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Diverse ways to build social protection?

Lessons from the breadth of emergency social policy responses around the world

by Santiago Soto and María Montoya-Aguirre¹

The unprecedented shock brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic and its potential effect on poverty, pushed for an expansion in the social policy response frontier. Although it is still early to assert whether the magnitude of the response was sufficient, let alone effective, most countries were able to rapidly expand social protection and assistance using diverse tools. Has this unprecedented response been only a temporary reaction, or will it pave the way to building stronger, more inclusive social protection systems? Can these systems take diverse forms given the local contexts and constraints; or are universal systems, rooted in complex institutional arrangements, the final benchmark to which developing countries should aspire?

This brief examines the social policy responses aimed at protecting income and job losses implemented amidst the pandemic. A rich dataset has been exploited to characterize the breadth of countries' policy responses by building an index that reflects the diversity of policies implemented, amongst all those available, in terms of social assistance, social insurance, and the labour market. This analysis offers a qualitative approach on whether governments' actions were comprehensive or narrow, conditional on the fiscal efforts and the stringency of the containment measures. There are three key insights from this analysis. First, even when social protection systems are highly conditioned by the income level of each country, all countries resorted to the social assistance dimension of social protection. Second, even in the presence of new social assistance measures, most developed countries also relied on social insurance and labour market policies. Finally, social protection systems should be continuously strengthened, especially in case more stringent measures are required due to the current and future threats to public health.

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on social protection

The pandemic has threatened years of progress in global poverty reduction.² Estimates of the impact of Covid-19 on extreme poverty in 2020 suggest that under different assumptions about the distributional impact of the crisis, between 119 and 168 million people could have been pushed into extreme poverty.³ These estimates show the severe stress that the pandemic has posed on social protection systems.

To what extent should social protection be transformed worldwide to face the threats of the pandemic on jobs and income losses? The UN Secretary-General has pointed to integration and investments into national policies and strategies, international cooperation in initiatives, such as the recently launched Global Accelerator for Jobs and Social Protection, and a comprehensive financial architecture, as key components for a job-rich and inclusive green recovery.⁴ The urgency of these transformations has positioned the current

social protection reform efforts “at the crossroads” according to the International Labour Organization (ILO).⁵

Countries’ reactions to the crisis can be divided into two dimensions: the breadth of their responses and the depth in terms of fiscal resource allocations. This brief innovates by building a “social response breadth index” as a proxy of the breadth of the instruments targeted at jobs or income support used by governments to face the social consequences of the pandemic.

The index is based on the measures surveyed by Gentilini et al. (2021)⁶ in an extensive database that reviews and classifies more than 3,000 social policy initiatives in more than 180 countries and territories. The index comprises three dimensions: (i) social assistance, (ii) social insurance, and (iii) labour market (figure 1).

Figure 1: Dimensions and categories of social response (Gentilini et al., 2021)



Each dimension is divided into categories comprising 42 subcategories of different kinds of measures.⁷ Policies under each grouping are not always elements of the exact same kind: some are fiscal, some are regulatory, some are contributory, some depend on the law, others depend on the strength of the fiscal system, etc. However, the index is built to grasp the amplitude of the response. The index varies between zero (no measures taken) and 0.41 (job or income support measures taken in 41% of the universe of subcategories of response).


The index was not rescaled between 0 and 1 to keep its interpretation as a fraction of the available tools used by governments. Higher values imply that the country resorted to a more extensive set of social protection instruments. The breadth of policy responses will also be analysed in this brief alongside the fiscal efforts made by countries,⁸ the stringency of lockdown measures⁹ and the necessary resources to fund a temporary basic income (TBI)¹⁰ that could have completely offset the increase in poverty due to the pandemic.

Only developed countries could resort to a broad set of instruments

The index varies widely amongst countries and regions (figure 2). Western European and South American countries, constituted mostly by upper-middle-income (UMIC) and high-income countries (HIC), are the regions where the breadth of social policy responses was greatest. This was followed by Asia, North and Central America, and then Oceania, where the spread of the virus was rapidly contained in some countries, especially in Australia

and New Zealand. Finally, the African continent, mostly integrated by low-income (LIC) and low-middle-income countries (LMIC), accounts for the least use of a wide range of social protection tools. It is worth noting that higher values do not represent the efficacy of each country's policies to mitigate the social impact of Covid-19. It is an index of the diversity of tools adopted by governments to alleviate the social consequences of Covid-19.


