Abstract

As a result of the exodus triggered by the humanitarian crisis in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Peru is now the country to have received the second-largest number of Venezuelan migrants. As of May 2022, Peru had received around 1.3 million migrants from Venezuela. The scale of this inflow has brought opportunities and challenges in relation to public policy. This document describes and evaluates the country’s public policy response to migration in terms of both the regulatory framework and the programmes and actions targeting the migrant population. The analysis finds that the institutional response to migration emphasized providing the migrant population with legal protection, based on the assumption that they and the native-born population have equal rights. However, in practice, this assumption did not translate into effective access to social protection programmes, the health system or livelihoods for the migrant population, nor did it result in social cohesion or socio-economic inclusion. The paper also presents best practices identified from among local initiatives and offers evidence-based policy recommendations with a view to contributing to Peru’s response to migration.
1. Introduction

Historically, Peru was a migrant-sending country. As a consequence, no major changes were made to its migration regulations and public policies until the beginning of the 21st Century. The situation began to change gradually from 2007 onward, then shifted dramatically in 2017, when the social, political and economic crisis in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela triggered the exodus of millions of people from the country. As a result, Peru now hosts the second-largest community of Venezuelan migrants in the world. As of May 2022, the country had received approximately 1.3 million migrants from Venezuela (Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, 2022b). This increase in migration flows poses considerable challenges relating to public policy. These challenges relate specifically to migration policy and also to broader public policy to address the growing needs of the migrant population (such as policies to promote socio-economic inclusion) and come at a time when Peru is experiencing considerable political and social instability. These issues centre on Lima, where approximately 75 percent of the Venezuelan migrant population lives (Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, 2022a; Vásquez Luque and Aguilar Lluncor, 2022). The situation in Lima is unusual: it is estimated that approximately 1 million migrants from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are now living in the city, accounting for 10 percent of the total population, a higher share than anywhere else in Latin America.

From a public policy perspective, there is a need for detailed descriptions of the living conditions and current status of Venezuelans living in and transiting through Peru, with a particular emphasis on their working conditions, health, education, nutrition, housing and overall inclusion in Peruvian society (Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, 2022a). More than 92 percent of the population does not have sufficient means to buy food, less than 20 percent are formally employed and more than 76 percent work more than eight hours a day. The situation described above is compounded by the discrimination that the Venezuelan migrant population endures and their lack of health insurance and access to education (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2021a; Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2020a). There is thus a need to explore how the change in the structure of migration in Peru, the Government’s response to this change and the social integration of the immigrant population help or hinder the possibility of migrants enjoying their rights.

This policy paper examines Peru’s new role as a migrant-receiving country, examines the strengths and limitations of Peruvian public policy on migration and analyses the opportunities and challenges ahead. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main migration flows to Peru in recent decades. Section 3 analyses the Government’s response to the current wave of migration, which includes national legislation and regulations, strategies for managing the refugee and migrant population and social programmes and actions targeting them. This information reveals a shift in the Government’s response to the growing flow of migrants into the country, as Peru was initially relatively open to migration but has since begun to implement more restrictive policies.

Section 4 examines the existing evidence on the impacts of the Government’s response to the refugee and migrant population, while section 5 analyses the effects of migration on Peruvian society. The paper concludes with a series of public policy recommendations that aim to improve the assistance provided to the refugee and migrant population, enhance the positive effects of migration in Peru and improve integration between the migrant and host communities. Based on lessons learned from Peru’s experience, this paper seeks to contribute to knowledge on the response to migration in Latin America.
2. The profile of migration flows towards Peru

Migration flows to Peru have varied considerably in terms of their scale, the profile of the migrant population and the Government’s response. Gradual changes started to take place in 2007. As a consequence, this section examines migration flows to Peru over the last two decades, divided by three cut-off points: 2010, 2017 and 2021. This breakdown allows us to describe the Government’s changing response to the different waves of migration the country has experienced and explore the effect of these on Peruvian society and the Peruvian economy. We provide a general description of the refugee and migrant population residing in Peru at each of these times. In 2021, we focus on describing the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population residing in the country as this group is far larger than any other migrant community in Peru.

2.1. Migrant population residing in Peru in 2010

The first major increase in migration to Peru took place in 2007, when the number of foreigners residing in the country grew by more than 70 percent compared to 2006. The migrant population increased steadily until 2010, by which point total numbers were almost three times higher than in 2006, when they had stood at around 3,800 people (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, 2012). This increase could be mainly due to Peru becoming an increasingly attractive destination in economic terms for people from various countries (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, 2012). In 2010, the majority of the migrant population in the country was from the United States (12.4 percent), China (8.7 percent) and Argentina (7.2 percent). This population was largely male and of working age (60.2 percent of migrants were aged 15 to 54). The migrant population that arrived during this period was highly educated: more than 63 percent of the working-age migrants in question had a higher education, suggesting that Peru was an attractive destination for skilled individuals seeking better opportunities. Some 97.5 percent of this group were employed, the majority of them in the service sector (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, 2012).

2.2. Migrant population residing in Peru in 2017

In 2017, the migrant population was still predominantly male (59.8 percent) and of working age (69.8 percent were aged 15–49) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática and Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, 2018). The main change in the migrant profile in Peru relates to country of origin. By 2017, the majority of migrants were from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (24.6 percent), followed by Colombia (15.3 percent), Spain (7.3 percent) and the United States (6.8 percent) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática and Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, 2018). Another important change relates to the formalization of their migration status, which is evidenced by the high growth in the number of foreigner cards and applications for Peruvian nationality that were issued between 2011 and 2012 (1,211 and 1,132 such applications were processed each year, respectively). This process has recently stabilized at between 600 and 750 applications per year (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, 2018).

