done with the aim of profit, that has international implications or impacts, while still giving room for global complexities surrounding the issue and allows for a wide range of joint efforts to overcome this challenge.

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted by the General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, and entered into force on September 29, 2003 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022). Over the years, the convention has been supplemented by three protocols namely (collectively known as the Palermo Protocol): the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms. Each of the protocols mentioned before has been created to target specific areas as well as manifestations of organized crime (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022). The outline for first and second protocols will be outlined due to the

specific focus of this paper on women as a vulnerable group to human trafficking while bearing in mind that some of the women in question will be individuals who are migrants smuggled into Kenya from Ethiopia in an effort to flee from conflict and violence (Gezie, Yalew, & Gete, 2019).

The purpose of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children as outlined in Article 2 of the protocol (United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2003):

» (a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons, paying particular attention to women and children, (b) To protect and assist the victims of such trafficking, with full respect for their human rights, and (c) To promote cooperation among States Parties in order to meet those objectives.

This protocol entered into force on December 23, 2003, a landmark event as it is the first legally binding international instrument that provides a definition of trafficking in persons (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022). Which is outlined (United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2003):

» 'Trafficking in persons' shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

This definition was specifically crafted to facilitate convergence in national approaches with regard to

the establishment of domestic criminal offences that would support efficient international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting trafficking in person cases (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022). The second protocol, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, was entered into force on January 28, 2004. It was put in place to help deal with the growing challenge of

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organized criminal groups that have been smuggling migrants across international borders. This is an endeavour that has been noted to often be at high risk to the migrant and great monetary profit to the organized criminal groups (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022). The protocol is notable for being the first legally binding international instrument that provides a definition of the smuggling of migrants (United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2004):

» 'Smuggling of migrants' shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.

The UNTOC has not been immune to criticism, more than two decades after it came into force, the question is why has transnational crime not diminished? Some critics point towards its lack of a clear definition of transnational organized crime. As Peter Gastrow (2018), former director of the Institute of Security Studies in Cape Town noted, this lack of clarity impeded implementation because as a result the concept of transnational organized crime remaining too vague, and thus, the convention was handicapped and could not effectively deal with the varied forms in which it presented itself, a prime example he explains is the manifestation

of cybercrime (Gastrow, 2018). Gastrow also notes some form of indifference towards UNTOC among some countries, as he notes the convention does not seem to have a role as far as law-enforcement cooperation is concerned. Countries like the United States have circumvented the convention through the creation of extraterritorial jurisdictions enabling their law enforcement to function on foreign soil (Gastrow, 2018).

On the African continent, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Palermo Protocol are not the only legal instruments created with the aim of tackling the issue of human trafficking. The African Union (AU) in conjunction with the European Union 2006 developed the Ouagadougou Action Plan. This action plan was drafted to help Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children. The action plan draws from universal legal documents such as; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2000), and A World Fit for Children - UN General Assembly Special Session on Children (2002) among other international conventions (African Union & European Union, 2006). This action plan was also informed by the African 'Banjul' Charter on Human and People's Rights, which was put into force in 1981 under the banner of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was later replaced by the AU, as well as its Protocol on the Rights of Women (2002).

These legal instruments were created at the continental level because the AU recognized the need to address border problems that threaten peace and security. The Ouagadougou Action Plan is a strategic migration policy framework drafted to help deal with the challenge of irregular migration, trafficking, brain drain and migrant rights (African Union, 2019). The need to address migration and the resulting challenges in Africa has grown, as dynamics shift on the continent. There are emerging trends

The African Union (AU) in conjunction with the European Union 2006 developed the Ouagadougou Action Plan. This action plan was drafted to help Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children.

across Africa, for instance following the collapse of Libya, there was a noted increase in the overlap between trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling (African Union, 2019). By 2016, when various states across North Africa and in the Middle East had collapsed there was a noted spike in incidents of irregular migration, while long-recognized forms of trafficking such as child trafficking, trafficking for domestic servitude, forced labour and sexual exploitation continued to proliferate within and beyond the continent (African Union, 2019).

Twelve years after its adoption the Ouagadougou was assessed by the AU to determine how effective the action plan was at assisting Member States to combat human trafficking. The evaluation determined some gaps in the action plan and its subsequent implementation including firstly, that 'trafficking in person' is the leading migration challenge as well as the main cross-border or transnational crime concerning the AU member states, which is the same at the global level (African Union, 2019). Secondly, there was a challenge with the implementation of the action plan. The action plan was not created in tandem with a regional framework or

structure dedicated to its oversight or implementation. This led to issues around the direct adoption of the action plan among the AU member states, where member states preferred to use their available National Action Plans backdrop of the UNCTOC and the Palermo Protocol and other regional and international frameworks (African Union, 2019). Lastly, the action plan was not adaptive enough in nature to evolve alongside the challenge of human trafficking. This transnational crime has evolved on the continent with noted increased social, economic, environmental, and political pressures. When this is juxtaposed with the increasingly restrictive migration regimes abroad, notably in European countries, that are pushing vulnerable migrants into the arms of international criminal networks/transnational criminal groups that facilitate human trafficking and smuggling (African Union, 2019).

The existence of the gaps highlighted above in the global and regional instruments dealing with transnational organized crime and more specifically human trafficking means that national instruments to effectively deal with these challenges must address these gaps. While this security challenge is experienced all around Africa, it is worrisome to note

While this security challenge is experienced all around Africa, it is worrisome to note that the majority of the international focus has been on West Africa, while transnational crime in East Africa has not garnered the same level of attention (Gastrow, 2011).

that the majority of the international focus has been on West Africa, while transnational crime in East Africa has not garnered the same level of attention (Gastrow, 2011). This has largely been attributed to the 'cocaine corridor' in West Africa that is being utilized to traffick drugs into Europe. Between 2019 to 2021, there were record-breaking seizures of cocaine in West Africa; drawing international attention. The coastal countries stretching from Senegal to Guinea, through Gambia and Guinea-Bissau are once again acting as a major corridor for cocaine enroute to European markets from Latin America (de Luigo, 2021).

This attention has meant that issue of transnational organized crime in East Africa has been overlooked. In 2011 the former executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime noted that East Africa had become a free economic zone for all manner of trafficking, including drugs, migrants, guns, hazardous wastes, and natural resources (Gastrow, 2011). The borderlands in the Horn of Africa region have unfortunately been synonymous with economic, social and political marginalization, entrenched poverty, conflict and violence, and forced displacement spilling across national boundaries (World Bank, 2020).

Unfortunately, Kenya is also among the states that are plagued by the security challenges of transnational organized crime. There are an estimated 14.5 million people in Kenya's 21 border counties who are plagued by inadequate means of livelihood and thus some members of the communities in these areas are driven towards committing transnational crimes for survival (National Crime Research Centre, 2019).

The identified prevalent borderland-related crimes in the country include drug trafficking, border-point corruption, cross-border robbery, cross-border stock theft/cattle rustling, smuggling of counterfeit goods, illegal possession of forest products (for example charcoal and sandalwood), trafficking of forest products (for example charcoal and sandalwood), use of unauthorized fishing techniques or equipment, provision of safe havens for both local and cross-border criminals, cross-border terrorism, smuggling and proliferation of arms and weapons, cross-border robbery/theft of goods on transit, currency forgery, and human trafficking (National Crime Research Centre, 2019). This paper, however, focuses on human trafficking as a critical challenge in Kenya.

Human trafficking is widespread in Kenya and the country has been identified as a source, en route and destination country for victims of trafficking. There are Kenyan nationals who are trafficked to other countries in Europe, the Gulf, and North America, while nationals from other East African and Asian countries are in transit in Kenya en route to other countries (International Organization for Migration, 2007). The available legal instruments in Kenya created to tackle the challenge of human trafficking include the Counter-Trafficking in Persons Act (2010). The Act provides a definition for 'Trafficking in Persons' under Section 3 (1), which is a criminal offence in Kenya (National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General, 2010):

» (1) A person commits the offence of trafficking in persons when the person recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives another person for the purpose of exploitation by means of—
(a) threat or use of force or other forms of coercion; (b) abduction; (c) fraud; (d) deception; (e) abuse of power or of position of vulnerability; (f) giving payments or benefits to obtain the consent of the victim of trafficking in persons; or (g) giving or receiving payments or benefits to obtain the consent of a person having control over another person.

The Counter-Trafficking Persons Act reflects the Government of Kenya's commitment towards the protection of victims of human trafficking. It has a principle of non-punishment as outlined in Section 14 of the article. This section makes it clear that victims of human trafficking shall not be held as liable parties for the offence of being in Kenya illegally, or for any other illegal activity that was committed as a result of being trafficked (National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General, 2010). In 2019, the Kenyan Government set up the National Employment Authority (NEA) which is among the set out national preventive measures against human trafficking. This organization's goal is to make it safer for Kenyans to find employment (Odhiambo, 2021). However, these legal instruments have not been sufficient enough to deal with the threat that human trafficking poses to Kenya and the international community.

DRIVERS OF TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN IN KENYA

Corruption

The prevalence of human trafficking cannot take place without corruption (OECD, 2016). The complicity and collusion between corrupt officials and organized criminal networks have played an important role in the occurrence of human trafficking and it could not have operated on the scale that it does if not for this fact (Leslie, 2009). Tremblay (2009) further argues that human trafficking would not have prevailed and be widely spread if it were not for the leverage supplied by corruption. Corruption is argued to have four goals: Allow the crime to be invisible, facilitate impunity once a case of trafficking in persons is to be detected, facilitate the execution of the crime and assure the re-victimization of the trafficked persons (IACC, 2010). Law enforcement agents who engage in bribery facilitate the recruitment, transportation and exploitation of victims while corrupt criminal justice authorities aid by obstructing investigations and prosecutions of cases as well as hinder the protection of the victims. There is also corruption within the private sector where hotels, travel agencies, marriage bureaus and model agencies have contributed to human trafficking. Corruption is one of the most crucial costs for traffickers as it is a major factor in the success of traffickers (PACO, 2002).

In Kenya, the corruption stages in human trafficking range from, workers in some of the foreign missions, staff members from the United Nations refugee camp in Dadaab (Gastrow, 2011), and law enforcers such as the police, immigration officers, and officers at the criminal justice department. There are also networks that are owned by respected individuals operating under 'legitimate' businesses and with connections with top government and political figures who coordinate and organize the trade, especially in Northern Kenya and Nairobi (IPI, 2010).

Poverty

Populations living in extreme poverty are at a higher risk of being preyed upon by traffickers who take advantage of their situation and approach them with false promises of better living conditions. According to the World Bank macro poverty outlook, estimates showed that the country's extremely poor, living below USD 1.9 (Ksh. 220) a day, to be 34.3 per cent in 2021 (Guguyu, 2022). On the other hand, the women in Kenya who are under the employment umbrella 49.3 per cent (Statistica, 2022). In the gender pay gap, women globally earn 23 per cent less than men. This is according to an article written by Daily Nation which also mentioned that the report on Gender Equality in Kenya further states that Kenyan women on average earn 32 per cent less than men and that with the current rate of change, pay parity may not be achieved before 2069 (Daily Nation, 2020).

This shows that there is still a substantive number of not just Kenyans but women who are still vulnerable to human trafficking due to their desperation to overcome poverty. Such women, in an attempt of looking for jobs to better their lives, are usually targeted by traffickers who exploit them by offering better jobs abroad, where they end up as commercial sex workers or subjects of forced labor.

In some instances, some families by reason of being poor end up accumulating huge debt to their fellow community members. The accumulation of the debts forces them to give away their young and middle-aged women up for marriage or to go work as a way of paying back the debts or in order to avoid facing the repercussions. Some of them end up being raped or abused, doing forced labor or prostitution.

Climate Change

Climate Change has become a new global phenomenon that has impacted most countries in the International system, especially with the rise of Global Warming. The effects of Climate Change lead to the disruption of the economic and social environments of the affected people thus increasing their vulnerability both as victims and perpetrators of criminal activities.

Kevin Bales, a professor of contemporary slavery said:

» *'Well, we know environmental change is part of the engine of slavery. The sharp end of environmental change, whether slow, or rising sea levels and desertification, or disastrously sudden like hurricanes or tsunamis, comes first to the poor. I've seen men, women and children, families and whole communities impoverished and broken by environmental change and natural disasters. Homes and livelihoods lost, and these people and communities are easily abused. Especially in communities where corruption is rife, slavers act with impunity after environmental devastation, luring and capturing the refugees, the destitute and dispossessed' (Bales, 2016).*

This means that communities that are dependent on a stable climate for their sources of livelihood would be at risk of being trafficked. According to Malinoski and Schulz (2019), because human trafficking is largely seen as an international crime perpetrated by organized criminal networks such as gangs, mafias and terror groups, and not local or regional individuals, interventions during and after climate disasters focus on humanitarian aspects with little or no attention on possible incidents of Human Trafficking among the affected population. Like many African countries, Kenya heavily depends on agriculture and self-subsistence farming and in cases where there are no other alternatives, the effects of drought become profound causing an increased vulnerability to human trafficking. This is because the affected communities are forced to engage in negative coping mechanisms

such as early marriages, child labor, or commercial sex work in order to guarantee their survival (Malinoski & Schulz, 2019).

Social and Cultural Practices

African countries among their communities possess positive and cultural practices that have helped in shaping some of their national values such as respect for elders, tolerance, solidarity, sharing, helping each other, and mediation and negotiation (Idang, 2010). However, there are some social and cultural beliefs and practices within these African communities that have proven to have harmful effects on particular groups within the communities such as women and children. It has been proven that in nearly every African country, women are subjected to second-class citizen status (Msuya, 2017). There has been an increasing growth in the interconnection between Human Trafficking and some negative cultural beliefs and practices caused by social practices that devalue women and girls in society making them more vulnerable to traffickers (UNODC, 2013).

In Kenya, there are communities whose practices and beliefs make women vulnerable to trafficking. For example, in some communities, young women have limited access to education because of limited traditions such as being considered ready for marriage once they get to puberty. This also leads us to another cultural belief and practice known as early marriage which in some cultures is considered a way of preventing pregnancy and pre-marital sex which may bring shame and dishonor to the family. Most communities in Kenya put value on dowry payment which is usually given by the groom to the bride's family. This practice is usually abused by traffickers who act as potential husbands and this attracts most greedy or desperate parent or guardians to give away their daughters for financial gains (Msuya, 2017).

There are also some tribes in Kenya that practice Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) also known as Female Genital Cutting (FGC). This refers to all kinds of procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injuries to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons (WHO, 2013). FGM is used as a measure to control the sexual desires of young women so that they can only be satisfied by their husbands once they are married (Musya, 2017). It is also seen as a way that

enables men to have easy intercourse with their wives (Wambura & Khaday, 2010). In these communities, girls who have undergone FGM are respected and given higher status in the community. On the other hand, those that rebel is often victimized, stigmatized and thought to bring bad luck to their families and community at large and so, most of them opt to flee to urban areas or better environs where they end up being engaged in forced labor and, or prostitution (UNHCR, 2009), while some manage to go abroad.

Globalization

Globalization has had a positive impact across the world by reducing barriers to movement thus promoting trade and investment among countries and providing access to opportunities which have in turn promoted economic growth. With the improved communication system, people across the world are able to interact freely and also access quickly information in real-time. Despite the positive impact it has had, globalization has also enabled non-state actors such as human traffickers to operate and exploit people across the world for example through the exchange in western cultures such as the feminization of poverty and labor (John, 2019). The perception that the developed states have got more opportunities in terms of employment again, as a result of globalization has attracted Kenyan women who travel abroad especially to the Middle East in search of greener pastures but later end up being used for forced labor or as prostitutes. Also, through globalization, although the tourism sector has flourished, the same industry has promoted Human Trafficking where women have been used as sex workers as a way of entertaining international guests in countries such as England and Thailand (John, 2019). There is also the fact that Africans provide cheap labor just like in the Transatlantic trade.

Porous Borders

Kenya is situated in a position where most of its neighboring countries are prone to political instability and conflicts resulting in people crossing into the country for safety. Aside from this, most people who manage to get into the

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country use 'panya routes' (local slang for informal and often illegal routes) which are usually away from the official border crossings with no government officials, checkpoints, patrols or security searches (Ebagir, 2015). This may easily facilitate Human Trafficking. The Common Market, which is the third level of economic integration was established by the East African Community (EAC) as a way to promote the growth and development of partner states. The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market (the Common Market Protocol) was signed in Arusha, Tanzania by the Republic of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania, on 20 November 2009 (EAC, 2009). Among the provisions is the fact that citizens within EAC are to Move freely within the territories of the Partners States for employment. As good and beneficial as this may sound, and even though the establishment of the Common Market has greatly aided EAC member states economically, it has also given traffickers an opportunity to carry out their business.

MAPPING HUMAN TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN ACROSS KENYA'S BORDERLANDS

Ethiopia-Kenya

The Ethiopia-Kenya borderland is one of the porous borders along Kenya's border that is utilized by human traffickers. The Kenya-Ethiopia border was initially defined in 1907 by the United Kingdom and the Empire of Ethiopia. An independent Kenya and Ethiopia would once again redefine the border between the two states in 1970 (Sovereign Limits, 2022). Apart from Ilemi, the established Ethiopia-Kenya frontier runs for 880 kms to the tripoint with Somalia in the east.

Human trafficking is a security threat to both Ethiopia and Kenya. Subsequently, on November 14, 2022 intelligence and security institutions of Ethiopia and Kenya agreed to jointly prevent human trafficking, terrorism, and in a broader sense all forms of transnational crimes (Addis

Figure 7: Map of the Kenya-Ethiopia Boundary



Source: Sovereign Limits

Standard, 2022). Efforts towards solving this issue in Ethiopia still face certain challenges, as highlighted in the U.S. State Department report on Ethiopia (2022), the effectiveness of overall anti-trafficking efforts is hindered by conflate of human trafficking and migrant smuggling by government officials despite ongoing trainings (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The trafficking profile in Ethiopia indicates that over the last five years, traffickers have exploited girls from impoverished rural areas, who are then forced into domestic servitude and sex trafficking (U.S. Department of State, 2022). The internal conflict that has gripped Ethiopia since November 2020 in Tigray, Afar, and Amhara has left an increasing number of people vulnerable to trafficking. There are reports by international organizations that indicate armed actors such as Eritrean forces, regional forces, the ENDF (Ethiopian National Defence Forces), and the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front), have committed human rights abuses and GBV (Gender-Based Violence) against women and girls in Tigray, including potential trafficking crimes (U.S. Department of State, 2022).

A study conducted in 2019, which sought to identify the characteristics among Ethiopian returnees which made them more vulnerable to human trafficking reported that younger individuals (18 – 20 years old) were five times more likely to be trafficked than their older counterparts (30 – 50 years old) (Gezie, Yalew, & Gete, 2019). This was justified by the fact that younger people may not have adequate access to information in order to discern what is true or false. Of the group under study, women were identified as more vulnerable to human trafficking in comparison to their male counterparts (Gezie, Yalew, & Gete, 2019). As the study outlines, there are several factors that influence this: firstly, women and girls might not get sufficient attention at home due to gender inequalities and disparities which could be risk factors that increase their vulnerability to exploitation including trafficking. Secondly, females are exploited for a longer period than males. Due to the nature of their work, which is mainly household-related activities, limits their freedom of movement; as a result, they would not have the opportunity to communicate with others to get out of exploitation (Gezie, Yalew, & Gete, 2019).

Trusted community members, known as manamasas, recruit and groom vulnerable youth on behalf of local and international human trafficking syndicates by exaggerating the advantages of working abroad. Scarce economic opportunities and poverty, coupled with familial encouragement, compel thousands of Ethiopians, including a substantial percentage of unmarried youths, predominantly below 30 (U.S. Department of State, 2022). One of the routes that is used by these traffickers is the southern route – through the Kenya-Ethiopia borderlands. Once these traffickers are in Kenya, they then transit through Kenya and onward to another destination. There are those whose intended destination is Kenya, as was highlighted in an investigative expose done by the KTN News on child trafficking, young girls are trafficked into the country. Some of these individuals have been trafficked into Kenya with the promise of a better life, and although their family members are resistant they agree due to desperation. While other young girls are sold to the cartels directly by their parents. These cartels would then sell these young girls to be domestic workers in households (KTN News, 2019). This exposes how young girls and boys were being preyed upon to provide labour within Moyale town.

The current Tigray crisis has made the situation even more complex, at the Kenya-Ethiopia border, particularly for the Moyale region in Marsabit County. It has been noted that the Moyale-Nairobi road is heavily used by traffickers (Wario, 2022), an increase in the number of refugees fleeing conflict makes it easier for traffickers to move across the porous border, blending in among those in need, and increases the number of people vulnerable to trafficking. Northern Kenya already hosts two of the world's largest refugee settlements, Kakuma to the northwest and Dadaab to the northeast. There are scarce resources available to adequately sustain the groups of people in those regions, due to the economic strain following the COVID-19 pandemic and the current food crisis caused by the lack of rain to support agriculture. An influx of migrants puts a strain on these resources and thus increases their vulnerability to exploitation by traffickers.

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Figure 8: Map of the Kenya-Uganda



Source: Sovereign Limits

Kenya-Uganda

The international boundary between Kenya and Uganda was formally drawn in 1926 as a British Order, defining the boundaries of its Uganda Protectorate with Kenya Colony. Reflecting a series of colonial demarcation exercises, the modern-day boundary extends for 870 km from the tripoint with South Sudan in the north to the tripoint with Tanzania in the south (Sovereign Limits, 2022).

