HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND STATEBUILDING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED SOUTH SUDAN: LESSONS EMERGING FOR NEXUS PROGRAMMING

FINAL REPORT
2023
This Humanitarian Assistance and Statebuilding in Conflict-affected South Sudan study is a joint publication by the UNDP and WFP.

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Contents

Acronyms ................................................................................................................................. 5

Preface .................................................................................................................................... 7

Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................... 9

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 10

Recommendations for a Nexus Approach to Statebuilding ...................................................... 13

Report Structure ..................................................................................................................... 15

CHAPTER 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................ 17

1.1 The Republic of South Sudan .............................................................................................. 18

1.2 Socioeconomic Development ............................................................................................. 19

1.3 International Assistance .................................................................................................... 19

1.4 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 20

CHAPTER 2: South Sudan: Statebuilding and the Triple Nexus ................................................ 21

2.1 Statebuilding ....................................................................................................................... 21

2.2 The Triple Nexus ................................................................................................................. 21

2.3 Conceptual Framework ....................................................................................................... 23

CHAPTER 3: The Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on National and Subnational .............. 28

3.1 The Evolution of Government Dependency on International Assistance ........................... 28

3.2 Governance Capacity .......................................................................................................... 29

3.3 Government-International Community Interaction ............................................................ 30

3.4 Service Provision ................................................................................................................ 33

3.5 Economic Foundations ...................................................................................................... 37

3.6 Access to Justice and Rule of Law ....................................................................................... 43

3.7 The Social Contract ............................................................................................................ 47

3.8 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 49

CHAPTER 4: The Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on Local Level Statebuilding ............... 51

Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State ............................................................................................................. 51

4.1 Services ............................................................................................................................... 51

4.2 The Economy ...................................................................................................................... 52

4.3 Rule of Law and Access to Justice ...................................................................................... 54

4.4 Social Cohesion and the Social Contract ......................................................................... 56

Upper Nile State ........................................................................................................................... 58

4.5 Services ............................................................................................................................... 58

4.6 The Economy ...................................................................................................................... 58
### 4.7 Rule of Law and Access to Justice

- Page 60

### 4.8 Social Cohesion and the Social Contract

- Page 61

### 4.9 Conclusion

- Page 62

### CHAPTER 5: The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus and South Sudan

- Page 64

#### 5.1 The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus

- Page 64

#### 5.2 The Reasons for Protracted Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan

- Page 67

#### 5.3 Operationalizing the Triple Nexus

- Page 69

#### 5.4 Fragility and Localization

- Page 74

#### 5.5 Experiences of Localization in South Sudan

- Page 76

### CHAPTER 6: Looking Forward: A Triple Nexus Approach to Statebuilding

- Page 79

#### 6.1 Key Aspects of Statebuilding

- Page 79

#### 6.2 Humanitarian Assistance and Statebuilding

- Page 81

#### 6.3 Statebuilding and the Nexus

- Page 86

#### 6.4 Recommendations for a Nexus Approach to Statebuilding

- Page 87

### Annexes

- Page 90

#### 7.1 References

- Page 90

#### 7.2 Contributors to the Study

- Page 98

#### 7.3 Methodology

- Page 118

#### 7.4 Guiding Questions

- Page 123
**Text Boxes**

1. International Humanitarian Funding for South Sudan in 2022  
2. South Sudan Government Entities for Humanitarian Assistance  
3. South Sudan Human Rights Commission  
4. Jamjang – a “UNHCR town” in South Sudan  
5. Predecessors of the Triple Nexus  
6. Aid Worker Deaths in South Sudan

**List of Figures**

1. Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus  
2. Relationship between Humanitarian Assistance, the HDP Nexus and Statebuilding
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCSS</td>
<td>Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CRSV</td>
<td>Conflict Related Sexual Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSPS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and Policy Studies</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDP nexus</td>
<td>Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Needs Overview</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>Heads of Cooperation</td>
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<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCG</td>
<td>Inter-Cluster Coordination Group</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institutes</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>InterGovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Implementation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking Relief and Rehabilitation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OLS</td>
<td>Operation Lifeline Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTR</td>
<td>Protection, Transition and Reintegration</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent-Teacher Association</td>
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<td>PRR</td>
<td>Partnership for Recovery and Resilience</td>
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<td>PFRR</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace, Recovery and Resilience</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-ARCSS</td>
<td>Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>SRRA</td>
<td>Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency</td>
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<td>SSOA</td>
<td>South Sudan Opposition Alliance</td>
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<td>Sudan People’s liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>SPLM/A-IO</td>
<td>Sudan People’s liberation Movement/Army – in Opposition</td>
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<td>South Sudan People’s Defence Forces</td>
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<td>SRS G</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<td>SRRA</td>
<td>Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>USDCF</td>
<td>United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework</td>
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<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Preface

The report provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of humanitarian interventions on the state-building process in South Sudan. South Sudan’s journey as an independent nation, since gaining sovereignty in 2011, has been marred by protracted conflict, political instability, and a series of humanitarian crises. These challenges have impeded the country’s efforts to establish effective governance structures and create the necessary conditions for sustainable development. Against this backdrop, humanitarian assistance has played a crucial role in addressing immediate needs, providing life-saving support, and mitigating the impact of conflict-induced displacement and food insecurity.

Amidst these challenges, South Sudan as a young state is at the nascent stage of building a viable state. Although the protracted humanitarian interventions interact with the statebuilding process, little is known about the complex relationship between humanitarian aid and state building. Humanitarian interventions often operate within a short-term and emergency-oriented framework, prioritizing immediate relief and focusing on meeting the basic needs of affected populations. On the other hand, state building requires a long-term perspective, aiming to establish functional institutions, promote good governance, and foster socio-economic development. Balancing these two objectives is a delicate task, and understanding their interplay is essential for designing effective and sustainable strategies in the context of humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

This report builds upon a rigorous and comprehensive review of existing literature, field research, and interviews with key stakeholders involved in humanitarian and state-building efforts in South Sudan. It examines the impact of humanitarian assistance on various dimensions of state building, including governance, security, justice, socio-economic development, and social cohesion. By analyzing these dimensions, the report seeks to provide insights into the challenges and opportunities that emerge from the intersection of humanitarian assistance and state building in a fragile context such as South Sudan.

The findings of this report underline the complex nature of this relationship. Humanitarian assistance has undoubtedly made significant contributions to mitigating the suffering of the South Sudanese population and addressing immediate needs. It has saved lives, provided critical services, and promoted resilience in the face of immense adversity. However, the report also highlights the potential risks and unintended consequences that can arise when humanitarian interventions inadvertently undermine or bypass state institutions.

The analysis presented in this report emphasizes the importance of recognizing and strengthening the capacity of local institutions, fostering effective coordination among stakeholders, and aligning humanitarian interventions with broader state-building goals. Furthermore, it explores innovative approaches and best practices that can enhance the positive impact of humanitarian assistance on long-term state building outcomes.

The findings of this report are intended to inform policymakers, practitioners, and researchers working in the field of humanitarian assistance and state building. By shedding light on the challenges and opportunities in South Sudan, we hope to contribute to the ongoing discussions and efforts to improve the effectiveness, coherence, and sustainability of humanitarian assistance in fragile states.
Finally, we would like to express our deepest gratitude to the countless individuals who generously shared their knowledge, insights, and experiences during the research process. Their contributions have been invaluable in shaping this report and providing a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of humanitarian assistance on state building in South Sudan.

We sincerely hope that this report serves as a catalyst for informed dialogue, evidence-based policymaking, and transformative action, ultimately contributing to the long-term peace, stability, and development of South Sudan.

Samuel Obaydee Doe  
Resident Representative  
UNDP - South Sudan

Marie-Ellen McGroarty  
Country Representative  
World Food Programme - South Sudan
Acknowledgments

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UNDP and WFP extend warm appreciation to civil society organizations, faith-based organizations, youth organizations, women’s organizations/groups, organizations for people with disabilities, academia, UN agencies, donors, and national and local government institutions for their support. The active participation and invaluable insights of respondents and stakeholders consulted in Juba, Wau, Yambio, Malakal and in the states of Upper Nile and Western Bahr el-Ghazal facilitated to form this report. Special recognition goes to the Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) and the Upper Nile Youth Development Association (UNYDA) cluster leads, and the NGO forum, who facilitated local-level research. UNDP and WFP also extend our thanks to the researchers Amani Ibrahim Deng, Ayom Alor Deng, Barnaba Chol Peter, Bedy Athyey, Both Winy Diew, David Ona Fruo Kal, Elizabeth Nyandeng Nyek, Khamisa William, Majak Maluah Kur, Nyangieth Wien Thongom, Stephen Robo.

We wish to extend our thanks to UNDP’s communication unit for the editing and formatting of this study and the SPACE unit for the technical and administrative support to the study team.

We sincerely commend the consultancy team for conducting this comprehensive study that will be instrumental in operationalizing the HDP nexus in South Sudan.
Executive Summary

Study Rationale
Since South Sudan gained independence in 2011, it has received and sustained large-scale humanitarian assistance. The successive and protracted crises have left millions of people reliant on humanitarian assistance. As international funding for South Sudan is decreasing and little progress has been made towards stability and development, a triple nexus approach which combines humanitarian development and peace interventions is being promoted as a means to promote statebuilding.

If the nexus approach is to be used effectively to contribute to multiple outcomes, including statebuilding, it is necessary to understand the interaction between humanitarian assistance and statebuilding, even if this interaction is not the intended outcome of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have commissioned a joint study to explore the relationship between humanitarian assistance and statebuilding.

The study focuses on four areas of statebuilding:
- Service delivery
- Economy foundation
- Access to justice and rule of law
- Social cohesion and the social contract

The objectives of the study are to:
- Inform the design and implementation of the HDP nexus programme/projects intended to advance statebuilding in South Sudan.
- Improve understanding of the link between humanitarian assistance and statebuilding in protracted humanitarian crises and fragile state contexts.

The study was conducted between November 2021 and December 2022 and draws on a document review and research conducted using qualitative techniques among over 400 people from South Sudan and the international community.

Key Aspects of Statebuilding
Statebuilding is an ongoing process that is shaped by the history and experiences of the state and its citizens. To function effectively, a state must have a minimum administrative capacity at all levels of government, clear divisions of roles and responsibilities, and effective communication and coordination across all levels of government and between all levels of government.

Statebuilding is founded on the social contract - the mutual responsibilities accepted by the government and the people. It requires the government to provide services, rule of law and security and to manage the economy. In return, the people agree to abide by the rule of law, pay taxes that are used to fund services, and to accept the state’s monopoly over the use of force.
The technical aspects of the state are complemented by social cohesion, which focuses on well-being, mutual-respect, and tolerance. For the government, social cohesion is promoted through social protection, the redistribution of wealth and the protection of human rights and equality. Among the population, social cohesion is practiced in daily life through goodwill towards others, a sense of belonging and a perception of equality.

Statebuilding is an endogenous process, but the international community has been criticized for adopting top-down approaches that ignore local capacities and traditions and fail to promote nationhood. Localization is defined in this study as a means to promote bottom-up approaches that are appropriate to the context and help to promote a sense of nationhood.

**Humanitarian Assistance and Statebuilding**

- Government institutions that liaise with the humanitarian sector and facilitate humanitarian interventions had high levels of human capacity. It is unclear whether the humanitarian sector has provided systematic capacity building to these institutions or whether the capacity has developed to facilitate the work of the humanitarian sector.
- Ministries involved in service provision worked with the humanitarian sector, but it is unclear whether their engagement has been substantive. The humanitarian sector has worked towards implementing government health and education strategies and implemented education programmes which are intended to provide a basis for the longer term.
- Humanitarian assistance to provide services, cash assistance and livelihood support can have a positive impact on statebuilding in terms of promoting development and stability. However, the impact of these interventions is limited by the lack of development interventions that would enable the initiatives from the humanitarian sector to have a greater reach and sustainability.
- The provision of protection by humanitarian organizations has had some positive impacts at the local level in terms of responding to immediate needs. However, as the country’s rule of law and justice systems do not function effectively, protection interventions have a limited wider impact because there is no real recourse to law or justice.
- Attitudes towards and understanding of the social contract among government representatives vary significantly. Some individuals at the national and state level government wanted to meet the people’s needs and fulfil their commitments to the social contract independent of external assistance. Others were content to or felt that there was no alternative but to rely on external actors to provide for the population. The presence of humanitarian assistance allows the government to ignore its responsibilities towards fulfilling the social contract because it knows that the humanitarian sector is obligated to respond to the population’s needs.
- There is a strong understanding of the social contract among the populations. In areas with greater stability there was a view that the government could fulfil its part of the social contract in time and with external support. In less stable areas, the population had given up on the government and had begun to call the humanitarian organizations to account when they were dissatisfied with the assistance. This illustrates a breakdown of the social contract.
- Humanitarian assistance contributes to social cohesion at the local level when it is evenly distributed. When it is not evenly distributed, it causes tensions. Men and boys are perceived to have received less assistance than women and girls, causing resentment and creating economic inequalities.
Challenges to Statebuilding

- The lack of political will to promote social cohesion and the social contract, widespread corruption and ongoing conflict often incited by the centre undermine progress towards statebuilding.
- The scale of oil revenues with respect to expenditure removes the necessity for the government to engage in collecting tax from the population. Without the transactional relationship between the citizen and the state, a key element of the social contract is missing.
- The international community’s focus at the national level and on technical aspects of statebuilding has resulted in a lack of nation-building and disparities between urban and rural areas.
- The absence of development actors and funding, in addition to cycles of emergencies, has resulted in protracted humanitarian interventions.

Statebuilding and the Nexus

For effective statebuilding, multiple interventions are required that can potentially be managed using a triple nexus approach. Although humanitarian assistance has had some positive impacts on aspects of statebuilding, these interventions need to be complemented by development and peace interventions. The different elements are implemented simultaneously to achieve an impact greater than the sum of their parts. There are various challenges to implementing a triple nexus with the aim of approaching statebuilding:

- The various stakeholders must be willing to take risks and accept setbacks. Development actors must recognize that they could be working in a more volatile and unstable environment than usual.
- Statebuilding is an overtly political process that cannot be advocated in South Sudan without doing it publicly, potentially exposing the international community to criticism. If the international community chooses not to promote statebuilding to achieve an independent South Sudan, it will indefinitely fund humanitarian assistance for the population.
- Humanitarian actors may be reluctant to engage in nexus approaches if they believe that humanitarian principles are threatened. However, humanitarian advocacy for human rights contributes to statebuilding. Ensuring that the impact of humanitarian interventions on social cohesion is positive is part of conflict sensitivity.
- There are significant transactional costs in the planning, sequencing, and coordination of complex multisectoral interventions with triple nexus and statebuilding objectives.
Recommendations for a Nexus Approach to Statebuilding

**Vision and Leadership**
Statebuilding is an endogenous process so the Government of South Sudan must provide a clear vision and leadership to work towards achieving that vision through the commitment of the necessary human and economic resources.

**Trust Building**
The Government of South Sudan must build trust with the population by fulfilling its commitments to statebuilding and the social contract and eliminating corruption.

**Effective Partnership**
The Government of South Sudan and the international community must build an effective partnership based on a shared commitment to work towards achieving statebuilding according to the agreed vision. The international community should engage at the national to local level to support statebuilding.

**Social Cohesion and the Social Contract**
Interventions must promote and mainstream social cohesion and the social contract as these are fundamental to effective statebuilding. In statebuilding contexts, conflict sensitivity is about understanding how interventions impact on social cohesion and the social contract. Analysis should consider the various potential scenarios about how interventions might impact on social cohesion and the social contract.

**Localization**
Mainstream localization at all levels of interventions across the nexus. Pursue the mantra "as local as possible, as international as necessary."

**Joint and Ongoing Analysis**
Analysis must be conducted from the perspective of the different nexus elements and shared among the different nexus stakeholders to develop a common, holistic understanding of the context and the different humanitarian, development, and peace needs. The context is dynamic, so analysis must be continuous.

**Strategy, Prioritizing and Sequencing**
A clear strategy to implement the government’s statebuilding vision that spans the nexus and guides the prioritization and sequencing of interventions. The implementation of interventions should be flexible to respond to changing circumstance.
**Coordination**

Effective horizontal and vertical coordination across the nexus and from the national to local levels that actively includes all stakeholders – government UN entities, NGOs, CSOs, traditional leaders, and the population.

**Funding**

Flexible multi-year funding is required for a nexus approach, and a long-term funding commitment is required to promote statebuilding. The Government of South Sudan and the international community should agree on what each will fund and a timescale to reduce the reliance on international funding and increase the levels of government funding.

**Commitment and Exit Strategy**

All nexus stakeholders have to commit to statebuilding and to continuing to operate to the greatest extent possible, even when the context becomes unstable. This will require development actors in particular to accept greater levels of risk in their operating environment and greater uncertainty about the outcomes of their programmes. An exit strategy based on agreed milestones should be developed. This would also inform a capacity-strengthening plan and motivate the pursuit of the localization agenda.
Report Structure

1. Introduction
This section provides background political and socioeconomic information about South Sudan and the international assistance it receives. It also provides a summary of the research methodology for the study. Further details of the methodology can be found in annex 7.3.

2. South Sudan: Statebuilding and the Triple Nexus
Section 2 introduces the concepts of statebuilding and the HDP Nexus and explains how they have been applied to South Sudan for this study and how they align with key strategy documents.

3. The Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on National and Subnational Statebuilding
The third section discusses the findings from the national and subnational governance levels about the evolution and nature of the relationship between the Government and international assistance and the interaction of humanitarian assistance with the four thematic areas of statebuilding that are the focus of the study.

   It also reviews the Government’s and international community’s contributions to fund different aspects of the state and the potential for South Sudan to assume greater financial responsibility for funding the state.

4. The Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on Local Level Statebuilding
The fifth section summarizes the findings from focus groups discussions on the impact of humanitarian assistance on development and peace at the local level and their comparisons of international community and government interventions.

5. The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus and South Sudan
The fifth section summarizes the findings from focus group discussions on the impact of humanitarian assistance on development and peace at the local level and their comparisons of the international community and government interventions.

This section discusses the challenges and opportunities of adopting and operationalizing the HDP nexus approach and the reasons for protracted humanitarian assistance in South Sudan. It also explains the importance of adopting a localization approach and summarizes experiences of localization in South Sudan which provide some useful insights into best practice.
CHAPTER 1:
Introduction

Since South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011, the country has experienced civil conflict and natural disasters. In response, the international community has funded humanitarian assistance delivered by a range of actors, including United Nations (UN) entities, international and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based and community-based organizations (CBOs). The potential impact of this assistance on statebuilding and the ability of the state to meet its people’s needs, provide rule of law, build social cohesion, and fulfill the social contract is not well understood. With the launch of the Revised National Development Plan (2021-2024), South Sudan’s Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) is calling on humanitarian, development, and peace actors to work together by adopting a Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus approach to support the country’s development and to build state institutions.

The ongoing UN reform processes advocate a HDP nexus approach, and there is increasing interest among the assistance community and international donors for the nexus. Among stakeholders, there is a recognition that current forms of assistance are failing to promote development and peace effectively, so it is necessary to adopt a new approach in an effort to transition from humanitarian assistance to more development-orientated interventions and greater stability. The promotion of the triple nexus is motivated by the belief that coordinated, complementary or joint humanitarian-development-peace interventions achieve better sustainable peace and development outcomes. Security, stability and long-term development are fundamental to effective statebuilding; therefore, it appears logical to link the adoption of a HDP nexus approach to statebuilding in South Sudan.

Although acknowledged that humanitarian assistance is not explicitly designed to have an impact on statebuilding – either positive or negative –, if the nexus approach is to be used effectively to contribute to multiple and collective outcomes, including statebuilding, it is necessary to understand the interaction between humanitarian assistance and statebuilding. Therefore, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have commissioned a joint study to explore the relationship between humanitarian assistance and statebuilding. The study combines the statebuilding and humanitarian expertise of UNDP and WFP respectively, putting into practice their belief that a nexus approach has the potential to meet humanitarian needs and promote effective development, peace and statebuilding outcomes.

For the purposes of the study statebuilding is defined as “an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations”\(^1\). Four key functions of the state necessary for statebuilding form the focus of the study.

These are:

- Service delivery
- Economy foundation
- Access to justice and rule of law
- Social cohesion and the social contract

The overall objectives of the study are forward looking to:

- Inform the design and implementation of the HDP nexus programme/projects intended to advance statebuilding in South Sudan;
- Improve understanding of the link between humanitarian assistance and statebuilding in protracted humanitarian crises and fragile state contexts;

\(^1\) OECD, 2008: 1
1.1 The Republic of South Sudan

South Sudan achieved independence in July 2011 after decades of conflict that began in 1956 when Sudan gained independence from Great Britain and lasted, with the exception of a precarious peace between 1972 and 1983, until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Just over two years after independence, conflict erupted in South Sudan, causing the deaths of an estimated 380,000 between December 2013 and April 2018 and the displacement of 4.5 million people. A peace agreement, the Resolution on the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), held from August 2015 until fighting resumed in July 2016.

The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was implemented in September 2018. It was intended that the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), formed in February 2020, and parties to the conflict should implement the R-ARCSS and prepare for national elections by February 2023. On 4 August 2022, the RTGoNU announced a 24-month extension for the implementation of the R-ARCSS until 2025. Although widely regarded as necessary because progress in implementing the R-ARCSS had been limited, the extension attracted criticism as the procedures to agree on an extension were not followed.

As almost 60 percent of the estimated 12.4 million people of South Sudan are believed to be under 18 years of age, the majority of the country’s population has little experience of peace and security. Similarly, the population has little experience of stable, clear, or effective governance structures. Under the CPA, there was one country but two governments - the Government of National Unity and the autonomous Government of South Sudan. At independence, South Sudan had 10 states but, in an attempt to appease various factions and to strengthen patronage links to the centre, Presidential orders in 2016 increased the number of states to 28 and again in 2017 to 32. In February 2020, the government reverted to the 10-state model.

Potential state structures, such as federalism or decentralization, divisions of power and distribution of roles and responsibilities have been discussed extensively among the country’s political leaders and the international community. However, the population has largely been excluded from such discussions, there has been little consideration of the possible impacts of different structures and power-sharing arrangements, and the focus on the technical aspects of statebuilding has neglected nation-building and the creation of a strong, united South Sudanese population. Following the CPA, decentralization was pushed as a means to create accountable governance structures because it transfers certain powers to lower-level governance structures to bring decision-makers closer to the people. Critics claim that decentralization was counter-productive as local-level government structures became tribal fiefdoms and that international actors put too much emphasis on Juba and the government structures and failed to consider issues of nation-building. The same criticisms have continued following independence with concerns expressed that South Sudan is “a notional state” and little more than “a geographical expression” yet still the international community is focused on statebuilding to the neglect of nation-building.

Nation-building is considered necessary because, although in January 2011, 98.83 percent of eligible participants in the Referendum voted in favour of South Sudan’s independence, the identity of the South Sudanese was forged through their conflict with the Government in Khartoum. Without the unifying force of the liberation struggle, individuals tend to identify as members of one of the 64 recognized ethnic groups with their different languages, cultures, and traditions before identifying as a citizen of South Sudan. Therefore, statebuilding and nation-building must be inclusive and promoted

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2 Checchi et al., 2018: 19
3 UNHCR, 2022
4 For analysis of the R-ARCSS amendment see Akech, Joseph Geng et al., 2022
5 HRP, 2022: 10

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6 Deng, David et al., 2022: 14
7 Johnson, 2014; Amir Idris cited in Colombant, 2012
8 DFID, 2002
9 Schomerus & Allen, 2010: 7
10 Amir Idris cited in Colombant, 2012
11 Jok, 2011; Bromley, 2019
12 UNMIS, 2011
13 HRP, 2022: 7
simultaneously, otherwise, the population will continue to be vulnerable to political elites exploiting ethnic divisions for their own agenda.\(^{11}\)

### 1.2 Socioeconomic Development

Historically marginalized, South Sudan is one of the least developed countries in the world and ranks 185 out of 189 countries in the Human Development Index.\(^{12}\) There has been limited progress against SDG 13 on Climate Action and SDG 15 on Life on Land. Progress on all other SDGs has either stagnated or regressed.\(^{17}\) Three-quarters of the population are in need, average life expectancy is just 57 years of age\(^{18}\) and literacy rates are around 30 percent.\(^{19}\) Access to education and health services is very limited, infrastructure is poor and only 40 percent of the population has access to clean water.\(^{20}\) Transport by road, air and water is limited and often insecure, the lack of all-weather roads or of roads altogether limits mobility and impedes access to markets. Only 28 percent of the population, located almost exclusively in urban areas, has access to electricity.\(^{21}\) In 2022, over 8.9 million people in South Sudan were estimated to be in need, most of whom faced severe food insecurity.\(^{22}\) Over 2 million people are internally displaced, mainly due to violence and severe flooding.\(^{23}\) Insecurity and violence are widespread. In 2021, 3,414 civilians were reported killed, injured, abducted, or subjected to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).\(^{24}\) At the beginning of 2022, the Protection of Civilians (PoC) site in Malakal hosted 34,000 people who could not or would not return home because of ongoing intercommunal conflicts and fears for their safety.\(^{25}\) The population of the PoC site had increased significantly since 2022 as a result of renewed fighting.\(^{26}\)

South Sudan is ranked among the ten countries most at risk from climate change.\(^{27}\) Flooding and other climate-related hazards are causing displacement, intercommunal conflict over natural resources, food insecurity and disruption to traditional migration patterns provoking conflict between pastoralists and farmers.\(^{28}\) Despite the environmental challenges, South Sudan is rich in livestock which have been calculated by various studies since independence to contribute between 12 and 33 percent to Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\(^{29}\) The country has vast tracts of fertile agricultural land of which only a small percentage is currently farmed predominantly by hand with few inputs. In 2017, agriculture contributed around 10 percent to GDP, with expansion, increased mechanization and improved soil management, agricultural production could be a significant economic sector in South Sudan as well as enhancing domestic food security.\(^{30}\) The country has water resources that could potentially be harnessed for hydroelectricity as well as forests of luxury hardwoods, minerals, and precious metals. The country’s young population provides a large workforce of working age and additional funding, and investment comes from the extensive diaspora.\(^{31}\) Estimates suggest that in 2019, remittances accounted for 6.7 percent of GDP.\(^{32}\)

### 1.3 International Assistance

Funding for South Sudan distributed through UN systems can be broken down into the different elements of the nexus. In the lead up to and following independence, humanitarian funding has hovered around 1.5 billion US$ annually although, in the last couple of years, it has declined significantly.\(^{33}\) UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes (AFPs) with development mandates invest around 600 million US$ a year in development assistance\(^{34}\) and the peacekeeping

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\(^{12}\) Jok, 2011
\(^{13}\) Idris, 2014
\(^{14}\) UNDP, 2020a
\(^{15}\) UNDP, 2022: 8
\(^{16}\) HRP, 2022: 6-7
\(^{17}\) UNESCO, 2022

\(^{27}\) Germanwatch, 2021: 8
\(^{28}\) Think Hazard, 2020 in World Bank, 2021
\(^{29}\) See Catley, 2018: 12 for a detailed discussion on calculations for South Sudan’s livestock wealth.
\(^{30}\) GoSS, 2019: 5
\(^{31}\) GoSS, 2019; World Bank 2021
\(^{32}\) Ferro, 2021: 15
\(^{33}\) OCHA, 2022
\(^{34}\) UNDP & WFP, n.d
mission, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), has an annual budget of 1.2 billion US$.\textsuperscript{10}

Core funding for humanitarian response in South Sudan has been disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. It is expected that the international funding to South Sudan will continue to decline as a result of the global economic downturn, other crises and donor fatigue. Therefore, it is necessary to do more with less funding and to begin to transition from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development interventions in which the government gradually assumes greater ownership and responsibility.

