

# VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT ON THE THREATS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION IN NORTHERN REGIONS OF GHANA

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**VULNERABILITY  
ASSESSMENT ON THE THREATS  
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## Acronyms

ACSS	African Centre for Strategic Studies
ADB	Agricultural Development Bank
AU	African Union
BOSEC	Border Security Committee
CDD	Centre for Democratic Development
CECOTAPS	Centre for Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies
CEPS	Customs, Excise and Preventive Services
CID	Criminal Investigations Department
CRVA	Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
CSVRA	Country structural vulnerability and resilience assessment
DCA	Development Communities Association
DISEC	District Security Council
EIU	Economic Intelligence Unit
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GAF	Ghana Armed Forces
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GPS	Ghana Police Service
GRA	Ghana Revenue Authority
GRB	Ghana Refugee Board
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IPEP	Infrastructure for Poverty Eradication Programme
ISIS	Islamic State
ISWAP	Islamic State in West Africa Province
JIC	Joint Intelligence Centre
LCB	Lake Chad Basin
LEAP	Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty
LMIC	Lower Middle-Income Country
MMDA	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
MMDSC	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Security Councils
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NCCE	National Council for Civic Education
NDA	Northern Development Authority
NFPCVET	National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIB	National Intelligence Bureau
NORSAAC	Northern Sector Action on Awareness Centre

Vulnerability Assessment On The Threats Of Violent Extremism And  
Radicalisation In Northern Regions Of Ghana

NPC	National Peace Council
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
PBS	Bureau for Public Safety
REGSEC	Regional Security Council
RISE-GH	Rural Initiative for Self-Empowerment Ghana
SADA	Savannah Accelerated Development Authority
SADP	Savannah Agricultural Value Chain Development Project
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SBH	Surge Data Hub
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VE	Violent Extremism
VEOs	Violent Extremist Organizations
WACCE	West Africa Centre for Countering Extremism
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

## Executive Summary

This Report focuses on an assessment of community-specific vulnerabilities of individuals, groups and communities to being radicalized towards eventual violent extremism. It applies a gender lens, in particular, to the transition areas and the five northern regions to guide targeted interventions. It seeks to: (a) develop a practical methodology and approach to analyse the drivers of violent extremism, socio-economic triggers, and dynamics in the national and regional contexts; (b) undertake a field-based analysis including broad stakeholder consultations and engagements at national and sub-national levels to aid overall analysis; (c) undertake an assessment of the drivers and vulnerabilities, provide a common analytical framework for understanding the underlying causes and consequences of violent extremism and radicalization; and (d) provide recommendations based on the analysis to support a vulnerability-sensitive approach to incorporate into UNDP programming.

Vulnerabilities to violent extremism and radicalization in northern Ghana should be understood within the wider socio-economic and governance processes and security developments in West Africa and the Sahel. Despite Ghana's democratic successes, its elections and post-electoral environment continue to be characterised by relatively high levels of violence. Moreover, the stability of Ghana's democratic practice has arguably not translated into addressing socio-economic and governance challenges, characterized by limited active citizenship, endemic corruption, rent-seeking activities and clientelism, stalling local governance and weak macro-economic fundamentals that continue to persist. In fact, the nexus between democracy and the distribution of its socio-economic dividends are at best tenuous in the Northern regions.


One significant revelation from the field data is the contrasting approaches taken at the national and local levels in defining and constructing the sources, nature, and direction of extremist threats facing Ghana. While state and official pronouncements appear to perceive the threat as mainly external, and thus focus more on preventing a spillover and infiltration of extremists from neighbouring countries, locals appear to be more concerned about how internal socio-economic and political factors are driving survival strategies and subtle cross-border interactions that expose desperate populations, especially the youth, to radicalism. Consequently, there are perceptible differences in views on whether the emphasis should be placed on security measures along the borders, surveillance operations and policing of public places or efforts at addressing structural inequalities and insulating the youth in northern Ghana against recourse to extremism and radicalization.

Indeed, the report notes that both approaches to preventing violent extremism in Ghana are of critical importance, characterized by the intensified security operations along the northern borders. This is informed by the dictates of the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana, which provides for the application of



proactive measures to deter and pre-empt potential extremist acts in the country. Official statements suggest that an externally-driven extremist attack is imminent, prompting a shift in emphasis from 'prevention' to 'pre-emption'. Nonetheless, the Report argues that care must be taken not to neglect internal vulnerabilities that expose populations to extremism, and thus pays attention to both internal and external sources of vulnerability, particularly on the interactions between them, the regional nuances, and the ways in which they manifest in potential extremism in the five northern regions.

The Report employed a mixed methods approach for data collection aimed at identifying community-specific vulnerabilities to radicalization towards violent extremism for targeted interventions. After an extensive literature review to identify existing gaps, the study focused on primary data collection by combining survey results as well as in-depth semi-structured and open-ended interviews with key informants which we have captured as Meeting Notes (MN) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The survey was conducted by utilizing a standardized and contextualized household questionnaire designed by the Surge Data Hub (SDH) at Crisis Bureau and the UNDP Country team in Ghana, in consultation with the Consultant. In all, 1394 questionnaires were administered by the UNDP and Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). Of this number, 53 percent of respondents constituted females while 47 percent were males. Majority of respondents also fall into the critical youthful population, with 41 percent aged between 15 and 35 years. Survey data was collected in December 2022 from willing participants of randomized households who are 15 years or older, employing a team of experienced enumerators fitted with the Kobo Collect application on Android tablets.



Structured into seven interwoven sections, the report commences with an introduction which provides background information on vulnerabilities to violent extremism and radicalization in Northern Ghana, methodology approaches and the dynamics of conflict. Chapter one charts the historical trajectories influencing development policies and state capacity for security provision, which dovetails into the cross-cutting vulnerabilities and socio-economic dynamics driving violent extremism in the five northern regions as presented in chapters two and three respectively. Chapter three examines how the interactions between global, regional, sub-regional and domestic factors in multiple ways contribute to creating vulnerabilities, by highlighting a gamut of veritable issues and threats that enable, facilitate, or promote

radicalization leading to violent extremism. This is followed by a discussion of a common analytical framework for interpreting the underlying causes and consequences of violent extremism, whereas a concluding section provides some key recommendations for addressing the vulnerabilities identified.

In designing a common analytical framework for understanding the underlying causes and consequences of the journey from being vulnerable to radicalization and possible eventual violent extremism, the Report applies two mutually reinforcing concepts, namely: constructive and destructive social incentives. The constructive social incentive aims to place the agency of youth and communities within a framework that defines these incentives as: 'those elements within a society that contribute to stability, and orderly, as opposed to violent, social change'. Other key findings of the Report, relate to how ways of preventing radicalization and violent extremism should be through a whole-of-society approach that addresses persistent socio-economic challenges and development gaps that have generated a sense of exclusion, marginalization and anger among the largely unemployed youth.

Furthermore, there is a multiplicity of duplicating efforts at understanding and responding to the vulnerabilities that can result in radicalization and by extension violent extremism. Clearly, a perception from people interviewed is that there is a saturation of initiatives with little verifiable endeavours of concrete interventions that prevent and strengthen community resilience. It is critical that, community enthusiasm and support for sharing time-sensitive information and making critical suggestions for improving livelihood schemes to reduce vulnerabilities are not lost. Time has become of the essence, for translating all the knowledge garnered into concrete, implementable initiatives that transform lives. Such initiatives do not necessarily have to be large, expensive ones.

Again, there is a need for a more granular appreciation of the local drivers of violent extremism and a recognition that the risks of vulnerability differ around contextual issues. The point here is that the issues that are prevalent in one region and the intervention measures that are applied to achieve particular results in one context cannot be simply imitated elsewhere.

Finally, the Report argues that catalysts for building resilience should necessarily include: community engagement, interventions for vulnerable youth, efforts to counter online extremism, and attempts to de-racialize through religious counselling. In identifying catalysts for resilience, the Report argues for the use of a transactional approach to building resilience and thus focuses on a two-prong approach: first, the individual, and second, the community, and such approaches may include shifts in attitudes, thoughts, beliefs, behaviours, practices and the re-allocation of scarce resources.

Several recommendations were made: (a) generally; (b) to the Government of Ghana and its International Partners; and (c) the UN Country Team.

- A General recommendation is that to reverse the dangerous trend of radicalized youth, a carefully crafted and politically-sensitive counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programme will be necessary as an early preventive measure.

- To the Government of Ghana and its international partners, recommendations were made to: Improve public awareness of information campaigns such as the “See something, say something” campaign. So far, communities are unaware of what it means. The slogan must exhaustively be translated into local languages;
- Integrate Border Security Committees (BOSEC) into already existing national security institutions around borderlands to tackle smuggling, and criminal networks and have a better understanding of borderland political economies; and
- To the UN Country Team: The fundamental discursive approach to any programming interventions focusing on radicalization and PVE is a programmatic logic, or a theory of change, for how the intended programme contributes to tackling VE; guaranteeing main streaming conflict in general programming so that no harm is inadvertently done when implementing work across the country.

## Introduction

This Report assesses vulnerabilities to violent extremism in the northern part of Ghana, which consists of five regions, namely: The Northern, Upper East, Upper West, Savannah, and North East regions. Its overall aim is to identify community-specific vulnerabilities to radicalization toward violent extremism to guide targeted interventions. An analysis of the vulnerabilities to violent extremism in northern Ghana should be understood within the context of the wider socio-economic and governance processes in the country, as well as security developments in West Africa and the Sahel. In West Africa and the Sahel Region, Ghana remains one of the relatively peaceful and stable democracies, after eight relatively peaceful elections. Indeed, the transfers of power from one political party to the other, namely from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in 2000 and 2016 and from the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2008 was a significant development, which can be described as a marker of democratic consolidation<sup>1</sup>. Despite these successes, Ghana's pre, electoral, and post-electoral environments continue to be characterized by relatively high levels of the threat of the use of violence, and in the specific case of the 2020 elections, resulted in the alleged shooting and killing of some followers of the opposition NDC<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, Ghana's democratic stability has arguably not translated into addressing socio-economic and governance challenges as questions in the form of limited active citizenship, endemic corruption and clientelism and rent-seeking activities, and weak macroeconomic fundamentals continue to persist. In fact, the nexus between democracy and the distribution of its socio-economic dividends are at best tenuous in the Northern regions.

Despite these challenges, southern Ghana, which comprises eleven regions, remains relatively more developed<sup>3</sup>. While this discrepancy can be traced to the discriminatory policies of British colonial rule, interventions by successive post-independence governments have also largely failed to adequately address the development gaps. This is in spite of multiple interventions, particularly in northern Ghana, to reverse such embedded problems. The Northern Region-specific programmes include: Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA), now the Northern Development Authority (NDA)<sup>4</sup>, which sought to help bridge the gap between the north and the south; and the Savannah Agricultural Value Chain Development Project (SADP). Other initiatives include Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty (LEAP); the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Agency (GYEEDA) and the Nation Builders Corps (NABCO),

<sup>1</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. (1993). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

<sup>2</sup> See 'Techiman South election day shooting: The incident that led to death of persons at collation center' 21 December 2022 available on <https://www.myjoyonline.com/techiman-south-election-day-shooting-the-incident-that-led-to-death-of-persons-at-collation-centre/techiman-south-election-day-shooting-the-incident-that-led-to-death-of-persons-at-collation-centre/> (accessed 31 October 2022)

<sup>3</sup> Abdulai, A.G Bawole, J.N & Kojo Sakyi, E. (2018). Rethinking persistent poverty in northern Ghana: The primacy of policy and politics over geography. *Politics and Policy*, 46(20), 233-262

<sup>4</sup> The Northern Development Authority (NDA) was established under the Northern Development Authority Act 2017 (Act 963) to provide a framework for the accelerated economic and social development of the Northern Zone. The NDA also serves as an agency for the implementation of the Infrastructure for Poverty Eradication programme (IPEP)

the Microfinance and Loans Centre (MASLOC), Ghana Enterprises Agency (GEA) to support small businesses and the Free Senior High School (SHS) interventions. These initiatives, which aim to address youth unemployment are largely political schemes and hardly 'survive' beyond a change of government. Overall, the results of these interventions have varied across different sectors. This is reflected in the survey results, where across the Northern Regions, just about 64 percent have full access to health services, but an appreciable 77 percent have full access to education and other social protection services such as LEAP, with 75 percent of people having access to water. A disaggregated examination of the data, however, shows great regional disparities with a low of 27 percent for education to 81 percent. Similar disparities are present in the provision of healthcare services and other social provisions relating to electricity provision from a low of 71 to 97 percent. For access to toilets, a high of 62 to 90 percent of respondents still use pit latrines.

Beyond the inadequacy and or outright failure of these interventions, Abdulai et al., (2018) argue that, to a large extent, state policies have paid relatively special attention to southern Ghana compared to the north; resuscitating ailing cocoa, timber and other agro-based industries that were found in the south as opposed to the north<sup>5</sup>. Although international partners and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have implemented several projects to address the inequality gaps between the north and the south<sup>6</sup>, the five northern regions remain largely under-developed and relatively vulnerable to the threat of radicalization leading to violent extremism, especially in the border communities with Burkina Faso and Togo<sup>7</sup>. Persistent extremist and terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso and other Sahel states of Mali and Niger since 2012, and the post-2020 incursions towards the littoral states of West Africa create uncertainty and distress for Ghana, particularly in the northern regions due to their vulnerabilities to a cocktail of socio-economic and governance challenges and conflict dynamics, that are instructive of how conflict processes can exhibit change across time. These are further explored in the subsequent sections.

One significant revelation from the literature review and field data relates to the interpretational differences in how the sources, nature and direction of the possible extremist threats facing Ghana have been construed and constructed at the national level on the one hand, and local level on the other. While state disposition and official pronouncements appear to perceive the threat as external, and thus focus more on preventing a spillover and infiltration of extremists from neighbouring countries, locals appear to be more concerned about how internal socio-economic and political factors are threatening survival strategies and subtle cross-border interactions can expose desperate youth to radicalism. Consequently, there are perceptible differences in views relating to whether preventive emphasis should be placed on security measures along the borders, surveillance operations

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid,

<sup>6</sup>See USAID (2018-2019) Feed the Future Northern Ghana Governance (NGG) Activity – FY19 Annual Report

<sup>7</sup>Aubyn, F.K. (2021). The Risk of Violent Extremism and Terrorism in the Coastal States of West Africa: Assessing Ghana's Vulnerabilities, Resilience and Responses. Conflict Trends (3). ACCORD.

and policing of public places or on efforts at addressing structural inequalities and insulating the youth in northern Ghana against recourse to extremism.

Indeed, both approaches to preventing violent extremism in Ghana are of critical importance. It must be noted here that intensified security operations along the northern borders are informed by the dictates of the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana, which provides for the application of proactive measures to deter and pre-empt potential extremist acts in the country. Clearly, the temperament of the security and intelligence agencies, as reflected in a 17th May 2022 statement by the Minister of National Security<sup>8</sup>, suggests that an externally driven extremist attack is imminent, prompting a shift in emphasis from 'prevention' to 'pre-emption'. Nonetheless, care must be taken not to neglect internal vulnerabilities that expose populations to extremism. This assessment pays attention to both internal and external sources of vulnerabilities, particularly the interactions between them, the regional nuances, and the ways in which they manifest in potential extremism in the five northern regions.

## Methodology

The Report employed a mixed methods approach for data collection aimed at identifying community-specific vulnerabilities to radicalization towards violent extremism for targeted interventions. After an extensive literature review to identify existing gaps, the study focused on primary data collection through a combination of a survey as well as in-depth semi-structured and open-ended interviews with key informants and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The survey was conducted utilizing a standardized and contextualized household questionnaire designed by the Surge Data Hub (SDH) at Crisis Bureau and the UNDP Country team in Ghana, in consultation with the Consultant. In all, 1394 questionnaires were administered by the UNDP and Ghana Statistical Service (GSS)<sup>9</sup>. Of this number, 53 percent constituted females while 47 percent were males. Majority of respondents also fall into the critical youthful population, with 41 percent aged between 15 and 35. Survey data was collected in December 2022 from willing participants of randomized households who are 15 years or older, employing a team of experienced enumerators fitted with the Kobo Collect application on Android tablets.

A purposive sampling technique was employed to select respondents for the interviews and FGDs, complemented by a snowball approach in several cases. Five focus group discussions involving 5 to 10 participants were conducted in Paga, Chereponi, Bolgatanga, Wa and Tamale in addition to several individual interviews, small group discussions between 3 to 4 people, and Key Informant Interviews (KII) in all five northern regions as well as in the national capital city, Accra.<sup>10</sup> The sample population for the interviews and FGDs included officials of the security

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<sup>8</sup>Ministry of National Security. (17 May 2022). Press Release: Enhancing Security at Public Places. Available at [myjoyonline.com: https://www.myjoyonline.com/terrorists-have-targeted-ghana-lets-be-vigilant-national-security-minister/](https://www.myjoyonline.com/terrorists-have-targeted-ghana-lets-be-vigilant-national-security-minister/)

<sup>9</sup>See sampling and sample breakdown in Annex...

