

# **CLEARANCE SHEET**

Annual report

PEACE SUPPORT FACILITY | AWARD ID# 00118265 | PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

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## **PEACE SUPPORT FACILITY**

### Cover Letter

September 2022, UNDP - Yemen

#### Subject: Annual Report, Peace Support Facility, Year 2021

We are pleased to enclose herewith the annual report for the Peace Support Facility (PSF), covering the period from January to December 2021, that has been supported by Canada, Denmark, European Union, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, and UNDP.

During this reporting period, the PSF has made progress towards achieving Priority 1 initiatives related to the rehabilitation of the port of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras-Al Issa.

The recruitment of the project staff has faced some challenges due to high turnover, however 80 per cent of the facility's core staff has been completed. The Gender and Social Inclusion Specialist has been deployed while the recruitment of the Strategic Planning Specialist and the Finance Specialist will be completed in 2022.

The PSF main results under Window 1 in 2021 are the rehabilitation of the workshop and the generator shelter that have been completed and handed over to Yemen's Red Sea Ports Corporation (YRSPC). While the procurement of the 27 buoys and the pilot boat have been completed and will be delivered in 2022 and 2024, respectively. The rehabilitation projects will contribute to enhancing the operations in the port, while the procurement of the pilot boat and the 27 buoys will strengthen the safety of ships entering in the Port of Hodeidah. Both results will contribute to enhancing access of commercial goods and humanitarian aid in the port, consequently increasing food security in Yemen.

PSF has also recruited a consultant to support authorities in the north and the south to develop a National Contingency and Preparedness Plan to respond to a potential oil spill from the FSO Safer tanker and beyond. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) stepped in to fund the capacity building component of this initiative.

Under Window 2, the PSF completed the assessment conducted by Public Works Project (PWP) that advised we reassess the needs before undertaking the rehabilitation works under the framework of the initiative (i.e., Managing conflicts around water management in Dhamar governorate) tabled by Berghof. The assessment has been completed, specifications, Bill of Quantities (BoQ), and revised budget available. The project has met challenges with PWP resulting in extended delays, going forward the PSF will directly implement the rehabilitation works.

The implementation of the community safety launched in 2020 has been partially completed. Two responsible parties have completed their respective projects while one has requested an extension until mid-2022 to complete critical activities in the governorate of Taiz where they could not implement the project because the location is an active frontline. The project has conducted a midterm review that has confirmed the relevance of the PSF and recommended that going forward: (i) a strategic review be conducted to adapt to the evolution of the political context in Yemen that has evolved from the PSF establishment in 2019; (ii) a more robust gender inclusion be streamlined in the implementation of the PSF; (iii) the coordination between the Resident Coordinator's Office, UNDP and the Office of the Special Envoy to the Secretary General for Yemen be enhanced; and (iv) the linkage between initiatives implemented by the PSF and the work of the special envoy be enhanced. At the end of this reporting period, 42 per cent of the contributions to the project have been utilized. More than 96 per cent of the Phase 1 budget has already been mobilized and the remaining 4 per cent are yet to be mobilised. The remaining balance are to be allocated to the ongoing contracts under Window 1, upcoming procurements for the rehabilitation of the Berths 1 and 4, the implementation of Window 2, and the staff salaries

We wish to express our sincere appreciation and gratitude to the contributing donors for their continuous support to the Peace Support Facility. If you have any inquiries, do not hesitate to contact us for more information.

Yours sincerely,

Nahid Hussein

Deputy Resident Reproductioned by gramme



### CONTRIBUTING PARTNERS






# PEACE SUPPORT FACILITY FOR YEMEN

Annual Report







## **PEACE SUPPORT FACILITY**

2021 Annual Report

September 2022

### PHOTOGRAPHY CREDITS

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# ACRONYMS

| СВМ    | Confidence Building Measures  |
|--------|---|
| СНМ    | Civilian Harm Mitigation  |
| CIVIC  | Center for Civilians in Conflict  |
| CPGs   | Community Protection Groups   |
| EHOC   | Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations Committee                            |
| GoE    | Governorate Education Office  |
| IDPs   | Internally Displaced People   |
| IHL    | International Humanitarian Law  |
| IHRL   | International Human Rights Law  |
| IMO    | International Maritime Organization   |
| IRG    | Internationally Recognized Government                                       |
| MoE    | Ministry of Education   |
| MTR    | Mid-Term Review   |
| ОМ     | Operations Manager  |
| OSESGY | Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen              |
| PILPG  | Public International Law and Policy Group                                   |
| POC    | Protection of Civilians   |
| PSF    | Peace Support Facility  |
| PDF    | Political Development Forum   |
| PWP    | Public Works Project  |
| RCC    | Redeployment Coordination Committee   |
| RCO    | Resident Coordinator Office   |
| RPs    | Responsible Parties   |
| RVO    | Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland                                      |
| SE     | Special Envoy   |
| SCM    | Steering Committee Meeting  |
| SCMCHA | Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| SDC    | Swiss Development Cooperation   |
| STC    | Southern Transitional Council   |
| SY     | Safer Yemen   |
| ТоТ    | Training of Trainers  |
| UNMHA  | United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement                    |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs          |
| UNOPS  | United Nations Office for Project Services                                  |
| WPS    | Women, Peace and Security   |
| YRSPC  | Yemen Red Sea Ports Corporation   |

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Yemen continues to be in the midst of a protracted political, humanitarian, and developmental crisis. The crisis has reversed the development gains made prior to the conflict when Yemen was already the poorest country of the Arab region suffering from weak human development, high population growth, sporadic unrest, chronic food insecurity, and weak government institutions. In 2021, 23.4 million people required some level of humanitarian assistance, including 12.9 million recorded under extreme or catastrophic severity, facing a collapse or total collapse of living standards. More than 25 million Yemenis are food insecure including 7.3 million who are one step away from famine. An estimated 4.3 million people remain displaced in 2021, of which 3.3 need humanitarian assistance. Yemen is also the lowest ranked on UNDP's Gender Inequality Index since 2000.