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4 These figures include non-Peruvian nationals residing in Peru but do not include the Peruvian returnee population.
5 The report includes data from the 2007 National Census; the 2006 Continuous National Survey; the National Household Survey on Living Conditions in Peru (conducted yearly since 1995); the 2008 and 2009 National Household Budget Survey; the 2009 and 2011 Youth, Employment and International Migration Survey and the 2011 National Youth Survey, all of which were conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI). It also includes migration data from Ministry of the Interior administrative records.
6 The statistics presented in the document cited above are based on data from the National Superintendence of Migration and include results obtained by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI).
2.3. Venezuelan refugee and migrant population residing in Peru in 2021

There has been a boom in Venezuelan migration to the rest of Latin America since 2017. As a result, the largest share of the inflow of migrants to Peru was made up of Venezuelans fleeing insecurity, political and economic instability, the high cost of living and the lack of job opportunities in their country. The scale of the increase was significant: the number of Venezuelan migrants in Peru went from 8,000 in 2016 to 110,000 in 2017 and more than 530,000 in 2018 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, 2021). As is explained in detail in the next section, this growth took place in parallel with a change in the country’s migration regulations, which became less receptive. This led to a substantial increase in the number of applications for refugee status, which is why we describe the current wave of migration from Venezuela as being made up of both refugee and migrant populations.

The National Household Survey (ENAHO) reveals some sociodemographic characteristics of the migrant population residing in Peru in 2020. As table 1 shows, migrants are mostly located in urban areas, particularly Lima, are of working age and are employed.

Table 1. Sociodemographic characteristics of the native-born and migrant populations in Peru in 2020 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Native-born population (percentages)</th>
<th>Migrant population (percentages)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in urban areas</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in rural areas</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in the capital city</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-age population</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed in the informal sector</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors, based on data from the National Institute of Statistics and Information Technology, National Household Survey (ENAHO) 2020.

In 2021, despite the fact that the majority of the Venezuelan population residing in Peru intended to stay in the country (71 percent), only 46 percent had completed procedures to regularize their migration status or to access an identity document (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2021a). This represents a change from the trend described for 2017. As discussed in later sections of this paper, there are several reasons for this change, including the low trust and poor perceptions that the Venezuelan migrant population has of Peru’s institutions and Government (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2021a), as well as the implementation of less responsive migration policies towards Venezuelan migrants.

The migrant and refugee population’s education level is quite high compared to the host community’s—most migrants have at least a secondary education. This suggests that, generally speaking, the Venezuelan population is highly educated. In other words, there is a high level of human capital moving to Peru. There are certain specific features to the employment situation of the Venezuelan population in the country: 68 percent are employed, but only 20 percent are working in areas that relate to their experience or training. Some 17 percent have a formal

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7 The migrant population profile presented in the document cited above is based on the Survey of the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Population in Peru carried out by Equilibrium-Center for Economic Development (Equilibrium CenDE).
contract and 40 percent are self-employed. This may be connected to how hard it is for migrants to get their qualifications officially recognized and validated in Peru (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2021a). In Lima, where approximately 75 percent of the Venezuelan migrant population live, migrants have excessive workloads: 43.1 percent work seven days a week and 76.9 percent work more than eight hours a day (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2020a).

Finally, only a small share of the Venezuelan population has access to health insurance: 7 out of 10 Venezuelan migrants are not registered with the health system (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2021a). This low coverage owes to bureaucratic constraints to registering with the system (e.g. a foreigner’s ID card is required), huge out-of-pocket costs for refugees and migrants seeking care, and delays in issuing documents and processing applications as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic (Naciones Unidas, 2021).

2.4. Twenty years of migration to Peru: 2000–2020

Breaking down the study period into three phases allows us to examine the changes in migration flows to Peru that took place in short periods of time. This reveals rapid changes in the composition of the migrant population, their main features and their migration status in Peru. This section presents a medium-term view, focusing on migration to Peru between 2000 and 2020. The statistics on migration over the last 20 years reveal two crucial findings. First, as can be seen in figure 1, since 2015, the number of migrants arriving from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the defining feature of migration to Peru. Managing migration and addressing the particular needs of this population are the main challenges Peru needs to address in its migration policy to be able to take advantage of the opportunities migration has to offer.

Figure 1. Immigrant population by country of origin in Peru (as a percentage of the total population), 1995–2020

Source: Compiled by the authors based on United Nations data published by the Population Division in the International Migration Stock database: www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock
The second defining feature of recent migration into Peru is the scale of the flows in question (see figure 2). At the beginning of the 21st Century, migration rates to Peru were below the average for Latin America and the Caribbean. At this point, the migrant population represented less than 0.3 percent of the total population. In 2015, this state of affairs began to change rapidly. That year, the migrant population accounted for 0.5 percent of the country’s total population, a share that grew to just over 3.5 percent by 2020. Not only did this increase occur over a short period, it brought Peru’s share of migrants in the total population on par with the world average.

**Figure 2.** Immigrant population by country of origin in Peru and world region (as a percentage of the total population), 1995–2020

These figures make it clear that there is an urgent need for studies of the Government’s public policy response to migration and for systematic reviews of the evidence on successes and opportunities for improvement in this area.

**3. Government response to migration**

The year 2017 was a turning point in the history of migration in Peru, as it was not until then that the issue came to occupy a prominent position in the country’s public agenda. The mass arrival of the Venezuelan migrant population posed a series of challenges on different fronts, including supporting the humanitarian effort to assist those who were fleeing their country, preventing migration from having negative socio-economic impacts in Peru and enhancing the positive effects of migration on Peruvian society and the Peruvian economy. These challenges prompted the creation of legislation to regulate migration to Peru, such as the Temporary Stay Permit (PTP), and the expansion of key public policies to include the refugee and migrant population—two such examples are the Vaso de Leche (Glass of milk) programme and the initiatives to combat anaemia. At the same time, the cooperation sector implemented multiple local initiatives to improve the living conditions of the migrant population and prevent negative effects on the lives of the national population, some of them in partnership with local and national public bodies.
This section is divided into three parts. Section 3.1 describes the regulatory framework that contains the legal standards established to regulate migration, refuge and the migration status of foreigners entering Peru. Public policies on migration management and care for the migrant population are the focus on section 3.2, while 3.3 describes the local programmes and actions implemented to assist the refugee and migrant population in Peru.