<sup>10</sup>See Annex 2.

and intelligence agencies, women's groups, traditional leaders and religious organizations, civil society groups, academics, as well as youth representatives. Key stakeholders in the five northern regions including regional security councils (REGSECs), metropolitan, municipal, and district security councils (MMDSCs), and Regional Peace Councils (RPCs) were consulted alongside community members in some border towns as well as relevant agencies and international actors in the regions. In locations where an in-person interview was not feasible due to the security situation, unavailability of interviewees, or other extenuating circumstance, telephone/virtual interviews were conducted instead. In this regard, a few telephone interviews were organized in Accra, Damango, Tamale, Bawku and Nalerigu. Where possible, interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed to facilitate easy referencing, validation, and analysis of data.

Analysis of survey data addressed key issues including social exclusion, identity, governance, and predisposition to violent extremism, which further reinforced the specific qualitative analysis of the study. In addition, data from the survey was critical for the development of multidimensional vulnerability indices to inform more detailed and targeted programme interventions. Narrative and thematic analysis of the data collected through interviews and FGDs enabled the Consultants to ascertain and interpret patterns and themes, causes and effects, existing and potential relationships, and other critical variables that help to make meaningful deductions.

### **Structure of the report**

The study is structured into seven interwoven sections. Following the introduction which provides background information on the phenomenon of violent extremism in Ghana, methodology and the dynamics of conflict, chapter one charts the historical trajectories influencing development policy and state capacity for security provision. This discussion dovetails into the cross-cutting vulnerabilities and socio-economic dynamics driving violent extremism in the five northern regions as presented in chapters two and three respectively. Chapter four examines how the interactions between global, regional, sub-regional and domestic factors in multiple ways contribute to creating vulnerabilities, by highlighting a gamut of veritable issues and threats that enable, facilitate, or promote radicalization leading to violent extremism. This is followed by a discussion of a common analytical framework for interpreting the underlying causes and consequences of violent extremism, whereas a concluding section provides some key recommendations for addressing the issues and vulnerabilities identified.

### **Country Context**

An understanding of Ghana's security context and its potential vulnerabilities to violent extremism should be situated within the wider background of Africa, particularly West Africa's political and security situations. Located within unstable regional security and political environments, Ghana shares contiguous boundaries with Togo to the East, Cote d'Ivoire to the West, and Burkina Faso to the North. While this contiguity establishes political, economic, and

socio-cultural ties between these countries, the evolving nature of violent extremism and terrorism in these contiguous states and the wider Sahel creates significant challenges for Ghana. Since violent extremist groups emerged in Northern Nigeria, they have mutated and launched several successful attacks, particularly in the Sahelian states of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, especially after the removal of former Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure in 2012. Although the situation in West Africa and the Sahel poses immediate challenges to Ghana, an appreciation of an Africa-wide contextual situation is useful in understanding the broader dynamics of violent extremism on the continent.

A 2021 case study by the UNDP titled ‘Toward New Policies for the Climate Change and Violent Extremism Nexus in Africa’, sought to understand the links between climate change and the emergence of violent extremist groups in the Central Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), Mozambique, and Somalia. The findings of the study established that similar to armed conflicts, there is no direct causal link between climate change and violent extremism in the four regions of Africa<sup>11</sup>. Rather, governance of these issues remains a challenge. For example, in the Central Sahel, climate-induced conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists have been exacerbated by national policies which place a premium on agriculturalists and neglect pastoralists<sup>12</sup>. In addition, it is the failure of customary arrangements and government policies to regulate and mediate a shared use of resources that leads to inter-communal conflicts, thereby serving as an incentive for violent extremism<sup>13</sup>. Similarly, in the LCB, it is the inability of state institutions to appreciate the scale, intensity and impact of future climatic patterns that are of concern relative to radicalization and violent extremism.

In Somalia, the real issue of concern is ‘the instrumental alliance that is forged between al-Shabab and marginalized sub-clans, including those that may have been disadvantaged by the impact of climate change’<sup>14</sup>. Strategically, al-Shabab provides access to water and land in exchange for recruits as potential extremists and terrorists. Essentially, the failure of the government to put in place the necessary infrastructure, preventive mechanisms, and mitigating interventions largely contributes to the radicalization and recruitment of vulnerable individuals and groups into violent extremism in many sub-Saharan countries.

It is, therefore, unsurprising that extremist attacks in the Sahel region involving militant Islamist groups resulted in 7,899 fatalities, a 63 percent increase in the number of violent events, and an almost 90 percent increase in fatalities over the past year<sup>15</sup>. This has compounded the deteriorating security situation in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Region. A 2022 report puts the death toll from instability at close to 14,500 in

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<sup>11</sup>UNDP. (2021) “Toward New Policies for the Climate Change and Violent Extremism Nexus in Africa”, Oslo Governance Centre, Extremism in Focus, Issue Brief 1

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Thérroux-Bénoni, L. A., & Dakono, B. (2019). Are Terrorist Groups Stoking Local Conflicts in the Sahel? ISS Today, 14.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid, p.4.

<sup>15</sup>Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (February 2023). Fatalities from Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Surge by Nearly 50 Percent. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/>



four and half years, resulting in 5.5 million refugees seeking humanitarian assistance<sup>16</sup>. These staggering statistics, and particularly the repetitive and expanding attacks in Burkina Faso continues to threaten Ghana's socio-political and economic security with the migratory flows from Burkina Faso and other Sahelian states as well as border community interactions between Ghana and its neighbouring countries. In the case of Burkina Faso, migratory flows have contributed to increasing communal clashes between Dogon, Mossi and Fulani ethnic groups and the growing extremist attacks on civilian targets<sup>17</sup>. Such movements are facilitated by weak and porous borders that exist between Ghana and its northern neighbours, namely Burkina Faso and Mali. Estimates point to over 80 unapproved borders and paint a realistic picture, first, of the numerous entry points around Ghana with routes along Togo, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire borders, and second, which makes the country vulnerable to infiltration by refugees and violent extremist groups<sup>18</sup>. Increasing refugee inflows and the limitation in tracking illicit flows<sup>19</sup> are creating a sense of uncertainty and uneasiness<sup>20</sup>.

This unease is widening in light of the post-2020 expansion of extremist activities toward the coastal states of West Africa. Littoral states such as Côte d'Ivoire, Benin and Togo have all recorded extremist attacks since mid-2020<sup>21</sup>. These attacks in Togo<sup>22</sup>, Côte d'Ivoire and Benin<sup>23</sup> have necessitated increased vigilance and intensified security operations in Ghana<sup>24</sup>. In particular, attacks in Togo, which is close to Ghana's Eastern border, confirm intelligence reports of possible terrorist attacks on Ghana, further raising the level of apprehension in the country<sup>25</sup>. However, while specific country statistics are hard to find, reports from field interviews point to the presence of radicalized individuals or groups in Ghana<sup>26</sup>, which is further driving nefarious criminal activities such as organized criminality and kidnapping for ransom<sup>27</sup>. These occurrences are rare in a country that has not experienced such trends in the past. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that regional security dynamics are influencing extremist ideology that is potentially finding fertile ground in Ghana<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup>See meeting notes from Wa, Tamale and Bolgatanga; ECOWAS: 14,500 Killed by Terrorists in Four and Half Years in West Africa.

<https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/07/14/ecowas-14500-killed-by-terrorists-in-four-and-half-years-in-west-africa/> (Retrieved 1 January 2023)

<sup>17</sup>Benjaminsen, T.A. & Ba, B. (2021) Fulani-Dogon Killings in Mali: Farmer-Herder Conflicts as Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, *African Security*, 14:1, 4-26; See also, 'Burkinabes Who Flew To Ghana Following Extremism Activities Return Home', <https://www.theghanareport.com/burkinabes-who-flew-to-ghana-following-extremism-activities-return-home/>

<sup>18</sup><http://www.faapa.info/blog/about-200-burkinabes-seek-refuge-in-ghana/>. These concerns came through multiple interviews

<sup>19</sup>Asiedu, K. G. (2019, June 25). As violence flares in Burkina Faso, refugees trickle into Ghana. Retrieved from Aljazeera:

<https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/6/25/as-violence-flares-in-burkina-faso-refugees-trickle-into-ghana>

<sup>20</sup>Multiple interviewees throughout the fieldwork made allusions to this. Samuel Hanson. 2021. 'Impact of Refugees on Host Community in Developing Countries: A Study of Two Communities in Ghana', A Policy Paper Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Public Policy, at [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356174477\\_Impact\\_of\\_Refugees\\_on\\_Host\\_Community\\_in\\_Developing\\_Countries\\_A\\_Study\\_of\\_Two\\_Communities\\_in\\_Ghana](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356174477_Impact_of_Refugees_on_Host_Community_in_Developing_Countries_A_Study_of_Two_Communities_in_Ghana); Berger, F. 2023. 'Locked Horns: cattle rustling and Mali's War economy', Global Initiative against Transnational Crime, March

<sup>21</sup>Pieter Van Ostaeyen and Kwesi Aning. 2023. 'Status of ISWAP and ISGS in West Africa and Sahel', June, Counter Extremism Project (CEP) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS). (forthcoming) Brottem, L. (2022). The Growing Threat of Violent Extremism in Coastal West Africa. Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

<sup>22</sup>See Togo First. (2021, November 10). Togo reports terrorist attack in the northern region, near the Burkina border. Retrieved February 3, 2022, from Togo First: <https://www.togofirst.com/en/security/1011-8908-togo-reports-terrorist-attack-in-the-northern-region-near-the-burkina-border>

<sup>23</sup>See Bruijine, K. D. (2021). Laws of Attraction: Northern Benin and risk of violent extremist spillover. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'; 'Death toll in Benin national park attacks rises as France opens terror probe', 11 Feb. 2022. at

<https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220211-death-toll-in-benin-national-park-attacks-rises-as-france-opens-terror-probe> accessed 29 October 2022.

<sup>24</sup>. MN 40/12.1.2023

<sup>25</sup>West Africa Center for Counter-Terrorism (WACCE) 2022. The Threat of violent extremism to Coastal States. Ghana's Exposure to Violent Extremism. West Africa Report: Ghana No. 003/2022.

<sup>26</sup>FGD in Wa, 14.12.22

<sup>27</sup>SR 4, 8.12.22

<sup>28</sup>. MN 12 and 13

In an attempt to understand the changing dynamics of insecurity in the West African subregion, several studies have been undertaken or commissioned. To begin with, the ECOWAS Commission conducted a Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (CRVA) in Ghana in 2017, which unearthed evidence of political violence manifesting through the politicization of communal conflicts, activities of politically-affiliated youth vigilante groups, and election-related violence as threats facing Ghana<sup>29</sup>. Furthermore, the African Union Commission's (AUC) Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategy report (2019) identified, among several issues, inadequate coordination and limited information sharing among security sector agents; extremism, radicalization, religious fundamentalism and terrorism; porous borders and irregular migration; the politicization of state security agencies; criminality and organized crime including human trafficking and smuggling' inadequate capacity and resources of state security agents as key security sector risks in Ghana. These Reports further identified electoral violence, vigilantism, and land and chieftaincy disputes as key governance-level risks in Ghana. Furthermore, the 2021 'Tracking Violent Extremism Spillover from the Sahel to Littoral West Africa' report by ELVA in cooperation with ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate and WANEP identified the challenges associated with increasing extremist activity<sup>30</sup>.

It is within this broad context and other factors that other vulnerabilities are located. Aning and Abdallah<sup>31</sup> had previously argued that issues of doctrinal and interpretational differences among the various Islamic groupings, youth bulge and funding support from the Gulf states constitute key drivers of radicalization and extremism among Muslims in Ghana. Several FGDs and interviews in Wa, Bolgatanga and Tamale provided strong indications of the nexus between the youth bulge and tension among different Islamic groups. Similar studies by Awudu<sup>32</sup> and Sulemana<sup>33</sup> discuss issues of poverty, marginalisation, unemployment, chieftaincy conflicts and political vigilantism as some of these drivers. Contributing to this discourse, Aning and Amedzrator<sup>34</sup> have also argued for a more nuanced and differentiated appreciation of the various risk factors which are present and can contribute to heightening and precipitating the possible operations of extremist organizations including; (a) structural motivators, (b) individual incentives, and (c) enabling factors. While these factors paint a picture of some of the underlying issues in the country, Ghana's current vulnerability to violent

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<sup>29</sup>ECOWAS Commission. (November 2017). Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Ghana; see also, other documents that highlights such developments. Kwesi Aning, Naila Saliu & Kwaku Danso. (Eds.) 2016. Managing Election-related Violence for democratic stability in Ghana. (Accra: FES); Kwesi Aning & Kwaku Danso (Eds.) 2012. Managing Election-related Violence for democratic stability in Ghana, Eds. (Accra: FES)

<sup>30</sup>. Aneliese Bernard. 2021. 'Tracking the Violent Extremism Spillover from the Sahel to Littoral West Africa', | Small Wars Journal. I take very strong exception to her argument that, 'Ungoverned Spaces Provide Safe Haven for Insurgent Expansion', see Jihadism is Spreading to the Gulf of Guinea Littoral States, and a New Approach to Countering It is Needed - Modern War Institute (usma.edu). I have consistently argued that these are not 'ungoverned spaces'. The fundamental discursive issue relates to 'what kinds and what degrees of governance mechanisms are desirable in any given landscape' or 'why and how these spaces are differently governed and how do these areas function? Even more importantly, what analytical tools are available for understanding the reality of these spaces. What is important, therefore, is to understand the types of governance and alternative systems that are prevalent in these areas and engage with it.

<sup>31</sup>Aning, K. & Abdallah, M. (2013). 'Islamic radicalization and violence in Ghana' Conflict, Security & Development, 13:2, 149-167.

<sup>32</sup>Awudu, F. (2015) 'Islamic Radicalization in West Africa: An Examination of the Case of Tamale, Northern region', A Thesis Submitted to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, (KAIPTC)

<sup>33</sup>Sulemana, W.M. (2017) 'Radicalization of Muslim Youth in Ghana: A Case Study of Northern Region', MA Dissertation in Gender, Peace and Security, Submitted to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, (KAIPTC)

<sup>34</sup>Lydia Amedzrator and Kwesi Aning. 2022. 'The scourge of violent extremism in West Africa: threats to Ghana's stability and socio-economic development', forthcoming

extremism appears to exhibit a complex set of interactive factors spanning both internal and external factors. Among others, ineffective border controls, illegal small-scale or artisanal mining (Galamsey) and related use of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) and social exclusion all contribute in differing dimensions to the potential for radicalization and violent extremism, and therefore need to be further interrogated<sup>35</sup> in addition to various forms of conflicts—the dynamics of which will be discussed in the following section.

## Conflict Dynamics and Violent Extremism

Ghana, unlike many West African countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Guinea, has not experienced full-blown civil conflicts. However, it is characterized by many localized conflicts that continue to threaten its peace and stability. Seini and Tsikata's<sup>36</sup> research indicate that, while none of the ten administrative regions in the country (now 16 administrative regions) is resilient from one form of conflict or the other, the three northern regions (now five) have recorded a number of conflicts, including inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic disputes that were the consequences of chieftaincy, land/ boundary, identity disputes, and contestations over resources<sup>37</sup>.

To understand the nature and causes of conflicts in Northern Ghana, there is a need to examine historical factors which reflect principally in the structures created by colonial administrations/policies to exploit and deliberately breed mistrust between ethnic groups and how these underlying dynamics have been compounded by post-independence politics.<sup>38</sup> To facilitate indirect colonial governance, the two main systems of traditional rule and social organisation in northern Ghana, (the hierarchical and acephalous) were interfered with through the creation of 'foreign and intrusive' chieftaincy structures that also affected the land tenure systems. One respondent noted that when land administration policies that vested land in the state were reviewed in recognition of the importance of customary land rights, chiefs and traditional authorities gained control over resources and became powerful figures, and with that competition over succession and land rights intensified<sup>39</sup>. This historical antecedent partially underpins the persisting inter-ethnic, chieftaincy and related land conflicts in northern Ghana<sup>40</sup>. Additionally, while intra-religious tensions and agro-pastoralist conflicts continue to create insecurities in certain parts of the country, persisting divisions between the two dominant political parties the NPP and NDC have resulted in politically-related violence, and since the early 2000s produced a dangerous phenomenon characterized as political vigilantism<sup>41</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> Aning, K. 2018. Arms Trafficking in Ghana: A Case Study. Unpublished report for the German Federal Foreign Office. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. As background paper for THE WEST AFRICA–SAHEL CONNECTION Mapping Cross-border Arms Trafficking Fiona Mangan and Matthias Nowak At <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/2019/highlight-bp-west-africa.html>

<sup>36</sup> Tsikata, D., & Seini, W. 2004. Identities, inequalities and conflict in Ghana. CRISE Working Paper 5, Oxford: University of Oxford.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. See also Salifu, E.S. and Longi, F.T. (2013) 'Conflicts in Northern Ghana: Search for Solutions, Stakeholders and Way Forward', Institute for Continuous Education and Interdisciplinary Studies, University for Development Studies GJDS, Vol. 10, No. 1 & 2, 2013

<sup>38</sup> MN 13; Kendie, S. B. (2010). Conflict management and peace building for poverty reduction. Tamale: GILLBT Press.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with a peace and conflict scholar, SR 3, 15.12.22

<sup>40</sup> Aapengua, C. M. (2012). The Dagbon conflict and cognitive processes. Northern Ghana Peace. October 9 2012 Available at [http://northernghanapeace.typepad.com/northern\\_ghana\\_peace/2008/10/the-dagbon-conf.html](http://northernghanapeace.typepad.com/northern_ghana_peace/2008/10/the-dagbon-conf.html).