The Peace Support Facility (PSF) was established in April 2019 following the Stockholm Agreement brokered by the United Nations Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (SE) in December 2018. The Agreement represented significant steps towards a more comprehensive peace agreement. The PSF aims to support the peace process by implementing programmatic interventions agreed on by the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY) and the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC/RC). The interventions are structured around three windows:

- **Window 1:** Initiatives emerging from high-level peace consultations or stemming from interactions with the parties.
- Window 2: Initiatives emerging from existing Track II dialogues.
- **Window 3:** Eventual interventions related to the transitional governance arrangement post-deal.

This annual report presents the Facility's key achievements, challenges faced, lessons learned,


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and a financial summary of the implementation period (1 January – 31 December 2021).

#### 2021 Achievements Highlights

**Window 1:** Initiatives emerging from high-level peace consultations or stemming from interactions with the parties:

- Contributed to a return of the ports' pre-war capacity by significant rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the Port of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa as agreed with port authorities based on the 2019 *Damage and Capacity Assessment*.<sup>1</sup>
- Increased the ports' self-reliance and sustainability by procurement of essential spare parts and equipment.
- Increased safety at sea by procurement of critical safety equipment, including a pilot boat and 27 buoys.



Engelberts, H, & Wormmeester, M., **Damage and Capacity Assessment: Port of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa**, 2019. Report carried out by consultants from the Port of Rotterdam.

**Window 2:** Initiatives emerging from existing Track II dialogues:

- Increased the trust between communities and security actors in Aden, Marib, and Taiz, by establishing Community Protection Groups (CPGs). The CPGs received capacity building in advocacy and communication skills, while security actors were trained on Civilian Harm Mitigation (CHM). Civil-military dialogues were hosted to provide civilians with a space to voice their grievances to security actors.
- Addressed civilians' grievances in Aden, Hadramaut, Marib, Shabwa, and Taiz by establishing a network of local civil society organizations and hosting local community dialogue. Security actors received capacity building to increase their ability to identify and address civilians' needs.
- Increased the safety of school children and school personnel by training teachers, Ministry of Education (MoE) officials and students, and by developing safety awareness materials which were broadcast via the radio.
- Contributing to the resolution of water driven conflicts by rehabilitating the water infrastructure in Dhamar governorate.

Interventions under **Window 3** are yet to be initiated as transitional government arrangements are still to emerge.

### Situational Background

Yemen remains one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. By the end of 2021, the conflict has caused around 377,000 Yemeni casualties across its seven-year lifespan. Most of the casualties being young children and women, caused by hunger and preventable diseases. 2021 saw the impact of the compounded crises of humanitarian, political and economic, resulting in an increasingly entrenched conflict with intense fighting in the North, around Marib Governorate.

In 2021, OCHA registered 4.3 million internally displaced people (IDPs), 3.3 million of which need humanitarian assistance. Of the non-displaced

In both areas controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and the De Facto Authority (DFA), the price of essential goods has increased dramatically due to the continuous devaluation of the Yemeni Rial (YER), the high price of importation associated fees, and the high price of fuel. The high prices have led to erosion of public services and increased existing challenges to pay civil servants' salaries and pensions.

During the year, almost 2,000 COVID-19 related deaths and 11,000 cases were recorded. However, tracking of cases and deaths was only instituted in the areas under the control of the IRG and resources to systematically record and track cases were not sufficient. The numbers are therefore expected to be significantly higher. As of 31 December 2021, only 2.1 per cent of the population has received at least one of the COVID-19 vaccines.

### The Peace Support Facility

The PSF contributes to the UNDP Country Programme Priority 3: "Support confidence building measures and national and local peace processes".<sup>3</sup> It is primarily linked to the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 aimed at supporting peace, justice, and strong institutions.

In 2021, the PSF made some progress across Windows 1 and 2. However, the overall implementation was hindered by political and military developments in the country.

The implementation of the Stockholm Agreement faced several challenges and was characterized by slow implementation. The peace process in Taiz did not crystallize into an agreement or tangible action; the prisoner exchanges faced many obstacles; and the parties never reached an agreement on the details of its implementation.

The Hodeidah Agreement, facilitated by United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), witnessed minimal progress on the ground and periods of relative de-escalation were counterbalanced by moments

population, 20.1 million need humanitarian assistance.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> OCHA, 2022, Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview.

<sup>3</sup> See UNDP Yemen Country Strategic Note (CSN) 2021-2024.

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of increased violence and clashes throughout the year. In November 2021, the United Arab Emiratesbacked 'Joint Forces' conducted a unilateral partial withdrawal from their positions in the southern and eastern areas of the country's Red Sea port city of Hodeidah. The vacant positions were filled by Ansar Allah.

Considering the above, and as further detailed in the following report, the main 2021 PSF results included:

1. Emergency rehabilitation of the Ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa by the rehabilitation of the generator shelter and the maintenance workshop.

- 2. Procurement of spare parts, buoys and pilot boat.
- Implementation of community safety initiatives aimed at creating channels to armed groups and security forces to improve their awareness of – and respect for – civilian protection, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL), mostly rights of detainees.
- Support conflict mediation in relation to water management in Dharmar governorate, the PSF commissioned the assessment and eventual rehabilitation of the water infrastructure.



## ACHIEVEMENTS: PROGRESS TOWARD OUTPUTS

#### Key Results - Highlights

#### Implementation of Window 1 initiatives

- Rehabilitation of the Port of Hodeidah maintenance workshop. (Completed)
- Rehabilitation of the Port of Hodeidah generator shelter. (Completed)
- Majority of spare parts for the handling equipment procured and handed over to Yemen's Red Sea Ports Corporation (YRSPC). (Completed)

#### **Implementation of Window 2 initiatives**

- Assessment of water infrastructure in Dhamar governorate. (Completed)
- Two out of three community safety initiatives completed. One initiative received a no-cost extension (July 2022) to complete activities in Taiz as the active frontline has delayed the implementation. (Partially completed)
- More than 80 per cent of PSF staff recruited. (Partially Completed)

Output 1: Support the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement or any other future agreement through initiatives agreed by the parties.

