DEVELOPMENT AS A PATHWAY FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

REGIONAL BUREAU FOR ARAB STATES FRAMEWORK

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1. SUMMARY

The Arab States countries comprise a dynamic and developing region, undergoing significant social, political, and economic changes. These changes provide an opportunity to progress human development for the good of all, leading to more legitimate governance, more effective services, wider implementation of human rights, and more open and equitable economies. They also come with risks of future violent conflicts, as change processes entail a clash of interests and values, or as reforms are insufficient to meet the social pressures created by climate change and shifting demographics.

The Arab states region has also seen substantial human suffering due to war, civil conflict, and their resulting wide-ranging humanitarian crises. Experiences of instability in some Arab States have not only negatively impacted people’s living standards and human security, but in some cases have also reversed overall development gains. Instability does not end at a nation’s borders, but rather reduces resilience to conflict across the region. It is telling that, while the region makes up only 5 percent of the global population, it hosts 30 percent of the world’s internally displaced persons, and 43 percent of its refugees.

Those supporting development in the Arab States Region are hence faced by three key fundamental questions. How can we support the change processes so essential for human development, while also avoiding new violent conflict? How can we maintain development gains during violent conflict, help early recovery from them, and reduce the likelihood of returns to violence? And, how can we work consistently to prevent violence across the diversity of economic, political, and social situations in Arab States?

This Framework, Development as a Pathway for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, provides some answers to these questions, outlining how UNDP is supporting conflict prevention and recovery using its development toolkit and unique positioning in the Arab States Region.

The Framework

- The Framework takes a development approach to conflict prevention that is distinct from (but complementary to) political efforts to mediate social crisis. It focuses on the long-term investments in people, society, and institutions required for forging peaceful societies that are resilient to violent conflict.
- It is adaptable to the level of stability and conflict experienced across the region, focusing UNDP on the actions most relevant for preventing conflict in various Arab States:
  - In more stable Arab States free from violent conflict, the Framework focuses on supporting economic, social, and political transformations so that they do not lead to violent conflict.
  - In Arab States suffering from protracted violent conflict, the Framework focuses on protecting development gains, and on preparing for early recovery.
  - In Arab States that have histories of violence, or where there has been a political settlement to end violence, the Framework focuses on enabling long-term war-to-peace transitions, and on the actions most likely to prevent a return to violence.
- The Framework supports UNDP’s global push to prevent conflict and crises. Not least, it provides a mechanism for delivering the Global Crisis Offer on Conflict Prevention across the Arab States Region.

The actions

Development as a Pathway for Conflict Prevention and Recovery is a comprehensive Framework to guide UNDP’s efforts across the Arab State Region. It consolidates UNDP’s existing toolkit, provides additional resources to UNDP’s country teams and UNDP’s partners,
and catalyzes cross-border capacities and actions to prevent violent conflict. Its main actions are as follows:

- **The Framework strengthens the technical capacity of UNDP and its partners** to plan for coordinated conflict prevention actions at a country level. It does this by providing a:
  - **National Conflict Prevention Planning Resource**, for assessing a country’s conflict prevention context and planning for conflict prevention actions.
  - **Standing Surge Capacity on Conflict Prevention**, available to UNDP Country Offices and UNDP’s partners, and drawing on region-specific expertise in conflict prevention.
  - **Double and Triple Nexus Advisory Resource**, which can be mobilized in support of United Nation Country Teams (UNCT), their partners and UN Resident Coordinator Offices (RCOs).
  - **Participatory Impact Assessment Tool** for conflict prevention, which can be deployed to assess existing programming, and as an evidence base for new projects.

- **The Framework will catalyze regional infrastructures for peace** by contributing to regional capacities, and by supporting cross-border collaborations to prevent violent conflict. It does this by:
  - Developing an **Arab States Conflict Prevention Network** comprising a set of physical platforms hosted by Arab States and online spaces.
  - Maintaining a **Network of Insider Mediators** skilled in facilitating the political, social, and economic transformations that are essential for development and conflict prevention.
  - Providing **Regional Development and Prevention Forecasts**, developed collaboratively with Arab States, and focused on Governance and Society, Climate and Environmental Security, and Economy and Aid.
  - Maintaining a **Cross-Border Programme Resource**, to support planning for conflict prevention actions across Arab States.

- **The Framework will enhance the knowledge base and understanding of conflict prevention** in the region, to strengthen the region’s peace efforts and sense-making on conflict prevention. It does this by:
  - Consolidating regional expertise into four **Communities of Practice**, which provide spaces and opportunities for joint lessons learning and actions.
  - Developing **Public Peace Education** resources, for use by the Communities of Practice, to help engender social and political support for conflict prevention.
  - Maintaining an **Arab States Conflict Prevention Archive** comprised of a context-specific case studies and regional learning papers.
  - Consolidating available UNDP analysis into a **Conflict Prevention Analysis and Crisis Risk Dashboard**, with its findings captured in country-specific fact sheets, regional analysis, and standard analysis of political economies.
Inclusive conflict prevention and peacebuilding solutions across the Arab States region

Goal

1. Strengthen technical capacity of UNDP and partners
2. Catalyze regional infrastructures for peace
3. Enhance knowledge base & understanding in region

Role of gender, youth and PWD

Individual level
- Cultures of peace & individual skills in conflict prevention

Societal level
- Capacities for participatory dialogue & problem solving

Institutional level
- Capacity of state to meet needs & be accountable

Levels of prevention (Section 2.2)

Vulnerabilities (Section 3)

Interactive
- Resource dependency
- Shared cultural & media spaces
- Regional lending and aid
- SALW proliferation
- Refugee & displaced people
- Economic migration

Principal
- 1. Political transformations
- 2. Economic transformations
- 3. Social transformations

Catalytic
- 1. Weak governance capacity & accountability
- 2. Limited statehood & non-government-controlled areas
- 3. Non-state armed actors’ proliferation
- 4. Coercive shadow economies
- 5. Climate related security risks
- 6. National & regional arms procurement

Strategic objectives (Section 4.1)

1. Prevent violent conflict between social & political groups by contextualizing & leveraging existing institutions and resource flows.
2. Prevent development gaps during frictional periods.
3. Support long-term war-to-peace transitions and reduce the likelihood of returns to violence.

Figure 1
Overview of Framework
2. BACKGROUND TO FRAMEWORK

2.1. UNDP’s Approach to Conflict Prevention

The Framework is designed to support inclusive conflict prevention and peacebuilding solutions across the Arab States region through three approaches. Firstly, it looks to strengthen RBAS’s technical support to the UNDP Country Offices (CO) on conflict prevention, and through them to the UN Country Teams (UNCT), so that UNDP is better placed to serve the differing conflict prevention and recovery needs of countries in the region. The Framework also identifies how UNDP can catalyse regional infrastructures for conflict prevention and recovery. Finally, the Framework identifies actions to enhance the knowledge base and understanding in the region necessary for effective action to prevent conflict and assist recovery.

The Framework recognizes the important role of women, young people, and persons with disabilities for conflict prevention and recovery. Hence, gender responsiveness, youth empowerment, and the inclusion and accessibility of persons with disabilities is integrated across these three pillars (see section 2.2). The Framework also recognizes that UNDP cannot make progress with conflict prevention and recovery on its own. Thus, the Framework emphasizes the importance of building partnerships and working in a complementary manner to other UN agencies, including the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and non-UN multilateral organizations.

The Framework contextualizes the outcomes of the inaugural Prevention in Action – Global Forum (3-4 March 2021), the resultant Global Offer on Conflict Prevention, and UNDP’s Crisis Offer: A framework for development solutions to crisis and fragility, to the needs, vulnerabilities, and resources in the Arab States region. In particular, the Framework’s three approaches align with the three components of the Global Offer on Conflict Prevention’s Output 3 to develop regional capacities for conflict prevention, dialogue, and infrastructures for peace, and with the Crisis Offer’s three development solutions and programmatic approaches:

1. For example, UNDP is working with ESCWA and IOM on attaining SDGs in a conflict affected countries.
‘Anticipation and Prevention’, ‘Response and Recovery’, and ‘Fragile and Protracted Contexts’. The Framework is further aligned with UNDP’s Strategic Plan 2022-2025, which emphasizes the importance of resilience, both as one of six UNDP ‘Signature Solutions’ that are critical to achieving the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals, and as a critical ‘Direction of Change’ along with structural transformations and leaving no-one behind. The Framework also aligns with the Strategic Plan’s three ‘Enablers’ of digitalization, strategic innovation, and development financing, by building the capacity of UNDP’s COs to scale-up development impact. Finally, the framework takes into account recent normative frameworks and UN-led studies, including the 2015 review of UN Peacebuilding Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture, the UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262 (2016) and Security Council Resolution 2288 (2016), the ‘Sustaining Peace Resolutions’, the joint UN / World Bank 2018 study Pathways for Peace, the UN Secretary General’s 2018, 2019, 2020 reports on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, as well as the 2020 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture.

The Framework was developed in a consultative process with three critical constituencies. UNDP COs were consulted on their conflict prevention programs and capacity needs. Key regional donors and partners were consulted on how the Framework aligns with their existing work. Consultations were held with potential ‘champion’ Arab States, on the basis of interest from both the UNDP CO and their national partners to play a leading role on conflict prevention in the region.

2.2. The Development Approach to Conflict Prevention

‘Conflict Prevention’ is a broad concept that has been theorized and applied in a range of manners, including resolving a particular conflict (by addressing root causes and structural conflict drivers), transforming how societies manage conflict differences, forecasting and preventing specific bouts of violence, enhancing the resilience of societies to external shocks that promote inter-group and political violence, and reducing the vulnerability of individuals to radicalization, and hence reducing individual acts of violence.

The Framework takes a development approach to conflict prevention. It focuses on preventing violent conflict, rather than suppressing the normal social and political conflict that occur in every country and can surface during transformation processes. This approach is holistic in that it looks to prevent violence at the individual level by building cultures of peace and individual conflict management skills, at the societal level by building capacities for participatory dialogue and problem solving, and at the institutional or structural level by strengthening the capacities of state institutions to meet the needs of all social and political groups, and to be accountable to them. The development approach to conflict prevention in this Framework is realistic, in that it acknowledges the long-term nature of the individual, societal, and institutional change that are required to prevent violence.

The Framework’s development approach to conflict prevention runs in parallel to political actions to build peace and prevent conflict. The two approaches – political and development – should fill each other’s gaps and be mutually supportive. However, developmental conflict prevention still requires country and context-specific political theories of change, and the development tools most appropriate for preventing conflict will depend on the specific context of each Arab State. UNDP COs play the central role, together with UNDP RBAS and national
partners, in assessing the national context, and identifying and deploying the development tools most relevant for preventing violence in it.

**Women, youth, and persons with disabilities**

This development approach looks at the role of *gender and gender dynamics* in creating (or preventing) cycles of violence at the individual, social, and institutional levels. As such, the Framework meets UNDP’s commitment to gender-responsiveness, meaning that the framework will design approaches that examine and actively address gender norms, roles, and inequalities, and to systematically meet commitments to the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, and to advance gender equality and women’s empowerment in crisis contexts.

![Figure 3: Levels of prevention](image)

The development approach also looks at the role of *youth and youth empowerment*, and how changes in demographics and values can influence the potential for peace or violent conflict. This approach is in line with UNDP’s commitment to the global Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) agenda, and is of particular importance in the Arab States area given its growing young population, and generational disparities in access to economic and political opportunities.

The development approach further looks to contribute to mainstreaming the inclusion and accessibility of persons with disabilities in relation to the prevention of violent conflict, so that persons with disabilities can play an active and meaningful role in society. Empowering persons with disabilities is essential given the Arab States protracted conflicts, and its relatively high number of persons with disabilities by global standards. Empowering persons with disabilities does not mean seeing them as a vulnerable group, but rather maximizing their potential as agents for change.

**Principles**

In addition, to gender responsiveness, youth engagement, and the inclusion and accessibility of persons with disabilities, the Framework is designed to adhere to the following principles.