3.1. Regulatory framework

In January 2017, the aforementioned Temporary Stay Permit (PTP) and the new Migration Act were created. The PTP was intended to be a migration document that proves that bearers’ migration status in Peru is regular, thus enabling them to work in the country and access programmes and services as established by Peruvian law. PTPs were granted to those who had entered the country regularly and whose criminal and legal records had been duly checked. The application process mostly took place online but also included an in-person procedure and cost PEN41.90. PTPs were initially valid for one year, after which they were automatically extended, and they enabled bearers to access formal employment.

The new Migration Act became the main legislation governing the entry of Peruvian nationals and foreigners into the country. This law includes provisions for issuing identity documents to the foreign population while also enshrining the fundamental rights of foreigners in the country, listing this population’s duties and ordering the creation of the Migrant Information Registry, to be overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The law also takes a step towards providing material guarantees for the rights of asylum seekers and refugees, which are enshrined in Peru’s regulatory framework through the international instruments to which Peru is a party. Finally, and most importantly, the Migration Act establishes the types of migration status that are recognized in the country. The most important of these are the humanitarian status and special status, as they contemplate the predicament of those who are unable to comply with the requirements that would allow them to settle in Peru legally when they leave their country.

The 2017–2025 National Migration Policy was also approved in 2017. Among other things, seeks to “promote the integration of foreigners into Peruvian society, guaranteeing the protection, care and defence of their human rights and cultural identity” (Supreme Decree No. 015-2017-RE, 27 April 2017). It also establishes five guidelines to help achieve this objective, which revolve around eliminating racism and xenophobia, guaranteeing access to education and health, channelling the capacities of skilled migration to the country, respecting the national identity of the foreign population, and responding to vulnerable situations experienced by foreigners in special situations in a timely fashion. The above guidelines include the refugee population but do not provide a particular description of their rights. Instead, the norm simply includes them in the general migrant population. The second and third phases of the implementation of the PTP were carried out in parallel in July 2017 and January 2018. The purpose of these phases were to extend validity periods and make minor changes to the level of detail in the guidelines, which allowed the bureaucratic process to be simplified.

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9 Supreme Decree No. 002-2017-IN to approve the guidelines for granting the Temporary Stay Permit to Venezuelan nationals (3 January 2017).
9 Legislative Decree No. 1350 to establishes the Migration Act (7 January 2017).
10 This decree was subsequently regulated in March 2017 by Supreme Decree No. 007-2017-IN to approve the Regulations for Legislative Decree No. 1350, the Legislative Decree on Migration and recognize the new migration statuses mentioned above (27 March 2017).
12 Supreme Decree No. 023-2017-IN to approve the guidelines for granting Temporary Stay Permits to Venezuelan nationals (29 January 2017).
13 Supreme Decree No. 001-2018-IN to approve the guidelines for granting the Temporary Stay Permit to Venezuelan nationals (21 January 2018).
In the first half of 2018, two pieces of legislation were issued that continued the process of relaxing the residency requirements for the migrant population in Peru. The first enables Venezuelan citizens with a PTP to obtain Special Resident migration status, which further formalizes this population's stay in the country. The second stipulates that Extraordinary Work Permits be provided free of charge to Venezuelan nationals who apply for the PTP. These permits allow Venezuelan migrants to access the formal labour market while waiting for their PTPs, a measure that enables this population to address their primary needs on a temporary basis.

The sudden change of government in mid-2018 marked a milestone in the country’s response to migration and led to a less receptive environment for migrants in Peru. Three pieces of legislation resulted in a tightening of the requirements for entering Peru and remaining there. The first limits the granting of the PTP to Venezuelans who entered the country up to 31 December 2018, excluding those who arrived after that date. The second stipulated that Venezuelans wishing to enter Peru needed to hold a valid passport, while the third involved the Peruvian justice system’s decision to repeal the second regulation a few months later.

In 2019, there were two new setbacks in terms of migrant regularization measures in Peru. The first concerned the requirement for Venezuelans entering the country to hold an ordinary or humanitarian visa and a passport. This measure ignores the political situation underlying the exodus from Venezuela and creates an additional obstacle hindering their ability to settle legally in Peru. In addition, those who had applied for the PTP were given an ultimatum to present pending documentation by the end of the year. This measure makes it harder for the Venezuelan population to regularize their status in the country and increases the risk of the migrant population losing their legal migration status and becoming undocumented. These years also saw an exponential increase in applications for asylum and refugee status. However, there was no corresponding increase in the approval rate for these applications. Indeed, the percentage of applications that were approved decreased, as indicated by the data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shown in table 2.

Table 2. Number of applications for refugee status submitted and accepted in Peru, 2015–2022

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requests for refugee status submitted</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>4,406</td>
<td>34,179</td>
<td>171,364</td>
<td>268,939</td>
<td>55,928</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for refugee status accepted</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>1,524</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the authors based on data provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to the Request for Access to Public Information (SAIP) No. 405-2022.
Note: Data for 2022 is for January to July 2022.
Some of the migration regularization measures provided for in the PTP were redesigned in 2020.\textsuperscript{21} The most significant of these amendments is that the PTP was replaced by the Temporary Stay Permit Card (CPP), which seeks to provide all foreigners residing irregularly in Peru with a temporary identity document. From a regulatory perspective, this is positive, as it standardizes the regulations for all foreigners, regardless of their nationality. In practice, however, barriers to this process have been identified, as the percentage of the migrant population to benefit from this change has been very low.