**Text Box 1: International Humanitarian Funding for South Sudan in 2022**

The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for South Sudan represents the joint efforts of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to identify and prioritize needs and to quantify the funds needed to deliver the necessary assistance. Despite an increasing number of people in need, including a 7 percent increase in food insecurity from 2021 to 2022,\textsuperscript{36} there has been a decline in funding from a high of 1.6 billion US$ in 2014, which funded 88 percent of the HRP, to 1.2 billion US$ in 2021 which was sufficient to fund only 68 percent of the HRP.\textsuperscript{37} In 2022, the HRP appealed for 1.7 billion US$. By the end of August, the HRP was less than 35 percent funded. There has been no funding for education, and the following interventions have received only a fraction of the funding needed to implement the HRP: health 15 percent; WASH 20 percent; and food security and livelihoods 30 percent.\textsuperscript{38}

1.4 Methodology

Detailed terms of reference and guiding questions were developed for the study, which was conducted between November 2021 and December 2022 and combined with a literature review with primary research conducted in South Sudan. The literature review draws on academic publications, reports produced by UN entities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs) and donors, surveys, and media reports. The primary research was conducted among institutions at the national and state level, including government officials, UN entities, NGOs, and CSOs. Around 200 people were consulted in Juba and in the state capitals of Upper Nile, Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Western Equatoria. These states were chosen because they were affected differently by the civil conflict, are at different stages of recovery, and all received high levels of humanitarian assistance. To develop a local-level perspective, over 130 people representing women, men, youth, and elders participated in focus group discussions (FGDs). The FGDs were held in the state capital, Malakal, and the PoC site in Upper Nile State and in the state capital, Wau, and the nearby village of Bussere in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. Three research workshops, which totalled around 100 participants, were held to discuss aspects of the study. The draft report was presented at a validation workshop to elicit feedback which was incorporated into the final report.

See the following Annexes for further information:

- Annex 7.2: List of contributors to the study;
- Annex 7.3: Detailed methodology and profiles of the local level research locations;
- Annex 7.4: The Terms of Reference for the Study;
- Annex 7.5: Revised guiding questions, which were modified during the inception phase.

No comments have been attributed to individuals. Unless otherwise stated, information in this report is based on comments made by study contributor.

\textsuperscript{10} UNMISS, 2022
\textsuperscript{36} HRP, 2022: 8
\textsuperscript{37} HRP, 2022: 8
\textsuperscript{38} OCHA, 2022
CHAPTER 2:

South Sudan: Statebuilding and the Triple Nexus

2.1 Statebuilding

According to the OECD DAC, statebuilding is “an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations”. Statebuilding is the process of “states functioning more effectively” to provide services, manage the economy and ensure security, rule of law and justice. In return, the population of the state agrees to pay taxes, abide by the rule of law, and accept the state monopoly on coercive force. This is known as the social contract. The exact nature of the state and state-citizen relations are shaped by history and experience to form the obligations and responsibilities that the state and the citizens have towards each other.\(^{39}\)

Effective statebuilding is built on a “minimum administrative capacity” and involves establishing state institutions and civil service at all levels of governance that are perceived as legitimate with the necessary resources and capacity and ability to mobilize resources, particularly through taxation.\(^{40}\) Statebuilding is an ongoing process, not just a process for new or conflict-affected states. The state-citizen relationship changes over time and faces challenges, which is why a state must be resilient and able to respond to its citizens’ changing needs and demands.\(^{41}\)

2.2 The Triple Nexus

As the world’s newest state, South Sudan is one of the poorest, most insecure, and most fragile states in the world and is heavily dependent on international assistance. A 2021 assessment revealed that citizens did not perceive any real progress towards statebuilding and peacebuilding since independence.\(^{42}\) In 2022, OECD analysis concluded that South Sudan is the second most fragile state in the world after Somalia and that effective political processes and security had deteriorated.\(^{43}\) As a new state and with a population and leadership with limited experience of a modern state, it is unclear what would be realistic expectations for the extent of statebuilding and the creation of a stable country and effective state apparatus in a little over 10 years of independence. Analysis by the World Bank concluded that it takes 15 to 20 years for the fastest developing states to transition from fragility to stability.\(^{44}\) As South Sudan is experiencing protracted crises with increasing numbers of people reliant on humanitarian assistance and no real progress against the SDGs or indicators of statebuilding and resilience, the country faces challenges to transition from fragility to stability within the next two decades. International assistance for South Sudan is declining, and there is widespread acknowledgment among national and international stakeholders that to improve statebuilding and socioeconomic development, the Government and the international community must try a new strategy as current approaches have failed to yield results.

Therefore, the triple nexus is being adopted in South Sudan because it is believed to be effective in complex contexts requiring humanitarian and development interventions alongside interventions to address root causes of conflict, strengthen the state, and improve stability and security. A lack of local ownership has been blamed for the poor outcomes of notable large-scale,\(^{45}\)
externally driven statebuilding initiatives. Barakat and Milton argue that integrating the localization agenda into each element of the triple nexus can promote and facilitate appropriate bottom-up approaches to achieve better outcomes in conflict-affected areas.

Views differ on the meaning and scope of peace interventions undertaken as part of the nexus. The twin UN Sustaining Peace Resolutions understand peace as a process and an objective. Peace is sometimes described as either “positive” or “negative”. Negative peace is merely the absence of violence whereas positive peace requires attitudes, institutions, and structures to exist to create and sustain peaceful societies. Through best practice principles, humanitarian organizations regularly engage in interventions that support the peace pillar as they promote conflict-sensitive programming. Some humanitarian and development organizations go beyond conflict sensitivity and actively support the peace pillar through interventions to promote social cohesion and local-level peacebuilding. Oxfam argues that the HDP nexus should be bottom-up to address the root causes of conflict. While it is appropriate and necessary for NGOs to focus on the local level, the UN, alongside other stakeholders, can promote peace at a regional and national level among governments, opposition groups, non-state actors, and member states.

Many argue that to be effective, HDP nexus interventions should take place on multiple levels - local, national, and regional - because the root causes and drivers of conflict occur on different levels. This is particularly important as recent research shows that 70 percent of wars in Africa since 1960 described as civil wars, have international dynamics, including the wars in Sudan and South Sudan. This creates complex conflict dynamics that must be addressed at a high level. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) describes the interventions necessary at the different levels as “little p” and “Big P” where “little p” is focused at the local and sub-national levels, possibly over an extended period, to build capacities for peace and conflict prevention among the population and institutions to strengthen trust and social cohesion. “Big P” interventions tend to be high profile, supported by a peace agreement or a UN mandate, involve a military component, and focus on political and security stakeholders. Barakat and Milton agree that peace interventions are needed at different levels but describe them as “soft” and “hard”. Soft interventions include peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and diplomacy and “hard” interventions aim to establish security through stabilization and peacekeeping.

Recognizing the range of challenges facing the country, including ongoing humanitarian crises as the result of natural disasters, conflict, and violence, through the Revised National Development Strategy (R-NDS), the Government is actively calling for a nexus approach. It plans to establish a high-level Triple Nexus Oversight Committee to be co-chaired by the Ministers of Finance and Planning and Humanitarian Affairs. The R-NDS has prioritized governance, the economy, and services. It is intended to support the implementation of the R-ARCSS. The Revitalized Peace Agreement does not explicitly call for a nexus approach, but it includes arrangements for humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, provision of services, protection, access to justice and rule of law, which it sees as necessary for peace. In line with the Government and UN reforms, UN entities in South Sudan are actively exploring opportunities to adopt the HDP nexus and the Cooperation Framework and Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) both call for nexus approaches. NGOs are also interested and several, including Caritas Switzerland with national and international partners, are initiating HDP approaches in South Sudan. Numerous international donors to South Sudan have also expressed support for a nexus approach. The focus on the triple nexus and the willingness, regardless of the conceptual and practical challenges, to explore how such an approach might be operationalized, reflects the recognition among a range of stakeholders that current...
interventions in South Sudan are increasing dependency on humanitarian assistance and international funding rather than promoting development, security, and stability, and statebuilding.

The triple nexus concept is often presented as a Venn diagram of three overlapping circles, one each for humanitarian, development, and peace interventions. Each intervention occurs simultaneously, although the emphasis on each nexus element can and should change depending on the context. The diagram shows that it is possible to have a double nexus of humanitarian and development interventions; development and peace interventions; or humanitarian and peace interventions; as well as a triple nexus intervention combining humanitarian, development, and peace actions.

2.3 Conceptual Framework

The four thematic state building areas of this study - service delivery, economy foundation, access to justice and rule of law, social cohesion, and the social contract - align with Government strategies, international assessments and ongoing humanitarian interventions.

Revitalized National Development Strategy

The R-NDS has divided its priorities into five clusters – services, governance, the economy, and infrastructure. Under these clusters it describes a range of priorities including the provision of security, access to justice and rule of law, the strengthening of the social contract and social cohesion through democratic, transparent, and accountable governance, the protection of the most vulnerable and the promotion of human capital. The fifth cluster is cross-cutting and focuses on the issues of gender and youth. The environment and capacity development are also noted as important cross cutting issues. The R-NDS has been designed to support the implementation of the R-ARCSS.

Fragility Assessment

The Government of the Republic of South Sudan’s (GRSS) 2021 Fragility Assessment uses “five key determinants of fragility known as the Peacebuilding and State building Goals (PSGs).” These are:

- Legitimate politics to foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution;
- Security to establish and strengthen the populations’ security;

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GRSS, 2021: 4
• Justice to address injustices and increase the populations’ access to justice;
• Economic foundations to generate employment and to improve livelihoods;
• Revenue and services to manage revenue and build capacity and fair service delivery.

A 2022 UNDP report explains how these different aspects of statebuilding interact to strengthen the state. For example, legitimate politics provides representation which is an aspect of the social contract; security, access to justice and rule of law contribute to equality which facilitates social cohesion; sound economic foundations are essential for a viable state; revenue provides capital for services and services give states legitimacy because they provide for the people and fulfill part of the social contract. 58

States of Fragility
The OECD measures fragility through indicators that assess the vulnerability and resilience of a state’s economic, environmental, human, political, security and societal dimensions. The economic, environmental and security dimensions explicitly relate to elements affecting statebuilding identified in the R-NDS and PSGs. The remaining dimensions use different terminology to refer to aspects of statebuilding discussed above. The human dimension relates to human capital and vulnerability and, therefore, access to services and social protection and social cohesion; the societal dimension also relates to social cohesion; and the political dimension refers to the extent to which a state can maintain the social contract and political stability. 59

Humanitarian Clusters in South Sudan
The table shows how specific humanitarian clusters align to the different thematic areas of the study. There are 11 clusters in total operating in South Sudan and many of these might be expected to interact with the thematic areas. 60 However, the study focuses on the clusters most closely related to the thematic areas and that offer tangible interventions for discussion at the local level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic areas of Statebuilding</th>
<th>Humanitarian clusters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic foundations</td>
<td>Food Security and Livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Justice and Rule of Law</td>
<td>Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection subclusters:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender-based violence (GBV);</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Child protection;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mine action;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Housing, land and property (HLP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion &amp; the Social Contract</td>
<td>How the operations carried out by the humanitarian clusters impact on social cohesion and the social contract.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Scope of Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian assistance in South Sudan is delivered by UN entities and NGOs. National NGOs account for 57 percent of the 183 partners responsible for delivering the HRP. Partners work with local populations, organizations, and leaders. Humanitarian interventions often extend beyond immediate lifesaving interventions to meet immediate needs, particularly in contexts of protracted crises. 61 The 2022 HRP for South Sudan aimed to build resilience into systems including education, health, and WASH and to strengthen the resilience of the population to recover from shocks. It also aimed to build national and local capacity and to establish bodies to represent the population and to address everyday problems such as parent-teachers associations (PTA). The various protection interventions aim to respond to immediate and longer-term needs, promote behaviour change and raise awareness about and respect for human rights. There are also interventions intended to improve access to legal recourse. Most interventions in South Sudan’s HRP focus on vulnerable populations including the food insecure, the forcibly displaced, returnees and the host

58 UNDP, 2022
59 OECD, 2022
60 HRP, 2022
61 The Sphere Project, 2018; HRP, 2022.
populations. Unfortunately, because of the series of protracted and overlapping crises, around three-quarters of the population is assessed as being in need and the HRP is designed to target over half the country’s population.

While humanitarian interventions are broadly within the scope of what might be expected, what is exceptional is the scale of the interventions and length of time for which they have been provided. For example, to enable food distribution, WFP might invest in infrastructure to improve road access, but the scale of its infrastructure activities in South Sudan exceeds normal expectations because the existing road network is so limited and the humanitarian imperative to distribute food has been so high. Similarly, UNHCR regularly provides services for displaced and host populations but in South Sudan UNHCR reports that the scale of service provision means that it supports large urban populations.

The Scope of the Nexus Development Pillar

For the purposes of this study, a discussion about the potential impact of humanitarian assistance focuses on the basic services of education, health, water, and sanitation.

Analysis of issues related to economic foundations includes the impact of humanitarian assistance on the economy and the impact that the presence of the sector has on the economy by, for example, providing employment and paying income tax. It also includes an analysis of South Sudan’s macro-economic opportunities, its potential to fund itself, and the funding modalities the international community uses to deliver assistance to the country.

Defining the Nexus Peace Pillar in South Sudan

Although the peace pillar of the triple nexus does not have an agreed definition, initiatives implemented under the peace pillar in South Sudan include “little P”, “Big P” and “hard” and “soft” and can be categorized as follows:

- **Conflict sensitivity**: interventions that contribute to peace through being conflict sensitive, aim to ‘do no harm’ and promote social cohesion and peaceful co-existence;

- **Governance**: interventions include rule of law, access to justice, strengthening of state and local institutions to enable sustainable development and protect human rights;

- **Political and military interventions**: national and international military action, security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), diplomacy, intelligence, and defense.

For the purposes of this study and to address the four thematic areas, peace interventions that fall under conflict sensitivity and governance, as defined above, will be considered. Social cohesion and the social contract fall under the peace pillar. The “harder” political and military interventions fall outside the scope of humanitarian assistance.

Cross-cutting Issues

The HRP, R-NDS and the OECD Fragility Dimensions focus on vulnerable groups, including women and youth, and recognize the impact of natural disasters and climate change. Therefore, the study will analyze gender, youth, and the environment. The HRP aims to build resilience and national capacity to align with current best practice interventions, nexus approaches and the localization agenda, so the study will also consider issues related to localization.

Stakeholders

The stakeholders relevant to the localization agenda and the different elements of the nexus are shown in the table.

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OECD, 2019

HRP, 2022: 6
The Relationship between Statebuilding, the Nexus and Humanitarian Assistance

By comparing the aspects of statebuilding identified for the study with the GRSS documents and measurements of fragility in the table below, it is apparent that, despite different terminology and organizations of the thematic areas, there is a strong correlation, demonstrating that the ToR identified commonly agreed on priority areas of statebuilding. The table also shows how the different areas can align with the nexus pillars. However, it should be remembered that there is overlap among the nexus pillars and thematic statebuilding areas, so the clear divisions in the table are rarely replicated in reality. Cross-cutting issues include youth, gender, and the environment. Youth and gender are addressed as part of social cohesion. Environmental issues should be mainstreamed through all the nexus elements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Study</th>
<th>Related Statebuilding Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDP Nexus</td>
<td>Study: thematic areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Economic foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crosscutting issues</td>
<td>Social cohesion &amp; social contract</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment Localization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OECD, 2022b
The Venn diagram below arranges all the elements of the study according to the HDP Nexus. It shows how the thematic areas of statebuilding and the key stakeholders relate to each nexus pillar. Localization is shown in all the pillars because it should be mainstreamed through the nexus. The study assumes that a nexus approach has the potential to promote statebuilding. This is indicated where all three elements of the triple nexus overlap.

Figure 2: Relationships between Humanitarian Assistance, the HDP Nexus and Statebuilding

H
Interventions: Lifesaving & Basic Needs
Actors: HCT, cluster system
Localization

D
Interventions: Services & Economy
Actors: UNCT & NGOs, IFIs
Localization

P
Social cohesion/contract
Interventions: A2J & RoL
Actors: UNMISS, UNCT, NGOs, CSOs, faith-based organizations
Localization
CHAPTER 3:
The Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on National and Subnational Statebuilding

This chapter examines the impact of humanitarian assistance on statebuilding at the national and state levels. It explores the governance capacity to provide for the population and how the interaction of the state and the international community has affected that capacity. It analyses the impact of humanitarian assistance on the four thematic areas of statebuilding identified for this study. It complements the following chapter, which focuses on the impact of humanitarian assistance on the population and the citizen-state relationship.

As Government officials often referred to international assistance in general terms, it has not always been possible to differentiate between humanitarian, development, and peace interventions. Where appropriate, there are specific references to more development-orientated interventions.

3.1 The Evolution of Government Dependency on International Assistance

To understand the interaction between humanitarian assistance and statebuilding, it is necessary to adopt a historical perspective. Although humanitarian assistance has been scaled-up in South Sudan following the outbreak of civil conflict, the population and the authorities have been recipients of humanitarian assistance for decades. In 1989 Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was established to respond to the conflict-related famine in Bahr el-Ghazal through an agreement between the UN, the Government in Khartoum, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). At the time, it was the largest coordinated humanitarian intervention ever established.\(^66\)

Initially, OLS focused on providing food aid and other emergency assistance. From 1993, its operations expanded into other Southern areas of the country and began to include “livelihood support, human rights protection, capacity building, public services and other recovery and development-related activities” to build capacity and infrastructure in preparation for peace.\(^66\)

The shift among the humanitarian organizations participating in OLS from lifesaving to longer-term support coincided with the creation of a SPLM/A civil administration in 1994 and Western, particularly US, expanding regional geopolitical interests, leading to allegations that Western powers were attempting to support the SPLM/A against the Government of Sudan.\(^67\)

Critics claim that OLS lacked neutrality by favouring the SPLM/A and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) and by supporting capacity and institution building.\(^68\) Maxwell et al. argue that humanitarian assistance provided the foundation for the creation of South Sudan. By negotiating with armed groups to access areas to provide aid, a process later formalized under the Agreement on Ground Rules, OLS helped confer legitimacy to opposition groups that strengthened their negotiating position for the 2005

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\(^65\) Maxwell et al., 2014
\(^66\) Karim et al., 1996; Macrae et al., 1997: 233 in Maxwell et al., 2014
\(^67\) Brusset 1998 in Bradbury et al., 2000: 24; Aboum et al., 2000 in Maxwell et al., 2014: 7
\(^68\) Bradbury et al., 2000
Humanitarian Assistance and Statebuilding in Conflict-affected South Sudan

CPA, ultimately leading to the creation of an independent South Sudan.69

The SPLM/A and SRRA complained that OLS prevented them from regulating and coordinating aid. Similar complaints are echoed in 2022 by many government representatives discussing international assistance. However, aid was diverted, taxed, and manipulated to consolidate power over the population.70 Through OLS, the SPLM/A was able to “assume the de facto role of a government providing social services” and began to see the aid sector as part of their resources, budget, and military strategy.71 Such views persist today as many study participants explained that the Government sees the humanitarian sector as their civil service and the aid budget as part of the national budget. It was apparent that some government officials, but certainly not all, at the national and state level were content for the humanitarian sector, and international community as a whole, to continue to provide services to the people. Staff from the UN, NGOs and CSOs expressed frustration that many government officials expect the international community to continue to fulfill the role of government in meeting the needs of the people and to support government entities by constructing and equipping offices and by providing transport. Several study participants noted that because the South Sudanese fought for decades for self-determination, some people, including senior military and government officials, see international assistance as a right and not a temporary means of support.

3.2 Governance Capacity

Statebuilding requires a minimum administrative capacity and effective civil service at all levels of government to fulfill the functions of state.72 Unfortunately, for various reasons, there is a significant lack of human and institutional governance capacity. Although beyond the scope of this study to conduct a systematic capacity assessment, comments on capacity have been collated from government and non-government stakeholders. The views expressed are consistent with a capacity assessment of local authorities conducted by Duany and Deng in 2021.

Many civil servants and politicians, often former military leaders, lack the requisite skills and experience because they have been appointed by the centre to reward and maintain loyalty and to consolidate power. Many appointees since the R-ARCSS lack personal authority in the geographical location of their appointment and are dependent on Juba to protect their position.73 Juba has deliberately pursued such a policy to ensure loyalty which angers local populations whose leaders lack legitimacy and power to fulfil their role to meet people’s needs.74

Those occupying senior civil service positions are often elderly but there is no tradition of retirement or pension payments, so people do not retire. Consequently, it is difficult to replace individuals with more suitable staff. Within the public sector, it is hard to recruit qualified people, especially for rural areas, when salaries are low and payment is delayed. Those with relevant qualifications but fear that their ethnicity puts them at risk have become reluctant to work in certain locations. Humanitarian and development actors who have established coordination mechanisms with government officials or entities to address issues of common concern express frustration because the relevant individuals are often absent, impeding coordination and the effective inclusion of the government in the planning and implementation of activities. Attempts by international organizations to build capacity have been thwarted by the high turnover of government officials. Some observers believe that it is more effective to build the capacity of civil servants, who tend to move less frequently than political appointees. Some efforts to build the capacity of government officials have been highly successful but have resulted in many entering the UN system. Other international and national NGOs and think tanks also attract many capable South

69 Maxwell et al., 2014:5
70 According to Bradbury et al. all conflict parties attempted to use aid to consolidate their power (2020: 20)
71 Maxwell et al., 2014: 7
72 OECD, 2008
73 Craze, 2021b and 2021c
74 Views expressed by many South Sudanese participating in this study particularly during the FGDs held in Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile States
Sudanese who seek better pay and conditions than those offered by the civil service and public sector.

There are numerous ministries and divisions of roles or responsibilities are unclear. Sometimes the divisions seem arbitrary and international organizations find themselves having to work with several ministries to implement a single project. Some line ministries have different names at the national and subnational government levels. Some government positions lack job descriptions so the understanding of their role and how individuals contribute to the government system is limited. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation noted the difficulty in coordinating its work with that of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. This is despite the fact that international actors consider these three government entities to have a high capacity.

Officials acknowledge the loss of capacity from government and the civil service public sector since independence which they blame on the reduction in oil revenues in years immediately following independence and the protracted civil conflict. Nevertheless, there are individuals in the government system with relevant capacity who recognize their responsibility to manage the country on behalf of the population and to respond to the needs of the people. However, their views differ about their ability to do so without international support.

Despite the lack of human capacity and material resources, South Sudan has a heavy governance structure that combines formal and traditional governance systems. It has 650 members of Parliament national-level and 1000 at the state-level (100 for each state), a national government, a state-level government, county commissioners and Payam administrators. The traditional structures include paramount chiefs who operate at the county level, chiefs who operate at the Payam level and subchiefs who head a boma which is a village. Several bomas form a Payam and several Payams a county. Each state contains several counties. With the exception of responsibilities reserved for the national government, the national-level governance structure is mirrored at the subnational levels. Little money for government activities flows from the central government to lower governance levels. Even at the state level, the second tier of government below the national level, the governor and ministers lack appropriate buildings, furniture, stationery, computers, internet access, communications facilities, and vehicles. Without these basic resources, they struggle to perform state functions, cannot travel, or communicate with the populations to hear grievances or to meet needs and cannot maintain effective contact with the government at the national level. Limited communications facilities and lack of transport compound the poor coordination between national and subnational governance structures. Any MPs committed to their constituency struggle to visit regularly because they lack transport and so tend to spend most of their time in Juba. It is notable that the research at the local level highlighted the positive impact that the few visits from local government officials had had. Although the visits did not provide substantial support, the local population interpreted them as a demonstration of concern for their wellbeing.

3.3 Government-International Community Interaction

Numerous government and non-government study participants noted that the international community, including the humanitarian sector, worked more closely with the authorities in the 1970s and 1980s than today. Those with direct experience of those earlier times, argue that the international and local aid organizations had better access and that programmes were easier to implement when those in power were more engaged in the delivery of assistance. Consequently, international organizations pay less attention to governance structures and government is less engaged or interested in humanitarian and development assistance than in the past. Many contributors to the study highlight that humanitarian organizations have a duty to meet the needs of the population when the state does not meet them. The Government of South Sudan is aware of this and, therefore, has no incentive to assume responsibility. The cycles of emergencies and therefore ongoing provisions of humanitarian assistance means
that state institutions to provide services are not being developed.

OLS in the past and the aid sector today are frequently criticised for undermining traditional governance and kinship systems by ignoring them in favour of working through young, educated English-speaking members of the population. Traditional governance systems have also been eroded by decades of conflict and deliberate government policies. The status and roles of traditional systems vary throughout the country, and, despite criticisms to the contrary, the aid sector engages with traditional structures to access the local population and disseminate information. Therefore, aid actors should be cognisant of local and national power dynamics. The preference for English-speaking national staff among current assistance providers has led to allegations of bias. Rather than hiring locally, staff are often recruited from the Equatorias, where educated English speakers are easier to find. There are reports that this is causing resentment among ethnic groups not from the Equatorias.

Some government entities complain that some humanitarian actors might fly directly from Nairobi to part of South Sudan to implement programmes without passing through Juba and without engaging with the national level government. In contrast, other government entities, such as the Ministry of General Education and Instruction, feel that they work closely with the humanitarian sector and are satisfied with the relationship. It was not possible during the course of this study to assess the validity of accusations that some humanitarian organizations completely marginalized the government or the claims by other government entities that they were meaningfully engaged in service delivery.

The humanitarian cluster system, unlike the development working groups, does not involve government officials in their regular meetings, which stems from the protection of humanitarian space. Humanitarian organizations interact closely with the RRC, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management and the Commission for Refugee Affairs.

All are considered to have effective senior staff, relatively good capacity, and are able to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is possible that the capacity has developed to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance or that additional support for capacity development has been provided. In addition, although South Sudanese, some staff in these organizations have worked outside the country for international organizations where they will have had opportunities to develop their skills. The staff in these three entities all recognize their limitations which include certain areas of expertise such as data collection and analysis, lack of computer equipment and a shortage of staff to undertake the work effectively. They also lack budget support from the central government. Consequently, they would need significant additional support to be able to undertake the work currently fulfilled by external organizations.

An area that requires particular attention is the development of Government technical capacity and resources to mitigate and respond to natural disasters which are a significant cause of humanitarian crises and can exacerbate political and ethnic conflicts. The World Bank is funding consultations in four states on a disaster management bill. Consultations in the remaining six states and three administrative areas are planned for 2023 so that the bill can be finalized. However, as South Sudan is increasingly affected by climate change, the frequency and scale of natural disasters are expected to increase. Unfortunately, the analysis provided by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) on trends for drought, floods, tsetse fly and desert locusts that is shared with Juba, is not disseminated throughout the country because State Governments lack the necessary software or hardware.

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75 Harragin and Chol, 1998 in Maxwell et al., 2014: 8
Text Box 2: Key South Sudan Government Entities for Humanitarian Assistance

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission

The RRC, which evolved from the SRRA, continues to coordinate with humanitarian and development actors and is considered to be very effective. Its development during OLS established capacity and the ongoing need to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance has maintained that capacity. However, some international aid staff are concerned that because the RRC is effective and closely associated with the provision of services, it has, by default, assumed the role of a local government which undermines state level governments.

Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management

The Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management was established in 2010 to support the return of displaced populations to Southern Sudan and later South Sudan. The Minister co-chairs the Humanitarian Coordination Forum with the HC. The Ministry, which focuses on coordination and leads humanitarian and disaster risk management policy for the government has no presence at the state level but is represented by the RRC. The RCC is responsible for facilitating the implementation of humanitarian and development interventions and monitoring activities.

Commission for Refugee Affairs

Following the passing of the Refugee Act in 2012, the Commission for Refugee Affairs was established in 2013. It is recognized by the government and has a credible physical presence. It has developed progressive legislation and supports the management of responses in line with international agreements. It is an effective partner to UNHCR and the international community although it relies on UNHCR and other international organizations to fund its operational costs. The motivation to create the Commission stems from the recognition that states have a responsibility towards refugees. There was a desire for South Sudan to be seen to be fulfilling its obligations and acting like a mature state as it gained independence.