Figure 2: Social response breadth index



Source: Own estimates based on Gentilini et al.'s (2021) social protection database.

The distribution of the index across income groups suggests three findings (figure 3). First, in general, the richer the country, the broader the types of social policy instruments to which they could resort. The most relevant divide seems to be between LIC and LMIC vs UMIC and HIC. None of the LIC and LMIC could resort to a response as ample as the average breadth response in UMIC and HIC. Second, the variance of the response breadth in UMIC and HIC is higher. This fact probably accounts for the pre-existing variance in the characteristics of the prevailing safety nets for this group of countries compared with LIC and LMIC, especially in HIC where safety nets are usually extensively developed. Third, in HIC the number of instruments slightly curves down (the average breadth of the response is lower in HIC than in UMIC). This might reflect their ability to concentrate efforts during the emergency on policy instruments that were already in place, for example, existing safety nets like unemployment benefits.

Figure 3: Social response breadth index (kernel distribution) by group of income




Source: Own estimates based on Gentilini et al.'s (2021) social protection database.

Social insurance and labour market instruments were out of reach for poorer countries

The breadth of the measures by dimensions portrays an interesting picture (figure 4). Social assistance instruments were used universally. However, social insurance and labour instruments were more intensively used by countries with higher income levels, where such mechanisms were

already well established. Whilst less than half of such instruments were used in LIC and LMIC, they constitute a major part of the instruments used in UMIC and HIC. This seems consistent with the relative developments of each dimension according to income levels.

Figure 4: Social response breadth index by components (all programmes and new programmes only)



Source: Own estimates based on Gentilini et al.'s (2021) social protection database.

Many countries resorted to social assistance programmes independent of their income level. Unlike the common perception that social assistance programmes were more commonly used in less developed countries, these tools have been used extensively at all income levels. Additionally, there was little creation of new social insurance


and labour market programmes in LIC and LMIC. In contrast, UMIC and HIC resorted more to already existing programmes in those areas. This result, combined with a lower breadth of responses, suggests a modest span of transformations in social protection systems in less developed countries.

What determined the breadth of the response? Was it enough?

The size of the response was constrained by countries' economic capacity (figure 5). Yet, there is substantial heterogeneity within them. This section explores what countries did with what they had readily available and the way they approached the challenge of protecting jobs and providing income

support. These heterogeneities are explored by looking at the relationships between the social response breadth index with IMF fiscal data,¹¹ the Oxford Covid-19 Government Response Tracker's Stringency Index¹² and the impact of the pandemic-induced shock on extreme poverty.¹³

Figure 5: Depth of fiscal response (as percentage of GDP)



Source: Own estimates based on IMF (2021) fiscal response database.

**Did depth determine the breadth of the response?
The fiscal response**

Countries were forced to mobilize resources to respond to the challenges posed by the pandemic. This happened during a decline in GDP and revenue due to the negative shock on both national and international demand and supply. In 2020, the world economy shrunk by 3.2% according to IMF estimates—the worst contraction in GDP since World War II. In this context, countries made diverse efforts to secure extra funding to tackle the impact of the pandemic.


The magnitude of the additional fiscal resources allocated to address the impact induced by the pandemic can be used as a proxy for the depth of countries’ responses. These include additional resources to health systems, social protection, support for workers and companies amongst others. This has been surveyed by the International Monetary Fund.¹⁴ The database includes the most trackable measures, implemented or announced by governments from January 2020 to June 2021, to address the impact of the pandemic. It also distinguishes the total fiscal effort made by countries in terms of their GDP in non-health, guarantees and other below-the-line measures (i.e. equity injections, loans, asset purchase or debt assumptions).

The fiscal response varied significantly in different countries in terms of their GDP according to the IMF data. The group of HIC was able to make significant efforts, whilst the middle-income countries’ strengths were more mixed. However, LIC were amongst those with the least fiscal response even in terms of their GDP.

Policy responses can be jointly analysed in terms of breadth and depth (figure 6). Three clear messages

emerge from this simultaneous consideration. First, reactions by LIC were relatively low both in terms of breadth of their social responses and also their fiscal depth. Almost all LIC belong to the quadrant below the mean global breadth and fiscal depth of social responses. Second, the same is true when considering LMIC. However, a handful of LMIC could resort to a broader set of policies but with relatively low fiscal depth. Third, the social policy breadth among UMIC has been above the world average but distributed around the global average in terms of fiscal depth. Finally, most of HIC belong to the quadrant of breadth and depth above the world average. Only some HIC have had strong fiscal responses (above the average) and limited breadth (below the average)—e.g. Australia. Some HIC likely focused on fewer instruments with relatively more resources. On the contrary, some countries have had an ample response but with less fiscal depth than the world average—e.g. Uruguay.