In 2021, two changes were made to the regulatory framework for migration in Peru. The first enables state authorities to assign a migration status to children and adolescents to facilitate their access to regular migration status.\textsuperscript{22} The second change expanded the scope of the foreigner identity card to include those who have applied for resident status. Previously, only those who had already been granted resident status could access foreigner identity cards. This change makes it easier for the migrant population in Peru to access identity documents and formalize their presence in the country in the short term.\textsuperscript{23}

Figure 3 shows the timeline for the regulations described in this section. It reveals that a great number of migration-related regulations and public policies were formulated up to mid-2018. From then onwards, there was a decrease in migration-related legislation, various regulations expired, and there was a change of direction in regulatory matters that tended towards an outlook that was less friendly towards migration.

**Figure 3.** Timeline of migration-related legislation in Peru, 2017–2022

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\textsuperscript{21} Supreme Decree No. 010-2020-IN to approve special, exceptional, temporary measures to regularize the migration status of foreigners (22 October 2020).
\textsuperscript{22} Supreme Decree No. 002-2021-IN to amend the Regulations of Legislative Decree No. 1350, the Legislative Decree on Migration, and the Regulations for Act No. 26574, the Nationality Act (24 March 2021).
\textsuperscript{23} Supreme Decree No. 002-2021-IN to amend the Regulations of Legislative Decree No. 1350, the Legislative Decree on Migration, and the Regulations for Act No. 26574, the Nationality Act (24 March 2021).
In short, Peruvian migration policy has undergone considerable changes in recent years in response to the increase in migration flows to the country, particularly from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Regulations in recent years have been directed almost exclusively at managing migration from Venezuela. It is important to note that recent political instability in Peru has coincided with setbacks in migration policy, which has led to the country becoming even less receptive to the arrival of migrants. This climate was compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic, which exacerbated the vulnerabilities of the refugee and migrant population (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2020b). This was compounded by the fact that the country’s public policy response to the pandemic did not include the migrant population (particularly the undocumented migrant population) and did not generate a more receptive climate towards them (Naciones Unidas, 2021).

3.2. Strategies for managing migrant population flows

One of the key points to understanding migration flows within Peru is the geographical distribution of migrant settlements in the country. Around 75 percent of the Venezuelan population residing in Peru is in the department of Lima, followed by other coastal departments (Banco Mundial, 2019; Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, 2022a). This is directly related to the social, economic and labour opportunities these places offer the Venezuelan population and the high demand for skilled labour there (Banco Mundial, 2019). Although the main features of migration from Venezuela are well-known, this information has been underexploited when it comes to coordinating migration management at the national level, particularly at the border, in a way that responds to the Venezuelan population’s expectations and needs and the circumstance in each of Peru’s regions.

The Binational Border Assistance Centres (CEBAF) established by the Andean Community aim to implement integrated control of migration flows at border crossings through cooperation between countries. The Peruvian State has established several CEBAFs, mainly on the border with Ecuador. One of border crossings that is most used by the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population is in Tumbes, which received more than 1 million migrants between 2016 and 2019 (Banco Mundial, 2019). The Tumbes CEBAF earned a reputation for carrying out immigration procedures quickly and efficiently and providing the migrant population with timely humanitarian assistance (Banco Mundial, 2019). CEBAFs are a positive response to the main barrier affecting migration management in Peru, which is the lack of inter-institutional and intersectoral coordination. The Tumbes CEBAF was able to coordinate state agencies such as the National Migration Authority, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Police Force, along with international agencies such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Save the Children, the Red Cross and UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, among others (Banco Mundial, 2019). This experience highlights opportunities for improvement in migration management in Peru, which could also be used in sectors such as health, education and labour.

However, there are three significant limitations to the CEBAF strategy. The first is that although these centres deal with applications from migrants and people hoping to enter the country as refugees, the response is split between the National Migration Authority and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter is responsible for processing refugee applications through its special window, but the sheer number of these mean that the ministry is unable to assist everyone in this group. Second, the only type of assistance that the migrant population receives at the CEBAFs is humanitarian: these centres need to be linked to social protection services and medium- and long-term support strategies. Third, the Covid-19 pandemic led to the closure of the Tumbes CEBAF for almost two years, which increased the vulnerability of the refugee and migrant population during that period. The resulting increase in irregular entry and exit points made the migrant population more vulnerable and exposed them to violence and lack of protection, leaving them at the mercy of illegal groups that control routes into the country. The closure
of the CEBAF also caused setbacks to the existing inter-institutional coordination mechanisms for assisting the migrant population at the border.

3.3. Programmes and actions targeting the refugee and migrant population

This section describes the different programmes and initiatives implemented by the public sector, the private sector, the international cooperation sector and civil society (including various Venezuelan migrant and refugee organizations) in response to the current wave of migration in Peru. The players spearheading these initiatives include organizations led by the Venezuelan community and international agencies such as UNHCR, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNICEF, among others. The Working Group for Refugees and Migrants (GTRM) and the Intersectoral Working Group for Migration Management led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in which the Peruvian State, the United Nations and civil society organizations participate) are umbrella groups that have helped design policies, programmes and actions targeting the refugee and migrant population in Peru (Banco Mundial, 2019; Arroyo, Iwami and López, 2022).

The policies and initiatives listed in this section can be grouped into three main areas: i) coverage of basic needs and humanitarian assistance; ii) socio-economic integration of the most vulnerable, with an emphasis on building skills and generating income; and iii) development of social capital, social harmony and the inclusion of the refugee and migrant population.

One notable feature of the Peruvian public sector’s policy response to the refugee and migrant population is that it has mainly entailed an expansion of programmes that were already in place for the general population. The logic underlying this strategy is to increase supply in response to greater demand for existing services. This strategy is positive in that it makes use of installed infrastructure, builds on previous experience and is based on the principle of non-exclusion. However, it entails one major limitation, namely that it is not a policy response that is rooted in a specific approach to migration and refugee assistance. The latter would require developing a strategy to formalize changes to programmes through legal and administrative mechanisms. Another vital aspect of this process is communicating these changes to the stakeholders that play a key role in implementing them.