UN entities including UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and WHO, provide technical and capacity-building support to relevant government bodies to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, these organizations are dual-mandated, and this support is provided as part of their development mandate. OCHA would not expect exclusively humanitarian organizations to provide support to Government, but it would expect dual-mandate organizations to do so. Government officials who understood their role and their responsibilities to the population criticised the withdrawal of technical experts when the post-independence conflict broke out and of short courses and workshops which were inadequate to meet capacity development needs. County stakeholders requested long-term capacity support, as was provided by UNDP prior to the 2013 and 2016 civil wars, and mentoring delivered as part of coherent capacity development.
Insecurity impedes access and poses significant challenges to implementing more development-orientated responses. However, many stakeholders criticized the lack of development actors and development funding in general which they believe, in the absence of alternatives, has resulted in protracted humanitarian assistance. They noted, for example, that flood responses in Bentiu are often temporary because of a lack of appropriate funding. Yet, it is known that Bentiu will flood again so a more efficient response would aim to implement long-term solutions. The conflict saw a reduction in development funding. For example, in the health sector, development funding decreased between 2013 and 2017 and humanitarian and development aid is largely given directly to international NGOs in an effort to bypass the government.\textsuperscript{76}

International actors believe that the presence of humanitarians and large-scale humanitarian interventions have conditioned authorities to respond to crises with assistance rather than support to help populations to recover. For example, in response to floods in 2021, government officials called on the international community to establish camps to accommodate displaced populations so that they could receive assistance. In contrast, the local population requested support for livelihoods to help them cope with displacement. The government’s preference for camps is also motivated by their visibility which draws attention to needs and helps to justify requests for humanitarian assistance. Such government attitudes are impeding more development-orientated interventions.

### 3.4 Service Provision

In the absence of government service provision, humanitarian actors (and others, including development and faith-based organizations) have become the primary service providers. In some instances, government bodies are involved in planning and decision-making, but whether such involvement is meaningful is unclear.

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\textsuperscript{76} Sami et al., 2020

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### Education

The Ministry of General Education and Instruction reports that it sets priorities and liaises with donors and the education cluster, in particular the cluster co-leads, UNICEF and Save the Children. There have been deliberate decisions to try to ensure that education through the humanitarian sector is sustainable and can contribute to development. This includes providing permanent foundations and roofs for school buildings but only temporary walls to be replaced at a later date with permanent walls. Teachers are trained using modules so that they can be deployed after initial training but return for more advanced training in the future. In support of the localization agenda, local NGOs have been capacitated with the intention that they will be able to continue to support the education sector when international organizations leave.

It is unknown whether these initiatives have been effective but significant challenges remain. Funding for salaries is supposed to come from the national level government. Teachers are paid less than 10 US$ a month, which is often delayed by up to six months. It is difficult to recruit and retain teachers, particularly in insecure areas. Since 2016, teacher attendance has fallen by a third.\textsuperscript{77} In some instances, UNICEF has supplemented teachers’ salaries. Education has been affected by growing insecurity, damage to school buildings, floods, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the termination of school feeding programmes, leading to school closures and absenteeism.\textsuperscript{78} More than 70 percent of school-age children are not receiving education.\textsuperscript{79}

Many South Sudanese believe that education is important and educate their children privately or outside the country as state provision is unsatisfactory. Surveys in 2016 and 2018 show that among the SDGs, SDG 4; quality education is regarded as a priority.\textsuperscript{80} Government officials and those who receive any form of salary from an international organization choose to pay for their children to be educated privately. Even a widow

\textsuperscript{77} World Bank, 2020: 12

\textsuperscript{78} HRP, 2022 and study participants, July-August 2022

\textsuperscript{79} World bank, 2020: 12

\textsuperscript{80} Ministry of Finance and Planning and UNDP, 2017: 32; UN SDG Action Campaign, 2019
in Wau with seven children, who struggled financially, reported paying to educate her children privately. After her husband died, she left her teaching position in a state school to teach in a private school for a higher and regular salary. The South Sudan Council of Churches and the Islamic Council provide numerous well-attended schools throughout the country using external funding. These schools are open to children of all faiths. Families unable to fund private education often take their children to refugee camps in Uganda and Kenya where access to education is superior to that available in South Sudan.

The number of parents educating their children outside the state school demonstrates a low level of confidence in the system and the importance families place on education. Those educating their children privately or outside the country include the wealthiest, most influential and best educated – those who, if their children were attending state schools, would be the most likely to exert pressure to improve the system.

Conflict impedes the development of social capital and long-term socioeconomic prosperity. In South Sudan, schools lost 18.5 percent of total enrolment each year during the post-independence conflict. The reduction in the number of boys enrolling for school was much larger than the number of girls. This could be because boys are more likely to be recruited to fight than girls, but it is also possible that boys were sent abroad to safety and to continue their education. Culturally, girls are rarely required to fight and, traditionally, education is not prioritized for girls because it is intended that they will marry. However, grants for girls’ education are believed to have increased enrolment of girls for primary school by 401 percent, even during periods of fighting.

Research shows that, in developing countries where literacy rates are relatively low, each additional year of primary education increases an individual’s adult earning capacity by 10 percent. Officials at the Ministry that liaise with the humanitarian sector recognize the importance of education to children and the lifelong negative impact on their lives if they miss out. Education also contributes to social cohesion because it acts as a socioeconomic equalizer and enables and motivates individuals to strengthen their societies. Increases in the number of educated people in a population has been shown to lead to a reduction in violence. Formal education is seen as part of the process of building social cohesion among children as they grow up and the provision of education by the state forms part of the social contract.

Healthcare

Health indicators in South Sudan are poor and it is estimated that the country’s ability to provide general healthcare services operates at only 37 percent of international standards. The fragile healthcare system collapsed during the post-independence conflict, and healthcare funding stagnated. A 2020 study concluded that the health of women and children was most affected during the conflict so efforts to meet their health needs during conflict should be prioritized.

An estimated 90 percent of health services is provided by non-governmental actors. Implementation of the National Health Policy (2016 - 2026) launched in 2016 has made little progress to date. There is a lack of testing facilities, buildings are in a state of disrepair and systems are not integrated. The Ministry of Health reports that it monitors the work of humanitarian and development provision of health services and facilitates communication and coordination among health providers and government at the national and sub-national levels. It recognizes that healthcare from humanitarian and development actors is essential in South Sudan. A study of maternal and child health in 2020 concluded that, although the Ministry is able to develop strategies and guidance, health services are implemented by externally funded organizations.

The Ministry regards preventative health services as humanitarian in nature, so the Directorate of Preventative Health Services participates in the cluster

81 Mayai, 2020: 23
82 Mayai, 2020: 26
83 Ikenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997; Mincer 1974 in Mayai, 2020
84 Gillis, 1994 in Mayai, 2020
85 Council of Europe, 2004
86 OECD, 2008
87 Sami et al., 2020
88 RSS, 2021a: 54
89 Sami et al., 2020
system. The Directorate of Preventative Health Services responds to emergencies and oversees the prevention of and responses to diseases such as tuberculosis, HIV, malaria, and other tropical diseases. The Ministry sees primary healthcare as developmental. It develops a package of primary health care for development partners to implement. It argues that some humanitarian organizations fail to coordinate with the Ministry and can terminate services a short notice causing confusion.

Health projects are not always implemented as planned for reasons beyond the control of the health sector. For example, if roads are poor or do not exist areas can be difficult to access or areas might be too insecure to access. It is difficult to attract skilled health workers to leave urban areas to work in rural areas where life is more difficult and there is a lack of accommodation. In Eastern Equatoria State, healthcare workers would stay only seven days because of poor accommodation. After UNOPS helped improve accommodation, healthcare workers remained for longer periods.

The Government pays salaries irregularly, owns some medical facilities and provides a vehicle for the Ministry which it fuels occasionally. Eighty percent of the budget allocation to the Ministry is supposed to be disbursed to the sub-national level but the Ministry does not receive the funding from the central government. According to the Abuja Agreement, the Ministry argues that 15 percent of the government budget should be allocated for healthcare. It recognizes that the international community is reluctant to fund healthcare through the government because of corruption, lack of accountability and poor public financial management. The percentage of the government budget that is actually committed to healthcare has shrunk since 2013, meaning that the humanitarian sector is funding a larger proportion of health services. This is likely to increase as the Health Pooled Fund, one of the two main sources of development funding for healthcare, is being cut and the humanitarian sector expects to have to cover the shortfall.

The Ministry of Health provided an essential humanitarian response to the Covid-19 pandemic and coordinated the rollout of the vaccination programme. The emergency preparedness response is a system for detecting and responding to epidemic diseases. It had been established before the emergence of Covid-19 and was mobilized in response to the pandemic. For the Covid-19 response, a national steering committee was established comprising the Ministry of Health, other relevant ministries, WHO and international partners. Collaboration occurs at the strategic and operation levels. For example, WHO has state coordinators who liaise at the subnational governance level. The Ministry of Health considers the institutional response to Covid-19 to be successful. The emergency preparedness system has proved a robust system and helped to build resilience.

The pandemic helped to institutionalize the use of modern communications to collect and share information rapidly through virtual meetings. There are regular meetings of around 500 people that combined online and in-person communication to collect regular reports. Some areas are better at reporting than others but, across the country, at different levels of government, around 80 percent of reports are received regularly.

Officials at the Ministry of Health recognize that healthcare has an impact across the nexus. In addition to responding to humanitarian needs, healthcare has a developmental impact and improves the overall health of the population increasing longevity and productivity. Although lack of education and belief in traditional medicines means that some people shun available modern medical care. Healthcare also has an impact on peace and stability. Access to healthcare is a human right and is part of the social contract. Equitable access to healthcare, one of the aims of South Sudan’s National Health Policy, helps promote social cohesion, gender equality and protect the rights of women and girls. Community health initiatives can bring people together. Support is needed to improve the capacity of the

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80 Sami et al., 2020: 7

81 Observations by some participants to the study
government to deliver healthcare at all levels and to ensure sustainability."

**Water and Sanitation**

The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation is critical of humanitarian actors that conduct WASH activities without informing the government. However, at the national level the Ministry confirms that it liaises with OCHA and the WASH cluster although it no longer attends the meetings. At the state level, the cluster lead reports that the WASH cluster and state-level governments are encouraged to meet. In states where the government is active, it hosts the WASH cluster meetings. UNMISS provides helicopters so that the Ministry can conduct aerial flood assessments. The Ministry notes that its human capacity was eroded during the conflict.

There is a lack of funding from the central government for the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to fulfil its role at the national and sub-national levels, so the country depends on the humanitarian sector for WASH. The international community argues that the WASH cluster is intended to operate in emergency situations and should not be necessary in parts of South Sudan, particularly Juba which has been stable since 2019. In the capital and other stable areas, the provision of water and sanitation should be the responsibility of the Government. In the absence of funding from central Government, state level governments want ongoing support for WASH. Currently, Government contributions to manage water and sanitation are limited to monitoring for quality control. The international community fears outbreaks of cholera and other water borne diseases, particularly in crowded urban areas or among displaced populations in camps, if the WASH cluster ceases some of its operations.

WASH actors are also frustrated about the lack of development funding for water and sanitation, preventing long-term solutions from being implemented and prolonging humanitarian assistance for WASH. Expenditure on sustainable water supplies and sanitation promotes economic development and reduces the costs of responding to waterborne diseases. The World Bank is assessing the Ministry to determine whether it can manage direct funding. It was directly funded by UNICEF using an emergency fund so that it could respond to floods as the Government was unable to finance the Ministry’s response. The Ministry reports that it successfully managed the funding from UNICEF and implemented the response through community-based organizations.

The Ministry in Juba also expressed frustrations about the lack of investment in sustainable water and sanitation systems. It recognizes that water and sanitation are essential to development, maintaining good public health – for example, during the Covid-19 pandemic - and allowing services and industry to function. It emphasized the positive impact the provision of sanitation in schools has had on education for girls. Irrigation is needed for agriculture which has significant economic potential. There are plans to dredge waterways to improve transport links, although the initiative has provoked controversy. Before independence, under the Government of National Unity, plans to improve water and sanitation to promote economic development were never implemented. As people in South Sudan are accustomed to paying for water, there is a belief at the Ministry, which seems to be shared by international actors, that the provision of permanent water and sanitation facilities could be self-sustaining as once the initial investment in the infrastructure has been made maintenance costs would be covered through customer payments for the service.

Poor management of water and sanitation has a negative impact on development and also stability. Better water management would improve climate resilience, help mitigate conflict by ensuring a water supply for people and animals, and irrigating agricultural land. Improved access to water would help to reduce clashes between pastoralists and farmers. During conflict, water pumps and boreholes are deliberately destroyed to displace populations from an area.

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92 Sami et al., 2020

93 Tiitmamer, Nhail, 2022
3.5 Economic Foundations

Conflict, natural disasters, the Covid-19 Pandemic, fluctuating oil prices, lack of economic diversification, hyperinflation, currency depreciation, financial mismanagement, and corruption have resulted in falling living standards and increasing poverty across South Sudan since independence. According to the World Bank, the poverty rate, based on 1.90 US$, increased from 45 percent in 2009 to 73 percent in 2016.\textsuperscript{94} Since 2013, almost half of all urban households have lost economic activity and most youth, who make up the majority of the population, are unemployed.\textsuperscript{95} Four and a half million people are internally displaced or are refugees in neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{96} Around 85 percent of the population is dependent on subsistence agriculture. Insecurity and displacement have reduced agricultural activities because areas of traditional food production have been vacated by people fleeing conflict, and many farmers are displaced internally or internationally. The negative economic impact of war can be intergenerational.\textsuperscript{97} Poor roads, insecurity in rural areas and a lack of storage impede effective food distribution from agricultural-producing areas to other parts of the country. The gap in food production in 2022 is about 480,000 metric tonnes which is filled by imports and support from the international community.\textsuperscript{98} The reduced economic and livelihood activities associated with the loss of employment, underemployment and large-scale displacement impact individual households and the country’s economic development.

As a consequence, the population of South Sudan is heavily reliant on food and cash assistance and support for livelihoods. This section examines the impact of this assistance and the impact of the presence of the humanitarian sector on the economy. The level of government involvement in humanitarian economic support is unclear. This section also examines the economic resources the government has available to invest in the country’s development including international assistance.

The economic impact of Humanitarian Assistance

The local level research for this study confirmed that for the individuals in receipt of assistance, there has been a positive impact on their standard of living and some speculation of a positive impact on the local economy, although there was concern that increased cash in the local economy could inflate prices. This view contradicts the findings from a 2016 global review of existing research.\textsuperscript{99}

Cash transfers are viewed by humanitarian organizations as humanitarian assistance but are considered a form of social protection by the World Bank and therefore a development intervention to “help individuals and families cope with crises and shocks, find jobs, improve productivity, invest in the health and education of their children, and protect the aging population.”\textsuperscript{100} Cash transfers are believed to offer recipients more dignity than distribution of goods because recipients can choose how to use the money. In South Sudan, participants in the FGDs for this study commented that cash assistance is less likely to distort the local economy as individual choice results in the money being disbursed among many small businesses. Distribution of goods tends to rely on large procurements from a small number of businesses. Therefore, economic growth from cash transfers is likely to be distributed across multiple sectors.\textsuperscript{101}

A 2016 global review of the impact of humanitarian assistance on the economy concluded that humanitarian assistance could have a positive multiplier effect but that the modality of humanitarian assistance - vouchers, cash assistance/transfers or in-kind assistance - seems to determine the extent of the multiplier effect. The review concluded that vouchers seem to have the greatest multiplier effect, but the context is also an important factor so further research is necessary. In Lebanon, voucher schemes contributed

\textsuperscript{94} World Bank, 2021: 9
\textsuperscript{96} UNHCR, 2022
\textsuperscript{97} Akresh et al. 2017; Bricker and Foley 2013; Cervantes-Duarte and Fernandez-Cano 2016 in Mayai, 2020: 106
\textsuperscript{99} Information provided verbally by an expert in food security

\textsuperscript{96} UNHCR, 2022
\textsuperscript{100} World Bank Group, 2022
\textsuperscript{101} Idris, 2016
1.3 percent to GDP, but the benefits were skewed in favour of larger and participating businesses.\textsuperscript{102} Research participants made similar comments about the impact of voucher schemes in South Sudan. Distribution of food aid in South Sudan seems to have had a negative effect on small local businesses.\textsuperscript{103} There is little evidence globally about the economic impact of cash for work.\textsuperscript{104} In South Sudan, cash for work projects focus on women because research has shown that they tend to make more constructive use of their cash than men. Cash is also distributed through labour-intensive public works programmes. However, some of these programmes have been criticised for diverting people away from vital agricultural activities.

Existing research shows that "market analysis is critical when deciding aid modalities in humanitarian responses." The economic impacts of humanitarian assistance vary depending on the size of the affected population relative to the overall population, the duration of assistance, the selection criteria and the methods used for distribution assistance.\textsuperscript{105} The global review of the impact of humanitarian assistance on the economy concluded that more research is required to develop a proper understanding of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and the economy.\textsuperscript{106} This is certainly the case in South Sudan. Humanitarian assistance is generally evaluated based on immediate and limited impacts, therefore wider and longer-term impacts are not assessed. Study participants were not aware of any significant research in this area.

**The economic impact of the humanitarian sector**

The lack of research about the impact of humanitarian assistance in replicated by the lack of research about the economic impact of the humanitarian sector in South Sudan. It is assumed that it has some positive impacts as it is a large employer of national and international staff who have income to spend in the country and require services and purchase goods in the local markets. However, large proportions of salaries from the humanitarian sector are spent abroad as international staff spend much of their income in their home country and on their families. Many national staff use their salaries to pay for their children's education abroad or to fund medical treatment abroad for family members. A large proportion of the goods purchased in South Sudan are imported. The study did not identify any information about the total number of humanitarian staff employed in South Sudan or their contribution in income tax. National staff expressed their frustration that they see no benefits from the 20 precent income tax they pay on their salaries.

At the local level, focus group participants noted that the provision of services and infrastructure development funded by the international community, some of which is provided by humanitarian organizations, has helped to promote economic development, and improve access to markets.

**Government Resources and Economic Management**

Statebuilding is undermined by the exploitation of natural resources and state revenue by political and military actors. In 2021, the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan reported that the ruling elite had diverted over 4 billion US$ from public coffers since 2012.\textsuperscript{107} Corruption, coupled with poor service delivery contribute to the lack of trust between the people and the Government. The low public sector salaries and the delays of up to six months in paying those salaries, means that employees literally cannot afford to go to work. As a result, public sector staff often resort to extortion and corruption which further erodes the population's trust in Government institutions.

Public Financial Management (PFM) is a pillar of the social contract and good PFM contributes to transparency and accountability and the development of positive state-citizen relationships through the provision of services and security. Chapter IV of R-ARCSS outlines necessary PFM reforms - medium-term economic and financial management reform

\textsuperscript{102} Bauer et al, 2014; Husain et al, 2014 in Idris, 2016
\textsuperscript{103} Mosel, Irina et al., 2015
\textsuperscript{104} Idris, 2016: 2
\textsuperscript{105} Idris, 2016: 3
\textsuperscript{106} Idris, 2016: 9
\textsuperscript{107} UN, 2021
programmes, new economic governance institutions, principles for sharing national wealth and resources, allocation of responsibilities for the collection of revenues by the central and subnational governments, the transparent allocation of revenues by the national government to subnational governments, and transparency over oil revenues.

Changes in the number of states led to the restructuring of the country’s financial system by the Ministry of Finance and Planning which caused severe disruption to all aspects of government including decision-making, financial management and service delivery as there was no clarity about the governance structure of allocation of roles and responsibilities. The restructure resulted in the loss of capacity across government systems. UNICEF noted that its investment in developing government capacity were lost and had to be repeated.

In 2016, traditional support for PFM development from entities such as UNDP, The African Development Bank (AfDB) and World Bank was unavailable because these organizations had scaled-down their interventions following the outbreak of conflict. Therefore, UNICEF began to provide technical support to the Ministry of Finance and Planning as a means to facilitate its work and to ensure that public funds are used for children from 0 to 17 years of age through the provision of social protection, particular to the most vulnerable in remote areas. UNICEF has been successful in establishing a national protection framework to which the government has committed 1 percent of its budget. UNICEF aims to build systems so that South Sudan can transition from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development.

Since the 2018 R-ARCSS and gradual return to peace, the World Bank and UNDP have resumed their support for PFM and increased their technical and financial support for the implementation of PFM reforms in the country. UNDP has focused on institutional capacity building for PFM and supports the PFM Secretariat, technical and oversight committees. As a result, there has been a gradual improvement in PFM. UNDP is extending support for PFM reforms to the states to replicate the PFM reforms at the national level. The AfDB and UNDP are providing technical and financial support to the National Revenue Authority to improve the management of non-oil revenue. Support to improve PFM increases transparency and accountability to help build trust and strengthen the social contract.

South Sudan is heavily dependent on revenue from oil which accounts for more than one-third of GDP, 90 percent of central government revenue, and over 95 percent of the country’s exports. Oil revenue is not well managed and some commercial oil companies have not made their agreed payments to the Government. Many of the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSAs) were made before South Sudan achieved independence and have not been renegotiated. South Sudan argues that it lacks the experience and capacity to negotiate with multi-national oil companies so it needs support to ensure that any agreement it enters into is fair. Furthermore, like many oil exporters, South Sudan is a hostage to global oil prices, it is not a price setter so is vulnerable to oil price fluctuations. Oil revenue was supposed to be shared as part of the peace dividend, but that did not happen because conflict erupted in 2013. “Before the drop in oil prices in early 2020, development assistance made up 61 percent of gross national income”.

South Sudan has many other resources that could contribute to economic growth including agriculture, water, land, mining, a young population, and the diaspora. The country must diversify to ensure sustainable economic growth, guard against global oil price fluctuations, and invest in alternative revenue streams to replace oil before reserves are depleted. For example, Dr John Garang championed the oil sector because he saw it as a means to develop agricultural production which he believed had the potential to contribute to the economy of South Sudan in the long term.

The National Revenue Authority (NRA) is responsible for managing non-oil revenue which includes personal income tax, customs and excise duties and business

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108 World Bank, 2021: 1
109 Deng, 2021
110 World Bank, 2021: 1
tax. The NRA sees the successful collection of taxes as important for South Sudan’s development because it provides the country with resources to invest in its own development, which makes it a more credible partner for support from the international community. It also gives the country a greater say over its own future rather than being subjected to conditions imposed by external actors. The NRA projects targets for tax collection, which it regularly exceeds. According to the NRA’s Strategic Plan, it is aiming to collect around 150 billion SSP annually and is in the process of rolling out electronic monitoring and collection systems. It has successfully increased tax revenue by 38 percent. However, there are numerous challenges: widespread corruption makes people reluctant to pay tax; taxation is not well-understood; and the majority of people work in the informal economy so suitable methods and rates of taxation have to be established. There is a lack of consensus between the NRA and the State governments regarding tax jurisdictions, tax rates, and distribution of revenue from taxes.

The Ministry of Petroleum collects the oil revenue on behalf of the Ministry of Finance and Planning which redistributes it. According to international stakeholders consulted during this study, the oil revenue is sufficient to fund the state’s key functions, including reasonable pay for government officials, provision of basic services infrastructure and security. Yet, the government invests little in health, education, and rural development services. Its highest expenditure is on accountability, public administration, education, and security as per the financial year 2022-2023. For the financial year 2021-2022, public expenditure allocation on economic affairs was 25.4 percent and on social and humanitarian affairs while it was 9.6 percent on the health sector. However, actual expenditure is likely to be much lower.\footnote{World Bank, 2021: 10-11}
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<td>75,708,448,11</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health Sector</td>
<td>4,051,664,584</td>
<td>12,543,853,20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
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<td>167,517,032,72</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
<td>6,293,063,926</td>
<td>19,483,170,06</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>4.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security</td>
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<td>13.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social and Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>7,265,636,15</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>148,019,980,786</strong></td>
<td><strong>468,266,039,69</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Education Sector</td>
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Most spending entities (ministries, agencies, departments) at the national and sub-national level report that they receive only salaries and some operational costs funded by the central Government and that the disbursement of these funds is usually delayed. Consequently, several government entities rely on funding from the international community to be able to fund projects and often use their own resources for communications. Government spending entities have experienced significant delays in the disbursement of their annual budgets since the 2013 crisis. The Government has been unable to disburse 10 million US$ from its emergency fund to respond to severe flooding in parts of the country. This is despite the fact that the emergency fund is pre-agreed and does not need to pass through the usual bureaucratic processes that impede rapid responses. Several contributors to the study suggest that if the Government is unable to respond effectively using the emergency fund, it is unlikely to be capable of assuming full responsibility for funding services in the near future. However, others suggest that corruption is responsible for the failure of the government to disburse the promised 10 million US$. When the Government pledged the 10 million US$ for flood response, many international observers saw it as an indication that it was beginning to assume its responsibilities.

South Sudan also fails to maintain its subscription payments to regional organizations such as IGAD and the East African community. Several senior government officials expressed regret because the failure to pay membership fees prevents South Sudan from participating in transboundary projects, such as water management, that might benefit the country’s economy.

Rather than providing a source of revenue to promote development and economic growth, the heavy reliance on oil revenue undermines South Sudan’s socioeconomic progress and statebuilding. With access to oil revenue, the Government does not have to enter into a transactional relationship with the population based on collecting taxes in exchange for services and security. This transactional relationship is the foundation of the social contract. The oil revenue also disrupts the relationship between national and subnational governance levels because the centre collects it. The state Governments are reliant on Juba to redistribute the oil wealth. Revenue raised through taxation is minimal in comparison with oil revenue, so the states have limited economic means to leverage the national government to fulfil its obligations to the subnational levels.

**International Nexus Funding**

Official Development Assistance (ODA) data for South Sudan compiled by OECD for 2020 shows that the majority of donors prioritized funding for the humanitarian and development elements of the triple nexus over funding for the peace element. Many donors allocated a significant proportion of their ODA to peace, although they may argue that their funding for peace is channelled through UNMISS. Humanitarian assistance is prioritized over development interventions. The United States, by far the largest donor, allocated over three-quarters of its funding, almost 600 Million US$ for humanitarian assistance, and less than half of all ODA is allocated to long-term development programmes.

Globally donors are increasingly risk-averse. For example, despite the current interest in the triple nexus approach, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) notes that between 2010 and 2020, funding from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members for peace initiatives in fragile contexts declined by 19 percent. In 2020, just 12 percent of ODA was allocated to peace objectives and only 4 percent to conflict prevention, even though research suggests that every US$ invested in prevention can save 16 US$ at a later date. Analysis shows that in 2020 80 percent of humanitarian assistance was targeted at protracted conflict.

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112 Bromley, 2019; Deng, 2021
113 OECD, 2020
114 OECD, 2020
115 OCHA, 2022
116 UNDP, 2022: 11
117 OECD, 2022
118 Hövelmann, 2020
OECD argues that current funding trends risk diverting assistance from development and peace objectives to fund protracted humanitarian needs. Climate adaptation is another area that donors are reluctant to fund in conflict-affected countries. On average, countries affected by climate change and conflict receive one third of the funding per capita provided to countries without conflict. South Sudan has received only 1 percent of the funding to implement its five-year climate adaptation plan, despite natural disasters causing new or exacerbating existing conflicts. However, 76 percent of the 100 million US$ for mitigation and adaptation strategies in South Sudan was invested in long-term projects rather than short-term relief.

Managing International Funding

ODA to South Sudan exceeds domestic public financial resources but less than half is allocated to longer-term development initiatives. Most ODA is disbursed through non-government stakeholders. Public sector involvement in projects declined from 20 percent in 2011 to just 5 percent in 2019. No donor is providing direct budget support because of the risks. The World Bank argues that there are opportunities to move from humanitarian assistance to development activities and third-party execution to implement projects through Government systems. It is undertaking capacity assessments of selected ministries at the national and sub-national levels and is providing technical support to improve public procurement and financial management, examine revenue opportunities and work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on macroeconomic reforms. In 2022 the World Bank increased its project expenditure to 800 million US$ up from 200 million US$ in 2021. It focuses on basic services and infrastructure to build human capital and facilitate economic development and on strengthening public institutions to ensure that the state will be able to assume responsibility for managing economic and development processes.