- **Conflict Sensitivity.** The Framework will systematically ensure that the design and implementation of programs do not exacerbate conflict dynamics, by using a conflict-sensitivity lens.
- **Context-specific.** The Framework’s programs will be tailored to the risks, capacities, drivers, and dynamics of each individual context, including its political economy.
- **Development Effectiveness.** The Framework is aligned with the range of commitments to enhance the quality, impact and effectiveness of international development
cooperation as outlined in the *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation*.

- **Quality Standards for Programming.** All programmes under this Framework will apply UNDP’s quality standards for programming, adapted to crisis and fragile contexts where necessary. The principles are: strategic, relevant, principled, management and monitoring, efficient, effective, sustainability and national ownership.

- **Risk-Informed.** UNDP will implement the Framework based on levels of risk rather than income levels.

- **Agenda 2030 Universal Values.** The Framework adheres to the universal values as enshrined in Agenda 2030: adopting a human rights-based approach, leave no one behind (LNOB) and gender equality and women empowerment; alignment with international norms and standards, equality, and non-discrimination; active and meaningful participation; and robust accountability mechanisms.
3. ARAB STATES CONFLICT PREVENTION CONTEXT

The Framework takes a development approach to conflict prevention and early recovery (section 1.2) and is focused on preventing violent conflict at the individual, social, and institutional/structural levels (figure 2). What this means in practice in the Arab States region was explored through an analysis of key vulnerabilities to violence, and capacities to resist violence, in a regional conflict prevention context analysis commissioned separately by UNDP RBAS. This analysis provides the basis for the Framework’s strategic objectives (section 3.1) and for effective application of its tools (section 3.2).

3.1. Vulnerabilities to violence

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13 *Reaching a Critical Will for Conflict Prevention in the Arab States*, Ola Saleh (October 2022). The regional conflict prevention analysis was based on a literature review, sets of remote interviews and collective online workshops. It has been adapted to meet the needs of this Framework.
The Arab States region is a closely interlinked system of inter-dependencies, meaning that changes in one country context have an impact on vulnerabilities to violence and capacities to resist violence in other Arab States. The analysis looked at the shared vulnerabilities across the Arab States, and how the context in one area influences that in another. The analysis identified the following principal catalytic, and interactive vulnerabilities (drawn from the ‘Key Driving Factors’ in the commissioned analysis).

**Principal vulnerabilities**

The Arab States are all undergoing three sets of long-term transformations – political, economic, and social. These transformations are essential for preventing future violence, by ensuring states are best able to manage the aspirations of social and political groups, but also risk violence as they can run contrary to existing interests.

1. **Social contract ‘stability’ vs ‘legitimacy’ transformations (political transformations).** Arab States are going through transformations in their social contracts, balancing citizens’ requirements for their broad human security needs to be met (stability), with the desire to have a greater role in decision-making, and for governments to be more representative and accountable (legitimacy). These political transformations may be overt and managed, or iterative and unmanaged. Political transformations are in part inspired by a lack of trust in authorities to deliver against all social and political groups’ needs equally. This is especially the case in diverse societies with histories of ethnic or sect-based violence. A focus on stability can be especially detrimental to the participation of youth and women, leading to an increased sense of disenfranchisement among both. Political transformations towards legitimacy are generally accompanied by attempts from a wider range of civilian and political leaders to participate in governance, and a greater emphasis on protecting human rights, and establishing a strong rule of law system. Political transformations are also driven by levels of press and media freedoms. Changes in the social contract can also be driven by environmental changes, dependent on the ability of state institutions to manage such changes. However, in some contexts (especially those experiencing protracted violence) there can be an equally strong desire to return to the greater stability of less legitimate governance arrangements. This reverse pressure can lead to suppression of some political and identity groups, reduction in participation and democratic processes, and suppression of free press and media. This reverse pressure towards stability is driven by a lack of trust in the effectiveness of new institutions and processes, and in some cases greater levels of physical insecurity as pre-existing security and justice mechanisms (including traditional mechanisms) have broken down. Reverse pressure can also be driven by elites’ fears of wider representation and loss of authority.

2. **Economic ‘open opportunity’ vs ‘rentierism/patronage network’ transformations (economic transformations).** Most Arab States are going through long-term economic transformations that balance demands for merit-based approaches to distribution of resources (open opportunity), against existing frameworks that emphasize identity, kinship, and collective protection (rentierism/patronage networks). Arab States citizens’ ability to access jobs and incomes has tended to depend on holding vertical relationships with governing elites, reinforcing the status and the role of such elites and of ethnic and sect association. Rentierism/patronage networks tend to reduce the economic opportunities available to women and young people, who may feel that they do not have a future in their society, and also entrenches poverty among lower economic classes. When combined with limited statehood, rentierism and patronage networks can be informal, localized and delivered through armed non-state actors. Rentierism/patronage networks can lead to: 1) poor economic management, which in turn reduces the overall wealth available for distribution, especially for natural resources; 2) a weakening of the middle class required to drive growth; 3) an unstable business environment, which also makes states unattractive for Foreign Direct Investment; and 4) endemic corruption. Economic transformations are in part driven by the failure of rentierism/patronage networks to provide jobs and opportunities for all, and especially for growing youth demographics. Climate-induced environmental change can create pressure for economic transformation, as available natural resources (e.g., ground water) reduce,
undermining local economies that many rely on. However, there can be equally substantive pressures to protect rentierism/patronage networks as proven mechanisms for providing livelihoods, especially if a country has not undertaken a robust political transformation. Economic transformations can create fear among some political and social groups that they are losing access to limited economic opportunities.

3. **Value ‘traditional’ vs. ‘global’ transformations (social transformations).** In parallel to political and economic transformations, Arab States are also negotiating a balance between existing social values that can emphasize group affiliation, religious and scripture-based norms, and proven informal mechanisms for managing social relations (traditional), and more universal values that emphasize the role of the individual, human rights norms, and rule of law mechanisms (global). Global transformations are in part inspired by a desire to maximise the development potential of society, enhance the rights and participation of women, empower young people, and improve the situation for persons with disabilities. They are mostly driven by younger demographics (in turn because of experiences of political and economic isolation) and by the increasing use of new technologies and social media. However, there can be an equally strong desire to protect traditional values, for moral and ethical reasons, or because global values are believed to be disruptive and ineffective given the present nature of a society. This reverse pressure towards traditional values can also be driven by (perceived) failed experiments with political and economic transformations in their own country or in the wider region. Social transformations can create fear among some political and social groups that they are losing influence and can catalyse zero-sum competitions to control values.

**Catalytic vulnerabilities**

The three principal vulnerabilities are exacerbated by a further set of six catalytic vulnerabilities.

1. **Weak governance capacity and accountability.** General government capacity to meet citizens’ needs is relatively limited across the region, with some states (especially those experiencing protracted conflict) manifesting anaemic capacity. Weak governance can be reinforced in a negative loop by limited accountability mechanisms, and limited space for press and media. Limited capacity can fuel social and political tensions, as groups compete to control existing services and opportunities, or believe that they are being actively discriminated against. Weak governance also perpetuates an uncertain business environment, limiting national revenue sources in resource-scare contexts.

2. **Limited statehood and non-government-controlled areas.** Some Arab States are marked by the limited ability of state authorities to project influence across the entirety of the country’s territory, or the existence of non-state actors that contest the authority and competencies of state institutions. It can be the case that some parts of the state are entirely outside government control with duplicated state functions. Limitations on statehood pose significant challenges to the negotiation of political, economic, and social transformations, as there can be limited appetite for them, or because they will only impact areas under government control.

3. **‘Non-State armed actors’ proliferation.** Some Arab States have also seen a proliferation of non-state armed actors, which can have a range of purposes, from self-protection and filling the gap left by weak government agencies to the capture of economic resources for personal enrichment, to the promotion of ideologies and politically challenging state authorities. The existence of non-state armed actors further complicates the political transformations, as non-state actors need to be accommodated, and economic transformations, if armed actors take over parts of the economy.

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14 Non-State Armed Actors can be defined as ‘operating primarily within state borders engaged in violent attempts to challenge or reform the balance and structure of political and economic power, to avenge past injustices and/or to defend or control resources, territory or institutions for the benefit of a particular ethnic or social group’. Ricigliano, Robert (ed.) (2005) ‘Introduction: Engaging Armed Groups in Peace Processes’. In Choosing to Engage: Armed Groups and Peace Processes, Accord Issue 16, Conciliation Resources. [Weblink](#).
4. **Coercive shadow economies.** Limited statehood, or elite capture of economic resources in stable states, can strengthen coercive shadow economies. This means that social and political groups rely more strongly on illicit economies for their survival, with these economies dominated by non-state actors, whose social and political authority is consequently increased. There is a gendered aspect to the coercive shadow economy which depends not only on operating outside the legal normative frameworks, but also on exploiting cheap labour, often provided by women who are either left as heads of households or have less negotiation power.

5. **Climate-related security risks.** The region overall is experiencing high levels of climate change-induced environmental degradation and biodiversity loss. Climate change increases the risk of resource unpredictability and scarcity, public pressure on authorities, reduced livelihoods, and migration. This in turn creates a conducive environment for limited sovereignty due to intensified tensions over revenue sources and service delivery. Environmental degradation and an increased awareness of climate related risks can also drive rentierism in relation to food and water security, and competition between states over access to natural resources with destabilizing impacts on water and agro-rich countries.

6. **National and regional arms procurement.** The region is the largest arms importer globally (over 30 percent of the global arms imports). Significant regional arms procurement perpetuates a political mindset of defence/defence resulting in security clientelism and a narrow understanding of security, focused on protecting the state rather than human security needs. These dynamics trickle down to the community and individual sense of insecurity.

**Interactive vulnerabilities**

Finally, some vulnerabilities occur because of the way that states’ policies and needs interact with each other.

1. **Resource interdependency.** The region is experiencing significant climate change impacts, which reduce the overall availability of water, with a down-stream impact on agriculture and food prices. Water and other resources are shared across boundaries, requiring cooperation for their effective management. In addition, high-income states (mostly Gulf Cooperation Council) have higher purchasing power of available resources, which can be at the expense of residents of middle- and low-income countries, which are also more likely to experience violent conflict and state fragmentation.

2. **Shared cultural and media space.** The Arab States region is, to a degree, a shared cultural and media space, in which the experiences of one country impact the attitudes and actions of citizens in other states. Failed moves, political and social transformations reduce the willingness of other societies to engage in similar processes (e.g., the fear of ‘becoming Iraq’).

3. **Regional lending and aid.** The Arab States region sees a high level of internal lending, from high income Arab states (which are also the most well-armed) to middle and low-income Arab states. High income Arab States have also become prominent financiers of aid into low-income countries, complementing traditional donors. This financing is reinforced by the creation of regional Arab humanitarian and development agencies, with growing experience and capacity. Lending and aid, if not managed in accordance with the highest ethical and fiduciary standards, can become levers to promote the geopolitical interests of more powerful states, with a negative impact on the potential for political, economic, and social transformation of client states.

4. **Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition proliferation.** The range of protracted conflicts in the region create a conducive environment for illicit small arms and ammunition trade and proliferation across porous borders, especially those suffering areas of limited statehood. The accessibility of small arms and related ammunition facilitates violent
actions by non-state armed groups, emerging in a context of limited statehood, armed conflict, and rentierism/patronage networks.

5. Refugee and Internally displaced populations. The region which accounts for around 5 percent of the world’s population, hosts 30 percent of the world’s internally displaced and 43 percent of its refugee populations.\textsuperscript{15} Host municipalities are under heightened pressure to receive, integrate, and expand their already challenged service delivery bandwidth to respond to climate and conflict related displacement from neighbouring countries. Refugees and internally displaced populations can influence the stresses of political, economic, and social transformations.

6. Economic migration/Labour mobility. In parallel to refugee and internally displaced populations, the region is home to substantial flows of migrant workers, mostly from low and middle-income states to high-income states. These migrants are drivers of growth in their host communities, and their remittance payments are an essential source of currency and livelihoods for their families at home, especially when they are from states suffering protracted conflicts. However, migrant workers can increase political, economic, and social tensions in their host community, and their presence shapes how transformations occur. In addition, remittance channels can have significant impacts on the political economy of the recipient state, given the common use of Hawala exchanges, rather than the formal banking sector. Further, while provide an important source of income for many vulnerable families, Hawala networks can benefit local conflict parties, and be used to finance violence.