#### 1.1 Rehabilitation of the Port of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa

The PSF has rehabilitated critical elements of the ports thereby contributing to facilitating the entry of vital humanitarian aid.

 Rehabilitation of the Generator Shelter (Completed) The rehabilitation of the generator shelter is identified as a Priority I, in agreement with the port authorities. The rehabilitation involved providing adequate shelter for the generators to prevent damage and minimize wear and tear from exposure to extreme weather conditions. The operationalization of the harbor was a key contributor to the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement. Through rehabilitation, the lifespan of the generators has been lengthened thereby improving port operation and ensuring sustainability.



Figure 1: Generator shelter before rehabilitation



Figure 2: Generator shelter after rehabilitation

#### Rehabilitation of the Maintenance Workshop (Completed)

Rehabilitation of the Port of Hodeidah's maintenance workshop and construction of straddles and annexes are Priority 2.<sup>4</sup> The intervention includes the workshop, straddles, three (3) interior rooms, shed for the forklift, and

shed for the fuel tanks. Restoration of the Port of Hodeidah maintenance workshop has improved the port's operations. Through rehabilitation, the wear and tear on equipment has been significantly reduced. The lifespan and sustainability of the port's operations has therefore been increased significantly.

4 Priority 2 projects aim at re-establishing containerized cargo handling capacity by the Port of Hodeidah.



Figure 3: Workshop before rehabilitation



Figure 4: Workshop after rehabilitation

 Spare Parts and Equipment Procurement (Completed)

Procurement of spare parts for the generators and rolling equipment is identified as Priority 1 projects in the **Damage and Capacity Assessment for Ports** report. The delivery of spare parts for the generators, rolling equipment and tugboats was crucial to restoring productivity and improving the operationality of the port.<sup>5</sup>

#### Procurment of Pilot Boat and 27 Buoys (Completed)

Procurement of a pilot boat is identified as a Priority 3 project<sup>6</sup> while the procurement of 27 buoys was listed Priority 1 project. The Port of Hodeidah is currently using tugboats to transport pilots, which is neither cost efficient (high consumption of diesel), time efficient, nor safe. The procurement of a new pilot boat will reduce time and cost and increase the safety of the port significantly. In addition, 27 buoys have been procured to guide ships entering the port. Without the buoys many ships might not return to the port.<sup>7</sup>


Already procured, the buoys will be delivered mid-2022 while the pilot boat will be delivered in 2024. Both the pilot boat and the buoys will enhance the security in the port significantly.

#### **1.2 FSO Safer Tanker Salvage**

France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden have contributed US\$ 6.4 million to Phase I of the salvage operation project implemented by UNOPS since 2020. UNDP established an interagency agreement with UNOPS that is responsible for the implementation of the project. UNOPS commenced the procurement of specialized diving equipment and rental of a vessel but faced challenges when Ansar Allah authorities requested substantive changes of the scope of work (SoW). The initial SoW included assessment and light repairs, but the changes requested were to fully restore the FSO Safer's functionality. Consequently, the project could not move forward.

At the UN principals meeting held in December 2021, it was decided to discontinue the UNOPS project. The principals designated the Resident Coordinator as the lead of the salvage operation and UNDP to support the effort as the implementing agency.

Following the closure of the UNOPS project, parts of its assets will be transferred to the PSF to support the national contingency plan. The remaining funds mobilized through the PSF were refunded in September 2021 and allocated to support the private sector salvage solution.



<sup>5</sup> See Annex 2: Handling Equipment Spare Parts (Phase II).

<sup>6</sup> Priority 3 projects are necessary to restore or improve safety and sustainability of the port's operations and assets.

<sup>7</sup> Many ship captains have complained about the lack of buoys and would not return to the port due to the security concern. See the *Damage and Capacity Assessment for Ports* report.

#### Output 2: Implement Discreet activities emerging out of Track II initiatives with the goal of catalyzing the political process.

#### 2.1 Community Safety Initiatives

The three (3) projects signed in October 2020 as part of the Community Safety Initiatives began in early 2021. Three (3) distinct partners were selected to implement the projects: Centre for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG), and Safer Yemen.

The collective aim of the projects was to create communication channels to armed groups and security forces to improve their awareness of and respect for civilian protection, involve local communities and make security actors more accountable and willing to prioritize local community needs, and create durable formats for communication between communities and security actors.

Due to contextual challenges, all the three (3) projects received a no-cost extension, extending the implementation period to the first quarter of 2022. The main challenges were the delays in permit authorizations, and the volatile and shifting conflict areas. Despite the challenges, however, two Responsible Parties (RPs) completed the implementation in 2021. One RP requested a further extension due to the ongoing fighting in Taiz.

The Enhancing Community Protection and Safety initiative implemented by CIVIC aims to promote the protection of civilians in Yemen.



In 2021, the project made significant progress. The most significant achievements were:

 Created Three (3) Community Protection Groups (CPGs) in Aden, Marib, and Taiz.

The CPGs went through an extensive capacity building programme before having community meetings about their concerns. During the training, participants gained knowledge about Civilian Harm Mitigation (CHM), Protection of Civilians (POC), and advocacy for civilian issues in direct coordination and communication with security forces. Training topics also focused on enhancing the CPGs' relations with the security and military actors to build trust:

- During the training, the cross-cutting issue mentioned in all three (3) locations was the overlapping mandate of security and military forces and the confusion it caused when wanting to address grievances.
- 2. Monthly community meetings were used to identify community concerns, accompanied by concrete actions to address the concerns.
- 3. Community reports were developed following every meeting.
- 4. Allowing for a safe space, particularly pertaining to women, one (1) womendedicated community meeting was hosted in each area. Issues that surfaced included the increase of women displacement, forced marriage, domestics violence, and rape due to the breakdown of public institutions and social provision. They were not addressed at the meetings.

A total of 262 participants (187 women and 75 men) contributed with their concerns and received training across the three (3) locations.

 Hosted Six (6) Rounds of Civil-Military Dialogues in Aden, Marib, and Taiz.