<sup>41</sup> Attuquayefio, P. & Darkwa, L. (2016). "Towards Elections 2016: Addressing the Phenomenon of Political Vigilantism" LECIAD Policy Brief. See also Edu-Afful and Allotey-Pappoe (2016), Op Cit

Of critical concern to radicalization and violent extremism in Ghana are chieftaincy and inter-ethnic conflicts. Undoubtedly, the chieftaincy institution remains revered and trusted relative to state institutions as far as local security provision is concerned. Though the survey did not capture this specific category, secondary literature and the interview results alluded to this, despite residual tensions<sup>42</sup>. However, the institution is beset with myriad conflicts, constituting sources of divisions and contestations between families and ethnic groups.<sup>43</sup> Examples of major chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana are the Nkonya-Alavanyo in the Volta Region, the Abudu-Andaniconflict in the Northern Region, and the Kusasi-Mamprusi land-chieftaincy conflict in the Upper East Region, the Bolga chieftaincy issues, the Kanjaga issues and the recurrent chieftaincy issues in the Savannah Region, which are intractably volatile and recurring.<sup>44</sup>

Although the conflict between the two Royal Gates of Abudu and Andani families has relatively stabilized with the installation of a new Ya-NaAbukari Mahama in Dagbon in January 2019, youth groups are still radicalized along family lines which have political undertones, traceable to pre-independence and post-independence politics.<sup>45</sup> While the political dynamics of the conflict persist under the current democratic dispensation characterized by the divisive politics of the NPP and the NDC, Aning and Abdallah highlight another dynamic rooted in ethno-religious complexities.<sup>46</sup> They maintain that large followers of the Ahlussunna group subscribe to the belief and ideologies of the NDC and belong to the Andani family, while the moderate Al-tijaniyya group mostly belong to the Abudu family and affiliate with the NPP.<sup>47</sup> These dynamics have occasionally resulted in religious and political clashes in the Tamale Metropolis, especially during the month of fasting (Ramadan) and the month of pilgrimage (Hajj)<sup>48</sup>. In Bawku, similar ethnopolitical dynamics manifest in which Kusasis align with the NDC while Mamprusis associate with the NPP<sup>49</sup>.

Overall, these politico-religious and chieftaincy alignments have tended to radicalize political groupings to engage in extremist and militant tendencies, especially during elections and post-electoral periods where contentions arise over election results and control over public institutions<sup>50</sup>. It must be emphasized that conflicts in themselves do not linearly translate to violent extremism. Several conflicts both in Ghana and elsewhere, have not necessarily led to radicalization and extremism. Nonetheless, the potential for exploitation of such internal fissures represents a potent pathway to violent extremism. Such conflicts can create conditions in which extremist groups can establish support networks, providing them with

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<sup>42</sup> Aning, K and M. Abdallah. 2022. 'Domestic Peacekeeping Practices in the Tamale Metropolis of Ghana', *Contemporary Journal of African Studies* Vol 9 No 1 (2022), pp 54-67

<sup>43</sup> Bukari, K. N. (2016). A Concomitant of Conflict and Consensus: Case of a Chieftaincy Succession in Ghana. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 23(1), 5.

<sup>44</sup> See Matveeva, Aning and Kufuor, op cit.

<sup>45</sup> Op Cit, Tsikata and Seini, 2004.

<sup>46</sup> Aning and Abdallah, 2013, Op Cit.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Op Cit, Aning and Amedzrator, 2022,

<sup>49</sup> Bawku's particular conflict dynamics are extensively discussed in an earlier 2020 UNDP Report. See Mateeva, Aning and Kuffuor, op cit.

<sup>50</sup> These assertions came through multiple interviews and FGDs.

access to resources, recruitment opportunities, and safe havens. This argument is reinforced by interviews with locals in the regions who listed unresolved land, chieftaincy, and inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts as a potential ploy for framing grievances by extremist groups. The phenomenon of exploiting local grievances to construct conscription narratives is a common tactic that has been effectively deployed by Jihadist groups in Mali and Burkina Faso, by intervening directly in an active conflict or siding with a party to the conflict. Given the sort of SALW proliferation and resource mobilization that occurs during these conflicts, it is not far-fetched to imagine how extremist groups could use such active conflicts as a pretext to gain a foothold in parts of the country. In a related survey conducted by the ACSS in Benin in 2021, “95 percent of respondents expressed the opinion that violent extremists could gain influence by intervening in land conflicts”<sup>51</sup>.

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<sup>51</sup>Benjaminsen, T.A. & Ba, B. (2021) Fulani-Dogon Killings in Mali: Farmer-Herder Conflicts as Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, *African Security*, 14:1, 4-26

## Chapter 1:

# The State, [in]security and perceptions about capabilities

Ghana's colonial and post-colonial state structures show uneven forms of development, investment and different levels of citizen inclusion in its developmental processes. Such advancements have led to distinctive perceptions about the state from individuals and communities. This has found expression in varying levels of loyalty and expectations about what the state can, ought to, is capable of, and prepared to deliver in terms of public services, including security provision and social welfare as a whole. Since 2012, one of the most central characteristics of Ghanaian statehood has been its ability to provide effective, responsive and collaborative security in a sub-region buffeted by ever-increasing violence that challenges the very authority and existence of states. Though this is a challenge that has defined successive governments and tested the capabilities of statutory and non-statutory security providers across the spectrum of society, the five (5) Northern Regions may be particularly vulnerable to radicalization and extremist violence because of several factors including porous borders, small arms and light weapons (SALW) availability, unemployment and poor surveillance. Despite this, the survey results paint a positive perception of law enforcement among respondents, as between 75 and 84 percent of the respondents described the performance of law enforcement agencies as 'very successful' and 'somewhat successful' in terms of the provision of everyday safety, justice, responses to domestic and external threats, and mediation of local disputes. This positive perception also correlates to the 'trust' and capacity of law enforcement agencies to protect communities.

However, the developmental trajectories (social, political, economic) of the Northern regions, and development gaps with the northern parts of the country, creates a sense of a state in 'retreat' from the Northern regions; one characterized by a sense of exceptionalism, or what has been portrayed as 'Northern peculiarity'<sup>52</sup>. The inter-relations between the positive perception of law enforcement by respondents and a sense of 'Northern peculiarity' offers opportunities for deepening and building trust. The term 'northern peculiarity' refers to how the Northern territories were annexed to the coastal states of Ghana, and were proclaimed a British protectorate in 1902, and how socio-economic developments have lagged relative to other parts of the country leading to the creation of particular types of vulnerabilities, to which this Report alludes to. Northern Ghana has thus trailed the other regions of Ghana in socioeconomic development, resulting in a historical North-South divide<sup>53</sup>. Aside from the legacy of colonial-era development policy, several post-independence challenges have also contributed to and deepened the already-existing structural challenges and cleavages, leading to pockets of relative instability and conflict intractability<sup>54</sup>. Endeavours aimed at

<sup>52</sup>see Matveeva, A, Kwesi Aning and Patrick Osei-Kufuor. 2020. Conducting a Conflict-related Development Analysis in Ghana (Accra: UNDP) August, pp.21ff

<sup>53</sup>MN 33 19 December 2022

<sup>54</sup>Several Meeting Notes and FGDs alluded to a number of such conflicts

tackling both the structural causes and disparities in the Northern regions have at best achieved mixed results. Correspondingly, isolated conflicts, including inter-ethnic disputes over identity, power to and control over resources (land, minerals), intra-ethnic disputes over chieftaincy succession, the expectations of the establishment of new paramountcies after the demarcation of new regions (especially with the Vagla, Birifor and Tampulima, Mamprusi and Gonja (dealing with jurisdictional and land boundary issues around Lukula area), land and chieftaincy disputes where violence associated with contestations around the occupancy of skins and/or Gates routinely occur and episodes of election-related and vigilante violence, continue to blight the landscape in the northern regions of Ghana.

Due to these trajectories, different political administrations have either sought to or initiated diverse economic policies with an aim to promote economic growth through the introduction of varying special initiatives to advance and improve livelihoods (see the earlier section on the introduction of different Northern-specific and wider Ghanaian initiatives including NDA, Free SHS, SADP and MASLOC). Ghana has experienced sustained economic growth since the 1990s and the discovery of hydrocarbons in commercial quantities only spurred on growth in a positive direction (at least for a while)<sup>55</sup>. In 2007, Ghana discovered oil in commercial quantities, which contributed to an average economic growth rate of 7% per annum, and made Ghana a lower middle-income country (LMIC) in 2010. The economy continued to expand in 2019, with real GDP growth estimated at 7.1%. With high growth momentum, Ghana has consistently been placed among Africa's 10 fastest-growing economies. However, these positive developments have been tempered by two external shocks: (a) the COVID-19 pandemic; and (b) the Ukraine-Russia of 2022. 2022 also saw the country's currency, the Ghana Cedi, depreciate by close to 54 percent. In April 2022, the UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) had projected the Ghana cedi to depreciate to GH¢7.87 to \$1 by the close of 2022; a fall driven by global supply challenges for oil and gas due to the Russia-Ukraine war<sup>56</sup>. However, by October 2022, the Ghanaian cedi had depreciated sharply against major currencies, in particular the U.S. dollar, declining by more than 55% between January and October 2022, and placing it among one of the steepest declines of any currency in the world in 2022<sup>57</sup>. The EIU subsequently characterized Ghana as being 'at high risk of debt-distress'<sup>58</sup>. Ghana's national debt is forecast to continuously increase between 2022 and 2027 by in total 44.6 billion U.S. dollars (+115.99 percent). The national debt is estimated to amount to 83.02 billion U.S. dollars in 2027. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the general government gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future<sup>59</sup>.

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<sup>55</sup>see <https://blogs.worldbank.org/african/ghanas-growth-history-new-growth-momentum-since-the-1990s-helped-put-ghana-at-the-front-of-poverty>

<sup>56</sup><https://yen.com.gh/business-economy/economy/206117-cedi-depreciation-uk-based-economist-intelligence-unit-predicts-almost-gh8-to-1-by-end-of-2022/>

<sup>57</sup>EIU. 2022. 'Rising economic hardship will fuel social unrest in Ghana', 29 June. <https://country.eiu.com/Ghana>

<sup>58</sup>Ghana, at <https://country.eiu.com/ghana>, accessed 27/12/22

<sup>59</sup>Ghana - national debt 2017-2027 | Statista

Such a decline in the value of the Cedi undermined the previously projected economic outlook<sup>60</sup>. According to the African Development Bank (ADB), ‘...[Ghana’s] debt shot up from 76.1 percent of GDP in December 2020 to 77.5 percent of GDP in September 2021 with the country classified in the category of high risk of debt distress countries’<sup>61</sup>. Consequently, the EIU concluded that the unexpectedly high and continuous depreciation of the cedi could result in: ‘...[p]ublic dissatisfaction over worsening living conditions due to high inflation [and] will spur sporadic unrest’<sup>62</sup>. These projections of worsening economic conditions appear consistent with the views of respondents surveyed in northern Ghana on their expectations on the Ghanaian economy in 2023. Indeed, the majority of the respondents (998 as against 513) perceived that Ghana’s economy will either remain unchanged and could be bad or very bad over the next six months in 2023. According to the survey results, ‘[o]ut of all households in vulnerability, 1.2 percent are very concerned over the household livelihood conditions for the next three months’<sup>63</sup>.

The levels of vulnerabilities that were identified in the five northern regions have a positive correlation to issues and developments, related in part, to the economic and developmental issues outlined above. In terms of specific issues, which correlated increased vulnerabilities to violent extremism and radicalization, unemployment, a sense of exclusion, and limited loyalty to the state, in part created vulnerabilities. As a result, appreciating how notions of economic deprivation can serve as possible drivers for radicalization and violent extremism are key to making recommendations and designing: (a) a common analytical framework for understanding the underlying causes and consequences of violent extremism and radicalization; and (b) support a vulnerability-sensitive approach to be incorporated into UNDP programming.

## 1.2 Perceptions about the state and its security capabilities

To understand the relationships between state capacity and citizens’ experiences and perceptions of the state’s provision of goods and services, the survey revealed that citizens’ perceptions about the state and its capacities spanned from mistrust, dismissiveness, dissatisfaction with its incapability of delivering protection and public service goods, to limited engagement or withdrawal from national and community-based governance activities. The chapter on ‘Multidimensional Vulnerability’ in relation to households states that, ‘[t]he overall level of vulnerability experienced by households is very high’<sup>64</sup>. In relation to governance, while 82% voted in the 2020 Presidential elections, only 37% are members of a political party, with only 11% being members of a community-based protection scheme). Though 10 percent of the

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<sup>60</sup>African Development Bank (2020). African Economic Outlook 2020: Developing Africa’s workforce for the future. Abidjan, African Development Bank.

<sup>61</sup>African Development Bank. 2022. Country Focus Report 2022 - Supporting climate resilience and a just energy transition in Ghana <https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/country-focus-report-2022-supporting-climate-resilience-and-just-energy-transition-ghana> accessed 24 December 2022

<sup>62</sup>Ghana’, <https://country.eiu.com/ghana>. [My emphasis]


<sup>63</sup>Hamad Sambo and Gentjan Cera. 2023. ‘Multidimensional vulnerability and violence extremism radicalisation indices’, UNDP, February, p. 7

<sup>64</sup>Sambo and Cera, *ibid*, p. 4 (my emphasis)



survey respondents had university level education, 43% had no education, with 8%, 7% and 2% having incomplete primary, JHS and secondary education respectively. These figures are indicative of the pathways for interventions and the potential levels of vulnerability as the chapter on 'Multidimensional Vulnerability' shows that '...education prevails over all other indicators in explaining the risk of violent extremism and radicalization. Having no formal education increase[s] the risk of radicalization and extremism'.<sup>65</sup> In terms of social protection services, 64% have full access with 15% having restricted access. In terms of access to water, 41% use boreholes, while a low figure of 15% have water inside their homes. The 'Multidimensional Vulnerability' chapter argues that, '[t]he censored headcount ratio of both indicators of vulnerabilities in terms of water and hygiene was relatively high'<sup>66</sup>.

Across the five northern regions, there is an increasing tension between the modern state and traditional institutions, a deepening tension and mistrust among different religious faiths<sup>67</sup> and a growing youth population that perceives both institutions and their leaders as insensitive to their needs<sup>68</sup>.



With the youth population in Ghana forming about 11,782,614 (38.2%) of the total population, the concerns and frustrations of this group are key to understanding their vulnerabilities and designing preventive measures to be initiated.

Across the northern regions, there is an ambivalent relationship with local governance processes, which have resulted from decades of an ossified sense of abandonment and exclusion from the state. Consequently, there are multiple embedded narratives about people's relationship to the state, its institutions, and their capacities and willingness to extend the presence of the state in a meaningful way. This has resulted in a situation where the Northern regions are perceived by state officials as a punishment zone for officials who have lost favour with their superiors; an operational zone where the state does not send its best and brightest<sup>69</sup>, creating 'internal discriminatory practices within the statutory security and civil services'<sup>70</sup>.

<sup>65</sup>Sambo and Cera, *ibid*, p. 14

<sup>66</sup>*ibid*, p.6

<sup>67</sup>FGD in Bolgatanga


<sup>68</sup>Multiple interviews made such references

<sup>69</sup>MN 41 13.1.2023

<sup>70</sup>MN 41 13.1.2023

Apart from poverty, limited opportunities and high youth unemployment and underemployment are the cross-cutting themes across all five regions. According to the Survey results, across all five northern regions, 39% of all youth are classified as 'not working'. A more granular disaggregation of the figures for youth show that agriculture/sale of crops, livestock/sale of animals and forestry account for 40.06% of employment, with 34% being self-employed in the agricultural sector and another 21% self-employed in the non-agricultural sector. A major implication for this, both for security and development interventions is the need to focus on the provision of support infrastructures for agriculture. In effect, state presence and capacity to provide both educational and employment opportunities for residents in the Northern regions is low. According to the survey results, a total of 39% of respondents have completed primary to JHS, secondary, technical training to having higher education.