The World Bank concluded that third-party implementation, which it used until 2018, resulted in a lack of technical engagement of the Government at a national level and a loss of capacity building at the subnational levels. Therefore, the World Bank has invested in a Project Implementation Unit (PIU), a robust monitoring system to oversee the management of the funding. Such monitoring demands a high level of capacity and resources which the World Bank could provide to other donors. Some observers question whether such a system effectively develops Government capacity and adequately involves the Government. The funding passes through the Government – it has no responsibility for providing the funding or for implementing the project. As the funding proceeds through Government systems, it is monitored by the PIU, which operates in parallel and is responsible to an external stakeholder, not the Government. The World Bank has reserved the right to manage funds if the PIU is unsuccessful.

3.6 Access to Justice and Rule of Law

Protection

Protection is the humanitarian intervention that relates to rule of law and access to justice. In a functioning state, protection is the primary responsibility of a government, but in contexts where a government is unable to provide protection, humanitarian actors assume much of the responsibility. Protection in South Sudan under the humanitarian cluster system includes:

- Support to displaced and host populations; durable solutions for displaced populations;
- Provision of legal protection and legal identity;
- Reduction, mitigation and prosecution of gender-based violence;
- Child protection to support access to education; prevent abuse, child labour and recruitment;
- Support for housing, land and property rights;
- Mine action to reduce the threats posed by explosive ordnance.

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119 OECD, 2022
120 ICG, 2022
UNMISS also provides protection through human rights monitoring, training and capacity development and physical protection through its peacekeeping troops, UN Police and protection of civilian sites. In addition, various organizations, including development actors, provide training to law enforcement and support to the justice system. Where possible, interventions by humanitarian and development actors have been differentiated.

**Humanitarian protection and the tension with statebuilding**

In South Sudan, “the lack of efficient and independent institutions to maintain the rule of law and the ability to safeguard fundamental human rights has led to a perceived sense of impunity resulting in increased crime and attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers.”

South Sudanese in close contact with the Government report its lack of concern for the protection of human rights. Therefore, humanitarian and other actors have assumed responsibility for protection. Protection actors have raised awareness and established referral pathways. Participants in this study at the local level were aware of protection activities, but it is unknown whether the same level of awareness exists across the country. Organizations providing protection lack the funding and resources to meet all protection needs so have established mobile protections units to respond to the most pressing needs. However, these cannot meet the needs in all locations. Durable solutions are on hold because there is no development funding, only funding for humanitarian responses to displacement.

The provision of protection outside the Government system undermines the authority of the state and impedes statebuilding. The creation of the protection of civilian sites by UNMISS in response to attacks on civilians demonstrates the state’s failure to protect. Furthermore, because the government, law enforcement and military are among those accused of human rights abuses, humanitarian organizations and the protection cluster are cautious about interactions with the Government. This limits coordination, knowledge exchange and capacity building and poses significant challenges to increasing Government involvement in elements of protection and human rights. For example, various UN entities and NGOs have developed a database to manage cases of sexual and gender-based violence. Currently the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) is the custodian of the data, which cannot be handed over to the Government because it contains allegations against individuals with Government connections. The independent South Sudan Human Rights Commission reports that it is unable to work closely with NGOs and the protection cluster because they see it as part of the Government.

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**Text Box 3: South Sudan Human Rights Commission**

South Sudan Human Rights Commission (SSHRC) is an independent government institution that operates at the national and state levels. Apart from salaries, it receives no funding from the Government. The Commission advocates for human rights and monitors human rights, women’s rights and the implementation of laws passed by Parliament.

Between 2005 until the outbreak of conflict in 2013, the SSHRC reports that it had a good relationship with the Government and the international community. From 2013 until 2018, the Commission experienced challenges as it was distrusted by both the government and the international community. These difficulties led to UNDP moving its office from inside the Commission in 2013.

The Commission has emphasized to the Government that South Sudan, as an independent state, is part of the global community and, as such is expected to uphold human rights. If it fails to do so it will face sanctions.

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Many humanitarian and development actors believe that they should have been more active in advocating for human rights, protection, and the protection of civic
Humanitarian Assistance and Statebuilding in Conflict-affected South Sudan

Humanitarian assistance has been manipulated by government and opposition since 2013, has been used to gain control of contested areas, and has exacerbated existing inequalities or inter-communal tensions. Critics suggest that humanitarian assistance has been manipulated by government and opposition since 2013, has been used to gain control of contested areas, and has exacerbated existing inequalities or inter-communal tensions.

Others extend their criticism to the whole of the international community and believe that their failure to call the government to account has had dire consequences. For example, the increase in the number of states from 10 to 28 and then to 32 created states based on ethnicity and motivated by the desire to strengthen the political control of the centre. It was a disruptive and divisive move that ultimately failed, and the government returned to the 10-state model.

Similarly, the government created ethnic tensions in Upper Nile State by moving Dinka into the Malakal area. The Shilluck were displaced, and the international community provided security for the Shilluck in a Protection of Civilians site. The international community unintentionally facilitated government actions by responding to the fallout rather than engaging earlier to try to prevent the situation from developing. The issue of land ownership is highly political and sensitive but until it is addressed, the root causes of conflicts cannot be tackled. Paradoxically, the aim to be apolitical, avoid controversy and remain impartial has resulted in humanitarians failing to recognize the potential of particular actions to threaten human rights.

**Human Rights and Legal Protection**

South Sudan has a plural legal system which includes statutory, customary, and sharia law. These different systems are not harmonized, and there is no family law. The Convention on the Rights of the Child has not been included in domestic law; there are no clear laws on early marriage or women’s rights. To resolve these issues, longer-term development-orientated responses are needed, although humanitarian actors have been engaged in advocacy for human rights and legal protection.

**Legal Identity**

UNHCR is working with the Government to address statelessness. In 2022, an estimated 15,000 individuals in South Sudan were at risk of statelessness. Since 2013, UNHCR has worked with South Sudan’s Department of Nationality, Passports, and Immigration to secure national documents for 9,000 people. National identity documents are important to help to protect the rights of individuals and enable them to access services and take up formal employment opportunities.

**Housing, Land and Property (HLP)**

Humanitarian actors have been involved in trying to clarify housing, land and property rights which are unclear and the source of many conflicts. Women are vulnerable because they have rights only to access land and property but no rights to ownership despite being the main source of agricultural labour. Women cannot inherit land and if a widow is childless, any land and property is inherited by another male relative leaving her with nothing.

International support to South Sudan to manage land and property rights has been inconsistent and lacked funding. In 2007 humanitarian stakeholders and the government established the Land Coordination Forum, which became the Housing, Land and Property technical working group in 2018. The members of the forum/working groups comprised mainly humanitarian as most development stakeholders withdrew during the conflict. Together with the Government, these organizations addressed land and property issues, including contributing to drafting the national land policy. In 2022, it was decided that the working group should become a protection sub-cluster which is the standard global structure for HLP.

With the support of mainly humanitarian actors, the draft national land policy was completed in 2012 but has yet to be validated. The policy is important to promote stability and rule of law, agree durable

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122 Craze, Joshua 2022a
123 Deng, David et al., 2022: 14
124 Figure provided verbally by a UNHCR staff member
125 UNHCR, 2022b
solutions and protect women’s of land and property rights.

**Access to Justice**

Access to justice is limited. No new judges have been appointed since 2013 and there is no reliable data about the number of judges currently working. Legal experts in South Sudan assert that there are supposed to be around 200 judges, it is believed that there are fewer than 100 throughout the country. There are no judges in Upper Nile State. The judges who are still working do not receive regular salaries, have little logistical support, face threats of violence and are disillusioned. At the state level, opportunities to seek justice through state structures are limited, the law is poorly applied and the population is wary of judges unsure whether they are independent of the Government. Below the state level, according to study participants, there is little in the way of courts and judicial system, rule of law or law enforcement.

Consequently, justice is generally provided by traditional chiefs without a jury or police using customary law which is well understood by the population. There is no punishment of individuals or justice for individuals and no sense of criminal responsibility, only collective punishment which involves compensation usually paid in cows. Traditional systems reinforce gender inequality. The payments of cows as a dowery makes women property. Women and girls experience inequalities in access to services, including education, and limited income generating opportunities. Local community leadership structures are patriarchal, so men dominate decision making in customary law, restorative justice and security.126

Development-oriented support for access to justice is provided by various UN entities and NGOs. UNDP has provided mobile courts which have been well received although they are insufficient to meet all the judicial needs. These development interventions enhance the outcomes of humanitarian protection interventions.

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126 World Bank, 2021: 11

**Support for capacity development**

**Policing and Law Enforcement**

Humanitarian NGOs have been involved in capacity building. For example, they have provided training so that police stations have a gender desk. However, these interventions are not part of a broader strategy and have limited impact because other parts of the justice and rule of law system are not working. In this instance, police are paid, so the gender desks are not staffed regularly. NGOs, in cooperation with the South Sudan Police, have supported the development of community policing. However, one international organization that has engaged in community policing recently has been criticized by a range of stakeholders for failing to follow the UN guidelines and coordinate its interventions with the Government, police and other relevant actors.

The South Sudan Human Rights Commission coordinates with other stakeholders to provide training and capacity building to law enforcement and the military.

**Conflict Related Sexual Violence**

There is support for capacity development from a range of actors to address conflict-related sexual violence (CSRV), which has been widely used as a weapon of war. Police, armed forces, and opposition groups are being trained to prevent CRSV and tackle perpetrators. Development actors, such as UNDP, support rule of law and access to justice interventions to bring the perpetrators to justice. There are attempts to develop capacity at the national and state levels for the Ministry of Gender, Child, and Social Welfare to tackle the stigma faced by victims and that of any child born as a result of rape. The Mission and UNFPA have been working with the Ministry of Health to promote access to healthcare for victims of CRSV. At the time of the research (November 2022), efforts were underway to include CRSV in the gender-based violence bill going through Parliament.

To ensure the sustainability of initiatives to address CRSV, more funding and resources are needed from the government, institutions need further capacity development, relevant laws must be passed, and policies and strategies developed.
Humanitarian Mine Action

Support for humanitarian mine action from the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and several NGOs has enabled South Sudan to progress towards fulfilling its commitments to the International Mine Ban Treaty. With adequate funds, it is estimated that clearance of explosive ordnance contamination can be completed by June 2026.\(^{127}\) However, the Government provides no funding for mine action operations. UNMISS covers around 75 percent of annual mine action costs. International NGOs have funding for only a small clearance capacity and there is no national clearance capacity. The mine action sector coordinates through the mine action subcluster and works to support the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) with whom working relations are positive.

Despite the success of mine action operations, it is unclear whether, after more than 20 years of international support, sustainable national mine action capacity has been developed. The country will need some capacity to respond to residual explosive ordnance threats once all known contamination is cleared and to maintain the mine action records in the internationally recognized IMSMA database. There are nationals with the relevant skills and experience, but the limited funds means that they are not employed. UNMAS aims to record the contact details of nationals with mine action experience in an effort to ensure sustainable national capacity.

Coordination Challenges

International interventions to improve protection, access to justice and rule of law seem to be disjointed. Views among international and national stakeholders differ about how and where support is targeted and which organizations cooperate with each other. There are some areas where it is clearly stated there is no coordination. UNDP reports that it does not coordinate its rule of law programme with the HCT. The Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements for CRSV is a formal mechanism that involves the Mission, UNFPA and other UN entities. It does not include humanitarian NGOs. The Mission has some contact with UNFPA and the GBV protection subcluster when they are also focusing on CRSV. Some observers argue that having separate interventions to tackle GBV and CRSV creates unnecessary divisions and complications for coordination.

NGOs are particularly critical of UN interventions to support access to justice and rule of law as they operate at the national level and neglect the subnational levels. NGOs and humanitarian organizations seldom engage in these high-level interventions. National and international NGOs tend to focus on implementing their own protection programmes, establishing referral pathways, and providing legal aid. The UN and Government entities criticize them for failing to coordinate their programmes with the national level Government ministries. However, the NGOs and some observers argue that their support focuses on the subnational level and that they liaise with the relevant authorities at the sub-national level.

National stakeholders also note a lack of coordination among international actors. The Ministry for Housing, Land and Public Utilities reports that some international organizations do not coordinate with other stakeholders and fail to communicate their activities to the Ministry. The SSHRC struggles to work closely with NGOs and the protection cluster because it is seen as part of the Government.

It was reported in October 2022 that stakeholders involved in protection, the rule of law, and access to justice were being mapped as there was no clear overview of which organizations were operating, where what programmes were being implemented and what funding was available.

3.7 The Social Contract

The role of some members of the government in inciting violence, the lack of stability, fair judicial processes and clear legislation and the widespread corruption undermined the social contract. The existence of the oil revenue which negates the need for a transactional relationship between the government and the people and the lack of clarity about the divisions of roles and responsibilities between formal and traditional...
government structures, impedes statebuilding and the development of the social contract.

The government and international community contributors criticised donor visibility for undermining the social contract. Populations know that the international community is providing interventions and not their government. The Ministry of Education expressed the concern that parents believe it is the NGOs’ responsibility to provide education for their children rather than the state. The lack of government visibility is compounded by the ongoing conflict, which means that it cannot easily access all areas, whereas international actors, including humanitarians, can move more freely. Lack of transport and, in some cases staff, also means that government is less visible in remote areas. Therefore, in some parts of the country, aid organizations are visible, and the Government is not.

The Government has come to rely on international assistance which, because of the ongoing crises, and limited presence of development actors and funding, has tended to be provided by the humanitarian sector. Ministries that are actively engaged with the humanitarian sector seem frustrated by their inability to fulfil their role, manage the sector, and provide services, mainly because of a lack of funding and capacity. They all want greater oversight of the humanitarian sector and to receive development funding directly although they understand why this is not yet happening. Overall, Government representatives participating in this study recognized the rights of the population to have access to basic services, although not necessarily the responsibility of the Government to provide these services. They also recognized the long-term positive impact such services have on development and peace.

Based on the local-level research for this study in Upper Nile and Western Bahr el-Ghazal states, the population seems to have a good understanding of the social contract. South Sudanese academics argue that similar views would be found throughout the country, although the population has limited means to call the government to account. However, the lack of Government service provision has resulted in people holding humanitarian organizations accountable for services rather than the government. This situation seems most prevalent among displaced populations living in camps and in less stable states. In Renk, the RRC reported that youth protests targeted aid agencies and not the government, believing that the aid agencies were responsible for providing services and livelihood opportunities. The RRC intervened and explained that aid agencies were present to complement the role of the Government but not to replace it and that, in fact, the ultimate responsibility for services and livelihoods lay with the Government. However, an IDP camp resident in Bentiu asserts, “Humanitarians are everything. They are our god, our father, our food, our education, our shelter, and our safety.” These examples highlight the broken citizen-state relationship of the social contract.

Text Box 4: Jamjang – a “UNHCR town” in South Sudan

In areas where UNHCR supports refugees, to mitigate refugee-host population tensions, the local population has access to many of the same interventions. In Jamjang camps in Unity State, UNHCR has inadvertently created a town and become a local government. It provides services, security, livelihoods opportunities and infrastructure which has included repairing the airport. There are no government police, detention centres or courts. UNDP provides some access to justice through mobile courts. UNHCR is trying to handover the responsibility of the hospital it has repaired, but the government claims that it lacks the resources to manage it.

There is a need to find an effective working relationship between the government and the aid sector. The government complains that it feels marginalised by organisations that do not consult it and implement projects without discussing them with Juba. The aid sector actors complain that the government is trying to control their activities to an unacceptable level, particularly humanitarian activities. National NGOs and CSOs that work on civic education and that call the government to account feel threatened and feel that their civic space and ability to voice the concerns of the

Simons, Christina, 2022
people is being restricted. Freedom of expression and the right to call the Government to account without fear of reprisals are part of the social contract. The July 2022 South Sudan Country Agreement for working with NGOs is controversial. International organisations should advocate on their own behalf and that of local organizations which are more vulnerable to Government actions to protect civic space. The international community and the government need to find a balanced working relationship that is based on mutual respect.

3.8 Conclusion

There has been a focus on technical statebuilding at the national level which has neglected the sub-national level and rural areas and the need to build a nation as well as a state. Among the political leaders at the national level there is a lack of vision, leadership, and engagement with the population. The presence of the oil revenue has undermined the social contract and fed into corruption. Corruption pervades all levels because the state does not function, and the public sector is not paid. This erodes the social contract further. The low levels of Government funding for services does not demonstrate a commitment to meet the people’s needs and work towards sustainable development. It also creates disillusionment among government and public sector workers, particularly those who are committed to improving the country.

The international community has not had a consistent or coordinated approach to capacity development of government institutions or public services. Although conflict has impeded continuity, the human resources needs of the government and public sector were ambitious for the new state. The lack of suitable funding has also limited development interventions.

South Sudan’s complex conflict dynamics and governance structures interact with assistance. It is important that the international community, including the humanitarian sector understands the different dynamics, opportunities, and challenges of engaging with modern state structures, and traditional leaders of the different ethnic groups. Any decisions should be informed by the impact that such engagement has on the social contract with the intended outcome to maximize the positive impact and minimize the negative.

Humanitarian assistance for services, livelihoods, access to justice and rule of law can have a positive impact on statebuilding in terms of promoting development and stability. However, it appears that the impact of these interventions is limited by the lack of complimentary development interventions which would enable the initiatives from the humanitarian sector to have a greater reach and sustainability.

It is assumed that the presence of the humanitarian sector has had an economic impact, but no research has substantiated such was identified.

129 GRSS, 2022
CHAPTER 4:
The Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on Local Level Statebuilding

This chapter analyses the impact of humanitarian assistance on statebuilding among the population at the local level to identify lessons for nexus programming. It provides insights into the impact of assistance on development, peace and the citizen-state relationship. It complements the previous chapter which focused on the impact of humanitarian assistance on governance, government, and the public sector at the national and state levels. The chapter is based primarily on FGDs conducted with men, women, youth, and the elderly in four locations, Wau town and Bussere village in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, and Malakal town and Malakal PoC site in October 2022. Information from the FGDs has been combined with contributions from other study participants and written sources.

More detailed information about the methodology used for this study, the rationale for the choice of case studies and the profile of the locations visited can be found in Annex 7.3.

Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State

4.1 Services

Provision of Services

Women, men, youth, and the elderly in Wau held similar views about service delivery. In Wau education, health, water, and sanitation services are provided by the UN, national and international NGOs, the South Sudan Council of Churches, and the South Sudan Islamic Council. The government provides only a few teachers, who do not pay regularly. Wau teaching hospital is a government facility but the parts that function effectively are managed by humanitarian organizations.

In Bussere, the water supply is limited; the government school has only five classes and lacks teachers, so children of different ages and abilities are taught together. Teaching may last for one or two lessons only a day. It is difficult to recruit teachers for rural areas. The local population tries to support the school in the absence of adequate funding from the Ministry of Education. There is a small clinic with no drugs or trained staff. Occasionally staff come from Wau. IOM used to support the clinic, but this support was withdrawn suddenly. The ambulance service is limited, so there is no reliable emergency response.

The participants feel abandoned by the government and argue that it relies on humanitarian organizations to provide public services. According to information disseminated by the central government in Juba, money is allocated in the national budget to state governments to provide services. However, the local population does not see government expenditure on services but is unsure whether the central government fails to provide the funds or the state government uses the funds it receives for something else. The population knows that the government should be providing services for its people. The elderly argued that, as many people are vulnerable, services should not only be provided by the government, but any payments due to access services should also be subsidized by the government.

As organizations that provide services in Wau have state-level authorization and security clearance, the population believes that the state government is aware of humanitarian activities. However, this assumption is based on the fact that organizations are working in the town rather than on information that explicitly explains the government’s role. Before the CPA and during the interim period before independence, the population
believed that the government provided leadership and worked for the benefit of the people; this is no longer the case. The South Sudan government has been weakened by conflict and corruption so public services and government systems have become dysfunctional. Participants were particularly critical of the government’s failure to pay public sector salaries on time.

Impact of services on development
The participants noted positive impacts on the development of services provided by humanitarian organizations. Support for education has included providing teachers, teacher training, financial support for teachers, teaching materials and the renovation of school buildings. Education is important for the long-term development and future prospects for children. Teachers have also been able to develop their own capacity and teaching skills. The provision of water and sanitation has reduced the incidence of waterborne diseases and contributed to an overall improvement of the public health. Distribution of soap has also improved hygiene. Humanitarian organizations have concentrated on providing services for women and children in Wau teaching hospital so their access to medical care has improved and drugs are available. As women are often unwilling or unable to travel to medical facilities outside the immediate vicinity, local healthcare provision is important. However, participants expressed concern that the population and government have become dependent on services funded by the international community and partially or wholly delivered by international organizations. Participants argued that the situation is unsustainable as the international funding will cease, and many international organizations will leave.

Impact of services on peace
Children, both male and female, are responsible for collecting water for the household. The provision of waterpoints in urban areas reduces the distances that children travel away from their home which lessens their exposure to violence and sexual assault. Accessible water supplies near home enables children to attend school, even during the dry season when school attendance can drop because of the distances children travel to collect water. There were concerns among all participants that support for education and healthcare tended to focus on women and girls. They suggested that services should be designed to address the needs of men, women, boys and girls more equally to avoid creating tensions.

Humanitarian organizations often liaise with the traditional chiefs as a means of communicating with the community and identifying needs. However, participants report that this has resulted in chiefs favouring some areas over others. They suggested that consultations should be held more widely to ensure a fairer distribution of services. They also noted that Wau and other urban centres receive more humanitarian (and development) assistance than rural and more remote areas because towns are more accessible, have a higher profile and are easier for donors to visit to see the impact of their funding. Such uneven distribution of services creates or exacerbates existing tensions and has the potential to undermine, rather than promote security and stability.

4.2 The Economy

Cash and food distribution
In Wau, participants identified the distribution of food and cash assistance as essential to save lives, particularly during the conflict among vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities. They cited the UN, national and international NGOs, the South Sudan Council of Churches, and the South Sudan Islamic Council as providers of food and cash assistance. WFP has substituted food for cash assistance: there was no comment on which was preferable. Cash has been given to girls for sanitary products to enable them to attend school while menstruating. The government does not contribute to or participate in cash distribution. FGD participants opposed the involvement of the government in cash distribution, arguing that it is corrupt.
By contrast, in Bussere, most participants had not received any cash or food assistance. Some had received cash and food assistance when they had been displaced elsewhere, and some on their initial return to Bussere. Despite the relatively short distance between Bussere and Wau, the village population seemed unaware that cash and food assistance were regularly distributed in the town.

**Impact of cash and food distribution on development**

Despite the different experiences of cash and food assistance between the populations of Wau and Bussere, the views on the positive and negative impacts of such assistance on development were similar. Among the positive impacts, women noted that children are able to attend school instead of working to contribute to the household income. The financial support for girls to attend school was believed to improve their educational prospects. The men argued that additional cash and food assistance improved recipients’ health by reducing disease prevalence and boosting energy for agricultural work.

The elderly in Wau argued that cash and food assistance had created a dependency culture among some people. Others suggested that cash assistance was misused, particularly by the men, to buy alcohol. FGD participants noted that a minority of the girls lied to their parents, denying that they had received any cash assistance for sanitary products. Instead, they use the cash to organize parties outside the town with drugs and alcohol, which could result in violence and unwanted pregnancies. It was noted that girls could be overheard planning parties when it was believed that a new round of cash assistance was about to be distributed. Some FGD participants commented that cash distribution inflated prices because the supply of goods and competition in the marketplace were limited and vendors, aware of cash distribution, would raise prices in response. As discussed in the chapter above, this commonly held view is contradicted by the findings of a 2016 global review of existing research. Without further research in these locations, the impact of cash assistance in inflation is unknown.

**Impact of cash and food distribution on peace**

The distribution of cash and food assistance reduces women’s exposure to risk because they do not have to leave their local area in search of food, goods to sell, or to work. Similarly, children’s exposure to risk was also reduced as they were less likely to be required to work after the household had received assistance. Assistance also helped to reduce violence and tensions among the population because people were able to meet their basic needs. However, cash assistance could contribute to violence if families disagreed over its use or if people, usually men, use the money to purchase alcohol. It was noted that food and cash assistance had been unevenly distributed, inciting local-level tensions. The FGD participants reported that, unlike the girls, boys did not receive any cash assistance to attend school. Some boys were unable to afford to go to school and some interpreted the lack of cash assistance as a signal that education was considered unimportant for boys and, as a consequence, dropped out of school.

There were also allegations that teachers, who had been asked to help to distribute cash assistance to female pupils, had included family members and friends among the lists of beneficiaries resulting in some of those who were entitled to assistance missing out. Accusations also included teachers asking for sexual favours in return for cash assistance.

Participants were angry with teachers over the misuse of cash assistance and the corruption of the distribution system. They suggested that there should be greater oversight of teachers involved in cash distribution by a third party, such as the parent-teacher association (PTA) to help limit corruption. It was also suggested that awareness-raising sessions before a new cash distribution to girls would alert parents about forthcoming cash assistance and emphasize among the girls the importance of education so that they use the money to help them attend school.
**Support for livelihoods**

Humanitarian support for livelihoods tends to concentrate on enabling recipients to meet their basic needs so it is usually relatively small scale in comparison with development programmes to promote livelihoods. Again, support for livelihoods came from a range of international, national, and local organizations and included training in and/or tools for agriculture, gardening, fishing, tailoring, carpentry, construction, computers, borehole construction and maintenance, electrical skills and establishing small businesses. The FGDs in Wau and Bussere criticised government ministries for their limited involvement in livelihoods projects, although they assumed that the state ministries are aware of the interventions and had granted permission for them to take place. FGD participants in Bussere noted that an agricultural extension worker from the Ministry of Agriculture had visited the village once. Although the extension worker was an international, the participants remembered the visit as important and interpreted it as the government showing an interest in Bussere. There was concern in both Wau and Bussere that support for livelihoods is unsustainable because it is driven by the international community rather than the government. All FGD participants wanted more livelihoods support.

**Impact of support for livelihoods on peace**

The support for livelihoods had enabled people to return home successfully after being forcibly displaced and reduced conflict over basic needs. People reported feeling greater self-esteem and believed that there had been a reduction in crime and conflict because people were busy working and able to meet their own needs. However, there were some notable negative impacts. The youth in Bussere said that they had not benefited from any livelihoods training and were forced to depend on their families for survival. They were frustrated and bored. Some elderly admitted to being afraid of the youth as they had nothing to do.

Uneven distribution of support and gender differences had also created tensions. In Wau, it seems that a critical mass of the population had received livelihoods support and overall, people were happy with the level of assistance. In Bussere, fewer people had received support and there was a notable difference in household prosperity between those who had received assistance, particularly for agricultural production and those who had not. Interventions to promote agricultural production had obviously been successful as recipients of support for agriculture were notably more productive than those who had not received any support resulting in surplus produce to sell. Women’s benefits from agricultural support were impeded by their reluctance to travel too far from home to attend training. Therefore, women were less successful in agriculture than men and this gap is unlikely to be closed unless women receive outside support. There was concern that the differences in levels of assistance and delays in provision of assistance would lead to long-term income disparities and local-level tensions.

**Impact of support for livelihoods on development**

Overall, it was believed that support for livelihoods has had a positive impact on standards of living and development. People could meet their basic needs and pay for their children to attend school. Support for agricultural activities was noted as particularly successful and participants appreciated their increased agricultural knowledge and technical expertise. The use of peer-to-peer training appears to have worked well and to have been accepted as an approach. It was noted that food prices in the local market had decreased as produce became more available. The ability to repair boreholes locally had had a positive developmental impact. Women receiving psychosocial support had also received training to establish small businesses. Investing in livelihoods helped create jobs and provided training so people could find employment. All FGD participants wanted more livelihoods support.

