Abstract

The Dominican Republic is a net emigration country. Despite having one of the highest economic growth rates in the region, about 14 percent of the Dominican population has sought better opportunities abroad, in countries such as Spain and the United States. At the same time, this growth has prompted demand for foreign labour. Today, nearly 4 percent of the country’s population is foreign-born, and 86.5 percent of that population is from Haiti. A review of the main migration policies that have been implemented in the country in the last century reveals that although further action is needed, the Dominican Republic has made progress on strengthening its institutions and implementing a long-term vision on migration. This paper analyses the main impacts of the migration patterns described in the literature, notably the fact that the migrant population plays a fundamental role in sectors such as agriculture and construction, as it is a substitute for unskilled native-born labour and complements the highly educated workforce. On the topic of emigration, the evidence clearly shows that remittances sent by the diaspora also play a key role in the national economy. The paper concludes by presenting a series of recommendations for the formulation of migration policies in the Dominican Republic, with the aim of addressing various aspects of the current situation, the link between migration and the labour market and the needs of the Dominican diaspora.
Disclaimer:
Migration in the Dominican Republic: Context, Challenges and Opportunities

UNDP partners with people at all levels of society to help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone. On the ground in nearly 170 countries and territories, we offer a global perspective and local insight to help empower lives and build resilient nations.

Copyright © UNDP 2022 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America
United Nations Development Programme | One United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA

The views, designations, and recommendations that are presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the official position of UNDP.
1. Introduction

The Dominican Republic has one of the highest economic growth rates in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the last three decades, the Dominican economy has grown at an average annual rate of 5 percent, well above that of the other countries in the region, whose average growth has been approximately 2.3 percent. Nevertheless, major challenges remain. These include the country’s high rates of poverty and inequality—although these have come down in recent years, they have not done so at the rate that might have been expected, given the country’s economic growth. This under-inclusiveness of this owes partly to factors such as high rates of informal employment, the creation of jobs in low-productivity sectors, the stagnation of real wages, limited access to social security and weak linkages between different sectors of production (Carneiro and Sirtaine, 2017).

The Dominican Republic is also a net emigration country, which implies that the outflow of Dominicans to other countries outstrips the number of foreigners migrating to the country. Despite the country’s economic growth, many Dominicans have chosen to seek a better future abroad. In the last 30 years, about 14 percent of the Dominican population sought better opportunities in other countries, mainly Spain and the United States (United Nations, 2019). At the same time, the development and growth of the country have created a demand for foreign labour, which has allowed various immigrant groups to find employment opportunities and livelihoods that were not available to them in their countries of origin. Today, nearly 4 percent of the country’s population is foreign-born, and 86.5 percent of this migrant population is from Haiti (United Nations, 2019). Various historical factors relating to the development of the agricultural sector have contributed to shifts in the migration patterns from Haiti to the Dominican Republic, which have also been shaped by the political, economic and social instability in the former and the fact that the two countries share a land border. In recent years, like many other countries in the region, the Dominican Republic has also received a growing number of migrants fleeing the socio-economic circumstances in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Some major contrasts emerge when migration patterns and policies and the impact of migration in the Dominican Republic are compared with the situation in other countries in the region. The first of these differences concerns timing. In most Latin American countries today, migration policy discussions focus largely on the recent impact of migration from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In contrast, the Dominican Republic has been experiencing emigration and immigration for more than 30 years. Looking specifically at immigration, although there are recent arrivals from Venezuela in the country, most of those migrating for economic and social reasons are from Haiti. Second, this difference in origin also affects the type of immigrants arriving in the Dominican Republic: while the Venezuelan migrant population’s educational attainment is on par with or outstrips that of the host population, on average, Haitians arriving in the country tend to have lower levels of education, and about 70 percent do not have a good command of Spanish. Third, the migrant population only works in specific, low-skilled sectors and occupations, which has major policy implications. Fourth, the world is experiencing a wave of expressions and acts of xenophobia. In the Dominican Republic, such sentiments are not a recent phenomenon, as Riveros (2022) details. Indeed, they date back to the Trujillo era and are also rooted in longstanding animosity. Consequently, combating xenophobia will require policies specifically designed to achieve this, which need to consider the historical relationship between the two countries and the socio-economic characteristics of the migrant population. Fifth, the Dominican Republic must step up its initiatives to design policies to attract resources from the Dominican diaspora (in the form of economic and human capital), as this is almost three times the size of the immigrant population.

4 Costa Rica’s migrant population is overwhelmingly Nicaraguan in origin. Although there are a large number of migrants from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, this population does not represent a significant percentage of the total migrant population, like in the Dominican Republic.
The Dominican Republic’s high rates of migration and the impact of these explain why migration frequently appears on the country’s political, social and economic agenda. As in the rest of the world, migration has had both positive and negative impacts on the country, and these are only just beginning to be understood. This document summarizes the information available on migration in Dominican Republic, which is presented in five sections, the first of which is this introduction. The second section presents statistics that describe migration patterns in the Dominican Republic over the last three decades, based on the most recent data available. The third section describes the country’s institutional framework and migration policies from 1912 to 2021 to show how migration legislation has evolved over the last 100 years. Section four summarizes the main impacts that migration has had on areas including the labour market, remittances, education, health and economic development, as identified in earlier studies. Finally, section five summarizes the challenges posed by migration and presents a series of recommendations that were formulated in light of the available evidence and expert recommendations. The aim of these is to bring about the effective inclusion of the immigrant population in the Dominican economy and society.

2. Migration patterns in the Dominican Republic

The large-scale waves of migration that the Dominican Republic is experiencing today first began to gain momentum nearly 50 years ago. As described in section three of this study, there was relatively little migration in the country from 1900 to 1950. What little there was mainly entailed the immigration of labour from Haiti and other Caribbean islands to work in the sugar mills. It was not until 1960 that the country’s migration processes became more dynamic, which was the result of various factors. The political, social and economic uncertainty that followed the fall of the Trujillo dictatorship; the Cuban Revolution; the Dominican civil war; the US invasion; and structural changes in the country’s economy all triggered large-scale social movements within and outside of Dominican borders.

These migration patterns have continued to increase at a significant rate over the last 30 years, particularly in the case of emigration. Figure 1 shows how the total numbers of Dominican emigrants and foreign immigrants in the country have evolved over the last 30 years. In the 1990s, the total number of Dominican emigrants grew by 92.5 percent. In the first two decades of the 21st Century, they did so by 32 percent and 31 percent, respectively. It is estimated that in 2019, more than 1.5 million Dominicans lived abroad. As figure 1 also shows, that same year, slightly more than 500,000 foreigners were living in the Dominican Republic. The growth rate of the immigrant population has been much less marked, although it is still significant. Between 1990 and 2019, the total number of immigrants in the country increased by nearly 95 percent, mainly as a result of the growth in immigration recorded between 2010 and 2015.
Figure 1. Evolution of migration (number of migrants) in the Dominican Republic, 1990–2019

![Graph showing migration trends from 1990 to 2019](source)

**Source:** United Nations (2019).

**Note:** The source provides the total number of migrants halfway through each of the years between 1990 and 2019.

In relative terms, taking the total population of the Dominican Republic as a point of reference, the share of migrants from and to the country has evolved over the last 30 years. As the figure shows, between 1990 and 2010, immigration remained at an almost constant 4.1 percent before increasing significantly in the 2010s. This recent rise is mainly due to the displacements caused by the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the arrival of the Venezuelan population since 2015. Turning to emigration, there has been a sustained increase in the share of the Dominican population leaving the country. In 1990, this stood at 6.5 percent but hovered at around 14.5 percent by 2019, representing growth of 123 percent over the last 30 years.

Figure 2. Share of migrants as a percentage of the total population in the Dominican Republic, 1990–2019

![Graph showing migration trends from 1990 to 2019](source)

**Source:** United Nations (2019).

---

5. The total population of the Dominican Republic has increased by 50.5% in the last 30 years. In 1990, the country had a population of 7,133,491, which had increased to 10,738,957 by 2019 (World Bank, “GDP growth (annual %)—Dominican Republic, Latin America & Caribbean”, data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=DO-ZJ).
There is still no detailed information on how migration patterns from and to the Dominican Republic changed during and after the Covid-19 pandemic, nor on how the migrant population was affected by it. A publication from the Centre for the Observation of Migration and Social Development in the Caribbean (OBMICA)\(^6\) was the first to examine this topic. With regard to the diaspora, the study provides a detailed description of the well-known fact that in the United States, the two communities most jeopardized by Covid were Latin Americans and people of African descent (OBMICA, 2022). The Dominican population abroad were hit hard by the economic impact of lockdown measures. However, government assistance packages partially offset these negative impacts and allowed emigrants to continue sending financial resources to their families back home throughout 2020, as is detailed in chapter four. Turning to the migrant population in the Dominican Republic, Riveros (2022) notes that during the pandemic, borders remained officially closed and the Government put deportations on hold. In socio-economic terms, because the majority of the migrant population were informally employed and the temporary government aid provided during the health emergency went exclusively to people of Dominican origin, the migrant population was estimated to have been among those who were most jeopardized by isolation measures (Riveros, 2022).

### 2.1. Emigration

Table 1 shows the main destinations chosen by the Dominican emigrant population. In 2019, 75.3 percent of this population resided in the United States. According to OBMICA, the Dominican migrant community is the fifth-largest Hispanic group and represents 3 percent of the Hispanic migrant population in the United States (OBMICA, 2020). The second-most-important destination is Spain, followed by Puerto Rico and Italy. One factor that has characterized emigration from the Dominican Republic is gender. According to United Nations data, the share of female migrants is higher than that of male migrants in all destinations.\(^7\) This rate remains constant and stable at around 57 percent.

**Table 1.** Main destination countries for Dominican emigrants (by number of emigrants), 1990–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>347,858</td>
<td>524,698</td>
<td>705,139</td>
<td>761,989</td>
<td>843,720</td>
<td>1,086,819</td>
<td>1,173,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15,160</td>
<td>21,654</td>
<td>36,953</td>
<td>73,049</td>
<td>136,976</td>
<td>156,905</td>
<td>167,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>37,207</td>
<td>49,325</td>
<td>61,563</td>
<td>66,983</td>
<td>63,981</td>
<td>57,891</td>
<td>50,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9,060</td>
<td>13,427</td>
<td>17,933</td>
<td>30,028</td>
<td>40,445</td>
<td>42,011</td>
<td>46,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)</td>
<td>18,280</td>
<td>16,240</td>
<td>14,293</td>
<td>14,286</td>
<td>14,423</td>
<td>14,743</td>
<td>14,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>4,751</td>
<td>5,976</td>
<td>7,223</td>
<td>8,108</td>
<td>9,543</td>
<td>11,481</td>
<td>12,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2,668</td>
<td>3,841</td>
<td>5,106</td>
<td>6,737</td>
<td>8,450</td>
<td>10,535</td>
<td>11,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>2,828</td>
<td>4,643</td>
<td>7,013</td>
<td>8,972</td>
<td>9,349</td>
<td>10,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td>3,933</td>
<td>5,593</td>
<td>7,037</td>
<td>7,792</td>
<td>8,688</td>
<td>9,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>3,554</td>
<td>5,859</td>
<td>6,227</td>
<td>6,893</td>
<td>8,095</td>
<td>8,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>26,343</td>
<td>29,806</td>
<td>33,620</td>
<td>41,985</td>
<td>44,351</td>
<td>50,433</td>
<td>54,742</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

\(^6\) OBMICA promotes the human rights of the migrant population and their families. Its mission, vision, values and objectives are described on its website: [obmica.org/index.php/obmica/vision-mision](http://obmica.org/index.php/obmica/vision-mission).