Another one of the borderlands that have been utilized in Kenya's human trafficking industry is the Kenya-Uganda borderland. It is estimated that an average of 50 girls are trafficked daily from Uganda into Kenya (Masaba, 2018). In January 2020, 96 Ugandan women were stopped in Nairobi by authorities at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, en route to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Daghar, 2020). The women, some of whom were identified as minors, had been restricted due to a lack of proper documentation and were later found to be victims of a well-established human trafficking ring established in Kenya. This is one of many cases of human trafficking of young girls from Uganda to Kenya. Eastern Uganda is particularly notorious for having markets in Arapai, Chapi, and Sire.

As was highlighted by ENACT Observer, there are young girls in Uganda who are sold by their families in these markets for as little as USD 5.46 (Okumu & Kirabira, 2021). Loske, a young girl highlighted in a news story, is a minor whose struggle reflects that of many other girls entering Kenya from Uganda. She was trafficked into Kenya through Busia town. From there was then taken to Garissa as a domestic worker, where she was underpaid and sexually abused by the young men in the household. Her position as a minor and an undocumented person left her vulnerable to these circumstances. Later, she found herself abandoned in Nairobi, with no place to

go, doing odd jobs to try and make a living (Okumu & Kirabira, 2021). It has been noted that business people in Kenya, notably Eastleigh in Nairobi, exploit young girls from the Karamoja region in Uganda by trafficking them into forced labour and sex trafficking (U.S. State Department, 2022). The Eastern Africa Child Rights Network of Civil Society Organizations estimates that there are over 3,000 Karamojong girls working as domestic workers in Eastleigh, where they are paid an average monthly salary of USD 50 cents (Okumu & Kirabira, 2021).

Uganda's trafficking profile indicates that human traffickers exploit both adults and children, drawing them into certain industries such as agriculture, fishing, mining, street vending, hospitality, and domestic work (U.S. State Department, 2022). Traffickers are noted to be using social media as a means of advertising opportunities to populations in urban areas, who are then lured to Kampala, and trafficked to Kenya through Busia. Children from the Karamoja region are particularly vulnerable to trafficking due to a lack of economic and educational opportunities in the region (U.S. State Department, 2022). University graduates from Uganda have also been identified as a vulnerable group, who are often lured in by promises of better economic opportunities and then trafficked into Kenya, and then to other regions where they are exploited in domestic servitude (U.S. State Department, 2022).



RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for Kenya:

- The Government of Kenya should establish shelters for victims of human trafficking instead of relying on international and non-governmental organizations. This would help build trust in the government and make it easier for victims of trafficking to seek help when stranded in the country.
- Continue rigorous public awareness campaigns through media on the issues of human trafficking, as the majority of the women who are victims of human trafficking in Kenya are held in households, it would be effective to equip the public with knowledge on how to deal with victims.
- Create public awareness about the existing public hotlines where victims and those who have identified potential victims can call in for help. These hotlines should also be made more accessible by having shorter numbers/fewer digits that people can easily recall.
- Strengthening anti-trafficking agencies in the Government of Kenya that deal with victims of human trafficking. This is to ensure that there are adequate resources available to ensure that victims are aided and not prosecuted in a similar fashion to illegal migrants.
- Re-evaluate the implementation of the Counter-Trafficking Act in Kenya in regard to the protection of victims of human trafficking.
- Kenya should develop robust County Action Plans dedicated to human trafficking. Tackling Transnational Organized Crimes as one collective problem hinders effective policy formulation that is targeted and formulated to tackle localized problems.
- The government needs to inculcate ethical integrity to overcome issues of corruption.

Recommendations for the Regional and International Community:

- Engage in rigorous trainings and capacity building around the issue of human trafficking through Regional or Global organizations like the East African Community and the United Nations to enhance understanding of Human Trafficking and the difference between human trafficking and smuggling of willing people across international borders. This is to enhance policy development and the regional and national level.
- The East African Community should emulate the (Economic Community of West African States) ECOWAS and SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) in coming up with a regional plan of action on Trafficking in Persons.
- The countries in the East African Region together should formulate a legal framework that clearly captures how victims of trafficking are to be handled. Additionally, member states should harmonize the national policies on Trafficking in Persons to regional action plans and policies. This is to ensure that these people's dignity is upheld. Additionally, they are not repatriated back to their countries of origin and are left vulnerable to trafficking once more.
- The African Union must re-evaluate its regional frameworks on Trafficking in Persons and create programmes that are adaptive in nature, to better capture the changing dynamics in Africa.



CONCLUSION

Human trafficking is a security challenge that goes against the development goals set out by the international community. While efforts have been made by the Kenyan government to deal with the issue, it is imperative that more is done. If Kenya can manage to effectively mitigate the trafficking of women in the country, this would have a flourishing effect on its neighbouring states and Africa at large. Because Kenya is a transit nation and a destination point, tackling of human trafficking in the country can help cripple the networks that transnational criminal groups utilize. These networks are used to commit other transnational organized crimes. Tackling human trafficking also ensures that the illicit funds created through this enterprise will diminish, and may no longer be used to fund other criminal activities. Lastly, tackling the trafficking of women is crucial if the country ever hopes to actualize the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs call for the actualization of a world where all people have access to basic amenities, good education, economic opportunities, and have access to safe environments. Successful rescue of the victims of trafficking helps bring the country and the region to this reality.



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ABOUT THE AUTHORS



JANICE NABWIRE SANYA is a Project Assistant at the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Studies and Diplomacy from the University of Nairobi (Kenya). Her areas of interest include Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, Food Security, Regionalism and World Politics, and Politics of Aid and Development. She also has experience in Project Planning and Implementation.



RAUDHAT SADDAM is a Research Assistant at the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies. She is currently pursuing an MSc in International Development from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.



PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN A PROTRACTED INTRA-STATE ARMED CONFLICT: A CASE OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

BY:

KARUMA WATSON,
OGAYE MARTIN,
KIRONGOTHI CATHERINE,
SITAWA MICHAEL (PhD)
*International Peace Support
Training Centre*

ABSTRACT

The conflict in Central Africa Republic (CAR) has affected civilians comprised of men, women, girls, and boys since 2014. The impact has led to displacement of civilians, deaths and injuries; as well as destruction of infrastructure that necessitated the United Nations (UN) through the UN Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014) to create a mandate for protection of civilians (PoC) through the UN Peacekeeping force under MINUSCA. The mandate of MINUSCA has been to protect civilians and support the transition process in CAR. The conflict is characterized by an intra-state conflict situation that erupted in 2012 and continues to disrupt a negotiated path to peace. This is caused by non-state armed groups continued hostilities as a result of grievances emanating from the government's lack of political will to honour past peace agreements. The resulting impact has been an economic meltdown, poor governance and breakdown of law and order that has led to various forms of abuses against civilian rights by all parties to the conflict. MINUSCA's attempts to stabilize the country both in 2019 and 2020 have been hampered by mistrust among these parties leading to a failed peace agreement and failed election. According to UNICEF, the resulting effects have been the displacement of over 200 000 civilians in the region in 2020 and over half a million men, women, boys and girls by 2021. Furthermore, borderlands issues impact protection of civilians given that the external dynamics revolving around CAR and her neighbours have far-reaching repercussions with the sustained PSO efforts addressing the crisis. In this regard, this paper will seek to analyse the level of protection of civilians in CAR. In addition, the paper will assess the strategies in place to protect civilians in CAR. It will also discuss the borderlands issues threatening the conflict management measures in place in CAR. Finally, the paper will use the relative deprivation theory to explain the continued disruption of the peace processes in CAR by non-state armed groups..

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Civilians, protection of civilians, mandate, parties to the conflict, displacement, borderlands

INTRODUCTION

United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping is an intervention within the international system through consensus from the UN member states to intervene in an armed conflict situation in order to maintain international peace as stipulated in the UN Charter. Deliberations on the need to deploy a peacekeeping mission are debated in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and recommendations forwarded to the UN Security Council who make the decision to deploy through a mandate outlining the specific objectives of respective missions (MacQueen, 2006). The peacekeeping missions are comprised of members of the national armed forces and police of troop and police contributing countries who are members of the UN. All peacekeeping missions have the overall objective of enhancing Protection of civilians caught up in armed conflict. The objective is to ensure men, women, girls and boys are shielded from the direct effects of conduct of hostilities and all Geneva Conventions Protocols and other instruments are instilled including separating civilians from combatants in conflict situations.

There are currently about 90,000 peacekeeping personnel operating in 12 active peacekeeping missions around the globe. In addition, apart from protecting civilians, peacekeeping missions also help countries experiencing armed conflict achieve lasting peace. This is achieved through the peacekeeping missions support of a political process that brings together all parties to a conflict through a negotiated peace agreement and a roadmap to post-conflict reconstruction. The presence of peacekeepers ensures that there are fewer civilians' deaths, less conduct of hostilities hence a higher chance for a negotiated peace agreement. As the move towards achieving a comprehensive PoC mandate



90,000

Peacekeeping personnel operating in 12 active peacekeeping missions around the globe.

is continuously sought, it is envisaged that UN Peacekeeping missions will have double the number of women serving the police formations and triple the number of women serving in military contingents.

Principles of peacekeeping

The UN peacekeeping operations are guided by three principles which forms the basis for securing and maintaining international security and order. The first principle is consent which comes from all parties to the conflict. This ensures that the peacekeeping mission has the greenlight to deploy and undertake its duties in order meet all the mandate's objectives. This is also a sign of that the parties to the conflict offer to commit to a political process towards ending the conflict through a settled agreement. This consent in certain conflict situations is not a guarantee of freedom of deployment especially in conflict situations of an intra-state conflict situation where non-state armed groups have a weak governance structure and are fragmented into smaller groups divided along ethnic or religious lines (UN Peacekeeping, 2022). Impartiality is the other principle of peacekeeping which ensure that peacekeepers are impartial when undertaking their mandate during their interaction with parties to the conflict. The UN emphasizes that this does not mean that the peacekeepers should be neutral in carrying out duties related to carrying out their mandate. The third principle is that of non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. This mandate gives peacekeepers the authority to protect the political process, civilians vulnerable to an imminent physical attack and when peacekeepers are assisting national authorities in the maintenance of law and order.

Central African Republic (CAR) at a Glance

Central Africa Republic was a French colony up until independence in 1960. In post-independence, the French still ran an influence in CAR with much of governance structures being run by the French authorities including government ministries (Carayannis & Fowles, 2017). After the cold war, the central African state was left at the mercy of new intricacies on governance in the form of weak African leadership that fuelled ethnic and religious

intolerance in CAR. This formed the basis for the current crisis that continues to plague the country. A series of military mutinies especially between 1996 – 2013 broke down any statehood and democratic principles that CAR had. International and regional interventions were futile as each intervention from the French government, the UN, and AU at different times failed to understand the underlying issues that pervaded the conflict to its deadliest period ever between 2013-2015 period. This is a period characterized by non-state armed groups direct attacks on civilians after the collapse of yet another government (Carayannis & Fowles, 2017).

The conflict in Central Africa Republic (CAR) has had a major impact on the livelihoods of civilians comprised of men, women, girls, and boys since 2014. This has been as a result of wanton displacement, deaths and injuries; as well as destruction of infrastructure.

This necessitated the United Nations (UN) through the UN Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014) to create a mandate for Protection of Civilians (PoC) through the UN Peacekeeping force under United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The mandate of MINUSCA has been to protect civilians and support the transition process in CAR.

The conflict is characterized by an intra-state conflict situation complicated by the emergence of various non-state armed groups and their continued fragmentation into smaller armed groups. These groups continue to disrupt any path towards a negotiated peace process due to their perceived government's lack of political will to honour past peace agreements. The resulting impact has been an economic meltdown, poor governance and breakdown of law and order that has led to various forms of abuses against civilian rights by all parties to the conflict as well as some elements of the peacekeeping mission.

The latest MINUSCA's attempts to stabilize the country both in 2019 and 2020 have been hampered by mistrust among these parties leading to a failed peace agreement and failed election. According to UNICEF (2021) the resulting effects have led to displacement of over 200 000 civilians in 2020 and over half a million men, women, boys and girls by 2021.



200,000

Civilians displaced in 2020 and over half a million men, women, boys and girls displaced by 2021 due to failed peace agreement and failed election.

According to UN (2022), the current government which came to power in 2021 continues to struggle with state stabilization which was the crucial agenda in the MINUSCA brokered 2021 Joint Road Map for Peace and the previous Khartoum Accord of 2019 in CAR that saw the appointment of a president to oversee this. Many armed groups consider this appointment illegitimate given that they insist they were not on the negotiating table when decisions were being deliberated on and decided. In addition, CAR has not had a democratic election in over 30 years.

MINUSCA mandate of PoC continues to be challenged as government forces continue to use excessive use of force on civilians, commit other human rights abuses like sexual and gender-based violence, as well target certain communities during their security operations. Continued use of children in war through forceful recruitment is also a concern that MINUSCA faces. The emergence of other external actors like the Wagner group, a private military entity undermines the role and mandate of MINUSCA in CAR. This group fuels human rights abuses alongside the CAR national army which has led to an arms embargo imposed through the UN Security Council and continues to take effect.

The use of Russian military instructors through a bi-lateral agreement between the Russian Federal Government and the CAR Government continues to hamper Security Sector Reform activities enshrined in the MINUSCA mandate (UN, 2022). The major actors in the security council of the UN reservations for Russia's involvement outside of the UN mission in CAR led to Russia's abstaining from the vote to

extend MINUSCA's mandate in CAR. This intricacies by external factors are a hinderance to supporting a political negotiated peace deal that will finally end the conflict in CAR. The current ceasefire agreement continues to be fragile as a result of these issues and the intra-state issues emanating from mistrust and lack of financial resources in CAR to finance grassroots elections, socio-economic avenues for the population to resume economic activities and social integration.

This study will seek to inform decision makers on matters of armed conflict and conflict management as well post-conflict recovery on issues of sustainable

The conflict in Central African Republic has over the years triggered wanton displacement of civilians especially in urban areas of the capital city of Bangui. Various attempts to manage the conflict over a decade later through UN peacekeeping has been ongoing under MINUSCA.

peace and security. Humanitarian actors will be informed on the role of UN Peacekeeping and how efforts by peacekeepers open logistical avenues for humanitarian action. Policymakers on conflict management will be informed on the critical role a mandate is when it comes to peacekeeping. The policymakers will be able to grasp decision-making mechanisms of both military, police and civilian components that operate within an armed conflict context. The CAR is undergoing a transition from conflict hence this paper can inform the need for all stakeholders to be included in the peace process. This is crucial for ownership of the process from all actors to avoid a relapse to a full-blown intrastate conflict.

The Conflict in Central African Republic (CAR)

(Klosowicz, 2016) avers that CAR is one of the least developed countries in Africa and this has been compounded by two intra-state conflicts in the last decade as well as weak governance institutions.

The first instance of this latest round of conflict was in 2012 when an uprising by anti-government actors brought out a rebellion orchestrated by an alliance of rebel militia factions known as the Seleka.

The second instance was in 2013 by a grassroots armed group known as the Anti-Balaka instigated by attacks from the Seleka group who have since disintegrated into smaller armed groups. The anti-balaka is an alliance of four ethnic groups rooted in the colonial era struggle for independence. This bond inspired by a long tradition of resistance is made up of the Gbaya, Banda, Mandjia and Mboum ethnic groups (ICG, 2015). The fragile nature of CAR as a result of a military Coup earlier which ushered in the reign of President François Bozizé fuelled the eventual near collapse of CAR as a state. Plagued by poverty, corruption and poor health and education systems, the fabric of nationhood was torn apart. Furthermore, the conflict over the years has triggered

wanton displacement of civilians especially in urban areas of the capital city of Bangui. Various attempts to manage the conflict over a decade later through UN peacekeeping has been ongoing under

MINUSCA. Priority for the peacekeeping mission has been maintaining the restoring law and order, as well as ensuring safe passage and distribution of humanitarian aid. It further seeks to support a political process that will see a peace agreement pave way for a transitional government through an agreeable timeline and peacebuilding plan (ICG, Central African Republic: Better Late Than Never, 2013).

Raleigh & Dowd, (2015) Intentional targeting of civilians in the conflict in CAR surpasses Africa's average which is estimated at 35%. It also one of the highest among countries experiencing armed conflict in Africa. The violence that has been directed at civilians in CAR also surpasses the number being targeted in the DRC. This is because the lack of law and order because of weak state structures leave few government security agents protecting citizens. Furthermore, many of the armed groups no longer have a proper command system given their continued disintegration into smaller warring factions further compounding civilian suffering.

Borderlands Issues in the Central African Republic Conflict

Throughout history, communities in the CAR and the larger Sahelian region have been characterized

by interdependence amongst each other. The movement of goods and people underpinned by extreme climatic conditions has led to this population mobility. This coupled by the porous borders that are more often than not ungoverned spaces has led to the people-based security complex is driven by deep-seated human existential concerns, which connect both human security and human development needs of the populations (UNECA, 2017).

The French colonists in CAR calculated that these lands were too remote and poor to administer, and essentially left them alone, except for (often-brutal) incursions by solo officers and their guards. Little changed with independence.

The fact that CAR, South Sudan and Chad rank lowly (188, 190 and 191 respectively) on the UN Human Development Index means that most of the communities will traverse these borderlands to practice their tradition such as seasonal and livestock migration and diversification of crop growing area (UNDP, 2022).

The conflict in CAR has all the hallmarks of a regional conflict formation (RCF). These include sustained violent activities, border wars, interventions. RCF's can be defined as sets of violent conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a broader region, making for more protracted and obdurate conflicts (Barnett, Armstrong, & Ntegeye, 2001).

What specifically are borderlands?

These are regions typically within 30 kilometres from international borders. Currently, there are around 270 million people living in Africa's borderlands (Africa Borderlands Centre, 2022). Alternatively, borderlands can be defined as a realm comprising of a population on the margins of power centres, traversed by a formal political boundary, living dynamic relations internally and externally (Zartman, 2010).

Armed groups attacked areas where national defence and security

forces were less present or completely absent, taking advantage of the fuel crisis (UNSC, 2022). In Basse-Kotto and Ouaka Prefectures, the *Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique* sporadically attacked villages and isolated national defence forces positions. It also increased its presence around Dimbi, Basse-Koto Prefecture, a strategic area rich with natural resources, with the apparent intent to retake its former strongholds. It is important to note that of the 16 prefectures in CAR, the one's bordering South Sudan, DRC, Sudan and Chad have faced the brunt of violent conflict as the areas are isolated from the CAR's national defence forces. Furthermore Between 2 June and 1 October, MINUSCA documented and verified 402 incidents (mostly around these isolated borderland regions) representing 625 human rights violations and abuses and breaches of international humanitarian law that affected 1,552 victims, including 597 men, 133 women, 196 boys, 137 girls and 27 unidentified children; 425 unidentified civilians; and 37 groups of collective victims, causing 66 conflict-related civilian deaths and one enforced disappearance (UNSC, 2022).

Most importantly, they have afforded conflict parties the ability to conduct lucrative business in the export of natural resources, and thereby have provided sustenance and fuel for their war agendas. borderlands can easily become natural locations for the flow and settlement of refugees, as well as strategic footholds for rebels and other clandestine actors (Scorgie, 2013).

Especially in Africa, these situations tend to be exacerbated by the lack of security measures and personnel at borders. There is often a severe weakness – if not absence – of policing on many African state boundaries, at times allowing for a sudden and uncontrolled movement of volatile populations across borders. As Anderson says, 'African states lack the trained personnel, the technology and the financial resources to prevent the unauthorised movement of persons and goods across their frontiers. Movements from one



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state to another of starving people, ethnic groups threatened with massacre, migrant workers, guerrilla fighters, diamond smugglers, drugs and weapons dealers can threaten the interests of a neighbouring state (Anderson, 1996).

Moreover, Sudan's notorious Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary has been selling weapons and military equipment to rebels from the Central African Republic, fuelling a military build-up that could threaten the country's peace process (UNSC, 2019). Since mid-2018, 3R has expanded the territory under its control considerably, having absorbed most of the Siriri elements operating in Mambéré -Kadéi Prefecture. The armed group has also conducted several joint operations with FDPC and RJ fighters. It also took control of northwest Ouham-Pendé Prefecture, where its fighters established a supply route from Chad and gained control over the area bordering Cameroon (UNSC, 2019). Their goal was reportedly to prevent the possible incursion of Sudanese armed groups coming from South Sudan and going to Chad through CAR territory. Am Dafok is a traditional passage route for rebel groups active in the three countries (Chad, Sudan and CAR). The armed group 3R controls a significant part of the area bordering Cameroon, a key zone from which to monitor activities related to transhumance. A former Cameroonian soldier referred to as "Abdulaziz" supervises the 3R training. This individual is reportedly a former member of the Brigaded 'Intervention Rapide (BIR) who had fled Cameroon to avoid imprisonment there (UNSC, 2019).

CAR – Chad Border Issues

Threats from Armed Groups and Proliferation of SALW

Following the failed coup of 2001 that was staged by General Francois Bozize in an attempt to oust President Ange-Felix Patasse, the CAR was plunged into a political crisis. This crisis saw the Chadian border with CAR laden with cross border attacks from rebels comprised of Chadian and CAR fighters, as well as Chad Commando Units. This had far-reaching repercussions on civilian lives and livelihoods. Further

in 2003, the rebels moved on an ambitious attack to capture Bangui which also failed as they were foiled by rebel movement. Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) from DRC led by J.P Bemba (Carayannis & Fowlis, 2017). This shows the protracted history of the cross-border issues that CAR has endured with Chad including threats relating to proliferation of SALW. This is occasioned by the influx of non-state combatants from neighbouring states engaging in cross-border conduct of hostilities. Prior to this incident, escalated cross-border skirmishes between Chad and Sudan affected the porous CAR borders given that combatants used CAR as a staging area for regrouping and as a hideout. This led to the formation of a European Union (EU) intervention force known as EUFOR along the North-eastern CAR – Chad region.