4.3 Rule of Law and Access to Justice

**Rule of Law**

In Wau and Bussere there was a belief that security begins with the individual and that people had a
responsibility to make sensible decisions to protect their own safety. In both Wau and Bussere, the FGD participants believed that the police should provide rule of law although the number of police needed to increase for effective rule of law. There was also recognition of the role of traditional chiefs in helping to maintain security, particularly in Bussere. In addition to the police and chiefs, in Wau, FGD participants mentioned UNMISS, UN agencies and various national and international NGOs that contributed to their feelings of security. They mentioned specific medical, psychological and practical support available to women who had been sexually assaulted and raped and understood the procedures in place for reporting sexual attacks and rape to the police. They also mentioned that neighbourhood watch groups had been established. Although in Wau town, there was no mention of any threats from pastoralists, FGD participants were aware of efforts by non-government actors to negotiate agreements between pastoralists and farmers to prevent conflict.

There were marked differences among the FGDs about perceptions of security. In Wau, all FGDs said that they felt safer in areas with a police presence and police patrols. Those from parts of the town where the police were not present felt unsafe. Town residents were afraid of armed criminals and militias and were reluctant to enter areas controlled by SPLA-IO. They complained of a shortage of police and police stations as well as lack of rule of law and noted that the police cannot move freely or enter areas controlled by rebel groups and that some police had been killed at work.

The population in Bussere felt threatened by pastoralists and the nearby centre for integrating forces. They also noted feeling safer with a police presence but had only three police officers who were not permanently present in the village. Their views of the SPLA-IO were more complicated. FGD participants noted that IO members lived in the bush outside the village and felt threatened by them because they were not participating in the peace process. However, FGD participants also noted that IO members had supported the police in maintaining law and order by breaking up fights and escorting those involved to the police station. This is unusual and the research team speculated that because the IO members came from the local area, they had a vested interest in preserving security.

Perceptions of security differed among the FGDs in Bussere. The men and women felt less safe than the elderly who claimed that they could walk to Wau town and back without any problems. Moreover, if they had been drinking heavily, they could sleep by the side of the road until they had sobered up and then continue on their way. Men and women did not feel safe when outside the village. It is possible that their engagement in agriculture and other income generating activities exposes them to rebel and criminal attacks to steal produce or anything of value, and to violence from pastoralists looking for grazing land and water for livestock. Male youth from Bussere felt that their age and sex made them targets for pastoralists and felt vulnerable outside the village. All demographic groups reported feeling safer during the rainy season as pastoralists and rebel groups are less active.

In contrast with other demographic groups, female youth in Bussere felt safe to move freely and for long distances. The research team speculated that female youth may feel safer now than during conflict when rape and sexual attacks were a weapon of war. Various non-governmental organizations have raised awareness about the importance of protecting women from violence and promoting women’s rights, which might have resulted in creating a safer environment for women locally. However, the research team noted that if a man marries the woman he has raped, which is often the case, this is accepted as a traditional form of justice. Fears that reporting rape to the authorities stigmatizes a woman and her family may result in underreporting and create a false sense of safety. In Bussere, there was some awareness of the support available for those who had been raped and sexually assaulted, but knowledge about the scope of the support and police procedures was less than in Wau.

Access to Justice

There was a marked difference in views between Wau and Bussere about justice processes. In both locations, there was an awareness that certain organizations
provide specialist support for people who have been raped and sexually assaulted to seek justice through the legal system. However, beyond that, in Bussere there did not appear to be an understanding of statutory law, the state judicial system or the role and importance of a lawyer. The population seemed more likely to rely on customary and local chiefs in seeking justice. FGD participants also mentioned the importance of locally respected figures in resolving issues such as elders or teachers and representatives from women’s and youth groups. In Wau, FGD participants were familiar with state justice systems and the mobile courts that have been established by development actors to support the overstretched state justice system. The youth provided details about which ministries and individuals were relevant to justice processes. It is possible that their knowledge had been gained through awareness raising about human rights.

Impact of humanitarian assistance on rule of law and access to justice

In both locations, there was an expectation that the state should be able to provide security, rule of law and access to justice but, the understanding of the statutory systems was much more detailed in Wau than in Bussere. FGD participants had positive views of the police, traditional chiefs, and neighbourhood watch groups in contributing to security but wanted a larger police presence to increase security. There was much greater reliance on traditional chiefs to provide security and rule of law in Bussere than in Wau and an expectation that the chiefs had a responsibility to represent the population to the state-level government and make requests on their behalf for more police and improved security. In Wau, FGD participants suggested that they would interact with the authorities directly to demand improvements in security and rule of law and that local youth and women’s groups could also help to raise awareness among the authorities about people’s security concerns. In Wau it appeared that there would be acceptance of a state-run judicial system if it could be made effective. In Bussere, a preference was expressed for customary law and traditional systems of justice. FGD participants perceived some action by the state to provide rule of law and access to justice in contrast to no state action for services and the economy. Security had improved since the conflict so those who had been forcibly displaced were able to return home. In both Wau and Bussere, traditional systems were accepted to ensure security and rule of law, which seemed to continue to function.

The FGDs acknowledged interventions by UNMISS and humanitarian organizations to negotiate access between pastoralists and farmers that contributed to security and rule of law. However, the sedentary population still feared pastoralists. The work of humanitarian organizations to raise awareness about GBV and to provide medical and psychosocial support to those affected by such violence was regarded positively and has succeeded in raising awareness although it is unknown what impact it has had on rule of law. Staff from organizations working on protection report that their resources are overstretched and that they are unable to respond to all the needs. They have raised awareness about protection issues but, without effective law enforcement, their work has limited impact. Humanitarian organizations have helped to establish gender desks at police stations, but staffing constraints have reduced the impact of the initiative. The justice system lacks capacity so the effectiveness of support from humanitarian organizations for access to justice is limited.

There were no negative comments about the impact of humanitarian protection interventions on rule of law and access to justice, despite humanitarian organizations noting their own limitations.

4.4 Social Cohesion and the Social Contract

Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on Social Cohesion

All the focus groups in Wau town and Bussere village agreed that social cohesion has deteriorated since independence. They identified violence among the different ethnic groups incited by politicians as the main reason for the breakdown in social cohesion and rule of law and increased insecurity. Before independence, rule of law was stronger, and conflict along ethnic lines was not a significant problem. Conflicts since independence
have caused mass displacements that are considered to have weakened social cohesion among neighbours, social and family networks within the same ethnic group. They have disrupted children’s upbringing and interrupted the socialization processes that take place naturally in stable social environments to integrate individuals into a society.

Overall, the availability of services, cash assistance and support for livelihoods by humanitarian organisations were believed to have helped to promote social cohesion by reducing conflict over money and resources among the population and tensions within households about meeting basic needs. Furthermore, people engaged in livelihood activities have little time to fight. More even distribution of services by humanitarian organisations among the population, including more inclusive approaches that consider the needs of different demographic groups equally, would support social cohesion. There was a view from all the focus groups that young men were neglected in favour of women. Young men in both locations had poorer access to education and healthcare and, in Bussere, also poorer access to livelihoods support than other population groups. Failing to address the needs of young men was seen as a potential future source of conflict. To reduce tensions among the population, prevent corruption and ensure that people could support themselves in their daily lives, participants wanted the government to pay public sector salaries on time.

The suggestions for improving social cohesion included more opportunities for dialogue, greater awareness raising about the dangers of ethnic tensions, more active promotion of peace and reconciliation, promotion of inter-ethnic sporting and cultural events, the use of faith to bring people together and to remind them about forgiveness and the importance of supporting one another, and a return to intermarriage between different ethnic groups to strengthen intercommunal relationships. Above all, focus group participants stated that the government must encourage peace and not undermine it and that traditional chiefs and local leaders should have more involvement in promoting peace.

**The impact of humanitarian assistance on the social contract**

The focus group participants in Wau and Bussere did not appear to believe that humanitarian assistance had had a positive or negative impact on the social contract. Instead, they said that the social contract was weaker now than before independence because the government failed to provide any services or stability in return for the payment of taxes. Before independence, public sector workers were paid on time, the taxation system was clearer, and the government provided services. There are widespread complaints that the taxation system is corrupt and that there are no standard rates. There was an understanding of the need to pay taxes, and members of all focus groups in Wau, except the youth, had paid taxes. In Bussere, fewer people were paying taxes, and the women participants had very little understanding of taxation.

The lack of service provision from the state government has angered the local population and led to resentment and mistrust among the people for their leaders, which damages the social contract. There were complaints that services have not been evenly distributed for political reasons, as different ministers are associated with different political blocs and that those living in areas controlled by SPLA-IO have been marginalized and are deliberately being excluded from services. There were accusations that some leaders of SPLA-IO are preventing humanitarian organizations from accessing areas that they control. FGD participants believed that political groups were more concerned about ensuring their own power than meeting the needs of the people.

Despite the views that the social contract had deteriorated since 2011, there was a belief that it could be strengthened if citizens were included in the constitution-making process and the unified forces graduated so that the population could believe in a stable peace and democratic future. Above all corruption must be tackled and taxes collected fairly and systematically and redistributed through the provision of services, infrastructure, salaries for the public sector and social protection. Overall, despite the challenges and criticisms of the state government, focus group participants were cautiously positive about the prospects for stability and development in the local
area and the potential of the state government to begin to fulfil its role more effectively.

**Upper Nile State**

### 4.5 Services

**Provision of Services**

In Malakal town and the PoC site, education, health and WASH services are provided by various UN agencies, international organisations, international and national NGOs and Christian organisations. FGD participants were aware of the work of the RRC and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs in coordinating external assistance and the Ministry of Education in providing the curriculum and overseeing examinations for organizations offering education. The Ministry of Health had been involved in the distribution of vaccinations against Covid-19 which was regarded as a positive intervention. In general, there was dissatisfaction with the services provided by humanitarian organisations as it was felt that their quality was deteriorating and the level of provision inadequate for the population’s needs. There was anger among all FGD participants at the lack of government support and no expectation that it would provide any services. Participants from the PoC reported that they felt completely neglected by the government. However, as services provided by humanitarian organizations were perceived to be deteriorating, FGD participants suggested that the government should be monitoring them for quality control. This seems odd given the criticisms of the government.

**The impact of services on development**

FGD participants stated that the positive impact of services on development was limited by a number of factors. The quality and training of teaching has deteriorated, and NGOs are recruiting unqualified teachers because they can be paid less than trained teachers. Some NGOs were accused of failing to pay teachers altogether and instead relying on pupils being able to pay for lessons. There were accusations that clinics provided by the humanitarian sector were refusing to see patients and to provide prescriptions. However, information provided to mothers about child nutrition has improved child health. The women in Malakal town said they could be without water for three days and were forced to take unclean water from the river. The lack of latrines forced people to defecate in the churchyard. Similarly, in the PoC there were accusations that humanitarian organisations were failing to provide clean drinking water and proper sanitation facilities. Overall research participants reported that the deterioration in and loss of services since 2013 has had a negative impact on people’s feelings of self-esteem.

**The impact of services on peace**

The lack of and the uneven distribution of services is causing tensions and the focus groups expressed anger towards NGOs that they perceive as failing to meet their needs. Focus group participants complained that assistance is not evenly distributed as the most vulnerable are always prioritized. Participants also accused some parents of deliberately depriving their children to increase their chances of accessing humanitarian support. In both locations, the water shortage has led to violence at water points.

### 4.6 The Economy

**Cash and food distribution**

Various international and national NGOs have provided food and cash assistance in Malakal town and the PoC. Although the government has not been responsible for providing the assistance, the RRC and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs have supported the coordination of food and cash assistance. Focus group participants did not want the government to be actively involved in the distribution of cash assistance for fear of corruption.

**Impact of cash and food assistance on development**

The food and cash assistance has enabled people to survive, supported the most vulnerable including the newly displaced female headed households, and had a
positive impact on development. Some households have been able to generate an income from the cash assistance. Assistance has also enabled girls to attend school because they do not have to generate an income to support the family. However, the assistance is inadequate and runs out before the next distribution of assistance. Financial support for girls and unaccompanied children to attend school was regarded as important, but there were other children who did not receive financial assistance and whose parents were unable to pay.

Impact of cash and food assistance on peace

The distribution of food and cash assistance reduces the need to engage in risky livelihoods activities, including survival sex and foraging for food or firewood which exposes people to violence and, more recently, attacks from a lion. Uneven distribution of cash and food assistance is creating tensions. Male youth in Malakal town are excluded from cash and food assistance because they are not considered vulnerable. Different organisations are responsible for different groups of displaced populations depending on which organisations have the capacity and funding to respond. This has resulted in distribution of food and cash assistance at different times and of varying amounts, which has created the impression that some groups are favoured over others. It has been noted that the distribution of food and cash can lead to an increase in crime and the theft of assistance from vulnerable groups. Tensions among the population have also arisen when food and cash assistance has been reduced. WFP, in particular, has reduced assistance dramatically because of funding shortages. Organisations have also been accused of distributing cooking oil in the PoC that is approaching its expiry date, creating fears about unsafe food.

Community leaders appointed by humanitarian organisations to facilitate the distribution of cash and food assistance have been accused of using their position to benefit friends and family.

Support for livelihoods

There is a marked difference in the support for livelihoods between Malakal town and the PoC. Apart from support for women to establish small businesses, no other groups in Malakal town have received livelihoods support. In the PoC site, there has been support for livelihoods although it is considered inadequate. Livelihoods support has included equipment and canoes to fish in the river, seeds and tools for agriculture, training and sewing machines for tailoring, support to establish small businesses such as selling tea, and training and tools to maintain water pumps. This support has been provided by UN agencies, international and national NGOs and interfaith Christian and Muslim organisations. There has been no government involvement.

The impact of livelihood support on development

The women in Malakal town report that the support they received for livelihoods has improved their standard of living, enabled them to support their families, clothe their children and send them to school. The women had positive experiences of livelihoods support and argued that men should receive similar support.

In the PoC, recipients of livelihood support report an improved standard of living, particularly among female-headed households. Households have been able to send their children to school, reduce the use of child labour and afford medical treatment. The availability of fish and agricultural produce in the market has reduced food costs. Support for agriculture is intended to enable families to feed themselves until the next harvest and, overall was believed to be successful, although, in some instances, the assistance has been inadequate to meet needs until the next harvest. Some households receiving seeds have been known to eat or sell them instead of planting them and sometimes seeds arrive too late for the planting season.

Focus groups from the PoC expressed concerns that people had become dependent on humanitarian organisations to support their livelihoods.

The impact of livelihood support on peace

The focus groups in Malakal town had no comment on livelihoods support as so few of them had experienced it. In the PoC there was a belief that livelihood support
reduced theft and cattle raiding as people were able to support themselves and reduced exposure to risk as people did not need to engage in survival sex, travel to collect firewood, food or water and send their children to work.

There have been reports of the misuse of some livelihoods support by community development committees established to oversee local-level projects. The distribution of water pumps in villages around Malakal had helped to improve irrigation for agricultural production. However, tensions had arisen around the management of water pumps which the research team believes results from a lack of knowledge about how to manage water resources effectively.

Uneven distribution of livelihoods support has created tensions. In the PoC, humanitarian actors report deliberately targeting youth with livelihoods support to prevent them from engaging in criminal or violent activities.

4.7 Rule of Law and Access to Justice

Rule of Law

In the PoC site, inhabitants want UNMISS to be responsible for security and rule of law. The Mission provides the inhabitants with a greater sense of security than they feel outside the camp. Through its human rights section, UNMISS also provides protection for human rights. There are also humanitarian organizations covering issues related to child protection, Gender Based Violence (GBV) and Housing, Land and Property (HLP). Community-based protection networks have been established in the PoC to help to communicate problems among the people to humanitarian organizations, raise awareness about specific issues and to promote inclusion. Until 13 August 2022 and the arrival of the newly displaced, protection trends were reported to be improving in the PoC camp.131 However, FGD participants complained that UNMISS did not deal with violence and disturbances inside the camp quickly or effectively enough.

In Malakal town, FGD participants reported feeling safe and that the government and the police provide security. The participants felt that they had been accepted by the town’s authorities and were not seen as outsiders. They stated that police and military patrols were important in providing security and rule of law. Neighbourhood problems could often be addressed by community leaders without the need to resort to the police. There was widespread awareness of the support available from humanitarian organizations for those who had experienced GBV. However, it was acknowledged that some women would be reluctant to report instances of GBV for fear of being stigmatized.

Access to Justice

In Malakal town, FGD participants said that the police and state justice systems offer access to justice. Lesser problems could be solved by a traditional leader or by local people at the neighbourhood level. Some participants stated they preferred to seek justice through the traditional rather than the state system. Other participants stated that the government should provide legal aid and access to lawyers.

In the PoC, although there was knowledge of statutory law among some FGD participants and a recognition among all participants that the government should provide justice, all participants preferred the mechanisms for seeking justice available in the camp provided by UNMISS, UNPOL and community police as well as the community-based committees and traditional leaders.

Impact of humanitarian assistance on rule of law and access to justice

There are very different views of rule of law and access to justice between inhabitants of the PoC site and displaced populations living in Malakal town. As those in the PoC fled to the UNMISS compound in search of safety from fighting in which government forces threatened civilians, it is unsurprising that UNMISS and humanitarian actors are regarded as the main providers

131 Information collected from humanitarian organizations operating in the PoC site, October 2022.
of rule of law and access to justice. They are also the ones who are criticised for shortcomings rather than the government or the national police.

The participants in the FGDs from Malakal town claim to have been welcomed by the state authorities which must positively impact their views on the state provision of rule of law and access to justice. Some international humanitarian staff working in Malakal expressed surprise that residents were positive about state security and justice as these institutions had often attacked or failed to protect citizens. Other town residents may have had different opinions. However, some humanitarian actors reported many displaced populations refused to return home unless government forces were present to provide security.

4.8 Social Cohesion and the Social Contract

Impact of humanitarian assistance on social cohesion

All focus group participants in Malakal town and PoC, despite their different ethnicities and experiences, agreed that social cohesion was stronger before independence than in 2022 and that the political elites were responsible for undermining social cohesion and deliberately dividing the population along ethnic lines. In the PoC there was also emphasis on the government’s failure to respect the state boundaries and land ownership from 1956. They cited the attempts to create more states and reallocate land to different ethnic groups as particularly damaging to social cohesion. Widespread displacement, especially of children outside national boundaries, had weakened social cohesion by disrupting social and family networks and intergenerational links.

Suggestions for improving social cohesion from research participants from Malakal town and PoC were also similar. They stated the need for strong leadership, improved security, including the graduation of unified forces, and state institutions that were inclusive and addressed the needs of everyone equally. There was a call for improved livelihood opportunities to reduce tensions around basic needs, dialogue and awareness raising to help to settle disputes and contribute to a shared understanding. A return to faith, intermarriage and cultural and sporting events were all seen as having the potential to strengthen social cohesion.

Focus group participants suggested ways in which humanitarian organizations could strengthen social cohesion. They believed that previously humanitarian organisations had tried to provide assistance equally to the people in Malakal town and in the PoC site. However, now the participants from Malakal town described the PoC inhabitants as VIPs and expressed a belief that the international community favours the Shilluk who are now the main inhabitants of the PoC site. They also said that they had been welcomed and promised support by the government in Malakal town as IDPs. This support had failed to materialise and, because they are registered as IDPs, they are seen primarily as the government’s responsibility and therefore receive less support from humanitarian organisations. Participants suggested greater coordination between humanitarian actors and the government would ensure a more even distribution of assistance within and between the town and the PoC. In the PoC camp, protection actors report trying to mainstream social cohesion through their interventions in an effort to reduce ethnic tensions.

Humanitarian actors argue that many IDPs are resilient and, despite their receipt of humanitarian assistance, still act independently. For example, UNHCR reports spontaneous returns of refugees and IDPs who negotiate long journeys through insecure and difficult terrain without external support driven by the belief that returning to their place of origin offers a better future than dependence on humanitarian assistance in a camp. Even in the Malakal PoC site, within a few days of arriving, IDPs had established small shops and cafes and improved their shelters. The IDPs arriving in August and September 2022 made an informed decision to travel to the PoC, believing it would be more secure than closer alternatives and provide greater access to services. However, some recent arrivals to the PoC complained that humanitarian assistance for them was poor compared to that of more established population groups and were considering leaving. Providing assistance can also help build resilience, as FGD participants believed that original PoC inhabitants had
greater resilience than newer arrivals because of the support provided while in the camp.

**Impact of humanitarian assistance on the social contract**

All participants said that the social contract was weaker in 2022 than before independence. They explained that the political elites had undermined social contract by inciting ethnic conflict, failing to provide rule of law, services and pay public sector staff despite high levels of taxation and widespread corruption. With the exception of the women’s FGD in Malakal town, which comprised women from the same rural area, all FGD participants understood tax; many had paid tax and believed that it was an important part of a functioning state. However, many complained about the high level of income tax at 20 percent and high levels of arbitrary tax on traders and daily livelihoods activities. For example, one man from the PoC site reported catching 15 fish from the river in one day and being forced by a local tax collector to hand over eight of those fish to pay the tax due.

FGD participants believed that efforts to strengthen the social contract had to come from the government and included improved leadership the promotion of a shared national identity and an end to the use of ethnicity as a political tool, improved security, the introduction of a fair and transparent taxation system with fixed and well-understood rates, the provision of services and the timely payment of public sector salaries.

**4.9 Conclusion**

It is apparent that despite the local level research being conducted in only four locations and each pair of locations being relatively close to each other, the people in those areas had experienced different levels of assistance. Therefore, it can be assumed that many of the remote areas in South Sudan would have had little experience of regular humanitarian assistance. It is also apparent that the state-citizen relationship is very different in Wau and Malakal. The local population in Wau and the surrounding area, although disillusioned with the state to a certain extent, believes that it is possible to achieve sustainable development and peace in cooperation with the state government. In Malakal, there is no expectation that the state is capable of meeting the population’s needs and the humanitarian sector has become the de facto government. However, the little attention that the government in each state had shown the populations seems to have had a significant impact, so even a low level but more consistent level of state engagement might help to strengthen the social contract.

The research shows that evenly distributed humanitarian assistance can have a positive impact on social cohesion, although greater care should be taken to ensure a gender balance in the distribution of assistance and to include youth. Livelihoods support, even relatively small and simple interventions, had had a positive impact on development, peace, well-being and self-esteem. A senior government official based in Juba noted the importance of livelihoods interventions to peace and security. They provide young men alternatives to joining criminal gangs and militias and protect women because they do not need to take risks, such as engaging in survival sex, to earn money. Where humanitarian assistance was perceived not to have been evenly distributed, tensions were reported. Sensitivity to social cohesion should be part of conflict sensitivity analysis.

The views of the population towards the state provision of security and rule of law in Wau, Bussere and Malakal town were relatively positive. This is consistent with observations of staff working in the assistance sectors. Given the levels of insecurity and the involvement of government entities in fighting, these views are surprising and further research is needed. However, it reflects the widely held view that the government should prioritize peace and security which were the findings of a 2021 survey. One of the main roles of traditional leaders is providing security and justice, which may influence how the population prioritizes what it sees as the government’s role.

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132 Deng, David et al., 2022
CHAPTER 5:

The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus and South Sudan

This section considers the challenges and opportunities presented by the HDP Nexus, the evolution of humanitarian assistance, the relationship between the Government and the international Community, and previous experiences of HDP initiatives in South Sudan. It considers the potential role of localization in a triple nexus approach to counter top-down externally driven technical approaches to statebuilding.

5.1 The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus

The Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus, also referred to as the triple nexus, is based on the assumption that combining humanitarian, development and peace interventions, particularly in complex settings of conflict and humanitarian needs, will lead to “greater and more sustained impact”. It is the latest iteration of approaches that attempt to maximize the positive outcomes of interventions by promoting coordination and integration through joint and complementary cross-sectoral programming. Its predecessors include: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD); Human Security; Stabilization; and Early Recovery.

The HDP nexus emerged from the 2016 United Nations Reform Agenda and New Ways of Working which initially pushed for greater integration of humanitarian and development interventions. Later in 2016, the dual United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Sustaining Peace Resolutions called for humanitarian and development interventions to address the root causes of conflicts through integrating peace and security interventions.

The UN views the nexus as a means to strengthen interventions across its different humanitarian, development and peace organizations, reflecting its emergence from a reform process to improve inter-agency coordination. However, the nexus approach can be operationalized in multiple ways; for example, through three organizations with expertise in each of the elements of the nexus, through a single entity with the necessary expertise to address each element of the nexus in a particular context, or through an individual programme specifically designed to tackle all three areas of the nexus. How interventions should be combined, whether through "collaboration, coordination, linkage, alignment, complementarity, operationality, reconfiguration, fusion, integration or joined-upness" is still being debated.

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133 Care, 2018
134 Hövelmann, 2020
135 Weishaupt, 2020
136 Dubois, 2020: 6
Text Box 5: Predecessors of the Triple Nexus

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

One of these early cross-sectoral approaches, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), emerged from experiences of responding to food insecurity in Africa in the 1980s. LRRD aimed to facilitate the transition from emergency relief to stability and long-term development.137

Human Security

Human security approaches were promoted through the 1994 Human Development Report and called for “freedom from fear, freedom from want,” and later also “freedom to live in dignity.” Human security advocates cross-sectoral interventions to reduce vulnerabilities and to strengthen peace, development, and human rights.138

Stabilization

Stabilization, initiated in Afghanistan and Iraq after the 9/11 attack and subsequent War on Terror, adopted a top-down approach to statebuilding with a significant international military presence to facilitate multiple interventions to promote stability, development and good governance that were considered mutually reinforcing.139 Although often poorly defined and understood, stabilization aims to bring a political settlement to conflict-affected populations.140 The emphasis on working towards a political solution has differentiated stabilization from humanitarian interventions, which adopt the principle of political neutrality.141 Since its inception, stabilization has evolved to become more inclusive and bottom-up with less emphasis on military intervention and more emphasis on local capacities and stakeholders.142 The use of the term ‘stabilization’ has also changed. At one time, non-governmental and non-military actors who would have shunned the term because of its association with Western military operations, now use it to describe their programmes. UNDP, for example, referred to its 2019 interventions to re-establish basic services lost in crises as stabilization programmes.143

Early Recovery

UNDP’s 2008 Early Recovery policy is another example of a nexus approach. It advocates for humanitarian, development and possibly peacekeeping partners to co-exist and interact to apply “development principles in humanitarian settings”. The policy specifically notes that early recovery is considered an effective approach in the context of conflict and natural disasters.144

According to Slim, the UN HDP nexus policy is driven by the belief that “development causes peace” and that “humanitarian action can help to cause development.”145 In isolation, the impact of humanitarian, development or peace interventions has limits. “Humanitarian action cannot prevent violent conflict, nor can it end humanitarian needs in the absence of political solutions to conflict.”146

137 Mosel and Levine, 2014
138 UNDP, 1994
139 USIP 2009; Stabilisation Unit 2014; Brown et al., 2011
140 Stabilisation Unit, 2008 & 2010
141 Barakat et al., 2010: 299
142 Barakat, and Milton, 2020; Department of Defence, 2018
143 UNDP, 2019
144 UNDP, 2008: 5
145 Slim, 2017
146 The Peace Promise, 2016
It is not intended to address the root causes of conflict and lack of developmental progress such as chronic vulnerabilities, intercommunal and political violence, and failing economic and development policies. Although the minimum standards of emergency assistance are often superior to those experienced by the recipients in their daily lives, which creates expectations and dependencies, and can impede the transition to locally-led development processes.

Conversely, development interventions aim to reduce poverty and inequalities by promoting long-term sustainable development. However, such interventions can rarely be mobilized rapidly in response to crises and may not address underlying problems that undermine development processes to achieve “transformative change.” Successful peace interventions to address root causes of conflict lead to sustainable security and stability only when supported by development interventions that bring transformative change. Despite the apparent logical, political science and ethical imperative for the triple nexus, in 2019, the OECD noted that there was little analysis of the effectiveness of the nexus as an approach or of the understanding of the causal relationship between the three nexus elements. In 2022, the OECD reported that, although analysis of the impact of nexus approaches has increased, challenges remain about how to measure both operational and strategic successes. It calls for greater investment in evaluations to inform nexus practices.