Participants included community representatives, security forces and military personnel. The first round of civil-military dialogues focused on civilians presenting their concerns and priorities to security forces. While concerns varied across the three (3) locations, most topics resonated across them. The overarching concerns included: arbitrary detentions at check points and in DFA areas, speeding vehicles in residential areas, and poor coordination between humanitarian organizations.

The second round of dialogues, focused on establishing, presenting, and implementing accountability measure such as reporting procedures, principles of civilian rights, investigation procedures, etc.

A total of 138 participants (44 women and 94 men) across the three (3) locations took part in these dialogues.

Broadcast the Concerns Raised by the CPGs.

To reach a wider audience the concerns of the CPGs were broadcast to a wider audience through live radio shows and radio flash messages targeting a total of 38 districts. By radio broadcasting their discussions and messages, the CPGs sensitized the public on civil-military engagement.

 Held 20 Trainings for Security Forces on Protection of Civilians (POC) and Civilian Harm Mitigation (CHM).

The training sessions significantly increased the awareness of security forces for POC and CHM. A cascade training of trainers (ToT) methodology was selected to rapidly increase the number of beneficiaries. The 20 trainings in Aden, Marib, and Taiz had a total of 401 participants (52 women and 349 men). A training session solely for women was held to foster a cohort of woman officers with in-depth training on addressing issues specifically affecting women.

Participants especially welcomed the genderinclusive process. However, despite the 20 training sessions held, the feedback from participants clearly demonstrate that the initiative only scratched the surface of the overall need for POC/CHM training, and that more organizations to carry out the training is in demand.

The Enhancing Local Security initiative implemented by Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) aims to enhance dialogue and trust between local communities and local government authorities. In 2021, the project:

 Developed a comprehensive baseline and survey tool to determine the current level of trust in local security and safety institutions.

PILPG developed a baseline in Aden, Hadramaut, Marib, Shabwa, and Taiz. 845 community representatives (323 women and 522 men) participated across the locations, providing insights to perception of safety and security, which will feed future programming.

 Built a network of local organizations to address community safety.

PILPG built a network of five (5) local civil society organizations (CSOs) in Aden, Hadramaut, Marib, Shabwa, and Taiz governorates. The CSOs received training on communication, advocacy, community dialogue facilitation, and human resources, enabling them to effectively identify and advocate the security needs of communities.

A total of 72 intermediaries and community facilitators (29 women and 43 men) were trained, along with 15 local police members (1 woman and 14 men), on International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and dealing with prisoners and detainees. The community facilitators collectively held 225 community forums to identify community needs with the participation of 6,335 community representatives (2,559 women and 3,776 men).

 Increased the accountability of security forces by identifying and addressing the needs and priorities of communities.

Through hosting community dialogues at district level between security forces and communities, PILPG contributed to increasing the accountability of security forces. 135 community dialogues were carried out across the five (5) governorates. At each community dialogue, community priorities were discussed and addressed, identifying local solutions and recommendations.

A total of 1,199 representatives from local communities, local police departments, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Defense (304 women and 895 men) participated.

The local solutions and options were implemented at a governorate level roundtable meeting of decision-makers from the office of the governor, general directors of the police department, civil defense, activists, and community representatives.

 The main implementation challenge is the overlapping mandate of different security forces, which complicates the approval process of activities.

In addition, important activities are yet to be implemented due to the conflict in Taiz, including: (1) the capacity building of community intermediaries; (2) liaising between local government and constituencies to hold 280 community forums; (3) conducting 110 community dialogues between communities and local security forces to develop actionable plans to address their needs; and (4) the allocation of 20 grants to advocate for 20 securitysupportive initiatives.

The Safer Schools Yemen initiative aims to support advocacy and awareness initiatives and to enable students to return safely to schools. It is implemented by Safer Yemen late in 2020 to better address and communicate safety concerns presented by security forces.

In 2021, the project:

 Contributed to the National Manual for Safety in Schools and had it approved in the North and South. Safer Yemen managed to obtain a signed MoU with the Ministry of Education (MoE) in the North and South, and secure authorization from the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (SCMCHA) to implement related activities. The national manual was prepared, then reviewed by the MoE in Sana'a and Aden as well as UNDP and OSESGY.

Following Safer Yemen advice, the MoE in the North and South have established genderinclusive review committees to ensure women teachers and students specific needs are addressed.

 Increased capacity of the Ministry of Education to develop, adapt, and implement the safety manual.

95 teachers and Ministry officials (27 women and 68 men) were trained on the Safer Schools materials, including response to emergencies, business continuity and recovery, and school safety and security management plan.

The training targeted the five (5) governorates of Aden, Al-Mahweet, Sana'a, Shabwa and Taiz, and applied a cascading ToT methodology. 3,146 teachers and school administration staff (1,695 women and 1,451 men) benefitted from the training. As a result, 50 schools developed a safety response plan to mitigate risk and implement Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to keep students and schools safer. This improved school safety for 39,726 students (19,994 girls and 19,732 boys).



 Raised awareness on school safety by broadcasting safety awareness materials.

To reach a broader audience, Safer Yemen has 17 radio stations and eight (8) television stations to broadcast the awareness messages for more than 40 days. The project also developed and printed 5,000 guides, 500 banners, and 250,000 awareness raising materials.

 The project enjoyed a prominent level of success, demonstrated by community leaders and imams, who were not initially included in the project, but directly requested safety training in their community.

The main challenge faced by the project was delayed authorization due to the necessary inclusion of the North and the South.

### 2.2 Addressing community conflict surrounding water infrastructure in Dhamar governorate

Under PSF's **Window 2**, the Berghof Foundation will implement an initiative in Dhamar governorate. The initiative emerged from local stakeholder consultation and aims to contribute to local communities demanding peace.

The intervention is two-fold, focusing on the resolution of water management-related conflicts by rehabilitating water infrastructure in Dhamar city and Maghreb Ans district, as well as conducting community engagement and discussions. The rehabilitation will provide safe drinking water and the engagement will aim to secure an agreement of the water distribution in the two districts.

A Letter of Agreement was finalized with Yemeni Public Works Project (PWP) to conduct the initial assessment of the water infrastructure.