Since the United States is the main destination chosen by Dominican emigrants, somewhat more is known about the characteristics of the Dominican population there. The average age is around 30, and there is some variation between the education levels of the US-born Dominican population and recent arrivals. The former have spent more years in formal education and tend to have bachelor’s or technical degrees. By 2019, 63 percent of the Dominican population had at most a high-school education or lower, while this share is just 36 percent among the US-born Dominican population. In terms of employment, both the US- and Dominican Republic-born Dominican populations have a labour force participation rate of approximately 63 percent (OBMICA, 2020). In addition, close to 50 percent of the Dominican labour force in the US works in the services sector, education and health, food or the provision of recreational services. However, one point of concern is the fact that 22 percent of Dominican households live in poverty, according to the 2017 US census.

The Dominican population is the third-largest group of Latino emigrants who obtain US citizenship through naturalization (OBMICA, 2020), nearly always through family ties to US citizens (98.67 percent). Legal emigration to the United States typically entails permanent residency, although a small but still significant number of Dominicans also migrate on temporary work visas. Approximately 40 percent of this group obtain visas for artists, athletes or entertainers, while the remainder are distributed almost equally between agricultural and non-agricultural jobs, specialist jobs and executive positions at multinational companies.

On the topic of emigration to other countries, as can be observed in table 1, there were just over 167,000 Dominicans living in Spain in 2019. One of the main reasons behind the current wave of emigration is family reunification with Dominicans that have settled in Spain. Between 2005 and 2015, the main driver of Dominican emigration to Spain was the issuing of more than 90,000 work permits, which increased the scale of these migratory flows (OIM and INM, 2017). In 2015, 54.9 percent of the Dominican population living in Spain had acquired Spanish nationality.

Emigration to Puerto Rico peaked in 2005 and has since declined. The census data shows that 48.6 percent of the Dominican population living in Puerto Rico live in poverty. The Dominican population is concentrated in the services sector, and 14.1 percent work in the construction sector. Nearly 60 percent of the Dominican migrant population in Puerto Rico is made up of women, who are predominantly paid domestic workers. Most migration to Puerto Rico is not legally recognized by the authorities and has been decreasing due to the maritime border controls implemented by the US Coast Guard in recent years (OIM and INM, 2017).

### 2.2. Immigration

At the start of the 20th Century, immigration in the Dominican Republic was shaped by the growth of the sugar industry, which depended heavily on foreign labour. Most of this labour came from Haiti, which shares a land border with the Dominican Republic and where opportunities have historically been lacking (OIM and INM, 2017). Economic growth and the development of the construction and tourism sectors later led immigrants from other parts of the world to join the Haitian population. These migrant workers filled a gap in the labour market by performing occupations that were undesirable for the native-born population. However, Haiti is still the source of the majority of the migrant population in the Dominican Republic. Table 2 shows how the numbers of migrants of different origins in the Dominican Republic have evolved. The data shows that in 2019, 86.5 percent of the immigrant population was of Haitian origin.

---

8 Data from the US Census Bureau (2016) based on the 2011 Puerto Rico Community Survey. Figure taken from the OIM and ILO (2017).
Table 2. Main countries of origin of the immigrant population in the Dominican Republic (by number of immigrants), 1990–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>187,210</td>
<td>207,931</td>
<td>228,652</td>
<td>271,273</td>
<td>311,969</td>
<td>475,084</td>
<td>491,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9,115</td>
<td>10,124</td>
<td>11,133</td>
<td>17,858</td>
<td>24,457</td>
<td>14,010</td>
<td>14,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7,354</td>
<td>8,368</td>
<td>8,982</td>
<td>7,864</td>
<td>6,691</td>
<td>6,967</td>
<td>7,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>8,767</td>
<td>9,738</td>
<td>10,708</td>
<td>8,265</td>
<td>5,763</td>
<td>4,578</td>
<td>4,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,960</td>
<td>7,731</td>
<td>8,501</td>
<td>6,070</td>
<td>3,595</td>
<td>4,192</td>
<td>4,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3,613</td>
<td>4,013</td>
<td>4,413</td>
<td>2,920</td>
<td>1,406</td>
<td>3,776</td>
<td>3,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,524</td>
<td>2,804</td>
<td>3,083</td>
<td>2,518</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>3,731</td>
<td>3,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)</td>
<td>14,235</td>
<td>15,811</td>
<td>17,386</td>
<td>11,299</td>
<td>5,132</td>
<td>3,561</td>
<td>3,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>6,824</td>
<td>7,580</td>
<td>8,335</td>
<td>6,008</td>
<td>3,639</td>
<td>3,259</td>
<td>3,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>4,697</td>
<td>5,217</td>
<td>5,737</td>
<td>4,593</td>
<td>3,416</td>
<td>2,838</td>
<td>2,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5,084</td>
<td>5,647</td>
<td>6,209</td>
<td>3,905</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>1,857</td>
<td>1,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3,562</td>
<td>3,957</td>
<td>4,351</td>
<td>2,761</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>31,206</td>
<td>34,660</td>
<td>38,121</td>
<td>30,667</td>
<td>22,990</td>
<td>24,221</td>
<td>24,985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Dominican authorities have acknowledged the importance of managing migration and have carried out several studies that provide systematic data on the migrant population in the country. The most recent, comprehensive survey conducted in the country is the 2017 Second National Immigrant Survey (ENI). Although the 2017 ENI data on the number of migrants in the country in 2015 differs from the figure reported by the United Nations, the survey provides insight into the main characteristics of this population.

According to data from the 2017 ENI, 64.4 percent of the foreign population live in urban areas. Specifically, 23.8 percent live in Greater Santo Domingo, 18.6 percent in large cities and 21.9 percent in other urban centres. In urban areas, 84.3 percent of foreigners were born in Haiti, while in rural areas this share increases to 94.3 percent. A comparison of the foreign-born population with the total population of each province reveals that the provinces with the highest relative proportions of migrants are the border provinces and those next to these (13.2 percent), provinces that grow sugarcane (13.1 percent), followed by densely populated provinces (7.6 percent) and those that produce rice, bananas, food and livestock products (7.3 percent). Distribution by geographic area is clearly determined by the economic sectors in which migrants arriving in the country (largely from Haiti) find work. The immigrant population is predominantly young and male. Some 39.5 percent are between 20 and 34 years old. Men make up 58.3 percent of the immigrant population, while women account for 41.7 percent. Some 82.1 percent of heads of households are men.

According to data from the 2017 ENI, the immigrant population in urban areas mostly live in houses (73.3 percent) and apartments (13.5 percent), while the rest reside in rooms or annexes behind dwellings. Some 65.6 percent of the foreign-born population rent their accommodation, while 18.4 percent own their own home. The remainder
state that they live in units provided by the companies they work for or access accommodation through other such arrangements. There are differences in the migrant population’s living conditions: while 55 percent of the Haitian-born immigrant population reported that the main construction materials used in their homes were brick or concrete walls, this share increases to 97.7 percent among the immigrant population from other countries. Similar divides were also present in relation to the type of flooring or roofing materials used. The precariousness of housing conditions is also evident in migrants’ access to public services: while only 14.7 percent of the Haitian migrant population has mains water and 11 percent obtains water from a neighbour’s house, the percentage of households with mains water supply increases to 80 percent among migrants from other countries.

With regard to the education level of the immigrant population, 13.0 percent have no formal education at all, 49.1 percent have a primary or basic education, 26.5 percent have a high school education and only 10.3 percent have a university education. The percentages vary among the different migrant groups. For example, 27.7 percent of the migrant population from Haiti responded that they do not know how to read or write, compared to 1.9 percent of migrants from other countries. Within the group of migrants who reported never having attended school, 87.9 percent were of Haitian origin, 11.8 percent were descendants of Haitians born in the Dominican Republic and only 0.3 percent were descendants of migrants born in other countries. It is also surprising that while only 32.0 percent of Haitians stated that they speak Spanish well or very well, this percentage was as high as 84.8 percent among the rest of the foreign population.

Although the following section explores the impacts that immigration from Haiti has had on the labour market in greater detail, it is worth mentioning the data available in the 2017 ENI here. According to the survey, the main reasons that Haitians migrate to the Dominican Republic are economic, such as a desire to seek employment and better opportunities, especially access to healthcare and education. These same reasons are also the main motivation for 78.5 percent of the foreign migrant population from other countries. The data from the 2017 ENI reveals that the migrant population of Haitian origin is concentrated in the agricultural sector (33.8 percent) and the construction sector (26.3 percent), while 16.0 percent are engaged in commerce. In contrast, the foreign population from other countries is employed in hotels and restaurants (28.4 percent) and the services sector (44.8 percent). On average, 40.0 percent of the immigrant population performs unskilled work, and 45.8 percent of this subgroup is from Haiti.

There is some variation in the labour market in terms of the conditions for hiring foreigners and their degree of formalization. While 49.0 percent of migrant workers from Haiti have stable contracts, this share is much greater among migrants from other countries—80.0 percent. There are similar disparities in access to social benefits. In relation to social security and protection, there are significant differences in access to private health insurance. Nearly 95 percent of the Haitian population said that they do not have health insurance, as compared to 50 percent of the foreign population from other countries. Likewise, while only 3.6 percent of the Haitian population are registered with a pension fund, 32.2 percent of the foreign population from other countries have pension plans. Furthermore, the average income of foreigners from other countries is 238 percent higher than that of the migrant population from Haiti.12 Haitian migrants and their descendants are clearly in a more vulnerable labour situation than people from other countries.

Another group of migrants that has received special attention from the Dominican Government is the Venezuelan population. Large numbers of Venezuelans have been leaving their country since 2014. According to the Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela,13 by late 2021 there were approximately 4.99

---

12 According to data from the 2017 ENI, the Haitian-born immigrant population earns an average DOP14,092 per month, while the average monthly income for migrants from other countries is DOP33,587.

13 For more on the Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, see [www.r4v.info](http://www.r4v.info)
million Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean and more than 6 million worldwide. According to the latest data, an estimated 115,300 Venezuelans live in the Dominican Republic, representing 2.31 percent of the total number of Venezuelan migrants living in Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole.

The 2017 ENI conducted a complementary study of the Venezuelan migrant population, finding that there were 25,872 Venezuelans in the Dominican Republic at the time of the survey (4.5 percent of the total foreign population). In addition, according to data from the 2017 ENI, more than 50 percent of the Venezuelans living in the Dominican Republic in 2016 had a university education, and almost 35 percent were high school graduates. Some 70 percent of migrants from Venezuela had entered the labour market, and 10 percent were looking for work.

The arrival of Venezuelans in the Dominican Republic is being monitored systematically by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) through tracking matrices that triangulate data from the National Statistics Office and the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (OIM, 2018b and 2019). In 2020, the National Migration Institute of the Dominican Republic, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) conducted a study mapping the educational and labour profiles of the Venezuelan migrant population in the country. According to data from this study, the working-age Venezuelan migrant population has 11.9 years of relevant professional experience, and 61 percent of the population has higher education. The main sectors they tend to be employed in are education, health, commerce and tourism.

Finally, there is a constant flow of Haitian nationals at the border who enter and leave the country regularly even though they are not permanent residents. The recent IOM Survey to Monitor Migration Flows of Cross-Border Inhabitants shows that between 25,000 and 37,000 Haitians cross the border each month to trade, stock up on goods, and receive basic primary health care and educational services (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, 2021). Some 90 percent of this cross-border migrant population travels between one and five times per week, and most of these people travel alone and with valid identity documents. According to the survey data, they spend between DOP1,000 and DOP3,000 per day per visit (US$17–US$52).  

3. Institutional framework for migration in the Dominican Republic in 1912–2021

This section summarizes the main regulations and institutional framework for migration in the Dominican Republic. Most of the data comes from the research conducted by Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021), based on 50 interviews with migration experts and the authors’ historical review of the main regulatory and administrative measures implemented in the country between 1912 and 2018. 

References to some of the measures implemented in the country between 2019 and 2021 are also included. This section therefore provides a historical overview of the legal framework that has guided the management of migration patterns in the Dominican Republic since the 20th Century, as summarized in diagram 1.