The triple nexus aims to move away from the siloed approach to improve the synergies between humanitarian, development, and peace interventions. Although in reality, there is already considerable overlap as organizations such as FAO, UNICEF, WFP, Care, Oxfam, and Save the Children are dual-mandated and implement both humanitarian and development interventions. Often the distinction between humanitarian and development interventions is blurred as humanitarian assistance regularly includes interventions to meet basic needs. Best practices also encourage forward planning within humanitarian assistance to build resilience and facilitate a transition to development. The Sphere Project was established to improve the quality of humanitarian assistance by setting minimum standards for humanitarian interventions. One of its principles states that relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meet basic needs. “Effective humanitarian response must address people’s needs holistically, and sectors should coordinate and collaborate with each other to do so. In the context of a protracted crisis, this may also expand beyond the humanitarian response with a need to work closely with development actors.”

Many would consider the difficulty in differentiating between humanitarian and development interventions as a positive. There are longstanding views that humanitarian assistance should aim to do more than immediate lifesaving and should be held to development standards with the intention that it contributes to long-term development and provides the “building blocks” for sustaining peace. Under the Global Humanitarian Cluster System there are immediate lifesaving interventions including food and shelter as well as interventions such as the provision of education, healthcare and livelihoods that, in line with the Sphere standards, and are intended to meet basic needs, particularly during protracted crises. Such interventions are arguably developmental as they have long-term and potentially sustainable impacts.

Humanitarian organizations in particular, but also development organizations, fear that the principles of humanity, impartiality, independence, and neutrality, derived from Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), will be compromised through their association with or participation in interventions intended to promote peace. Humanitarians argue that their ability to operate effectively, especially in conflict settings, relies on the perception that they are disinterested in political dynamics and focused on

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147 Anderson et al., 2012
148 UNRISD, 2016
149 Slim, 2017
150 OECD, 2019
151 OECD, 2022
152 Care, 2018; IASC, 2020; OECD, 2019; Slim, 2017
153 UN OCHA, 2020
154 The Sphere Project, 2018: 5
155 Anderson, 1999; Anderson and Woodrow, 1989; IASC, 2020: 2
156 UN OCHA, 2020
157 Slim, 2017
delivering humanitarian assistance to civilians. Yet, to operate in a particular country, humanitarian organizations are required to register with host governments that may be actively involved in a conflict and complicit in human rights abuses. Registration and subsequent operations for humanitarian organizations usually involve paying various government fees including income taxes levied on employees. Research conducted in 2020 by Hövelmann and Weishaupt working independently of each other, concluded that organizations differ in their understanding and application of humanitarian principles. Macrae contends that humanitarian organizations tend to exaggerate their ability to deliver principled aid. “Humanitarianism is always politicized, somehow,” as aid is delivered in highly challenging and politicized environments. IASC argues that collaboration among humanitarian, development and peace actors does not compromise humanitarian principles. Interventions by all three sectors should be grounded in human rights, aim to “do no harm” and be based on sound conflict analysis. IHL focuses on promoting the protection and survival of civilians, it does not proscribe a time limit or differentiate between humanitarian and development assistance. UN Resolutions such as 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security, for example, are consistent with a nexus approach and are already supported by organizations working across the nexus. Promoting IHL, Human Rights and specific Resolutions provides legitimate and acceptable entry points for organizations concerned about protecting humanitarian principles.

All sectors in South Sudan – humanitarian, development, and peace – clearly expressed their willingness to work together through a triple nexus approach. This is significant as there is often reluctance, particularly among the humanitarian sector, but also to some extent among development actors, to engage with peace actors for fear of compromising their humanitarian principles. On a practical level, humanitarian actors have been engaging with UNMISS. For example, convoys of humanitarian assistance are protected by UNMISS troops. Humanitarian organizations have delivered assistance for years inside the PoC camps established by UNMISS adjacent to their bases for civilians fleeing conflict. The South Sudan NGO forum comprises national and international humanitarian and development NGOs. It regularly meets government partners to discuss strategy and practical issues related to aid disbursement and programme implementation and is supportive of closer and more effective working relationships among the government, UN and NGO sector across the humanitarian, development, and peace sectors.

There is a recognition among UN, NGO and CSO humanitarian, development and peace actors, international donors, and the government that South Sudan is becoming increasingly, rather than less dependent on humanitarian assistance and making little progress towards sustainable development and peace. Therefore, it is imperative to adopt a different approach.

5.2 The Reasons for Protracted Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan

Most participants in this study, including those from government, international development, and peace organizations, argue that since the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan in 2013, humanitarian assistance has been vital to the survival of the population. Humanitarian actors have the ability to raise funds and deploy quickly in response to crises whereas development actors cannot. A few, mainly South Sudanese, with specific references to WFP’s reduction in food distribution, believe that a reduction in humanitarian assistance would force the Government and the people to rely on their own resources for survival which would demonstrate that the national capacity exists to support the population’s basic needs.

158 Hövelmann, 2020; Slim, 2017; Tronc et al., 2019
159 Hövelmann, 2020; Weishaupt 2020
160 Macrae, 2019: 4
161 Hugo Slim quoted in Craze, 2022
162 IASC, 2020a
163 Slim, 2017
164 Author’s experience working on stabilization and triple nexus programming with UNAMID in 2014, MONUSCO in 2015 and 2016, and UNITAMS in 2021.
A minority of stakeholders argued that the cycles of emergencies caused by conflict and natural disasters, meant that the context has not been conducive for effective development interventions. Therefore, it has been necessary to deliver humanitarian assistance over a long period of time. Conversely many stakeholders expressed the view that peace and development are mutually reinforcing and that such interventions are possible in an unstable context and while humanitarian assistance is ongoing.

Many humanitarian actors argued that humanitarian assistance is initially effective but that the quality deteriorates after a couple of years. It is apparent from OCHA’s monitoring of funding levels that donor fatigue has set in and humanitarian actors in South Sudan are having to do more with less. The ongoing reduction in funding means that humanitarian organizations cannot continue to operate at that current level, despite the widespread needs, so alternative sources of more sustainable support for the populations must be identified. The humanitarian sector is also beginning to push the Government, which it argues has funds, to respond to humanitarian needs.

Best practice for humanitarian action is that the transition to development interventions should be integrated into initial planning for humanitarian interventions. Many humanitarians admitted that the pressure to react quickly to a crisis and the ongoing pressure to continue to deliver while frequently lacking funding and human resources often resulted in transition plans being neglected. The humanitarian sector is overstretched. The HCT is still using the ToR from 2014. The humanitarian cluster system has vacant positions and individuals are fulfilling two or even three roles. OCHA reported that the humanitarian clusters had been asked to develop transition plans to facilitate the shift from humanitarian to development interventions.

Many from the international community expressed the view that humanitarians had been providing basic services for too long and that the development sector should have assumed responsibility for these some time ago. However, it was widely noted that there is a shortage of development actors. There was criticism of UNDP, particularly from international and government stakeholders, which scaled down rapidly at the start of the conflict and has yet to resume the post-independence period level of programming. Some UN staff expressed that UNDP, rather than taking a national-level decision, should have continued to operate in more stable areas, withdrawing only from heavily conflict-affected areas. They argued that UNDP investments before the outbreak of conflict to develop the capacity of government entities at the national and state level had been lost.

Various stakeholders also noted the lack of development funding for South Sudan. Donors are reluctant to invest in longer-term development interventions while South Sudan continues to be unstable, there is a lack of progress in implementing the Peace Agreement and corruption is rife. Double-mandated UN entities noted that they can secure funding for humanitarian activities more easily than for development activities. Humanitarians also expressed frustration about the nature of the funding they receive. Very often, they are required to disburse large sums of money over a period of a few months. They argue that the only way they can do this is to deliver humanitarian assistance that has little sustainability. Humanitarian actors argue that if they were given the same amount of funding but permitted to spend it over a longer period of time, they could provide more effective assistance that would facilitate longer-term development.

National NGOs and CSO were particularly critical of short-term interventions that lack tangible inputs. Many have been involved in awareness-raising programmes to promote local-level peacebuilding and social cohesion or to deliver civic education. Such short-term programmes often highlight underlying tensions and latent conflicts without providing the funding and resources to address them and tackle the root causes. South Sudanese cynically note that interventions that revolve around talking are cheap and that, although discussions may be successful in identifying and understanding problems, they must be followed up with long-term interventions that have tangible inputs and invariably require much more significant funding than dialogue.

135 UN OCHA, 2020
5.3 Operationalizing the Triple Nexus

Despite the generally positive response among all stakeholders to adopting a triple nexus approach, there were no clear views about how the different humanitarian, development and peace interventions should be prioritized and sequenced and few recognized examples of the approach being used in South Sudan. Senior figures from the NGO sector reported that the HDP nexus approach seemed to be a UN initiative from which non-UN stakeholders were excluded. However, they are also keen to explore new approaches and were positive about the potential of the triple-hatted DSRSG/HC/RC to bring together the different nexus actors.

Many UN staff were unclear about what a triple nexus approach would involve and how it could be implemented. They felt that there had been a lack of leadership, clear vision and strategy for adopting a nexus approach within the UN system. Very few were aware of the collective outcomes which were intended to draw together UN entities from across the nexus. They were, however, aware of another initiative - the Partnership for Recovery and Resilience (PFRR) – promoted as a nexus approach but were vague about its design and implementation. However, many saw the appointment of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) for UNMISS, who is also the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Resident Coordinator (RC), as an effective way to bring together the UN peace, humanitarian, and development stakeholders.

Coordinating the Nexus

Despite the existence of dual mandate organizations, the blurring of humanitarian and development interventions and the provision of basic needs under the humanitarian cluster system, organizational structures, mandates, operating principles, and funding streams often create or reinforce divisions. There is no established mechanism to coordinate across the nexus so that each sector can maintain a watching brief which might provide insights into opportunities for cooperation. Large-scale, multi-sectoral UN operations illustrate structural divisions in providing assistance through the different organizational structures, strategies, objectives, and reporting lines of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and the UN political and peacekeeping missions. The appointment of the triple hatted DSRSG for South Sudan is intended to help overcome these structural obstacles.

- **The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)** includes UN entities and local and international NGOs that provide humanitarian assistance. They are organized according to the humanitarian cluster system to coordinate specific interventions focused on the needs of the civilian population, such as nutrition, shelter, health, and education. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) headed by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) facilitates the organization and funding of the humanitarian sector through leading the multi-partner Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). The HCT reports to the UN General Assembly.

- **United Nations Country Team (UNCT)**, led by the Resident Coordinator (RC), works to implement the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (USDCF), which is developed jointly by the UN and the host government. The Cooperation Framework must articulate the UN’s “collective response” and “embody the spirit of partnerships” with the host government and all stakeholders, including parliament, civil society, academia, and local and international NGOs. The RC reports to the UN Secretary-General. NGOs are not included in the UNCT, although they are implementing partners for many developmental UN AFPs.
• The United Nations Security Council mandates UN Political and Peacekeeping Missions to assist the member-state host government to achieve stability and security through support for governance and rule of law, and in the case of peacekeeping missions, through the provision of troops. Missions are led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and include the protection of civilians (PoC) and the promotion of human rights as part of their mandate. The composition and interventions of each mission are guided by their individual mandates, which outline their key objectives. The SRSG reports to the UN Secretary-General.

The humanitarian cluster system provides a relatively effective means of coordinating humanitarian action and is a well-established and recognized system that operates at multiple levels. There is also an inter-cluster coordination group that facilitates coordination across the cluster systems. The working groups for the development sector are less effective. There is no specific mechanism for coordinating peace actors, although there is a lot of research being conducted on the peace and conflict dynamics in South Sudan and many national NGOs working on issues related to social cohesion, violence reduction and awareness raising about social and political rights. In fact, there is no repository or systematic review of research analysing the conflicts in South Sudan. To ensure localization into the peace pillar, analysis of conflict dynamics and ethnographic research must be used effectively.

There is no effective mapping of stakeholders and the different interventions. During the primary research for this study, two relevant initiatives were identified: The Inter-Cluster Coordination Group is mapping the cluster system stakeholders and, as mentioned above, there is a mapping of the rule or law/access to justice stakeholders.

Implementing Nexus Programmes

Many stakeholders noted that the UN tends to have a limited view of the nexus approach and sees it as a means of coordinating the three different nexus actors, with each focused on one element of the nexus. In reality, there are many ways to implement a nexus programme. For example:

One programme, three nexus partners

Caritas Switzerland is working with partners to implement an area-based nexus programme located in the South Sudan-Uganda border region to promote gender-equitable access and natural resource management. With three national partners, each with expertise to cover a different nexus element, the programme aims to meet the immediate humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable, promote resilient and sustainable livelihoods and build local capacities to address conflicts related to natural resources. Caritas reports that, along with its partners, it had to invest time in understanding and developing the programme design to be able to implement different elements of the nexus simultaneously and to accept the risk that progress would not necessarily be linear. Therefore, the programme incorporated a six-month inception phase during which programme stakeholders were able to internalize the triple nexus approach and build capacity in gender and conflict sensitivity to develop a shared vision.

One organization, complementary interventions across the nexus

Another approach is one adopted by WFP. As a double-hatted organization it provides emergency food assistance and support to livelihoods to enable people to meet their basic needs. In addition, WFP works with government entities to build governance capacity and technical expertise. This study conceptualizes governance under the peace element of the nexus.

One intervention, three nexus outcomes

The nature of mine action, which is designed to mitigate the impact of explosive hazards, means that it is a humanitarian intervention, implemented as part of the protection cluster, and mandated by a humanitarian treaty. In practice, it reduces the immediate threat to life, promotes development because land is released for productive use and access and mobility improve, and
contributes to peace by ensuring routes are clear for peacekeeping patrols and are safe for use by returnees.

Although the UN advocates nexus approaches, it has little experience of implementing them in South Sudan and, unfortunately, no real documentation of successes or lessons learned from the nexus or nexus-like interventions to date.

**Protection of Civilian Sites – evolving nexus approach**

Initially intended as a short-term response to protect civilians from immediate threat to life, the protection of civilians’ camps established by UNMISS have been managed through a nexus approach. Although not generally identified by the UN as a nexus approach, the PoC involves entities from across the nexus implementing activities under each nexus element. UNMISS has provided security and physical protection for the inhabitants and liaised with Government about the management of the camps, although the Government cannot enter them without permission. Lifesaving assistance was provided initially by humanitarian actors, followed by services to meet basic needs and, as the situation became protracted, the same organizations, some of which are dual-mandated, have also supported livelihoods development.

**Collective Outcomes**

Collective Outcomes were developed by the UN as a means to bring together humanitarian, development, and peace actors to address issues over multiple years from different perspectives with the intention of achieving better outcomes. The following Collective Outcomes were agreed for South Sudan:

- Reduction in the food insecurity during the lean season;
- Improved response to GBV;
- Reduction in flood displacement.

However, few study participants from UN entities were aware of the collective outcomes and, those that were, reported that after the first year, they had not been followed and that there was no documentation recording interventions intended to contribute to the collective outcomes and no monitoring of their progress. OCHA argues that the nature of the collective outcomes means that UN entities automatically contribute to them through their programmes although there is no systematic monitoring of collective outcomes.

The same collective outcomes have underpinned the 2023-2025 Cooperation Framework.

**Partnership for Recovery and Resilience**

The Partnership for Recovery and Resilience (PfRR) was an attempt to operationalize the nexus in South Sudan and to bring together humanitarian, development, and peace actors from among donors, UN entities and NGOs. Initiated in 2018, the area-based programme promoted integrated assistance through community-based delivery mechanisms focused on four interrelated outcomes.

1. re-establish access to basic services
2. rebuild trust in people, among communities, and in institutions
3. restore productive capacities;
4. nurture effective partnerships among humanitarian, development, and peace actors.

PfRR was designed to be community-driven instead of being imposed from above and aimed to address immediate humanitarian needs as well as to support the recovery of the productive sector as the foundation for resilience and recovery. The geographical areas identified for PfRR initiatives, Aweil, Torit, Wau, Yambio, fulfilled the following criteria:

- Commitment among local partners to organize themselves for engagement;
- Existing footprint and inclusive engagement by partners among local authorities and civil society;
- Potential to leverage resources for impact;
- Local ownership and commitment to peace and recovery.

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169 IASC, 2020b
170 For full details see UN OCHA, 2022: 86
171 PfRR n.d.
Among study participants, there was a perception that the programme had drifted during the pandemic. Initially, organizations were encouraged to contribute to the outcomes voluntarily drawing on their expertise and resources—there was no overarching coordination mechanism or detailed strategy. Implementing partners at the state level expressed frustration at their country offices in Juba for failing to respond to proposals and support resource mobilization resulting in a loss of enthusiasm for the PfRR. It was felt that some organizations were unwilling to coordinate across the humanitarian, development, and peace sectors. Despite these negative views, there has been support for reviewing and revitalizing the PfRR as it is believed to have the potential for nexus programming if coordination can be strengthened. There was also support for the area-based approach. It allows stakeholders to focus on locations where they feel interventions are more likely to be effective and to adopt bottom-up approaches that actively engage local populations. This is considered an important counterbalance to high-level and top-down interventions accompanying statebuilding initiatives and is compatible with the localization agenda.

However, it is important that interventions occur at multiple levels, especially if statebuilding is an objective as an effective state needs effective working relations between the different governance levels. Furthermore, humanitarian, development, and peace issues at the local level in South Sudan are linked to Juba. Critics argue that local-level peacebuilding overlooks the role of “national elites” who are “pulling the strings,” which makes it difficult to resolve conflicts at the subnational level without engaging the centre. Interventions to improve natural resource management among the people on the South Sudan-Uganda border are unlikely to be sustainable if government policies and legislation do not underpin such initiatives.

The PfRR has been relaunched as the Partnership for Peace, Recovery and Resilience - PfPRR. Unfortunately, there has been no systematic evaluation of the original PfRR to inform the design and implementation of its second incarnation.

The PfPRR has three focus area which are linked to the original collective outcomes. Each focus area has a task team comprising relevant stakeholders:

- Climate Action and Flooding: co-led by the International Organization for Migration and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office of the United Kingdom
- Food Security and Agriculture: co-led by FAO and WFP
- Support for Durable Solutions to Internal Displacement: co-led by UNDP and IO NGOs were critical of their initial exclusion from the relaunched PfPRR but are now being involved. It is likely that the UN and donors will contract INGOs to implement programmes in partnership with national NGOs. The active inclusion of local NGOs is important for localization processes and the execution of a successful exit strategy.

The development of the PfPRR has been prolonged because staff have other priorities. If it is intended that the PfPRR and other statebuilding/nexus programmes are a priority this must be reflected in the funding and staff levels. Task groups have been established for PfPRR but these seem to comprise individuals who already have a heavy workload and it is unclear how much time they will have to devote to the PfPRR. Within the Office of the DSRSG, there are plans to create an integrated office that would draw together representatives from across the nexus. Such complex interventions cannot be managed by staff in their spare time.

The PfPRR is under development and the three task teams are planning to present their joint proposals early in 2023.

**Pockets of Hope**

Pockets of Hope is a UNHCR initiative launched in response to the high numbers of spontaneous refugee
returns from neighbouring countries. It adopts an area-based approach to support returnee and host populations and focuses on relatively stable locations in South Sudan led by government officials who have expressed support for the initiative and political will to work with the international community. The programme comprises a range of activities to address immediate and long-term needs, ensure inclusivity and promote resilience and stability. The Ministry of Housing, Land and Planning confirmed that it is helping to identify and confirm locations for returnees.

Pockets of Hope is being initiated in seven states. Implementation in Torit in Eastern Equatoria was disrupted by pastoralists unexpectedly moving to the area because of flooding in Bor in Jonglei state. High-level discussions with local stakeholders have contained the situation and the Pockets of Hope initiative will go ahead. This experience highlights the need for flexibility in nexus approaches and also the importance of mainstreaming localization to ensure effective working relationships with influential individuals. It was also possible to build on the work of the FAO in analysing cattle migration and facilitating conferences with farmers to agree on migration routes. This demonstrates the need for good contextual knowledge and analysis to support the peace part of the nexus.

Experience from other contexts has shown that community-driven development interventions, such as PfPRR and Pockets of Hope, can help to foster more bottom-approaches and improve local ownership and state-citizen relations although results have been mixed, particularly in the area of service delivery. Therefore, interventions must be based on detailed contextual analysis and understanding and have a rigorous theory of change which has explicit objectives and considers realistic causal pathways. The purpose of these programmes must be clear and universally understood. For example, if they are intended to support statebuilding this must be clearly articulated and understood by all stakeholders.174

Nexus Funding Modalities

There are various options for funding the nexus. As responses to the PoC sites demonstrate, organizations can work together adopting a nexus approach while drawing on their usual funding streams. Interventions such as mine action, which have a nexus impact, often have access to specific funding streams to respond to civilians needs. UN missions allocate part of their assisted budget to mine action to support of mission objectives. Caritas responded to a call for proposals that specifically required a nexus approach. However, there are challenges to funding nexus programmes such as the PfPRR. Nexus interventions require flexible multi-year funding that can be repurposed rapidly depending on need. Often bi-lateral donors have specific budget lines for the different elements of nexus programming that have been determined by longstanding political and legal domestic frameworks which may be difficult to change. Other funding mechanisms, such as trust funds, might feasibly provide funding across the nexus have to be negotiated, established, and administered among key stakeholders. Options being considered for PfPRR include:

- Using the pre-existing management and oversight mechanisms of the Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Reconciliation, Stabilization and Resilience (RSRTF) and creating a specific window to fund the PfPRR;
- Creating a dedicated nexus fund which has been proposed by the Dutch Embassy in Juba;
- Accessing the Peacebuilding Fund for nexus programmes that are jointly agreed by the Government and UN;
- Following the PoC model and encouraging work across the nexus with entities accessing specific budget lines relevant to their core activities.

Another challenge in funding the nexus is the level of risk. It requires multi-year funding for longer-term interventions in unstable contexts meaning that outcomes are less predictable and may fail to yield the intended results. It can be difficult for donors to commit to long-term funding in fragile environments that still require high levels of humanitarian funding. There will be emergencies requiring flexible programming and

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174 UNHCR, 2022c
175 King, 2015; Saguin, 2018 in Barakat and Milton, 2020: 6
Humanitarian Assistance and Statebuilding in Conflict-affected South Sudan

funding. Although, some development actors have emphasized the need to protect development funds because transferring the funding to humanitarian activities would impede development processes and extend the need for humanitarian assistance.

Individual organizations including WFP and UNHCR, have initiated multi-year strategies in South Sudan for the first time in recognition that the goals they wish to achieve are complex and demand long-term focus and continuity. WFP has extended its three-year strategy to 15 years. Any organizations engaging in nexus approach, including humanitarian organizations, need to adopt longer-term planning if they are to contribute to stability and work towards a transition to development. This would require incorporating emergency responses into ongoing interventions that have long-term goals. The cycles of emergences in South Sudan have demonstrated that organizations can respond quickly with lifesaving responses, but they need to be able to maintain their longer-term interventions at the same time. This requires a mentality shift among some humanitarian organizations and a willingness from donors to provide the necessary funding.

Nexus Prioritizing and Sequencing

The different stakeholders in the triple nexus have different mandates, objectives, working practices, expertise, planning horizons and access to funding. The demands on development organizations to justify their planned interventions before they can secure funding means that their timelines and lead times are longer than those for humanitarian organizations. Determining how to prioritize and sequence nexus interventions in a context such as South Sudan where there are competing needs requires analysis and planning and a willingness to be flexible across the nexus. Lead times for development programming must be considered. Initiatives funded by the RSRFT, which comprised humanitarian and development interventions found that the development elements of the programme were not ready in time to succeed the humanitarian. In future the RSRFT will allow a longer lead time to ensure a timely transition from humanitarian to development activities.

5.4 Fragility and Localization

In the early 2000s, following a reassessment of international security threats posed by what have become known as “fragile states”, interventions shifted from a primarily humanitarian response to natural disasters and conflict towards comprehensive approaches intended to address instability and insecurity through peacebuilding and governance interventions, in addition to humanitarian needs. These large-scale interventions have been led by the international community and implemented by international stakeholders adopting a predominately top-down approach in contrast to earlier conventions of best practice to promote bottom-up community-led initiatives that sought to develop existing, contextually appropriate capacities rather than imposing external solutions. The concept of fragile states has elicited international responses focused on human security, peacebuilding and statebuilding to promote sustainable development.\(^\text{176}\) The OECD defines fragility as a “combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacities of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks” across “economic, environmental, political, security, societal and human” dimensions.\(^\text{177}\) In 2022, the OECD ranked South Sudan as the second most fragile state in the world.\(^\text{178}\)

Critics argue that the fragile state concept led to an over-emphasis on the technical and bureaucratically imposed processes of creating state structures and powers while overlooking more complex issues and ignoring the importance of the “state-citizen paradigm”.\(^\text{179}\) Similar criticism have been made about international interventions in South Sudan.\(^\text{180}\) In recent years, in the light of disappointing results in so-called fragile states, there has been a re-evaluation of technical and internationally imposed approaches. The adoption of resilience approaches from the disaster response sector into international assistance, has refocused attention on supporting and enhancing existing

\(^{176}\) Barakat, and Larson, 2013; Brown et al., 2011
\(^{177}\) OECD, 2022b
\(^{178}\) OECD, 2022b
\(^{179}\) Barakat, and Larson, 2013; Brown et al., 2011
\(^{180}\) Jok, 2011; Bromley, 2019
individual, community, and institutional capacities to recover from shocks, crises, violence or conflict which has helped to redress the balance between top-down and bottom-up approaches. Therefore, the resilience ideology and beliefs underpinning the localization agenda. As resilience approaches are promoted in conflict settings and aim to link immediate responses with longer-term interventions, it is consistent with the HDP nexus. At the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, localization was declared a major issue and the approach “as local as possible, as international as necessary” was given a renewed impetus.

While generally accepted as best practice, localization is not a panacea and presents conceptual and operational challenges. Power dynamics are usually skewed in favour of international actors. Traditional practices and cultural heritage may challenge the objectives of international actors so compromises must be identified. Local should not be conflated with “good” – they are not necessarily synonymous. To understand the merits of “local” in a particular context, it is necessary to differentiate between non-government and governmental, national and grassroots actors and to understand their motivations, allegiances, ideologies and whether they have been complicit in conflict and human rights abuses. Critics of localization question whether national actors can deliver assistance impartially, particularly during conflict. While recognizing that such fears may be legitimate, Barakat and Milton argue that international actors are not immune to political influence and so can also lack impartiality.

At the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, it was agreed that 25 percent of humanitarian aid would be transferred directly to local actors by 2020. Unfortunately, the decision to fund local organizations directly has dominated the localization debate and distracted from other aspects of localization. Views differ about the importance and feasibility of direct transfers to local actors. Donors and UN entities are criticized for shifting implementation from international to local and national organizations because they view it as cost-effective. Local and national organizations feel under pressure to reduce costs and report resorting to negative coping mechanisms to keep their costs down. Consequently, many argue that localization has been reduced to a transactional relationship between national and international actors and lacks longer-term financial commitments that would enable effective partnerships to be developed that support capacity building and knowledge exchange.

Despite the challenges, it is argued that integrating localization approaches into each pillar of the nexus facilitates bottom-up approaches and leads to better outcomes in conflict-affected areas. For example, in the humanitarian sector, research has shown that the context-appropriate knowledge of local actors produces more effective humanitarian interventions. As many humanitarian settings have become more violent, international organizations have relied on local organizations to deliver assistance as they are better able to negotiate access. Without local partners, international assistance could not have been delivered. Barakat and Milton maintain that poor development outcomes stem from a lack of meaningful engagement of local populations and the imposition of what the international community regards as appropriate solutions. Localization of the peace pillar should harness ethnographic research to identify local peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms that resonate with the conflict-affected populations and are inclusive of local actors rather than imposing alien external approaches. At the same time, it is important to recognize that local approaches have limits, especially as conflict tends to disrupt traditional mechanisms. Similarly, statebuilding interventions should be grounded in local ownership and promote endogenous systems and structures while recognizing the need for support through external security.

185 Barakat and Milton, 2020
186 Barbelet, 2018
187 European Commission, 2021
188 Tanner and Moro, 2016; Ward 2020; and Healy and Tiller in Barakat and Milton, 2020
189 Hamsik, Lindsay, 2019: 13 and views expressed by study participants
190 Barakat and Milton, 2020
191 Tanner and Moro, 2016; Ward 2020; and Healy and Tiller in Barakat and Milton, 2020: 3
guarantees and resources. Brown et al. have termed such approaches as hybrid because they attempt to combine traditional and Western structures to create a state that is appropriate for developing countries emerging from conflict. The challenge is to determine how Western and traditional governance structures should be combined and how to balance the two.