Most of the programmes and actions listed in this section were implemented in Metropolitan Lima. As mentioned above, Lima has received 75 percent of the country’s refugee and migrant population, who now constitute 10 percent of the city’s total population. This situation entails enormous challenges and opportunities for the city. In terms of initiatives that cover the basic needs of the refugee and migrant population and provide them with humanitarian assistance, Lima managed to expand programmes such as the Vaso de Leche [Glass of milk], Lima te Cuida [Lima looks after you], Manos a la Olla [Let’s get cooking] initiatives and the programme to combat anaemia. The aim of these changes was to make existing programmes available to the most vulnerable subgroups of the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population: children, adolescents, nursing mothers, pregnant women and the elderly (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2020b). One example of a best practice was the coordinated public- and private-sector initiative to provide support and assistance to groups of people living on the streets, victims of gender-based violence and people at risk, such as Venezuelan sex workers and members of the LGBTIQ+ community (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2020b).

Several important programmes seeking to improve the socio-economic integration of the vulnerable population were identified, particularly in the city of Lima. The Emprende Segur@ programme was implemented in 2020–2022 to promote socio-economic integration by building skills and generating income. It was developed by the
ILO and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and seeks to support Peruvian and Venezuelan entrepreneurs in Peru. The programme is based on the premise that there is a lack of information and support for the highly vulnerable Peruvian and migrant population in need of financial services. In response, the programme provides training courses in entrepreneurship, marketing and business, as well as seed capital and the possibility of accessing a portfolio of loans to help new businesses develop (Asociación Civil La Bastilla, 2021). The programme provided training to 1,351 people, the majority of whom were Venezuelan (58.5 percent) and women (71.2 percent), and 1,325 entrepreneurs accessed seed capital (Migration Network Hub, 2022). Strategies aimed at promoting employment have been identified as good practices in response to two specific challenges facing Peru: labour legislation limiting the hiring of foreigners, who cannot represent more than 20 percent of any payroll (Poder Ejecutivo, 1991), and the downturn in hiring caused by the Covid-19 pandemic (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2020b).

In the education sector, Lima Aprende: Ni Un Niño Sin Estudiar [Lima is learning: Not a single child out of school] is a programme that focuses on access to education in Lima, particularly for migrant children and adolescents from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, although it does not exclude the Peruvian population. In response to the low school attendance rates among these two groups, the Ministry of Education and the Regional Department of Education of Metropolitan Lima offered thousands of children places at school in 2019 and 2020 with the aim of including those who were outside the system and closing the education gap (Asociación Civil La Bastilla, 2021). However, no evaluations have been conducted to ascertain whether this programme was effective or how it impacted the education of the target population.

Actions carried out to promote the development of social capital, social cohesion and the inclusion of the migrant population include initiatives implemented by the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima to promote social harmony between the refugee and migrant population and the host population in Central Lima, which consisted of organizing sporting, recreational, cultural and civic training activities in public spaces. Efforts were also made to promote leadership development in neighbourhood social organizations through the inclusion of the refugee and migrant population, and a pilot programme for the Neighbourhood Migrant Office was created to provide the migrant population in Lima with information and assistance (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2020b).

Our review of the literature suggests that multiple initiatives were implemented by the public sector, the private sector, civil society and international and cooperation organizations to respond to the needs of the refugee and migrant population in Peru. These have helped researchers and policymakers identify best practices for humanitarian action, socio-economic inclusion and the development of social capital in connection with human mobility (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2020b), which will undoubtedly help Peru to overcome the enormous challenges that it is facing in connection with migration policy.

These challenges include formalizing public-sector policies and programmes and improving intersectoral and inter-institutional coordination to design, implement and evaluate programmes targeting the refugee and migrant population. The absence of formalization and coordination between programmes has led to a lack of continuity and connection between the work carried out by various state agencies, which often seek to achieve the same objective through different programmes.

One further challenge is the lack of detailed public information on the mission, vision and coordination of policies, programmes and actions, as the initiatives carried out by multiple stakeholders in different sectors have not yet been documented in detail for evaluation. This lack of documentation makes it impossible to determine whether there is an organized structure in place that is striving to meet public policy objectives.
Finally, when considering Peru’s migration policy as a whole, as reflected in its regulatory framework and the programmes and actions targeting the migrant population, it is clear that the country has focused more on providing legal protection (through the enactment of laws and decrees on migration and refuge) than on ensuring the humanitarian and socio-economic protection of this population. As Arroyo, Iwami and López (2022) point out, making the migrant population equal on paper (through regulations and legislation) has not translated into actual equality of access to services and programmes in Peru. For example, the extension of existing services to include the migrant population seems to have fallen short of meeting their needs, and the assistance provided during the Covid-19 pandemic did not bring the expected results. Some 67.2 percent of the Venezuelan population living in Metropolitan Lima reported that their food intake was affected during the pandemic, and more than 92 percent said that this was because they did not have enough money to buy food (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2020a). It is thus vital to consider including a human mobility approach in the design of future policies and initiatives.

4. Impact of the Peruvian Government’s responses to migration

Unfortunately, there have been no rigorous evaluations of the effects of public migration policy on the refugee and migrant population residing in Peru. This section presents findings on the political, social and institutional factors that have shaped Peru’s migration policy in recent years.