The community engagement and discussions will be led by Berghof Foundation and their local partner Political Development Forum (PDF). Their community engagement is set to resume once the preparation work, including the technical assessment, has been concluded by PWP.

### 2.3 Clearing a path to peace: A cleaning campaign on the frontlines of Taiz

A proposal for a clean-up campaign to remove garbage on the frontlines of Taiz was proposed by DeepRoot Consulting. It entails negotiating a limited ceasefire to allow workers to clear the rubbish and move between the two sides of the frontline. In addition to addressing a major public health concern, the aim is to build trust between the parties (relevant to Track I and II efforts), to open a humanitarian corridor and reduce hostilities.

Due to the on-going conflict in the region, the initiative was delayed and could not start in 2021. DeepRoot later confirmed the cancellation of the initiative due to a failure to secure a temporary ceasefire.

#### Output 3: Transitional governance and post-peace agreement arrangements supported upon parties' agreement.

**Window 3** continues to be an important placeholder for initiatives aimed at supporting the eventual transitional government arrangements. Potential initiatives include support to the Presidency, the Central Bank, the security sector, constitutional reform, and other core government functions and it will be contingent upon discussion and buy-in from the warring parties. To date, the political and military circumstances have not favored the activation of Window 3.

#### Output 4: The Project Management Unit of the Peace Support Facility is set up and operational.

#### Staffing

The PSF has deployed more than 80 per cent of its target for staffing. The Gender and Social Inclusion Specialist was deployed in October 2021, while the recruitment of the Strategic Planning Specialist will be completed in 2022.

The Operations Manager left at the end of 2021. The position will be replaced by a Finance Specialist who will respond more appropriately to the needs of the project while being recruited at a lower level. The recruitment process will be launched and completed in 2022. The staff turnover created challenges in 2021 and the project did not manage to reach optimum staffing, impacting the delivery speed.

The gender proportion is 50 per cent women holding managerial positions.

## CHALLENGES AND MITIGATION MEASURES

The project faced numerous challenges. Some were external in nature such as the changing political context and COVID-19, while others were internal such as programmatic and operational.

#### Programmatic Challenges

Established in 2019, the PSF faced a dynamic political context that continued to raise new challenges. The PSF must be more agile and adaptive, especially concerning the strengthening of it local peace component. The dynamic political context continues to bring up new challenges, questioning the relevance of the theory of change. It is therefore necessary for the PSF to be more agile and adaptive, especially concerning strengthening of its local peace component.

#### Operational Challenges

In 2021, it was challenging to strike a balance between the PSF's commitment to agility and adaptability, UNDP's programmatic protocols and requirements, and the expectations from partners to fast-track initiatives and minimize the bureaucracy, usually associated with development projects. To meet the expectations of partners, the PSF needs to identify which processes can be conducted quicker.

#### Authorization, Clearance, and Approvals

Obtaining multiple authorizations has caused delays on several initiatives throughout PSF's portfolio. Authorizations are often required from multiple authorities, including the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG), Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations Committee (EHOC), the De facto Authorities (DFA), the UN Sanctions Committee, Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (SCMCHA), etc. Additional authorizations delay implementation and procurement timelines significantly.

#### Market Access

The rehabilitation of the Port of Hodeidah involves high value procurement processes that have been affected by lack of local suppliers' capacity and lack of incentive for international suppliers to work in Yemen. The lack of incentives is tied to a combination of factors, including COVID-19 restrictions, the ongoing conflict, and national travel and trade restrictions.

Lack of Substantial Peace Progress

**Window 3** activities are yet to be initiated as they are contingent on the signing of a peace agreement.

#### **Mitigating Measures**

UNDP took several mitigating measures to minimize the impact of these challenges.

Pre-Approval

When possible, items for procurement were preapproved by the IRG and EHOC prior to launching procurement processes.

Changing Delivery Routes

When possible and necessary, delivery routes were changed to avoid the extensive and often impossible authorization processes from the beneficiaries of the opposing party.

Direct Contracting

When needed the PSF has made direct contracting to Yemeni organizations and companies on behalf of RPs.

#### Direct Communication

When RPs have faced challenges in obtaining authorization, UNDP has contacted the relevant institution directly.

## ACHIEVEMENTS AGAINST THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK

| Indicator  | Annual<br>Target | Progress                   | Status   |  |
|--|------------------|----------------------------|--|--|
| Project Output 1: The implementation of the Stockholm Agreement or any other future agreement are supported through initiatives agreed by the parties. |                  |                            |  |  |
| 1.1 Number of initiatives<br>agreed upon by the<br>parties implemented   | 2                | 1 of 2<br>implemented      | Partially achieved – The intervention on the Port of<br>Hodeidah is being implemented while the<br>assessment of Marib Power Plant has been cancelled<br>due to the ongoing hostilities in Marib.  |  |
| 1.2 Number of<br>infrastructure<br>rehabilitated   | 2                | 2 of 2<br>implemented      | Fully achieved – Rehabilitation of the generator shelter and worskhop.   |  |
| Project Output 2: Discree<br>catalyzing the political pr   |                  | emerging out of            | Track II initiatives are implemented with the goal of  |  |
| 2.1 Number of<br>recommendations<br>emerged from Track II<br>dialogues implemented   | 3                | 2 partially<br>implemented | Partially achieved – Of the three (3) initiatives<br>packages recommended, two are being<br>implemented while the third has been cancelled due<br>to failure to broker a ceasefire.  |  |
| 2.2 Number of locations<br>targeted by PSF<br>peace-related<br>interventions   | 7                | 7 of 7<br>implemented      | Fully achieved – Since this indicator is meant for only<br>Window 2, all the seven (7) areas targeted by the<br>different responsible parties have been covered.   |  |
| 2.3 Number of people<br>benefiting from<br>improved services and<br>living conditions  | 2,000            | 52,232                     | Over achieved – The implementation of the community safety intiative has reached 52,232 direct beneficiaries.  |  |
| Project Output 3: Transitio  | onal gover       | nance arrangeme            | nts are supported as and when the parties agree.   |  |
| 3.1 Number of<br>transitional mechanisms<br>supported by PSF   | N/A              | N/A                        | This indicator was introduced after the revision of<br>the project document following the Steering<br>Committee's decision in September 2019. PSF<br>stands ready to implement related activities when<br>progress on the peace process is made.   |  |
| 3.2 Number of core institutions assisted   | N/A              | N/A                        | This indicator was introduced only after revision of<br>the project document following the Steering<br>Committee's decision in September 2019. PSF<br>stands ready to implement related activities when<br>progress on the peace process is made.  |  |
| Project Output 4: The Project Management Unit of the Peace Support Facility is set up and operational.   |                  |                            |  |  |
| 4.1 Number of PSF project staff recruited  | 9                | 8 of 9<br>implemented      | Partially achieved – 80 per cent of the total staff<br>deployed. The Gender and Inclusion Specialist was<br>deployed in October 2021. The Operations Manager<br>left end of December 2021, and the recruitment of the<br>Finance Specialist and the Strategic Planning Specialist<br>is to be finalized in 2022. |  |