---

14 The exchange rate on 16 January 2022 was DOP57.85 per US dollar.
15 The migration policy instruments analysed by Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021) can be classified into three groups: i) national regulations, which include laws issued by the State; ii) international regulations, which guide policy based on agreements or treaties signed by the State, including binational agreements with Haiti; and iii) administrative instruments, which include the circulars, provisions and ordinances required to implement the two previous instruments.
Diagram 1. Migration policy milestones in the Dominican Republic, 1912–2022

1912-1939
- Migration Act No. 5074
- Creation of the Immigration Office (now the General Immigration Authority).
- Colonization of State Lands Act (1934).
- Parsley Massacre (1937).
- Migration Act No. 95
- Act No. 199.

1940-1960
- Naturalization Act No. 1638 (1948).
- Treaty with Haiti for the Migration of Agricultural Labourers (1952).

1961-1989
- Change in the orientation of the country’s economic structure towards the tourism and service sectors.

1990-1999
- Decree No. 417-90.
- Decree No. 233-91.

2000-2010
- Decree No. 618 (2006).
- Act No. 1-08 creating the National Council for Dominican Communities Abroad (CONDEX).

2010-2022
- Act No. 169 on Special Naturalization (2014).
- Announcement of the Second Phase of the PNRE by the National Migration Council (2017).
- Resolution No. 00119-2021, which enables a process for regularizing the status of the Venezuelan population.
- Start of construction of Dominican-Haitian border fence.

Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021).

3.1. Policies for the immigrant population

As Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021) explore in detail, Dominican migration policy in the first few decades of the twentieth century was based on two visions of the role that migration should play in the country’s development. On the one hand, migration was seen as a tool that would increase the availability of the unskilled labour required to promote the development of the Dominican agricultural sector, based on the idea that it would be the driving force of the national economy. On the other hand, the country sought to promote the migration of an educated population from Europe that would contribute to educational and cultural development and thus promote the growth and consolidation of the Dominican State. Based on this twofold vision, the country passed Migration Act No. 5074 of 1912, which facilitated the migration of both of these groups, which were explicitly differentiated in the regulations. With the aim of creating a developed nation driven by the agricultural sector, the regulations facilitated the migration and settlement of Caucasian Europeans, who were granted concessions that facilitated their becoming owners and developers in the rural sector. The law also oversaw the migration of labourers to develop the industry, to make up for the labour shortage the country was experiencing.
During the 1930s, Dominican migration policy was based on the control and regulation of cross-border movements. Several historical facts pay testimony to this. First, the Immigration Office (now the General Immigration Authority) was created as part of the Ministry of the Interior and the Police, meaning it had a clear mission to exercise immigration control. Second, in 1934 the Colonization of State Lands Act was passed, which sought to increase the settlement rates of Europeans, provided that they were white. The law also required that 70 percent of employees of all companies in the country be of Dominican origin. Third, after a failed attempt at a border treaty with Haiti at the beginning of the 1930s, the border was militarized and negotiations continued until the signing of the Protocol of March 1936. This legislation prompted General Trujillo to implement a policy of “Dominicanization” that reached its darkest point in 1937, when Trujillo ordered a massacre that aimed to eradicate the Haitian population from the agricultural estates along the border.¹⁶

The different treatment afforded to migrants depending on their origins became more acute in the following years. First, at the end of the decade, on 14 April 1939, Migration Act No. 95 was enacted. Unlike the law preceding it, this specifically sought to attract the labour needed for the growth of the sugar industry to promote the development of the agricultural sector. However, unlike the previous law, it also included mobility restrictions for agricultural labourers (braceros), confining them to remain in the camps and settlements around the sugar mills (bateyes), while excluding them from the social and labour rights recognized for Dominican workers. According to the law, these low-skilled temporary workers were even treated as non-immigrants (arts. 3.4 and 6), and how they were handled was defined by Migration Regulation No. 279. The Migration Act also established the General Migration Authority, which still exists today. Indeed, the law remained in force for 65 years, albeit with some amendments, and thus shaped the country’s vision of migration and dual approach to managing it.

The second regulatory framework that differentiated types of migrants was Act No. 199, passed in 1939, which specifically set out the modus operandi for migration between the Dominican Republic and Haiti and enabled the former to legitimize deportation and deny entry into the country. According to a study carried out by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the ILO, the Dominican Government calculated the number of Haitian workers required by the sugar sector each year, which the Haitian Government then recruited (OECD/ILO, 2018). Third, the distinction between types of migrants continued with the passing of Act No. 1638 on naturalization in 1948: this only granted regular residents, property owners and foreign investors the possibility of becoming naturalized Dominican citizens. Foreigners working in the agricultural sector continued to be excluded from these rights.

The dual nature of Dominican immigration policy continued during the 1950s, the last decade of the Trujillo dictatorship. In 1951, the Labour Code was approved, under which companies were obliged to ensure that a minimum of 70 percent of their workforce was of Dominican origin. However, given that General Trujillo already owned many of the sugar mills in the country, the law gave the Executive Branch the discretion to grant permits to agricultural companies to employ foreigners beyond this quota. In 1952, a contracting agreement was signed with Haiti that regulated the entry of temporary day labourers into the country and obliged the Haitian Government and the companies that employed them to guarantee the social rights of this population. These rights included the right to documentation, food, health certificates, housing and social security and the right to receive the same wages as Dominican workers.

The 1960s brought a rupture in the political, economic and migration-related history of the Dominican Republic. The assassination of General Trujillo ushered in the transition towards democratic rule and the transformation of the sugar industry and also triggered a mass exodus of the Dominican population to the United States. Milestones in

¹⁶ Historians estimate that between 9,000 and 12,000 people of Haitian origin were killed during this event, which is known as the Parsley Massacre.
the legislative sphere included the Identity Card Act of 1962, under which all adult Dominicans or foreign residents became obliged to carry an identity card at all times. The law also established the criteria through which foreigners could obtain one. In the case of rural workers, the law made agricultural companies (most of which were in the hands of the Dominican State after having been expropriated from General Trujillo and his family) responsible for their workers obtaining identity cards through the appropriate authorities. In 1963, the new Constitution was passed. This maintained the spirit of previous laws on immigration by seeking to protect the border and prioritize the agro-industrial sector to promote the country’s development.

Between the 1970s and the mid-1980s, there was a fundamental change in the country’s vision, and tourism development began to be promoted as a core development strategy. Compounded by the collapse of international sugar prices, this shift triggered a crisis in the agricultural sector that prompted Dominican agricultural workers to emigrate, thus increasing the demand for Haitian labour in rural areas. During his second term in office, President Balaguer dismantled the State-owned sugar industry, leasing the land from this to private companies and creating free trade zones.

Most of the Haitian migrant population began to arrive in the country after the fall of President Duvalier in Haiti in 1986. At the start of the 1990s, Decree No. 417–90 was passed, regulating the migration of Haitian day labourers. Under pressure from various international organizations, the decree required this population’s legal situation to be regularized through the issuing of cards specifying their work status and place of residence. It also increased the responsibility of the State Sugar Council and individual producers to ensure these workers had dignified lives. Decree No. 233–91 was enacted in 1991 in response to international allegations regarding child labour. It ordered the repatriation of all foreigners under the age of 16 and over the age of 60 who worked in the sugar mills. An estimated 35,000 people were expelled from the country at that time.

A year later, in 1992, the State passed Act No. 16–92, which created the Labour Code that is still in force in the country. Again, the rights this contained were not applicable to foreign workers, and it also reduced the maximum proportion of foreign workers that a company could hire from 30 percent to 20 percent. According to Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021), the new Labour Code ignored not only the realities of the demand for labour in the agricultural sector but also the growing demand in the emerging construction and tourism sectors. In other words, not only did Dominican migration policy remain exclusive, it also failed to take into account the needs of the labour market to achieve development and growth in the country. These regulations meant that the law itself included concessions regarding foreign worker quotas depending on the sector and type of work in question.

This inherent contradiction has not even been addressed in more recent laws, such as the General Migration Act (Act No. 285) of 2004. This was passed after a long period of discussion and covers new issues such as emigration and the return of people of Dominican origin, human trafficking and matters relating to refugee status. In addition, it also created new residence categories by differentiating between permanent and temporary residence and established that people in transit are “non-residents,” a category that includes temporary workers and those living in border zones. The law also implemented an organization chart for managing migration. This included existing institutions such as the General Migration Authority, alongside new entities such as the National Migration Institute and the National Migration Council. However, procedural issues meant that the Migration Act only truly became operational in 2011, when Decree No. 631–11 was passed. This delay explains why the implementation of the law has been slow and partial. For example, the National Migration Council has met only sporadically, and the National Migration Institute only became operational in 2015 (OECD/ILO, 2018).
The most controversial point that emerged from the law related to the conditions for acquiring Dominican nationality. The law excluded the sons and daughters of non-resident immigrants from obtaining Dominican nationality via jus soli, and article 28 set out a new procedure for registering the birth of children of non-resident foreign mothers. This article was declared unconstitutional by various groups, as were the articles on foreign worker quotas, the expulsion of foreigners, and mobility-related conditions and restrictions for temporary workers. However, these claims were dismissed by the Supreme Court, which ruled in favour of the constitutionality of each of the articles in question in 2005. Moreover, the new Constitution of 2010 also ratified the restrictions on acquiring nationality via jus soli included in the General Migration Act.

The first measures implemented on the basis of the new law were related to birth certificates and the granting of nationality to the sons and daughters of foreigners. Through Circular No. 017–07 and Resolution No. 12–07, the Central Electoral Board ordered the temporary suspension of the issuing of civil status certificates to the sons and daughters of non-resident foreign mothers since they are people in transit and their descendants are thus not entitled to Dominican nationality. Likewise, in Ruling No. 168–13, the Constitutional Court ordered that the birth certificates of Dominican persons of Haitian descent born between 1929 and 2007 be transferred to the Birth Registry for Foreigners.

These measures also led to the implementation of the National Plan for the Regularization of Foreigners (PNRE) through Decree No. 327. Although the PNRE had already been contemplated in Act No. 285–04, the Constitutional Court ruling fast-tracked its implementation, which began on 29 November 2013. This plan was in effect for a year and a half, during which some 288,466 foreign nationals from 116 countries were admitted, 97.8 percent of whom were Haitians. Only 3 per cent of Haitian applicants were able to meet the entry requirements, so the remainder were issued provisional permits that needed to be renewed between 2017 and 2018. In 2019–2020, more than 196,000 provisional permits for temporary workers expired.

The PNRE was complemented by the Special Naturalization Act (Act No. 169), which established a specific naturalization regime for two groups of people (groups A and B). The law became operational in 2014 through Regulation No. 250. Group A consisted of persons whose Dominican nationality was restored after an audit of their birth certificates. Group B comprised descendants of foreigners whose parents who had never registered with the Dominican Civil Registry Office. Members of this group were able to regularize their status as migrants and could opt for Dominican nationality through ordinary naturalization after two years. However, there were several drawbacks to this process, as most of the people seeking to regularize their status did not have the documentation they needed to do so, such as a valid identity document.