3.2. Regional Conflict Prevention Capacities

The regional conflict prevention analysis identified some significant regional capacities for conflict prevention, as well as some capacity limiters.

Capacities

- **Non-violent resistance and protest movements.** The Arab States region has a rich and vibrant experience of both non-violent resistance and wider public protest movements to progress beneficial transformations. Furthermore, through these experiences, a ‘barrier of fear’ has been broken over public protest, opening new avenues for addressing the root causes of conflict, and providing for building of trust and social cohesion. This experience can be tapped into with lessons learned communicated widely.

- **Regional media capacities.** The region’s media is going through a transformation, with increasing capacities in conflict sensitive reporting among traditional media, as well as growing use of social media as a source of news. Social media has proved a powerful tool for challenging status quo politics, social contracts, and economies, and has been used to counter hate speech (although it’s use can also drive hate).

- **Social accountability practices.** Linked to non-violent resistance and protest movements, are sets of organised civic actions by activist groups to increase social accountability over local, regional, and national government (e.g., I Watch Tunisia\textsuperscript{16}). Social accountability practices have had a growing focus on gender equality, and countering sexism and racism.

- **Women and youth-led social movements.** At the heart of protest and social accountability movements are growing networks of women and youth activists that have become more experienced and professional. Making adequate resources available and enhancing the knowledge production capacities of those actors will not

\textsuperscript{15} Situation Report on International Migration 2021Building forward better for migrants and refugees in the Arab region, ESCWA et al, (2022). \textcolor{blue}{Weblink}

\textsuperscript{16} ‘I watch Tunisia’ website \textcolor{blue}{weblink}.
only enrich an analysis poor environment but also create the space for new notions to emerge.

- **Endogenous mediation practices.** Meditation is not new to the region, with established practices in labour rights, land rights, family disputes and debt collection. These practices are indicative of communities’ capacities to resolve conflicts non-violently, and communities tend to resort to these practices as they are faster than formal processes. Tribal and traditional modes of mediation and conflict resolution are also widespread.

- **Globally informed conflict prevention expertise.** Since the 2011 uprisings and the protracted conflicts that followed them, the region has seen a rapid acceleration of conflict prevention initiatives, that go beyond endogenous experience and draw on international experience and practice. These initiatives have skillled up individuals and organisations in the Arab States to play a role in preventing conflict.

- **Community-based humanitarian mediation (often women led).** While a less documented area, examples from Syria, Libya, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia indicate occasions where community leaders, and especially women, mediated access for civilian-organised humanitarian assistance or prisoners’ exchanges. Women appear to play a particularly strong role in humanitarian mediation given perceptions of their role in society. Women’s mediation style can also differ stylistically from formal masculine norms, providing an additional opportunity to build peace locally.  

- **Shifting mindset and behaviours.** The region is seeing a change in mindset and behaviours, either organically generated from below (e.g., via new technologies), or through state led reform processes (e.g., the 2030 agenda in Saudi Arabia).

- **Accelerated use of new technologies.** The Arab States region has seen an explosion of use of new technologies, especially among generations. This has included mobile banking (e.g., in Somalia) and a transition to social media as the main source of information across the region. While the use of new technologies provides risks (e.g., hate speech and misinformation), it can also be harnessed for the purposes of conflict prevention. The COVID-19 period demonstrated the potential for such use in a number of contexts.

- **Organic socio-economic resilience mechanism.** The region has seen powerful examples of patterns of behaviour at the individual, household, and community level that builds resilience and enables citizens to recover from shocks. For example, rotating credit is one of the most prevalent forms of socio-economic resilience in the region, which can be found in neighbourhood-based rotating credit associations, Zakat associations, urban migrant associations, and kinship based rotating credit.

- **Transboundary natural resource management and clean energy cooperation.** The region has seen some significant cooperation on natural resource management (especially for water) and clean energy. For example, the ‘Blue Peace Middle East’ initiative brings together a range of states to manage water from the Tigris River basin. Similarly, the North African aquifer system is a sustainable model of regional cooperation between Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia.

**Capacity limiters**

- **Limited regional infrastructures.** While there are good examples of regional cooperation on natural resource management, there are few regional institutions/structures that can act as a vehicle for collective action on the other vulnerabilities identified.

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18 Blue Peace Middle East website [Weblink](#).
- **Limited political will, and policies and legislation.** Most countries have significant gaps in policies and legislation for conflict prevention. This is especially evident for managing environmental degradation, and for taking an inclusive approach to prevention beyond securitized initiatives focusing on PVE. Limited policies and legislation can be caused by limited political will to tackle conflict prevention issues head on.

- **Weak justice mechanisms and limited transitional justice.** Successful management of vulnerabilities for violence during political, social, and economic transition requires strengthening of justice mechanisms. However, the region is afflicted by relatively weak justice mechanisms, marked by poor protections for human rights. In addition, the region has seen only limited attempts to implement transitional justice processes, as part of wider initiatives to deal with the past.

- **Challenged civil space.** The space for civil engagement is variable across the Arab State region, reducing from a relative high point during the 2011 uprisings. Limitations on the civil space can stem from a prioritization of stability over legitimacy. Such limitations restrict the voice of a range of actors and can create pressure for violent change.

- **Externally driven agenda.** Conflict prevention can be mostly considered an externally driven agenda, with funding and technical expertise provided from outside the Arab States region. There is a need to insert greater national and regional buy-in and leadership on conflict prevention.

- **Conflation of the peace movement with the Palestinian question.** Moves to prevent conflict are potentially undermined at a social level with a tendency to conflate the broader peace movement with normalization of Israel’s policies towards Palestinian communities, and the failure to find a sustainable resolution of the Palestinian question.
4. **UNDP’S ROLE IN PREVENTING CONFLICT IN THE ARAB STATES REGION**

4.1. **Strategic Objectives**

As noted in *UNDP’s Crisis Offer*, UNDP’s approach is to ‘helps ensure that vulnerable and fragile communities are strengthened before, during and after crises, to contribute to more peaceful, resilient and sustainable societies’. The regional conflict prevention context analysis (section 2) was used to identify strategic objectives for the Framework to support conflict prevention at individual, societal, and institutional levels in the Arab States region.

These strategic objectives align with the three sets of development solutions and programmatic approaches in *UNDP’s Crisis Offer*.

1. Prevent violent conflict, between social and political groups, over control of institutions and resources. This objective aligns with *UNDP’s Crisis Offer* solution (ii), ‘Get ahead of the curve: anticipate and prevent crises’.

2. Protect development gains during periods of violent conflict and increase the potential for early recovery. This objective aligns with *UNDP’s Crisis Offer* solution (iii), ‘Invest in hope – from jobs to justice: sustain development during crisis’.

3. Support long-term war-to-peace transitions and reduce the likelihood of return-to-violence. This objective aligns with *UNDP’s Crisis Offer* solution (i), ‘Break the cycle of fragility: transform protracted and fragile contexts’.

As the Framework takes a development approach, the strategic objectives are designed to respond to the three principal vulnerabilities to violent conflict across the Arab States region described in the conflict prevention context analysis. This means they should support the political, economic, and social transformations, and do so before bouts of violence, during periods of violent conflict, and after violence.
These strategic goals were also designed to deliver the Framework’s threefold approach of strengthening the technical capacity of UNDP COs (and partners), by catalysing regional infrastructures for peace, and by enhancing the regional knowledge base for conflict prevention.

**Prevent violent conflict between social and political groups**

The Arab States region is transforming politically through institutional reform and democratization processes (albeit at different rates), economically to modernize, meet environmental challenges and provide more secure livelihoods, and socially as a globalized world and modern technologies influence the ambitions of younger generations, women, and persons with disabilities (see section 3). These transformation processes are happening against the background of limited financial capacity, especially as the global economy recovers from COVID-19, meaning that governments’ abilities to meet people’s demands are very limited. The parallel nature of political, economic, and social transformations means that many states are in a process of rewriting their social contracts.

Transformations and revised social contracts are essential for overcoming cleavages between social groups (so that ‘horizontal’ relations are strengthened), and so that Arab States citizens feel themselves to have equal status and believe that their national institutions are able and willing to meet needs of all groups equally (so that ‘vertical’ relations are improved). Hence, citizens are less likely to resort to violence to protect their rights. As such, successful transformation processes in themselves make a substantial contribution to the prevention of violent conflict. This is because the region is diverse, with each country encompassing a range of social and political groups. The relationships between groups can be marked by histories of tension, as state institutions are (believed to be) captured and prioritise the needs of some, and economic resources are (believed to be) unequally distributed. This strategic objective is aligned with the *International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*, which recognizes the two-way interdependence between building effective and responsive states, and achieving sustainable peace, especially in fragile contexts. Transformations can also expose social and political cleavages, and run the risk of inducing violence, as some may fear that they are under threat or that they will lose influence.

Development actions are critical for supporting transformations, whether through (e.g.) technical support for institutional reforms that encourage professionalism and accountability, entrepreneurship schemes that reshape economies, or youth and women empowerment programmes. As such, UNDP and other development partners can have a significant impact in supporting Arab States resilience to violent conflict or ability to sustain peace. It is important to maximise this impact through tailoring UNDP’s existing toolkit to the conflict prevention needs of each state, and by improving early warning, so that UNDP is managing its programmes dynamically. This is achieved by generating timely insights into emerging problems and applying the right development tools at the right time, and with the right partners, to maximise collective effectiveness in preventing violence and sustaining peace.

**Protect development gains during periods of violence, and prepare for early recovery**

Preventing violent conflict is a long-term endeavour, and some states in the region have experienced bouts of short-term and even protracted violence. This is not indicative of the failure of development programming in contributing to conflict prevention. Rather, bouts of violence reinforce the need to take a long-term approach outside of narrow funding cycles. Unfortunately, protracted periods of violence also weaken the very long-term development gains that are essential for preventing violent conflict – whether professional and accountable services, sufficient economic opportunities, or educational levels. For example, violent conflict can reduce GDP and economic opportunities, in turn fuelling conflict over remaining resources. By contrast, moves away from conflict can be helped by a stronger economy and an increase

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20 *International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding* website [weblink](#).
in economic opportunities. A reversal of development gains also undermines the potential for early recovery during humanitarian crises, making it harder to develop an exit strategy for humanitarian actors and re-establish nationally led development. Failures to protect development gains in the Arab States region is in part due to the shift to humanitarian aid modalities that occurs during violent conflict, with limited funding and political space available for essential development programming, even under an early recovery umbrella.

It is critical that UNDP takes a long-term approach that prepares for periods of protracted violence. Firstly, this means that UNDP is able to continue operating in support of key state services (e.g., maintaining irrigation systems and policing), and continues to build the capacity of national partners, even within a constrained political and funding environment. This entails protecting ‘the development space’ during periods of violent conflict, enhancing UNDP’s ability to deliver during such periods, and reinforcing its ‘double nexus’ and ‘triple nexus’ partnerships and working arrangements with humanitarian and political agencies/missions. Secondly, UNDP should have the capacity to play a critical leadership on strategic planning for early recovery with a range of humanitarian and development partners. Finally, UNDP should be able to rapidly scale up to deliver projects that support a more rapid transition back to peaceful civilian societies (e.g., through stabilisation projects).

Reducing the likelihood of a return to violence

Violence in some Arab States in the region has proved to be cyclical, with previous injustices, marginalization, and poor governance fuelling conflictual relationships in the present and making future violence more likely. Preventing cycles of violence entails establishing robust and inclusive transitional processes that support long-term war-to-peace transformations following the end of violence, whether because of military victory or political agreements. Robust transitional processes are hence an important cornerstone of preventing violent conflict between social groups and between political groups (objective 1). Development has a critical role during and after formal transition processes, by contributing towards (inter alia) (re)building governance institutions that are trusted across social and political groups, supporting a society to deal with the past, including through transitional justice (i.e., right to reparations, right to truth, right to justice, guarantee of non-recurrence), strengthening the rule of law, creating cultures of equal opportunity, and by enhancing capacities for mental health services and psycho-social support. UNDP and other development partners remain after political missions have downsized or wrapped up and play a critical role in ensuring delivery of an agreement in practice over the long-term. UNDP should be prepared to play a central role in supporting the transition processes that follow the end of violence and planning for their linkage to longer-term development.