Across all the five regions, poverty and unemployment are an ever-present 'critical factor and cause for possible violent extremism, due to unemployment and high poverty levels, even for those with education, [therefore] people are 'willing to accept anything that is offered, and the sense of frustration can lead to seduction and incentives to think otherwise'<sup>71</sup>.



Across the five regions, there are segments of largely unemployed and unemployable youths (ranging from 36% in Savannah, Upper East and West, to a high of 40% and 49% respectively for Northern and North East regions), who are mostly male, who live by their wits or have one foot in what is generally referred to as the informal or underground economy as demonstrated by Table 2<sup>72</sup>. The 'Multidimensional Vulnerability' chapter confirms both the survey and fieldwork interviews arguing that 'the most vulnerable region is North East, followed by Northern region. On the other hand, the region with lower vulnerable households is Savannah, followed by the Upper East region'<sup>73</sup> For female youth, the figures ranged from 37% to 47%, still showing a high unemployment rate across all Northern regions. With limited access to education and usually substandard education in the categories 'none' and 'incomplete primary education', the Survey results showed that with respect to males across all regions, the figures indicated a low of 12% for Savannah and a high of 31% for Upper West. With respect to females in the same categories,

<sup>71</sup>MN 12 14.12.22

<sup>72</sup>Multiple meeting Notes referred to this phenomenon.

<sup>73</sup>Sambo and Cera, p. 8

Savannah has a low of 10% with a high of 67% for the North East. Combined with ill-formed political consciousness or limited political awareness, youth have become willing and available cannon fodder 'used by politicians and political parties to distort political processes for small payments'<sup>74</sup>. While in the North East, the perception that youth are deliberately organized and manipulated for violence was a limited occurrence, this does not appear to be so in the other regions.

The Report seeks to highlight an emerging trend with youth mobilization, which is characterized as camps, where youth groups mostly gather for entertainment or as political mobilization sites. These spaces, or what was also described as channels, 'act as spaces for radicalization'<sup>75</sup>. An increasing sense of exclusion and marginalisation by the youth in all the five northern regions have developed out of political and economic factors that are contributing to ruptures in social cohesion, increasing crime rates, armed violence, and despondency. With the high levels of vulnerability of the youth in these regions, the possibility that they may have an interest in joining any process that in their world view would contribute to improving their living conditions is an ever-present possibility. This is reflected in the 3 to 8 percent of those surveyed who stated that efforts had been made to recruit them during the period of their studies. A clear sense of frustration was expressed about the present state of affairs with unemployment, behaviour of law enforcement agencies and general poverty<sup>76</sup>. The statement below encapsulates a pervasive perspective conveyed by the youth participants during the FGDs. When prompted regarding the extent of insecurity within their communities and attempts by individuals or groups to propagate messaging that may foment radicalization or extremism, a respondent articulated the following sentiment:

Looking at the economic trends of our current situation, we realize that having conversations with people, people[sic] are always of the view that a time will come whereby people will have to rise up against our leaders because of the way they're treating us. We hear it every day...I think we're being too tolerant, that's the reason why this is happening. They don't care about us. There will be a time that we have to rise against them. It's just a matter of time. That has been a common thing we hear among the youth in our communities<sup>77</sup>.

The above sentiment is concerning because it mirrors the cognitive patterns of vulnerable youth who are at risk of joining violent extremist groups. Significantly, this implies that the radicalization process and propensity towards extremism may not necessarily be contingent upon direct association with some existing violent extremist groups. Rather, the prevailing societal conditions could engender common ideations among disenfranchised and marginalised youth, thereby reinforcing the belief that violent extremism is the sole means of

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<sup>74</sup>MN 5, 11.12.22

<sup>75</sup>MN 5/11.12.22

<sup>76</sup>Multiple meeting Notes from Bolgatanga, Wa and Tamale.

<sup>77</sup>FGD Bolgatanga 13.12.2022

instituting change. As a result, the Report argues that the narrative of frustration, exclusion and desperation is present not because there is a generation of youth inherently predisposed to violence, but because incentives and opportunities offered to youth are inadequate to guarantee their livelihoods. From the diagnostic of violent extremism, for the categories of 'intolerance' and 'passion for movement', the respective figures ranging from strongly agree, just agree to neither agree nor disagree was 64 percent. Such high scores make it imperative that actions that are specifically targeted are introduced to create opportunities and a sense of hope. Creating opportunities has become an imperative of critical proportions as the quality, variety and successes of state performance or lack of same have created a situation in which large categories of people have weak identification with the Ghanaian state. For all categories, identification with the Ghanaian state ranged from a low of 29% in the Upper West. This points to the argument made in the 'Multidimensional Vulnerability' chapter that '...the findings show that Upper West and North East are falling under high risk of violent extremism and radicalization'<sup>78</sup>. Levels of identification rise to 67% in Savannah and North, and such tenuous identification with the state predisposes people in all the Northern regions vulnerable to recruitment. Figures become particularly dismal when the aggregation focuses on the youth. For all youth categories, those who 'completely identified with the state' was 43%, while those who did not 'identify at all' with the state were 42%.

Exploratory incursions: Multiple factors are contributing to creating a deepening sense of insecurity resulting in vitriolic criticisms and distrust about the state's willingness to respond to the security and developmental challenges and needs of communities. Though these multiple reasons exist as shown in Box 1 and are widely recognized that they could contribute to radicalization and eventually to violent extremist tendencies, there was no community, during the fieldwork that expressed interest in striking a blow against the state, however tenuous their relationship. However, there were several instances in which interviewees expressed concern about the deliberate and conscious endeavours by 'foreigners and strangers' who are perceived to be on exploratory visits to sensitize, obtain information about the presence and movements of security personnel and how many check points were present on roads<sup>79</sup>. The implications, from the interviews and FGDs, of such foreign exploratory visits is a sense of targeted approaches at obtaining information. Furthermore, there have been occasions where individuals, described as 'foreigners' visit different communities especially schools, religious sites and markets and seek to proselytize. Simultaneously, some seek to provide basic humanitarian services, such as boreholes, distributing food aid, support in constructing mosques and asking critical questions about security prevention strategies as a means of 'testing the waters to see if they can settle'<sup>80</sup>. Though they come under the guises of religion, and present themselves as humanitarian providers, the general perception and

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<sup>78</sup>Sambo and Cera, p.12

<sup>79</sup>MN 12, 13.12.22 Page

<sup>80</sup>MN 12, 13.12.22

understanding of people is that, these individuals have 'ulterior motives'<sup>81</sup>. There is a clear knowledge that, those who come have a definite ideology, but hide their real intentions within 'humanitarian' narratives and actions.

Generally, there was concern that, if these 'humanitarian' endeavours were allowed to continue, 'they will [eventually] be perceived as saviours who can provide protection and capable of helping us improve our lives. Then it can be a problem'<sup>82</sup>.

### Box 1: Underlying causes of violent extremism and radicalization

**'There is danger on the horizon';**

**'Calm unpredictability because of countries bordering us'**

- Worsening ethnic conflicts;
- Economic exclusion, poverty and unemployment
- Negative political influence and exploitation
- Clamour for Paramountcy
- Tensions between traditional and modern authorities
- Land and chieftaincy
- Migration
- Deepening inter and intra-religious tensions
- Shift from inter-party to intra-party vigilante group violence
- Farmer-herder struggles
- Social media
- Mining
- 'Tithing' as criminal tax and hostage taking
- Mix of ideology and humanitarianism
- Changing SALW nuances
- Border porosity
- Regionalisation of violence

**Based on these concerns, the time and window for preventive action is NOW.**

<sup>81</sup>MN 12.

<sup>82</sup>MN 12

## Chapter 2:

# Cross-cutting drivers and vulnerabilities in the five northern regions

Although Ghana is largely perceived as a stable and peaceful democratic nation, security realities since the mid-2000s suggest that there are persisting internal vulnerabilities such as poverty, high youth unemployment rate and politics of exclusion and marginalisation, which continue to predispose the youth to radicalization and violent extremism<sup>83</sup>. As evidenced from the survey results, between 3-8 percent of all respondents with some education reported attempts at recruitment into radical groups during their studies. The multiple linkages between social exclusion, limited welfare goods, unemployment and attempts to be recruited paint a picture of a positive correlation. Since the early 2000s, issues of radicalization and its various mutations into violent extremism, especially during national and by-elections<sup>84</sup> have become a major focus of attention, challenging the notion of Ghana as an inherently peaceful and safe country. The five northern regions have come to represent the full extent of Ghana's vulnerability to violent extremism. The assessment revealed a confluence of factors that make these regions synonymous with threats and risks exposing individuals, groups and communities to extremist tendencies. While there is some distinctness in the ways in which these vulnerabilities manifest, there is little doubt about the convergence of these factors in all the regions assessed. Disturbing as this situation is, these vulnerabilities have become 'normalized' to the average resident in these regions. In other words, respondents interviewed in all the regions identified similar drivers and vulnerabilities that are part of their everyday struggles. When unpacked, Northern Ghana appears to be a spaghetti bowl of development and governance challenges reflecting in marginalisation, acute economic and social inequalities, inter-ethnic and inter-communal violence, exacerbated by cross-border pressures and the lack of adequate state presence and capacity.




<sup>83</sup>MN 5, 6, and 10

<sup>84</sup>Edu-Afful, F. and Allotey-Pappoe, S. (2016) 'Political Vigilantism and Electoral Violence in Ghana' in eds "Aning, K., Danso, K. and Salihi, N. "Managing Election-Related Violence for Democratic Stability II, KAIPTC.

Beyond the issues of intractable land, chieftaincy, inter-ethnic and inter-communal conflicts discussed above, one of the most common drivers of vulnerability in the five northern regions is the phenomenon of youth unemployment. According to the Ghana Statistical Service, youth unemployment rate, representing 15-35 years, is 19.7 percent, and is much higher (32.8 percent) for young adults of 15-24 years<sup>85</sup> (see data below) In this age category, the average unemployment rates are much higher in the northern regions compared to southern regions. When disaggregated, the five northern regions appear in the top six regions with the highest youth unemployment rate. This demonstrates a peculiar trend that reinforces perceptions of youth exclusion and marginalisation that have preoccupied most debates and discussions on insecurity in the northern regions (see earlier discussions above).

Figure 1: Youth unemployment rate by region



Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2021, Ghana 2021 Population and Housing Census

Related to the above, '[political] vigilantism' represents a major driver and pathway to radicalism. According to Edu-Afful and Allotey-Papoe, political vigilante groups are "violent, aggressive or even criminal gangs that unleash fear and terror into constituents of the population who may be perceived as [political] opponents, rivals or enemies"<sup>86</sup>.

<sup>85</sup>Ghana Statistical Service, 2021, Ghana 2021 Population and Housing Census, General Population Highlights

<sup>86</sup>Op Cit, Edu-Afful and Allotey-Papoe, 2016, p.67

The violence linked with these mostly idle youth, operating sometimes under the influence of drugs, has manifested in attacks against political opponents, forced occupation and destruction of state properties, and forceful removal of government appointees. After the enactment of the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act (Act 999) of 2019, which outlawed vigilante operations, vigilante groups have not only intensified their trade through intra-party violence; they have also transformed and mutated into other non-political criminal enterprises. Information from the field indicates that active recruitment of youth into vigilante cells persists in some regions<sup>87</sup>. These mobilizations appear to be done through informal person-to-person contacts that occur in everyday social interactions, even though there are nuances from region to region. One respondent remarked:

“Several vigilante camps still exist in the Wa Metropolis. Taliban group still operates from their location behind the RCC. Majority of the vigilante groups depend on the political elites they follow for survival. Currently, these groups are transforming into intra-party vigilante groups, supporting key political figures. There are boys staying in the [Minister’s] residence 24/7 depending on the Minister. Recruitment of cells in Tumu is currently ongoing”<sup>88</sup>.

Another type of vulnerability that has the potential to radicalize individuals and youth groups is the cyclical agro-pastoralist or farmer-herder conflicts. Although reportage on this seasonal conflict seems to focus predominantly on Agogo and Afram plains in the Ashanti and Eastern regions, it is common in many communities in the northern regions and continues to intensify and assume worrying dimensions in recent times. A key reason for the recurrence of this conflict relates to how the citizenship/ identity of Fulani herders is constructed and perceived. Their categorization as non-Ghanaians, ‘Alien Fulani’ or settlers by farming and non-farming communities across the country generates a feeling of marginalization and denial of civil and political rights. This view is corroborated by Aning et al. 2017, who argue that such experiences arise from the stereotyping of the Fulanis as “armed robbers, rapists, violent, non-citizens, aliens, and uncivilized people”<sup>89</sup>. They observe that such practices have over time crystallized into denying some Fulani herders community rights and protection and, as a consequence, legitimizing discrimination against them. Such discrimination has resulted in reprisal attacks in some communities in the northern regions, leading to the killing of innocent citizens<sup>90</sup>. In some instances, the counter-attacks have disturbingly resulted in increased militarization, with some forced migrations. Herders who remain in such communities and feel threatened have resorted to the acquisition and use of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) as a defence mechanism against any potential acts of violence. Indeed, the bearing of arms by Fulani herders, which is borne out of the necessity to protect themselves and their herds from the elements as they migrate in search of grazing lands and water, has often been

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<sup>87</sup>FGD in Wa, 14.12.22

<sup>88</sup>FGD in Wa, 14.12.22

<sup>89</sup>Aning, K., Aubyn, F. & Adomako, M. (2017). Herder-Farmer Conflicts in West Africa: a challenge for Regional Security: A Ghana Case Study. See also Bukari, K. N., & Schareika, N. (2015). Stereotypes, prejudices and exclusion of Fulani Pastoralists in Ghana. *Pastoralism*, 5(1), 20.

<sup>90</sup><https://www.mynewsgh.com/zakoli-killings-spark-uproar-on-social-media/>



misconstrued as recourse to violence and crimes, which has consequently influenced the negative stereotyping of all Fulani communities<sup>91</sup>.

Easy availability of SALW, which is also intrinsically linked to porous borders and poorly constructed and implemented concept of border security, is one of the enabling factors for radicalization and extremism in Ghana, which is not only related to porous borders but organized smuggling networks and local manufacture of SALW, illegal small-scale mining and smuggling of commercial good<sup>92</sup>. Persistent chieftaincy, land and inter-ethnic conflicts have also partially driven the surge in the proliferation of SALW in the region. The availability of small arms appears to be an enabler and consequence of complex intractable conflicts, and one of the common denominators of all identified vulnerabilities. As poignantly narrated by one respondent:

I think that communal violence, whether involving chieftaincy, land, ethnic, political, or religious issues, provides a context within which people become radicalized; and our community leaders also use those situations to identify certain youth, encourage them, arm them, train them and use them as either defenders of their interests or their sects. It is through this kind of communal violence that people gain access to small arms; they also get to know the traders, how to use them, the kind of opportunities available and all those kinds of things. It is through communal violence that this kind of radicalization begins<sup>93</sup>.

Another phenomenon created by the easy access to SALW is guns-for-hire, especially in mining communities, where armed so-called 'local warriors' or self-appointed community watchdog members brazenly patrol communities with the excuse of providing security to gold buyers or the miners at a fee in the full glare of law enforcement authorities. One respondent indicated specific communities such as Tinga, Banda Nkwanta, Ntereso, Yerinde, and Jama in the Savannah region where 'local warriors' openly display AK47 and pump action guns<sup>94</sup>.