Despite the importance of the PNRE, there have been no evaluations of results that would allow us to examine different aspects of its implementation, assess its impact on the migrant population or design complementary policies or programmes. The only publication that analyses some of these results is Joseph (2020), which examines the regulations and conducts a qualitative study based on semi-structured interviews with migrants in three regions of the country that implemented the PNRE. The study found several shortcomings with the PNRE, starting with the seven-year lag in its implementation. It also explores how although the process was officially in place between January 2014 and June 2015, the first six months were in fact spent designing and planning implementation, such that the plan did not begin to operate until 2 June 2014. Finally, the study notes that although offices were supposed to be set up within the country’s 32 provincial governments, only 24 were actually established, and just 18 of these were in operation nine months after the publication of the decree in question.
Joseph (2020) also includes an initial assessment of the population that actually benefited from the plan. According to official figures presented by the author, a total of 288,467 people registered with the PNRE, 260,248 of whom regularized their migration status. Some 97 percent of these were of Haitian nationality. In other words, 10 percent of the total people who registered were rejected. Likewise, 3 percent of the total were categorized as residents, while the remaining 87 percent were granted non-resident status. This means that just 3 percent were viewed as people who had entered Dominican territory with the intention of settling or remaining there, while the rest were deemed people in transit. While the former group were granted residence status and work permits or renewals of these, non-residents could only obtain temporary work permits or renewals. The document also lists the basic sociodemographic characteristics of people who managed to register with the PNRE, most of whom were men residing in urban areas, in proportions that were in line with the country’s total migrant population.

The study notes the legal implications of the fact that the vast majority of the people who participated in the PNRE were deemed non-residents. It also mentions that the plan did not set out a road map detailing steps that migrants could take to change or renew their migration status. This point is fundamental since the residence permits that were granted under the PNRE were valid for two years for residents and just one year for non-residents. It is thus unsurprising that the validity of the cards was extended in July 2016 and that a year later, the National Migration Council announced the second phase of the PNRE. However, Joseph (2020) notes that the protocol for implementing this second phase was never published and that no basic data on its outcomes has been made public.

There are two more recent migration policy measures of note. First, in November 2021, as bilateral relations between the Dominican Republic and Haiti worsened, the Dominican Government announced that the special visa programme for Haitian university students in the country would be suspended. Second, in February 2022, the Dominican Government began the construction of a border fence. According to official information, this fence will help regulate migration movements and trade and combat organized crime relating to human trafficking and drug smuggling along the border (Presidencia de la República Dominicana, 2022a).

Venezuelan migrants have also received special attention. In 2019, for example, the channels for this population to migrate to the Dominican Republic were drastically reduced. Through Resolution No. 006–2019 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dominican Government revoked the visa exemption for people of Venezuelan origin to enter the country. On 19 January 2021, Resolution No. 00119–2021 was issued, which established a process for regularizing the status of Venezuelans that entered Dominican territory legally between January 2014 and March 2020. By May 2021, more than 42,000 Venezuelans had applied. The process not only allows applicants to extend their residence permits, it also enables those in the student and temporary worker categories (art. 4) to change their migration status after a vetting process (art. 3).

The response to migration in the Dominican Republic goes beyond the legal sphere. For example, in 2012, Congress approved the 2030 National Development Strategy, chapter 2.3 of which establishes specific objectives regarding equality of rights and opportunities, and migration is contemplated as a specific issue. One of the objectives set out in the chapter is organizing migration movement in accordance with the country’s development needs. To achieve this, it proposes modernizing the country’s legal and institutional framework to strengthen the system for registering, managing, and monitoring migratory flows, and to enable the regularization of the foreign population, in accordance with the relevant legal provisions. The chapter proposes that a quota system be established for granting temporary or longer-term residence permits, depending on national development needs. It also mentions the importance of guaranteeing respect for human rights, preventing human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and strengthening law enforcement agencies to comply with these objectives. Finally, it also mentions the protection of the rights of the Dominican population residing abroad.
In 2015, the National Migration Institute of the Dominican Republic was created to ensure the country had up-to-date information on migration and personnel that were trained to handle this. Since being established, the institute has spearheaded important initiatives on migration-related research and training in the country. After the need for reliable migration data had been acknowledged, two rounds of the National Immigrant Survey were carried out in 2012 and 2017. Progress is also being made on other migration-related initiatives, such as the recent plan to regularize the Venezuelan population described above. However, despite these initiatives, the Dominican Republic decided not to sign the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

3.2. Policies for the emigrant population

According to Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021), the emigration of the Dominican population increased in the 1960s when the Trujillo regime came to an end. This led to a lifting of the restrictions that had been imposed by the dictatorship to limit movement abroad and from rural areas. In conjunction with other political issues, the end of the regime prompted middle- and upper-middle-class Dominicans to migrate overseas, mainly to Spain and the United States. By the 1980s, the main reasons for migration had become economic, and the destinations chosen by Dominican emigrants began to shift somewhat towards Latin America and the Caribbean. As will be explored in the next section, the impacts this had on the labour market also affected the economy, as did the ensuing brain drain and remittance flows.

Despite the significant emigration that the country experienced during this period, legislation targeting the emigrant population only began to be developed in the 1990s. The first fundamental change took place in 1994, when the right to dual nationality was recognized for all Dominicans living abroad. In 1997, this population was also granted the right to vote from abroad through Electoral Act No. 275. In 1999, the Inter-Institutional Committee for the Protection of Migrant Women was created to promote the protection of Dominican migrant women, and a few years later, Act No. 137–03 against human trafficking and migrant smuggling was passed.

The emigrant population has become more important in recent years. Notable legal initiatives in this field include the creation of the National Council for Dominican Communities Abroad through Act 1–08 of 2008; the fact that the 2010 Constitution includes the obligation for seven deputies elected in representation of the Dominican community abroad (overseas deputies) to be added to the Chamber of Deputies, and the creation of the Unit for the Reintegration of Repatriated Individuals within the Attorney General’s Office in 2014. In 2016, the Deputy Ministry for Dominican Communities Abroad was created through Act 630–16.

3.3. Executing agencies for migration policy

Migration Act No. 285 of 2004 set out the regulatory framework and institutions that would govern migration policy in the Dominican Republic. This section examines these executing agencies and their main functions.

i. The General Migration Authority is responsible for enforcing migration laws in the country. It was established through Migration Act No. 95 of 1939 and has since been part of the Ministry of the Interior and the Police. Today, it is responsible for monitoring and keeping a record of the entry and exit of the migrant population by issuing temporary and permanent residence permits and pre-entry permits, as well as instructions to deport or expel

17 Dirección General de Migración, “Proceso de normalización de ciudadanos venezolanos”, Dirección General de Migración, Santo Domingo, migracion.gob.do/so-bre-proceso-de-normalizacion-de-ciudadanos-venezolanos.
foreigners. It also coordinates or facilitates the return of the Dominican population from abroad and provides information for migrants or those interested in migrating, among other functions.

ii. The **National Migration Council** (CNM) was created through Act No. 285 of 2004 and is a supra-ministerial, multi-sector agency that is made up of the ministers of the interior and the police, foreign affairs, defence, labour, tourism, public works, public health and agriculture. Other council members include the judge presiding over the Central Electoral Board and the presidents of the Commission of the Interior and the Police at both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The council’s functions include the following: design national migration policy; advise the State by proposing objectives and measures for the design and implementation of migration policies; prepare five-year migration policy plans; recommend special measures on migration issues; propose strategies to rationalize the use of immigrant labour in accordance with the sector-specific requirements of the labour market; and promote research on migration and its economic, social, political and cultural impacts. Although the council was supposed to meet every six months, Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021) point out that until 2018, there was no mechanism in place to ensure that its functions could be carried out fully.

iii. The **National Migration Institute** (INM RD) was established through the General Migration Act (Act No. 285) and is a technical body attached to the Ministry of the Interior and the Police that supports the National Migration Council. Its functions include designing, promoting and implementing migration-related research to enable the development of evidence-based public policies and the organization of national and international technical activities on the issue. According to its mission statement, the institute aims to contribute to the management of migration through research, training and proposals for the design of public policies. It has carried out various studies, organized conferences, and spearheaded agreements on migration issues, many of which are cited in this document.

iv. The **National School of Migration** is a branch of the National Migration Institute. It is responsible for designing and implementing courses, diploma programmes and other training-related activities for public officials working in migration in the country. It has run courses on general migration, migration and development, public policies, gender and migration, labour migration, the management of migration and human trafficking.

v. The **Ministry of the Economy, Planning and Development** (MEPYD): as the agency responsible for coordinating and developing sector-specific policies in the country, its decisions impact migration policies. For example, the 2030 National Development Strategy specifically included migration-related issues, as detailed above.

vi. The **Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (MIREX) is the agency that oversees the visa system from its offices outside the country. According to the Migration Act, it grants three types of work visas once the Ministry of Labour has confirmed that all requirements have been met: business visas for work purposes, visas for temporary workers, and visas for residents.

vii. The **Ministry of Labour** plays a role in issuing work visas. The Department of Labour Migration verifies that job offers actually exist and reviews the employment conditions in question. Two offices that operate within the ministry are the Dominican Labour Market Observatory and the National Employment Service, which could potentially make a significant contribution to research into the migrant labour market and promoting this (both in the country and abroad).
4. Impacts of migration in the Dominican Republic

4.1. Impacts on the labour market

As in most countries, studies analysing the labour impact of migration in the Dominican Republic focus on the effects of immigration on the local market. Until the mid-1980s, most immigrants were people with low levels of education who came to work in agriculture near the border with Haiti. Research at the time suggested that this type of migration filled existing demand in the sector, since they were rural labourers who performed jobs that Dominicans were not willing to accept but were necessary for expanding production. In the mid-1980s, the country’s development vision shifted towards the service sector and tourism, which has combined with high rates of economic growth to trigger a change in the number and type of migrants arriving in the country in recent years. This, in turn, has changed migrants’ connections to the labour market and the impacts that migration has on this.

To understand the impacts of the immigrant population on the Dominican labour market, we first need to analyse the types of jobs this population is performing. According to a study by the OECD and the ILO that draws on data from the National Labour Force Survey, the labour participation of the immigrant population is 11 percentage points higher than that of the native-born population, a difference that remained steady between 2005 and 2014 (see table 3). This gap mainly owes to immigrant men having higher labour participation rates than men of Dominican origin (89.2 percent and 77.5 percent, respectively). There are also differences between the labour participation of immigrant and national women, although they are less marked (53.5 percent and 49.6 percent, respectively). Moreover, the unemployment rate is lower among the immigrant population: the unemployment rate of immigrant men is almost 50 percent lower than that of Dominican men (5 percent and 10 percent, respectively), while the rates are very similar for the two groups of women (close to 22 percent, regardless of their place of birth) (OECD/ILO, 2018).

Table 3. Labour force participation rate and unemployment rate by origin and sex (in percentages) in the Dominican Republic, 2005–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force participation rate</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


18 Performing this type of statistical differentiation with data from the new Continuous National Labour Force Survey (ENCFT) is difficult, since the data is for the nation as a whole and macro-regions and the survey does not contemplate specific population groups (e.g., the immigrant population). Such data may be added in the future (the survey is ongoing and more data will accumulate). The only source of statistical information that is representative of the immigrant population is the National Immigrant Survey, which is conducted by the National Statistics Office.
Given the differences in the education levels of the migrant population and the native-born population, as well as the history of migration in the country, it is not surprising that the two population groups work in very different sectors. Figure 3 shows how the labour force in each group is distributed among the various economic sectors. The data shows that while nearly 50 per cent of the migrant population work in the agricultural and construction sectors, only 18 per cent of native-born workers are employed in these two sectors. The Haitian population’s participation in the agricultural sector is very significant. Indeed, a recent qualitative study based on estimates by the Dominican Agribusiness Board suggests that close to 90 per cent of the sector’s workforce is of Haitian origin (Macías Hernández, 2021). According to the agricultural entrepreneurs interviewed in the study, young Dominicans no longer wish to work in the rural sector, so production in the sector depends on the supply of foreign labour.

Figure 3. Labour participation by sector and origin (in percentages) in the Dominican Republic, 2016

In contrast, while 38 percent of native-born workers are employed in manufacturing, transport, education, health, finance or the public sector, only 12 percent of the migrant population work in any of these sectors. Some 21 percent of native-born workers and 19 percent of migrant workers are employed in commerce, while between 5 percent and 6 percent of each group work in the hotel and restaurant sector or perform paid domestic work. Finally, approximately 10 percent of native-born workers and 4 percent of migrant workers are engaged in other activities related to community, social and personal services.