## CONTRIBUTION TO LONGER-TERM RESULTS

PSF's donors have recurrently requested explanations and supporting evidence of coherence between the facility's three Windows, UNDP's broader programme, and their contribution to the broader peace process and the work of the OSESGY. To ensure the facility remains relevant, fast, and flexible, a Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) was mandated. The evaluation concluded that a comprehensive vision and strategy for the next phase of the PSF has yet to emerge.

Despite the lack of significant progress in the peace process, the PSF should in the next phase, continue to focus on supporting opportunities emerging from the Special Envoy efforts toward the national peace process. However, subnational peacebuilding opportunities (of a political, social, security, or economic nature) with the potential to lay the foundations, incentivize, and make the national peace process more inclusive should complement the Track I "top-down" focus.

On **Window 2,** the MTE did not question the relevance of the "stand-alone" initiatives. However, it emphasized that "stand-alone" initiatives should also contribute to the Special Envoy-led national peace process.

Under **Window 1**, the rehabilitation of the workshop and the generator shelter, as well as the delivery of spare parts to the Port of Hodeidah, have contributed to achieving the partial implementation of the Stockholm Agreement. The PSF will continue the rehabilitation of the ports, focusing on the delivery of procured equipment and reconstruction of slipways and Berths 1 and 4. This further secures port operation

and increased the ease of access for goods, including humanitarian aid to Yemen.

Another aspects of developing the ports is better revenue management which will contribute to the port's self-sustainment and result in an increase of commercial goods and humanitarian aid at a more affordable price.

UNDP's lead on implementing the salvation of the FSO Safer has the potential to strengthen the UN's position on the ports. By building confidence around the UN, the avoidance of a massive oil spill in the Red Sea, can create an environment that incentivize further agreement between the parties around other critical issues such as a more sustainable peace agreement.

**Window 2** initiatives were effectively launched late 2020 by RPs identified, agreements signed, and first instalments paid. This Window contributes to the objective of building peace at subnational level through confidence building interventions, which will increase communities' demand for peace and thereby contribute to the broader peace process. The project is being approached by potential implementing partners with interesting initiatives. The project will gain in expanding **Window 2** to have a more significant impact on resolution of conflicts at communitylevel to build peace ground up.

**Window 3** is tied to the brokering of a more comprehensive peace agreement by supporting transitional governance mechanism. The Window cannot be launched at this stage since no significant peace agreement has been reached by the parties. This Window has no entry point at this stage to achieve its contribution to the overall outcome of a sustained peace in Yemen.

### **CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

#### **Gender Mainstreaming**

The PSF continues to advance women's empowerment and promote women's role in peacebuilding, in line with the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. In this pursuit, the Gender and Social Inclusion Specialist was deployed in October 2022. After joining, the Specialist developed a draft Gender Inclusion Strategy, Gender Mainstreaming Framework for implementing partners, and a standalone Gender Initiative project. All strategic documents are with UNDP Senior Management and will respond to the MTE recommendations while creating a more robust gender dimension to PSF implementation.

Several of PSF's initiatives focus on large-scale rehabilitation where opportunities for gender mainstreaming have been limited. A focus on gender mainstreaming of **Window 2** initiatives has therefore been increased. This has been done by providing training to RPs, ensuring inclusion of quota for project activities, developing the above-mentioned Gender Strategy, and increased efforts on collection of gender disaggregated data. Going forward, the PSF will include standalone gender-specific projects.

An increased focus on gender mainstreaming was also identified in the MTE.

#### **Conflict Sensitivity**

Implementation of the PSF has been guided by the principles of conflict sensitivity and the "Do No Harm Approach". For each initiative, as part of the vetting process, the PSF Manager prepares a Risk Framework that encompasses all the potential risks with status, risk rating, impact, and mitigation measures. The Framework touches upon a conflict sensitivity analysis that outlines all the connectors and dividers. It is then passed to "Operations and Compliance Unit" in the Resident Coordinator's Office that further develops the analysis to determine the costbenefit analysis of the initiative. The PSF, throughout its implementation, has developed five (5) risk frameworks, one for each initiative. The Manager of the Facility regularly monitors and updates the Risk Log.

In addition, the community safety initiatives are all focused on building peace at local level between local communities and security authorities. They contributed to enabling an environment conducive to enhancing peace at local level.

#### **Environmental Considerations**

The PSF is implementing two larg-scale infrastructural projects: the rehabilitation of the Hodeidah Port and the FSO Safer salvaging. Both projects have a risk of considerable environmental impact.

To mitigate the risk of the rehabilitation, a separate project document with its own mitigation measures was drafted last year. A separate contingency plan will be developed for the FSO Safer salvaging project to mitigate the risk. The contingency plan includes a national response and preparedness plan and a capacity building component that will train members of the Safer emergency committees both in the North and the South.



#### Coordination

Four aspects are to be noted in this regard:

#### 1. PSF Coordination Working Group

Comprising of UNDP, RCO, and OSESGY was established last year. The objective of the group was to identify implementable projects for the PSF and following to conduct risk, feasibility assessments, and preemptively address bottlenecks. While the group was functioning, its mandate needed to be formalized to enhance accountability and strengthen coordination, as recommended by the Mid-Term Review.