The collapse of the Government in CAR was also occasioned by Seleka rebels advancement to Bangui, which was mostly comprised of Chadian fighters mixed with fighters from North-eastern CAR. These two groups share common dynamics that made them share a common interest to advance towards Bangui (Carayannis & Fowlis, 2017). These cross-border dynamics had far-reaching repercussions as

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the armed incursion towards Bangui led to a deadlier civil war that took a religious dynamic as Christians and Muslims clashed in the capital leading to wanton destruction of property and maiming and killing of civilians caught up in the conflict.

The arming of these groups was made possible through reliance on hunting ammunition that aided their engagement in conduct of hostilities. These hunting ammunitions are smuggled from Cameroon by traders who target legal hunters but end up selling or being ambushed by various armed groups operating in CAR (Varisco, Wezeman, & Kuimova, 2022).

Pastoralist Herders

The porous CAR – Chad border is also a volatile region for pastoralists because of Fulani armed

herders and Chadian Arab herders backed by Chadian high ranking government officials and Oudda, Biibe-Woyla, Hanagamba and Hontorbe subgroups. The armed herders drive large herds of cattle into CAR causing friction between CAR herders and agropastoralists whose crops are destroyed. The herders from Chad pay little attention to CAR demarcated pastoral routes and official CAR dispute resolution mechanisms in place. Instead, their armed cross-border forage is always a source of tension and skirmishes which worsens the already volatile border region. Furthermore, a phenomenon known as Zaraguina orchestrated by Chadian groups masterminds abduction of CAR children in the N.E region neighbouring Chad where ransom is paid in terms of cattle. This phenomenon has encouraged cattle rustling and rise of militia groups in this border area as a counter measure. In addition, young boys as a measure of retaliation and protection from abduction have formed their own militia groups. Additionally, the Zaraguina menace has driven many villagers to Cameroonian refugee camps as the CAR Government is unable to police this border effectively. Since the onset of the 2013 protracted conflict in CAR and its aftermath, impact of the crisis has been severe on the Fulani herders who have lost almost a million herd of cattle as a result of massacres and theft. Furthermore, Fulani herders becoming part of the Seleka combatants that orchestrated human rights abuses on civilian populations stigmatized their pastoralist tag as it was viewed that they were part of expanding pastoral routes. In addition, they became targets of anti-balaka purge that saw a huge population of them massacred (DIIS, 2018).

CAR – Cameroon Border

According to the VoA, the CAR and Cameroonian government have reached an agreement to demarcate their porous border which have been a source of protracted dispute. This has brought relief given that armed groups from both sides have been harbouring in the disputed territories. Constant conflict emanating from this has left villages marooned by the threat of sporadic skirmishes orchestrated by fleeing CAR rebel groups. The threat has also been made worse by the rebel groups infiltrating refugee camps accommodating CAR refugees in Cameroon (VoA, 2022) (VoA, Cameroon, CAR Join Forces to Fight Rebels on Border, 2022). The issue of disputed

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territories is a major threat to refugee populations given that the continued use of these territory which are close to the refugee camps would have seen continued infiltration into the camps. The local villages whose livelihoods were impacted before the demarcation had the threat of being accommodated close to the refugee camps as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) leaving the Cameroonian and UNHCR in a dilemma on how to protect these civilians.

Central African Republic – Sudan Border Issues

The border between the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan has long been a source of tension and disputes. This borderland region is home to a diverse population with different ethnic and religious backgrounds, as well as rich in resources such as oil, timber, and minerals. This has led to conflicts between local communities and government or private actors seeking to exploit these resources. This has led to a loss of livelihoods for many people and has also contributed to environmental degradation (CNN, 2022).

However, the border region is also affected by violence and instability, which has led to a humanitarian crisis and has made it difficult for communities to access vital resources and markets. The crisis in CAR has caused displacement of 518,000 people with another 3,100,000 in need of humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA, 2022).

The humanitarian crisis on the border between Sudan and the Central African Republic is a result of ongoing conflict and instability in both countries. Additionally, there have been reports of human rights abuses, including sexual violence and forced recruitment of

children into armed groups (Yahia & Daghar, 2020). The situation is further complicated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which has made it more difficult for aid organizations to provide assistance (UNOCHA, 2022).

Another issue is ethnic and religious tensions. The border region is home to a diverse population and there have been tensions between these groups. These tensions have been exacerbated by the ongoing conflicts and violence in the region, which have created a climate of fear and mistrust. This has led to human rights abuses and has made it difficult for communities to live together in peace (ACCORD, 2013).

The cross-border movement is also an issue. The border region is also home to many nomadic and pastoralist communities, who have traditionally moved across the border with their livestock. However, border closures and restrictions on movement have made it difficult for these communities to access vital resources and markets. This has led to a decline in their livelihoods and has also hindered the economic development of the region (ACCORD, 2013).

Security is another concern. The border region has been affected by violence and instability, and there have been reports of armed groups and criminal networks operating in the area. The security situation has also been complicated by the ongoing conflict in Sudan and the ongoing civil war in CAR and Chad (Abdallatif, 2022). The presence of these groups has led to human rights abuses and has made it difficult for people to live and work in the region safely (UNOCHA, 2022).

Finally, the ongoing violence and instability in the border region has led to a humanitarian crisis. The displacement of thousands of people, who have been forced to flee their homes in search of safety, has led to a humanitarian crisis, with many people in need of assistance. The crisis has been exacerbated by the lack of access to basic services such as healthcare and education, as well as the lack of food and clean water (UNOCHA, 2022).

In conclusion, the border between CAR and Sudan is a complex and multifaceted

issue, with a range of challenges that need to be addressed. The issues of resource competition, ethnic and religious tensions, cross-border movement, security concerns and humanitarian crisis, if not addressed properly will continue to fuel the instability and violence in CAR and the region. A comprehensive approach, which takes into account the needs and perspectives of all stakeholders, is needed to address these issues and promote peace and stability in the border region.

Central African Republic – Congo Republic Border Issues

The Central African Republic (CAR) and the Congo Republic (also known as the Republic of the Congo) share a border that has been the source of ongoing tensions and disputes. One of the key issues is the question of sovereignty and control over certain areas, particularly the region known as the “tri-border” area where the two countries' borders meet with those of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Both countries claim certain areas as their own, leading to disagreements over land and resources. This issue has been ongoing for many years and has resulted in tensions between the two countries. In recent years, there have been efforts to resolve the dispute through negotiations and mapping exercises, but a final resolution has yet to be reached (UNHCR, 2016).

Another significant issue is the presence of armed groups operating in the border regions, which have been accused of committing human rights abuses and fuelling instability. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group, has been active in the border areas of CAR and Congo, and has been responsible for the LRA was responsible for more than 100,000 deaths, the abduction of between 60,000 to 100,000 children, and the displacement of as many as 2.5 million civilians between 1987 and 2012 (Global Centre for The Responsibility To Protect, 2019).

Illegal logging is a significant issue on the border

The collapse of the Government in CAR was also occasioned by Seleka rebels advancement to Bangui, which was mostly comprised of Chadian fighters mixed with fighters from North-eastern CAR.

between the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo. Loggers often operate in protected areas, clearing large swaths of forest for valuable hardwoods such as rosewood and ebony. This not only damages the environment but also has a negative impact on local communities who depend on the forest for their livelihoods. The sector has serious governance problems, and this is reflected in the estimated levels of illegal logging on the Congolese side could be as high as 70% (Lawson, 2014). Moreover, when the Seleka rebel coalition took over in CAR in 2013-14, international timber traders paid them at least 3.4 million euros in protection fees to continue their harvesting and exporting operations (Global Witness, 2015). This reinforced the rebels' presence and also facilitated arms trafficking bankrolled from illegal logging sales. After the Seleka lost power, Anti-Balaka militias were also reportedly paid to provide protection (Browne, Kelly, & Pilgram, 2022).

Efforts to address these issues have been hindered by a lack of trust and cooperation between the two countries, as well as a lack of resources and capacity on the part of both governments. However, in recent years, there have been some efforts to improve relations and address these issues through dialogue and joint initiatives. For example, in 2017, the two countries signed an agreement to establish a Joint Border Security Committee to improve coordination and cooperation on border security (UNSC, 2018). Central African Republic – Democratic Republic of Congo Border Issues

The Democratic Republic of Congo-CAR border has not changed since both States' independence in 1960. The border follows the Oubanghi and M'Bomou Rivers, spanning 1,792 km, (Sovereign Limits, n.d.).

The uptick in fighting plaguing both countries has subjected their relationship to that of cross-border movements taking more of a refugee nature than a transhumance one. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees'

database on the refugees under their mandate (n.d.), as of 2022, the DRC refugees in CAR were 6,298 while the refugees from CAR to DRC were 207,054. In 2019, UNHCR and its partners began voluntary returns of CAR refugees in DRC, however, due to COVID-19 and a reappearance of electoral violence in CAR in December 2020, the process was halted. In October 2021, they facilitated the voluntary return of over 5,500 Central African refugees from the Inke, Mole and Boyabu camps in DRC's North and South Ubangi Provinces, (Achu, 2022). Some CAR refugees in DRC have settled along the Ubangi river, in the Congolese districts of Gbadolite and Mobayi-Mbongo where they are somewhat out of UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations reach and on occasion cross to back to CAR often facing violence by armed groups on the way or upon their temporary return to the country, (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2018).

The border regions have been affected by violence and instability. Violence in the southern border areas of Central African Republic is driving more people to flee, including into remote areas of northern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The presence of armed groups such as the LRA and its splinter groups has led to displacement in both countries. The LRA

is a Ugandan rebel group operating in the border region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan. According to Invisible Children -an NGO focused on the LRA-, there exists two prominent splinter factions in the region. One LRA splinter faction maintains a base in CAR where it has on occasions launched attacks into DRC while the other independently operates out of a camp in northern DRC next to the CAR border, (2021).

The escalation of LRA activities has led to the disruption of life due to violence and kidnappings characterized by roadside ambushes and attacks on communities, (ReliefWeb,2010). According to Crisis Tracker (2020), from April to May, the LRA systematically carried out ambushes and lootings along key



LRA was responsible for more than 100,000 deaths, the abduction of between 60,000 to 100,000 children, and the displacement of as many as 2.5 million civilians between 1987 and 2012 (Global Centre for The Responsibility To Protect, 2019).

routes and within communities in DRC and in the neighbouring areas of CAR.

The kidnappings have introduced a new challenge to an already complex conflict dynamic, that of repatriation and family reunification processes. In 2020, LRA groups abducted more than 180 people, majorly adults used to porter looted goods, and released them after a week or so. Children and youth on the other hand have been kept on for longer periods with 108 of them still missing from 2018-2021(2021). Reports of brutality within the factions have led to a rise in the number of escapees, of whom a substantial number are left in the lurch as many escape in a country other than the one in which they were abducted, (Invisible Children, 2017). In 2017, returnees, three children included, were stuck in the Mbomou-Uele border region following stalling of the repatriation and family reunification processes. Factors contributing to the stall include, the remote nature of the border regions making it difficult for humanitarian organizations to access, prolonged conflicts in the communities some were abducted from, and lastly a step back by donors and partners in matters LRA, (Invisible Children, 2017). In study conducted by the Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa Research on the life of LRA returnees in Uganda, DRC, South Sudan and CAR, returnees are subjected to rejection, trauma and denial of access to family assets such as land,(Owiny, 2022).

Despite being riddled by conflict and sharing common enemies in the form of armed groups, there is no evidence of CAR-DRC government collaborations in addressing their border issues.

Engaging Local Humanitarian Actors in Complex Protracted Armed Conflicts

While international actors continue to struggle with what ails CAR, the largely ignored local humanitarian actors space sits on a wealth of knowledge as stakeholders in the pursuit of peace and conflict. This has led to numerous failed peace accords as well as conflict management strategies fronted by both regional and international actors through

intervention mechanisms (Piquard, 2022). The need to collect data and understand local actors especially on humanitarian issues can help external stakeholders understand the conflict tree that fuels an intra-state conflict. Responding to the needs of the local population, men, women, boys, and girls can be informed by the data shared and disseminated to the intervention mechanisms be they regional or international.

Adebajo (2011) states that there were thirteen peacekeeping missions around the world with the first being the deployment of troops to manage the Suez Canal crisis of 1956. He also avers that, the term peacekeeping was not a part of the UN Charter hence peacekeeping was loosely referred to as "chapter six and a half" signifying the fact that its provisions fell between chapter six on pacific avenues of conflict resolution, and use of force under chapter seven. Deployment to African conflicts has been vital to ensuring that intra-state dynamics in

The peace action plan emphasized on the need for using regional mechanisms as means for deployment for missions as well as employing peace enforcement as a tool for intervening in highly volatile conduct of hostilities in intra-state conflicts.

armed conflict are managed through an impartial actor. This is characterized by the third generation of peacekeeping that evolved in 1999 with deployment to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a former UN Secretary General has had a great input on the peacekeeping agenda for Africa including Agenda for peace published in 1992 that informed on the techniques and tools for enhanced peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace-making.

The peace action plan emphasized on the need for using regional mechanisms as means for deployment for missions as well as employing peace enforcement as a tool for intervening in highly volatile conduct of hostilities in intra-state conflicts. Kofi Annan, another former UN Secretary General uncovered another milestone that brought in the agenda for regional capacity building mechanisms for regional peacekeeping actors in Africa. This brought in the aspect of a regional stand-by force made of

five sub-regional bodies within Africa. These are tasked with deploying sub-regional troops within their geographical space for a faster and efficient deployment of troops as measure of de-escalating a conflict as well as managing it at a less lethal stage. According to (Gorur, 2019), there are principles that guide peacekeeping operations on deployment of peacekeepers. These principles ensure that a systematic deployment is achieved with a view of having a sustainable conflict management effort that involves consent from the host state, impartiality of the peacekeepers as well as non-use of force unless in self-defence, or in defence of the mandate. These principles are the greatest factors that give legitimacy to peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping Mandate on Protection of Civilians (PoC)

According to Kullenberg (2021), the new aspects of international peacekeeping are led by a mandate which prioritizes the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in any intervention of an armed conflict. This protection is based on the various vulnerabilities and special needs each aspect needs in terms of children (boys and girls) under the Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) Agenda; the general victims of armed conflict under PoC, and protection of women and girls within the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. WPS focuses on the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) and is directly related to enhancing protection, participation, and protection.

(Day & Hunt, (2022) opine that for peacekeepers to enhance PoC, there are threats they must address as part of their respective mandate goals. Protection failures in Rwanda (1994 genocide) and CAR (2013 – 2016). Civilians are most of the displaced during conflict and are directly targeted by combatants and other criminal groups who take advantage of the breakdown of law and order during intra-state conflict of a protracted nature. Therefore peacekeepers must ensure protection mechanisms are in place even when working on achieving the larger aspect of their respective mandates.

In CAR, WPS was instrumental in the protection of women and girls against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) by UN Peacekeepers (Karuma, 2016).



The PoC mandate was heavily compromised when peacekeepers within some Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and Police Contributing Countries (PCC) began sexually exploiting and abusing civilians, most of whom were women, girls and boys.

The PoC mandate was heavily compromised when peacekeepers within some Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and Police Contributing Countries (PCC) began sexually exploiting and abusing civilians, most of whom were women, girls and boys. Widespread reports of these abuses led to a report tabled to the UN Secretary General which brought out far reaching recommendations and action in 2016 on the future of peacekeeping.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic in CAR

In 2013, armed conflict of an intra-state nature erupted in CAR and was mainly devastating around the capital city of Bangui. In 2014, the international community noted the breach of international peace and the suffering that civilians were enduring the violence. The hostilities between Seleka and the Anti-balaka armed groups escalated to a religiously instigated direct targeting of civilians in an environment that had an African Union led mission (African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic - MISCA). MISCA failure led to MINUSCA taking over the peace support operations mantle in CAR within the auspices and mandate of UNSCR 2149 (2014).

There has been multiple reports of International Humanitarian Law violations and Human Rights abuses from 2016 up to the time leading to the renewal of the mandate in 2021. Over 200 annual

deaths and 10 000 cases of displacement were reported in different areas of CAR emanating from direct attacks on civilians (MINUSCA, 2017). Furthermore, 100 deaths from attacks on Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in 2018 brought out the threat caused by armed groups. These groups also loot and pillage homes, infrastructure and institutions worsening the destructive nature of the armed conflict (MINUSCA, 2019).

MINUSCA's mandate has been extended to a further 12 months under UNSC Resolution 2605 (2021) and will run until November 2022. The extension though unanimous, had two notable members abstaining during the vote (China and Russia). MINUSCA currently has 14 400 military, 3020 Police and 108 corrections officers. Using these resource persons, the extended mission mandate will enhance conditions suitable for ensuring support for the full implementation of the 2019 peace Agreement. This is a political settlement that will usher in reconciliation path as well as de-escalate the threat posed by armed groups in the country. It also mandates the full protection of civilians caught in the conflict including the promotion and protection of human rights. This comes at the backdrop of the 2016 sexual exploitation and abuse cases against women and girls that perpetrated by both armed groups and peacekeeping personnel as well as humanitarian actors (UN, 2021).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative Deprivation is defined as the conscious feeling of negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities.

Relative Deprivation proponents believe that political discontent and its consequences (protests, instability, violence, revolution) depend not only on the absolute level of economic well-being, but also on the distribution of wealth.

Relative deprivation theory suggests that people who feel they are being deprived of something considered essential in their lives (Human rights, political voice, access to resources) may organize or join social movements or armed conflicts dedicated to obtaining the things of which they feel deprived.

The theory is cited as a factor driving incidents of social disorder like looting, and civil wars. In this nature, social movements and their associated disorderly acts can often be attributed to the grievances of people who feel they are being denied resources to which they are entitled. The main assumptions of this theory state that conflict is not merely a passing social event but an inseparable part of the human experience. Therefore, when the population is living in conditions rife for conflict, then the underlying causes of this conflict will be fuelling it until it is addressed.

Furthermore, relative deprivation and inequality are responsible for the manifestation of conflict, political violence, and growth of armed groups. As stated above, when structural violence dictates the modus operandi of the state, the marginalized and oppressed in the population will rebel, take up arms, and attempt to fight the system that is impeding their rights at a social, political and economic level.

Thus, conflict has its own foundations in people's mind in that people or communities who feel deprived of some essentials tend to conflict and engage in armed conflict to improve their chances of attaining better conditions. As stated earlier, CAR is one of the poorest countries in Africa as a result of weak governance and intra-state conflict. The MINUSCA continues to stabilize the country as negotiations continue for a peace deal, and road map to emerging out of the conflict.

Various actors including non-state armed groups, local humanitarian actors, state actors, regional mechanisms among others mentioned above have been part and parcel of the efforts. Addressing inequalities and fostering a state identity can enhance this theory's perspectives on the cause of armed conflict and explain the need for protection of civilians in CAR. This has been witnessed in the humanitarian, peacekeeping and capacity building that has been going on in CAR.



CONCLUSION

Overall, the conflict in CAR and the greater Sahel region is a complex and deeply entrenched issue that requires a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach to address. This includes addressing the underlying economic and social issues that fuel the conflict, as well as addressing the threat posed by extremist groups and the need for effective governance and security.

Peacekeeping is an avenue for conflict management and post-conflict recovery. It has given CAR a political process that has been in the making since armed conflict erupted in 2013. Engaging non-state armed groups in the political process ensures that, and an enhanced negotiated agreement provides for protection of civilians. During the peacekeeping process, the humanitarian process is also guaranteed to help civilians in dire need of assistance given that the impartial nature of peacekeeping opens up all areas controlled by parties to the conflict to ceasefire.

As observed, peacekeeping also has its shortcomings on PoC, through human rights abuses like the SEA on women, girls, and boys. This was widely reported and perpetrated by MINUSCA personnel as well as other actors including humanitarian and parties to the conflict. It is through local humanitarian actors that these abuses were documented. These actors have first-hand information on issues affecting civilians in conflict especially at the grassroots level. All these actors need to protect civilians as well as safeguard the political process to end armed conflict.

With peacekeeping comes the mandate of protection of civilians and the need to ensure that in the midst of hostilities, their normal lives continue. In addition, a political solution to the conflict is the most sustainable avenue for protecting civilians in armed conflict.

The overlapping and over layering of mandates CAR is a problem that has exacerbated the continued protracted nature of the conflict. This has left the fate of the civilians in a vulnerable state with threats from armed groups, criminal gangs, weak governance, and rouge peacekeepers looming everyday a peace deal is not ratified.

The borderland issues between the Central African Republic, Chad, Cameroon, the Congo Republic, and Sudan are complex and multifaceted, and include disputes over sovereignty and control, the presence of armed groups, displacement of civilians, banditry, competition for resources over pasture, kidnapping, as well as proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and other illegal activities. Addressing these issues will require sustained efforts from these countries, regional mechanisms within ECCAS, as well as the support of the international community. CAR being a PSO environment has the MINUSCA mandate threatened by dynamics surrounding the borderlands issues herein.