According to the OECD/ILO study mentioned above, in 2014, the migrant population was more likely to be working in the informal sector than the native-born population (73 percent and 59 percent, respectively), the informal sector being understood as comprising jobs in companies with fewer than five workers and the work performed by agricultural or fishery workers, craftspeople, basic workers, the self-employed, unpaid family workers or paid household workers (OECD/ILO, 2018). However, as Perry (2007) describes, workers themselves seem to seek informal jobs, as these provide access to higher average nominal gross wages and greater freedom. These differences may also be rooted in the lack of legal documentation among foreign workers and labour code restrictions on the number of foreign workers that firms can formally hire.
Turning to wages, the literature suggests that their stagnation in real terms may be one of the reasons poverty and inequality did not fall as fast as was expected, even though the country experienced very high economic growth rates for more than a decade. As the OECD/ILO study explores in detail, the stagnation of nominal wages implied a drop in real wages, particularly in the first decade of the millennium, and wages remained relatively stagnant until 2014. The fall in real wages was much sharper for immigrant workers than native-born workers, but the stagnation affected both groups. Finally, in terms of the returns to education, OECD and ILO estimates based on 2014 data suggest that these were equal on average across the two groups and constituted a 6-percent increase in hourly wages for each additional year of education (OECD/ILO, 2018).

Four recent studies have examined migration’s impacts on the probability of being employed, the type of work held, and wages in the Dominican Republic. The first of these studies is Sousa, Sanchez and Baez (2017). Using multiple data sources and a mixed methodology that links regional variations in the share of Haitian migration and gender-differentiated levels of human capital, the authors find no correlation between migration and the wages earned by workers of Dominican origin. Indeed, they suggest that the Haitian migrant population’s low education levels mean that they complement the Dominican Republic’s labour capital and skilled labour force. In the second study, Kone and Özden (2017) use a structural model that captures possible substitution between foreign and Dominican workers, workers with high and low levels of education, and workers in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. Based on this model, by simulating different levels of migration and various parameters, the authors find that wages and the probability of native-born workers with low levels of education finding employment are both negatively affected by increased migration movements. The impact of migration on the wages of workers with high levels of education is almost zero, and is even positive for native-born workers with low levels of education employed in the formal sector.

In a third study, the OECD and ILO use the methodology of Borjas (2003) and divide individuals into skill cells according to their levels of education and experience. They then analyse the main indicators for native-born individuals in the Dominican Republic depending on the share of migrants in each of their skill cells (OECD/ILO, 2018). By using this methodology, they find that the migrant population has a negative effect on the probability of native-born workers being employed, as their labour supply is reduced and unemployment rises. However, the share of migrants does not seem to affect the wages of the native-born population except in the case of highly skilled workers, whose wages decrease when the share of migrants increases. When this analysis was performed at the regional level—in line with Facchini, Mayda and Mendola (2013)—it was observed that the immigrant population tends to live in municipalities with lower unemployment rates. Once the authors controlled for this factor, migrants were no longer found to have any effect on their unemployment rate, even though they continue to have a negative impact on the probability of native-born workers being part of the labour force. However, when the focus is on regional markets, the share of migrants has a negative effect on the wages of the Dominican population with similar levels of experience and education.

Finally, using individual data from the National Labour Force Survey for 2003–2016, Hiller and Rodriguez Chatruc (2020) conclude that a higher percentage of migrant women in the population brings down the number of hours worked and the wages earned by native-born women with low education levels. According to the authors, if exposure to migration moves from the 25th to the 75th percentile, the hours that low-skilled women work decrease by 0.38 (about 23 minutes) and wages drop by about 2 percent. In contrast, they find that the number of hours worked by highly educated Dominican women with children increases as the proportion of migrant women in their province of residence increases. The authors therefore conclude that, in contrast to the literature analysing the impacts of migration on labour markets in developed countries, South-South migration does appear to reduce labour opportunities for poorly educated women, suggesting that migrant women act as substitutes in the local labour market.

---

19 Specifically, the study is based on data from the 2012 ENI, data from the 2010 National Labour Force Survey, and information from the 2002 and 2010 censuses.
Of course, emigration may also impact the Dominican labour market directly or indirectly. A study by the OECD and the Centre for Research and Social Studies at the Ibero-American University (CIES-UNIBE) explores this issue using data from a survey conducted in the country to study these effects (OECD/CIES-UNIBE, 2017). First, statistics suggest that migrants of Dominican origin are mostly of working age and about 60 percent of them were already working before they migrated. This clearly implies that they leave job vacancies for someone else to fill. Indeed, Kone and Özden (2017) point out that highly skilled native-born workers benefit from higher levels of emigration through this channel. The OECD/CIES-UNIBE (2017) study mentioned above notes that native-born workers who emigrate from rural areas are replaced by hired labour, which revitalizes the labour market in those areas. The study also suggests that emigration decreases the likelihood of the native-born population participating in the labour market through remittances, particularly in the case of women. However, households that have a member who migrated outside the country but do not receive remittances contain a higher proportion of working adults (OECD/CIES-UNIBE, 2017). Finally, few studies analyse the reintegration of returning emigrants into the labour market. Two recent studies by the National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migración, 2018) and Arboleda, Díaz Segura and Durán (2019) have begun to fill this gap by showing that there is significant variation in the type of migrants who leave the Dominican Republic and then return. The results of the two studies suggest that the most vulnerable population in terms of employment are migrants who returned to the country after having been deported or expelled from abroad. This population has high unemployment rates, which are difficult to bring down as they have low educational levels and lack social networks. Furthermore, Arboleda, Díaz Segura and Durán (2019) show unemployment rates are much lower among emigrants that return voluntarily and at an older age. This group also engages more in entrepreneurial activities, probably due to the assets and savings they accumulated while abroad.

4.2. Impacts on remittances

Although a significant percentage of the Dominican emigrant population lives in poverty in their destination countries, the remittances that this population manages to send back to their families and relatives are a fundamental driver of the Dominican economy. Figure 4 tracks the evolution of personal remittances received in the country, expressed as a percentage of GDP, according to data from the World Bank. As can be seen, at the beginning of the 1990s, remittances accounted for less than 5.0 percent of GDP, but by 2020 they represented 10.6 percent. As was described in a 2018 OECD study, 87 percent of these resources in 2017 came from the Dominican population living in Spain and the United States, the two main destination countries for the Dominican emigrant population. The average amount per remittance was about $217 for remittances from the United States and $376 for those from Spain.

---

20 World Bank, “Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)—Dominican Republic”, data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=DO
21 According to the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic, in 2021 “remittances reached $10,402.5 million, $2,183.2 million more than was received in 2020, registering year-on-year growth of 26.6% and outperforming the total for 2019, before the pandemic, by 46.8%” (Banco Central de la República Dominicana, 2022).
In 2015, these flows were the third-largest source of foreign exchange in relation to GDP, outperformed only by exports (14 percent) and tourism revenue (9 percent). Remittance flows far outstrip foreign direct investment (3.3 percent). Finally, Laloum and Ruiz-Arranz (2021) note that the pandemic and the loss of jobs it prompted in the first few months of 2020 reduced the remittances sent by the migrant population residing in the United States as a whole. However, as the authors point out and as can be seen in figure 4, the country’s economic recovery and the sizeable federal aid package reversed this drop, and remittances quickly climbed above pre-Covid levels.

The sheer scale of these remittances points to the country’s opportunity to strengthen its ties with the migrant population. As indicated in an IOM report, the Dominican diaspora has the human capital and financial resources to breathe new life into the economy via the country’s middle- and low-income sectors (OIM, 2018a). The paper suggests that the flow of remittances into the country is just the tip of the iceberg of the potential that the Dominican Republic could exploit. As Bonilla (2015) argues, remittances are a major driver of local economic development because they finance consumption among the households that receive them and decrease their poverty levels. Further studies cited below show that remittances also impact the labour market, entrepreneurship, and education. According to the IOM, in addition to these impacts, the Dominican diaspora could potentially increase the productivity of labour resources in the country if they return, as a result of their human capital and the experience they have acquired abroad (OIM, 2018a). They also have the financial resources and connections with the local population to start productive ventures in the country. The study estimates that the average annual income of the Dominican population that sends remittances is 9–10 times greater than the amounts they send—a total of $54 billion. Consequently, the Dominican diaspora is saving around $3 billion per year. The IOM suggests encouraging the investment of these resources in housing or other local ventures (OIM, 2018a). Bonilla (2015) argues that this proposal is both feasible and desirable for the diaspora, noting that 62 percent of the Dominican migrant population surveyed who send remittances to the country would be willing to purchase a home of their own there if they could get a long-term

---

22 The IOM argues that the Dominican population abroad save significant amounts (OIM, 2018a). Izaguirre et al. (2016) agree, noting that Dominican and Colombian migrants have the highest savings capacity in the Latin American population migrating to Spain.
mortgage to do so. Moreover, in their study on returnee emigrants, Arboleda, Díaz Segura and Durán (2019) point out that homeownership is one of the main motivating factors for emigration.

To achieve this objective, the IOM suggests implementing two complementary policies. First, it recommends the creation of an International Guarantee Fund for Dominicans Abroad (FIG-DOMEX) to support access to credit for the emigrant population seeking to acquire a home or start a business in the Dominican Republic. The IOM and the civil organization Dominicanos USA (DUSA) recently signed a memorandum to promote this initiative and others that benefit the Dominican diaspora abroad (El Dinero, 2021). The second strategy is implementing a public-private institutional platform to provide support and guidance for these investments. The document suggests that the country’s labour unions and chambers of commerce could play an important role in this platform (OIM, 2018a).

4.3. Impacts on entrepreneurship and economic growth

The OECD/ILO study mentioned above estimates the impact of migration on economic growth in the Dominican Republic by analysing its effects on entrepreneurial activity and its contribution to the value added of each economic sector (OECD/ILO, 2018). Based on 2016 data from the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic and the ILO, the study found that 4 percent of the migrant population and 3 percent of the native-born population own a business. The differences between the size of these businesses in the two groups are not statistically significant, and the majority are small businesses (fewer than five employees). However, the study shows through probit regressions that a 10-percentage-point increase in the concentration of migrants implies a 0.6-percentage-point increase in the probability of the Dominican population owning businesses. This result holds true even when controlling for the fact that the immigrant population is not distributed randomly across the territory and when taking the proportion of immigrants residing in each region in 2002 into account (Sousa, Sanchez and Baez, 2017). 23

Emigration may also impact the probability of business ownership through remittances. The studies in question indicate that these impacts vary depending on migrants’ place of residence. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) use data from the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) in the Dominican Republic (LAMP-DR7). Through a system of simultaneous regressions, they find a negative association between receiving remittances and the probability of a household owning a business. The authors suggest that households are mainly likely to use these remittances to cover household expenses rather than for investment. Paradoxically, they note that owning a business increases the probability of receiving remittances and point out that this might be due to the emigrant population seeking to maintain alternative enterprises in their country of origin. The more recent OECD/CIES-UNIBE study suggests that urban households that receive remittances from abroad are more likely to own a business of some sort (OECD/CIES-UNIBE, 2017), which may be due to the relationship found by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006). No statistically significant association is observed between the two variables in question for households in rural areas. According to the OECD/CIES-UNIBE study, the limited banking penetration and access to financial education programmes could be related to the low impact of remittances on entrepreneurship rates (OECD/CIES-UNIBE, 2017).