Figure 6: Social response breadth index and depth of fiscal response



Source: Own estimates based on Gentilini et al.’s (2021) social protection and IMF (2021) fiscal response databases. Note: Lines represent database averages in each dimension.


Did the health emergency determine the breadth of the social protection response? The relationship with the stringency of measures

Much has been discussed about the relationship between the social policy responses and the capacity of governments to take non-pharmaceutical actions to reduce the spread of the virus. This subsection exposes the breadth of the social protection responses and its correlation with the stringency of the measures taken by countries (figure 7). This is a composite index based on nine indicators, including school closures, workplace closures, cancellation of public events, restrictions on public gatherings, closures of public transport, stay-at-home requirements, public information

campaigns, restrictions on internal movements and international travel controls. Larger values of the index imply stricter measures.

There is a positive correlation between the social response breadth and the average stringency.¹⁵ Countries that could afford to live under more stringent conditions to contain the virus also implemented broader social protection measures. This fact illuminates some discussions on the role and importance of social protection systems to enable countries to act to prevent the spread of viruses. This is also an interesting observation when considering that there is no significant correlation between stringency and the fiscal depth of the social policies.

Figure 7: Social response breadth index, Stringency Index, and fiscal response



Source: Own estimates based on Gentilini et al.'s (2021) social protection, IMF (2021) fiscal response, and Oxford Covid-19 Government Response Tracker (Hale et al., 2021) databases.

Additionally, most of the countries that were able to implement a broad set of social policies and impose strong stringency measures belong to HIC and UMIC. When analysed by subindexes, these countries were able to resort to broad social insurance and labour market policies. This is probably because they could afford to stop the economy with lockdown measures and protect their citizens with social policies and furlough schemes simultaneously. However, in the fewer cases of less developed countries that implemented both broader social policy responses and strong stringency measures, they were able to do so fundamentally based on the social assistance policies (e.g. through cash transfers).

Was the response enough? Comparing it with a temporary basic income (TBI) to completely offset the pandemic-induced increase in extreme poverty

Even though the effectiveness of the whole social policy efforts on poverty is still under analysis, it is possible to compare them to an ad hoc benchmark.¹⁶ This subsection compares available information on social policy responses to the “ideal” effort countries should have made to completely offset the increase in poverty induced by the responses to the pandemic. The depth and breadth of social responses are compared with the magnitude of establishing a TBI to fully offset the increase in extreme poverty as advocated by UNDP. For this exercise, the TBI is supposed to be delivered over six months given the depth and duration of the crisis, coupled with pre-existing conditions of inequality and exclusion that made


the poor and vulnerable more prone to devastating economic effects of the emergency.

Poverty increases could have been completely offset, on average, with a six-month TBI of approximately 3.0%, 2.6%, and 0.7% of annual GDP of LIC, LMIC, and UMIC, respectively. These estimates show that the required resources to prevent extreme poverty increases (at the \$1.90 a day poverty line) were more important for less developed countries, even when those resources were out of reach for most of them. This is the inverse picture to the actual depth of the countries' fiscal responses. Despite needing it most, the depth of the responses in LIC and LMIC was lower even in terms of their own GDP.

Additionally, when this "ideal" TBI is compared with the breadth of the social policy responses, the correlation between both is negative (figure 8). This potentially highlights the scarcity of tools available for poorer countries compared to the benchmark magnitude of the efforts required.¹⁷

Both results, in terms of depth and breadth, showcase the magnitude of the challenge imposed by the pandemic on social protection systems in terms of poverty increases. It also points to how distant many countries and the international community were from sufficiently facing those challenges in terms of fiscal resources and available social protection tools. Only a small group of countries, mostly within the HIC, seem to have been able to be up to the challenge.

Figure 8: Social response breadth index and size of the theoretical TBI to fully offset extreme poverty increase



Source: Own estimates based on Gentilini et al.'s (2021) social protection and Fajardo-Gonzalez et al. (2021) Covid-19 poverty increase databases.