The security situation in the eastern part of Chad and parts of the Central African Republic has deteriorated dramatically over the years. However, this is not primarily due to a spill-over of the conflict from the neighbouring Darfur Region, but rather an escalation of pre-existing national conflicts, proliferation of illegal arms, and competition for resources over pasture. While the crisis in the Central African Republic is of a predominantly intra-state nature, the growing interrelation between the conflicts in Darfur and Chad has given rise to a new conflict system that can only be resolved by addressing the underlying causes within the different theatres unfolding in the respective countries and using the regional mechanisms to simultaneously foster improved relations among the states.



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ABOUT THE AUTHORS



KARUMA WATSON is currently an Assistant Researcher within the Peace and Security Research Department of IPSTC



OGAYE MARTIN is currently an Assistant Researcher within the Peace and Security Research Department of IPSTC



KIRONGOTHI CATHERINE is a dynamic professional with a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations specializing in Foreign Policy and Diplomacy and Development Studies from United States International University (USIU-A), and is also pursuing a Diploma in Project Management



SITAWA MICHAEL (PhD) is currently a Senior Researcher at IPSTC. He is also a lecturer at the National Defence University - Africa



THE NATURE OF COMMUNITY ARMED GROUPS IN NORTHERN KENYA: A FRAMEWORK OF TERRITORIALITY AND ETHNICITY

BY:

CLIFFORD COLLINS OMONDI
OKWANY, EVELYNE ATIENO
OWINO, AND ZEDEKIAH
OPONDO SIDHA

RAAD Peace Research Institute,
Bonn International Centre for
Conflict Studies (BICC),
National Defence University - Kenya

ABSTRACT

In this article, we analyze the fluidity of territoriality—state control or influence of space, looking at how community-based armed groups (CBAGs) from the Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana ethnic communities take advantage of semi-territoriality—spaces with limited state security personnel. We analyze the conflict belt—areas in north and west of Samburu County bordering Baringo north and Turkana east, giving an understanding of how the change of norms and development impact the dynamics of conflict and violence in Samburu. The article benefits from our research experiences and networks from the community policing ICT4COP—EU Horizon 2020 and the Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) 228 project on Future Rural Africa. Our empirical evidence was gathered from 34 interviews with key informants, such as state representatives and civil society officials, and 11 Focus Group Discussions (FDG's) with communities in Samburu and Turkana. The findings show that the fluidity of state-territoriality has an impact on human security, leading to community mistrust of the security forces. We recommend robust community-oriented policing (COP) as a devolved security strategy, strengthening a public-private partnership (PPP)—a hybrid of the private sectors and government in policing work and civil societies and communities in helping to monitor and evaluate the police. Additionally, mapping illegal arms and CBAGs through clan structures is a community-oriented strategy that helps strengthen territoriality and counter semi-territoriality.

INTRODUCTION

Africa is facing rapid development through infrastructure, leading to imaginary development corridors (Dye, 2016; Enns, 2018). These developments have continuously attracted geographers, explaining the change in landscape value and how such changes create socio-political tension in the frontier (see for example, Enns, 2019; Kirshner & Power, 2015; Lesutis, 2019; Mosley & Watson, 2016). However, there is still little attention on how these changes impact the dynamics of conflict and violence, looking at the future of pastoralists from a human security perspective, how the changing of land-use value shapes territoriality—states control or influence of spaces or how organized violence—legitimization and monopoly of the use of force is taking shape in the frontier.

Territoriality can help to analyze the direct use of property such as land, and it can also help analyze state sovereignty—the control of political geography, including organizational structures (Sack, 1983). In this article, we use territoriality in the context of spatial analysis; the use of land among the Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana pastoralists, and states sovereignty and control of its political geography, looking at how Community-based Armed Groups (hereafter CBAGs) impact human security in what we describe as the conflict belt—spaces which are underdeveloped, with limited presence of state security, and characterized by competition over resources such as pasture, and water.

CBAGs are militia groups, vigilantes, or gangs who gain legitimacy by protecting their ethnic communities from insecurity and crime. In the case of the pastoralists, they are the age-set of the male gender who are between 16 to 35-years, and they protect their communities, however, sometimes they take advantage of limited state presence and conduct criminal activities. These groups sometimes act as an instrument of political patrons and are an economic gain to organized criminals (Schuberth, 2019). The state sometimes legitimizes these groups for political gain, but they have no motive of overthrowing the government. They can have an international characteristic, especially when their ethnic communities live across international borders; however, they have no intention of attracting

international attention like violent extremist groups (Okwany, 2023).

The Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu CBAGs take advantage of the terrain in areas bordering Suguta Valley, and we define these spaces as the conflict belt. The locations are Longewan and Pura in Suguta Marmar, Charda, Mbukoi, Lokwanya and Moruakiring, Marti, Nachola, Kawaap, and Parkati in northern Samburu (See, Figure 1 below). Development and state security forces are limited in these spaces, giving the CBAGs a semi-territoriality advantage to exist. The areas are dominated by militarization—the youth protecting their communities and practicing warriorhood. However, the Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu CBAGs do not only protect their communities but also take advantage of uncertainty and steal from their ethnic community, causing unrest and insecurity. Sometimes the groups practice roadside banditry, cattle theft, and stealing from town shops. We investigate such a scenario, adding to the body of knowledge on violence and territoriality literature, as much of the academic work focuses on traditional violence of cattle raids. However, there is a literature gap on how CBAGs take advantage of semi-territoriality and how the involvement of the state and development ventures are shaping such spaces to territoriality in the context of organized violence.

The fluidity of territoriality is a problem in the conflict belt; it leads to semi-territoriality—spaces where it is difficult to identify state institutions such as the police or, if they exist, the police have limited capacity seen in many ways, including small bases and lack of adequate personal and security hardware; this scenario gives the Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana CBAGs an advantage to exist, and there is limited research to understand the conflict belt, particularly with the framework of territoriality and the effect and dynamics of organized violence. In the past, government policy initiatives have not been effective, ordering disarmament initiatives and curfews and employing police reservists—community scouts to help with the security situation. However, such initiatives are limited due to the capacity, resources, and accessibility of the terrain. Thus, there is a need for robust policies such as public-private partnership (PPP) initiatives and community involvement through community-oriented policing (COP)—building trust, a proactive, reassuring, problem-oriented, and

Keywords: Community-based Armed Groups, Land and Boundary Conflict, Territoriality, Semi-territoriality, and Kenya


problem-solving initiative with the communities to manage security in these areas.

As such, the article draws empirical evidence from 34 interviews and 11 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) collected from April to December 2022, with a follow-up in January and February 2023 in Samburu County. These interviews are triangulated with the existing literature, demonstrating how the Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana CBAGs impact human security in areas we define as the conflict belt. We show ethnic imagined boundaries, how government norms such as devolution change the dynamic of the conflict, and the CBAGs take advantage of semi-territoriality. The following research questions are the central theme of the article; 1) how does development impact

the conflict belt area in Samburu? 2) how do the community-based armed groups take advantage of the fluid nature of territoriality? and 3) what are the existing strategies suitable to enhance development and security?

We begin with conceptualizing territoriality, giving an understanding and its relevance to the analysis of the CBAGs. In addition, we reveal the difference between state-territoriality and ethnic-territoriality. Thereafter, we show the fluidity nature of territoriality, shifting to semi-territoriality, showing how the CBAGs take advantage of such fluidity. Our analysis focuses on the boundary, ethnicity, land conflict, the fluid nature of territoriality, and COP as a strategy to strengthen state control.

Figure 1 : Map of Samburu showing the conflict belt and the dominant areas by the three ethnic groups



THEORY: TERRITORIALITY AND SEMI-TERRITORIALITY

Territoriality connotes control of space or influencing access, action, or interaction by means of applying the use of force or power. It implies spaces where the state controls and has a monopoly of violence. Sack (1983) points out that territoriality is commonly defined as defense and asserting dominance over space. It implies states' political and spatial control or influence of the socio-ecological landscape of an area (Brenner & Elden, 2009; Elden, 2010). It is what Hansen (2019) describes as a state control scenario, and such a scenario is not always suitable for areas with weak security personnel.

Territoriality can be asserted through cultural norms, state laws, or regulation of behavior. The concept does not connote a physical space but a behavior in the physical space; it implies an action-reaction relationship between the person asserting control and the one being controlled, encompassing the powerful assertion of rules and regulation that governs the relationship. Territoriality is socially constructed, while territory is not. The former does not exist unless there is a relationship of action-reaction, while the latter implies physical distance (Sack, 1973). However, distance affects territoriality. The high presence of law enforcers or regulations in space suggests more influence or control, while the distance between the controller and the controlled means weak territoriality (Okwany & Owino, 2022).

For this reason, treating distance as nonrelational risks exhausting the definition of territoriality (Sack, 1973). A psychological aspect validates that territoriality can exist even with the social distance, winning hearts and minds through the controller's behavior (Okwany, 2023). The social and psychological aspect of territoriality means the concept is more abstract than territory. Territoriality helps with the level of analysis, giving an understanding of the implication of security strategies, the existence of the CBAGs, and how these groups take advantage of the fluidity nature of state control.

ETHNICITY AND TERRITORIALITY

Ethnicity and territoriality can be understood from the concept organized violence—monopoly and legitimate use of force, which explains security of the state or national security; this definition is characterized by some Eurocentric biases which evolved with the concept nation-state, a politico-territorial unity with homogeneous culture and language which offer social cohesion and eases tension due to resource distribution. However, the concept state security ignores the ethnic territories within the African state leading to tension and challenges of social cohesion, particularly, when there is limited resource distribution and state capacity to govern spaces with ethnic boundary contestation (Thomas & Saravanamuttu, 1989). Schlee (2022) summarizes the nexus between territoriality and ethnicity, pointing at language and the social aspect

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of monopolizing control of space. The British colonial government created ethnic boundaries, which promoted ethnic-territoriality in Northern Kenya to date. They escalated ethnic boundaries by identifying 'tribal grazing areas.' Those found grazing in the wrong territory were fined 10% of their livestock. Schlee (2013) affirms that the pastoral communities did not understand such a fine but thought it was a sign of the survival of the British, who also needed to live and eat.

Ethnic-territoriality differs from state-territoriality; the former implies a subjective monopoly of control/influence among a particular tribe or ethnic group. It is what Moreno (1999, p. 63) describes as "conflict and political mobilizations" by "ethnic groups which possess a geographical underpinning" or what Cornell (2002, p. 6) loosely defines as "ethnicity linked to territorial control." It is what Moore (2016) refers to as ethnic-territoriality. Thus, ethnicity subject outsiders or different tribes to the practices and

culture of the dominant tribe. On the other hand, the state-territoriality concept implies a collective monopoly of control of a particular physical and social space. Citizens within the jurisdiction of the state should enjoy equal rights without being subjected to a group or tribe. In this article, we demonstrate how ethno-territoriality explains the manifestation of conflict and violence. We further give attention to state-territoriality, demonstrating how state initiatives such as community-oriented policing (COP) helps increase state influence, and how CBAGs from the Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu ethnic groups take advantage of what we describe as semi-territoriality.

Semi-territoriality implies spaces where it is difficult to identify state institutions like the police force, or if they exist, they have small bases. The state sometimes has strong military patrols or campaigns; however, the campaigns are not maintained (Hansen, 2019). Sometimes semi-territoriality is characterized by the state ignoring some spaces due to limited security resources or state disinterest in such areas (Okwany, 2023). The Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu CBAGs take advantage of such limitation and neglect; thus, they sometimes relatively control these spaces (Okwany & Owino, 2022). Such a scenario is our focus, analyzing how the CBAGs take advantage of the fluidity of territoriality and giving existing strategies to enhance development and security.

Semi-territoriality is characterized by power vacuum, and politicians and influential individuals in such communities break power; they are the principal negotiators of the community, and support to the CBAGs is critical to the power brokers' survival. In this context, CBAGs' access to illegal arms is a powerful political weapon, and the support of cattle raids culture and boundary conflict proves advantageous to the patron who uses the CBAGs as their clients.

Thus, violence in northern Kenya is fueled by the dynamics of ethno-territoriality politics. The local politicians form what Greiner (2013, p. 236) refers to as "unholy alliance"—coalitions among ethnic groups fighting each other and Resolve Network (2020) affirms that both the political class and CBAGs take advantage of the confluence of weak governance.

LAND USE AND THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

Economists measure land use by how the fixed area of land is affected by the demand for economic expansion and growth. They measure how land is used per individual/land ratio, per person km squared (Hardie, Parks, Gottlieb, & Wear, 2000; Seeley, 1976). Northern Kenya demonstrates the increasing population, investors, and the use and privatization of land, which changes the value of land, boundaries, and its use, leading to more stress, conflict, and human insecurity. The pastoral communities in Samburu continue to receive government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) development interventions that shape these spaces from semi-territoriality to territoriality. As a result, there is increased security in these spaces, and the pastoral livelihood is shrinking due to new laws and environmental changes.

The heightened arms race between the Cold War rivalry—United States-led western alliance versus the Soviet Union, which lasted from 1947-1991, escalated the changes and dynamics of conflict in the Horn of Africa from the 1980-1990s, giving arms to their supporters and fueling proxy wars in the region, and the pastoralist accessed the guns due to the porous borders between Kenya and its neighbors (Mulugeta, 2017; Sharamo & Mesfin, 2011). As such, the Cold War effects of the arms race led to illegal arms and violence in northern Kenya (Branch, 2014), increasing cattle raids, violence over

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land, insecurity, and risk to human lives (van der Hoeven, 2021). In addition, the insecurity created by the community-based armed groups (CBAGs) taking advantage of the limited presence of state security existed but was exacerbated towards the 1990s (Kamungi, 2013; Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). These periods the beginning of the 1990s came

with the multiparty democracy—the repealing of section 2(a) of the Kenyan constitution, introducing democratic elections in 1991, an advantage to the political class from northern Kenya to champion their dominance through political campaigns, and funding the CBAGs to protect their interests. Thus, multiparty escalated land conflict, ethnicity, and violence among the pastoralist communities.

Most of the CBAGs' increased attacks heighten during the electoral campaign period or after election results, and these periods escalate conflict among political rivals. For example, the Turkana CBAGs shot an airplane, killing 46 police and the district commissioner, James Nyandoro, after raiding Rendile and Samburu cattle in 1996 before the 1997 general election (Ltipalei, Kivuva, & Jonyo, 2020). The 2007 post-election violence gave an advantage to the CBAGs protecting their communities, escalating violence, and discriminating against other ethnic communities (Schuberth, 2019).

The November 10th, 2012, killings of the police in Suguta Valley affirms a repeat of the CBAGs action of 1996. The killings described Suguta Valley as the 'valley of death' after the massacre that led to the killing of 42 Kenyan policemen by Turkana CBAGs (Manga, 2012). Both 1996 and 2012 led to curfews, torture, and thousands fleeing their homes due to the security forces' reaction to the killings. Just after the August general election of 2022, the Pokot CBAGs took advantage of semi-territoriality, killing eight general service unit (GSU) police and two civilians in Namariat close to Kapedo, Napeitom ward in Turkana East; the newly elected William Kipchirchir Samoei Arap Ruto's regime retaliated similarly with multi-agency security to root out the CBAGs (Okwany & Owino, 2022).

The Kenya police inherited the traditional British colonial government of recruiting tribal police known as the administration police to help with the problem of semi-territoriality. They were voluntary police known as Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs), introduced in 1948 as home guards (Mutsotso, 2018). Such recruitment of voluntary police continued in the post-colonial government with changes in their administration. In the 1980s, they were under the chiefs' jurisdiction and given guns to protect their communities and pastoral livelihood (Okumu,

Bukari, Sow, & Onyiego, 2017). However, the KPRs were poorly vetted, and their remuneration was low, sometimes not paid, leading some of them to support cattle raids and banditry (Sharamo, 2014). The ineffectiveness led the government to reduce KPRs recruitment, which was advantageous to the CBAGs' operation (Okwany, 2023).

The introduction to the devolved government came with a similar policy of recruiting the KPRs, and the Samburu County government re-introduced the recruitment of voluntary tribal police—mostly warriors known as community rangers (Okumu, 2022). The policy initiative for recruiting the rangers is due to the lack of police personnel. Thus, rangers are states' supplementary security forces, helping with local and immediate insecurity issues. Still, their effectiveness is not different, and their remuneration is not better than the KPRs (Okwany, 2023); this illustrates how traditional violence continues to occur/operate in northern Kenya. However, there is limited empirical evidence on the fluidity of state-territoriality and how CBAGs operate within such fluidity and take control of ungoverned spaces. The general lack of empirical data requires further research but also highlights the importance of our contribution to the field.

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The competition and contestation over land has been a driver of violence at the national level. For example, the introduction of multiparty in 1992 and the electoral violence of 2007 prove the land conflict, the importance of the CBAGs as protectors of the community, and the powerful renegotiating and protecting of boundaries. However, such protection promotes ethnic territoriality, which is different from state-territoriality—promoting state influence

through organized violence. In addition, development such as the large-scale infrastructure—the Lamu Port South Sudan Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) and its component, such as the Isiolo airport is creating contestation and competition over land and justifying the CBAGs involvement in ethnic violence (Owino & Okwany, n.d.), mining and discoveries such as geothermal energy, and conservancies are creating new conflicts and violence. These developments lead the political class/elites to negotiate their interests carefully and take advantage of the CBAGs whenever their interests are in question (Okwany, 2023).

Development is projected from a human perspective, pushing the agenda of people-centered to it and the sustainability of such action (UNDP, 1994). However, the reality points to different outcomes. Sustainable development is costly because it involves growth through exploitation but also taking care of the environment, continually stressed by scarce resources, the changing environmental conditions, and the involvement of new actors, shapes, and shrinks pastoral land. The 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) focus on the following agendas; 1) People—pushing for empowerment and equality 2) Prosperity—sustainable economic growth 3) Peace and social justice—working towards an inclusive world society 4) Planet—urgent action on climate justice, and lastly 5) Partnership at the global, national and local level (Carlsen & Bruggemann, 2022; Fritz et al., 2019). Thus, SDGs connect security and peace to the development agenda. However, international interventions on security



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have proven to miscalculate the security of civilians, and equally, state application of hard power—military control influences the security of civilians negatively (Okwany, 2020b).

Development is imagined through 'modernity,' valuing some lives over others, and it is pushed through the extractive accumulation of capital and pushing for territoriality by a complex integration of state and private interests (Lesutis, 2020). Such integration continuously increases global capital expansion, stressing pastoral livelihood. Samburu demonstrates an assemblage of state and private actors, Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT), an NGO with a conservation agenda—protecting pastoral land and wildlife through community-oriented policing (COP) initiatives, dominating in Samburu east since 1995 to date, and is today cooperating with the County and national government to create the conservancies (NRT, 2020). The dominance of NRT in the north is questionable and a challenge to state-territoriality.

Schetter, Mkutu, and Müller-Koné (2022) prove that it is not clear whether the NRT is an agent of peace or escalating violence and land conflict. However, Mkutu (2020) earlier revealed that the NGO is an agent of violence, he affirmed that the NRT security agents—rangers guarding the conservancies are involved in criminal activities. Such development shapes land use, shrinks pastoral grazing areas, and changes their livelihood through territoriality. Essentially, COP is a better strategy that includes a public-private partnership (PPP)—a hybrid security that creates a collaboration between private entities such as NRT and the government security fraternity to counter the semi-territoriality scenario in northern Kenya. However, Samburu County affirms that the PPP strategy is applied through monopolizing and legitimizing the use of force.

The National Police Service (NPS) Act 2011 (amended in 2012) stipulates such PPP through the leadership and coordination of the NPS to enhance security. However, COP in Kenya is politicized (Lid & Okwany, 2019). In addition, it is an instrument government uses for surveillance rather than being a philosophy to create trust among the community (Okwany, 2020a, 2023), and it fails to be a strategic instrument for proactive, reassuring, partnering, problem-oriented, and problem-solving (Lid & Okwany, 2020). Thus, the Kenyan government and the NRT apply COP as

a strategy for territoriality, used through organized violence—legitimizing and monopolizing the use of force.

Greiner (2013) pointed to territoriality in Northern Kenya, demonstrating boundary re-making, sedentarization—the communal use of spaces for long and claim ownership, and the spread of conservation and agriculture, which does not consider or compensate pastoral livelihood, causing pressure over boundaries. All these elements are components of increasing the land use value through increasing privatization and state security presence. Such privatization, re-making of boundaries, and developments are our focus on explaining territoriality. We shall demonstrate later in this article the element of ethnic territoriality as the behavior of the government increasing control in northern Kenya due to development and the increase of land use value, and CBAGs taking advantage of spaces with limited state security control and push for dominance and survival through, selling illegal weapons and using them for highway banditry, livestock theft for commercialization, and cattle rustling practices.

The presence of CBAGs in Sub Sahara Africa affirms the complexity of security on the continent. They take advantage of the limited presence of state security or resources. These groups have various goals, from protecting community land to promoting the ideology and identity of their ethnic group, but they also safeguard resources and territory. Evidence-based information concerning hybrid security to control and limit the CBAGs' behavior and their internal and external drivers is challenging and constructive because some groups can gain support from the government, others from external sources, while most get support from their ethnic community and the political class (Resolve Network, 2020; Schuberth, 2019), and Okwany (2023) affirms that such challenges affect policy interventions to fight the CBAGs.

