Podcast Series: Exploring Extremism

Exploring Extremism is a podcast series produced by UNDP’s Oslo Governance Centre. It dives into uncovering and understanding emerging issues in violent extremism.  Hosted by journalist Anneliese Mcauliffe, the series shines a light on some of the under explored issues related to violent extremism through expert-level discussions. In this first series over four episodes, we will focus on a separate topic each time, from the rise of the far right in Europe to the role of mercenaries in extremist organisations. 

PODCAST 4: Uncivil Society 

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Civil society has been used to describe a community that holds shared norms and values and where free citizens are equal under the rule of law. In more recent times a robust, strong and vibrant civil society was meant to strengthen and enhance governance, build cohesive societies and foster and promote peace and stability. But the nature of civil society means that illiberal and exclusionary ideologies may provide fuel that accelerates political polarization, drive radicalization and mainstream divisiveness. Uncivil parts of civil society may grow and expand from the margins. This session aims to examine the relationship between uncivil society and violent extremism.

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Organisations working across peacebuilding and governance have become accustomed to the concept that civil society is important for both transitioning to democracy and strengthening governance. In this light, the best civil society organisations represent a vital force for human rights and justice, with robust, strong and vibrant civil society strengthening and enhancing governance. But the nature of civil society is not passive or neutral. Illiberal and exclusionary ideologies may provide fuel to civil society activities that accelerate political polarization, drive radicalization and mainstream divisiveness leading to what is termed “uncivil society”.

So how does civil society become “uncivil” or illiberal? What does “uncivil society” actually mean?

Vedi Hadiz, is the Director and Professor of Asian Studies at the Asia Institute at the University of Melbourne. He was also a former pro-democracy activist in Indonesia in the 1990s. Hadiz warns of complacency when assessing the merits of civil society groups.

“Throughout history, we've seen associational life, not just in the Asia region, but also in Europe and America and Latin America, where uncivil society groups have developed together with associational life. The best example I can give you is the Nazi party in Germany. And, in contemporary times, many sorts of representative or very illiberal sorts of politics, even in the west, you know, related to the BNP in Britain or the Front Nationale now in France and the Tea Party in the United States” says Hadiz.

Uncivil parts of civil society may grow and expand from the margins of associational life to colonize the domains of public space. Groups can gain traction and make themselves into an outsize power that can influence policy and can, in some circumstance, serve to radicalize those along the margins.

Mario Gomez is the Executive Director at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, an independent think-tank in Sri Lanka. He says oppressive states can manipulate, co-opt and nurture “uncivil” society groups to achieve their own goals.

“I think one of the functions of civil society has been to be a critique of governance and of the state, but oppressive states have realized the value of civil society and therefore unleash their own illiberal civil society movements as a way of boosting their politics and their power,” says Gomez.

Civil society groups have also received strong criticism, including, amongst other things, for being conduits for international influence and agendas, and for being biased toward one ‘side’ or another in the conflict. This can be amplified, in some circumstances, when funding for civil society groups is supported by donors.

“Governments have constantly attacked civil society because they are recipients of foreign funding and that has been used as a stick to kind of brand human rights groups and peace groups as advancing an agenda that emanates from the west. So that's been one of the attack lines of government constantly. But I think you know, donors are also not a homogeneous group. Obviously, those donors who are a little more consultative, who are willing to engage with civil society and also invest perhaps, even if the sums are not large, but invest in sort of funding that extends over a larger period of time, I think perhaps have a sort of greater impact,” explains Mario Gomez.

In today’s podcast we’re joined by three experts. Vedi Hadiz is the Director and Professor of Asian Studies at the Asia Institute and an Assistant Deputy Vice-Chancellor International at the University of Melbourne.  Mario Gomez is the Executive Director at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, an independent think-tank in Sri Lanka and Thinzar Shunlei Yi is a pro-democracy and anti-coup campaigner from Myanmar. 

Todays podcast will unpick the following questions: How does civil society provide space for Iliberal and exclusionary ideologies that may accelerate political polarization, drive radicalization and mainstream divisiveness? How does uncivil society embrace negative “out” groups and pull them into a polarised and divisive discourse? How do religious organisations play a significant role in pressuring democratic governments to support, or at least not interfere with, their anti-secular and sometimes reactionary and exclusionary religious agendas?

PODCAST 3. Mercenaries and their role in violent extremism

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Wars between States are becoming rarer but violent confrontations between non-state actorsin spaces beyond state reach or in fragile governance areas are becoming more common. Wecan see this in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Ukraine and more recently in the territorial conflictbetween Azerbaijan and Armenia in the disputed region of Nagorno- Karabakh. State actorsfind mercenary forces a useful temporary army of fighters to further their foreign policy goals.It can be loaded with cash payments and pose little domestic political risk. The emotionalresponse at national level is reduced by the use of non-national fighters and these fighters canbe discarded once usefulness has expired. We speak about the current state of affairs andpotential trajectories in the area of mercenaries and violent extremism.

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Mercenary fighters allow states to conceal their role in a conflict, both protecting governments from the political fallout from direct involvement while allowing for plausible deniability of involvement. “These mercenaries are tools or instruments of state,” says historian Thomas Heghammer, “and they must be seen as seen as an extension of the foreign policy of the states in the region.”

These ‘pay for hire’ armies of itinerant fighters from failed revolutions and civil wars in Africa and the Middle East - alongside the growth of private military companies like Blackwater and the Wagner Group - allow states to fight covert wars, hide casualties and mitigate international repercussions from violating the sovereignty of other nations.