BOX - Country highlights: breadth, policy innovations, depth, and the virus



Colombia is an UMIC that has had a relatively broad social policy response, well above the world average. However, the depth of the fiscal response was near the world average. Colombia's response was also innovative in some specific social assistance programmes, in particular *Ingreso Solidario*, which increased its coverage by 160%.¹⁸ One innovation, for example, was the delivery of funds through bank accounts with e-money. This implies that a million *Ingreso Solidario* beneficiaries that did not have accounts before the pandemic, now do. The efforts resulted in temporarily mitigating all poverty increases at \$1.90 and \$3.20 a day, and a sizeable share of the increase was even at \$5.50 a day.¹⁹ However, the pre-existing poverty and inequality problems persist.



Togo is an interesting case of an LIC. The breadth of its response was below the world average, but one of the amplest for an LIC. The depth of the fiscal response was near the world average and at the top of the LIC. It was also innovative in terms of its social assistance instruments, using a recent database built with electoral purposes (95% coverage) to target a new cash transfer programme for informal workers. It also used digital platforms to transfer money.²⁰



Nigeria is an LMIC that had a relatively low breadth response and fiscal depth. In terms of social assistance, it expanded the coverage of its cash transfer programme by 642% from a very low base.²¹ Additionally, it innovated the use of satellite data to identify dwellings and target beneficiaries.²² The actual impact of these efforts and innovations on poverty is yet to be known.



Uruguay is a Latin American country with one of the most developed social protection systems in the region. It has recently been classified as an HIC. Uruguay had a very large response in terms of breadth, based on innovation in its already existing social protection institutions. However, it had a very low response in terms of depth according to IMF data. It also had a successful policy to contain the spread of the virus during 2020 but faced increasing challenges at the beginning of 2021. A recent study suggests that the impact on poverty alleviation of the measures taken by the Uruguayan government at its national poverty line were modest.²³

Policy implications for social protection

This brief summarised the breadth of the social policy transformations in terms of income support and jobs during the pandemic for a wide set of countries from the perspective of a “social response breadth index”. The results suggest that social policy transformations have been heterogeneous and positively correlated with GDP levels. They also suggest that most countries implemented social assistance programmes, but social insurance and labour market responses were mostly possible only for UMIC and HIC. The breadth of the responses was positively correlated with the fiscal depth and the stringency of measures. However, the breadth of the response was negatively correlated with the magnitude of the challenge in terms of extreme poverty increases.

Some relevant policy implications can be derived from these results. First, even when social protection systems are highly conditioned by the economic development stage of each country, all countries needed to resort to the social assistance dimension of social protection. This breaks a previous trend that placed them as an emerging instrument fundamentally aimed at developing countries. This might be linked to recent transformations in the labour market of HIC (e.g. the emergence of the gig economy). For LIC and LMIC, however, the challenges are greater, for example, collecting and organizing the necessary information to protect citizens in the context of large informal sectors. This has been a challenge even when fiscal resources were available. Limited information and low-quality data determined low capacities to deliver responses creating an obstacle that only some countries could overcome.²⁴ For LIC, for example, reduced or inexistent social safety nets also became a clear obstacle for governments in expanding their protection.

Assistance instruments in the information and communications technology (ICT) era imply rethinking many policy challenges for all countries. These include:

- Integration of administrative records
- Innovation in the use of new targeting instruments (e.g. satellite maps)
- Privacy of the structuring and usage of data
- Development of electronic or mobile money and financial inclusion instruments in developing countries
- Enhancement of policy designs to incorporate gender, ethnic and regional inequalities
- Improvement of programme delivery mechanisms

Second, even in the presence of new social assistance measures, many countries also relied on social insurance and labour market policies. The use of these instruments, even by HIC, highlights the importance of social insurance and labour market policies in facing social risks and mitigating poverty in all countries. Some challenges of developing countries regarding the implementation of these instruments are known, but no less important. In particular, combating the high informality in the labour market, strengthening the administrative capacities associated with low fiscal pressure and expanding the base of the sometimes dual broad protection systems for very small population groups.

Third, as the pandemic is not over yet, due to the appearance of new variants and the differential vaccination rates amongst countries, social protection systems should be continuously strengthened. Even when the uncertainty about the duration of the pandemic poses serious political and fiscal barriers to the design and implementation of social policy responses, these are needed to mitigate the long-term effects on welfare. Strengthening an ample set of instruments that countries can resort to, along with efforts to back fiscal capacities, such as the historic IMF \$650 billion allocation of Special Drawing Rights, will be eventually needed to take more stringent measures when confronted with potential new infection waves. This will also require working on improving vaccination rates that will have a direct impact on combating poverty increases. Sharing doses amongst countries, sharing know-how and technology amongst laboratories and facilitating intellectual property sharing are all challenges at the core of the fight against the poverty and vulnerability impacts of Covid-19.