#### 2. Donor Coordination and Communication

It was limited to one (1) coordination meeting in 2021, with the aim to address the recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation and preparation of the strategic orientation note. The note was discussed in the meeting before its presentation to the Steering Committee Meeting. The project team maintains regular contact with donors to discuss the strategic orientation for PSF phase II, cost sharing agreements, and establish new agreements. The regular bilateral exchanges are also opportunities to answer specific demands from donors.

#### 3. PSF Steering Committee

Consists of the UN Special Envoy, the Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator, the UNDP Resident Representative, and senior representatives from donor countries. One (1) meeting was held virtually on 25 October. Donors stressed that a stronger linkage between the PSF and OSESGY was needed, and that the strategic note should be reflected in a project document going forward.

#### 4. The Port Project Technical Committee

Formed in 2020 and serves as a platform where all project partners (UNDP, UNMHA, WFP, and YRSPC) can discuss technical issues, obstacles, or emerging initiatives regarding the port. We expect the first meeting to take place in early 2022.

### **RISK MANAGEMENT**

| Description   | Туре                       | Impact/<br>Probability | Countermeasures  |
|---|----------------------------|------------------------|--|
| In the absence of a peace<br>agreement, space for peace<br>support activities remains<br>limited.                 | Strategic<br>and Political | I = 3<br>P = 4         | In consultation with the UN Special Envoy and<br>Resident Coordinator, it was proposed to the<br>Steering Committee that the PSF can support more<br>local-level initiatives by implementing<br>recommendations stemming out of Track II<br>dialogues. |
| Security conditions impede<br>staff deployment, mobility,<br>and face to face consultations<br>with stakeholders. | Security                   | = 4<br>P = 3           | Continuous monitoring of political and security<br>developments was done in close coordination with<br>RCO and OSESGY.   |
| The residual risk of project<br>implementation is assessed<br>as too high.  | Strategic<br>and Political | I = 5<br>P = 3         | Through the engagement of UN senior management<br>and the parties, it was ensured that parties<br>recognized that implementation is predicated by<br>the need for robust independent risk assessment.  |
| Perception by the parties of partiality and unfairness of project activities.                                     | 0                          | = 4<br>P = 2           | Close and regular coordination between RC, SE<br>and UNDP RR took place to ensure equity of PSF<br>interventions and gauge parties' acceptance.  |

| Lack of resources and capacity undermines project implementation.                                |                            | l = 5<br>P = 3 | Regular coordination with donors took place to ensure the availability of needed resources.  |
|--|----------------------------|----------------|--|
| Local ownership by<br>Yemeni partners is limited<br>by lack of confidence in<br>peace and the UN | 0                          | I = 4<br>P = 4 | Through engagement of UN Senior Management<br>with the parties, agreement from authorities at all<br>levels was secured. UNDP established a National<br>Steering Committee for the port project to ensure<br>stronger buy-in and address bottlenecks in<br>implementation. |
| Recommendations<br>emerging from Track II<br>partners do not fit the<br>scope of the PSF.        | Strategic and<br>Political | I = 3<br>P = 2 | An operationalization document was developed to<br>clarify Window 2 scope, criteria, and procedures.<br>Coordination with OSESGY and donors was done<br>to organize a Track II coordination meeting in early<br>2020 to describe the PSF to partners.                      |

#### Continue

## **LESSONS LEARNED**

#### Flexibility

The PSF should maintain the highest degree of flexibility with regards to interventions to be undertaken. To achieve this, it needs to maintain a flexible structure and draw on UNDP Yemen Country Office capacities to address the multitude of proposed interventions. The PSF should also regularly revise its Theory of Change to adapt to the changing political context.

#### Subnational Peacebuilding and Capacity Building

While Track I political negotiations have not yield meaningful results during the past year, there is a wealth of opportunities to build peace at the local level. The PSF must further engage local authorities and communities within **Window 2.** This can produce quick wins by enhancing the relationship between communities and local security forces which significantly enhances the safety and security of civilians. So far, this resulted in procedural changes at checkpoints, their relocation, and in some cases even closure. In addition, it has contributed to regular dialogues between authorities and communities, focused on identifying solutions to security concerns.

The budget allocated to this Window should be expanded considering the flexibility that can be achieved by enhancing local level security and peace building. The interventions have also contributed to significant capacity building of local NGOs, which can contribute to the sustainability of local level peacebuilding.

#### Gender Sensitivity

The lack of gender sensitive programming during the initial phase of the PSF may be related to the facility's orientation towards infrastructure rehabilitation.

Going forward gender mainstreaming will be prioritized, and existing capacities will be enhanced, so that the PSF contributes to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and Yemeni women empowerment.

The implementation of the Gender Strategy and the gender standalone initiatives will yield more tangible results in the next reporting cycle. This can be further enhanced if **Window 2** is expanded.

#### Enhanced Coordination

The PSF, OSESGY, and RCO will need to focus more on coordination to enable a more robust identification of new initiatives and jointly draw lessons from ongoing initiatives and ensure better project design of new ones. The PSF, OSESGY and the RCO will hold more regular meetings so linkages between the initiatives and the work of the Special Envoy are clearly identified.

## CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

The PSF major initiative to support the peace process remains the rehabilitation of the Port of Hodeidah. The establishment of **Window 2** has presented an opportunity to build peace at community level and thereby address specific needs and create locally-rooted incentives for peace in both the North and the South.

Under the Emergency Port Rehabilitation Project framework, UNDP is implementing initiatives in the Port of Aden. This will balance support to ports both in the North and the South (Aden and Mukalla). These initiatives are outside the PSF scope but will contribute to the balanced approach of the support to Yemen.

The context of Yemen has shifted since the initial three (3) Windows were agreed upon. Demand for strategic reorientation will be addressed during the following reporting cycle through a substantive strategic revision of the PSF and its governing structures to enhance coordination, efficiency, and ability to fulfill the need.