Other forms of violence, including politically violent attacks, have become part of public and private discourses. Ghana's present domestic situation leaves no doubt about its potential vulnerability to the threat of both domestic (though for the purposes of this report, the focus will be more on the domestic imperatives) and transnational extremist violence. The above facts contradict the pacifist notions about Ghana and increase its susceptibility and vulnerability to extremist violence. The Survey data, Interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs) were instructive, in painting a picture reflecting that, Ghana's vulnerability to violent extremism is factual and progressively growing. From the

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<sup>91</sup>NR 1, 6.12.22

<sup>92</sup>MN Tamale. The increasingly organised nature of criminal networks is also challenging state authority and the roles of its statutory security services also in the Southern section of the Ghanaian state. See for example, Galamsey Man drops 'bomb' on police, Daily Guide, 4 April 2023

<sup>93</sup>NR 3, 6.12.22

<sup>94</sup>SR 4, 8.12.22

fieldwork, there are a number of potential hotbeds for radicalism and the recruitment of violent actors in the northern regions: first, are the urban Muslim quarters and marginalized communities, especially in the densely populated migrant settlements, popularly referred to as 'zongos'; second, is the growth of the Ahlus-Sunnah Movement, which is becoming more militant and looking for opportunities to develop its activities. The danger associated with the Ahlus-Sunnah group is the growing schism between the more radical group that subscribes to the original Salafist ideology and the moderate one, which recognizes both Islamic and circular education as the best form of jihad<sup>95</sup>. In Tamale, for example, the Ambariyya group<sup>96</sup> is characterized as moderate, while the Masjidul Bayan group<sup>97</sup> is described as radical brand of the Ahlus-Sunnah group. Contestations between these intra-sunni groups have resulted in violent clashes in Tamale,<sup>98</sup> a development, which has the potential to spread and radicalize other migrant communities in the region. Particularly, during the FGDs in Bolgatanga and Tamale, allusions were made to such tensions; and another Islamic group whose proselytization activities are gaining currency in northern Ghana is the Tabligh<sup>99</sup> worshippers. Although the group aims to spread the teachings and practices of the Prophet, there is apprehension that their growing numbers, and the interpretations they offer can feed onto the existing vulnerabilities such as ignorance, to achieve impetus under a combination of both external and internal factors<sup>100</sup>. The findings of the study indicate that there are significant intra-religious tensions present among various Islamic sects in the Northern, Upper East, and Upper West regions, primarily due to doctrinal contestations. This sense of competition and the need to establish superiority or legitimacy in order to expand followership can potentially lead to the adoption of extremist ideologies and the use of violent means, as observed in other regions such as the Sahel. Religious tensions were observed to manifest in different forms from one region to the other, even if subtly. In the northern region, law enforcement agencies were concerned about violent clashes between the Tijāniyyah and Ahlus-Sunnah in Tamale, and the presence and activities of radical Muslim clerics in Karaga and other communities, some of whom are said to be foreigners from neighbouring countries.<sup>101</sup> In the Upper East Region, while Muslim leaders are said to be swift in distancing themselves from foreign Muslim clerics who preach violence and radical views, respondents noted intra-religious tensions between the Sunni, Shia, and Tijaniyyah as a worrying trend. In the Upper West regional capital, Wa, intra-religious tensions often transmute into political tensions, pitching neighbourhoods and local communities against one another<sup>102</sup>.

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<sup>95</sup> Aning, K. & Abdallah, M. (2013). Islamic radicalization and violence in Ghana. *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol.13, No.2, pp.149-167.

<sup>96</sup> The Ambariyya group in Tamale is a sunni sect led by Imam Basha, a prominent moderate scholar.

<sup>97</sup> The Masjidul Bayan sunni group traces its history to the first sunni revivalist in Tamale known as AfaAjura.

<sup>98</sup> FGD Bolgatanga; Acheampong, K. (2018, February 21). Two Sunni factions clash in religious dispute in Tamale. Retrieved 30 12, 2022, online: <http://ghheadlines.com/agency/ultimate-fm/20180221/73056601/two-sunni-factions-clash-in-religious-dispute-in-tamale>. See Also Aning and Amedzrator, 2022

<sup>99</sup> Tabligh basically means spreading the message and teachings of the Prophet, first to enlighten Muslims about the Islamic practices, and second, to draw more people to Islamic religion.

<sup>100</sup> MN 11/13.12.22

<sup>101</sup> NR 12.12.22


<sup>102</sup> UW FGD 14.12.12

An important factor influencing religious radicalization of youth is access to the internet and social media. In the Northern Region, respondents produced some evidence of the use of social media platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp to target youth for indoctrination<sup>103</sup>.



On the surface, the use of the internet as a source of information appears to be low in the northern regions, hovering at an average of 12 percent according to results from the survey. However, a deeper disaggregation and analysis reveals that the use of the internet is high among people aged between 15-35 years, particularly in the Northern and Savannah regions where it ranked second and first respectively as an information source for current events. Another intriguing dimension of the source of information is that the vast majority of youth rely on friends for information, which points to the likelihood of the internet and social media being the main source of information<sup>104</sup>. This is particularly instructive because perceptions of low internet access in the five northern regions are creating a false impression that confines efforts at sensitizing people to the dangers of radicalization through the internet.

Figure 2: Top ranked information source for current events



UNDP household survey of the five Northern regions of Ghana, December 2022

<sup>103</sup> Respondents indicated that such sensitive information has been shared with appropriate authorities. NR 7.12.22

<sup>104</sup> Cumulatively, 'friends' ranked the top source (30 percent) of information for current events, according to the survey results. It can be deduced that majority of 'friends' use the second most cited source of information – internet (21 percent).

Exacerbating these issues is the porous nature of artificially-erected borders that enables cross-border movements and interactions that may pose a serious security risk to the country. Although migratory flows in themselves do not constitute a threat, the existence of conditions such as poverty, lack of sustainable economic opportunities, or inimical government policies can be a basis for migrants to transmute and pose a threat to their country of residence. At the moment, Ghana's vast land borders presents a significant challenge to border agents. The vastness of these borders and the limited capacity of border institutions make it unrealistic to expect effective management of cross-border migratory flows<sup>105</sup>.

The consequence of the above drivers and vulnerabilities in the regions are their potential to blur the already complicated lines between extremism, organized crime and intercommunal violence. This situation, however, needs to be disaggregated and the national and local dynamics delineated to separate the state's central role from its decentralized or sub-national roles. Though there are overlaps and interdependences, the report argues that, how the state works at national and sub-national levels in terms of demonstrating its capacity to control its territory, provide protection and goods and services at different sites have important operational and practical implications for citizen experiences and perceptions of the state. When the state fails at the sub-national level, it presents an opportunity for militant groups who seek to exploit local conflicts and grievances to foment more violence, gain a foothold in communities, assert their influence and secure access to necessary resources to fund further operations. Due to weak state presence in large parts of the northern regions, and the weak capacity of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) to control their areas and to provide services to the vast areas under their jurisdictions, extremist groups could infiltrate those under-governed spaces to exert control over local populations through the provision of security and critical social services that, in turn, enables them to gain loyalty and perpetuate their activities.

Information from the fieldwork indicates the emergence of this phenomenon in some communities. Respondents mentioned the slaughter and distribution of cattle and building of social amenities such as mosques sometimes by unidentified entities as a worrying threat<sup>106</sup>. Extremist groups could craftily integrate local grievances to create conscription narratives centered on perceived marginalization. As witnessed elsewhere in the Sahel region, these groups have used local grievances to radicalize individuals, provoke tensions between communities and incite violence. Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) has, for instance, exploited resentment over cattle rustling and theft to exacerbate tensions between Tuareg nomads, seen as cattle rustlers, and the Fulani herders along the Niger-Mali border<sup>107</sup>. Likewise, the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) has manipulated unresolved grievances to renew existing communal cleavages between the Fulani and other groups such as the Bambara and Dogon.

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<sup>105</sup>MN 23

<sup>106</sup>FGD in Wa, 14.12.22

<sup>107</sup>Ostaeyen and Aning, op cit

With over 70 percent of the population in northern Ghana dependent on agriculture and livestock, exploitation of farmer-herder conflicts by extremist groups could have a devastating effect on populations in the region and the country in general.

## Chapter 3:

# Interplay among global, regional, sub-regional and domestic factors

Global, regional and sub-regional developments must be factored into discussions about possible vulnerabilities to violent extremism within Ghana's domestic setting. Presently, a southward drive towards the coastal states of West Africa has gained impetus since 2020. West Africa and the Sahel are experiencing intensified threat levels posed by violent extremists resulting in community upheavals and indiscriminate attacks<sup>108</sup>. Though vulnerabilities to violent extremism have become a shared security challenge globally, even within a particular country such as Ghana, there may be variations with respect to the drivers of vulnerability. Such variations also affect perceptions and stakeholder responses. As a result, the violent extremism landscape must be understood as diverse, multifaceted and fractious, but simultaneously characterised by inter- and intra-group rivalries and various forms of opportunistic cooperation at the operational, tactical and strategic levels<sup>109</sup>. It is, however, of critical and important analytical and operational value that, globalized understandings of radicalization and extremism do not supplant nuanced local trajectories and vectors of radicalization. Vulnerabilities, therefore, defy geographical boundaries, gender and social status among other factors, while economic difficulties are contributing to and compounding already existing disparities to worsen insecurities and create enabling and conducive environments in different geographical locales for extremists.

### 3.1 Cross-border dynamics:

Since 2012, several West African and Sahel states have experienced different forms of political and ecological violence<sup>110</sup>. As a result of state inability and ineffectiveness in responding to the threats posed by violent armed groups, new forms of security orders and provisions have emerged. Mali and Burkina Faso's experiences (useful also in understanding the situation in Niger, north-eastern Nigeria, and elsewhere) are instructive in terms of how the practices of states facing debilitating resource constraints are challenging the accepted notions of who provides state, community and citizen security<sup>111</sup>.

<sup>108</sup>ECD/SWAC (2020), *The Geography of Conflict in North and West Africa*, West African Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/02181039-en>, 14 February

<sup>109</sup>AFRICA: West Africa and the Sahel, December 2019 Monthly Forecast. Security Council Report, 27 November 2019; Michael Safi. 2020. 'Masked men, murder and mass displacement: how terror came to Burkina Faso', <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/mar/16/we-dont-know-whos-in-control-900000-flee-violence-in-burkina-faso>. According to this report, "... local analysts have noted that groups aligned to Isis and al-Qaida appear to have launched joint attacks in Burkina Faso and elsewhere in the Sahel – even though the two terrorist organisations are bitter rivals in the Middle East". Accessed 18 April 2020.

<sup>110</sup>According to a Security Council Report for November 2019, 'The Lomé Declaration from the 30 July 2018 joint heads of state summit between ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) on terrorism and violent extremism expressed deep concern at the escalating number and extent of violent conflicts between herders and farmers, a phenomenon that has also been prevalent in both sub-regions.


<sup>111</sup>Aning, K and Ilana Axelrod. 2023. 'Hybrid security orders in uncertain times: confronting violence in Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso', *The International Spectator*; Vol. 58, No. 1; Christian Lara and Gabriel del Sol. 2020. *Sustaining Peace in Burkina Faso: Responding to an Emerging Crisis*. New York: IPI

The multiple crises that several Sahel and West African states have faced since 2012, coupled with Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso's worsening insecurities since 2020, is starting to pose specific challenges to Ghana, recognized as '...a potential broadening of the "arc of crisis" to stable countries, including Ghana.'<sup>112</sup>

### 3.2 Influx of migrants, illegal mining and long, unmanned borders and organized smuggling networks.

#### 3.2.1 Border communities

Ghana's three main land boundaries with Cote d'Ivoire, Togo and Burkina Faso are long and in the dry season resembles vast 'football parks'.<sup>113</sup> The considerable distances and limited human resource capacity and logistics makes the 134 km land border between Hamle and Kumchorkor and the 176 km river border line between Hamle and Wechau and the over 200 km Pulimakong stretch from Northern Togo and Burkina Faso to Paga difficult to monitor<sup>114</sup>. The distances between manned stations are long, with dotted settlements and several mainly unmanned posts. Along Ghana's border communities, there are numerous unapproved borders and entry points which are used for different forms of cross-border activities such as the movement of arms<sup>115</sup>, human trafficking<sup>116</sup>, fertilizers<sup>117</sup>, cattle<sup>118</sup>, motorbikes<sup>119</sup> and vehicles<sup>120</sup>.



<sup>112</sup>Kwesi Aning and Mustapha Abdallah. 2013. 'Islamic radicalism and violence in Ghana' Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 13, No.1; Peter Knoope, Dr. Grégory Chauzal. 2016. 'Beneath the Apparent State of Affairs: Stability in Ghana and Benin: The Potential for Radicalization and Political Violence in West Africa' The Hague: Clingendael - the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. The report argues that, See, pp. 21ff. Méryl Demuyneck and Julie Coleman. 2020. The Shifting Sands of the Sahel's Terrorism Landscape (12 Mar) The Hague: International Centre for Counter terrorism. According to the authors, '...whereas in other parts of the world they have different objectives and a different point of view that tends to bring Islamic State and al-Qaida into conflict, here [in West Africa] they're able to overcome that and work for a common purpose.' This common purpose seems to be to exploit existing criminal networks (which in the Sahel are most often linked to traffickers of arms, drugs, or people) and interethnic violence, as well as carry out brutal and deadly attacks, in order to gain control of territory, further destabilize the region, and win over local populations'.

<sup>113</sup>MN 12

<sup>114</sup>MN 25

<sup>115</sup>See Aning, Kwesi. 2019. 'Ghana' in Fiona Mangan and Matthias Nowak, Eds. The West Africa-Sahel connection: mapping cross-border arms trafficking. Briefing Paper, December. Geneva: Small Arms Survey

<sup>116</sup>A. Tisseron, C. Collin, N. Aladeselu, K. Aning. 2019. Op cit

<sup>117</sup>'Smuggling of fuel, fertilizer from Ghana to Burkina Faso ongoing despite border closure', 23 June 2021. At

<https://citinewsroom.com/2021/06/smuggling-of-fuel-fertilizer-from-ghana-to-burkina-faso-ongoing-despite-border-closure-article/> accessed 12

February 2022. According to the reportage, '... According to the Planting for Food and Jobs Secretariat, of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Ghana lost a whopping GHS120 million from unaccounted for fertilizer, diversion of coupons and fertilizer smuggling in 2017 and 2018 planting seasons'. There is tangential evidence that the massive amounts of fertilizer smuggled out of Ghana can be a source of critical material for extremists to make explosives. Fertiliser, which is a critical component for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which is the weapon of choice for VEOs are smuggled in sizable quantities to Burkina Faso. Earlier interviews in 2020 at in border towns such as Hamle, Kulungugu and Namori pointed to this fact. See Mateeva, Aning and Kufuor, 2020.

<sup>118</sup>See Abubakari Ahmed. 2021. 'Ranches won't solve farmer-herder conflicts in Ghana if they don't deal with root causes', The Conversation, 3 October; Berger, F. 2023. 'Locked Horns: cattle rustling and Mali's War economy', op cit

<sup>119</sup>Interviews between 2020 and 2022

<sup>120</sup>Interview with member of a civil society group in Tamale

As demonstrated by Table 2 below, all five regions reveal similar vulnerabilities with respect to the porosity of the borders, ineffective law enforcement and personnel under stress to monitor the long borders leading to poor border security management practices. The net negative impact of the influx of migrants and trafficking networks in several of these border communities is that 'industries are collapsing because Togolese fuel is cheaper'<sup>121</sup>.

### 3.2.2 Mining

Mining in all its forms continues to create both opportunities for employment, but also individual and group vulnerabilities by spurring the acquisition and proliferation of SALW in the communities within which they are located.

Activities along and across the borders and those near mining sites attract settlers characterized interchangeably as 'refugees', 'foreigners', and 'fighters' in several of the interviews. The interchangeability of these categories of West African and Ghanaian youth with no particular fixed abode and with itinerant lifestyles is leading to the formation of opportunistic relationships driven solely by the desire to survive on a day-to-day basis and a willingness and preparedness to sell whatever skill they have to the highest bidder. These groups, variously characterized as Okada boys and other youth groups of indistinctive identity also engage in the cross-border trade either for themselves or as 'agents who facilitate contacts and engage in extortion from traders which has become a 'norm'. Indeed, traders prepare a percentage of their income to pay for such extortion fees' but mainly as a protection fee<sup>122</sup>.

In relation to cross-border trade, it is critically important to highlight the pronounced role of women and women's groups in the disruption or promotion of extremist activities. The involvement of women in cross-border trade has been well-documented, and it is increasingly recognized that they play a critical role in promoting economic development and social cohesion especially in border regions. In addition to their economic contributions, women are uniquely positioned to provide early warning signals on cross-border criminal interactions, smuggling activities, and the presence of criminal foreign entities. Data gathered from the field indicated that women often have close relationships with communities and individuals across borders. They may have family members or business partners on both sides of the border, and they are often engaged in informal networks that enable them to move freely across borders. This gives them an intimate knowledge of local dynamics and enables them to pick up on unusual or suspicious activity that may go unnoticed by others<sup>123</sup>.

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<sup>121</sup>MN 10, 13.12.22


<sup>122</sup>MN 6, 11.12.22

<sup>123</sup>Interview with a Gender and Youth Advocacy Officer, Tamale. 04.12.22



The Report argues that, although mining can take different distinct forms, requiring different human resources, particularly for women in the trade links and value chain, and its different implications, it will be unhelpful to separate these two. Mining, and the support infrastructure that underpins it and trade overlap in ways that makes it unhelpful to separate the two. Table 1 provides a disaggregated list of key regional towns and districts and their trade dynamics. From the interview and FGDs, all the five regions and different districts and municipalities are at risk on the trade issues.

In disaggregating the vulnerability risk variations among the different regions, there was almost unanimous consensus that, in terms of the threats to regional security and stability, 'Northern region faces more internal threats, which is a worry to security officials<sup>124</sup>, while Upper East and West may face more external threats<sup>125</sup> due to their close proximity to countries facing presently evolving extremist violence. This underscores the importance of understanding the nuanced nature of vulnerability risks across different regions, and the need for region-specific strategies to counter violent extremism, particularly in the Northern, Upper East, and Upper West regions. While addressing internal grievances and promoting social and economic development may be particularly relevant to the Northern Region, border security and intelligence sharing with neighbouring countries may be more pressing in the Upper East and West regions due to their proximity to countries facing extremist violence. However, it is important to recognize the interdependent nature of the vulnerabilities in these regions, and to adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach to addressing them.