The presence of CBAGs is not new in Kenya; political parties and leaders have funded CBAGs to threaten their opponents or supporters. These CBAGs have

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been active during Kenyan election periods, which are typically tense, and have been used by politicians to instigate ethnic clashes. While presumably unofficially funded by political elites, CBAGs are not legally established and thus not formally recognized as state security organs. However, they can be used by these political elites. For instance, in Kenya's 2007, 2013, and 2017 elections, politicians instrumentalized CBAGs such as the Mungiki. The

Mungiki participated in post-election violence, offering security to the Kikuyu ethnic community, targeted by other united communities opposing the election results (Lid & Okwany, 2020). The 2017 electoral dispute protests affirmed the Mungiki's pro-Jubilee government stance, as the group was also part of the police abuse of the protestors. Human Rights Watch recorded both the Mungiki and the police killing 37 people between September and November 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2018), an illustrative example of the connection between CBAGs and the political class, targeting the opposing side, thus challenging the implementation of security policies, and the conflict belt in Samburu which we exhaustively discuss below, reveals such scenario.

RESULT AND ANALYSIS: IMAGINED BOUNDARIES, ETHNICITY, AND LAND CONFLICT

The conflict and violence among the Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu ethnic communities have escalated over the years due to externally imposed 'artificial' boundaries by the historical colonial government, separating ethnical groups and disturbing their way of life. The three ethnic communities have co-existed for generations with conflict and violence triggered by the fight for pasture, water, and cattle raids. The colonial government escalated the conflict by demarcating the ethnic boundaries, favoring some

ethnic communities over others, leading to historical injustices such as the exclusion of the Turkana and Pokot communities living in Samburu. As such, historical injustices escalated the pastoral conflicts over land use.

The promulgation of the 2010 constitution created county government structures, allocating resources in Northern Kenya, giving access to roads, and expanding territoriality through devolved government. Such changes have also escalated imagined boundaries, ethnic conflict, and violence. Our observations proved that County resource allocation is skewed towards the Samburu population, which has better schools and built water points. At the same time, areas occupied by the Turkana and Pokot ethnic community are less developed, stressed with water, and has poor roads. Baragoi town exemplifies the demarcation of imagined boundaries. The main road divides Baragoi into Turkana-dominated areas towards the west and the Samburu-dominated regions towards the east. Most state security forces, water points, schools, and hospitals are on the Samburu imagined boundary. As a result, the town is disposed to conflict and violence between the Turkana and Samburu. The Samburu bandits killing a teacher 200 meters outside the gate of Baragoi Boys secondary school demonstrate such violence. Bandits' bullets sprayed Cyrus Kirukura, a Turkana teacher at Baragoi boys, in July before the August 2022 general elections.

In reducing this increased violence and friction between the indigenous communities created by the new changes, the state has created buffer zones, demarcating huge pastoral land as protected conservancies, infrastructure project areas, and the Kenya defense forces occupying vast pastoral land for military training. These state initiatives and development increase state-territoriality in marginalized spaces. Samburu exemplifies such facts, and the County leads with community conservancies—vast protected land by the state to neutralize conflict and violence among Pokot, Samburu, and Turkana. For example, Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT) has partnered with the Samburu County government to manage conservancies in the east and west of Samburu. The county government has created conservancies in the northern aiming for further

collaboration with NRT in managing the north, Baragoi (see figure one above); however, the lack of flourishing flora and fauna in the north delays such partnership since NRT has an economic focus as opposed to the NGOs hyped concentration on conservation. Military occupation in the Kawaap location, northern Samburu, confirms the creation of a buffer zone to stop violence in the conflict belt along Tuum and Kawaap territories. Such infrastructure developments that come with the occupation help to access the terrain and maintain order.

Developments such as devolution, conservation, and infrastructures such as roads are shaping the dynamics of conflict and violence in Samburu. For example, conservation is shrinking pastoral land and increasing militarization in the conservancies; NRT is employing rangers to guard the investments with the aim of natural resource management, an increase

The access to roads is expanding state control of these spaces but also giving the CBAGs access to illegal markets, leading to the commercialization of meat and cattle theft. The main roads are easily accessible but with limited security forces, and extreme weather patterns and droughts create stress for food, giving the CBAGs an advantage to rob M-Pesa —mobile money automated teller machine (ATMS) and other retail shops.

of territoriality through organized violence in the conservancies, which is shrinking grazing land. The access to roads is expanding state control of these spaces but also giving the CBAGs access to illegal markets, leading to the commercialization of meat and cattle theft. The main roads are easily accessible but with limited security forces, and extreme weather patterns and droughts create stress for food, giving the CBAGs an advantage to rob M-Pesa —mobile money automated teller machine (ATMS) and other retail shops.

Locations such as Marti, Nachola, and Kawaap, stretching towards Suguta Valley and bordering Baragoi town in Samburu north, are rich in pasture. The same applies to the land along Longewan and Pura in Suguta Marmar, west of Samburu. In comparison, areas such as Tuum location are favored by water from mount Nyiro but with less pasture.

Moreover, these areas have a limited presence of state security with poor road access, giving the CBAGs an advantage in the fight over pasture and water. In addition, the increased presence of illegal arms in the region has led to road hijackings, cattle theft, and stealing from retail shops.

The Pokot ethnic group dominates the Amaiya triangle—an area bordering north of Baringo County, southeast of Turkana County, and Samburu west, neighboring Longewan and Pura in Samburu County. The Turkana occupies Marti, Nachola, Kawaap, Parkati, and the lower part of Samburu north in Moruakiring towards Suguta Valley (see figure 1 above), which Samburu claim as part of their land, leading to contestation over the pasture. These Turkana-dominated areas are neighboring Samburu ethnic communities in Masikita, Baragoi, and Tuum, respectively (see figure one showing Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu-dominated regions). Consequently, the areas are predisposed to ethnic conflict, road hijacking, and banditry. Suguta Valley runs along the borders of Samburu and Turkana and ends in the northern part of Baringo. Although the areas occupied by the Pokot and Turkana characterize semi-territoriality, it is underdeveloped and has harsh terrains with poor road access, giving the CBAGs an advantage to operate. However, the increase in development and access to illegal weapons, mobile phones, and access to roads is reshaping the dynamics of conflict and violence in these areas.

Devolution—transfer of functions, services, and power to the counties increases local resource allocation but also encourages imagined boundaries, borderland contestation—Samburu claiming county resources and discriminating the minority Turkana and Pokot in Samburu County, escalating tribal domination in political offices and resource allocation. The conflict belt—Longewan and Pura areas in Suguta Marmar central Samburu bordering Baringo and Turkana east, and northern Samburu; locations such as Marti,

Ethnic tension can be observed in the areas mentioned above, where Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu co-exist and have created imaginary boundaries. However, the conflict is not just tribal; different clans from the same ethnic groups steal from each other. Such stealing promotes banditry among the CBAGs. The Pokot ethnic community invades Suguta Valley as a rescue for their pastoral livelihood, while Samburu communities claim Suguta Valley as their ancestral land invaded by the Turkana.

Nachola, Kawaap, and Parkati (see figure 1 above) has triggered such political boundary demarcation, and land contestation, leading to further conflict and violence.

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the development of ethnic boundaries through devolution, the discovery of minerals, the envisioned geothermal in the Suguta trough, and the anticipation of conservancies and large-scale infrastructure such as the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopian Transport corridor (LAPSSET) in Samburu north are creating boundary tension among these three ethnic groups.

The 2010 constitution gave more powers to the elected county officials than the president-appointed administrators, and the Samburu ethnic group dominated the elected offices; these changes undermined the appointed chiefs in the Pokot and Turkana-dominated areas. The majority Samburu ethnic group occupies Samburu County leadership, putting the smaller ethnic groups, such as Turkana and Pokot ethnic communities, into the sideline regarding resource allocation and conflict resolution. As per the Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission outcome of 2017, Samburu County had 26 Members of the County Assembly (MCAs), with only four

from the Turkana ethnic group and non from the Pokot ethnic group who voted in Tiaty constituency, Baringo County, despite the Pokot living and getting support from Samburu County. The 2022 election resulted in only one elected and one nominated Turkana MCAs. Such county leadership domination by the Samburu escalates further conflict due to the structural nature of Kenya's politics of patron-client relationship. Thus, the dominant tribe benefits from resource allocation more than the minority tribe. The minority Pokot Turkana in Samburu County believe that the state subjects them because the Samburu tribe dominates the leadership in the County; they tend to be in opposition to the government policies, leading to a confrontation with state security policies and initiatives, thus, further increasing the level of conflict and violence in the southwest and northwest of Samburu County.

Despite developments and resource allocation through devolution to Samburu County, ethnic tension has escalated among the Turkana and Samburu tribes. It has strengthened ethnic boundaries leading to more conflict. The pastoral communities existed with imaginary boundaries, but devolved resources escalate ethnic benefits, tension, and marginalization. For example, Samburu County boundaries stretch to Suguta Valley and Amaiya triangle (see the map above). However, regarding resource allocation, the county leadership discriminates against the Turkana in Marti, Nachola, Parkati, and Suguta Valley, including the Pokot in the Amaiya triangle. As such, discrimination and skewed resource allocation promotes conflict and justifies the existence of CBAGs to protect their respective communities.

THE FLUID NATURE OF TERRITORIALITY AND THE CBAGS' EXISTENCE IN THE CONFLICT BELT

Territoriality offers a framework for understanding the existence of CBAGs. However, the fluid nature of the concept shifts it to semi-territoriality. There are spaces where the state has firm control, but such power is sometimes limited, giving the CBAGs an advantage to exist. However, despite the limitation, the state sometimes strengthens its operation to

destabilize the existence of these groups. Northern and western Samburu areas towards Suguta Valley confirm the fluid nature of state control—semi-territoriality.

Locations such as Marti, Nachola, Suguta Valley, Parkati, Tuum, Kawaap, Baragoi, and Masikita in Samburu north, and Longewan and Pura in Suguta Marmar, Samburu west are underdeveloped compared to Maralal, Central Samburu and Wamba and Archers Post in Samburu east (see, figure 1 above). However, increased development leads to state security forces and control of these spaces. NRT is trying to introduce conservation management in the north, but the communities are skeptical of the

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NGO managing their conservancy as it does in the east. Thus, insecurity in the north is more rampant compared to the east and central part of Samburu, which has a concentration of NGOs, mining, and wildlife for tourist attraction.

The conflict belt along Suguta Valley, bordering Turkana County from the east, Samburu County from the west, and Baringo County from the north, characterizes semi-territoriality. There is a weak presence of the state, the terrain is difficult to access, and the mobile network is a challenge. The police stations are a distance apart, 35 to 40 km² away from each other. In Some cases, the CBAGs have better arms than the police, and they understand the terrain better than the security forces who are not familiar with these terrains. Sometimes the nearby police have limited personnel, about 8 to 10 in a station. The poor roads make it difficult for a quick response, and Suguta Valley demonstrates such a scenario. The Pokot ethnic communities are closer to Marti location, about 25 to 30km away, an area Samburu County is reluctant to develop due to ethnic divisions between Pokot and Turkana tribes. Conflict, poor roads, and rampant cattle rustling

characterize the area. This area covers Charada, Mbukoi, Lokwanya, and Moruakiring, bordering Suguta valley, a conflict corridor in Samburu, Baringo, and Turkana, respectively (see figure 1 above). There is competition over pasture and water, and the terrain is challenging in these areas, making it difficult for the police to access, thus, giving the CBAGs a relative advantage.

The Samburu and Pokot conflict is concentrated in Longewan and Pura in Suguta Marmar, bordering Baringo and Turkana Counties. The nearest police station to these areas is Maralal town, about 35 to 40km away; these areas are advantageous to the Pokot CBAGs. The areas experienced tension during the 2022 election because Samburu communities had different political alignments to their neighboring Pokot communities.

The political class took advantage of the election, using the CBAGs to create tension and dis-organize their opponents' campaigns. The cattle raid on the 25th near Kapedo affirmed election tension; Pokot CBAGs from Tiaty took advantage of the situation, raided Turkana, stole cows, killed eight general service unit (GSU) police, and took their arms. Many of our interviews pointed to politicians from Tiaty and Samburu north funding such CBAGs. As such, some of the parliament and county assembly members have a hand in cattle raids, and the CBAGs act as a political tool; thus, the County and national governments are reluctant to address illegal arms and insecurity escalated by the CBAGs.

The state's security operation in these areas is minimal; however, when there is an insecurity issue, the fluidity nature of territoriality can be experienced. The disarmament and hunting of the CBAGs is always by means of hard power—strong and forceful operations. The CBAGs cannot confront the security forces in an open battle. However, these groups take advantage of the police's limited resources. For example, there are cases they block the police station before raiding the community. Our interaction with the communities and security forces in Marti indicated that the station has one patrol car shared by the police and rangers. If reinforcement is needed, the closest assistance is the GSU camp in Baragoi, which is about 36.4km from the police station in Marti. The location, a conflict belt, shows the exhaustive security work and the limitation of

police personnel; they cover the significant zone which stretches from Suiyian to Baragoi, a distance of 39.5 kilometers, and almost the same distance from Suiyian to Suyani, stretching towards Suguta valley. Such security resource limitation proves the semi-territoriality scenario, which is advantageous to the CBAGs who possess illegal weapons through political patronage.

The local rangers are recruited to assist with security due to their experience with the terrain and understanding the operation of the CBAGs. These rangers are volunteers who get a stipend from the county government, but the salary is delayed, sometimes six months before pay. The delay in the remuneration demotivates the rangers, leading to a security challenge. In some cases, the rangers and police commercialize cattle rustling; they secretly organize cattle raids with the CBAGs and give access to the market from police roadblocks. They work with the CBAGs through intelligence and identifying better strategies for cattle raids and theft. This partisan aspect of the rangers and police is very blurred; some are involved in cattle rustling and stealing. Both rangers and police have a network with some of the CBAGs, but such facts can only be identified from their effects.

There is a social order of Moranism—warriorhood culture; their existence has been supported by traditional militarization of ethnic groups—protection of the community, herding, and restocking through cattle raiding. These groups are expected to protect the community. They are engaged in herding and protecting community wealth. Moranism is encouraged through culture, praised by the women, and approved by the elders. The brave Morans receive praise and are likely to be heroes and remembered through their 10 to 15 years of Moranism, and bravery and restocking and cattle raiding other communities earn them a respective position in their society. Thus, community militarization—arming the community youth and giving them the responsibility to protect their ethnic tribes promotes banditry and warriorhood. The CBAGs emerge from these warriors, mainly young boys who have undergone the initiation of circumcision; usually, their ages range from 15 to 30, and they are expected to be brave, protect and create wealth for the community.

Criminals also take advantage of the 'morán tag,' and the behavior makes it difficult to isolate the community warriors from the bandits/CBAGs because they protect their ethnic communities, gain support from their political leaders, and they subject their neighboring ethnic communities. Thus, identifying what they call good warriors from bad ones is blurred. The communities support the cattle raids because it is a pastoral cultural practice. However, the commercialization—raiding, stealing, and selling of cattle raids are increasing due to easy access to the market, and businesses are developing with the road infrastructure, thus, promoting settlements and eroding migration and it also increases roadside banditry, car hijacking, stealing from M-Pesa shops—mobile phone-based cash transfer shops/booths, and cattle theft.

Illegal arms are evident in Samburu north; both Turkana and Pokot acquired arms much earlier than the Samburu. However, these communities raid each other and steal arms. The arms are also bought and transported across Kenya's neighboring borders. The Turkana and Pokot purchase the arms and illegally transport them from Uganda and South Sudan-Kenyan porous borders. The Samburu's started acquiring guns later from the Rendile, Borana, and Somalia through the porous borders of Kenya-Ethiopia and Somalia-Kenyan borders. Despite acquiring guns later than their counterparts, Samburu seems to have more illegal arms than their Turkana counterparts in Samburu County. Our interviews from Samburu and Turkana communities affirm



The illegal arms cost between **\$2500 to \$3000**, and one bullet costs about \$2 to \$3. However, the cost depends on the type of gun.

that Samburu got arms from politicians who used Constituency Development Funds (CDF) money to buy arms and protect their communities through the Samburu CBAGs. The illegal arms cost between \$2500 to \$3000, and one bullet costs about \$2 to \$3. However, the cost depends on the type of gun.

Conflict in Samburu is seasonal, elections trigger the conflict, and the CBAGs become more active in the election period due to support from the political class. For example, the August 2022 electoral period created tension leading to the fear of electoral violence. Thus, many retail shops hesitated to restock due to insecurity. The pastoral communities' limited development and minimal education are also drivers of conflict. Lack of education encourages the youth, mainly males, to engage in herding and restocking through cattle raids. However, the increased development, state-territoriality, and privatization of land shrink the pastoral land, shifting the dynamics of conflict and violence.

Conflict among the three ethnic communities, Samburu, Turkana, and Pokot, is ethnic-based and caused by the fight for pasture and water. Still, the changing weather patterns also promote cattle rustling for restocking purposes. Environmental stress that comes with drought and excess rains creates different conflicts. Livestock theft increases in good rainfall seasons, and the CBAGs are active in these periods because the animals are healthy and can run faster. However, during drought seasons, there is a reduced level of cattle raids and theft due to the poor health of the livestock, and some police posts cease from operating in some areas because the communities migrate in search of better grazing conditions, leading to large territory with no inhabitants; the police post in Kom, a region bordering Isiolo from Samburu East exemplifies such scenario.

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING INITIATIVES

Community-oriented policing (COP) is a better strategy for security in the conflict belt. In some instance, particularly, where there is limited security capacity, police are forced to work with the community, building relationships with the

communities through rangers and the chiefs. In some cases, the communities have more sophisticated arms than the police. Thus, policing with the community makes police work easier, and trust is enhanced through such a relationship. The rangers are community scouts recruited to work with the police and guard the conservancies, and also help the police maintain law and order. Recruiting them from the community creates trust between the community and the police, which is not new. However, the government tactics of applying the use of force when there is insecurity incidence, and neglect to these spaces create community mistrust. The communities in the conflict belt are secretive and do not share intelligence to the security forces because of the government neglect of the psychological aspect that validates territoriality, influence by winning hearts and minds, which can exist even with the social distance if there is continuous assurance and trust building from the government.

The government used to recruit Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs)—tribal voluntary police from the Turkana and Samburu CBAGs to help in police work. Such personnel was claimed to be effective since they knew the business of cattle raids. However, after the government stopped recruiting more KPRs due to the challenge of remuneration and maintaining the recruitment policy, some joined the criminal activities of cattle raiding since there is an accessible market for meat. More so, the government reduced the KPRs' recruitment because they misused the firearms and ammunition, shifting from their responsibility of protecting their communities to engaging in cattle raids and highway banditry.

The political class in Samburu County demands the KPRs back because these tribal and voluntary police were trusted and seen as community guards. Furthermore, such KPRs were being hired by private contractors to guard private properties because they gained money from these private contractors and supported cattle raiding due to the increased accessibility of the black market for the meat business. Therefore, the recruitment of the KPRs increased crime and violence due to the lack of remuneration from the government, yet they were

armed to fight the criminals and raiders. Thus, the national government reduced the initiative to recruit the KPRs in Samburu.

The Issues of KPRs created ethnic rivalry; for example, the West Pokot warriors claimed that the Marakwet had more armed KPRs than the Pokot side. Such biases are attributed to the past Inspector Generals, David Kimaiyo and Joseph Kipchirchir Boinet, both from Marakwet Ethnic communities who supported the KPRs from Marakwet. These preferences for some ethnic groups triggered insecurity in West Pokot and Baringo counties, spreading to the Amaiya triangle. Pokot ethnic tribes claimed that the past police leadership subjected them to the advantage

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of their neighboring rivals in Baringo and Marakwet. They felt that the disarmament by the government was biased because the police leadership from Kimaiyo to Boinet favored the Marakwet tribe.

The county government of Samburu revived the initiative of community guards, employing community rangers/scouts—security personnel within the tourism department to protect the wildlife, and such county security structure is unclear because they are supposed to coordinate with the national police, but our fieldwork experience proved limited coordination with the police; this is despite the rangers being supplied with arms by the national government and paid a stipend through the county government funds. They operate the way KPRs used to work but aim to secure the conservancies such as Kalomudang community conservancy, Nyiro, and Ndoto, and the rangers also protect group ranches in the north of Samburu. Essentially, it should be noted that land in Samburu County is managed under community conservancies and group ranches, and these scouts are deployed to guard the conservancies. However, similar to the security personnel, the scouts are sometimes involved in the cattle raid business, thus, fueling more violence in Samburu County. For

example, the case of Kilepoi village demonstrates that county rangers being used as raiders is evidence of the worsening of the violence.

The county government policy on the community rangers is a good COP initiative. However, proper remuneration and monitoring of these rangers is a challenge. The rangers in Turkana-dominated areas claim to have fewer resources than their Samburu counterparts. Our observation verified that the Rangers in Tuum, Bendera, and Masikita have better housing than those in Marti and Nachola. However, they claim to have poor conditions that demotivate their policing work. All the rangers claim the stipend of 10,000 Kenya shillings they get from the county government, which sometimes delays for about six months. In addition, the Turkana rangers claim that the Samburu counterparts are well-armed, while they have fewer arms and lack the resources needed to enhance effective policing.

Samburu East demonstrates a joint initiative between the government and NGOs in COP initiatives. The NRT helps the county government in policing the conservancies, monitoring the scouts, and paying their monthly stipend. Such an initiative is not present in the north of Samburu, where rangers' stipend is delayed. The collaboration between the Samburu County government and NGOs demonstrates a hybrid security assemblage. However, the support NRT gets from donors is questionable, and if such funding seizes, then the management of these rangers/scouts can be challenging. NRT also dominates in the conservancy agenda controlling the conservancies with well-equipped rangers and scouts. Such control limits the communities from owning their land, creating skepticism and shrinking grazing areas.