23 A study published by the OECD and the ILO, the Dominican Government also mentions that migration can impact businesses and the overall economy through changes in productivity (OECD/ILO, 2018). For example, studies such as Peri (2012) point out that in the United States, higher immigration increases firm productivity. Although business surveys are conducted in the country—such as the National Survey of Economic Activity (ENAE), which includes questions about foreign workers—the OECD/ILO study argues that the samples in these surveys are not large enough to allow causal analyses of the impact of migration on productivity to be carried out. The descriptive data does not generate information on this point, since it is not clear which sectors the immigrant population tends to be employed in. A large part of this population works in high-productivity sectors (mining, energy, and financial activities), as well as in lower-productivity sectors (agriculture and commerce).
Turning to the impact of immigration on economic growth, the OECD and ILO study estimates the share of value added produced by the immigrant population by economic sector (OECD/ILO, 2018). To do so, it multiplied the value added for each sector by the share of immigrants, controlling for productivity differences between migrant workers and native-born workers (based on wages or educational attainment). Based on data from the 9th National Population and Housing Census (2010) and the 2010–2014 National Labour Force Survey, the immigrant population was estimated to produce 5.3 percent of unadjusted value added, which is equal to 4.3 percent and 3.8 percent when the value is adjusted for wages and educational attainment, respectively. However, as the paper notes, these estimates are based on old data. Since migration has increased in recent years and its profile has changed, new studies are needed.

4.4. Impacts on health and education

In the Dominican Republic, a number of initiatives have sought to improve the social inclusion of the migrant population. Measures such as Resolution No. 377 of the National Social Security Council in 2015 granted those taking part in the PNRE access to the social security system. In 2016, the regulations of the Social Security Treasury were also amended to allow this group’s identity documents to be used to register with the country’s social security system. However, despite the Government’s efforts, many people who have regularized their status still lack access to the social security system. Although by law every Dominican and every legal resident in the country is entitled to join the social security scheme, according to a study by the Centre for Migration Observation and Social Development in the Caribbean (OBMICA, 2022), only 28,500 direct beneficiaries of the PNRE and 10,000 family members had managed to enrol with the system by the beginning of 2020.

The 2017 ENI provides a comprehensive overview of the issue of access to social security and overall health status from a perspective that seeks to further the social inclusion of the population of foreign origin (the survey includes an additional module on the sexual and reproductive health of immigrant women and descendants of immigrants). On the matter of social security, the 2017 ENI data indicates that only 5 percent of the Haitian-born migrant population have insurance against work-related accidents, and only 7 percent have health insurance. In contrast, other foreigners’ rates of access to social security are similar to those of the native-born population: almost half have health insurance, and 42.3 percent are insured against occupational accidents. Regarding migrants’ state of health, the data from the 2017 ENI shows that 34.6 percent of foreigners reported having been ill in the last 12 months. This share was 32 percent among foreigners born in Haiti, 23.3 percent among foreigners born in other countries but increases to 41.3 percent for descendants of foreigners. Some 75 percent of those surveyed were treated at public hospitals, 15.2 percent received care at a private clinic, and the remainder were distributed among primary care units, military clinics, social security hospitals, church clinics, and those that either did not receive medical attention or did not seek this. About 75 percent of the population born in Haiti or of Haitian descent were treated at public hospitals and 15 percent received care at private clinics, while the shares for the foreign population from other countries were 33.9 percent and 61.3 percent, respectively.

In terms of prenatal care, the 2017 ENI contains information on the number of check-ups, consultations with specialists, and care received the last time the respondent gave birth. Some 96.6 percent of immigrant women reported having had a medical check-up at a health centre. Some 41 percent had between 1 and 3 check-ups; 13 percent had between 4 and 6 check-ups; 53.7 percent had between 7 and 9 check-ups; and 21 percent had more than 10 check-ups. Of the immigrant women who visited a general practitioner, 69.5 percent lived in cities, and 30.5 percent lived in rural areas. Likewise, some 77.2 percent of those who visited a gynaecologist lived in urban areas and 22.8 percent in rural areas. Turning to care during childbirth, based on a report by the Ministry of Public Health,
the national press estimates that in 2021 nearly 40 percent of the births that took place in hospitals in the Dominican Republic were to Haitian nationals. The report states that medical care during childbirth costs $253 in Haiti, which is why Haitian women in labour travel to the Dominican Republic, where the costs are shouldered entirely by the Dominican State (Fernández, 2021).

Beyond this descriptive information, there are no studies that help us understand the impacts or the fiscal cost of the health care provided to migrants in the country. There is also little that can be extrapolated from the evidence available in the region. The only known impact study in this area is Ibáñez and Rozo (2020), which analyses how the collapse of the Venezuelan health system and migration to Colombia have affected the spread of infectious diseases among the local population. The authors observe an increase in vaccine-preventable diseases (such as chickenpox and tuberculosis) and sexually transmitted diseases (such as AIDS and syphilis). This suggests that mass vaccination policies for the migrant population are important, as is access to health systems to cure and prevent the spread of diseases.

With regard to education, the Ministry of Education has worked to strengthen inclusion in the country’s schools for all children and adolescents, regardless of their origin. However, despite these efforts, what is happening in education is similar to social security and health. Although access to education is universal in the Dominican Republic, at least on paper, the fact is that children from Haitian migrant households are less likely to attend an educational establishment than those from Dominican households (OECD/CIES-UNIBE, 2017). According to 2017 ENI data, school attendance rates for foreign-born girls and boys aged 5 or older vary significantly depending on their country of origin. Just 66 per cent of migrant children from Haitian families and aged 5–9 and 10–14 reported that they were attending an educational establishment at the time of the survey. In contrast, the attendance rates for migrant children from other countries were 94 percent and 92 percent for each of these two age groups, respectively. This shows clear inequality in access to education, despite government initiatives to ensure that children attend school.

The data on the type of educational establishment attended by children who go to school shows that 69.1 percent attend public schools while 28.5 percent attend private schools. There are also significant differences by country of origin. Some 85.1 percent of children of Haitian parents attend public schools, while this is true of 65 percent of those born in Haiti. In contrast, 47.4 percent of children whose parents are from other countries attend public schools. There are no studies that analyse the impact that the immigrant population’s school attendance has on the education system. However, analyses and research on other countries in the region provide some insight into this issue. Contreras and Gallardo’s (2020) study on Chile shows that the 2015–2018 migration shock that increased the migrant school-age population from 0.9 percent to 3.2 percent reduced the educational attainment of the native-born student body in mathematics and reading (although reading achievement only declined among boys). The authors noted that migration leads native-born students to transfer from public to private schools, which the study above suggests may be partly responsible for the negative impacts observed. Rozo and Vargas (2020) analyse the effects that Venezuelan migration has had on the Colombian education system. As in the Dominican Republic, the Colombian Government authorized Venezuelan children to attend the public education system regardless of their migration status. According to the authors, the promotion rate has decreased for both native-born and migrant students, while the school attrition rate is on the rise. Finally, no effect was observed on the educational attainment of the native-born population.

Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010) analyse the impact of emigration on human capital accumulation. Using information from the LAMP-Dominican Republic database (LAMP-RD7) and by instrumenting the receipt of remittances with the unemployment rate in the United States, they find that remittances increase the probability of children in recipient households attending school. The impact is greatest among the high-school-age population and the youngest members of households. However, the authors note that when regressions include children and young people who are part of a household with a member who has migrated, the positive effect of remittances disappears. According to the survey conducted by the OECD/CIES-UNIBE, households with a member who has migrated or returned to the country spend more on education, particularly at private schools, than households without migrant members (OECD/CIES-UNIBE, 2017). The situation is very different from that of the immigrant population, who are less likely to attend school, as seen above.

4.5. Other impacts

Migration impacts countries’ public finances. In addition to contributing to the economy by paying taxes, the migrant population may demand services provided by the State, such as healthcare or education. The 2018 OECD/ILO study uses data from the 2007 National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (ENIGH) and an accounting methodology to estimate how migration affects public finance. The study notes that in 2018, the migrant population’s tax contributions were higher than those of the native population in four of the six main tax categories (corporate income tax, social security contributions, payroll tax, and taxes on goods and services) (OECD/ILO, 2018). In terms of average fiscal outlays, the study divided public spending into pure public goods (administration, defence, the environment, agriculture, tourism, and finance) and impure public goods (security, social security, sanitation, energy, transportation, cultural and sports activities, and the prison system). The migrant population received fewer benefits than the native-born population in both categories. However, these results should be analysed with caution. First, because they are based on an accounting methodology, they only take into account the contributions and expenditures for migrants and the native-born population for a single year. More importantly, the estimates are based on old data. An updated analysis based on more recent information that takes current migration and labour market conditions into account is thus needed.

Migration may have various impacts, depending on how integrated the migrant population is into the receiving society. Although there is little information on the cultural and social inclusion of the migrant population in the Dominican Republic, the first step towards analysing this is whether or not they speak Spanish. According to data from the 2017 ENI, 26.0 percent of the immigrant population claim they speak very good Spanish, and 25.1 percent say that they speak good Spanish. When responses are subdivided by nationality, only 7.8 percent of Haitian-born migrants say they speak Spanish very well, and 24.2 percent say they speak it well. Among the migrant population of other nationalities, these shares are 72.1 percent and 12.7 percent, respectively. Conversely, 19.4 percent of the total immigrant population speak only a little Spanish, and 7.6 percent do not speak any. However, among the migrant population from Haiti, these two shares are 27.7 percent and 11.2 percent, respectively, while among migrants from other countries they are 3.7 percent and 0.5 percent. These disparities in language skills seem to hamper the socio-economic integration of Haitian migrants. For example, the study cited above published by the IOM and the National Migration Institute argues that poor language skills are one of the factors that seem to have hindered the PNRE (OIM and INM, 2017). Similarly, Macías Hernández (2021) argues that poor language skills may make it difficult for the Haitian migrant population to perform good-quality work in the country’s agricultural sector.

25 The authors are able to distinguish between households with and without migrant members since 52% of the children and young people registered with the LAMP-RD7 database who receive remittances do not report there being a migrant in the household.
Finally, there is no available data on the impacts that migration has on crime rates in the Dominican Republic. This is unsurprising since, as Blyde, Busso and Ibáñez (2020) note, there are few studies on this topic in Latin America. According to these authors, this may be due to a lack of available data and the difficulty in identifying the causes of crime, given that the vulnerable migrant population tends to live in areas with high crime rates. According to the authors, there is only one study on Chile that analyses the issue, and even it does not find that migration has an impact on the crime rate, although it does note that migration affects the native-born population’s perceptions of security (Ajzenman, Domínguez and Undurraga, 2020). A similar sensation is noted by Macías Hernández (2021), who states that the native-born producers interviewed look upon the Haitian population as violent and associate them with theft in the community. Further studies on the situation in the Dominican Republic are needed, as Macías Hernández (2021) is qualitative and is based on the views of a handful of producers.

5. Challenges and recommendations for migration policy in the Dominican Republic

According to United Nations data, emigration and immigration rates in the Dominican Republic currently stand at 14.5 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively (United Nations, 2019). This makes it one of the countries with the largest migration movements in the region and explains why migration has been at the heart of the country’s political, social and economic agenda over the last century. Despite the clear progress that the Dominican Republic has made on migration-related regulations, institutions, research and public policies, many challenges remain. This section summarizes these challenges and puts forward public policy recommendations. Its suggestions are based on a review of the evidence presented in the previous sections and the opinions of various experts on the subject. The recommendations are divided into three broad categories: the regulatory and institutional sphere, the labour market, and the Dominican diaspora.

5.1 Challenges and recommendations in the regulatory and institutional sphere

According to Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021) and the experts interviewed in their study, migration policy in the Dominican Republic has been selective and inconsistent until recently and was not applied uniformly across the country. As the authors demonstrate, this has changed in recent years with the introduction of more inclusive laws that take the full spectrum of the migrant population into account. Recent initiatives such as the plans and measures to regularize the status of migrants from Haiti and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela demonstrate the State’s interest in managing migration patterns in line with the country’s needs and possibilities.