<sup>124</sup>MN 7, 12.12.22

<sup>125</sup>MN 5, 11.12.22

Vulnerability Assessment On The Threats Of Violent Extremism And Radicalisation In Northern Regions Of Ghana

Table 1: Major Border Towns in the Northern Regions and Types of Smuggling Activities

Region	District	Critical Border Town(s)	Types of Trade/Smuggling
Northeast	Chereponi	Wonjuga (leads to Mango-Togo)	Fuel; fertilizers; soya beans; rice; cars. (other critical border towns exhibit similar smuggling and trading patterns) currency trafficking
	Naturi-Tinchango		
	Saka		
	Naduni		
	Tombu		
	Kudani-Bakanu		
	Bunkprugu-Nakpanduri	Manbabiga (leads to Togo)	Foodstuff (mainly grains); petrol and diesel; clothing; motorbikes; cars; accessories. Other towns exhibit similar smuggling and trading patterns
		Kinkangu <sup>126</sup>	
		Pagnatiik <sup>127</sup>	
	Bunkprugu-Nakpanduri	Bunkprugu	
		Yenbur <sup>128</sup>	
Upper East	KasenaNankana West	Page (leads to Burkina Faso)	Fertilizer; building materials; guns; motorbikes; mining; fuel smuggling
	Bongo District	Namoo	
	Bawku Municipal	Mognori	
	Pusiga Municipal	Missiga	
	Pusiga Municipal	Kulungungu	
	Pusiga	Pulimakan	
Upper West	Lambussie	Hamile (leads to Burkina Faso)	Grains, petrol; diesel; fertilizer; clothes; cars; motorbikes
	Sissala East	Tumu/Leo	
	Wa West District	Wechiau	Trade/smuggled items are same as above
	Wa West District	Wechiau/Dorimon Route <sup>129</sup>	
	Nadowli-Kaleo District	Charikpong route	
	Sissala West District	Gwollu Route	
	Lawra Municipal	Babile(Babili) Route <sup>130</sup>	
Northern Region	Tatale District	Tatale-Sanguli	Shea nut and shea nut butter; food items; guns; fertilizer, accessories
Savannah	Bole District	Chache (serves as boundary between Ghana and La Cote d'Ivoire. Though the Chachi border is unrecognized, GIS officers man it	Clothes, arms, narcotics, gold, cooking oil, rice, foreign and locally manufactured guns, pethidine (tablets and injection), sodium cyanide  (all 3 towns listed exhibit similar trading dynamics)
	West Gonja	Banda Nkwanta	
	Bole	Dollar Power	
	West Gonja district	Wasipe	

Source(s): Multiple interviews between November and December 2022

<sup>126</sup>At Bunkprugu, one can take the Yenbur road towards Kinkangu, which is in Ghana. One can also travel by the Cheriponi road and get to Kinkangu before Cheriponi.

<sup>127</sup>From Bunkprugu to Togo, one arrives at Pagnatiik before the border. About 100m from the border is Yenbur


<sup>128</sup>Yenbur is in Togo and very close to the Ghana border

<sup>129</sup>The district has two paramoucies, that is Wechiau and Dorimon, and has a stretch of the Black Volta

<sup>130</sup>Connects Ouagadougou and Bouake

### 3.2.3 Migratory flows

Ghana continues to experience both seasonal and ad hoc movement of different categories of migrants across its borders. First, there are irregular migrants who transit through the country's borders to their destinations in Northern Africa and Europe. One of the routes that is favoured by these migrants is through Cinkassé (a town in Togo which shares borders with Ghana and Burkina Faso), to Kantchari (in Eastern Burkina Faso) to Agadez (Niger) to Libya. Second, undocumented migrants who are fleeing from conflict situations in Sahel countries such as Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mali enter Ghana and settle in communities while others have a more insecure existence<sup>131</sup>.



Recently, a series of attacks by jihadist groups in southeastern Burkina Faso is forcing increasing numbers of displaced populations into northern Ghana. Currently, news reports indicate over 4000 Burkinabe refugees have pitched camp in several border communities in the Upper East Region over the past year<sup>132</sup>. A similar situation exists in the Upper West region, including communities in the Sissala West District. Exposed to harsh living conditions, some of these migrants, particularly able-bodied youth, move to illegal small-scale mining (galamsey) sites in areas such as 'Accra dollar power', Banda Nkwanta and Tinga in the Savannah Region or communities around Nadowli-Kaleo and Wa-East in the Upper West Region.

### 3.2.4 The Changing Face of Vigilantism


Several other potential vulnerabilities are beginning to emerge with respect to the age-old vigilante challenge to state authority. Once more, there are slight regional, but analytically and operationally important variations to the manifestation of this problem. First, irrespective of whatever form vigilantism manifests itself, the character of politics and politicians still plays an overriding role. Second, in Northern and Upper East regions, vigilantism manifests in the old form, while in Savannah and North East regions, their presence is limited<sup>133</sup>.

<sup>131</sup>. MN

<sup>132</sup> Joyonline. (January 2023). Scores of Burkinabe's flee to Ghana following attacks by suspected terrorists. <https://www.myjoyonline.com/scores-of-burkinabes-flee-to-ghana-following-attacks-by-suspected-terrorists/>

<sup>133</sup> MN 6, Tamale

However, in both Upper East and West, vigilante violence has transformed from a largely inter-party, politically motivated violence to an intra-party phenomenon breeding internal mistrust and violence among adherents of the same party.



Consequently, the contestations to be 'admitted' into the camps of different competing factions in the same party is creating a new class of winners and losers, and generating frustrations among those within political parties who feel their sacrifices and 'actions' have not been adequately rewarded. This new intra-party vigilantism is intensifying a sense of exclusionary politics; and generating a groundswell of frustrated and increasingly vulnerable youth,<sup>134</sup> who have formed themselves into camps supporting different factions within the same party.

<sup>134</sup>MN 8, 12.12.22

## Chapter 4:

# Multidimensional vulnerability and violent extremism radicalization indices

### 4.1 How vulnerable households are in the Northern regions? Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI)

Vulnerability has been defined as the characteristics of a person or entities, in terms of their capacity, to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (Blaikie et al. (1994). However, recent debate defines vulnerability as the exposure to uncertainty and risk, which is likely to affect the well-being of entities. In this regard, reducing individual vulnerability means minimizing the likelihood that a shock leads to a sharp decline in their well-being. At the macro level, vulnerability has been measured as a multidimensional phenomenon, composing of a host of dimensions: economic, social, environment, governance, and peripherality (Jacob and Riad, 2020). Though all these dimensions cannot be covered at the micro level, it is essential to construct the vulnerability index of individuals based on a multidimensional approach, enabling a synthesis of different components of vulnerability. The constructed index is called a Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI).

An MVI helps to capture the many layers of vulnerability and facilitates a more nuanced and holistic analysis of how and why some individuals are more vulnerable than others. As such, an MVI is a powerful tool which provides policy-makers with an enhanced understanding for evidence-based decision making. Policies and programmes can be designed to mitigate varied and numerous factors which result in vulnerability and can assist in protecting those most at risk.

In this analysis, the empirical calculation of the individual MVI for Ghana is based on the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) methodology developed by Alkire and Foster (2011). The rationale for choosing this methodology is that it is intuitive and easy to understand for policymakers. It emphasizes the joint deprivations faced by individuals with regard to the indicators that compose the MVI. Like the MPI, the MVI is an adjusted headcount ratio measure designed to measure vulnerability, and can be broken down into **incidence**<sup>135</sup>, **intensity**<sup>136</sup>, and

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
<sup>135</sup>The incidence of vulnerability (H, for Headcount ratio) is the proportion of individuals (within a given population) who are identified as vulnerable on the basis of the multiple deprivations they experience.

<sup>136</sup>The intensity of vulnerability (A, for Average deprivation share) is the average proportion of deprivations vulnerable individuals experience. It measures how vulnerable individuals are, on average.

**dimensional composition**<sup>137</sup>

In this study, the indicators selected to calculate the MVI are based on the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Ten (10) indicators were selected using the questionnaire of Prevention of Violent Extremism. These indicators have been grouped into three dimensions: i) Health and Nutrition, ii) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, and iii) Livelihood and Living standards, as shown in Figure 3.

**Figure 3: Composition of the MVI – Dimensions and indicators**



Source: Surge Data Hub, UNDP

The overall level of **vulnerability experienced by households is very high**. As shown in Table 2, the incidence of vulnerability for the threshold of 33% or more deprivations (one third of all weighted indicators) is 25%, meaning that one-fourth of households are vulnerable to at least 33% of the deprivations. Also, the value of 0.45 represents the intensity, which indicates that these vulnerable households are deprived on average in 4.5 of the 10 (45%) indicators considered for the index. As a result, the MVI score of 0.114 indicates that households who are vulnerable experience 11.4% of all the potential deprivations they could experience.

<sup>137</sup>The MVI is the product of both H and A.


$$MVI = H \times A$$

The MVI can also be calculated using its dimensional composition, by breaking it down by each of its indicators. The figure to be used in this regard is the censored headcount ratio,  $h_j$ , which is the percentage of individuals identified as vulnerable and deprived in each component indicator (j). The MVI is constructed by summing the weighted censored headcount ratio of each indicator.

$$MVI = \sum_{j=1}^d w_j h_j$$

Where, d is the total number of indicators and  $w_j$  are indicators' weights, where  $w_j$  add up to 1.

**Table 2. Individual MVI by number of deprivations (n=1394)**



These results can be contrasted with those presented in the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) provided by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI, 2020) for Ghana (using data from 2017-2018), which shows only a 24.6% incidence of multidimensional poverty and an MPI score of 0.111 at the national level (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Comparing MPI (2017-2018) and MVI (2022) results**





Figure 5 shows censored headcount ratios, which are the percentages of households experiencing deprivations for each indicator and identified as vulnerable. For the Health and Nutrition dimension, the deprivation experienced by the highest percentage of vulnerable households was access to health centre, with 2.7% expressing to have no access or major difficulties in access to health centres, services, or supplies. This percentage is 27 times higher than those saying that the most common sources of food for their household was no food sources, gifts from family / friends, borrowing, begging, or solicitation of alms.

The censored headcount ratio of both indicators of vulnerabilities in terms of water and hygiene was relatively high, compared to other indicators. Only 3.7% of vulnerable households declared no facility / bush / field when asked to report “What kind of toilet facility is used by the household members consuming lower quality food?”. Almost 2.2 times lower is the figure associated to drinking water indicator, which means those who selected “Water from unprotected well, Surface water (river / lake / pond), Rainwater, Water from truck tanks / loaded in” when asked “What is the current main source of drinking water in your household?”.

Figure 5: Censored headcount ratios



Finally, regarding livelihood and living standards, the main deprivation experienced by vulnerable households was in expenditure prospect. Out of all households in vulnerability, 1.2% are very concerned over the household livelihood conditions for the next three months. These percentages are almost twice as high as those for vulnerable population with deprivations in energy and social protection.

Analyses based on censored headcount ratios can be complemented by considering the percentage contribution<sup>138</sup> of each indicator or dimension to overall MVI. The censored count ratio shows the extent of deprivation among the vulnerable but not the relative value of the indicators or dimensions. For instance, two indicators can have the same censored count ratios but very different contributions to overall vulnerability. This is because the contribution depends not only on the censored headcount ratio but also on the weight or value assigned to each indicator or dimension. This is important, because not every dimension and indicator have the same level of impact on people’s vulnerability. Limiting the analysis to headcount ratios would assume that this is the case, thus inflating the apparent influence of less impactful aspects. The inclusion of the weighting applied to each indicator and dimension allows us then to obtain their real level of contribution to the MVI. Therefore, while the count ratios are useful for knowing the incidence of each specific vulnerability among all vulnerable population, the contributions are more useful when comparing the different indicators and their impact on the vulnerability of the population.

<sup>138</sup> The contribution of each indicator to overall MVI is calculated as follows. Let us denote the contribution of indicator  $j$  to the MVI by  $\phi_j$ . Then, the contribution of indicator  $j$  for vulnerability cut-off  $k$  is given by  $\phi_j(k) = w_j \times \frac{h_j(k)}{MVI}$ , where  $h_j(k)$  is the censored headcount ratio of indicator  $j$ , and  $w_j$  is the weight of indicator  $j$



Figure 6: Contribution of each indicator to overall MVI




Figure 6 presents the contribution of each indicator to overall MVI. There are very small changes between the censored headcount ratios and contributions with hygiene, access to health centres, drinking water, and expenditure prospect also being the indicators contributing the most to the overall MVI. The main difference can be seen when comparing food quality to mental health, social protection and assistance. When looking at the contribution of each dimension, we see that Health and Nutrition still has a lower percentage, at 25%, compared to 47% for Water and Hygiene, and 28% for Livelihood & Living standards.

#### 4.1.2 MVI by individual socio-demographic characteristics

Comparing the results obtained by the different regions, as shown in Figure 7, we can see that the **most vulnerable region is North East, followed by Northern region**. On the other hand, the region with lower vulnerable households is Savannah, followed by Upper East region. It is worth noting that the trend in the MVI values per region matches that of the vulnerability incidence. This means that the difference in vulnerabilities between regions is likely more due to the incidence than the intensity of the vulnerabilities. While the deprivations suffered by vulnerable households across the regions may be somewhat similar, there are variations in the percentage of households that are in a condition of vulnerability.

Figure 7: Incidence and MVI by regions





Figure 8 also provides the contribution<sup>139</sup> of each region to the overall MVI. The region with the highest of both population share (38%) and contribution (45%) is Northern Region. Savannah region bears a disproportionate load of vulnerability given that their population share (11%) is almost three times higher than contribution to the MVI (4%). This is not actually the case for Upper West Region. In fact, the contribution of urban areas to the MVI (16%) is slightly lower than the population share (19%).

Figure 8: Population and contribution by regions



<sup>139</sup> The calculation of sub-group contribution to MVI is made possible by the property of population subgroup decomposability of the approach from Alkire, Foster, and al (2015). The subgroup contribution formula is  $D^l = v^l * \frac{MVI^l}{MVI}$ , where  $v^l$  is the population share of subgroup  $l$  and  $MVI^l$  is the multidimensional vulnerability of subgroup  $l$ . Whenever the contribution to vulnerability of a region or some other group greatly exceeds its population share, this suggests that there is a seriously unequal distribution of vulnerability in the country, with some regions or groups bearing a disproportionate share of poverty.

## 4.2 Violence Extremism Radicalization Index (VERI)

In this report, we take a simple and intuitive approach to calculating the violent extremism and radicalization index (VERI)<sup>140</sup>. It consists of averaging the scores of all the 27 indicators of radicalization and violent extremism, presented in Table 3. The same weight is applied to all the indicators.

The overall VERI score for all the assessed areas is 0.46, meaning that the risk of violent extremism and radicalization is moderate in those areas (Figure 9). However, the findings show that Upper West and North East are falling under high risk of violent extremism and radicalization. Moreover, Upper West is the region with the highest risk of radicalization and violent extremism, with a VERI score of 0.53. The regions with a moderate risk of radicalization are Upper East (0.42 VERI score), Savannah (0.43), and Northern (0.445).

Figure 9: VERI by regions





Figure 10 indicates that there is no significant difference between male and female when considering their risk of radicalization and violent extremism. However, considering the age of individuals, those under middle age are more likely to show a higher risk of violent extremism and radicalization, with the VERI score of middle age being 0.48, as compared to 0.46 for youth, and 0.45 for elderly.

<sup>140</sup> Assuming, the normalized VERI is denoted  $VERI_n$  :

$$VERI_n = \frac{VERI - VERI_{min}}{VERI_{max} - VERI_{min}}$$


Figure 10: VERI by gender and age of the respondent



#### 4.2.1 What role social and economic vulnerabilities play in explaining radicalization and violent extremism?

In order to have a better understanding of the two analysed indices, one can suggest looking more in depth at their possible association. Therefore, their results can be plotted together in a single graph. Figure 11 illustrate the results of MVI and VERI by regions. The graph shows that the region with the lowest MVI (Savannah region, 0.05) does not correspond to the lowest VERI (Upper East region, 0.42). Moreover, the latter finding can be applied to the region with the highest value of the indices (MVI, North East, 0.24%; VERI, Upper West, 0.53). Nevertheless, there is an association between the two indices because as the MVI value increases from Savannah to North East regions, almost same can be said for the values of VERI. Such assumption needs to be tested in a more rigorous approach. For this reason, in this report it is presented the regression analysis, which is expected to shed more light to this issue.