Despite such skeptics, the interviews demonstrate the effectiveness of NGOs' role in Community-Oriented Policing (COP). However, suppose the private sector's involvement in security is not checked by other stakeholders such as civil society, community, and government, it might lead to the dominance of the private sector in the pastoral area. Therefore, some civil societies have created communities shift to shift forums used to spread intelligence in the Amaiya triangle, covering Baringo, Suguta Valley, and Suguta Marmar. Information is shared through mobile technology, tracking the stolen cows, working with

the rangers to identify potential Bandits among the warriors and Morans, and such intelligence is shared with the chiefs and the police. The forums comprise retired chiefs, elders, and rangers who network as community ambassadors, and they are voluntary. Still, they get stipends from the NGOs working on security issues in the Amaiya triangle. These forums are community driven as opposed to policing the community through surveillance. The NGOs have 10 to 15 peace ambassadors in every village in Suguta Marmar, Suguta Valley, Marti, Parkati, Nachola, and Baragoi, helping with security research, intelligence gathering, and community engagement. They also engage the community in safety initiatives, engaging the community in policing, and conflict reconciliation efforts. Thus, public-private partnership (PPP) efforts are a hybrid security initiative that promotes policing and fighting the CBAGs' existence.

DISCUSSION

Territoriality gives the intellectual space to understand the relationship between power and society. Thus, it is not an ethical theory that shows a better way to control the populace; it does not establish a malevolent, neutral, or benign relationship, but it describes a relationship between the one asserting influence and the one being influenced (Sack, 1973). In other words, territoriality is a strategy for control and influence; thus, human territoriality implies influencing, affecting, or controlling people's actions and interactions (Sack, 1983). Samburu north has the Anti Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) in Tuum location, the General Service Unit (GSU) from the Kenya Police Service in Baragoi town and Nachola location, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) camps in Kawaap location, and police station in Baragoi town and Marti location. However, these security forces are a distance apart, and the terrain between them is difficult to access. For example, the distance between Nachola to Suguta Valley has terrains that are difficult to administer, making it easier for the CBAGs to access, steal cattle and hide in the mountains. The road along Marti to Baragoi is an imaginary boundary, this area is occupied by the Turkana neighboring Samburu community, and the limited state's resources to access the area is advantageous to the CBAGs

New norms such as devolution and anticipation of infrastructure and conservation agenda create development initiatives and increase the state's

presence in the conflict belt. However, such devolution has also escalated ethnic tension, shaping imagined boundaries and borderland contestation —Samburu claiming county resources and discriminating against the minority Turkana through elected county offices dominated by the Samburu tribe. As such, the domination and control create skewed resource allocation to the advantage of the dominant tribe, leading to different dynamics of conflict and violence.

Territoriality is not fixed like geographical space —territory, but it is dynamic; control can be asserted in space. However, there is constant change due to the controller's ability (available resources) to maintain order in the territory. The unavailability or limited resources to control leads to a semi-territoriality scenario —spaces where the state has relative control (Hansen, 2019). The dynamics aspect creates fluidity, and the CBAGs can exist and take advantage of the weak state security (Okwany, 2023). For example, the Kawaap location in the Samburu north demonstrates a semi-territoriality scenario to the Turkana and Samburu CBAGs. However, the occupation by the Kenya defense forces to create a buffer zone between these communities shifts Kawaap to a territoriality scenario. Though the military is not engaged in domestic security, infrastructure development that emerges with the military occupation changes conflict dynamics in such spaces.

Analysis of territoriality gives the lens to understand the change created by developments such as infrastructure, indicating how such action impacts the increase of state control in frontier areas such as northern Kenya. For the controlled (pastoral communities) not to feel excluded and oppressed, there is a need for a good-natured relationship to exist. Therefore, asserting control or influence needs the controller's (state's) efforts to build trust towards the controlled (pastoral communities), and the philosophy of COP is a good security strategy. However, territoriality is not an ethical theory, demonstrating a benign relationship but only a descriptive nature of the association between the controller and the controlled. Development mainly focuses on the people and is connected to peace and security (UNDP, 1994). Yet, the challenge to territoriality exists when the controller benefits at the expense of the controlled. Thus, a hybrid of

the private sector, government, and communities is essential in development and policing (Okwany & Owino, 2022).

Security is personal and political, and initiative such as COP is highly politicized. Policing in Kenya is greatly influenced by the political class despite the constitutional framework stipulating the independence of the police institution. For example, the constitutional framework on COP was short-changed by the executive in 2013 to undermine the local policing mechanism, such as the County Policing Authority (CPA), and apply surveillance of the counties through the Nyumba Kumi initiative—a security cluster for collecting intelligence (Lid & Okwany, 2020); this undermined the county government initiative of CPA. However, Samburu County has embarked on such initiatives through the conservancy agenda.

A hybrid security strategy involving the community, civil society, private sector, and state's security fraternity promotes such connection. The County policing initiative of employing community rangers, supported by the Northern Rangeland Trust (NRT), is an excellent hybrid security strategy of public-private partnership. However, the dominance of NRT in the conservancies, and their engagement in security is questionable because their push for conservancy agenda shrinks pastoral grazing land and is not community-oriented, but a hard power strategy which entails policing the community. In addition, NRT depends on external funding, and if such funding seizes, it can be challenging to police the conservancies. Therefore, security should be community-oriented, and NRT's dominance and push to manage Samburu conservancies should be monitored. Community rangers/scouts supported by NRT and the county government offer a better strategy for policing with the community and mapping these groups, equipping them with better policing needs. Furthermore, proper remuneration will enhance their work and promote trust between the community and police and sustainable policing initiatives.



CONCLUSION

Africa has become the new frontier of development. Many external actors focus on mega projects such as infrastructure, mining, and oil in the continent, particularly spaces that have been historically neglected, impacting territoriality and the dynamics of conflict and violence. Northern Kenya, Samburu, in this case, is facing new land use structures such as conservation and envisioned large-scale infrastructures such as roads and geothermal energy. The changes are creating development corridors and escalating imaginary ethnic boundaries. Pastoral communities have existed in these areas for generations, fighting each other over pasture, water, and grazing land. State security forces are also increasing in these development corridors, shifting these areas from semi-territoriality—limited state presence, to territoriality—firm state control or influence. The military occupation and anticipation of conservation in Samburu north as a buffer zone will help reduce ethnic politics between the Samburu and Turkana communities, creating roads and investments as it has been in the Samburu east. However, these land use strategies shrink pastoral grazing land leading to different dynamics of conflicts.

The conflict belt, areas covering Longewan and Pura in Suguta Marmar, Samburu west, and Marti, Nachola, Kawaap, Parkati, Tuum, Bendera, and Masikita locations, including Suguta Valley and Baragoi town have historically been neglected areas, giving advantage to the community-based armed groups (CBAGs) to exist. Samburu east has a concentration of development ventures and the state's security forces, and policing the conservation has relatively improved the east as compared to the west and north of the County. However, the developments are changing the pastoral livelihood, leading to new dynamics of conflicts and violence. Despite the increase of state security, these areas are still dominated by cattle rustling, and developments such as access to roads and mobile network technology are an advantage to the CBAGs because the terrains are difficult to access, and limited state security leads to roadside hijackings, thefts and stealing from retail shops.

Devolution has allocated resources to the counties, leading to the development of roads, water points, schools, and healthcare. However, it has also escalated ethnic boundaries; the Turkana and Pokot in Samburu are marginalized regarding resource allocation. The Samburu ethnic community dominates Samburu County government offices, and the County's political leadership subjects the minority Pokot and Turkana ethnic communities. Thus, the locations occupied by these minority ethnic communities are underdeveloped, with poor roads, water, and state security forces being limited, giving an advantage for the Pokot and Turkana CBAGs to exist.

Development should be inclusive, people-centered, and sustainable development in Samburu should focus on social justice and urgent action against climate change affecting pastoral livelihood. Partnerships should involve the local communities for development to be connected to peace and security. COP is a better strategy for building trust between the security forces and the pastoral community. It promotes reassurance, problem-solving, and partnership among stakeholders such as police, civil society, the private sector, and the community, leading to a hybrid security assemblage. Samburu county revived the national government policing strategy of community scouts or rangers, a better strategy for partnership. However, the rangers must be equipped with proper policing tools, and their remuneration should be harmonized for better policing and countering bandits, cattle theft, and highway hijackings, and they must coordinate with the National police in COP initiatives.



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ABOUT THE AUTHORS



CLIFFORD COLLINS OMONDI OKWANY is the Åland Peace Fellow in 2023, and a senior researcher at Raad Peace Research Institute. His research work is based in Kenya and Somalia, focusing on non-state armed groups (NSAGs), community-based armed groups (CBAGs), violent extremist organizations (VEOs), radicalization, countering violent extremism, ontological security, and territoriality. Email: cliffmode2006@uonbi.ac.ke



EVELYNE ATIENO OWINO is a research fellow at BICC. Her work cuts across thematic areas of development, peace, and conflict within Kenya. Her previous research addressed the implications of large-scale infrastructure projects on pastoral communities. She is based at the University of Bonn in Germany. Email: evelyne.owino@bicc.de



ZEDEKIAH SIDHA is an Evaluation, Security, and Policy Sciences Expert. He attained his Ph.D. at the University of Nairobi, and he is an experienced manager of people and projects with more than 17 years of experience in international development. He is an M&E expert with experience teaching and facilitating baseline surveys and evaluations. He is well adapted to the logical framework, theory of change, and outcome mapping approaches to evaluation. In addition, he teaches Political Science at the National Defence University -Kenya. Email: zedekia.sidha@gmail.com



BEYOND THE BORDERS THAT BOTHERS US: ILLICIT DRUGS, BORDERLAND INSECURITY AND RESPONSES IN NIGERIA

BY:

**OLASUPO OLAKUNLE
THOMPSON (PhD)**

*History and International Studies
Unit, Communication and General
Studies, Federal University of
Agriculture Abeokuta, Nigeria*

ABSTRACT

Illicit drug is not only a social problem but it also poses a global security threat. There is a general consensus that there is a linkage between illicit drugs and insecurity in Africa and on its borderlands. While porous borders across Africa has been identified as one of the major challenges to peace and security on the continent, other factors particularly illicit drug trade is becoming a bludgeoning and bourgeoning factor. The questions that this article sets out to answer are: What are the drivers of illicit drugs in Nigeria? What are the impacts of illicit drug on Nigeria's borderlands particularly on insecurity and what are the responses to the menace? The study finds that the growing rate of illicit drug has reached an alarming level and the drivers are: broken homes and family values, the elite, poor economy, porous borders, poor immigration laws and lapses, intergovernmental conventions, government officials including some law enforcement agencies and a transnational drug cartel or syndicate. Illicit drugs have political, economic and socio-cultural impacts on borderland security. Responses have been majorly through international, regional and sub-regional organisations, national and State governments, and community but national responses have been majorly through confrontational means by law enforcement agencies, non-state actors and community. The article argues that except for a multi-track approach to combat the menace, the belief that shoring up our porous borders alone will put an end to illicit drugs trafficking and use in the country will remain a chimera. Addressing the major drivers of illicit drugs, good governance, more political will and building institutions are some of the recommendations. The data for the study is elicited from secondary sources such as books, governmental and non-governmental desktop reports, media, documentary and video documentaries.

Keywords: Drug abuse, Insecurity, Border, Customs, NDLEA, borderland

INTRODUCTION

Peace and security in Africa's borderlands and on the continent itself is a dream of not only Africa's past heroes and founding fathers but major stakeholders including its international partners. This underscores Africa place in global affairs. To be sure, many international and continental frameworks have been fine-tuned in this regard. The Sustainable Development Goal-16 aims to ensure a peaceful and secured world; the Africa Union agenda 2063 advocates a shared framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development for Africa to be realised in the next five decades (AUC 2015). However, this noble dream remains a wishful thought until certain things are gotten right including insecurity in Africa's borderlands.

Africa borderlands mostly lie at the geographical margins of the state are synonymous with economic, social and political marginalisation, entrenched poverty, persistent conflict, forced displacement and refugees, environmental degradation, poor health and sanitary condition, lack of adequate and potable water, lack of basic amenities, hunger, poor education, social exclusion, unaffordable clean energy, infrastructural decay, inequalities, poor life under the waters and on land, injustice and weak institutions and above all poor leadership. Thus, peace and security have been fundamentally intertwined with the good governance and the attainment of sustainable development of borderlands (AU, 2017). The borderlands of Africa play host to more than 270 million inhabitants, a combined population significantly larger than many western countries and even any single state on the African continent



270 million
inhabitants with the
borderlands of Africa.

(UNDP, 2021a). Though this population is closely connected to circuits of regional and global trade based on cross-country clan and ethnic affiliations, they are faced with the consequences of not just being on these borderlands but also the crimes associated with borderland communities. Just like the continent itself, these borderland communities face

human and national insecurities. While the causes are numerous, one major and rising factor is illicit drug with its varying shades ranging from its trade, use to its abuse. The place of borderland becomes imperative as a result of its proximity and linkage with the hinterlands. Put differently, the borderlands are reflections of the continent itself.

Since the 1980s Nigeria has served as the transit corridor for drug and illicit trafficking. Nigeria borders in the west with Benin (border length is 773 km), in the north - with Niger (1497 km), in the north-east - with Chad (87 km), in the east - with Cameroon (1690 km) (Hoffman and Melly, 2015). Thus, it is established that there is a nexus between banditry, terrorism, kidnapping and other types of violent crimes in Nigeria especially in the northern region to the use of illicit drugs. The Sustainable Development Goal 3.5 is also clear on the need to strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol (UN, nd). Making a tsunaminous impact on this community and the continent as a whole, responses to illicit drug trafficking and abuse have come from concerned stakeholders.

Though many studies have focused on illicit drugs (Igbinovia, 1982; Jatau et al 2019), its impacts and linkage with insecurity and responses (Pinson, 2022; Bish et al 2022), adequate attention has not been dedicated to how illicit drugs affects the security and peace of Africa's borderlands. This article examines the linkage between illicit drugs and insecurity along Africa's borderlands as well as the present responses to the menace in Nigeria. 'Beyond the borders that bothers us' is an offshoot of Agbiboa's (2017) assessment of terrorism and Nigeria's borders. Agbiboa (2017) described Nigeria's borders as not only porous but also a nightmare for the government and the greatest challenge in the successful fight against insurgency. To adequately resolve this aim, the specific questions of the study are: What are the drivers of illicit drugs in Nigeria? What are the impacts of illicit drug on Nigeria's borderlands particularly on insecurity and what are the responses to the menace? The answers to these questions will be of immense benefit to policy makers, international donors, scholars and researchers in the field of borderlands, insecurity and transnational crimes, think-tanks, narcotic agencies among others.

The article relies on descriptive method. The method helps to describe, explain and validate the research findings. Sources for the study are elicited from documentary evidences, literature, media and verified video evidences from the internet and empirical evidences through observations. The criteria for selecting these evidences stem from its relevance to the issue of illicit drug, insecurity and borderlands. The study area covers the borders of Chad, Benin and Niger Republics.

The article is divided into six structures. These are: introduction, literature review on illicit drugs, impacts and Africa's borderlands; drivers of illicit drugs in Nigeria; impacts of illicit drugs on Nigeria's borderlands; responses to illicit drug in Nigeria and conclusion.

Illicit Drugs, Impact and Africa's Borderlands: A Literature Review

There are lots of literature on the subject matters of illicit drugs, insecurity and Africa's borderland. These discourses are not only germane but also help to understand the basics of the phenomenon. Scholars have examined the history and use of illicit drug use in Africa and its borderlands. Igbinovia (1982) traces the use of marijuana in Africa to the advent of the World War I. Though some poor peasants and craftsmen use these drugs for enhancement in their daily work tasks, sexual performance among other things, certain factors are responsible for the misuse of these drugs. He noted that it is used by males and youths the most and also identified the factors responsible for its use and misuse as population movement, socio-economic or population shift and unemployment. He established a linkage between marijuana use and crimes and then observed that possession, trafficking and production of marijuana are usually met with very harsh penalties in the form of long prison sentences or fines or both has not reduced the tendencies of the use and abuses. Anyanwu (1992) traces the history of drug pushing or trafficking to the effect of the introduction of the structural adjustment programme which gave rise to increased money supply and demand pressure, accelerating inflation further. The United Nations International Drug Control Programme [UNDP] (1995) describes illicit drug trafficking as a systemic process that involves high caliber people and that trafficking of large quantities of drugs can only be



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effected by groups and not individuals. It further held that drug abuse is a global menace with its social impact on family and community, health, education, crime and work and employment. The study concludes that while policy development experts do not pay attention to drug abuse as a requisite for growth and development, the impact of drug on a society's economy is monumental be downplayed. Scholars have also taken time to examine some of the responses to illicit drug trade and use. Shaw (2015) explores the drug trafficking business in Guinea-Bissau. He affirms that it is so sophisticated and complex that a sort of transnational cartel emerged from the country's elite including top military brass who do more than just offering protection for the illicit trade. Klantschnig (2016) discussed how the Nigeria's Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) in spite of its growing role in the drug war monopolised the policy decision and control of drug in Nigeria at the detriment of other enforcement agencies, customs and ministry of health. The author went on to state that the fight against narcotics have failed because apart from the fact that most states are paying lip-service to the fight, the people do not trust the government. Uzuegbu-Wilson (2019) stresses that in spite of the efforts of the drug enforcement agencies in Nigeria, the elite has not been able to replicate the gesture and most of the proceeds of the drug trade are used by the elite to circulate themselves in Nigeria's political space. Dumbili and Ebuenyi (2022) argued that the punitive measures and the concentration of law enforcement agencies in urban areas in search of illicit drugs must stop and other sustainable and inclusive ways as well as addressing the sustaining factors encouraging the drug trade and trafficking should be imbibed.

Indeed, illicit drug trafficking and use has impacts on the society and the continent as a whole. Aning and Pokoo (2014) established a linkage between drug trafficking, violence and extremism on the continent. Aning and Pokoo argue that the financial benefits from drug trafficking contribute to the development of symbiotic and opportunistic relationships between extremists groups that threaten West Africa's fragile States. This is indeed a situation many African countries particularly Nigeria is still battling with



100 million
The population particularly children, security forces and women displaced worldwide.

regarding the cases of insurgents, bandits and the recent unknown gunmen. Olurishe (2019) describes drug abuse and misuse as serious challenges in the West Africa sub-region with post conflict countries bearing most of the burdens of the menace. He noted that cannabis, cocaine, other unconventional substances and prescription medicines are amongst the drugs most commonly abused in the sub-region and that social status and availability to resources appear to be important drivers of drug abuse culture. He went to state that this abuse of drugs has obvious psychosocial consequences and negative impact on academic performance was reported. Onifade (2022) agrees that drug abuse is a global problem with its attendant challenges in curbing it particularly among the youths range from personal conviction to lack of inclusive treatment programme; he reiterates the need for a sustained and overall preventive method to address the challenges. Jatau, et al (2021) avers that drug abuse has significant impact on socio-economic state of the society particularly youths and school children.

Okumu et al (2020) noted that in spite of the initiative of the African Union on silencing the guns by 2020, it failed as a result of conceptual issues, internal and institutional issues, strategic issues, operational issues, political challenges and foreign influence. The UNDP (2021b) prioritises the importance of border communities. It highlights the six impact areas as core for the realisation of

Africa's promise as natural resource governance, youth employment and empowerment, structural economic transformation, sustainable energy, climate change, and peace and security. It states that inclusive participation of African citizens in championing peace and development resonates around the support given to border community which constitutes more than 400million people and which existence is affected by the triple threat of conflict, climate and COVID-19. The Human Development Index (2022) noted the impact of insecurity on the population particularly children, the security forces and women as more than 100 million people are believed to have been displaced worldwide. It traced some of the root causes of conflict to organised crimes especially drug cartels with its attendant impact on mental health of residents. It also stresses on the need for a secured border as a result of the threats of technology, covid-19, climate change and other existential challenges to the peaceful co-existence of the world and Africa fragile states.

While Pinson (2022) argued that illicit arms fuel organised crime and armed conflict in weak states, emphasis was placed on the role of borders because illicit arms trafficking encompasses unauthorized cross-border transfers. Pinson stresses that cross-border movement of arms bear the inherent risk that diversion may likely occur somewhere along the route or after shipment reaches the final recipient. Pinson then recommends among other things the need for an effective detection of arms and ammunition trafficking incidents, seizures of arms at the time of their illicit movements, especially at border crossing before they are used to fuel armed conflicts and organised crimes. She went further to state that there was also the need for investigating and preventing networks involved in the illicit arms and ammunition trade. Similarly, Bish et al (2022) established a linkage between illicit market, violence and instability in Nigeria. The authors also stressed the germane role that border security must play in reducing conflict and instability because the border permeates these drugs and illicit weapons. While there have been some responses by stakeholders to address this menace, much has not been achieved (Nelson, 2020; Aning and Pokoo, 2014; Shaw, 2015). These literature have given an expose of the discourse, however what is yet to be given adequate attention are the drivers of illicit drugs, its impact on borderland security and responses.