One of the most significant institutional milestones was the establishment of the National Migration Council, which is responsible for organizing and coordinating different stakeholders and migration-related research and policies. However, as Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021) suggest, the council is not fully consolidated and is not yet carrying out all the functions it should perform. Specifically, the authors propose that the Operational Regulations of the National Migration Council be debated and passed, as these would clarify the processes for coordination and strategic and administrative decision-making, which would promote an even more active role for the institution and contribute to achieving its mission. The authors also argue that the council needs to develop a National Migration Plan that draws on all the migration-related data gathered in the country, convenes and coordinates the relevant public- and private-sector bodies, and considers the specific objectives set out in the 2030 National Development Strategy.
In the field of research, the creation of the National Migration Institute was undoubtedly a major step forward for the country. The institute has successfully coordinated and carried out studies that have contributed to understandings of migration-related issues and policies and have helped to fill gaps in knowledge, as is evident in the works cited in this report. The first recommendation is to continue strengthening this institution to ensure that Dominican migration policy is based on accurate, up-to-date evidence. The focus of the National Migration Institute should be carrying out new studies and updating existing ones to meet the country’s demands for knowledge.

For example, research is needed on the outcomes of the PNRE. The spirit of the PNRE follows the guidelines implemented in Argentina in 2004 through Act No. 25871 to regularize nearly 500,000 migrants from the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru, and the programme implemented in Colombia in 2018 to regularize the Venezuelan migrant population. Two studies evaluate the impact of these plans, which may shed light on what might happen in the Dominican Republic as a result of the PNRE. Ronconi (2020) notes that although Argentina’s regularization scheme increased the probability of regularized individuals paying taxes as self-employed workers and receiving benefits from the social security system (e.g., non-contributory pensions), it did not impact their access to healthcare and education, nor did it change the probability of their being arrested for any type of crime or going to prison. However, the author does argue that the likelihood of the migrant population buying or living on illegally occupied land increased, perhaps because fear of deportation decreased. Similarly, Bahar, Ibáñez, and Rozo (2020) analyse how the Colombian labour market was impacted by the amnesty that the Government granted the Venezuelan migrant population in 2018 (a measure known as the temporary residence permit). The authors identify few labour-related impacts for either the migrant or local populations, despite the fact that 64 percent of the Venezuelan migrant population took part in the programme (about 500,000 people). In their view, this zero impact may be partly due to the fact that this migrant population may have already held informal jobs and had no interest in moving to the formal sector. Instead, their aim in regularizing their migration status may have been gaining access to the social security and education system for their families and themselves.

The results of the studies on Argentina and Colombia suggest that it makes sense to foster research that would help understand the impact of the PNRE in various areas. First, the results of the second phase of the plan are not yet clear. Furthermore, there is no data on the current migration status of those who took part in the PNRE and who registered under one of the categories contemplated by the plan. Nor is there information on the impact that the PNRE has had on the population’s access to social security, education and housing, since there is little evidence on other Latin American countries. In the area of education, the evidence for other countries described above, particularly Chile and Colombia, suggests that the migrant population puts pressure on the public education system. If this is not taken into account, dropout rates may increase, and the educational achievements of the native-born student body may decline. Ascertaining whether this is indeed the case and understanding the reasons for this would enable the Ministry of Education to take the necessary corrective action. In addition to the humanitarian reasons for investing in education, doing so clearly makes sense if the migrant population is likely to remain in the country and form part of the workforce in the future. Similarly, to guide future policies, we need to understand the barriers that the migrant population faces in accessing health services, estimate the economic pressure they put on the system, and find out more about the implications for their health (e.g., due to disease transmission).

Second, continuing with the theme of migration-related research, Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021) propose the creation of a National Migration Statistics Plan to monitor and evaluate the impact of both migration and policies responding to this, with support from the National Statistics Office. Significant work has already been carried out in this area, as evidenced by the two working groups on migration statistics convened by the National Migration

26 Given how central labour-related matters are, specific suggestions are presented below in the subsection on specific recommendations.
Institute. However, the literature review conducted for this study revealed the need to update the data on specific areas. For example, we would recommend that a third round of the ENI be conducted, taking into account the impact of the PNRE, the large-scale arrival of Venezuelan migrants since 2017 and the impacts that the Covid-19 pandemic may have had. Likewise, up-to-date statistics and analyses need to be generated using the Dominican Labour Market Observatory’s Continuous National Labour Force Survey (ENCFT). This data would shed light on the migrant population’s labour force participation and the impacts of this on the economy, since the most recent available public data on this topic dates to 2016. It would also make sense to conduct a new round of the ENIGH to measure the impacts of migration on the country’s public finances.

Finally, Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021) suggest that a strategic communication plan be created to address two issues. First, stakeholders from the different government and civil society organizations taking part in the National Migration Council and that could form part of the National Migration Plan team need to be kept up-to-date and made aware of the migration-related initiatives and research carried out in the Dominican Republic. Second, there needs to be a communications plan to help the general public understand the causes of migration, the profiles of migrants, the policies that respond to migration and the impacts that migration has on the country. This plan would feed into discussions and provide an objective view of migration and its consequences for the population in general. The findings of Macías Hernández (2021) and Ciriacono and Gratereaux (2020) on how native-born agricultural producers perceive the economic contributions and social inclusion of the migrant population show that research and information campaigns on this issue are essential. To complement this campaign, given the specific characteristics of the history of Haitian migration in the Dominican Republic, we recommend that a team specializing in the integration of different peoples and cultures should design a programme to detect and reduce existing prejudices in the country, to promote true integration between these two populations.

5.2 Challenges and recommendations relating to the labour market

As is the case around the world, one of the main causes of migration in the Dominican Republic relates to the labour market. Labour mobility attracts individuals and drives them away both within countries and beyond their borders. Acknowledging the importance of this mobility for the Dominican labour market, the National Migration Institute engaged in about two years of research, consultation and dialogue with various stakeholders on this topic, with technical support from the ILO. The main findings and recommendations are presented in a document published the two organizations, which are summarized below (OIT and INM, 2020).

First, on the topic of information, it is clear that the country has the capacity and knowledge to collect data and carry out studies and analyses to inform the creation of an efficient policy on migration. However, as mentioned above, the databases of the National Immigrant Survey (ENI), the National Labour Force Survey (ENFT) and the National Economic Activity Survey (ENAE) need to be updated. New studies of the profile of the migrant population need to be conducted using this up-to-date information, and the impacts of migration on entrepreneurship and the employment probabilities and wages of the native-born population need to be explored. The working groups for the ILO and National Migration Institute project underlined the importance of obtaining demand-side information to be able to understand employers’ current and prospective needs (OIT and INM, 2020). For example, information on job vacancies or the skills and competencies required would help policymakers to better understand the demand for labour in the country. The proposal for the National Statistics Plan outlined above could integrate effectively with the needs identified by the ILO and the National Migration Institute. This data would allow for further research to be

carried out regarding how migration impacts productivity and economic growth, or the circumstances and demands in specific sectors that the country wishes to promote or towards which it seeks to direct foreign labour or native-born labour displaced by migrant workers. For example, the document cites the initiatives being implemented by the National Migration Institute, the IOM and the ILO, among others, to carry out specific studies on labour policies for migrants in the agricultural and construction sectors in the Dominican Republic.\(^{28}\)

Second, according to the various working groups organized as part of the ILO/National Migration Institute project, solutions need to be found to the presence of irregular migrants and the need to apply for visas from abroad (OIT and INM, 2020). To address this problem, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already presented a bill to create a unit to receive migrants and review visa applications abroad, which is currently being debated in the legislature. An alternative or perhaps even complementary initiative is the proposal from the ILO and the National Migration Institute to extend the regularization and flexibilization included in the PNRE. In the specific case of Haitian workers, this contemplates the possibility of expanding bilateral agreements and the border resident category. Finally, there is agreement on the need to include employers and workers in the conversation and on the importance of these having access to full information on the conditions for hiring foreign workers that are currently in force (OIT and INM, 2020).

Recommendations from these stakeholders would provide guidelines to facilitate processes relating to compliance with migration- and labour-related legal requirements. Broadly speaking, they suggest simplifying the requirements that employees and employers must meet to hire migrant workers.\(^{29}\) As mentioned in previous sections, studies have been conducted on the two sectors where the demand for migrant workers is greatest. According to Macías Hernández (2021) and Ciriaco and Gratereaux (2020), the demand for foreign workers in the agricultural and construction sectors clearly outstrips the limit established in the country’s Labour Code. Indeed, even the foreign population included in the PNRE falls short of satisfying demand in these markets. The country needs to take advantage of the discussions around the labour code reform that was announced by the Ministry of Labour in February 2022, with a view to including quotas for foreign workers that align with the realities of these markets (Presidencia de la República Dominicana, 2022b). As well as being essential to the growth of these sectors, there are humanitarian reasons for this initiative, as it would allow workers to access formal employment and the social security system. For example, the labour code reform could contemplate exceptions to allow for specific quotas for certain jobs within these sectors. As Ciriaco and Gratereaux (2020) argue, while the initial stages of construction require a workforce that is nearly 80 percent Haitian, workers with higher training are needed during the later stages, when the percentage of Haitian workers required drops to 20 percent. In this sector, establishing specific quotas for different occupations may be useful. Similarly, both studies make it clear that in the case of agriculture, formal employment requirements should be simplified and adapted to production cycles.

The studies cited above suggest the need to coordinate the supply of education to reduce mismatches between labour market supply and demand in terms of the skills of the labour force. Specific policies need to be designed for both the migrant and native-born populations because the two groups work in very different sectors. In the cases of agriculture and construction, the studies being carried out by the National Migration Institute will provide clear guidance as to what businesses in each sector need. Soler, Salcedo and Núñez (2018) clearly identifies the programmes that need to be modernized for the construction sector and which occupations are in greatest demand in the business sector. The study argues that programmes need to be implemented targeting master builders, bricklayers, carpenters and plumbers to improve their skills and knowledge of new materials and construction processes, as well as managing new energy sources and various other environmental issues.

\(^{28}\) The first of these is Macías Hernández (2021), a qualitative study that notes that quantitative analysis still being developed.

\(^{29}\) These proposals are also mentioned in a document which addresses the issue of Venezuelan migration that was published by the ILO, the National Migration Institute and the UN Refugee Agency (OIT, INM and ACNUR, 2020).
The studies cited in this paper also present clear evidence of how migration has affected the native-born labour market in the Dominican Republic and put forward a number of recommendations in this regard. Both the aforementioned OECD/ILO study and Hiller and Rodríguez Chatruc point out that the migrant population has a negative effect on the probability of native-born workers being employed, particularly those with lower education levels (Hiller and Rodríguez Chatruc, 2020; OECD/ILO, 2018). To reduce these impacts, it is recommended that job training programmes be implemented to give the native-born population the opportunity to update and improve their skills to respond to the demands of the economy. Such actions would help reduce unemployment and generate more significant growth in strategic sectors. Soler, Salcedo and Núñez (2018) suggest that training programmes for construction managers need to be implemented to increase their knowledge of the use of more efficient modern technologies. Native-born workers could take advantage of such programmes thanks to their higher educational levels. Of course, such programmes may also foster the emigration of skilled people, as is shown in the OECD/CIES-UNIBE study and has been observed in other countries in the region analysed by the OECD (OECD/CIES-UNIBE, 2017).

Decisions on the type of training programmes to be promoted should also be based on the opinions of stakeholders such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, and institutions such as the National Institute for Technical Vocational Training. Based on feedback from the private sector, the objective is to fill the gaps in the type of workers needed and the skill levels required. When designing these programmes, policymakers should take the evidence from implementing job training programmes in other contexts into account, as this suggests that they reduce youth unemployment, for example (Hanushek et al., 2011; Biavaschi et al., 2012). With regard to the specific features of such programmes, Card et al. (2018) suggest that they should be implemented for a minimum of four months and include the private sector when analysing demand. Case studies on other programmes implemented in the region—such as Entre 21 in Argentina, Jóvenes en Acción in Colombia or Juventud y Empleo in the Dominican Republic—are useful starting points in this regard.