But in an increasing numbers of conflicts, political and religious ideology increasingly intersect and overlap with financial incentive; can we still clearly differentiate between the role of mercenaries and foreign fighters?

“Lines are definitely blurred,” says analyst Mary Fitzgerald, “but I think if you look at the numbers of foreigners who have been inside Libya since 2014 and the year that Libya tipped into a civil conflict, I think that the lines are definitely blurred.”

And while most mercenaries continue to be motivated by financial incentives, these blurred lines can lead to prolonged conflicts and the erosion of the power of the state.

In this episode, with Thomas Hegghammer Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment in Oslo and Mary Fitzgerald, Associate Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at Kings College in London. We discuss how the role of mercenaries has changed in the post 9/11 era and how can we differentiate between foreign fighters and mercenaries in increasingly complex theatres of conflict?

PODCAST 2. Strategic Errors? Are communications interventions effective in preventing and countering violent extremism?

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Reading through the academic literature on violent extremism communication initiatives, there seems to be a circular argument – “it’s difficult to evaluate the impact with existing tools: therefore we can’t assess whether communications interventions work”. While the evidence has no supported impact of counter narrative work to-date, there are some interesting communications interventions that integrate with other programming or focus more on radicalisation trajectories and/or structural factors. We speak with communications practitioners from across the world to unpack what actually works and the metrics for measuring success.

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The efficacy of strategic communications interventions for preventing violent extremism have been increasingly questioned byimplementing institutions and donors in recent years. Debate has swirled around program design, effectiveness and how tomeasure impact. Vast sums of donor money have poured into communications programming. But criticism has been levelled at interventions thatlack robust research into local conditions, that are overly replicated across varying geographic and political contexts, and that arepoorly integrated into larger prevention and stabilization programming.

What’s clear is that too many communications interventions rely on the use of social-media based counter narratives. Thesetypically aim to deconstruct and debunk extremist messaging using logic, humour and religiously based counter-information oralternative narratives that focus on positive messaging of ‘what we are for’, rather than ‘what we are against’. This results in anover-reliance on social media metrics have that been called into question due to the ability to manipulate data via a variety oftools, most commonly paid-for “boosted” posting.

What is now needed is measurement tools that more robustly measure qualitative impacts rather than the quantitative specialmedia and web-based metrics. But how can both short-term and long-term impacts be measured in a field where it is notoriouslydifficult to define success?

How can we measure results of active choices versus passive measures? And if robust communicationsprogramming is to be designed and implemented, what indicators and metrics are effective in measuring impact?

The over-arching question remains: Just how effective are strategic communications interventions at disrupting recruitment andradicalization?

In this podcast we discuss what does and does not work in PVE and CVE strategic communications. We discuss howimpact can be measured and what can be done to improve programme design and integration.

We’re joined by local and international strategic communications practitioners who work across the Middle East, Southeast Asiaand Africa. They talk about their work, and how best to align and integrate communications interventions that are more focussedon radicalisation trajectories or structural factors to achieve successful outcomes.

PODCAST 1. UTØYA – 10 YEARS ON 
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It’s been 10 years since the far-right extremist Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people in Norway in twin attacks: a car bomb in the government quarter of Oslo followed by a horrific attack on a youth summer camp at Utøya Island which left 69 people dead, many of them children and teenagers. A decade on, today we’re looking at the far right in Norway: reflecting on ten years after Utøya, how have far right groups changed and what is being done to contain them?

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It’s been 10 years since Norwegian right-wing extremist Andres Behring Breivik perpetrated dual acts of domestic terrorism that left 77 people dead. The attacks on 22 July 2011 began in the Regjeringskvartalet or the government quarter in Oslo when a bomb in a parked van detonated, killing eight people. Later that day, the horrific attack on participants at the Norwegian Labour Party youth summer camp at Utøya Island left 69 people dead as Breivik stalked and killed his victims, firing automatic weapons as his terrified victims fled. The massacre at Utøya remains the deadliest mass shooting committed by a single gunman. The attack sent shockwaves through Norway and, both domestically and globally, placed far right extremism and it’s potential for mass casualty attacks firmly on the public policy agenda. What was driving this these groups to mobilise? What was the likely trajectory of these groups? What was the potential for further attacks? In the aftermath of the attacks, it became important to differentiate between the groups inhabiting and organizing within the extreme right space, namely the radical right and extreme right. While similarities exist – such as a strong ethnic nationalism and xenophobic intolerance of migrants, particularly Muslim migrants, radical right actors generally operate within democratic boundaries. According to Professor Katrine Fangen, “extreme right groups are clearly anti-democratic, but we also have Stop Islamization of Norway taking a more extreme direction.” A significant shift from a decade ago has been the change in demographic makeup of those attracted to and participating in right-wing extremist groups in Norway. Participants are no longer predominantly youth but are now generally formed of older, more adult participants. However, small groups of highly radicalised youth still exist at the more violent fringes. Why has this demographic shift occurred? How have grievances changed and what role do conspiracy theories play? How did Islam become the main “enemy” that mobilises these groups? What is their perception of feminism and gender? What role does social media play? And what can be done to prevent right-wing radicalisation and prevent further attacks? Professor Katrine Fangen from the University of Oslo and the C-REX Center for Research on Extremism, Deeyah Khan, documentary filmmaker and human rights activist and Bjorn Ihler, a survivor of the Utøya attack and co-founder of the Khalifa Ihler Institute discuss these issues in the Oslo governance Centre podcast.