Improved communications between headquarters and field offices have resulted in “off-the-shelf” initiatives rather than drawing on the expertise of national actors or even respecting the insights of international field staff. There are local capacities among NGOs, CSOs, faith-based organizations, government institutions, academia, professional classes and local “know-how” developed through experience and tradition. In conflict and post-conflict recovery contexts, not all local actors have the capacity or expertise to respond at all stages of the conflict or the recovery phase. Nevertheless, local capacities should be supported and nurtured to build long-term national and local resilience.

5.5 Experiences of Localization in South Sudan

To understand the dynamics of localization in South Sudan and how they might support a nexus approach intended to promote statebuilding that balances top-down and bottom-up interventions, the views of mainly South Sudanese working for think tanks, NGOs and CSOs have been sought and are summarized in this section.

The focus on Juba and the national level has resulted in a lack of understanding of the different contexts throughout the country and an assumption that a project designed in Juba can be implemented without tailoring it to the local contexts. Simultaneously, it is seldom fully appreciated that the root causes of political and ethnic tensions are often found in Juba. Therefore, conflict must be addressed at multiple levels, not just locally, if sustainable resolutions are to be found.

Conflict dynamics in South Sudan are complex and dynamic and ongoing analysis of specific geographical regions is necessary to understand each specific context. At the sub-national level, participants in this study identified three main causes of conflict: tensions between pastoralists and farmers or more sedentary populations, particularly over access to water and grazing land; cattle raiding; and land disputes. Conflict and climate change have forced pastoralists to alter migration routes bringing them into contact with farmers in different geographical locations or at different times of the year without the traditional mechanisms to manage the farmer-pastoralist relationship. These views on conflict are consistent with findings from a 2021 survey of over 2,000 people.

Urban, secure, and easily accessible areas have been favoured for interventions over rural, insecure, and remote areas. This creates uneven levels of development, particularly as remote areas that are already less well-developed. It also means that it is likely that the international community and possibly some South Sudanese are unaware of the needs across the country.

There has been a failure to engage effectively with traditional leaders and local-level influential figures who have both the power to support and disrupt programmes. Organizations should develop a more sophisticated understanding of the role of these individuals and introduce additional oversight mechanisms because, in some instances, local leaders and influential community members have been involved in diverting assistance to their friends and relatives.

There are different views about levels of dependency among the South Sudanese. OLS was criticised for creating a dependency culture, but others argued that, rather than dependency, it was a misunderstanding of traditional coping mechanisms. Today some stakeholders also argue that accessing assistance is a form of resilience that is being misinterpreted as dependency. If humanitarian organizations are providing services not available elsewhere, it is natural that people try to access these services for as long as

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193 Barakat and Milton, 2020: 9
194 Brown et al., 2011
195 Barakat and Milton, 2020: 4
196 Barblet, 2008
197 Deng, David et al., 2022
198 Maxwell et al., 2014
possible. Evidently, analysis is needed to determine what is dependency and what is resilience so that programmes can be effectively designed to avoid creating a dependency culture and to strengthen resilience.

In relation to the above, there should be more research into effective community-based development programmes. National staff from the aid sector note that they are rarely sustainable unless communities are actively involved in developing and implementing programs. This means that consultations with communities without meaningful engagement tend to result in poor programming. Furthermore, asking communities to donate money and/or materials to a programme as well as their time had better sustainable outcomes than asking communities to give their labour alone.

International organizations must be realistic about the capacity of national organisations and develop effective means of developing their capacity and agreeing on milestones for an exit. There needs to be a shared understanding of localization. Currently, international donors and organizations tend to focus on cost-effectiveness. For many national organizations, localization simply means direct funding. In fact, the aims of localization should be to strengthen national capacity so that it is sustainable and to ensure that national expertise and knowledge inform interventions so that they are appropriate.

In conflict and sensitive environments, local and national organizations often have better access than international organizations, but this exposes them to greater risks, especially as they lack the security analysis and apparatus of international organizations. The localization agenda allows risk-averse international organizations to transfer exposure to risks to national partners without funding the safety and security measures that would be employed for international staff.

Text Box 6: Aid Worker Deaths in South Sudan

South Sudan is one of the most dangerous places in the world for aid workers. Since the war broke out in 2013, at least 130 aid workers have been killed while on duty, the majority of whom were South Sudanese. Data from January 2020 to July 2022 shows that the death rate among national staff and national organizations is significantly higher than among international staff and international organizations.

There is a greater need to learn from local-level and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and from successful national organisations. For example, the South Sudan Council of Churches and the South Sudan Islamic Council cooperate and report that there are currently no religious tensions in the country. Both organizations work across the nexus, with people of both faiths and with all ethnic groups. Analysis of the SSCC concluded that through its programmes which include welfare and education, it has credibility among the population, allowing it to engage in peacebuilding. It is reasonable to assume that the Islamic Council is viewed in a similar way. An international study participant noted that the SSCC community-driven initiatives seem more successful than initiatives by international actors.

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199 Barakat and Milton, 2020
200 Hamsik, Lindsay, 2019
201 Care, 2022
202 Human Rights Watch 2022b
203 Aid Worker Security Database January 2020-July 2022
204 Njaastad, 2022
CHAPTER 6:
Looking Forward: A Triple Nexus Approach to Statebuilding

This section discusses how the four thematic areas of statebuilding interact to contribute to the development of a strong, functional state and positive state-citizen relations and then looks at how humanitarian assistance has interacted with these functions of state and statebuilding. It then considers the proposition that the adoption of the triple nexus approach might contribute to statebuilding and provides recommendations about how this might be done.

6.1 Key Aspects of Statebuilding
Statebuilding is an ongoing process that is shaped by the history and experiences of the state and its citizens. To function effectively, a state must have a minimum administrative capacity at all levels of government, clear divisions of roles and responsibilities, and effective communication and coordination across all levels of government and between all levels of government.  

Public Services
Delivery of public services including health, education, water and sanitation, social services, and provision and maintenance of infrastructure to facilitate access and mobility, are generally regarded as areas of state responsibility and "effective and equitable delivery of services" reinforces the state’s "legitimacy" and strengthens the statebuilding process. Provisions of these services help to ensure a fit and healthy population that has increased capacity and access to the necessary resources to contribute to the economic and social well-being of the country and the people around them. Fair and equitable access to services helps to maintain stability and security.

The Economy
Effective state management of the economy and collection of revenue is fundamental to a viable state as it enables the state to fund services for its citizens. “Tax revenues are considered the only means to achieve sustainable government financing and support inclusive governance over the long term.” Evidence suggests that revenue from natural resources and ODA do not have the same development impacts as tax revenue and “reduce the incentive to invest in fiscal capacity”. Income tax revenues create a transactional relationship between the citizen and the state that forces the state to engage with the population and respond to its demands continuously. Other forms of revenue do not empower citizens to call the government to account or require the government to be accountable. Data compiled by the UN University suggests that a tax-to-GDP ratio of 15 percent is the minimum taxation contribution of GDP required to achieve an effective functioning state and economic development.

The state is responsible for facilitating income generation and livelihoods opportunities. Meaningful economic opportunities for the population are essential

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205 OECD, 2008
206 Bromley, 2019
207 OECD, 2008: 2; UNDP, 2022: 59
208 UNDP, 2022: 59
209 Thompson, 2013, Financing in Fragile Contexts in OECD, 2022
210 Besley and Mueller 2021
211 Bromley, 2019
212 UN University, Government Revenue Dataset, 2021 in OECD, 2022
to achieving peace. Investment in income generation and livelihoods includes the provision of safe and secure infrastructure, effective communication and mobility, training and education, and access to services, all of which facilitate the economic engagement of the population. For those unable to generate an adequate income, the provision of social protection for vulnerable groups redistributes the wealth collected by the state and contributes to peace.

Access to Justice and Rule of Law

Mechanisms and institutions to administer justice and maintain rule of law are part of the state’s responsibility to provide safety and security for its populations, ensure that all are equal before the law, and have their human rights respected regardless of their demographic or socioeconomic group. The state and rule of law are mutual, inclusive and interdependent. Rule of law exists where the “ruler and the ruled respect the legal rules that govern the relationships.” Provision of security and justice is essential to creating a stable state in which the population feels safe and free to conduct daily life. In the aftermath of conflict, security brings hope and a “commitment to a common future.” Belief in the prospect of peace “helps to generate momentum for transitional processes” and to promote political engagement among the population. Peace processes are credible only if security and stability for the civilian populations improve.

Social Cohesion and the Social Contract

The social contract and social cohesion are essential to effective statebuilding and to achieving peace and stability. The social contract is enacted through the provision of services, the economy, government revenue including tax contributions from citizens, and state and citizen respect for rule of law. The citizens and the state have mutual responsibilities and the provision of services by the state and the payment of taxes by the people should reinforce those responsibilities continuously.

The social contract and social cohesion are closely linked. The Council of Europe defines social cohesion as “the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding polarisation.” Social cohesion involves state action to redistribute wealth and resources through social protection interventions to protect the most vulnerable and human rights for all to ensure an inclusive society. The state should manage the economy, promote macro-economic development and protect the right to work because good economic foundations and performance help to promote social cohesion. The structure of the state from the national level to the subnational and local levels, and the management of resources among these different levels, affect the ability of state institutions to fulfil their roles and to contribute to social cohesion. In addition to the state intervention to promote social cohesion, public and private institutions must be committed to social responsibility.

Social cohesion must also be promoted at the grassroots level and is often seen as a part of peacebuilding among conflict-affected populations. UNDP promotes social cohesion as a tool to prevent conflict-escalation, as a vital component of post-conflict and post-crisis recovery, and as a prerequisite for long-term stability, social well-being, and development. WFP links social cohesion with conflict sensitivity and uses it to prevent conflict and promote stability. WFP has focused on promoting social cohesion at the local level. Through analysis and a better understanding of the effect of food and cash distribution programmes on social cohesion among forcibly displaced and host populations in Bangladesh, Lebanon and Turkey, WFP has shaped interventions to maximize their positive impact.

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213 Deng et al., 2021
214 Bromley, 2019
215 UNDP, 2022: 59
216 Plunkett, 2005:76
217 Salomons, 2005: 19
218 Deng, David et al., 2022: 5
220 Council of Europe, 2004: 3
221 Council of Europe, 2004: 10
222 UNDP, 2020b: 17
223 WFP, 2021
224 WFP, 2021
225 ODI, 2020
226 WFP, 2017
Social cohesion requires individuals and institutions to be tolerant and to respect diversity. They must have a sense of belonging and mutual responsibility. Through formal education, the family and social networks, younger generations should be taught about and socialized into the concept of social cohesion to strengthen and perpetuate feelings of belonging and responsibility to others. At the grassroots level, in addition to equitable distribution of resources and access to services, people also understand social cohesion as the extent to which interpersonal and inter-communal relationships are positive and the levels of informal cooperation and goodwill among the population contribute to the greater good.

The promotion of social cohesion is both a state and citizen endeavour with vertical and horizontal dynamics. It requires trust in government and society and willingness to engage in "a shared vision of sustainable peace and common development goals." It is promoted and supported through official policies and informally through citizens in their daily lives and how they behave towards one another. It is a tool that international actors can use to promote stability and security because economic growth makes it easier to achieve social cohesion. The provisions of services, livelihood opportunities, access to justice and rule of law and the collection of income taxes and redistribution of wealth all contribute to statebuilding by promoting development, economic growth and stability. As the state provides for its people and state functions become more efficient and transparent "a virtuous cycle of legitimacy" is created. The technical aspects of statebuilding are complemented by social cohesion and the social contract, which contribute to a sense of nationhood and belonging. There are criticisms that the international community has overlooked nationhood as part of its statebuilding interventions. The four key thematic areas of statebuilding examined in this study are inextricably linked and all must be addressed for South Sudan to move from conflict and dependency on international assistance to stability and internally driven sustainable development processes.

6.2 Humanitarian Assistance and Statebuilding

Humanitarian assistance in South Sudan is designed to save lives and meet basic needs. The study focused on interventions to provide education, health and water and sanitation services, cash assistance and livelihoods support, and protection in relation to access to justice and rule of law to explore how these interacted with development, peace, social cohesion and the social contract and statebuilding.

Institutional Capacity Development

According to study participants and a 2022 UNDP report, it seems that over the decades, the active involvement of Government institutions in the management and implementation of internationally supported and financed services has decreased. This has reduced the mutual interdependence of the Government and the aid sector to the detriment of assistance, institutional capacity development, the social contract and statebuilding. High levels of corruption account for donor reluctance to fund initiatives directly through the Government. It is less clear why the involvement of Government institutions in the delivery of assistance has declined since the 1980s. However, the decline in Government involvement in the delivery of assistance since independence can be attributed to the switch from humanitarian to development assistance and the disruption caused by the conflict and, in some instances, the imperative to protect humanitarian space.

Lack of material and financial resources is a significant impediment to the active participation of Government entities in the delivery of assistance.

Government institutions that liaise with the humanitarian sector and facilitate humanitarian interventions have high levels of human capacity. This research has not determined whether the high level of capacity has been developed with active support from the humanitarian sector or whether, in response to
demands to facilitate humanitarian assistance, South Sudanese institutions have developed the capacities themselves.

It is not expected that humanitarian organizations provide comprehensive capacity development to government institutions, although development and double-mandated organizations are expected to provide support. However, the lack of development funding and development actors has resulted in a lack of support for capacity development since the outbreak of conflict. Some organizations have engaged in non-traditional areas in the absence of development actors. For example, UNICEF supported PFM.

Effective engagement of the humanitarian sector with the state is challenging as the state structures and divisions of roles and responsibilities are unclear, and positions are reallocated. This changes interpersonal relationships but may also mean a loss of capacity that had been developed with external support. Perhaps a greater presence of development actors supporting the state structures and staff might help to mitigate some of these challenges.

**Service Delivery**

It was impossible to ascertain the level of meaningful involvement of Government Institutions in providing services. However, some ministries, such as the Ministry of General Education and Instruction, report a good working relationship with organizations supporting education. Government institutions focused on issues related to humanitarian and development interventions also report good working relationships with stakeholders. Humanitarian and development organizations shared this view and acknowledged the positive relationships facilitate implementation.

Interventions for health and education have been aligned to Government strategies and education projects have been designed to respond to immediate needs and to provide the foundations for longer-term education services. The response to the Covid-19 pandemic seems to have strengthened coordination and communications within the health sector and tested previously developed plans to respond to health emergencies. However, the public sector would be unable to respond to education and health without international support. Water and sanitation services are provided by the humanitarian sector. It argues that the Government should assume responsibility for these services in stable areas, but it is not doing so. The humanitarian sector is afraid of outbreaks of waterborne diseases means if it reduces its programmes.

At the local level, where the population equal access to humanitarian assistance, there has been a positive impact on development, peace and social cohesion. People recognize that without external actors, there would be very little provision of public services from the Government. Where the provision of services by humanitarian organizations has been inadequate or has been aimed at specific demographic and socioeconomic groups and excluded others, there has been resentment and uneven levels of development, which has undermined social cohesion.

South Sudanese in more stable areas, as opposed to less stable areas of the country, had more confidence that the local government institutions would be able to provide public services and recognized their responsibility as part of the social contract to do so.

**The Economy**

The study findings found that financial and in-kind support and support for livelihoods where evenly distributed, has had a positive impact on development, peace, and social cohesion. The involvement of the Government and public sector in the provision of financial and livelihood support seems to be limited. Local level contributors to the study did not want the Government to be involved in distribution of cash assistance because of the high levels of corruption.

Government funding for the public sector is limited to wages and some operational costs. The money allocated in the national budget for ministries at the national and state levels is rarely distributed. Consequently, the country is reliant on ODA to fund services which undermines statebuilding. The provision of international funding may reduce pressure from the population on the Government to provide funding. There
are reports of the population calling humanitarian actors to account for more services rather than the Government. However, if international assistance were withdrawn, it is not clear how the Government would respond. Economic experts insist that the Government has adequate resources to assume responsibility for funding much of the public sector.

It is not known what impact the presence of the humanitarian sector has had on the economy, although it is assumed that employees have made significant contributions in tax payments. A significant proportion of money from salaries will be spent outside the country by international staff supporting families elsewhere and national staff accessing health and education services abroad. Many goods are imported which limits the economic benefit from the expenditure of salaries and procurement for the humanitarian sector.

Rule of Law and Access to Justice

Findings on rule of law, access to justice and related issues are complicated and seem inconsistent. The protection sector is clear that its resources are overstretched and inadequate to meet needs satisfactorily. The sector is disjointed and engagement with Government entities is sensitive because of the need to protect humanitarian space. The necessity to provide protection outside the Government system undermines the authority of the state and impedes statebuilding. The creation of the PoC sites to provide physical protection highlights the state’s failure to provide security.

The humanitarian sector has been engaged in advocacy for human rights and the development of legislation to clarify and protect land and property rights, although legislation has either not been enacted or not implemented. The sector recognizes that it should have been more proactive in trying to prevent Government actions that led to human rights abuses and created humanitarian needs rather than reacting to the consequences. National organizations have requested support from international organizations to protect civic space and initiatives that aim to make the Government accountable.

The provision of protection by humanitarian organizations has had some positive impacts at the local level in terms of responding to immediate needs and raising awareness about their rights. Knowledge of the assistance available and referral pathways was good among the FGD participants. However, as the country’s rule of law and justice systems do not function effectively, protection interventions have a limited wider impact because there is no real recourse to law or justice. The greater presence of development actors to provide more support to the Government for access to justice and rule of law may have helped to increase the impact of humanitarian protection interventions.

Among government entities, there tended to be an emphasis on providing rule of law, even when other aspects of the social contract were ignored. This could be a result of a very limited understanding of the social contract or the view, which was expressed by some government officials, that until South Sudan has achieved stability socioeconomic development is not possible. At the local level, the population were positive about the provision of security by state Government and law enforcement, despite ongoing insecurities and the allegations of human rights abuses against state entities.

There has been some capacity building for access to justice and rule of law and in specific areas of protection. Some of this has been provided by the Mission and development actors. Understanding of protection by some government entities, such as the Commission for Refugee Affairs, is high.

Social Cohesion and the Social Contract

Attitudes towards and understanding of the social contract among government representatives vary significantly. Some in national and state level government wanted to be able to meet the needs of the people and to fulfil their commitments to the social contract independently of external assistance. Others were content or felt that there was no alternative but to rely on external actors to provide for the population. Some of those who were content to rely on external actors to meet the needs of the people seem to have little sense of responsibility towards the population. The presence of humanitarian assistance has enabled
government institutions to ignore their responsibilities if they chose to do so.

Understanding among the population of the social contract was high. Study participants argued that the effort to improve social cohesion and the social contract had to start with the government. Suggestions included improved leadership, the promotion of a shared national identity, improved security, the introduction of a fair and transparent taxation system, the provision of services and the timely payment of public sector salaries.

In addition, study participants suggested that faith, intermarriage and sporting and cultural events could be used to overcome conflict and re-establish more positive inter-ethnic relationships.

Based on the local level research, findings show that in more stable areas of the country, there was a belief among the population that, in time and with external support, the State Government would be able to fulfil the social contract. In unstable areas, the population had given up on the State Government to respond to their needs except in providing security. This finding seems contradictory.

The percentage of Government funding allocated to services is very low and, without international support, services would not be funded. Government access to oil revenue means that it is not reliant on tax collection. The loss of this transactional relationship between the citizen and the state has undermined the social contract.

Evenly distributed humanitarian assistance has promoted social cohesion. However, South Sudanese felt that women and girls were prioritized over men and boys. This has caused resentment, undermined social cohesion, and potentially threatened the country’s long-term stability.

It is clear that the presence and work of the humanitarian sector can have significant influence, positive and negative, on social cohesion so it is important that this is taken into account when designing and implementing projects and programmes. It also has influence on the social contract. When there is humanitarian need that cannot be met by the Government the sector must be present which highlights weaknesses in the state. If the Government and humanitarian sector are seen to be working closely together, the negative impact on the social contract is reduced. However, this is not possible when some state actors are complicit in human rights abuses and corruption.

Women, Youth and the Environment

Women, youth, and the environment are important cross-cutting issues recognized by the Government and international community. Findings from this study suggest that humanitarian assistance has had a positive impact on the wellbeing of women. Findings also reveal that the youth feel neglected. Study participants from the humanitarian and development sectors acknowledged that they were failing to address the needs of youth adequately. The youth are the future so effective economic development and, ultimately statebuilding is not possible without them. There were also concerns that disaffected youth are vulnerable to recruitment into criminal gangs and armed groups. As such, they pose a threat to security and stability which undermines statebuilding.

Humanitarian actors acknowledge that their responses to natural disasters and climate change are short-term because of a lack of funding for more sustainable interventions. Within Government institutions, there is little capacity to respond to climate change and even to react to forecasts of natural disasters because communications systems in the country are inadequate. The inability to adopt a longer-term approach to environmental management is not a cost-effective use of international funding and resources and does not contribute to sustainable development. Forecasts predict that South Sudan is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change, so inadequate responses and a lack of Government capacity will likely negatively impact development and statebuilding processes.

Knowledge Gaps

The findings from this research provide an overview of the impact of humanitarian assistance on statebuilding. Time and resources and the availability of existing
research findings constrained the scope and depth of
the research for this report. To inform specific
interventions, a greater understanding of the contexts
in different geographical locations and of the key
thematic areas is necessary. Although there are many
aspects of this study that could be explored in more
detail, there are specific knowledge gaps that require
more research:

Long-term Impact

The long-term impact of humanitarian assistance does
not seem to have been systematically researched. From
this study, it is evident that humanitarian assistance
has potentially positive impacts on development and
peace. Understandably, the monitoring and evaluation of
humanitarian assistance focuses on countable
indicators and immediate objectives. The management
and funding of humanitarian assistance does not allow
its longer-term impacts to be analysed on a regular
basis. However, it is necessary to develop a better
understanding of these longer-term impacts to improve
the design of interventions and facilitate the transition
to development and, in the context of this study, to
understand in more detail its impact on statebuilding.

Economic Impact

The understanding of the impact of humanitarian
assistance on the economy seems to be particularly
limited. This includes the impact of cash, in-kind and
livelihoods programmes as well as the impact on the
national and local economy of the presence of the
humanitarian sector. Given the large-scale and
protracted provision of humanitarian assistance in
South Sudan it would seem necessary to have a better
understanding of the economic impact of humanitarian
assistance to understand how the sector can have a
positive impact and avoid undermining the economy.

Security

This study found that, in some instances, attitudes
among the population to the state security services are
positive and that the presence of state law
enforcement improved perceptions of safety and
security. Given the post-independence conflict and
ongoing instability in which state security and law
enforcement have been complicit, this finding is
surprising. Further research is needed to understand
the relationship between the population, state and
security.

Contextual Challenges

Humanitarian assistance is not delivered in a vacuum.
There are factors outside the humanitarian sector that
influence the effectiveness of humanitarian
interventions as well as interventions by development
and peace actors. The most important of these factors
are highlighted here because of their significance to
statebuilding.

- The level of political will to promote social
  cohesion and the social contract. At the
  national level, some members of government
  are accused of inciting conflict along ethnic
  lines and high levels of corruption that has
  eroded trust and undermined the social
  contract. The failure of the government to
  meet its commitments made in the national
  budget means that national and state level
  ministries are unable to fulfil their roles. The
  existence of the oil revenue weakens the
  government’s incentive to fulfil the social
  contract.

- The experience of the state-citizen
  relationship is influenced by traditional
governance systems. Traditional systems are
still important and the division of roles and
responsibilities between traditional systems
and modern state structures is unclear.

- The engagement and focus of the international
  community. The absence of development
  actors and funding has limited progress
towards statebuilding. The response to crises
with humanitarian assistance and the avoidance of political engagement to tackle
Humanitarian Assistance and Statebuilding in Conflict-affected South Sudan

Root causes have undermined statebuilding. The focus on technical aspects of statebuilding and interventions at the national level ignores issues of nation-building and rural areas.

- **The South Sudan context** – at independence there was a low level of development and human capacity for government and the public sector. Cycles of emergencies caused by conflict, natural disaster and climate change have prevented or impeded development progress and stability.

### 6.3 Statebuilding and the Nexus

Statebuilding is founded on the social contract - the mutual responsibilities accepted by the government and the people. It requires the government to provide services, rule of law and security and to manage the economy. In return, the people agree to abide by the rule of law, pay taxes which are used to fund services and to accept the state’s use of force. These functional aspects of the state are complemented by social cohesion, which focuses on well-being, mutual respect and tolerance. For the government social cohesion is promoted through social protection, the redistribution of wealth and the protection of human rights and equality. Among the population, social cohesion is practiced in daily life through goodwill towards others, a sense of belonging and a perception of equality. In conflict-affected states, the social contract and social cohesion are weak so strengthening them promotes statebuilding.

Although statebuilding is defined as an endogenous process, efforts by the international community to promote statebuilding in fragile states, which have been viewed as a threat to Western security, have tended to be externally driven and to focus on technical fixes. They have also tended to ignore the importance of state-citizen relations and the emotional and social importance of nation-building that provide the foundations for a stable and cohesive state. A shift in focus from the negative entry point of fragility to the positive approaches promoted by localization which aim to build on existing knowledge, capacities, and systems to encourage a more bottom-up approach to statebuilding and, in theory, an approach that is context-appropriate. Therefore, rather than imposing alien structures, processes, and procedures, statebuilding becomes internally driven and, where necessary, externally supported. The result is a hybrid state which combines modern and traditional aspects of governance. However, the challenge is to combine and balance modern and traditional approaches effectively.

There is a need to learn about, and where appropriate use, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, lessons from successful interventions by local organizations, including faith-based organizations, CSOs and NGOs. Active engagement of the local populations and encouraging them to make financial or in-kind contributions to programmes has been shown to promote sustainable outcomes.

For effective statebuilding, multiple interventions are required that can potentially be managed using a triple nexus approach. The triple nexus is intended for use in complex environments where humanitarian, development and peace interventions are needed simultaneously to reinforce one another. Based on international experiences to date, there is an assumption that interventions, which address the different key functions of a state, can be managed through a nexus approach to build the necessary flexibility to respond to a dynamic situation and emphasize that interventions should be mutually reinforcing. To ensure that interventions are appropriate, localization should be mainstreamed through each nexus element. The objective of bringing the humanitarian, development, and peace sectors together would be to strengthen social cohesion and the social contract through their traditional core interventions to promote statebuilding.

There are significant challenges for the international community to engage in statebuilding and to adopt a nexus approach:

- The various stakeholders have to be willing to take risks and accept setbacks. Development actors in particular must recognize that they could be working in a more volatile and unstable environment than usual. They may have to scale-
back, reschedule and reprioritize plans but they
cannot withdraw. The point of a nexus approach
is that the different elements are implemented
simultaneously to achieve an impact greater
than the sum of their parts.

- Statebuilding is an overtly political act, and it
cannot be advocated in South Sudan without
doing it publicly. This will expose the international
community to criticism for supporting
government elites accused of corruption and
human rights abuses. By working closely with the
government, which will be necessary to promote
statebuilding, stakeholders will inevitably confer
greater legitimacy to the country’s leaders inside
and outside South Sudan. Decades earlier, OLS
was criticized for seeming to endorse the
SPLA.\(^{232}\) It will be a delicate balancing act
because, if the international community chooses
not to promote statebuilding to achieve an
independent South Sudan, it will be funding
humanitarian assistance for the population
indefinitely.

- Engaging in the peace pillar may be regarded as
compromising humanitarian space. However,
given the broad range of activities that can be
considered to fall under the peace pillar, there is
scope for different actors to support it through
their specific areas of expertise while protecting
humanitarian principles.