Beyond correlations: The future challenges of social protection

The future will tell the long-term effects of the pandemic on social protection. The experience of some countries during this crisis shows that there are different ways to build social protection. This is especially true in countries with different structural conditions to those that are usually considered a benchmark, in general, the Nordic countries. There are several possible scenarios for the future of social protection. Social protection systems are traditionally path-dependent and historically built.²⁵ Therefore, the transformations described in this brief are likely to have long-lasting effects. For example, gradual investments in adaptive social protection, emergency funds and more capacity for vertical and horizontal expansion in times of emergency seem necessary. However, a more permanent social protection system-building strategy also looks essential.

There are distinctive political economy challenges to establishing and sustaining social assistance, social insurance and labour market policies. The political economy challenges of social assistance tend to be mostly fiscal, based on consolidating support from taxpayers to recipients. Labour market measures such as furloughs have different challenges. Businesses can only grant furloughs if they are compensated for lost labour and lost business activity. Social insurance policies are mostly about contributory schemes. This usually comprises a negotiated relationship amongst organized players: the state, businesses and workers. This fact makes insurance policies a long-term arduous challenge that is also highly dependent on the social and productive structure of the societies.

Why not start from the gradual additions of those citizens currently excluded? We learned from countries that quickly responded to the crisis that a broad social protection system was a relevant prerequisite for social policy innovations. Given the ongoing urgent and unprecedented reaction, is it feasible to make some of these emergency changes permanent? It would be difficult to do so amidst multiple competing challenges, including vaccine access, lockdowns due to new variants, additional costs on the health systems, educational investments to compensate for time lost, climate change and energy transition, amongst others. It is urgent to transform social protection to tackle these challenges. Social protection should be viewed as a building block to achieve these multiple goals.

The unprecedented shock brought by the pandemic showcased the capacities and the fragilities of social protection worldwide and also expanded the policy response frontier for many countries in terms of possible tools. In that context, some countries were able to rapidly expand social protection through different routes compared, for instance, to the traditional benchmarking schemes of the Nordics. Is that the final benchmark for social protection systems for developing countries? The future of social protection will be shaped by the efficacy of the delivery of the social protection institutions and its depth delimited by fiscal restrictions. However, this future will ultimately depend on the capacity to build viable political coalitions to shape and sustain broad-based social protection systems.

Endnotes

- 1 [Santiago Soto](#) is a Chevening Alumni and Master in Public Policy at Blavatnik School of Government of the University of Oxford, email: ss.santiagosoto@gmail.com. María Montoya-Aguirre is Economic Analyst at the UNDP Strategic Policy Engagement Unit, email: maria.montoya-aguirre@undp.org. The authors are grateful to Johanna Fajardo-Gonzalez, George Gray Molina, Lars Jensen, and Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez for their comments to this brief, and to Tanya Pedersen for quality oversight in the publishing process.
- 2 World Bank. (2020). *Poverty and shared prosperity 2020: Reversals of fortune*. The World Bank.
- 3 Fajardo-Gonzalez, J., Molina, G. G., Montoya-Aguirre, M., & Ortiz-Juarez, E. (2021). *Global Estimates of the Impact of Income Support during the Pandemic*.
- 4 United Nations Secretary-General. (2021). *Secretary-General's Policy Brief Investing in Jobs and Social Protection for Poverty Eradication and a Sustainable Recovery*. United Nations.
- 5 ILO. (2021). *World Social Protection Report 2020–22: Social protection at the crossroads — in pursuit of a better future*.
- 6 Gentilini, U., Almenfi, M., Blomquist, J., Dale, P., De la Flor Giuffra, L., Desai, V., ... & Weber, M. (2021). *Social protection and jobs responses to COVID-19: a real-time review of country measures*. World Bank Living Paper, Version 15 (14 May).
- 7 Operatively, the index was built as follows. First, only programmes aimed at job protection or income support were selected from the database (using the classification of programme objectives defined by Gentilini et al. (2021)). Second, a vector indicating whether the country implemented at least one measure of a given subcategory was created (categories and subcategories in the table below). Third, the proportion of subcategories used from the total available was calculated for each dimension, obtaining individual subindexes of social policy breadth for social assistance, social insurance and labour market. The final “social response breadth index” was obtained as the average of the subindexes of each dimension.