Effective delivery of development projects before, during, and after violence

The three contexts – when states are undergoing political, economic, and social transformations, when they experience violence, and after violence – bring specific challenges for effective development programming. They require work across the double and triple nexus, conflict sensitivity, adaptive management, and risk management. Such actions are required not just at the level of individual projects, but also at the sector and strategic levels. UNDP has a leadership role in conflict sensitivity and the nexus, both for its own programming, and in encouraging shared conflict sensitive practice among development, humanitarian, and political partners. UNDP is also the leading agency experimenting with adaptive management, especially in states suffering from protracted violence.

4.2. UNDP’s Arab States Conflict Prevention Toolkit

UNDP and its development partners employ a range of programming tools that are relevant for conflict prevention. This includes a set of core tools for preventing individual, societal, and institutional violence, as well as tools that are best deployed in each of the three contexts – during transformations in order to achieve Strategic Objective 1: Prevent violent conflict, during violence in order to achieve Strategic Objective 2: Protect development gains, and after
violence, in order to achieve **Strategic Objective 3: Support long-term war-to-peace transitions.**

The overview of UNDP’s Conflict Prevention Toolkit is provided in the following figure. The figure is followed by brief description of each tool and its use, with select examples of how the tools have been applied by UNDP in the Arab States region.

**Core tools**

**Peace Education** looks to build children’s capacity to manage conflict, as well as developing a shared sense of civil identity and responsibility. It also looks to strengthen the eco-system around children, including parents, teachers, administrators, and the children-communities’ at large. Peace Education is especially important following periods of violence or when there are substantial social and political tensions. In such environments, Peace Education programmes can be used to encourage dialogue across social and political groups, to develop shared curriculums, and to encourage difficult conversations that assists transitional justice and dealing with the past. For example, UNDP Lebanon has implemented a long-term Peace Education program that looks to bridge the learning experience of Lebanese students from different backgrounds. Peace Education is not only critical for reducing the potential for individual violence, but it also makes a contribution to preventing social and institutional violence. Peace Education can also help shift gender roles, empowering women to play a more active role in society.

**Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE)** attempts to reduce the drivers of radicalization, and hence reduce acts of individual violence driven by ideological or political beliefs. PVE is a cross-cutting approach that addresses the structural drivers of radicalization, such as political exclusion, and lack of governance, that builds social norms of inclusion and tolerance, and that builds the individual skills of those at risk to manage conflict and be resilient to calls to violence. UNDP has integrated PVE into its work with Arab States region through its global framework and national plans to prevent violent extremism. UNDP has worked with multiple governmental commission to develop PVE agendas and programmes, including in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Tunisia. For example, UNDP Lebanon has supported the Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office to develop a holistic **National Strategy for Preventing Violent Extremism**. UNDP has also developed leading methodologies and guidance on PVE, including by applying behavioural science and mental health lens. Some of the Arab States have also been covered under the RBA-RBAS joint initiative Regional PVE Project, which is also in the process of being extended to cover the Mashreq of Arab States. Like Peace Education, PVE programming prevents violent conflict at individual, societal, and institutional levels. Recent developments in PVE approaches have also looked to include a gender lens more strongly.

**Social Cohesion** (sometimes referred to as social co-existence or social peace, due to language and cultural sensitivities regarding ‘social cohesion’) is a set of methodologies that look to enhance the vertical relations between state institutions and community groups, and horizontally between the community groups that exist in a state. Social Cohesion has been at the heart of UNDP Tunisia’s support for the country’s transition, based on the understanding that it is essential for overcoming the ‘trust deficit’ in government and hence for preventing future unrest. Social Cohesion has proved to be an important entry point for managing tensions between refugee or displaced communities, and the host communities where they reside. For example, social cohesion is a key component of the **Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)**, in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Social cohesion work can have a significant impact on the social contract and hence on reducing the

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21 [UNDP Peace Building Project in Lebanon Project (Phase 3) website](#)
22 [Applying Behavioural Science to Support the prevention of violent extremism: Experiences and Lessons Learned, UNDP (2021). Weblink](#)
23 [Strengthening social cohesion: Conceptual framing and programming implications, UNDP (2020). Weblink](#)
24 [Social cohesion: strengthening trust and implementing inclusive policies in Tunisia Project website](#)
25 [In Response to the Syrian Crisis: Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan website](#)
likelihood of violence at the societal and institutional levels, dependent on factors such as the geographic coverage of social cohesion programs and the linkages between actions at the local and national levels. Social cohesion actions can be gender responsive by understanding and increasing the ability of women to access state institutions vis-à-vis men or to engage across social divides.

**Local Participatory Dialogue** builds the practice of local problem solving across social and political divides, and in partnership with local government agencies or other relevant authorities. Local Participatory Dialogues can take a range of forms, depending on the need (e.g., access to water, enhancing safety, or supporting the local economy) and the context (e.g., stable government, large social divisions, or open war). Common dialogue processes include municipal planning forums, community safety mechanisms, and resource dispute processes. Such local processes are especially impactful in violent contexts when national institutions are not able to function (or are themselves disputed). Over time, these local mechanisms can reduce frictions between social and political groups, lessen the potential for violent actions, and can become formalized into sustainable state mechanisms – providing a bridge for early recovery and war-to-peace transitions. 

For dialogues to contribute to conflict prevention, they require a clear vision for how they will include all relevant groups, and how they will become re-integrated into the state, rather than creating parallel processes. UNDP has supported such localized mechanisms in a range of countries, including Sudan, Lebanon, Libya, and Iraq. Local Participatory Dialogues can prevent violence at the societal and institutional levels. Like Social Cohesion, Local Participatory Dialogues are important vehicles for including women in decision-making, and also for addressing women’s specific needs.

**Insider Mediation** provides critical peace resources that assist negotiations inside their own society, either at the local or national level. UNDP has led on the development of insider mediation best practices, supporting key actors and leaders in conflict contexts with dialogue and mediation skills. Such skills are relevant not just for peace negotiations, but also for the wider participatory processes essential for development, including the Local Participatory Dialogues (see above). Insider mediation has important linkages with a wider set of leadership skills required for development in fragile contexts. For example, UNDP Yemen has supported Insider Mediators to negotiate community needs on conflict-affected areas such as Taiz. Insider mediation primarily support conflict prevention at the societal level and can build the capacity of women to mediate in their societies.

**Tech for peace** programs have a dual focus on reducing the potential for technology to drive violent conflict (e.g., through safeguarding from hate speech, and by monitoring and addressing dis/misinformation) and on building resilience and social cohesion through digital networking across divides, and by supporting stronger and more accountable service delivery online platforms. Tech for peace is especially important for the Arab States region given the shared media space, and accelerated use of new technologies, especially by young people (see section 3). Tech for peace can also play an important role in gender responsiveness, youth empowerment, and inclusion and accessibility for persons with disabilities. For example, a women’s organisation in Somalia has developed an app to gather data from thousands of women on their particular needs, as the basis for advocating for women’s rights.

**Participatory early warning**, when conducted with a cross-section of international, national, and local counterparts, is not only important for UNDP to ensure that its programs are best placed to prevent violent conflict, but also builds capacity and alliances for action across key decision-makers. As such, early warning should be incorporated into a range of other tools (e.g., Social Cohesion) to ensure that national and local counterparts are sufficiently informed of potential risks of violence, and best able to take decisions collectively to avert such violence.

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28 UNDP’s Crisis Risk Dashboard website [weblink](#).
For example, UNDP Sudan established a crisis risk dashboard based on the outcomes of social media monitoring, while UNDP Lebanon has established a Tensions Monitoring System (TMS) that has become a cornerstone of data for international programming in the country. Early warning should incorporate gender responsiveness, youth empowerment, and the inclusion and accessibility of persons with disabilities.

### Core tools

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**Figure 6a** UNDP’s Conflict Prevent Toolkit

**Core tools**

**Context-specific tools**

*National Visioning* can help states and societies to negotiate difficult discussions over values and change. This is especially important given the impact of demographic change, new technologies, climate change, people movements (including the internally displaced, refugees, and migrants) and globalization in the region. National Visioning allows states to plan for key reforms and enhancements to critical services (e.g., water provision, given the impact of climate change). It is essential that National Visioning is not used to suppress social disagreement or change processes, but rather assist them to take a constructive and non-violent form. For example, UNDP Saudi Arabia is supporting national partners to meet the targets set in its 2030 national visioning process. National Visioning processes can enable a discussion about women’s rights and role in society and can also provide opportunities for women to influence future visions of their society.

**Governance and Political Reforms** are core UNDP programming tools that support inclusive and accountable government, and that increases confidence in the ability and willingness of governments to meet the needs of all their citizens. Such programming can include electoral laws, civil service reforms, capacity building and professionalization in specific services (e.g., waste collection), anti-corruption, and decentralization. For example, UNDP Jordan is delivering a project to support professional decentralized government that promotes ‘agency’ and ‘voice’ (‘Networks of Local Government’), acknowledging that poor local services can represent a driver of social and political tensions in the country. Governance and Political Reforms play a critical role in reducing violence at the institutional and societal levels. Unfortunately, most governance and political reforms stop during periods of violence, with the shift to humanitarian delivery modalities. Such reforms, if well supported, also take account of the particular needs of women, and enhance women’s participation in both governance and politics.

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29 UNDP Lebanon Tensions Monitoring System [website](#).
30 Capacity Development and Related Services for an Integrated Sustainable Development and Management of the Water Sector Project [website](#).
31 Network of Local Governments 2nd Phase Launch Project [launch website](#).
**Security Sector Reform (SSR),** with an emphasis on justice and policing, are a sub-set of governance reform that are particularly important for preventing violence. Poorly functioning justice systems and unprofessional policing can drive social tensions, especially if they are believed to target specific groups, be corrupt, or be captured by elites. Justice and policing reforms, and especially community policing, looks to professionalize the sector, ensure it is focused on meeting community needs, and is accountable to society at large. For example, UNDP Iraq has a long-term programme of support for ‘Security and Justice Sector Governance’ in the country, recognizing that effective policing is critical to long-term stability and preventing a resurgence of violence.\(^{32}\) Justice and policy reforms can support the role of informal mechanisms, such as tribal processes and local level dispute resolution mechanisms, and their linkages to formal mechanisms. Justice and policing reforms play a critical role in reducing violence at the institutional and societal levels. Similar to wider governance and political reform, most policing and justice programs are discontinued or downsized during violent periods (or are switched to support for military capacity). Such reforms can also take account of the particular safety and protection needs of women and enhance women’s participation in the sector.

**Sustainable Economic Development, Resource Management and Environmental Peacebuilding** is a critical area of programming for conflict prevention in the Arab States region, given the disparities in economic opportunities in some Arab States and the ongoing impact of environmental change. Such programmes look to support diversified economies and widen economic opportunities to all groups in society in a manner that reduces social tensions. They also look to reduce the impact of climate change and limited resources on communities and the economies on which they depend. For example, UNDP Egypt is working in partnership with the government and the Green Climate Fund to protect communities and economies from the impacts of rising sea levels along the Nile Delta.\(^{33}\) Such actions are critical for preventing violence at the social level. Economic development projects can play a particularly important role in empowering women economically.

**Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery** programmes strengthen national capacities for disaster risk reduction, preparedness, recovery assessments, programmes, and planning. Such programmes support the management of natural disasters that could drive social and political tensions (e.g., the forest fires in Algeria), and even lead to violent conflict. The region hosts a United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Management, and UNDP runs DRR programs in a range of country contexts, including Egypt, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Palesti ne, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia.