As was mentioned above, the Peruvian Government’s policy response to the recent wave of migration, most of which has been from Venezuela, went from being flexible and responsive to less friendly. Two main factors form the backdrop to this policy shift: the change in political leadership from the Kuczynski Administration (2016–2018) to the Vizcarra Administration (2018–2020) and the change in the socio-economic profile of the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population arriving in Peru (Aron Said and Castillo Jara, 2022). Until 2018, the country’s migration policy was relatively open and oriented towards protecting the needs of the refugee and migrant population. However, from 2018 onwards, Peru’s migration policy was oriented more towards guaranteeing the economic security of Peruvian society (Aron Said and Castillo Jara, 2022). This change is evidence of a deterioration in Peru’s response to the migration crisis, as the facilities for legalizing the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population were reduced. Unfortunately, no evidence is available on how this change in public policy has impacted the quality of life of the migrant population.

This policy shift was influenced by the social and political attention that migration has attracted in Peru. In a study on the stakeholders involved in designing migration policy in the country, Blouin (2021) notes that the Peruvian Government’s response has been heavily swayed by the concepts of migration control and the utility of migration. Utility relates to the economic benefits of migration, such as increases in skilled labour, consumption and investment in the country. Another aspect of the backdrop to Peru’s migration policy is the rise of anti-migration discourse in the social and political spheres, particularly migration from Venezuela. The intensification of such discourse has shifted the focus of state initiatives away from humanitarian obligations and the protection of vulnerable populations, partly because complying with these comes at a high political cost. This is evidenced by the stark contrasts between public announcements on migration policy and the ways in which this policy is actually implemented. Programmes are described as open and inclusive but are in fact restrictive and confusing for migrants and those who must implement them at schools, health posts or municipalities (Blouin, 2021).

The political crisis resulting from the conflict between Peru’s executive and judicial branches has also hindered migration governance, which has in turn impacted the humanitarian and social response to migration (Aron Said and Castillo Jara, 2022). In this sense, the change in tone in Peru’s migration policy after 2018 is due not only to a
change in the Government’s political positions but also relates to the need for a shift in leadership in response to the institutional and political instability in the country (Aron Said and Castillo Jara, 2022).

In some cases, local programmes have also become more exclusive towards the refugee and migrant population. One example of this is the discrimination that surrounded the implementation of the Covid-19 vaccination policy at the local level. Zapata et al. (2021) argue that to access the Covid vaccination programme, the foreign population in various cities had to comply with requirements beyond those stipulated by the Ministry of Health. Another example is the political campaigns that took place in 2022. As part of their election campaign, one of the mayoral candidates for Lima expressed his intention to ban foreigners from working for transportation services and home delivery apps. Attitudes such as these ignore the evidence showing that the refugee and migrant population do not have a negative impact on Peruvian society, not to mention the fact that such statements are openly discriminatory (Meneses, 2022).

Consequently, the Peruvian State’s regulatory response to migration has become less friendly over time. This transition from a legal framework that was receptive to migrants towards a less receptive one was shaped by various social, institutional and political factors. These factors have led to shortfalls in programmes and actions that specifically target the migrant and refugee populations, which has further hindered the social inclusion of these groups in receiving communities.

5. Impact of the migrant population on Peru

To date, few empirical studies have been published on the effects that migration to Peru has on the country. The available studies include measurements of the impact of Venezuelan migration on citizen security and the country’s macroeconomic situation and descriptions of the positive effects that Venezuelan migration has had on Peru, mainly in terms of the human capital that highly educated migrants contribute. These issues are of great interest to policymakers and the general public.

On the matter of citizen security, a 2020 study carried out by Equilibrium-CenDE notes that Venezuelan migration had no significant effect on the rates of various types of crime in Metropolitan Lima. This study also argues that the arrival of Venezuelan migrants has had no impact on citizen security indices. Furthermore, it indicates that the percentage of Venezuelans in the prison population is insignificant in comparison with the percentage of Peruvians. This evidence contrasts with public perceptions of insecurity in the city of Lima and with the fact that in the public imagination, crime is attributed to the presence of Venezuelan migrants (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2020d).

With regard to the effects of Venezuelan migration on Peru’s macroeconomy, there is evidence of an impact on employment, economic growth and the tax structure. Asencios and Castellares (2020) argue that an increase in migration leads to reductions in people’s primary income and the probability of them keeping their jobs, but they find that this mainly affects women aged 14-24 with low education levels. Significantly, this group’s labour market participation rate is just 2.9 percent. A study concludes that in Lima, Arequipa and Piura, Venezuelan migration has not displaced the Peruvian population from paid employment, nor has it caused a decrease in the average wages for formal and informal jobs in urban areas (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, Organización Internacional del Trabajo, Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo, and Universidad Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, 2019). In other words, the impact of migration from Venezuela on both formal and informal employment in Peru
is insignificant. This is a positive indicator that could contribute to ending stigmatization and preventing acts of xenophobia in the country.

With respect to economic growth, spending by the migrant population contributed 0.33 percentage points to Lima’s GDP growth in 2018 (Asencios and Castellares, 2020). Productivity and income gains can also be expected as a result of the migrant population being better educated than the local population (Asencios and Castellares, 2020; Vásquez Luque and Aguilar Lluncor, 2022). A World Bank study estimates that Venezuelan migration will boost aggregate economic growth and contract per capita growth in the short term, but will increase both slightly in the medium term (Banco Mundial, 2019).

Finally, in fiscal terms, the estimated net revenue is positive until 2025, which implies that the fiscal revenue generated by the Venezuelan migrant population residing in Peru outstrips the fiscal costs the population represents for the system (Banco Mundial, 2019). On aggregate, the demographic shock from migration appears to have a positive fiscal impact and contribute to Peru’s investment attractiveness and development.

The limited available evidence on the impact of migration in Peru strongly suggests that Venezuelan migration does not have negative effects on employment or security. This runs counter to public opinion, which expresses concern and fear regarding the impact of Venezuelan migration on these two aspects. In fact, not only does migration have few negative impacts on the economy, there is also evidence and projections that associate migration with economic and fiscal growth, which would be beneficial for Peruvian society.