Finally, once all of the above steps have been implemented, the ILO and the National Migration Institute propose the introduction of a quota or incentive system to guide the issuance of work visas in the country in the future, to promote the labour market and economic development in line with national objectives (OIT and INM, 2020). This proposal would also be in line with the objectives of the 2030 National Development Strategy.

5.3 Challenges and recommendations for managing the Dominican diaspora

The studies consulted agree that the country’s economic growth could be strengthened by the Dominican diaspora abroad. Remittances undoubtedly improve the lives of middle- and low-income Dominican households through their impact on consumption, poverty reduction and school attendance. However, as the IOM study clearly demonstrated, this influx of money is only the tip of the iceberg: specific programmes need to be implemented to make better use of the diaspora’s human capital and resources (OIM, 2018a).

One initial area of action is labour development for the returning migrant population. Both the IOM study mentioned above and Paredes, Balbuena and Gómez (2021) argue that the country needs to leverage the diaspora’s human capital. However, as Arboleda, Díaz Segura and Durán (2019) makes clear, the employment policies that this population needs vary depending on the profile of the returnee. Those who are forcibly returned to the country (the second-most-common reason for return) require educational and labour integration policies: they are vulnerable as a result
of their low levels of human capital, their lack of local connections and labour market networks, and the fact that their legal status is often irregular. For those who have children, policies that ensure that children and young people are included in the school system are also essential.

In contrast, very different labour market inclusion policies are required for people who return after pursuing education opportunities abroad or those who return by choice. As this group has more specialized human capital, it needs to find employment in sectors that the country considers essential to its development, as well as direct connections with chambers of commerce and business organizations. It would be helpful to design programmes and platforms that provide this group and the diaspora in general with information on vacancies in the labour market. One example is the Retos project developed in Peru (OIT and INM, 2020).

Furthermore, diaspora-related migration policies should focus on managing the resources this population has at its disposal, which could invigorate the Dominican economy. Early initiatives should aim to ensure that remittances can be sent and received as efficiently as possible. According to the study by the Multilateral Investment Fund (FOMIN, 2016), many of the households receiving these resources are unbanked, which could prevent them from making optimal use of remittances. It would thus make sense to implement policies to increase banking penetration and financial education among this group. Such measures are also in line with the country’s development objectives as a whole. Another objective is attracting the savings of the Dominican diaspora: according to the IOM, these represent around $3 billion per year (OIM, 2018a). Arboleda, Díaz Segura and Durán (2019) note that entrepreneurship rates are higher among voluntary returnees and that many of these are retirees with savings. The IMO’s FIG-DOMEX proposal would benefit both this population group and Dominicans still residing abroad (OIM, 2018a). Research shows that this population has financial means and is interested in investing in the country, particularly in housing (Arboleda, Díaz Segura and Durán, 2019; OIM, 2018a). To complement the initiatives described above, awareness-raising days could be organized by the National Migration Council in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and MSMEs to provide information on how the FIG-DOMEX functions and the opportunities available for engaging in such activities.
Annex: Second National Immigrant Survey (2017 ENI)

The Second National Immigrant Survey (ENI) of the Dominican Republic was conducted in 2017 and provided important information for analysing the status quo of migration in the country and the implementation and evaluation of the National Plan for the Regularization of Foreigners (PNRE) (UNFPA, 2019). The sample observed by the 2017 ENI was specified by stratified cluster random sampling. The sampling frame was obtained from the 9th National Population and Housing Census of 2010, from which 912 primary sampling units were selected, stratified by rural and urban area. According to the 2017 ENI documentation, data was collected from a total of 73,286 households, and a total of 223,528 people were interviewed, including 17,397 immigrants and 9,022 descendants of immigrants (a total of 26,419 people of foreign origin).

Two main population groups were observed in the 2017 ENI. The first is the immigrant population regardless of their immigration status, and the second are people born and residing in the Dominican Republic whose parents were born in or moved from another country. The main objectives of the 2017 ENI were to describe sociodemographic characteristics disaggregated by age group, sex, and geographic location, to find out more about health, education, and housing. The survey also sought to describe labour market-related factors. In addition, the 2017 ENI serves as a basis for assessing the impact of the PNRE on the immigrant population whose status is irregular by verifying their current status and that of their descendants. The ENI also collects information on the reproductive health of women in the sample.
References


Arboleda, Joel, Jesús Díaz Segura and Rafael Durán. 2019. Caracterización de la población dominicana retornada de cara a la formulación de políticas públicas considerando su reinserción en la sociedad dominicana y la protección social, Instituto Nacional de Migración y Gabinete de Coordinación de Políticas Sociales, Santo Domingo.

Aristy-Escuder, Jaime. 2010. Impacto de la inmigración haitiana sobre el mercado laboral y las finanzas públicas de la República Dominicana, Universidad de Alcalá, Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos, Madrid.


FOMIN (Fondo Multilateral de Inversiones), 2016. "Remesas e inclusión financiera. Análisis de una encuesta de migrantes de América Latina y el Caribe en España", FOMIN, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC.


OBMICA (Centro para la Observación Migratoria y el Desarrollo Social en el Caribe), 2020. Estado de las migraciones que atañen a la República Dominicana 2019, OBMICA, Santo Domingo.
OBMICA (Centro para la Observación Migratoria y el Desarrollo Social en el Caribe), 2022. Estado de las migraciones que atañen a la República Dominicana 2020, OBMICA, Santo Domingo.


OIM (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones), 2018a. Diáspora dominicana, inclusión productiva e inversión en el desarrollo de la República Dominicana. Potencial de capital humano, ahorro y crédito de la diáspora desde Estados Unidos y España. Factibilidad del Fondo Internacional de Garantías para Dominicanos en el Exterior Fig-DOMEX, OIM, Fondo de la OIM para el Desarrollo, Santo Domingo.


OIM (Organización Internacional para las Migraciones), 2021. Movilidad humana en la frontera dominicana. Encuesta de monitoreo de flujos migratorios de habitantes transfronterizos en la República Dominicana, OIM.

OIT and INM (Organización Internacional del Trabajo and Instituto Nacional de Migración), 2020. Gobernanza de la migración laboral en la República Dominicana, OIT.

OIT, INM and ACNUR (Organización Internacional del Trabajo, Instituto Nacional de Migración y Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados), 2020. Promoción de medios de vida para personas venezolanas en República Dominicana, OIT.


Riveros, Natalia, 2022. “Situación de derechos humanos de las personas migrantes y sus descendientes”, in Estado de las migraciones que atañen a la República Dominicana 2020, Centro para la Observación Migratoria y el Desarrollo Social en el Caribe, Santo Domingo.


Soler, José, Nancy Salcedo, and Yanira Núñez, 2018. Estudio prospectivo de la formación profesional del sector de la construcción civil, Instituto Nacional de Formación Técnico Profesional.


UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 1
Constantino Hevia and Andy Neumeyer

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 2
Suggestions for the emergency
Santiago Levy

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 3
The economic impact of COVID-19 on Venezuela: the urgency of external financing
Daniel Barráez and Ana María Chirinos-Leañez

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 4
Social and economic impact of the COVID-19 and policy options in Honduras
Andrés Ham

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 5
COVID-19 and external shock: Economic impacts and policy options in Peru
Miguel Jaramillo and Hugo Ñopo

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 6
Social and Economic Impact of COVID-19 and Policy Options in Argentina
María Laura Alzúa and Paula Gosis

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 7
International financial cooperation in the face of Latin America’s economic crisis
José Antonio Ocampo

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 8
COVID-19 and social protection of poor and vulnerable groups in Latin America: a conceptual framework
Nora Lustig and Mariano Tommasi

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 9
Social and economic impact of the COVID-19 and policy options in Jamaica
Manuel Mera

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 10
Social and economic impact of COVID-19 and policy options in Uruguay
Alfonso Capurro, Germán Deagosto, Sebastián Ithurralde and Gabriel Oddone

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 11
Coronavirus in Colombia: vulnerability and policy options
Andres Alvarez, Díana León, María Medellín, Andrés Zambrano and Hernando Zuleta

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 12
COVID-19 and vulnerability: a multidimensional poverty perspective in El Salvador
Rodrigo Barraza, Rafael Barrientos, Xenia Díaz, Rafael Pleitez and Víctor Tablas. UNDP country office El Salvador

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 13
Development challenges in the face of COVID-19 in Mexico. Socio-economic overview
UNDP country office Mexico

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 14 A
Lessons from COVID-19 for a Sustainability Agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean
Diana Carolina León and Juan Camilo Cárdenas

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 14 B
Latin America and the Caribbean: Natural Wealth and Environmental Degradation in the XXI Century
Diana Carolina León and Juan Camilo Cárdenas

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 15
Social and Economic Impacts of the COVID-19 and Policy Option in the Dominican Republic
Socrates Barinas and Mariana Viollaz

UNDP LAC C19 PDS N°. 16
The Bahamas Country Note: Impact of COVID-19 and policy options
Manuel Mera
UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 17
UNDP country office Paraguay

UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 18
The Coronavirus and the challenges for women's work in Latin America
Diana Gutiérrez, Guillermina Martin, Hugo Ñopo

UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 19
COVID-19 and primary and secondary education: the impact of the crisis and public policy implications for Latin America and the Caribbean
Sandra García Jaramillo

UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 20
Challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in the health of women, children, and adolescents in Latin America and the Caribbean
Arachu Castro

UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 21
Planning a Sustainable Post-Pandemic Recovery in Latin America and the Caribbean
Mauricio Cárdenas and Juan José Guzmán Ayala

UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 22
COVID-19 in Bolivia: On the path to recovering development
UNDP Bolivia Office

UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 23
Do we Need to Rethink Debt Policy in Latam?
Federico Sturzenegger

UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 24
Policy Responses to the Pandemic for COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Use of Cash Transfer Programs and Social Protection Information Systems
Guillermo M. Cejudo, Cynthia L. Michel, Pablo de los Cobos

UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 25
The impacts of COVID-19 on women’s economic autonomy in Latin America and the Caribbean
Paola Bergallo, Marcelo Mangini, Mariela Magnelli & Sabina Bercovich

UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 26
The invisible COVID-19 graveyard: intergenerational losses for the poorest young people and actions to address a human development pandemic
Orazio Attanasio & Ranjita Rajan

UNDP LAC C19 PDS Nº. 27
Social Protection Response to COVID-19 in Brazil
André Portela Souza, Lycia Lima, Camila Magalhaes, Gabriel Marcondes, Giovanna Chaves, Juliana Camargo, Luciano Máximo (FGV EESP Clear)

UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 28
El sistema tributario colombiano: diagnóstico y propuestas de reforma
Leopoldo Fergusson and Marc Hofstetter

UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 29
The Economic Impact of the War in Ukraine on Latin America and the Caribbean
Mauricio Cárdenas and Alejandra Hernández

UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 30
Migration in Mexico: complexities and challenges
Elena Sánchez-Montijano and Roberto Zedillo Ortega

UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 31
Migration in the Dominican Republic: context, challenges and opportunities
Daniel Morales and Catherine Rodríguez

UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 32
Migration situation in Chile: trends and policy responses in the period 2000-2021
Carolina Stefoni and Dante Contreras

UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 33
Migration and migration policy in Ecuador in the period 2000-2021
Gioconda Herrera

UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 34
Migration in Colombia and public policy responses
Sebastián Bitar
UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 35
Recent migration to Peru: situation, policy responses and opportunities
María Cecilia Dedios and Felipe Ruiz

UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 36
Migrations in Costa Rica: development of recent migration policies for your attentions
Laura Solís and Jason Hernández

UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 37
Migration in Trinidad and Tobago: Current Tends and Policies
Elizabeth Thomas-Hopeez

UNDP LAC PDS Nº. 38
Migration in Barbados: What do we know?
Natalie Dietrich Jones
We acknowledge the kind support of the Spanish Cooperation.