Dimensions, categories, and subcategories (Gentilini et al, 2021) Op. cit.
- 8 IMF. (2021). *Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 pandemic*. IMF Fiscal Affairs Department. International Monetary Fund.
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- 11 IMF. (2021). Op. cit.
- 12 Hale et. al. Op. cit.
- 13 Fajardo-Gonzalez et al. (2021). Op. cit.
- 14 A complementary joint analysis of the fiscal and policy dimensions can be found at the *United Nations COVID-19 Stimulus Tracker* (tracker.unescwa.org).
- 15 To compute the level of stringency during a long period, the average level of daily stringency values was calculated. However, the observations of this subsection are robust to other summary values such as the median.
- 16 See Fajardo-Gonzalez et al. (2021) Op. cit. for the most extensive estimations on poverty mitigation during the pandemic. The estimates were based on Gentilini et al. (2021) Op. cit. on cash transfer programmes.
- 17 Note that the TBI information was available for a narrower subset of countries compared to previous figures.
- 18 See Gentilini et al., (2021). Op. cit.
- 19 See Fajardo-Gonzalez et al. (2021) Op. cit.
- 20 Lowe, C., McCord, A., & Beazley, R. (2021). *National cash transfer responses to Covid-19*. Working paper 610. ODI.
- 21 Gentilini et al. (2021). Op. cit.
- 22 See Lowe et al. (2021) Op. cit.; and Roelen, K., Archibald, E., & Lowe, C. (2021). *Covid-19: crisis as opportunity for urban cash transfers?* Working paper 609. ODI.
- 23 See Brum, M., & De Rosa, M. (2021). Too little but not too late: nowcasting poverty and cash transfers' incidence during COVID-19's crisis. *World Development*, 140, 105227.
- 24 See Lowe et al. (2021) Op. cit.
- 25 For a comprehensive review on this topic, refer to Schüring, E., & Loewe, M. (Eds.). (2021). *Handbook on Social Protection Systems*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Dimension	Categories	Subcategories
1. Social assistance	Unconditional cash transfers	Unconditional cash transfers, Conditional cash transfers, Old age social pensions, Disability pensions, Food vouchers (quantity or value-based), In-kind food distribution, Health kits and other in kind transfers, School meals (on-site school feeding), Take-home rations, Food for training/other non-work activities, Cash for work, Cash for services, Food for work, Education, Health, Housing (rent support), Water, Electricity, Telephone, Internet, Transportation, Price control (food and in-kind), Agricultural inputs, Money transaction fees, Mortgages and other loans, Other.
	Conditional cash transfers	
	Social pensions (non-contributory)	
	Unconditional food and in-kind transfers	
	Conditional in-kind transfers (School feeding)	
	Public works	
2. Social insurance	Utility and financial obligations waivers/reductions	Old age pensions, Disability pensions, Survivors pensions, Individual retirement accounts and social contributions for individuals, Social security contributions for firms, Sickness and population at risk, Maternity/Paternity, Work injuries, Occupational disease, Health insurance, Out-of-work income support.
	Pensions	
	Social security contributions	
	Paid leave	
	Workers' compensation (work injuries and occupational diseases)	
	Health Insurance	
3. Labour market programmes	Unemployment	Labour market includes: Labour market services including intermediation (PES), Training (vocational, life skills, cash for training, others), Job rotation and job sharing, Early retirement for labour market reasons, Wage subsidy with reduced work time (including zero working hours), Wage subsidy without reduced work time (include waivers/payments of social security), Subsidies for job creation that are targeted on newly created jobs, Entrepreneurship support / start-up incentives (cash and in-kind grants, microcredit), Employment measures for disabled, Other Active Labour Market Programmes, Labour income tax deferral or reduction, Severance payment, Hiring flexibility, Dismissal procedures, Working conditions/methods, Leave policies, Remuneration, Relaxation of cooling-off periods, Labour inspector interventions including occupational health and workplace safety measures, Other regulatory adjustment, Credit facilities, access to credit guarantees, Payment facilities, Access to public tenders (open tenders, competitive tenders), Taxes, Other special measures, Banking sector.
	Activation measures	
	Redistribution of labour	
	Wage subsidies	
	Other ALMPs	
	Labour income support	
Labour regulatory adjustment and enforcement		
Firm liquidity support		