- Humanitarian organizations may be cautious
about being associated with statebuilding, but,
as the local level research revealed, humanitarian
interventions have an impact on social cohesion.
Where the population perceived that assistance
had been evenly distributed it strengthened
social cohesion. Where certain groups believed
that some had benefitted more than others,
interventions undermined social cohesion.
Therefore, when conducting conflict sensitivity
analysis, all interventions, including humanitarian
ones, should consider their potential impact on
social cohesion.

- There are significant transactional costs in the
planning, sequencing, and coordination of
complex multisectoral interventions with triple
nexus and statebuilding objectives where
stakeholders have different objectives and
different expertise. Patience and time will be
necessary to understand the different
terminology and working practices for different
nexus stakeholders. It is widely accepted that
complex contexts require approaches that are
flexible, dynamic, and responsive to rapidly
changing contexts. Maintaining agility and
efficient decision-making mechanisms across
large-scale interventions involving different
nexus stakeholders is extremely difficult. In
addition, nexus interventions are implemented in
challenging environments, so the need for
analysis, reflection and revised approaches and
timelines is ongoing.\(^{233}\)

6.4 Recommendations for a Nexus
Approach to Statebuilding

\(^{232}\) Brusset 1998 in Bradbury et al., 2000: 24; Aboum et al., 2000 in Maxwell et
al., 2014: 7

\(^{233}\) Roberts, 2020
Vision and Leadership

Statebuilding is an endogenous process so the Government of South Sudan must provide a clear vision and leadership to work towards achieving that vision through the commitment of the necessary human and economic resources.

Trust Building

The Government of South Sudan must build trust with the population by fulfilling its commitments to statebuilding and the social contract and eliminating corruption.

Effective Partnership

The Government of South Sudan and the international community must build an effective partnership based on a commitment to work towards achieving statebuilding according to the agreed vision. The international community should engage at the national to local level to support statebuilding.

Social Cohesion and the Social Contract

Interventions must promote and mainstream social cohesion and the social contract. In statebuilding contexts, conflict sensitivity is about understanding how interventions fundamental to effective statebuilding impact on social cohesion and the social contract. Analysis should consider how interventions might impact on social cohesion and the social contract.

Localization

Effective nexus programmes must be informed by local knowledge rather than being driven by head offices or Juba headquarters using standard global approaches that may not be appropriate at the community level in South Sudan. Mainstream localization at all levels of interventions across the nexus. Pursue the mantra “as local as possible as international as necessary.”

Joint and Ongoing Analysis

Analysis must be conducted from the perspective of the different nexus stakeholders to develop a common, holistic understanding of the context and the different humanitarian, development, and peace needs. The context is dynamic so analysis must be ongoing. In line with the localization agenda, national actors should be involved in the research and analysis to provide the cultural and context-specific interpretation of findings.

Strategy, Prioritizing and Sequencing

A clear strategy to implement the government’s statebuilding vision that spans the nexus and guides the prioritization and sequencing of interventions. The implementation of interventions should be flexible to respond to changing circumstances. How localization will be included in the nexus programming for statebuilding must be articulated in the planning phase.

Coordination

Effective horizontal and vertical coordination across the nexus and from the national to local levels that actively includes all stakeholders – government, UN entities, NGOs, CSOs, traditional leaders and the population.

Funding

Flexible multi-year funding is required for a nexus approach and a long-term funding commitment is required to promote statebuilding. The Government of South Sudan and the international community should agree what each will fund and a timescale to reduce the reliance on international funding and increase the levels of government funding.

Commitment and Exit Strategy

All nexus stakeholders must commit to statebuilding and continue to operate to the greatest extent possible even when the context becomes unstable. This will require development actors to accept greater levels of risk in their operating environment and greater uncertainty about the outcomes of their programmes. An exit strategy based on agreed milestones should be developed. This would also inform a capacity-strengthening plan and motivate the pursuit of the localization agenda.
Annexes

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### 7.2 Contributors to the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Jul</td>
<td>Adeyinka Badejo</td>
<td>Acting Country Director</td>
<td>WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>Kurl Paul</td>
<td>Director of Training</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>Qambek Ring Kuol</td>
<td>Director of Operations &amp; Compliance</td>
<td>Ministry of National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>Dominic Michael Genge</td>
<td>Registrar General of NGOs</td>
<td>Relief &amp; Rehabilitation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>Makoi Malek Guol</td>
<td>State Coordinator</td>
<td>South Sudan Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>Gatuoth Rik Lam</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Naath Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>Dr Melha Rout Biel</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic Policy Studies (CSPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jul</td>
<td>Samuel Doe</td>
<td>Resident Representative</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>Dr Augustino Ting Mayai</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
<td>The Sudd Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>Mr. Oneil Yasir Daima</td>
<td>Director General Cooperative Development</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>Mrs. Malin Atero</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Cooperative Development</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>Mrs. Joice Silver Lado</td>
<td>Assistance Director, Community Development</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>Mr. Taban Alonie</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Crop Production</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul</td>
<td>Nicholas Kerandi</td>
<td>Head of Food Security &amp; Nutrition Unit</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jul</td>
<td>Dr Biong Kuol Deng</td>
<td>Dean of Law School</td>
<td>University of Juba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jul</td>
<td>George Ali</td>
<td>Director for Development Partners Coordination</td>
<td>Ministry of General Education &amp; Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 Jul</td>
<td>Evelyne Edoma</td>
<td>RoL</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jul</td>
<td>Justin Dabit Freemotes</td>
<td>Acting Director General of Housing</td>
<td>Ministry of Land, Housing &amp; Planning</td>
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<td>21 Jul</td>
<td>Emmanuel Lado</td>
<td>Under Secretary</td>
<td>Ministry of Water Resources &amp; Irrigation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Peter Mahal Dhieu</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 Jul</td>
<td>Arafat Jamal</td>
<td>Acting Resident Coordinator</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jul</td>
<td>Hon Pia Philip Michael</td>
<td>Undersecretary</td>
<td>Ministry of Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jul</td>
<td>Fanta Wondimagegn</td>
<td>GBV Subcluster Coordinator</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jul</td>
<td>Maria Kiani</td>
<td>Senior Development Officer</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salma Abdillahi</td>
<td>Protection Lead</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Jul</td>
<td>Eliaba Darundu</td>
<td>Social Policy</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jul</td>
<td>Susan Le Roux</td>
<td></td>
<td>OCHA</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Jul</td>
<td>Marco Kirschbaum</td>
<td>Triple Nexus Advisor</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jul</td>
<td>Dr Atem Annon</td>
<td>Director General Primary Healthcare</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Jul</td>
<td>Dr John Rumuna</td>
<td>Director General Preventative Health Services</td>
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<td>29 Jul</td>
<td>Salma Abdillahi</td>
<td>Protection Cluster co-chair</td>
<td>NRC</td>
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<td>Issac Jebaseelan</td>
<td>Food Security &amp; Livelihoods co-chair</td>
<td>WVI</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Jul</td>
<td>William Nall</td>
<td>Head of Research</td>
<td>WFP</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Aug</td>
<td>Francis O’Grady</td>
<td>Chief of Mine Action</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Aug</td>
<td>Dr Banak Joshua Dei Wal</td>
<td>Director General Disaster</td>
<td>Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs &amp; Disaster Management</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Aug</td>
<td>Tut Thomas</td>
<td>Head of Programmes</td>
<td>South Sudan Council of Churches</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Juan Racheal</td>
<td>Advocacy Coordinator</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jackcilia Salathiel</td>
<td>National Woman Coordinator</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arek Francis Malek</td>
<td>Youth Coordinator</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mambo Leonard</td>
<td>Advisor on Programmes and</td>
<td></td>
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<td>George Agrey Duku</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Ministry of Roads and Bridges</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>David Kenyi Paulino</td>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marko Aleardo Paul</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Planning</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Aug</td>
<td>Del Rumdit Deng</td>
<td>Acting Chairperson</td>
<td>Local Government Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elias Asu Kidia</td>
<td>Director General, Programmes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malony Akau</td>
<td>Director General of Administration &amp; Finance</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deng Gatluak Chiok,</td>
<td>Acting Director</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Aug</td>
<td>Daniel Kiernan Balke</td>
<td>Country Coordinator for Fragility, Conflict &amp; Violence</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Aug</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Action Worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Aug</td>
<td>Arsen Khanyan</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>GICHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug</td>
<td>Sheila B Keetharuth</td>
<td>Senior Women’s Protection Advisor</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sept</td>
<td>Yasmin Idris Maychane</td>
<td>Acting Director</td>
<td>NGO Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Sept</td>
<td>Irena</td>
<td>Senior Human Rights Officer</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Sept</td>
<td>Robert Kennedy</td>
<td>FSL Coordinator</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Sept</td>
<td>William Lukudu</td>
<td>Projects Manager</td>
<td>Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Uma Julius</td>
<td>Media &amp; Communications Lead</td>
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<td>Elizabeth Lubanga</td>
<td>Human Rights, Justice &amp; Protection Lead</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
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<td>21 Sept</td>
<td>Flavio A. Soares Da Gama</td>
<td>Principal Country Economist</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sept</td>
<td>Ali Mure Alli</td>
<td>Secretary for humanitarian and health affairs</td>
<td>South Sudan Islamic Council</td>
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<td>George Kwamina Otoo</td>
<td>Head of RCO Office</td>
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<td>23 Sept</td>
<td>Nasir Yousafzai</td>
<td>Education and Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Sept</td>
<td>Gabriel Sostein Bathuel</td>
<td>Housing Land and Property sub-cluster</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Sept</td>
<td>Annette Hearns</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Office</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
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<td>Eric Sattin</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>WHO</td>
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<td>27 Sept</td>
<td>John Pan Panguir</td>
<td>Director General for Planning, Research &amp; Statistics</td>
<td>Ministry of Trade and Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Sept</td>
<td>Labanya Margaret</td>
<td>Director General of Administration &amp; Finance</td>
<td>Ministry of Petroleum</td>
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<td>Daniel Kon Ater</td>
<td>Budget and Revenue</td>
<td>National Revenue Authority</td>
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<td>Chol Paul Kur</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner for Head of Operations</td>
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<td>28 Sept</td>
<td>Douglass Hansen</td>
<td>Access to Justice Lead</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Justin Valfrido Droko</td>
<td>Deputy Auditor General</td>
<td>National Audit Commission</td>
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<td>Lwiza Deng</td>
<td>Director of Aid Coordination</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance &amp; Planning</td>
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<td>Sarmad Sardar</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
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<td>Food Security &amp; Livelihoods Cluster Lead</td>
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<td>Isaac Jebaseelan</td>
<td>Food Security &amp; Livelihoods Cluster Lead</td>
<td>WVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sept</td>
<td>Jan Huesken</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Mission/Head of Development Cooperation</td>
<td>Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Simon Ruf</td>
<td>Head of Cooperation, Deputy Head of Mission</td>
<td>German Embassy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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**First Research Workshop, Juba, 23 February 2022**
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**Malakal, Upper Nile State**

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Cooperative

### Edward Lino
Director General
MAR F and T

### Joseph Richard Mbuka
Director General
Ministry of C and RD

### Sepit Ibrahim
Assistant Director General
Ministry of Agriculture, Environment & Forestry

### Akol Majok Rok
Minister
Trade and Industry

### Karlo Vitale Kuku
Director General
Housing

### Tito Gabriel Akol
Director General
Trade and Industry

### Stephen Andreah Ujika
Director General
Finance

### Stephen Robo Musa
Regional Coordinator
Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO)

#### Yambio, Western Equatoria State

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### Local Levels, Bussere, Western Bahr el-Ghazal, 12 October 2022

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**Local Level FGDs Protection of Civilians Camp, Malakal, Upper Nile State, 18 and 19 October**

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### Local Level FGDs Malakal town, Upper Nile State, 18 and 19 October

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“IMPROVE WOMEN PARTICIPATION TO BECOME PEACE AGENT IN THE COMMUNITY”
7.3 Methodology

The research draws on an extensive literature review and discussions with a wide range of stakeholders to collect a range of perspectives and enable triangulation. The literature review includes qualitative and quantitative research from academia, think tanks and the various humanitarian, development and peace actors in South Sudan, Government strategy and policy documents and the media.

Primary research, using a combination of individual and group discussions and research workshops, was conducted from mid-July until the end of October 2022 at the national, state and local levels to understand the impact of humanitarian assistance on statebuilding, on the population, on the national and state level governments, on the relationship between the different governance levels governments, and on the citizen-state relationship also known as the social contract.

The guiding questions from the ToR were revised in consultation with UNDP and WFP before beginning the primary research. Separate semi-structured question guides, based on the revised guiding questions (see Annex 5), were developed for the national and state level governments, UN entities, IFIs and donors, think tanks and civil society. The guiding questions also informed the design of the research workshops and focus group discussions at the local level.

Research at the state level was conducted in:

- Upper Nile State (state capital: Malakal)
- Western Bahr el-Ghazal State (state capital: Wau)
- Western Equatoria States (state capital: Yambio)

The states were chosen because they have had different experiences of the conflict and are at different stages of recovery. Upper Nile State, including the state capital, Malakal, was severely affected by the conflict and is considered by many study participants as the state most affected by conflict since independence. Some counties of Upper Nile State are among the poorest in the country234 and, at the time of writing (November 2022) affected by ongoing conflicts and floods. Despite the conflict in Tambura County, the State of Western Equatoria has been relatively stable, not as severely impacted by conflict as other parts of the country, there have been agricultural interventions and there are opportunities for development interventions. Western Bahr el-Ghazal State was affected by conflict but has re-established security and stability. Wau, the state capital, is one of the largest urban areas in South Sudan, has relatively good transport links and a potential for trade.

Following a visit to each of the three state capitals, which focused on meeting institutional stakeholders, Wau and Malakal were identified for second visits to conduct research among the local population using focus groups. It is believed that the two locations provided a good contrast between a relatively stable area with where longer-term development interventions seemed to be a possibility, and an area still experiencing conflict and natural disasters in which the population and state level government continue to be heavily dependent on external assistance.

To facilitate the local level research, two national NGOs, Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) (WAU) and the Upper Nile Youth Development Association (UNYDA) (Malakal) were contracted to identify and hire suitable researcher and to organization focus groups discussions of around eight people. CEPO and UNYDA advised on how to ensure a conflict sensitive approach, selected researchers from appropriate ethnic groups, facilitated community entry, identified FGD participants and provided feedback on the guiding questions for the FGDs and translated them into the relevant languages. To ensure a representative cross-section of the population and to

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234 World Bank, 2021: 10
mainstream gender and diversity, four FGDs were organized in each location one with men, another with women, a mixed group of youths and a mixed group of elderly. Most FGDs contained different ethnic groups. The FGDs were held in Malakal town among displaced populations, in the PoC Camp among people mainly displaced from Malakal town, in Wau town and the village of Bussere outside Wau town. The findings from the FGDs were collated and analysed in consultation with the research teams to cross-reference conclusions among research teams members and explain important cultural and local dimensions to the international researcher.

Inevitably, biases among the research team and in research design have the potential to distort findings and conclusions, particularly in developing countries and rural areas. Those that might affect the primary research in South Sudan include: concerns over safety and security that confine research to areas that are considered safe and results in a “security bias;”; a “spatial bias” when research is focused areas that are most accessible which usual means that there have to be roads and other transport links; similarly “seasonal bias” influences when research is conducted resulting in researchers failing to understand the impact on daily life of a particular season; reliance on a small number of key informants who may not be representative of their community or the general population can result in “personal bias”. Such key informants are often educated and able to communicate in a Western language. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was criticized for an over reliance on young, educated English speakers to inform its food distribution programmes; “personal bias” occurs when researchers focus on their particular areas of expertise and avoid those with which they are less familiar; and “diplomatic bias” where embarrassment leads to researchers limiting interaction with the poor and sick.

To mitigate against such biases, at the local level, research teams included members from different ethnic groups. Research was conducted during the rainy season which disrupted travel arrangements but meant that the research team experienced at first hand the challenges faced by the populations. There were attempts to include an urban and rural area which demonstrated remarkable differences in levels of assistance despite the rural area being located relatively close to a major town. Following advice from international and national UN and NGO staff, research proceeded as planned in Malakal town and in the PoC site in October 2022 during a period of heightened tensions. Appropriate measures were taken to ensure the safety of the research team. The experience raised awareness about the instability in around Malakal and the potential for renewed violence. It is possible that the responses from the FGD participants may have been more negative than if the research had taken place a few weeks earlier where the area was calmer.

At the national level, consultations were as broad as possible using individual and group discussions and three research workshops. Research participants included ministers and representatives from a range of ministries and government departments, UNMISS and UN AFPs, international NGOs, in particular those active in the humanitarian cluster system, national NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs), international financing institutions (IFIs) and donors.

At the state level, research participants included the state governors and the state level secretariate, UNMISS field office staff and other UN entities and INGOs present at the state level as wells as local NGOs and CSOs. Consultations were held with individuals and groups according to the preference of participants. In all four locations for consultations at the local level research, the focus groups included educated and uneducated participants. Participation was voluntary, the groups were self-selecting and it is likely that most participants were individuals comfortable with expressing their opinions. Many of the groups were ethnically diverse and comprised participants

235 Chambers, 1983:13-22
236 Barakat and Ellis, 1996: 151
237 Chambers: 1983: 13-16; 20-21
238 Sommers, 1995
239 Harragin and Chol 1998 in Maxwell et al., 2014: 8
240 Chambers, 1983: 22
that had been or were displaced so many compared their experiences of humanitarian assistance in different locations.

Study participants include around 100 people who were consulted through research workshops, a further 100 who were consulted in Juba in-person or remotely using individual and group discussions, and another 100 in the three states consulted in-person using individual and group discussions. Around 130 people from the local population in four different locations were consulted using FGDs. In total, over 400 people have shared their opinions and expertise for this study.

**Research Constraints**

Not all relevant stakeholders were available for a meeting during the primary research phase. South Sudan is a huge country with a diverse population that was affected differently by the post-independence conflicts depending on geographical location. It has not been possible to conduct a comprehensive country-wide study that captures the complexity of South Sudan. The scope and depth of the research was constrained by time, resources and insecurity as well as by a lack of documented information and statistical data. This is partly because of the logistical challenges of working in South Sudan and difficulty in collecting information, especially in remote areas, but also because the study sought to explore the impact of humanitarian assistance on statebuilding which is not an area that humanitarian organizations routinely monitor. Although the above limited the ability of the study to respond in depth to the guiding questions, it has been possible to draw conclusions in response to the overall objectives of the study and to explore the links between humanitarian assistance, statebuilding and the triple nexus. Remaining gaps in knowledge and recommendations for further research have been noted.

**Profile of Locations in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State**

**Wau**

Wau is the second largest city in South Sudan after the capital, Juba. It is the state capital of Western Bahr el-Ghazal and the main city of the historic region of Bahr el-Ghazal which comprises the states of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes. It is an economic hub and is well connected with transport links including an airport and roads to other parts of South Sudan and to the Republic of Sudan to the north. Until independence in 2011, when Sudan suspended the service, the railway transported goods and people between Wau and Khartoum. The railway has since fallen into disrepair but the local population would like it be restored as the area is dependent on imported goods. Now, road is the main form of transport for goods which is slow and, at times, insecure. Wau has education and health services, some infrastructure for water and sanitation, a university and vocational training centre. The town trades goods from Sudan and Uganda and supplies the surrounding area. Subsistence agriculture is the main livelihood activity. There are also pastoralists that bring their cattle through the state but this does not affect the city of Wau.

Wau is ethnically diverse with a predominately Christian population and a minority Muslim population. There are no reported religious tensions and faith-based Christian and Islamic national and international organizations are active in the city. However, there have been ethnic tensions and violence in the region that has divided the population. There was also fighting between the government forces and civilians although the government continued to control the town throughout the post-independence conflict. During the civil war militias attacked and looted goods being transported severely affecting the population. Now Wau hosts a training centre for the Unified Forces.
Wau acts as a centre for humanitarian assistance and the UNMISS regional headquarters. Many organizations use the town as a regional base for operations because it is stable, has transport links and access to services. There is an IDP site which transitioned from a PoC site.

Bussere

Bussere is described by the local population as a village although it has a population of thousands. It takes approximately 30 minutes to drive the 12km to Bussere from Wau on good roads. There are numerous checkpoints en route although the research team reported that they were not stopped or questioned at any of them. The population was displaced during the post-independence conflict and, when it returned, mainly from the PoC in Wau, it received humanitarian assistance. There are roads to Western Equatoria State and to Juba. Infrastructure in the village was originally established by missionaries and there is a well-known school which has been attended by leaders from South Sudan including the late Dr John Garang.

The population is ethnically mixed and is mostly Christian although there are some Muslims. It is vulnerable to violence from pastoralists whose livestock destroy the cultivated land. The SPLA-IO is also present in the village and surrounding area and because IO has not signed the 2018 peace agreement, the population worries about a return to violence. There are only three police officers in the village, which is inadequate, so the population feels insecure. It is difficult to recruit police to work outside the main urban centres.

People who have been displaced to urban areas find it difficult to return to rural areas where there are far fewer services.

Profile of FGD Locations in Upper Nile State

Malakal Town

Malakal town on the White Nile is the capital of Upper Nile State located close to the border with the Republic of Sudan. It is predominately Christian but there is also a minority Muslim population. According to staff working for humanitarian organizations, before the post-independence conflict, the population of the town was around 120,000, it is now around only 30,000. Most of the people living in the town are displaced from elsewhere and there is not really a host population. The Shilluck population of the town is in the PoC site. IDPs have arrived at different times and have been supported by different humanitarian organizations depending on which had the capacity to respond. In August and September 2022, the town received new influxes of IDPs who report that they were welcomed by the state authorities. There is a lack of accommodation and some IDPs have occupied buildings belonging to the fire service.

Before the conflict, Malakal was prosperous and relatively well developed for South Sudan with some infrastructure, a university and schools, hospitals and clinics and local commerce. The town was severely damaged during the conflict and derelict buildings and burned-out cars are clearly visible. There appears to have been little effort to rebuild or to remove the debris of war which indicates that the population has no sense of permanence or confidence in lasting stability.

Malakal has an airport operating internal flights and flights to Sudan. Before the war there were more international flights. The White Nile is used to transport goods but illegal checkpoints collecting taxes deter traders or add to the costs of goods for consumers in Malakal. Road links to Malakal are poor and insecure.
Following the 2018 R-ARCSS, Upper Nile was the last state to be appointed a governor. Many state ministers, senior state level officials and the governor are absence from Malakal and are either in Juba or abroad. Consequently, there is a lack of leadership and a lack of government partners for the UN and non-governmental organizations.

**Malakal PoC**

The PoC site in Malakal was created in December 2013 and was initially intended to provide temporary protection to around 11,000 people. In 2022, Malakal has the only PoC that has not been re-designated as an IDP camp. This is because the main inhabitants of the camp, who are Shilluck, are afraid to return to Malakal town and say that their houses and land are occupied by Dinka. Any Dinka who were at PoC site have returned home and many Nuer have also left and travelled to neighbouring countries because they fear for their safety. State authorities are unable to enter the PoC without permission from UNMISS. In October 2022, the PoC had a population of around 60,000 people who are mainly, but not exclusively, from Malakal town. Recent fighting in the areas around Malakal has led to an influx of new IDPs. Humanitarian organizations working in the PoC report receiving around 16,000 new IDPs in August and September 2022. Many of whom had travelled independently for around a week through insecure and flooded areas to reach the PoC. The camp also houses some refugees from Sudan and Ethiopia. UNMISS provides physical protection for the PoC and 17 humanitarian organizations meet lifesaving and basic needs. UNMISS has asked the state government for support to provide security to the PoC but (up to 18 October 2022) support had been refused.

To find the additional space for the new IDPs, humanitarian organizations negotiated with UNMISS to use the buffer zone which the Mission initially insisted was necessary for security. Communal buildings such as community centres and schools have been moved out of the PoC to another area adjacent to the PoC and the UNMISS base. UNMISS has agreed to provide security for the communal buildings but at a lower level than the security it provides for the PoC. Humanitarian organizations fear that another influx of people will result in the area for communal buildings being occupied by IDPs and increasing the size of the PoC.

Humanitarian organizations report a high mortality rate in the PoC including suicides. Mortality rates and suicides were not mentioned by the FGD participants. The high density of the population and inadequate water and sanitation provisions are creating concerns about outbreaks of waterborne diseases such as cholera.

Humanitarian actors report that the shift towards more development-orientated in both Malakal town and PoC had shifted again towards humanitarian assistance following the latest conflicts. Such regression is having a negative impact on the displaced populations who had been requesting more livelihoods support as well as the staff from humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian organizations report that funding they had for development-type activities has been diverted to humanitarian response. UNHCR states that its development funding is protected and that it has been able to access emergency funding for the renewed humanitarian response. Stakeholders believe that the humanitarian cluster system and effective coordination helped to scale-up the humanitarian response to the new influx of IDPs quickly and to raise awareness of the situation among donors.
7.4 Guiding Questions

In consultation with UNDP and WFP, the guiding questions for the study, included in the ToR were refined and expanded on 17 July 2022 as follows:

**Service Delivery**

1. How have humanitarian actions expanded to the provision of basic services and what has been the impact on the credibility and capacity of the State at the national level and at the level of the ten states that comprise South Sudan?

2. How do these actions influence public expectations of service delivery and, by extension, the notion and quality of the social contract?

3. What role are public institutions currently playing in the humanitarian-led service delivery initiatives? And if not, how does that impact the building and/or rebuilding of service delivery institutions of the infant state?

4. Why did humanitarian action in South Sudan expand beyond immediate relief to include service delivery?

5. What capacities [including human capacity, procedures, infrastructure] are in place for transitioning from humanitarian-driven service delivery to state provision and how do current actions facilitate readiness for the transition?

6. How can the GoSS ensure that the support of humanitarian assistance has a long-lasting effect on Statebuilding?

**Social Cohesion and Social Contract**

1. How does humanitarian assistance interact with processes that advance social cohesion and what are the results?

2. What lessons can be learnt from attempts made to bridge the humanitarian, development and peace divide to promote social cohesion?

3. How can we identify the potential contribution of humanitarian activities to social cohesion that can help consolidate nationhood and the social contract?

4. How has humanitarian assistance inadvertently contributed to social discontent or been exploited to further social discontent?

5. In what ways can humanitarian, development and peacebuilding combine to advance social cohesion in South Sudan?

**Access to Justice and Rule of Law**

1. How humanitarian assistance interacts with processes that advance protection, security, access to justice and the rule of law?

2. What are the intended and unintended consequences of humanitarian actors’ engagement on protection, security, and rule of law in the context of statebuilding?

3. In what ways should humanitarian, development and peace actors combine their interventions to lay foundations for security, access to justice, and rule of law?
The Economy

1. How are current modalities for managing the economy contributing to statebuilding? This includes public financial management, arrangements for non-oil revenue, coordination between M of Petroleum and other GoSS financial entities. IMF and WB work on macroeconomic stability. NRA and SRA are key stakeholders.

2. How are state resources being used to finance service delivery?

3. How can public financial management systems contribute to statebuilding?

4. What taxation systems are in place? How is the tax collected and used? How does taxation contribute to the legitimacy of the state and the social contract?

5. What is the potential of the economy to finance services currently provided by humanitarian actors in the short term and transition fully to sustainable development in the medium to long term? What would a full transition look like? Are their indicators? This seems ambitious, is there a partial transition that would be acceptable to donors?

6. How are humanitarian crises and conflict drivers taken into account in the national development strategy and how will this affect state-building?

7. What percentage of government resources are allocated and executed for each of the nexus domain (peace and security, humanitarian, development) and how is this contributing to statebuilding? I assume this is a desk review once data has been collected?

8. How has humanitarian assistance contributed to economic growth/development in the state/country: the proportion of humanitarian assistance that is direct cash transfers? Has this increased the purchasing power of people? Has the promotion of livelihoods improved the economy at the household and local levels? What is the economic impact of humanitarian assistance?

9. How are traders and trade affected by humanitarian assistance? Have we seen an increase in the volume of specific goods to respond to demand by humanitarian actors?

10. Are there impacts of humanitarian assistance on labour? and wages? Do we see more people employed to provide humanitarian assistance? or during humanitarian crisis? If so, do you observe increase in wages?