Figure 11: MVI and VERI by regions



As the family size increases, so does the value of VERI. The opposite is manifested regarding the MVI and family size: as the family size increases, the MVI decreases. Hence, there is a clear trend for both indices, although in different directions. A family with many household members may have the possibility to fight vulnerability much easier than those with less than three members. In this line, one can say that a family with many family members has more chances to

improve livelihood and living standards, such as expenditure prospect, income and social protection. Such relationship is illustrated in Figure 12.

Figure 12: MVI and VERI by family size




Table 4 shows, through regressions, the relationship that exists between the level of economic and social vulnerability of individuals, and the risk of radicalization and violent extremism. The first regression which only considers the MVI as potential determinant of radicalization shows that, with a confidence level 90%, economic and social vulnerabilities play a significant role in explaining radicalization. More explicitly, the higher is the level of vulnerability, the more people are likely to fall into radicalization and violent extremism.



In the second regression, the gender of the households was added as a potential explanation for radicalization and violent extremism. It can be seen that vulnerabilities remain as main explainer of radicalization, even when the gender of the households is considered. The second regression also validate the above findings which shows no significant differences between male and female when comparing their risk of radicalization.

To continue verifying to what extent economic and social vulnerabilities affect radicalization and violent extremism, we also considered education in the third regression. The result is that the MVI becomes nonsignificant, while education is significant, with 99% confidence. This means that education prevails over vulnerability in explaining the risk of violent extremism and radicalization. Having no formal education increase the risk of radicalization and violent extremism.

This finding is also confirmed by the last regression in which the regional fixed effects are considered. Using regional fixed effects allows for controlling unobserved social differences between regions which independently impact radicalization on their own.

**Table 4: Explaining violent extremism and radicalization**

	(1) VERI	(2) VERI	(3) VERI	(4) VERI
MVI	.045* (.024)	.046* (.025)	.03 (.025)	0 (.025)
Ln(age)		.006 (.012)	-.014 (.013)	-.013 (.013)
Gender (Ref. Female)				
2.Male		-.011 (.01)	-.007 (.01)	-.008 (.01)
3.Other		0 (.071)	.005 (.071)	-.007 (.069)
No education			.036*** (.012)	.032*** (.012)
Region (Ref. Northern)				
13.Savannah				-.063*** (.017)
14.North East				.051*** (.017)
15.Upper East				-.041*** (.013)
16.Upper West				.065*** (.014)
Constant	.457*** (.006)	.442*** (.043)	.496*** (.047)	.496*** (.046)
Observations	1394	1394	1394	1394
R-squared	.002	.004	.01	.063

*Standard errors are in parentheses*

\*\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < .1$

## Chapter 5:

# A common analytical framework for understanding the underlying causes and consequences of violent extremism and radicalization

Several explanatory and analytical frameworks and models have been presented for understanding, clarifying and interpreting or providing reasons for the causes and consequences, dynamics and rationales behind the journey from recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism. Often times, the debates have shifted from domestic imperatives to ‘contagion’ or ‘spillover’ of external imperatives. However, in designing this framework and based on the extensive results from the Survey and fieldwork, the Report argues that any analytical framework relating to causes and consequences of vulnerabilities relating to violent extremism and radicalization should understand the motivations for and the centrality of youth and youth culture and their changing behaviour relating to violence. In designing a common analytical framework for understanding the underlying causes and consequences of the journey from radicalization to violent extremism, the Report applies two mutually reinforcing concepts, namely: constructive and destructive social incentives. Constructive social incentive aims to place the agency of youth and communities within a framework that defines these incentives as:

‘those elements within a society that contribute to stability, and orderly, as opposed to violent, social change. They constitute the broad range of elements that shape people’s choices, including those of youth [and the wider community]. The erosion of constructive incentives can be brought about by warfare, taking the form of disintegration of family and community cohesion, educational and economic opportunities; [and] narrowing the available choices and survival strategies and ultimately, the protected social spaces afforded to young people[and communities] for growth and development’.<sup>141</sup>

For the purposes of the Reports’ analytical framework, both radicalization and violent extremism are understood as processes, and therefore, the shift from ‘constructive’ to ‘destructive’ social incentives must be understood as a continuum located within global, continental, regional and domestic imperatives. Furthermore, it must be understood as the interfaces and overlaps occurring at different places and impacting on and transforming local imperatives that contributes to vulnerabilities. The report further argues and concludes that domestic volatility contributes more to the shift from ‘constructive’ to ‘destructive’ incentives

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
<sup>141</sup>See MN 5/11.12.22 where the point about ‘social norms and power should be understood in a cultural context’; McIntyre, Angela, Kwesi Aning & Prosper Addo. (2002) ‘Politics, war and youth culture in Sierra Leone’, *African Security Studies*, Vol.11, No.3, pp. 6-15, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2002.9627964

in which domestic challenges are capitalized upon and transformed into destructive incentives. The Report argues for understanding the vulnerabilities in the Northern regions by:

- (a) Considering the structural causes of vulnerabilities: this must be done by incorporating historic, political, economic and socio-cultural factors in any analyses;
- (b) Appreciating the multiple, overlapping networks (women, youth, religious groups), interests and motivations of different actors and the performance of diverse institutions;
- (c) An urgent need for flexibility in appreciating present (2022 and onwards) violent extremism undercurrents, comprising possible triggers for conflict;
- (d) Identifying and strengthening capacities for peace engines, such as the National Peace Council, Religious institutions; and
- (e) Recognizing and appreciating the multiple variables that contribute to regional differences in vulnerabilities, and design targeted response mechanisms.

**Figure 13: Analytical Framework for understanding the shift from 'constructive' to 'destructive' incentives and preventive/moderating factors**

Constructive social incentives-----intervening moderating/preventive factors---Destructive social incentives





## Conclusions and Recommendations

Throughout the fieldwork period, there was no doubt that there is a multiplicity of duplicating efforts at understanding and responding to the vulnerabilities that can result in radicalization and by extension violent extremism. There is a clear sense from people interviewed that, there is a saturation of initiatives with little verifiable endeavours at translating the discussions and recommendations into concrete interventions that contributes to, prevents and strengthens community resilience. It is critical that community enthusiasm and support for sharing time-sensitive information and making critical suggestions for improving livelihood schemes to reduce vulnerabilities are not lost. Time is of the essence, for translating all the knowledge garnered into concrete, implementable initiatives that transform lives. Such initiatives, do not necessarily have to be large, expensive ones.

From the fieldwork, it is clear that there is a need for a more granular appreciation of the local drivers of violent extremism and a recognition that the risks of vulnerability differ around contextual issues. The point here is that the issues that are prevalent in one region and the intervention measures that are applied to achieve particular results in one context cannot be simply imitated elsewhere. As a result, the recommendations that are set out seek to achieve a public-facing, whole-of-society approach that speaks to extremism and counters existing and evolving vulnerabilities to violent extremism.

Within the context of the five northern regions, one major way of preventing radicalization and violent extremism through a whole-of-society approach is to address the persisting socio-economic challenges and development gap that has generated a sense of exclusion, marginalization and anger among the largely unemployed youth.

Findings from the fieldwork recommend that catalysts for building resilience should include: community engagement, interventions for vulnerable youth, efforts to counter online extremism, and attempts to deracialize through religious and other available forms of counselling. In identifying catalysts for resilience, the report argues for using a transactional approach to building resilience and thus focuses on a two-prong approach: first, the individual, and second, the community. For individuals, resilience can be best appreciated as the interaction between aspects of the individual, life circumstances, and context, emphasizing the family, community, and culture. Concerning communities, resilience is the capacity of community members to take considered, persistent, communal steps to reduce the negative impacts of unpleasant developments. As discussed above, such approaches may include shifts in attitudes, thoughts, beliefs, behaviours, practices and the re-allocation of scarce resources.

Recommendations based on the analysis to support a vulnerability-sensitive approach to incorporate into programming.

### **Youth Empowerment**

- Disrupt extremist recruitment networks by providing alternative opportunities for vulnerable individuals, such as education, employment, and other forms of social support
- Support youth entrepreneurship programmes that help young people in the northern regions to start their own businesses and become self-sufficient. This can help create economic opportunities and reduce feelings of hopelessness and despair, which can make young people vulnerable to extremist ideologies
- Mentoring and leadership programmes can help provide young people with positive role models and support networks. These programmes can help build self-esteem, resilience, and a sense of belonging, which can reduce the appeal of extremist ideologies

### **Information sharing and Collaboration**

- Improved information-sharing, intelligence gathering, early warning and collaboration among statutory security agencies. Most importantly, improve public awareness of information campaigns such as the See something, say something campaign. So far, communities are unaware of what it means. The slogan must be exhaustively translated into local languages
- Improve information-sharing across government agencies in the North, for example, improved data collection on firearms-related injuries in hospitals, clinics et al
- Strengthen inter-agency collaboration through joint exercises and training on preventing extremism
- Prioritization should be made for resources for preventive efforts, including community-based outreach and intelligence-led policing
- Intelligence agencies should reinforce timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence by enhancing information sharing at both the horizontal and the vertical levels

### **Border Security Management**

- Integrate Border Security Committees (BOSEC) into already existing national security institutions around borderlands to improve intelligence gathering along the borders, as well as enhance information sharing and collaboration in tackling smuggling, and criminal networks and have a better understanding of borderland political economies
- It is also important to engage communities along the borders and involve them in the design and implementation of border security measures
- Build the capacity of border officials through training, provision of equipment and resources. Particularly, speed up the provision of equipment to border posts such as hand-held portable scanners, among others, to help with non-intrusive searches;
- Enhance border security management confidence-building measures with international partners, through the establishment of a Joint Drone Centre managed by all security agencies

- Enhance and improve profiling along border crossings
- Establish a Common Platform for information-sharing among Ghanaian, Togolese, Burkinabe and Ivorian border officials.

#### **Monitoring abuse of Social Media**

- Provide better oversight over use and exploitation of social media as political and social mobilization tools. Government can achieve this by fostering public-private partnerships with social media platforms in the sharing of data and information, joint monitoring and transparent reporting about their content moderation policies and collaboration on targeted interventions

#### **Operationalizing the Counter-terrorism Framework**

- Ministry of National Security and the country's law enforcement and security agencies should work actively to ensure the translation of the national counter terrorism policy framework into operational practices
- Increased and improved coherence within the legal framework relating to counter terrorism laws in Ghana
- Security force assistance, delivered by foreign nation security partners, should be coordinated to avoid duplication, focused on supporting sustainable inter-agency collaboration across the crime-terror-developments spectrum, and tailored to the operational needs of current preventive efforts
- Improve SALW stockpile management systems by strengthening the legal and regulatory framework, inventory management, monitoring and reporting, and disarmament programmes

# ANNEX 1

## Sampling and Sample Breakdown

Cluster No.	EA CODE	Region Name	Region Code	District Code	District Name	EAType	EA_BASE	BASE LOCALITY	BASELOCALITYNO	Urban/Rural	Urban Rural code	Total_Pop	Hsehold_Pop	Num_of_Hseholds_enum
001	1207200030	Northern	12	1207	YENDI	1	JANBONI	JANBONI	01	Rural	2	494	494	78
002	1207200086	Northern	12	1207	YENDI	1	ZAGBANG NO. 2	ZAGBANG NO. 2	01	Rural	2	465	465	68
003	1207200128	Northern	12	1207	YENDI	2	ZAKPALSI ENTERPRISE	YENDI	15	Urban	1	392	392	91
004	1207200175	Northern	12	1207	YENDI	2	ALHASSAN WOMBEI'S HOUSE	YENDI	15	Urban	1	447	447	69
005	1207200218	Northern	12	1207	YENDI	2	YAKUBU CHAIRMAN'S HOUSE	YENDI	15	Urban	1	441	441	125
006	1207200252	Northern	12	1207	YENDI	2	FAIZAL BIN MOHAMMED MOSQUE	YENDI	15	Urban	1	779	779	191
007	1207200307	Northern	12	1207	YENDI	2	M/A PRIMARY SCHOOL	OSEIDO	23	Rural	2	454	454	92
008	1210301007	Northern	12	1210	TAMALE SOUTH	2	DATOYILI JHS	DATOYILI	02	Urban	1	1617	1617	343
009	1210301126	Northern	12	1210	TAMALE SOUTH	2	FANTASTIC HAIR BARBERING SHOP	BILPEILA	22	Urban	1	580	580	128
010	1210301248	Northern	12	1210	TAMALE SOUTH	2	NBA TEACHER YILI	NYOHINI	30	Urban	1	2056	2056	587
011	1210302015	Northern	12	1210	TAMALE CENTRAL	2	RADIO JUSTICE	LAMASHEGU	01	Urban	1	319	316	67
012	1210302084	Northern	12	1210	TAMALE CENTRAL	2	ST.JOSEPH'S CATHOLIC PRIMARY & JHS	DOHINAAYILI	09	Urban	1	502	502	143
013	1210302176	Northern	12	1210	TAMALE CENTRAL	2	H/NO. C_1	SABON-GIDA	03	Urban	1	298	298	60
014	1210302267	Northern	12	1210	TAMALE CENTRAL	2	BONZALI RURAL BANK	MOSHIE ZONGO	20	Urban	1	279	279	97
015	1211200066	Northern	12	1211	SAGNERIGU	2	H/NO. NY BLK 38B	NYOHINI	07	Urban	1	823	823	179
016	1211200134	Northern	12	1211	SAGNERIGU	2	WASHING BASE	JISONAYILI	23	Urban	1	944	944	203
017	1211200197	Northern	12	1211	SAGNERIGU	2	THE DON'S PUB	GUMANI	10	Urban	1	719	719	164
018	1211200264	Northern	12	1211	SAGNERIGU	2	KINGS GUEST HOUSE	KALPOHINI	13	Urban	1	423	423	125
019	1211200335	Northern	12	1211	SAGNERIGU	2	METHODIST BASIC SCHOOL	GBANYAMNI	18	Urban	1	575	575	82
020	1211200383	Northern	12	1211	SAGNERIGU	2	BI-WATER RESERVOIR	KUKUO-YEPALSI	30	Rural	2	882	882	152
021	1211200414	Northern	12	1211	SAGNERIGU	2	MOHAMMED KAMAL-DEEN'S HOUSE	KUKUO	45	Urban	1	424	424	80
022	1215100011	Northern	12	1215	KARAGA	2	D/A PRIMARY & J.H.S	YEMO-KARAGA	03	Rural	2	653	653	129
023	1215100023	Northern	12	1215	KARAGA	2	POLICE STATION	KARAGA	05	Urban	1	2693	2644	429
024	1215100045	Northern	12	1215	KARAGA	2	AFA BABA'S HSE	KARAGA	05	Urban	1	608	608	79
025	1215100069	Northern	12	1215	KARAGA	2	FUSIENI BABA'S HSE	NYONG GUMA	10	Rural	2	579	579	99
026	1215100103	Northern	12	1215	KARAGA	2	NANGUN-NAYILI E/A PRIMARY	NANGUN-NAYILI	18	Rural	2	586	586	133
027	1215100144	Northern	12	1215	KARAGA	1	LULUGU	LULUGU	01	Rural	2	732	732	100
028	1215100169	Northern	12	1215	KARAGA	1	KPASALIKU	KPASALIKU	01	Rural	2	762	762	103
029	1301100030	Savannah	13	1301	BOLE	2	NAFANA RURAL BANK	BANDA NKWANTA	07	Urban	1	1309	1309	360
030	1301100039	Savannah	13	1301	BOLE	1	NUOYIRI	NUOYIRI	01	Rural	2	864	864	199
031	1301100052	Savannah	13	1301	BOLE	2	R/C PRIMARY & JHS	SIMPUAYIRI	09	Rural	2	1269	1269	294
032	1301100071	Savannah	13	1301	BOLE	1	GBENFU	GBENFU	01	Rural	2	439	439	132
033	1301100108	Savannah	13	1301	BOLE	2	MOBAST CARPENTRY SHOP	BOLE	15	Urban	1	948	948	208
034	1301100121	Savannah	13	1301	BOLE	2	ASSEMBLIES OF GOD CHURCH	MANDARI	16	Rural	2	302	302	57
035	1301100148	Savannah	13	1301	BOLE	1	KAKIASE	KAKIASE	01	Rural	2	1341	1341	234
036	1302100036	Savannah	13	1302	SAWLA-TUNA-KALBA	2	PENTECOST CHURCH (CENTRAL ASSEMBLY)	SAWLA	04	Urban	1	396	396	105
037	1302100042	Savannah	13	1302	SAWLA-TUNA-KALBA	2	CHURCH OF PENTECOST	BLEMA	05	Rural	2	596	596	94
038	1302100077	Savannah	13	1302	SAWLA-TUNA-KALBA	1	TONTORIYIRI (BUGALI)	TONTORIYIRI (BUGALI)	01	Rural	2	427	427	70
039	1302100125	Savannah	13	1302	SAWLA-TUNA-KALBA	2	D/A PRIMARY	GUNSI	11	Rural	2	281	281	45
040	1302100152	Savannah	13	1302	SAWLA-TUNA-KALBA	2	PENTECOST CHURCH	URO	01	Rural	2	641	641	150