The literature abounds with cost-benefit arguments that rightly claim that migration increases the human capital of migrant-receiving countries and that the migrant population increases the consumption of goods and services. However, these are not the only benefits that migrants bring about in receiving societies. In the case of Venezuelan migration in Peru, one of the key contributions is the migrant population’s high level of education. Vásquez Luque and Aguilar Lluncor (2022) note that approximately 40 percent of the Venezuelan migrants in Peru in 2020 had a higher education, many in the areas of health and education. Peru does not have enough professionals in these sectors, a problem that is more pronounced in certain regions of the country and rural areas. If migrants were able to get their degrees officially recognized in Peru, they could make a significant contribution to meeting the country’s need for health and education professionals. However, the process for validating foreign qualifications and degrees entails significant unresolved challenges, particularly in the health sector. In practice, however, migrant professionals are already contributing to this area. During the Covid-19 crisis, an emergency decree was issued to authorize foreign health personnel to exercise their professions in Peru.25 The decree remains in force in 2022. It is a clear sign of the country’s need for health professionals and pays testimony to the valuable contribution that the migrant population make to Peru.

However, public opinion has not always been willing to accept the benefits of migration and the migrant population’s contributions to the country. Efforts therefore need to be made to combat the stigmatization of the migrant population as part of the fight against xenophobia and discrimination. These two factors hamper their inclusion and make it harder for the country to reap the social and economic benefits that migration brings to Peru.

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6. Challenges and opportunities for public policy

This section addresses the main challenges around Peru’s migration policy and puts forward proposals to address them.

i) Coordinate migration policy among sectors and institutions.

Peru has tried to respond in a timely manner to the recent waves of migration through legislation to facilitate the process for obtaining regular migration status. However, this legislation has not been implemented in such a way as to make this objective a reality. One of the main obstacles to effective migration management in Peru is institutional weakness and the lack of intersectoral coordination between the stakeholders responsible for designing and implementing Peruvian migration policy. As the IOM points out, it is important for Peru to establish and properly implement a regulatory framework that covers every stage in the migration process to the country. It also needs to define the remits of each of the institutions responsible for guaranteeing the rights of the migrant population (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, 2012).

Experience suggests that it is advantageous for there to be an authority to lead the implementation of migration policy, and this authority must have sufficient resources to be able to operate smoothly. One example of such organizations is Colombia’s Inter-Institutional Unit for International Cooperation, which manages the border with the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The unit is made up of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the President of the Republic and the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation, and coordinates the work of ministries and state entities in relation to migration. In turn, the unit guides the work of international cooperation, embassies and missions and connects them with the relevant organizations and agencies on the ground in Peru. A similar setup in Peru could help to address the challenges outlined above.

ii) Mitigate discrimination and xenophobia in Peru.

Discrimination based on nationality is a huge challenge that is experienced in most migration contexts worldwide. Venezuelan migration to Peru is no exception: levels of perceived discrimination are high among the Venezuelan population, most of whom view this as a direct risk that hinders social cohesion and harmony in the country (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2021a). Discrimination has a negative impact on access to services such as health and education, as noted by several studies analysing Venezuelan migration in Peru (Arroyo Laguna et al., 2022; Vásquez Luque et al., 2020). This poses a huge public policy challenge: combating discrimination requires initiatives that work within the education system and promote a culture of citizenship, but xenophobic and discriminatory behaviour also need to be monitored at the regulatory level.

The Government has not implemented a timely response to discrimination, which it does not recognize as a specific problem that merits targeted policies to eradicate it. On approach to achieving this would be to publicly provide evidence on the benefits that Venezuelan migration brings to Peru and to reinforce the institutional protection of migrants’ rights, thus preventing the repetition of discriminatory behaviour or the deepening of the stigmatization of this vulnerable population. In addition, implementing integration programmes between the host community and the migrant and refugee population could help strengthen ties of cooperation and build a culture of understanding between the two communities, which would help reduce discrimination in the medium and long term. The evidence on programmes to combat racism and xenophobia highlights the importance of eliminating the false beliefs that circulate about the population that is being discriminated against. Other helpful approaches include focusing actions on eliminating discriminatory behaviours (rather than discriminatory attitudes)
and adopting longitudinal strategies that initially seek to emphasize the similarities between minority and majority groups before moving towards promoting the values of diversity and plurality (Centre for Social Change & Social Equity, 2003).

iii) Guarantee supplies of food and other essentials for Venezuelan families.

One additional challenge entails guaranteeing basic provisions for Venezuelan families residing in Peru. The high levels of informal employment among this population make them extremely dependent on their day-to-day earnings, such that they are highly vulnerable to external shocks (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2020a). This issue is particularly concerning in contexts that make informal work difficult (such as lockdowns), which can lead to situations like the beginning of 2020, when 77.2 percent of the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population found themselves without the means to access basic necessities, and more than 35.0 percent went without food (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2020a).

This challenge can be addressed in different ways. For example, it may be useful to implement initiatives that promote formalization or other strategies that seek to protect the population from crises that affect their income. Specifically, the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated the existing vulnerabilities of the migrant population, which were aggravated by the lack of access to the subsidies distributed by the State, as well as to other social benefits (Arroyo, Iwami and López, 2022). Covering the migrant population's basic needs implies including them in the support network during social and health emergencies, as was the case in other countries in the region. On this point, Colombia's decision to include migrants in its Ingreso Solidario subsidy programme is significant. In Bogotá, the migrant population was identified and included in the response that was deployed to provide assistance during lockdowns. Identifying migrants to enable this assistance to reach them required a great deal of work, but it paid off: the migrant population received support throughout the crisis, and this assistance was sustained over time—the Ingreso Solidario programme was still in operation in June 2022.

iv) Recognize the academic qualifications of the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population.