The main obstacle faced by the PSF since its inception has been the lack of meaningful progress on the political process. This not only applies to the limited implementation of the Hodeidah Agreement, and the Stockholm Agreement at large, but also to the national-level peace negotiations which have not officially resumed. While the PSF has demonstrated its flexibility as an instrument to support OSESGY's work with the parties, a more conducive political environment is needed to launch **Window 3**.

The operationalization of **Window 2** has been successful in 2021, and it is necessary to further expand, strengthen and define this Window, to incentivize local demand for peacebuilding.

Meanwhile, it is inherent if the PSF is to fulfill its mandate to continuously monitor political developments and identify opportunities to implement initiatives that will directly consolidate progress of the peace process.

The deployment of a Gender and Social Inclusion Specialist in October 2021 and the consequent Gender Strategy have contributed to enhancing **Window 2**. Segregation of results and gender mainstreaming will be applied across the PSF initiatives going forward.

2022 will focus on the strategical review of the PSF to ensure it remains relevant, flexible, and agile. More gender sensitive programming, enhanced coordination, and governance structure along with determining the scope of intervention of the facility will be the focus of the substantive review.



## **ANNEX 1: FINANCIAL REPORT**

#### **2021 Additional Funding**

The additional funding the PSF received in 2021 is the contribution of Italy (EUR 1 million), International Maritime Organization (IMO) (US\$ 175,591), and NorCap (US\$ 113,720) – a total of US\$ 1,404,288. Italy made additional funding available for PSF **Window 1**, IMO contributed to the capacity building component of the contingency planning for the FSO Safer Project, and NorCap contributed to the implementation of the National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security (NAP/WPS).

#### **Financial Status**

In 2021, an amount of US\$ 6,772,376 was disbursed for the implementation of **Windows 1 and 2**. The amount includes covering the expenses of the damage assessment, light repairs cost of FSO Tanker, and the US\$ 1,041,869 disbursed by UNOPS under the framework of the UN-to-UN agreement signed between the two UN entities.

The table below summarizes the contributions received by the PSF. The first one is the cumulative table that combines PSF and FSO Safer contribution to the UNOPS project channeled through the PSF.

| Donor Contribution                  | Amount in US\$ | Donor Contribution                     | Amount in US\$ |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|--|----------------|
| Canada                              | 1,524,390      | NORCAP                                 | 113,720        |
| Denmark                             | 2,104,947      | Norway                                 | 1,072,464      |
| European Union                      | 1,118,900      | Sweden                                 | 1,077,702      |
| France                              | 1,098,901      | Swiss Development<br>Corporation (SDC) | 1,016,260      |
| Germany                             | 5,116,868      | UNDP                                   | 377,904        |
| Italy                               | 1,405,499      | United Kingdom                         | 2,094,241      |
| Netherland                          | 2,246,966      |  | *              |
| Total Contribution Received for PSF |                | 20,368,763                             |                |

#### **Summary of PSF Resource Mobilization**

#### Safer Tanker Contribution by Donor

| Donor Contribution                         | Amount in US\$ |
|--|----------------|
| France                                     | 295,988        |
| Germany                                    | 2,202,746      |
| International Maritime Organization (IMO)  | 175,591        |
| Norway                                     | 1,344,348      |
| Sweden                                     | 2,649,607      |
| Total Contribution Received for FSO Tanker | 6,668,280      |

| Donors                      | Contributions in US\$ | Fund Utilized in<br>US\$ | Balance<br>Resource      | Utilizations<br>Percentage |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| Canada                      | 1,524,390             | 982,166                  | 542,224                  | 67                         |
| Denmark                     | 2,104,947             | 846,718                  | 1,258,229                | 40                         |
| European Union              | 1,118,900             | 1,118,900                | 0                        | 100                        |
| France <sup>8</sup>         | 1,394,889             | 530,913                  | 863,976                  | 38                         |
| Germany <sup>8</sup>        | 7,319,614             | 3,115,027                | 4,204,588                | 43                         |
| IMO                         | 175,591               | 0                        | 175,591                  | 0                          |
| Italy                       | 1,405,499             | 9,618                    | 1,395,880                | 1                          |
| Netherlands                 | 2,246,966             | 1,653,289                | 593,677                  | 74                         |
| NORCAP                      | 113,720               | 0                        | 113,720                  | 0                          |
| Norway <sup>8</sup>         | 2,416,812             | 1,101,535                | 1,315,277                | 46                         |
| Sweden – SIDA <sup>8</sup>  | 3,727,309             | 386,829                  | 3,340,480                | 10                         |
| Swiss Dev Corp<br>(SDC)     | 1,016,260             | 501,038                  | 515,222                  | 49                         |
| UNDP                        | 377,904               | 377,904                  | 0                        | 100                        |
| United Kingdom <sup>9</sup> | 2,094,241             | 817,911                  | 1,276,330                | 39                         |
| Grand Total                 | 27,037,042            | 11,441,848               | 15,595,194 <sup>10</sup> | 42                         |

#### PSF Final Expenditure Report 2019 – 2021

8 After the discontinuation of the UNOPS project, the contributions from France, Germany, Norway and SIDA for FSO Safer (of US\$ 6,492,689) that were transferred to UNOPS and accounted for as a disbursement in 2020 has been refunded in 2021.

9 Allocation to Operations and Compliance Support Unit (OCU) refunded to PSF after closure of the output.

10 The obligation for ongoing contracts in the amount of US\$ 2,209,898 and 2022 salaries are already committed. This leaves a balance of estimated US\$ 11,500,000.

### ANNEX 2: HANDLING EQUIPMENT SPARE PARTS (PHASE II)

| S/N | Item  | Quantity | Handover Date    |
|-----|---|----------|------------------|
| 1   | Caterpillar tugboats spare parts and power generators | 900      | 13 January 2022  |
| 2   | Caterpillar 40-ton forklift and 25-ton lift truck     | 287      | 12 December 2021 |
| 3   | Fantuzzi 45-ton forklift                              | 170      | 28 August 2021   |
| 4   | Hyster 40-ton forklift                                | 393      | 28 August 2021   |



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