**Maintenance of Basic Services** during violence, when most governance and political reform is on hold, helps to lessen the impact of conflict on citizens’ lives, helps overcome cycles of violence, and provides a foundation for early recovery. Basic services include health, education, water and sanitation, roads and critical infrastructure, and waste management. During protracted violent conflicts, as aid modalities focus on humanitarian needs, and authorities are disputed, national institutions’ effectiveness reduces. UNDP has a history of working with partners to fill such essential gaps. For example, UNDP Yemen manages several World Bank funds to support local critical services across the country.\(^{34}\) Such projects help prevent violence at the societal level, as they help ensure that critical services are available to all, and that disparities in access do not drive tensions. Basic service projects also look to cater to the specific needs of women during periods of protracted violence.

**Professional Exchanges (‘Track II and III’)** are run in parallel to political dialogues during periods of violence and allow for technical exchange on areas of shared interest, such as water, education, or health. Professional Exchanges can contribute to confidence building in

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\(^{32}\) Support to Security and Justice Sector Governance Project website [weblink](#).

\(^{33}\) Protecting the Nile Delta Project website [weblink](#).

\(^{34}\) For example, the Yemen Emergency Crisis Project (YERCP) Project website [weblink](#).
support of political processes, and also play a role in reducing social tensions and levels of violence – which are often driven by perceived inequalities in access to critical needs. For example, during the Global COVID Pandemic, UNDP Libya worked in partnership with UNSMIL and WHO to support a professional exchange between health officials on management of the pandemic. Such projects support conflict prevention at the societal and institutional level and should also be designed to increase the participation of women and ensure that professional services meet women’s needs during violent conflict.

**Early Recovery** programming occurs during humanitarian crisis response and aims to provide the foundation post-crisis resilience. Early Recovery is holistic, and depends on the shape of each crisis, but can include *inter alia* rehabilitation of community infrastructure, and support for local government. UNDP plays a critical role in early recovery, leading the national Early Recovery Cluster at the request of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). For example, UNDP Syria has conducted a study on behalf of the Early Recovery and Livelihoods Sector of local needs in the country and is delivering a wide range of local resilience-building projects as an entry point to early recovery.³⁵ Early Recovery helps prevent social violence during periods of violence, but also following them. Early Recovery projects should be conflict-sensitive and inclusive to the needs and roles of women.

**Stabilisation** programming looks to quickly rebuild areas damaged by war, and in doing so reinforces the trust of communities in the authorities that serve them. UNDP has on behalf of the UNCT, and UN political missions been the key vehicle for delivering Stabilisation programmes with funding from interested donors (e.g., USAID, UK FCDO, and Germany AA).³⁶ Such programs have had prominence in Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Syria and more lately Yemen. For example, UNDP Iraq manages the Funding Facility for Stabilization, which was established to rebuild areas damaged following the defeat of Islamic State.³⁷ These areas are mostly populated by Sunni Iraqis who have demonstrated low levels of trust in the Iraqi Government following the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Stabilisation as an approach can make a significant contribution to resilience and statebuilding, by meeting immediate needs and enhancing legitimacy, and in turn preventing violence at social and institutional levels. Stabilization Programming should take account of the needs and roles of women.

**Resilience** programming covers a range of activities that enhance the potential of individuals and communities to endure during protracted crises. Resilience programming’s flexibility is part of its strength but can also lead to confusion over the timeliness of application and measures of success. For example, Resilience and Stabilisation programmes often run concurrently; and while peacebuilding actors most often interpret resilience to mean managing conflict risks and the likelihood of violence, development actors most often use the term to refer to livelihoods and climate change.³⁸ Resilience programming is also often closely linked to Early Recovery. For example, UNDP Syria has supported early recovery through a set of local resilience projects. Resilience programming can make an important contribution to preventing violence at the societal level. Like Early Recovery and Stabilisation, Resilience programmes should take account of the needs and roles of women.

**National Dialogues** provide an alternative mechanism for developing country-wide agreements during and after periods of violence. As political processes have proved insufficient by themselves to resolve conflicts, the international community has invested more in national dialogues – to gain wider buy-in and support for resolution processes.³⁹ For example, from 2012 UNDP Tunisia supported the National Dialogue on drafting a new constitution following the public uprising in 2011.⁴⁰ National Dialogues can play a significant role in reaching...
political accommodations, and hence in preventing future cycles of violence at the societal and political levels, and are in effect the counterpart of national visioning processes that occur in more stable contexts. Like National Visioning, National Dialogues can provide unique opportunities for women to express their visions for the future of the society and country.

**Transitional Justice and Dealing with the Past**, as well as Restorative Justice, are integral components in the move beyond periods of conflict, balancing the needs to address past grievances, trauma, and healing, building positive relationships in the present, and building trust in shared institutional frameworks.\(^{41}\) UNDP has wide experience in supporting Transitional Justice and Dealing with the Past globally, as distinct programming and within justice sector development. Transitional Justice processes have been tried in Lebanon, Libya, and Tunisia. Without Transitional Justice, social and political groups can feel that past abuses have not been addressed and are more likely to engage in violence in the future. Hence, Transitional Justice assists with preventing violence at the societal level. Transitional Justice can be gender responsive by understanding, and responding to the distinct experiences, of women and men.

**Reconciliation** programming encourages sets of social and political dialogues that allow for groups to better understand and build trust with each other. Such programmes are especially powerful in mixed communities and when there has been a history of violence. For example, UNDP Iraq’s ‘Integrated Reconciliation Project’ looks to create local infrastructures for peace, especially for the most vulnerable communities and minority groups.\(^{42}\) Reconciliation projects are often aligned with social cohesion and local participatory dialogue. Reconciliation projects support conflict prevention at the societal level and provide a powerful vehicle for women to express and overcome the particular impact of violence on them.

**Post-Conflict Reconstruction** actions support country-wide recovery through large scale investments in physical infrastructure, the renovation (or creation) of governance institutions, and economic recovery.\(^{43}\) UNDP’s contribution to recovery and Post-Conflict Reconstruction was partly driven by a recognition that emphasis should be placed on development cooperation as a tool of crisis prevention as well as a means to sustainable recovery and socio-economic progress in the aftermath of crisis.\(^{44}\) UNDP has been involved in the planning for or delivery of Post-Conflict Reconstruction projects in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Post-Conflict Reconstruction projects support conflict prevention at the societal and political levels and should take account of the specific needs and roles of women.

**Durable Solutions** to forced displacement is a continuous and longer-term process in countries characterized by internal displacement and/or refugee displacement. A solutions lens is vital in conflict prevention work, as it helps include displaced persons and displacement-affected communities in peacebuilding efforts. Displacement-affected populations can be agents of peace in their communities and for their countries. Within communities, social cohesion is an important element for displacement-affected communities to thrive and advance on common objectives. UNDP’s [Adaptive Solutions Position Paper](#) outlines how incremental development steps can lead to reducing displacement-related needs and discrimination resulting from displacement. In the long-term, sustaining peacebuilding efforts will rely on individuals, communities and societies’ resilience to manage and minimize the effects of conflict or other shocks.\(^{45}\)

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\(^{41}\) From Justice for the Past to Peace and Inclusion for the Future A Development Approach to Transitional, UNDP (2021). [Weblink](#).

\(^{42}\) Integrated Reconciliation Project website [weblink](#).


Figure 6b UNDP’s Conflict Prevent Toolkit
Wider toolkit

Supporting effective delivery

‘Double’ and ‘Triple’ Nexus. The New Way of Working (NWoW), outlined by the UN Secretary General in the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit,\(^{46}\) emphasizes the need to work across the double humanitarian-development nexus, and where possible the triple humanitarian-development-peace nexus (HDPN). HDPN has close synergies with conflict sensitivity, as it looks to identify where development and humanitarian aid can have a positive peace impact. UNDP has played an important role in development of the HDPN nexus globally. For example, it has worked closely with the World Bank (WB) on the HDP Initiative,\(^{47}\) and in some instances such as Yemen been tasked by the UNCT with elaborating a national nexus approach. The potential for UNDP to play a strong leadership role on the HDPN, in support of the RCO, was consistently raised in consultations for the Framework.

Conflict Sensitivity is a progression of ‘do no harm’ that looks to ensure that aid not only avoids negative impacts on conflict contexts, but also that where possible, aid can make a positive impact towards peace.\(^{48}\) Conflict Sensitivity has been integrated through UNDP’s programming, and the wider UN system,\(^{49}\) at a project level but has most relevance at the sectoral and strategic level in terms of overall aid objectives and delivery frameworks. UNDP has played a leading role in sectoral and strategic Conflict Sensitivity in a range of contexts, including Lebanon and Syria.

Risk Management is separate from conflict sensitivity and is the process of managing risks to UNDP, its staff, beneficiaries and implementing partners in protracted conflicts (although there is some overlap with the ‘working around conflict’ stage of conflict sensitivity). Risk Management entails understanding the risks to operations and staff, and improving performance by maximizing gains, while avoiding unnecessary losses.\(^{50}\)

Adaptive Programming represents an attempt to accelerate the speed at which aid efforts adjust to changes in the conflict context, and to tailor deliver mechanisms (and objectives) to

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\(^{46}\) The New Way of Working website [weblink].
\(^{47}\) The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Initiative website [weblink].
\(^{48}\) Conflict Sensitivity Community Hub website [weblink].
\(^{49}\) Good Practice Note on Conflict Sensitivity, Peacebuilding, and Sustaining Peace, UNSDG (2022). [weblink].
\(^{50}\) Guidance Note: Managing Risks Across UNDP Programming and Operations, UNDP (2019). [weblink].
sub-national contexts in a country. Adaptive Programming is presently being piloted by UNDP Yemen, with potential interest from other UNDP COs in the Arab States region.

**Area Based Programming (ABP)** has emerged as a central tool for addressing the challenges of specific geographical areas, which are distinguished from the rest of a country context by the degree of vulnerability and disadvantage, or by specific conflict dynamics. ABP aims to reduce the disparities between areas and groups, narrowing the gap through integrated, participatory, and inclusive sustainable investments in subnational governance initiatives, resilience, education, health, and livelihoods. ABP has proved especially important in diverse countries suffering from protracted conflict, such as Syria.

**Portfolio Approaches** to development are grounded in systems thinking, allowing for greater flexibility to uncertainty and unpredictability. This means that instead of funding short-term unrelated projects, UNDP deploys a portfolio of options to ignite a long-term transformation in the community.

**Cross-border and Sub-Regional** programming is essential for managing drivers of violent conflict that are shared across country contexts. Such programming entails joint actions by UNDP COs and their national partners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting Effective Delivery</th>
<th>Political, Economic, &amp; Social Transformations</th>
<th>Violent Conflict</th>
<th>Post Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Double and Triple Nexus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Sensitivity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Adaptive Programming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Area-based Programming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Portfolio Approaches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross-border and Sub-regional Programming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 6c** UNDP’s Conflict Prevent Toolkit
Supporting effective delivery

**Mainstreamed themes**

*Gender Responsiveness, Youth Empowerment, and the Inclusion and Accessibility of persons with disabilities* are essential at any stage of violence (before, during, or after). Such programmes are especially important in the Arab States region given contested gender relations, its large young population, and the significant proportion of persons with disabilities in the region. Limited opportunities for women, young people, and persons with disabilities can become a substantial driving factor in fragility, undermining the social contract, and increasing the potential for violent episodes. Gender Responsiveness, Youth Empowerment, and the Inclusion and Accessibility of persons with disabilities can encompass political participation, economic opportunities, and wider education projects. For example, UNDP Somalia recognizes the importance of enhancing the employment prospects of young people for preventing violent conflict in the country. Gender Responsiveness, Youth Empowerment, and the Inclusion and Accessibility of persons with disabilities can make a significant contribution to preventing conflict at the individual and societal levels.

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51 What is Adaptive Management? Dr. Gregory Wilson. [Weblink](#).
54 UN Joint Programme on Youth Employment. [Website](#).
Figure 7
Development as a Pathway to Conflict Prevention
4.3. Categorisation of Arab States

RBAS encompasses a broad range of country contexts organised into four sub-regions:\n
- The Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman (no country office), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (no country office).
- The Maghreb: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia
- The Mashreq: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria
- Southern Tier: Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen.