Drivers of illicit drugs in Nigeria

Drivers of illicit drugs in Nigeria

Ungoverned and Porous Borderlands

The ungoverned and porous borders have worsened the inflow of illicit drugs into Africa's borderlands. Africa is eked as one of the worst in the world and it is home to illicit drugs such as cocaine, opium, tramadol, and other forms of drugs fuelling violence along borderlands and its hinterland. Inadequate security personnel and infrastructures are lacking in these borders. Nigeria's security architecture apart from suffering from inadequate personnel, indiscipline, underfunded, inadequate weapon and working tools and equipment and ethnicity among its security also have a problem of corrupt culture and lack of morale among its personnel. This has made many of them to prefer being transferred to urban centres to rural areas thereby creating these vast ungoverned spaces. Onwuzuruigbo (2021) argues that the ungoverned spaces have increased the activities of cattle rustling and banditry in the northern borderlands of Nigeria.

Porosity of the borders have also given way for the nefarious activities that take place therein. The Chief of Defence Staff, General Lucky Irabor stated that there are 137 borders in the North unprotected out of the 261 approved borders. He noted that apart from the fact the borders are unmanned, the vulnerability of the unmanned land areas in the north-east and north-west zones, particularly Borno, Yobe, Sokoto, Zamfara, and Katsina states – with neighbouring countries such as Niger Republic and Chad among others have made it easy to be a major access route to criminality and violent crimes. For instance, the National Security Adviser, Major General Babagana Monguno at a workshop in 2021 stated that:



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» *Africa's porous borders remain a major source of concern as this has aided smuggling of prohibited items and irregular migration as well as other transnational organized crimes. Nigeria is bordered to the North by Niger, to the East by Chad and Cameroon, to the South by the Gulf of Guinea of the Atlantic Ocean, and to the West by Benin (Monguno, 2021).*

The activities at these porous borders have resulted in the inflow of contrabands, small arms and light weapon, illicit drugs and other triggers of bloody clashes in the mainland and borderlands. Drugs have to a large extent fueled several insecurity across the country and in the borderland of Nigeria and other Africa states. Worryingly, the gaffers who should be at the helms of Nigeria's border security have consistently come out to say they do not know how many ungoverned spaces are in Nigeria and that the porous situation cannot be salvaged.

Broken homes and family values

Most of the consumers of illicit drugs are those who are from broken homes and inadvertently lost family and African values and moors. These consumers have had history of either staying with none or one of their parents. Some also stay with guardians who cannot take care of them. In recent times, the displacement around the borderland as a result of conflicts have driven many consumers into the streets or with friends who are themselves drug abusers. With peer pressure, these consumers have taken solace in the intake of illicit drugs. Some parents are also consumers and they have significant influence on their children who make up the youths. Jazuli et al (2021) from an empirical studies in Indonesia established that though broken homes does not significantly contribute to drug abuse, it had some effects but they also found that having a disharmonious family has a 6.179 times greater risk of being a drug abuser than people/adolescents who have a harmonious family.

Transnational Cartels, The elite and Corruption

Trafficking of drugs is usually not done by an individual. Most of the illicit drugs trafficking are done by constellation of transnational cartels and the elite. Any wonder then that the UNDCP (1995) posits that "individuals acting alone do not usually move

significant quantities of drugs; hence the focus on control of supply is normally on organized groups or cartels." In cases where powerful politicians and elite are also users of these illicit drugs, then it becomes very hard if not futile to make laws to curb it.

In Nigeria, attempt to unravel these cartels by the media and law enforcement agencies have not been easy as some of these investigators have paid with their lives. A case in point is the late Dele Giwa, a renowned editor who was at the verge of unraveling a criminal drug cartel during the military regime of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime traced the supply of methamphetamine, locally known as 'Mpuru Mmiri', to South Africa since 2019 (Adepegba, 2022). The Nigeria's senate president, Dr Ahmad Lawan noted that drug barons were behind the lingering insecurity in the country through provision of funds for insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, bandits and kidnappers with which they use the money to procure arms and ammunition. He further stated that the proceeds of illicit drug trade is used to fund terrorism and one would wonder how these groups usually get rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and sophisticated arms (Aborisade, 2021).

The illicit drug business is a complex, abrasive and very secretive kind of business that entails some forms of networks and ritual. Formation, successes and sustenance involve a good number of collaborations, alliances and compromises. This can only be achieved by the elite. The elite are a provided group in a society who use their clout and network to macadamize the staring up and running of the illegal business. In some climes, these groups form the political echelon of the society. Cases of these elite groups attaining as high as head of states have been established in South America and Europe. In Nigeria, these elite have their sponsors and members even in the presidency. A case in point was the alleged involvement of some high caliber cabals during the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida. Seizures in 2013 in several West African countries reveal that trafficking network involves a range of actors including businessmen, politicians, members of the security forces and the judiciary, clergymen, traditional leaders and youth (Aning and Amedzrator, 2013). Shaw and Gomes (2020) established how Guinea-Bissau has not just become a transit route to cocaine especially during the COVID-19 pandemic

but also how the proceeds from the trade has become addictive for the political elite and military brass. In Nigeria, some personnel of the drug enforcement agency have fallen victims to the activities of these cartel. The NDLEA chairman, Buba Marwa has noted that some of its officials have been kidnapped or killed by these powerful cartel and elite. In one of its raid in Lagos Island, five of the personnel lost their lives (Okere and Ogundepo, 2022).

Sustaining the success of the cartel and the elite is the menace of corruption. Corrupt practices of customs and immigration officers who compromise their positions have also made the explicit trafficking of illegal drugs into the borderlands and hinterland successful. For example, Professor Onyeiwu while sharing his experience along the borderland between Ghana and Nigeria stated that when the public bus he was travelling in was caught by the Nigeria customs with smuggled products, rather than detain it, they asked the driver to settle his way. Also, Communities around Nigeria and the Niger republic border in Jigawa State accused some personnel of the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) and other security agencies of engaging in heinous activities (Muhammad, 2022).

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Poor economy, Poverty and Unemployment

The oil doom and decapacitation of the nation's economy by the forces of neo-colonialism and neo-liberal and multi-national banks have impoverished the Nigerian State and drove most of its population into organised crimes such as internet fraud, counterfeiting and illicit drug trade in the 1980s. The acceptance of the Structural Adjustment Programme did not only impoverish the State but also began the eroding of values and norms among its population. Dwellers along the borderland are most hit by these changes because of their peculiarities thereby pushing them into illegal activities to sustain themselves and their families. In several countries in Africa, political instabilities have led to diminishing human and capital and social infrastructure and productive national development thereby plunging the state into

poverty. This in turn reinforces the illicit drug trade and abuse among the population. Nagelhoutab et al (2017) established that drug use increases in times of recession as a result of the conditions that many find themselves thereby causing psychological distress. In Nigeria, the endemic poverty of 133 million poor people has further driven most of those at the borderlands into smuggling business, oil theft, drugs trafficking and other criminal activities.

Ineffective laws, Ethnic Proclivities and Inadequate Technology

Immigration and Customs laws in border communities of third world countries are always ineffective to fight against illegal activities. Ineffective laws also include poor regulations to curb the activities of pharmaceutical companies and marketers who import some of these drug products in order to make huge profits at the detriment of the citizenry. Klantschnig et al (2020) argued that though the West African sub-region has become a route for the trade and use of tramadol but state policies in checkmating its abuse has created a blurry line between its legality and medical need. Klantschnig & Dele-Adedeji (2021) for instance established how opioid (Tramadol) is officially despised and yet so widely used and traded in Lagos Nigeria. This also extend to the customs and borders as many of those in West Africa and the continent are even more precarious based on their propensity to act as the transit and destination of most illegal activities in Africa's sub-region. The Commander of Narcotics, NDLEA, Shehu Dankolo blamed the rising cases of drug abuse on failed laws in Nigeria (Nzor, 2022).

The mismanagement or inability to control the Economic Community of West Africa State protocol on free movement among member states is also a driver of illicit drug trade. The Protocol stipulates among other things the right of community citizens to enter, reside and establish economic activities in the territory of member states and outlined a three phased approach to achieve the "complete freedom of movement" envisaged by the treaty. This protocol which came in to effect in 1979 in spite its goodwill has not been well managed by member states. Thus, the benefits of the protocol have not been maximized. It was also reported that the four supplementary protocols adopted between 1985 and 1990 committed member states, among other things, to:

» *Provide valid travel document to their citizens, grant Community citizens the right of residence for the purpose of seeking and carrying out income-earning employment, ensure appropriate treatment for persons being expelled, not to expel Community citizens en masse, limit the grounds for individual expulsion to reasons of national security, public order or morality, public health or non-fulfilment of an essential condition of residence (Opanike and Aduloju, 2015).*

Apart from the poor custom laws; ethnic affinities and religion have played major roles in reproducing crimes along these borderlands. In Nigeria border community, the allowance of some Arab speaking or Fulfude speaking herders into the country have further allowed the illegal trade to flourish. Often times; these illegal drugs are saddled on the backs of these beasts of burdens or inside motor bikes and vehicles. There are allegations that ethnic affinities have allowed the activities go on unchallenged. There is a viral video recently in Nigeria where a custom officer angrily spoke against his superior officers and tore his uniform because of the compromise in illegal border trade along Cameroun, Chad and Niger borders. He confessed how he arrested so many smugglers at Malabo checkpoint on Bele Road, Adamawa state but he got a call from a senior officials of the NCS who asked him to release the suspects (Ogbuokiri, 2022). The Custom Officer was not only relieved off duty but also arrested, detained and tagged mentally derailed. There are growing rumours and concerns that he may even be dismissed. This shows the extent that the so called elite and government officials could go in the racketeering.

Lack or ineffective deployment of technology is also a huge problem. While Nigeria government has allocated a lot of monies for the purchase of high-technology for its border controls either in land or at the ports, these monies have been embezzled or misappropriated.

Poor Policies and Lack of Political Will

The policies of the government on borders, customs and immigration has not only been poor but most

times ineffective to deal with the array of challenges affecting illicit drug trafficking, use and abuse in Nigeria as a whole and along border communities in particular. There seems to be cherry-picked policies that favour certain areas at the detriment of the other ethnic group in Nigeria. In fact, the dual custom and immigration policy between the north and southern borders are pointer to the failures to stop these activities of transnational organised criminal gangs. For example, while many of the porous borders are domiciled in the north, most of the security personnel are deployed to the south. While the Nigerian Government closed its land borders with neighbouring Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger in august 2019, it excluded Ghana from the border ban. This gesture was criticized by many analysts for not only being selective but also compromising (Vanguard, 2019).

While people were allowed to pass through, the movement of goods was blocked. The reason for the policy was to stem the smuggling of goods, particularly rice. Yet the phenomenon did not stop, but it also increased the poverty level in the Nigeria and increased the smuggling as the smugglers devised other means. There were allegations that some borders in the north were still left opened and operational. One will then wonder if such policy was purported for the south alone. It was no surprise when government stated that in spite of the border closure, it gave freedom to certain individuals to continue to import and export the borders. Of importance is that of these three individuals (Dangote, BUA and an unnamed gas company), two were certainly from the north and the identity of the third remains unknown (Olatunji, 2020). In all it shows that the government over the years has lacked the political will to control the border.

Media, Pop-Culture and Beliefs of Border Community Dwellers

The media has not given adequate reportage to border activities. The new media and even the academia have all not done enough to unveil the activities of the border community. Perhaps, this is because this people occupy the dregs of the society. Most of the songs and popular celebrities also glorify the use of illicit drugs and crimes.

Also, one of the drivers of the illicit drug trade, use and abuse along border community is the dwellers in the border community. This is because while the government sees trade and activities of traffickers around borderlands as illegal, the indigenous community along borderland sees it as a way of life. The then Public Relations Officer of Nigeria Customs, Joseph Attah noted that the challenges they face from illegal smuggling are non-cooperative attitude of some border dwellers; willingness of some Nigerians to help the smugglers mob Customs operative; and use of motorcycles and animals to smuggle through difficult terrains, among others (Salau, 2018). He went on to state that "suppression of smuggling remains the most challenging aspect of Customs functions as different people see anti-smuggling operations differently, he said the Customs has device more technical means of tackling the menace." Other drivers are change in status, tourists, inadequate personnel, lack of training, poor interagency collaborations, celebrity lifestyles, greed among others.

Illicit drug and its Impact on Nigeria's Borderland Security

Illicit drugs have found its transit and destinations through Africa's borderlands to the hinterland. Cannabis is the most widely used of the illicit drugs with about 209 million users globally. This is followed by opioids (61 million), amphetamines (34 million), cocaine (21 million) and ecstasy (20 million) (UNODC, 2022). The UNODC (2022) states that the annual use of the substance was higher in Africa in 2020 than the global average estimated at 6.5 per cent of the population aged 15-64. It also reported that West and Central Africa had the highest prevalence of use in the region at 9.7 per cent. These drugs have explicit impacts on Nigeria's borderland from political, socio-cultural to economic. These impacts all form both the national or physical security and human security matrix.

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a. Socio-cultural

Family and Community Disintegration

The family is the smallest unit of the society. It is also the first place of socialization. It has a huge role in child and societal development because it is the first place where children learn what is right and what is bad. The family is experiencing existential crises in recent times. In other words, Family is the smallest unit of socialization through which the child learns about morals, belief, rules, social norms and values system of a society. Illicit drug abuse can find its way in the family setting thereby destroying the bond in this revered institution. Hoffman and Goldfrank (1990: 467) averred that “Substance abuse and addiction have grave consequences on our existing social systems, effecting crime rates, hospitalizations, child abuse, and child neglect, and are rapidly consuming limited public funds.”

Studies have shown a relationship between substance abuse and disintegration of family and societal values (Christensen, 1983; Lander et al, 2013; Meghan, 2018). Recent records show that there is an increasing rate of divorces. For example, between January and February 2020, a total of 4, 000 divorce applications were reportedly filed before various courts in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and that in the same year, Kano State registered over one million divorcees (Editorial, III). Indeed, many cases could not have been reported officially. Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development, Sadiya Umar Farouq, decried the adverse effect of social ills such as drug abuse on the well being of families. She went on further to state that drug abuse is one of the causes of family and social disintegration (Obi, 2022). According to the National survey on Drug Use released by the European Union, not less than 14.3 million Nigerians between ages 15-64 have used drug outside of medical need. The survey revealed that one in eight persons in Nigeria have suffered consequences of another person’s drug use (UNODC, 2022).

Health challenges and Mortality

Illicit drug in all shades such as trafficking, trade, use and abuse have direct and indirect impact on the health and wellbeing of the dwellers of the community around the borderland. This manifests

itself in prevention and treatment cost, hospital costs or medical costs, disease burden as well as mental health and depression. Commonly abused drugs include cannabis, cocaine, methamphetamine (crystal meth), heroin, diazepam, codeine, cough syrup and tramadol (Jatau, et al 2021). As Agwogie 2022 puts it:

» *As a country, Nigeria is about 3% of the world’s population, but account for 6% of the world population of cannabis users and 14% of the world’s population who misuses pharmaceutical opioids making Nigeria one of the countries in the world with the highest number of people who misuse tramadol and cough syrups containing codeine or dextromethorphan (2022:3).*

The side effect of the addiction of these drugs is also gory. For example, studies have shown that crystal meth causes the following Increased physical activity, increased high blood pressure, high body temperature, dilated pupils, heavy sweating, paranoia, sleeplessness, loss of appetite, fleeting euphoria, unpredictable behaviour, tremors, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, headache, dry mouth, anxiety, depression, fatigue and exhibition of violent behaviours, seizures, respiratory or airway abnormalities, persistently elevated heart rate etc. (Brande, 2022).


The use and abuse of these illicit drugs have had adverse effect on the users and the community in many ways. First, there has been an established relationship between maternal mortality, infant mortality, and birth weight and drug abuse. In other words, women who take either alcohol or abuse or misuse drugs in pregnancies or after birth are likely to either lose the baby or lose their lives (WHO, 2014; Stone, 2015).

Secondly, some of those who are addicted involve in all forms of shady deals to get money to take these drugs. Some of the most infamous type of crime is kidnapping for ransom. The users also have to put up with the cost of sustaining the use. For instance, Médecins Sans Frontières [MSF] (2015) noted that there were only two medical doctors in the whole of Borno North.

Thirdly, when the drugs begin to take its effect, access to healthcare which is really unavailable or almost non-existent in border communities is crowded. This is because apart from the lapses in the country’s healthcare system, many of the border communities lack access roads and adequate healthcare practitioners. Apart from the strains it has on users, access to health care is also affected by the users. The increase in the number of these affected by drug intake also affects the unequal health facilities available in the country. Nigeria has only 24, 000 actively licensed physicians giving a doctor-patient ratio of approximately 1:10,000 as against the needed 363, 000 to attend to the over 200 million population (Adebowale-Tambe, 2022). Nigeria has only 250 trained psychiatrists for its more than 200 million populations according to the Association of Psychiatrists in Nigeria (APN) which is a 1:800,000.

The environments where drugs are processed and manufactured are also not left out of the targets of pollution and hazards. The discovery of methamphetamine laboratories across Nigeria particularly in south-east, south-south and Lagos State raises points to the extent of this menace. The disposal of the illicit drugs or its inappropriate disposal into the environment in sewage, on land, may find its way into underground water and thereby affect plants, human and animal including aquatic organisms. Thus, these animals and humans may be chronically exposed to very low doses of these drugs and the chemicals used in their illicit manufacturing which may not only cause the death of these animals and humans but also cause food insecurity and scarcity. The destruction of the aquatic and vegetation may also affect the ozone layer and contribute to the challenge of climate change and food insecurity. In many borderland communities in

Figure 4: The Three Routes of Drug Environmental Impact



Source: UNODC (2022)

Nigeria, farmers now jettison food and cash crops for substance growing thereby contributing to food insecurity.

Gender Violence

The impact of illicit drug drugs particularly use and abuse has led to an increase in gender violence particularly domestic and spousal violence. The use of steroids has also led to many cases of rape and physical abuse of spouses. It has been revealed that when criminals such as cultists, bandits and terrorists take these illicit drugs, they are sexually aroused and this leads to the urge to rape their victims and sometimes the need for them to go and kidnap women and girls in the towns in other to pleasure themselves. In 2021, about 10 women were violently raped in their camps after they were kidnapped from a community in Shiroro Local Government Area of Niger State (National Daily, 2021). In 2022, a victim who narrated her ordeal in the hands of the bandits stated that:

» *They made sure all the women abducted were raped. So, we all watched as they raped every one of us in our presence. They were two men, each of them had their way with me twice. They had told us before we left the village that they came for the wives. They didn't demand ransom; the abduction was only for sexual gratification (Abdullahi, 2022).*

There is no doubt that rape and domestic violence or spousal abuse also has unintended effect on not only the victims but also family and friends. Thus, it can be established that there is a linkage between drug abuse, rape, mental health and productivity. The use of drugs was particularly high during the emergence of the coronavirus pandemic and lockdown and the impact was unprecedented. Thompson and Awange (forthcoming) established that while women were the most abused during the lockdown period in Nigeria, men were not also left out though in lower number.

Endangered Youth and Productivity

Most of the users and victims of these illicit drugs are the youth population. The projection is that illicit drug users are likely to increase by 40 percent by the

year 2030. The youth population has overtly been referred to as the future and leaders of tomorrow. The NDLEA found that 40 percent of youths aged between 18 and 35 were deeply involved in drug abuse. Few youths arrested with some of these illicit drugs have argued that it makes them do work easily, however, available evidence show the opposite as it has a long term effect on not just the muscles but also on their thinking and reasoning faculty thereby affecting productivity. The productive base of the borderland community has also suffered from the abuse of drugs since the youth are supposed to be the engine of growth and development of these marginalized communities. It also affects school leaving age and out-of-school children. There has been significant relationship between drug abuse and school abandonment or drop out.

Violent Crimes, Terrorism and Banditry

There has been a linkage between illicit drugs and all shades of violent crimes including terrorism across the globe and around Africa's borderlands. Igbinovia (1982) argues that illicit drug abuse and use is criminogenic and violence-inducing in African states. Other scholars have shared similar perspective on the linkage between illicit drug and violent crimes (Bishi et al 2022, Pinson, 2022). For example, Piazza (2011) finds that illicit drug production and opiate and cocaine wholesale prices are significant positive predictors of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. A UNODC Report (nd) notes that in 2004 about 400 tons of cocaine was exported from one Latin American country with an estimated value of \$US2billion and that by 2006, the total potential value of Afghanistan's opium harvest accruing to farmers, laboratory owners and Afghan traffickers reached about \$US3.1billion. Aside from Afghanistan, the cases of drug trafficking has exacerbated the domestic terrorism in most Latin American countries especially between around the borderlands of the Gulf of Mexico and the United States. While this has not transcended into terrorism, the proceeds have sometimes been sent abroad to finance terrorism in vulnerable countries and emerging democracies. Nigeria has also recorded such cases. For example, the government of the United Arab Emirate arrested and prosecuted some Nigerians financing terrorism in Nigeria (Oyeleke, 2021).