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041	1302100180	Savannah	13	1302	SAWLA-TUNA-KALBA	2	GBEGU CHIEF'S HOUSE	GBEGU	24	Rural	2	752	746	124
042	1302100207	Savannah	13	1302	SAWLA-TUNA-KALBA	2	MOSQUE	GOYIRI NO. 1	27	Rural	2	532	532	96
043	1403200031	North East	14	1403	EAST MAMPRUSI	1	NAKPAYARIGA	NANKPAYARIGA	01	Rural	2	691	691	92
044	1403200051	North East	14	1403	EAST MAMPRUSI	2	GOMENA KOLIGU'S HOUSE	GBINTIRI	05	Urban	1	1046	1046	170
045	1403200096	North East	14	1403	EAST MAMPRUSI	2	C.R.S CLINIC	BOWKU (BOKO)	20	Rural	2	578	578	61
046	1403200168	North East	14	1403	EAST MAMPRUSI	1	LANGBINA	LANGBINA	01	Rural	2	838	827	101
047	1403200207	North East	14	1403	EAST MAMPRUSI	2	MBA GANI'S HOUSE	NAGBOO	26	Urban	1	742	742	84
048	1403200250	North East	14	1403	EAST MAMPRUSI	2	VRA SUBSTATION	NALERIGU	34	Urban	1	480	480	78
049	1403200309	North East	14	1403	EAST MAMPRUSI	1	SOASOBIGI	SOASOBIGI	01	Rural	2	1401	1401	157
050	1405100009	North East	14	1405	YUNYOO NASUAN	1	KWALIK	KWALIK	01	Rural	2	630	630	103
051	1405100033	North East	14	1405	YUNYOO NASUAN	2	MARKET	GBINGBANE	04	Rural	2	410	410	69
052	1405100048	North East	14	1405	YUNYOO NASUAN	1	SAMBIK	SAMBIK1	01	Rural	2	388	388	52
053	1405100066	North East	14	1405	YUNYOO NASUAN	1	NAMONG NO.1	NAMONG NO.1	01	Rural	2	542	542	70
054	1405100092	North East	14	1405	YUNYOO NASUAN	2	MARKET SQUARE	WAWA	09	Rural	2	302	302	42
055	1405100108	North East	14	1405	YUNYOO NASUAN	1	BUNBONG NO.1	BUNBONG NO.1	01	Rural	2	533	533	70
056	1405100131	North East	14	1405	YUNYOO NASUAN	2	SHINNING STAR INT. SCHOOL	NASSUAN	17	Rural	2	284	284	45
057	1501100010	Upper East	15	1501	BUILSA SOUTH	1	YIWASI-GOLLUK	YIWASI-GOLLUK	01	Rural	2	729	729	156
058	1501100022	Upper East	15	1501	BUILSA SOUTH	2	BAASA BASIC SCHOOL	FUMBISI BAASA	02	Rural	2	281	281	55
059	1501100026	Upper East	15	1501	BUILSA SOUTH	2	FUMBISI MARKET	FUMBISI	06	Urban	1	272	268	66
060	1501100039	Upper East	15	1501	BUILSA SOUTH	1	KASISA YEMONA	KASISA YEMONA	01	Rural	2	469	469	93
061	1501100052	Upper East	15	1501	BUILSA SOUTH	2	AKAZARA'S YERI (ASSEMBLY MAN'S HOUSE)	KANJARGA NYANKPIENSA	09	Rural	2	381	381	90
062	1501100066	Upper East	15	1501	BUILSA SOUTH	1	GBEDEMA-DABOMSA	GBEDEMA-DABOMSA	01	Rural	2	631	631	130
063	1501100077	Upper East	15	1501	BUILSA SOUTH	2	LUISA/VUNDEMA BASIC SCHOOL	KANJARGA VUNDEMA	12	Rural	2	322	322	66
064	1502200021	Upper East	15	1502	BUILSA NORTH	2	THE METHODIST CHURCH	KADEMA GAADEM	03	Rural	2	737	737	169
065	1502200044	Upper East	15	1502	BUILSA NORTH	2	ST FRANCIS PARISH CHURCH	WIAGA	05	Rural	2	562	507	170
066	1502200076	Upper East	15	1502	BUILSA NORTH	1	BALANSA AKURIYERI	BALANSA AKURIYERI	01	Rural	2	355	355	71
067	1502200096	Upper East	15	1502	BUILSA NORTH	2	MTN MAST	SANDEMA	08	Urban	1	509	509	175
068	1502200103	Upper East	15	1502	BUILSA NORTH	2	NYANSA PRIMARY SCHOOL	SANDEMA NYANSA	07	Rural	2	340	340	89
069	1502200123	Upper East	15	1502	BUILSA NORTH	1	JAATA AYIREZABA YERI	JAATA AYIREZABA YERI	01	Rural	2	121	121	31
070	1502200147	Upper East	15	1502	BUILSA NORTH	2	PRESBY CHURCH	NAWAASA NJAANSA (NAWASA NO. 1)	15	Rural	2	316	316	79
071	1512200045	Upper East	15	1512	BAWKU MUNICIPAL	2	GOZESI: MAMUDU APAALE'S (CHIEF'S HOUSE)	GOZESI	11	Rural	2	532	532	102
072	1512200065	Upper East	15	1512	BAWKU MUNICIPAL	2	BAWKU MISSIGA: PUMA OIL	BAWKU MISSIGA	15	Urban	1	775	762	125
073	1512200088	Upper East	15	1512	BAWKU MUNICIPAL	2	BAWKU GINGANDE: WATERNIA ARABIC/ENGLISH PRIM/JHS	BAWKU GINGANDE	22	Urban	1	929	929	206
074	1512200126	Upper East	15	1512	BAWKU MUNICIPAL	2	BAWKU SOUTH NATINGA: APENG ABUBAKRI'S H/NO. E221	BAWKU SOUTH NATINGA	28	Urban	1	376	376	80
075	1512200160	Upper East	15	1512	BAWKU MUNICIPAL	2	BAWKU POSSOM: ALHAJI BUKARI'S H/NO.A319	BAWKU POSSOM	26	Urban	1	493	493	78
076	1512200196	Upper East	15	1512	BAWKU MUNICIPAL	2	BAWKU KUTANGA: AZARIA PRIMARY/JHS	BAWKU KUTANGA	36	Urban	1	779	779	173
077	1512200222	Upper East	15	1512	BAWKU MUNICIPAL	2	BADOR PRIMARY SCHOOL	BADOR	46	Rural	2	765	765	124
078	1513100004	Upper East	15	1513	GARU	2	PRESBY BASIC SCHOOL	SIISI	01	Rural	2	676	676	100
079	1513100022	Upper East	15	1513	GARU	2	DENUGU PRIMARY SCHOOL	DENUGU (DANVORGA)	05	Rural	2	914	911	147
080	1513100034	Upper East	15	1513	GARU	2	HEALTH CENTRE	SONGO	07	Rural	2	410	408	112

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081	1513100065	Upper East	15	1513	GARU	2	PRESBY CHURCH	ZAARI	01	Rural	2	349	349	68
082	1513100079	Upper East	15	1513	GARU	2	MARKET	KUGRI-NATINGA	01	Rural	2	359	359	78
083	1513100109	Upper East	15	1513	GARU	1	SALOGO	SALOGO	01	Rural	2	778	778	139
084	1513100119	Upper East	15	1513	GARU	2	COMMUNITY CENTRE	GARU	20	Urban	1	1107	1107	254
085	1514100008	Upper East	15	1514	TEMPANE	2	PRIMARY/JHS	KPIKPIRA (NATINGA)	01	Rural	2	501	501	102
086	1514100045	Upper East	15	1514	TEMPANE	1	KUGRAGO GBANDE	KUGRAGO GBANDE	01	Rural	2	1291	1244	270
087	1514100066	Upper East	15	1514	TEMPANE	2	GN BANK	WORİYANGA	05	Rural	2	541	541	121
088	1514100088	Upper East	15	1514	TEMPANE	1	GAGBIRI NATINGA	GAGBIRI NATINGA	01	Rural	2	526	526	89
089	1514100120	Upper East	15	1514	TEMPANE	2	NABA'S HOUSE	ZAMBALA NO.2	11	Rural	2	344	344	63
090	1514100138	Upper East	15	1514	TEMPANE	1	SUSUDI	SUSUDI	01	Rural	2	821	821	183
091	1514100142	Upper East	15	1514	TEMPANE	2	KOLAN MICHAEL'S HSE	BASYONDE (SABZUNDE)	17	Urban	1	808	808	123
092	1601100019	Upper West	16	1601	WA WEST	1	TAWONCHELE NO. 2 (BAGA)	TAWONCHELE NO. 2 (BAGA)	01	Rural	2	463	463	85
093	1601100045	Upper West	16	1601	WA WEST	2	ORTAA'S HOUSE	METEJU	11	Rural	2	521	521	93
094	1601100071	Upper West	16	1601	WA WEST	2	DA-EYIRI CHPS COMPOUND	DA-EYIRI (DA-ETENG)	06	Rural	2	325	325	80
095	1601100098	Upper West	16	1601	WA WEST	2	POLICE STATION	WECHIAU	23	Rural	2	541	541	150
096	1601100128	Upper West	16	1601	WA WEST	1	POLE	POLE	01	Rural	2	552	552	86
097	1601100156	Upper West	16	1601	WA WEST	2	D.A. PRIMARY AND JHS	DOMAWA	31	Rural	2	324	324	47
098	1601100182	Upper West	16	1601	WA WEST	1	NYAGLI	NYAGLI	01	Rural	2	625	625	120
099	1603200071	Upper West	16	1603	WA MUNICIPAL	2	ISLAMIC PRIMARY SCHOOL	KPONGU	11	Rural	2	356	356	51
100	1603200123	Upper West	16	1603	WA MUNICIPAL	2	WA: DAN-IBU INT SCHOOL	WA KAMBALI	21	Urban	1	732	732	210
101	1603200177	Upper West	16	1603	WA MUNICIPAL	2	MAHAMA ALHASSAN'S HSE NO. KT 58	WA KONTA	20	Urban	1	219	219	56
102	1603200223	Upper West	16	1603	WA MUNICIPAL	2	SIITA SAEED'S HSE	WA DONDOLI	34	Urban	1	381	381	86
103	1603200279	Upper West	16	1603	WA MUNICIPAL	2	ROYAL PURE WATER	WA KUMBIEHE	37	Urban	1	506	506	132
104	1603200323	Upper West	16	1603	WA MUNICIPAL	2	DR. SULEMAN MAHAMA'S HSE	WA MANGU	40	Urban	1	431	431	133
105	1603200361	Upper West	16	1603	WA MUNICIPAL	2	MOMBU III'S PALACE	SAGU	47	Rural	2	655	655	119
106	1606200008	Upper West	16	1606	SISSALA EAST	1	GBENEBSI	GBENEBSI	01	Rural	2	677	677	142
107	1606200034	Upper West	16	1606	SISSALA EAST	2	FORMER DAYCARE CENTER	KUROBOI	08	Rural	2	476	476	164
108	1606200055	Upper West	16	1606	SISSALA EAST	1	BANDEI	BANDEI	01	Rural	2	584	584	138
109	1606200077	Upper West	16	1606	SISSALA EAST	2	OLD MOSQUE	KONG	27	Rural	2	382	382	96
110	1606200086	Upper West	16	1606	SISSALA EAST	2	TUMU SENIOR HIGH TECHNICAL SCHOOL	TUMU	28	Urban	1	1883	979	297
111	1606200098	Upper West	16	1606	SISSALA EAST	2	TUMU HOME STORE	TUMU	28	Urban	1	227	227	78
112	1606200125	Upper West	16	1606	SISSALA EAST	2	CENTRAL MOSQUE	NABUGUBELLE	21	Rural	2	953	953	187



## Sample design – Ghana

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### A note on the sampling design

The sample design for the assessment titled “Conducting a Comprehensive Study on the Vulnerabilities to Violent Extremism Nexus in Northern Ghana”, is based on the *Sampling Note* published by the World Bank.<sup>1</sup> It follows a two-stages random selection. The first random selection is at sub-region level, while the second one is at individual level.

The population by region and each district is provided as shown in the table below. Five regions together have a population of 5,825,879, according to the most recent Census done in Ghana.<sup>2</sup>

The first step was to randomly select a number of districts within each of the five regions. There are 55 districts in five selected regions. It was decided to select randomly four districts in Northern, four districts in Upper East, three districts in Upper West, and two districts in Savannah and North East. All in all, 16 districts were selected, which represents 30% of all districts in these regions. To ensure randomization, the RAND function in Microsoft Excel was used. So, to each district was assigned a random number. Then, within each region were selected those regions with the highest random number.

The second step was to calculate the sample size based on the population size of the districts. The minimum sample size per each district is calculated using this formula:

$$n = \left[ \frac{1}{N} + \frac{N-1}{N} \frac{1}{PQ} \left( \frac{k}{z_{1-\alpha/2}} \right)^2 \right]^{-1}$$

where,

n = sample size

N = population size

P = population proportion, assumed 50%

Q = 1 - P

$z_{1-\alpha/2}$  = confidence level, 1.645 (90% confidence level)

k = level of precision, 9.5% = desired level of precision

Since the budget is limited, the sample size is constrained by that. It was decided to collect 1,200 respondents. This number is allocated to the selected districts satisfying the requirements of the above formula.

<sup>1</sup>For more details, please refer to **Survey Methodology** webpage of the World Bank:

[https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/content/dam/enterprisesurveys/documents/methodology/Sampling\\_Note-Consolidated-2-16-22.pdf](https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/content/dam/enterprisesurveys/documents/methodology/Sampling_Note-Consolidated-2-16-22.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Refer to Ghana 2021 Population and Housing Census, General report, Volume 3A – Population of Regions and Districts.

Vulnerability Assessment On The Threats Of Violent Extremism And  
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**Sample frame and sample size**

Region	Sub-region/district	Population size	Sample size	Rand
Northern 2,310,939 40% 375 25%	Kpandai	126,213		0.123
	Nanumba South	106,374		0.534
	Nanumba North Municipal	188,680		0.681
	Zabzugu	82,846		0.145
	Tatale	74,805		0.402
	Saboba	95,683		0.14
	Yendi Municipal	154,421	75	0.728
	Mion	94,930		0.678
	Nanton	50,767		0.051
	Tamale Metropolitan	374,744	75	0.744
	Savelugu Municipal	122,888		0.688
	Sagnarigu Municipal	341,711	75	0.831
	Tolon	118,101	75	0.718
	KumbunguKumbungu	110,586		0.175
	Gushegu Municipality	153,965		0.135
Upper East 1,301,226 22% 300 31%	Karaga	114,225	75	0.829
	Builsa South	36,575		0.628
	Builsa North Municipal	56,571	75	0.796
	Kassena Nankana East Municipality	99,895		0.482
	Kassena Nankana West	90,735		0.226
	Bolgatanga Municipal	139,864		0.44
	Talensi	87,021		0.594
	Bolgatanga East	38,824		0.109
	Bongo	120,254		0.208
	Nabdram	51,861		0.054
	Bawku West	144,189		0.366
	Bawku Municipal	119,458	75	0.72
	Binduri	76,679		0.462
	Garu	71,774	75	0.975
	Tempne	86,993	75	0.919
Upper West 901,502 15% 225 19%	Pusiga	80,533		0.613
	Wa West	96,957	75	0.799
	Wa East	91,457		0.18
	Wa Municipal	200,672	75	0.896
	Nadowli-Kaleo	77,057		0.28
	Daffiama Bussie	38,754		0.482
	Sissala East	80,619	75	0.861
	Sissala West	63,828		0.246
	Jirapa	91,279		0.316
	Lawra	58,433		0.138
Savanah 653,266 11% 150 13%	Lambussie-Karni	51,118		0.743
	Nandom	51,328		0.229
	Bole	115,800	75	0.957
	Sawla-Tuna-Kalba	112,664	75	0.455
	North Gonja	61,432		0.447
	West Gonja	63,449		0.309
	Central Gonja	142,762		0.063
North East 658,946 11%	East Gonja	117,755		0.025
	North East Gonja	39,404		0.289
	Mamprugu Moagduri	68,746		0.009
	West Mamprusi Municipality	175,755		0.718
	East Mamprusi Municipal	188,006	75	0.83
Bunkpurugu Nyankpanduri	82,384		0.538	



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150 Yunyoo-Nasuan	56,879	75	0.871
12% Chereponi	87,176		0.643
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,825,879</b>	<b>1,200</b>	

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SURGE Data Hub is an initiative of the Crisis Bureau to provide governments with human-centered data for evidence-based decision-making in crisis response and recovery.

## ANNEX 2

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