These countries can be further organised according to level of risk of violent conflict, in order to identify the types of development tools that can be most effectively applied. The risk attribution is not rigid and should be determined against the most recent events characterizing the country context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>LOW RISK</th>
<th>MEDIUM RISK</th>
<th>ACTIVE CONFLICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVE 1: Prevent violent conflict between social and political groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVE 2: Protect development gains during periods of violent conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVE 3: Support long-term war-to-peace transitions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOOLKIT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core tools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation settings tools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Violent settings tools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Violence settings tools</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 Applying the toolkit across the region

Such categorizations are of course broad and should be further established through rigorous research during implementation of the Framework. The main proposed categories are:

- **Low Risk Contexts**: These contexts do not have recent histories of widespread internal violent conflict, have relatively stable social and political relationships, and represent very limited risk of future violent conflict. In these states, UNDP would look to achieve strategic objective (1) by employing the transformation settings tools, and through selective application of the core toolkit.

- **Medium Risks Contexts**: These contexts are marked by weak social contracts, and governance challenges, and may experience reoccurring bouts of violent conflict. These contexts are at a high risk of future violent conflict. In these states, UNDP should look to achieve strategic objective (1) by employing the transformation settings tools.
and strategic objective (3) through use of the post-violence settings tools. These should be supported by wide use of the core toolkit.

- **Active Violence Contexts.** These contexts experience ongoing violent conflict, either nationally, or in specific parts of the country. In these states, UNDP should look to achieve strategic objective (2) by employing the violent settings tools, supported by wide use of the core toolkit.

While each country context requires separate and regular conflict prevention analysis, in broad terms the four sub-regions manifest different types of vulnerabilities to conflict.56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal vulnerability</th>
<th>GCC</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Masherq</th>
<th>Southern tier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Social contract ‘stability vs legitimacy’ transformations (political transformations)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Economic ‘open opportunity vs ‘rentierism/patronage network’ transformations (economic transformations)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catalytical vulnerability</th>
<th>GCC</th>
<th>Maghreb</th>
<th>Masherq</th>
<th>Southern tier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Weak governance capacity and accountability</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Limited statehood and non-government controlled areas</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Non state armed actors’ proliferation</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Coercive shadow economies</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Climate related security risks</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. National and regional arms procurement</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 9** Intensity of vulnerability by sub-region

Vulnerabilities have been organised by ‘principal vulnerabilities’ related to the political, economic, and social transformations occurring across the region, and ‘catalytical vulnerabilities’ that influence the way that transformations are managed, and the likelihood of violence being used. The different vulnerabilities are explained in more depth in section 3 ‘Arab States Conflict Prevention Context’.57 The table on the previous page assesses the level of intensity of each vulnerability by Arab States sub-region, from low intensity, through medium intensity, to high intensity.58

### 4.4. UNDP Comparative advantage

The three-step consultative process undertaken to develop this Framework focuses on country-specific assessments of UNDP’s Strengths and Weaknesses to support conflict prevention and early warning, and the external Threats and Opportunities to it undertaking such work. These country-specific assessments were used to develop an overall S.W.O.T analysis for UNDP in the Arab States region (overleaf). The headline findings are:

- **Unique placement.** UNDP is uniquely placed to progress conflict prevention and early recovery through development given its long-term and consistent presence in most countries, the partnerships and trust it holds with national partners, and its proven ability to work to scale (e.g., Stabilisation.)

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56 The risk attribution should be understood as indicative of the situation at the time of the analysis and does not necessarily reflect the most recent developments.

57 An additional set of vulnerabilities, related to how country contexts interact with each other, are also explored in section 3.

58 This categorisation of the intensity of each vulnerability reproduces the analysis contained in *Reaching a Critical Will for Conflict Prevention in the Arab States*, Ola Saleh (Jan. 2022); although this report uses Key Driving Factors, rather than vulnerabilities.
Depth of technical expertise. As a pivotal development actor in the Arab States region, with a broad toolkit built on expertise and experience, UNDP has a leading role in developing methodologies (e.g., PVE). Furthermore, UNDP is well equipped to leverage technical expertise and local knowledge for conflict prevention in the region.

Mainstreaming conflict prevention. To be more effective on conflict prevention in the Arab States region, UNDP should better mainstream conflict prevention through early-stage analyses, development of consistent terminologies and methodologies, flexibility in programmatic revisions during implementation, better staff development, and robust information management on best practice across COs.

Donor and partner appetites. The main impediments to UNDP’s conflict prevention are developing understanding among donors of its importance and added value (e.g., vis-à-vis humanitarianism in protracted violent conflicts, or in middle-income contexts that have a smaller donor footprint) and that some national partners are reluctant to be seen as fragile contexts, or to use language and methodologies associated with conflict prevention.

Understanding and need. There is an opportunity for UNDP to make a larger contribution to conflict prevention due to the impact it is having through its conflict-related toolkit, and the growing understanding of the risks of conflict presented by changes in the region (e.g., climate change, new technologies, and economic stresses).
### STRENGTHS

- UNDP has had a long-term presence in most countries in the region, which gives it a better understanding of the national context for conflict prevention.
- UNDP has managed to maintain strong working relationships with most national counterparts across the region. This means it is trusted to assist with difficult issues related to conflict prevention.
- UNDP’s broad mandate means that it can use a range of entry points for conflict prevention, dependent on the country context. For example, in some countries (e.g., Lebanon and Iraq) technical support for taxation and budgetary planning provides an entry point.
- It is important that UNDP is not only a conflict prevention organisation. The fact that it delivers programs that are believed to provide tangible benefit gives it extra credibility to also work on conflict prevention.
- UNDP has an integrated suite of approaches to conflict prevention, from governance to social cohesion, to mediation. This makes the organisation versatile and responsive to different country contexts.
- When UNDP has been able to work to scale (e.g., the on stabilisation in Iraq) it is able to promote conflict prevention much more effectively.
- UNDP works with a very diverse group of stakeholders, all of whom need to be included for effective conflict prevention activities.
- UNDP can have levels of national access that is not possible to all (e.g., in Syria).
- UNDP can be considered a natural lead on (non-political) conflict prevention in the UN system, and has played this role in a number of UNCT.
- UNDP has been at the heart of developing PVE methodologies, meaning we are a trusted and sought-after partner.
- UNDP has been at the forefront of work to develop ‘insider mediators’. These are a critical resource in countries and across the region.

### WEAKNESSES

- UNDP does not consistently conduct the early analysis required for effective conflict prevention.
- Good planning for conflict prevention depends on data. UNDP has struggled to design effective programs in data poor environments.
- Some COs in the region do not have a clear conflict prevention strategic vision, and have not strategized for how the development toolkit can contribute to preventing violence.
- Terminologies relevant for conflict prevention are understood differently across UNDP missions in the region. For example, similar projects in different COs may be referred to as ‘peacebuilding’, ‘conflict prevention’, or ‘social cohesion’. There is a need to develop a consistent understanding across countries.
- Staff capacity on conflict prevention is variable, and usually low for new UNDP national staff. Training and capacity building of staff does not take a holistic conflict prevention approach. For example, a staff member trained in local governance and conflict prevention, may not be up to speed in misinformation.
- Information management and sharing on conflict prevention among UNDP COs in the region could be stronger. UNDP staff can operate in a silo focused on their own country, and be unaware of relevant programs in other countries in the region.
- Our knowledge products on conflict prevention could be improved to be more useful to COs.
- While the Crisis Bureau is responsible conflict prevention, it is less well represented in the region than the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS): meaning it can be difficult to promote a conflict prevention agenda.
- Not all leadership figures in UNDP in the region understand conflict prevention or its value-add to UNDP’s mission.
- We need to work to scale. There is a tendency to try to cover so many issues and topics, and we have a range of small activities that leave no impact behind.
- UNDP works with national state institutions, as well as with other partners. This state-based approach can limit UNDP’s effectiveness on conflict prevention when (a) national partners are part of conflict dynamics, or (b) non-state actors may be more effective partners.
- The UN system is generally weak on political economy, and the role that finances play in the social contract (and hence the potential for conflict).
THREATS

• Conflict prevention has tended to be sidelined since 2011 due to a greater focus on humanitarian responses.
• Develop approaches are also sidelined during periods of violence in the region, even if they are essential for conflict prevention.
• It is hard to gain donor interest for conflict prevention activities in middle income (e.g., Algeria) and high income (e.g., Saudi Arabia) countries. Funding for “conflict prevention” often comes online to late, once violence has started.
• There is a risk that conflict prevention becomes “securitized”, and used to suppress public protest and opposition movements, or as a pretext for human rights violations. This risk is especially large for PVE, which can be used to channel resources towards (e.g.) police, counter terrorism agencies, and the military, at the expense of a truly holistic conflict prevention approach.
• Most donor cycles are too short to meaningfully contribute to conflict prevention, which is a long-term endeavor.
• Donors tend not to see value in the (relatively) small research studies that help capture and disseminate best practice on conflict prevention.
• Some countries do not want to plan for conflict prevention because they don’t want to identify as a fragile state. It is important that we develop an approach to conflict prevention that is understood and accepted by countries with very different contexts.
• The language of conflict prevention can close doors, and each country will have particular words and phrases that it deems unacceptable or does not understand. This can include ‘conflict’ (which is often understood as violence), ‘mediation’, and reconciliation. Hence, we should be flexible with language depending on the country context (while being consistent with internal terminologies - see weaknesses).
• UNDP has struggled in particular to gain interest and support from national counterparts in transitional justice programming.
• Effective conflict prevention work means being on the ground. There are a range of impediments to field work, including security and recent COVID-19 policies.
• Our rate of research on conflict prevention best practice is not keeping speed with changes in methodologies and contexts. In some fields, such as PVE, information is constantly changing, and having the most recent research is crucial.
• While we have engaged early on climate change (see opportunities) the rapidity of climate change means we have limited time to identify its impact on social and political tensions, and in driving violent conflict. We need a surge of funding and programming on this issue.

OPPORTUNITIES

• Donors have demonstrated consistent interest in some programming areas essential for conflict prevention - most evidently Stabilisation and PVE. We can make the case that the success of such programs depends on taking a holistic approach (e.g., stabilisation is not just about infrastructure, but the relationships and dialogue mechanism for agreeing them).
• The SDGs can help frame conflict prevention in a way that is appealing for countries that might be otherwise resistant to conflict prevention programming.
• ‘Social cohesion’ has provided an important entry point to conflict prevention, as it has on occasion been written into government policies (e.g., Algeria and Iraq).
• National visioning and transformation processes (such as in Saudi Arabia) provide a unique entry point for planning for conflict prevention; as they are supported by wide-ranging analytical and planning processes.
• The region is tech-savvy, with generally a high usage of social media usage among younger demographics. This means that there is great potential to develop new technology-based approaches to conflict prevention specific for the region.
• UNDP has engaged early on the link between climate change and conflict. The importance of climate change, especially for access to water and agriculture, provides a new entry point for working with national partners on conflict prevention.
• There is a growing understanding among national and international partners of the importance of the economy development for preventing conflict. Much of UNDP’s work on economic development - such as addressing structural inequalities - can be framed as conflict prevention. This requires capacity building of staff to better understand political economy issues, and the link between conflict and the economy.
5. THE FRAMEWORK

The following diagram provides an overview of the Framework. The rest of this section describes in detail the goal, outcomes, outputs, and the underpinning logical framework.

UNDP’s Conflict Prevention Regional Framework (CPRF) has the following strategic objectives for conflict prevention in the Arab State region:

1. Prevent violent conflict, between social and political groups, over control of institutions and resources.
2. Protect development gains during periods of violent conflicts and increase the potential for early recovery.
3. Support long-term war-to-peace transitions and reduce the likelihood of returns to violence.
These strategic objectives reflect the need for UNDP to work proactively to prevent occurrences of damaging and violent conflict, to respond more effectively when such conflict occurs so that development gains are less likely to be reversed, and to further support war-to-peace transitions after periods of violence. UNDP works towards this goal through three linked outcomes that are aligned with the Global Offer on Conflict Prevention. The outcomes and outputs are derived from the conflict prevention context analysis in section 3.