One of the major factors preventing one segment of the population from accessing formal employment is the fact that their qualifications are not officially recognized in Peru. In 2021, an Equilibrium-CenDE study found that although 57 percent of the Venezuelan migrant population residing in Peru in 2018 had a higher education, only 2.9 percent of this population had been able to get their qualifications validated (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2021b). This is because the validation process is expensive, migrants have difficulties obtaining the necessary documents, and there is a lack of information on the procedures in question (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2021b). Furthermore, the Government has not responded effectively to the precariousness of the migrant population’s employment situation. There are no regulations or public programmes to promote formalization, and in some cases, bureaucratic processes end up hampering this. As a result, Peru is missing out on an opportunity to close existing labour gaps in the country, particularly the lack of skilled labour in certain sectors and areas of the country, such as rural areas (Ministry of Labour and Employment Promotion, cited in Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2021b).

The best way to address this challenge would be to simplify bureaucratic processes and promote access to timely information. Another recommendation is for the strategies that have already been implemented to this end to be properly evaluated. The emergency decree authorizing foreign health personnel to work in Peru has already been in force for two years. It is essential for the benefits, barriers and lessons learned from this experience to be evaluated so that policymakers can make evidence-based migration policy decisions.
v) Guarantee Venezuelan children and adolescents access to the education system.

To ensure that the Venezuelan population residing in Peru can truly exercise their rights, one fundamental challenge that needs to be addressed is expanding the capacity of the education system to guarantee that migrant children and adolescents can access it. Although the Venezuelan migrant and refugee population has been included in the target population for various social policies initially designed for the Peruvian population, migrants’ particular needs regarding access to education have not been taken into account. The World Bank (Banco Mundial, 2019) made the following recommendations: (i) consider the information gaps that affect enrolment processes and the distribution of available places at school; (ii) strive to recognize or certify students’ prior learning and the learning acquired in Peru; and (iii) provide personalized assistance for students of Venezuelan origin. If policymakers take into account the challenges faced by Venezuelans in Peru in relation to access to education and adapt policies and strategies to their needs, they will be possible to close the educational gaps between the migrant population and the native-born population.

(vi) Include a human mobility approach in policies, programmes and actions targeting the migrant and refugee population residing in Peru.

As was described in the previous sections, the fact that the Peruvian and Venezuelan populations are equal on paper has not translated into equal access to services, programmes and support networks for the refugee and migrant population living in Peru. While the principle of non-exclusion is a good starting point for public policymaking, the refugee and migrant population residing in Peru face particular challenges that would be better addressed through a human mobility approach. Designing, implementing and evaluating public policy from a human mobility perspective will help to take the specific challenges and needs of the refugee and migrant population into account. Doing so will help ensure that migrants’ basic needs are met and that they are provided the humanitarian assistance they need. It will also contribute to greater socio-economic inclusion, cohesion and integration in Peru and develop the country’s social capital.
Annex 1

Data sources consulted

i. International Organization for Migration (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, 2012)

ii. The 2007 National Census (9th Population Census and 6th Housing Census), which was carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and Information Technology (INEI) and covered 704,746 households, 91.6 percent in urban areas and 8.4 percent in rural areas. The objective of the census is to profile households in demographic, social and economic terms.

iii. The 2006 Continuous National Survey, which was carried out by INEI and comprised a sample of 380,000 households. Its objective is to acquire data on the dynamics of migration, with an emphasis on Peruvian emigration abroad, including emigrants’ destination countries and remittance flows.

iv. The National Household Survey (ENAHO), which has been carried out by INEI since 1995 and comprises a sample of about 25,000 households. Its objective is to monitor relevant social and economic issues in Peru by studying variables related to the labour market, income, expenditure, education and health, among other factors.

v. The 2008 and 2009 National Household Budget Survey, which was conducted by INEI and comprised a sample of 36,000 households. Its objective was to acquire data on household consumption patterns by monitoring household income and expenditure.

vi. The 2009 and 2011 Youth, Employment and International Migration Survey, which was conducted by INEI and gathered information on the population aged 15–29 living in the cities of Lima, Trujillo, Arequipa, Huancayo, Cusco, Piura and Pucallpa. The 2009 and 2011 samples covered 8,573 and 9,516 households, respectively.

vii. The 2011 National Youth Survey, which was carried out by INEI and comprised a sample of 6,900 households. Its results were representative of the whole country, including both urban and rural areas, and it sought to provide data on the sociodemographic features of the youth population (those aged 15–29) and their situation with regard to employment, education and engagement in civic life.

viii. Administrative records and registries: these resources are not developed for statistical purposes, so the concepts and definitions used in them were standardized, and data consistency and coverage checks were carried out. The following records and registries were used: The Migration Control Registry, registries of the General Migration and Naturalization Authority, the National Identification and Civil Status Registry, registries of work permits for foreign citizens, consular registries and records of arrests in connection with human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

National Institute of Statistics and Information Technology and International Organization for Migration (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática and Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, 2018)

i. Migration flows were calculated based on the administrative records of the National Migration Authority, especially the Andean Migration Card. Data from the National Identification and Civil Status Registry were also used. Statistical limitations relating to the data source are acknowledged.
National Institute of Statistics and Information Technology (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, 2021)

ii. Migration flows were calculated based on the administrative records of the National Migration Authority, especially the Andean Migration Card. Data from the National Identification and Civil Status Registry was also used. Statistical limitations relating to the data source are acknowledged.

Equilibrium-Centre for Economic Development (Equilibrium-Centro para el Desarrollo Económico, 2021a)

i. Data gathered in August 2021.

ii. Universe: Venezuelan migrants and refugees over the age of 18.

iii. Sample size: 515 Venezuelan nationals surveyed in Peru.

iv. A weighting factor was applied to the sample collected to assign a population weight to each observation, disaggregated by sex. This weighting is based on official data from the migration authorities of each country.
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