These terrorists aside using the proceeds of drugs to purchase small and light weapons also use these drugs to stimulate their activities. For example, the Chairman of the National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency, NDLEA, Buba Marwa revealed that kidnappers and armed bandits request for drugs as ransom. He furthered:

» *Unfortunately, drug use does not show in the face, so you won't know if your next-door neighbour is using drugs. We now have an increase in criminal acts starting with kidnapping, insurgency, and banditry. Now it has upgraded to rape and assassinations. Behind it all is drug use. Criminals all use drugs, even kidnappers now ask for ransom in drugs and until we get to the root of the problem, these criminals will continue to flourish (Nwosu, 2021).*


This level of hypnotic drug use leads to manslaughter, burglary, rape, communal violence, amongst other ones. To further buttress this point, it was reported that bandits terrorizing some communities in the Munya local government area of Niger State demanded for packs of cigarettes and rolls of marijuana as ransom from residents to secure the release of their kidnapped relations in late 2021. This shows that the bandits and terrorists are now accustomed to taking the substances and since they could not get it in their hide-outs, kidnapping to get such commodity is likely to continue along the borderlands. The Director, Media and Advocacy, Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Mr Femi Babafemi narrated how psychotropic drugs were discovered in the camps of the Boko Haram during a clearance operation by the Nigerian Armed Forces. He further observed that most of the insurgents and bandits terrorizing hinterland and borderlands of Nigeria particularly the North-West and Boko Haram/ Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorists operating in the North-East after being arrested confessed to regular use of drugs and a few were captured with drugs including pharmaceutical opioids and that these bandits and insurgents usually showed some forms of withdrawal symptoms after spending some days in custody of law enforcement agents (Mbele, 2021). This in turn leads to the displacements

of victims and creation of refugee crises which are already manifesting in the country and borderlands in particular. The West Africa Commission on Drug (2014) agrees that the sub-regional insecurity, state fragility and violent extremism are fueled by drug trafficking and corruption. Thus, the activities of these criminals affect the overall peace and security of the borderlands and the continent and global community as well.

b. Political

Drug abuse has a tendency of thwarting democracies and destabilizing the political space. Most people who use drugs may feel agitated and decide to wage a so called just war against the state thereby causing political instability. In Nigeria where youth make up the highest demographics of voters; no doubt that their activities could make or mar Africa's largest democracies. In terms of demographic distribution of the 2023 general elections and voter registration, the National Commissioner at Independent National Electoral Commission, (INEC) in charge of Information and Voter Education Committee, Mr. Festus Okoye stated that 7.2 million new voters or 76.5% are young people between 18-34 years while there is a slightly higher number of female (4.8 million or 50.82%) than male (4.6 million or 49.18%) and that the youth, make 48 million out of the entire 93.5 million eligible voters (Vanguard, 2023). There have been instances of youths under the influence of drug destroying campaign boards and vehicles in some States in Nigeria.

Drug cartel through their activities could also destroy governance and democracy. They could do this by



influencing corrupt public officials at all levels of law enforcement and government. This can in turn lead to unbridled chaos and protests and even coups which may destabilise the democratic space. This played out in the 1980s in Nigeria where it was alleged that a coup that brought in General Babangida was as a result of an investigation into the drug business of some cabals by the Muhammadu Buhari regime. Maja-Pearce (1988) in a newspaper report wrote:

» According to rumour (I say rumour, since no-one has been charged there has yet to be a denial) Dele Giwa had been told by one Gloria Okon, whom he had visited in London, that the wife of a certain person at the highest level was implicated in the escalating cocaine trade. No names need be mentioned, but every Nigerian journalist – every Nigerian – knows perfectly well who is being referred to.

Leaders or politicians under the influence of drugs may also make policies and decisions that are anti-people and tend to support the continued trend in the trade. It was on this basis that many professional agencies, religious leaders and even the NDLEA called for compulsory drug test for the next crop of politicians in the country (Adewale, 2017; Ayitogo, 2022a).

c. Economic

The economic cost of illicit drug abuse along border communities vary from its waste of financial resources, reduction of labour force and turnover to absenteeism from legitimate workplaces. Most times, proceeds of illicit drugs are sufficient enough to invest and empower thousands of vulnerable population such as women, aged and physically challenged who live in border communities. With more than 20 million drug users in Nigeria who are both within the mainland and Africa borderlands, one can vehemently state that there would have been sufficient developmental and welfare programmes if these monies are channeled into such ventures.

Workplace productivity can also suffer when employees are abusing drugs. Employees under the influence may make costly errors, not show up for work (which may require the business to hire

a temporary substitute), or incur health care costs that could affect the company's insurance and tax plan. While the economic cost of drug abuse in the United States was estimated at US\$193 billion in 2007 (ONDCP, 2007), there is no available statistics for Nigeria. The money allocated to the fight against illicit drug can also be used to develop other areas along Africa borderlands.

The labour force also suffers in the sense that addicts become less productive to the society and eventually lose their jobs and livelihood. Though most of the communities in Nigeria's borderland tend to farming, fishing and agricultural activities generally, the effect of illicit drug use affects productivity and societal development. It was estimated that there were 4.6 million non-medical users of pharmaceutical opioids, of whom 3 million were men in Nigeria in 2017. Of the non-medical users of pharmaceutical opioids, most had used tramadol and, to a lesser extent, codeine, or morphine, in the past year, representing 4.7 per cent of the adult population aged 15-64 (UNODC, 2022). The Commander of Narcotics, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Shehu Dankolo revealed that 40 per cent of Nigerian youths between 18 and 35 years were deeply involved in the abuse of drugs (Nzor, 2022). Many of the youths have also adopted illicit drugs as a source of livelihood due to lack of employment opportunities or underemployment and since drug economies can overshadow legal livelihoods because of its lucrateness. Addicts sell their property and even engage in all shades of illegalities to get access to any of these drugs. In a country where kidnapping thrives, many of these addicts even kidnap their bosses in order to use the ransom to purchase illicit drugs.

Responses to Illicit Drugs and Borderland Insecurity in Nigeria

International

The international community has made several efforts in dealing with illicit drug trade and borderland insecurity. This is because of the linkage between drugs and peace and security. The United Nations, through the United Nations Office of Drug Committee (UNODC) has spearheaded this responses through laws, policy frameworks and programmes including financial aid to assist countries particularly those around border areas. The UNODC has led the war


against transnational drugs, narcotics and all forms of corruption that could affect peace and security. This has also been followed from efforts from the United States US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other international partners such as the European Union. For example, the UNODC has intervened in Nigeria's drug and narcotic challenges since the 1980s through the 21st century.

In 2014, the European Union in collaboration with the UNODC committed more than EUR34 million for a duration of 53-month (January 2013-May 2017) in the fight against drug abuse in Nigeria (<https://www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/drug-prevention.html>). In fact, the UNODC have consistently collaborated with the Nigerian government on its anti-drug and narcotic drugs polices. These collaborations range

from providing assistance in terms of training, human capacity development to technical aid.

In more recent times, the UNODC has embarked on a more ambitious and practical plan anchored in its belief in the limitless promise that Africa holds for its people, and the conviction that UNODC can contribute to realizing this potential. The Vision also embodies the UNODC unwavering commitment to realizing the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the African Union's Agenda 2063, and in doing so bringing true change to the everyday lives of Africa's people, now and in the future. This is reinforced by the new UNODC corporate strategy 2021-2025, which will ensure efficient, impact-oriented delivery across our mandate areas around the globe (UNODC, 2020).

Figure 5: Overview of UNODC Strategic Vision for Africa



Source: UNODC (2021: 5)

The area regarding drug control involves improved data collection and analysis, strengthened responses to drug trafficking, improved responses to drug use and related HIV prevention, treatment and care, better access to medical use of controlled medicines containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and finally give more protecting from falsified medical products (UNODC, 2021). On drug control, it also involves assisting Member States to enhance cross-border, regional and international cooperation contributing to more secure borders, ports, airports and maritime areas. By this, it contributes to peace and security on the continent. Be that as it may, the UNODC is not unmindful of the challenges in achieving these desired goals and vision for the continent. To be sure, some of the identified challenges it identified are Africa's population (1.3billion), climate change, poor healthcare limited for a bit above 400 million Africans, endemic poverty among its population which foresee about 2/3 of world's poorest people living in fragile situations by 2030, corruption which has denied Africans more than \$50 billion per year in public and private money and the global pandemic (UNODC, 2021:6. There is no doubt that these assessment of its weaknesses can help the UNODC achieve its vision but with just two years to the expiration of its strategy (2021-2025), it appears as if a lot is needed to be done as many African states are still battling with the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and global oil glut.

Regional Response

At the regional levels, the African Union has over the years championed the fight against illicit drugs and its effect on peace and security on the continent. Some notable interventions were the African Union Continental Minimum Quality Standards for Drug Treatment (2012); the Common African Position on Controlled Substances and Access to Pain Management Medication (2012). The African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control (2013-2017) adopted in January 2013 encourages AU member states to ensure that policies reflect the importance of human rights and public health in drug control (AU nd). Between 2014 and 2016, the AU initiated the Addis Ababa Declaration (2014) which stresses the need to scale up balanced and integrated responses towards drug control in Africa and the Common African Position for UNGASS (2016) as

well as the Decisions & Declarations of Sessions of the African Union Specialized Technical Committee on Health, Population. In 2017, the African Union Commission (AUC) also demonstrated its firm commitment to transform the nature of border governance by establishing the African Union Border Programme (AUBP). The AUBP developed and galvanised support from the AU Member States on a multitude of normative guidelines and instructive documents including the AU Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation (Niamey Convention) (AU, 2017). Anchored on the principle of subsidiarity, the Strategy emphasised the role of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Member States, constituting the building blocks of the AU. In this regard, the Strategy has taken into account the major international and continental initiatives and blueprint documents of peace and security and development


MAY 2022

The African Union launched the Global Dialogue on Drug Demand Reduction in order to explore and interrogate thoughts on how Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean can find mutual working opportunities that benefit our people both today and in the future.

such as Agenda 2063, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Governance Architecture (AGA), the Common African Positions related to Migration, the Humanitarian System, and the Sustainable Development Goals (AU, 2017). In 2019, it launched the African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control (2019-2023) (AU, 2019). This appears to be comprehensive as a result of the key areas of implementation.

It appears the dialogue to end drug abuse is unending. In May 2022, the African Union launched the Global Dialogue on Drug Demand Reduction in order to explore and interrogate thoughts on how Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean can find mutual working opportunities that benefit our people both today and in the future. This was anchored on the Agenda 2063. The Director of Social Development, Culture and Sports of the African Union Commission (AUC), Mrs Cisse Mariama Mohamed stated that, "together we can identify gaps and opportunities and come up with actionable recommendations

Figure 6: The Nine Key Areas of AU Plan of Action on DC&CP, 2019-2023



Source: Basutu, (2020).

in developing and implementing sustainable drug demand reduction initiatives. We are committed to sustaining the dialogue. You can count on the African Union" (AU, 2022).

However, due to limited reporting by member states, assessing the level of political and operational engagement in implementing AU policy in the area of illicit drug trade and borderland security remains difficult. Additionally, a lack of synergy among the member states as well as poor planning and lack of political will have made a mess of most of these regional interventions. More so, the Union has not been able to evaluate the effectiveness of previous policies before inaugurating new ones and it has been established that the problems are not making new ones but building institutions to implement these policies. Moreover, the AU has not taken into consideration the capacity and weaknesses of the member states in implementing these novel policy. For example, the Union has not been able to deal with leaders involved or culpable in some of these atrocities.

Sub-Regional Response

At the sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South Africa Development Commission among others, though emphasis will be on the ECOWAS. ECOWAS had championed several strategies in the context of its commitment to international norms and standards regarding narcotics control. Resolution relating to Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse in West Africa (ECOWAS 1997); Recommendation C/98 on the establishment of a Regional Fund for Financing of

Drug Control Activities in West Africa; Decision on the establishment of a Regional Fund for Financing Drug Control Activities (ECOWAS 1998); and Decision on establishing the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (ECOWAS 1999).

In the 21st century, it has embarked on other ambitious policy to curb the menace of illicit drugs and insecurity in Africa's borderlands. The ECOWAS initially put in place, adopted and endorsed its Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan on drugs for 2008- 2011 which was then extended until 2015. Prior to the ministerial meeting, experts on the subject matter – as well as stakeholders from member states, the African Union (AU), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), INTERPOL and the European Union (EU) – deliberated on strategies to address the drug problem in West Africa, and to agree a new Regional Action Plan for 2016-2021. It also includes a commitment to review and collate drug policies across the region.

In addition, ECOWAS set up the West African Epidemiology Network on Drug Use (WENDU) for the collection and collation of epidemiological data at the regional and national levels in July 2017 (ECOWAS, 2017). The Network is present in all 15 ECOWAS member states, and includes a focus on drug treatment demand indicators and aggregate data on drug supply to inform policies. There has been constant revision on the initial framework. For example, it launched the Regional Report of statistics and trends on illicit drug supply and use in September 2021 (ECOWAS, 2021). However,

lack of a harmonized sub-regional policy hindered by different language, currency, and economy as well as political instability and eroding democracies among others have not allowed these noble policy to succeed.

National Response

So far there has been no national framework for fighting illicit drug in Nigeria particularly in the borderlands. Nigerian state has made significant efforts in combating illicit drug and disrupting illicit flows over the years particularly since the 1980s. Nigeria has both unilaterally and in collaboration with other countries and international agencies spearheaded a range of measures against transnational crime. The country's responses to organized crime including illicit drugs in the borderland and in the country as a whole encompass legislation, policy, enforcement and military operations (Bish et al 2022). In May 2015, the then president, Goodluck Jonathan endorsed the National Drug Control Master Plan (NDCMP) 2015- 2019. The policy and strategy provided provide a roadmap on drug control for all ministries, departments and agencies in Nigeria and help to strike a balance between drug supply suppression and drug demand reduction actions. To facilitate implementation of the Plan, the project worked with member agencies and ministries of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Drug Control to develop a costed operational plan and a monitoring and evaluation framework for the master plan (UNODC, 2015). This worked simultaneously with the drug agency--The Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).

The NDLEA was formed by Decree No. 48 of 29th December 1989 to specifically combat narcotics in the country. This was in response to the rising trend in the demand for and trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which adversely affected the international image of Nigerians and Nigeria in the 1980s. The agency is in charge of drug policy and control in Nigeria and it is also mandated to curtail illicit production, importation, exportation, sale and trafficking of psychoactive substances (NDLEA, nd). The agency has 14 directorates, 14 zonal commands, 111 state area commands and 10 Special (airports & seaports) commands. Its commands are situated in all the nation's airports, seaports, border posts and strategic locations on the road networks in the country.

Though there are specific laws on crimes in the country, the country has also specifically laid down laws on narcotics. The NDLEA Act Section 11 (c) stipulates a life imprisonment for a person who engages in the selling and buying or makes an offer for sale or deals with any cocaine heroin, LSD or any other drugs of similar nature. Section 11 (d) of the Act punishes mere possession of a drug, using a drug by inhaling, smoking or injecting, by imprisonment for not less than 15years but not more than 25 years (<https://nigeria.tradeportal.org/media/NDLEA%20Act.pdf>). However, the Chairman/ Chief Executive Officer of the NDLEA, Brig. Gen. Mohamed Buba Marwa (Retd) seek for the removal of the clause that allows for the option of fine for drug offenders as way to strengthen the deterrence effect of court prosecution and conviction (NDLEA, 2021). He also called on more collaboration with both regional and sub-regional organisations. At the 30th Conference of Heads of Drug Law Enforcement Agencies Africa (HONLEA) in Nairobi, Kenya in November 2022, he notes:

» *The global drug problem has placed higher demands on countries to work round the clock to achieve this goal and consolidate the achievements recorded. It is on the above premise that my delegation is proposing strengthened collaboration at both regional and sub-regional levels. This noble objective could be realized with the creation of an informal network of HONLEA contact persons to complement and enhance real time exchange of intelligence or operational information. It will also enhance more robust activities all year round. At the sub-regional level, countries should endeavour to establish sub-regional group like HONLEA for strengthened collaboration under the auspices of the regional economic communities (NDLEA, 2022a).*

To show that the agency has set an example on the continent, Nigeria was elected to host the next conference of Heads of Drug Law Enforcement Agencies Africa, HONLEA in 2023. It also appears as if the agency has achieved some successes. In his remarks, Mr Marwa stated that:

The starting point is the harnessing of all the stakeholders by the national drug focal agency. Through this national coordination and collaborative effort, Nigeria has steadily made significant efforts in tackling drug challenges and has between January 2021 and August 2022, recorded unprecedented arrests, in the region of 21,302 suspected drug traffickers, including 28 drug barons. In the area of prosecution, the agency has secured 3,111 convictions, and seized 5.4 million kilograms of illicit substances. On Drug Demand Reduction, the Agency within the same period had brief interventions, counselling/rehabilitation for over 12,326 drug users (NDLEA, 2022a).

However, the agency has also deplored violent and militant means in carrying out its tasks. Apart from barging into people's privacy; extrajudicial killings in the name of arrests have raised questions and demeaned the few successes recorded (Ezeobi, 2022). More so, some of the personnel have also been fingered in shady deals. A case in point is the ongoing case of some NDLEA official working in cahoots with a former police chief, Abba Kyari who is alleged to be a member of an international drug cartel (Ayitogo, 2022b). The case is still before the court but Mr Kyari apart from the allegations of being involved in a drug cartel was also identified in the case of a global internet fraudster (Ramon Abass AKA Hushpuppy) by the United State of America (Busari and Princewill, 2021).

While Mr Kyari may be a scape-goat or unlucky, there is no doubt that there are other ones who have not been caught among the law enforcement agencies and even border security in our airports and ports as most of the illegal drug interceptions are made inside the country and very few at the point of entry. One will then wonder if there are no personnel or intelligence to track these drugs before its entry into the country. It is on that basis that the communities and private individuals have also joined in the response to the illicit drug trafficking war.

State and Community

Some of the states with international borders have made laws or implemented awareness programmes on the illicit drug abuse. Some or their wives have also entered into collaborations with the NDLEA in order to stem the tide of the menace. For example, in 2018, Northern Governors' Wives Forum (NGWF) stressed the need for collaboration by stakeholders to tackle increasing cases of drug abuse by youth in the country. Hadiza Abubakar, the Chairperson of the forum and wife of Bauchi State Governor made the call at the forum's quarterly meeting in Sokoto in May 2018. In 2021, the Gombe State Government under Governor Inuwa Yahaya and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) resolved to support each other in the fight against illicit drugs in the state (Ayitogo, 2021). Its counterpart in Adamawa also passed a bill against drug abuse which also stresses the need for all categories of persons in the state to undergo compulsory drug test for applicants for appointment, employment and schools admission in the state. Nevertheless, these have not succeeded in curbing the menace as the basics have not been tackled. To be sure, the borders still remain porous and there have been no concentered efforts at examining the drivers of drug abuse including endemic poverty, religious extremism, increasing out-of-school children or rather put succinctly, there have been no political will by the governors and their wives who usually inaugurate pet projects for the aesthetics and corrupt tendencies and not altruistic reasons.

State based security operatives have also taken the fight by the horn. Suspects have been arrested and paraded by the State created Ebubeagu Security outfit, in Ebonyi State. Many communities have taken the fight to the drug traffickers and users by naming and shaming and even publicly beating and stripping them. This method seems to be prevalent among the south-east area of Nigeria. There have been viral videos of youths and even children being stripped naked and publicly flogged by community vigilante or youths (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLGh0HvYwII>). Some of the traffickers have also been banished from the community. However, just like the inhuman way used by the NDLEA, many have condemned this approach of abuses and lack of dignity of the human persons.

The above show how the community and non-state actors are taking the fight to the drug manufacturers and peddlers in their various communities. The above are only a few example of man's inhuman to man in the name of fighting against drug trafficking in the fringes or borderlands across the country. Many extrajudicial killings remains unreported. Nevertheless, while there are evidences of such responses against illicit drugs in south east as a result of the consequences on peace and security in the area, there are no evidences that such community response exist in the northern borderland of the country except for those tackling insurgencies.

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CONCLUSION

The revealed that illicit drug is a social and global menace. While many studies have emphasised on the porosity of Africa and Nigeria's borderlands as the major factor affecting the peace and security in the area, this article argues that it goes beyond the borders. Other factors identified for the continued trend in the problems include poverty, elite, corruption, inadequate personnel, unemployment, lack of technology, lack of political will among others. The illicit drug market (trafficking, use and abuse) also have negative impacts, politically, socially and economically on border security. While there have been international, regional and sub-regional frameworks as well as national and community responses to tackle the menace, the cases have continued to increase daily. The national and community response approach have majorly been through violent means which has violated the rights of many citizenry and at times led to extrajudicial killing in the name of making arrests.

The article argues that except for a multi-track approach to combat the menace, the belief that shoring up our porous borders alone will put an end to illicit drugs trafficking in the country will remain a chimera. Addressing the major drivers of illicit drugs, good governance, more political will and building institutions are some of the recommendations. The government must also invest in human capital development by providing job opportunities and enabling environment for businesses to thrive, provide affordable and quality healthcare and above all invest in the youth because they are the major users of these illicit drugs and perpetrators of violent crimes. In the short term, technology and sufficient personnel should be deployed to the borderlands. All the unmanned borders should be manned and the dwellers around the border communities should be re-oriented and provided with sustainable jobs with a conducive environment for businesses to thrive. In the long term, a harmonized framework should be designed by the international framework to curb the menace of illicit drugs on the continent especially borderlands as the failure to do this will affect the peace and security of these states and may pave way for state fragility. Moreover, there is the need for proper evaluation of past national and international policies on drugs in order to understand the areas where interventions is most needed.



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ABOUT THE AUTHOR



DR OLAKUNLE OLASUPO THOMPSON is a fellow of Institute of French Research Association (IFRA) and the International Labour Organisation on child labour. He is presently working on an IFRA sponsored project on the Nigeria 2023 General Elections.



International Peace Support Training Centre

Westwood Park Rd, Karen Nairobi, Kenya
P.O. Box 24232-00502 Nairobi, Kenya

✉ info@ipstc.org
🌐 www.ipstc.org
aaj.ipstc.org



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UNON Complex Gigiri, Block M, Level 3
P.O. Box 30218-00100, Nairobi, Kenya

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