5.1. Outcome 1: Technical Support

The first outcome is that: **UNDP Country Offices have the vision and capacity to develop and deliver actions that prevent conflict...**

**UNDP Country Offices have the vision and capacity to develop and deliver actions that prevent conflict...**

- Output 1.1: Standard National Conflict Prevention Planning Resource
- Output 1.2: Standing Surge Capacity on Conflict Prevention

...and do so in support of the RCO, and in partnership with the UN Country Team, and with national and international partners.

- Output 1.3: Double & Triple Nexus Advisory Resource
- Output 1.4: Participatory Impact Assessment Tool

The ability of UNDP COs to work on conflict prevention is limited by the absence of context-specific narratives and toolkits, and by the relative capacities of COs on conflict prevention.

UNDP is not able to engender substantial progress on its own but depends on the level of understanding and buy-in from the wider UNCT, national counterparts and donors.

However, collaborative actions are made difficult by the complex aid environment, encompassing humanitarian, development, and peace actors, and lack of shared analysis and evidence of what is successful.

**Figure 11** Outcome 1 – Strengthening technical capacities

**Outcome theory of change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The ability of UNDP COs to work on conflict prevention is limited by the absence of context-specific narratives and toolkits, and by the relative capacities of COs on conflict prevention. | Output 1.1: Standard National Conflict Prevention Planning Resource  
Output 1.2: Standing Surge Capacity on Conflict Prevention | UNDP Country Offices have the vision and capacity to develop and deliver actions that prevent conflict... |
| UNDP is not able to engender substantial progress on its own but depends on the level of understanding and buy-in from the wider UNCT, national counterparts and donors. However, collaborative actions are made difficult by the complex aid environment, encompassing humanitarian, development, and peace actors, and lack of shared analysis and evidence of what is successful. | Output 1.3: Double & Triple Nexus Advisory Resource  
Output 1.4: Participatory Impact Assessment Tool | ... and do so in support of the RCO, and in partnership with the UN Country Team, and with national and international partners. |

**Figure 12** Outcome 1 Theory of Change
If support is made available to UNDP COs in building contextualized and gender-sensitive conflict prevention narratives, and contextualized plans for the utilization of UNDP’s toolkit; and additional capacity is provided for COs on conflict prevention; and UNDP uses a systems approach to analysis as the basis for catalysing and convening linkages between humanitarian, development, and peace actions, in support of the UN RCO, and in collaboration with UN partners.

Then COs will be better placed to work with national counterparts on conflict prevention, in a manner that is inclusive, publicly supported, and that is likely to be funded by donors; and COs will be better able to deliver conflict prevention through its existing development toolkit,

Because COs will have concrete narratives, and clearly defined tools, that can be explained to national counterparts and donors; and the UNCT as a whole will have shared measures of success, and shared strategies for working across the double and triple nexus.

Output 1.1: Standard National Conflict Prevention Planning Resource

It is critical that UNDP is able to articulate conflict prevention in a manner suitable to the specific context in each country, including the social and political room for conflict prevention, and donor strategies towards that context. It is also critical that UNDP’s existing development toolkit is best tailored to deliver conflict prevention outcomes in each country context given the same factors.

The Standard National Conflict Prevention Planning Resource will provide a methodology for assessing the conflict prevention context and planning for conflict prevention actions, in support of Common Country Assessments (CCA) and national Cooperation Frameworks (CF). The Resource is distinct from CCA and CF, as well as partners’ analysis tools (e.g., the World Bank’s Risk and Resilience Assessment), in that focuses providing a conflict prevention narrative, that explains the relevance of conflict prevention for development and humanitarian programming. The methodology will be flexible to the conflict prevention country categorization (section 4.3), in that it will provide options for narrative development that can be used with national partners and will be developed to support the mainstreaming of conflict prevention in CCAs and CFs. The Resource will mainstream gender sensitivity, youth empowerment and inclusion and accessibility for persons with disabilities. The Resource would be delivered by RBAS in close partnership with UNDP COs. The results will be:

- Bespoke narratives on the why and how of conflict prevention, which can be used to encourage social and political buy-in for conflict prevention, as well as providing the basis for fundraising.
- A country-specific development toolkit for use by the CO.

Output 1.2: Standing Surge Capacity on Conflict Prevention

UNDP COs have variable levels of experience in, and capacity for, conflict prevention. COs can have access to Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs), many of whom have several years of learning from delivering peace or conflict relevant projects and can share conflict prevention programmes and staff with political missions or other UN agencies. Overall, however, there are four important capacity gaps, as identified in the S.W.O.T analysis: (1) when new staff are onboarded, to ensure that they are fluent in the development approach to conflict prevention; (2) as conflict and peace programmes are in a start-up phase, before experienced team members can be brought onboard and the project team has gone through a full learning cycle;

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59 PDAs are presently active in Algeria, Djibouti, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen. Joint UNDP-DPPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention.
(3) when UNDP manages conflict and peace programmes on behalf of political missions;\(^\text{60}\) and 
(4) when country contexts are undergoing rapid or significant developments.

These gaps will be addressed through the creation of a Standing Surge Capacity on Conflict Prevention, which complements the existing resources from the Joint UNDP-DPPA Programme on Building National Capacity for Conflict Prevention, and the DPPA’s Mediation Support Unit,\(^\text{61}\) as well as global surge capacities provided by UNDP’s SURGE roster and ExpRes Roster. The Surge Capacity will comprise:

- An onboarding training in development approaches to conflict prevention, for use with 
  incoming staff, and tailored to the Arab States region and the conflict prevention 
  country categorisation and utilizing Prevention Academy resources.

- A pool of rapidly deployable conflict prevention experts with diverse peacebuilding-
  relevant skill sets, experience in the region and of each country context, and balanced
  by gender and languages, which can support COs as they bring on board experienced
  professionals and work through first learning cycles. This pool will also comprise the
  Insider Mediators Network, Output 2.2.

- CO exchange placements, to allow COs staff to learn from established and impactful
  conflict prevention programming from other country contexts.

- Peer exchange and cross-CO learning processes between project leads from different
  COs using the same conflict prevention tools (e.g., conflict prevention).

- Context briefing sessions, managed through a network of context-specific research
  institutes.

**Output 1.3: Double and Triple Nexus Advisory Resource**

UNDP has been at the forefront in experimenting on how to deliver the HDPN in practice and
has demonstrated that it is uniquely positioned to drive programming on the nexus in the UNCT
and HCT, in support of the UN RCO. This can include generating understanding of humanitar
development and humanitarian-development-peace linkages, generating political
will and support for a nexus approach, developing a strategic framework for programming
on the nexus, and nexus related analyses, monitoring, and evaluations. UNDP COs have through
their work on the double and triple nexus also contributed to strategic-level conflict sensitivity,
which looks to identify how the overall positioning of aid can at a minimum do no harm, and
where possible have a peace dividend. Globally, UNDP is part of the Nexus Academy
delivered through the UNDP Crisis Academy.\(^\text{62}\)

The Framework will support UNDP COs’ work on the double triple nexus by establishing a
Double & Triple Nexus Advisory Resource that can be used with the UNCT, and in support of
the RCO in its leading coordination role on the nexus. The Resource will provide:

- A set of regional best practice case studies on the nexus.
- A triple nexus assessment and planning tool organised according to the conflict
  prevention country categorisation.
- Capacity support for context specific triple nexus planning processes.

This resource would draw on and complement the Nexus Academy.

**Output 1.4: Participatory Impact Assessment Tool**

It is critical to create a learning loop from past conflict prevention projects to future strategies
and actions. During the S.W.O.T. analysis, UNDP COs have indicated limited capacity to assess

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\(^\text{60}\) For example, the Peace Support Facility in Yemen website [weblink].
\(^\text{61}\) Mediation Support Unit website [weblink].
\(^\text{62}\) Nexus Academy website [weblink].
the impact of conflict prevention projects, and that RBAS can add significant value when assisting such assessments. The Framework will include development of a Participatory Impact Assessment Tool for conflict prevention, for assessing the contribution of past and ongoing projects to the strategic objectives outlined in section 4.1. The Assessment Tool will mainstream gender responsiveness, youth empowerment, and inclusion and accessibility of persons with disabilities. It will also tap into existing analysis resources, such as the Prevention and Peacebuilding Impact Measurement Tool.

5.2. Outcome 2: Regional Capacities

The second outcome is that: Enhanced regional conflict prevention infrastructure, and regional and cross-border collaboration on conflict prevention through governance and society, the environment and resource management, and the economy and aid.

This outcome reflects the wealth of experience of, and potential for, conflict prevention in the region, while recognizing that this experience and potential is not maximized due to limited infrastructure for conflict prevention. It also recognizes that some drivers of violent conflict are regional or cross-border in nature and are best tackled through regional or cross-border cooperation, rather than through country specific interventions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The wealth of experience of, and potential for, conflict prevention is not maximized due to limited dedicated infrastructure, both in terms of mechanisms and human resources. | Output 2.1: Arab States Conflict Prevention Network (physical and online)  
Output 2.2: Network of Insider Mediators                              | Enhanced regional conflict prevention infrastructure...                |
| While drivers of violent conflict are often regional or cross-border in nature, and require regional or cross-border cooperation, there are limited mechanisms for such collaboration and action. | Output 2.3: Regional Development for Prevention Forecasts  
Output 2.4: Cross-Border Programming Resource                         | ...and regional and cross-border collaboration on conflict prevention through governance and society, the environment and resource management, and the economy and aid. |

Figure 13 Outcome 2 – regional infrastructures for peace

Figure 14 Outcome 2 Theory of Change

If networks are created and strengthened to encourage exchange on conflict prevention, and to build the capacity and resilience of a cross-section of stakeholders relevant for conflict prevention in the region; and Arab States representatives collectively forecast the conflict risks related to (1) governance and society, (2) environment and resources management, (2)
economy and aid; and opportunities are created for support cross-border actions that respond to this forecasting,

Then regional infrastructure for conflict prevention will be stronger; and Arab States will be better able to take the collective action required to prevent damaging and violent conflict,

Because the networks will create a presently absent infrastructure at the regional and sub-regional levels; and the forecasting and networking will allow for Arab States representatives to collectively identify conflict prevention priorities, and ways of responding to them.

Output 2.1: Arab States Conflict Prevention Network (physical and online)

The Region lacks an institutional focus for exchange and learning specifically on conflict prevention, for developing region-specific methodologies and processes, and for building diplomatic, government, and civil society capacity. The institutions that exist are not situated in, or owned by the region, and are not set-up to be sustainable.

In response, the Framework includes support to the creation of a sustainable Arab States Conflict Prevention Network. This Network will provide the fulcrum for conflict prevention infrastructure, in conjunction with a set of sub-region Community of Practices (see Output 3.1). It will build on and align with the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts (GPPAC). Sustainability will be provided through a partnership with interested Arab States, which will provide a long-term investment in the Network. The Network will encompass a physical space hosted in the region, mirrored by an online platform. The Network would have diverse foci, for example:

- Regional exchange, lesson learning, and capacity building on conflict prevention, encompassing government officials, and civil society.
- Support to the Regional Network of Insider Mediators (Output 2.2)
- Catalysing regional and cross-border conflict prevention initiatives focused on: (1) governance and society; (2) the environment; and (3) the economy.

Output 2.2: Network of Insider Mediators

UNDP has led on the development of Insider Mediation (IM) best practices, globally and in the Arab States region, supporting key actors and leaders in conflict contexts with dialogue and mediation skills. UNDP’s approach to IM is gender responsive, by ensuring that IM have a stronger understanding of how to include women and women’s issues in practical dialogues, and by strengthening and promoting women insider mediators. IM skills are relevant not just for local level dispute resolution and negotiations, but also for the facilitating the political, social, and economic transformations essential for development. As such, insider mediators provide a critical resource for conflict prevention in the Arab States Region.

The Framework will look to maximise and expand regional insider mediator capacity through establishment of a Regional Network of Insider Mediators. This network will:

- Be used to share learning and best practice among mediators in the region, through a shared IM context analysis, risk assessment, capacity development plans.
- Comprise a rapidly deployment mediation resource for use across the region, and form part of the Standing Regional Surge Capacity on Conflict Prevention (Output 1.2).
- Focus on promoting women insider mediators, and by building skills across all insider mediators (men and women) to ensure their dialogues are gender responsive.

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63 There are examples of regional infrastructure relevant for conflict and peace, such as on counterterrorism. However, there is no infrastructure that specifically focuses on conflict prevention.
64 GPPAC website [web link](#).
Output 2.3: Regional Development for Prevention Forecasts

The potential for damaging and violent conflict, and the resources to prevent conflict, often exist at the regional level or encompass more than one country in the region. For example, it is difficult for individual states in the region to take unilateral actions that enhance water management.

In response, the Framework will establish a set of three participatory processes to develop Regional Development for Prevention Forecasts, bringing together government and non-governmental representatives to undertake forecasts on the likely impact on conflict of: 1) governance and social trends; 2) climate-change induced environmental degradation and resource management; and 3) the economy and aid. Each process will start with a lesson learning on past cooperation in the region, will assess the timeline for potential conflict risks and mitigation measures and explore the potential for regional or sub-regional actions to deliver such mitigation measures. The forecasting processes are designed for dialogue and joint forecasting by Arab States and are hence distinct from agency-specific data-driven analysis (e.g., a Conflict Risk Dashboard, CRB), although the processes should be informed by data collected.

- **Governance and society.** This process will look at how governance, and the social contract linked to it, play a central role in establishing the likelihood of damaging or violent conflict. This process will help plan for political and social transformations. Based on the regional context analysis and consultations on the Framework, this process should encompass four themes: (1) accountability and participation, including elections; (2) social cohesion, including radicalization towards violence; (3) youth development and engagement; and (4) gender participation.

- **Climate and Environmental Security.** This process will look at how resources are managed regionally, how resource management impacts on the environment, and in turn on the availability of resources and hence the potential for strains to social cohesion and societal trust, and eventually damaging and violent conflict. There is already a good deal of work focused on the environment and resource management, including in RBAS. Hence this process will look at themes that are less explored. Based on the regional context analysis and consultations on the Framework, this process should encompass three themes: (1) water and food security; (2) natural disasters and their impacts (e.g., wildfires); and (3) planning for climate-change induced migration.

- **Economy and aid.** Generally, political economy issues are under-explored as a driver of damaging and violent conflict in the region. The Framework will address this by establishing a process that is forward looking, focused on economic modelling and likely conflict scenarios. This will help Arab States plan for economic transformations. Based on the regional context analysis and consultations on the Framework, this process should encompass three themes: (1) economic incentives for peace and violence; (2) migration management for conflict prevention; and (3) regional aid processes and conflict prevention.

The participatory forecasting processes may also be most useful if organised by the conflict prevention country categorisation. For example, the governance and society contexts in high GCC states are different from the Maghreb, and hence could be conducted separately.

Output 2.4: Cross-Border Programming Resource

As noted under 2.3, conflict prevention needs often cut across Arab States. Hence, the framework will build on the Regional Development for Prevention Forecasts, by also providing space for bilateral cross-border planning on shared conflict prevention needs between Arab States, and between UNDP COs, as the basis for potential cross-border programming by UNDP.

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65 For example, the Blue Peace project could be assessed as part of lesson learning as part of the environment dialogue.
COs. This will occur through three annual planning workshops, for governance and society, the environment and resource management, and the economy and aid. The Annual planning workshops will occur following forecasting sessions, with one day bringing together Arab States and UNDP COs, and a second day for UNDP COs alone. RBAS will play a catalytic role, in assisting the design of cross-border programming, by providing analytical and project design resources for projects identified in the planning sessions.

5.3. **Outcome 3: Knowledge**

The third outcome is that: *The regional peace movement is strengthened, and space exists for local knowledge development and sense-making on conflict prevention.*

This outcome recognizes the challenges facing those engaged in conflict prevention in the region, due to low levels of social and political support for such activities. It also recognizes that while the region has produced some exemplary conflict prevention initiatives, there are limited regionally based forums and mechanisms to learn from them and make sense of their implications for good conflict prevention.

**Outcome 3 theory of change**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Those working on conflict prevention in the region are often confronted with low levels of social and political support.</td>
<td>Output 3.1: Four Communities of Practice. Output 3.2: Public Peace Education</td>
<td>The regional peace movement is strengthened...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While the region has produced some exemplary conflict prevention initiatives, there are limited regionally based forums and mechanisms to learn from them and make sense of their implications for good conflict prevention.</td>
<td>Output 3.3: Arab States Conflict Prevention Archive. Output 3.4: Conflict Prevention Analytics and Crisis Risk Dashboard</td>
<td>... and space exists for local knowledge development and sense-making on conflict prevention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If* the resilience of those working on conflict prevention across the region is increased, and the public is educated on the success of conflict prevention work; *and* there is a concerted effort to capture and disseminate learning from regional conflict prevention initiatives, and to establish an accessible set of analytics on conflict prevention that can inform crisis prevention,

*Then* the peace movement is likely to face less political and social resistance, and to be more resilient when resistance is encountered; *and* Arab States representatives will take the lead on sense-making on conflict prevention for the region,
Because Arab States leaders will have greater access to relevant information on best practice in how to prevent conflict, and information on risks of conflict; and a more informed public will be more supportive of actions to prevent conflict.

Output 3.1: Four Communities of Practice

As noted above, the region lacks an institutional focus for exchange and learning specifically on conflict prevention, for developing region-specific methodologies and processes, and for building local capacities. The Arab States Conflict Prevention Network (Output 2.1) provides part of the solution but does not help build capacities at sub-regional level. Most importantly it does not help to support the resilience of conflict prevention practitioners, who can face social and political repercussions in the places that they work.

The Framework envisions a set of four Communities of Practice. One Community of Practice will be based within the physical space of the Network, with the remainder in existing universities, or public bodies focused on conflict prevention, rather than through the creation of new structures. The Communities of Practice will:

- Work closely with the Network on its three foci: (1) regional exchange, lesson learning, and capacity building; (2) support for Insider Mediators; and (3) catalysing regional conflict prevention initiatives.
- Support the resilience conflict prevention practitioners in each sub-region, through advisory and legal support, and peer-to-peer support groups.
- Provide specific support to women practitioners, who are often at more threat because of their activities.
- Provide a focal point for Peace Education Programs (see 3.2).
- Provide public resource centres, and venues for public events on conflict prevention.
- Will be supported to interact with and learn from each other.

The Communities of Practice will be linked through the Network’s online platform, enabling interactive online learning and joint work across the Communities of Practice and the Network.

Output 3.2: Public Peace Education

The peace and conflict prevention movement faces substantial challenges in the region, due to low levels of social and political support for such activities. This is partly because of association of the peace movement with the Palestinian question, and the failed reform processes that followed the 2011 revolutions / civil conflicts in the region.

The Framework will support Public Peace Education to be delivered at the sub-national level and organised by the Communities of Practice (Output 3.1). The Public Peace Education will:

- Provide a regional vision for engendering public and political support but tailored to the context and language of each sub region an Arab State.
- Provide education materials that can be used in formal and informal education, tailored to each sub region and Arab State.

Public Peace Education will look to inform the public on the significant impact that women can play in preventing violent conflict, in line with UNSC Resolution 1325. Public Peace Education will also align with the UNSC Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security, by emphasizing the importance of training and empowering young people.67

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66 North Africa, Levant, and Horn of Africa.
67 UNDP is in discussion with the League of Arab States on development of a regional strategy for Youth, Peace, and Security.
Output 3.3: Arab States Conflict Prevention Archive (ASCP)

The region has substantial experience and expertise on conflict prevention. However, sense-making of this experience and expertise is often generated outside the region.

The Arab States Conflict Prevention Archive would remedy this through development of a set of Context Case Studies and Regional Learning Papers. This Archive would focus on practical learning and application rather than academic learning and would provide a key resource across the Communities of Practice.

Where possible, the Case Studies and Learning Papers would synergize (e.g., general learning from National Dialogue Case Studies would be captured in a Learning Paper). The Case Studies/Learning Papers would also reflect the proposed country categorisation (see Section 1.4 above). The Case Studies/Learning Papers would be developed and disseminated by UNDP in conjunction with the Center and Communities of Practice, as well as online through the ASCP portal. While the Archive subject matters would be agreed in an inception period, the following options were identified in consultations for the Framework (all tentative and to be agreed in during implementation of the Framework):

Example Case Studies

- The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s National Dialogue.
- Area-based programming in Syria.
- Education and Peace in Lebanon.
- Women and Conflict Prevention in Yemen.
- Application of portfolio approaches to social cohesion in Iraq.

Example Learning Papers

- Country conflict prevention.
- National Dialogue (e.g., linked to the KSA and Tunisian Case Studies).
- Technology and Dialogue for Peace.
- Early Warning as a Conflict Prevention Tool.
- Dealing with the Past and Transitional Justice.
- Analysis and Evaluation of Conflict Prevention in Data-Poor Environments.
- Regional aid practices in conflict zones.

Output 3.4: Conflict Prevention Analytics and Crisis Risk Dashboard

The S.W.O.T. analysis demonstrates that UNDP COs in the Arab States region lack: 1) a consistent set of measures for judging context-specific, sub-regional, and regional risks of damaging and violent conflict; and 2) a consolidated approach to Political Economy Analysis (PEA).

This will be addressed through the development of:

- Annual country-specific conflict prevention fact sheets that can be used by UNDP COs and their national partners to plan for and evaluation conflict prevention programs. The information from the annual analysis would be captured in a Crisis Risk Dashboard (CRD).
- Incorporating of country-specific analysis into a regional CRD that capture and compare the analysis from country-specific fact sheets, as the basis for planning for regional actions.
- A Local Mapping Toolkit, which can be deployed on a country level by UNDP COs and their partners, based on negative trends identified in the CRD.
- Standard template and process for PEA that contributes to conflict prevention.

### 5.4. Overall logical framework

While the context analysis in section three was conducted using a systems approach, the strategic framework uses a linear Theory of Change that moves from problem states through activities to:

- Outputs, which are achieved directly by the Framework
- Outcomes, which are real world changes that the outputs help achieve
- Strategic Objectives or Impact, the desired end real world situation

This linear ToC is based on a series of ‘If… Then… because ’ statements that look to create a causal link between activities and a hierarchy of results. This section describes the ToC for each outcome, and then provides a visual representation in a logical framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objectives</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (1) Prevent violent conflict, between social and political groups, over control of institutions and resources. | 1: Strengthen technical capacity of UNDP and partners | **Outcome 1:** UNDP Country Offices have the vision and capacity to develop and deliver actions that prevent conflict... and...
... do so in support of the RCO, and in partnership with the UN Country Team, and with national and international partners. |
|  | **Output 1.1:** Standard National Conflict Prevention Planning Resource | **Output 1.2:** Standing Surge Capacity on Conflict Prevention |
|  | **Output 1.3:** Double & Triple Nexus Advisory Resource | **Output 1.4:** Participatory Impact Assessment Tool |
| (2) Protect development gains during periods of violent conflicts and increase the potential for early recovery. | 2: Catalyse regional infrastructures for peace | **Outcome 2:** Catalyse regional conflict prevention infrastructure... and...
... regional and cross-border collaboration on prevention through governance and society, the environment and resource management, and the economy and aid. |
|  | **Output 2.1:** Arab States Conflict Prevention Network | **Output 2.2:** Network of Insider Mediator |
|  | **Output 2.3:** Regional Development for Prevention Forecasts | **Output 2.4:** Cross-border Programming Resource |
| (3) Support long-term war-to-peace transitions and reduce the likelihood of returns to violence. | 3: Enhance knowledge base & understanding in the region | **Outcome 3:** The regional peace movement is strengthened... and...
... space exists for local knowledge development and sense-making on conflict prevention. |
|  | **Output 3.1:** Four Community of Practices | **Output 3.2:** Public Peace Education |
|  | **Output 3.3:** Arab States Conflict Prevention Archive. | **Output 3.4:** Conflict Prevention Analytics and Crisis Risk Dashboard |

**Figure 17** Overall Project Logical framework